AMADEA AQUINO v.

AQUINO

II

The statutory prohibition against reciprocal intestate succession between nonmarital children and the marital
children and relatives of their parents is rooted in Article 943 of the Spanish Civil Code, made effective in the
Philippines on December 7, 1889:

ARTICLE 943. A natural or a legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the
natural or legitimated child.

This is in line with what this Court had considered as the regime under the Spanish Civil Code: The "legitimate"
relationship is the general rule, and exceptions made for nonmarital ascendants or descendants, which would allow
properties of the marital family to pass to nonmarital relatives, must be expressly stated.[152]

Under the Spanish Civil Code, "natural children”[153] and "legitimated children"—natural children made legitimate
children through subsequent marriage of the parents, provided the child is acknowledged by the parents,[154] and by
royal concession[155]—were covered by the prohibition. However, they could still inherit in intestate succession,
but only in their own right.[156] Nonmarital children who were neither "natural" nor "legitimated" had no right at all
to inherit in intestate succession.[157]

When Republic Act No. 386, ordaining and instituting the Civil Code of the Philippines, took effect in 1950,
nonmarital children, or "illegitimate children,"[158] was classified as the following: "natural children," or those
whose parents were unmarried at the time of conception, and not disqualified to marry each other;[159] "natural
children by legal fiction," or those conceived or born of marriages void from the beginning;[160] and "illegitimate
children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction[.]"[161]
Later, the Family Code would eliminate the distinctions among the various categories of nonmarital children:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code.
Now, there are only two classes of children — legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of
legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.

Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: "Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or
absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate.
Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate."

Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, without any
distinction between natural and spurious. The concept of "natural child" is important only for purposes of
legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child remains an illegitimate child.[162] (Citations omitted)

Because the Civil Code changed the classification of nonmarital children, so did the wording of the prohibition,
reflected now in Article 992:

ARTICLE 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother; nor shall children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The Civil Code now allows all nonmarital children as defined in the Civil Code to inherit in intestate succession. But
because of Article 992, all nonmarital children are barred from reciprocal intestate succession:

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in
statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must
be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v.
Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]).The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart
from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation.
It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al.
v. RFC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be
strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by
statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A. 145 SCRA 654
[1986]).

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category,
which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently,
in the negative.

It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).[163]

The prohibition extends to the descendants of the nonmarital child. In Rodriguez v. Reyes:[164]

Now, the record before us is totally barren of proof as to any personal acts of recognition by Juan Villota with regard
to Luciano; nor is there evidence on the question of who was Luciano's father. The Court of First Instance cites no
proof; and the evidence of the appellees is merely to the effect that Gavino and Luciano were "full blood brothers",
which is only a conclusion of the witnesses and irrelevant to the issue of legitimation or recognition, especially
under the laws of Toro. For under the Law XI the son had to be acknowledged by the parent and by no other person,
said law expressly requiring "con tanto que el padre le reconozca por su hijo." (Sent. Trib. Sup. of Spain, 23 June
1858). It is well to recall here that the conferment of the status of acknowledged natural child by acts of the
members of the parent's family (authorized by Article 135, No. 2, of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889) was entirely
without precedent in the pre-Codal legislation of Spain and its colonies.

....

In the absence of reliable proof that Juan Villota had begotten and acknowledged Luciano de los Reyes as his natural
son, his legitimation can not be declared duly proved.

"To hold otherwise would make possible the admission of fraudulent claims made after the decease of a married
couple, based upon an allegation that the claimant was the fruit of illicit relations prior to their marriage, and without
any attempt to show that the putative father had ever recognized the claimant as his child or even knew of its
existence; and the mere possibility that such claimants might present themselves would cast doubt and confusion on
may inheritances, and open wide the door to a form of fraud which the legitimate heirs would find great difficulty in
combating." (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, supra.)
And without such legitimation, Luciano could not succeed to the estate of Gavino Villota y Reyes, in view of Article
943 of the Civil Code of 1889 (later clarified by Article 992 of the new Civil Code):

"ART. 943. A natural child has no right to succeed ab intestate legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural child."

"ART. 992. (New Civil Code) An illegitimate child has no right to inherit an intestate from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child."

And the disqualification of Luciano to succeed Gavino Villota extended under these articles to Luciano's own
progeny, Zoilo and Andres and Martin Macatangay, since they could not represent him[.]

In conclusion, we hold:

....

(3) That a natural child, not recognized as required by the law XI of Toro, is not legitimated by the subsequent
marriage for his parents; and therefore, he is barred from succeeding to the legitimate issue of said parents.

(4) That such disqualification to inherit extends to the descendants of the unrecognized natural child.[165] (Citations
omitted)

The prohibition affects the nonmarital child's right of representation under Articles 970 to 977 of the Civil Code.
[166]

In Landayan v. Bacani,[167] this Court denied the right of representation to a nonmarital child, as the child was
disqualified to inherit intestate from the marital children and relatives of the child's father:

As stated above, petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, he being only an
acknowledged natural child of Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of petitioners, whom they claim to be the sole
legitimate daughter in first marriage of Teodoro Abenojar. If this claim is correct, Severino Abenojar has no rights of
legal succession from Teodoro Abenojar in view of the express provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which
reads as follows:

"ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child."

The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar depends on the truth of his
allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro
Abenojar. On this assumption, his right to inherit from Teodoro Abenojar is recognized by law (Art. 998, Civil
Code). He even claims that he is the sole legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who
are admittedly the children of the deceased Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal successional rights from Teodoro
Abenojar, their mother being a spurious child of Teodoro Abenojar.
Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of
Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar. The right of representation is denied by law to an
illegitimate child who is disqualified to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father.
(Art. 992, Civil Code). On this supposition, the subject deed of extra-judicial partition is one that included a person
who is not an heir of the descendant whose estate is being partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article 1105 of
the Civil Code, reading as follows:

"Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect
to such person."[168]

Similarly, in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals,[169] a grandchild was found not to have the right to represent his
predeceased mother in his grandmother's estate, because the grandchild was a nonmarital child of the mother:

Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner [grandchild] is the child of Sotero
Leonardo [mother], still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased
Francisca Reyes [grandmother] considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside
wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother
were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)[170]

The prohibition in Article 992 is so restrictive that this Court has characterized it as an "iron curtain"[171] separating
marital and nonmarital relatives. In Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[172] this Court after conducting oral
arguments on the matter even rejected an interpretation of the word "relatives" that would bar reciprocal intestate
succession only between collateral relatives:

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all
the kindred of the person spoken of (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. II, Third
Revision, Eighth Edition)[.] The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who
claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six
minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of
Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin
to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof.
Ruben Balane has this to say:

"The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the
canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the
term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction
prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. Escriche, in his Diccionario de
Legislacion y Jurisprudencia defines parientes as "los que estan relacionados por los vinculos de la sangre, ya sea
por proceder unos de otros, como los descendientes y ascendientes, ya sea por proceder de una misma raiz o tronco,
como los colaterales."(cited in Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457).(p. 377, Rollo)

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense than it is used and
intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the
term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the
New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but
also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or
limited sense — which, as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.

To recapitulate, We quote this:

"The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates, which goes back very far in legal history, have
been softened but not erased by present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and
illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the
gradation between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done away with the subclassification of
illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children have only those
rights which are expressly or clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed.,
vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended to clarify the term
"relatives", there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June
17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.[173] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Yet, while Article 992 prevents nonmarital children from inheriting from their marital parents' relatives, there is no
such prohibition for the nonmarital child whose parent is a nonmarital child as well. Articles 989 and 990 of the
Civil Code provide:

ARTICLE 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of another illegitimate child
who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by right of representation.

ARTICLE 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children shall be
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their deceased
grandparent.

Because of this, the reciprocity in intestate succession of nonmarital children now depends on their parents' marital
status. The parity granted to nonmarital children is more illusory than real. This disparity of treatment was not left
unnoticed. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in his Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, stated:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family; so
much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to
this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in
subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his
own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a
legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an
illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the
Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles
995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.
[174] (Emphasis supplied)