Filed: Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk

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Case: 18-17031, 10/04/2019, ID: 11455297, DktEntry: 26, Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED


FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT OCT 4 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
LEZMOND C. MITCHELL, AKA Lezmond No. 18-17031
Charles Mitchell,
D.C. Nos. 3:09-cv-08089-DGC
Petitioner-Appellant, 3:01-cr-01062-DGC-1
District of Arizona,
v. Prescott

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ORDER

Respondent-Appellee.

Before: IKUTA, CHRISTEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Before an execution date had been set in this capital case, this Court granted

a Certificate of Appealability, entitling Mitchell to appeal the district court’s denial

of his Rule 60(b) motion. Mitchell has moved to stay the execution pending the

disposition of the appeal. Briefing is not yet complete on the appeal, and the Court

believes that oral argument would be appropriate.

The Court therefore hereby stays the execution pending resolution of the

appeal. Oral argument will be heard on December 13, 2019 at 2:00 p.m. in Phoenix,

Arizona, at the Sandra Day O’Connor Courthouse, and shall be limited to 20 minutes

per side.
Case: 18-17031, 10/04/2019, ID: 11455297, DktEntry: 26, Page 2 of 6

Mitchell v. United States, No. 18-17031


Ikuta, Circuit Judge, dissenting

We may not grant a stay of execution pending appeal without first

determining whether the defendant has a “significant possibility of success on the

merits” of the appeal. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). The

majority here grants Lezmond Mitchell’s motion to stay the government’s

execution date without making this determination, even though we have adequate

time to decide the merits of Mitchell’s claim prior to the execution date.

Therefore, I dissent.

Mitchell’s sentence of death has been pending for sixteen years. In 2003,

Lezmond Mitchell was convicted and sentenced to death under the Federal Death

Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3598, for the murder of a 63-year-old

grandmother and her nine-year-old granddaughter. Mitchell raised multiple

challenges to his conviction and sentence, both on direct appeal and in a § 2255

motion,1 but they all failed. See United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 942 (9th

Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1094 (2008); Mitchell v. United States, 790 F.3d

881, 885 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 38 (2016).

1
A prisoner serving a federal sentence may bring a motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 claiming that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
federal laws.
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Mitchell brought this new appeal in 2018, after the Supreme Court decided

Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). Peña-Rodriguez held that

“where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial

stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant,” then the Sixth Amendment

allows the trial court to “consider the evidence of the juror’s statement.” Id. at 869.

Based on this holding, Mitchell brought a motion in district court under Rule

60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Mitchell sought to reopen his

prior § 2255 motion to investigate whether jurors were influenced by bias against

him because he is a member of the Navajo Nation, even though the jurors had

signed a certification attesting that race played no role in their decision, and there

was no evidence that any of the jurors in his case were biased against him. The

district court denied this motion in a well-reasoned opinion, holding that

Peña-Rodriguez did not grant Mitchell a procedural right to investigate potential

juror bias and that Mitchell’s motion did not comply with Local Rule of Civil

Procedure 39.2(b), which requires meeting certain procedural requirements and

showing good cause for a request to interview jurors. Mitchell v. United States,

2018 WL 4467897, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2018). In April 2019, we granted a

2
Rule 60(b)(6) provides that a court may relieve a party from a judgment or
order for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

2
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certificate of appealability (COA) on the question whether the district court

properly denied appellant’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion to reopen his § 2255 motion.

On July 25, 2019, sixteen years after the death sentence was imposed, the

government informed Mitchell that his execution date was set for December 11,

2019. On September 9, 2019, Mitchell filed a motion for stay of execution with

our court.

II

The Supreme Court has emphasized that “a stay of execution is an equitable

remedy” that “is not available as a matter of right, and equity must be sensitive to

the State’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue

interference from the federal courts.” Hill, 547 U.S. at 583–84 (2006). Therefore,

we may grant a stay of execution only “where the inmate seeking the stay can show

a significant possibility of success on the merits.” Moormann v. Schriro, 672 F.3d

644, 646–47 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Hill, 547 U.S. at 583–84 (holding that

inmates seeking a stay of execution “must satisfy all of the requirements for a stay,

including a showing of a significant possibility of success on the merits.”). If the

petitioner fails to show “a strong likelihood of relief on the merits” we must deny

the motion for stay. Moorman, 672 F.3d at 649; see also Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d

598, 612–13 (9th Cir. 2012) (same).

3
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The majority does not comply with this requirement. Instead of explaining

why Mitchell has a likelihood of success on the merits of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion,

the majority grants a stay of execution based on our prior grant of a COA on

Mitchell’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. But a COA grant does not mean that the

petitioner has shown a significant possibility of success on the merits of the claim

at issue. To the contrary, at the COA stage a “court of appeals should limit its

examination . . . to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of [the] claims,”

and ask “only if the District Court’s decision was debatable.” Buck v. Davis, 137 S.

Ct. 759, 774 (2017) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003)); see

id. (holding that a prisoner may successfully make “a preliminary showing that his

claim was debatable” even though the prisoner “failed to make the ultimate

showing that his claim is meritorious”). While Mitchell’s Peña-Rodriguez claim

may be debatable for COA purposes, it is far from obvious that it is likely to

succeed on the merits. The district court has issued a persuasive opinion to the

contrary. At a minimum, it is necessary for the majority to address this issue

before interfering with the government’s scheduled execution.

Because granting a stay requires evaluating the likelihood of success of

Mitchell’s appeal on the merits, it would be more efficient to decide the merits of

the appeal and motion to stay simultaneously. Briefing on the Rule 60(b)(6)

4
Case: 18-17031, 10/04/2019, ID: 11455297, DktEntry: 26, Page 6 of 6

motion and the stay motion will be complete on October 11, 2019, two months

before the scheduled execution date. Therefore, we have sufficient time to

evaluate and decide Mitchell’s appeal on the merits. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2266(a) (“The

adjudication of any . . . motion under section 2255 by a person under sentence of

death, shall be given priority by . . . the court of appeals over all noncapital

matters.”). We frequently decide claims in capital cases in a matter of days. See,

e.g., Bible v. Schriro, 651 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Rhoades v. Reinke, 671 F.3d

856 (9th Cir. 2011). We should do so here. If we conclude that the district court

abused its discretion in denying Mitchell’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion, we can grant the

motion to stay at that time.

Accordingly, I dissent.

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