256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huertas vs. Gonzalez

*

G.R. No. 152443. February 14, 2005.

ANGELITO HUERTAS, petitioner, vs. ANDREW

GONZALEZ, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS), and CAROLINA DIZON, respondents.

Administrative Law; Public School Teachers; Magna Carta

for Public School Teachers (R.A. No. 4670); Due Process; Where the
members of the Grievance Committee tasked to conduct a formal
investigation of public school teachers belonged to the Legal
Affairs and Complaint Service of the Division of City Schools, the
same contravenes Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670—the Committee is not
the competent tribunal required by law; In any proceeding, the
essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.—In the
present action, the members of the Grievance Committee who
were tasked to conduct a formal investigation of the complaint of
respondent Dizon belonged to the Legal Affairs and Complaints
Service of the Manila Division of City Schools; hence, contrary to
Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670. In fine, the Committee that was
tasked to conduct the formal investigation was not the competent
tribunal required by the law. Indeed, we made the following
ruling in Fabella v. Court of Appeals: In the

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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Huertas vs. Gonzalez

present case, the various committees formed by the DECS to hear
the administrative charges against private respondents did not
include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required
by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were
deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings
undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide
any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents.
The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’ organization in
these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given
substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in
the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard.
Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; Where a party never assailed
during the hearings before the Grievance Committee such
committee’s composition or competence to take cognizance of and
conduct a formal investigation of his case, and he only assailed it
for the first time in his petition before the Court of Appeals, he is
estopped from subsequently assailing the competence of the
committee.—As the OSG averred, during the hearings before the
Grievance Committee, the petitioner never assailed its
composition or its competence to take cognizance of and conduct a
formal investigation of respondent Dizon’s complaint. He,
likewise, failed to do so before the Regional Director, and did not
even appeal the matter to DECS Secretary Gloria, and his
successors Secretary Pefianco and Secretary Gon-zalez. The
petitioner assailed the committee’s composition and competence
for the first time only in his petition before the CA. Moreover, the
petitioner submitted his counter-affidavit before the committee,
and even agreed to submit the case for report and
recommendation without any formal investigation, on the basis of
mere affidavits of the parties and those of the witnesses of
respondent Dizon. Verily then, the petitioner is estopped from
assailing the competence of the committee.
Same; Same; Same; Civil Service Decree; Parties; The Court
has already overturned and abandoned its ruling that only the
government employee against whom the administrative case is
filed is entitled to appeal from a decision adverse to him.—The
petitioner cites Section 39(a) of Presidential Decree No. 805,
which provides

258
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Huertas vs. Gonzalez

that appeals where allowable, shall be made by the party

adversely affected by the decision. He also cites Del Castillo v.
Civil Service Commission, where the Court ruled that only the
government employee against whom the administrative case is
filed is entitled to appeal from a decision adverse to him, and the
ruling of this Court in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission that
the civil service law does not contemplate a review of decisions
exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.
The petitioner insists that when Secretary Gloria ordered the
dismissal of the complaint against him for lack of due process, he
was exonerated of the charge. We do not agree with the petitioner.
The Court overturned its ruling in Mendez v. Civil Service
Commission and in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, which
latter holding, in turn, was reiterated in Philippine National
Bank v. Garcia, Jr.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the Secretary merely
nullified the proceedings before the grievance committee as well as
its report/recommendation, the same is not an exoneration of the
charge against the respondent.—It must be stressed that the
petitioner was not exonerated of the charge against him in the
November 20, 1997 Resolution of Secretary Gloria; the DECS
Secretary merely nullified the proceedings before the committee
as well as its report/recom-mendation. Hence, respondent Dizon
was moving for the reconsideration of the November 20, 1997
Resolution of the Secretary, and was not, in effect, appealing from
any resolution exonerating the petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Where the respondent
teacher agreed to do away with the formal investigation, and to the
submission of the case for reporting and recommendation on the
basis of the affidavits on record, he is deemed to have waived his
right to a formal investigation.—We agree with the petitioner that
there was no formal or trial-type investigation conducted by the
committee, and that it relied solely on the affidavits submitted by
the parties when it rendered its report/recommendation. The
Court notes, however, that no less than the petitioner agreed to do
away with the formal investigation, and to the submission of the
case for reporting and recommendation on the basis of the
affidavits on record. In fine, the petitioner waived his right to a
formal investigation.

259

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 Huertas vs. Gonzalez

PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Yolando F. Lim for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us 1 is a petition for review on certiorari of the

Resolution of the Court of Appeals2 (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
60086 which reversed its Decision in the said case and its
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the
said resolution.

The Antecedents

An administrative complaint dated July 9, 1996 was filed

with the Office of the Regional Director of the then
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
National Capital Region, by Dr. Carolina C. Dizon, the
principal of the Bacood Elementary School in Sta. Mesa,
Manila, against Angelito M. Huertas, a school teacher in
the same school, for grave misconduct, disrespect of
authority and violation of the
3 provision of the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers.
It appears that shortly after the opening of academic
year 1996, the school conducted a regular election of the
officers of the faculty club. Huertas was re-elected
president, besting for the second time around his co-
teacher, Mrs. Catalina Lorenzo. This notwithstanding, a
group of teachers circulated a manifesto denouncing
Huertas. As a countermove, Huertas

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired), with

Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Eliezer R. de los Santos,
concurring.
2 Rollo, pp. 42-52.
3 Id., at p. 23.

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260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huertas vs. Gonzalez
launched 4 his own signature campaign to show his clear
mandate.
Huertas received information that Dizon5 was preventing
the teachers from signing in his favor. He rushed to the
office of Dizon and angrily demanded, “Bakit mo
pinipigilan ang mga teachers na pumirma?”
6 (Why are you
preventing the teachers to sign?) Shocked at Huertas’s
accusations and violent gestures, Dizon stood up and
retorted: “Anong pinipigilan
7 ang sinasabi mo?” (What are
you talking about?) to which Huertas riposted, “May mga
teachers na nagsasabi na pinipigilan mo silang pumirma
sa pinapipirmahan ko.” (Some teachers are claiming 8 that
you are preventing them from signing in my behalf.) Dizon
then dared Huertas to show to her the faces of her
detractors: “Bakit ko sila pipigilan, hindi ko alam ang
sinasabi mo.
9 Sino man ang nagsabi niyan, iharap mo sila
sa akin.” After the heated exchange of words, Huertas
decided to leave, but before doing so, warned Dizon, “Pag
hindi ka tumigil, tayo 10 ang magkakasuhan.” (If you don’t
stop, I will sue you.) Dizon preempted Huertas and filed
an administrative complaint against him.
An Investigating Committee (Grievance Committee) was
constituted for the purpose, chaired by Atty. Manuel Ano,
with Mrs. Purificacion11 Balingit and an unidentified school
official, as members.
Aside from her affidavit-complaint, Dizon submitted the
affidavits of Amelia del Rosario and Rosario Amarante, the
clerk and janitress of the school, respectively. Huertas sub-

_______________

4 Id., at p. 27.
5 Id.
6 Id., at p. 23.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id., at p. 17.

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Huertas vs. Gonzalez

mitted his counter-affidavit. Dizon submitted her reply-

affidavit, to which Huertas submitted his rejoinder-
affidavit.
The Investigating Committee conducted a preliminary
hearing which was held on July 23, 1996. No amicable
settlement was forged by the parties. The formal
investigation was set on September 10, 1996, during which
Huertas appeared without the assistance of counsel. The
parties agreed to submit the case for resolution without
any formal investigation on the basis of the affidavits on
record.
In time, the Grievance Committee submitted its
investigation report, finding Huertas guilty of gross
discourtesy in the course of official duties and 12

recommended the penalty of six (6) months suspension.

Huertas appealed the report, claiming that Purificacion
Balingit, one of the members of the hearing committee, was
partial against him.
In a Resolution dated October 16, 1996, Regional
Director Nilo Rosas modified the findings and
recommendation of the Grievance Committee. He found
Huertas guilty of gross disrespect and imposed on him the
penalty of one (1) month suspension from service without
pay. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing incidents, the instant

charge of Grave Misconduct is hereby dropped for lack of
substantial evidence. However, respondent is hereby found guilty
of the charge of Gross Disrespect. However, to temper the
harshness of the law, hereby meted is the penalty of suspension
for one (1) month effective upon receipt hereof without pay.
Further, respondent is hereby advised to be more circumspect in
his actuations to forestall, henceforth,
13 the filing of similar
complaints against him in the future.”

Huertas moved for a reconsideration of the resolution on

the alleged ground of lack of due process, both substantive

_______________

12 CA Rollo, p. 31.
13 Rollo, p. 29.

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262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huertas vs. Gonzalez
14

and procedural. He claimed that he was not represented

by counsel during the investigation on September 10, 1996
and that the Grievance Committee failed to conduct a
formal investigation of the case. Director Rosas denied the
motion, prompting Huertas to appeal the resolution to the
DECS Secretary via a petition for review.
On November 20, 1997, then DECS Secretary Ricardo T.
Gloria issued a Resolution reversing the resolutions of the
Regional Director and dismissing the administrative
complaint for want of a formal hearing. The Secretary
ruled that Huertas was deprived of his right to due process
when the Grievance Committee dispensed with a formal
investigation and based its report-recommendation merely
on the affidavits of the parties and those of the witnesses of
the complainant. The fallo of the resolution reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the

Regional Director, Department of Education, Culture and Sports,
National Capital Region, meting the penalty of one month
suspension without pay is hereby reversed. Accordingly, the
administrative case against the respondent is hereby dismissed
for lack of due process. However, respondent is hereby warned to
be more circumspect in his actuations to forestall the filing of
similar complaint against
15 him in the future.
SO ORDERED.”

Dissatisfied, Dizon herself filed a motion for the

reconsideration of the resolution. On March 20, 1998, then
Acting Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco reconsidered the
ruling of her predecessor and reinstated the resolution of
the Regional Director. The fallo of the resolution reads:

“In view hereof, the Resolution of this Office dated November 20,
1997 is reconsidered. Accordingly, the decision of the DECS

_______________

14 Id.
z
15 Id., at p. 36.

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Huertas vs. Gonzalez

Regional Director, National16 Capital Region, dated October 28,

1996, is hereby restored.”

Huertas filed a petition for review which was treated as a

motion for reconsideration by then DECS Secretary
17
Andrew Gonzalez, FSC. On June 10, 1999, Secretary
Gonzalez reconsidered and set-aside Secretary Pefianco’s
March 20, 1998 Resolution and reinstated Secretary
Gloria’s November 20, 1997 Resolution. The dispositive
portion reads:

“The resolution of then Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco, dated

March 20, 1998, is hereby reversed and the Resolution of then
Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria dated November 11, 1997 (sic), which
dismissed the complaint
18 for lack of due process, is hereby revived.
SO ORDERED.”

In reinstating Secretary Gloria’s November 20, 1997

Resolution, Secretary Gonzalez tersely and succinctly
ratiocinated:

“It is evident that then Secretary Pefianco acted on the motion for
Reconsideration of the [complaint] contrary to the rule that only
the respondent can file a motion 19 for reconsideration (CSC
Resolution No. 94-0512, Sec. 7).”

Dizon, this time, filed a motion for the reconsideration of

the June 10, 1999 Resolution of the Secretary. Acting
thereon, the Secretary made a volte face and reinstated
Secretary Pefianco’s Resolution of March 20, 1998 on July
23, 1999, thus:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office hereby recalls

its Resolution dated June 10, 1999 and restores the Resolution of
Acting Secretary Erlinda
20 Pefianco, dated March 20, 1998.
SO ORDERED.”

_______________

16 Id., at p. 37.
17 Id.
18 Id., at p. 38.
19 Id.
20 Id., at p. 40.

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264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huertas vs. Gonzalez

Huertas filed a letter-request for the reconsideration

thereof, which the Secretary denied. The case was
considered closed and terminated:
“WHEREFORE, this Office hereby denies the said motion and
considers the case closed 21 and terminated, insofar as this
Department is concerned.”

The Secretary considered the letter-request of Huertas as a

second motion for reconsideration which was proscribed by
Section 49, Rule XIV of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292,
otherwise known as the 1987 Revised Administrative Code.
Aggrieved by the foregoing rulings, Huertas filed a
petition for review in the CA wherein he raised the
following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPOSITION OF THE

GRIEVANCE/INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, DECS-NCR,
DIVISION OF CITY SCHOOLS, THAT CONDUCTED THE
HEARING IN THE PRESENT CASE WAS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE MANDATE OF REPUBLIC ACT 4670, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS.

II

WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE

REQUIREMENTS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 AS REGARDS
THE COMPOSITION OF THE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

III

WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CAROLINA

DIZON HAS THE LOCUS
22 STANDI TO FILE A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.

_______________

21 Id., at p. 41.
z
22 CA Rollo, pp. 9-10.

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Huertas vs. Gonzalez

In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG) averred that Huertas was estopped from
assailing the composition of the Grievance Committee,
thus:
“A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court by voluntarily
submitting a cause to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot
renounce the jurisdiction of the court a quo considering that he
had earlier submitted to such jurisdiction. Estoppel by laches bars
petitioner’s attack on the jurisdiction of the investigating
committee because
23 he never raised the issue when he was being
investigated.”

On July 24, 2001, the CA rendered a decision setting aside

Secretary Gonzalez’s Resolutions dated July 23, 1999 and
July 10, 2000, and reinstating Secretary Gloria’s November
20, 1997 Resolution. The CA ruled that Dizon herself had
the right to appeal or move for a reconsideration of the
November 20, 1997 Resolution of Secretary Gloria as held 24

by the Court in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy. It

rejected the argument of the OSG that a decision in
administrative cases penalized by one month suspension or
less shall be final under Section 47(2), Chapter 7, Subtitle
A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292. According to the CA, the
petitioner’s case does not fall within the ambit of E.O. No.
292 because “the root of the penalty is an illegally
constituted investigating committee. 25 As the old adage tells

us ‘it is a fruit of a poisonous tree.’ ”

The appellate court also ruled that the composition of
the committee which investigated the administrative
complaint against Huertas was not in accordance with
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers; hence, the
petitioner was deprived of his right to due process.

_______________

23 Id., at p. 44.
24 306 SCRA 425 (1999).
25 Rollo, pp. 47-48.

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266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huertas vs. Gonzalez
26

However, upon motion for reconsideration filed 27 by the

OSG, to which Huertas filed his opposition, the CA
reconsidered its Decision of July 24, 2001 and dismissed
the petition for lack of merit on September 27, 2001. The
fallo of the resolution reads:
“WHEREFORE, the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 24, 2001, is hereby
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack
28 of merit.

SO ORDERED.”

The CA held that Huertas was barred from assailing the

composition of the Grievance Committee and was
proscribed from appealing the resolution of Regional
Director Rosas to the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports. 29

Huertas filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof

which was denied by the CA.
Huertas, now the petitioner, comes to the Court via a
petition for review on certiorari against respondents Dizon
and the DECS Secretary, contending that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION/APPLICATION OF THE
LAW AND IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE PRESENTED.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE NON-COMPLIANCE
OF THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF REPUBLIC ACT
4670 AS

_______________

26 CA Rollo, p. 70.
27 Id., at p. 76.
28 Rollo, p. 57.
29 CA Rollo, p. 99.

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Huertas vs. Gonzalez

REGARDS THE COMPOSITION OF THE GRIEVANCE

COMMITTEE WHICH IS VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS
LAW.

III
 THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT
CAROLINA DIZON HAS NO PERSONALITY
30 TO FILE A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

As the first two issues are interrelated, the Court shall

delve into and resolve them simultaneously.
The petitioner avers that an integral component of his
right to due process is a tribunal vested with complete
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality. The petitioner asserts that
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 4670 enumerates those who
should compose an investigating committee, and that
under DECS Order No. 34, Series of 1999, noncompliance
with the requirements of the said law would amount to a
denial of due process. The petitioner avers that Atty.
Manuel Ano was not a school superintendent of the
division, and that the teacher’s organization was not
represented in the committee. Citing 31 the ruling of this
Court in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, the petitioner posits
that the proceedings before the committee and its report
are null and void. He maintains that since the Grievance
Committee failed to conduct a formal investigation prior to
the submission of its report to the Regional Director, he
was deprived of his right to present his side and adduce
evidence in his behalf.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents,
through the OSG, aver that there exists at the Division of
the City Schools, Manila, a specialized section denominated
as Legal Affairs and Complaints Service (LACS), which is
tasked to investigate complaints for disciplinary actions
against the

_______________

30 Rollo, p. 15.
31 282 SCRA 256 (1997).

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268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huertas vs. Gonzalez

teachers of its division. One of those cases investigated by

the LACS was the complaint of respondent Dizon against
the petitioner. Besides, the respondents argue that the
petitioner is estopped from assailing the composition of the
committee because—

. . . The administrative case against petitioner for Grave

Misconduct and Disrespect to Authority, filed by his own lady
Principal, is one of these cases belonging to the LACS. From the
very start of the investigative proceedings up to its termination,
and even after the DECS Grievance Committee submitted its
report of findings and recommendation, petitioner never
questioned the competence of the hearing officers or the legality of
the proceedings. He is now barred effectively by laches and
estoppel to question the proceedings conducted and the judgment
rendered in the administrative case against him. When petitioner
appealed the judgment of Rosas, he did not raise therein the issue
of the composition of the investigating committee. Litigants
cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would
contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice. A question that
was never raised in courts below cannot be allowed to be raised
for the first time on appeal without offending basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process. No question, issue or argument will
be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court a
quo. Basic is the rule that parties may not bring on appeal issues
that were not raised on trial.
More importantly, the judgment of conviction with the penalty
of one month suspension is final and unappealable. In fact,
petitioner had already partially served his penalty of suspension.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible
error in upholding the Pefianco Resolution, thus, reinstating
ultimately and correctly
32 the Rosas Resolution in the DECS
administrative case.

We agree with the respondents that the petitioner is

estopped from assailing the competence of the Grievance
Committee.
Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670 reads:

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32 Rollo, pp. 120-121.

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Huertas vs. Gonzalez

SECTION 9. Administrative Charges.—Administrative charges

against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the
Division or a duly-authorized representative who should, at least,
have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs,
as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teacher’s organization and a
supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the
Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its
findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools
within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided,
however, That where the school superintendent is the
complainant or an interested party, all the members of the
committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

In the present action, the members of the Grievance

Committee who were tasked to conduct a formal
investigation of the complaint of respondent Dizon
belonged to the Legal Affairs and Complaints Service of the
Manila Division of City Schools; hence, contrary to Section
9 of Rep. Act No. 4670. In fine, the Committee that was
tasked to conduct the formal investigation was not the
competent tribunal required by the law. Indeed, 33we made
the following ruling in Fabella v. Court of Appeals:

“In the present case, the various committees formed by the DECS
to hear the administrative charges against private respondents
did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence,
any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization” as
required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees
were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all
proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They
could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of
private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a
teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to
ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would
have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard.
Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of

_______________

33 Supra, note 31.

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270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huertas vs. Gonzalez

procedural due process is embodied in the 34 basic requirement of

notice and a real opportunity to be heard.”
However, such ruling is inapplicable in the instant case. As
the OSG averred, during the hearings before the Grievance
Committee, the petitioner never assailed its composition or
its competence to take cognizance of and conduct a formal
investigation of respondent Dizon’s complaint. He, likewise,
failed to do so before the Regional Director, and did not
even appeal the matter to DECS Secretary Gloria, and his
successors Secretary Pefianco and Secretary Gonzalez. The
petitioner assailed the committee’s composition and
competence for the first time only in his petition before the
CA. Moreover, the petitioner submitted his counter-
affidavit before the committee, and even agreed to submit
the case for report and recommendation without any formal
investigation, on the basis of mere affidavits of the parties
and those of the witnesses of respondent Dizon. Verily
then, the petitioner is estopped from assailing the
competence of the 35 committee. As we ruled in Cloma v.
Court of Appeals:

“It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79).
In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further
said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of
the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not
important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid
and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice can not be tolerated—obviously for reasons of public
policy.
“Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones, etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61
L. Ed. 715, 37

_______________

34 Id., at p. 269.
35 234 SCRA 664 (1994).

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Huertas vs. Gonzalez

S. Ct. 283; St. Louis, etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed.
659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that
it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to, afterwards, deny that same jurisdiction to
escape a penalty.
“Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases
mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20,
1963 (supra)—to the effect that we frown upon the “undesirable
practice” of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse—as well as Pindañgan, etc. vs. Dans,
et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al. vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor
Union, etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. L-
20307, Feb. 26, 1965,
36 and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil., p. 277.”
(Italics supplied).

On the third issue, the petitioner avers that respondent

Dizon was barred from filing a motion for the
reconsideration of the November 20, 1997 Resolution of
Secretary Gloria. This resolution reversed that of Regional
Director Rosas and ordered the dismissal of the said
complaint, on the ground that the petitioner was deprived
of his right to due process when the committee dispensed
with a formal investigation and because its report was
based merely on the affidavits on record. The petitioner
cites Section 39(a) of Presidential Decree No. 805, which
provides that appeals where allowable, shall be made by
the party adversely affected by the decision.
37 He also cites
Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, where the Court
ruled that only the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed is entitled to appeal from a
decision adverse to him, and the ruling
38 of this Court in
Mendez v. Civil Service Commission that the civil service
law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating
officers or employees from administrative charges. The
petitioner

_______________

36 Id., at pp. 673-674.

37 241 SCRA 317 (1995).
38 204 SCRA 965 (1991).

272

272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huertas vs. Gonzalez
insists that when Secretary Gloria ordered the dismissal of
the complaint against him for lack of due process, he was
exonerated of the charge.
We do not agree with the petitioner. The Court
overturned 39its ruling in Mendez v. Civil Service
Commission40 and in Civil Service Commission v.
Dacoycoy, which latter holding, in turn,
41 was reiterated in

Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr. Thus:

“In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Reynato S. Puno explained

that the Civil Service Law did not categorically sanction the old
doctrine barring appeals by parties other than the respondent
employee. What the law declared as “final” were only those
decisions of heads of agencies involving suspensions of not more
than thirty days or fines not exceeding thirty days’ salary. These
decisions, he said, involved minor and petty offenses, and to allow
multiple appeals in those instances would overburden the quasi-
judicial machinery of our administrative systems.
“Neither can the old doctrine barring appeal be justified by the
provision limiting the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission. According to that provision, the CSC was limited to
the review of decisions involving: (1) suspension for more than
thirty (30) days; (2) fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days’
salary; (3) demotion in rank or salary; and (4) transfer, removal or
dismissal from office. Nothing in the provision, however, indicates
a legislative intent to bar appeals from decisions exonerating a
government official or an employee from an administrative
charge.
“It is a well-entrenched rule that if a statute is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. Verily, the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intent or will and preclude courts from construing it differently.
The legislature is presumed to have known the meanings of the
words, to have used those words advisedly, and to have expressed
its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.
Where the language of a statute is

_______________

39 Ibid.
40 Supra, note 24.
41 388 SCRA 485 (2002).

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VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 14, 2005 273

Huertas vs. Gonzalez
plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning,
there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory
construction, and this Court has no right to look for or impose
another meaning.
“Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and
misfeasance will be seriously undermined if we bar appeals of
exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the
nature of criminal actions, in which acquittals are final and
unappealable based on the constitutional proscription of double
jeopardy.
“Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the
range and scope of judicial review. Thus, to prevent appeals of
administrative decisions except those initiated by employees 42 will
effectively and pervertedly erode this constitutional grant.”

It must be stressed that the petitioner was not exonerated

of the charge against him in the November 20, 1997
Resolution of Secretary Gloria; the DECS Secretary merely
nullified the proceedings before the committee as well as its
report/recommendation. Hence, respondent Dizon was
moving for the reconsideration of the November 20, 1997
Resolution of the Secretary, and was not, in effect,
appealing from any resolution exonerating the petitioner.
We agree with the petitioner that there was no formal or
trial-type investigation conducted by the committee, and
that it relied solely on the affidavits submitted by the
parties when it rendered its report/recommendation. The
Court notes, however, that no less than the petitioner
agreed to do away with the formal investigation, and to the
submission of the case for reporting and recommendation
on the basis of the affidavits on record. In fine, the
petitioner waived his right to a formal investigation. We
thus agree with the following disquisitions of the OSG:

“The records of the administrative proceedings before the

Investigating Committee show that petitioner was accorded all
the opportunity to secure the services of a lawyer, to prepare
himself

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42 Id., at pp. 490-491.

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274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huertas vs. Gonzalez
with witnesses and evidence to be presented at the next scheduled
hearings, but he opted instead to submit the case on the basis of
his counter-affidavits. A formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all
times, essential to due process. The requirements are satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side. Due process in an administrative context does
not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts.
After all, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the ruling or action complained of, all of which were amply
afforded respondent Huertas. If not availed of, as petitioner is
shown to have treated the administrative proceedings lightly
before, it is deemed
43 waived or forfeited without violation of the
Bill of Rights.”

Besides, as further noted by the OSG, the petitioner had

commenced serving the penalty meted on him.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

          Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and

Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Petition denied.

Notes.—A litigant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a

court to secure affirmative relief and, after failing to obtain
such relief, to repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
(Stilianopulos vs. City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523 [1999])
Participation by parties in the administrative
proceedings without raising any objection thereto bars
them from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an
adverse decision is rendered against them. (Emin vs. De
Leon, 378 SCRA 143 [2002])

——o0o——

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43 Rollo, p. 119.

275
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