Original Article

An integrated terminal operating system

for enhancing the efficiency of seaport
terminal operators

Hokey Mina,*, Seung-Bum Ahnb, Hyang-Sook Leeb

and Heekeon Parkb

a
Department of Management, College of Business Administration, Bowling
Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, USA.
E-mail: [email protected]
b
Graduate School of Logistics, Incheon National University, Incheon, Korea.
*Corresponding author.

Abstract A seaport terminal is a vital link in the global supply chain which has a
profound impact on port competitiveness and international trade. However, ongoing
worldwide economic slumps, coupled with the proliferation of terminal operators, have
created a glut for terminal-related logistics services and intensified competition among
terminal operators. As a way to better utilize the existing terminal infrastructure and
enhance terminal operating efficiencies, we propose an integrated terminal operating system
that can reduce duplicated investments in equipment, redundant workforce, and non-value-
adding processes, while standardizing terminal services including loading/unloading, dis-
charging, and transferring cargo. To verify the usefulness of the proposed integrated ter-
minal operating system, we develop key performance indicators of terminal operations
which help to measure the comparative performances of both an integrated group and a
non-integrated group of terminal operators and then formulate viable strategic options for
creating ‘‘win–win’’ situations for terminal operators and their stakeholders including port
administrators. In so doing, we examine the current practices of terminal operators at the
Incheon Inner harbor in Korea through in-depth interviews and then identify critical success
factors for integrated terminal operations based on a questionnaire survey and analytic
hierarchy process. These factors include the terminal operator’s cargo attraction level, cargo
turnover ratio, cargo storage capacity, and ability to comply with government rules and
policies.

Maritime Economics & Logistics (2017) 19, 428–450. doi:10.1057/s41278-017-0069-5;

published online 9 March 2017

! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450
www.palgrave.com/journals
 Integrated terminal operating system

Keywords: terminal operating companies; global supply chains; analytic

hierarchy process; maritime logistics; performance indicators

Introduction

Thanks to the recent improvement in the global economic climate, the ocean
cargo industry is finally showing signs of recovery from the doldrums it has
experienced in the last decade. Oskin (2014) reports that ocean transportation in
the major shipping lanes increased in 2014 four times as much compared to
1992. This growth has been partially fueled by the rapid rise of sea freight
bilateral trades between China and its major trading partners such as the United
States (U.S.), Japan, Korea, Brazil, and India. For example, the volume of trade
between China and the U.S. is expected to increase, by 2030, more than twice as
much as in 2009 (Selfin and Hope, 2011). Riding on this optimistic trend and
rosy outlook, a number of gateway- or hub-ports in the Asia–Pacific region have
made sizable investments in the expansion and modernization of their ports. For
example, in 2011, Shanghai started its fourth phase of expansion of its Yangshan
port, a project that would add more than 40 per cent to port handling capacity
(Ren, 2011). Similarly, through continuous capacity expansion, the Incheon Port
handled a total throughput of 2.84 million TEUs in 2015, expected to rise further
to 4.27 million TEUs by 2020 (Lee, 2013). Ironically, coinciding with sluggish
demand for port services, the rapid and unplanned expansion of port capacity
deteriorates port finances and results in broad-ranging impacts on the maritime
logistics industry including the terminal operating industry. As the port suffers
from mounting financial pressures, it tends to keep its charges (including
concession fees) deliberately low to lure more carriers and shippers, passing on
its cost drivers to cargo handlers such as terminal operators. In general, terminal
operators (or dubbed terminal operating companies) are organizations which
provide various port-related logistics services and make wharfs, docks,
warehouses, or other marine terminal facilities and equipment available to
ocean transportation companies. These TOs are publicly or privately or semi-
privately (both publicly and privately) owned (Federal Maritime Commission,
2016). Typical logistics services of a TO include the following: Loading/
unloading (e.g., ship to truck/truck to ship), intermodal cargo interchanges,
cargo inspections at the in-gate and out-gate, container repair and maintenance,
container yard management, chassis rentals, office support (including support
for electronic data interchange and telecommunications), and cargo booking. As
such, TO activities are broader than those of terminal-operating shippers (TOS),
which are mainly active in non-containerized cargo operations, and those of

! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450 429
 Min et al.

terminal-operating shipping lines (TOSL) which operate terminals on a

dedicated or a common-user basis (Bichou and Bell, 2007).
To cope with greater cost pressures partially resultant from the rapid
privatization of TOs, and the vicious circle of operating inefficiency, a growing
number of TOs have begun to explore ways to survive in an increasingly
competitive industry. One such way is the formation of multiple partnerships
among TOs through the concerted effort to integrate their terminal service
offerings and managerial activities (e.g., demand planning, sales/promotion),
harness interfaces among their stakeholders, and increase their marketing
synergy. In other words, many TOs have realized that a competitive struggle
between individual TOs was counter-productive and thus sought to integrate
their managerial activities with new mindsets. Such mindsets call for the
development of an integrated terminal operating system (ITOS) that can
facilitate the sharing of resources (e.g., assets, capital, and labor), business
intelligence (e.g., demand forecasts), expertise, and sales/marketing plans
among TOs and increase their bargaining strength in current and future business
dealings. In addition, TO integration through joint venture operations can help
solve the problem of inadequate capital for a single TO, while providing the
opportunity to acquire specialized techniques and market connections, when
the partner of a joint venture is a specialized and locally based TO. Furthermore,
TO integration through the joint venture with a local TO can reduce hindrance
and interference imposed by the local government (Lee and Meng, 2014). This
system will eventually strengthen the competitive position of TOs by eliminating
or reducing the duplicated investment in equipment and use of redundant
workforce, while increasing the scale efficiency. Despite the aforementioned
benefit potentials, the effort to integrate multiple TOs’ managerial processes is
still lacking due in part to skepticism of ITOS without proven success.
To alter these skeptic views and provide a convincing rationale for the
proposed ITOS, this paper looks into the case of 10 TOs currently operating at
the Inner Harbor of the Incheon Port in Korea and builds a conceptual
framework for assessing the impact of ITOS on their comparative efficiencies
based on the key performance indicators (KPIs) suitable for the TO industry. In
so doing, this paper also identifies key success factors for TO operations which
are critical for the enhancement of TO competitiveness. In light of the above
discussion, major objectives of this paper are (1) to identify the potential sources
of TO inefficiency; (2) to develop key performance indicators (KPIs) for
evaluating TO efficiency; (3) to figure out ways to facilitate the integration of
TOs’ managerial activities by leveraging the proposed ITOS; and (4) to develop
action plans that help boost TO efficiency and subsequently TO competiveness.

430 ! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450
 Integrated terminal operating system

Relevant literature

In general, a terminal operating system (TOS) is referred to as a computer

system that is designed to plan, track, and manage the movement and storage of
all cargo, the use of assets, and the deployment of people in and around the
seaport terminal or the port (including the hinterland) on a real-time basis. It can
comprise a broad range of technologies including software features, handling
yard planning, berth planning, stowage planning, carrier/vessel traffic control,
document transmission, record keeping, accounting, Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP), Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Electronic Data Inter-
change (EDI), Optical Character Recognition (OCR), and Differential Global
Positioning Systems (DGPS). Although intended for the optimization of cargo
movement and storage throughout terminal operations, its complexity can
create unexpected difficulties such as lack of connectivity among different
softwares, incompatibility between different components (e.g., different mod-
ules of creating shipping lists of cargoes, keeping track of cargoes, invoicing,
reporting), and uncoordinated functionalities (e.g., a failure to synchronize
activities of container handling at the terminal with those of container transfers
between different ships and modes of transport). Such difficulties may stem
from a failure to integrate TO components and managerial activities of multiple
TOs. Thus, to optimize terminal operations through TOS, strategies that enable
TOs to integrate their activities should be formulated. Unfortunately, those
strategies were rarely available from the published literature.
Despite the paucity of research dealing with TO managerial issues regarding
integration or coordination, there are some pioneering studies that can be the
theoretical foundation of the current study. One of the earlier studies on TO
integration may be credited to Heaver et al (2001) who documented the
changing relationship between the port authority and TOs, while noticing the
trend of increasing alliances amongst maritime logistics service providers,
including TOs. They found that the blurred demarcation between separate
logistics sectors such as terminal leasing, inland cargo transfers, cargo
containerization, cargo tracking, break-bulk services, crane services, and on-
site equipment maintenance, resulting from expanded logistics service offerings
amongst TOs, has triggered their alliances and the integration of their services.
Similar to the observation made by Heaver et al (2001), Notteboom (2002)
noticed the growing trend of consolidation and integration amongst container
handling companies, including TOs, in the European maritime logistics industry.
That trend has been established due to a growing number of larger vessels (e.g.,
Post Panamax mega-containerships), the subsequent cargo concentration
(transshipment), fewer port calls, and the need for greater cargo handling

! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450 431
 Min et al.

efficiency. Also, through a case study, Song (2002) found a pattern of increasing
collaboration (so-called ‘co-opetition’ meaning collaborate to compete) and
integration between Hong Kong and South China ports, as well as between TOs
operating in those ports. Motives for collaboration and integration include the
following: risk reduction, economies of scale, rationalization, technology
transfers, co-opting or blocking competition, overcoming government-mandated
trade or investment barriers, and vertical quasi-integrated advantages of linking
the complementary contributions of partners in a global supply chain.
Unlike these earlier studies, Slack and Frémont (2005) observed the
transformation of TOs as a result of the globalization of maritime logistics. Two
of the most notable patterns that they found were the increased role of a small
number of transnational TOs in the global container handling market, and the
increased participation of international shipping lines in terminal operations.
These patterns have resulted in the disappearance of independent local TOs.
Based on a case study of the port of Rotterdam, Van der Horst and De Langen
(2008) analyzed the various managerial challenges of coordinating hinterland
services provided by shipping lines, TOs, freight forwarders, and hinterland
transportation providers. These challenges included the following: difficulty in
building contractual relations among different actors (e.g., shipping lines, TOs),
information asymmetry (or insufficient information exchange among the actors
involved in hinterland services), a limited exchange of cargo handling capacity,
and a lack of incentives for cooperation among multiple actors (or logistics
firms) in the hinterland transportation network. From a different angle, De
Langen and Chouly (2009) analyzed the changing role of terminal operating
companies (TOs) in supply chains based on a case study of the Netherlands.
They discovered that TOs in the Netherlands, such as APM Terminals,
increasingly offered integrated logistics services, depending on the commodities
they handled. For instance, container TOs offered fewer integrated logistics
services than break-bulk TOs which handle and transport oversized, over-
weight, or odd-sized cargoes individually, e.g., on a skid or pallet or in a crate,
without using standard shipping containers. Most of the TOs operated in their
‘home port’ alone and provided additional services in-house, with a less well-
developed partnership. That is to say, the extent of integrated service offerings
among container TOs was still limited despite growing demand for those
offerings in times of fierce competition in the cargo handling industry. Based on
case studies on the Hamburg–LeHavre port range, Franc and Van der Horst
(2010) explained why and how shipping lines and TOs integrate their hinterland
services. One of the reasons for such integration includes synergistic benefits
gained from the coordination of intermodal transportation services and inland
terminal operations in the hinterland areas. Predicated on the resource-based
view (RBV) and the theory of transaction cost economics (TCE), they argued
432 ! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450
 Integrated terminal operating system

that the strategic integration between shipping lines and TOs would improve
their competitive advantages by broadening the scope of their services.
More recently, Chiu et al (2015) identified key determinants affecting
strategic collaboration among container terminal operators, specifically in the
port of Kaohsiung, Taiwan. They found that cost was the most important factor,
followed by efficiency, service, risk, and compatibility. Their findings also
indicated that a joint venture was the common strategic collaboration pattern in
container terminal operations. Reflecting this pattern, Table 1 illustrates the
worldwide joint venture operations of TOs.
Most recently, Yoon et al (2015) examined the determinants of compet-
itiveness in the South Korean TO industry by considering both traditional (e.g.,
facilities, location, cost, and service) and softer (e.g., human resource,
network, customers, government support policy, and reputation) factors and
then investigated empirical relationships amongst the determinants of com-
petitiveness and I–U–G (Industry–University–Government) alliance networks.
Based on the test results of structural equation models, they found that, except
for government support policy, factors such as human resources, facilities,
service quality, customer orientation and reputation, had significant effects on
the competitiveness of TOs. In particular, they discovered that an I–U–G
alliance network could play a pivotal role in improving the competitiveness of
TOs.
As this literature review reveals, the majority of the aforementioned prior
studies on TO integration/coordination seem to focus on the examination of the
changing roles of TOs over the years, the observation of recent trends in
terminal operations, and the identification of key determinants for TO
competitiveness. As recapitulated in Table 2, none of the prior literature on
TOs to date has discussed the significance of integrating terminal operating

Table 1: Examples of international joint venture operations of terminal operators

Terminal Operators …and their Joint Venture Partners (selected, non-exhaustive, list)
APM Terminals Container Corporation of India (CONCOR), Cartagena, Compañia de
Puertos Asociados (Compas), New Jersey Container Terminal
Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH) Shanghai International Port, Shanghai Mindong Container
Terminals, Shenzhen Yantian West Port Terminals, COSCO-HIT
Terminals (Hong Kong), Alexandria International Container
Terminals Company Ltd. (Egypt)
Dubai Ports (DP) World Pusan Newport Company (PNC), Caisse de Depot et Placement du
Quebec, Montreal, Somaliland Port of Berbera
PSA Singapore Terminals Pte. Ltd. CMA CGM Lion Terminal, COSCO Pacific
(PSA)
China Ocean Shipping Company PSA, Hong Kong International Terminals Limited (HIT)
(COSCO) Pacific Limited

! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450 433
 Min et al.

Table 2: A review of the selected TO integration literature

Author(s) Year of Study Research focus Key shortcoming(s)

publication methodology
Heaver 2001 Descriptive Observed the TO integration Did not identify factors
et al. (narrative) trend influencing TO
performances
Notteboom 2002 Qualitative Observed the growing trend Did not identify factors
of TO integration in the influencing TO
European container performances
handling industry
Song 2002 Case study Identified motives for TO Did not develop
(Hong Kong integration performance metrics
and South
China)
Slack and 2005 Descriptive Observed the gradual Did not develop
Frémont (narrative) disappearance of performance metrics
independent local TO
Van der 2008 Case study Analyzed the potential Did not develop
Horst (Netherlands) problems of coordinating performance metrics
and De and hinterland services
Langen descriptive provided by shipping
lines, TOs, and other
transportation service
providers
De Langen 2009 Case study Observed the changing role Did not develop
and (Netherlands) of TOs performance metrics
Chouly
Franc and 2010 Case study Theorized the potential Did not develop
Van der (Germany) benefits of integration performance metrics
Horst between shipping lines
and TOs
Chiu et al 2015 Case study Identified key determinants Did not develop
(Kaohsiung, facilitating TO performance metrics
Taiwan) integration
Yoon et al 2015 Empirical study Identified antecedents of Did not develop
TO competitiveness performance metrics
and did not discuss
about the potential
ramifications of TO
integration

systems to terminal operating efficiency and it has rarely offered managerial

guidelines that can facilitate the integration of TOs for the purpose of eliminating
waste of resources. More importantly, prior studies have failed to provide
systematic measurement tools (e.g., key performance indicators or metrics) for
assessing the impact of integration of TOs on their operating efficiency. The
current study aims to fill the aforementioned void left by prior studies, through a
hybrid case study (see, e.g., Yin, 2003; Gerring, 2007 for the relevance of case
based research) and exploratory analysis aided by the analytic hierarchy process
(AHP). Our paper also attempts to develop a conceptual framework for

434 ! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450
 Integrated terminal operating system

exploiting an integrated terminal operating system (ITOS) that would lead to

greater TO competitiveness and more resilient global supply chains.

K ey p e r f o r ma n c e i n d i c a t or s f o r t e r mi n al o pe r a t o r s

Triggered by the anticlimactic global financial crisis of 2009, shipping volumes

began to taper off or decline in some of the major hub ports across the world.
These ports include the Incheon Port in Korea. As summarized in Table 3, total
shipping volumes handled by the Incheon Port shrank for the last few years after
peaking in 2007. In particular, the Inner Harbor area of the Incheon Port has
suffered from a substantial (almost 29 per cent) decline in cargo volumes
between 2007 and 2013. Such a decline has further limited business opportu-
nities for TOs which have struggled to recover from their earlier investment in
infrastructure during their heydays. The crisis also undermined the effort to
utilize existing capacity, managed by TOs, and it created a downward spiral of
their operating efficiency. To reverse this trend, TOs need a systematic survival
strategy which can help TOs continuously improve their operating efficiency
through a better utilization of existing resources and the development of greater
business growth opportunities. That strategy should start with a critical
assessment of current practices, using the relevant KPIs, and the reduction in
sources of operating inefficiencies.
Prior to developing KPIs, which can measure the effect of TO integration on
operating efficiency, we attempt to figure out which factors might significantly
influence TO performances. To identify those factors, we have conducted in-
depth interviews with seven selected individuals (i.e., a group of college
professors specializing in maritime logistics, port administrators, and top
executives of TOs) about their opinions on terminal performance standards and
their inputs for the relevant survey questionnaire. Afterwards, we sent out the
questionnaire to the executives (CEO, Vice President, or Director) of the 21 TOs

Table 3: The cargo shipping volume of the inner and North Harbor in Incheon Port (in 1,000 tons)

Year Inner harbor North harbor Total

2007 42,720) 3,657 46,377
2008 38,566 6,579 45,145
2009 30,371 6,459 36,830
2010 33,438 7,684 41,122
2011 31,617 7,763 39,380
2012 31,701 7,849 39,550
2013 30,483 9,041 39,524

Data source: Internal report on terminal operators at the Incheon Port, Korea Maritime Institute (2014).

! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450 435
 Min et al.

in Korea and selected 15 maritime logistics experts (e.g., college professors,

researchers at maritime logistics research centers, such as the Korea Maritime
Institute (KMI), port administrators) via both e-mail and normal post. The
questionnaire contained various questions related to the respondent’s degree of
familiarity with TO managerial issues, his/her knowledge of potential causes of
TO efficiency/inefficiency, his/her perceived importance of TO factors affecting
the TO operating efficiency, the extent of a need for integrated TO management,
and the level of integration needed among TOs (e.g., full integration including
mergers and acquisitions, selected integration of duplicated service offerings,
selected integration of physical and human resources). Out of 36 target
respondents, we received a total of 13 valid responses. Based on both interviews
and the questionnaire, the respondents initially identified metrics that were
considered to be relevant for gauging TO performances. As summarized in
Table 4, these were (1) cargo attraction ratio; (2) productivity ratio; (3) cargo
storage ratio; (4) return on investment; (5) safety; (6) the level of TO user
(carrier, shipper) satisfaction; and (7) the level of compliance with government
rules and policy guidelines.
Among these, return on investment, safety, and the level of TO user
satisfaction received an average importance score below five, indicating that
they were not considered even moderately important on a seven-point Likert
scale (7 = most important, 1 = least important). Also, when we asked the
respondents to make pairwise comparisons of the aforementioned seven
metrics, those three received the lowest priority scores (i.e., below 0.068 out

Table 4: A summary of key performance metrics for measuring TO efficiency

Performance criteria Specific performance metrics

! "
Cargo attraction ratio Cumulative cargo volume handled annually by TO
! 100
Total volume of incoming and outgoing cargoes at the harbor
! "
Productivity Total cargo throughout handled annually by TO
ratio (e.g., cargo ! 100
Total cargo handling capacity of TO
turnover ratio) ! "
Cargo storage ratio Space occupied by stored cargo
! 100
Total available cargo storage area
Return on Percentage of cargoes handled by TO with a greater profit contribution
investment (ROI)
Safety Frequency of accidents or security breaches
The level of TO user The average degree of user satisfaction with TO services
satisfaction
The level of compliance Frequency of violations of government rules and policy guidelines in a
with government given period
rules and policy
guidelines

436 ! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450
 Integrated terminal operating system

of the maximum score of 1), based on the analytic hierarchy process (AHP)
results, and thus were eliminated from further consideration for the TO
evaluation criteria. In other words, they were no longer considered to be key TO
performance indicators. Among the four remaining criteria, the cargo attraction
ratio was considered the most important, based both on the perceived
importance score (5.9 out of 7) and the AHP priority score (0.505 out of 1).
The level of compliance with government rules and policy guidelines was
considered the least important (with an AHP score of 0.324 out of 1). The second
most important criterion was the productivity ratio.
Since the cargo attraction ratio is heavily affected by the volume of cargo
handled by TOs in a given year, a gradual decline in this volume, handled by
TOs at the Incheon port, over the last seven-year span (2007–2013) reflects the
TO’s failure to attract more cargoes. This pattern prompted us to investigate
further the causes of this development. Both the majority of the respondents (8
out of 13) and the panel of the seven experts pinpointed a lack of integrative
efforts among TOs as the main culprit for the TO’s lagging performance. For
instance, they believed that a lack of integration among TOs has led to the
underutilization of their resources (both human and capital) due to the
imbalance between TO service capacity and service demand. They also believed
that a lack of integration among TOs has created inequity between TOs, due to
the government’s preferential treatment of several TOs. Furthermore, they
believed that a lack of integration among TOs further constrained their financial
resources in making the necessary investments to upgrade and modernize their
facilities, equipment, and information systems. With this mind, the following
section discusses ways to facilitate integration among TOs, while overcoming
any potential integration barriers.

A c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k o f a n i n t e gr a t e d t e r mi n a l o p e r a t i n g
system

Riding on the wave of increasing privatization of port activities, a group of TOs

took over activities managed by the port authority. For instance, a consortium of
10 TOs currently handles terminal operations at the Incheon Port. As
summarized in Table 5, multiple TOs are vying for the same type of shipments
in the same berth with similar service offerings. With dwindling cargo volumes,
redundant service offerings in the same terminal area have intensified
competition among TOs and reduced the utilization of their resources (e.g.,
equipment and workforce) and the return on investment on terminal
infrastructure improvement and upgrade. Realizing this concerning situation
and its negative impact on TOs’ operating efficiency, the idea of integrating part
! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450 437
438 Table 5: A status of TOs in the incheon inner harbor

TO [Investor(s)] Available berth Facility Cargo handling Cargo type Cargo The number
capacity handled volume of

Min et al.
! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics

(in 1,000 ton) (in 1,000 workers

ton)
All 10 Terminal Operators Berth 7 Berth: 50,000–2,036 32,742 All types 25,576 541
Yard: 854.912.4 m2
Shed: 119.491 m2
Berth length: 8,292 m
Access road: 86,447.7 m2
Unloader: 5
The 2nd Terminal of Incheon Berth 2 Berth: 30,000 9 1, 20,000 9 2, 5,298 Miscellaneous 2,693 Union:44
Port Operating Co. Ltd: (97.01.27) 8,000 9 4 goods, Iron Dongbang:39
Union Transport Co., LTD: (#20 * #26) Yard: 68,305.9 m2
Dong Bang Transport Shed: 53,293 m2
Logistics Co., Ltd. Berth length: 1,442 m
Access road: 9,109.8 m2
The 3rd Terminal of Incheon Berth 3 Berth: 20,000 9 1, 10,000 9 1, 4,507 Miscellaneous 2,417 Hanjin:25
Port Operating Co., Ltd.; (97.01.27) 8,000 9 4 goods, Iron Dongbu:15
Hanjin Transportation Co., (#30 * #36) Yard: 103,264.3 m2 Sebang:38
Ltd.; Dongbu Express; Shed: 45,815 m2
Sebang CO., LTD Berth length: 1,250 m
Access road: 18,997.6 m2
Hanjin Transportation Co., Berth 4-1 Berth: 30,000 9 1, 20,000 9 1, 2,095 Container Total: 47
Ltd (93.12.30) 10,000 9 1 3,314
(#40 * #42) Yard: 149,700 m2
Berth length: 625 m
Korea Express Co. Berth 4-2 Berth: 50,000 9 1, 40,000 91 1,461 Container Total: 23
Vol. 19, 3, 428–450

(93.12.30) Yard: 126,803.5 m2 4,709

(#43, #44) Berth length: 535 m
Korea Express Co. Berth 5-1 Berth: 50,000 9 1 896 Miscellaneous 422 21
(99.05.01) Yard: 36,005.2 m2 goods, Iron
(#50) Shed: 4,507 m2
Berth length: 270 m
Access road: 7,450.6 m2
 Table 5 continued
TO [Investor(s)] Available berth Facility Cargo handling Cargo type Cargo The number
! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics

capacity handled volume of

(in 1,000 ton) (in 1,000 workers
ton)
Sunkwang Co., Ltd. Berth 5-2 Berth: 50,000 9 3 8,038 Miscellaneous 5,416 96
(97.01.27) Yard: 137,053.3 m2 goods,
(#51 * #53) Berth length: 880 m Automobile
Access road: 25,917 m2
Dongwha Co., Ltd. Berth 6 Berth: 50,000 9 1, 30,000 9 2, 2,828 Miscellaneous 1,748 45
(97.01.27) 20,000 9 1 goods
(#60, #61, #62, Yard: 91,227 m2
#65) Berth length: 950 m
Access road: 19,527 m2
Dongbu express Berth 8-1 Berth: 50,000 9 1.46 2,411 Lumber, 995 35
(99.05.01) Yard: 28,356.2 m2 Miscellaneous
(#80, #81) Shed: 12,150 m2 goods, Iron
Berth length: 400 m
Access road: 1,657.9 m2
Unloader: 2
The 8th Terminal of Incheon Berth 1 Berth: 50,000 9 1, 4,500 9 2 1,478 Lumber, 3,597 Youngjin:63

Integrated terminal operating system

Port Operating Co.Ltd.; (#10,#11, #13) Yard: 23,457 m2 Miscellaneous Korea
Youngjin Enterprise, Co: Berth length: 596 m goods, Iron Express:18
Korea Express Co. Access road: 3,221.8 m2
Berth 8-2 Berth: 50,000 9 1.54 2,411
(97.01.27) Yard: 71,533 m2
(#81,#82) Shed: 3,726 m2
Vol. 19, 3, 428–450

Berth length: 1,020 m

Unloader: 3
Daewoo Heavy Industry Co., Berth 8-3 Berth: 20,000 9 1 682 Miscellaneous 244 16
Ltd. (07.10.01) Yard: 8,462 m2 goods
(#84) Berth length: 120 m
Access road: 209 m2

Data Source: The internal report of the Incheon Port Authority Statistics of Incheon Port in 2014.
439
 Min et al.

Lack of integra!ve 6.3

6.0
efforts 6.5

5.7
Separate facility 5.6
5.8

5.8
Separate equipment 5.8
5.8

5.7
Separate workforce 5.9
5.5

5 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8 6 6.2 6.4 6.6

TO execs Experts Total

Scale: 1 = least concerned, 7 = most concerned

Figure 1: The biggest concerns for TO operations.

or whole of TO resources (e.g., stevedore/dock workers, gantry cranes,

information technology, and finances) and managerial processes (e.g.,
sales/marketing) has received more attention from TO executives and port
administrators. Indeed, both surveyed respondents and the panel of experts
recognized the lack of integrative efforts as the biggest hurdle for TO efficiency.
As shown in Figure 1, they rated the seriousness of a lack of TO integration
highest among potential barriers (its seriousness rating was 6.3 out of 7 – one
being least serious and 7 being most serious). In particular, TO executives rated
its seriousness even higher than their expert counterparts (6.5 vs. 6.0). More
specifically, among TOs, the separate use of their own workforce (which creates
redundancies) was considered more serious than the separate use of their
equipment and facilities (a seriousness rating of 5.9 for non-integrated
workforce vs. 5.8 for equipment and 5.6 for facilities, respectively). In other
words, the TO’s failure to recognize the managerial benefits of TO integration
and the subsequent lack of resource sharing practices seems to be the main
cause of TO operating inefficiency.
In an attempt to boost TO operating efficiency, the Korean government (i.e.,
The Korean Ministry of Land, Transport, and Marine Affairs) started putting
pressures on TOs by penalizing lagging performers, while providing incentives
for high performers (Ahn and Lee, 2014). Pressured by both growing
competition and government policy shifts, TOs have no choice but to change
their business-as usual mentality and embrace an integration strategy (Ahn and
Lee, 2014). The various options of an integration strategy include the following:

440 ! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450
 Integrated terminal operating system

(1) joint berth operations of multiple TOs which share the same berth for their
business activities; (2) joint yard operations through coordination of inbound
and outbound flows of containerized cargoes; (3) joint demand planning, which
encourages TOs to share their demand forecasts and thus improve their sales
forecasting accuracy; (4) sales integration, which encourages TOs to share their
marketing budgets and salesforce, jointly advertising their service capabilities;
(5) joint workforce planning that aims to eliminate duplicate tasks (e.g., multiple
IT managers and salesforces working on the same, routine managerial tasks for
different TOs) and reduce the underutilization of current labor forces. Given the
complexity and variety of aforementioned integration options, integrative efforts
should entail the multiple phases of incremental strategic plans as depicted in
Figure 2. Specific details of these phases are described below.
As shown in Figure 2, the last but most important phase of integrative
procedures is the development of an integrated terminal operating system
(ITOS) which is designed to smooth out the flow of cargo unloading/loading,
discharging, and transfer processes at the port’s operational areas and areas
surrounding the port such as the hinterland. Examples of port operational areas
include (1) an area (e.g., apron) between quay wall and container yard; (2) a
container yard where containers are stacked and stored; and (3) an area
dedicated to landside operations (e.g., gates, parking space, office buildings,
customs offices, container freight stations, and the container/equipment
maintenance and repair space). To better utilize these areas and allow the
uninterrupted flows of cargo movement at the port and across its surrounding
areas, we propose the ITOS. Primarily ITOS aims to not only streamline terminal
operations, but also facilitate terminal integrative efforts through coordinated
information and communication flows. For example, ITOS is designed to
encourage multiple (often competing) TOs to share real-time information about
the availability of yard space and port equipment, for the use of TOs which
urgently need such space and equipment. Our interviews of TO executives
revealed that a lack of integration among TOs often created a situation where
some TOs’ yard space became empty, or cranes were idle, when other TOs
needed additional yard space and cranes for ongoing terminal operations. In the
current unintegrated setting, TOs are not allowed to use each other’s yard space
and equipment, regardless of availability.
With this in mind, as displayed in Figure 3, the proposed ITOS consists of
six modules: (1) berth planning module, which optimizes vessel berthing and
controls vessel traffic to avoid vessel bunching or traffic congestion, and
maximizes the allocation of resources (e.g., gantry cranes, crane operators) on
berth; (2) yard planning module which optimizes yard configuration/layout,
container stacking density, container dwell time in the stacking yard, and
movement of tractor-trailers and other equipment (e.g., reachstackers, forklift
! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450 441
 Min et al.

Phase 1: Determine the Scope of

Integra!on:

(1) Iden!fy overlapped service areas and

service offerings.
(2) Determine specific service offerings to
be integrated.
(3) Select the specific scope of integra!on
among workforce, equipment, and
facili!es.

Phase 2: Select the Integra!on

Target TOs:

(1) Iden!fy the compa!bility of poten!al

integra!on target TOs.
(2) Select the TOs which are willing to
partake in integra!ve efforts.

Phase 3: Assess the Impact of

Integra!on on TO Performances:

(1) Develop the Integrated Terminal

Opera!ng System Framework to
facilitate the integra!ve success.
(2) Develop specific performance metrics
(e.g., KPIs) relevant to TO performances
and then evaluate integrated TO
performances as compared to non-
integrated TO performances.
(3) Solicit feedback from mul!ple TO
stakeholders and then take necessary
correc!ve ac!ons for con!nuous
improvement.

Figure 2: The multi-stage integration of TO activities.

trucks) in the yard; (3) vessel planning module which monitors vessel schedules,
prepares for shipside operations, minimizes load shifts and re-stowage, and
maximizes crane productivity; (4) resource planning module which tracks
container movement on a real-time basis, reduces/eliminates unproductive
container movement and equipment idle/waiting time, minimizes port traffic
congestion (or minimizes the disturbance of tractor-trailer movement), and
optimizes the work assignment (including scheduling) of labor force (e.g., dock
workers) using both mathematical (e.g., mixed-integer programming) and
442 ! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450
 Integrated terminal operating system

Vehicle
Booking Berth Planning
System (VMS) Module

EDI

Vessel Planning
EDI Yard Planning
Module
Module
EDI

Interface Module
Intelligent
Transporta!on Yard
System (ITS) Management
EDI System (YMS)

EDI

Resource Planning Communication

Module Module

Labor
Enterprise Repor!ng Access
Management
Resource Control and
System (LMS)
Planning (ERP) Data Security

Figure 3: Architecture of the integrated terminal operating systems.

simulation models; (5) communication planning module which provides

customs offices and TO customers with all necessary real-time information
about the cargo movement and the status of vessels using the secure
communication media such as electronic data interchange (EDI); (6) interface
module which synchronizes and integrates various planning software that can
support the ITOS such as intelligent transportation systems (ITS), yard
management systems (YMS), labor management systems (LMS) and enterprise
resource planning (ERP) used by TOs.

K ey s u c c e s s f ac t o r s a n d m a n a g er i a l gu i d e l i n e s f o r T O
integration

Since 2009, TOs doing business in the Inner Harbor of the Incheon Port have
suffered from chronic profit losses. Their total estimated loss grew from $5
million in 2009 to $30 million in 2013 and eventually led to the bankruptcy of
! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450 443
 Min et al.

one TO (Chung Myoung) in 2013. One of the leading causes of such losses is a
constant increase in labor costs. In fact, labor costs have gone up at an average
rate of 3 per cent since 2008, and the average (per worker) annual labor cost for
the TOs reached approximately $50,000 in 2013. Ironically, TOs ended up hiring
more workers than needed lost their profits during 2011–2013 with a misguided
expectation that the volume of cargo would increase in the foreseeable future, as
the expanded reconfiguration of two berths (berths 1 and 8) was planned. For
example, in 2013, TOs newly hired a total of 54 workers after losing 10 workers.
In addition to this poor manpower plan, the TOs struggled to cope with a
growing competition from a nearby port (Pyeong-Taeck Port), in the same
province, which recently became fully operational. To stop bleeding from
accumulating deficits and competitive pressures, TOs should identify key
success factors, essential for the improvement of their financial health and
sustained business growth. Some of such factors were revealed in our in-depth
interviews with the expert panel and the survey of TO executives: the
inducement of TOs into integration including mergers and acquisitions
(M&A); development of incentives for TO integration (e.g., 15 per cent discount
for leasing berth areas and tax benefits); ease of internal resistance against
integration (especially M&A); assignment of TOs to berths based on their
performances including their operating efficiency and earned income; enhance-
ment of labor stability and productivity; integration of information and
communication technology (ICT) across TOs; and a change in service offerings
in accordance with a projected decrease in the shipping volume of certain bulk
cargoes such as lumber, coal, steel, and agricultural crops.
Given that the integration of TO is the core of TO success, we asked both the
TO executives and the panel of external experts to suggest which form of
integration would work best for the improvement of TO performances. All five
TO executives and seven out of eight experts believed that total managerial
integration (including M&A and strategic partnership), or at least the sharing of
equipment and facilities, was preferred over the limited sharing of berths or
yard. In particular, both TO executives and experts rated the shared use of
manpower as the most important factor for successful TO integration (5.9 out of
7-point Likert scale, as shown in Figure 4). Also, all five TO executives and six
out of eight experts believed that the reduction of TOs from the current 10
separate companies to two or three integrated TOs was preferable, over the
restructuring of four or five merged TOs with niche service offerings. In other
words, the respondents felt that no more than three TOs in the current market
situation made sense. Other suggestions made by these respondents included as
follows: the gradual phase-by-phase integration of TO operations as opposed to
the instant integration; the encouragement of TO executives who would be
dismissed as a result of M&A, or full integration, to participate in the integrated
444 ! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450
 Integrated terminal operating system

5.0
Sales integra!on 4.0
5.9

5.9
Workforce integra!on 5.3
6.4

5.9
Berth integra!on 5.5
6.3

5.8
Yard integra!on 5.3
6.3

5.4
Equipment integra!on 5.0
5.5

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

TO execs Experts Total

Scale: 1 = least important, 7 = most important

Figure 4: Resources that should be integrated first.

TO as its shareholders; the use of guarantees or the arrangement of alternative

job opportunities for laid-off workers as a result of integration.
More importantly, all of the respondents recognized the importance of
periodic performance reviews for the continuous improvement of TO operating
efficiency. For such reviews, we propose the use of systematic scoring methods,
such as the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), designed to organize decision
objectives, performance criteria, and decision alternatives into a hierarchy and
then synthesize the aggregated performance scores using pairwise comparisons
(Saaty, 1990). As specific performance criteria for measuring TO operating
efficiency, the respondents identified five criteria: (1) unloading productivity per
hour (=annual total volume of cargoes unloaded at the berth/annual total hours
of berthing time); (2) a percentage of reduction in average berthing time per
vessel [=(annual total hours of berthing time in the current year/annual total
hours of berthing time in a previous year) 9 100]; (3) cargo inventory
occupancy ratio (=average inventory level for each cargo/size of the total
storage area set aside for each type of cargo); (4) weighted cargo turnover
ratio = [(weight assigned to each cargo 9 annual total volume of cargoes
handled by each TO)/total cargo handling capacity of each TO] 9 100]; and (5)
cargo handling efficiency per berthing time [= (annual total volume of cargoes
handled by each TO 9 weight assigned to each type of cargo)/annual total
hours of berthing time]. When asked to make pairwise comparisons of these
criteria with respect to their relative importance, unloading productivity per
hour was considered most important (with an AHP priority score of 0.390) as
shown in Figure 5. This was followed by cargo inventory occupancy ratio (with
! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450 445
 Min et al.

0.390
0
0.400 40

0.255
0.300 0
30

0.200
20
0 0.125 0.122 0.108

0.100 0
10

0
un

ca

ca

re
eig

du
rg

rg
lo
ad

oh

c!
ht
in

ed

on
in

an
ve
g

ca

in
dl
nt
pr

in
rg

av
or
od

g
ot
yo

er
uc

effi

ag
ur
!v

cc

cie
no

eb
up
ity

nc
ve
an

er
pe

y
rr

th
cy
rh

a!

in
ra
ou

g
o
!o

pe
r

r ve
sse
l
Priority score

Priority score: 0 = least important, 1.00 = most important

Figure 5: Priority scores (relative importance) of TO efficiency measures.

a priority score of 0.255). In terms of relative importance ratings, a weighted

cargo turnover ratio received a priority score of 0.125 and cargo handling
efficiency had a priority score of 0.122, while a percentage of reduction in
average berthing time per vessel registered the lowest priority score of 0.108.
To develop a holistic Performance Management System (MPS), we
categorize the aforementioned performance criteria and other key performance
indicators (KPIs) within the framework of a balanced scorecard (BSC) originally
proposed by Kaplan and Norton (1992). As displayed in Figure 6, the chosen
KPIs are divided into four categories: (1) stakeholder; (2) internal; (3) innovative
and learning; and (4) financial perspectives. Since most of these indicators are
quantifiable and repeatable over time, they are considered proper performance
metrics for evaluating the dynamic (multiple-period) performance of TOs.
However, one of the biggest challenges for incorporating these indicators into a
Performance Management System (PMS) is the difficulty involved in tracing and
collecting timely and accurate performance data. To identify and then properly

446 ! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450
 Stakeholder Perspective
Goals Key Measures
! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics

Regional Number of jobs saved by the

economic improved financial health of
development TOs
TO TO value added as % of the
competitiveness regional GDP
Sustainability Number of environmental
accidents in the inner harbor

Internal Perspective Innovation and Learning Perspective

Goals Key Measures Goals Key Measures

Process Number of redundant
Cost reduction Life cycle cost of managing
innovation procedures eliminated via TO
Quick response TO assets and workforce
R&D capability integration
Safety Unloading productivity
Inter- The total amount of shared R
Cargo turnover ratio
organizational &D investment between
Cargo inventory occupancy
learning integrated TOs
ratio
The degree of management
Cargo handling efficiency
knowledge and expertise
Frequency of safety violations

Integrated terminal operating system

sharing among integrated TOs

Financial Perspective
Goals Key Measures
TO revenue Volume of cargo handled by
Vol. 19, 3, 428–450

growth TOs
Improved Profitability of TO in the
profitability assigned berth
Higher return on Return on TO assets (e.g.,
investment equipment and facilities)
Asset turnover of the TO

Figure 6: Key TO performance indicators within a balanced scorecard framework.

447
 Min et al.

collect target data, we develop a basic BSC framework of the proposed PMS
depicted in Figure 6.

C o nc l u di n g r e ma r ks an d f u t u r e r e s e a r c h d i r ec t i o n s

Since ocean and land traffic converges at a seaport, the latter has become the
most critical intermodal link between maritime and surface transportation. As
such, deficiencies at the seaport could disrupt the smooth flow of cargo transfers
between different modes of transportation and thus undermine supply chain
efficiency. Although conscientious efforts have been made to prevent port
deficiencies, the continuous improvement of port efficiency still remains an
onerous task due in part to little flexibility associated with fixed port
infrastructure. Such infrastructure includes terminals where cargo is assembled,
stored, and distributed, while a variety of value-adding logistics activities (e.g.,
customs clearance, container staging, cargo tracking, on-site repair services) are
performed. Despite the usefulness of terminals for productive port operations,
they can be a major cost driver because the development and maintenance of
terminal sites and equipment require substantial financial resources and time
commitments with unforeseen risks. Thus, once unwise terminal operating
decisions, such as the fragmentation of TO operations in the crowded TO
market, are made, it would have a long-lasting adverse impact on the TO’s
bottom-line. For example, the TOs serving the Incheon Inner harbor have
suffered from such decisions in the last few years, as evidenced by their
declining revenue, underutilization of terminal equipment and workforce, and
chronic budget deficits which have led some TOs to the brink of bankruptcy.
As a viable solution to these problems, we propose an integrated terminal
operating system (ITOS) that aims to increase the opportunities for cost savings,
resource sharing, information sharing, risk sharing, organizational learning, and
unified management. Given a lack of understanding of ITOS roles in TO
integration and the absence of assessment tools for TO integration strategy, this
paper develops a conceptual framework and action plans for systematically
building ITOS, while introducing key performance indicators (KPIs) with
specific formulas through both descriptive and exploratory case studies of 10
TOs at the Incheon Port in Korea. Based on the lessons learned from these
studies, we recommend the following guidelines.

• To encourage and facilitate TO integration, meaningful incentives such as tax

benefits should be provided for TOs which still have not been convinced that
TO integration would bring significant financial benefits;

448 ! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450
 Integrated terminal operating system

• Given the increasing financial burden associated with surplus workforce,

workforce sharing should be a priority over the sharing of facilities and
equipment;
• TO integration should encompass the synchronization and coordination of
inter- or intra-organizational information and communication flows via ITOS
to increase the visibility of TO operations and then improve TO demand
planning (e.g., demand forecasts of transit, storage, marshaling, loading and
unloading of cargoes at the Incheon Inner Harbor; investigation of ship-
per/carrier behavior or preferences for terminal-related services);
• A gradual integration of TOs is recommended, as opposed to an instant
integration, because the latter is likely to create more confusion and resistance
from some stakeholders such as displaced labor.
• To monitor the progress of the TO integration initiatives and then keep these
initiatives on the right track, a relevant performance management system
(PMS) reflecting the interests of multiple stakeholders should be established.
That is to say, a PMS simply based on the traditional financial measures is not
sufficient for the periodic monitoring of TO integrative efforts. The multi-
dimensional balanced scorecard seems to be a better option.

As summarized above, this paper is one of the first to tackle TO integration

issues, as a way to improve TO operating efficiency and competitiveness, while
developing practical guidelines that can allow success to TO integrative efforts.
In future related studies, this paper can be further strengthened with the
inclusion of other seaport terminal operators throughout the world and then
compare and contrast the performances of TOs with the different levels of
integration using alternative evaluation methods such as data envelopment
analysis (DEA).

R e f e r e n c es

Ahn, S.B. and Lee, H.S. (2014) The Status of Incheon Inner Harbor: The Integration Strategy of
Terminal Operating Companies. Unpublished Internal Report, Incheon, Korea: Incheon
Graduate School of Northeast Asia Logistics.
Bichou, K., and M.G. Bell. (2007) Internationalisation and consolidation of the container port
industry: Assessment of channel structure and relationships. Maritime Economics & Logistics 9
(1): 35–51.
Chiu, R.H., C.W. Wong, T.C. Lirn, and K.C. Shang. (2015) Determinants of strategic collaborations
in container terminal operations. International Journal of Shipping and Transport Logistics 7
(2): 156–173.
De Langen, P.W., and A. Chouly. (2009) Strategies of terminal operating companies in changing
environments. International Journal of Logistics: Research and Applications 12 (6): 423–434.

! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450 449
 Min et al.

Federal Maritime Commission (2016) Maritime terminal operators. http://www.fmc.gov/

resources/marine_terminal_operators.aspx, retrieved on January 6, 2016.
Franc, P., and M. Van der Horst. (2010) Understanding hinterland service integration by shipping
lines and terminal operators: A theoretical and empirical analysis. Journal of Transport
Geography 18 (4): 557–566.
Gerring, J. (2007) Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Heaver, T., H. Meersman, and E. Van De Voorde. (2001) Co-operation and competition in
international container transport: Strategies for ports. Maritime Policy & Management 28 (3):
293–305.
Kaplan, R.S., and D.P. Norton. (1992) Balanced scorecard—Measures that drives performance.
Harvard Business Review 70 (1): 71–79.
Lee, H.L. (2013) Incheon port expanding to accommodate bigger box ships. Sea Trade
Communication, November 14, http://www.seatrade-global.com/news/asia/incheon-port-
expanding-to-accommodate-bigger-boxships.html, retrieved on April 15, 2015.
Lee, C.Y., and Q. Meng. (2014) Handbook of Ocean Container Transport Logistics: Making Global
Supply Chains Effective. New York: Springer.
Notteboom, T.E. (2002) Consolidation and contestability in the European container handling
industry. Maritime Policy & Management 29 (3): 257–269.
Oskin, B. (2014) Ship traffic increases dramatically, to oceans’ detriment. Live Science, November
18, http://www.livescience.com/48788-ocean-shipping-big-increase-satellites.html, retrieved
on April 15, 2015.
Ren, D. (2011) Expansion at Yangshan port to begin. South China Morning Post, http://gochina.
scmp.com/shanghai/news/expansion-yangshan-port-begin, retrieved on July 28, 2012.
Saaty, T.L. (1990) How to make a decision: The analytic hierarchy process. European Journal of
Operational Research 48 (1): 9–26.
Selfin, Y. and Hope, D. (2011) Future of World Trade: Top 25 Sea and Air Freight Routes in 2030.
Unpublished Report, PricewaterhouseCoopers: London, United Kingdom.
Slack, B., and A. Frémont. (2005) Transformation of port terminal operations: From the local to
the global. Transport Reviews 25 (1): 117–130.
Song, D.W. (2002) Regional container port competition and co-operation: The case of Hong Kong
and South China. Journal of Transport Geography 10 (2): 99–110.
Van der Horst, M.R., and P.W. De Langen. (2008) Coordination in hinterland transport chains: A
major challenge for the seaport community. Maritime Economics & Logistics 10 (1–2): 108–129.
Yin, R.K. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications Inc.
Yoon, J., H.Y. Lee, and J. Dinwoodie. (2015) Competitiveness of container terminal operating
companies in South Korea and the industry–university–government network. Transportation
Research Part A: Policy and Practice 80: 1–14.

450 ! 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 19, 3, 428–450
 Reproduced with permission of copyright owner.
Further reproduction prohibited without permission.