Signals intelligence

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence-gathering by

interception of signals, whether communications between people
(communications intelligence—abbreviated to COMINT) or from
electronic signals not directly used in communication (electronic
intelligence—abbreviated to ELINT).[1] Signals intelligence is a
subset of intelligence collection management. As classified and
sensitive information is usually encrypted, signals intelligence in
turn involves the use of cryptanalysis to decipher the messages.
Traffic analysis—the study of who is signaling whom and in what
quantity—is also used to integrate information again. RAF Menwith Hill, a large site in the
United Kingdom, part of ECHELON
History and the UKUSA Agreement, 2005

Origins

Electronic interceptions appeared as early as 1900, during the Boer

War of 1899–1902. The British Royal Navy had installed wireless
sets produced by Marconi on board their ships in the late 1890s,
and the British Army used some limited wireless signalling. The
Boers captured some wireless sets and used them to make vital
transmissions.[2] Since the British were the only people transmitting
at the time, no special interpretation of the signals that were A German message intercepted by
intercepted by the British was necessary.[3] the British during World War II,
signaling Germany's unconditional
The birth of signals intelligence in a modern sense dates from the surrender
Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. As the Russian fleet prepared
for conflict with Japan in 1904, the British ship HMS Diana
stationed in the Suez Canal intercepted Russian naval wireless signals being sent out for the mobilization of
the fleet, for the first time in history.[4]

Development in World War I

Over the course of the First World War, the new method of signals intelligence reached maturity.[5] Failure
to properly protect its communications fatally compromised the Russian Army in its advance early in World
War I and led to their disastrous defeat by the Germans under Ludendorff and Hindenburg at the Battle of
Tannenberg. In 1918, French intercept personnel captured a message written in the new ADFGVX cipher,
which was cryptanalyzed by Georges Painvin. This gave the Allies advance warning of the German 1918
Spring Offensive.

The British in particular built up great expertise in the newly emerging field of signals intelligence and
codebreaking (synonymous with cryptanalysis). On the declaration of war, Britain cut all German undersea
cables.[6] This forced the Germans to use either a telegraph line that connected through the British network
and could be tapped, or through radio which the British could then intercept.[7] Rear Admiral Henry Oliver
appointed Sir Alfred Ewing to establish an interception and
decryption service at the Admiralty; Room 40.[7] An interception
service known as 'Y' service, together with the post office and
Marconi stations, grew rapidly to the point where the British could
intercept almost all official German messages.[7]

The German fleet was in the habit each day of wirelessing the exact
position of each ship and giving regular position reports when at
sea. It was possible to build up a precise picture of the normal
operation of the High Seas Fleet, to infer from the routes they chose
where defensive minefields had been placed and where it was safe
for ships to operate. Whenever a change to the normal pattern was
seen, it immediately signalled that some operation was about to take
place and a warning could be given. Detailed information about
submarine movements was also available.[7]

The use of radio-receiving equipment to pinpoint the location of the

transmitter was also developed during the war. Captain H.J. Round,
working for Marconi, began carrying out experiments with
direction-finding radio equipment for the army in France in 1915.
By May 1915, the Admiralty was able to track German submarines
crossing the North Sea. Some of these stations also acted as 'Y'
stations to collect German messages, but a new section was created
within Room 40 to plot the positions of ships from the directional
reports.[7]
Zimmermann Telegram, as decoded
Room 40 played an important role in several naval engagements by Room 40 in 1917.
during the war, notably in detecting major German sorties into the
North Sea. The battle of Dogger Bank was won in no small part
due to the intercepts that allowed the Navy to position its ships in the right place.[8] It played a vital role in
subsequent naval clashes, including at the Battle of Jutland as the British fleet was sent out to intercept
them. The direction-finding capability allowed for the tracking and location of German ships, submarines,
and Zeppelins. The system was so successful that by the end of the war, over 80 million words, comprising
the totality of German wireless transmission over the course of the war, had been intercepted by the
operators of the Y-stations and decrypted.[9] However, its most astonishing success was in decrypting the
Zimmermann Telegram, a telegram from the German Foreign Office sent via Washington to its ambassador
Heinrich von Eckardt in Mexico.

Postwar consolidation

With the importance of interception and decryption firmly established by the wartime experience, countries
established permanent agencies dedicated to this task in the interwar period. In 1919, the British Cabinet's
Secret Service Committee, chaired by Lord Curzon, recommended that a peace-time codebreaking agency
should be created.[10] The Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) was the first peace-time
codebreaking agency, with a public function "to advise as to the security of codes and cyphers used by all
Government departments and to assist in their provision", but also with a secret directive to "study the
methods of cypher communications used by foreign powers".[11] GC&CS officially formed on 1
November 1919, and produced its first decrypt on 19 October.[10][12] By 1940, GC&CS was working on
the diplomatic codes and ciphers of 26 countries, tackling over 150 diplomatic cryptosystems.[13]
The US Cipher Bureau was established in 1919 and achieved some success at the Washington Naval
Conference in 1921, through cryptanalysis by Herbert Yardley. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson closed
the US Cipher Bureau in 1929 with the words "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."

World War II

The use of SIGINT had even greater implications during World

War II. The combined effort of intercepts and cryptanalysis for the
whole of the British forces in World War II came under the code
name "Ultra", managed from Government Code and Cypher
School at Bletchley Park. Properly used, the German Enigma and
Lorenz ciphers should have been virtually unbreakable, but flaws in
German cryptographic procedures, and poor discipline among the
A Mark 2 Colossus computer. The
personnel carrying them out, created vulnerabilities which made
Bletchley's attacks feasible.
ten Colossi were the world's first
programmable electronic computers,
Bletchley's work was essential to defeating the U-boats in the Battle
and were built to break the German
of the Atlantic, and to the British naval victories in the Battle of
codes.
Cape Matapan and the Battle of North Cape. In 1941, Ultra exerted
a powerful effect on the North African desert campaign against
German forces under General Erwin Rommel. General Sir Claude Auchinleck wrote that were it not for
Ultra, "Rommel would have certainly got through to Cairo". Ultra decrypts featured prominently in the
story of Operation SALAM, László Almásy's mission across the desert behind Allied lines in 1942.[14]
Prior to the Normandy landings on D-Day in June 1944, the Allies knew the locations of all but two of
Germany's fifty-eight Western Front divisions.

Winston Churchill was reported to have told King George VI: "It is thanks to the secret weapon of General
Menzies, put into use on all the fronts, that we won the war!" Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, at the end of the war, described Ultra as having been "decisive" to Allied victory.[15] Official
historian of British Intelligence in World War II Sir Harry Hinsley argued that Ultra shortened the war "by
not less than two years and probably by four years"; and that, in the absence of Ultra, it is uncertain how
the war would have ended.[16]

Technical definitions
The United States Department of Defense has defined the term
"signals intelligence" as:

1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually

Unit 8200 (the SIGINT unit of the
or in combination all communications intelligence
Israeli Intelligence Corps) base on
(COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and foreign
instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT), however Mount Avital, Golan Heights
transmitted.
2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic,
and foreign instrumentation signals.[17]
Being a broad field, SIGINT has many sub-disciplines. The two
main ones are communications intelligence (COMINT) and
electronic intelligence (ELINT).

Disciplines shared across the branches

Targeting
A52 Oste, an Oste class ELINT
A collection system has to know to look for a particular signal.
(Electronic signals intelligence) and
"System", in this context, has several nuances. Targeting is the
reconnaissance ship, of the German
process of developing collection requirements:
Navy
"1. An intelligence need considered in the allocation of
intelligence resources. Within the Department of
Defense, these collection requirements fulfill the
essential elements of information and other
intelligence needs of a commander, or an agency.
"2. An established intelligence need, validated against
the appropriate allocation of intelligence resources (as
a requirement) to fulfill the essential elements of
information and other intelligence needs of an Satellite ground station of the Dutch
intelligence consumer."[17] Nationale SIGINT Organisatie (NSO)
(2012)

Need for multiple, coordinated receivers

First, atmospheric conditions, sunspots, the target's transmission schedule and antenna characteristics, and
other factors create uncertainty that a given signal intercept sensor will be able to "hear" the signal of
interest, even with a geographically fixed target and an opponent making no attempt to evade interception.
Basic countermeasures against interception include frequent changing of radio frequency, polarization, and
other transmission characteristics. An intercept aircraft could not get off the ground if it had to carry
antennas and receivers for every possible frequency and signal type to deal with such countermeasures.

Second, locating the transmitter's position is usually part of SIGINT. Triangulation and more sophisticated
radio location techniques, such as time of arrival methods, require multiple receiving points at different
locations. These receivers send location-relevant information to a central point, or perhaps to a distributed
system in which all participate, such that the information can be correlated and a location computed.

Intercept management

Modern SIGINT systems, therefore, have substantial communications among intercept platforms. Even if
some platforms are clandestine, there is still a broadcast of information telling them where and how to look
for signals.[18] A United States targeting system under development in the late 1990s, PSTS, constantly
sends out information that helps the interceptors properly aim their antennas and tune their receivers. Larger
intercept aircraft, such as the EP-3 or RC-135, have the on-board capability to do some target analysis and
planning, but others, such as the RC-12 GUARDRAIL, are completely under ground direction.
GUARDRAIL aircraft are fairly small and usually work in units of three to cover a tactical SIGINT
requirement, whereas the larger aircraft tend to be assigned strategic/national missions.
Before the detailed process of targeting begins, someone has to decide there is a value in collecting
information about something. While it would be possible to direct signals intelligence collection at a major
sports event, the systems would capture a great deal of noise, news signals, and perhaps announcements in
the stadium. If, however, an anti-terrorist organization believed that a small group would be trying to
coordinate their efforts using short-range unlicensed radios at the event, SIGINT targeting of radios of that
type would be reasonable. Targeting would not know where in the stadium the radios might be located or
the exact frequency they are using; those are the functions of subsequent steps such as signal detection and
direction finding.

Once the decision to target is made, the various interception points need to cooperate, since resources are
limited.

Knowing what interception equipment to use becomes easier when a target country buys its radars and
radios from known manufacturers, or is given them as military aid. National intelligence services keep
libraries of devices manufactured by their own country and others, and then use a variety of techniques to
learn what equipment is acquired by a given country.

Knowledge of physics and electronic engineering further narrows the problem of what types of equipment
might be in use. An intelligence aircraft flying well outside the borders of another country will listen for
long-range search radars, not short-range fire control radars that would be used by a mobile air defense.
Soldiers scouting the front lines of another army know that the other side will be using radios that must be
portable and not have huge antennas.

Signal detection

Even if a signal is human communications (e.g., a radio), the intelligence collection specialists have to
know it exists. If the targeting function described above learns that a country has a radar that operates in a
certain frequency range, the first step is to use a sensitive receiver, with one or more antennas that listen in
every direction, to find an area where such a radar is operating. Once the radar is known to be in the area,
the next step is to find its location.

If operators know the probable frequencies of transmissions of

interest, they may use a set of receivers, preset to the frequencies of
interest. These are the frequency (horizontal axis) versus power
(vertical axis) produced at the transmitter, before any filtering of
signals that do not add to the information being transmitted.
Received energy on a particular frequency may start a recorder, and
alert a human to listen to the signals if they are intelligible (i.e.,
COMINT). If the frequency is not known, the operators may look Simplified spectrum analyzer display
for power on primary or sideband frequencies using a spectrum of superheterodyned, amplitude
modulated signals.
analyzer. Information from the spectrum analyzer is then used to
tune receivers to signals of interest. For example, in this simplified
spectrum, the actual information is at 800 kHz and 1.2 MHz.

Real-world transmitters and receivers usually are directional. In the figure to the left, assume that each
display is connected to a spectrum analyzer connected to a directional antenna aimed in the indicated
direction.

Countermeasures to interception
 Spread-spectrum communications is an electronic counter-
countermeasures (ECCM) technique to defeat looking for particular
frequencies. Spectrum analysis can be used in a different ECCM
way to identify frequencies not being jammed or not in use.

Direction-finding
Hypothetical displays from four
spectrum analyzers connected to The earliest, and still common, means of direction finding is to use
directional antennas. The transmitter directional antennas as goniometers, so that a line can be drawn
is at bearing 090 degrees. from the receiver through the position of the signal of interest. (See
HF/DF.) Knowing the compass bearing, from a single point, to the
transmitter does not locate it. Where the bearings from multiple
points, using goniometry, are plotted on a map, the transmitter will be located at the point where the
bearings intersect. This is the simplest case; a target may try to confuse listeners by having multiple
transmitters, giving the same signal from different locations, switching on and off in a pattern known to
their user but apparently random to the listener.

Individual directional antennas have to be manually or automatically turned to find the signal direction,
which may be too slow when the signal is of short duration. One alternative is the Wullenweber array
technique. In this method, several concentric rings of antenna elements simultaneously receive the signal, so
that the best bearing will ideally be clearly on a single antenna or a small set. Wullenweber arrays for high-
frequency signals are enormous, referred to as "elephant cages" by their users.

An alternative to tunable directional antennas or large omnidirectional arrays such as the Wullenweber is to
measure the time of arrival of the signal at multiple points, using GPS or a similar method to have precise
time synchronization. Receivers can be on ground stations, ships, aircraft, or satellites, giving great
flexibility.

Modern anti-radiation missiles can home in on and attack transmitters; military antennas are rarely a safe
distance from the user of the transmitter.

Traffic analysis

When locations are known, usage patterns may emerge, from which inferences may be drawn. Traffic
analysis is the discipline of drawing patterns from information flow among a set of senders and receivers,
whether those senders and receivers are designated by location determined through direction finding, by
addressee and sender identifications in the message, or even MASINT techniques for "fingerprinting"
transmitters or operators. Message content other than the sender and receiver is not necessary to do traffic
analysis, although more information can be helpful.

For example, if a certain type of radio is known to be used only by tank units, even if the position is not
precisely determined by direction finding, it may be assumed that a tank unit is in the general area of the
signal. The owner of the transmitter can assume someone is listening, so might set up tank radios in an area
where he wants the other side to believe he has actual tanks. As part of Operation Quicksilver, part of the
deception plan for the invasion of Europe at the Battle of Normandy, radio transmissions simulated the
headquarters and subordinate units of the fictitious First United States Army Group (FUSAG), commanded
by George S. Patton, to make the German defense think that the main invasion was to come at another
location. In like manner, fake radio transmissions from Japanese aircraft carriers, before the Battle of Pearl
Harbor, were made from Japanese local waters, while the attacking ships moved under strict radio silence.
Traffic analysis need not focus on human communications. For example, if the sequence of a radar signal,
followed by an exchange of targeting data and a confirmation, followed by observation of artillery fire, this
may identify an automated counterbattery system. A radio signal that triggers navigational beacons could be
a landing aid system for an airstrip or helicopter pad that is intended to be low-profile.

Patterns do emerge. Knowing a radio signal, with certain characteristics, originating from a fixed
headquarters may be strongly suggestive that a particular unit will soon move out of its regular base. The
contents of the message need not be known to infer the movement.

There is an art as well as science of traffic analysis. Expert analysts develop a sense for what is real and
what is deceptive. Harry Kidder,[19] for example, was one of the star cryptanalysts of World War II, a star
hidden behind the secret curtain of SIGINT.[20]

Electronic order of battle

Generating an electronic order of battle (EOB) requires identifying SIGINT emitters in an area of interest,
determining their geographic location or range of mobility, characterizing their signals, and, where possible,
determining their role in the broader organizational order of battle. EOB covers both COMINT and
ELINT.[21] The Defense Intelligence Agency maintains an EOB by location. The Joint Spectrum Center
(JSC) of the Defense Information Systems Agency supplements this location database with five more
technical databases:

1. FRRS: Frequency Resource Record System

2. BEI: Background Environment Information
3. SCS: Spectrum Certification System
4. EC/S: Equipment Characteristics/Space
5. TACDB: platform lists, sorted by nomenclature, which contain links to the C-E
equipment complement of each platform, with links to the parametric data for each
piece of equipment, military unit lists and their subordinate units with equipment used
by each unit.

For example, several voice transmitters might be identified as the

command net (i.e., top commander and direct reports) in a tank
battalion or tank-heavy task force. Another set of transmitters might
identify the logistic net for that same unit. An inventory of ELINT
sources might identify the medium- and long-range counter-artillery
radars in a given area.

Signals intelligence units will identify changes in the EOB, which

might indicate enemy unit movement, changes in command
relationships, and increases or decreases in capability.

Using the COMINT gathering method enables the intelligence

officer to produce an electronic order of battle by traffic analysis
and content analysis among several enemy units. For example, if EOB and related data flow
the following messages were intercepted:

1. U1 to U2, requesting permission to proceed to checkpoint X.

2. U2 to U1, approved. please report at arrival.
3. (20 minutes later) U1 to U2, all vehicles have arrived to checkpoint X.
This sequence shows that there are two units in the battlefield, unit 1 is mobile, while unit 2 is in a higher
hierarchical level, perhaps a command post. One can also understand that unit 1 moved from one point to
another which are distant from each 20 minutes with a vehicle. If these are regular reports over a period of
time, they might reveal a patrol pattern. Direction-finding and radio frequency MASINT could help
confirm that the traffic is not deception.

The EOB buildup process is divided as following:

Signal separation
Measurements optimization
Data fusion
Networks build-up

Separation of the intercepted spectrum and the signals intercepted from each sensor must take place in an
extremely small period of time, in order to separate the different signals to different transmitters in the
battlefield. The complexity of the separation process depends on the complexity of the transmission
methods (e.g., hopping or time-division multiple access (TDMA)).

By gathering and clustering data from each sensor, the measurements of the direction of signals can be
optimized and get much more accurate than the basic measurements of a standard direction finding
sensor.[22] By calculating larger samples of the sensor's output data in near real-time, together with
historical information of signals, better results are achieved.

Data fusion correlates data samples from different frequencies from the same sensor, "same" being
confirmed by direction finding or radiofrequency MASINT. If an emitter is mobile, direction finding, other
than discovering a repetitive pattern of movement, is of limited value in determining if a sensor is unique.
MASINT then becomes more informative, as individual transmitters and antennas may have unique side
lobes, unintentional radiation, pulse timing, etc.

Network build-up, or analysis of emitters (communication transmitters) in a target region over a sufficient
period of time, enables creation of the communications flows of a battlefield.[23]

Communications intelligence
COMINT (communications intelligence) is a sub-category of signals intelligence that engages in dealing
with messages or voice information derived from the interception of foreign communications. COMINT is
commonly referred to as SIGINT, which can cause confusion when talking about the broader intelligence
disciplines. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff defines it as "Technical information and intelligence derived from
foreign communications by other than the intended recipients".[17]

COMINT, which is defined to be communications among people, will reveal some or all of the following:

1. Who is transmitting
2. Where they are located, and, if the transmitter is moving, the report may give a plot of the
signal against location
3. If known, the organizational function of the transmitter
4. The time and duration of transmission, and the schedule if it is a periodic transmission
5. The frequencies and other technical characteristics of their transmission
6. If the transmission is encrypted or not, and if it can be decrypted. If it is possible to intercept
either an originally transmitted cleartext or obtain it through cryptanalysis, the language of
the communication and a translation (when needed).
 7. The addresses, if the signal is not a general broadcast and if addresses are retrievable from
the message. These stations may also be COMINT (e.g., a confirmation of the message or a
response message), ELINT (e.g., a navigation beacon being activated) or both. Rather than,
or in addition to, an address or other identifier, there may be information on the location and
signal characteristics of the responder.

Voice interception

A basic COMINT technique is to listen for voice communications, usually over radio but possibly
"leaking" from telephones or from wiretaps. If the voice communications are encrypted, traffic analysis
may still give information.

In the Second World War, for security the United States used Native American volunteer communicators
known as code talkers, who used languages such as Navajo, Comanche and Choctaw, which would be
understood by few people, even in the U.S. Even within these uncommon languages, the code talkers used
specialized codes, so a "butterfly" might be a specific Japanese aircraft. British forces made limited use of
Welsh speakers for the same reason.

While modern electronic encryption does away with the need for armies to use obscure languages, it is
likely that some groups might use rare dialects that few outside their ethnic group would understand.

Text interception

Morse code interception was once very important, but Morse code telegraphy is now obsolete in the
western world, although possibly used by special operations forces. Such forces, however, now have
portable cryptographic equipment.

Specialists scan radio frequencies for character sequences (e.g., electronic mail) and fax.

Signaling channel interception

A given digital communications link can carry thousands or millions of voice communications, especially in
developed countries. Without addressing the legality of such actions, the problem of identifying which
channel contains which conversation becomes much simpler when the first thing intercepted is the
signaling channel that carries information to set up telephone calls. In civilian and many military use, this
channel will carry messages in Signaling System 7 protocols.

Retrospective analysis of telephone calls can be made from Call detail record (CDR) used for billing the
calls.

Monitoring friendly communications

More a part of communications security than true intelligence collection, SIGINT units still may have the
responsibility of monitoring one's own communications or other electronic emissions, to avoid providing
intelligence to the enemy. For example, a security monitor may hear an individual transmitting inappropriate
information over an unencrypted radio network, or simply one that is not authorized for the type of
information being given. If immediately calling attention to the violation would not create an even greater
security risk, the monitor will call out one of the BEADWINDOW codes[24] used by Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other nations working under their procedures.
Standard BEADWINDOW codes (e.g., "BEADWINDOW 2") include:

1. Position: (e.g., disclosing, in an insecure or inappropriate way), "Friendly or enemy position,

movement or intended movement, position, course, speed, altitude or destination or any air,
sea or ground element, unit or force."
2. Capabilities: "Friendly or enemy capabilities or limitations. Force compositions or
significant casualties to special equipment, weapons systems, sensors, units or personnel.
Percentages of fuel or ammunition remaining."
3. Operations: "Friendly or enemy operation – intentions progress, or results. Operational or
logistic intentions; mission participants flying programmes; mission situation reports; results
of friendly or enemy operations; assault objectives."
4. Electronic warfare (EW): "Friendly or enemy electronic warfare (EW) or emanations control
(EMCON) intentions, progress, or results. Intention to employ electronic countermeasures
(ECM); results of friendly or enemy ECM; ECM objectives; results of friendly or enemy
electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM); results of electronic support measures/tactical
SIGINT (ESM); present or intended EMCON policy; equipment affected by EMCON policy."
5. Friendly or enemy key personnel: "Movement or identity of friendly or enemy officers,
visitors, commanders; movement of key maintenance personnel indicating equipment
limitations."
6. Communications security (COMSEC): "Friendly or enemy COMSEC breaches. Linkage of
codes or codewords with plain language; compromise of changing frequencies or linkage
with line number/circuit designators; linkage of changing call signs with previous call signs
or units; compromise of encrypted/classified call signs; incorrect authentication procedure."
7. Wrong circuit: "Inappropriate transmission. Information requested, transmitted or about to
be transmitted which should not be passed on the subject circuit because it either requires
greater security protection or it is not appropriate to the purpose for which the circuit is
provided."
8. Other codes as appropriate for the situation may be defined by the commander.

In WWII, for example, the Japanese Navy, by poor practice, identified a key person's movement over a
low-security cryptosystem. This made possible Operation Vengeance, the interception and death of the
Combined Fleet commander, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.

Electronic signals intelligence

Electronic signals intelligence (ELINT) refers to intelligence-gathering by use of electronic sensors. Its
primary focus lies on non-communications signals intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff define it as
"Technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic
radiations emanating from sources other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources."[17]

Signal identification is performed by analyzing the collected parameters of a specific signal, and either
matching it to known criteria, or recording it as a possible new emitter. ELINT data are usually highly
classified, and are protected as such.

The data gathered are typically pertinent to the electronics of an opponent's defense network, especially the
electronic parts such as radars, surface-to-air missile systems, aircraft, etc. ELINT can be used to detect
ships and aircraft by their radar and other electromagnetic radiation; commanders have to make choices
between not using radar (EMCON), intermittently using it, or using it and expecting to avoid defenses.
ELINT can be collected from ground stations near the opponent's territory, ships off their coast, aircraft
near or in their airspace, or by satellite.

Complementary relationship to COMINT

Combining other sources of information and ELINT allows traffic analysis to be performed on electronic
emissions which contain human encoded messages. The method of analysis differs from SIGINT in that
any human encoded message which is in the electronic transmission is not analyzed during ELINT. What is
of interest is the type of electronic transmission and its location. For example, during the Battle of the
Atlantic in World War II, Ultra COMINT was not always available because Bletchley Park was not always
able to read the U-boat Enigma traffic. But high-frequency direction finding ("huff-duff") was still able to
detect U-boats by analysis of radio transmissions and the positions through triangulation from the direction
located by two or more huff-duff systems. The Admiralty was able to use this information to plot courses
which took convoys away from high concentrations of U-boats.

Other ELINT disciplines include intercepting and analyzing enemy weapons control signals, or the
identification, friend or foe responses from transponders in aircraft used to distinguish enemy craft from
friendly ones.

Role in air warfare

A very common area of ELINT is intercepting radars and learning their locations and operating procedures.
Attacking forces may be able to avoid the coverage of certain radars, or, knowing their characteristics,
electronic warfare units may jam radars or send them deceptive signals. Confusing a radar electronically is
called a "soft kill", but military units will also send specialized missiles at radars, or bomb them, to get a
"hard kill". Some modern air-to-air missiles also have radar homing guidance systems, particularly for use
against large airborne radars.

Knowing where each surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system is and its type means that air
raids can be plotted to avoid the most heavily defended areas and to fly on a flight profile which will give
the aircraft the best chance of evading ground fire and fighter patrols. It also allows for the jamming or
spoofing of the enemy's defense network (see electronic warfare). Good electronic intelligence can be very
important to stealth operations; stealth aircraft are not totally undetectable and need to know which areas to
avoid. Similarly, conventional aircraft need to know where fixed or semi-mobile air defense systems are so
that they can shut them down or fly around them.

ELINT and ESM

Electronic support measures (ESM) or electronic surveillance measures are ELINT techniques using
various electronic surveillance systems, but the term is used in the specific context of tactical warfare. ESM
give the information needed for electronic attack (EA) such as jamming, or directional bearings (compass
angle) to a target in signals intercept such as in the huff-duff radio direction finding (RDF) systems so
critically important during the World War II Battle of the Atlantic. After WWII, the RDF, originally applied
only in communications, was broadened into systems to also take in ELINT from radar bandwidths and
lower frequency communications systems, giving birth to a family of NATO ESM systems, such as the
shipboard US AN/WLR-1[25]—AN/WLR-6 systems and comparable airborne units. EA is also called
electronic counter-measures (ECM). ESM provides information needed for electronic counter-counter
measures (ECCM), such as understanding a spoofing or jamming mode so one can change one's radar
characteristics to avoid them.

ELINT for meaconing

Meaconing[26] is the combined intelligence and electronic warfare of learning the characteristics of enemy
navigation aids, such as radio beacons, and retransmitting them with incorrect information.

Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence

FISINT (Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence) is a sub-category of SIGINT, monitoring primarily

non-human communication. Foreign instrumentation signals include (but not limited to) telemetry
(TELINT), tracking systems, and video data links. TELINT is an important part of national means of
technical verification for arms control.

Counter-ELINT

Still at the research level are techniques that can only be described as counter-ELINT, which would be part
of a SEAD campaign. It may be informative to compare and contrast counter-ELINT with ECCM.

SIGINT versus MASINT

Signals intelligence and measurement and signature intelligence
(MASINT) are closely, and sometimes confusingly, related.[27] The
signals intelligence disciplines of communications and electronic
intelligence focus on the information in those signals themselves, as
with COMINT detecting the speech in a voice communication or
ELINT measuring the frequency, pulse repetition rate, and other
characteristics of a radar.

MASINT also works with collected signals, but is more of an

analysis discipline. There are, however, unique MASINT sensors,
typically working in different regions or domains of the
electromagnetic spectrum, such as infrared or magnetic fields.
While NSA and other agencies have MASINT groups, the Central
MASINT Office is in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Where COMINT and ELINT focus on the intentionally transmitted

A model of a German SAR-Lupe
part of the signal, MASINT focuses on unintentionally transmitted
reconnaissance satellite inside a
information. For example, a given radar antenna will have sidelobes
Soviet Cosmos-3M rocket.
emanating from a direction other than that in which the main
antenna is aimed. The RADINT (radar intelligence) discipline
involves learning to recognize a radar both by its primary signal,
captured by ELINT, and its sidelobes, perhaps captured by the main ELINT sensor, or, more likely, a
sensor aimed at the sides of the radio antenna.
MASINT associated with COMINT might involve the detection of common background sounds expected
with human voice communications. For example, if a given radio signal comes from a radio used in a tank,
if the interceptor does not hear engine noise or higher voice frequency than the voice modulation usually
uses, even though the voice conversation is meaningful, MASINT might suggest it is a deception, not
coming from a real tank.

See HF/DF for a discussion of SIGINT-captured information with a MASINT flavor, such as determining
the frequency to which a receiver is tuned, from detecting the frequency of the beat frequency oscillator of
the superheterodyne receiver.

Legality
Since the invention of the radio, the international consensus has been that the radio-waves are no one's
property, and thus the interception itself is not illegal.[28] There can, however, be national laws on who is
allowed to collect, store, and process radio traffic, and for what purposes. Monitoring traffic in cables (i.e.
telephone and Internet) is far more controversial, since it most of the time requires physical access to the
cable and thereby violating ownership and expected privacy.

See also
Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Science & Technology
COINTELPRO
ECHELON
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008
Geospatial intelligence
Human intelligence (espionage)
Imagery intelligence
Intelligence Branch (Canadian Forces)
List of intelligence gathering disciplines
Listening station
Open-source intelligence
Radio Reconnaissance Platoon
RAF Intelligence
Signals intelligence by alliances, nations and industries
Signals intelligence operational platforms by nation for current collection systems
SOT-A
TEMPEST
US signals intelligence in the Cold War
Venona
Zircon satellite
Vulkan files leak

References
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Further reading
Bamford, James, Body of Secrets: How America's NSA and Britain's GCHQ Eavesdrop on
the World (Century, London, 2001) ISBN 978-0-7126-7598-7
Bolton, Matt (December 2011). "The Tallinn Cables: A Glimpse into Tallinn's Secret History
of Espionage" (https://web.archive.org/web/20131113200915/http://www.hot.ee/aasa/LPL_1
211.pdf) (PDF). Lonely Planet Magazine. ISSN 1758-6526 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/17
 58-6526). Archived from the original (http://www.hot.ee/aasa/LPL_1211.pdf) (PDF) on 13
November 2013. Retrieved 25 June 2013.
Biyd, J. A.; Harris, D. B.; King, D. D. Jr.; Welch, H. W., eds. (1979) [1961]. Electronic
Countermeasures. Los Altos, CA: Peninsula. ISBN 0-932146-00-7.
Gannon, Paul (2007) [2006]. Colossus: Bletchley Park's Greatest Secret. London: Atlantic
Books. ISBN 978-1-84354-331-2.
Jõgiaas, Aadu. "Disturbing Soviet Transmissions in August 1991" (https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20111114094618/http://www.okupatsioon.ee/en/lists/47-aadu-jogisoo). Museum of
Occupations. Archived from the original (http://www.okupatsioon.ee/en/lists/47-aadu-jogisoo)
on 14 November 2011. Retrieved 25 June 2013.
West, Nigel, The SIGINT Secrets: The Signals Intelligence War, 1900 to Today (William
Morrow, New York, 1988)

External links
Media related to SIGINT at Wikimedia Commons
Part I of IV Articles On Evolution of Army Signal Corps COMINT and SIGINT into NSA (http://
www.armysignalocs.com/index_jan_14.html) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2014020
3201852/http://www.armysignalocs.com/index_jan_14.html) 3 February 2014 at the
Wayback Machine
NSA's overview of SIGINT (https://www.nsa.gov/what-we-do/signals-intelligence/) Archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/20160801024348/https://www.nsa.gov/what-we-do/signals-intel
ligence/) 1 August 2016 at the Wayback Machine
USAF Pamphlet on sources of intelligence (https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afpam14-210/part1
6.htm)
German WWII SIGINT/COMINT (https://web.archive.org/web/20110710143344/http://fykse.d
nsalias.com/radio/dok/german_sigint.pdf) (PDF)
Intelligence Programs and Systems (https://fas.org/irp/program/index.html)
The U.S. Intelligence Community by Jeffrey T. Richelson (https://books.google.com/books?i
d=BaeJNdRySPoC)
Secrets of Signals Intelligence During the Cold War and Beyond by Matthew Aid et al. (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=KaR5O4PKNAoC)
Maritime SIGINT Architecture Technical Standards Handbook (http://www.tscm.com/sigintarc
hmsh.pdf) (PDF)

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