Legal Research On Right To Counsel On Admin Hearings

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To: Atty.

Vigor Mendoza

From: Gerald Cesar G. Chavez and Regine Yan-Cruz

Re: Legal Research on Right to Speedy Trial Cases

SIR VDM:

This serves as our research on the above subject matter:

In the case of In De Vera v. Layague, the court held that:

The constitutional mandate to promptly dispose of cases does not only refer to the
decision of cases on their merits, but also to the resolution of motions and other
interlocutory matters, as the constitutional provisions explicitly mention "cases" and
"matters." Therefore, respondent judge must not be excused for his delay in resolving
the incident in Civil Case.

In another case, specifically the case of State v. Frith, 194 So. 1 (1940). wherein there
was a discussion as to what constitutes speedy trial, the court ruled that: “The right of
the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration
of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of
criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such
right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition
is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

In the case of MARIALEN C. CORPUZ and ANTONIO H. ROMAN, SR., petitioners,


vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Fourth Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, the court ruled that the elements in determining whether the accused
has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial,
four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should
be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was

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designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize
anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense
will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There
is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the
distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety,
suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is
curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

References:

De Vera v. Layague, 341 SCRA 67 (2000).

MARIALEN C. CORPUZ and ANTONIO H. ROMAN, SR. vs.


THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Fourth Division) G.R. No. 162214 (lawphil.net)

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