Journal of Environmental Management 136 (2014) 37e46

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Environmental Management

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jenvman

An assessment of the impacts of the REDDþ pilot project on

community forests user groups (CFUGs) and their community forests
in Nepal
T.N. Maraseni a, *, P.R. Neupane b, F. Lopez-Casero c, T. Cadman d
a
Australian Centre for Sustainable Catchments, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, Queensland 4350, Australia
b
Friends of Nature, Nepal (FON), Sundhara, Kathmandu, Nepal
c
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), Hayama, Japan
d
Institute for Ethics Governance and Law, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: REDDþ has the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, meet climate stabilisation targets and
Received 9 April 2013 protect biological diversity. Consequently, millions of dollars are being channelled into developing
Received in revised form countries rich in forests, for pilot projects that will provide data for the design of REDDþ projects that are
10 December 2013
based on incentives and performance. This paper evaluates the impacts of REDDþ pilot projects on
Accepted 2 January 2014
Available online
community forests and associated user groups (CFUGs) in Nepal. A field study targeted eight CFUGs that
participated in a REDDþ pilot project funded by the Forest Carbon Trust Fund in Nepal. The pilot project
increased the participation of Dalit, Indigenous people, women and the poor, and was able to provide
Keywords:
REDDþ
some social safeguards. However, when all the additional costs and foregone benefits of the project are
Pilot project considered, REDDþ is not an attractive market-based option for Nepalese CFUGs. A better approach
Social safeguard would be a bilateral or multilateral approach that is not market based, but provides incentives beyond
REDDþ payment environmental and social safeguards. The results of this study will be useful in designing REDDþ policies
Nepal and programmes for community forest-based REDDþ stakeholders in developing countries.
Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction activities are of a non-permanent nature, and are therefore not

eligible under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
The annual global gross deforestation rate in the period 2000e ETS) e the largest GHG market in the world (World Bank, 2012). Of
2010 is estimated at 13 million hectares (FAO, 2011): almost the size the 5511 CDM projects registered by the end of 2012, less than 0.8%
of Nepal. Deforestation and forest degradation account for about were afforestation or reforestation projects (UNFCCC, 2013). This
20% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: more than the reality may be reflected in the transition in the negotiations of the
entire global transportation sector, and second only to the energy United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
sector (UN REDD Programme, 2010). Hence, deforestation and (UNFCCC), via the Bali Action Plan (2007), to the concept of
forest degradation must be halted if the goal of climate stabilisation “reducing of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
is to be reached (Angelsen et al., 2009, p vii). The Clean Develop- and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests
ment Mechanism (CDM) e one of the three market-based mecha- and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries”
nisms under the Kyoto Protocol e recognises the role of forests in (REDDþ), as agreed at the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties
mitigating climate change. However, forests are not well repre- (COP15) to the UNFCCC.
sented in the registered CDM project list for three main reasons: (1) The basic economics behind REDDþ are simple; it provides cash
developing countries often have poor finance, administration and for developing countries in exchange for those countries lowering
governance systems (Thomas et al., 2010); (2) only afforestation their GHG emissions by reducing deforestation and forest degra-
and reforestation projects are eligible under the CDM; and (3) dation, and managing their forests sustainably from accepted
carbon credits generated from afforestation and reforestation baselines. With growing recognition of REDDþ, developed coun-
tries may have a chance to offset part of their GHG emissions
through payments to developing countries that wish to participate
in REDDþ (Dooley, 2013). The idea of REDDþ has proved popular
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ61 746312995.
E-mail address: [email protected] (T.N. Maraseni). because it is sufficiently broad to accommodate different interests;

0301-4797/$ e see front matter Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2014.01.011
38 T.N. Maraseni et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 136 (2014) 37e46

however, without international agreement, things are likely to Nepal is playing a leading role in developing a mountain forum and
carry on as usual (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). a least-developed country forum, and influencing climate change
At COP15, a number of agreements were reached regarding negotiations through these forums. The Land Use Land Use Change
REDDþ, although these were not legally binding (Lesniewska, 2010: and Forestry (LULUCF) sector is a major source of GHG emission in
p105). The mechanism gained further recognition at COP16 in Nepal. Total CO2 emissions from the LULUCF sector in Nepal in the
Cancun, with conference parties committing to REDDþ at a global base year 2000/2001 was 16,909 Gg, which included 12,561 from
level, and to developing a framework for negotiations around a forest and grassland conversion, and 4348 from soil (Ministry of
range of important issues, such as safeguarding Indigenous peoples’ Environment, Science and Technology, 2012, Table ES-2a). Hence,
rights, and monitoring, verification and reporting (CIFOR, 2011). there is scope to reduce emissions from forests in Nepal, under the
Developing countries could stand to make considerable financial REDDþ mechanism. Seeing the possibilities of REDDþ, Nepal has
gains from REDDþ, because forestry will be a major component of been implementing various REDDþ initiatives, such as the REDDþ
the US$100 billion funding referred to in the Copenhagen Accord readiness activities supported by the Norwegian Agency for
(Lesniewska, 2010: p107). This accord was formalised at Cancun Development Cooperation (NORAD), the World Bank and the Forest
with the establishment of a ‘green climate fund’ (GCF), and an Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). A new institutional body, the
expectation that developed countries will provide $30 billion of REDDþ Forestry and Climate Change Cell (the REDDþ Cell), has
climate finance to developing countries by 2012 (WRI, 2010: 5). At been created under the Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation to
the Doha Conference in 2012, developed countries reiterated their coordinate and implement REDDþ activities in Nepal, and has
commitment to mobilise US$100 billion by 2020, for both adapta- prepared a REDDþ readiness proposal that is aligned with the
tion and mitigation (Arab Sustainability Association, 2012). A few National Development Strategy (Ministry of Forests and Soil
European countries put on the table a new pledge of more than Conservation, 2010).
US$10 billion for post-2012, and a similar amount has been pledged Nepal has a successful history of over three decades of partici-
for the GCF. However, parties presented varying views on several patory forest resource management. There are several forest
issues, particularly in the areas of verification, mode of finance and management regimes in Nepal, but community forestry is the
design of new REDDþ institutional arrangements (Dooley, 2013). major one, and Nepal is considered a pioneering country in com-
These are some of the topics that will be discussed in the Subsidiary munity forestry. More than 1.66 million ha (>28% of total forest
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) meetings in land) of national forest is managed by 17,808 CFUGs, and currently
2013, and it is expected that the REDDþ architecture will be about one third of the total population of Nepal are members of the
finalised soon (Dooley, 2013). CFUGs (DoF, 2012). Different aspects of REDDþ are the subject of
REDDþ is designed for developing countries where, coinciden- pilot studies at the level of CFUGs; these studies are funded by the
tally, community-based forest management systems (CBFMS) are Government of Norway, and jointly implemented by three major
becoming more popular. In developing countries, at least 22% of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs): the International Centre
total forest area is legally under community management systems for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), the Asia Network
(Nurse and Malla, 2006), compared with only 3% in developed for Sustainable Agriculture and Bioresources (ANSAB) and the
countries (White and Martin, 2002). Although the latest report Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal (FECOFUN)
from Sunderlin et al. (2008) has not clearly discussed the topic of (Operational Guidelines of Forest Carbon Trust Fund, 2011).
developed and developing countries status, this report found that
the past transition continued in the period 2002e2008. Sooner or
2. Research methods
later, the forest management regimes in developing countries could
be dominated by CBFMS (Smith and Scherr, 2002).
This study was conducted in the Chitwan and Gorkha districts of
In 2010, social and environmental safeguards were developed
Nepal. Altogether, 16 CFUGs participated in the REDDþ pilot project
and adopted by the UNFCCC, to realise the co-benefits of the
in Chitwan district, and 31 in Gorkha district. During a field trip
REDDþ mechanism without compromising the rights of local users
(OctobereDecember 2012), a series of discussions was held with
and Indigenous people, or reducing biological diversity (Swan,
staff from District Forest Offices (DFO) and FECOFUN. These orga-
2012). With these developments, several Indigenous and local
nisations are the key REDDþ stakeholders in both districts. The
communities are making efforts to increase the carbon stock in
discussions were helpful in identifying issues and developing four
their forests through REDDþ readiness and demonstration activ-
selection criteria for CFUGs; these were: (1) have received the
ities. Study of these pilot projects may provide an opportunity to
highest payment from the REDDþ carbon fund; (2) have received
assess current practices, the trade-off between carbon benefits and
the lowest payment from the REDDþ carbon fund; (3) are led by
their opportunity cost and, most importantly, guidance for policy
Indigenous people; and (4) are led by women. Based on these
makers on how to design incentive-based REDDþ projects
criteria, four CFUGs were selected from each district. In Gorkha
(Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009; Springate-Baginski et al., 2013;
district, researchers were able to include all four types of CFUG. In
Caplow et al., 2011). The overarching goal of this paper is to eval-
Chitwan district, the CFUG that received the lowest payment did
uate the impacts of the REDDþ pilot project on community forests
not have time to participate, so we instead selected the active
user groups (CFUGs) and their community forests in Nepal. REDDþ
Janapragati CFUG, which had also received a relatively low payment
payment should be solely based on the amount of avoided emis-
(the fourth lowest of the 16 CFUGs). The sample size was small, and
sions. However, in Nepal, approximately 60% of the total payment is
the findings are therefore symbolic only; however, the selected
based on social safeguards and only about 40% is related to carbon
eight samples did represent four different types of CFUG.
emissions (Operational Guidelines for Forest Carbon Trust Fund,
2011). Nevertheless this is a pilot project and there are lessons to
be learned for the full-scale implementation of REDDþ policies and 2.1. A snapshot of the study area
programmes.
Nepal contributes less than 0.1% (or 40.6 m tCO2e) of global GHG Table 1 gives the names of the selected CFUGs and their key
emissions; however, in terms of climate change impacts, it has been attributes related to REDDþ. Figs. 1 and 2 show maps of Chitwan
assessed to be the fourth most vulnerable country in the world and Gorkha districts, respectively, and the location of the four
(Climate Investment Fund, 2011). In response to this situation, CFUGs in each district.
 T.N. Maraseni et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 136 (2014) 37e46 39

Table 1
Key attributes of the selected CFUGs for the study in Chitwan and Gorkha districts.

District Name of Selection criteria Year of Mode of Dominant tree species in the respective Total Total C stock Total C increment Rate of C
CFUGs handover forest community forests population (t) in 2012 (t) (2010-12) increment
origin (tC/ha/yr)
(2010-12)

Chitwan Kankali Highest payment 1995 Natural & Shorea robusta Gaertn. F., Terminalia 11,539 26,990.1 357.7 0.24
plantation tomentosa, Lagerstroemia parviflora,
Cedrela toona, Syzygium cumini, Acacia
catechu, Dalbergia sissoo, Semicarpus
anacardium, Michelia champaca, Bombax
ceiba, Phyllanthus emblica, Cassia fistula
Chelibeti Led by women 2010 Natural Shorea robusta Gaertn. F., Terminalia 901 19,519.7 265.1 2.33
tomentosa, Terminalia belerica, Adina
cordifolia, Schima wallichii,
Lagerstroemia parviflora,
Michelia champaca
Janapragati Active but lower 2003 Natural Shorea robusta Gaertn. F., Terminalia 1314 34,820.2 452.2 1.50
payment tomentosa, Terminalia belerica, Adina
cordifolia, Schima wallichii,
Lagerstroemia parviflora,
Michelia champaca
Nibuwatar Led by IPs 2006 Natural Shorea robusta Gaertn. F., Terminalia 1064 98,396.8 1370.2 1.92
tomentosa, Terminalia belerica, Adina
cordifolia, Schima wallichii,
Lagerstroemia parviflora,
Michelia champaca
Gorkha Ludi Damgade Highest payment 1992 Natural Shorea robusta Gaertn. F., Schima 3551 58,138.7 2219.26 4.60
wallichii, Pinus roxburghii Sarg.
Baghepani Led by IPs 2004 Natural Shorea robusta Gaertn. F., Schima 447 15,268.9 562.99 4.13
wallichii, Terminalia tomentosa, Quercus
spp.
Sitalu Pakha Active but lowest 2001 Natural & Shorea robusta Gaertn. F., Schima 126 1139.3 46.45 4.08
payment plantation wallichii, Quercus spp., Pinus roxburghii
Sarg.
Laxmi Mahila Led by women 1998 Natural Shorea robusta Gaertn. F., Schima 458 1924.02 71.83 4.43
wallichii, Quercus spp.

Fig. 1. Locations of the studied CFUGs in Chitwan district.

40 T.N. Maraseni et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 136 (2014) 37e46

Fig. 2. Locations of the studied CFUGs in Gokha district.

In Chitwan district, the selected CFUGs are located in the north- Trust Fund (FCTF) as a REDDþ payment, were collected from
eastern part of the district (Fig. 1). Kankali is the largest CFUG in respective CFUGs. The data collected were subsequently verified
terms of forest area (760 ha) and population (11,539), followed by with the data from the project implementing agencies (ANSAB,
Nibuwatar (357.5 ha; population 1064), Janapragati (150.5 ha; FECOFUN and ICIMOD). In order to distribute the seed grant, social
population 1314) and Chelibeti (56.88 ha; population 901). REDDþ and environmental safeguards were identified and their relative
payment also follows the same trend; that is, the greater the area of weights were allocated by national level REDDþ stakeholders.
forest and human population, the greater is the carbon payment Approximately 60% of the total weight was distributed for social
(Tables 1 and 2). Low-land Sal forest (Shorea robusta Gaertn. F.), safeguards (20% for the poor, 15% for Dalit or untouchables, 15% for
which can grow up to 40 m high, is the major forest type under the women and 10% for Indigenous people) and another 40% for envi-
forest management entities. In Chitwan district, Sal is associated ronmental safeguards (24% for carbon stock maintenance and 16%
with Terminalia tomentosa, Terminalia belerica, Adina cordifolia, for carbon increment) (Operational Guidelines for Forest Carbon
Schima wallichii, Lagerstroemia parviflora, Cedrela toona and so on. Trust Fund, 2011).
Sal is a popular species in Nepal, and can be used for many different Regarding the cost and forgone benefits, about 28 potential
purposes (e.g., timber, poles, firewood, leaves and fodder). The CFUGs performance criteria (hereafter referred to as indicators) that
species has a high economic potential for local and national markets. could have been affected by the REDDþ pilot project were identi-
In Gorkha district, in which hill Sal forests are the major forest fied through expert discussions at the central level. These in-
types, the selected CFUGs are located in the southern part of the dicators were then discussed with the key district-level
district (Fig. 2). Lundi Damgade CFUG has the largest forest area, stakeholders. Finally, in the local context they were narrowed down
followed by Baghepani, Laxmi Mahila and Sitalu Pakha CFUGs. to 23 CFUGs indicators (Table 3).
REDDþ payments are commensurate with the size of the forest A one-day workshop was organised in each CFUG. In the
area (Tables 1 and 2). Other associates are Chilaune (S. wallichii), Saj workshops, users and committee members (including women,
(T. tomentosa), Khote Salla (Pinus roxburghii Sarg.) and Katus Dalits, Indigenous people and the poorest) participated. The
(Quercus spp.). average number of participants in each workshop was 24 (range
Total carbon stock and the rates of carbon increment (tC/ha/yr) 18e35). In the workshops, participants were asked to discuss the 23
in community forests are given in Table 1. Ludhi Damgade CFUG has indicators in their own context, and to come to a consensus on
the highest carbon increment rate, followed by Laxmi Mahila and whether each indicator had increased or decreased (on an annual
Baghepani CFUGs. basis) after the implementation of a REDDþ pilot project in their
CFUG and the respective community forest. Participants were also
2.2. Data collection asked to indicate group perception on a 1e4 scale (4 for extraor-
dinarily decreased/increased, 3 for highly decreased/increased, 2
Data on the total carbon in different years, and the amount of for fairly decreased/increased, and 1 for slightly decreased/
seed grant received by the selected CFUGs from the Forest Carbon increased) against each activity. If there had been no change,
 T.N. Maraseni et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 136 (2014) 37e46 41

respondents were asked to indicate “same”. Finally, the average

Average annual

2011 and 2012

impact of the seed grant payment to CFUG activities was estimated

payment in
from the perceived figures from the CFUGs.

(US$/ha)
REDDþ

$18.42

$11.76
$11.78
$34.27
$41.11
$6.98

$8.28
$5.90

$24.7
3. Results and discussions

$9.9
Average annual REDDþ

3.1. Seed grant and management cost to eight selected CFUGs in

payment in 2011 and

Chitwan and Gorkha districts

2012 (US$/HH)

Table 2 presents the REDDþ payments for selected CFUGs in

2011 and 2012. In Chitwan, the four selected CFUGs received US$$
8857 of seed grant in 2011; this increased to US$ 10,551 in 2012. In
$2.98
$6.13
$6.92
$2.31

$5.82
$9.23
$7.80
4.44
$4.6

$6.8
Gorkha, the four selected CFUGs received US$ 4380 in 2011; this
decreased to US$ 3954 in 2012. There was no default amount in the
payments (US$)

2011 payment, but since participants raised the issue of “principle

Total REDDþ

of fairness” (i.e. irrespective of environmental and social criteria,

in 2012

each participating CFUG should receive some incentives for their

$6011
$1075
$1303
$2162

$2584
$2638

$773
$233
$364
$989
time), in 2012, each CFUG was given $100 as a default grant.
As noted, this REDDþ pilot project is funded by NORAD, and
Total REDDþ payment

jointly implemented by three renowned NGOs. NORAD determines

and fixes the seed money, irrespective of changes in social and
environmental attributes. Once the total seed money for the whole
(US$) in 2011

REDDþ pilot project for a year has been finalised, it is distributed to

each CFUG based on social and environmental criteria (as described
$4591
$1021
$1188
$2057

$3088
$2214

$1095
$833
$157
$302

in Section 2.2). Although the carbon increment rate in CFUGs in

Gorkha district was higher than in Chitwan district, the CFUGs in
Chitwan district still received higher payment (Table 1), mainly
2011 and 2012 (US$/
management cost in

thanks to (1) a higher payment from social safeguard criteria

(because the larger the total population, the larger the female
Average annual
expenditure or

population, which carries 15% of the total weight); and (2) the
presence of a higher amount of initial carbon stock.
$149.56

$290.92
$64.82

$66.84

$41.83
$46.00

Of the 40% weighting for environmental criteria, only 16% is

$143.0
$7.33
$9.07

$26.1
ha)

allocated to carbon increment. This 16% allocation is low if we see

REDDþ simply from a carbon trading perspective. However, the
main objectives of this ‘dummy’ carbon trading system in REDDþ
2011 and 2012 (US$/
management cost in

pilot project are to: (1) consider both social and environmental
Average annual

safeguards, so that CFUGs know the international view of these

expenditure or

safeguards; (2) familiarise CFUGs with how REDDþ works; and (3)
motivate CFUGs towards sustainable management of forests, so
$243.24
$63.86
$21.56

$26.14

$3.63
$7.11
$9.52
$4.97
$88.7

that they can receive carbon incentives without compromising the

HH)

$6.3

basic needs of local users (Operational Guidelines of Forest Carbon

Trust Fund, 2011).
2011 and 2012 (US$)
management cost in

3.1.1. Average annual management cost and REDDþ payment

Average annual
expenditure or
Average annual expenditure or management cost and REDDþ payment.

Table 2 gives the total number of household and area of each

$113,667.73

$43,782.73
$23,895.52

CFUG and their average annual management costs. The higher

$46,258.2
$3686.75

$1768.48
$618.39
$238.00
$372.62

management costs in CFUGs in Chitwan district was mainly due to:

$749.4

(1) larger forest areas; (2) intensive silvicultural operations; and (3)
use of a higher number of paid workers.
The average annual REDDþ payments for the selected CFUGs in
(HH) involved

Chitwan district and Gorkha district were US$ 2426 and US$ 1042,
household

respectively. However, the number of households in CFUGs in

761.3

168.5
No of

1780
171
180
914

487
87
25
75

Chitwan district was much higher than in Gorkha district (Table 2);
therefore, the average annual REDDþ payment per household in
Area of
CF (ha)

56.88

68.16
5.69

CFUGs in Chitwan district was much lower than that of Gorkha

8.1
150.5
357.5

241.2
331.2

80.8
760

district. Likewise, the average area of CFUGs in Gorkha district was

much lower than that of Chitwan district; hence, the per hectare
Name of CFUGs

Avg of 4 CFUGs

Avg of 4 CFUGs
Ludi Damgade

REDDþ payment in Gorkha district was more than two times that of
Laxmi Mahila
Sitalu Pakha
Janapragati
Nibuwatar

Baghepani

Chitwan district.
Chelibeti
Kankali

Comparing the average annual management cost and the

average REDDþ payment received by selected CFUGs illustrates
that the payment is a significant financial transaction for these
Chitwan

Gorkha
District

CFUGs. In Gorkha district in particular, the payment was higher

Table 2

than the average annual expenditure of the CFUGs in the district.

This implies that the payment could represent considerably higher
42 T.N. Maraseni et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 136 (2014) 37e46

Table 3
Impact of REDDþ pilot project on CFUGs indicators.

Indicators CFUG1 CFUG2 CFUG3 CFUG4

I D S I D S I D S I D S

Chitwan district
No. of total participants in general assembly 3 4 4 2
No. of women’s in general assembly 4 4 4 2
No. of indigenous people in general assembly 4 4 4 3
No. of poor people in general assembly 3 3 2 3
Frequency of committee meeting 3 4 3 4
No of participants in committee meeting * 3 2 3
Plantation activities/area 2 4 2 2
Thinning, pruning and cleaning activities * 2 2 2
Weeding activities/area * 2 4 2
Fire control and prevention activities 4 4 3 4
No. of fires 3 4 4 4
Quantity of timber extraction from the forest * 4 * 4
Quantity of grass extraction from the forest 1 4 3 4
Quantity of fodder grass extraction from the forest * 4 3 4
Quantity of green twigs extraction from the forest 1 3 2 4
Quantity of leaf litter extraction from the forest 2 3 4 *
Quantity of fuel wood extraction from the forest 4 4 2 3
Quantity of NTFPs extraction from the forest * 3 * *
Quantity of illegal logging 4 4 * 4
No. of buffalo grazing in the forest * * * 2
No. of cow/ox grazing in the forest * 4 * 2
No. of goat grazing in the forest 3 4 * 2
More organised grazing (e.g., rotational) * * * 3
Gorkha district
No. of total participants in general assembly 2 2 3 2
No. of women’s in general assembly 2 3 4 1
No. of indigenous people in general assembly 3 4 4 1
No. of poor people in general assembly 2 3 4 2
Frequency of committee meeting 4 3 4 4
No. of participants in committee meeting * * 2 2
Plantation activities/area 1 * * 2
Thinning, pruning and cleaning activities * 3 * 4
Weeding activities/area * 3 * *
Fire control and prevention activities 4 3 * *
No. of fires 4 4 * 1
Quantity of timber extraction from the forest * 2 * *
Quantity of grass extraction from the forest * 4 2 4
Quantity of fodder grass extraction from the forest 2 3 2 *
Quantity of green twigs extraction from the forest 1 1 3 *
Quantity of leaf litter extraction from the forest * * 2 *
Quantity of fuel wood extraction from the forest * 2 2 *
Quantity of NTFPs extraction from the forest 4 * * *
Quantity of illegal logging 4 * 2 *
No. of buffalo grazing in the forest * 4 * *
No. of cow/ox grazing in the forest * 4 4 *
No. of goat grazing in the forest * 3 4 *
More organised grazing (e.g., rotational) * * * *

Note: CFUG stands for Community Forests User Group. In Chitwan district CFUG 1, 2, 3 & 4 are Kankali CFUG, Chelibeti CFUG, Janapragati CFUG & Nibuwatar CFUG, respectively.
Similarly in Gorkha district CFUG 1, 2, 3 & 4 are Ludi Damgade CFUG, Baghepani CFUG, Sitalu pakha CFUG & Laxmi Mahila CFUG, respectively. The notations “I”, “D” & “S”
indicate increased, decreased and same, respectively. Similarly, scale 4 stands for extraordinarily decreased/increased, 3 for highly decreased/increased, 2 for fairly decreased/
increased and 1 for slightly decreased/increased.

additional revenue for the CFUGs in Gorkha district than in the permanent nature of forest-based carbon sequestration). At a car-
Chitwan district. However, three things are noteworthy here. First, bon price of US$ 10/tCO2, the average carbon payment to each CFUG
the management cost stipulated here does not include voluntary would be about US$ 245 per year. This does not take into account
work by community members, which is manyfold higher than this the cost of monitoring, reporting and verification, which could be
cost. Second, the REDDþ payment is not only the income from high for small community forests. If this cost is taken into account,
community forestry; there are several other direct and indirect the net REDDþ payment for CFUGs could be much less than US$
benefits. Third, this dummy REDDþ payment gives high priority to 245.
social safeguards. However, the real carbon trading in the forestry The CFUGs spent most of the fund on pro-poor activities and the
sector must be solely based on the carbon increment rate. If this community, particularly women, Dalits and marginalised CFUG
were the case, the districts would receive much lower payment. For members, which contributed to their empowerment. The pro-poor
example, on average, each CFUG increases its carbon stock by activities involved seed money for small enterprises based on forest
668.22 tC/year (2452 tCO2/yr) (Table 1). If the 100-year rule is products; income-generating activities such as goat, pig, cow and
applied (Fearnside et al., 2000; Moura-Costa and Wilson, 2000), to buffalo farming; support for poor and under-resourced students;
make it equivalent to an emissions reduction project, the carbon and loans for CFUG members who wanted to go aboard for
stock increment equates to 24.5 tCO2/year (because of the non- employment. The CFUGs also used the fund for forest management
 T.N. Maraseni et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 136 (2014) 37e46 43

activities such as construction of fire lines, salary for forest and fire “quantity of fodder-grass extraction from the forest”, “quantity of
watchers, and implementation of silvicultural measures such as fuel-wood extraction from the forest” and “quantity of illegal log-
thinning and enrichment plantations. ging”. In seven of the eight CFUGs, there was no change in the
grazing system.
Average scores of eight CFUGs for all indicators, and their
3.2. Impact of REDDþ pilot project on different indicators rankings, are given in Table 4. On average, 11 of the 23 indicators in
CFUGs increased, whereas 12 decreased. Both increased and
Table 3 gives the status and the scale of CFUGs’ perception of the decreased indicators are solely linked with the efforts to maintain
23 different indicators affected by implementation of the REDDþ or increase carbon stock in the forests.
pilot project. Table 4 gives the average perceived impact of REDDþ Based on the results from this study, we attempted to answer
pilot project on these 23 indicators. two questions: (1) Is the additional revenue received by CFUGs
Indicators that generally increased in most of the CFUGs from the REDDþ payment sufficient to cover their additional costs
included “number of total participants in general assembly”, and the benefits forgone?; and (2) Has the REDDþ pilot project
“number of women in general assembly”, “number of Indigenous addressed its global-level social safeguards objective, and the
people in general assembly”, “number of poor people in general second-generation issue of community forestry in Nepal? Each of
assembly”, “frequency of committee meetings” and “fire control these questions is answered below.
and prevention”. Indicators that generally decreased included
“number of fires”, “quantity of grass extraction from the forest”, 3.3. Is additional revenue received by CFUGs sufficient to cover
benefits forgone?

Table 4
Table 2 shows that the average annual payment of eight CFUGs
Average impact of REDDþ pilot project on CFUGs indicators (N ¼ 8 CFUGs).
was US$ 1734. To receive this payment, communities have to bear
Indicators Increased Decreased significant additional costs, and sacrifice many benefits. For
Average scale Ranking Average Ranking example, in the field survey, most of the CFUGs mentioned that
scale they are now having at least three “committee meetings” in a
No. of total participants in 2.8 IV month, whereas before the REDDþ pilot project they might not
general assembly have had even one meeting in a month. If 10 people participate in a
No. of women’s in general 3.0 III committee meeting, this represents an additional meeting burden
assembly
No. of indigenous people in 3.4 II
of 105 person-days (assuming 3.5 h per meeting including travel-
general assembly ling time, and a working day of 8 h) in a year. At a rate of 500
No. of poor people in 2.8 IV Nepalese rupees (NRs) per person-day, which equates to US$ 525
general assembly (US$ 1 ¼ NRs 88). Also, after a meeting, committee members need
Frequency of committee 3.6 I
to spend at least a couple of hours passing their decisions on to all
meeting
No. of participants in 1.5 VI users, through either “corner meetings”, phone calls or paper work.
committee meeting In addition, many more people participate in the general assembly,
Plantation activities/area 1.6 V which lasts for at least 1 day, and there is an increase in activities
Thinning, pruning and 1.6 V such as thinning, pruning, weeding and fire control in forest areas.
cleaning activities
Weeding activities/area 1.4 VII
If the costs of all these activities are considered, REDDþ payment is
Fire control and prevention 2.8 IV almost certainly not sufficient to offset them.
activities To maximise carbon benefits, CFUGs have sacrificed many
No. of fires 3.0 I things. For example, they have decreased the quantity of grass,
Quantity of timber 1.3 IX
fodder grass, green twigs, leaf litter, fuel-wood, timber and non-
extraction from the
forest timber forest products (NTFPs) extracted from the forests. They
Quantity of grass extraction 2.8 II have also reduced the number of animals (goats, buffalo, cows and
from the forest oxen) grazing in the forest. If these additional costs and forgone
Quantity of fodder grass 2.3 III benefits were evaluated in monitory terms, the REDDþ payment
extraction from the
forest
would be even less attractive.
Quantity of green twigs 1.9 VI There are three major implications of these reduced activities:
extraction from the (1) livelihood of users may be at stake, because there may have
forest been limits on collecting NTFPs and necessary goods (e.g., wood for
Quantity of leaf litter 1.4 VIII
making hoes and coal for fuel); (2) cattle and other agricultural
extraction from the
forest production may have been reduced by limited supply of grass,
Quantity of fuel wood 2.1 IV fodder grass, green twigs and leaf litter; and (3) some people may
extraction from the have been forced to find alternative sources of these goods.
forest Therefore, the opportunity cost of the reduced access to resources
Quantity of NTFPs 0.9 X
extraction from the
could be high, especially in the long run, because scarce private
forest land could be used for the production of these resources. The
Quantity of illegal logging 2.3 III reduced access would also affect the production of crops and
No. of buffalo grazing in the 0.8 XI livestock.
forest
The REDDþ funding agency is trying to minimise leakage (i.e.
No. of cow/ox grazing in the 1.8 VII
forest the increase in emissions or reductions in removals by sinks outside
No. of goat grazing in the 2.0 V the project boundary that occurs as a consequence of a REDDþ pilot
forest project) (Maraseni, 2007), by supporting households through
More organised grazing 0.4 VIII improved cooking stoves and biogas plants. However, some leakage
(e.g., rotational)
problems continue, because only some of the CFUGs are covered by
44 T.N. Maraseni et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 136 (2014) 37e46

the REDDþ pilot project so those that are excluded create a leakage between inclusion and equality (or inequality): governance is
problem (Maraseni et al., 2005). For example, people from the legitimate when it gives voice to those affected by any given deci-
REDDþ pilot area have been trying to collect some resources from sion (Young, 2000).
non-pilot areas, and cattle from the REDDþ pilot area have been left Governance research also points to the need for resources, or
to graze in non-pilot areas. However, at this stage, the exact op- economic, technical and institutional capacity (money and exper-
portunity cost of reduced access to resources and the amount of tise), if previously marginalised interests are to represent their in-
leakage are difficult to quantify. terests effectively (Mason, 1999). Resources also include education
The findings of our study are in line with Neupane and Shrestha and training, both of which increase participants’ skills to represent
(2012), who reported that REDDþ could adversely affect the Nep- their interests effectively (Simmons and Birchall, 2005). The results
alese poor in several dimensions, including access to forest prod- shown in Table 4 suggest that REDDþ has led to an increase in
ucts. Also, as suggested in Bushley and Khatri (2011), REDDþ could participation in CFUG meetings, and in general assemblies of Dalit
recentralise forest rights in Nepal, a country where community and untouchable castes, Indigenous people, women and the poor-
forestry policy and programme have been touted as a successful est households. In addition, CFUGs in the REDDþ pilot projects
case in decentralised forest management (Sunam et al., 2013). On investigated have allocated REDDþ payment funds for pro-poor
the other hand, better coordination in the forest sector could spur community-based activities with an emphasis on women, Dalit
private investment in this sector (Bluffstone et al., 2008; Mekonnen and marginalised CFUG members. This also suggests that there has
and Bluffstone, 2008; Bluffstone et al., 2012a,b) and benefit poor been an increase in recognition of social interests e and indicates
people. For this to happen, REDDþ proponents e especially donors the potential for future increased representation in REDDþ. In
financing REDD eneed to work closely with REDDþ stakeholders Nepal, the poor, women and Indigenous people have low partici-
and governments to carefully design REDDþ institutions that pation rate in CFUGs activities. This has been termed a ‘second-
improve rather than destabilise community forestry systems generation’ issue because these ‘new’ recruits into community
(Bluffstone et al., 2013). forestry have less participatory capacity; efforts are being made to
There are various activities that can ensure effective forest address this issue through several policies and programmes (Kanel,
protection on one hand, and higher productivity and forest vitality 2004). It encouraging that REDDþ may be reversing this trend. To
on the other. Such activities include increased tending and cultural guarantee ongoing participation, incentive payments need to be
operations; fewer forest fires; more activities in fire prevention and continued. This would ensure that social safeguards are provided as
control; undertaking less illegal and illicit felling; and having fewer a trade-off for ongoing emissions reduction from deforestation and
livestock grazing the forest. Protecting forests for carbon would forest degradation.
have a number of other co-benefits, including increased biodiver- The REDDþ pilot project investigated by this research in Nepal
sity and soil conservation. Because of the REDDþ pilot project, appears to have promoted meaningful participation of these mar-
CFUGs are highly motivated, and are working together to receive ginalised and vulnerable people to some extent. This enhanced
carbon benefits that could promote social capital and cultural participation of stakeholders in the project has allowed the poorest
harmony among the CFUGs. If these benefits are considered, and most marginalised groups to have a voice and a choice in
REDDþ projects could be attractive. Therefore, comprehensive decision-making processes, and has thus contributed to improving
research that covers all the related costs and benefits is essential; the governance of forest management overall. However, for these
this study provides a basic framework for such research. stakeholders increased participation particularly the greater num-
ber of meetings and discussions, means that they must expend
3.4. Has the REDDþ pilot project process provided social safeguards considerable time and labour on being involved. If these costs are
and addressed ‘second-generation’ issues of community forestry in not compensated for, participation by these stakeholders may only
Nepal? be temporary.
The REDDþ fund could be beneficial, but an overemphasis on
The international policy community has published a number of this fund could blind us to other approaches to reducing forest
documents containing various principles and criteria aimed at emissions; for example, one approach could be to recognise the
safeguarding the interests of Indigenous people, women and mi- property rights of Indigenous peoples and forest communities,
nority groups, and ensuring their meaningful participation in because the cost per hectare of recognising rights is orders of
REDDþ projects (FCPF, 2011; redd-standards.org, 2010; UN-REDD, magnitude less than the estimated costs of REDDþ (White, 2011). In
2012). Participation has been described as the, “cornerstone of Mexico, property rights, along with factors such as emigration and
democracy [and] a categorical term for citizen power”, because it reduced land-use pressures, have already resulted in successful
redistributes power between the advantaged and disadvantaged, REDDþ projects, even though no market opportunities for investors
enabling them to share benefits; without participation “the redis- were created (Bray, 2013). Therefore, in addition to REDDþ funding,
tribution of power is an empty and frustrating process” (Arnstein, promoting policies that improve community forestry systems could
1969: 216). be helpful.
REDDþ offers a great opportunity because it is designed to share
benefits arising from reducing deforestation and forest degrada- 4. Conclusions and recommendations
tion; on the other hand, it could be a problem unless power is
redistributed, with some degree of power going to marginalised The overarching goal of this research was to evaluate the im-
groups. Interest representation has been identified as a key criterion pacts of the REDDþ pilot project on selected CFUGs in Nepal. The
of good governance, and has been broken down into three impor- REDDþ pilot project affected all 23 CFUG indicators studied, with 11
tant components: inclusiveness, equality and resources (Cadman, increasing and 12 decreasing. Among the indicators that increased,
2011). Inclusiveness has been further divided into two elements: the frequency of committee meetings increased the most, followed
access (the extent to which interests actively participate) and by the number of Indigenous people and women in general as-
weight (the level of influence among participants). Governance is semblies. Among the indicators that decreased, the number of fires
inclusive when those directly or indirectly affected are involved in decreased the most, followed by the quantity of grass and fodder
decision making, either formally or informally (Koenig-Archibugi, extraction from the forest. These are positive developments.
2006; Gentle and Maraseni, 2011). There is also a relationship However, the increased participation of stakeholders in a larger
 T.N. Maraseni et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 136 (2014) 37e46 45

number of meetings and discussions, in forest protection and Bluffstone, R., Robinson, E., Guthiga, P., 2013. REDDþ and community controlled
forests in low-income countries: any hope for a linkage? Ecol. Econ. 87, 43e52.
patrolling, and in cultural and tending operations, requires
Bray, D., 2013. From Mexico, global lessons for forest governance. Solutions 4 (3).
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attributes and 40% to environmental considerations. If payments gating global warming through land-use change and forestry. Mitig. Adapt.
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tCO2, each CFUG would receive US$ 245 on average, which would tation practices by rural mountain communities in Nepal. Environ. Sci. Policy
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related costs. Therefore, in this situation, REDDþ may not be the Kanel, K.R., 2004. Twenty-five years of community forestry: contribution to mil-
lennium development goals. In: Kanel, K.R., et al. (Eds.), Twenty-five Years of
appropriate avenue, so other non-REDDþ funding approaches need Community Forestry. Proceedings of the Fourth National Workshop on Com-
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This project was conducted with the assistance of the Institute Maraseni, T.N., 2007. Re-evaluating Land Use Choices to Incorporate Carbon Values:
A Case Study in the South Burnett Region of Queensland, Australia (a PhD thesis
for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), Hayama, Japan. We are
submitted to the University of Southern Queensland, Australia).
extremely grateful to the many people who have contributed in a Maraseni, T.N., Cockfield, G., Apan, A., 2005. Community based forest management
variety of ways to this project. We particularly extend our sincere systems in developing countries and eligibility for clean development mecha-
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thanks to the CFUGs, DFO and FECOFUN staff in Chitwan and Gor-
Mason, M., 1999. Environmental Democracy. St Martin’s Press, New York.
kha districts in Nepal, who generously contributed valuable time Mekonnen, A., Bluffstone, R., 2008. Is There a Link between Common Property Forest
and information. We would also like to thank Hilary Cadman for her Management and Private Tree Growing? Evidence of Behavioral Effects from
extensive editing work on this paper. We cordially thank anony- Highland Ethiopia. EfD and Resources for the Future Discussion Paper Efd DP 08e29.
Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology, June, 2012. National Greenhouse
mous referees for their highly valuable suggestions, which were Gas Inventory Report for Second National Communication to the Conference of
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Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology, p. 81.
Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation, September, 2010. Nepal’s Readiness
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