Fact Sheet - Detailed Research On Corporate Governance (Chapter 10)
Fact Sheet - Detailed Research On Corporate Governance (Chapter 10)
Fact Sheet - Detailed Research On Corporate Governance (Chapter 10)
Group 8 Members:
PELONIO, JAMAICA G.
POBADORA, MA. JHEZARIE
RABAYA, MITZI ROSE
SALADAGA, RICAMAE P.
FAQ ACTIVITY I
Test I. Enumeration (21 items)
1. What are the three internal governance mechanisms that are used in modern
corporation?
- Ownership concentration
- The board of directors
- Executive compensation
- Insiders
- Related outsiders
- Outsiders
4. The demand for improved performance and greater accountability is simulating
many boards to make changes, such as:
6. Attitudes toward corporate governance in Japan are affected by the concept of:
- Obligation
- Family
- Consensus
1. The most effective boards of directors set boundaries for their firms’ business
ethics and values.
- True
2. The stock markets of China, which were once strong due to significant insider
trading, are still young and developing.
- True
- False, Japan
- True
8. German firms with more than 2,000 employees are required to have a three-
tiered board structure that places the responsibility for monitoring and controlling
managerial (or supervisory) decisions and actions in the hands of separate
group.
- False, two-tiered
- True
- True
- True
- True
13. Firms targeted for a hostile takeover may only use one defense tactics to fend
off the takeover attempt.
14. As a governance mechanism, investors sometimes use the market for corporate
control to take an ownership position in firms that are an imperfect governance
mechanism.
- True
15. An effective market for corporate control ensures that ineffective and/or
opportunistic top-level managers are disciplined.
- True
Test III. Identification (15 items)
- Corporate governance
- Agency relationship
- Managerial opportunism
- Product diversification
7. The cash remaining after the firm has invested in all projects that have positive
net present value within its current businesses – is the source of another
potential agency problem.
8. Are the sum of incentives costs, monitoring costs, enforcement costs, and
individual financial losses incurred by principals because governance mechanism
cannot guarantee total compliance by the agent.
- Agency costs
- Ownership concentration
- Large-block shareholders
11. Are financial institutions, such as mutual funds and pension funds, that control
large-block shareholder positions.
- Institutional owners
- Board of directors
- Shareholders
14. Individual not involved with the firm’s day-to-day operations, but who have a
relationship with the company.
- Related outsiders
15. Is a governance mechanism that seeks to align the interests of managers and
owners through salaries, bonuses, and long-term incentives such as stock
awards and options.
- Executive compensation
3. Why are German executives have not been dedicated to maximizing shareholder
wealth to the degree that is the case for top-level managers in the United Stated
and United Kingdom?
Because of the role of local government (through the board structure) and the
power of banks in Germany’s corporate governance structure, private
shareholders rarely have major ownership positions in German firms.
Large institutional investors, such as pension funds (outside of banks and
insurance companies), are relatively insignificant owners of corporate stock.
4. Why are the most effective boards of directors set boundaries for their firms’
business ethics and values?
FAQ ACTIVITY II
Column A