Case Digests in Election Law

COLLEGE OF LAW
Case Digests in
Election Law
Digested and compiled by:

Agustin, Audrich Carlo R.
Apalisoc, Khayle Marie F.
Balinuyos, Mayflor A.
Baquiran, Jacob B.
Caluya, Angelica M.
Clemente, Arlene Kristine Joy M.
Flores, May December A.
Garma, Nikki Gene O.
Martinez, Myla Fei Q.
Sacoco, Ma. Kristel Kae T.
Santos, Kastine Kaye A.
Juris Doctor II
Academic Year 2021-2022
COLLEGE OF LAW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
No. Case Title Page Number
1 Marquez v. COMELEC 1-3
2 AES Watch v. COMELEC 4-5
3 ANGKLA v. COMELEC 6-8
4 Mayor Rovelyn E. Villamor v. COMELEC 9-10
5 Aldrin Madreo v. Lucilo R. Bayron 11-12
6 Marcos vs. Robredo 13-15
7 Radames F. Herrera v. Noel P. Mago, Simeon B. 16-17
Villacrusis, And Jose R. Asis, Jr.
8 Halili v. COMELEC 18-19
9 Marquez v. COMELEC 20-21
10 Del Rosario v. COMELEC 22-23
11 Penson v. COMELEC 24-25
COLLEGE OF LAW
Case Title Marquez v. COMELEC

Citation G.R. No. 238274
Date November 9, 2021
Relevant
Petition for Recall
Topic/s
Recall is an incident of sovereign power granted by no less than the 1987
Philippine Constitution. It is a mechanism of democratic government
whereby constituents are given the power to remove an elected official from
office before the end of his or her term.
DOCTRINE
COMELEC must strictly comply with all requirements under applicable laws
relative to the conduct of elections as well as the exercise of the electorate
of their power to recall, if only to uphold the sovereign will of the people and
safeguard the rule of the majority.
FACTS:
Private respondent Arnold P. Lagdameo (Lagdameo) led the initiation and filing of a
Petition for Recall against Mayor Celestino T. Marquez (petitioner) for loss of confidence. The
petition was supported by the following documents: (1) The Voter's Certification of Lagdameo; (2)
Certification of Voting Age Population of Pandi, Bulacan issued on September 30, 2017 by the
Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA); (3) Letter dated July 24, 2017 issued by Darwin D. David,
OIC-Provincial Director of Department of Interior and Local Government, certifying that petitioner
assumed office at noon of June 30, 2016; (4) EastWest Manager's Check in the amount of
Phpl5,000 addressed to the COMELEC; and (5) Folder per volume/barangay containing the
alleged names and signatures of the supporting petitioners.
Election Officer Emelyn Mendoza (EO Mendoza) evaluated the petition and its
attachments and found it sufficient. Although she found that the position for which petitioner was
being recalled was not indicated in the signature sheets, as required under Section 8 of
COMELEC Resolution (CR) No. 75054, she concluded that said petition was sufficient in form
and that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the required percentage of the voting population
based on the certification issued by the PSA and that the necessary requirements set forth in
Section 10 of CR No. 7505 were complied with.
On review, the Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations (ODEDO) headed
by Bartolome Sinocruz, Jr. affirmed EO Mendoza's findings, stating that the indication in the
signature sheets of the name of the local elective official sought to be recalled was substantial
compliance considering that the position was already indicated in the petition itself, and there was
no other official sought to be recalled in the petition.
On November 28, 2017, the COMELEC approved the ODEDO's recommendation in
Minute Resolution No. 1 7-0718 to certify the sufficiency of the petition for recall.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for recall is sufficient in form, notwithstanding the fact that it
did not comply with the following requirements of CR No. 7505: Rules and Regulations for the
Recall of Elective Local Government Officials as Provided for Under the Local Government Code,
as Amended.
HELD:
No. CR No. 7505 entitled 'Rules and Regulations for the Recall of Elective Local
Government Officials as Provided for Under the Local Government Code, as Amended,' which
laid down the procedure upon which the electorate may exercise its power to initiate a recall.
Section 8 thereof enumerates the details which must be contained in the petition for recall as well
as in the signature sheets of the supporting petitioners, to wit:
Section 8. Format of the petition for recall. - The petition for recall shall be in writing and
under oath, prepared in twelve (12) copies, and contain the following:
a. The name, address and signature of the main petitioner;
1
COLLEGE OF LAW
b. The name, address and signature of the main petitioner's

representative, if any;
c. The name of the official sought to be recalled, including his
position;
d. A brief narration of the reasons and justifications for the filing
of the petition;
e. The names, addresses and signatures of the supporting
petitioners; and
f. The barangay, municipality, city, and signatures of the
supporting petitioners;
The names, addresses and signatures of the supporting petitioners shall be indicated on
signature sheets, in the form prescribed by the Commission. Each page of the signature sheet
shall also indicate the name of the official sought to be recalled, including his position, a brief
narration of the reasons and justifications for the filing of the petition, and the barangay,
municipality, city, local legislative district and province to which each of the petitioners belong.
The above provision clearly directs the indication of the position of the official sought to be
recalled and a brief narration of the reasons and justifications for the filing of the petition not only
in the body of the petition itself but also on each page of the signature sheet. It bears stressing
that this requirement was retained in CR No. 10649. The reason therefor is not difficult to discern.
Considering the number of supporting petitioners in a petition for recall, which could be in the tens
of thousands as in the case at bench, the requirement ensures that each supporting petitioner is
aware of the pertinent details which will allow him/her to make an informed judgment before
affixing his/her signature on the signature sheet.
Dispensing with this requirement will only increase the chances of fraud as when
petitioners are made to sign a signature sheet without reading the contents of the petition and by
merely relying, for instance, on the verbal communication of the main petitioner or his/her
representative for the sake of expediency. It is, therefore, not an empty requirement but one that
serves an important practical purpose.
In the case at bench, the signature sheets show the following details at the top of each page:
Petition for recall of CELESTINO T. MARQUEZ

Name and position of official sought to be recalled
PANDI, BULACAN
Local government unit
Reason/s for recall LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
Brief narration of the reasons and justifications for filing of the petition
While there was failure to indicate petitioner's position in the signature sheets as required
by CR No. 7505, The Court agrees with the COMELEC that the indication of his position in the
petition itself is substantial compliance with the Rule. In fact, Section 70(2)( c) of R.A. No. 7160
merely requires his name and not his position. The mention of an official's position would,
however, be indispensable in a situation where two officials of the same local government unit
bear the same or similar name and hold different government positions.
In the case at bench, there is only one Mayor Celestino Marquez in Pandi, Bulacan. While
petitioner claims that a certain Henry Marquez is a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Pandi,
his name is too different to cause confusion among the petitioners. Further, if indeed he is more
known among his constituents by his nickname "Tinoy" rather than by his real name, the
petitioners would certainly not have affixed their signatures to the petition had they not known
who "Celestino Marquez" was.
As regards the failure to indicate a brief narration of the reasons and justifications for the
filing of the petition, while it may be ideal to reproduce the same verbatim in the signature sheets,
the brief statement "loss of trust and confidence" could encapsulate said grounds and may be
considered substantial compliance as long as the narration and discussion of the reasons and
justifications for the filing of the petition are present in the body thereof.
2
COLLEGE OF LAW
On the alleged failure to attach the original documents to the petition for recall, however,
the Court held that a petition which lacks an original signature sheet shall not be accepted. This
requirement applied even during the effectivity of CR No.7505 for important reasons.
Section 70(b)(2) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 8 of CR No. 7505 enumerate the required
contents of the petition while Section 10 of CR No.7505 lists the required attachments thereto.
The fact that the signatures of the supporting petitioners form part of the enumeration in Section
8 of CR No. 7505 is a clear indication that the signature sheets are not mere attachments to the
petition for recall but are an integral part thereof and are as indispensable as the page that
contains the signature of the main petitioner himself. The aforementioned provisions do not treat
the signature of the main petitioner and those of the supporting petitioners differently. The term
"supporting" does not render the signatures of the supporting petitioners any less important than
that of the main petitioner. On the contrary, all petitioners are on equal _footing in a petition for
recall because it is the required number of signatures which determines the sufficiency of the
petition. Lacking such, the petition necessarily fails. The clear and unequivocal wording of Section
70(b )(3) of R.A. No. 7160, as amended by R.A. No. 9244, provides that '[t]he Comelec shall,
within fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition, certify to the sufficiency of the required
number of signatures. Failure to obtain the required number of signatures automatically nullifies
the petition.'
3
COLLEGE OF LAW
AES Watch, Buklod Pamilya, Capitol Christian Leadership, Citizens'

Crime Watch, Connecting Businessmen In The Marketplace To Christ,
Case Title
One Vote Our Hope, Upper Room Brethren Church Vs. Commission On
Elections (Comelec), Smartmatic Total Information Management
Date December 09, 2020
Relevant
RA No. 8436 Automated Election System
Topic/s
The COMELEC is vested with the constitutional power and function to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
DOCTRINE an election." Among its powers is the promulgation of rules and regulations
of election laws. It exercises discretion on how certain aspects of elections
are implemented.
FACTS:
In 1997, Republic Act (RA) No. 84362 authorized the COMELEC to adopt an automated
election system (AES) using appropriate technology for voting and electronic devices to count
votes and canvass or consolidate results. In 2007, RA No. 93693 amended the provisions of RA
No. 8436 allowing the COMELEC to use a paper-based or a direct recording electronic election
system as it may deem appropriate and practical. The changes also provided the minimum
system capabilities, and required the authentication of electronically transmitted election results.
Accordingly, the COMELEC implemented a paper-based AES technology and utilized
optical mark reader machines in the 2010,2013,2016, and 2019 National Elections. Specifically,
the COMELEC used the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines in 2010, and 2013, and
the Vote-Counting Machines (VCM) in 2016 and 2019. In these national elections, the members
of the electoral board8 are assigned with an iButton security key and a personal identification
number (PIN), which they must use in initiating the voting machines to accept the paper ballots
and in closing them to print and transmit elections results.
On April 24, 2019 or days before the May 13, 2019 National Elections, AES-WATCH, et
al. filed a petition for mandamus seeking the COMELEC to faithfully implement the directive in
Bagumbayan case. They claimed that the COMELEC had not adopted measures for the VVPAT's
"auditability" and proposed a "camerambola"
On May 2, 2019, United Filipino Consumers & Commuters, Froilan M. Dollente, and
Teofilo Parilla intervened in the case. They supported AES-WATCH, et al., and urged the
COMELEC to submit a complete list of the Media Access Control (MAC) and Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses in the 2019 National Elections. On May 10, 2019, Bagumbayan-VNP Movement
Inc. likewise intervened.
On May 22, 2019, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
averred that the conclusion of the 2019 National Elections mooted the petition.
Alternatively, the OSG claimed that AES-WATCH, et al. have no legal standing to file the
petition for lack of material interest and that mandamus will not lie because COMELEC had yet to
respond to the letter/request on their queries.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not AES-WATCH, et al. have a legal standing to file the petition for lack of
material interest because COMELEC had yet to respond to the letter/request on their
queries.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC unjustifiably neglects the performance of a duty enjoined
by law on the matter of VVPAT requirement.
HELD:
1. AES-WATCH, et al. and Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. have legal standing but not
United Filipino Consumers & Commuters.
Legal standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in the Rules
of Civil Procedure. The question as to real party in interest is whether he is the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
4
COLLEGE OF LAW
Here, AES-WATCH, et al. assail the constitutionality of the prohibition on poll watchers
from taking photographs of the proceedings during the elections as well as the
COMELEC's compliance with the Bagumbayan ruling. However, they did not allege any
material injury or claim that they are poll watchers, registered voters, candidates, members
of a political party, or members of an accredited citizens group in the 2019 National
Elections. Nevertheless, we deem it proper to relax the requirement of legal standing given
AES-WATCH, et al.'s allegation that they are filing the petition as citizens.On the other
hand, United Filipino Consumers & Commuters failed to establish that they have the
requisite personal and substantial interest. They did not sustain any direct injury or is in
danger of suffering any damages from the assailed COMELEC actions. They were silent
in what capacity they are seeking for intervention. They claimed that the issues are of
"transcendental importance," but failed to allege any interest in the outcome of the case.39
Hence, their motion to intervene must be denied.
2. Petitioners and intervenors failed to show that the COMELEC unjustifiably neglects the
performance of a duty enjoined by law.
Foremost, the COMELEC is vested with the constitutional power and function to "enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." Among its
powers is the promulgation of rules and regulations of election laws. It exercises discretion
on how certain aspects of elections are implemented. This is explicit in the following
provisions of RA No. 8436, as amended, by RA No. 9369, thus:
SEC. 13. Continuity Plan. - The AES shall be so designed to include a continuity plan in
case of a systems breakdown or any such eventuality which shall result in the delay,
obstruction or nonperformance of the electoral process. Activation of such continuity and
contingency measures shall be undertaken in the presence of representatives of political
parties and citizens' arm of the Commission who shall be notified by the election officer of
such activation.
Here, the petitioners and intervenors failed to show that the COMELEC unjustifiably
neglects the performance of a duty enjoined by law. They maintain that the COMELEC
did not adhere to the Bagumbayan ruling on the matter of VVPAT requirement. As a
solution, they propose the "camerambola" method. However, a comparison of the
dispositive portion of the Bagumbayan case and the COMELEC guidelines in the 2019
National Elections reveals the futility of their theory. As held in the Bagumbayan, the
VVPAT requirement is substantially complied with when the voter's receipt is printed, and
the voter can physically verify his or her vote.
5
COLLEGE OF LAW
ANGKLA: Ang Partido ng mga Pilipining Marino, Inc. (ANGKLA), and

Case Title Serbisyo sa Bayan Party (SBP) vs Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Commissioners
Citation GR No. 246816
Date September 15, 2020
Relevant
Party-list System; Constitutionality of RA 7941
Topic/s
Round 1:
a. The participating parties, organizations or coalitions shall be ranked from
highest to lowest based on the number of votes they each garnered in the
party-list election.
b. Each of those receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to and guaranteed one seat each.
Rationale: The statute references a two-percent (2%) threshold. The one-
seat guarantee based on this arithmetical computation gives substance to
this threshold.
Round 2, Part 1:
a. The percentage of votes garnered by each of the parties, organizations
and coalitions is multiplied by the remaining available seats after Round 1.
All party-list participants shall participate in this round regardless of the
percentage of votes they garnered36
b. The party-list participants shall be entitled to additional seats based on
the product arrived at in (a). The whole integer of the product corresponds
to a party's share in the remaining available seats. Fractional seats shall not
be awarded.
Rationale: This formula gives flesh to the proportionality rule in relation to
the total number of votes obtained by each of the participating party,
organization, or coalition.
c. A Party-list shall be awarded no more than two (2) additional seats.
Rationale: The three-seat cap in the statute is to be observed.
Round 2, Part 2:
DOCTRINE
a. The party-list party, organization or coalition next in rank shall be allocated
one additional seat each until all available seats are completely distributed.
b. Rationale: This algorithm endeavors to complete the 20% composition for
party-list representation in the House of Representatives.
FOUR-INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under
the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system
are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats;
that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total
number of votes."
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives." (Republic Act
No. 7941, Section 2)
6
COLLEGE OF LAW
FACTS:
Petitioners ANGKLA: Ang Partido Ng Mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc., (ANGKLA) and
Serbisyo sa Bayan Party (SBP) and Petitioner-in-Intervention Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig
ng Masa (AKMA-PTN) essentially assert that the allocation of additional seats in proportion to a
party-list's "total number of votes" results in the double-counting of votes in favor of the two-
percenters. For the same votes which guarantee the two-percenters a seat in the first round of
seat allocation are again considered in the second round. The proviso purportedly violates the
equal protection clause, hence, is unconstitutional.
The petitioners prays that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) be enjoined from
double-counting the votes in favor of the two-percenters. Instead, the 2% votes counted in the
first round should first be excluded before proceeding to the second round of seat allocation which
is consistent with the Court's Resolution in Barangay Association For National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) vs COMELEC.
On May 22, 2019, the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) declaring the winning party-
list groups in the May 13, 2019 elections. Based on the National Canvass Report and adhering to
the Court's pronouncement in BANAT, respondent COMELEC distributed sixty-one (61)
congressional seats among the following parties, organizations, and coalitions taking part in the
May 13, 2019 party-list election. Additionally, the National Canvass Report No. 8 revealed that
the four (4) parties, organizations, and coalitions taking part in the May 13,2019 party-list election
with the next highest votes were (1) (AKMA-PTM); (2) SBP; (3) ANGKLA; and (4) Akbayan
Citizens Action Party.
In view of this development, the aforenamed petitioners amended their petition to
additionally seek the annulment of NBOC Resolution on ground that it supposedly violated the
Court's Resolution in BANAT Case. They also pray that the COMELEC be directed to proclaim
that they are entitled to at least a seat each in the May 13, 2019 party-list election based on their
proposed framework for seat distribution, whereby AKMA-PTM, SBP, ANGKLA and AKBAYAN
would allegedly be entitled to one (1) seat each to be taken from, or at the expense of, the seats'
allocated to BAYAN MUNA, 1 PACMAN, MARINO, and PROBINSYANO AKO.
Since the remaining votes of 1 PACMAN, MARINO and PROBINSYANO AKO, on the one
hand, are fewer than those garnered by petitioners AKMA-PTM, SBP and ANGKLA, the latter
should be prioritized in the second round of seat distribution. Accordingly, 1 PACMAN, MARINO
and PROBINSYANO AKO should not have been allocated a second seat on top of the first
guaranteed; their supposed second seats should have been awarded to petitioners. Applying the
same formula, the third seat allocated to BAYAN MUNA must also be forfeited, allowing
AKBAYAN representation in the House of Representatives.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) defends the position of the COMELEC on the
following grounds: (1) there is no double-counting since the system of counting, pertains to two
(2) different rounds and for two (2) different purposes; (2) there was no violation of equal
protection clause as the two-percenters have a clearer mandate of the people than the non-two-
percenter; (3) the petitioner mislead the Court in claiming that its Resolution in BANAT supports
their proposed framework; and (4) Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 does not defeat the rationale
behind the party-list system.
ISSUES:
1. Whether RA 7941 allocating additional seats to party-list in proportionate to their total
number of votes is unconstitutional.
2. Whether the ANGKLA, SBP and AKMA-PTN are entitled for a seat.
HELD:
NO. The Constitution mandates that the party-list system shall compose twenty percent
(20%) of the total membership in the House of Representatives. But the matter on how party-lists
could qualify for a seat is left to the wisdom of the legislature. Its features preclude the allocation
of seats based solely on absolute proportionality (1) to bar any single party-list party, organization
or coalition from dominating the party-list system, and (2) to ensure maximization of the allotment
of 20% of seats in the House of Representatives to party-list representatives.
RA 7941 ordains a two-tiered seat allocation wherein those who reach the 2% threshold
7
COLLEGE OF LAW
are guaranteed seat in the first round and get to keep their votes intact for the first stage of the
second round. To recall, the original application of RA 7941 in Veterans limited the allocation of
guaranteed and additional seats to two-percenters alone. Though the Court opened the system
to non-two percenters, this was only to abide by the 20% composition decreed by the Constitution.
Given the reasonable distinction between two-percenters and non-two-percenters, the Court sees
no cogent reason to nullify their advantage.
Petitioners are mistaken in claiming that the retention of the 2% votes in the second round
of seat allocation is unconstitutional. All votes, whether cast in favor of two-percenters and non-
two-percenters, are counted once. The perceived "double-counting of votes" does not offend the
equal protection clause – it is an advantage given to two-percenters based on substantial
distinction that the rule of law has long acknowledged and confirmed.
Just because a party-list was allocated a guaranteed seat and an additional seat does not
mean that its votes were counted twice. It just means that the party-list concerned surpassed the
proportional thresholds prescribed under the law in both rounds of seat allocation. Similarly, just
because a party-list is not awarded a guaranteed seat or an additional does not mean that its
votes were not counted. Failure of a party-list to obtain a seat only means one thing - it lost the
elections. It was outvoted or outperformed by other party-lists. It was simply left without a seat in
the game of musical chairs. Under these circumstances, their remedy is not to wrest others of
their allocated seats by changing the rules of the game, but by doing better in the subsequent
elections.
In addition as has been stated by the Honorable Court, there is no Constitutional
requirement for absolute proportional representation in the allocation of party-lists seats. The term
"proportional", by its very nature, means that it is relative. It cannot be successfully argued that
the current formula for allocating party-list seats is not proportional. What the petitioners seek, or
at least what they are impliedly seeking, is absolute proportionality. Such absolute proportionality
is neither mandated by the Constitution nor the law. Much less can it be effected through a flawed
formula such as that proposed by the Petitioners.
NO. RA 7941 was enacted in 1995. In 2009, the Court settled the interpretation of Section
11(b) in BANAT. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that, thereafter, petitioner ANGKLA
was proclaimed as a winning party-list organization in the 2013 and 2016 party-list elections. On
the other hand, SBP garnered enough votes to secure a congressional seat in 2016. Petitioners
ANGKLA and SBP had therefore benefited from the BANAT doctrine in the previous elections. In
fact, SBP itself, being among the winning party-list groups in the 2016 elections impleaded as
respondent in An Waray v. COMELEC, even defended the application of the BANAT formula.
Petitioners knew and still know how they had ended up to obtain party-list seats - through
the BANAT formula. They knew and still know the BANAT rule, by heart. They knew and still know
what this rule entails. Petitioners consist of knowledgeable individuals, not ones who accidentally
or luckily became legislators, but ones who through tactics and strategies became party-list
representatives in Congress.
In any event, had petitioners believed in good faith that the BANAT formula was and still
is inapplicable and invalid, they should have early on refused their seats as a result of this formula
and contested its constitutionality, if only to show that this issue is essential to a resolution of their
claims.
To repeat, the Court may deny redress despite the litigant establishing a clear right and
availing of the proper remedy if it appears that said litigant acted unfairly or recklessly in respect
to the matter in which redress is sought, or where the litigant has encouraged, invited, or
contributed to the injury sustained.
8
COLLEGE OF LAW
Case Title Mayor Rovelyn E. Villamor vs Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

Citation GR No. 250370,
Date October 5, 2021
Relevant
Misrepresentation in Certificate of Candidacy
Topic/s
Section 74 of Omnibus Election Code - The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized
city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
DOCTRINE permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy
are true to the best of his knowledge.
Section 78 of Omnibus Election Code - A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing not later than fifteen days before the election.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mayor Rovelyn Villamor filed her Certificate of Candicacy (CoC) for Mayor in
Lagangilang, Abra for the 2019 National and Local Elections. She stated therein that (1) she has
been a resident of the Lagangilang, Abra for almost thirty-seven (37) years; (2) she is a Filipino
citizen and not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country; and (3) she is
eligible for the position she seeks to be elected to.
Private respondent and rival candidate Antonio Viernes filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course/Cancel CoC against Villamor due to the latter's false misrepresentation that as she is
neither a resident of their locality nor a Filipino citizen. Respondent Viernes supported his claim,
presenting a photocopy of Villamor's American passport and pointed to Villamor's failure to attach
her sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship to her CoC.
Petitioner Villamor won and was proclaimed as Mayor of Lagangilang, Abra. In her
answer, she averred that she has duly complied with all the requirements for the reacquisition of
her Filipino citizenship under Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 prior to filing her CoC and that the
documents pertaining her reacquisition was attached to the CoC she filed before the local Election
Officer.
She insisted that it is accurate as to her declaration of residence as she already deducted
the period of her stay in the United States (US); argued that the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) has no jurisdiction to deny due course or cancel her CoC as there was no prior
authoritative declaration against her qualifications for the office for which she seeks to be elected
to.
The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution in favor of respondent Viernes on
the ground of false material representation as to her residence. That she was considered to have
abandoned her domicile of origin being naturalized in foreign country. It declared that in the
absence of contrary proof, petitioner Villamor was presumed to have retained her status as a
permanent resident of the US, her domicile of choice, notwithstanding her reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship.
In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner Villamor maintained that Lagangilang, Abra
9
COLLEGE OF LAW
remained to be her domicile of choice as manifested by her acts and transactions in the town
even after she become naturalized US citizen. However, the same was denied.
Aggrieved, petitoner Villamor filed this special civil action and prohibition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the cancellation of
Villamor's CoC on the ground of false representation.
2. Whether there was no false material misrepresentation.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court finds that COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
ordered the cancellation of petitioner Villamor's CoC without any prior determination of whether
or not she had intended to deceive or mislead the electorate.
Section 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) govern the cancellation of, and
grant or denial of due course to CoCs; their combined application requires that the facts provided
by the candidate in his CoC be true, under pain of denial or cancellation of the CoC if any false
representation of a material fact is made.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, however, a false representation under Section
78 must also consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Otherwise stated, it must be made with a malicious intent
to deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's qualifications for public office.
Verily, the lawmakers contemplated Section 78 to cover CoCs filed in bad faith to limit the
power granted to COMELEC. Intent to deceive is thus an integral element of the material
misrepresentation under Section 78 of the OEC.
Here, there is nothing in the assailed Resolutions showing COMELEC's determination of
whether Villamor had intended to deceive or mislead the electorate. This omission constitutes
grave abuse of discretion. In fact, records reveal that Villamor never hid the fact of her
naturalization as an American citizen or the date when she renounced the same. Villamor's
Certificate of Naturalization, the Order of Approval of her application for citizenship re-acquisition,
Identification Certificate, and Affidavit of Renunciation all appear to have been submitted to, and
received by, the local Election Officer. Further, in computing the number of years of her residence
in Lagangilang, Abra, i.e., 36 years and 8 months prior to the 13 May 2019 elections, Villamor
excluded the period of her stay in the U.S. This, to our minds, negate the existence of bad faith.
Rather, it was a mere error or mistake by Villamor on a difficult question of law as to residency,
which, in turn, may be the basis of good faith.
10
COLLEGE OF LAW
ALDRIN MADREO VS. LUCILO R. BAYRON

Case Title
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. LUCILO R. BAYRON
G.R. No. 237330
Citation
G.R. No. 237579
November 3, 2020
Date
November 3, 2020
Relevant
Doctrine of Condonation
Topic/s
The Supreme Court elucidates the applicability of the Condonation Doctrine,
otherwise known as the Aguinaldo Doctrine, following its abandonment in
DOCTRINE Carpio-Morales vs. Binay in 2016.The Court emphasized that elected public
officials, re-elected on or after April 12, 2016, can no longer avail the
doctrine as defense for previous misconduct.
FACTS:
During the 2013 elections, Lucilo won as the Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. He
assumed office on 30 June 2013. On 1 July 2013, the City Government of Puerto Princesa,
represented by Lucilo as city mayor, entered into a Contract of Services with Lucilo's son, Karl
Bayron (Karl), engaging the latter as Project Manager for Bantay Puerto-VIP Security Task Force,
with a monthly compensation of P16,000.00, from 1 July 2013 to 31 December 2013.
On 22 November 2013, Aldrin Madreo (Madreo) filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Lucilo and Karl
before the OMB, charging them with the following:(1) Administrative offenses of Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty; Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Officer and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, 4; and (2) Criminal offenses of Nepotism, Perjury,
Falsification of Public Documents, and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019
The 2015 Recall Election. On 8 May 2015 and during the pendency of the proceedings, a recall
election was held for the position of city mayor of Puerto Princesa. After the casting and counting
of the votes, Lucilo was proclaimed as the winner and duly elected mayor of Puerto Princesa City.
On 22 June 2015, Lucilo, through his counsel, filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss, praying for the dismissal of the administrative complaint in light of his proclamation as
the winner of the recall election. He asserted that re-election to office operates as a condonation
of the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefrom.
ISSUE:
Whether condonation doctrine is still applicable in this case
HELD:
The doctrine of condonation first enunciated in the 1959 En Banc ruling in Pascual v.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecij1 and reiterated in Aguinaldo v. Santos, hence also known as
Aguinaldo doctrine, states that an elected public official cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove
him therefor.
This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot, however, apply to criminal acts which
the re-elected official may have committed during his previous term. The Court also clarified that
the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no
sovereign will to disenfranchise.
It bears noting that the condonation doctrine was abandoned in Carpio-Morales primarily
on the grounds that there was no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this
jurisdiction, and for being contrary to the present Constitution's mandate of holding all public
officials and employees accountable to the people at all times. However, Carpio-Morales was also
clear that the abandonment of the condonation doctrine shall be "prospective in application for
the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines."
Notwithstanding that the Court had already declared that the abandonment of the
condonation doctrine is to be applied prospectively from 12 April 2016, the OMB asserts that the
11
COLLEGE OF LAW
doctrine still does not apply to Lucilo because the administrative case against him was already
pending before its office prior to the finality of Carpio-Morales. Pursuant to its Office Circular No.
17 dated 11 May 2016, the OMB maintains that it could still resolve the case and has in fact
decided the same on 18 November 2016.
The doctrine of condonation, however, cannot be extended to Lucilo's re-election during
the May 2016 elections. By then, the doctrine had already been abandoned, and his re-election
no longer had the effect of condoning his previous misconduct.
12
COLLEGE OF LAW
Case Title Marcos vs. Robredo

Citation PET Case No. 005
Date February 16, 2021
Relevant
Election Protest
Topic/s
In failure of election cases, pre-proclamation controversies, and election
contests, the specificity in bases and allegations are required. Specific
DOCTRINE allegations of the essential grounds are a must in order to justify the exercise
of these extraordinary remedies. Otherwise, the COMELEC may outright
dismiss the petitions for lack of merit.
FACTS:
Protestant Marcos and Protestee Robredo were 2 of 6 vice presidential candidates during
the May 9, 2016 elections. Robredo garnered 14,418,817 votes while Marcos garnered
14,155,344 votes, giving protestee a slim margin of only 263,472 votes over protestant.
Protestant filed an election protest premised on 2 causes of action. First cause of action
states that the proclamation of Robredo as the vice president is null and void due to the COCs
(Certificate of Canvass) generated by the CCS (Consolidation and Canvass System (CCS) are
not authentic and cannot be the basis of the number of votes for Vice President
Second Cause of action states that Massive electoral fraud, anomalies, and irregularities
compromised and corrupted the conduct of the elections and the election results for the position
of VP in the protested precints.
In her Verified Answer with Special and Affirmative Defended and Counter-Protest,
protestee alleged that the Protest failed to provide the specific acts or ommissions that led to
electoral frauds, anomalies, or irregularities in the clustered precincts. In her counter-protest,
protestee contested the election results gathered from 7,547 clustered precincts in 13 provinces,
alleging that vote-buying, intimidation, substitution, and other irregularities occurred in the said
provinces during the 2016 national and local elections.
During the preliminary conference, the Tribunal added a third cause of action, the
Annulment of Election for the position of Vice President in the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao
Del Sur, and Basilan. The Tribunal limited the issues to Marcos’ second and third causes of action.
It then directed the revision of ballots, beginning with protestant’s designated pilot provinces,
which were Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros Oriental.
The said pilot provinces would serve as test cases and the revision results would
determine if the Tribunal would proceed with the revision of Ballots in the remaining contested
clustered precincts. The revision and appreciation of the 5,415 clustered precincts in the pilot
provinces lead to the following results:
As to Robredo, she had a total vote of 12,926,159 representing the votes in the clustered
precincts other than the pilot clustered precincts. A total of 1,510,178 were then added to her total
votes, representing the votes from the pilot clustered precincts. Giving Robredo a total of
14,236,337 votes after the revision and appreciation of the ballots from the piloc clustered
precints.
As to Marcos, he had a total vote of 13,953,259 representing the votes in the clustered
precincts other than the pilot clustered precincts. A total of 204,512 were then added to his total
votes, representing the votes from the pilot clustered precincts. Giving Marcos a total of
14,157,771 votes after the revision and appreciation of the ballots from the pilot clustered
precincts.
The final tally lead to the lead of protestee over protestant from 263,473 to 278,566 votes.
ISSUES:
1. WON Marcos has sufficiently shown reasonable recovery of votes after the revision and
appreciation of ballots from the 3 pilot provinces.
2. WON unfavorable results of revision and appreciation of votes in the 2nd cause of action
moots protestant’s third cause of action of annulment of election.
3. WON the 2010 Presidential Electoral Tribunal Rules allows for different pilot provinces per
cause of action.
13
COLLEGE OF LAW
4. WON the grant of the 3rd cause of action will result in the calling of a special elections for
the position of vice president and all other local and national candidates.
HELD:
The Court, in resolving the issues, first discussed the requirement for the specificity of
allegations in election protests. The results of an election may be challenged through different
legal vehicles: first, failure of election cases; second, pre-proclamation petitions; and third,
election contests. These have substantive and procedural differences, with varying remedies, but
what remains consistent across all modalities is the requirement of specificity.
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, a failure of election may be
declared if, "on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes
the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or . . . such election results in a failure
to elect, [or] in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of
the election[.]"
In a pre-proclamation controversy, the issues provide in Section 243 of the Omnibus
Election code may be raised, which are restrictive and exclusive. Such issues include:
a. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
b. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in the
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Section 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code;
c. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or
they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
d. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed,
the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or
candidates.
Under the Automated Election System, pre-proclamation controversies cover only two
issues, both concerning the Board of Canvassers: (a) its illegal composition; and (b) its illegal
proceedings.
Finally, election contests, which only contemplate post-election scenarios, take the form
of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto. An election protest involves "a contest
between the defeated and winning candidates on the grounds of fraud or irregularities in the
casting and counting of ballots, or in the preparation of the returns." On the other hand, a petition
for quo warranto is defined as "an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully
holds or exercises a public office."
Jurisprudence discussing failure of election cases, pre-proclamation controversies, and
election contests reveals that specificity in bases and allegations has always been critical to their
appraisal. The same is true of pre-proclamation controversies and protests before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal. Basic wisdom underlies the need for specific allegations before entertaining
pleas to set aside election outcomes. "The power to annul an election should be exercised with
the greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will." A protest wanting
in specific factual footing must be dismissed; "otherwise, the assumption of an elected public
official may, and will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate."
Despite the fact that this Protest could have been dismissed under Rule 21 of the
Tribunal’s rules, the Court painstakingly heard every argument to afford the parties due process.
However, the protestant’s claims under his causes of action were not only unsubstantiated, but
did to contain, nor submit a single supporting affidavit. Unsubstantiated allegations amount to
nothing more than "mere doubts, fears and apprehensions" which deserve scant consideration.
"These doubts, fears, and expressions of probability are not actionable. They do not constitute a
cause of action simply because they are not yet in the realm of a wrong which is the essence of
a cause of action.
In election protests before this Tribunal, the mandatory ceiling in designating pilot
provinces is three. Failure to show substantial recovery of votes in these pilot provinces entails
the protest's dismissal. The imposition of the mandatory ceiling in pilot provinces to serve as a
litmus test of the allegations in this protest. When no substantial recovery of votes in the pilot
provinces is shown, the election protest must be dismissed. After examining the revision of the
14
COLLEGE OF LAW
ballots of protestant’s designated pilot provinces, namely Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros
Oriental, the Protestant failed to show any substantial recovery of votes. In fact, the revision of
the ballots lead to the further increase in the lead of the protestee over the protestant. Hence,
protestant failed to make out his case through his designated pilot provinces. Thus, this Protest
must be dismissed.
Lastly, the power to annul election results rests within the electoral tribunals. This power
is "an incident of the judicial function of electoral tribunals," and an indispensable consequence
of the constitutional mandate of electoral tribunals to decide all election contests within their
jurisdiction. The following requirements must concur to annul an election:
1. The illegality of the ballots must affect more than fifty percent (50%) of the votes cast
on the specific precinct or precincts sought to be annulled, or in the case of the entire
municipality, more than fifty percent (50%) of its total precincts and the votes cast
therein;
2. It is impossible to distinguish with reasonable certainty between the lawful and unlawful
ballots; and
3. Evidence presented which will directly point to protestee as the one responsible for
the incidents which allegedly happened before and during the elections.
On the other hand, it is the Commission on Elections that can declare a failure of elections.
Republic Act No. 6388, or the 1971 Election Code, provided the following grounds to proclaim a
failure of elections: (1) force majeure; (2) violence; (3) terrorism; or (4) fraud.
Failing to make out his case through his designated pilot provinces Camarines Sur, Iloilo,
and Negros Oriental-protestant cannot now insist on the annulment of the election results in
Lanao de! Sur, Maguindanao, and Basilan. The Rules explicitly direct the forthwith dismissal of
his Protest "without further consideration of the other provinces mentioned in the protest." A resort
to his third cause of action can no longer be had.
15
COLLEGE OF LAW
RADAMES F. HERRERA v. NOEL P. MAGO, SIMEON B. VILLACRUSIS,

Case Title
AND JOSE R. ASIS, JR.
Date January 15, 2020
Relevant
Abandonment of Condonation Doctrine
Topic/s
In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular
constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction,
DOCTRINE there is no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies
condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic
and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation.
FACTS:
On January 9, 2015, respondents Noel Mago, Simeon Villacrusis, and Jose Asis, Sr., all
residents of the Municipality of Vinzons, filed a Complaint¬ Affidavit (with Urgent Prayer for
Preventive Suspension) against petitioner. They accused petitioner of disregarding the ethical
standards of public officials and gravely abusing his position when he facilitated the release of the
RATA differential for the four (4) former councilors despite the refusal/reservations of the
municipal accountant, municipal treasurer, and municipal budget officer. Notably, Municipal
Accountant Leonilo Pajarin still issued Obligation Request No. 713-12-13-2722 because
petitioner told him "Ipaparelease ko yan at ako na ang may sagot kung idis-allow yan ng COA."
Petitioner was guilty of grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of law, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, and violation of the rules and regulations on the disbursement of
public funds because of his act of illegally releasing the RATA differentials to the four (4) former
councilors.
The petitioner argues that his alleged illegal acts were committed sometime between 2013
and 2014. He was re-elected as Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Vinzons, Camarines Norte in
the 2016 national and local elections, thus, he was already exonerated of the charges per the
"Aguinaldo doctrine." The "Binay doctrine," which abandoned the "Aguinaldo doctrine," only has
prospective application, that is, it only covers administrative charges from November 10, 2015
onward.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent election or appointment of petitioner condones the prior
misconduct.
HELD:
Petitioner can no longer avail of the condonation doctrine. The condonation doctrine had
been considered as good law since then until November 10, 2015 when the Court promulgated
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts
would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be
sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular constituency
chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to
conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say
that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation
of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then
the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at
the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a
constitutional or statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it
cannot be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re¬electing a local official,
are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded
or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such
presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule. Besides, it is contrary to human experience
that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman
16
COLLEGE OF LAW
correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy,
and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up,
and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes. At a conceptual level,
condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned.
Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
In Crebello v. Ombudsman, it was underscored that the prospective application of Carpio-
Morales should be reckoned from April 12, 2016 because that was the date on which the Supreme
Court had acted upon and denied with finality the motion for clarification/motion for partial
reconsideration thereon.
Verily, petitioner can no longer avail of the condonation doctrine because although the
complaint below was instituted on January 9, 2015, he got reelected only on May 9, 2016, well
within the prospective application of Carpio-Morales.
17
COLLEGE OF LAW
CHRISTIAN C. HALILI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PYRA

LUCAS, and CRISOSTOMO GARBO, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
Case Title MARINO P. MORALES vs.
PYRA LUCAS and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
CHRISTIAN C. HALILI and CRISOSTOMO GARBO, Respondents-
Intervenors.
G. R. No. 231657
Citation
G.R. No. 231643
Date January 15, 2019
Relevant Three-term limit rule; Conversion of municipality into city does not
Topic/s interrupt the term of an incumbent official
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
DOCTRINE serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
FACTS:
Petitioner Marino P. Morales (Morales) was elected and served as Mayor of the
Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010. He was elected again
as mayor during the 2010 elections.
On 15 May 2012, or during Morales' second term, Congress passed Republic Act No.
(RA) 10164,5 converting the Municipality of Mabalacat into a component city. Thereafter, a
plebiscite was held. In the 2013 elections, Morales ran again and was elected as mayor of the
new Mabalacat City.
On 8 December 2015, Morales filed his Certificate of Candidacy6 (COC) for the 2016
elections for the position of mayor of Mabalacat City, as substitute candidate for Wilfredo Feliciano
of Aksyon Demokratiko Party.
On 4 January 2016, respondent Pyra Lucas (Lucas), also a candidate for the position of
mayor of Mabalacat City, filed a Petition for Cancellation of the COC and/or Disqualification of
Morales for the Mayoral Position of Mabalacat City. Lucas alleged that Morales was disqualified
to run for mayor, since he was elected and had served three consecutive terms prior to the 2016
elections. Lucas also alleged that the conversion of the Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat
City did not interrupt Morales' service for the full term for which he was elected.
Morales claimed that his candidacy did not violate the three-term limit rule, because the
conversion of the Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat City interrupted his term. According to
him, his term as mayor of Mabalacat City is not a continuation of his term as mayor of the
Municipality of Mabalacat.
In a Resolution dated 3 August 2016, the COMELEC First Division granted the petition,
cancelled Morales' COC, and ordered the proclamation of the qualified mayoralty candidate with
the next higher number of votes.
In a Resolution dated 26 May 2017, the COMELEC En Banc denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Morales.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the three-term limit rule shall apply despite the conversion of the
municipality into a city.
HELD:
The three-term limit rule shall apply.
The three-term limit rule is embodied in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, to
wit:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
18
COLLEGE OF LAW
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
It is restated in Section 43 of the Local Government Code, thus:
Section 43. Term of Office.- (a) x x x.
b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
xxxx
There are two conditions which must concur for the application of the disqualification of a
candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.
In a decided case, it was already ruled upon the same issue in the case of Latasa v.
COMELEC (Latasa), where the court held that the conversion of a municipality into a city does
not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official's continuity of service.It was held that to be
considered as interruption of service, the "law contemplates a rest period during which the local
elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit."
Thus, contrary to Morales' arguments, the territorial jurisdiction of Mabalacat City is the
same as that of the Municipality of Mabalacat. Also, the elective officials of the Municipality of
Mabalacat continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new
city officials.
Applying the ruling in Latasa, the delineation of the metes and bounds of Mabalacat City
did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Mabalacat.
Consequently, the inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected Morales to be their mayor
for three consecutive terms, and over whom he held power and authority as their mayor.
Accordingly, Morales never ceased from acting and discharging his duties and responsibilities as
chief executive of Mabalacat, despite the conversion of the Municipality of Mabalacat into
Mabalacat City.
19
COLLEGE OF LAW
Case Title NORMAN CORDERO MARQUEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Nuisance candidate; Lack of proof of financial capacity to sustain the
Relevant
financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign is a ground to declare an
Topic/s
aspirant for senator a nuisance candidate.
DOCTRINE
FACTS:
On October 15, 2018, petitioner Norman Cordero Marquez (Marquez) filed his Certificate
of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of senator in the May 13, 2019 national and local elections.
He is a resident of Mountain Province, a real estate broker, and an independent candidate.
On October 22, 2018, the COMELEC Law Department, motu proprio, filed a petition to declare
Marquez a nuisance candidate. The Law Department argued that: (1) Marquez was "virtually
unknown to the entire country except maybe in the locality where he resides;" and (2) though a
real estate broker, he, absent clear proof of financial capability, "will not be able to sustain the
financial rigors of a nationwide campaign."
Marquez countered that he: is the co-founder and sole administrator of Baguio Animal
Welfare (BAW), an animal advocacy group, and is thus, known in various social media and
websites; is a member of relevant task forces and advisory committees, is in regular consultations
with government offices to discuss animal welfare issues and concerns, has been interviewed in
television and radio shows, has travelled all over to promote his advocacy, and has received
donations and contributions from supporters.
He argues that the COMELEC should not discount "the potential for vastly untapped sector
of animal lovers, raisers and handlers, and the existing local and foreign benefactors and donors
who are willing and capable to subsidize the expenses of a social-media-enhanced national
campaign."
The COMELEC First Division on December 6, 2018, cancelled Marquez' CoC, citing this
Court's ruling in Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L.
Salimbangon (Martinez III) that "[i]n elections for national positions x x x the sheer logistical
challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for (he Commission to exercise
its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious
intention to mount a nationwide campaign."The amounts set forth in Section 13 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7166 "would at least require [Marquez] to prove that he can mount a viable nationwide
campaign" and "x x x running as an independent further decreases a candidate's chances with
even more limited resources at his disposal."
Marquez filed a motion for reconsideration which the COMELEC En Banc denied on
January 23, 2019. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMEEEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Marquez
a nuisance candidate for his failure to prove his financial capability to mount a nationwide
campaign.
HELD:
The Court finds that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. There is grave
abuse of discretion: (1) when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence;
or (2) when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal
bias. Both elements appear to be present in this case.
First, the Constitution, in providing for the qualification of Congressmen, sets forth only
age, citizenship, voting and residence qualifications. No property qualification of any kind is
thereunder required. Since the effect of Republic Act 4421 is to require of candidates for Congress
a substantial property qualification, and to disqualify those who do not meet the same, it goes
against the provision of the Constitution which, in line with its democratic character, requires no
property qualification for the right to hold said public office.
Freedom of the voters to exercise the elective franchise at a general election implies the
20
COLLEGE OF LAW
right to freely choose from all qualified candidates for public office. The imposition of unwarranted
restrictions and hindrances precluding qualified candidates from running is, therefore, violative of
the constitutional guaranty of freedom in the exercise of elective franchise. It seriously interferes
with the right of the electorate to choose freely from among those eligible to office whomever they
may desire.
Second, Section 13 of RA 7166 merely sets the current allowable limit on expenses of
candidates and political parties for election campaign. It does not (whether by intention or
operation) require a financial requirement for those seeking to run for public office, such that
failure to prove capacity to meet the allowable expense limits would constitute ground to declare
one a nuisance candidate.
The COMELEC's invocation of Section 13, without making explicit, by rule, the minimum
amount that meets the financial capacity requirement, is constitutionally anathema because it
violates the equal protection rights of Marquez and all of the other candidates it disqualified on
this ground. Since the COMELEC did not require all candidates for senator to declare the amount
of money they had, and were committed, to fund their campaign (whether evidenced by bank
certification, guarantee or standby-letter of credit, for instance), one wonders how the COMELEC
chose who to target for disqualification.
It seems the Legal Department employed a cookie-cutter motion, generally alleging lack
of financial capacity in a transparent attempt to shift the burden of proof upon the candidate,
without setting forth by rule the acceptable minimum financial capacity. This process puts an
unfair and impermissible burden upon the candidate.
Thus, The COMELEC cannot conflate the bona fide intention to run with a financial
capacity requirement. That is, a candidate's financial capacity to sustain the rigors of waging a
nationwide campaign does not necessarily equate to a bona fide intention to run for public office.
21
COLLEGE OF LAW
Case Title Cynthia Del Rosario, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al.

Date March 10, 2020
Relevant
Pebliscite; Referendum
Topic/s
The Constitution does not establish prior public consultation as a
prerequisite for the validity of a statute. Article XIII, Section 16, as cited by
DOCTRINE petitioners, is a protection against any action which serves to abridge the
right of people's organizations to "effective and reasonable participation at
all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making."
FACTS:
The provinces of Palawan del Norte, Palawan Oriental, and Palawan del Sur are appealing
Republic Act No. 11259, alleging that it contradicts their charters. On April 5, 2019, the proposal
was signed into law, and it will take effect on May 20, 2019. In fact, said petitioners, a qualified
voters of Puerto Princesa, have not participated in the elections for provincial officials of Palawan.
According to petitioners, this constituted a violation of the political right of the people of Palawan
to participate in public consultations on matters affecting their interest.
Respondents Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Government of Palawan counter that
the assailed statute was developed in coordination with the various offices of the provincial
government, as well as the municipal mayors and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members of
Palawan. They also claim that petitioner Cynthia del Rosario was even present during one of the
deliberations of the House of Representatives on the matter.
Respondents Commission on Elections and the Department of Budget and Management
argue that the passage of the statute did not disregard the right to participate in public
consultations on matters of the public interest, for the creation of the proposed provinces still
needs the approval of the electorate of Palawan.
The petition claims that RA No. 11259 has three flaws that render it unconstitutional: firstly,
it infringes the people's right to participate in public activities by enacting it into law. Second,
contrary to Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, it does not allow the voters of the City of
Puerto Princesa to vote in a scheduled ballot; and third, it provides for a significant change in the
distribution of proceeds from the development and use of national wealth between the three new
provinces and the cities directly underthe central government, as well as the existing bays.
Respondents Commission on Elections and the Department of Budget and Management
argue that the passage of the statute did not disregard the right to participate in public
consultations on matters of the public interest, for the creation of the proposed provinces still
needs the approval of the electorate of Palawan.
ISSUE:
Whether, until a city has been turned into a highly urbanized city (HUC), the voters of a
city that used to be a component city of a province are able to vote in a referendum for the partition
of that province
HELD:
YES. Sections 51, 52, and 54 of the assailed law provide:
SEC. 51 Plebiscite Regardless of whether or not the amount necessary for the conduct of
the plebiscite shall be charged against the appropriations of the present Province of Palawan.
SEC. 52. Commencement of Corporate Existence. The provinces of Palawan del Norte,
Palawan Oriental, and Palawan del Sur shall commence its corporate existence upon the election
and qualification of its provincial governor, provincial vice governor and majority of the members
of the sangguniang panlalawigan. The election of the provincial officials of the newly created
provinces shall be held on the second Monday of May in the year 2022.
SEC. 54 Residents of the City of Puerto Princesa. Regardless of whether or not the
Residents of the City of Puerto Princesa, as a highly urbanized city, will not be eligible to vote in
the plebiscite or for candidates for provincial elective positions.
Sections 51, 54, 58, 59, and 60 of the law can be considered to be in full force and effect,
22
COLLEGE OF LAW
as these provisions pertain to matters preparatory to the conduct of the plebiscite for the creation
of the three proposed provinces. These are the very provisions sought to be implemented by
respondents as they prepare for the conduct of the plebiscite this coming May. It is therefore
premature for this Court to make any declaration on the unconstitutionality of the law in toto, when
most of the provisions of the law have yet to take effect.
The Court agrees with the submissions of the respondents on the matter. Petitioners' long
but vacuous citation of various constitutional provisions and treaty instruments does not persuade.
The records of the case reveal that the proposed division of Palawan, as reflected in the assailed
statute, was in fact made in consultation with the people of Palawan, through their elected
representatives: the municipal mayors, municipal councilors, and the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as reflected in the transcripts of the consultative meeting,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan meetings, and resolutions from the municipal councils of Palawan.
Furthermore, the Constitution does not establish prior public consultation as a prerequisite for the
validity of a statute. Article XIII, Section 16, as cited by petitioners, is a protection against any
action which serves to abridge the right of people's organizations to "effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making."
The foregoing disquisitions make it abundantly clear that Puerto Princesa has become a
distinct political entity independent and autonomous from the province of Palawan, by virtue of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city in 2007. Hence, it can no longer be considered a "political
unit directly affected" by the proposed division of Palawan into three provinces; and perforce, the
qualified voters of the city of Puerto Princesa, including herein petitioners Cynthia S. Del Rosario,
Federico N. Virgo, Jr., Renato V. Baladad, Beatriz A. Dioso, and Corazon Manalon Davila were
properly excluded from the coverage of the plebiscite scheduled by RA No. 11259.
23
COLLEGE OF LAW
Case Title Ricardo Penson, et al. vs. COMELEC

Relevant
Jurisdiction of Senate Electoral Tribunal
Topic/s
It is the SET which has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
matters relating to the alleged irregularities in the canvassing of election
returns and nullity of the proclamation of the 12 winning senatorial
candidates. To delve on these matters would be to usurp on the clear,
complete and categorical authority bestowed upon the SET as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
DOCTRINE members of the Senate.
...the power of the SET is full, clear and complete. It excludes the exercise
of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or
curtail it or even affect the same. This is in recognition and faithful adherence
to the constitutional mandate that the Electoral Tribunal of each House of
Congress shall be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective members."
FACTS:
On December 2, 1997, the Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436 or the
"Election Modernization Act of 1997" in line with the State's policy to ensure a free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
One of the innovations introduced in R.A. No. 8436 is the concept of Automated Election
System (AES) or a system which uses appropriate technology for voting and electronic devices
to count votes and canvass/consolidate results. Pertinently, Section 6 of R.A. No. 8436 has
authorized the COMELEC to utilize an AES for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidation of results in the national and local elections.
Section 23 thereof further provides for the composition of the NBOC for Senators, which shall be
comprised of the Chairman and Members of the COMELEC sitting en banc. The mandate of the
NBOC for Senators is to canvass the results of the election and consequently, proclaim the
winners for the position of Senators.
On January 23, 2007, R.A. No. 8346 was amended by R.A. No. 9369 or the "Automation
Law." Among the provisions introduced by the amending law is a change in the mandate of the
COMELEC, now sitting as the NBOC for both Senators and Party-List Representatives, which
shall proclaim the winning candidates for both positions after consolidating the certificate of
canvass electronically transmitted.
Unlike in R.A. No. 8436, the AES in R.A. No. 9369 can either be paper-based10 or direct
recording election system depending on COMELEC's determination. In both cases, however, the
law mandates that there be a Random Manual Audit (RMA) in one precinct per congressional
district.
On May 13, 2013, the national and local elections were held.
After the May 13, 2013 national and local elections, the COMELEC-NBOC proceeded to
canvass the results by consolidating the electronically transmitted certificates of canvass.
True to the intent and spirit of R.A. No. 9369, is to have a fast and accurate result that is reflective
of the genuine will of the people, the COMELEC-NBOC issued the first assailed Resolution which
initially proclaimed the following senatorial candidates who garnered the most number of votes
during the May 13, 2013 elections. The initial proclamation of the aforesaid senatorial candidates
was based on COMELEC-NBOC's determination that the remaining number of votes that have
yet to be canvassed will not materially affect the votes obtained by the 12 winning candidates for
Senator. The COMELEC-NBOC issued the second assailed Resolution which officially declared
the 12 candidates as winners and thus proclaimed them as duly elected Senators of the Republic
of the Philippines.
On March 31, 2014, petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to nullify the
aforementioned NBOC Resolutions and Senatorial Canvass Report on the grounds that,
generally, COMELEC-NBOC committed grave abuse of discretion and that it failed to comply with
24
COLLEGE OF LAW
the Authentication of Electronically Transmitted Election Results.

Procedurally, the OSG asserts that the Court has no jurisdiction over the issues presented
by petitioners as the same fall within the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET), which
is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the Senate under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
Furthermore, the OSG propounds that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is not the proper remedy to assail the NBOC Resolutions because the same were not
issued by the COMELEC-NBOC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Petitioners likewise
failed to show that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to
question the assailed NBOC Resolutions. The OSG stressed that petitioners has available and
adequate remedy, that is, to file a petition before the SET. At any rate, even if the present petition
for certiorari is the proper remedy, the OSG points out that the same is dismissible outright for
being filed out of time.
ISSUE:
Whether Senate Electoral Tribute has the jurisdiction over the issues presented by the
petitioners.
HELD:
YES. The Court is constrained to dismiss the present petition.
Firstly, the jurisdiction of the SET to take cognizance over the instant petition, to the
exclusion of other tribunals, is clear. It is the SET which has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all matters relating to the alleged irregularities in the canvassing of election returns and
nullity of the proclamation of the 12 winning senatorial candidates. To delve on these matters
would be to usurp on the clear, complete and categorical authority bestowed upon the SET as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the Senate. As succintly held in Barbers, any pursuit by the Court to assume jurisdiction would
be tantamount to an encroachment of the constitutional functions of the SET.
Secondly, it cannot be overemphasized that a special civil action for certiorari is a limited
form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. The Court has often reminded members of the
bench and bar that this extraordinary action lies only where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to
a case fails to appeal a judgment to the proper forum despite the availability of that remedy,
certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the
court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of
power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the
decision, order or resolution.
Here petitioners should have timely filed an election protest before the SET, which We
stress is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, before invoking the Court's discretionary power
of judicial review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners failed to prove that the election
protest before the SET is an inadequate remedy that would not promptly relieve them from the
effects of the assailed COMELEC-NBOC's issuances. Thus, the existence and availability of such
remedy precludes them from resorting directly to this Court via a petition for certiorari.
All told, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain much less resolve, the matters raised in
the main petition and petition-in-intervention. The issues advanced therein are matters best
addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the SET, which has exclusive jurisdiction to
act on it. At the risk of being repetitive, the power of the SET is full, clear and complete. It excludes
the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or
even affect the same. This is in recognition and faithful adherence to the constitutional mandate
that the Electoral Tribunal of each House of Congress shall be the "sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members."
25

Case Digests in Election Law

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case Digests in Election Law

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case Digests in Election Law

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

COLLEGE OF LAW

Digested and compiled by:

Case Title Marquez v. COMELEC

b. The name, address and signature of the main petitioner's

Petition for recall of CELESTINO T. MARQUEZ

AES Watch, Buklod Pamilya, Capitol Christian Leadership, Citizens'

ANGKLA: Ang Partido ng mga Pilipining Marino, Inc. (ANGKLA), and

Case Title Mayor Rovelyn E. Villamor vs Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

ALDRIN MADREO VS. LUCILO R. BAYRON

Case Title Marcos vs. Robredo

RADAMES F. HERRERA v. NOEL P. MAGO, SIMEON B. VILLACRUSIS,

CHRISTIAN C. HALILI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PYRA

Case Title NORMAN CORDERO MARQUEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Case Title Cynthia Del Rosario, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al.

Case Title Ricardo Penson, et al. vs. COMELEC

the Authentication of Electronically Transmitted Election Results.

You might also like