The LUMUN Spirit

The LUMUN Spirit was first introduced as a concept at LUMUN XV. It sought to
reintroduce a recognition of the most essential components of MUN culture; imparting a
sense of responsibility accepting that the onus is on us to be the forerunners of change. The
fundamental premise of a Model UN is to develop our understanding of the issues and
conflicts in the world as a collective, and to connect individuals with vastly differing life
experiences with each other. The pursuit of quantitative success and accolades has fermented
a tradition of MUN being a space mired in hostility and distrust. The LUMUN Spirit is our
continuing effort to inculcate empathy, compassion, understanding and diplomacy within this
competitive activity.
As we proceed on our journey of revamping Model UN, the LUMUN Spirit is an idea
that we aspire to incorporate in the entire LUMUN experience: from the Host Team, to an
expectation that we will have from the delegates as well. It is not an abstract concept – it is a
vision that should embody the behavior of every delegate in every committee. Inside the
committee or out; the enthusiasm to meet other people, present arguments in a true
ambassadorial manner and the idea to enjoy LUMUN should never be forgotten. In this very
essence we will be able to represent what it means to simulate a true world model; an actual
representation of the United Nations. We continue to strive and ensure that the outlook of
LUMUN XVIII is to not be an average Model UN conference anymore.
And so, leadership and prowess within a committee is not characterized by exerting
one’s overbearing presence on others or by alienating and excluding others from discussion.
They manifest in a delegate’s ability to engage with others, help them play their part in the
committee, and to facilitate the committee as a whole to engage in a fruitful and informative
debate. This includes actions as simple as maintaining a moderate temperament, inviting
others’ input and operating with honesty and respect. The LUMUN Society invites you to
understand what it means to be an ambassador of a country and represent its foreign policy
means to employ collaboration alongside reasoned argumentation to press forward with that
actor’s policy agenda.
Dear Delegates, Coaches, and Faculty Advisors,

After two years of persevering behind laptop screens, it gives me immense pleasure to
welcome you all to the 19th iteration of the Annual LUMS Model United Nations Conference.

This year, LUMUN is simulating eleven exciting committees- including General

Assemblies, ECOSOCs, Specialized Bodies and Crisis Committees- with unique mandates and
structures that cover a wide range of international issues. Delegates will debate over the most
pressing global concerns, ranging from frozen conflicts to femicide- as they strive to faithfully
represent their country’s positions. In their struggles to arrive at a common solution, delegates
will learn the art of negotiation and compromise. But through it all, the delegates can be assured
of the LUMUN spirit, which endeavors to prioritize inclusivity and civility so that both novices
and veterans feel at home. And above all, delegates can look forward to making life-long
friendships and networking with the most resourceful individuals from across the country.
 LUMUN is scheduled to take place from 29th December, 2022 to 2nd January, 2023 at
the lively LUMS campus. This year marks a new beginning for LUMUN as we return to
welcome you all in person with warm hugs, exhilarating real-time debates, exciting social
events and delicious meals. We are bracing ourselves for an unprecedented level of intellect
expressed through meaningful discussions, based on the unique lived experiences over the past
2 years. Simultaneously, we hope to rejuvenate long-established traditions that have whittled
down through online conferences. We are excited to hand out lanyards to familiar and new
faces at the registration desk, see you laughing at the delegate lounge, counting down at New
Year’s Eve, and for so much more. This sentiment is captured in the theme for LUMUN this
year- ‘Tales of Survival, Hopes for Revival’.

As we meticulously prepare with each passing day, our hearts grow more eager to
welcome you all to LUMUN again!

Yours truly,

Sakina Zulfiqar Ali | Secretary-General 2022-2023

Dear Delegates,

It is my utmost joy and delight to welcome you all to the 19th edition of LUMS Model
United Nations. Our main aim for this year’s conference resides within our theme: Tales of
Survival, Hopes for Revival; we wish to rejuvenate the spirit of in-person MUN’s, and for that
purpose, we are absolutely thrilled to have you back on campus!

LUMUN’s core values have always centered around developing understanding and
garnering insight about issues the world is currently facing. Not only do we guarantee you an
exposure to global problems, but also an opportunity to hone a variety of your skills. LUMUN
has and will always be a growth experience; for the day you leave the conference, you will take
along with you in-depth international affairs knowledge and exceptional life lessons, but most
importantly, you will take along with you unparalleled memories and friends to last a lifetime,
so make the most out of your days here at LUMUN. We are working tirelessly to ensure the
most remarkable delegate experience for you, so buckle up, for this year, we are jam-packed
with intriguing debate topics, enlightening panel talk sessions and enthralling socials that you
will cherish for long.
 LUMUN is a piece of my heart; from learning valuable life lessons to making long
lasting friendships, I have had the time of my life here. I am Saliha Ahmed, Under Secretary
General for the General Assemblies (DISEC, SPECPOL, SOCHUM) and I am an Accounting
and Finance major at SDSB. I am a huge fan of young-adult fiction (books and movies) and I
am always up for a Harry Potter quiz :p I am a hobbyist writer as well, if you strike up a
conversation with me, maybe you’re lucky enough to read one of my excerpts. I am and will
be available throughout LUMUN to cater to any of your concerns and assist you in any way
possible.

I hope that this year’s LUMUN is a phenomenal experience for you, I hope that you
prosper in terms of knowledge and friendships, and I hope that when you go back, you have
your own, unique story to tell.

Best of Luck!

Saliha Ahmed

Under Secretary General 2022-2023

LUMUN 19
Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Social, Cultural , and Humanitarian Committee (SOCHUM) at the

nineteenth iteration of the annual LUMUN Conference! My name is Amna Sohaib Naqvi and
I am a law junior here at LUMS. This committee is a small but concerted effort at
highlighting some of the most gross violations of social and human rights by discussing
issues that seldom dominate the international debates. Through these discussions, the Third
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly wishes to invoke compassion and
humanity at an international level to ensure state-led policies stay true to ground-level
realities.

As an avid and motivated legal student, questions around International Human Rights
Law have exclusively peaked my curiosity especially when they relate to on-going war time
conflicts. In this sense, I have been interested in two primary issues: What International Law
regulates the behavior of non-state actors in war-zones and what form of accountability can
truly deter their heinous behavior in war times. These questions have helped formulate the
complex and engaging subject matter that SOCHUM will be dealing with today.
 My expectations from delegates are simple: critical research and engagement with
peers. Since, our topic involves comprehension of complex humanitarian law and specific
case studies that we’ll exclusively focus on in relation to the law, a good understanding of
gaps in the law are important to ensure that the solutions are in line with theory and on-
ground realities. Additionally, engagement with peers and display of diplomacy are qualities
that will dutilfully looked for especially during un-moderated caucuses. Overall, delegates are
expected to keep moving the discussion forward to keep the conference intellectually and
socially stimulating for all.

That is all for now.

Hope you all have a wonderful time at this conference!

Until then,

Amna

Committee Director-SOCHUM

LUMUN XIX
Dear Delegates,

My name is Taimur, and I will be serving as one of your chairs for SOCHUM at the
upcoming edition of LUMUN. I am in my third year at LUMS, and in my fifth year of
association with LUMUN. Having experienced this conference from both sides of the dais, I
can attest to the rigour and zeal with which the LUMUN society curates a fulfilling
experience for the delegates. This year at SOCHUM, you will witness the same level of
enthusiasm and commitment to your learning.

A little about myself: I am an Economics major at LUMS, and I enjoy staying up to

date with international relations. I am a city-tour enthusiast and street-food junkie, and I'd
love to talk to you about cricket, Coke Studio and anything in between. At MUNs, I prioritise
enjoying the learning experience, and hope for you to share a spirit of empowering others and
making friends from across the country.
 You will find the LUMUN week electrifying and memorable, and you will have in
our team a supportive dais. I am eager to see you all in SOCHUM.

Best,

Taimur Azfar

Committee Director - SOCHUM

LUMUN XIX
 Violations of International Humanitarian Laws By Non-State Actors

Table of Contents
KEY DEFINITIONS .............................................................................................................................. 1
International Humanitarian Law ......................................................................................................... 1
The need for a definition of armed conflict ........................................................................................ 1
The need for categorization of armed conflict .................................................................................... 1
International armed conflict ................................................................................................................ 1
Non international armed conflict ........................................................................................................ 2
Internationalized armed conflict ......................................................................................................... 2
Limitations of the definition of non-international armed conflict ...................................................... 3
HOW DID THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DEVELOP ....................................... 3
HOW DOES THE IHL FUNCTION NOW ........................................................................................... 6
GENERAL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ................................... 8
KEY TREATIES .................................................................................................................................... 9
The Geneva Conventions & Three Additional Protocols ................................................................... 9
The Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) ........................................................................................ 11
The Vienna Law of Treaties ............................................................................................................. 12
Customary Law ................................................................................................................................. 12
CASE STUDIES ................................................................................................................................... 13
Afghanistan ....................................................................................................................................... 13
Myanmar ........................................................................................................................................... 17
Ethiopia ............................................................................................................................................. 18
Syria .................................................................................................................................................. 24
CULTURAL PROPERTY .................................................................................................................... 28
REPARATION ..................................................................................................................................... 28
 SOCIAL, HUMANITARIAN, AND CULTURAL COMMITTEE
(SOCHUM)

TOPIC AREA: VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

LAWS BY NON-STATE ACTOR

KEY DEFINITIONS

 International Humanitarian Law

It is the body of law which seeks to balance the violence inherent in armed conflict
with the dictates of humanity. It belies the idea that ‘when the guns go off the law becomes
silent’. International Humanitarian Law has recognized three types of armed conflict:
International armed conflict, Internationalized armed conflict and non-internationalized
armed conflict.

 The need for a definition of armed conflict

The IHL or international humanitarian law can only apply to areas with armed
conflict. Hence, it is essential that we understand the definition of an armed conflict
completely before moving on. Without it, we would not be able to recognize areas of armed
conflict and subsequently fail to apply the IHL.

 The need for categorization of armed conflict

The categorization of armed conflict is crucial because the IHL has different laws
pertaining to different types of armed conflict. Hence, determining the type of armed
conflict that exists is crucial. One of the primary purposes of this committee would be to
discuss and fix the loopholes in the definition and categorization of armed conflicts.

 International armed conflict

International armed conflict is defined by Geneva Convention 1949, common
article 2 as the following:
“All cases of declared war or of any armed conflict that may arise between two or more
high contracting parties, even if the state of war is not recognized, the convention shall
also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a high contracting
party even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance” [1]

1
The International Commission of Red Cross puts it in simpler words:

“An international armed conflict occurs when one or more States have recourse to armed
force against another State, regardless of the reasons or the intensity of this confrontation.”

This is to say that international armed conflict occurs when two sovereign states
face a conflict where they both use armed forces. There is no barrier of intensity or specific
reasons for the IHL to apply. Hence, IHL would apply to any situation where two sovereign
states face each other with armed forces.

 Non international armed conflict

The definition provided by the IHL is in Geneva convention 1943 article 3. It states:
‘conflicts that are non-international in nature occurring in one of the High contracting
parties’ [2]
This means that one of the parties involved in the conflict must be non-
governmental or non-international. Being non-governmental refers to a body or
organization that has no link with any legal government in the world, i.e., no funding,
backing, or any other connection exists between them. The common article also tries to
distinguish it from 'situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of similar nature.' The IHL has thus raised the
bar high for the intensity of non-international armed conflicts to be considered for IHL. The
IHL provides two requirements. Firstly, the two parties need to have a certain level of
hostility, and secondly, the organization of the parties involved must be considered for IHL
to apply. The bar for requirements is not rigid and can be changed according to the situation.

 Internationalized armed conflict

There is no specific expression such as Internationalized armed conflict. Rather, it
is only used to refer to a special situation between the two above classifications. Essentially,
an internationalized armed conflict is a non-international armed conflict with an
international dimension. This means there is international support for the non-state party or

2
 the state fighting against the other non-state party [3]. The laws of IHL, which are to be
applied, are varied from situation to situation with two main possibilities. So, if an
international state supports without their legal armed force, the IHL of Non-international
armed conflict would apply. If a state is supporting a non-state party with its legal armed
force, the IHL of international armed conflict will apply [4].

 Limitations of the definition of non-international armed conflict

Additional Protocol 2 of the Geneva convention has limited the IHL's application
on non-international armed conflicts. The Additional Protocol has introduced a completely
new requirement for IHL application. It has made it mandatory for non-state parties to have
territory to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and
implement this Protocol [5]. This has limited the IHL’s application even further. Secondly,
it has introduced an obligation of state armed forces to be involved if IHL is to be applied,
which has led to IHL only being applied to situations where government forces are present
and not to situations like the Lebanese civil war where two non-state parties are involved.
This is a serious problem as this limits the protection of the rights of people who are being
targeted in these non-international armed conflicts.

HOW DID THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DEVELOP

This section pertains to the historic aspect of the International Humanitarian Law,
crucially why and how it was developed. The first clarification to make is that the international
humanitarian law is sometimes referred to as the human rights law of armed conflict. Such a
definition is false because they are two distinct bodies of law, with different backgrounds, and
work in different ways despite having some similarities in their objectives.

The International human rights law came into being after the Second World War, with
the ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It has since been
followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as numerous treaties
and declarations. However, international humanitarian law emerged in the 1860s with the
unanimous decisions of the Instructions for the Governments of the United States Armies in

3
the Field, the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded in
Armies in the Field, and the St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War,
of Explosive Projectiles Weighing Less Than 400 Grams.

International humanitarian law is applicable when two or more adversaries (states

and/or armed organizations) are acting in accordance with the same requirements for the parties
to the conflict. On the other hand, international human rights legislation concerns the
interaction between states and people. More obviously, the content of the two sets of
regulations varies. Human rights law, for instance, is based on the principle that no one has the
right to be unjustly deprived of their life. The foundation upon which all other rights are based
is this one. In contrast, the killing of civilians is permitted under specific circumstances under
international humanitarian law, which recognises the killing of fighters and combatants as a
vital component of an armed conflict.

For example, if an attack "may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated," for instance,
then that military objective must not be attacked. As a result, unintended civilian casualties are
tolerated as long as they don't outweigh the expected military advantage. Because of this, the
principles of international humanitarian law, no matter how humanitarian they may be, stem
from the privilege of the fighter, namely a license to kill.

Having understood this – the IHL emerged outside of the United Nations (UN) system,
Under the umbrella of its protector, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This
was since the UN at the time was more concerned about the ratification of a law which applied
during conflict and thus outrightly opposed the ban of both the threat or use of force in the UN
Charter.

4
 The two bodies of law did not align closely with one another until 1968 at the
International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran. A resolution was adopted at that
conference, imploring member states to ratify the IHL and subsequently asking the General
Assembly to take the issue to the Secretary-General for the preparation of a document on the
various facets of the IHL. [6]

5
 HOW DOES THE IHL FUNCTION NOW

The IHL strives to humanize warfare by establishing guidelines for combatants, while
also protecting civilians from the repercussions of armed conflict. Thus, there is no question
about the prospect of 'necessity' being a justification for breaking the law by an involved party.
The question, however, of how and when the IHL applies (the "scope of applicability") is not
as simple as it may initially seem.

Traditionally, the law of war has been brought into action by a declaration of war, with
the legal consequence of ending a majority of legal contacts between hostile States during times
of peace.

In reality, Since the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in August 1945, there have not
been any official declarations of war. This is because the practice has been abandoned due to
such declarations appearing to be the unlawful use of armed force under the UN Charter.

As a result, in modern international law, ‘armed conflict’ is favored over ‘war’ because
the former only refers to a situation's facts and lacks moral implications in reference to the jus
ad bellum.

In 1995 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated
that:

“An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States
or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from
the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until
a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful
settlement is achieved.”

Despite long - standing flaws in the application of the IHL generally, there are a
number of ways to maintain conformity with it. In order of effectiveness and impact these
are; Legal implications to violent retaliation; States' accountability for neglect carried out
by their armed forces; States' obligation to communicate IHL to and provide for its
adequate measures to their armed forces; Commanders' obligation to oversee behavior and

6
repress violations; States' obligation to implement IHL and take stringent action for its
neglect in their national legal systems; Criminal investigation and, where appropriate,
prosecution of those accused of breaking the law; and external scrutiny by third parties.

Prosecution may take place both domestically, and with the establishment of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), internationally. While the ICC will be authoritative,
prosecution is not a panacea for all of the world's problems; domestic prosecutions are
uncommon, and even when they happen, they are usually handed down some time after the
relevant battle started.

Similarly, a major hindrance to the application of IHL is the lack of a single

authoritative body mandated to provide verdicts on matters pertaining to the existence of armed
conflict, whether it is an international or non-international conflict, or whether a region is
occupied. Questions like these and others are left at the mercy of the state and the armed groups
to decide; nonetheless it is no surprise that such considerations are hardly undertaken
objectively [7].

Here, it is helpful to establish three types of contributions various UN bodies have been
implored to make for a strengthening of IHL: reiteration and updated standard setting of IHL,
ensuring that those guilty of serious IHL violations are held accountable and prosecuted, and
increased adherence to the law’s obligations by parties to particular conflicts (humanitarian
diplomacy).

The United Nations does not assert that its participation in promoting and upholding
international humanitarian law is complete, but rather that it is something that it takes seriously.
In fact, the organization's various bodies have become quite active in advancing the law's
principles and enhancing its application. Such active involvement has developed over the years
and contributed to humanitarian policy in a variety of ways.

In spite of the fact that it is humanitarian in intent and non-political in nature,

humanitarian law does in fact require the assistance of political agencies in order for States and
any parties to armed conflict to fully embrace and adhere to it. The UN is an unique global

7
forum for expressing the concerns of the victims as well as concern for the victims of armed
conflict because it is the most prominent and truly universal institution. Furthermore, the UN
is best equipped to implore opposing parties to uphold their humanitarian commitments
because only the UN has the power to demand that States act in a manner that is consistent
with the Charter, with international law in general, and with international humanitarian law in
particular.

GENERAL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

General violations of International Humanitarian Law and the Geneva Conventions

cover a broad range of acts.

The willful killing or causing of suffering and injury to persons protected under the
Conventions, torture and sexual violence, sexual enslavement, forced prostitution, colonisation
of occupied land, unauthorised exile, detainment, holding hostages, brutalising of surrendered
soldiers, deliberate destruction or appropriation of real estate, requiring POWs to serve in the
forces of hostile powers, denying a POW a fair trial, attacks on civilians and humanitarian
workers, misusing a flag of truce, form only part of the broader violations that can and have
occurred.

SOCHUM’s mandate, however, does not allow for the deliberation and passing of
policy that requires the use of security forces. Instead, the intent is to pass long-term policies
that can investigate and resolve issues of social and humanitarian concern. These include, but
are not limited to, sexual slavery, torture, and settlement of occupied territories.

8
 KEY TREATIES
 The Geneva Conventions & Three Additional Protocols

The Geneva Conventions and its three additional protocols are a series of treaties that
form a fundamental source of international humanitarian law. They establish a large range of
protections, rights, and standards of humane treatment for the affectees of armed conflict. They
provide guidelines for the treatment of civilians, prisoners of war and soldiers rendered
incapable of fighting.

The Conventions and their additional Protocols have the status of universal jurisdiction.
This concept is based on the belief that certain acts, specifically those of genocide, crimes
against humanity, torture, and war crimes, are of such interest to the international community
that the principles of territorial jurisdiction are foregone. Under this principle, persons accused
or convicted of such crimes fall under the jurisdiction of all signatory states, irrespective of
their nationality or the territory in which their crimes were committed.

The first Convention, initiated by the ICRC in 1864, provided protection to wounded
and infirm soldiers and medical personnel who are not active combatants. It prohibited torture,
the impugning of personal dignity, extrajudicial execution and guaranteed the right of the
aforementioned parties to medical treatment. In strict contrast to the conventions of warfare at
the time, it expressly forbade discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, wealth
etc. The introduction of the red cross emblem was of great importance, signifying medical
services and neutral states.

The second, third and fourth Conventions, adopted in 1949 against the backdrop of the
aftermath of World War II, extend the base protections afforded by the first Convention to a
broader category of ‘affectees’.

The second Convention afforded protections to shipwrecked soldiers and specified

particular guidelines on dealing with naval forces assigned for medical purposes.

9
 The third Convention defined the term ‘Prisoner of War (POW)’, establishing that
prisoners of war be afforded humane treatment as outlined in the first Convention. It outlawed
the use of physical or psychological torture to extract information from POWs, establishing the
convention of identifying prisoners by their names, ranks, and serial numbers. In case of death
or injury, parties to the Convention had the responsibility to record such information.

Under the fourth Convention, the rights of POWs and spies/saboteurs were specified,
limiting their mobility and access to communication while maintaining their fundamental rights
to humane treatment. Civilians were afforded the same protections as sick and wounded
soldiers in the first Convention. Additional stipulations concerning the treatment of civilians
were established, explicitly outlawing attacks on civilian hospitals, medical transports etc.
Lastly, it outlined acceptable methods of occupation, explicitly restricting occupiers’ actions
with respect to an occupied populace.

In the decades following the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, there was a
multiplication in number and fierceness of non-international armed conflicts and wars of
‘national liberation’. Two Additional Protocols were established as a response to this,
strengthening protections of victims of international (Protocol I) and non-international armed
conflicts (Protocol II). They placed additional limits on the way war could be waged [8].

The first Protocol standardized jargon used in the Conventions, and established new
rules for how deceased persons, cultural items, and important targets like dams and nuclear
power plants should be treated.

The second Protocol addressed military conflict that was not between nations. Among
these are civil wars, internal armed conflicts that spread to neighboring states, or internal
conflicts in which international states or multinational groups get involved. It further clarified
‘humane treatment’, affording protections to POWs and those accused of crimes during
wartime. The second Protocol also identified the rights of civilian populations.

10
 The third Protocol established another emblem to identify humanitarian workers, the
‘red crystal’, affording it the same international status as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent
[9].
Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions, specifies fundamental principles
from which neither departure nor abrogation is permitted. With no exceptions, it guarantees
humane treatment for everyone held captive by the enemy, outlaws hostage-taking, murder,
mutilation, torture, and other cruel or unusual punishment, and forbids unjust court cases. It
ensures the recovery and care of the sick, injured, and shipwrecked. Most significantly, it gives
the ICRC permission to provide assistance to all parties to the conflict. [10].

 The Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907)

The Hague conventions are another extremely important series of international treaties
that paved the way for the establishment of International Humanitarian Laws. Initially held in
1899 at the Netherlands’ administrative capital city, Hague, the first conference convened by
Count Mikhail, foreign minister of Russia, adopted three significant conventions: prohibiting
the use of asphyxiating gasses, the discharges of explosives from balloons, and expanding
bullets. Although the conference failed to achieve its primary aim, i.e., putting limitations on
military weapons, it still was a significant one with participants from over 25 nations [11].

The second Hague conference was held in 1907 with 44 participating nations to discuss
the proposal of limitation of armed weapons but was rejected once again. It did, however,
succeed in adopting several other conventions, including the rights and duties of neutral nations
and individuals on land & water, the introduction of international prize goods, and the layout
of submarine mines.

Another Hague convention was supposed to be held in 1915, but the outbreak of world
war I never allowed it to occur. Nevertheless, the Hague convention was an important step that
eventually led to the League of Nations' creation.

11
  The Vienna Law of Treaties

As the name suggests, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties refers to the set
of agreements applied only to treaties written between two or more states. The convention
began to be drafted under the supervision of the International Law Commission in 1949. In
1961, Sir Humphrey Waldock played an integral role in its development [12]. He produced six
different reports, which helped the International Law Commission to draft a paper to introduce
to the United Nations General Assembly. After two sessions in 1968 discussing this draft paper,
the participating parties officially adopted the Vienna Convention [13].

The convention can be broken down into six sections. The first portion deals with the
definitions of the terms and discusses the scope of the agreement. The second part conveys the
principles and regulations to be followed regarding the adoption of certain features or entire
sections of treaties by the states involved. The third section sheds light on the application and
helps clarify certain areas of the treaties, while the fourth deals with the methods of introducing
amendments and modifications to the existing treaties. The most important part of the
convention, the fifth part, outlines grounds and sets principles for termination, invalidation, or
suspension of the signed, agreed treaties between two states. The fifth part also grants
jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice to convene in any events of disputes. The last
part of the treaty discusses the effects of other factors, such as government changes within one
state on the ratified treaties. It also lays out the rules for the ratification of existing treaties [14].

 Customary Law

Customary Law refers to a set of general practices that have been accepted as laws in
the international community. An example of this could include the universal Law against
slavery or individual piracy, which are represented in both the official accounts of military and
national legislations. These general practices are followed as a result of policy instead of being
a requirement by the Law. They are specifically crucial in non-international armed conflicts,
where they bind the states and armed opposition groups to follow a set of general practices as
policy.

12
 CASE STUDIES

 Afghanistan

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is located at the center of Central and South Asia.
This landlocked country is called the ‘Heart of Asia’.

i.The Saur Revolution

King Mohammed Zahir of Afghanistan was deposed in 1973 by Mohamed Daoud

Khan, the country's first self-declared leader. Daoud declared his disapproval of the monarch
during the reign of King Mohamed Zahir, which prompted him to stage a coup and destroy the
government.
On April 27 and 28, 1978, the Saur revolution took place. The war was started by
military members of the Khalq faction of the PDPA attacking the palace and other significant
governmental structures in Kabul. [15]
The palace and the main government buildings were destroyed as a result of the
Revolution. Daoud and the majority of his family members were assassinated during the coup,
thereby ending his rule. A new administration was established by the communists, led by Nur
Muhammad Taraqi (Khalq). [15]
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Saur revolution put an end
to that country's Cold War neutrality. To keep control of Afghanistan and Asia, the Soviet
Union waged war against it. The revolution also signaled the start of a tumultuous time of
conflict in Afghanistan. [17]

ii.Mujahideen movement

An opposition movement against the Soviet Union that ultimately became known as
the Mujahideen Movements was launched when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

13
 During the Afghan War (1978–1992), there were several guerrilla groups operating in
Afghanistan that used the Arabic term mujahideen to refer to their fighters. These groups fought
against the Soviet invasion and eventually overthrew the communist regime. After then, rival
factions started fighting among themselves, which led to the establishment of the Taliban and
the Northern Alliance, an opposing coalition. [15]

iii.Taliban takeover till 2014

Fighting between the mujahideen and the government supported by the Soviet Union
persisted after the Soviet Union left Afghanistan entirely in February 1989. Mohammad
Najibullah's regime was able to survive with the aid of the Soviets in terms of resources, but
on April 28, 1992, it was ousted due to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Kabul was left
without fortifications after Abdul Rashid Dostum's army submitted to Ahmed Shah Massoud,
and Massoud swiftly took control of Kabul. In the airport in Kabul, Doustum had 1,500 militia
at the time. [15] [16]

The leaders of the mujahideen organizations stationed in Peshawar organized a

temporary Jamiat-e Islami to rule Kabul in mid-April in an effort to settle these conflicts. A
10-member leadership council made up of mujahideen leaders and headed over by the president
of the Jamiat-i-Islami, Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, was to be established after the moderate
leader Prof. Sibghatullah Mojadeddi completed his two-month term as chairman. A Loya Jirga,
or grand council, of Afghan elders and notables would meet during this six-month period to
choose an interim administration that would rule for up to a year while elections were held.
[16]

However, Rabbani hastily established the leadership council in May 1992, undercutting
Mojaddedi's precarious power.

14
 Osama bin Laden, a Saudi national who had fought alongside them against the Soviets,
was given asylum by the Taliban starting in the middle of the 1990s, and the Taliban also
served as a base for his and other terrorist groups. The Taliban were frequently penalized for
these actions by the UN Security Council. Until American pressure drove them to end their
open backing for the Taliban after September 11, 2001, Bin Laden, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia
all supplied both financial and political support to the Taliban. The 1998 bombings of the US
embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were allegedly carried out by bin Laden and his al
Qaeda organisation. The Unoted States of America launched a cruise missile attack against Bin
Laden's terrorist base in August 1998. [18] [19]

Among other crimes, the September 11, 2001 assaults in the United States are attributed
to bin Laden and al Qaeda.
After the Ioya Jirga in June 2002, the Bush administration of the United States and the
United Nations established a transitional government to rule Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai was
elected by the assembly as president, a role he held until 2014 in succeeding governments.

iv.Nato Invasion

Under a United Nations (UN) Security Council mandate, NATO Allies and partner
nations have had military personnel stationed in Afghanistan for nearly 20 years. After the 9/11
terrorist attacks on the United States, NATO allies entered Afghanistan to make sure the nation
wouldn't once again serve as a refuge for foreign terrorists planning strikes on NATO member
countries. There haven't been any terrorist assaults from Afghanistan against Allied territory in
the past 20 years. [19]

In 2001, NATO allies invaded Afghanistan and assumed command of the UN mandated
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by 2003. ISAF’s mission was to polish the
capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces. This was to aid the battle against
International terrorism. ISAF came to an end as the Afghan National Defence and Security
Forces took a lead in enforcign security throughout this territory in December 2014. [19]

15
 NATO started the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) by January 2015. It had three goals:
education, advisor, and assistance of the Afghan security forces. These forces were already
embroiled in the fight against terrorism. The Mission ended in early September 202. This was
in August 2021 when the departure of all RSM forces was finished . [19]

NATO has stopped providing any assistance to Afghanistan in light of the current
situation. Any future Afghan administration must defend the rule of law, uphold Afghanistan's
international obligations, protect the human rights of all Afghans, particularly women, children,
and minorities, and ensure that Afghanistan never again serves as a refuge for terrorists. [19]

In December 2021, NATO Foreign Ministers reviewed a thorough political and military
evaluation that summarized significant findings and suggestions before discussing the lessons
gained from the Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan.

v.Current Situation

The current state of affairs in Afghanistan does not appear to be ending anytime soon.
The International Monetary Fund previously cut off financing to Afghanistan (IMF). Few
nations refuse to see the Taliban as a legitimate administration, and it will always be thought
of as a terrorist group. The US and its coalition allies have a moral duty, as many have noted.
There is currently a crisis, and whatever occurs after will inevitably be connected to years of
violence and intervention. [20]
Afghanistan's current situation does not seem to be changing anytime soon.
Afghanistan's funding had previously been cut off by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Few countries refuse to recognise the Taliban as a legitimate government, and it will always
be regarded as a terrorist organisation. As many have emphasised, the US and its coalition
allies have a moral obligation. Whatever happens after the current crisis will inevitably be
linked to years of bloodshed and intervention. [19] [20]

16
  Myanmar

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, also formerly known as Burma, is located in
Southeast Asia. It has a population of about 54 million as of 2017, making it the largest country
in Mainland Southeast Asia. [21]

Conflict has afflicted Myanmar, commonly called Burma, for many years. Following a
coup d'état in 1962, a military junta that reigned for the following 49 years took the place of
Myanmar's parliamentary democracy. During these years, the populace became more
impoverished, a war economy began to take shape, and drug production increased. [21]

Hopes for democratization and peace were boosted in March 2011 with the installation
of a purportedly civilian government. However, at the same time, a 17-year ceasefire in
hostilities between the government and the KIA armed group was broken. [21] The military
has been criticized for violating human rights as the violence in Kachin worsened in 2016 and
2017. This led to a humanitarian disaster. [21]

In its 2017 report, Amnesty International documents war crimes, such as arbitrary
detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings, committed by the Myanmar Army against these
populations and civilians who belong to ethnic minorities. [21]

The situation in Myanmar and its democratic transition are still tumultuous. The
Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar continue to face discrimination in the west. The scale of mass
killings, gang rapes, and village burnings committed by some Myanmar security forces
increased in October 2016. Since 2012, this has caused 168,000 people to leave their homes.
[21]

17
 General elections in 2015 saw a resounding victory for Aung San Suu Kyi's National
League for Democracy Party, raising the prospect of nonviolent political reform. However, in
2016 and 2017, ethnic violence in the north increased. As successive governments continue to
deny the Rohingya citizenship, human rights violations against them are still prevalent. [21]

 Ethiopia

i. Background & Primary Stakeholders

The current Ethiopian conflict, also referred to as the Tigrayan Conflict or the Tigrayan
War, is a conflict between the federal government of Ethiopia - under the presidency of Abiy
Ahmad - with the backing of military support from Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation
Front - a former ruling party. [22]

The EPRDF, which has ruled Ethiopia for 28 years, and a number of opposition groups
were combined into Abiy's new Prosperity Party on December 1, 2019. The long-ruling TPLF,
which was opposed to joining this new party. [23] Instead, the TPLF maintained its rule in the
country's Tigrayan region. The TPLF has been accused of trying to retake control of the nation
by force and violence, according to the Ethiopian government. Tensions in the nation only
increased as a result of frequent skirmishes between the TPLF and the federal administration.
[24]

Due to the COVID-19 epidemic, the National Election Board of Ethiopia postponed the
general elections, which were initially set for August 29, 2020, to an as-yet-undetermined date
in March. [25] In defiance of the federal authorities, the TPLF organized its own regional
election on September 9 after rejecting these measures and claiming they were unconstitutional.
[26] Ethiopia responded by cutting off federal funding to the Tigrayan region. The TPLF
considered this action as ‘tantamount to declaration of war.’ [27]

18
 ii. Transition Towards Armed Violence

The Tigray Special Forces and allied local militia attacked the northern command
headquarters of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) in Mekelle, the capital of the
Tigray province, on November 3, 2020, just before midnight. [28] On November 4, Ethiopia
launched an offensive in reprisal, coupled with the emergency declaration, the creation of the
State of Emergency Inquiry Board, and the suspension of government operations in the Tigray
Region. [29] Airstrikes were used in conjunction with Ethiopian offensives in the north, and a
number of towns and cities were retaken. [30]

600 civilians, predominantly Amharas and Welkait, were slaughtered in the town of
Mai Kadra on the night of November 9 to 10, 2020, by local militias and police loyal to the
TPLF, according to preliminary findings by Amnesty International and the Ethiopian Human
Rights Commission. [31]

The regional capital of Mekelle was surrounded on November 23 by Ethiopian forces.

Ethiopia warned Tigrayan civilians to leave Mekelle because its soldiers would not spare them
from attack and declared that Mekelle would be shelled. [32] On the morning of November 28,
the Ethiopian forces launched their direct attack on Mekelle and began severe shelling of the
city, despite the fact that the TPLF leaders, Tigray Special Forces, and militia forces had
already departed the city.The city has been completely taken over by Ethiopian soldiers by the
evening, according to Prime Minister Abiy. A total of 100 people were hurt and 27 civilians
were killed. [33] Witnesses and survivors, including refugees in Sudan, said that the Eritrean
Defense Forces massacred 720–800 citizens at Axum on November 28 and 29, 2020. [34]

Following a TDF guerilla warfare campaign, the situation on the ground radically
changed. In February 2021, UN chief humanitarian coordinator Mark Lowcock claimed that
up to 40% of Tigray was not under Ethiopian control. He claimed that Eritrean forces were in
charge of much of the region and were pursuing their own goals independently of Ethiopian
leadership. [35]

19
 The ENDF was in command of the main roadways and the urban areas in April 2021,
while the Tigray Defence Force was in control of the rural areas of central and southern Tigray
as well as portions of eastern and south-eastern Tigray. The west and north of Tigray were also
under the authority of Amhara and Eritrean soldiers. All parties desired a military victory, but
they were unable to achieve it in the immediate future, so they started preparing for a prolonged
struggle. [36] Ethiopia's House of People's Representatives designated the TPLF as a terrorist
group on May 6, 2021. [37]

iii. Humanitarian Law Violations Increasingly Frequent

On May 21, Ethiopia's military prosecutors found three soldiers guilty of rape and filed
accusations against more than 50 other people who they believed had killed civilians in Tigray
or had engaged in rape or other sexual crimes. The document also corroborated claims of two
massacres in Tigray, claiming that 110 civilians were killed in Axum on November 27–28 by
troops from Eritrea and that 229 civilians were massacred in Mai Kadra at the beginning of
November. [38] The Tigray Defense Forces recaptured Mekelle on June 28, 2021. As the TDF
conquered Mekelle, people celebrated in the city's streets. [39] The TDF entered Shire on June
30, 2021, after Eritrean forces had fled the town, which is located 140 km (87 mi) northwest
of Mekelle. [40] The Tigrayan government organized on July 6, 2021, to drive Amhara soldiers
out of western Tigray. [41]

The Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, Harari, and Somali regions all joined the conflict
as a result of the TDF's invasion of the Afar Region to the east. Over 54,000 people were forced
to flee the fighting in western Afar, and the TDF is reported to have taken control of three
districts there. [42] [43] The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the TDF declared an alliance
to overthrow Abiy Ahmed's government on August 11. They said that they were also in contact
with other rebel organizations to form a "great coalition." [44]

20
 According to the Tigrayan administration, on October 11, Ethiopian-allied forces
launched synchronized ground assaults "on all fronts" against the TDF using a variety of
weapons, including tanks, helicopters, heavy artillery, airplanes, and drones. [45]

iv. State of Emergency

With a federal government embargo still preventing the majority of aid from reaching
Tigray, the latest offensive effectively put an end to the unilateral ceasefire that the federal
government declared in June and heightened fears of a looming famine there. [46]

The Ethiopian government imposed curfews, instituted censorship, restricted freedom

of movement, and called on any adult to fight in the war for fear of serving from three to ten
years in prison on November 2, 2021, as the counter-offensive advanced deeper into federally
controlled territory. This state of emergency, which will last for six months, allows the
government to arrest and detain critics of the government without a court warrant. [47]

A nine-group coalition known as the United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and

Confederalist Forces was announced by the TPLF, OLA, and other rebel organizations on
November 5. [48]

In the Amhara and Afar areas, notably Lalibela and Shewa Robit, Ethiopian allied
forces regained key towns between November 26 and December 6, 2021. [49] Government
forces asserted on December 6 that they had retaken the vital cities of Dessie and Kombolcha.
[50] According to TPLF head Debretsion Gebremichael, the TPLF announced on December
20, 2021 that it has withdrew its soldiers from Amhara and Afar in an effort to "provide a
decisive opening for peace." [51] However, the Ethiopian Air Force started a bombing
campaign in the Tigray Region in January 2022, which resulted in the deaths of 108 persons,
at least 56 of them were civilians. [52]

21
 v. Armistice (March 2022 - August 2022)

In order to permit the delivery of humanitarian aid into Tigray, the Ethiopian
government established an indefinite humanitarian truce on March 24, 2022. Ethiopia and the
TPLF concurred to hold discussions about a formal conclusion to the war during the ceasefire.
[53] By August, negotiations had stalled, with the Ethiopian government and the TPLF each
accusing the other of refusing to reach a settlement. [54] After several months of a ceasefire,
combat started again in late August 2022. Both sides deflected responsibility for starting the
conflict and voiced disappointment at the slow pace of negotiations to put an end to the 21-
month conflict. [55]

vi. Resumption of Armed Conflict

The serious conflict took place along the Tigray, Amhara, and Afar border. Following
allegations that the Tigray were bringing weapons into the country illegally, the Ethiopian Air
Force shot down a jet it believed was transporting weapons for the TPLF. Meanwhile, the
government was charged with indiscriminate airstrikes on civilian areas. [56] On September
1, Ethiopia and Eritrea declared an offensive in North Tigray. [57] The TPLF claimed Sheraro
had been captured by Eritrea on September 13, 2022. Around 210,000 people were displaced
by the town's capture by Eritrea and the violence in the area; the majority of them fled to Shire.
[58] By the middle of September, there were indications that Eritrea was mass mobilizing its
reservists for deployment to Tigray. [59] On September 20, the Tigrayan authorities said that
Eritrea had invaded the region and that fierce combat had broken out throughout the province.
[60]

22
vii. Eritrean Actions After Armistice

On October 2, the TPLF declared it had removed troops from Amhara's North Wollo
Zone, including Kobo, in order to redeploy them further north to support lines that were heavily
under attack from Eritrea. However, it also issued a warning that if its southern border was
endangered, it would return. [61] Later reports provided evidence that Eritrea was ramping up
its efforts to recruit additional soldiers for the conflict; it imprisoned "elderly mothers and
fathers" and hunted down draft dodgers. [62] Tigray also organized its people, urging everyone
who could to take up arms. [63]

Estimates place the number of Ethiopian casualties in the three-front onslaught

conducted by Ethiopia and Eritrea at over 90,000 in a single month, while Tigrayan casualties
were also thought to be extremely high. [64] By October 22, ENDF and EDF-allied forces had
also taken Adwa and Axum, just as South African peace negotiations with the TPLF were due
to get underway. [65] Witnesses claimed that between October 23 and October 29, Eritrean
military frequently killed civilians. [66]

Moussa Faki, the chair of the AU Commission, declared on October 25, 2022, that the
Ethiopian government and the TPLF had begun negotiations for peace in Pretoria, South
Africa. [67]

viii. Major IHL Violations Committed

With evidence of illegal killings, torture, and sexual assault, all sides in the battle have
been charged with breaking international human rights legislation. [68] By the end of 2022, it
was believed that between 385,000 and 600,000 people had died as a result of the combined
effects of wartime brutality, starvation, and a lack of access to healthcare, with some estimates
going as high as 700,000–800,000. [69] Rape and other forms of sexual assault were frequently
employed as weapons of war, both by the Ethiopian government and the Tigray rebels. [70]
The various militant forces raped girls as young as 8 and adults as old as 72, frequently in front
of family.

23
  Syria

i. 2011 Civil Uprising

The Syrian Revolution, which lasted from March to July 28, 2011, was a precursor to
the wider Arab Spring that gripped the Arab world. The Syrian Arab Republic reacted violently
to the protests. The movement, which at first demanded democratic reforms, developed from
small-scale protests that started as early as January 2011 and became large-scale rallies in
March. [71]

On March 18 following Friday prayers, protesters and local police engaged in escalating
clashes. Four people were killed when security forces opened fire on demonstrators gathered
outside the Omari Mosque after attacking them with tear gas and water cannons.

On March 20, a group of people set fire to the Ba'ath Party's headquarters and other
public structures. Security personnel reacted rapidly, opening fire on the people with live
ammunition and striking the rallies' main areas. The two-day attack claimed the lives of fifteen
demonstrators and seven police officers. [72],[73]

Minor demonstrations were taking place elsewhere in the nation in the meantime. The
released political prisoners, the repeal of the 48-year old emergency law, increased liberty, and
stop to widespread government corruption were some of the demands made by the protestors.
[74] On March 25, large-scale demonstrations broke out all around the country. Security
personnel reportedly murdered at least 20 demonstrators. Later, demonstrations also occurred
in Homs, Hama, Baniyas, Jasim, Aleppo, Damascus, and Latakia in Syria. There were
reportedly about 70 demonstrators killed in total. [75]
Syria's state of emergency law was lifted on April 21 after several weeks of discussion
and Assad's signing of the order. [76]

24
 However, the riots continued. For the first time, tanks were used to suppress protesters,
and snipers positioned themselves on mosque rooftops. Mosques that served as gathering
places for protesters and organizers were particularly hit. Security personnel started cutting off
phone, power, and water lines while seizing food and bread. Numerous people were killed
during clashes between the army and the opposition, which also included armed protestors and
defections from the military. [77]

The National Organization for Human Rights in Syria had recorded the identities of
1,062 people who had died in the revolt since mid-March until 24 May. [78]

The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was established on July 29, 2011, by members of the
Syrian Armed Forces, with the intention of removing Bashar al-Assad's regime. [79]

Mass protests and riots continued throughout October and it was met with violent
repression.

ii. 2013 ISI enters Syria

Al-Qaeda militants utilised the torture and murder carried out by the Assad regime as a
prop in order to profit from Syria's chaos. In April 2013, the remains of al-Qaeda in Iraq were
discovered by a group called the Islamic State of Iraq. In a few months, its fighters seized
territory in western Iraq and eastern Syria. The development of the Islamic State and other
extreme groups resulted in abuse of civilians living in the Islamic State's fiefs, as well as those
living under the rule of the Free Syrian Army and pro-regime militias. [80]

iii. Kurdish Rebel Forces

When the Islamic State attacked Kobani in 2014, a strategically significant Kurdish
town close to the Turkish border, a turning point was reached. The town's defence by the
Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) illustrated the militant group's effectiveness against
the Islamic State. In addition to helping to expel Islamic State fighters from Kobani, U.S. forces
continued to supply and support the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Soldiers (SDF). [81]

25
 Rojava, the Kurdish territory of Syria, experienced many difficulties as it developed
into a sociopolitical entity, not the least of which was the destruction wrought by ISIS. The
majority of Kobani's population has fled to Turkey and is unsure if they will be able to return
to a town that is riddled with concealed explosives and has minimal functioning infrastructure.
Eighty percent of Kobani is in ruins. [82]

Rojava has struggled to establish any sort of functional economic structure or export
commodities in any significant quantity because it is blockaded by ISIS territory to the south.

In addition, 300,000 Syrian Kurds—roughly 15% of the estimated two million total—
remain stateless, lacking basic rights and living in a legal void. [83]

iv. Major IHL Violations Committed

The Human Rights Council established the Independent International Commission of

Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic on August 22, 2011, through resolution S-17/1 passed at
its 17th special session. The commission's mandate is to investigate all alleged violations of
international human rights law in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. [84]

The range of violations noted by almost all actors involved ranges from the use of barrel
bombs, cluster munitions, chemical weaponry such as chlorine munitions, and the targeting of
medical facilities, schools, and water sources. Additionally, humanitarian aid access was
blockaded. [84].

ISIS has carried out indiscriminate strikes in which many civilians have died, including
direct attacks on civilians. [84]. This is in addition to the targeting of civilians in suicide
bombings, the indiscriminate use of chemical weaponry, the use of sexual violence and rape as
a weapon of war, the use of civilians as ‘human shields’, and public executions and summary
killings of opposition forces and civilians. [85]

26
 v. A Brief Timeline of ISIS Movement

The activity of ISIS within the Syrian region may seem a little complex to follow, due
to branching within the organization, as well as their parallel activities in the region of Iraq. A
short timeline has been included below to help illustrate necessary details, specifically
regarding the conflicts between the Kurdish Forces and the ISIS presence in Syria. This is
intended as a guide to assist in determining the direction this case study pursues. [86]

In 2013, The Syrian opposition captured Raqqa, and now it is occupied by ISIS, the
Nusra Front (another extreme organization that swore allegiance to Al Qaeda), and secular
opposition forces. In order to establish control and open up new fronts for combat in Syria,
ISIS has started shifting its military assets. Attacks by ISIS against rebel organizations, such
as the Nusra Front, start in Raqqa and Aleppo. [86]

In 2014, Raqqa was seized by ISIS, who subsequently proclaimed it the ISIS emirate's
capital. ISIS fighters take control of Raqqa and Syria's Taqba air base. The entire province of
Raqqa is now under ISIS's authority. Thousands of people are forced to flee into Turkey as
ISIS moves on the Syrian border town of Kobani.

In 2015, After a four-month war, Kurdish soldiers drove ISIS extremists from the
Syrian border town of Kobani with the aid of coalition and US aircraft. ISIS is driven out of
the important Syrian border town of Tal Abyad by Kurdish fighters. ISIS militias are
completely ousted from control of the military installation Ain Issa by Kurdish forces. In
retaliation, ISIS fighters invade Kobani, Syria, and kill at least 145 civilians. [86]

In 2016, US aircraft supported Kurdish troops as they launched an advance on the

Syrian area to the north of Raqqa. Syrian rebels with Turkish support seize the town of Dabiq
from the Islamic State. ISIS believed that Dabiq would be the scene of the last cataclysmic
battle and the caliphate's triumph, hence it had special symbolic meaning for the group. At least
14 Turkish soldiers and 138 ISIS members are killed in clashes between Syrian opposition
groups backed by Turkey and the Islamic State in the town of al Bab in northern Syria.

27
According to President Tayyip Erdogan's spokesman, 226 Islamic State members have been
"neutralized" in Turkish operations near the town of al Bab in northern Syria. [86].

CULTURAL PROPERTY

Apart from the physical and emotional abuse carried out against victims of war crimes
in highly complicated on-going conflicts, destruction of cultural property is a strong symbolic
and material tool of oppression against the most vulnerable minorities in conflict zones. In
armed conflicts the destruction of heritage sites with strong religious and historic relevance is
a mode of solidifying territorial expansion and spreading a group’s ideology [87]. This has
been seen in the case of the destruction of mosques of Uyghur minorities in Xinjiang and
damage to more than two-hundred sites already in the on-going Russo-Ukraine war [88]. A
resounding plea of victims of these crimes has been an abrupt stop to the outright destruction
of coveted historical and religiously relevant sites. Our discussion should analyze the role of
non-state actors in causing such damage and possible ways of deterring this harm through
serious accountability.

REPARATION

An important facet of our discussion includes possible remedies for the heinous war
crimes that have taken place within these conflicts. Reparative justice serves as the one sure
way of ensuring that the harm done to the victim is repaired to help both symbolically recognize
the wrong done while materially compensating them. According to the International Court for
Transitional Justice all victims of international rights violation have a right to reparations which
changes according to different needs as well as circumstances [89]. Reparations include
financial compensation amongst public apologies, rehabilitation, and non-repetition of abuses.

The United Nations General Assembly Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 2015 have chronicles the obligations
of states to ensure the implementation of International Human Rights and International

28
Humanitarian Law. These guidelines set standards within law that states must follow in
providing reparations to victims of war crimes [90]. In this way, the enumerated principles
make sure that states are held accountable for the humanitarian obligations that they violate
through international armed conflicts. Interestingly, the role of reparations is seldom explored
in relation to the abuses and blatant violation of rights done by non-state actors in non-
international armed conflicts. Our discussion should focus on the possible ramifications of
such a disregard for reparative justice for victims of these conflicts while also figuring out ways
of applying similar guidelines to non-state actors.

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER

A. What is the proposed law under which Non International Armed Groups may
be contained and their actions curtailed?
B. How can Non International Armed Groups be bound by International Law?
What are the stakes involved and if any, which stakes should be involved?
C. Is regulating Non International Armed Groups equivalent to providing them
legitimacy as groups that can form governments and takeover?
D. What sort of strategies can be used to curtail Non International Armed Groups?
Do the strategies have to be uniform?
E. For the damages caused by Non International Armed Groups, what is the
mechanism that may be developed for reparations?

29
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