Design of Fire and Gas Detection System

in Process Industry

Udbhav Srivastava, Ashish K. Gangola, Yash Dhiman, and Rishi Dewan

1 Introduction

Process industry is a place which contains enormous number of hazards: firstly,

general physical hazards such as noise, vibration, and fall from height; secondly,
chemical hazards such as fires, explosions and toxic leakages (Crowl 2002). When
a potential hazard is released due to leak, then it may pose danger to people as well
as asset. By installing fire and gas detection system (FGS), we can easily detect
the source of leak and isolation is done for that area and indication is given to the
people to escape from the escape routes from the place, and immediately active
protection takes place to stop the fire (Fig. 1). It is used for detecting a fire at early
stage of escalation. The fire and gas detection system along with alarm system is
to be focused during the design stage that contributes to enhanced safety (2006)
(Benmebarek 2006).
Fire and gas detectors are the major components in FGS. The placement of the
detectors is important to detect leaked gas and thereby implement further control
measures. The position of the gas detector affects the reliability of the gas. The FGS
systems in existing facilities have been traditionally designed with conventional
method without any modeled simulation design (Shabaka 2006). The performance
of such conventional designs is questionable where the detectors are placed randomly
based on experience.

U. Srivastava · A. K. Gangola · Y. Dhiman

Department of Health, Safety and Environment, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies,
Dehradun, India
R. Dewan (B)
Department of Physics, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun, Uttarakhand,
India
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 155

F. I. Khan et al. (eds.), Advances in Industrial Safety, Springer Transactions in Civil and
Environmental Engineering, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6852-7_13
156 U. Srivastava et al.

Fig. 1 Fire and gas design lifecycle

The relevant codes and benchmarks, for example, NFPA 72 arrangement, espe-
cially NFPA 72E, BS 5839 and EN54 gave an extensive learning on choice, estab-
lishment and support of se gauges address the necessities of FGS and flame alerts
in structures, but fall short for the mitigation of fire and toxic hazards in process
industry. Industrial designers identified a need of more information particularly for
design and placement of FGS in a process plant layout. Current standards provided
only general considerations and recommendations for design of gas detector. These
data are based on rule of thumb and do not addresses the complexities involved in
the detector placement (Legg 2012).

2 Fire and Gas Detection

The fire detection system consists of the fire detector, control unit, and control devices
which activates from the signal of control unit. When the fire breaks out, two things
come into picture, one is saving life and the other one is safeguarding assets. The
main objective of the fire detection system is to monitor for the potential leakage
of flammabi2 or toxic gas and triggers the personnel by alarms thereby allow for
further control measures. By and large, they are a piece of a completely programmed
Design of Fire and Gas Detection System in Process Industry 157

framework which alarms defensive gadgets, for example, steam blinds, or discharges
firefighting operators. In different cases, in any case, the capacity of the location
framework is constrained to giving a caution flag to the work force, who needs to
translate and actualize control measure, for example, crisis shutdown, ventilation,
start source control, and putting out fires framework. There are a few explanations
behind not continually making the framework completely programmed. One is that
location frameworks are subject to give false cautions, another is that it is not in every
case simple to characterize ahead of time correctly what is required.
FGS configuration comprises of different sorts of locators, tuned to various set
focuses and caution rationales; therefore, numerous components must be considered
before introducing FGS like kind of identifier, number of indicators, area, set focuses
and alert rationale. At the point when spillage of gas happens, it tends to be either
structure a steady cloud or be dispersed relying upon elements like the hole rate,
wind, thickness of the gas and condition present around the break. Every one of the
elements are to be considered for planning of FGS for a procedure plant design. For
the most part, modern discovery is required for loss of control (holes) and flame.
Three types of gas detectors can serve for detecting the loss of containment; they
are flammable gas detector, hydrogen gas detector, and toxic gas detector.
In case of detection of fires, three detectors can serve the purpose; they are fire
indicator, heat locator, and smoke finder.

3 Criteria for Detector Selection

Detectors are basically of two types fixed or portable. Fixed detectors are perma-
nently installed in a given location for continuous monitoring of process plant. Fixed
detectors are useful in enclosed spaces and are less reliable in open spaces. Portable
gas detectors are small handheld device which are used for testing gas at confined
space and emergency response. While utilizing fixed location framework, one can
pick between two identification standards which are point discovery and open way
recognition.
Point identifiers measure the grouping of intrigued vapor/gas at inspecting point.
They cover limited area and are often used near to single equipment. Gas concentra-
tions are measured in % lower flammability limit and toxic gas in ppm or ppb (Bafjord
2011). For detection coverage over large areas, multiple point detectors are needed.
Many industrial detector types like infrared, catalytic, acoustic, semiconductor, and
electrochemical detectors are based on this principle.
Open path detector contains infrared source and separate receiver. The target gas
when passes through the infrared beam is detected through receiver. The advantage
of path detector over point detector is that a single point detector can monitor large
area instead of several point detectors. Gas/vapor concentration is measured in path
length multiplied by %LFL or ppm. The issue with way indicator is that it is hard
to recognize a little piece of gas with high focus and a huge one with less fixation.
Since the open way indicator covers substantial region of recognition, it is hard
158 U. Srivastava et al.

to discover exact area of gas. Climate conditions and residue can have genuine
impact on working of the open way identifiers. Election of detector type depends
on type of target gas/vapor. Before deciding the detector, one should have sound
knowledge on type of gases to be detected on process plant and applications of
various detectors, for example, catalytic bead sensors are suitable for detection of
combustible gases, whereas electrochemical sensors are useful for detection of toxic
chemicals (CCPS 2009). Moreover the designer should aware of gases that cannot
be detected, for example, infrared sensors cannot detect hydrogen. Some type of
detector is susceptible to particular type of gases. All such required data should be
reviewed before choosing detector.
Expected concentration of gas is a determining factor for choosing a detector. Both
catalytic bead detector can and ionization detector can monitor flammable gases, but
their range of detection varies significantly. Catalytic bead sensor cannot measure
below LFL of flammable gases; however, ionization detector can measure as low as
1 ppm (CCPS 2009).

4 Factors Affecting the Design of Fire and Gas Detector

Systems

There are many environmental and operational factors which can impair the perfor-
mance of the FGS, so the designer should evaluate all the responsible factors before
designing the FGS to a process plant (API 1991).

4.1 Density

The density of the measuring gas is one of the prime factor of importance, gases
with higher density than air locates more toward ground, whereas the gas with lower
density than that of air disperses fast and rise upwards. Before installing, the designer
has to check for the type of the gas to be leaked and its density for deciding the position
of the detector, i.e., near to ground or at certain height at ceiling.

4.2 Wind Speed

The speed of the wind can affect the dispersion of the released gas. In case of calm
weather, the leaked gas behave according to density but at higher wind speeds, the gas
movements are abnormally. Take an example of placing detector near to ventilation
may not give desired output, even in case of leaked gas behaves like the air because
Design of Fire and Gas Detection System in Process Industry 159

of quick mixing with local air. These factors are to be considered especially in case
of offshore installations.

4.3 Temperature

Selection of detector is based on the ranges of operation of temperature; generally, it

varies from manufacture to manufacture and also on type of technology. Operating
FGS at upper and lower limits allowable temperatures may lead to drift in reading
of 5–10% than the actual lower flammability limit concentration (API 1991).

4.4 Obstructions

There are many chances of obstruction in process plant especially in case of open path
detectors ranging from personnel, piping, equipment, dust, and particulate matter
which deteriorates the detection capability and lag in response time. In order to
prevent this, constant inspection is needed for FGS during both installation and
operation.

4.5 Vibration

Even though vibrations of higher frequency do not have significant effect on sensor,
low frequency and high vibrations create a problem in FGS. High vibration is respon-
sible for disabling the electrical circuit hence fail the detection mechanism. Care
should be taken to avoid the mounting of detector on vibrating structures such as
rotating equipment.

4.6 Miscellaneous

The sensitivity of the detectors generally decreases with time due to aging. Proper
installation and maintenance make the sensors to work for a period of 3–5 years.
Check for calibration of detector regularly. The frequency of calibration is based on
experience. Higher levels of humidity (>95%) are the factor which can affect the
sensitivity and response time. Manufacturer has to be consulted.
160 U. Srivastava et al.

5 Detector Placement Methods

Detector placement plays an important role for achieving the objective of FGS to
give quick and reliable detection for early mitigation of major hazards. There is no
guarantee of cent percent safety for detector positioning always a better way exists for
detector placement. Heuristic placement for detector layout is simple and completely
depends on past experience in similar applications. Any sort of numerical modeling
is not used in this approach for determining detector coverage. Most of the times,
heuristic method falla short for achieving safety goals because it puts more emphasis
on source of gas leaks rather than gas accumulation. On other hand, prescriptive
placement is used for placing detector which is strictly based on predefined standards.
In this method, design engineers locate detectors solely based on rules of thumb or
prescribed standards.
Semi-quantitative method for detector mapping is one of the most common
methods to determine coverage (DET-TRONICS 2011). It considers factors like type
of hazardous chemical, equipment used, process parameters, and level of occupancy.
After evaluation of these factors, risk value is estimated, and based on the level of risk
(NORSOK 2008), the place is classified into zones. After zonal classification, each
zone’s plot is loaded into the mapping application to determine the detector coverage
which is based on the rules of thumb. Before loading, each application must be care-
fully considered based on toxic or flammable gas detection. Mapping application
gives the percentage of detected and undetected coverage. Finally, decision has to be
made by design engineer to whether to accept the level of coverage.
Full quantitative mapping or a risk-based approach is developed in recent years.
Initially, a set of all possible release scenarios are defined and all the required input
data such as release rate, grid set, and environmental factors are considered. In second
step, dispersion modeling is done to identify the maximum distance of exposure
(Defriend 2008). In third step, the risk of every possible scenario is calculated similar
to semi-quantitative method. Then risk-based objective function is developed which
is to be solved by using any iterative approach to get the optimum detector layout.

6 Set Point and Voting of Detector

As mentioned in the previous sections, the objective of the FGS is to monitor the
hazardous gas and alert the personnel; in most of the cases after detection, the alerting
mechanism is alarm system.
After measuring the gas concentration, the set point should be present for sending
signal to alarm. For toxic gases, the set point is OSHA permissible exposure levels
and for flammable gases maximum of 50% of lower explosion limits for a minimum
of 30 days. Review the frequency of alarms and average concentration of gas leaks to
adjust the set point downwards until minimal set point is reached to avoid nuisance
alarms (CCPS 2009). According to NORSOK standard, the set point for low alarm
Design of Fire and Gas Detection System in Process Industry 161

and high alarm is 20% LEL and 30% LEL for point-type detectors (Health and Safety
Executive 2003).
To avoid situations like emergency shutdowns because of alarm signal obtained
from one detector due to small gas leakage at that particular detector, voting logic
is employed in industries. Voting logic is deciding of number of gas detectors has to
monitor the gas out of N detectors. Suppose if voting logic is 2 out of 5 (2oo5), then
two detectors should detect the gas for the alarm to give signal. Voting of detector
results in change of effective coverage and time of response because a gas cloud
must grow to come in contact with multiple detectors. Many mapping applications
do consider voting logic on gas detection coverage.

7 Methodology for FGS Design

The overall design procedure for FGS is shown in Fig. 2. Process industry poses
a wide range of hazards because of its inherent nature of dealing with flammable
and toxic chemicals. FGS system should not be used for good facility system and
maintenance. Whenever potential leak of flammable or toxic gas cannot be elimi-
nated, there arises the need for fire and gas detectors. One should always remember
that installing FGS does not fits the purpose until proper control actions are installed
along with FGS.

Fig. 2 Methodology for fire

and gas detection design IDENTIFIYING NEED FOR FGS

DEVELOPING A DESIGN PHILOSPHY

COLLECTING & ANALYSING STREAM

DATA

PLACEMENT OF DETECTOR

COVERAGE AREA ASSESSMENT

OPTIMIZED FIANL DETECTOR LAYOUT

162 U. Srivastava et al.

Verify that release of concern can be detected with a relatively high probability
of success especially in case of open areas.
Detection philosophy shall cover the design requirements of FGS systems, and to
what extent, the coverage is needed. There is no straight forward answer to answer
this some interpret the risk in FGS with arbitrary calculations of SIL which may lead
to some over engineered systems. Design philosophy varies with companies as well
as type of plants. It is based on previous experience and knowledge in their domain.
It is also based on the amount of funds allocated to FGS and to what level of safety
systems are needed for the specific plant.
Once the design philosophy of FGS is developed, one shall collect all the required
input data which is required for design of FGS. Equipment plot layout of the unit,
all the equipment list, process flow diagram, process data sheet, heat and material
balance sheets and site topographical data and wind velocities (Miyata 2011).
Once the preliminary collection of data is completed, start collecting properties
of all chemical components involved in the process. The properties like flash point
auto-ignition temperature and density of the pure components. Then start analyzing
every stream of the process and identify the components in each stream which are
greater than 5% volume in composition. Based on the design philosophy, identify
which type of detector is needed for specific equipment.
Segregate the plot plan into zones based on the similar type of equipment in
one zone. Start placing the detector in equipment plot plan from the previously
identified. Place the detector by considering the wind directions. Coverage area
assessment is needed to validate the detector layout and optimize it. It can be of two
types, geographical assessment and scenario assessment. For flame detectors based
on the vendor specifications, check for area coverage in three-dimensional plot. For
scenario assessment, carry out dispersion modeling using available mathematical
CFD tools and thereby optimize the layout of the detector for cost effective detection
(Roman 2016). As mentioned in previous sections, the signal from the detector is
properly linked with control equipment like alarm signaling, emergency shutdown,
and activating fire water pump, etc. for the mitigation of risk.

8 Redundancy and Cost

Based on experience review of past case studies ,it is aware that there are one or more
detectors which do not have any extra value of safety. These redundant detectors
can be removed from mapping layouts; however, there should be no compromise on
effectiveness of safety. A balance should be maintained between cost of the detection
and safety offered by the FGS. All risk mitigation measures should be employed
unless there is a negative effect on gross disproportionate to the benefits (Vinnem
2007).
Design of Fire and Gas Detection System in Process Industry 163

9 Traditional 2D Versus 3D Detector Mapping

Conventional 2D mapping is drawn on a paper or utilizing plant design PC program-

ming which thinks about two-dimensional perspectives. There are many problems
involved in using 2D mapping and one of the main problem is elevation and orien-
tation issues during 2D mapping process. After completion of detector mapping a
walk throughout the plant is necessary to identify for any deviations. Walkthrough
needs sound knowledge and experience in detector mapping. Consider the factors
like ease of maintenance, cleaning, and calibration during the walkthroughs. After
the detector mapping is completed, review it multiple times for any deviations.

10 Conclusion

A definitive point of any security framework introduced in the process plant is to

ensure the life of work force and forestall harm to resource and condition. Proper
detector selection and various performance factors are to be considered for improved
placement of detectors. By carrying out dispersion analysis and coverage area assess-
ment, one can validate the detector layout. Quantitative detector mapping is advan-
tageous over heuristic approach for enhanced effectiveness of safety. Optimization
of detector layout yields the better safety performance and reliability at low costs.

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