SECURING COMMUNITIES FOR

RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN

FINAL REPORT OF THE CONFLICT

PREVENTION INITIATIVE E-CONFERENCE

29 APRIL – 10 MAY 2002

Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research

- Conflict Prevention Initiative -
http://www.preventconflict.org
 SECURING COMMUNITIES FOR RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN

FINAL REPORT OF THE CONFLICT PREVENTION INITIATIVE (CPI)

E-CONFERENCE
29 April – 10 May 2002

1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 2

2. BACKGROUND ON HPCR & THE CONFLICT PREVENTION INITIATIVE (CPI) ...................... 2

3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................... 4

4. DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................ 5

4. 1. LOYA JIRGA ................................................................................................................................... 5

4. 2. WARLORDS ..................................................................................................................................... 7

4. 3. SAFETY: MILITARY PRESENCE AND COMMUNITY PROCESSES .................................. 9

4. 4. INTERNATIONAL AID ................................................................................................................ 10

4. 5. NATIONAL UNITY AND SOCIAL COHESION ....................................................................... 14

4. 6. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT ......................... 15

ANNEX 1 – LIST OF PARTICIPANTS .................................................................................................. 18

ANNEX 2 – CHARTS AND TABLES ...................................................................................................... 19

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1. Introduction

For two weeks in April and May 2002, the Conflict Prevention Initiative (CPI) of the
Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) hosted the first
ever international e-conference on “Securing Communities for Reconstruction in
Afghanistan,” attracting over 90 participants. The majority of the participants were
Afghan NGO and civil society leaders working in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Others
included representatives of various inter-governmental organizations, INGOs, academic
institutions and donor governments. This report summarizes the principal themes of the
discussion and concludes with a series of recommendations for various actors involved in
the process of reconstruction in Afghanistan. These recommendations include both those
specifically formulated by participants as well as those drawn more generally from the
conference discussion. In addition, actual quotes from the participants are interspersed
throughout the report in shaded boxes to suggest the richness and depth of the discussion.

The e-conference was preceded by conversations with NGO leaders in Kabul, as well as
roundtables with Afghan civil society leaders in Peshawar, Pakistan and Mashad and
Zahedan, Iran. The roundtables were designed both to produce substantive inputs for the
e-conference as well as to gather perspectives from those who may not have regular
internet access. In this way, both the roundtables and the e-conference were designed to
engage participants from their separate localities and yet still connect them with broader
discussions and analysis.

2. Background on HPCR & the Conflict Prevention

Initiative (CPI)

The Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) is a research and
policy program based at Harvard University in Cambridge, MA. The Program is engaged
in research and advisory services on conflict prevention strategies, the management of
humanitarian crises and the protection of civilians in conflict areas. The Program advises
international organizations, governments, and non-governmental actors and focuses on
the protection of vulnerable groups, conflict prevention strategies, and the role of
information technology in emergency response.

A key project of the Program is the Conflict Prevention Initiative (CPI), a website
interface on conflict prevention and crisis management developed in partnership with the
UN Executive Office of the Secretary General and the UN Department of Political
Affairs. The CPI website provides an interactive virtual platform for policy and decision
makers to gain access to information and academic resources as well as online discussion
forums and conferences on conflict prevention strategies. In light of recent military,
political and humanitarian developments in Afghanistan, the Program has established a

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dedicated CPI web platform to provide easy access to information and strategic analyses
on the current situation in Afghanistan and the Central Asia region. In addition to the CPI
collection of links to online documents, HPCR is providing original policy inputs on the
challenges of rehabilitating Afghan society. The policy activities of the Program include
the preparation of briefs, the dissemination of key information on the situation,
networking among field contacts, and, as needed, the convening of expert consultations
on strategic issues that might help to better inform decision-makers.

The principal objective of the current phase of the CPI Central Asia project is to facilitate
the engagement of Afghan civil society in the debates and decisions about the political,
economic, and social future of the country. An important impulse behind the Harvard
Program’s efforts to host an event that would so engage civil society leaders from the
region was an intuition that the internationalization of the current reconstruction process
had rendered local civil society organizations voiceless. Many had been active for several
years in preparing for the moment when their country would be ready for a concerted
rehabilitation effort. When that moment arrived, however, the avenues through which
they could engage and influence the international effort turned out to be limited. HPCR’s
consultations with Afghans in Kabul and roundtables in Pakistan and Iran confirmed that
many ideas and concerns have not been receiving attention by the international
community.

The e-conference was thus a venue to transcend the practical challenges associated with
bringing widely dispersed actors together to provide an opportunity for engagement with
each other and, through reports such as this one, with international actors. The e-
conference therefore proved an important event for learning through aggregating diverse
perspectives. The implicit message of the active participation of local actors is that the e-
conference format can be an important forum for ongoing discussions with many actors
involved in the reconstruction process, infusing international assistance with a process of
constant feedback and sharing of perspectives.

While it is clear that aid provision must be carefully coordinated to achieve the complex
objectives of reconstruction, the e-conference program rests on the notion that activities
which promote learning and widespread civil society engagement should proliferate
throughout Afghan society. The more fora through which Afghans can interact with each
other and with others interested in the reconstruction process, the richer the learning
process can be. Reconstruction is a complex process; no single master plan can capture
the breadth of activity nor resolve all the difficult policy challenges that lie ahead. The
only feasible approach is one that recognizes diverse efforts, creates multiple fora for
many voices to be heard and engaged, and emphasizes learning and collaboration. The
HPCR e-conference is intended to contribute to such an approach.

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3. Executive Summary

The e-conference was a lively site for wide-ranging discussion on the reconstruction
process. Views were diverse and several core themes were apparent. Although not all
participants agreed on all issues, a consensus did emerge in a number of key areas. This
section summarizes the major themes, while the next section elaborates them in more
detail and identifies policy recommendations.

A theme of the overall discussion was that a comprehensive understanding of security

was essential to any reconstruction effort. Physical safety—that is, security of person and
property—is clearly an important priority. But broader insecurities, if left unaddressed,
can render unsustainable a physical security that is ensured only by military or police.
Thus, participants were careful to consider insecurity arising from threats to economic
well being, income, and livelihood; health and education; food and water; religious
freedom and ethnic tolerance; and territorial integrity and sovereign independence arising
from foreign intervention. All of these dimensions were closely linked so that a weakness
in one area would have implications for others. Thus, the reconstruction process needs to
move forward on all these dimensions simultaneously for a sustainable peace to be
achieved.

This broad understanding of security was a common thread through many of the specific
topics discussed by participants. These substantive issues can be summarized as follows:

The Loya Jirga was seen as an important step in the process of reaching a
political settlement, but participants expressed concerns about its numerous
shortcomings. Consequently, expectations about what the Loya Jirga can deliver
must be moderated, and attention must not be diverted from other critical
reconstruction priorities.

Security is severely threatened by the presence of warlords, but it is important to

recognize that each warlord is motivated by a different set of interests; thus,
policy toward them must be individually tailored. Moreover, warlords are a
symptom of underlying conditions of poverty and illiteracy; if these conditions
are not addressed, warlordism will be ineradicable.

Physical safety is being at least partly addressed by the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul but continues to be a significant concern in the
rest of the country. Expanding ISAF to other major centers appears to be
essential, but should be accompanied by building on existing community based
processes of conflict prevention and security in rural areas.

International assistance must be attentive to the need to build, rather than

compromise, local capacity and strive for accountability and coordination.
Moreover, a series of substantive tensions must be carefully balanced in
formulating an assistance strategy: between ‘quick impact projects’ to meet urgent

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 needs and carefully assessed, collaboratively developed programs for longer term
issues; between national infrastructure in Kabul and regional and local
investment; and between strengthening the government and strengthening the
local NGO sector.

Reconstruction is not only about economic or institutional aid; it is also a process

of national unity and reconciliation. Although participants disagreed about the
nature of ethnic and linguistic tension in the country, the need to foster a culture
of peace through tolerance and reconciliation was identified as essential.

Ultimately, peace will be the outcome of a process of community development

and civil society engagement. Democracy should not be thought of simply in
terms of creating national institutions, but rather by deepening the capacities of
individual communities to govern themselves, in the best tradition of Afghanistan.
Thus, investments in national infrastructure must be accompanied by the
revitalization and strengthening of local community governance structures and
broad-based engagement of civil society.

4. Discussion & Recommendations

4. 1. Loya Jirga

Conference participants were ambivalent about the Loya Jirga process. On the one hand,
many recognized that it was an important step in the process of reaching a political
settlement that recognized Afghanistan’s own traditions and history. On the other hand,
many were concerned that expectations were too high since the Loya Jirga also exhibited
significant limitations in achieving the goals of a democratic and peaceful Afghanistan.

Some conference participants believed that the Loya Jirga was indicative of the
democratic nature of traditional structures of decision making in Afghanistan.
Traditionally, the people of the country had an important role in governance, and only
recently when the connection between “rulers” and “the people” had become severed had
political peace suffered. The traditional structure valued culture and religion as
paramount, and fostered the unity of the Afghan people. The present Loya Jirga could
draw upon this tradition of unity, and declare a new strategic approach for reconstruction
on behalf of all Afghans which would be the centerpiece for the coordination of
international and local efforts. Although Loya Jirgas in the past have often turned a blind
eye to issues of ethnicity, linguistic diversity, and group exclusion, this Loya Jirga could
provide a good forum to discuss and debate the issues in an inclusive manner.

Many others raised significant concerns about the use of the Loya Jirga to secure the
future political peace of Afghanistan. Some were concerned that the practical

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arrangements for the Loya Jirga would undermine its effectiveness. The selection process
seems to have been tainted by the presence of armed groups who were hindering the
ability of people to freely express their views. And although a small number of seats at
the Loya Jirga have been reserved for NGO representatives, the broader processes
through which the Loya Jirga would engage civil society groups and local communities
in its deliberations remain unclear, generating concerns that the Loya Jirga would be
simply a conversation among elites who are socially and culturally alienated from the
vast majority of Afghans. Historically, Loya Jirga participation was by selection rather
than by election, and therefore the model does not contemplate an expression of public
will through representation.

“To be credible, the Loya Jirga will have to be transparent, representative, and
participatory. If it fails to meet popular expectations … the transitional
administration will lack legitimacy and popular support.”

Aside from these practical concerns, some participants suggested that the history of Loya
Jirgas did not bode well for the success of the current effort. For instance, since
consensus is usually the mode of decision making, small groups have been able to hold
up the entire process in order to pursue their own narrow agenda. Additionally, past Loya
Jirgas have not contributed to political peace. King Amanullah, Daoud, Najibullah, and
Mullah Omar all faced severe political turmoil and eventually fell from power despite
having supportive Loya Jirgas.

Finally, some were concerned that the Loya Jirga’s capacity to make and implement
decisions in support of peace was limited. First, the representatives to the Loya Jirga need
conflict management and peacebuilding training, otherwise the discussion could simply
lapse into traditional disputes. Second, the procedures typically have just provided for
speeches by dominant figures rather than any real analysis or deliberation of issues.
Third, the extent to which the Loya Jirga’s decisions will be respected and implemented
by the people in different parts of the country remains an open question.

Even in the face of these fundamental concerns, however, the participants as a whole
expressed cautious optimism that the Loya Jirga process would move the process of
peace forward to the next stage. The Loya Jirga is thus probably best understood not as
the realization of a democratic ideal, but rather as the next step in defusing conflict and
building democracy slowly. Even for this to occur, however, a few conditions would have
to be met. Expectations for what the Loya Jirga would achieve would have to be
moderated; it would not usher in democracy in one miraculous step, but would be a
bridge to a new political settlement. Not everyone will get what they want from the
outcome so a strategy to deal with dissatisfied groups will be necessary. Furthermore,
transparency and equal representation are key to ensuring its legitimacy in the eyes of the
people. People must understand their right to participate, and must be invited into the
process.

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 “Loya Jirga is a major step towards the long journey of achieving relative peace
and representative governance in Afghanistan. The subsequent selection,
processes/elections will hopefully improve upon the Loya Jirga and gradually
voices from below will influence the kind of people and governments to emerge.
It will certainly take time, patience and consistence on the part of international
community and Afghans before we see a visible change in the post-Taliban
Afghanistan. One step at a time!”

Participants also discussed essential elements of a new constitution, with a special focus
on guaranteeing basic civil and political rights as well as equality of all Afghans
irrespective of ethnicity, language, religion, or gender.

Recommendations

• Communicate moderate expectations for what the Loya Jirga can accomplish;
emphasize its role as one step in the broader process of political settlement rather
than as a moment of transformation to democracy.
• The Afghan administration and the UN should develop a strategy for dealing with
the potential for dissatisfied groups emerging from the Loya Jirga, ensuring that
they do not become spoilers to the overall process.
• The Loya Jirga should seek to be as transparent as possible in its deliberations,
and not shy away from confronting the most challenging issues the country faces.
It should insist on the same transparency in any governance processes that it
launches.
• The Loya Jirga should ensure that the new constitution enshrines basic political
and civil rights for all Afghans irrespective of language, ethnicity, religion, or
gender.

4. 2. Warlords

A significant part of the conference discussion revolved around the issue of warlords and
their impact on security in different parts of the country. Discussions on this issue
followed two simultaneous tracks: understanding who the warlords were and considering
the context in which they were emerging as powerful actors.

Participants quickly realized that the blanket term “warlord” was not helpful in describing
the very different individuals who comprised the group. Different warlords have different
interests; equating Padshah Khan Zadran in Gardez, Ismail Khan in Herat, Rashid
Dostum in Mazar-e-Sharif and Yunus Khalis in Jalalabad obscures rather than sheds light
on the problem. One participant suggested that it would be better to understand the

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warlords as “spoilers,” interested in disrupting the peace and reconstruction process.
Some of these were “total spoilers,” seeking to frustrate peace at any cost. Others were
“limited spoilers” who could be convinced to support peace if some set of their political
interests were met. Still others were “greedy spoilers” whose primary interests were
economic, and could be potentially “paid off” to support peace. The other benefit of
abandoning the label “warlord” and generating names that better describe their interests is
that it focuses discussion on the actual grievances and legitimate concerns they bring to
the table, rather than dismissing them as simply “evil”. Eliminating warlords is a remote
possibility; the only way to deal with them is to create the institutional infrastructure
within which they can pursue their interests peacefully. Although some participants
expressed concern in allowing these actors to escape their past misdeeds with impunity,
others felt resigned to include them with the hope of transforming them into legitimate
participants. They feared that warlords would wreak havoc if excluded.

Other participants were more interested in considering the conditions that allowed for
warlords to assume positions of such power and influence in the country. The underlying
impulse for this analysis was that the warlords were a symptom of a deeper set of issues.
Removing warlords, on this view, would not result in peace, but only pave the way for
others to take their place if the underlying problems were not addressed. After all,
Afghanistan now needs builders and visionaries, not warlords who are more interested in
destroying peace. Some participants expressed significant doubts whether simply paying
off warlords could ever bring sustained peace. The consensus appeared to be that
economic depravation was the central underlying problem creating the opportunity for
warlordism: poverty makes communities particularly vulnerable to exploitation by
warlords. This economic vulnerability, coupled with illiteracy and poor educational
opportunities, is leading to a certain ideological or political vulnerability that allows
warlords to manipulate communities more easily.

“Accepting the realities on the ground, it seems like we have to live with many
objectionable characters for quite some time. What seems to be promising,
however, is that in exchange for new labels such as "legitimization," a chance for
peace will hopefully prevail. While the exploitations and manipulations would not
come to an immediate end, we will probably see a positive transformation process
begin. Maybe this time the incentives of playing peace outweigh those of
instigating violence.”

Having identified the central problem in this way, the imperative for economic
development is obvious. One participant insisted that the only way to end the hold of
warlords was to engage young men in high impact development programs so that they
lessen their dependence on warlords and realize the immediate gains of peace. Since
warlords seem to have control over many common community resources in the rural
areas, ensuring access to these resources by all people without recourse to warlords is an
urgent priority.

“We [must] engage these young men in development program activities and
bring them away from fighting … towards active participation in the
reconstruction of our homeland which in turn will help in securing the
reconstruction process in Afghanistan.”
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Recommendations

• Warlords should not be thought of as an undifferentiated group; each should be

seen as an individual, with responses tailored to the specific interests and
concerns of each one.
• Economic development assistance and alternative income generation projects
should be undertaken as a priority in communities that are affected by warlords.

4. 3. Safety: military presence and community processes

Both the presence of ISAF and the ongoing U.S. military operation against Al-Qaeda
were subjects of discussion. On ISAF, participants insisted that security in Kabul did not
mean security in the rest of the country. Therefore, the need to expand ISAF to other
major centers was seen as imperative. In the same vein, training a national army and
police service were seen as important to alleviate dependence on ISAF.

The importance of a professional, disciplined, and civilian controlled national army and
police service were reiterated several times. They were seen as integral parts of a
functioning national legal system, a prerequisite to general disarmament in the
population, and essential to the capacity of the national government to gain credibility
and extend its mandate to the entire country.

In the meantime, however, participants seemed to recognize that the prospect of ISAF
expanding beyond urban centers to the rest of the country was dim, and some suggested
that such an expanded international military presence may not even be desirable. Instead,
it was important to build upon current community-based processes of security.
Communities in many parts of Afghanistan have developed their own methods of
ensuring security that have persisted even in the face of many years of conflict. In this
way, community survival has depended, and will likely continue to depend on localized
practices of accommodation and cooperation between and among communities to ensure
safety and security.

“There is a risk in assuming that conflict-resolution is something that Afghans

might not know about, because of their turbulent past. While urban communities
are currently more reliant for security on ISAF (in the case of Kabul) and the
regional authorities (elsewhere), many rural Afghans maintain a form of fragile
peace by accommodation, within and between communities.”

Nonetheless, other participants suggested that many of these community processes had
been severely compromised during the war: they must be purposefully revived rather than
simply assumed to be fully functional. In any event, they cannot be successful on their
own. They require a complementary set of national institutions to support and underwrite

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them: a legal framework, police and military personnel, funding and official recognition,
among others.

Several participants expressed concerns about the ongoing international military

operation against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces. Concerns ranged from the future
implications of enlisting and arming Afghan proxies to wage the war on the ground at a
time when the focus needed to be on disarmament to the effect of international military
objectives on local processes of mediation and tribal accommodation as in Gardez.

Recommendations

• ISAF should be expanded to other major urban centers in Afghanistan.

• The creation of well trained and disciplined national army and police service
should be a priority in the reconstruction process.
• Community-based security processes should be identified, supported, and
revitalized.
• The creation of national infrastructure should be prioritized with a clear view to
supporting rather than displacing such localized processes.

4. 4. International Aid

The lively discussion about the nature and prospects for international assistance to the
reconstruction process focused on three themes: local capacity, accountability &
coordination, and effectiveness.

Local Capacity. The effect on local capacity of current methods of assistance was a
significant concern along three dimensions. First, participants cited evidence of a “brain
drain”, whereby skilled Afghans were migrating from the government and local NGOs to
the UN and large international NGOs who were providing significantly higher salaries.
This trend has had a debilitating effect on local organizations’ ability to contribute
effectively to reconstruction. Second, the sudden and dramatic increase in international
efforts to provide aid threatens to create dependency on international assistance and a
lack of ownership of the reconstruction program by Afghans themselves. The anxiety
about creating dependency seems exacerbated by a lingering uncertainty about how long
the international community can be relied upon to provide aid. Much of the money
pledged at the Tokyo Conference has yet to be disbursed and other pressing international
matters may divert international attention from Afghanistan. The concern is that Afghans
will then be left with little indigenous capacity to carry on the process. Third, some
participants expressed concern that the government was being marginalized in delivering
key services as NGOs and the UN stepped in to fill urgent needs. The inadvertent
consequence is that the government may be losing (or simply not gaining) credibility in
the eyes of Afghans.

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 “… unless there is a sense of ownership and the feeling of having a say at the
community level, the people may continue to suffer …”

Of course, international assistance was recognized as essential to reconstruction, but it

was equally clear that assistance had to be managed carefully to ensure that it was truly a
process of reconstruction rather than simply humanitarian aid. One participant suggested
that this was a symptom of the inability of the international aid community to shift from a
mindset of a complex political emergency to that of a post-war reconstruction. In the
latter scenario, the imperative must be to ensure that aid lasts no longer than necessary to
empower communities to address their own problems.

The result was a call for international actors—the UN, donor governments, international
NGOs—to reconsider their methods of engaging Afghans in reconstruction. The
international community must create the space for the government to fulfill its functions,
and support it in doing so. Likewise, international NGOs should seek to collaborate with
local partners at every moment, rather than appropriating their skilled staff. This will
increase the credibility and legitimacy of the government as well as strengthen civil
society and community participation.

“If we help people through NGOs, people will be dependent on NGOs and they
will want support and help from the NGOs, so relations between the people and
government will become weaker and weaker. But when we help them through the
government, they will trust their government and will support it so in this case
not only we help the people but also we build a strong relation between people
and government.”

Accountability & Coordination. Participants recognized that coordination was

something many had been concerned about and had been widely discussed, but raised
questions about whether the current assistance approach could be characterized as
coordinated. Indeed, one participant suggested that the various coordinating bodies
themselves lacked coordination. Another participant suggested that the only viable
approach was to adopt a ‘systems’ approach that included donors, various intermediary
organizations, and beneficiaries. On this view, the system’s overall management and
coordination depended on (a) an articulated and widely shared common objective, (b) a
common means of coordinating at and across all three levels, and (c) a feedback
mechanism to allow for ongoing assessment of effectiveness. In the absence of this
overall management, competition sets in among different agencies, leading to adverse
outcomes such as the skyrocketing rents in Kabul.

“Shouldn't one question the gap of coordination between the Coordination

Bodies with open doors to anyone who is interested in making an NGO? How to
make these COORDINATORS Coordinated?”

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A second concern was accountability of all actors providing assistance. Participants
called for more transparency in the operations of all actors so their donors, methods, and
results would be open to public scrutiny.

Effectiveness. Comments about the effectiveness of international assistance were of two

kinds: some concerned the work and capacity of the NGO sector, while others concerned
substantive choices and priorities for reconstruction.

The most provocative suggestion, supported by several participants, was to create a

process of certification for NGOs wishing to operate in Afghanistan. The suggestion rests
on a number of issues. First, participants expressed concern about the rapid proliferation
of international NGOs that had no prior experience in Afghanistan and seemed to be just
following new opportunities for funding. These NGOs were detracting from the efforts of
NGOs who had a long history of performance in Afghanistan, and were familiar with the
country’s historical and cultural context. Certification would also alleviate many
accountability concerns. Moreover, certification would ensure that collaboration in
support of national objectives replaced uncoordinated activity. One participant suggested
that the Ministry of Planning should develop a set of criteria in consultation with NGOs,
the UN, donor governments, and others, and then create a commission to certify
individual NGOs according to those criteria.

“… it is now time to screen the INGOs, from their technical expertise to

professional levels. The time should cease for Pocket NGOs, individuals carrying
their whole offices, letterheads, stamps and going around to seek funding for
various projects. The Ministry of Planning should adopt criteria and request all
NGOs to re-register.”

Other concerns about the NGO sector related to the limited capacity to absorb the funds
being pledged given the history of inattention and inactivity in Afghanistan. This is
exacerbated by the fact that many NGOs working in Afghanistan have focused largely on
short-term relief rather than longer-term reconstruction activity. Still other concerns had
dealt with the lack of mutual understanding between different NGOs, local and
international, in Afghanistan. Workshops and conferences that bring together NGOs to
share experiences and learn about and from each other would be an important element in
addressing this issue.

A second set of concerns about aid effectiveness concerned a series of strategic choices
and tensions that were being made. One significant tension was connected with the pace
of reconstruction. On the one hand, participants recognized the importance of ‘quick
impact projects’ to meet urgent needs and sustain the peace process during this fragile
time; yet, on the other hand, many believed that sustained success could only be achieved
through careful, collaborative planning with appropriate needs assessments based on
reliable information and broad participation. Although ‘quick impact projects’ were
important, reconstruction is a long-term process and therefore should not be rushed at the
expense of in-depth planning and participation. Moreover, the way immediate needs are

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met will affect the future shape of Afghanistan. Merely addressing urgent issues,
therefore, is not an option: the work of humanitarian aid and security in Kabul must be
accompanied by carefully planned and considered assistance for security in the rest of the
country, a political settlement, and state infrastructure such as a civil service, legal
system, education, and economic development. Addressing such issues as rights may not
seem urgent, but are in fact important for laying the groundwork for a peaceful future
during this transitional period.

Another tension concerned the choice between concentrating efforts on Kabul and on the
rest of the country. Some participants recognized the importance of building up national
infrastructure as an essential element of reconstruction, while others suggested that
partnering only with the central government could create unhealthy competition in the
regions, and ignore significant needs in areas where most of the population lives.

Other participants raised concerns about whether donors should concentrate on

strengthening government capacity to deliver important public services or invest in
strengthening the Afghan NGO sector since the government would not be able to serve
the whole country in the short term. One participant suggested that one overarching goal
should guide all substantive and strategic decisions about reconstruction: to address the
needs of the most vulnerable in Afghan society.
Many participants suggested that the first priority had to be economic development.
Allowing people to improve their lives through stable homes and incomes is the best
recipe for stability, security, and peace. Until Afghans reach economic security, they will
not be able to lessen their dependence on ISAF and other international assistance.

Recommendations

• The aid community—UN, international and local NGOs, donor governments—

should consider ways of collaborating with the Afghan administration and local
NGOs to, for example, share Afghan employees, in order to avoid ‘brain drain’
and competition with high salaries.
• The aid community should develop a policy framework that clarifies the roles of
all the parties involved in aid—the AIA, local NGOs, international NGOs, donor
governments, the UN and other multilateral organizations—with specific focus on
ensuring that the Afghan government and local NGOs are given ample
opportunities to develop their own capacities and eventually take over
responsibilities from the UN and international NGOs.
• The aid community should develop mechanisms for accounting for their activities
and use of funds, not only to their donors but to Afghan beneficiaries as well.
• The aid community should create better vehicles for coordination, and yield to the
Afghan government’s attempts at ensuring a coherent aid program.
• The Afghan government should develop a process of NGO certification to ensure
quality, accountability, and coordination among NGOs as well as a process of
monitoring and evaluation in each area of development programming, to assess
progress, to learn from experience, and to maintain accountability.

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4. 5. National Unity and Social Cohesion

“Afghans today have little basis to trust their own recent history; too much
remains hidden. The country has become a cauldron of interlocking conspiracies,
both real and imagined, a maze of fractured mirrors designed by war-makers
who embraced deception as a winning weapon. Afghanistan’s successful
reconstruction as even a semi-normal country, then, must eventually include
some reclamation by Afghans of the truth about their recent past.”

The participants were eager to move beyond surface symptoms of insecurity to

interrogate more deeply the set of fundamental building blocks that would establish
sustainable peace in Afghanistan in the future. One such building block was the issue of
social cohesion after two decades of violence that has exacerbated ethnic, religious, and
linguistic cleavages.

Participants were uniformly concerned that a cultural change needed to occur, replacing a
mindset of violence with one of peace. Two decades of war have engendered “conflictive
minds,” and therefore peace will only result if individual Afghans change their way of
thinking about social problems. Many participants thus advocated peace education
workshops and training for all Afghans, as well as peace curriculum development for
schools.

The issue of ethnic division sparked important discussion and revealed some fundamental
disagreements. Some participants believed that ethnic division was an inherent part of
Afghan history and society. Although elites may believe in national unity, ordinary
people have developed deep feelings of hatred toward Afghans of other ethnicities.
Consequently, the prospects of a united Afghanistan seemed dim to these participants.

Most participants, however, were adamant that ethnic tensions were the result of foreign
entrepreneurs who had fueled inter-group conflicts to achieve their own goals, rather than
an inherent part of Afghan society. On this view, ethnic divisions were a new
phenomenon, standing in stark contrast to a history in which ethnicity was not part of the
consciousness of most Afghans. One participant pointed to a long history of ethnic
cooperation, relating a specific anecdote about how Pashtun villagers in Ghazni twice
supported the neighboring Hazara community when they were suffering at the hands of
strict blockades, first by Hafizullah Amin’s pro-Soviet regime and then by the Taliban.
Indeed, this participant suggested that ethnic harmony was simply a fact of life among the
masses, and an ethnic consciousness was only an elite preoccupation. Overall, most
participants felt that an Afghan identity transcending all ethnic groups was strong, even if
that identity did not translate into a full consensus on how to govern the country.

“The diverse cultures and backgrounds of Afghans have been extensively

exploited over the years of protracted civil strife. Bringing them together and
building the spirit of national integrity, tolerance and unity amongst populations
representing various ethnicities and backgrounds could not be taken as an
overnight task.”

14
Some participants suggested that whatever the genealogies of the ethnic tensions, there
was a need to develop an institutional response in order to promote social healing in
Afghanistan. One participant raised the possibility of a People’s Council for National
Understanding (“Shuraa-I-mardurn Braa-e Tafahoom-e-Milli”), to promote a sense of
nationhood premised on respect, understanding, and tolerance of difference. It could also
serve to help Afghans confront the truth about their recent past. Furthermore, the new
constitution must enshrine full equal rights among all Afghans, regardless of ethnicity,
religion, or gender.

Finally, one participant suggested that an important aspect of the process of national
reconciliation was promoting a better understanding of Islam, through better monitoring
of seminary activity and to ensure that religious leaders better represent the true religious
convictions of Afghans.

Recommendations

• The Afghan government and UN should support efforts at peace education, not
only for youth through schools, but also for the population at large through
workshops, conferences, and mass media.
• The Afghan government should consider the establishment of a national council
to promote reconciliation, understanding, and national unity among different
groups in Afghanistan.

4. 6. Community Development and Civil Society Engagement

“In villages, towns and cities everywhere on earth there is a need to solve
immediate problems while proactive work continues for long-term prosperity
and security. Is there any reason why traditional shuras and newer village
development associations cannot combine their knowledge, talent and efforts
toward a good future for each and every Afghan?
I recall my memory attending an election process of a local shura in the western
part of the country, where one ANGO was implementing some community
development programmes. In this meeting many people, including some
commanders, were also present. Before the nomination took place, a ground rule
for how to proceed with the process and criteria for a good community leader
were set, e.g., honesty, knowledge, negotiation skills, respect, literacy, trusted by
the community, etc. Then the people started whispering to each other, and at last
they came with a name of whom no one was even thinking before. The man stood
up, with a charismatic smile and simple outfit came forward and exhibited his
respect to the people. No one could say that he was not trusted, even the
influential people present at the meeting. This could be a simple example that the
potential and opportunities are there, but the challenge is how we make use of
and maximize its utilization.”

15
Democracy was an important theme of the e-conference and was connected to broader
ideas about the importance of local communities in reconstruction. Participants suggested
that while national infrastructure was important, peace would need to be earned bottom-
up, by revitalizing community governance structures. Afghans could look for inspiration
from their past; democracy, it was suggested, has a history in the country even if it is not
expressed in familiar Western institutional forms. At the same time, many traditional
practices would have to evolve in order to include all members of the community in
governance.

Participants were uniform in calling for more attention to community development as an

essential element of reconstruction. One participant noted that for most of Afghan
history, power and control has been concentrated in Kabul, but this has been
accompanied by short periods of political liberalization, where popular sovereignty and
democratic institutions were built. These periods of liberalization could provide a basis
for future institutional development. These national democratic institutions—parliament,
an independent judiciary, etc.—however, cannot take the place of robust community
governance structures.

Many participants discussed the history of community-based shuras as a model for a

reinvigorated community development. While shuras were lauded as a means for
community ownership over community problems, participants felt that they would need
to evolve significantly to truly express democratic sentiments and effectively steward
reconstruction at the community level. Thus, the spirit, but not the form of shuras should
provide the roadmap for the future.

Traditionally, shuras included only males and played a reactive role to solving specific
conflicts or problems in the community. What is needed today is a broad-based, inclusive
structure that will be proactive in identifying community needs, planning development
programs, and implementing them across various dimensions of community life. This
approach will ensure that the needs of common Afghans are put first, that local
communities have a say in the development programming that most affects them, and that
reconstruction becomes a vehicle to improve the nature of people’s relationships with one
another in the context of authentic expressions of belief, culture, and tradition. This is a
bottom-up view of security and democracy: starting with people’s local relationships,
ensuring that they are based on rights, obligations, and reconciliation, and creating
connections and capacities to strengthen civil society. Security emerges as a result of
such a process of participatory governance, rather than as a prerequisite.

The community development approach also requires investment in economic and social
development. As one participant noted, illiteracy can severely limit the engagement of the
population in the process of reconstruction. Therefore, education and health programs
throughout the country, not just in Kabul, are essential.

This bottom-up view was not universally held among participants. At least one
participant urged that the focus should be first on stability and good governance, not on
democratic engagement. In fact, concentrating on democratic engagement could just as

16
easily lead to less rather than more stability. Democracy can be deferred until
reconstruction is well underway. Another participant suggested that reconstruction of the
economy must be the first priority: securing trade routes, investing in protection of body
and property, and creating a climate to attract international investment.

Recommendations

• The international assistance program should invest in revitalizing and

strengthening local community governance structures, inspired but not limited by
traditional shuras, to develop capacity for self-government.
• National infrastructure development should be designed to be supportive of
community-level governance and investment in such national infrastructure
should be accompanied by community development efforts.
• The Afghan government should promote participatory decision-making, involving
citizens and civil society in its activities.

17
ANNEX 1 – LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Abdul-Karim Khan Helay Zadran Patricia Garcia

Abdul Razique Samadi Homa Khalid Paul O'Brien
Ahmad Fahim Hakim Homira Nassery Pierre Helg
Alexander Their Humayun Hamidzada Rahela Hashim
Alison Betts Ijaz Khan Ramesh Rajasingham
Ambrish Dhaka Ina Breuer Raz Mohammad Dalili
Amelia Nice Isabelle Behm Razia Stanikzai
Amena Chenzaie Jean Kissell Richard Conroy
Andrea Armstrong Jean-Michel Monod Sajid Gill
Andrew Cox Joanna Santa Barbara Samina Ahmed
Anna Walters John Renninger Sarah Bryce
Anthea Sanyasi John Schoeberlein Seddiq Weera
Arif Surachman Jolyon Leslie Sepideh Yousefzadeh Faal Deghati
Arnold Luethold Jonathan Goodhand Scott Smith
Asif Rahimi Kamol Abdullaev Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh
Asila Wardak Kanishka Nawabi Shamila Chaudhary
Aurangzaib Khan Karin Wermester Sharon Morris
Barmak Pazhwak Ken Hurwitz Shepard Forman
Bernadette Sexton Kerri Sherlock Spyros Demetriou
Brian Williams Kevin John Austin Steve Gleason
Chandra Lekha Sriram Khaled Mansour Steven Sabol
Christoph Berg Laure Beaufils Suba Chandran
Daniel Langenkamp Manouchehr Shiva Tahmina Mehrgan
Dan Ryan Mark Vcislo Tahmina Rahaman
David J. Katz Markus Muller Teresa Cunningham
David McLachlan-Karr Martine van Bijlert Tomas Nordberg
Diego Osorio Maryem Sader Umer Daudzai
Dr. Annette Ittiq Michael Ignatieff Urs Beer
Dr. Joseph Klaits Michael Marx Vladimir Boyko
Dr. Syed Ali Wasif Mirwais Nahzat Farahi Wahid Sarij
Dr. Uwe Kievelitz Mirza Abdul Hameed Willem Vogelsang
Dr. Abdul Wahid Mohammed Ehsan Zia William Wood
Elizabeth Cabot Mohammad Ismail Qarizada
Elizabeth Winter Mohammad Fayyazi
Eng. Naim Salimee Mohammad Rafiq Ahmadzai
Esther Robinson Mozhda Namwar
Fahim Youssofzai Muhammad Arif
Farda Asadov Mustafa Aziz
Fazel-Rabi Haqbeen Naqib Ahmad Noory
Frank Method Nastaran Moossavi
Gul Rahman Qazi Neguin Yavari
Günther Baechler Nick Robson
Hakim Gul Ahmadi Nishkala Suntharalingam
Hamidullah Natiq Oliver Ulich

18
ANNEX 2 – CHARTS AND TABLES

The following charts and tables were contributed by Ahmad Fahim Hakim, program co-
ordinator for Co-operation for Peace and Unity (CPAU), in the course of the conference.
They bear directly on the principal themes enumerated in this report and make important
contributions as fresh analyses to the challenges faced by Afghanistan.

Table 1

Violence Types
Physical Violences Cultural Violences Structural Violences

Family • Beating • Deprivation of girls from • Spirit of

• Child education indifference
labor/forced labor • Not allowing children to express • Lack of freedom
• Calling names their ideas to express self
• Intimidation • Unhealthy cultural values and opinions
• Imprisonment traditions • Denying rights
• Depriving from • Superstitions related to others
food • Preference of boy vs girl • Poverty at the
• Men can easily get married for family level
2nd and 3rd time • Only one person
• Taunting language as income earner
• Notion of son/daughter in law • Malnutrition
Schools • Beating • Messages of hatred • Texts full of
• Use of sticks • Top-down teaching approach violence messages
(most often and • Students as objects • Heavy subjects
normally) • No room for students beyond
• Calling names participation understanding of
• Torture • Prejudice and discrimination students
• Punishment • Taunting language • Unilateral made
• Sexual curricula
harassment/power • No school
abuse facilities for all
Community/society • Intimidation • Forced marriages • Indifference to
• Sexual abuse • Excessive expenses for wedding public assets
• Power abuse and condolence ceremonies • Poverty
• Kidnapping • Not allowing women and • Exploitation by
• Killing children in decision making those ceasing
• Beating • Ethnic discrimination power (landlords
• Torture • Difference between man & and farmers)
• Isolation woman • No domestic laws
• Taunting language
• Deprivation of women from
their inheritance rights
National • Fighting • Lack of free media • Less chances for
• Killing • Discrimination in recruiting people to
• Arrest governmental employees participate in
• Beating • Low roles for women in the social, cultural and
• Torture and government and state positions political forums
amputation • Poor are poor because of their • Scourge of
• Human rights fate poverty
abuse and grave • Selection vs election • Inaccessibility to
violation • War and criminal economy health and
• Demolished • Not quality education education facilities
residential areas • Taunting language • Exploitation
• Sexual abuse and • Weal civil society
trafficking with less influence
• Drug and • Unjust distribution
smuggling of resources
• Deprivation of
people of their
civil, economic
and political rights
• State building vs
nation building

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 Table 2

How CPAU sees the interaction between various components of violence.

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 Table 3

Traditional Shura Village Development Association1

Membership Open Fixed
• Age • Having development vision
• Religious competence • Have modern education
• Conservative and more • Representative of whole
Member traditionalist population
characteristics • Economic power • Contact with agencies
• Social power • Willing to bring about
• Contact with Authority changes

Problem solving; Conflict Planning, Implementation, and

Objectives
resolution running of community projects
Function Reactive Proactive

1
Village Development Association tends to address the root causes of conflicts not only
the symptoms. It tends to use improved communication, negotiation and mediation skills
for conflict resolutions and transformation. It tries to be proactive and to set up strategic
thinking and objectives. It establishes contacts with other agencies in order to reduce
economic, social and political vulnerabilities and decreases the level of defencelessness
to external shocks.

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 Table 4

Change Required in Responses by Aid Community

From Complex Political Emergency to Post War Situation

Complex Political Emergency Post-war Situation

Feature Responses by Aid Feature Responses by Aid
Community Community
Collapsed/failed State Life saving: emergency Good will: political and Life sustaining
Corruption Short-term economical programmes
Extremes: rich/poor Coordination/info Emphasis on rules and Longer term
Warfare sharing regulations/code of conduct programming
Lack of national plans Hardware eg technical and principles Software eg attitudes
Displacement Taking over form Agreement on new set-up Bridging role…
Lack of law and order government of a Linking: government,
Lack of political will Withdrawal due to government/administration local communities,
Insufficient funds for security situation and Increase in international community,
long-term programmes adaptation to prevailing bilateral/multilateral and private sector
War/political economy situation funding Facilitation
Deprivation of women’s Micro-level Transitional period Capacity building and
social and civil rights intervention Focus on national planning development
Lack of rehabilitation Dealing with symptoms Increased interest for Adaptation?
and development by reconstruction by How to facilitate smooth
government government and transition from CPE to
Brain drain international community Reconstruction
Low participation of Returning of refugees and Changes required in
civil society Diaspora organizations to meet the
Mist trust Demobilization and needs for a smooth
Gross violation of demilitarization transition
human rights Hopes and optimism for Address or efforts to
Traumatized people better future leading to new address the root causes of
commitments problems
Emphasis on women’s
participation
Emphasis on role of civil
society
Emphasis on effective govt.
institutions building

22
 Table 5

Illustration from the book ‘People First’ by Stan Burkey.

Examples:
- Health facilities and services Examples:
- Education facilities & - Raising awareness
services
- Potable water systems
(rights,
- Transportation and responsibilities, and
communication systems capacities)
- Banking services - Participation in
- Energy decision-making
- Election of their
representatives
Social Development - Organisations and
networks
Economic Development

Political Development
Sustainable
development

Examples:
- Increased
income
- Building
infrastructures
- Increased Human Development
production
- Marketing Examples:
- Poverty - Self confidence
alleviation (Developing skills and
- Effective use of knowledge).
production tools - Self sufficiency (active
& equipment participation in political
economic and social
activities).
Sense of co-operation / self
awareness (strength &
weakness)…

23