MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN INDIAN OCEAN: PROSPECTS AND

WAY AHEAD FOR IORA

- Rear Admiral Khaled Iqbal (retd)

Vice Chancellor, BSMRMU

Geo-Strategic Significance of Indian Ocean

The ocean has been a source of wealth for millennia linking economics around the world.
International shipping and ports provide crucial linkages in global supply chains. The vast
maritime-littoral space of the Indian Ocean is of immense geo-political, geo-economic and
geo-strategic significance where economics and security have always influenced the
historical and contemporary discourses in the region. Today the global geopolitical focus has
squarely set its gaze on this so-called Great Connector- the IOR that is likely to shape the
regional and global events on a larger canvas.

With increased levels of shipping and trade through the IOR, there is a corresponding
increase in associated maritime crimes and other challenges at sea. However, guided by the
quest for security and economic development, a positive trend is fast emerging in
international geopolitics about partnership and close maritime cooperation. But there are
several social, religious, cultural and ideological fault lines that give rise to conflicting
strategic interests, competing economies, social instability, demographic stresses and the
power struggle between regional and extra-regional actors. Hence maritime governance today
demands flexible and multi-pronged response strategies.
The regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean thus needs to be charted and navigated
carefully, taking into account the regional architecture, especially the security dynamics. A
good number of regional forums and organizations have been formed in the recent past by the
Indian Ocean states, but most of these forums have not lived up to the expectations. The
single biggest regional forum is IORA which was initiated in 1997 as IOR-ARC (Wagner,
2013). With the present 23 members and 10 dialogue partners IORA has had a sustained
growth but there are issues and challenges that have so far hampered its expected
effectiveness in terms of maritime security cooperation.

Choke Points and Strategic Petroleum Streams

However, in order to understand the security dynamics of the Indian Ocean, it is important to
understand a little better about the IOR Choke Points and strategic oil routes. Oil is seen as an

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essential strategic commodity which needs to be protected all the time. The strategic
petroleum streams are the conduits and connectors between the sites and nodes of the oil and
gas export activity, strategic refining hubs, waypoints and consumer markets. On the other
hand, the 5 important Choke Points can literally choke the IOR littorals’ economy if not
protected well.

Emerging Indo-Pacific: Two Oceans One Region

In view of the US continued strategic interest in the IOR, today there is a major ‘Indian
Ocean Vector’ in the previously conceptualized ‘US Strategic Rebalance’ which vindicates
the ‘Indo-Pacific’ school of thought (Bisley and Phillips, 2013). So, this emerging Indo-
Pacific - two oceans but one region is increasingly linked by shipping and strategy with
intertwined trade and economy, with the maritime security scenario of both oceans often
overflowing into each other.

Bay of Bengal as Fulcrum of IOR Security

The maritime security matrix of the Indian Ocean is largely influenced by the cumulative
security scenario of different regions and sub-regions of the IOR. For example, the Bay of
Bengal region has historically played a pivotal role as a maritime highway to the greater
Indian Ocean - where trade, commerce and cultures were intertwined for centuries. Today,
due to geo-strategic and geo-economic factors, the Bay emerges as a fulcrum of a wider Indo-
Pacific region because of its vicinity to the maritime trading routes overlooking the Malacca
Strait. The Bay also remains a route for piracy, narcotics, human trafficking, arms smuggling,
and illegal fishing.

Maritime Security Landscape in IOR

Apart from conventional threats from state actors, today’s maritime security challenges refer
to a wide spectrum of low intensity maritime crimes or conflicts, mostly emanated from the
non-state actors. Such maritime threats and challenges are normally transnational in nature
and do not recognize national boundary.

a. Piracy and Armed Robbery. The piracy in the Indian Ocean region has
seriously degraded the maritime trade in IOR in the past. Their root cause basically
lies in the social instability, poverty, poor governance, corruption, internal power
struggle, fund generation through ransom, etc. Earlier the major piracy incidents

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reported in the Indian Ocean were prevalent in the Malacca Straits and the Horn of
Africa. However, coordinated anti-piracy patrols along with multilateral initiatives
like ReCAAP (Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery in the Asia Pacific) lead to temporary reduction in the number of incidents
after 2004 (Ho, 2009). On the other hand, due to adoption of Best Management
Practices and good works of the Combined Task Forces, multi-national naval
coalitions and especially CTF 151, have decreased the piracy incidents almost to nil
since 2014 (Terry, 2009).

b. Maritime Terrorism and Asymmetric Threats. Today, world shipping is

facing newer challenges like maritime terrorism and asymmetric threats and a
dramatic illustration was seen in October 2002, when the French super tanker
Limburg was rammed by an explosive laden dingy off the coast of Yemen. The attack
on USS Cole in Aden in 2000 has shown that even highly sophisticated warships can
be threatened by low-tech attacks (Langworthy et al., 2004).

c. Pirate-Terror Nexus. A great cause of concern that the world shipping may
face is the unholy nexus between the pirates and the terror groups.

d. IUU Fishing. ‘Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU)’ fishing incidents

are common in IOR especially in all disputed and unregulated waters causing huge
loss to the national exchequer.

e. Marine Pollution. Land based or shipborne Pollution causes ecological

and environmental disasters. In spite of various MARPOL Conventions, Anti Ballast
Water Convention and Anti Fowling Paints Convention, the menace of pollution
could not be eradicated that hampers the marine biodiversity and ecological integrity
of our oceans. f. Human Trafficking. The political instability, economic disparity,
lack of employment opportunity, etc. cause people to cross the national boundary
especially through the porous sea routes. For example, illegal immigration efforts in
recent years by fortune seekers of the Rohingya from Myanmar towards Thailand and
Malaysia have been a cause of great concern.

g. Natural Disasters and Marine Accidents. An important category of challenges

in maritime environment of IOR is presented by nature itself. The IOR is the locus of
almost 70% of world’s natural disasters demonstrated through cyclones that regularly
hit the Bay of Bengal littorals (Balaguru et al., 2014). IOR is also a Tsunami prone
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 region. More so, there are significant numbers of marine accidents taking place in
IOR like the case of MH 370. Moreover, major shipping accidents like X-Press Pearl
and MT New Diamond near Sri Lanka’s coast and bulk Carrier Wakashio off
Mauritius Coast have caused irreversible oil pollution havoc in recent years.

Challenges to Effective Collaboration

Influence of Geo-strategy. The presence of global hub of oil and gas, spillover effect of
South China Sea disputes, tensions related to OBOR and Maritime Silk Route and other geo-
strategic reasons may lead to continued great power rivalry in IOR. Reflecting on the reality
of the situation Robert Kaplan describes in his book ‘Monsoon’ the US position in the region
as one “where the rivalry between the United States and China interlocks with the regional
rivalry between China and India.” It therefore transpires that the stakes and interests of major
powers from within and outside the region may cross roads in the IOR which may be inimical
to IOR security. However, while India as the so-called net security provider in the IOR is
expected to maintain a balancing act in line with her concept of SAGAR. This remains to be
seen how the future matrix transpires in the context of Ukraine war and global financial
decline (Ullah and Hayat, 2014).

Diversity and Disparity in Maritime Forces. The Indian Ocean Region is unique not just
on account of its centrality to trade and energy flows but also because of stark diversity and
contrasts in the littoral countries’ politics, culture, ethnicity, language, economics and
environment. As regards the law enforcement capability at sea, the contrast and disparity is
even more prominent. Because of this, there has not been any meaningful holistic approach
by the maritime forces of IOR in addressing transnational maritime threats.

Lack of Information Sharing. Insufficient data and lack of information sharing at regional
level due to over-sensitivity issue often results in poor situational awareness in IOR.

Lack of Trust and Cooperation. Absence of mutual trust is one of the considerable
obstacles to be overcome. The lack of adequate confidence building measures have prevented
the creation of an overarching security architecture for the entire region.

Bilateral Issues and Disputes. There are still some key bilateral issues among the IOR
nations. In BIMSTEC, while Bangladesh and India have amicably resolved the maritime
boundary delimitation, the Rohingya issue unless resolved, may dampen and delay the

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otherwise enthusiastic mood of the Bay of Bengal littorals for effective maritime security
cooperation.

Existing Regional Cooperation Mechanism

Lack of Effective Regional Forums. On a sub-regional level, SAARC is currently dormant

amidst sharp political differences among their members. However, cooperation exists
individually among the GCC, SADC, IOC, ASEAN, BIMSTEC, etc. but these have limited
roles, mandates and effectiveness at larger forum across the IOR.

Relevance of IORA for Maritime Security. The IORA is the only Ministerial level forum
for cooperation in the entire IOR. IORA was originally formed upon the values of open
regionalism for boosting economic cooperation especially on the realms of trade facilitation,
investment, the region’s social development and promotion. IORA assigned Maritime safety
and security in 2011 as the top priority area of focus.  The IORA Leaders’ Summit held in
March 2017, in Jakarta, Indonesia, highlighted the prioritization of these concerns through its
theme, “Strengthening Maritime Cooperation for a Peaceful, Stable, and Prosperous Indian
Ocean” (IORA, 2017).

In August 2019, Sri Lanka hosted the First Meeting of the IORA Maritime Safety and
Security Working Group, which finalized the regional Work Plan drawn up for a period of
two years (2019 – 2021) (IORA, 2019).  The Second IORA Meeting of Experts on MSS held
in November 2017 in India, provided an outcome document entitled “Blueprint for Maritime
Safety and Security in IORA” (IORA, 2018). IORA has also devised flagship initiatives such
as the Indian Ocean Dialogue, which is held annually as a track 1.5 event, bringing together
key representatives including scholars, experts, analysts, and policy makers from think tanks,
civil societies and governments from IORA Member States to discuss pertinent issues
including MSS. Apparently IORA has made some useful course corrections in the last decade
in order to address the maritime security challenges and formulate regional policy.

Functional Limitations of IORA. However, IORA has delivered only mixed results due to
various limitations and did struggle to identify common ground and a shared vision. IORA
itself is its own worst enemy since IORA is a consensus-based organization, which allows
any state to block a decision not to its liking, and de facto paralyzing the Association. Finally,
the extra-regional powers will continue to have a strong interest in the region somewhat

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legally, because in 2018, IORA adopted the ‘Declaration on Guidelines for Enhancing
Interaction with Dialogue Partners’ which acknowledges the contribution of dialogue partners
and their commitment in assisting IORA in creating a stable and prosperous Indian Ocean
region, as underlined in the Jakarta Concord (IORA, 2018). Interestingly, the inherent theme
of this declaration on Guidelines for Dialogue partners is opposite to the concept of ‘Indian
Ocean-Zone of Peace’ proposed by Sri Lanka five decades back.

Contribution of IONS. The primary aim of IONS is to attain “mutually beneficial maritime
security outcomes within the Indian Ocean” through the promotion of a shared understanding
of maritime issues and the formulation of a common set of strategies designed to enhance
regional maritime security; to strengthen capacity building; to promote trans-national
maritime cooperative-mechanisms; and to develop interoperability in terms of doctrines and
procedures for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) (Ghosh, 2012). Navy is
a country’s instrument of foreign policy which can be used for benign tasks in foreign waters
like goodwill visits and exercises in addition to its traditional roles. IONS must also
recognize the risk of interstate tensions in the IOR and contribute its share to confidence-
building measures.

Functional Gaps between IORA and IONS. There exist some functional grey areas when
we try to operationalize both IORA and IONS at tandem. There are several countries which
are Members of both IORA and IONS. But, key Members of the IONS such as Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan and Myanmar are not Members of the IORA; and Members of the IORA such as the
Comoros and Somalia are not Members of the IONS. Significantly, the UK and France are
Members of the IONS but dialogue partners of the IORA; China and Japan are observer
countries in the IONS and dialogue partners in the IORA. The US is a dialogue partner of the
IORA only but not a member of IONS in any capacity. As such dealing IONS and IORA in
an integrated manner for encountering the security challenges might cause some
discontinuity.

MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION IN IORA: WAY AHEAD

The distinct nature of the geostrategic environment must be at the core of any cooperative-
security considerations. The Indian Ocean is too big, too diverse, and too important and the
challenges too large to be dominated or “owned” by any single nation or small group. They
need, therefore, to be constructively engaged following some tailormade version of regional
cooperation, if necessary.

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ARF and CSCAP - Models for Indo-Pacific Cooperative Architecture

The ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF is an important platform for security dialogue in the
Indo-Pacific. It provides a setting in which members can discuss current security issues and
develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security in the region. The ARF is
managed by the member states and the platform generally avoids discussing sensitive
security issues. Instead, the platform generally focusses on non-traditional security aspects
where it is easier to build consensus (Haacke, 2009).

Similarly, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is a “Track 2”
entity that performs a very useful function in enabling sensitive and controversial issues to be
informally discussed by experienced former diplomats, officials, and academics, generating
proposals that can be put forward to official forums and regional governments for
consideration. This platform too, uses informal mechanism integrating state and non-state
actors to raise security awareness among member states.
Both ARF and CSCAP could be seen as a model for an Indo-Pacific cooperative
architecture. IORA can borrow this framework of non-interfering cooperation to organize its
institutional structure. On the other hand, IONS is likely to facilitate relatively mainly navy-
to-navy cooperation. Therefore, IORA with its Track 1 or Track 2 initiative like ARF or
CSCAP should formulate IOR comprehensive maritime security policy, while IONS can be its
enforcement tools.

Strengthen Sub-Regional Maritime Security. BIMSTEC has displayed some proactive

initiatives in the recent years to bolster regional security, which can be replicated in other
regional forums for comprehensive security in IOR. In the recent years, Annual Meeting of
BIMSTEC national security chiefs on information and intelligence sharing to discuss security
issues pertaining to the region of the Bay of Bengal is being held. It was also discussed
during the previous BIMSTEC meetings to consider a single, unified regional security
umbrella for BIMSTEC to address non-traditional security threats in the Bay of Bengal.

IORA to Engage Mini-lateral Groupings. Over the decades, the ability of the various
multilateral forums to take collective action has been hobbled by institutional inertia, vested
interests, and challenges to decision-making. Mini-laterals are thus being seen as an
alternative route to form partnerships and smaller coalitions to resolve issues of regional and
global concern. In early March 2022, the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), a grouping of
India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Mauritius, adopted a road map for cooperation and

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collaboration in areas such as maritime security, counterterrorism, and drug trafficking in the
Indian Ocean (Subhadeep, 2022). IORA can make constructive engagements with mini-
lateral groupings and encourage such initiatives in other sub-regions for maritime security.

A Holistic Multi Layered Approach. We need to adopt a holistic and multi-layered

approach with comprehensive multinational coordinated efforts that involve political, military
and societal measures, strengthens regional security capabilities and brings about more
effective law enforcement measures. Much can be gained from a cooperative regional
approach between states that promotes consultation not confrontation, reassurance not
deterrence, transparency not secrecy and inclusiveness not unilateralism.

Collaborative Capacity Building and Interoperability. Particular attention may be given

to collaborative capacity building and interoperability in the fields of information exchange,
surveillance, maritime law enforcement, and interoperability in terms of common doctrine,
SOP and unity of efforts.

Maritime Domain Awareness and Information Sharing.

Neither any single agency sees the full national picture nor a single navy gets the full trans-
boundary picture. The IOR maritime nations need to collaborate in establishing a shared
common sea situation picture for maritime domain awareness which should be dynamic and
real time. In this spirit, Singapore navy set up the Information Fusion Centre in 2009, to
information sharing on white shipping and other maritime security issues. However, every
region and sub-region in IOR needs to effectively maintain such fusion centres and create an
overlapping and interlocking situational awareness picture. The task may be executed by
several regional Maritime Coordination Centres in IOR.

Trust and Confidence Building Measures. We need to come out of the legacies of mistrust
and lack of confidence that have hitherto prevented meaningful engagement. Various
confidence building measures like goodwill visits, combined naval exercises, HADR
missions will greatly facilitate this cause. Bangladesh navy and Indian navy carry out
CORPAT along the maritime boundary (Sengupta, 2018). On the other hand, BN has
extended HADR support to countries like Maldives, Sri Lanka, Philippines and even to
Malaysia during MH 370 search mission.

Regional Maritime Trade Security Structure. IONS can act as the prime executive body
for trade security while there has to be some ministerial level forum under IORA to discuss

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broader maritime security issues. Moreover, for operational coordination on trade security,
we may form several CTFs under the aegis of existing sub-regional bodies (SAARC,
ASEAN, GCC etc) for joint patrol and monitoring.

From Strategic Competition to Accommodation. Given the huge strategic and economic
interests involving the major regional and extra-regional players, their engagements and
active presence can’t be denied or contested. But while identifying common interests for
multilateral engagement, IORA should afford to veer the Great Power dynamics from
strategic competition to accommodation.  Such cooperation, however, is contingent on
building trust, or at the very least reducing mistrust. We should not lose sight of the fact that
‘Freedom of Navigation’ is universally applicable to everyone and to all the seas of the world
as per UNCLOS III.

IOR Comprehensive Maritime Policy. Indian Ocean nation-states must articulate a

comprehensive IOR maritime security policy incorporating UNCLOS III, SUA Convention,
Port State and Flag State Control and other IMO Conventions.

Conclusion. It is pertinent to emphasize that maritime trade and security is our regional
concern and we must work together to build up a common security structure of our own
choice. Today, a comprehensive multilateral approach on maritime security is required for the
convergence of interests for greater benefit of the Indian Ocean Region.

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