Aira Azhari is Manager of the Democracy and Governance Unit at IDEAS.

She
has provided commentary on Malaysian politics and governance to the BBC (World
News and Radio), Al Jazeera, Astro Awani, Bernama, Channel News Asia, Radio
Televisyen Malaysia, Lite FM and BFM. Her op-eds have appeared in The Malaysian
Insight, Malay Mail Online, Utusan Malaysia and Sinar Harian. She holds a Masters in
Public International Law from the London School of Economics and Political Science
(LSE).

2 Political financing in Malaysia: Aligning reforms with voters’ expectations

 Policy Brief NO. 34

Introduction
Political corruption in Malaysia is multi-faceted,
multi-layered and deep rooted. Ever since Malaysia
gained independence, politicians and political parties
have been involved in businesses, investments,
utilised Government-Linked Companies (GLCs)
and accepted donations from local and overseas
donors, all with the purpose of strengthening political
support, fund election campaigns and party activities.
In 2015, revelations brought about by the 1Malaysia
Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal became a
turning point in Malaysia’s history. The global scandal
prompted civil society groups and ordinary citizens to
mobilise and call for transparency and accountability
in political funding.

Numerous recommendations to improve transparency in our political financing system have been submitted
to the government over the years and Pakatan Harapan (PH) came close to tabling the Political Financing Bill
in Parliament before the government collapsed during the Sheraton Move in February 2020.1 Legislation is
undoubtedly needed to ensure political donations are governed by a rules-based system, but passing an Act
is just the beginning of the long journey towards a healthy, mature and inclusive democracy underpinned by a
political system that is transparent, accountable and does not depend on large amounts of money from entities
with vested interests. An important, but sometimes overlooked part of this long journey is the relationship
between politicians and their voters. Some scholars have termed this relationship “relational clientelism”, where
personal connections are built with voters over the long term, which goes beyond disbursing patronage.2 For
political financing reform in Malaysia to be holistic, this clientelist relationship must be probed and examined
further.

This paper provides some insight into the relationship between voter and politician by discussing the findings
from a series of workshops IDEAS conducted with youth wings from political parties across Malaysia on the
topic of political financing.To try and understand the perspective of voters, in May 2021 IDEAS commissioned
a survey to understand Malaysians’ perception of politicians. The findings from this survey will be presented
and discussed, which will contribute to understanding the linkages between voter expectations and political
financing.

Ultimately, legislation is urgently needed to institutionalise the many reforms needed to improve transparency
and accountability in Malaysia’s political financing system. Equally important however, are concrete efforts to
decouple the party and the state, to professionalise our politics and to increase the capacity of state welfare
institutions in providing for the most vulnerable in our societies.

1.
1 See (1)Secretary General Ms Josie Fernandez and Executive Director Mr. Alan Kirupakaran to Mr Asrul Affendi, May 5, 2011, Prime Minister’s Office, Transparency
International Malaysia (TI-M), Reform of Political Financing in Malaysia, https://www.transparency.org.my/pages/news-and-events/reforming-political-financing/submission-
of-memorandum-on-reform-of-political-financing-in-malaysia-to-the-prime-minister-of-malaysia
(2) G25 Malaysia, Reforms for Transparent and Accountable Political Funding in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: G25 Malaysia, 2018), 1-12, https://www.g25malaysia.org/media and,
(3) National Consultative Committee on Political Funding, Report of the National Consultative Committee on Political Financing, August 26, 2016, http://transparency.org.my/
filemanager/files/shares/LAPORAN-JKNMPP-ENGLISH.pdf
2.
Meredith L. Weiss, “Clientelism, Institutional Change, and Civil Society Activism in Malaysia,” An Interview with Meredith L. Weiss, Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs 6,
(2020): 111-118, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1059390#_ga=2.241189314.1927065921.1633603541-151145593.1633603541

www.ideas.org.my 3
 Research methodology
The research process for this paper is as follows:

• Desk research to identify the literature on political financing, news coverage, policy papers and reports

• Findings from workshops with youth wing members from a range of Malaysian political parties,
conducted by IDEAS in September 2020 and June - July 2021

• Findings from a survey conducted by IDEAS between 28 May - 8 June 2021, with a sample size of
25403

The findings were supplemented by several interviews with politicians’ officers.

Political parties: the neglected stakeholder

Although significant progress had been made to raise awareness on the importance of political financing
reform, the Sheraton Move and subsequent change of government brought any discussion of tabling the
Political Funding Bill to a grinding halt. Years of research and advocacy by numerous academics and CSOs was
at risk of going to waste and the fate of the Governance, Integrity and Anti-Corruption Centre (GIACC)4 and
the National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP) was also uncertain. The subsequent onslaught of Covid-19 made
it even more challenging to restart the discussion on political financing. In January 2021, Malaysia’s democracy
suffered a setback when the Yang di-Pertuan Agong declared a state of emergency to curb the spread of
Covid-19, although the move was decried by the Opposition as a means to retain the Prime Minister’s control
of the government.5 More worryingly, the emergency also meant that Parliament and all state legislatures were
suspended, allowing the government to act without any checks and balances.6 Parliament was finally reopened
on 26th July 2021 for five days and subsequently suspended again before reconvening on 13th September
2021 upon the swearing in of Datuk Seri Ismail Sabri’s new government.

Even without the political instability, change of governments and the pandemic, getting the Bill passed in
Parliament was going to be an uphill battle. One of the main reasons for this is a general lack of political will
from both government and opposition parties. Realising that any proposed reform will eventually hit a dead end
without buy-in from what is arguably the most important stakeholder of all - politicians and political parties,
IDEAS decided to focus on working more directly with politicians and political parties themselves. This shift in
approach also came with an awareness that senior party leaders are often the most challenging to convince,
hence we decided to work more closely with young party leaders through engagement with their youth wings.
From our engagements with them, it is evident that young leaders from almost all the major parties have
exhibited more open-mindedness and acceptance of reforms and the need for a Political Financing Act.

3.
IDEAS commissioned vase.ai to conduct this survey. The survey was carried out in the form of an online questionnaire. The questionnaire was distributed via
email to the Vase database, each with a unique link to avoid duplicate responses. The email addresses the survey was sent to were from the email addresses
registered with Getvase.com.
4.
The GIACC was formed on 1st June 2018 and is tasked, among others, to oversee the strategy for the implementation of the NACP. The NACP was launched on
28th January 2019 and is the primary document that outlines the government’s strategy to combat corruption. Both the GIACC and NACP were initiatives of the PH
administration.
5.
Rozanna Latiff and Joseph Sipalan, “Malaysia declares emergency to curb virus, shoring up government,” Reuters, January 12, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
health-coronavirus-malaysia-idUSKBN29H06G ( accessed October 7, 2021).
6.
Al Jazeera, “At COVID-19 ‘breaking point’, Malaysia suspends parliament,” Al Jazeera, January 12, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/12/malaysia-heads-into-
lockdown-with-hospitals-at-breaking-point (accessed October 7, 2021).

4 Political financing in Malaysia: Aligning reforms with voters’ expectations

 Policy Brief NO. 34

Engaging political parties: workshops with youth wings

The first workshop series was conducted in September 2020 in Kuala Lumpur.The workshops saw participation
from the national level youth wings of UMNO, MIC, Gerakan, PBRS, PKR, Amanah and DAP. The objectives of
the workshop were as follows:

• To create a safe space where political parties and civil society can interact with each other openly

• To identify the challenges faced by political parties in obtaining and managing political funds

• To build a network of sustainable cooperation between civil society and political parties

The workshops were extremely useful in revealing what politicians face in their day-to-day work with their
constituents on the ground. The main takeaways and lessons learned from the workshops are as follows:

• Funding for political parties and constituency development should be kept separate in
practice
Although in theory, funding for political parties should be kept separate and independent from
development funds, the current situation is that these funds are usually mixed and used interchangeably.
Oftentimes, the elected representatives themselves do not understand the difference between the
two and the importance of keeping them separate. Constituents also do not understand and are quite
indifferent to the need to separate political and development funds.

• Transparency in funding must begin from within political parties themselves

Even within political parties, there is little transparency amongst party members about where funds
come from. Unless one is in the upper echelons of power within the party, it is not likely that one will
be exposed to from whom and where political funds are raised. This point was especially important
coming from the participants because youth wings are not known to be powerful or influential within
political parties. Thus, the lack of transparency within parties is to the detriment of youth wings and
serves as yet another barrier for young people’s participation in politics.

• Public funding for political parties needed to mitigate reliance on single, large donors
Overall, there was general agreement that some form of public funding is required to mitigate the
negative effects of solely relying on wealthy tycoons and large corporate funders. The participants
acknowledged that politicians are often trapped in situations where they are not able to refuse large
donations due to the high cost of politics, which in turn means that these funders expect favours in
exchange for their contributions.

• Lack of clarity on the actual role of elected representatives

All participants shared the same concerns about the difficulty for an elected representative to juggle
between the roles of a policymaker, “24-hour on call welfare officer” and party obligations.There were
also differing viewpoints on what is the actual role of an elected representative – many understood
that they are meant to be policymakers, but acknowledge the reality of needing to cater to the
“KBSM” (Kahwin, Bersalin, Sakit, Mati)7 for their political survival.

7.
Kahwin = wedding, bersalin = giving birth, sakit = illness, mati = funeral. Attending these four events in their constituencies is seen as a must for MPs and ADUNs, to build
close personal relationships with voters. During one of our workshops, a participant (who is an elected representative) shared the dread he feels whenever a constituent
questions why he was not present at one of these occasions.

www.ideas.org.my 5
 • Concerns regarding exposure of donors must be mitigated
Nearly all participants expressed concerns about their donors being exposed and persecuted for
choosing to donate to a certain political party. Participants also acknowledged that donors often hedge
their bets and contribute to parties on both sides of the political divide. In framing any legislation on
political financing, this concern must be taken into account.

• The public must be made aware of the actual role of their elected representatives
There was general agreement on the need to improve political literacy amongst the public. The
root cause of many of the problems identified lies in the public’s expectations that their elected
representatives should assist them with matters that concern their livelihoods. In reality, this is not a
role that should be played by MPs or ADUNs, as their main duty should be policymaking.

• The reliance on elected representatives by constituents signals a breakdown in social

security systems and other state institutions
The fact that constituents expect their elected representatives to pay their bills, provide goods, services
and cash handouts signals a breakdown in social security systems and other state institutions whose
duty is to ensure vulnerable communities needs are provided for.

The 2020 workshops received positive feedback from the participants. Many of them felt that their party
members at the state and divisional levels would benefit greatly from these workshops. Thus, in 2021, due to
the demand, we decided to further deepen our relationship with youth wings of political parties and organised
a series of workshops on political financing with youth wing representatives at the state level. We held four
virtual workshops throughout June and July 2021, with a total of 116 participants from 13 states and 11 political
parties: UMNO, MCA, MIC, PKR, DAP, Amanah, PBRS, Warisan, MUDA, Pejuang and PPBM.

The findings from the 2020 workshops prompted a deeper focus on the questions of voters’ expectations of
their MPs and ADUNs, public funding of political parties and parties’ involvement in business. Some of the main
takeaways from the 2021 workshops are:

• Voters expect their elected representatives to act as their guardians and saviours
It was striking that the 2021 participants shared almost identical experiences with their 2020
counterparts regarding voter expectations. MPs and ADUNs roles are relegated to that of monetary
and welfare aid providers, problem solvers and promise-keeper. One participant likened this to MPs and
ADUNs needing to be jelmaan tuhan (God incarnate) to their constituents. Some of the participants
realised this fundamental flaw and called for reforms to be introduced.

• Party-owned assets and businesses should not be banned but they must be transparent,
accountable and governed under the same rules
One of the key questions during the workshops was whether or not political parties should be allowed
to own businesses and assets. A majority of participants were in favour of parties being involved in
businesses and asset ownership. Doing business is seen to be a necessity in Malaysia’s political climate
where public funding of parties does not exist and crowdfunding, at least on a large scale, is not the
norm. Owning assets such as office buildings was also seen as important to ease party operations,
especially for parties in Opposition constituencies that do not receive development funds from the
state. However, there was broad agreement that there must be transparency and accountability in
how these par ty-owned businesses are managed, and the usual corporate governance rules that

6 Political financing in Malaysia: Aligning reforms with voters’ expectations

 Policy Brief NO. 34

apply to any other business in Malaysia should apply to these businesses as well. Most participants
agreed that the current system is plagued by allegations of corruption, conflict of interest and abuse
of power.

• The distribution and management of constituency development funds (CDFs) is problematic

CDFs are funding arrangements that channel money from the central government directly to electoral
constituencies for local infrastructure projects.8 CDFs ensure that the central government’s funds
reach the community directly, typically through MPs representing their constituency.9 The inequality
in the disbursement of CDFs was brought up frequently during both rounds of workshops. Even
participants from the PH parties, who were in government for 22 months, admitted that they should
have implemented equal funding while they were in power. Unequal CDFs were a major source of
dissatisfaction amongst the participants, especially the ones from PH component parties and smaller
BN parties such as MIC.

• The intertwined nature of political party and the state

Many participants, especially from PH, shared that they faced problems when dealing with government
agencies when they were in power. This is due to the agency’s perceived loyalty to the previous
government, which signals that, whether consciously or unconsciously, UMNO/BN is seen to be
synonymous with government. This perceived fusion between party and state is worrying, especially
now that it is unlikely for one party to hold absolute majorities both at the federal and state levels.

• Public funding is needed to level the playing field between political parties
There was broad agreement that public funding of political parties is needed, especially for party
operations. Many participants shared that the high costs incurred by parties come from paying staff
at the branch and divisional levels all around the country. However, there was scepticism to this idea
because of mistrust towards the impartiality and integrity of state institutions. Some participants
argued that public funding can be misused by the party in power to allocate more funds to their own
party, resulting in other parties being marginalised.

From the two rounds of workshops, some common trends can be identified. Firstly, there was agreement
that there is a mismatch between what voters expect from their elected representatives and the role they
are supposed to play. Second, the mechanism of CDFs allocation and distribution needs to be re-examined.
Third, separating political parties from the state is critical if transparency in political financing is to be achieved
holistically. Voter expectations is an aspect that is rarely thought about in discussions about political financing
within civil society circles. Furthermore, voters’ expectations of their elected representatives has a great impact
on many other areas of policy, such as social protection, development spending, inequality and poverty.

The trends identified during the workshops have also raised some questions, such as what has existing research
said about clientelism? How do the key findings from research drive our understanding of what are the policy
solutions needed to tackle the problems that currently plague our political financing system?

8.
Albert Van Zyl, “Budget Brief No. 10 – What is Wrong with the Constituency Development Funds?,” International Budget Partnership, June 29, 2010, https://
internationalbudget.org/publications/brief10/
See also, Murniati Sri, Jason R.J. Lee, Danial Ariff, Armand Azra, and Jeffrey Law, “Removal or Reform: Charting the Way Forward for Malaysia’s Constituency Development
Funds,” Bersih & Adil Network Sdn. Bhd., (2021), 1-59 https://www.bersih.org/download/removal-or-reform-charting-the-way-forward-for-malaysias-constituency-
development-funds/
9.
Sri, et al., Constituency Development Funds, 2

www.ideas.org.my 7
 Literature review
Post GE-14, there has been an increasing number of scholars looking into the voter-politician relationship in
Malaysia. Weiss and Dettman (2018), in their analysis of political patronage in Malaysia argue that even though
BN lost in GE-14, political patronage and clientelism has not changed very much.10 PH has built their own
clientelistic relationships with their constituencies to allow better competition against their BN counterparts
that have a track record of real and targeted benefits to their loyal voters. Weiss and Dettman also bring up
the important point of unequal allocation of funds between government and opposition constituencies, a
practice that continued when PH won power, albeit PH did grant the then opposition MPs one-fifth of their
own MPs’ annual allocation. To a lesser extent than BN did, PH also punished Malaysians who did not vote
for them. Weiss (2019) characterises Malaysia as a competitive electoral authoritarian state – governed by
political parties who do not simply manufacture wins; instead they focus on building real popularity within their
voters.11 This makes it difficult for reform. She analyses relational clientelism in terms of “network, resources
and discretionary control over said resources and the effects of such practices for electoral outcomes and
governance.” Weiss argues that PH partly mimicked BN’s clientalist outreach and replicated some features
that were within their capacity. This is an important point as it shows that clientelism is utilised consciously by
both sides of the political divide to outdo each other in winning over voters. Saravanamuttu and Mohamad
(2019) coined the term “monetisation of consent” to describe the reliance on money to consolidate political
dominance.12 Interestingly, the authors posit that monetisation of consent is differentiated from money politics
“as it represents a subtler notion of monetary transactions that does not always or necessarily imply any
iniquitous, fraudulent or criminal use of money in the shaping of public opinion and consent.”The authors then
draw useful contrasts between money politics and monetisation of consent, as shown in the table below.
Image 1

Source: Savaranamuttu and Mohamad (2019)

10.
Sebastian C. Dettman and Meredith L. Weiss, “Has Patronage Lost Its Punch in Malaysia?,” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 107, no.
6 (2018): 739-754, https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2018.1545936
11.
Meredith L. Weiss, “Duelling networks: relational clientelism in electoral-authoritarian Malaysia,” Democratization 27, no. 1 (2020): 100-118, https://doi.org/10.1080
/13510347.2019.1625889
12.
Johan Saravanamuttu and Maznah Mohammad, “The Monetisation of Consent and its Limits: Explaining Political Dominance and Decline in Malaysia,” Journal of
Contemporary Asia 50, no.1 (2019): 56-73, https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1569710

8 Political financing in Malaysia: Aligning reforms with voters’ expectations

 Policy Brief NO. 34

This classification is useful in understanding the relationship between voter and constituent as it distinguishes
between vote-buying and practices such as cash payments to vulnerable groups who have voting potential
outside campaigning periods. This is an important distinction as it echoes Dettman and Weiss’s argument that
“one-time episodic vote-buying” does not happen much in Malaysia. They therefore argue that the “material
lures that marked GE-14 punctuated enduring relationships between politicians and their constituents.”

Voter expectations, political funds and the role of the state

It was interesting that many of the problems the workshop participants shared can be traced to the roles
played by the MPs and ADUNs. Many constituents, especially in the rural areas rely almost completely on their
MPs and ADUNs to provide various forms of aid such as food, shelter, paying telephone bills and repairing
infrastructure such as clogged drains, fallen trees, potholes and others. Despite this, many participants also
understood and acknowledged that the role of “welfare officer” is not a role that MPs and ADUNs should
be playing, at least not as their main duty. An MP or ADUN, once elected, should primarily be involved in the
policymaking process at the federal and state levels respectively. Instead of being the primary provider of aid
to their constituents, elected representatives could instead direct their constituents to the right government
agency or act as a “nudge” for welfare bodies to provide the aid needed in their constituency.

One of the key findings from the workshops was that constituents have become accustomed to asking their
MP or ADUN for basic needs and help with infrastructure problems, because politicians “move things faster”
and are more responsive compared to government agencies, state welfare bodies and local governments.
Constituents often face a barrage of bureaucratic red tape and long waiting times when dealing with government
agencies which leads to them turning to their MP or ADUN who, because of their power, either can channel
resources to get things done quicker, or can compel government agencies to attend to constituents’ requests
immediately. One of the reasons why government welfare agencies are not well equipped to cater to the
needs of the constituents is due to capacity issues, for example, an Social Welfare Department officer handles
around 400 active cases daily.13 The Social Welfare Department offices are often inaccessible to people who
need them the most, as they are located in areas that are difficult to reach unless one owns a car.14 Thus,
lack of capacity and accessibility are major factors that contribute to constituents’ reliance on their elected
representatives for basic needs.

Lastly, it is important to examine the role CDFs play in the discourse on political financing. During the workshops,
some participants were confused at the beginning as to whether we were talking about constituency allocations
(CDFs) or campaign financing - in reality, the lines between the two are blurred. The fact that CDFs were
brought up multiple times by many participants throughout the workshops show the significance of CDFs in
building politicians’ relationship with their voters and maintaining political support. The politicisation of CDFs
is a common, even expected practice despite the circulars issued by the Implementation and Coordination
Unit (ICU) prohibiting the use of CDFs for political activities or to fund political organisations.15 Because there
is little transparency and accountability in the way CDFs are allocated and distributed, MPs and ADUNs who
receive them can choose projects and groups that can potentially increase their political support.16 There
are also instances where MPs and ADUNs use the allocation to donate to non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) that are indirectly linked to them. On paper, these donations might look impartial, but in reality, these
NGOs contribute to the support that the MP or ADUN needs.17

13.
Interview with Afiqah Zulkifli, YB Syed Saddiq’s officer in the constituency of Muar
14.
Interview with Nalina Nair, YB Lim Yi Wei’s officer in the state constituency of Kampung Tunku
15
. Sri, et al., Constituency Development Funds, 30
16
. Ibid
17.
Ibid

www.ideas.org.my 9
 For opposition MPs, who were discriminated against from receiving CDFs, a lack of institutional support when
it comes to funding means that they need to find other sources of income to service constituents. Besides
that, opposition politicians also need to compromise on research officers, parliamentary officers and interns.
In many cases, these officers are paid using the salary of the MP or ADUN. This situation is problematic
because these officers and interns play an important role for an MP and ADUN to credibly play their roles
as effective policymakers. Furthermore, working as a research officer or intern of a politician is often the first
step towards a political career for many young people. Recently, the Opposition Leader openly urged elected
representatives from his par ty PKR to use their own money to help constituents, and not depend on
allocations given by the government.18 Once again, statements like these normalise the inadequacy of state
resources to cater to people’s needs, and reinforces the expectation for elected representatives to act as the
provider of aid for their constituents.

CDFs also continue to reinforce incumbency advantage through the personal relationships developed with
constituents over decades. The current flawed system is a major contributor to why transparency and
accountability in political financing remains a challenge. When politicians themselves are unclear about the
need to separate development funds, party funds and campaign funds, the political system is ripe for conflict of
interest and money politics to be entrenched more deeply.

IDEAS survey: Malaysians’ perception of politicians

To better understand voters’ expectations towards their elected representatives, IDEAS commissioned a
nationwide survey that was carried out between 28 May - 8 June 2021. The survey was conducted online and
collected a total of 2540 responses. Respondents were Malaysians aged 21 years and above and the distribution
of age, race and region was according to Malaysian census data. The survey objectives were:

• To understand Malaysians’ perception of the roles of their elected representatives

• To find out Malaysians’ perception of money and financial aid in politics

The survey questions were structured to first understand the respondents’ political involvement and literacy.
The following questions were asked19:

• What is your source of political information?

• Do you know the difference between an ADUN and an MP?

• Which party is your ADUN/MP from?

The survey then asked questions to test the respondents’ understanding of the role of their elected
representatives:

• What are the main functions of an MP/ADUN?

• What are the most important factors in choosing a candidate during an election?

18.
The Malaysian Insight, “Anwar tells reps to dig into own purses to quickly aid voters,” The Malaysian Insight, September 17, 2021, https://www.themalaysianinsight.
com/s/339779 (accessed October 7, 2021).
19.
Please see the full survey report for a full breakdown of questions.

10 Political financing in Malaysia: Aligning reforms with voters’ expectations

 Policy Brief NO. 34

• Would you vote for someone even if it is unlikely that they will win?

The last segment of the survey tested the respondents’ understanding of where politicians get their money
from. Some of the questions were as follows:

• To the best of my knowledge, my MP gets most of his money from the following sources:
• The government
• The party he belongs to
• Fundraising dinners
• Public donations
• Business tycoons
• His salary
• Constituency development funds
• Not sure

• Do you agree with the following statement?

“I am not concerned about where my MP gets money from as long as he caters to the needs of his
constituents.”

• Do you agree with the following statement?

“I am fine with my MP receiving money from business tycoons and large corporations to fund their
political activities.”

• Do you agree with the following statement?

“If my MP appears poor, I do not trust him to carry out his duties.”

• Have you ever received BR1M or Bantuan Sara Hidup?

• Have you ever received direct financial assistance from your MP?

• When you face economic or financial difficulties, have you asked for help from any of the following?
(Select all that apply)
• State Welfare Department
• Zakat bodies
• Private charities
• My MP
• My ADUN
• My MP service center
• My ADUN service center
• None of the above

• When you face economic or financial difficulties, have you received aid from the following? (Select all
that apply)
• State Welfare Department
• Zakat bodies
• Private charities
• My MP
• My ADUN

www.ideas.org.my 11
 • My MP service center
• My ADUN service center
• None of the above

• Have you ever donated to a political party?

• Have you ever donated to an individual politician?

• When you encounter the following problems in your constituency such as the following, but not
limited to, who do you seek help from?
• Damaged infrastructure (broken bridges, clogged drains, leaking pipes)
• Pollution or disruption resulting from development projects
• Falling trees
• Flooding and other natural disasters
1. Relevant government departments, for example: district office, district education office,
district welfare office
2. City council
3. Village chief
4. Tuai rumah
5. Tok batin
6. Residence association
7. MP
8. MP service center
9. ADUN
10. ADUN service center
11. Others

Selected findings

70% of respondents use Facebook TV3 and WhatsApp come at

as one of their sources of political a distant second, with 12%
information. of respondents choosing the
two.
37% of respondents ranked
Facebook as their most frequently
used source of political information.

65% of respondents know the difference between an ADUN and an MP, 23% are unsure
and 12% do not know at all.

12 Political financing in Malaysia: Aligning reforms with voters’ expectations

 Policy Brief NO. 34

59% of respondents believe that debating policies and enacting legislation in Parliament
is the main function of an MP

57% of respondents believe that providing a check and balance to the government’s
decisions in Parliament is the main function of an MP

42% of respondents believe that giving aid to constituents in the form of cash and basic
goods is the main function of an MP

53% of respondents believe that giving aid to constituents in the form of cash and basic
goods is the main function of an ADUN

49% of respondents believe that debating policies and enacting legislation in the State
Assembly is the main function of an ADUN

36% of respondents will seek help from relevant government departments when they
encounter problems in their constituency. Less than 10% will seek help from their MP
or ADUN.

61% of respondents think that their MP gets most of his money from the government

65% of respondents have never asked for help from any of the bodies listed (State
Welfare Department, zakat bodies, private charities, MP, ADUN, MP service center,
ADUN service center) and 68% have never received help from any of those bodies

www.ideas.org.my 13
 Key takeaways
• The sources of funding for MPs and ADUNs are not clear to people on the ground
More than half (61%) of respondents chose the government as the main source of funding for their
MP, when in fact Malaysia does not have a public funding system for political parties. This is interesting
to observe as it may allude to the point about CDFs made earlier. CDFs might be seen as “money
from a politician” by people on the ground who receive these funds, either directly or indirectly. This
corresponds with findings from the workshops where the participants named CDFs as one of the
most problematic issues they face on the ground.

• It is unclear where Malaysians get help from when they are in need
Another interesting finding is that over 60% of respondents never received nor asked for help from
either state institutions, private charities or their elected representatives. Considering that the survey
was conducted in the midst of the pandemic, it is likely that there might have been sources that the
survey did not capture, for example youth groups, religious organisations and resident associations.

• There is some understanding of the proper role of an MP

More than half of the respondents chose debating policies, enacting legislation and acting as a check
and balance to government decisions as the main functions of an MP. This shows an encouraging
understanding of what an MP should do, although the fact that 42% of respondents chose giving aid to
constituents as a main function should not be discounted.

• ADUNs’ main function is still seen as a provider of aid to constituents

Despite the relative understanding of what an MP’s role is, the role of an ADUN is still seen to be a
provider of aid such as cash and basic goods. If Malaysia had local council elections, it will be interesting
to see whether an ADUN’s role is still seen in the same light, or will these roles be viewed as the
responsibility of local councillors.

• Facebook overwhelmingly dominates the sources of political information

The overwhelming number of respondents chose Facebook as their main source of political information,
which echoes the current debate going on in the rest of the world about the role of Facebook in
undermining democracies.20 Although these concerns have not been very serious in Malaysia, it is
still important to keep in mind that social media can exacerbate mistrust and division that is already
prevalent in our political climate today.21

Recommendations
The approach IDEAS has taken, which is to engage more closely with political parties and to understand more
about voters’ expectations, has given us the opportunity to view political financing with a broader lens. Our
findings have shown us that introducing transparency in political financing is not only urgent, but also a first
crucial step that must be taken to enable other fundamental changes to take place.

20.
Larry Madowo, “Is Facebook undermining democracy in Africa?,” BBC News, May 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48349671 (accessed October
7, 2021).
21.
“Do Malaysians lack trust in Government and Institutions?,” Ipsos, January 19, 2020, https://www.ipsos.com/en-my/do-malaysians-lack-trust-government-and-
institutions

14 Political financing in Malaysia: Aligning reforms with voters’ expectations

 Policy Brief NO. 34

This paper puts forward the following recommendations:

• The management and disbursement of CDFs must be transparent and accountable

On 23rd September 2021, Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister’s department Datuk Mastura Mohd
Yazid announced that MPs from both government and opposition will receive equal allocations for the
next four months.22 In the short term, equal CDFs allocation regardless of political affiliation is a good
start. However, more must be done to ensure the system remains sustainable and institutionalised
in the long term. This paper has made clear the real complications that the current CDF mechanism
presents on the ground.This is why transparency must be introduced into the system by firstly revising
the current circulars and guidelines to indicate clearly the sources of CDF.23 A transparent formula for
distribution must be introduced and disclosed in relevant budget documents.24 Furthermore, Malaysia’s
rapid urbanisation must be taken into account when reviewing how CDFs are allocated.25 Different
levels of development means that people’s needs in different areas differ, thus CDFs may be useful in
rural areas, while urban areas may rely on more institutional funding mechanisms via local councils.26
In the longer term, a CDF Act must be introduced which should include the allocation formula for
each constituency, sources of funding, requirements to publish key information to the public and
punitive measures for any instances where CDFs are misused.27 Ultimately, Malaysia should move
towards a system where MPs and ADUNs are no longer the gatekeeper of CDFs.28 YB Gooi Hsiao
Loong, the ADUN for Bukit Tengah and former MP for Alor Setar attempted to table a Constituency
Development Fund Bill in 2017 where he proposed the creation of a constituency development fund
to be coordinated by the Federal Development Office in each state; a formal committee chaired by
the MP on all projects within the constituency; a twice yearly public forum for feedback purposes; and
a bipartisan parliamentary select committee to oversee and review the allocated funds.29 However, the
Bill was never tabled.

• State welfare institutions must be strengthened

Much of the feedback shared during the workshops was regarding the role an MP and ADUN needs to
play to fulfill the expectations of constituents who are in great need of basic goods and services. One
way to solve this problem is through strengthening state welfare institutions such as the Department of
Social Welfare and Lembaga Zakat. More staff needs to be allocated to these bodies so that applications
can be processed efficiently and in a timely manner. In terms of welfare spending, The World Bank
has highlighted that Malaysia only spends about 0.7% of GDP on safety nets, which they categorise as
being “lower than the expenditure of 1.5 - 3.4% of GDP found in almost all the countries that have
graduated to high-income status since 2000.”30 Analysing social protection systems is beyond the scope
of this paper, however, it is important to recognise that low investment on social safety nets means
that politicians become the arbiter and gatekeepers of welfare, which increases risk of discretionary

22.
Martin Carvalho, Rahimy Rahim, Tarrence Tan and Fatimah Zainal, “Equal allocation for all MPs announced in Dewan Rakyat,” The Star, September 23, 2021, https://
www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/09/23/equal-allocation-for-all-mps-announced-in-dewan-rakyat (accessed October 8, 2021).
23.
Sri, et al., Constituency Development Funds, 38
24.
Ibid
25.
Tricia Yeoh, “The Political Economy of Federal-State Relations: How the centre influences resource distribution to the periphery,” IDEAS Policy Paper No. 63, (2020),
https://www.ideas.org.my/publications-item/policy-paper-no-63-the-political-economy-of-federal-state-relations-how-the-centre-influences-resource-distribution-to-
the-periphery/
26.
Yeoh, Federal-State Relations, 19
27.
Ibid
28.
Sri, et al., Constituency Development Funds, 31-32
29.
The Malay Mail, “Claiming voter blackmail, Kedah MP pushes for new law to disburse constituency funds,” The Malay Mail, March 3, 2017, https://www.malaymail.com/
news/malaysia/2017/03/03/claiming-voter-blackmail-kedah-mp-pushes-for-new-law-to-disburse-constituen/1327551 (accessed October 8, 2021).
30.
World Bank, Aiming High: Navigating the Next Stage of Malaysia’s Development. Country Economic Memorandum, (World Bank, 2021), 84, https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/handle/10986/35095 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO

www.ideas.org.my 15
 allocation of funds and politicisation of government agencies31 that are meant to serve the needs of all
Malaysians.

• Reintroduce the Parliamentary Services Act to strengthen the role of MPs as genuine
policymakers and to professionalise politics
The professionalisation of parliament and in turn, politics, is at the heart of institutional reforms. One
of the key institutional reforms needed is to reintroduce the Parliamentary Services Act, which will
give parliament the autonomy to decide on its staffing and maintenance (which is currently managed
by the Public Service Department) and its finances (which currently must be approved by the Ministry
of Finance).32 At an institutional level this is important to truly separate the Legislative body from the
influence of the Executive. For MPs, an autonomous parliament means that the role of Parliamentary
Select Committees (PSCs) can be strengthened through larger budgets and the hiring of a proper
secretariat and researchers. When PSCs are empowered, greater scrutiny can be given to government
policies. All of this contributes to the professionalisation of an MP’s job, which reduces the time and
need for the MP to attend to requests by constituents. Additionally, parliamentary sitting days must
also be increased at both the federal and state levels, which are currently very short compared to our
Commonwealth counterparts.33 With a higher number of sitting days and an autonomous parliament,
Malaysians will eventually understand the important role their MPs need to play in policy formation and
the larger nation building agenda instead of being overly focused on constituency works.

• Reintroduce local council elections (LCEs)

Ever since LCEs were suspended in 1965, civil society has called for its reintroduction. Benefits of LCEs
include enabling accountability for local council elections, combating and disincentivising corruption,
providing bottom-up leadership for localised areas, especially urbanised areas and facilitating
decentralisation of powers from federal to state and local governments.34 Furthermore, LCEs will
enable MPs and ADUNs to focus on their legislative duties instead of being overly focused on
local council matters.35 At the moment, local councillors are not very visible and their job scope is
not well-known, which is part of the reason why constituents often overlook them when in need
of infrastructure repairs or roadworks around their housing area. With the reintroduction of LCEs,
Malaysians get to choose their local councillors, thus instilling a sense of ownership and accountability
in local government.

31.
Keertan Ayamany, “Don’t turn JKM into your political machine, Hannah Yeoh tells Rina Harun regarding plans to hire 8,000 contract workers,” Malay Mail, December
16, 2020, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/12/16/dont-turn-jkm-into-your-political-machine-hannah-yeoh-tells-rina-harun-rega/1932354 (accessed
October 7, 2021).
32.
Imran Ariff, “It may be coming back, but what is the Parliamentary Services Act?,” Free Malaysia Today, September 4, 2021, https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/
category/nation/2021/09/04/it-may-be-coming-back-but-what-is-the-parliamentary-services-act/ (accessed October 7, 2021).
33.
Sri, et al., Constituency Development Funds, 1-59, see also (1) Robert Marleau and Camille Montpetit, “ 8.The Parliamentary Cycle,” In House of Commons procedure
and practice, (Ontario: House of Commons, 2000),
https://www.ourcommons.ca/marleaumontpetit/DocumentViewer.aspx?DocId=1001&Sec=Ch08&Seq=4&Language=E
and, (2) “Parliamentary Statistics,” Parliamentary Education Office, accessed October 7, 2021, https://peo.gov.au/understand-our-parliament/how-parliament-works/
parliament-at-work/parliamentary-statistics/
34.
Danesh Prakash Chacko, “Reintroduction of Local Government Elections in Malaysia,”Bersih & Adil Network Sdn. Bhd., (2021), 1 – 75, https://www.bersih.org/
download/bersih-policy-research-reintroduction-of-local-government-elections/
35.
Prakash Chacko, Local Government Elections, 4

16 Political financing in Malaysia: Aligning reforms with voters’ expectations

 Policy Brief NO. 34

Conclusion
Transparency in political financing is the cornerstone of a mature and healthy democracy.Through the workshops
and survey IDEAS conducted, we gained a deeper understanding of how money politics affects the day-to-
day workings of our wakil rakyat and the livelihoods of ordinary Malaysians. At the heart of voter-politician
relationships is a dependency that is fulfilled using resources that are unclear and sometimes questionable,
which is in turn used to maintain political support over decades. This paper has shown how some of this
dependency can be reduced, and how politics can be shifted to being more programmatic and professional. For
Malaysia’s democracy to thrive, the state must play its role in supporting those who fall through the cracks, and
our elected representatives must prioritise policy formation that benefits all people who call this country home.

www.ideas.org.my 17
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www.ideas.org.my 19
The Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS) is a nonprofit research institute based in Malaysia
dedicated to promoting solutions to public policy challenges. Our vision is :

“A Malaysia that upholds the principles of liberty and justice”

Our mission at IDEAS is to improve the level of understanding and acceptance of public policies based on the
principles of rule of law, limited government, free markets and individual liberty and responsibility. Our work
is independent of vested interests and partisan influences. We act as an intellectual centre creating space for
principles-centric and results-oriented dialogue.

We achieve this by:

• Publishing cutting-edge research

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Please support us by making a donation. You can make a contribution by cheque payable to
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Wisma Hang Sam, 1, Jalan Hang Lekir 50000 Kuala Lumpur

www.ideas.org.my
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BRANDING GUIDELINE
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Supported by:

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USAID Funded | DAI Implemented

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Selection of IDEAS’ Publications (2020 - 2021)

Policy Ideas

Policy Ideas No. 72 – Corruption in the supply chain: forms and impact on consumers by Adli
Amirullah, Danya Frances, Laurence Todd and Sri Murniati (June 2021)

Policy Paper No 71 – Paddy and Rice Sector Policy Roadmap:Towards Equity and Sustainability
by Fatimah Mohamed Arshad, Kusairi Mohd. Noh and Emmy Farha Alias (February 2021)

Policy Paper No 70 – Post COVID-19 Recovery: Building SME Resilience by Lau Zheng Zhou,
Sabrina Tang and Yohendran Nadar Arulthevan (January 2021)

Policy Paper No 69–Social Protection for the Poor and Vulnerable Malaysians during COVID-19
by Ya Shin Wan and Gamaliel Kan (December 2020)

Policy Paper No 68 – Improving Direct Negotiation rules in Malaysia: Learning from current
practices and international laws by Sri Murniati and Danial Ariff (November 2020)

Policy Paper No 67 – Next Steps for Rare Diseases in Malaysia: Improving Access to treatments
by Laurence Todd, Vaisnavi Rao (October 2020)

Policy Paper No 66 – Education Policies in Overcoming Barriers Faced by Orang Asli Children:
Education for all by Ya Shin Wan (October 2020)

Brief Ideas

Brief IDEAS No. 32 – Falling Through the Cracks: Identifying Children with Learning Difficulties
in Malaysian Schools by Sharmini Xavier (September 2021)

Brief IDEAS No. 31 –The government’s policy commitments on State-owned enterprises

(SOEs) in the National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP) and the Shared Prosperity Vision (SPV)
2030 by Nur Zulaikha Azmi (August 2021)

API 2020 Briefing Paper No.04 – Intra-ASEAN mogration: riska and opportunities by Armand
Azra and Laurence Todd (November 2020)

Brief IDEAS No. 30 – COVID-19 and Malaysia’s Democratic Resilience by Halmie Azrie, Faiz
Zaidi, Marisha Ubrani and Iman Amran (November 2020)
aheng Zhou (November 2020)

Report

Youth Suicide in Malaysia by Chua Sook Ning and Vaisnavi Rao (February 2021)

Public Procurement and Bumiputera Company Development in the Construction Industry:

Reviewing Policies, Exploring Possibilities by Lee Hwok Aun (September 2021)

Policy IDEAS are IDEAS’ regular publications that introduce and propose ideas for policy
reforms based on analysis of existing policies or best practices.

Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS)

The Lower Penthouse. Wisma Hang Sam, 1, Jalan Hang Lekir 50000 Kuala Lumpur

Website: ideas.org.my Tel: +603 2070 8881 / 8882 Fax: +603 2070 8883