Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SALVADOR ARROJADO, accused-appellant.

MENDOZA, J.:

TOPIC

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000, requiring that every
complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. This
provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that “statutes regulating the
procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. Thus herein
aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant for failure to allege the
same in the information.

FACTS OF THE CASE

On or about June 1, 1996, the accused, armed with a knife, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, attack, assault, and stab one Mary Ann Arrojado, on the different parts of the
body. Thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of her death. That by reason of her death, her heirs incurred actual and moral damages. The
information was read and explained to accused-appellant in his native dialect, after which he pleaded
not guilty.
Prosecution’s Version
Accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado and the victim Mary Ann Arrojado are first cousins, their fathers
being brothers. The victim's father, Alberto Arrojado, who was living in Canada, suffered a stroke for
which reason he decided to come home to Roxas City and financially supported by the victim's sister
Asuncion.
Starting February 15, 1996, accused-appellant lived with the victim and her father. He helped care for
the victim's father, for which he was paid a P1,000.00 monthly salary.
In the early morning of June 1, 1996, accused-appellant went to the house of his cousin, Erlinda
Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim had committed suicide. The victim, who was
bloodied, was lying on her left side facing the bedroom door with her hands clasped together. On her
bed was a rosary and a crucifix. Near her was a knife. Erlinda recognized it to be the knife kept in the
kitchen. Erlinda also noticed that the electric fan was turned on full blast, while all the windows were
closed except the window on the east side which was slightly open.
As he went to the other room, where the victim's father stayed, accused-appellant told Erlinda that he
was afraid he might be suspected as the one responsible for the victim's death. The police noticed
that the victim's room "was very neat as if nothing happened." The police saw no signs of forcible
entry. They made a sketch of the victim's position in relation to the whole house and took pictures of
her.
Dr. Lourdes Roldan, of the Roxas City Health Office, conducted the post-mortem examination of the
victim at 1:30 p.m. of June 1, 1996. Her findings revealed that the victim sustained the following stab
wounds 10 stab wounds, 5 of which are fatal.
Dr. Roldan listed "hemorrhagic shock” as the victim's immediate cause of death and "multiple
stab wounds" as the antecedent cause.

Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that the relationship between the victim and accused-appellant
had been strained as the victim constantly picked on accused- appellant even for the slighest mistake.
Erlinda remembered the scolding that the victim gave accused-appellant on May 27, 1996 over the
loss of keys. The victim also entrusted her jewelries and bank accounts to Erlinda, but later returned
the same thereafter.
Another relative, Thelma Arrojado, corroborated Erlinda's testimony that she knew the latter to be a
snob ("suplada") and overly strict. Because they did not get along with the victim, Thelma and her
husband eventually left. She testified that accused was angry at the victim and in fact passed by her
store thrice complaining to her of the victim's maltreatment of him.
Accused’s Version/Defense
Accused testified in his behalf. He told that Alberto Arrojado asked him for food, so accused went to
the kitchen to find out if the victim had already prepared breakfast. When he found that the victim
was not in the kitchen, he proceeded to the victim's room. From the doorway, he saw the victim lying
on her bed, bloodied. He thought that the victim had committed suicide because the victim had told
him that she felt tied down taking care of her father. She in fact once remarked that "It would be
better that my father and I commit suicide."
Accused said that the victim scolded him only once and that was for buying rotten cabbage. He said
that the victim was the one who was constantly being scolded by her father who often found fault with
her.
Crime charged: murder
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of murder
In the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, the accused, who is a detention
prisoner and not otherwise disqualified, shall be credited with the full time of his confinement under
preventive imprisonment, provided he voluntarily agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed on convicted prisoners, pursuant to Art. 29 of the RPC.
 ISSUE
1) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in finding that Mary Ann Arrojado was
stabbed ten times at her home.
2) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in ruling that Mary Ann Arrojado could not
have committed suicide.
3) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in finding that the house of Mary Ann
Arrojado was totally closed and locked against intruders.
4) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in finding that accused-appellant was abused
and oppressed by Mary Ann Arrojado that led accused-appellant to kill Mary Ann Arrojado.

SUPREME COURT RULED

1. No, the victim indeed sustained ten stab wounds.
That accused-appellant only saw one wound while Erlinda Magdaluyo saw two wounds on the victim
does not necessarily mean that the other wounds were inflicted upon the victim afterwards. The two
might have simply missed seeing the other wounds. In accused-appellant's case, it may be because
he did not go inside the room but only viewed the body from a distance. Dr. Roldan, who conducted a
post-mortem examination, testified that the victim actually sustained ten wounds.
Accused-appellant also argues that the varying depths of wound despite the fact that they had the
same surface length of 3 cm. could only mean that after the victim was found dead, she was again
stabbed with a knife or knives other than the one beside her. The contention is without merit. The
variance in depth does not necessarily mean that more than one weapon was used.
2. No, the victim did not commit suicide.
Somewhat inconsistently with his claim that the victim committed suicide, accused-appellant disputes
the trial court's conclusion that only one of those residing in the house could have killed the victim
because the police found no sign of a break-in. Accused-appellant says that in the morning of June 1,
1996, he found that the kitchen door leading outside was open. Accused-appellant's contention must
fail. Accused-appellant admitted that it did not occur to him that an intruder was in the house in the
evening of May 31, 1996 because "No person could get inside because the windows were closed and
besides the doors were closed." Accused-appellant never told Erlinda that the kitchen door was open
that morning. Indeed, Erlinda testified that "it is not possible that somebody would enter the house as
the doors were securely locked… with additional barrel bolts, and the windows have grills."
3. No, the house of Mary Ann Arrojado was totally closed and locked against intruders.
To be sure, the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal
unless it is shown that it overlooked certain facts or circumstances. In sum, the following circumstances
point to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime:

a. Accused-appellant, the victim, and the latter’s father were the only ones living in the house
in which the crime was committed in the evening of May 31, 1996.
b. No one from the outside can gain entry since all doors of the house were locked and the
windows had grills.
c. Accused-appellant had access to the victim’s bedroom because the bedroom doors were
left unlocked so that the victim could check on her father’s condition
d. The murder weapon was a kitchen knife readily accessible to the occupants of the house.
As the Solicitor General observed, common sense dictates that if an outsider entered the
 house with the intent to kill the victim, he would have brought his own weapon to ensure
the execution of his purpose.
e. None of the victim’s belongings was missing or disturbed, indicating that the motive for
the crime was not gain but revenge.
f. Judging from the number and severity of the wounds (10 stab wounds, half of which were
fatal), the killer felt deep-seated resentment and anger toward the victim. Accused-
appellant had admitted those feelings to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojado.
g. Aside from accused-appellant, no one was known to harbor a grudge against the victim.
h. As the Solicitor General also pointed out, accused-appellant’s behavior in the morning of
June 1, 1996 was inconsistent with someone who had just found his cousin and employer,
a person he claims to get along with, dead. By his testimony, he did not even go inside the
room to check on her condition on the lame excuse that he was afraid. He also did not
inform his neighbors about the incident for the equally flimsy reason that he did not know
them nor did he go to the police.
Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:

• there is more than one circumstance;

• the facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and
• the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
As the foregoing discussion shows, these requisites have been established in this case.
4. No, the RTC correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery against accused-
appellant. Anent the first requisite, Dr. Roldan testified that based on her findings, the victim was not
in a position to fight the assailant and that she might have been stabbed while she was asleep. As
regards the second requisite, the number and nature of the wounds sustained by the victim lead to no
other conclusion that accused-appellant employed means in killing the victim which tended directly
and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense; so many wounds,
a total 10, half of which were fatal, if he had not deliberately adopted such manner of attack.
Abuse of superior strength also attended the killing since accused-appellant, a man and armed with a
knife, attacked the victim, an unarmed and defenseless woman. However, since abuse of superior
strength is absorbed in treachery, there is no need to appreciate it separately as an independent
aggravating circumstance.
The trial court correctly held that there was no proof of evident premeditation
since the requisites thereof have not been established in this case.

No generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling since the latter and the victim lived in the same
house.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence is present. For this aggravating circumstance
to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal
such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act.
The confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking
advantage of the offended party's belief that the former would not abuse said confidence. In this case,
while the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety for which reason she entrusted her jewelry
and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, her fears were subsequently allayed as shown by the
fact that she took back her personal effects from Erlinda. Thinking that accused-appellant would not
do her any harm, because he was after all her first cousin, the victim allowed accused-appellant to
sleep in the same room with her father and left the bedroom doors unlocked.
Death Penalty(moot) and Retroactivity of the Law/Rules of Court
The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. 7659 on December 31, 1993 which
increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death to reclusion perpetua to
death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and in
accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the penalty
of death on accused-appellant.

However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect, requiring that
every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances.
This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that "statutes regulating
the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent." The
aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not having been alleged in the information, the same
therefore could not be appreciated to raise accused-appellant's sentence to death.
In People vs. Lucas, the penalty of reclusion perpetua remains indivisible notwithstanding the fixing of
its duration from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, the trial court erred in imposing
on accused-appellant the penalty of 30 years of reclusion perpetua. In line with the ruling in Lucas,
accused-appellant should suffer the entire extent of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in its entire duration and to its full extent. Furthermore, he is ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim Mary Ann Arrojado the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the further sum
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the costs.
 epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 184500 September 11, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PIIILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WENCESLAO NELMIDA @ "ESLAO," and RICARDO AJOK @ "PORDOY," Accused-Appellants.

TOPIC
When various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and
in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed.
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime
proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Wenceslao Nelmida and Ricardo Ajok, with 10 other accused, allegedly ambushed the vehicle of
Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Together with the Mayor are his security escorts,
2 of which died due to the ambush while the others have been injured, although not severely, but
needed to be hospitalized. In the conduct of the said alleged ambush, appellants and their co-accused
brought Samuel (whose task was to identify the vehicle) to a waiting shed where a pick-up service
vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group would pass. Appellants and their co-accused,
thereafter, assembled themselves on both sides of the road and surreptitiously waited for the vehicle.
The moment it passed by the waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained
bullets thereon resulting in the killing and wounding of the victims. Immediately, appellants and their
co-accused fled to escape.

The prosecution presented their witnesses. Samuel, who became a witness, categorically pointed to
Nelmida and Ajok as two of the people who participated in the commission of the ambush as well as
named all the other co-accused. The same was given as testimony by other witnesses, including the
other surviving victims of the ambush as they were, accordingly, of the vantage point where they saw
the perpetrators of the offense.
In their defense, both herein accused interposed their respective alibis corroborated by testimonies of
their respective relatives, and being that they both left their respective domiciles after the incident,
posed their separate explanations. In the case of Nelmida, that such was prompted by the fear and
restlessness of his wife so that she wanted to go to an environment further from the place of the
ambush; and for Ajok, that such was prompted by fear of being harassed as what he said was
happening to the others with the same political affiliation as him.
CRIME CHARGED: Amended Information: DOUBLE MURDER with MULTIPLE FRUSTRATED
MURDER and DOUBLE ATTEMPTED MURDER.
RTC: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

CA: AFFIRMED the RTC Decision.

ISSUE
Whether or not there complex crime?

SUPREME COURT RULED

No, in a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law
and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed.
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime proper,
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.

The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons.
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is
the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and
distinct crimes.

Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances present in this case
do not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.

From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding of the victims were
not the result of a single discharge of firearms by the appellants and their co-accused. Appellants and
their co-accused performed not only a single act but several individual and distinct acts in the
commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not apply for it speaks
only of a "single act."
Appellants should be convicted of SEPARATE CRIME – two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts
of attempted murder – and NOT of a COMPLEX CRIME
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246
dated 18 June 2008 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows: (1) appellants are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder thereby imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count; (2) appellants are also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7)
counts of attempted murder thereby imposing upon them the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count;
(3) other than the civil indemnity and moral damages already awarded by the trial court and the
appellate court, appellants are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally exemplary and temperate
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively, to the heirs of each deceased
victims; and (4) appellants are also directed to pay, jointly and severally, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC
Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito the amount of P40,000.00 each as moral damages, P25,000.00
each as temperate damages and P30,000.00 each as exemplary damages.

Costs against appellants.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 199892 December 10, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR., Accused-Appellant.

TOPIC
When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period.
In view of the enactment of RA 9346, prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty for
the killing of each of the two victims is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In August 2002, Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio Bacosa,
SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members of the
Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) at San
Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales.
On August 10, 2002, at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went to the “All-in-One” Canteen to
have some drink. Later, at around 10:00 in the evening, they transferred to a nearby videoke bar,
“Aquarius,” where they continued their drinking session. Shortly thereafter, a heated argument
between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued regarding a flickering light bulb inside “Aquarius.” When
SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off (“Patayin ang ilaw”), appellant who must have
misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s statement belligerently reacted asking, “Sinong
papatayin?,” thinking that SN1 Bacosa’s statement was directed at him. SN1 Cuya tried to pacify SN1
Bacosa and appellant, while SN1 Bundang apologized to appellant in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However,
appellant was still visibly angry, mumbling unintelligible words and pounding his fist on the table.
To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave “Aquarius” and return to the NETC camp.
They walked in two’s, namely, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo in the first group, followed by the
group of SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Cuya, and SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna in the last group, with each
group at one arm’s length distance from the other. Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry
gate which was being manned by SN1 Noel de Guzman and F1EN Alejandro Dimaala at that time.
SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna even stopped by to give the sentries some barbecue before proceeding
to follow their companions.
Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN Dimaala flagged
down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van with plate number DRW 706. The sentries
approached the van and recognized appellant, who was reeking of liquor, as the driver. Appellant
angrily uttered, “kasi chief, gago ang mga ‘yan!,” while pointing toward the direction of the navy
personnel’s group. Even before he was given the go signal to proceed, appellant shifted gears and
sped away while uttering, “papatayin ko ang mga ‘yan!”
While F1EN Dimaala was writing the van’s plate number and details in the logbook, he suddenly heard
a loud thud. Meanwhile, SN1 De Guzman saw how the van sped away towards the camp and suddenly
swerved to the right hitting the group of the walking navy personnel prompting him to exclaim to F1EN
Dimaala, “chief, binangga ang tropa!” SN1 De Guzman then asked permission to go to the scene of
the incident and check on the navy personnel.
When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa were thrown away towards
a grassy spot on the roadside. They momentarily lost consciousness. When they came to, they saw
SN1 Duclayna lying motionless on the ground. SN1 Cuya tried to resuscitate SN1 Duclayna, while
SN1 Bacosa tried to chase the van. SN1 Domingo was not hit by the van as he was in the first group
and was pushed away from the path of the speeding van. He was able to see the vehicle’s plate
number. He also tried to chase the van with SN1 Bacosa but they turned around when the vehicle
made a U-turn as they thought that it would come back for them. The vehicle, however, sped away
again when other people started to arrive at the scene of the incident.
CRIME CHARGED: Complex Crime of Double Murder qualified by treachery with Multiple Attempted
Murder attended by aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle
RTC: GUILTY of Complex crime of Double Murder qualified by treachery with multiple Attempted
Murder attended by the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
CA: Affirmed

ISSUE
Whether or not appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murder?

SUPREME COURT RULED

Yes, the felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, double
murder with multiple attempted murder, is a complex crime contemplated under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code: Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act of
stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel,
causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an attempt to
kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo.

The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies as the law attaches an afflictive
penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while attempted murder is
punished by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63[56] of the same Code provides that if the penalty prescribed is composed of two indivisible
penalties, as in the instant case, and there is an aggravating circumstance the higher penalty should
be imposed. Since use of vehicle can be considered as an ordinary aggravating circumstance,
treachery, by itself, being sufficient to qualify the killing, the proper imposable penalty the higher
sanction is death. In view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalty for the killing of each of the two victims is reduced to reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02816 affirming the conviction of appellant Arturo Punzalan, Jr. for
the complex crime of double murder with multiple attempted murder, imposing upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the following:

(a) To the respective heirs of SN1 Arnulfo Andal and SN1 Antonio Duclayna:
(i) P75,000.00 civil indemnity;
(ii) P75,000.00 moral damages;
(iii) P30,000.00 exemplary damages; and

(iv) P25,000.00 temperate damages;

(b) To the heirs of SN1 Andal, P2,172,270.21 for loss of earning capacity;
(c) To each of the surviving victims, SN1 Danilo Cuya, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Erlinger Bundang
and SN1 Cesar Domingo:
(i) P40,000.00 moral damages; and
(ii) P30,000.00 exemplary damages; and
(d) To SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Bundang, P25,000.00 temperate damages each is
AFFIRMED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

TOPIC
For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time;
unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more
violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the
perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago, the then Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID)
Commissioner, was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization
Program wherein Santiago, approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens who
arrived in the Philippines in violation of Executive Order No. 324 which does not allow the legalization
of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and
advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused.
She filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was
then a presidential candidate. She also moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
Garchitorena from the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. Her
motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan
Santiago filed a motion for a bill of particulars stating that while the Information alleged that she had
approved the application for legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it
lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to her, unless she was furnished with the names and
identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
She contended in this case that the public prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against her,
after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one Amended Information. She also
questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the splitting of the
original information.
She even claimed that the Amended Informations filed against her did not charge any offense
punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were
authorized under E.O. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation
adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children
of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the Informations.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was only one crime that was committed in Santiago’s case wherein there should
only be one Information to be filed against her.

SUPREME COURT RULED

Yes, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner Santiago's case, and
hence, there should only be one Information to be filed against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and
sometimes referred to as "continuous crime”.
Where only one single criminal act of approving the application for legalization of 32 aliens was
committed on the same period of time, the 32 Informations should be consolidated into only one. In
the case at bench, the original Information charged petitioner Santiago with performing a single
criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the
law to enjoy such privilege.

The original Information also averred that the criminal act committed by petitioner: (i) was in violation
of a law—Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended
party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The
32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original Information, except that
instead of the word “aliens” in the original information, each Amended Information states the name of
the individual whose stay was legalized.

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e.,
on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application
for the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the
approval was embodied in the same document.

For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time;
unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more
violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to
the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. A delito continuado consists of several crimes
but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator.
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied
to crimes penalized under special laws. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall
be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles
developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under
special laws. The question surrounding the concept of delito continuado is that whether a series of
criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or separate offenses.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they would
file only one Amended Information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. Hence, in this
case, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate
the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging
only one offense under the original case number, No. 16698

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is
MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is
directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one
information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the disqualification
of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 135457 September 29, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA JESSIE" and TEN
(10) JOHN DOES, accused-appellant.

TOPIC
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into
oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
FACTS OF THE CASE

This case involved the appeal of the accused-appellant, as regards to the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, convicting him of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant, Patriarca along with others, were charged with the murder of Alfredo Arevalo in
1990. He was also charged with murder for the killing of de Borja and Cadag.
He pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged, and joint trial of the three cases was conducted.
A prosecution witness testified that his house was requested by the Patriarca and his companions for
resting purposes. The witness took cognizance of a hogtied person, and heard gunshots which lead
to the execution of the said hogtied person.
Another witness, the mother of the victim, Arevalo, testified that the accused told her to not let her son
join the military. She was later informed that her son was abducted by the accused and his companions
and was notified that her son was killed by Patriarca.
During the trial, accused appellant's defense involved denying the abduction of the victims in the three
criminal cases filed against him.
In 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting the accused.
Hence, this appeal was filed by the accused appellant, contending that the trial court allegedly
committed an error in its verdict of conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder in pursuance
or in furtherance of rebellion.

SUPREME COURT RULED

Yes. The accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation 724 in 1994, and his application
was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board.
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into
oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
In his application for amnesty, the accused-appellant admitted joining the NPA in 1977, and
participated in its several armed activities, including the liquidation of Alfredo Arevalo. The grant of
amnesty to the accused-appellant became final when there has been no motion for reconsideration
filed by any party within 15 days from receipt of notice.
As provided by Article 89, par. 3, criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty. Hence, the Court
took judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, and deemed it
as binding and effective, once granted.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Griminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683, 11 Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664, which are both filed in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, 12 are ordered DISMISSED. The release
of Jose N. Patriarca who is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon is likewise ORDERED
unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his compliance with this decision.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006

LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

TOPIC

There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document; If the falsification of a
private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is
falsification; If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper
crime to be charged is estafa.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Herein petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming with modification the
decisions rendered by the Regional Trial Court for Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627,
convicting Leonila Batulanon of estafa through falsification of commercial documents
Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its
Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits
from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative. During an audit conducted in December
1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered. Thereafter, four
informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against Batulanon.
That on 4 separate dates, the accused in her capacity as Cashier / Manager falsified Cash/Check
Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao by then and there making an entry
therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion, Ferlyn Arroyo, Dennis Batulanon, were
granted a loan, in Philippine Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the their
signatures showing that they correspondingly received the loan, thus making it appear that the said
names were granted a loan and received the amount when in truth and in fact the said persons were
never granted a loan, never received the same, and never signed the cash/check voucher issued in
their name.

Respondent pleaded not guilt to the charges. The prosecution on the other hand presented witnesses
who testified that accused indeed filed and approved the said loans and saw her sign the forms making
it appear like the personal signatures were made by the victims.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is guilty of falsification of private document.

SUPREME COURT RULED

Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial document,
appellant could be convicted of falsification of private document under the well-settled rule that it is the
allegations in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name
given in the preamble of the information.
The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 236 of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in
paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that
the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent
to cause such damage.

In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act38 of falsification falls under paragraph
2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and
Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee of the amounts appearing
in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they obtained a loan and received
its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash
vouchers.
The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the name
of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI members and not qualified for a loan from
the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that while the former is a member, she
did not apply for a loan with the cooperative.
Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in
the vouchers and made it appear that the amounts stated therein were actually received by these
persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallo's credible testimony and her familiarity with the
handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the name of Arroyo. Contrary
to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to present the persons whose signatures
were forged as Medallo's eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover, under Section
22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not
commercial documents because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transaction1 nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of
Commerce or other commercial law. Rather, they are private documents, which have been defined
as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary or of
other person legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set
forth.

As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is important to

ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa.
If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime
to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a
document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three
counts of falsification of private documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
for each count, and to indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the amount
of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this
judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its
satisfaction; and

(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit
Cooperative Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed
from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.