Walter F. LaFeber - The New Empire - An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898-Cornell University Press (1967)

THE NEW EMPIRE
An Interpretation of American Expansion

1860-1898
THE NEW EMPIRE
An Interpretation o f American Expansion
i86o-i8g8
By WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University
C o rn ell P a p erb a ck s
C O R N E L L U N IV E R S IT Y PR ESS
ITH A C A AND LONDON
© 1963 by the American Historical Association
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First published 1963 by Cornell University Press
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Second printing 1965
First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 1967
Second printing 1968
Third printing 1969
Fourth printing 1971
Fifth printing 1975
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Albert J. Beveridge Award winner, was
published for the American Historical
Association.
International Standard Book Number 0-8014-9048-0

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 63-20868
Printed in the United States of America
FOR
M y Mother and Father

Preface
T H IS monograph attempts to examine the crucial incubation

period of the American overseas empire by relating the develop-
mènt of that empire to the effects of the industrial revolution on
United States foreign policy. I have employed this approach be
cause the industrial transformation that occurred during the last
half of the nineteenth century marked the beginning of modem
America. This momentous transformation has never been ade
quately linked with the maturation of the United States into a
world power, an event almost equal in significance to the indus
trial revolution. These, then, are the themes of the work: that
those historians who label this era as the A ge of the Robber
Barons or as the time when “Industry Comes of A ge” are cor
rect, and that foreign policy formulators were not immune to
the dominant characteristic of their time.
These themes suggest tw o conclusions implicit in this work.
First, the United States did not set out on an expansionist path
in the late 1890’s in a sudden, spur-of-the-moment fashion. T he
overseas empire that Americans controlled in 1900 was not a
break in their history, but a natural culmination. Second, Ameri
cans neither acquired this empire during a temporary absence
of mind nor had the empire forced upon them. I have discovered
vit
Preface
T H IS monograph attempts to examine the crucial incubation

period of the American overseas empire by relating the develop-
mènt of that empire to the effects of the industrial revolution on
United States foreign policy. I have employed this approach be
cause the industrial transformation that occurred during the last
half of the nineteenth century marked the beginning of modem
America. This momentous transformation has never been ade
quately linked with the maturation of the United States into a
world power, an event almost equal in significance to the indus
trial revolution. These, then, are the themes of the work: that
those historians who label this era as the A ge of the Robber
Barons or as the time when “Industry Comes of A ge” are cor
rect, and that foreign policy formulators were not immune to
the dominant characteristic of their time.
These themes suggest tw o conclusions implicit in this work.
First, the United States did not set out on an expansionist path
in the late 1890’s in a sudden, spur-of-the-moment fashion. T he
overseas empire that Americans controlled in 1900 was not a
break in their history, but a natural culmination. Second, Ameri
cans neither acquired this empire during a temporary absence
of mind nor had the empire forced upon them. I have discovered
vit
vin Preface
very little passivity in the systematic, expansive ideas of Seward,
Evarts, Frelinghuysen, Harrison, Blaine, Cleveland, Gresham,
Olney, and M cKinley and the views o f the American business
community in the 1890*8.
In developing an interpretation of this period, I have discovered
that it is difficult to use accurately the terms imperialism, colo
nialism, and expansion. I have not used the first term, since the
connotations given to it in the Cold W ar make it almost meaning
less. I have used the term colonialism when I mean a policy which
attempted to obtain both formal political and economic Control
of a given area and which especially aimed to use this area as a
source of direct economic benefits (that is, returns on capital
investment or markets for surplus goods). I have used the term
expansion in discussing American attempts to find trade and in
vestment opportunities in areas where the United States did not
want to exert formal political control. I have also used this term
in characterizing the United States policy toward Hawaii and the
Philippines, since I believe that American policy makers and
businessmen did not want these islands primarily in order to ob
tain direct economic returns. Rather, the United States annexed
these areas in order to develop interests in Asia and, in the case
of Hawaii, to safeguard the commercial passageway which Amer
icans hoped to build in Central America.
This study does not pretend to be a thorough examination of
all aspects of American foreign policy during the last half of
the nineteenth century. I have emphasized the economic forces
which resulted in commercial and landed expansion, because
these appear to be the most important causes and results in the
nation’s diplomatic history of that period. Little material is in
cluded on fisheries, seals, and immigration, for example, unless
these problems bear directly on American commercial and landed
expansion. The first chapter is a long introductory section, writ
ten mostly from secondary sources, which attempts to show that
the climactic decade of the 1890’s can be properly understood
only when placed in the context of the last half of the century.
Preface ix
Chapter VIII, which discusses the outbreak of the Spanish-
American W ar, is not an analysis of day-to-day events, but rather
an attempt to stress the operative economic forces and to point
out the interaction of events in Asia, Cuba, and the American
business community.
Finally, I must add that I have been profoundly impressed with
the statesmen of these decades. I find it very difficult to label them
idealists (if this means visionaries cut off from the realities of their
society), or isolationists (as this term is used in its derogatory
sense), or spineless victims of rabid mass public opinion. I found
both the policy makers and the businessmen of this era to be
responsible, conscientious men who accepted the economic and
social realities o f their day, understood domestic and foreign
problems, debated issues vigorously, and especially were un
afraid to strike out on new and uncharted paths in order to cre
ate what they sincerely hoped would be a better nation and a
better world. A ll this, however, is not to deny that the decisions
of these men resulted in many unfortunate consequences for
their twentieth-century descendants.
W alter L aF e b e r
Cornell University
May 196$
Contents
I Years o f Preparation, 1 8 6 0 - 1 8 8 9 ....................................1

The Roots of the N ew E m pire..........................................3
The Industrial R e v o lu tio n ............................................... 6
Westward the Course of Empire—and Discontent . 10
The Reaction of American Business.................................. 17
Seward . . . 24
Grant and Fish . 32
E v a r t s ............................. . . . 39
Blaine and Frelinghuysen . . 46
Bayard and the P a c ific ...................................................53
The Beginning of the Modem American Navy . . 58
Conclusion: The Period of Preparation............................60
II T he Intellectual Formulation . . . . 62
Frederick Jackson Turner and the American Frontier 63
Josiah Strong and the Missionary Frontier . . . . 72
Brooks Adams, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and the Far
Western F r o n tie r .........................................................80
The Ideological C onsensus............................................. 95
III T he Strategic F o r m u la tio n ...........................................102

The Assumptions and O b jectives................................ 104
xi
xii Contenu
Pan-Americanism: “The Battle for a Market” . . . 112
The Beginnings of the Modem Battleship Navy . . 121
The Haitian Revolution . . 127
The Chilean Revolution ..................................................130
The N ew Empire in the Western Pacific, 1889-1892 . 136
A Premature American Frontier in the Pacific . . 140
IV The Economic Formulation . . . . 150

The Goldbugs and Foreign Markets . . 153
The Tariff of 1894 . • • • l 59
“Symptoms of Revolution” ................... . 172
The American Business Community: Analysis . . 176
The American Business Community: Solutions . . 186
V Reaction: Depression Diplomacy, 1893-1895 . . 197

Hawaii ................................... . 203
The Brazilian Revolution of 1894 . . 210
Replacing the British in Nicaragua . . 218
Depression, Expansion, and the Battleship Navy . . 229
VI Reaction: The Venezuelan Boundary Crisis of 1895-

1896 . 242
Lighting the Fuse . . 243
The Explosion . . 259
Aftermath . 270
V II Reaction: N ew Problems, N ew Friends, N ew Foes 284

The Cuban Revolution, 1895-1897 . 285
The Far East . 300
N ew Friends 311
N ew Foes 318
VIII Reaction: Approach to W ar 326

M c K in le y ............................. • 327
Cuba, 1897 to March 17, 1898 . 333
The Far East, 1897 to March, 1898 . 352
Contents xiii
H a w a ii.............................................................................. 362
The American Business Community before the War
with Spain, 1897 to February, 1898 . . 370
The Decision for War . . . . 379
E p ilo g u e .......................................................... . . 407
Selected Bibliography . . . . . 418
Acknowledgments . . . 427
Index • . 429
THE NEW EMPIRE
An Interpretation of American Expansion
1860-1898
Years o f Preparation, 1860-1889
M O DERN American diplomatic history began in the 1850’s and

1860’s. By then the continental empire of which Madison, Jeffer
son. and John Quincy Adams had dreamed spanned North Amer
ica from sea to sea. Cords of rails and water, common economic
and social interests, and a federal political system tied the empire
together. Edmund Burke had stated the principle: “An empire is
the aggregate of many states under one common head, whether
this head be a monarch or a presiding republic.”
But by the time W illiam Seward became Lincoln’s Secretary
of State in 1861, a new empire had started to take form. T w o im
portant features distinguished it from the old. First, with the
completion of the continental conquest Americans moved with
increasing authority into such extracontinental areas as Hawaii,
Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Second, the form of expansion
changed. Instead of searching for farming, mineral, or grazing
lands, Americans sought foreign markets for agricultural staples
or industrial goods. In the late 1840’s American export figures
began their rapid climb to the dizzying heights of the twentieth
century. Between 1850 and 1873, despite an almost nonexistent
export trade during the Civil War, exports averaged $274,000,000
2 T he N e w Empire
annually; the yearly average during the 1838-1849 period had
been only $116,000,00o.1
As these figures indicate, the United States was not isolated
from the rest of the world in the years 1850-1873. W hen ex
amined in economic and ideological terms, the familiar story of
American isolation becomes a myth. It is true, however, that
from the end of the Napoleonic W ars until the 1890’s the vast
Atlantic sheltered America from many European problems.
Many problems, but not all, for even before the 1890’s the United
States became involved in such episodes as the international slave
trade, Latin-American revolutions, numerous incidents in Asia
with the major powers of the world, and even colonial questions
in Africa and Madagascar.
External factors, such as England’s command of the seas and
the balance of power in Europe, might have given the United
States the luxury of almost total isolation; but internal develop
ments, as interpreted by American policy makers, led the United
States to become increasingly involved in world affairs. The eco
nomic revolution, new scientific and ideological concepts, and
the policy makers’ views of these changes had begun to accelerate
this involvement before the Civil W ar.
This development is sometimes overlooked, since economic
and ideological expansion are often considered apart from po
litical entanglements. American history, of course, belies such a
separation, for the United States annexed a continental empire
by undermining, economically and ideologically, British, French,
Spanish, Mexican, and Indian control and then taking final pos
session with money, bullets, or both. Similarly, one rule may be
suggested which particularly helps in understanding the course
of American foreign policy in the nineteenth century: the United
States could not obtain either continental or overseas economic
benefits without paying a political and often a military price.
1 C. J. Bullock, J. H . W illiams, and R. S. Tuckner, “T he Balance o f

Trade o f the United States,” Review of Economics and Statistics, I (July,
1919), 215-266, especially 216-221.
Years of Preparation %
Economic expansion and political involvement became so inter
linked that by 1900 a reinvigorated Monroe Doctrine, participa
tion in an increasing number of international conferences, and
a magnificent battleship fleet necessarily made explicit America’s
world-wide political commitments.
This initial chapter briefly discusses the economic, social, and
political transformations of the 1865-1889 period—a metamor
phosis which must be comprehended in order to understand
American foreign policy during these years—and the more im
portant policy makers who tried to meet the challenges of these
transformations. First, however, it is useful to describe the his
torical backdrop of the new empire.
The Roots of the N e w Empire

Long before the 1860’s Americans had been involved in the
affairs of Canada, Latin America, Hawaii, and Asia. In its first
moments of independence, the United States had struck quickly
and unsuccessfully in an effort to bring into the new nation the
territory north and east of the Great Lakes. The Americans
failed no less miserably in their second try during the W ar of
1812. But tw o strikes were not out, and time and again in the first
half of the nineteenth century Americans tried more subtle
measures for adding Canada to the Union. The carrot of trade
replaced the stick of war when in 1854 the United States and
Canada entered into a reciprocity treaty which many Americans
hoped would tie the northern nation to them with unbreakable
economic bonds. W hen the treaty tended instead to strengthen
Canadian autonomy, a disgusted American Senate allowed the
agreement to terminate in 1866.
The United States did not attempt to annex Latin America as
it did Canada, but there was no lack of interest in the southern
continent. Jefferson had declared that North America would be
the nest from which the entire W estern Hemisphere would be
peopled. H enry Clay later admonished the United States to put
itself at the head of the entire hemisphere through a “Good
4 The N e w Empire
Neighborhood” policy. Increasing interest in Latin-American
markets as replacements for those lost with the closing of the
Napoleonic Wars in Europe provided adequate material reasons.
In a negative sense, the Monroe Doctrine, as formulated by
President James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy
Adams, had tried to exclude European powers from affairs in
this hemisphere. Viewed positively, the Doctrine staked out the
hemisphere as an area for future American economic opportuni
ties and de jacto political control.2 In the mid-1890’s an American
Secretary of State would announce the positive aspects of the
Doctrine in blunt terms. The annexation of Texas in 1845, which
had formerly been a part of Mexico, the war with Mexico in
1846-1848, which resulted in the enlargement of the United
States by one-fifth, and the numerous filibustering expeditions
into Central America in the 1850’s only partially indicated Amer
ican interest in lands south of the border.
Also to the south lay Cuba, an island which Jefferson had
considered annexing as early as 1808 and which John Quincy
Adams delayed taking only because he believed that the “laws of
political . . . gravitation” demanded that Cuba, like “an apple,
severed by the tempest from its native tree,” would “gravitate
only towards the North American Union.” By the 1850’s Cuba
had refused to fall in spite of increased American interest, so
three distinguished United States envoys to Europe decided to
shake the tree. Failing to persuade Spain to sell the island, they
issued the Ostend Manifesto, which proclaimed the right of the
United States to take the island if Spain would not sell it. W ash
ington, however, quickly disavowed the Manifesto. Such ex
pansionist projects failed in the 1850’s, not because they were
unpopular, but because too many of them were advocated by
men who spoke with the drawl of southern slaveholders. Even
2 For an excellent summary of the American empire in the nineteenth

century with specific reference to a positive Monroe Doctrine, see
Richard W . Van Alstyne, The Rising American Empire (N e w York,
i960), 1-194.
Years of Preparation j
such northern expansionists as Seward refused to cooperate in
attempts to extend the slavocracy.
American attention had also turned to the Pacific. Trading
and whaling vessels from Massachusetts had early stamped the
Hawaiian Islands as outposts of United States trade. N ew England
missionaries established colonies during the i 82o ’s. Soon Ameri
can interests grew from within as w ell as from without. In the
1840’s the United States began sending notices to England and
France (the mailing list would later include Germany and Japan)
that it would not tolerate European control of the islands. By the
decade before the Civil W ar, the American Secretary of State,
W illiam L. Marcy, tried to negotiate a treaty of annexation with
Hawaii, was outsmarted by the antiannexationist bloc in H ono
lulu, and retreated with the warning that future annexation by
the United States was “inevitable.” More than forty years later
W illiam M cKinley would say, while successfully annexing the
islands, that his action was “the inevitable consequence” of “three-
quarters of a century” of American expansion into the Pacific.
By the time o f the Civil W ar, the Monroe Doctrine had been
im plicitly extended as far as Hawaii, but important American
interests were developing still farther west. (Textbooks call the
Orient the Far East, but this hinders the understanding of Ameri
can expansion, for the United States has more often considered
this area as the Far W est.) The “Empress of China” had sailed
out o f N ew York G ty in 1784 to make the first important con
tact. The United States signed its first commercial treaty with
China in 1844. T en years later Commodore Matthew C. Perry
opened Japan. By the time Seward assumed his duties as Secretary
of State, the United States had been caught in the web of Asian
power politics. T he State Department had to maintain trade
privileges and safeguard traders and missionaries either by co
operating with the European powers or by developing a go-it-
alone policy. Americans debated only the means, not the fact of
involvement.
6 The N e w Empire
The Industrial Revolution

United States interest in these extracontinental areas intensified
after 1850 w ith the completion of the continental empire and
the maturation of the American industrial econom y. Between
1850 and 1900 this industrial complex rapidly developed into
one of the tw o greatest economic forces in the world. During
the same half century the United States battled with other in
dustrial nations for control of the Latin-American, Asian, and
African markets. It was not accidental that Americans built their
new empire at the same time their industrial complex matured.
As recent studies have indicated, the industrial econom y rolled
into high gear after recovering from the 1837 panic. T o use
Professor W alt W . Rostow’s apt phrase, the econom y reached
its “take-off” stage between 1843 and 1857, that is, long before
the cannons of Charleston bombarded Fort Sumter. The Civil
W ar actually retarded the rate of economic growth, but the
industrial econom y then accelerated again after 1866. Value
added to manufactured goods (in terms of constant dollars of
purchasing power) rose 157 per cent from 1839 to 1849, 76 per
cent from 1849 to 1859, but only 25 per cent during the next
ten years. During the 1870’s, however, the figures show 82 per
cent added for the decade after 1869 and 112 per cent for that
after 1879.8
This does not mean that the Civil W ar was unimportant as a
cause of this burgeoning industrial sector. It was important, but
in a political and social sense. Charles Beard caught an important
aspect of the conflict when he noted that it marked the shift of
political power from planters to the industrialists and financiers.
The legislation passed by the northern- and eastern-dominated
war Congresses included a measure for stronger central banking,
•T hom as C. Cochran, “D id the Civil W ar Retard Industrialization?”

Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVIII (September, 1961), 197-
210; see also Douglass N orth, The Economic Growth of the United
States, 1790-1860 (Englew ood Cliffs, N .J., 1961).
Years of Preparation 7
high tariffs for budding (and blossomed) industries, the Home
stead A ct to develop interior markets and provide new oppor
tunities for speculative capital, the giving of millions of acres
and generous loans to build rail links between the industries in
the East and Midwest and the growing markets of the W est, and
a contract labor law which allowed employers to import cheap
foreign labor. During the G vil W ar, then, industrialists re
ceived political help of no small value, but the fact remains that
the manufacturers simply used these benefits to build a super
structure (though it was towering) on a solid foundation which
had been constructed before the war.4
These tw o facts—that by i860 the industrial econom y was
already moving ahead rapidly and that the G vil W ar marked the
transference of power from planters to industrialists and finan
ciers— do much to explain the dynamics of the new empire. The
roots of this empire date back at least to the 1843-1860 period,
which climaxed in the taking off of the economy, for during
this era eastern industrial interests, working through such men
as Daniel W ebster and W illiam Marcy, began showing interest
in the vast China market and in such areas as California and
Hawaii to serve as stepping-stones to that market. W illiam Sew
ard, rising to a lofty position in American politics during the
1850’s, developed an expansive philosophy within the context
of this industrialism which he attempted to realize during the
next decade. Policy makers in the post-1870’s completed what
these men had begun, but the later empire builders succeeded
because the Civil W ar had given them the political power to carry
out their plans. T he control of policy making by the industrialists
and financiers was a prerequisite to the creation of a new com
mercial empire in such noncontiguous areas as China and South
America.®
4 Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization
(N e w York, 1927), II, 199; Cochran, “D id the Civil W ar Retard Indus
trialization?” 197-200.
6 See especially Van Alstyne, Rising American Empire , for an excellent
discussion on the 1840’s. Seward is discussed below in this chapter.
S T he N e w Empire
The United States thus developed into a great industrial power,
but it paid a high price for the privilege. As efficient machines
produced more and more industrial and agricultural goods, con
sumption could not maintain the pace. The resulting deflation
needed only the impetus derived from a few failures of large
banks or W all Street firms to push the econom y into a full-scale
depression. In the twenty-five years after 1873, half were years
of depression: 1873-1878, 1882-1885, and 1893-1897. As each
panic struck, Americans became convinced that the new one was
worse than the last. Although they believed the 1893-1897 crisis
to be most destructive, and although it did have the greatest im
pact on the formulation of foreign policy, economists have dem
onstrated that the depression of the 1870’s was actually the worst.
If the 1873 general price index is figured as 100, then the index
took a precipitous drop to 77 in the next few years. In the 1880’s
it again fell from 87 to 76 and from 78 in 1890 to 71 in 1894 an<^
1896. The break in the early eighties was especially sharp. A g
ricultural prices fell when good European crops combined with
still greater American wheat production in 1881 and 1882. In
dustrial prices follow ed suit. Between 1880 and 1884 business
failures tripled in number to almost 12,000 annually. The econ
om y would not stand upright again until after 1897. Carroll D .
W right, first United States Commissioner of Labor, reported in
1888: “The day of large profits is probably past. . . . The mar
ket price of products w ill continue low .” 6
In some respects, however, the mushrooming industrial econ
om y fed upon these depressions. In discussing the 1873 panic
Andrew Carnegie later acknowledged: “So many o f m y friends
needed money, that they begged me to repay them. I did so and
bought out five or six of them. That was what gave me m y lead-
6 Edward C. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age: Business, Labor, and
Public Policy, 1860-1897 (N e w York, 1961), 6-8; David M. Pletcher,
The Awkward Years: American Foreign Relations under Garfield and
Arthur (Columbia, Mo., 1963). Professor Pletcher was kind enough to
allow me to read his manuscript before the book was published. A ll
references w ill be to that manuscript.
Years of Preparation p
ing interest in this steel business.” After buying the Homestead
plant during the 1883 economic downturn, Carnegie could jus
tifiably comment, “I’ve enjoyed this flurry after all.” 7 Out of
this expanded and productive plant would come vast amounts of
steel, much of which sought foreign markets in the 1890’s be
cause of insufficient demand at home. It was truly tw enty years
of boom hidden in tw enty years of crisis.
This industrial power also began to affect the historic flow of
international finance capital. Foreign investments continued to
expand in the United States until they reached the mountainous
figure of $3,300,000,000 in 1899, but this tells only part of the
story. During these years more and more money moved from
the United States to Europe. As capital accumulated from the
profits of the American industrial revolution, much of it went
back into new machinery and plants in the United States, but
some flowed into Latin America, Canada, Asia, and Europe, and
other dollars went to London and Paris to buy back American
stocks at panic prices. This trend was especially noticeable dur
ing the slump in the 1890’s. In other words, the United States
began measuring itself for Britain’s shoes: exporting more than
importing, and making up the difference by buying back Ameri
can securities, purchasing foreign stocks and bonds, and building
American-owned transportation systems and industries abroad.8
The importance of this industrial power was just becoming
apparent by the time of the Civil W ar, but agricultural surpluses
had played a key role in the nation’s foreign relations ever since
Maryland and Virginia planters had tried to find markets out
side the British Empire for the rich tobacco harvests in the seven
teenth century. By 1870 the American economy depended so
much upon foreign markets for the agricultural surplus that the
econom y’s ups and downs for the next thirty years can be traced
7 Thomas C. Cochran and W illiam Miller, The Age of Enterprise (N e w

York, 1942), 145; Burton J. Hendrick, The Life of Andrew Carnegie
(Garden City, N .Y ., 1932), I, 268.
8 Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age , 304-305.
10 T he N e w Empire
in large measure to the success or failure of marketing each year’s
wheat and cotton crops. N o matter how many markets could be
found, more always seemed to be needed. W ith the opening of
vast new lands after 1865 and under the impact of farm mechani
zation, the production of wheat and cotton soared beyond all
previous figures. In 1870 the United States produced 4,300,000
bales of cotton; by 1882 it counted 6,900,000 bales, and in 1891
it grew 9,000,000 bales. Prices meanwhile dropped from 18 cents
per pound in 1871 to 10 cents in 1880 and to a little over 7 cents
in 1891. W heat figures tell the same story. From 1873 to 1882
wheat production jumped from 368,000,000 to 555,000,000
bushels, while exports soared from 40,000,000 to 150,000,000
bushels. But prices slumped from $1.52 per bushel in 1866 to
77 cents in 1878, moved back up to $1.19 in 1881, and then sunk
to 68 cents in 1887 and 54 cents in 1893. Between 1869 and 1900
the home market bought between 75 per cent and 85 per cent
of the total value of farm products, but the most important items
o f cotton, tobacco, and wheat depended much more on foreign
markets. Cotton exports, for example, fluctuated between 66
per cent and 82 per cent of the total crop, and tobacco exports
accounted for 41 per cent to 79 per cent of total production.®
If foreign markets meant good instead of mediocre or poor profits
for some industrialists, adequate markets abroad meant the differ
ence between being solvent or bankrupt to many farmers.
W estward the Course of Empire—and Discontent

Historians have long fixed the 1865-1877 period as the era of
Reconstruction. For some chroniclers, such as those concerned 9
9 Fred Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier . . . (N e w York, T o

ronto, 1945), 355, 415, tables in appendix (for the spectacular results o f
farm mechanization see ibid., 140-147); Morton Rothstein, “America
in the International Rivalry for the British W heat Market, 1860-1914,”
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVII (December, i960), 401-
418, especially 402.
Years of Preparation Il
with the history of the South, this demarcation has certain values.
But for historians of American diplomacy this emphasis on the
South can entice them to take their eyes off events during these
years which had more importance in the making of foreign pol
icy. Certainly the energy and time devoted to waving the bloody
shirt in the 1870’s did divert some attention from external affairs;
and no doubt the beginnings of industrialism in the South deserve
attention since many southern industrialists soon joined their
compatriots in the N orth in the search for foreign markets. A ll
this can be granted and the point can still be emphasized that, as
far as the internal dynamics of American foreign policy are con
cerned, the most important events occurred outside the South.10
W hen coupled with the maturing of the economy, especially
in the industrial segment, America’s western history provides
valuable insights into the formulation of foreign policy after
Seward. This is so for several reasons. First, the American W est
supposedly held the great open frontier of opportunities for both
individual farmers seeking land and for eastern and midwestern
industrialists searching for markets and raw materials. W hen in
the 1880’s many Americans feared that this frontier was closing,
they reacted in the classic manner of searching farther west for
new frontiers, though primarily of a commercial, not landed,
nature. This swept them into the Pacific and Asiatic area and
hence into one of the maelstroms of world power politics. Sec
ond, when the belief spread that the internal frontier had quit
expanding and had begun to stagnate, the new ly restored Union
faced an intensified internal threat. This came from bankrupt
farmers, unemployed laborers and miners, and bitter social critics
including some of the foremost novelists of the day. Foreign
policy formulators and many businessmen viewed expanding
10 For a good discussion of the South’s industrial development, see

Paul H . Buck, The Road to Reunion , 1865-1900 (N e w York, 1959),
182-195. A most valuable source for this development is Adolph Ochs’
Chattanooga Tradesman in the late 1880’s and 1890’s.
12 The N e w Empire
diplomatic interests as one way to ameliorate the causes of this
discontent.
A t the beginning of the Preconstruction period Americans
saw the area west of the Mississippi as a vast land of limitless
opportunities which, they believed, would be open for many
years. Horace G reeley’s N ew York Tribune in April, 1865,
gloried in the fact that “our country has already an ample area
for the next century at least.” The Chicago Tribune boasted at
the same time, “W e have already more territory than we can
people in fifty years.” Pioneer farmers earlier had shied from
moving into the treeless Great Plains area, but they now received
assurance from no less a person than the director of the G eologi
cal and Geographical Survey of the Territories that although the
area just east of the Rockies might resemble a desert, this could
be corrected through settlement, plowing, and the planting of
trees.11
Farmers, cattlemen, and speculators took such statements at
face value. Americans settled more land during the thirty years
after 1870 than they had during the entire three hundred years
before. Four new trunk railways formed an iron link with the
Pacific; the booming cattle industry and bonanza wheat farms
sprouted new fortunes. These gigantic granaries structured them
selves for agricultural production as corporations had organized
for industrial production, a significant fact for a supposedly raw
frontier. Linus P. Brockctt reported in Our Western Empire
(1881) that this area was “destined to be the garden of the
world.” 12
If farmers thought of this as a new frontier, so did persons in
the East who had their own or European money to invest. Money
11 Donald Marquand Dozer, “Anti-Expansionism during the Johnson
Administration,” Pacific Historical Review, XII (September, 1943), 255-
256; Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American W est as Symbol
and Myth (N e w York, 1959), 209.
12 Ray Allen Billington, W estward Expansion . . . (N e w York, 1949),
703, Smith, Virgin Land, 214-216.
poured into the W est. T o cite but one example, twelve million
dollars settled in the W yom ing cattle industry in the single year
of 1883. Brockett had no doubt that this was the “grandest em
pire this world has ever seen.” 13
B y the 1880’s, however, the weeds of discontent began to
clutter this garden of the world. Supposedly limitless frontiers
started to snap shut on every side. A resurgence of good Euro
pean wheat crops after 1881 forced agricultural prices downward
until the cost of raising wheat amounted to one-third more than
its selling price. N ot accidentally, the tw o most important agrar
ian revolts, those of the Grangers and the Populists, derived much
strength from areas where crops óf wheat and cotton depended
on the world market. A horrible winter in 1885-1886 and the
1886-1887 freeze nearly ruined the range cattle industry. Be
tween 1888 and 1892 half the population of western Kansas
filtered out to search for new opportunities. A t the same time
the death rattle of the railroad frontier could be heard.14*
B y 1886 railroad construction had virtually halted. In 1875
half the iron produced in the United States had found its market
in the American railroad system, and by 1880, 200,000 men had
earned their living working on railroad construction. In the mid-
1880’s many of these workers had to search for other jobs. Iron
industrialists were forced to find new markets at the same time
their blast furnaces were increasing output from an annual aver
age of forty-five tons in i860 to four hundred tons in 1905.
Brockett had feared that the great wealth of the W est would lure
settlers away from education and other “civilizing influences”
and turn them into followers of any man on a horse. W hen the
men on horseback appeared in the persons of General James B.
W eaver of the Populist Party and W illiam Jennings Bryan in
13 Billington, W estward Expansion, 731-732; Shannon, Farmer’s Last

Frontier, 154-161; Smith, Virgin Land, 214-216.
14 Billington, W estward Expansion, 732; Samuel Hays, Response to
Industrialism, 1885-1914 (Chicago, 1957), 8-10.
if The N e w Empire
1896, westerners flocked to them because of poverty and panic,
not wealth.15
One of the most acute observers of this or any other period of
American history had warned of such dangers. H enry Adams,
writing in 1870, noted that a “loose and separately responsible
division o f government” suited the expanding United States of
1800. But, he said, with the nature of the U nion rapidly chang
ing, “all indications now point to the conclusion that this system
is outgrown.” True, statistics penned on paper could demonstrate
that hourly wages for wage earners in all industries almost
doubled in the thirty years after i860, although they declined
somewhat in the 1890’s. Real wages rose in an even more spec
tacular fashion according to the statisticians.1671
But statisticians could not reconcile such figures with the or
ganization o f the first American Socialist party in the decade
after the G vil W ar or with the violent railroad strikes o f 1877.
During the chaotic summer of 1877 many agreed with Jay Gould,
w ho thought he saw the beginnings of “a great social revolution.”
United States Judge W alter Quintín Gresham, w ho remembered
the nightmarish times of 1877 when he formulated foreign policy
for Grover Cleveland in 1893-1895, wrote a friend immediately
after the strike: “Our revolutionary fathers . . . went too far
w ith their notions of popular government. Dem ocracy is now
the enemy of law & order.” 1T
B y 1879 the United States was emerging from the fearful
period which had follow ed the 1873 panic, but the scars re
mained. Many Americans who had unquestioningly accepted
the results of the Civil W ar as insurance for an indefinite period
o f American greatness were now shaken, never to regain their
16 There is a good discussion o f Brockett in Literary History of the

United States, edited by R. E. Spiller et al. (N e w York, 1948), 792.
16 H enry Adams, “T he Session,” North American Review , CXI (July,
1870), 60-62; Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age , 402.
17 Robert V . Bruce, /Í77: Year of Violence (Indianapolis, 1959), 310-
311, 26, 317; John Higham, Strangers in the Land . . . (N e w Brunswick,
N.J., 1955), 31-32.
full confidence. In the m id-i88o’s disasters in the W est com
bined w ith the 1884 panic to produce another series of strikes.
This time the violence climaxed in the Chicago Haymarket Riot
of 1886.18
Some Americans reacted to this strife by publishing candid
novels and outspoken social criticism questioning the fundamen
tals of a system which could produce such suffering and turmoil.
O f some sixty novels written before the end of the century which
dealt with the American businessman, at least fifty of these were
critical o f business activities and values. Literature especially
reacted to the panics and riots of the m id-i88o’s and 1890’s; of
sixty-eight utopian novels published in the half century after
1865, thirty-five appeared in the seven-year period between 1888
and 1895. Their literature, like their foreign policies, indicated
the grave concern with which Americans observed how indus
trial maturity paradoxically helped to cause class and sectional
disruptions.19
Hamlin Garland, Edward Bellamy, W illiam Dean H owells,
Mark Twain, Frank Norris, and E. W . H ow e were among lead
ing critics and novelists who prescribed solutions for these social
problems. H ow ells displayed a rather watery socialism (not the
less sincere because it was largely water) in his A Hazard of N e w
Fortunes (1890). Immediately follow ing the Haymarket Riot,
and while H ow ells was changing his political viewpoint, Bellamy
published Looking Backward, Garland wrote many of his bitter
stories incorporated later in Main-Travelled Roads, and Tw ain’s
A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court appeared. Ben
jamin Orange Flower’s Arena, a journal publishing the more re
spectable radical literature of the day, began its push toward a
70,000 subscriber list.
A s these men searched for the causes of the social upheavals,
they frequently commented on the frontier. One o f the most
18 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 53.

19 Merle Curtí, The G row th of American Thought (2nd ed.; N e w
York, 1951), 523; Hays, Response to Industrialism, 41.
16 The New Empire
fascinating changes in American literature occurred when these
and other novelists began externalizing the evil which Hawthorne
and Melville had internalized. Many naturalists and realists em
phasized a sordid environment, not “bad humours,” to explain
man’s evil works. Howells neatly summarized this view of ex
ternal evil in the preface to Main-Travelled. Roads when he re
marked about Garland’s characters, “T hey felt that something
is wrong, and they know that the wrong is not theirs.” Mark
Twain publicly stated his disillusionment with the once glorious
W est in his Pudd’nhead Wilson published in 1894, one year after
Turner’s frontier thesis and the economic panic. It is interesting
to note that Twain became a bitter anti-imperialist in 1898; he
had little faith that the American system could operate a new
frontier in the far Pacific if it had trouble with the one on this
continent.20
The violence of the labor and agrarian protests in the 1870’s
and 188o’s, combined with the warnings from some of America’s
foremost authors that a beneficent frontier could no longer be
taken for granted, shocked many Americans into the realization
that, as Goldwin Smith phrased it during the chaos of 1877,
“the youth of the American Republic is over; maturity, with its
burdens, its difficulties, and its anxieties, has come.” A restless
society could not wait for a Darwinian fate to solve its problems.
The N ew York Times, N ew York Graphic, and Minneapolis
Tribune agreed with Harper's: “It is the business of the State, that
is, of the people, to prevent disorder of the kind that w e saw in
the summer, by removing the discontent which is its cause.” 21
American businessmen and policy makers in increasing numbers
viewed expanding foreign markets as a principal means of re
moving the causes of this discontent.
20 Richard Chase, The American N ovel and Its Tradition (Garden
City, N ew York, 1957), 199; Hamlin Garland, Main-Travelled Roads.
. . . W ith an Introduction by W . D. Howells . . . (Chicago, 1894),
4; Smith, Virgin Land, 285-287; Mark Twain, Pudd'nhead Wilson and
Those Extraordinary Twins (Hartford, Conn., 1903).
21 Bruce, /Í77, 312, 314.
Years of Preparation n
The Reaction of American Business

Andrew Carnegie’s Gospel of W ealth offered one remedy
for the increasing unrest. Carnegie and his followers moved from
the assumption of individual freedom in the economic sphere
to the belief that the resulting wealth would benefit the entire
community. But as strikes follow ed depressions, it became evi
dent that the Gospel of W ealth was inadequate on either quanti
tative or qualitative grounds, for the community did not benefit
and unite; instead, it became more sectionalized and belligerent.
W ealth, distributed through paternalistic methods, somehow ex
acerbated, not ameliorated, the nation’s troubles. Other potions
administered by the government, as Civil Service reform and the
Interstate Commerce Commission, moved in the right direction
but could not immediately correct the imbalance in the new in
dustrial America. By the m id-i88o’s, John H ay, a former mem
ber of the State Department and a man who had little use for
radical remedies, could nevertheless cry out: “This is a govern
ment of the people, by the people, and for the people no longer.
It is a government of corporations, by corporations, and for
corporations, [sic] H ow is this?” 2232
Given the increasing industrial mechanization, however, these
corporations were virtually powerless in one area: their attempts
to slow down production by choice instead of by bankruptcy.
N ew machinery in huge, integrated industries cost so much that
the owners early concluded that they would have to keep their
plants running continually in order to pay off vastly increased
overhead. Andrew Carnegie put this idea in tablet form in his
so-called “Carnegie’s Law o f Surplus” when he said that it cost
less to keep the machines running, even when no market was in
sight, than it did to shut down the factories.28
The American internal market consumed much o f this out-
22 Ralph H enry Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought

(2nd ed.; N e w York, 1956), 168-169; Bruce, /Í77, 320.'
23 Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age, 172-173, also 8-11.
18 The N e w Empire
put as it exploded with a 97 per cent population increase between
1870 and 1900. Home consumers bought nine-tenths of Ameri
ca’s production. B y 1898, however, the other tenth amounted
to more than one billion dollars; the important iron, steel, tex
tile, and agricultural machinery industries accounted for much
of this. In i860 American imports totaled $353,616,000, while
$316,242,000 worth of goods left as exports. B y 1897 these fig
ures shot up to $764,730,000 and $1,032,008,000, respectively.
B y the 1870’s the staggering rise in exports changed the histor
ically unfavorable balance of American trade to a favorable
balance which would last at least through the first half of the
twentieth century. From 1874 to 1898 exports exceeded imports
every year except 1875,1888, and 1893. By 1893 American trade
exceeded that of every country in the world except England.
Farm products, of course, especially in the key tobacco, cotton,
and wheat areas, had long depended heavily on international
markets for their prosperity.24
T he United States needed export markets, not only for its
surplus goods, but also to pay the large interest charges which
went from America into the pocketbooks of European investors.
Interest rates dropped during the 1874-1895 period from 6 per
cent to about 4 per cent, but for the tw enty-one year period in
terest charges averaged about $85,000,000 a year for a total of
$1,870,000,000. N ew foreign investments reached $1,000,000,000
during the period. T he United States therefore sent out about
$870,000,000 overall or an annual average of $39,500,000 in in
terest on foreign investments. This interest provided the chief
item o f “invisible” indebtedness for which the growing Ameri
can exports had to pay.25
241bid.y 278-279; see also Bullock, W illiams, Tuckner, “Balance o f
Trade o f the United States,” 223-227; Ralph Dewar Bald, Jr., “T he D e
velopment o f Expansionist Sentiment in the United States 1885-1895,
as Reflected in Periodical Literature” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pittsburgh, 1953), 51, 147-148.
25 Bullock, W illiams, Tuckner, “Balance o f Trade o f die U nited
States,” 226.
Years of Treparation ip
Other than its mushrooming exports, several notable charac
teristics marked America’s foreign trade during the post-1860
period. In the 1850’s over 70 per cent of American trade traveled
in ships flying the Stars and Stripes, but by 1897 only 15 per cent
of the imports and 8.1 per cent of the exports traveled under that
flag. Ship destruction during the G vil W ar, American reluctance
to recognize the usefulness of the steamship, increased investment
in industrial rather than mercantile enterprises, and government
legislation making it almost impossible to put cheaper foreign
vessels under American registration, all these factors explain the
decline of the United States merchant marine. The last reason
was of special importance. Economist David Ames W ells grum
bled, “There are three things, the importation o f which is
theoretically impossible, viz., counterfeit money, indecent pub
lications, and ships.” 26 An 1894 survey by Bradstreet’s revealed,
however, that Americans still had their share of the world’s mer
chant marine, even though the ships were not sailing under
United States registration. T he journal estimated that “Ameri
cans own and operate under foreign flags a steam tonnage equal
to or greater than one-half the steam tonnage registered under
the American flag.” 27
Another characteristic of this expanding trade was that with
each panic and depression the American business community
displayed a reintensified interest in foreign markets. The most
far-reaching, concerted, and important movement outward during
this period came after the panic of 1893; this w ill be examined in
detail in Chapter IV . Foreign observers, constantly on the look
out for American threats to their own world trade, noted as early
as the depression of the 1870’s, however, that United States “in
terest in [foreign] trade has now become general.” 28 But just
28 Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age, 296-301.

27 Bradstreet’s W eekly: A Business Digest, April 28, 1894, 260—cited
hereafter as Bradstreet's.
28 Otto zu Stolberg-W em igerode, Germany and the United States
during the Era of Bismarck (Reading, Pa., 1937), 137.
20 The N e w Empire
as the 1884-1886 turmoil marked the real beginnings of nativism
in modern America, so also did this crisis initiate the energetic
and widespread American interest in foreign markets which con
tinued into the twentieth century. In January, 1885, Banker1s
Magazine noted that, since the depression of 1883 had piled up
surplus goods inside the country, foreign markets were now of
“pressing importance.” Outlook declared the follow ing year that
the federal government should take the responsibility “to pro
vide” markets for the country’s industry; the periodical prophe
sied that this idea would be the “dominant theory” of W ashing
ton policy makers within five years, especially in the formulation
of Latin-American policy. (W ith the advent of James G . Blaine
in 1889, this prophecy was fulfilled.) The Board of Trade and
Transportation in N ew York called special conventions to find
new ways of expanding overseas commerce; in 1884-1885 this
board suggested that delegates from all seacoast cities meet to
ponder this problem. The A ge of Steel, spokesman for one of
the nation’s most powerful industrial segments, wrote in Jan
uary, 1885, that since the internal frontier was rapidly disappear
ing, the glut of industrial products “should be relieved and pre
vented in the future by increased foreign trade.” T w o months
later this publication explained the implications of this request
for the American State Department. It quoted “one of the largest
manufacturers of steam goods in the United States” as saying
that industrialists and merchants needed most of all “an intelli
gent and spirited foreign policy,” in which the government
would “see to it” that these men had enough foreign markets,
even if the State Department had to use force to obtain the mar
kets.2®
But at least one business periodical proved discriminating in 92
29 T he quotations are given in Bald, “Expansionist Sentiment,” 121,

128, 266-267, 291; and Milton Plesur, “Looking Outward: American A tti
tudes towards Foreign Affairs in the Years from Hayes to Harrison”
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University o f Rochester, 1954), 210.
the type of markets it desired. The Commercial and Financial
Chronicle wrote in April, 1882, that the United States had sur
vived the crises o f the 1870’s because of agricultural exports.
This the journal interpreted as a sign of weakness. Good Euro
pean crops, such as those of 1882, could undermine the entire
American econom y if the nation depended exclusively on agri
cultural exports. Industrial exports provided a much firmer foun
dation. A consensus on this point was still ten years off, but in the
1880’s export tables began to indicate a quiet and crucial turn to
industrial goods. In 1880 agricultural products reached a peak
of 84.3 per cent o f all exports. In 1897 and 1898 cotton exports
hit an all-time high of seven million bales, but the percentage of
agricultural goods in the over-all export trade nevertheless
dwindled to 79.1 per cent. Five years later it had sunk to 66.8
per cent.30
Some acute observers saw the meaning of this slow turn to
industrial exports. The Boston Sunday Herald as early as 1881
termed South America “the great market for our surplus manu
factures . . . [which] lies at our door neglected.” The N ew
York State Chamber of Commerce cried that England infringed
on American rights by dominating the South American trade
and demanded the correction of such an unnatural development.
The American Protectionist pointed out another market for
United States industrial goods when it predicted that “China
and Japan would soon offer us one of the largest outlets that w e
may ever be able to secure for our products of all kinds.” By the
end of the 1880’s wheatgrowers and millers, tired of being over
dependent on a weak British market, began requesting govern
mental help in finding Latin-American outlets. One result would
be the reciprocity agreements of the 1890’s. In order to win the
cherished Latin-American markets, however, United States tex
tile manufacturers first had to displace British merchants who sold
perhaps thirteen times the number of yards of cotton goods in
80 Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age, 280-286.
22 The N e w Empire
the area as did the Americans. British exports of iron and steel
products swamped those from American factories perhaps one
hundred to one.31
A group led by David Ames W ells thought it had the answer
to the question of how to end Great Britain’s domination of in
ternational trade. A Connecticut Republican who had been com
missioner of revenue after the Civil W ar, W ells’s annual reports
of 1866-1868 provided statistical and theoretical ammunition for
the onslaughts of the low-tariff people. H e noted that low er
tariffs meant cheaper raw materials. These, along with increasing
mechanization, would soon enable American industrialists to un
dersell England anywhere in the world. W ells was joined by
economists such as Francis A . W alker (a president of the Ameri
can Econom ic Association), publicists such as E. L. Godkin and
James Russell Lowell, and importers such as Isidor and Oscar
Straus, as w ell as many western farmers who wanted to buy
cheaper British goods.32
Perhaps the best formulation of the free trade argument before
1893 came from Cleveland’s Secretary of Treasury Daniel Man
ning. In his Annual R eport of 1886 Manning used tw o arguments
which Cleveland did not emphasize in his tariff message the fol
low ing year, but which the President did use while in the W hite
House during the 1893-1897 crisis. Manning first argued that
with expanded production low wages need not result from a low
tariff. Second, he believed not only that American industry
could now withstand foreign competition in the home market,
but that with free raw materials it could expand and successfully
compete all over the world. W hen Cleveland marched into the
tariff fight in 1887 (without Manning’s tw o main arguments in
hand), he found many industrialists staunchly opposed to any 18
81Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” 3-7; Plesur, “Looking Outward,” 28;

Rothstein, “America in the International Rivalry,” 406-407.
32 Allan N evins, G rover Cleveland: A Study in Courage (N e w York,
1933), 281-282; Plesur, “Looking Outward,” 197-198.
free trade ideas; but he also found himself tramping alongside
coastal iron manufacturers, machine tool firms, munitions and
rifle makers, and especially woolen textile producers.88
Industries interested in foreign markets particularly wanted
the aid of federal agents abroad. During the 1870’s and 1880’s
antiexpansionists and self-styled watchdogs of the Treasury at
tacked American legations in overseas capitals as needless lux
uries. But very few if any extended their attack to the consular
service, which provided valuable aid to industrialists who sought
foreign markets. Civil Service reformers especially attempted to
modernize this service by discharging the political hacks and re
placing them with men who knew foreign languages, interna
tional law, and commercial regulations.84
One important American company which moved into the
world market during the 1880’s deserves a small section to itself.85
Between 1882 and 1891 foreign sales of American lubricants
quadrupled. By the later date the Standard Oil Company (W il
liam Rockefeller’s Standard Oil of N ew York controlled most
of the foreign operations), accounted for 90 per cent of American
kerosene exports and held over 70 per cent o f the world market.
W illiam Herbert Libby, Standard Oil’s cutting edge for over
seas expansion, could point out that only cotton topped petro
leum products in the percentage o f total national production
shipped overseas. Libby placed special emphasis on the oriental
trade. Standard O il’s own marketing organizations began to re
place the usual methods of selling overseas through independent
foreign merchants and agents. Such new organizations appeared
shortly after 1888 in England, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Italy,
Canada, and the Far East. Libby could proudly conclude that
83 Daniel Manning, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury ,
1886 (W ashington, 1887), lx, bei; N evins, Cleveland, 387-388, 293, 411.
84 Plesur, “Looking Outward,” 26-29, ch. ii.
85 A n excellent discussion o f Standard O il’s foreign enterprises may be
found in Ralph W . and Muriel E. H idy, Pioneering in Big Business,
1882-1911 (N e w York, 1955), 122-154.
24 The N e w Empire
petroleum had “forced its w ay into more nooks and comers of
civilized and uncivilized countries than any other product in
history emanating from a single source.” 36
This interest in foreign markets was not new to American
history. Observing the industrial upsurge between 1843 and
1857, Hunt's Merchant Magazine had outlined the salient points
of the new empire in 1851. It encouraged overseas economic
expansion, since “the accumulations of industry furnish us with
a constantly augmenting capital that must seek for new chan
nels of employment.” The journal also pointed to the enemy
(Great Britain) and one of the main battlegrounds ( “the whole
Oriental trade”). These beliefs only increased in intensity and
popularity after 1865. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle
tersely formulated the central issue in 1885: “the time is near at
hand” when the vast American “surplus must be employed in
extending American interests in other countries— or not at all.” 37
Seward
In the unfolding drama of the new empire W illiam H enry
Seward appears as the prince of players. Grant, Hamilton Fish,
W illiam M. Evarts, James G . Blaine, Frederick T . Frelinghuysen,
and Thomas F. Bayard assume secondary roles. Although Seward
left the stage in the first act of the drama, only a few of the other
players could improve on his techniques, and none could ap
proach his vision of American empire.
Henry Adams described Seward near the end of his career as
“a slouching, slender figure; a head like a wise macaw; a beaked
nose; shaggy eyebrows; unorderly hair and clothes; hoarse voice;
offhand manner; free talk, and perpetual cigar.” Seward never
theless attracted an urbane, educated person like young Adams,
for the Secretary of State, like Adams, was an intellectual in 786
86 See H . M. Flagler to Senator W ilkinson Call o f Florida, July 23,

1888, Thomas F. Bayard papers, Library of Congress, W ashington, D.C.
87 Curti, G rowth of American Thought , 663; Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, July 18, 1885, 62-63.
nearly every sense of the word. H e won Phi Beta Kappa honors
at Union College while still in his teens and for a short time
taught school. H is son later noted that Seward regularly read
Chaucer, Spenser, Ben Jonson, Ariosto, Macaulay, Carlyle, Burke,
Lieber, and Prescott’s histories “as fast as they came out.” H e
also knew the Latin classics, but his favorite, appropriately
enough, was the theorist of the British Empire, Francis Bacon.
Seward also learned from John Q uincy Adams. It was not coin
cidental that Seward’s ideas of American empire so resembled
those of Adams; after Adams’ death, Seward eulogized, “I have
lost a patron, a guide, a counsellor, and a friend—one whom I
loved scarcely less than the dearest relations, and venerated above
all that was mortal among men.” 38
H e also understood more mundane things—such as the value
of political parties for his own advancement. W hen once asked
how to fight slavery he answered: “Organization! Organization!
N othing but organization.” This served as the motto for most of
his political operations. H e was tabbed by many political ob
servers as the Republican nominee for the W hite House in i860.
But paradoxically, he was cut off from the strongest segments
of the Republican party during the 1865-1869 period, the years
when he most actively worked for the advancement of the new
empire.89
Seward deserves to be remembered as the greatest Secretary
of State in American history after his beloved Adams. This is
so partially because of his astute diplomacy, which kept Euro
pean powers out of the Civil W ar, but also because his vision of
empire dominated American policy for the next century. H e
based this vision, as would be expected of an intellectual, on “a
political law—and when I say political law, I mean a higher law,
a law of Providence—that empire has, for the last three thousand
88 H enry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams: An Autobiography
(Boston and N ew York, 1930), 104; Frederic Bancroft, The Life of W il
liam H. Seward (N e w York, 1900), I, 4-6, 153, 184-185, 200-201; W illiam
H enry Seward, Autobiography (N e w York, 1877-1891), II, 203-204.
89 Bancroft, Seward, I, 390, 64, 386-398.
2Ó The N e w Empire
years . . . made its w ay constantly westward, and that it must
continue to move on westward until the tides of the renewed
and of the decaying civilizations of the world meet on the shores
o f the Pacific Ocean.” In the same speech he noted, “Empire
moves far more rapidly in modern than it did in ancient times.”
In this single pronouncement, noting the historic movement of
empire westward across America and into the Pacific and Asia,
Seward anticipated many (especially Brooks Adams) who would
ring the changes on this theme in the 1890’s; he emphasized that
this imperial movement traveled at a much faster speed during an
industrial age than it did in ancient times; and he reiterated the
theme of imperial manifest destiny ordained by Providence for
the American people.40
Seward spent much of his life attempting to prepare the United
States for its proper role in this westward flight of empire. It was
his misfortune that he tried to unify and strengthen the nation
for this role at the very time slavery made his task impossible.
A fter the Civil W ar he renewed his quest. H e always envisioned
an empire which would not be acquired haphazardly, but would
develop along carefully worked out lines. T he best word to de
scribe his concept of empire, perhaps, is integrated. The empire
would begin with a strong, consolidated base of power on the
American continent and move into the w ay stations of the Pa
cific as it approached the final goal of Asia. Each area would have
its own functions to perform and become an integrated part of
the whole empire.
Seward prophesied that the battle for world power would oc
cur in Asia, since “commerce has brought the ancient continents
near to us.” But the victor in this battle would be the nation
operating from the strongest economic and power base. There
fore he advised in 1853:
Open up a highway through your country from N ew York to San
Francisco. Put your domain under cultivation, and your ten thou-
40 W illiam H enry Seward, The W orks of William H . Seward, edited
by George E. Baker (Boston, 1853-1883), IV , 319.
sand wheels of manufacture in motion. Multiply your ships, and
send them forth to the East. The nation that draws most materials
and provisions from the earth, and fabricates the most, and sells
the most of productions and fabrics to foreign nations, must be, and
will be, the great power of the earth.41
Seward offered concrete suggestions to realize this base of

power. First, he advised the passing of a high tariff to protect
small industries and attract foreign laborers. Once Europe was
drained of her cheap labor, the ocean could be “reduced to a
ferry” for American products. H igh tariffs would also allow
effective planning and allocation of resources by the federal
government and give the government m oney for internal im
provements (an idea from John Q uincy Adams’ repertoire).
Second, Seward wanted to offer the public lands quickly and
at low prices. This would not only attract cheap labor, but would
also provide adequate agricultural products; “commercial su
premacy demands just such an agricultural basis” as American
lands, when inhabited, could supply. Third, he hoped to obtain
cheap labor, especially by enticing Asian workers. H e accom
plished this with the 1868 treaty between the United States and
China, which gave Chinese laborers almost unrestricted entry
into the country. Finally, he would tie the continent together
w ith canals and one or more transcontinental railroads. M oney
was no object: “It is necessary; and since it is necessary, there is
the end o f the argument.” Seward summed up these views w ith
a favorite story of the barbarian looking at King Croesus’ great
hoard o f gold and then remarking: “It is all very well; but who
ever comes upon you with better iron than you have, w ill be
master o f all this gold.” Seward would add: “W e shall find it so
in the end.” 42
Latin America and Canada would inevitably become a part
41 Ibid., Ill, 618, IOQ, 616.

42 Ibid., 1, 163; III, 657; Bancroft, Seward , II, 46-57; Frederick H . Stutz,
“W illiam H enry Seward, Expansionist’* (unpublished Master’s thesis,
Cornell University, 1937), 53.
28 The N e w Empire
of this continental base. Seward declared that he wanted no
American colonies in Latin America, but this did not mean he
found no interest in the area. H e feared that establishing colonies
would result in either a standing army in the United States or
anarchy in the colonies. Instead, he wanted to hold islands in the
Caribbean which would serve as strategic bases to protect an
Isthmian route to the Pacific and also prevent European powers
from dabbling in the area of the N orth American coastline. But
Central America would come into the Union eventually when
“the ever-increasing expansion of the American people westward
and southward” began. Soon Mexico would “be opening herself
as cheerfully to American immigration as Montana and Idaho
are now.” Then Mexico would not be a colony, but a state,
fulfilling Seward’s prophecy that Mexico C ity was an excellent
site for the future capital of the American empire. Canada would
also eventually be a part of the continental base. In an 1860 speech
Seward noted that “an ingenious, enterprising, and ambitious
people” are building Canada, “and I am able to say, ‘It is very
well, you are building excellent states to be hereafter admitted
into the American Union.’ ” 43
In the same speech he made a similar comment about Alaska.
Seward realized this particular dream when he negotiated its
purchase in 1867. The United States bought “Seward’s Icebox”
for several good reasons, including traditional American friend
ship for Russia, the hope that the deal would sandwich British
Columbia between American territory and make inevitable its
annexation, and the belief that Alaskan resources would more
than pay the $7,200,000 price tag. But given Seward’s view of
empire, perhaps his son, a distinguished diplomat in his own right,
later offered the best reason: “T o the United States, it would
give a foothold for commercial and naval operations accessible
43 Frederic Bancroft, “Seward’s Ideas of Territorial Expansion,” N orth

American Review, CLXVII (July, 1898), 83; J. Fred Rippy, The United
States and Mexico (rev. ed.; N ew York, 1931), 276-278; Bancroft, Seward,
II, 429; Seward, Works, III, 605-618; Stutz, “Seward,” 11.
from the Pacific States.” Nathaniel P. Banks, Chairman of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1867 and a strong supporter
of Seward’s imperial ideas, called the Aleutians the “drawbridge
between America and Asia.” 44
Seward approached the Asian market cautiously and methodi
cally. Alaska protected one flank. An American-controlled canal
would provide a southern corridor. In the center would be Cali
fornia and Hawaii. California, Seward exulted:
California that comes from the clime where the west dies away into
the rising east; California, that bounds at once the empire and the
continent; California, the youthful queen of the Pacific. . . . The
world contains no seat of empire so magnificent as this. . . . The
nation thus situated . . . must command the empire of the seas,
which alone is real empire.
Hawaii offered the next step west. Here Seward promoted the
American representative to Minister Resident in 1863 and four
years later tried to prepare the islands for the hug of annexation
by pulling Hawaii into a reciprocity treaty. The Senate was too
busy with Reconstruction to deal with Seward’s proposal, but he
nevertheless told the American Minister in September, 1867,
that annexation was still “deemed desirable by this government.”
H e was immediately successful in placing the Stars and Stripes
above the M idway islands in 1867. These islands, 1,200 miles
west of Hawaii, became an important outpost for America’s
Pacific interests.45
44 Thomas A. Bailey, “W h y the United States Purchased Alaska,”
Pacific Historical Review , III (March, 1934), 39-49; Frederick W . Sew
ard, Reminiscences . . . (N e w York and London, 1916), 359-360; Fred
Harvey Harrington, Fighting Politician; Major-General N . P. Banks
(Philadelphia, 1948), 182-185.
45 Stutz, “Seward,” 12; W illiam Adams Russ, Jr., The Hawaiian Revo
lution:, ¡893-94 (Selinsgrove, Pa., 1959), 9; Donald Marquand Dozer,
“Anti-Imperialism in the United States, 1865-1895: Opposition to An
nexation of Overseas Territories” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Har
vard University, 1936), 28—cited hereafter as Dozer, “Anti-Imperialism.”
Stutz, “Seward,” 85-86, gives a good account o f Seward’s attempt to
obtain exclusive American rights to an Isthmian canal area.
ßO T he N e w Empire
And beyond lay the bottomless markets of Asia, “the prize”
for which Europe and the U nited States contended, “the chief
theatre of events in the world’s great hereafter.” Here lay the
crucial area if the United States hoped to control “the commerce
of the world, which is the empire of the world.” Here too the
United States moving westward would meet another great na
tion moving eastward. “Russia and the United States,” the new
Secretary of State wrote to the American Minister to Russia in
May, 1861, “may remain good friends until, each having made a
circuit of half the globe in opposite directions, they shall meet
and greet each other in the region where civilization first be
gan.” 46 Seward had few illusions about the implications o f his
expansionist policy.
America’s success in Asia depended upon the success o f its
open-door policy, which advocated equal commercial rights for
all nations and no territorial aggrandizement by any. Seward
cooperated with European powers in order to protect this Amer
ican policy. The open-door concept was nothing new, dating
back to the most-favored-nation clauses in the first American-
Chinese treaty in 1844. W hat was new was Seward’s vigorous
moves to protect the policy. H e could deal gently w ith China;
the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 provided for the preservation of
American rights of travel and residence in China as w ell as freer
entry into the United States for Chinese laborers. But the Secre
tary of State was tough w ith Japan. W hen that nation proved
reluctant to correct what Seward considered to be infringements
upon American rights, he ordered naval units to participate in
a show of strength that climaxed w ith the powers dictating to
Japan from a British gunboat. H e was equally vigorous in Korea.
A t one point he proposed to the French that they cooperate with
the United States to force open the Hermit Kingdom to outside
interests. W hen the French refused this offer, Seward sent his
46 Seward, W orks , III, 618; V , 246; Stutz, “Seward,” 26; Charles Vevier,
“T he Collins Overland Line and American Continentalism,” Pacific H is
torical Review, XXVIII (August, 1959), 237-252.
nephew, George F. Seward, to sign a trade treaty with Korea,
but this attempt also failed.47 Fifteen years later, however, Korea
grudgingly opened its doors to American traders and mission
aries.
H enry Adams summed it up: “The policy of Mr. Seward was
based upon this fixed idea [of expansion], which, under his active
direction, assumed a development that even went somewhat too
far and too fast for the public.” Seward’s Caribbean plans, espe
cially the purchase of the Danish W est Indies and Santo Domingo,
came to nothing. N or did he bring Hawaii into the American
orbit when he wanted. But he did outline in some detail his ideas
of an integrated empire w ith a great continental base which
would produce vast quantities of goods for hundreds of millions
of consumers in Asia. H e did see the completion of the trans
continental railroad, industries supported by tariffs and internal
improvements, and the acquisition of Alaska and M idway as w ay
stations to the Asian market. H e accomplished much of his
work, moreover, despite the G vil W ar and a strong antiexpan
sionist feeling in the late 1860’s.48
T he antiexpansionists effectively used several arguments to
thwart Seward’s ambitions. As noted earlier, they claimed that
the United States suffered from a land glut already; no more
land could properly be developed. If the Union acquired more
territory, it might be Latin-American, and this would aggravate
the race problem. Others argued that the United States should
avoid a colonial policy, especially at a time when England was
trying to dispose of her own unprofitable outlying areas. Finally,
47 T yler Dennett, “Seward’s Far Eastern Policy,” American Historical
Review , XXVIII (O ctober, 1922), 45-62; Knight Biggerstaff, “T he Offi
cial Chinese Attitude toward the Burlingame Mission,” American His
torical R eview , XLI (July, 1936), 682-702; Stutz, “Seward,” 31-35.
48 Adams, “T he Session,” 54; Bancroft, Seward , II, 479-491. Also Dozer,
“Anti-Expansionism during the Johnson Administration,” 253-275. For
mention o f Seward as the “chief link” between expansion before and
after the Civil W ar, see Julius Pratt, “T he Ideology o f American Ex
pansion,” in Essays in H onor of William E . D odd . . . » edited by A very
Craven (Chicago, 1935), 346.
$2 The N e w Empire
some antiexpansionists urged financial retrenchment in order to
start American industries and farms booming again rather than
paying fancy price tags for noncontiguous territory.4® T he
most notable characteristic of these arguments is not that they
were effective in the late 1860’s, but that they melted away in
large measure after the 1870’s, as the frontier closed, an open-
door commercial policy eliminated colonial problems, and Amer
ican factories and farms boomed so successfully that the result
ing glut of goods threatened to inundate the econom y. W ith
these changes, Seward’s successors were able to complete much
of what he had been unable to finish.
Grant and Fish

Upon Seward’s departure from office in 1869, the control of
American foreign policy fell into the highly ambitious hands of
Ulysses S. Grant. A t several junctures during his tw o terms,
however, Grant’s avidity was restrained by his capable Secretary
of State, Hamilton Fish. A conservative N ew Yorker who had
little use for many of the President’s reckless schemes of expan
sion, Fish nevertheless wholeheartedly cooperated with Grant in
stretching American interests into certain areas of Latin Amer
ica and the Pacific, the most promising hothouses for the growth
of the new empire. Characterizing this administration as one o f
the worst in American history is no doubt correct, but such an
easy interpretation loses sight of Grant and Fish as important
links in the chain of economic expansion running from Seward
to Theodore Roosevelt and beyond.
The last period of intense American interest in annexing Can
ada occurred immediately after the G vil W ar. The Grant ad
ministration did not debate the desirability of annexing Canada;
most Americans wanted it. W hen Horace Greeley declared that
“our country has already an ample area for the next century at
least,” he quickly added that Canada, however, “would always
be a welcome addition.” Senator Justin Morrill, the finest example
49 Dozer, “Anti-Imperialism,” ch. i.
of the few who wanted no foreign entanglements of any kind,
had nevertheless doted on Canadian annexation ever since he had
owned a country store at Derby Line on the northern border in
1838. Morrill fought bitterly against reciprocity agreements not
only because he wanted a pure high tariff, but also because he
believed that reciprocity could not result in the annexation o f
Canada. “Marriage,” Morrill warned, “seldom follow s seduc
tion.” 60
United States interest in Canada differed in tw o ways from
American involvements elsewhere during this period. On the
one hand, almost all those Americans who professed no interest
in other areas did show great interest in Canada. This interest
emanated from the hope of eliminating troublesome disputes
over boundaries and fisheries, dislike of Great Britain, appeals to
the Irish vote, and a sincere desire to fill out the American con
tinental empire. On the other hand, the success of such ambitions
would result in a vast new area of land coming under American
control. This would occur at a time when the nature of American
expansion was changing because many policy makers and pub
licists believed the United States either had an adequate unde
veloped frontier or already had too great an expanse to govern
well. The widespread desire for the addition of Canada’s im
mense domain provided an exception to the general trend of a
nonpolitical, nonlanded type of expansion.
Although almost everyone wanted Canada, differences arose
over means. Some demanded the northern neighbor as payment
for damages caused by the “Alabama,” a British-built Confederate
ship which had preyed with much success on the Union’s fleet
and merchant marine. President Grant and a few of his more
501bid. y 1-3; Albert K. W einberg, Manifest Destiny . . . (Baltimore,

1935), ch. viii; W . B. Parker, Life . . . of Justin S. Morrill (Boston, 1904),
255-256, 320-321; Harrington, Banks, 177-181; Allan Nevins, Hamilton
Fish: The Inner H istory of the Grant Administration (N e w York, 1936),
150; Joe Patterson Smith, “T he Republican Expansionists o f the Early
Reconstruction Era” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University o f
Chicago, 1930), 117-124.
belligerent supporters in Congress, such as Zachariah Chandler
and Ben Butler, advocated settling the “Alabama” claims and
other squabbles with the British by marching the American army
across the border and solving the problem w ith force. Fish as
sumed a more moderate position. Assured by the British Minister
in W ashington that England would not keep Canada if Canadians
wanted annexation, Fish hoped to smooth the w ay with goodwill
and happy negotiations. T o rephrase Morrill’s metaphor, Fish
believed that peaceful wooing would end in a happy marriage.51
Such a marriage, either voluntary or shotgun, was not in store.
In 1871 the Treaty of W ashington resolved the outstanding
issues between the United States, Great Britain, and Canada.
W ith the onset of the 1873 panic in the United States, Canadian
sentiment for political or commercial union dwindled. Late in
the decade, however, the sentiment reappeared when Canada
sank into the worst quarter century of her economic history.
Again, however, Americans could not agree on the means of
annexation. Most Americans wanted to suck Canada into their
economic orbit through the workings of reciprocity, confident
that this would result in political union. Eastern business interests
in the United States especially favored this approach. But when
Canadian representatives visited W ashington in 1887 to discuss
reciprocity, American Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard
politely told them that he could discuss nothing but the fisheries
problem. H e himself preferred annexation, but the impending
election, protectionist sentiment, and loud protests from western
agrarians who feared the influx of cheap Canadian wheat forced
Bayard to evade the subject of closer commercial ties.62
Better success attended Grant’s and Fish’s expansionist efforts
when they swam with the westward current of empire into the
61Nevins, Fish, 216-220.
62 Ibid., 395; Donald F. Warner, The Idea of Continental Union . . .
(Lexington, Ky., i960), 100-127; Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Diary and
Letters . . . , edited by Charles Richard W illiams (Columbus, Ohio,
1924), III, 554; John Bartlet Brebner, N orth Atlantic Triangle . . . (N e w
York, 1945), 221-224.
Years of Preparation
Pacific. From this administration dates the formal beginnings of
the new empire in the central and southern Pacific. As American
expansionists moved in the direction of the traditional frontier,
Hawaii served as the first stopping-off place beyond the con
tinent. Seward had attempted to sign a reciprocity treaty with
the islands, but his plans had fallen before the political animosities
of Reconstruction. W hen Fish finally concluded such a pact
in 1875, the motives were obvious. Growing British influence
and the 1873 panic had jeopardized American interests. Fish
also observed that the United States would soon “require a
resting spot in the midocean, between the Pacific coast and the
vast domains of Asia.” Both Fish and Congress said nothing about
direct commercial benefits, because none existed. The treaty
benefited Hawaiian producers and American refiners, particu
larly refiners on the west coast, while keeping sugar prices high
for consumers. The proponents stressed instead the British threat
and pictured Hawaii as “the key to Oriental commerce,” the
“Thermopylae of the Pacific.” The pact considerably restricted
Hawaiian foreign policy, for Fish required that government to
promise that it would never dispose in any w ay any part of its
territory to foreign powers.63
As early as the 1870’s the United States was demonstrating so
much interest in the Pacific that Great Britain welcomed Ger
many into the area as a counterbalance to the acquisitive Amer
icans. Besides Hawaii, the British could point to events in Samoa
as good reason for their apprehension. Private American interests
on Samoa, including California land speculators, a N ew York
shipbuilder, and the owners of a new steamship line between San
Francisco and Australia, steadily attempted to draw State D e
partment attention to the islands. In 1872 Commander Richard
W . Meade concluded a pact with the native chiefs which gave
the United States the use of the fine harbor of Pago Pago. In
63 Sylvester K. Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1898

(Harrisburg, 1955) 95-107, 108-140; Dozer, “Anti-Imperialism,” 10-31,
ch. iii.
%6 The N e w Empire
return Meade offered American good offices in case of trouble
between the chiefs and other governments. Fish and Grant ap
proved this treaty, and Evarts finally pushed it through the Sen
ate in 1878.64
The establishment of these Pacific beachheads claimed only
a small part of the administration’s time, most of which was spent,
in the realm of foreign affairs, in expanding American interests
into Latin America. Here, unlike the neighbor to the north, no
vast landed expanse which might be hooked on to the new ly re
stored Union was involved. Instead, the United States launched a
four-pronged attack bearing all the characteristics of the new
empire: attempted control of certain Caribbean islands, important
for their strategic locations and raw materials; investment, notably
in the new southwestern frontier of Mexico and Central Amer
ica, by American capitalists; trade expansion, especially along
lines which anticipated the blueprints offered later by James G.
Blaine and Frederick T . Frelinghuysen; and American control
of an Isthmian canal. By 1904 the attack launched during the
previous half century had won the field.
In the 1870’s, however, an enemy, strong and entrenched, oc
cupied the approaches to this prize. Behind British bankrolls
glowered the greatest navy in the world. Germany also had be
come a factor in the area. Grant and Fish began their attack by
attempting to eliminate the political power that traveled with
foreign investments. In 1869 and 1870 Grant became the first
American President to proclaim in unqualified terms the non-
transfer principle— “that hereafter no territory on this continent
shall be regarded as subject to transfer to a European power.”
Fish soon had an opportunity to use the new ly enforced Monroe
Doctrine. W hen a revolution erupted in Venezuela, the Secretary
84 George Herbert Ryden, The Foreign Policy of the United States in
Relation to Samoa (N e w Haven, 1933), 44-74, 173-206; Seward, Remi
niscences, 438-439; Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” 114; see also W . D .
McIntyre, “Anglo-American Rivalry in the Pacific: T he British Annex
ation of the Fiji Islands in 1874,” Pacific Historical Review, X X IX (N o
vember, i960), 361-380.
of State informed Germany that she could intervene alone to
protect her interests, but the United States would not counte
nance concerted intervention. In 1875 the Secretary of State of
fered American good offices to stop the use of Dutch force
against Venezuela.05
As such State Department action attempted to undermine
European political influence in Latin America, Americans looked
increasingly to the positive benefits which might be derived
from such policies. Fish touched on this subject in a long com
munication to the Senate in July, 1870. H e assumed that the
United States ought to have “the proportionate share” of the
Latin-American trade to which it was entitled by “geographical
contiguity and political friendship.” H e then mentioned an active
Monroe Doctrine and Grant’s nontransfer principle as means
to acquire this trade.56
The Caribbean had long been considered in fancy, though
not in fact, as belonging to the United States. Immediately after
the Civil W ar, Americans set out to obtain clear title. Their first
major opportunity arose in 1868 when the Cubans rebelled
against a corrupt Spanish administration. The United States be
came involved in this fray because of geographical proximity,
property interests, and its desire to assist any revolution which
would eliminate a European power from this hemisphere. Many
Americans worked through the well-financed N ew York Junta
which spent a million dollars in its first year to whip up prorebel
sentiment.
Fish sympathized with the revolutionaries and attempted to
arrange a settlement whereby American and European capi
talists would work to obtain a Spanish grant of independence
while the United States would guarantee Cuban payment of
65 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-
¡897, edited by James D. Richardson (W ashington, 1900), VII, 32, 61-
62, 129. See the thorough discussion in Dexter Perkins, The Monroe
Doctrine , 1867-1907 (Baltimore, 1937), especially 22726, 111-112.
86 For Fish’s important paper, see Messages and Papers of the Presidentsy
VIII, 70-78.
28 The N e w Empire
$100,000,000. Spain refused to listen. Although Fish wanted
Cuban independence, he did not want to obtain it through a
Spanish-American war. H e feared that such intervention would
lead to annexation. This he deprecated on racial grounds and
because of his belief that American institutions might not func
tion properly on that chaotic island. Opposed by an ambitious
President and a belligerent Congress, Fish narrowly averted in
tervention by threats of resignation and shrewd political tactics.07
The end of the revolution in 1878 did not terminate American
interest in Cuban affairs. The revolution destroyed many Spanish
and Cuban planters by forcing them to sell their remaining hold
ings to pay debts. By 1895 Edwin Atkins Company of Boston
had become the largest single American sugar investor in
Cuba by acquiring the Soledad plantation in this manner. T he
war also taught many property owners that American citizen
ship shielded them from both Spanish troops and rebels. A fter
the revolt ended, many foreigners became United States citizens
as insurance against the inevitable outbreak of another rebellion.
American capital also entered the island in large quantities when
the expansion of European beet sugar production drove down
sugar prices and bankrupted inefficient growers, who happily
sold out cheaply to American buyers. N o m ystery surrounded
these advancing United States interests. A n article in the N orth
American R eview in 1888 bragged that this “species of owner
ship” gave Americans the financial fruits without political re
sponsibilities.08 But ten years later the United States began paying
the price.
That Santo Domingo did not precede Cuba into the American
system was no fault of Grant or certain N ew York adventurers.
“Awestruck w ith the brilliant prospects” of developing D o
minican riches, as one of the adventurers said, this group soon
67Nevins, Fish, 179-182, 194-200, 295-296, 354-359, 615-637.

58 John L. Offner, “President M cKinley and the Origins of the Spanish-
American W ar” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State
University, 1957), 12-13; Plesur, “Looking Outward,” 67-69.
Years of Preparation
enjoyed the backing of such capitalists as Cyrus M. McCormick,
Ben H olliday, and Spofford, Tileston & Company, the great
N ew York banking house. Grant also had recognized the value
o f Samaná Bay.09 Hamilton Fish would have accepted a protec
torate, but his fear that “the incorporation of these people . . .
would be but the beginning of years of conflict and anarchy”
set him against the President’s schemes of annexation. For other
reasons many congressmen agreed with Fish’s conclusion. Some
feared that annexation would mean the ultimate seizure of Haiti,
thus creating another explosive racial problem; hot-blooded ex
pansionists viewed the issue as unimportant compared with Cuba
and Canada; the powerful Senator Charles Sumner of Massa
chusetts lined up against Grant on bitter personal grounds; and
some of the more righteous senators smelled, correctly, an under-
the-table deal between the President and the adventurers. The
results of the conflict, however, were notable. The issue gave
Grant the opportunity to announce the nontransfer principle.
Also, a number o f senators who were repelled by other adminis
tration policies used the fight to accelerate the movement for
the Liberal Republican party.60
Grant and Fish had made an important new addition to the
Monroe Doctrine, focused attention on the Caribbean, and es
tablished the first formal United States holds on Hawaii and
Samoa. Judged a failure in its domestic policies, the administra
tion’s foreign policies contributed much to the eventual success
of the new empire.
Evarts
From 1877 to 1881 one of the more underrated Secretaries of
State hastened the progress of this empire. Born in 1818 of a
distinguished family, W illiam M. Evarts had graduated with
69 Nevins, Fish, *50-257, 263-264, ch. xii.

90 Ibid., 262, 318, 335; Dozer, “Anti-Imperialism,” 43-46, 51-55, 63-66,
72-75; Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VII, 412; Earle Dudley
Ross, The Liberal Republican M ovement (N e w York, 1919), 9-10.
40 The N e w Empire
honors in one of the most famous classes in Yale’s history. W ith
his vast capacity for work, a quick mind, legendary w it (it was
Evarts who told a puzzled British Minister that W ashington had
thrown a dollar across the Rappahannock because a dollar went
farther in those days), and large store of legal knowledge, he
dominated the American bar for the last third of his life. He
learned from W illiam Seward as w ell as from law books. The
tw o men became close friends after a besieged Andrew Johnson
named Evarts as Attorney General near the close of Johnson’s
administration. The new cabinet member worked closely with
Seward in attempts to interest N ew York financiers in an Isth
mian canal project.61
Carrying the heavy burden of national responsibility when the
great railroad strike of 1877 erupted, Evarts apparently appre
ciated Seward’s goal of commercial empire. A t a N ew York
G ty Chamber of Commerce affair at Delm onico’s in 1877, almost
half the Hayes cabinet, including the President and his Secretary
of State, elaborated on the virtues of expanding trade. Evarts
emphasized that “the vast resources of our country need an out
let.” “It is for us,” he proclaimed, “to enter into the harvest-field
and reap it.” A t another time Evarts reiterated this dynamic of
the new empire:
The question which now preemptorily challenges all thinking minds

is how to create a foreign demand for those manufactures which
are left after supplying our home demands. . . . This question ap
peals equally to the selfishness and patriotism of all our citizens, but
to the laborer it appeals with tenfold force, for without work he
cannot live, and unless we can extend the markets for our manu
facturers he cannot expect steady work, and unless our manufac-
81 T he best accounts are Chester Leonard Barrows, William M. Evarts,

Lawyer, Diplomat, Statesman (Chapel H ill, 1941); Brainerd D yer, Public
Career of William M. Evarts (Berkeley, 1933); and Frederick C. Hicks,
“W illiam Maxwell Evarts,” Dictionary of American Biography, edited
b y Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (N e w York, 1931), V I, 215-218.
turers can undersell foreign manufacturers, we cannot enlarge our
foreign market.62*36
In his first R eport upon the Commercial Relations of the United
States, Evarts left no doubt that “the fostering, the developing,
and the directing o f our commerce by the government should
be laid down as a necessity of the first importance.” The Secre
tary o f State worked for enlarged trading rights in the Far
East, Samoa, and Madagascar and also advocated a Canadian-
American Zollverein. H e made his most lasting contribution to
trade expansion when he secured a congressional appropriation
which allowed the State Department to issue monthly consular
reports. The first report appeared in October, 1880. Evarts ex
plained w hy these reports were issued: “This step was taken in
response to the wishes of the leading commercial communities
of the United States as expressed through the chambers of com
merce.” A reticent manifest destiny thus received another push.66
Although viewing England as a commercial competitor, Evarts
differed from many commercial expansionists in his belief that
the United States could befriend England. H e wanted the United
States, England, and France to “keep the peace o f the world
until other nations gradually get ready to join us in due course
o f natural development.” Evarts, reflecting the hopes o f most
American businessmen, thought that commercial empire could
be acquired without war. Enlarged foreign markets to ameliorate
labor discontent, governmental support of businessmen seeking
these markets, and an Anglo-French-American alliance to main
tain peace and stability so that these international commercial
62 Barrows, Evarts, 167, 375-378; Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age,

291-292.
63 Barrows, Evarts, 375-378; D yer, Evarts, 234-235, 237; Plesur, “Look
ing Outward,” 195; “Private Letters from the British Embassy in W ash
ington to the Foreign Secretary Lord Granville, 1880-1885,” edited with
an introduction b y Paul Knaplund and Carolyn M. Clewes, Annual Re
port of the American Historical Association . . . 1941 (W ashington,
1942), I, 100.
interests would be secure and would prosper—the pieces fell
cleanly into place.64
Evarts did not follow such a cooperative course in Latin Amer
ica, however. Picking up the thread of Fish’s policy to contest
increasing European political power in that area, Evarts issued
strong protests against alleged British encroachment upon Gua
temalan soil. W hen the W ar of the Pacific broke out between
Chile and Peru, he refused to join European attempts to mediate
the conflict.65
The State Department’s Latin-American policy was begin
ning to operate from an economic fulcrum o f great power. Dur
ing Evarts’ term this power became particularly noticeable in
Mexico. A fter Porfirio Díaz w on a revolutionary struggle in
1876, M exico rapidly developed into an American investment
frontier. Grant led into that country a group of railroad investors
including such prominent capitalists as Collis P. Huntington,
Grenville M. Dodge, and Russell Sage. Jay Gould, E. H . Harri-
man, and the Pennsylvania Railroad system also sought conces
sions. W ithin three years Americans had obtained from the
Mexican government subsidies of $32,000,000 and concessions
providing for the construction of five railways amounting to
2,500 miles. As the railroad frontier closed in the United States,
a new one dawned to the south.66
Trade with all of Latin America amounted to only 3.74 per
cent of American exports in 1885, but this figure is misleading
on tw o counts. First, American trade was predominant in some
countries. In terms of total exports and imports the United States
controlled 64.5 per cent of Guatemala’s, 41.6 per cent of V ene-
64 Barrows, Evarts, 402; D yer, Evarts, 234-235.

65 Dyer, Evarts, 225.
66 For the best discussion of this new railroad frontier see David M.
Pletcher, Rails, Mines, and Progress; Seven American Promoters in
Mexico, ¡867-1911 (Ithaca, N e w York, 1958); also James M orton Calla
han, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (N e w York, 1932),
475~5°6; Barrows, Evarts, 351-362; Rippy, United States and Mexico ,
308-312.
zuela’s, 39.4 per cent of M exico’s, 36.6 per cent of Colombia’s,
and 26.8 per cent of Brazil’s. Second, exporters and importers
valued these areas for their potentialities. As the United States
industrialized, some Americans viewed an unindustrialized Latin
America as the prime market for surplus manufactured goods.
Although much more attention would be given these markets
in the 1890’s than in the previous decade, articles emphasizing
their importance appeared in the earlier period, especially in the
N orth American R eview , American W ool and Cotton Reporter,
Engineering Magazine, A ge of Steel, and Dixie, one of the South’s
most important industrial journals.07
Evarts knew that the worth and effectiveness of this commer
cial and financial movement southward could be gravely threat
ened the moment a non-American power opened an Isthmian
canal. The State Department feared that this moment was near at
hand when in 1878 Ferdinand de Lesseps, the famed creator of
the Suez Canal, began formulating concrete plans for construc
tion of a passageway on Colombia’s Panamanian Isthmus. The
diary of President Rutherford B. Hayes reveals his great anxiety
over Lesseps’ activities. The President hurried warships to the
Pacific coast area between Panama and the proposed location of
the Nicaraguan canal. Evarts then attempted to use these levers to
pressure Colombia to interpret an 1846 treaty negotiated by the
Polk administration with that country to mean that the United
States must have “potential control” over any canal. Colombia
indignantly refused to concur in this interpretation. Fortunately
for the United States, the Lesseps project soon became mired in
the fever and damp jungles of Panama.68
Evarts’ concern for markets reached out beyond Latin Amer
ica. Like Seward, Evarts coveted the many consumers in Asia.
But he differed from his predecessor in the »means he employed
to obtain this prize. The open-door policy, working through the
e7Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” 158; Bald, “Expansionist Sentiment,”

132-133.
68 Hayes, Diary and Letters, III, 583-589; Barrows, Evarts, 363-371.
H The N e w Empire
most-favored-nation clauses, guided American policy after Sew
ard, as it had since the 1844 treaty. This approach theoretically
allowed American goods to enter Asian markets on the same basis
as goods from the stronger European powers. But it also placed
the State Department squarely against any European attempts
to infringe upon Chinese or Japanese territorial integrity; such
moves could ultimately lead to the exclusion of American trade
from the absorbed areas. Since the United States had little military
power in the Far East apart from a few gunboats, it had to pro
tect this fragile policy in one of tw o ways. It could either co
operate with the other nations to manipulate the balance of power
so no one country could overwhelm the others, or it could work
for a strengthening of either China or Japan (or both) in the hope
that a stronger Asia would defend itself against territorial ag
grandizement, but also keep its markets open to all on equal
terms.
Seward exemplified the cooperative policy, and Hamilton Fish
continued this approach, though in a less vigorous manner. But
in the m id-1870’s the American policy took a more unilateral
position. The new approach was consistent with the expansionist
tendencies which the United States exhibited in Latin America
and the eastern Pacific at the same time. As noted by John Russell
Young, American Minister to China, 1882-1885, the new tactic
freed the United States from a cooperative policy which neces
sarily revolved around the power of Great Britain. Many am
bitious Americans did not want to cater to British wishes, es
pecially when these wishes were often contrary to American
interests. The State Department also hoped that by granting
China and especially Japan certain privileges which the powers
had refused, Asians would be happy to recompense Americans
with trade privileges and other rights not enjoyed by Europeans.
Evarts began to turn away from the cooperative policy when he
concluded separate treaties with Japan in 1878 and China in
1880. The Chinese treaty primarily attempted to control the im
migration of Chinese laborers into the United States, but th«
American negotiators also received additional extraterritorial
privileges and a change in the discriminatory duties levied on
American goods.
More important was the 1878 Convention in which the United
States granted Japan a large measure of tariff autonomy. The
anguished words which soon appeared in the British and French
press verified the belief that this treaty undermined the coopera
tive policy which the powers had follow ed toward Japan since
1854. Evarts, however, had w isely stipulated that the terms of the
pact would not take effect until the other powers also granted
similar privileges to the Japanese. This effectively prevented
discrimination against American goods, but it also stopped the
agreement from taking effect immediately, since the Europeans
were extremely reluctant to grant such tariff autonomy to the
Japanese. The negotiations nevertheless signified that the United
States was moving toward a go-it-alone, pro-Japanese policy in
the hope that it would obtain some freedom of action in Asia as
w ell as commercial privileges.69
This was a dangerous gamble. It could produce an overweening
Japan while estranging the United States from its traditional
allies. Many wondered whether the stakes were worth the gam
ble. The fabled Asian market, ever promised since the 1780’s,
had not materialized. England dominated China and far outdis
tanced American exports in the Japanese trade even though the
United States had first pried open the door to Japan. Between
1850 and 1890 Asia received only 5 per cent of all United States
exports; at the same time the great American mercantile houses
founded earlier in the century began to disappear. But as in Latin
America, expansionists cherished this area for its potentialities,
and many believed that this potential was beginning to be realized
in the 1880’s when large exports of American kerosene and cot-*06
60 T yler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (N e w York, 1941), 512-

520; Barrows, Evarts, 381-390; Dyer, Evarts, 235-236. For an analysis o f
the 1878 Convention, see Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between
the United States and Japan, ¡853-1895 (Stanford, 1932), II, 48-55.
4& The N e w Empire
ton goods began to close the trade gap which the British enjoyed.
Evarts’ successors, James G. Blaine and Frederick T . Freling-
huysen, did not continue the priority which the N ew Yorker
had placed on his Asian policies. American interest in the Far
Pacific would pick up again with the advent of the first Cleveland
administration in 1885. Meanwhile, American policy would look
southward.
Blaine and Frelinghuysen

W hen new ly elected James Garfield chose James G. Blaine,
the “Plumed Knight” from Maine, to replace Evarts in 1881, the
country was slow ly pulling itself out of the economic morass of
the 1870’s. Some observers warned that in spite of the business
upturn Evarts’ ideas of commercial expansion would have to be
continued if the United States hoped to maintain its prosperity.
John A . Kasson, one of the most able American diplomats dur
ing these years, admonished the many readers of the N orth Am er-
lean R eview in 1881: “W e are rapidly utilizing the whole of our
continental territory. W e must turn our eyes abroad, or they w ill
soon look inward upon discontent.” Blaine expressed a similar
thought in an official instruction of 1881: “Throughout the con
tinent, N orth and South, wherever a foothold is found for Amer
ican enterprise, it is quickly occupied, and this spirit of adven
ture, which seeks its outlet in the mines of South America and
the railroads of Mexico, would not be slow to avail itself of open
ings for assured and profitable enterprise, even in mid-ocean
[H aw aii].” 70
Blaine centered his official attention on Latin America. H e later
recounted that, during his brief tenure in the State Department
in 1881, his policies for the W estern Hemisphere had follow ed
tw o principles: “first, to bring about peace . . . ; second, to cul-
T0 Edward Younger, John A . Kasson . . . (Iow a City, 1955), 295;

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States . . . [1881]
(W ashington, D.C., 1882), 636-639—cited hereafter as Foreign Relations,
followed by year and page number o f document.
tivate such friendly commercial relations with all American coun
tries as would lead to a large increase in the export trade o f the
United States. T o attain the second object the first must be ac
complished.” This might be interpreted as a shrewd politician
rationalizing his actions after the fact were it not for the declara
tions of commercial manifest destiny which rang through several
of Blaine’s most important official messages in 1881.71
The Plumed Knight had served as Secretary o f State only six
months when Garfield’s assassination brought to power V ice-
President Chester A . Arthur, a member o f the anti-Blaine faction
of the Republican party. Dismissing Blaine, the new President
named Frederick T . Frelinghuysen, a scion of a distinguished
N ew Jersey fam ily and a well-known corporation lawyer. Fre
linghuysen had appeared briefly on the national stage as senator
from 1866 to 1868 (w hen he worked for the impeachment of
Johnson) and again from 1871 to 1877. But he made his mark on
American history as Secretary o f State. It is unfortunately a
vague and blurry mark, for history has not yet given him his
just deserts as a capable statesman. O f all those w ho came be
tween Seward in 1869 and Blaine’s return to office in 1889, only
Evarts did as much as Frelinghuysen to prepare for and encourage
the coming of the new empire.72
Frelinghuysen, like Blaine, devoted much of his attention to
finding Latin-American markets for American goods. W hen the
T1A . Curtis W ilgus, “James G. Blaine and the Pan-American M ove

ment,” Hispanic American Historical R eview, V (Novem ber, 1922),
668. For Blaine’s view o f Latin America as a field for American com
mercial and financial expansion, see especially Blaine to C. A . Logan
(Minister to Central A m erica), M ay 7, 1881, Foreign Relationst 1881,
102-104; and Blaine to P. H . Morgan (Minister to M exico), June 1, 1881,
ibid., 761-762. For another interpretation, see Russell H . Bastert, “A
N e w Approach to the Origins of Blaine’s Pan-American Policy,” H is
panic American Historical Review , X X X IX (August, 1959), 375-412.
See also A lice Felt T yler, The Foreign Policy of James G . Blaine (M in
neapolis, 1927), 46-47.
72 Frelinghuysen has received adequate treatment for the first time in
David Pletcher’s excellent work, “T he Awkward Years.”
^8 T he N e w Empire
new Secretary arrived in late 1881, the British Minister in W ash
ington accurately forecast that the Republicans would now push
“the policy of sole supremacy over South America—a policy
which certainly is likely to be popular among the constituencies.”
Frelinghuysen’s approach, however, differed from that of his
predecessor. Blaine had invited the Latin-American nations to
meet in an inter-American conference to discuss various prob
lems. Frelinghuysen withdrew these invitations, partly for po
litical reasons, but also on the grounds that he did not relish the
idea of submitting American hemispheric policy to a group of
nations in which the United States had only one vote. American
freedom of action was becoming more valuable as United States
economic and naval power grew .73
N or did Frelinghuysen want to discuss multilateral commer
cial agreements. H e emphasized instead separate bilateral reci
procity treaties through which the United States could concert
its power to obtain lower tariff rates for its manufacturers; in
return, he would lessen the rates on imported raw materials. T he
Secretary of State ultimately negotiated such reciprocity treaties
with Mexico, Cuba and Puerto Rico, British W est Indies, Santo
Domingo, El Salvador, and Colombia. H e did not deal with the
larger countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, for here he would
have to negotiate on wool, a move which would have stirred the
powerful woolen lobby.74
Frelinghuysen, however, was aiming at bigger game than
merely the markets of these countries. Each nation which finally
signed a treaty controlled a crucial sector in the various ap
proaches to the proposed Isthmian canal area. If the reciprocity
treaties could work successfully, the United States would bring
these nations within its economic grasp and be able to exert
necessary control without assuming the political burdens of gov-
78 “Private Letters from the British Embassy, 1880-1885,” 160-161;
Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” 78, 256.
74 For a good analysis of Arthur’s view of the desirability o f Latin-
American markets, see Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VIII, 256-
260; also James Lawrence Laughlin and H . Parker W illis, Reciprocity
(N e w York, 1903), 27-29.
Years of Preparation 4$
em ing such a conglomerate assortment of people. The British
diplomat who discussed the pact for the W est Indian colonies
clearly perceived this aspect of Frelinghuysen’s plans. The Sec
retary of State, the Englishman believed, was attempting “to
attach the W est India Colonies, by the creation of commercial
interests, to the United States.” John Foster, the State Depart
ment’s agent who negotiated several of these treaties, corrob
orated this view. If the Spanish reciprocity treaties could be
ratified, Foster observed, “it w ill be annexing Cuba in the most
desirable w ay.” 75 It should be kept in mind that such strategic rea
sons worked for a commercial end; any canal would be cherished
largely because it would draw millions of consumers in Asia and
western Latin America much closer to producers in the Ameri
can Northeast and Southeast.
The Secretary of State enlarged upon his economic interpre
tation of American foreign policy in a notable letter to the Sen
ate Foreign Relations Committee. H e explained that the signing
of the reciprocity pacts negotiated with Spain for Cuba and
Puerto Rico brings “the islands into close commercial connec
tion with the United States [and] confers upon us and upon
them all benefits which would result from annexation were that
possible.” This would be “one of a series of international engage
ments” (including other reciprocity treaties and the Freling-
huysen-Zavala treaty providing for American control of an
Isthmian canal) “which [by] bringing the most distant parts of
our country into closer relations, opens the markets of the west
coast of South America to our trade and gives us at our doors a
customer able to absorb a large portion of those articles which
we produce in return for products which we cannot profitably
raise.” This reply is especially notable since the Senate committee
had asked Frelinghuysen for the political, not economic, reasons
for the treaties.76
H e believed that “the United States have never deemed it need
ful to their national life to maintain impregnable fortresses along
76Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” ch. xvi, especially 159-160.
76 Ibid., 295; also Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VIII, 250-251.
jo The N e w Empire
the world’s highways of commerce,” but at times Frelinghuysen
could be quite inconsistent in this view. In 1883 he unsuccessfully
approached the Mexican government for a coaling station at
Magdalena Bay in Lower California. H e also worked for an
American-built and American-controlled Isthmian canal. T he
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty had long been a stumbling block to such
a canal. In this pact Great Britain and the United States had
promised each other in 1850 that neither would ever fortify or
exercise exclusive control over such a passageway. As Americans
developed their trade and influence in this area, however, they
began to condemn this treaty as a threat to their commercial and
strategic security. Blaine tried to untie this albatross from Amer
ica’s neck by negotiating with England changes in the agreement
which would free the hands of the United States. W hen the
Foreign Office refused Blaine’s advances, Frelinghuysen tried a
more direct approach.77
A cting as if the 1850 pact did not exist, he signed an agreement
with Nicaragua which provided for a joint American-Nicaraguan
canal. In return, the United States entered into a permanent en
tangling alliance by assuming a virtual protectorate over its new
partner. W hen the Senate threatened to block the treaty because
it conflicted with the Clayton-Bulwer agreement, Frelinghuysen
pulled out the usual stops: “It opens the markets of Asia and the
west coast of South America to the manufacturers of the Atlantic
seaboard . . . ; it provides a new field for our coasting trade,
and incidentally tends to the increase of the American steam mer
chant marine.” The Senate gave the treaty a majority of nine, but
not the necessary two-thirds. The pact finally disappeared when
Grover Cleveland moved into the W hite House in 1885 an<^
withdrew the treaty because it evaded American responsibilities
under the 1850 pact.78
77 Blaine to Lowell, June 24, 1881, James G. Blaine papers, Library o f

Congress, W ashington, D.C.; T yler, Blaine, 32-45.
78 W einberg, Manifest Destiny , 261; Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” 123,
292-293; Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VIII, 256-260.
Years of Preparation <¡1
T he U nited States did not lose interest in an Isthmian canal
during the remainder of the decade. W hen local insurrections
threatened American interests in the Panama area in 1885, the
United States landed 750 sailors and marines in what one his
torian has described as “a w ild display of force.” T w o American
construction companies meanwhile formulated extensive plans
for building the canal. T he Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was still in
force, but the handwriting was on the wall as clearly as at King
Belshazzar’s feast. W hen the British Foreign Office rejected
Blaine’s overtures in 1881, the London Times remarked candidly:
“Blaine’s position is stronger in some ways than he ventures to
make it. The United States are indisputably the chief power in
the N ew W orld. . . . Manifest destiny is on one side. The
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is on the other.” 79
The Times was correct. Great Britain and President Cleveland
could stop Frelinghuysen’s immediate plans, but they could not
retard the onrush into Latin America of American capital and
commerce, which would soon provide a solid basis for United
States influence in the area. M exico provided a prime example.
W hat the N ew York Herald called in 1878 the “Proposed In
vasion o f M exico” resulted five years later in the discovery, in
the words of the Chicago Tribune, of an “almost virgin outlet
for extension of the market of our overproducing civilization.”
Blaine helped relations, and neatly summarized one of the themes
of the new empire, by officially informing M exico that the United
States desired no more land; it only wanted to use its labor and
“large accumulation of capital, for which its own vast resources
fail to give full scope,” to exploit Mexico’s “scarcely developed
resources.” Americans invested heavily in Mexican railroads,
mining operations, and petroleum development. United States
trade with Mexico had been $7,000,000 in i860. It doubled to
79 Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” 28, 6o-6ia; Admiral D . G. W alker to
Admiral S. B. Luce, N o v . 6, 1886, Area 11 file, Box 6, Naval Records
Branch, United States Archives, Record Group 45 (cited hereafter, N A ,
R G 45). T he historian quoted is John R. Spears, The H istory of Our
N avy . . . (N e w York, 1899), V , 139-141.
y2 The N e w Empire
$15,000,000 in 1880, doubled again to $36,000,000 in 1890, and
nearly doubled again to $63,000,000 in 1900. Such economic ties
nullified the defeat of the Frelinghuysen reciprocity treaty with
M exico.80
As American interests moved away from the W estern Hem i
sphere, it became more difficult to make a strong case for mani
fest destiny. Particularly was this so when they moved eastward,
against the grain of the traditional course of empire, into the
African Congo in the 1880’s. American interest in this area had
been whetted by missionary reports of mineral wealth, the ad
ventures of a N ew York Herald reporter, Henry M. Stanley,
and by Commodore Robert W . Shufeldt, who reported after his
stop at W est Africa while on his round-the-world trip that the
area was the “great commercial prize of the world.” The N ew
York City Chamber of Commerce and other eastern businessmen
asked for governmental help in opening railroads and steamship
lines. In 1884 Senator John T . Morgan of Alabama proposed an
open door in the Congo for American goods. Frelinghuysen im
mediately sent a mission to the Congo to survey the commercial
possibilities.81
A European power struggle broke out in the area in the late
1870’s. The United States sided with King Leopold II of Belgium,
who had made extensive claims, and opposed British and French
interests. Thus when the European powers headed for a final
settlement in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, the United
States had already reserved a place at the negotiating table. The
American delegation, led by John A. Kasson, played a major role
at the meeting in the formulation of trade rights. But the Senate
was reluctant to act on the final treaty. It feared that ratification
80Plesur, “Looking Outward,” 63-64. Foreign Relations, 1881, 761-
762, gives Blaine’s view; see also Blaine’s statement in Callahan, Am er
ican Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations, 494-497, also 420-421, 507, 516-
5 *7, 519 -
81Plesur, “Looking Outward,” ch. viii; Stolberg-W em igerode, G er
many and the United States, 204.
Years of Preparation yj
would contradict the Monroe Doctrine’s dogma of no American
interference in Europe and so invite European meddling in Latin
America.82
Frelinghuysen had devoted most of his attention to Latin
America, and here he had made an important contribution. Five
years later Blaine would make Frelinghuysen’s reciprocity
treaties a successful part of his own Latin-American policies.
Frelinghuysen had exemplified the new expansive attitude of the
United States toward its southern neighbors. The N ew York
Herald summed up this attitude in 1882 when it informed Eng
land that if she had to be active outside British borders, she should
“take another turn” at the Zulus or Boers. “She need not bother
about this side of the sea. W e are a good enough England for
this hemisphere.” 83
Bayard and the Pacific

The Cleveland administration halted Frelinghuysen’s expan
sive plans for American involvement in darkest Africa and the
reciprocity treaties with Latin-American nations. But Cleveland
and his Secretary of State, Thomas F. Bayard, replaced Freling
huysen’s plans with expansive ideas of their own. Compared
with his predecessor’s policies, Bayard made one major change
in the course of the new empire: he switched State Department
attention from Latin America to the Pacific.
The reciprocity treaty signed with Hawaii in 1875 had been re
newed in 1884, but eastern sugar interests had combined with high
tariff advocates to prevent Senate ratification. These groups were
fighting a losing cause. Between 1876 and 1885 Hawaiian sugar
production had rocketed from 26,000,000 pounds and $1,300,000
in value to 171,000,000 pounds and $8,400,000. Under the 1875
treaty the islands’ sugar producers had become utterly dependent
82Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” ch. xvii; Younger, Kasson, 292-295,

334; Bald, “Expansionist Sentiment,” 144-146.
83 Plesur, “Looking Outward,” 79.
The N e w Empire
upon the American market. Blaine correctly considered Hawaii
“a part of the productive and commercial system of the Amer
ican states.” 84
The Cleveland administration condemned reciprocity as the
handmaiden o f high tariffs. Bayard nevertheless pressured the
Senate to ratify the Hawaiian reciprocity treaty quickly. A con
sistent open-door expansionist, Bayard wanted nothing to do
with Hawaii’s internal political problems, but he determined,
first, that no foreign power should ever be allowed to acquire
dominant interest in the islands, and, second, that Hawaii would
serve as a base for exploiting the Asiatic market: “The vast im
portance and our close and manifest interest in the commerce of
the Pacific Ocean upon which w e now hold the most important
seaboard, renders the Hawaiian group of essential importance to
us on every score.” Cleveland called the islands the “outpost o f
American commerce and the stepping-stone to the growing
trade o f the Pacific.” “America’s commercial competitors,” the
President warned, could never be allowed this “valuable ground.”
The treaty finally passed, however, only after the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee included a provision giving the United
States the Pearl Harbor naval base. A t first cool, Bayard soon ac
cepted the amendment wholeheartedly.85
Looking back on this episode, Bayard could use John Q uincy
Adams’ classic analogy: the United States only had “to wait
quietly and patiently and let the islands fill up with American
planters and American industries until they should be w holly
identified with the United States. It was simply a matter of wait
ing until the apple should fall.” 86
84 Donald Marquand Dozer, “Opposition to Hawaiian Reciprocity,
1876-1888,” Pacific Historical R eview , X IV (June, 1945), 157-183;
Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 141-147, 159. Blaine’s views are
in Foreign Relations, 1881, 635-639.
85 Charles Callan Tansill, The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard,
1885-1897 (N e w York, 1940), 373-374; Messages and Papers of the Presi
dents , VIII, 500-501; Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, ch. viii.
86 T he statement was made in 1888 (Tansill, Foreign Policy of Bayard,
400).
Years of Preparation yy
Though less certain about the future of Samoa, Bayard main
tained and enlarged American rights in these islands in the far-off
South Pacific. T he United States had become officially in
volved in 1878. The follow ing year England and Germany es
tablished their own treaty rights with the Samoan chiefs. In the
m id-i88o’s Germany, which had developed the largest interests
on the islands, began to threaten the use of force to make itself
sole ruler. Bayard warned Germany and Great Britain that the
United States would never allow a single power to dominate the
islands. Conditions grew worse. In 1887 the Secretary of State
met with the German and British ministers to W ashington in an
attempt to find a solution before war broke out. During a period
when the United States was supposedly providing the classic ex
ample of a nonentangling, nonexpansive foreign policy, it had
actually jumped into the middle of a tumultuous power conflict
in the Pacific.87
A t the second meeting of the three men, the German Minister
pressed Bayard for the reason w hy the United States cared so
about Samoa. The Secretary of State replied that the United
States had the moral responsibility for maintaining native inde
pendence and sovereignty on the islands. Bayard also added
another reason. The islands were on the highway of a great com
merce which was still in its early stages. The transcontinental
railroad, he continued, had opened the west coast of N orth Amer
ica to commerce and civilization, and this area now looked out
upon the great Pacific theater. W hen an Isthmian canal was con
structed, Bayard concluded, Samoa would assume crucial impor
tance. The German Foreign Office grumbled that the Secretary
o f State was interpreting “the Monroe Doctrine as though
the Pacific Ocean were to be treated as an American Lake.” 88
87Ryden, United States and Samoa, 173-321.
88 Ibid., 276-299, 301-316, 396; Tansill, Foreign Policy of Bayard, 30-31,
62-63, 72-73, 81, 92-93; memorandum read to cabinet meeting by Bayard,
N o v . 19, 1888, Bayard MSS; “Protocol of Second Samoan Conference,”
July 2, 1887, Box 162, John Bassett Moore papers, Library o f Congress,
W ashington, D.C.; Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 183-186.
$6 The N e w Empire
Unfortunately the conference could not reach agreement.89
As Bayard and Cleveland observed, Hawaii and Samoa were
particularly valuable as w ay stations on the road to Asia. By
centering his attention on Seward’s favorite area, the Pacific,
Bayard had also refocused on what Seward had considered “the
prize”—millions of oriental consumers. The State Department
and certain members of the business community cooperated dur
ing the 1880’s to keep alive the vision of the fabled Asian market.
Some businessmen, especially the colorful and unscrupulous
General James Harrison W ilson, who was on the boards of di
rectors of several leading American railroads, conjured up great
phantasms of American-built railroads in China and Korea. These,
W ilson believed, would serve as the wedges to open this huge
area to industrial goods from the United States. W hen Bayard
named Colonel Charles Denby of Indiana as the new Minister
to China, the Secretary of State had assured expansionists such
as W ilson that the Cleveland administration had their interests
in mind. Denby began to push his plan for an American-con
structed railroad system which, he believed, would stop the pro
gressive weakening of China. W hen one N ew York businessman
asked Bayard for assurance on the State Department’s China
policy, the Secretary of State replied that Denby did not “lack
friendly instruction in relation to American enterprises of the
kind General W ilson alludes to,” and that the new Minister was
prepared “to rattle all the china in the National Cupboard.” 90
American policies in Korea exemplified the attempt to find
new commercial opportunities through a more unilateral ap
proach. China had long claimed suzerainty rights over the Hermit
Kingdom, but the rising power of Japan became explicit in a
89 For German and British reaction, see Stolberg-W em igerode, G er

many and the United States, 256-258.
" D e n b y to Bayard, Sept. 6, 1888, Bayard MSS; also Van Alstyne,
Rising American Empire, 181; Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 579-
580; Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” 179-180, 193—195; Tansill, Foreign
Policy of Bayard, 422-431.
Years of Preparation j7
treaty between that country and Korea in 1876 in which Japan
recognized Korean independence. In 1882 Commodore Shufeldt,
working through Chinese officials after he had tried and failed
to enter Korea through Japan, signed a treaty for the United
States which opened Korea to the non-Asian world.
But Shufeldt’s success soon proved to be a Pyrrhic victory.
The United States had again pushed itself into a whirlpool of
power politics in which it could exert little leverage. Russia be
lieved the control of Korea necessary for the success of her Trans-
Siberian Railroad; Japan, wanting no foreign-held Korean dagger
hanging over her home islands, worked against both China and
Russia; and Great Britain became alarmed because of Russian
moves and the fear that China’s loss of Korea might trigger other
attempts to divide and annex Chinese territory.
The United States meanwhile insisted on creating a Korean
vacuum which could be filled at least partially with American
commerce and missionaries. The State Department feared that a
Chinese-controlled Korea would weaken American trading
rights, discourage the entry of missionaries, and bring into the
picture too many pro-British Chinese officials. Frelinghuysen
halted a Chinese attempt to obtain exclusive trade privileges in
the Hermit Kingdom. This introduced Bayard’s and Denby’s
attempts to fill the vacuum with American concessions. T hey
were joined in this venture in 1884 by the fascinating figure of
Horace Allen, a Presbyterian medical missionary from Ohio who
used his intimate relations w ith the Korean court to sell Amer
ican interests along with the Lord’s. Bayard also attempted to
weaken Chinese control by declaring that American policy was
“not adverse to the autonomical independence o f Corea,” and
then successfully exerting pressure on the Chinese to allow
Korea to establish a separate legation in the United States.91
91 Treat, U S . and Japan, II, 218-219; Dennett, Americans in Eastern

Asia, 450-474; Tansill, Foreign Policy of Bayard, 417-449; Fred H arvey
Harrington, G od, Mammon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace Allen and
Korean-American Relations, 1884-190s (Madison, W ise., 1944), 1-17.
j8 The N e w Empire
Shufeldt had opened the door while Frelinghuysen and Bayard
had tried to weaken the Chinese hold and fill the void w ith the
open-door policy. It might have worked if all the claimants w ho
scrambled to get through the Korean threshold had started from
the same position, and if the State Department had demonstrated
a willingness to pay a military price for the commercial benefits.
As it was, the Japanese enjoyed a head start on the other powers.
This fact became dramatically clear in 1894-1895.
The Beginning of the M odern American N a vy

As the imbroglios in Central America, Samoa, and Korea
proved, the United States needed a strong navy to protect its
far-flung interests in the new empire. By 1880 the great Amer
ican navy of the Civil W ar had decayed into a flotilla o f death
traps and defenseless antiques. O f 1,942 vessels in the navy, only
forty-eight could fire a gun. Political fights over Reconstruction
policies, the decline of the merchant marine, the desire for finan
cial retrenchment after the Civil W ar, and the fallacious belief
held by some congressmen that the United States would stay out
of entangling foreign affairs made impossible the creation of a
modern navy in the 1870’s. Oscar W ilde’s Canterville Ghost
could w ell reply to a young American lady who complained that
her country had no ruins and no curiosities: “N o ruins! N o
curiosities! You have your N avy and your manners!” 92
In 1883, however, the modern American navy began to take
form. It became a great navy only after 1890, when Congress
authorized the building of the first battleships, but during the
preceding seven years other classes of vessels rolled out of Amer
ican shipyards, and a rationale developed to justify such a power
ful naval establishment. A number of new developments made
this break-through possible. Partial recovery from the depres-
92 John D . Long, The N ew American N avy (N e w York, 1903), I

13-14; Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power,
1776-1918 (Princeton, 1939), 174-177; Elting E. Morison, Admiral Sims
and the M odem American N avy (Boston, 1942), 19.
Years of Preparation yp
sion of the 1870’s resulted in Treasury surpluses to pay for naval
expenditures. By 1886 the N avy Department had ordered that
all armor, steel, and ordnance for American ships be made in the
United States, a move which put an important vested interest
back of the “N ew N avy.” 93
But tw o additional factors were of most importance. In 1881
the Secretary of the N avy, W illiam Hunt, established a naval
advisory board to counsel him on matters of strategy and tech
nology. A group of rising naval officers now began channeling
their demands through this new board to a receptive Congress.
Representative Benjamin W . Harris of Massachusetts recalled
that at one meeting between the House Committee on Naval
Affairs and the naval officers, “W e . . . listened to the advice
o f naval officers, and our bill was changed in obedience to their
views.” Other naval officers obtained a sounding board with
the opening of the Naval W ar College in 1884.
T he second major factor was the knowledge that expanding
American interests, especially in the W estern Hemisphere, lay
at the mercy of stronger European and even Latin-American
fleets. More ambitious expansionists, as Representative W illiam
M cAdoo of N ew Jersey and John Kasson, pleaded for a great
navy to protect Americans in such distant areas as Samoa and
the Congo. These factors meshed to produce appropriations in
1883 for the four steel vessels which mark the beginning of the
N ew N avy. Between 1885 and 1889 Congress authorized thirty
more ships while cooperating with the Secretary of the N avy,
W illiam W hitney, to improve the N avy Department’s bureauc
racy and the fleet’s personnel.94
But just as American policy in Latin America proved more
93 Robert Seager II, “T en Years before Mahan: T he Unofficial Case

for the N e w N avy, 1880-1890,” Mississippi Vaftey Historical Review,
X L (December, 1953), 491-512; Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power,
183-184; House Report N o. 653, 47th Cong., ist Sess., xxii-xxiii.
94 Seager, “T en Years before Mahan,” 491-500; Annual Report of the
Secretary of the N avy, 188t, 27; Congressional Record, 50th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 1437.
6o The N e w Empire
vigorous in the 1890’s than in the preceding decade, so the build
ing of the N ew N avy in the 1880’s had little of the dynamic
quality it exhibited in the post-1890 period. T he one element
lacking in the naval debates of the earlier decade was a consensus
on the need for a seagoing, offensive, battleship navy. Instead,
the United States built a lightly armored fleet of fast cruisers
suited for hit-and-run destroying of commerce, not for major
naval engagements with the great ships of Europe. N o t even
such leading expansionists as M cAdoo advised the building of
such capital ships. The lack of support for large battleships in
dicates the limited tactics and strategy of American foreign
policy in the 1880’s, just as the creation of a great battleship fleet
after 1890 so revealingly typifies the more ambitious qualities of
American expansion in that decade.95
Conclusion: The Period of Preparation

The 1890’s may correctly be called a major watershed in
American history, but this decade cannot be understood without
comprehending domestic and foreign policy in the 1850-1889
period. Spurred by a fantastic industrial revolution, which pro
duced ever larger quantities of surplus goods, depressions, and
violence, and warned by a growing radical literature that the
system was not functioning properly, the United States prepared
to solve its dilemmas with foreign expansion. Displaying a notable
lack of any absentmindedness, Americans set out to solve their
problems by creating an empire whose dynamic and character
istics marked a new departure in their history. This would not
be a colonial empire. As the Daily Alta California phrased it in
1874 with a homey frontier metaphor, “Acquisition of territory
with us is . . . ‘dead cock in the pit.’ ” But Export and Finance
noted in 1889 that, although the country was filled w ith self-
95 Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, 195; Congressional Record,

50th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1441; for the lack of consensus see the vote on an
Important bill authorizing the construction o f tw o warships o f 15,000
tons, in Congressional Record, 50th Cong., ist Sess., 6728.
styled “isolationists,” it was impossible to find a single person who
did not favor increased commercial entanglements. In due time
these commercial ambitions would result in political and military
entanglements also; affairs in Samoa and the growing navy pro
vided ample proof of that.96
The years between 1850 and 1889 were a period of prepara
tion for the 1890’s. These years provided the roots of empire,
not the fruit. The fruit of empire would not appear until the
1890’s, when Frederick Jackson Turner, Josiah Strong, Brooks
Adams, and Alfred Thayer Mahan systematically reformulated
and publicized the nature of this empire, when the Harrison-
Blaine policies outlined most explicitly the strategy of the empire,
and, finally, when the depression of 1893 acted as the catalyst
to these developments of a half century.
96 Dozer, “Anti-Imperialism,” 80-81; Plesur, “Looking Outward,” 192.
II
The Intellectual Formulation
SOME intellectuals speak only for themselves. Theirs is often

the later glory, but seldom the present power. Some, however,
speak not only for themselves but for the guiding forces of their
society. Discovering such men at crucial junctures in history,
if such a discovery can be made, is of importance and value.
These figures uncover the premises, reveal the approaches, pro
vide the details, and often coherently arrange the ideas which
are implicit in the dominant thought of their time and so
ciety.
The ordered, articulate writings of Frederick Jackson Turner,
Josiah Strong, Brooks Adams, and Alfred Thayer Mahan typ
ified the expansive tendencies of their generation. Little evidence
exists that Turner and Strong directly influenced expansionists
in the business community or the State Department during the
1890’s, but their writings best exemplify certain beliefs which
determined the nature of American foreign policy. Adams and
Mahan participated more directly in the shaping of expansionist
programs. It is, of course, impossible to estimate the number of
Americans who accepted the arguments of these four men. W hat
cannot be controverted is that the writings of these men typified
62
T he Intellectual Formulation 6}
and in some specific instances directly influenced the thought of
American policy makers w ho created the new empire.1
This chapter does not pretend to explore all the nooks and
corners in the intellectual realm of each man, but only those
areas which relate to the development of foreign policy, especially
the policies o f the 1890’s. N o attempt is made, for example, to
enter into all the shadowy labyrinths o f the frontier thesis; but
it is legitimate and possible to extract certain parts of that thesis
to find their relationship to American expansion. In the conclud
ing part of the chapter an attempt is made to cut across the
thoughts of these four men in order to ferret out a few commonly
shared ideas.
Frederick Jackson Turner and the American Frontier

In 1898 an angry British professor at Cambridge University
published a book which hotly disputed the right of an obstrep
erous United States to act as if it dominated the entire W estern
Hemisphere, especially since that area o f the globe included
large chunks of British-owned territory. W . F. Reddaway ad
mitted, however, that the new, bumptious policy had evolved
naturally out of the American past: “Hitherto, the internal de
velopment of the Union has been favoured by the existence of
relatively inexhaustible supplies of land. W ith fertile territories
crying out for settlement, a foreign policy has been superfluous.”
But in the 1890’s, Reddaway’s argument continued, Americans
exhausted their supply o f free land and a foreign policy became
1 One of the weakest sections in the history o f ideas is the relationship

between the new intellectual currents and American overseas expansion
during the last half o f the nineteenth century. T he background and some
o f the general factors may be found in Alfred Kazin, On N ative Grounds:
A n Interpretation of Modern American Prose Literature (Garden City,
N .Y ., 1942, 1956); H enry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An
Interpretation of American Thought and Character since the ¡886*3 (N e w
Haven, 1950, 1959); W einberg, Manifest Destiny; Julius W . Pratt, “T he
Ideology o f American Expansion,” Essays in H onor of William E. D odd
. . . , edited b y A very Craven (Chicago, 1935).
64 The N e w Empire
necessary. Reddaway bitterly disapproved of the policy, but he
thought he understood the motivations.2
N o such cause-and-effect relationship can, of course, be found
which so neatly links the closing of the frontier with American
expansionist activities in 1895 or 1898, especially since historians
have demonstrated that a larger number of original and final
homestead entries were registered after 1900 than during the
previous three hundred years. But there can be no doubt that
one important part of the rationale for an expansive foreign
policy in the 1890’s was a fervent (though erroneous) belief held
by many American that their unique and beneficent internal
frontier no longer existed.3
The importance of the frontier w ill be associated with the
name of Frederick Jackson Turner as long as historians are able
to indent footnotes. Yet as Theodore Roosevelt told Turner in
a letter of admiration in 1894, “I think you . . . have put into
definite shape a good deal of thought which has been floating
around rather loosely.” As has been amply shown by several
scholars, a number of observers warned of the frontier’s disap
pearance and the possible consequences of this disappearance
long before Turner’s epochal paper. The accelerating communi
cation and transportation revolution, growing agrarian unrest,
violent labor strikes, and the problems arising from increasing
numbers of immigrants broke upon puzzled and frightened
Americans in a relatively short span of time. Many of them
clutched the belief of the closing or closed frontier in order to
explain their dilemma.4
2 W . F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine (Cambridge, Eng., 1898),
141.
31 am especially indebted to Professor Paul Gates of Cornell Univer
sity, who not only improved this work with his criticism of several chap
ters but also aided me with statistics and information which gave me
a much clearer picture of the nature of the American frontier in the
late-nineteenth century.
4 See especially Fulmer Mood, “T he Concept o f the Frontier, 1871-
1898,” Agricultural H istory , XIX (January, 1945), 24-31; Lee Benson,
“The Historical Background of Turner’s Frontier Essay,” Agricultural
The Intellectual Formulation 6$
From the perspective of more than half a century, one can envy
the timing of Turner’s paper, though as far as he was concerned
the timing was probably unintentional. Read before a solemn as
semblage of American historians at the W orld’s Fair in Chicago
in mid-July, 1893, it came just as the panic of the spring trans
formed into a devastating four-year depression. It is interesting
to note that many of the frontier theses which had presaged
Turner’s had appeared during or immediately after previous de
pressions. The 1883-1886 slump had produced the first spate
of warnings about the frontier, though few went as far as James
Bryce, who wrote gravely in his American Commonwealth that
when Americans occupied all their western lands “it w ill be a
time of trial for democratic institutions.” But the depression of
the 1890’s destroyed whatever was left of “the myth of the
garden.” A conservative journal such as the Cornmercial and
Financial Chronicle could im ply a closed frontier in 1894 when
it blamed the stagnation in the W est on slackening railroad con
struction and fewer land sales. On the other end of the political
spectrum, the most popular spokesman of the Populist forces,
“Coin” Harvey, could use the same factor to explain w hy the
“suffering race” battled the wealthy during the turbulent 1890’s:
“The unexplored portions of the world . . . were escape valves
for the poorer people. . . . The damming up of the stream has
now come. There is no unexplored part of the world left suitable
for men to inhabit, and justice now stands at bay.” 65*
H istory , X X V (April, 1951), 59-82; Herman Clarence N ixon, “T he

Precursors of Turner in the Interpretation o f the American Frontier,”
South Atlantic Quarterly , XXVIII (January, 1929), 83-89. For the
Roosevelt letter, see The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, selected and
edited by Elting E. Morison et al. (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), I, 363.
5 For warnings issued during the middle and late 1880’s, see especially
N ixon, “Precursors of Turner in the Interpretation o f the American
Frontier,” 83-89; Congressional Record , 49th Cong., ist Sess., 7830-7831;
Thomas P. Gill, “Landlordism in America,” N orth American Review,
CXLII (January, 1886), 52-67, especially 60; A. J. Desmond, “America’s
Land Question,” N orth American Review , CXLII (February, 1886), 153-
158, especially 153. Smith, Virgin Land, 219, mentions the effect o f the
Turner’s own introduction to his frontier thesis can be found
in a most important paper published in the fall of 1891, “The
Significance o f H istory.” Anticipating the twentieth-century
theme that, as Turner phrased it, “each age writes the history
o f the past anew with reference to the conditions uppermost in
its own time,” the young W isconsin professor provided notice
o f his own viewpoint: “Today the questions that are uppermost,
and that w ill become increasingly important, are not so much
political as economic questions. T he age of machinery, of the
factory system, is also the age of socialistic inquiry.” W riting
at that time, it is not strange that he interpreted the last part of
the century as the age of Econom ic Man.6
Turner rested the central part of his frontier thesis on the
economic power represented by free land. American individual
ism, nationalism, political institutions, and democracy depended
on this power: “So long as free land exists, the opportunity for
a com petency exists, and economic power secures political
power.” Stated in these terms, landed expansion became the
central factor, the dynamic of American progress. W ithout the
econom ic power generated by expansion across free lands,
American political institutions could stagnate.7
Such an analysis could be extremely meaningful to those per
sons w ho sought an explanation for the political and social
troubles of the period. Few disputed that the social upheavals
in both the urban and agrarian areas of the nation stemmed from
1893-1897 depression; also Commercial and Financial Chronicle, D ec. 22,

1894, 1082-1084; W illiam H . Harvey, Coin's Financial School (Chicago,
1894), 79. For the Bryce quotation see James Bryce, The American
Commonwealth (London, 1889), II, 701.
8 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Early W ritings of Frederick Jackson
Turner . . . with an Introduction by Fulmer M ood (Madison, W ise.,
1938), 51-52.
7 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (N e w
York, 1947), 32, 30; see also Per Sveaas Andersen, W estward Is the Course
of Empires: A Study in the Shaping of cm American Idea: Frederick
Jackson Turner's Frontier (O slo, N orw ay, 1956), 20-21; Smith, Virgin
Land , 240.
The Intellectual Formulation <>7
economic troubles in the international grain markets, from the
frequent industrial depressions, or, as the Populists averred, from
the failure of the currency to match the pace of ever increasing
productivity. This economic interpretation also fitted in nicely
with the contemporary measurement of success in terms of ma
terial achievement. Perhaps most important, the frontier thesis
not only defined the dilemma, but did so in tangible, concrete
terms. It offered the hope that Americans could do something
about their problems. Given the assumption that expansion
across the western frontier explained past American successes,
the solution for the present crisis now became apparent: either
radically readjust the political institutions to a nonexpanding
society or find new areas for expansion. W hen Americans
seized the second alternative, the meaning for foreign policy
became apparent—and immense.
W ith the appearance and definition of the fundamental prob
lems in the 1880’s and 1890’s, these decades assumed vast im
portance. T hey became not a watershed of American history,
but the watershed. Many writers emphasized the supremely
critical nature of the 1890’s, but no one did it better than Turner
when he penned the dramatic final sentence of his 1893 paper:
“And now, four centuries from the discovery of America, at
the end of a hundred years of life under the Constitution, the
frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period
of American history.” The American W est no longer offered a
unique escape from the intractable problems of a closed society.
A s another writer stated it four years after Turner’s announce
ment in Chicago, “w e are no longer a country exceptional and
apart.” H istory had finally caught up with the United States.8
The first solution that came to some minds suggested the open-
8 Turner, Frontier in American H istory , 38; Eugene V . Smalley, “W hat
A re Normal Times?” The Forum , X X 111 (March, 1897), 98-99; see also
Turner, Frontier in American H istory , 311-312. For a brilliant criticism
of Turner’s closed-space concepts, see James C. Malin, The Contriving
Brain and the Skillful Hand in the United States . . . (Lawrence, Kan.,
1955), the entire essay, but especially ch. xi.
68 The N eiv Empire
ing of new landed frontiers in Latin America or Canada. Yet
was further expansion in a landed sense the answer? T op policy
makers, as Secretaries of State James G. Blaine, Thomas F.
Bayard, and W alter Quintin Gresham, opposed the addition of
noncontiguous territory to the Union. Some Americans inter
preted the labor violence of 1877, 1886, and 1894 as indications
that the federal government could no longer harmonize and
control the far-flung reaches of the continental empire. Labor
and agrarian groups discovered they could not command the
necessary political power to solve their mushrooming problems.
The sprouting of such factions as the M olly Maguires, Populists,
Eugene Debs’ Railroad Union, and several varieties of Socialist
parties raised doubts in many minds about the ameliorating and
controlling qualities which had formerly been a part of the
American system.
Perhaps the political theories of The Federalist, N o. 10, had
worked too w ell. Madison had dreamed of a vast landed empire
which would divide various factions so that no one faction could
become dominant. But in a single century the Founding Father’s
plan of landed expansion had apparently been so successful that
the resulting continental empire not only prevented some fac
tions from obtaining control of the nation’s political institutions,
but threatened to prevent these institutions from adequately con
trolling the factions. If this condition persisted, Americans might
soon arrive at the forked road where one path led to an all-
powerful central government and the other to anarchy.9
This was a cruel dilemma. Nonexpansion threatened economic
and political stagnation, but further expansion could worsen the
abscesses already festering on a sick body politic. N o one under
stood this dilemma better than Turner. In his 1893 paper he ob
served that free land provides the opportunity for com petency,
“and economic power secures political power.”
9 For an outstanding example of this thesis, see Banker's Magazine,
XLVIII (February, 1894), 563-565.
The Intellectual Formulation *9
But the democracy bom of free land, strong in selfishness and in
dividualism, intolerant o f administrative experience and education,
and pressing individual liberty beyond its proper bounds, has its
dangers as well as its benefits. Individualism in America has allowed
a laxity in regard to governmental affairs which has rendered pos
sible the spoils system and all the evils that follow from the lack of
a highly developed civic spirit. In this connection may be noted also
the influence o f frontier conditions in permitting lax business honor,
inflated paper currency and wild-cat banking. . . . A primitive so
ciety can hardly be expected to show the intelligent appreciation
o f the complexity o f business interests in a developed society.10
Expansion in the form of trade instead of landed settlement

ultimately offered the answer to this dilemma. This solution,
embodied in the open-door philosophy of American foreign
policy, ameliorated the economic stagnation (which by Turner’s
reasoning led to the political discontent), but it did not pile new
colonial areas on an already overburdened governmental struc
ture. It provided the perfect answer to the problems of the 1890’s.
Turner, however, wrote of past American expansion in colo
nial terms: “the advance of American settlement westward.”
W ith his fixation on this historical landed development, he might
have missed the amazing new cure-all of the open-door doctrine.
But Turner did not miss this crucial change in the nature of
American expansion. Unlike most policy makers, in fact, he saw
far beyond it. In his 1891 paper, “The Significance of H istory,”
he made a statement which offers to historians the Ariadne
thread for unraveling American foreign policy after 1890.
Turner began by noting that the United States believed itself
isolated politically from Europe.
But it is one o f the profoundest lessons that history has to teach,
that political relations, in a highly developed civilization, are in
extricably connected with economic relations. Already there are
signs of a relaxation of our policy of commercial isolation. Reci-
10 Turner, Frontier in American H istory , 32.
7o The N e w Empire
procity is a word that meets with increasing favor from all parties.
But once fully afloat on the sea of worldwide economic interests,
we shall soon develop political interests. Our fishery disputes fur
nish one example; our Samoan interests another; our Congo rela
tions a third. But perhaps most important are our present and future
relations with South America, coupled with our Monroe Doctrine.
It is a settled maxim of international law that the government of a
foreign state whose subjects have lent money to another state may
interfere to protect the rights of the bondholders, if they are en
dangered by the borrowing state.11
It is difficult to overemphasize the significance of this statement

and unnecessary to elaborate upon it.
A t the request of the editor of the Atlantic M onthly, W alter
Hines Page, Turner published an article in September, 1896,
during the heat of the Bryan-M cKinley campaign, entitled “The
Problem of the W est.” It is probably the best statement on the
subject written during the decade. In one paragraph Turner as
sembled his thought on the relationship of the closing frontier
to the new, vigorous American foreign policy:
For nearly three hundred years the dominant fact in American life
has been expansion. W ith the settlement of the Pacific Coast and
the occupation of the free lands, this movement has come to a check.
That these energies of expansion will no longer operate would be
a rash prediction; and the demands for a vigorous foreign policy,
for an interoceanic canal, for a revival of our power upon the seas,
and for the extension of American influence to outlying islands and
adjoining countries, are indications that the movement will continue.
The stronghold of these demands lies west of the Alleghenies.12
W hen writing his presidential address for the meeting of the

American Historical Association fourteen years later, Turner
saw no need to change this interpretation. The American in-
11 Turner, Early W ritings , 61-62.

12 Frederick Jackson Turner, “T he Problem of the W est,” Atlantic
M onthly , LXXVIII (September, 1896), 289-297. This essay is reprinted
in Frontier in American H istory , 205-221.
The Intellectual Formulation V
volvement in the Far East “to engage in the world-politics of
the Pacific Ocean,” the “extension of power” and “entry into
the sisterhood of world-states,” were not isolated events. They
were, “indeed, in some respects the logical outcome of the na
tion’s march to the Pacific.” 13
It is difficult to measure Turner’s influence on expansionists in
the 1890’s, although he certainly affected Theodore Roosevelt’s
view of American history. H e also played a major part in shap
ing the ideas of a future American statesman, W oodrow W ilson.
In the 1890’s, however, W ilson was more than a potential Chief
Executive; as a well-known political scientist he enjoyed an
influential reading public. In books and reviews he echoed
Turner’s theme that, since the closing of the continental frontier,
Americans searched for “new frontiers in the Indies and in the
Far Pacific.” A close friend of Turner’s, W ilson was not reticent
in admitting, “AU I ever wrote on the subject came from him.” 14
The ideas which Turner publicized exerted much force in the
1890’s. The previous chapter mentioned the frontier theme, and
the remainder of this work w ill note an increasing number of
references after 1893 to a filled W est. Such references were
especially noticeable in debates waged over the necessity for an
enlarged foreign trade and for a battleship navy to protect that
trade. Americans were not slow in translating the fact of the
closed landed frontier into the necessity for discovering a new
commercial frontier.15
Turner is of prime importance to the student of American
is ibid., 315.
14 For a pioneer interpretation, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, “Frederick
Jackson Turner and Imperialism,” Social Science, XXVII (January, 1952),
12-16; and for an excellent analysis see W illiam A. W illiams, “T he
Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy,” Pacific Historical Review,
X X IV (N ovem ber, 1955), 379-395. For W ilson’s view see “Mr. Goldwin
Smith’s ‘V iew s’ on Our Political H istory,” Forum , X V I (December,
1893), 489-499, especially 496-497.
16 For examples of how the frontier thesis was included in debates on
naval appropriations, see Congressional Record, 53d Cong., 3rd Sess.,
March 2, 1895, 3109; also Chapters IV , V , V I, below.
•j2 The N e w Empire
foreign policy. During a crisis period of his nation’s history he
provided an explanation of that crisis by uniting various ideas
about the American frontier, ideas which, as Roosevelt remarked,
were “floating around rather loosely.” H is formulations best
exemplify the thinking that was concerned with the disappearing
frontier, the relationship of this frontier to the turbulent society
o f the 1890’s, and the implications for foreign policy. In his
crucial observation that an open-door form of economic expan
sion made inevitable political responsibilities, Turner saw be
yond the limited vision of most policy makers and businessmen.
In doing so he provided the key to understanding American
foreign policy in the first half of the twentieth century.
Josiah Strong and the Missionary Frontier

Josiah Strong shared Turner’s views of the 1890’s as a crisis
decade and of the closing frontier as a matter for grave concern.
Here the similarity between the tw o men becomes less evident.
Strong did not approach Turner’s intellectual powers, and
Turner never blew a clarion call for American expansion as
loudly as Strong did in his several books. Turner attempted to
analyze the frontier in a cool, methodical manner, in order to
gain insight into the past. But Strong attempted to find good
reasons for something he desired passionately for the future: a
thunderous Protestant missionary charge which would conquer
the American W est for Christ and then use this region as the
home base for overpowering the world. Yet the ideas of the tw o
men were in a sense complementary, for Strong stressed the
necessity of finding a new world frontier to replace the internal
frontier which Turner so eloquently described. In substituting
a new frontier for the old, Strong offered his solution for the
spiritual, economic, and political problems of his day.
Born in Naperville, Illinois, in 1847, Strong knew the W est
well; not only was he raised on its periphery, but after becoming
a Congregational minister in 1871 he traveled extensively in the
area for the Home Missionary Society. The turning point in his
The Intellectual Formulation 13
life came with the publication of Our Country in 1885. The
Home Missionary Society had requested Strong to update a
small manual which had stolidly pleaded for more Christian mis
sions. But as a scholar of sorts, social reformer, and a keen ob
server who noted and feared the growing labor and agrarian
discontent, Strong infused new life into the book. W ithin a dec
ade 175,000 copies were sold in the United States, and many
other issues of the work sold in European and oriental languages.
A t a time when exhortations for missionary work were much in
vogue, the Nation called Our Country “a Home Missionary
address raised to the nth power.” In terms of popularity few
books of the time could equal it. Strong became a national figure,
spreading his ideas from innumerable lecture platforms and
through other books. H e later became involved in the Social
Gospel movement and dedicated himself to making this move
ment a world-wide affair. Symbolically, he had entitled his first
book Our Country; in 1913, four years before his death, he be
gan a four-volume work entitled Our W orld. But the change in
titles is misleading. The latter title could legitimately have been
the name of his first work.16
Strong pleaded fervently for the expansion of Christian mis
sions, but he framed his argument in terms which had vital im
plications for foreign policy. His goal was a Christianized world,
but what is of primary concern here is that he perceived and
discussed certain aspects of American society which, he believed,
made the attainment of this goal absolutely necessary. H e es
pecially stressed the disappearance of the public lands; increasing
industrialization, with its effect on the speeding up of social
processes and the resulting plethora of wealth; and, finally, the
characteristics of Anglo-Saxons which made them peculiarly
suited to distribute the spiritual and economic values of western
civilization throughout the heathen world.
10 John Haynes Holmes, “Josiah Strong,” Dictionary of American

Biography, XVIII, 150-151; Bald, “Expansionist Sentiment,” 7; Nation ,
Sept. 30, 1886, 273.
74 The N e w Empire
Strong posed as one of the intellectuals of his day. His books
reflect wide and intensive reading in historical documents and
contemporary publications, especially the census reports (one
of Turner’s favorite sources also). From his collage of reading
Strong had extracted the fascinating idea that the centers of
world empire had moved west since the beginning of recorded
history. H e gave Bishop Berkeley and Tocqueville (a source
whom he frequently cited) credit for this insight, but drew his
own conclusions. The center of empire, Strong believed, would
settle “to our m ighty W est, there to remain, for there is no
further W est; beyond is the Orient.” This W est would be the
greatest of all empires. Other nations would bring their offerings
to “the cradle of the young empire of the W est,” as they had
once taken their gifts to the cradle of Jesus.17
But this message was too sanguine for the depression-haunted
1880’s, especially if the author hoped to sketch a picture that
would attract sympathetic cash contributions. So Strong quickly
added that the W est could not be assured of ascending and main
taining the seat of world empire; in fact, he continued, the W est
was at that moment approaching a crisis partly because of the
rapid disappearance of the public lands. In a passage which re
sembles Turner’s statement of eight years later not only in con
tent but in stately cadence as w ell, Strong concluded with the
warning: “W hen the supply is exhausted, w e shall enter upon
a new era, and shall more rapidly approximate European con
ditions of life.” 18
This occurrence only partially explained w hy the W est faced
new and dangerous times. T o round out the picture, Strong ex
plored the many implications of the exhaustion of the western
lands. H e discovered secondary effects which almost over
whelmed him with their gravity. The East, he observed, had
begun as farms and then slow ly evolved over several centuries
17 Josiah Strong, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis
(N e w York, 1885), 29.
18 Ibid., 153-158.
The Intellectual formulation 15
into urban, industrialized areas. But the W est developed with
the railroad, which immediately spawned industry. The farms,
for the most part, follow ed or arrived concurrently with this
industrialization. H e concluded that the innumerable, complex
problems inherent in an urban-industrialized society would strike
the W est much earlier in the process of its settlement and with
a greater impact than when they had struck the East. The W est
had to be prepared or a social breakdown might result.19
This sense of urgency throbbed throughout Strong’s writing,
and it was intensified by the observation that modern history
moved many times faster than ancient, “for the pulse and the
pace of the world have been marvelously quickened during the
nineteenth century.” H e outlined the communication and trans
portation revolutions, the astonishing changes in modern science,
and the rapidity with which “great ideas” sprouted. The “western
world in its progress is gathering momentum like a falling body.”
H is view of history, like that of H enry Adams’ “law,” saw events
moving ever faster. Out of this insight he evolved his own law:
tw o “great principles” were at work in history—the develop
ment of the individual and the organization of society. The ac
celerated pace of history, caused by the discovery and uses of
the steam engine and electricity, was creating a centripetal force
that ever more rapidly transformed diversity into unity. This
tendency toward centralization appeared not only in industry,
but in politics and society as w ell. The effects of such a basic
change in Man’s history could be perilous since it was occurring
so rapidly that Man could not adequately adjust to it. “Thought
ful men everywhere have become expectant of great social
changes,” Strong warned. “Many expect revolution,” and “prob
ably” the Christian church was all that stoodîn the path of such
a revolution.20
19 Ibid.; Smith, Virgin Land , 300, provides an analysis of a similar aspect

o f Turner’s thought.
20 Strong, Our Country , 1-7; Josiah Strong, The N ew Era or the Com
ing Kingdom (N e w York, 1893), 1-16, 26-27, 342-3435 ch. vii.
yS The N e w Empire
H e thought he saw this centralization occurring in another
sphere also. N oting the opening of Japan, Korea, and parts of
Africa to western civilization, he believed that these events “point
unmistakably to one conclusion [ : ] The drawing of the peoples
of the earth into ever closer relations, which w ill render isola
tion and, therefore, barbarism impossible, and w ill operate as a
constant stimulus.” H e predicted that “the growth of freedom
which removes the greatest barriers to progress, the social fer
ment and the evident tendency toward a new social organization”
would lead to a “new era, for which the nineteenth century has
been the John the Baptist.” Thus he concluded that expansion
and consolidation would result in further expansion and further
consolidation. If he had correctly assessed the world situation,
and no doubt many of his thousands of readers were confident that
he had, then American foreign policy makers could only operate
from the basic assumption of an ever increasing involvement in
world politics. The policy makers had no choice, given the dis
coveries of steam and electricity and the resulting unity of the
peoples of the world.21
The rapid industrialization, especially in the American W est,
laid another heavy burden on the American people— a tremen
dous amount of wealth which became the idol and also the op
pressor of the nation. As a man whose main problem was to find
financial backing for missionary activities, Strong had no illu
sions about the power of money: “M oney is power in the con
crete. It commands learning, skill, experience, wisdom, talent,
influence, numbers.” H e hoped every cent of American money
would “be employed in the w ay that w ill best honor G od,” but
he expressed well-founded doubts. T oo often unscrupulous poli
ticians used m oney to purchase the “floating vote.” Others spent
their earnings on needless luxury. But overproduction which
led to gluts of goods and to unemployment endangered Amer
ica’s great wealth most of all. The concentrated m oney power
refused to improve the deplorable living and working conditions
21 Ibid., 3-16.
of laborers. Strong wondered if the growing discontent rising
out o f this surfeit of wealth did not herald an event as epochal
as the Reformation or the French Revolution. W hile the first
destroyed spiritual despotism and the second political despotism,
“perhaps the third indicates the fall of economic despotism.” 22
H e could discover a number of threats to American society,
including immigrants, Roman Catholicism, Mormonism, intem
perance, and immoral city life; but all these perils could be
grouped, for purposes of his analysis, under one indescribably
evil force—socialism. In the second longest chapter of Our
Country y he warned against socialists who attempted “to solve
the problem o f suffering without eliminating the factor of sin.”
Now here did the acid of socialism threaten the fabric of society
more than in the American W est, for here capitalism was de
veloping full blown under the impetus provided by eastern
capital. Class distinctions were already the rule. Destroying his
readers’ last hope for an easy salvation in this world, Strong con
cluded with the grave observation that the United States could
not stave off socialism by giving more political freedoms for there
were no more to offer; beyond lies “but anarchism.” The solu
tion had to be found elsewhere, in a more difficult and compli
cated realm than politics.23
T he future could be America’s, but she could not trust in a
beneficent, inexorable manifest destiny. Strong quoted Professor
Austin Phelps (w ho wrote the “Introduction” to Our Country)
that although “we are the chosen people,” Americans “can no
longer drift with safety to our destiny. W e are shut up to a
perilous alternative.” Salvation lay in the fulfillment of the
Anglo-Saxon mission to reshape the world in the mold of western
civilization. A fter modestly reminding the reader that he made
public these thoughts in a public lecture three years before the
appearance of John Fiske’s popular “Manifest Destiny,” “which
contains some of the same ideas,” Strong outlined this mission
22 Strong, Our Country y 113-128, 181-185; Strong, N ew Era, ch. vii.
23 Strong, Our Country y 85-112.
78 The N e w Empire
in detail. Because o f the westward movement of empire he as
sumed that England would provide some help but necessarily
be the junior partner. T he Anglo-Saxon, with his tw o virtues
of civil liberty and “pure spiritual Christianity,” would em ploy
his “genius for colonizing” to “move down upon Mexico, down
upon Central and South America, out upon the islands of the
sea, over Africa and beyond. And can any one doubt that the
result of this competition of races w ill be the ‘survival of the
fittest’?” 24
This expansion of Anglo-Saxon Christianity would also solve
the fundamental question of overproduction. N oting that “steam
and electricity have m ightily compressed the earth” so that “our
markets are to be greatly extended,” he told how these markets
could be conquered: “The world is to be Christianized and
civilized. . . . Commerce follow s the missionary. . . . A Chris
tian civilization performs the miracle of the loaves and fishes, and
feeds its thousands in a desert.” H e could not resist invoking
Africa and especially the fabled Asian market as his examples:
“W hat w ill be the wants o f Asia a century hence?” 25
Our Country combined a view of the religious and industrial
manifest destiny o f the Anglo-Saxons, but The N e w Era, pub
lished in 1893, reflected an immersion in the growing Social
Gospel movement. Seven years later Strong published Expan
sion, which reassembled and elaborated his earlier thoughts on
American foreign policy, especially the dynamics of this policy.
In the preface he thanks tw o of the leading expansionists o f the
day, Senator W illiam P. Frye of Maine and Alfred Thayer
Mahan, for providing information and also for reading some o f
the chapters. Little o f the Social Gospel can be found in this
book. H e began by restating his belief that the disappearing in
ternal frontier had forced capital and “energy” to find foreign
outlets. This overseas expansion had been further motivated by
the great industrial capacity of American factories. (H e entitled
24 Ibid., 159-180; Strong, N ew Era, 78-79; also Our Country, 218, 159.
25 Ibid., 7-15; Strong, N ew Era, 355-356.
one of his chapters, “Foreign Markets, a N ew N ecessity.”) If
adequate markets could not be found, an internal revolution
would result. A fter examining in detail the markets of China
and the Pacific and the commercial importance of an Isthmian
canal, Strong very significantly noted the revision of W ashing
ton’s Farewell Address by Richard O lney in the Venezuelan
note of July, 1895. H e then concluded by spelling out once again
the Anglo-Saxon mission, its virtues, and its inevitability.26
Brooks Adams hoped to create a world-wide American empire
by increasing the nation’s efficiency and restoring its martial
spirit. Strong hoped to accomplish the same objective by making
the country both efficient and Christian. Yet in spite of his re
ligious principles, he had perhaps as brutal a view of the future
as did Adams. Strong prophesied that with the closing of the
frontier tw o events would follow: the W est, if properly Chris
tianized, would become the pivot of world empire; it would then
“enter on a new stage of its history—the final competition of
races.” The peoples of the western world, advancing across the
American continent for four hundred years, would now be
thrown back upon themselves and find outlets no longer in open
frontiers, but in populated areas of the world such as Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. Strong hoped that the resulting con
flict would be a peaceful one, fought with Christian principles
and technology, but he did not hesitate to advocate the use of
force whenever necessary. A fter all, time was short and the
Anglo-Saxon destiny could not wait: “The closing years of the
nineteenth century [are] second in importance to that . . .
which must always remain first; viz., the birth of Christ.” 27
Strong’s influence reached the masses and the mighty of Amer
ican society. The sophisticated Nation blasted The N e w Era
in a review in 1893, but grudgingly admitted that it had to devote
space to the book “because it is doubtless destined to considerable
26 Josiah Strong, Expansion under N ew W orld Conditions (N e w York,

1900). For an analysis of O lney’s message, see Chapter V I, below.
27 Strong, N ew Era, ch. vi, 79-80, 1-16; Strong, Our Country , 1-7.
So The New Empire
vogue,” since “it is the very flower of a kind of . . . writing
. . . which is accepted by the multitudes in lieu of sounder
thought.” 28 The amazing sales of Strong’s books justified such
fears. But his books also reached the elite. On the sheet opposite
the title page of the Cornell University Library’s copy of Our
Country appears the scrawl: “An exceedingly valuable and in
teresting little book. A D W , April 3, 1887.” Andrew Dickson
W hite may have carried the message of Strong to James Bryce.
Such striking popularity makes Strong an important historical
figure. More to the point, much of his contemporary popularity
and his later value to historians rests on Strong’s success in uniting
the frontier thesis of Turner, the themes of the westward move
ment of empire and the increasing concentration of society
stressed by Brooks Adams, and the Anglo-Saxon commercial and
military mission outlined by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Finally,
Strong exemplified the fervent expansionism emphasized by the
other three.
Brooks Adams, Alfred Thayer Mahan,

and the Far Western Frontier
Strong, Adams, and Mahan flashed with equal intensity in
their writing of history and in their calls to action. Strong and
Adams fervently believed in their own personal version of the
apocalypse, partly because of their study of history, but m ostly
because of their own emotional experiences. In this w ay they
differed from Mahan, who with Brooks exerted more direct in
fluence on policy makers in the 1890’s than did any of the other
intellectuals. Mahan had rifled the history books more than his
soul or his past in order to construct what he believed to be the
necessary world of the coming twentieth century. His writings
can be understood when separated from the personality of the
author.
Such judgment cannot be passed on the books and articles
of Adams. As the grandsons of John Quincy Adams and the
28 Nation, July 20, 1893, 52.
The Intellectual Formulation Si
sons of Charles Francis Adams, the noted G vil W ar diplomat,
Brooks and his brother H enry suffered from the seemingly utter
hopelessness which they feared was inherent in being the fourth
generation, the fag end, of a great family. This hopelessness
turned to fright in 1893, when the depression forced Brooks and
H enry to the verge of bankruptcy and then generated social up
heavals which threatened with extinction the brothers’ funda
mental beliefs of class and politics. Just the year before, Brooks
had predicted some sort of social and economic breakdown. H e
had warned that unless a solution could be found quickly,
the division between the haves and have-nots would deepen un
til the latter would be driven to revolution in order to readjust
the imbalance. But the crushing force of the 1893 crisis shocked
even the pessimistic, prepared Adamses. As H enry later com
mented, he felt “that something new and curious was about to
happen to the world.” 29
Brooks responded by working out a “law” of history which he
believed gave a reading of the present position of the United
States. His manuscript was notable for its thesis, not for its his
torical evidence. N ot that Brooks particularly cared, for he
loathed the antiquarian and he railed against footnote sloggers
who lost their thesis in a morass of details. In his mind only the
thesis counted, and he believed that he had thrown up adequate
historical supports for his “law .” 30
29 Arthur F. Beringause, Brooks Adams: A Biography (N e w York,

1955), 98-102; see also Thornton Anderson, Brooks Adams: Constructive
Conservative (Ithaca, N.Y ., 1951); W orthington Chauncey Ford, “Mem
oir of Brooks Adams,” Proceedings, Massachusetts Historical Society , LX
(M ay, 1927), 345-358. For an excellent analysis o f Adams’ foreign policy,
see Charles Vevier, “Brooks Adams and the Ambivalence of American
Foreign Policy,” World Affairs Quarterly, X X X (April, 1959), 3-18;
also Brooks Adams to H enry Cabot Lodge, April 23, 1894, H enry Cabot
Lodge Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.; Henry
Adams, The Education of Henry Adeems: An Autobiography (Boston
and N ew York, 1930), 338.
80 Brooks Adams, The N ew Empire (N e w York and London, 1902),
xvii; for an excellent analysis of Brooks as a historian, see Tim othy Paul
82 The New Empire
Brooks offered a hypothesis which attempted to classify the
phases through which society passed “in its oscillations between
barbarism and civilization, or, what amounts to the same thing,
in its movement from a condition of physical dispersion to one
of concentration.” Barbarian societies worked under the impetus
of fear, which produced the military and religious classes. These
classes generated and conquered energy to keep the society on
going; ultimately they were able to store surplus energy. But
since the social movement of a civilization is proportionate to
its energy and mass and its centralization proportionate to its
velocity, societies centralize as human movement accelerates. As
this centralization occurs, greed replaces fear and the surplus
energy comes under the control of the economic man (the
banker) who expends more energy than can be produced. Once
in control, the banker forces the use of a single standard which
appreciates currency, pushes debtors to the wall, and eliminates
the “elasticity of the age of expansion.” The imaginative and
martial man disappears and the store of surplus energy declines.
Art and architecture decay. The society continues to disinte
grate until invigoration occurs with the infusion of new bar
barian blood. As one of Brooks’s close friends noted, his writings
“tended in one direction—to warn of the end of the economic
world.” 31
Infuriated at a hostile review of the book, Brooks protested that
his work was not “a sort of political pamphlet,” but “scientific,”
and “from this standpoint political nostrums would be as mis
placed as agitation for legislation to correct Mr. Darwin’s theory
of the ‘Descent of man.’ ” This argument was disingenuous.
V iew ing history as a series of cycles, Brooks believed that one
cycle would end about 1900; the 1893 panic bolstered this belief.
Donovan, H enry Adams and Brooks Adams: The Education of T w o
American Historians (Norman, Okla., 1961), 73-75.
31 Brooks Adams, The Law of Civilization and Decay: A n Essay on
History (London and N e w York, 1895), 290-294, vi-viii; Ford, “Memoir,”
350; see also Brooks’s summary and defense of the book in Journal of
Commerce, Sept. 28, 1897, 4:4.
H e hated with bitter intensity the bankers on whom he placed
the responsibility for the decay of the western part of the world
in the 1890’s, and he believed their selfish ambitions were driving
a doomed United States down the path marked out by the “law .”
His protestations that the “law” was scientific and that the
western world was w ell along the path to destruction to the
contrary notwithstanding, Brooks set out to repeal the “law.” 32
His study of history had taught him that a particular society
could rule its world for a time, but would sink into oblivion
when it failed to retain adequate flexibility to cone with its
rapidly changing environment. Translated into contemporary
terms, Brooks interpreted this to mean that the gold standard,
controlled and manipulated by the bankers, prevented the rapidly
expanding United States from being able to deal with problems
arising out of the nation’s development, especially the prob
lem of the distribution of wealth. Brooks consequently advo
cated bimetallism. In 1896 Adams supported the Democratic
silver bloc to the extent that W illiam Jennings Bryan sallied into
the campaign with several hundred dollars from Brooks’s and
H enry’s bank accounts.33
The results of that fevered campaign forced the Adamses to
accept the ascendancy of McKinleyism and the bankers. Brooks
changed his attention from domestic politics to foreign policy
as he desperately continued his attempt to exempt the United
States from the fate of the “law .” If he could not wrench the
surplus energy from the bankers, he had to discover stores of
new energy. Expansion provided the answer. Genuflecting be
fore the frontier thesis, Adams noted that “the continent which,
when W ashington lived, gave a boundless field for the expansion
of Americans, has been filled; and the risk of isolation promises to
32 Ibid., 4:3; Beringause, Brooks Adams, 122; H enry Adams, The
Letters of Henry Adams, edited by W orthington Chauncey Ford (Bos
ton and N ew York, 1930-1938), II, 100.
33 Brooks Adams to Lodge, April 3, 1896, Lodge MSS; Donovan,
Henry Adams and Brooks Adams, 90-93; Ford, “Memoir,” 348; Berin
gause, Brooks Adams, 152.
8¿f The New Empire
be more serious than the risk of an alliance.” A replacement
would have to be found for the frontier. Tracing the movement
of world empires, Brooks claimed he had found their key in the
changing locations of the center of commercial exchanges. As
he developed this idea, these centers had moved ever westward
until now they had settled in London and Paris. But they would
not remain there long. These centers would next move either
east toward Germany and Russia, or westward toward the United
States.84
T o ensure America’s rise to economic supremacy and thus
repeal the “law” which he feared was slow ly crushing the United
States of the 1890’s, Adams developed three lines of policy: en
courage American efficiency through centralization so that the
nation could compete successfully with other powers for stores
of energy; help the United States gain control of Asia, that Far
W est which contained the potential energy for which the powers
would compete; and, finally, discover a man brimming with
martial spirit who would be w illing to lead the American people
on this crusade. Brooks Adams did not concern himself with
small problems.
H e believed that he had found his man on horseback in Theo
dore Roosevelt. Throughout 1897 and early 1898 Adams and
Roosevelt believed that the approaching war with Spain would
give them the opportunities they needed to repeal the “law.”
Moving into H enry’s empty house on W ashington’s H Street,
Brooks found as frequent dinner guests Cushman Davis, Chair
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, H enry Cabot
84 Brooks Adams, “T he Spanish W ar and the Equilibrium o f the

W orld,” foru m , X X V (August, 1898), 641-651. Brooks filled out the
skeleton of this theme in his post-1898 writings. T he history of this idea
o f the westward movement of world empire is one o f the most fascinating
and least explored facets o f intellectual history. For an 1878 evaluation
based on the thesis that industrial supremacy is the key to empire, see
Leonard Courtney, “T he Migration of Centres o f Industrial Energy,”
Fortnightly Review , X X X (December, 1878), 801-820. See also the sec
tion on Josiah Strong in this chapter.
The Intellectual Formulation
Lodge, and Mahan. The Law of Civilization and Decay had
made a resounding impact, nowhere more than in W ashington.
The first printing had sold out in three months, and H enry had
made certain that all the Supreme Court Justices and the Cleve
land cabinet received copies. N ow , as the United States gathered
its immense economic strength and approached armed conflict
with Spain, leading figures of the M cKinley administration pro
claimed Brooks a prophet.35
During this period Brooks Adams, Roosevelt, and Lodge were,
in the words of Arthur F. Beringause, “three musketeers in a
world of perpetual war.” Alfred Thayer Mahan became a fourth
in 1897. Agreeing with much of Brooks’s grand strategy, Mahan
suggested the tactical details with which Brooks did not concern
himself. Because of his technical knowledge as a naval officer,
Mahan became not only the best known of the so-called intel
lectual expansionists of his time, but the most influential. Unlike
Turner, Strong, and Adams, his significance for American
foreign policy can be measured in such tangible terms as the
15,000-ton battleships built in the post-1889 period, which ini
tiated the modem United States battleship fleet.
Mahan’s approach to American expansion in the 1890’s was
less personal and more scholarly yet scarcely less dynamic than
was Adams’. The austere, scholarly, arm-chair sailor-turned-
prophet constructed a tightly knit historical justification of w hy
and how his country could expand beyond its continental limits.
Recent American historians have defined his philosophy as
“mercantilistic imperialism.” 36 N o doubt an intense study o f
35 Roosevelt to Cecil Spring-Rice, May 29,1897, Letterbooks, Theodore

Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Beringause,
Brooks Adams, 131-132, 129, 143, 156-161, 164-165; W illiams, “T he
Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy,” 387.
36 W illiam Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norm an, Okla., 1947), 4 8-
49, 294-295; Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval
Power, 1776-1918 (Princeton, 1946), 203; Foster Rhea Dulles, The Im
perial Years (N e w York, 1956), 42. T he following section, which com
pares the writings o f the early mercantilists with Mahan’s views appeared
86 The New Empire
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century mercantile empires heavily
influenced Mahan’s thinking. But characterizing him as a mer
cantilist tends to taint American expansion in the 1890’s with
strong mercantilist colors too, for his writings both reflected the
reasons for, and directly stimulated the movement into, Latin
America and the Pacific. Yet clearly, the industrial, financial,
Darwinian, and humanitarian impulses of this decade only
slightly resembled the forces of seventeenth-century mercantile
expansion. Likewise, Mahan’s thinking had few similarities w ith
the conclusions of Thomas Mun, George Berkeley, and Daniel
D efoe tw o centuries before.
A comparison of Mahan’s thought with that of the early mer
cantilists reveals several insights into the nature of American
expansion in the 1890’s. Some of his tenets meshed perfectly with
mercantilist principles. Both philosophies agreed upon the neces
sity of expansion. Both desired a favorable balance of trade. But
on most points Mahan differed, and in doing so he demonstrated
his recognition of the peculiar crisis that the United States faced
at the end of the century. The mercantilists believed tariffs were
necessary in order to enjoy favorable balances of trade; but
Mahan praised Blaine’s and M cKinley’s policy of reciprocity
and their efforts to lower tariff walls. V iew ing high tariffs as
“essentially a defensive measure,” Mahan, always on the offen
sive, stressed that “reciprocity, increased freedom of movement,
is the logical corollary of expansion.” N or did Mahan agree with
the mercantilist view that the state was an economic unit rather
than a moral or religious one, or that the welfare of the state
rated a higher priority than the welfare of the individual. Mahan
drank deeply of the “W hite Man’s Burden” elixir of his day,
and this did not mix with the view of an amoral state which rele
gated the individual to an inferior status. Few seventeenth-cen
tury mercantilists would have agreed with his dictum, “Personal
in slightly expanded form in the author’s “A N o te on the ‘M ercantilists

Imperialism’ of Alfred Thayer Mahan,” Mississippi Valley Historical
Review, XLVIII (March, 1962), 674-685.
The Intellectual Formulation *7
liberty is a greater need than political independence, the chief
value o f which is to insure the freedom of the individual.” 37
The tw o philosophies differed most notably, however, on the
three fundamental issues of production, the merchant marine,
and the nature o f colonial empires. The mercantilist solicitude
for production did not arise originally from a fear of overproduc
tion, underemployment, or overpopulation. T he desire for a
favorable balance of trade which would result in an inflow of
bullion caused seventeenth-century thinkers to want increased
production. Mahan, however, said little about production as a
means of bringing bullion into the country, and though he viewed
production as both a means and an end, he emphasized it as an
end in itself. Industrial efficiency led to the creation of a strong
naval arm, but stating the problem this w ay reverses Mahan’s
371 am deeply indebted to Curtis P. N ettels of Cornell University and

W illiam Appleman Williams of the University of W isconsin, w ho gave
me much o f their time and many insights into the relationship of mer-
cantilistic concepts and American history. T he following are helpful in
understanding mercantilist thought, especially as it related to the diplo
matic world o f the 1890’s: E. F. Heckscher, Mercantilism, translated by
Mendel Shapiro and edited b y E. F. Soderlund (2nd ed.; London, 1955);
Gustav F. von Schmoller, The Mercantile System and Its Historical
Significance . . . , translated and edited by W illiam J. Ashley (N e w
York, 1896); Philip W . Buck, The Politics of Mercantilism (N e w York,
1942); Curtis P. Nettels, “British Mercantilism and the Economic D e
velopment o f the Thirteen Colonies,” Journal of Economic History , XII
(Spring, 1952), 105-114. Some of these interpretations have been chal
lenged in a series o f articles by W illiam D . Grampp. See especially his
“T he Liberal Elements in English Mercantilism,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, LXVI (Novem ber, 1952), 465-501. For Mahan’s views on
the topics discussed in this paragraph, see A . T . Mahan, “Retrospect and
Prospect,” Retrospect and Prospect . . . (Boston, 1902), 19-22; Captain
A . T . Mahan, “T he United States Looking Outward,” The Interest of
America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston, 1897), 5; Livezey,
Mahan on Sea Power, 82-83; A. T . Mahan, From Sail to Steam: Recollec
tions of a N*aval Life (N e w York and London, 1907), 324-325. For the
differing mercantilist view, see Buck, Politics of Mercantilism, 14, 184;
and Heckscher, Mercantilism, II, 286-292. For a good discussion of
Mahan’s emphasis on morality and his concern for the welfare o f the
individual, see Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power, 258-262.
88 The New Empire
priorities. H e did not define a battleship navy as his ultimate
objective, nor did he want to create a navy merely for its own
sake. In the 1890’s he did not seek military power for the sake
o f military power.38
Mahan grounded his thesis on the central characteristic of the
United States of his time: it was an industrial complex which
produced, or would soon be capable of producing, vast sur
pluses. In the first paragraph of his classic, The Influence of Sea
Power upon H istory, 1660-1783, Mahan explained how this in
dustrial expansion led to a rivalry for markets and sources of
raw materials and would ultimately result in the need for sea
power. H e summarized his theory in a postulate: “In these three
things—production, with the necessity of exchanging products,
shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on, and colonies . . .
—is to be found the key to much of the history, as w ell as of the
policy, of nations bordering upon the sea.” The order is all-
important. Production leads to a need for shipping, which in
turn creates the need for colonies.39
Mahan’s neat postulate was peculiarly applicable to his own
time, for he clearly understood the United States of the 1890’s.
His concern, stated in 1890, that ever increasing production
would soon make necessary wider trade and markets, anticipated
the somber, depression-ridden years of post-1893. W riting three
years before Frederick Jackson Turner analyzed the disappear
ance of the American frontier, Mahan hinted its disappearance
and pointed out the implications for America’s future economic
and political structure. H e observed that the policies of the
American government since 1865 had been “directed solely to
38 See Mahan to Gen. Francis V . Greene, Sept. 17, 1900, Alfred Thayer
Mahan Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. James C. Malin
has caught the importance of Mahan’s writings for the technology of
the late nineteenth century in The Contriving Brain and the Skillful
Hand in the United States, 344.
39 A. T . Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783
(Boston, 1890), 53, 28. This postulate is mentioned two more times in
the famous first chapter, pages 70 and 83-84.
The Intellectual Formulation St
what has been called the first link in the chain which makes sea
power.” But “the increase of home consumption . . . did not
keep up with the increase of forth-putting and facility of distri
bution offered by steam.” The United States would thus have to
embark upon a new frontier, for “whether they w ill or no, Amer
icans must now begin to look outward. The growing production
of the country demands it. An increasing volume of public senti
ment demands it.” The theoretical and actual had met; the pro
ductive capacity of the United States, having finally grown too
great for its continental container and having lost its landed
frontier, had to turn to the sea, its omnipresent frontier. The
mercantilists had viewed production as a faculty to be stimulated
and consolidated in order to develop its full capabilities of pulling
wealth into the country. But Mahan dealt with a productive com
plex which had been stimulated by the government for years and
had been centralized and coordinated by corporate managers.
H e was now concerned with the problem of keeping this society
ongoing without the problems of underemployment and result
ing social upheavals.40
Reversing the traditional American idea of the oceans as a
barrier against European intrigue, Mahan compared the sea to
“a great highway; or better, perhaps . . . a wide common, over
which men pass in all directions.” T o traverse this “highway”
a nation needed a merchant marine; Mahan made this the second
part of his postulate. In his 1890 volume he expressed doubts
whether a navy could be erected without the solid foundation of
a carrying fleet.41 This, however, was one of the few times in the
decade that Mahan emphasized the necessity of a merchant
marine. As the 1890’s progressed, he could look about him and
40 Ibid., 83-84; Mahan, “A Twentieth-Century Outlook,” Interest of

America in Sea Power, 220-222; Mahan, “The United States Looking
Outward,” ibid., 21-22. In their work which traces this centralization
movement, Thomas C. Cochran and W illiam Miller call the result the
“corporate society” (The Age of Enterprise: A Social History of Indus
trial America [N e w York, 1942], 331).
41 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, 25, 87-88.
ÿo The New Empire
conclude that in this respect his theory did not correspond to
reality. Congress constructed a new battleship fleet, American
businessmen focused their attention on foreign markets, the
impetus for building an Isthmian canal accelerated, and Mahan
himself became a prophet with honor in his own country. And
all this occurred in spite of the minuteness of the American
merchant marine.
Mahan’s early theory had been misleading, for a nation no
longer had to ship its goods in its own bottoms to become com
mercially prosperous. T he exporting country only needed war
ships capable of protecting the carrying fleet, whether it be
domestic or foreign. This was a crucial result of the industrial
revolution; m odem machinery and technological inventions had
replaced the merchant marine as the process which determined
the victors in the markets of the world. It is tempting to specu
late that Mahan realized this, because after his initial outburst
in 1890 he de-emphasized the merchant marine theme. But it is
more probable that he neglected the middle link in his theory
simply because he could see the third part (military sea power)
becoming a reality without the second factor. In any case, this
de-emphasis sharply differentiated Mahan’s ideas from those of
the early mercantilists. The latter not only were concerned about
carrying their own goods, but encouraged their own nations to
develop an entrepot trade between foreign powers. W hen Mahan
im plicitly subordinated his merchant marine theme, he eliminated
the central part of early mercantilist theory.42
Most important, Mahan differed from the British and French
42 For contemporary statements of the early mercantilist view, see Buck,

The Politics of Mercantilism, 107-108; for the early view o f the entre
pôt trade, see W illiam Cunningham, Growth of English Industry and
Commerce in Modern Times: The Mercantile System (Cambridge, Eng.,
1912), 471-479. Livezey believes that Mahan paid less attention to mer
chant shipping because o f America’s comparative isolation (w hich af
forded natural geographic protection) and because seasoned sailors from
a merchant marine were of little value in the new technological navy
(241-242).
mercantilists in the final part o f his theory—the definition and
purpose of colonies. T he early writers wanted colonies as sources
o f raw materials, markets for surplus goods, and as areas for the
settlement o f a surplus or discontented population. T h ey simply
assumed the establishment of naval bases in these colonies. Mahan,
however, separated these functions of colonies. T h ey could
serve “as outlets for the home products and as a nursery for
commerce and shipping.” H e then stressed the second aspect
(colonies as strategic naval bases) and set aside the first part
(colonies as markets).43
It is especially in this crucial area—the purpose of colonial
possessions—that Mahan becomes so dissimilar to the mercan
tilists, but so representative of the special characteristics of Amer
ican expansion in the 1890’s. T o Mahan, W illiam M cKinley,
Theodore Roosevelt, and H enry Cabot Lodge, colonial posses
sions, as these men defined such possessions, served as stepping
stones to the tw o great prizes: the Latin-American and Asian
markets. This policy much less resembled traditional colonialism
than it did the new financial and industrial expansion o f the
1850-1914 period. These men did not envision “colonizing”
either Latin America or Asia. T hey did want both to exploit
these areas econom ically and give them (especially Asia) the
benefits of western, Christian civilization. T o do this, these ex
pansionists needed strategic bases from which shipping lanes
and interior interests in Asia and Latin America could be pro
tected.
In outlining his tactics, Mahan first demanded that the United
States build an Isthmian canal. This would be the channel through
which the Atlantic coast could “compete with Europe, on equal
terms as to distance, for the markets of eastern Asia” and the
markets on the western coast of Latin America. H e viewed
Hawaii through the same lens. T he islands, once in American
hands, would not only offset British naval dominance in the Pa-
43 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon H istory , 55-58, 82-87; Mahan
to B. Clark, N o v . 5, 1892, Mahan MSS.
¡>2 The New Empire
tifie, but, viewed in a postive way, be a major step in the “natural,
necessary, irrepressible” American expansion into this western
theater. But nothing better demonstrates Mahan’s nonmercan-
tilistic colonialism, strategic-bases philosophy than his view of
the Philippines in 1898. As late as July, 1898, he still entertained
doubts about annexing all the islands. H e proposed to Lodge that
the United States take only the Ladrones and Luzon (including,
of course, the port of Manila), and allow Spain to keep the
Carolines and the remainder of the Philippines. W ith the achieve
ment of his double objectives of a battleship fleet and the occu
pation of strategic bases leading to the Asian and Latin-American
markets, plus the writing of the Open-Door N otes to protect
American commerce in China (Mahan actively advised John
H ay while the State Department formulated the notes), the
United States could repudiate once and for all a colonial empire
in the mercantilist sense.44
Mahan had actually supplied the rationale for the open-door
philosophy several years before the State Department issued the
notes. H e foresaw the advantages which commercial expansion
possessed over further landed expansion. Most important, per
haps, he believed that commercial expansion would not cause
political upheaval. Using French policy in the eighteenth century
as an abject example, Mahan condemned France for pursuing a
policy of expansion through land warfare when it had outlets
to the sea. H e quickly pointed to the lesson:
A fair conclusion is, that States having a g o o d seaboard . . . w ill

find it to their advantage to seek prosperity and extension b y the
w a y o f sea and o f com m erce, rather than in attem pts to unsettle and
m o d ify existing political arrangements in countries w here a m ore
44Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power, 90-94, 181-183, 190-191; for Mahan’s

hope for an active United States in Latin America, see Influence of Sea
Power upon History , 33-35, 324-326; also Alfred T . Mahan, “T he
Isthmus and Sea Power,” The Interest of America in Sea Power , 99-100.
See also W . D. Puleston, Mahan: The Life and W ork of Captain Alfred
Thayer Mahan, U.S.N. (N e w Haven, 1939), 186-187, 194.
or less long possession of power has . . . created national allegiance
or political ties.45
Following these ideas to their conclusion, Mahan declared that,

while financial and commercial control, rather than political,
would lessen possible points of dispute, international conflict
would not end. Here military sea power entered the theory,
for “when a question arises of control over distant regions . . .
it must ultimately be decided by naval power.” Mahan em
phasized that giant battleships, not commerce destroyers as
American planners had earlier believed, would decide such con
flicts, for only battleships could gain and maintain control of
the sea. Mahan thus closed his circle: the foundation of an ex
pansive policy is a nation’s productive capacities that produce
vast surpluses; these surpluses should preferably be sold in non
colonial areas in order to lessen political irritations; and sea power
in the form of battleships enters the scheme to provide and pro
tect lines of communication and to settle the conflicts which in
evitably erupt from commercial rivalry, thus ensuring access to
foreign markets for the surplus goods.46
T he policy makers and other influential Americans who em
braced Mahan’s teachings made them a central part of the ex
pansionist ideology of the 1890’s. Albert Shaw, a close friend
of Lodge, Roosevelt, and Mahan, advanced the Captain’s ideas
through the w idely read pages of his new ly established R eview
of Reviews. Book reviewers in the most popular periodicals of
the day warmly received Mahan’s voluminous writings. Theo
dore Roosevelt, perhaps the most important of these reviewers,
emphasized the Captain’s basic ideas in the Atlantic Monthly and
then put these ideas into practice as Assistant Secretary of the
N avy in 1897-1898 and later as President. Mahan and Roosevelt
were the closest of friends and could often be found in the com
pany of Brooks Adams, John Hay, and Lodge. Congressmen
45 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon H istory, 324; also “A Tw entieth-
Century Outlook,” Interest of America in Sea Power, 220-222.
46 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon H istory, 416.
24 The New Empire
paid homage by plagiarizing not only ideas but phrases and para
graphs from Mahan’s works in order to substantiate their own
arguments for expansion.47
One of the more notable of Mahan’s converts was Hilary
Herbert, congressman from Alabama and then Secretary of the
N avy in Cleveland’s second administration. Herbert had been
a devotee of small commerce-destroying cruisers, and deprecated
both giant battleships and the training of men to operate these
battleships in the new ly established W ar College. A fter reading
Mahan’s work in 1893, Herbert reversed his opinion and saved
the W ar College just as it was about to close its doors. More im
portant, Mahan’s books demonstrated to Herbert the superior
ity which a battleship fleet enjoyed over commerce-destroyers.
B y pushing through the naval appropriation acts of 1895 and
1896, Herbert can share with Benjamin Tracy the honor of being
the founding father of the modern American navy. Mahan, in
turn, can justly receive much of the credit for both Herbert’s
and T racy’s activities.48
Mahan, both the man and his writings, continued to receive
tribute at home and abroad until his death in 1914. The course
of Brooks Adams was not as triumphant. Roosevelt and Adams
continued to try to repeal the “law” by meddling in Asia until
1906, when a rising Japan and a revolutionary Russia brought
second thoughts to the President’s mind about his Asian policies.
47Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power , 116, 171; Congressional Record , 53rd

Cong., 3rd Sess., Feb. 15, 1895, 2249-2250; for Roosevelt’s reviews see
Atlantic Monthly , LX VI (October, 1890), especially 567, and ibid., LXXI
(April, 1893), 559; see also Theodore Roosevelt, “T he Naval Policy o f
America as Outlined in Messages o f the Presidents of the United States,
from the Beginning to the Present D ay,” Proceedings of the United
States Naval Institute, XXIII (1897), 509-522; Bald, “Expansionist Senti
ment,” ch. v.
48 F. G. Chadwick to Mahan, Aug. 10, 1893, and Hilary Herbert to
Mahan, Oct. 4, 1893, Mahan MSS; Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 296-297;
see especially Herbert’s Annual Report as Secretary o f N avy in 1893
and 1896.
Brooks returned to the Adams home in Quincy, there to bury
himself in a study of John Q uincy Adams in an attempt to dis
cover the point where the United States had made its first turn
onto the road which had led to San Juan H ill and the Portsmouth
Peace Conference. In 1919, eight years before his death, he ad
mitted, “Each day I live I am less able to withstand the suspicion
that the universe, far from being an expression of law originating
in a single primary cause, is a chaos which admits of reaching no
equilibrium, and with which man is doomed eternally and hope
lessly to contend.” The recantation, of course, came too late to
mitigate his part in setting the United States on the course of
her new empire during the 1890’s.4*
T he Ideological Consensus
These four men typified and/or stimulated the thought of
American expansionists in the 1890’s. Their views provide a
start (and this chapter pretends to be no more than that) in
understanding the avowed reasons for accelerating the develop
ment of the new empire at the end of the century. In some re
spects these men disagreed with each other. But on some of the
most vital issues they reached a substantial consensus.
A ll agreed with Turner that the 1890’s marked the closing of
“the first period of American history” and the beginning of a
new epoch. T hey defined this as a crucial period partly because
they discerned the disappearance of the landed frontier. Turner,
o f course, made this central to his thesis, but the other three men
also recognized to a lesser degree the importance of the frontier
in their writings. This frontier, as Turner declared, provided
the econom ic support for political and social democracy. The
others, using as evidence either the economic importance of the
frontier and/or the glut of material wealth produced by Amer
ican factories and farms, also interpreted the cause of the crisis in
econom ic terms. This was the age o f Econom ic Man, and these
49 Beringause, Brooks Adams, 376; Ford, “Memoir,” 355-356.
pS The New Empire
writers, as they traced the crisis to economic causes, reflected the
emphasis of their time.50
Many Americans displayed their anxiety in one particularly
fascinating way; they constantly compared their era w ith the
late stages of the Roman Empire. Turner’s most influential
teacher at W isconsin, W illiam F. Allen, published in 1890 a
seminal book on the Roman Empire, which opened to Turner
new insights into American history. Brooks Adams made an
extensive study of Rome in order to trace the working o f the
“law,” and both he and Henry, although they preferred medi
eval history, were not above buttressing their pessimism w ith
references from the three centuries after Augustus. Mahan’s
study of the Punic W ars had amazingly transformed him from
an anti-imperialist in the early 1880’s to the foremost exponent
o f an offensive policy in the follow ing decade. H e compared
the “barbarians” of Asia in his own time w ith the barbarians on
the Roman frontiers who remained peaceful while Caesar held
a strong hand over them, but who overran Rome once the
Empire’s desire for peace made it soft. Cecil Spring-Rice, Sec
retary o f the British Embassy in W ashington and a close friend
of Roosevelt and both Adamses, justifiably complained to a
close friend after reading Law of Civilization and Decay:
“Everyone has a new prescription for humanity and a new
diagnosis. T hey all begin with the Roman Empire and point out
resemblances.” 51
Americans balanced the pessimism and fear implicit in this
80 For Mahan’s views especially, see “Twentieth-Century Outlook,”

Interest of America in Sea Power, 220-222, and “Isthmus and Sea Power,”
ibid., 71-72; for an interesting review which interpreted Mahan’s doc
trine as a quest for a new frontier, see “Nauticus,” “Sea Power: Its Past
and Its Future,” Fortnightly Review, reprinted in Proceedings of the
United States Naval Institute, XIX (1893), 460-484, especially 483.
51 Turner, Early Writings, 27; Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 274-277;
Mahan, “T he Possibility o f an Anglo-American Reunion,” Interest of
America in Sea Power, 118-122; The Letters and Friendships of Cecil
Spring-Rice: A Record, edited by Stephen G w ynn (Boston and N e w
York, 1929), I, 214.
analogy with the optimism and hope contained in the American
version of Social Darwinism. Perhaps Social Darwinism was
not the primary source of the expansionist ideology, but as
Mahan wrote, “ ‘the struggle of life,’ ‘the race of life,’ are
phrases so familiar that we do not feel their significance till w e
stop to think of them.” Perhaps Turner’s essay of 1891 pro
vided che neatest summary of this influence: “Historians have
accepted the doctrine of Herder. Society grows. T hey have
accepted the doctrine of Comte. Society is an organism.” But it
must be noted that other leading Social Darwinists, including
John W . Burgess, E. L. Godkin, and W illiam Graham Sumner,
could discuss an evolving American society, yet draw back from
a belligerent foreign policy or a Mahanian interpretation of “the
struggle of life.” 62
American businessmen were trapped between the concepts
o f these tw o groups of intellectuals. Few disagreed with Andrew
Carnegie’s application of Spencer’s ideas to the business com
munity. After all, the increasing flow of American industrial
goods into foreign markets after 1893 seemed to indicate that
the fittest would indeed survive. This cycle of competition
and American victories could not continue unbroken, however.
The more perceptive Social Darwinists warned that the victors
were often decided by violent as well as by peaceful competi
tion. Mahan and Brooks Adams especially emphasized this
bloody but necessary fact. W hen such a climactic occasion arose
in 1898, however, the business community became hesitant.
W anting no war to disrupt the accelerating American industrial
processes which were setting the pace in the race for survival,*25
52 Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Bos

ton, 1955), 172. There is an especially good discussion in Bald, “Ex
pansionist Sentiment,” 56-69. See also Mahan, “United States Looking
Outward,” Interest of America in Sea Power, 18, and Turner, Early
Writings, 52, 58. For the influence o f Social Darwinism on the thought
of Brooks and Henry Adams, see Donovan, Henry Adams and Brooks
Adams, 87-93, 99- Julius W . Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 ". . . (Baltimore,
1936), Ó-12, has a good discussion of Burgess.
p8 The New Empire
businessmen discovered that only war would prevent such dis
ruption. Mahan, Adams, and Strong illuminate this paradox; they
had thought out the process and divined the conclusion while
businessmen, such as Carnegie, were still enjoying the fruits but
unsuccessfully trying to evade the violent climaxes o f Social
Darwinism.
Realizing that Spencer’s ideas had such sordid aspects, several
o f the intellectuals w ho are discussed in this chapter did not
hesitate to use Social Darwinism as a justification for tw o related
ideas: the use o f military force in the struggle for survival; and
cooperation w ith Great Britain to pave the w ay for the future
assumption of power by the most fit of all the species, the A nglo-
Saxon. N o doubt Mahan contributed most to the glorification
of military power and war, but when Brooks Adams concluded
that only through the valor o f the soldier could the American
people escape the fiat of the “law ,” he differed only in slight
degree from Mahan’s extreme view. Even Strong realized that
force might be necessary if the Anglo-Saxon hoped to carry out
the w ill of the Alm ighty. This apotheosis of military power had
several sources: the Social Darwinist emphasis on struggle de
termining the fittest in primitive times, the discovery of N ietz
sche, the success of Bismarckian methods in western Europe, and
the fear o f some Americans that w ith the disappearance of the
rough-and-tumble frontier their fellow countrymen were becom
ing flabby. W hatever the source, this admiration of force and war
offered something new in American history, for with the possible
exceptions of some of the inhabitants of the Old South and the
pioneer’s notions of how to deal w ith Indians, Americans had
generally viewed war as an evil to be avoided, not cultivated.63
63 Curtí, Growth of American Thought, 673; Mahan, “T he Future in
Relation to American Naval Power,” Interest of America in Sea Power,
140-141; Puleston, Mahan, 262-263. For a pioneering essay on the rise
o f the military spirit in the U nited States during the 1890’s, see James
C. Malin, Confounded R ot about Napoleon: Reflections upon Science
and Technology y Nationalism, W orld Depression of the Eighteen-
A virulent strain of Anglo-Saxonism emerged from American
nationalism and romanticism, but men such as James K. Hosmer,
John W . Burgess, Mahan, and Strong made it particularly ac
tive and meaningful within the context of Social Darwinism.
Paradoxically the belief in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon
gained popularity as the nation’s econom y slid into an almost
continual twenty-year depression marked by violent social out
breaks. Americans could justify disposing their glut of goods
and capital with the argument that the United States, blessed
w ith so many of G od’s gifts, had the right to spread them around
the world. In doing so, some writers candidly admitted that this
was necessary also to save their own system from either anarchy
or socialism. This theme particularly runs through Mahan’s and
Strong’s writings.*64
This expansive Anglo-Saxonism found its champion in John
Fiske, perhaps the most popular public lecturer in American
history. Fiske mixed Anglo-Saxonism, Social Darwinism, and
expansionism in his w idely known lecture and article of 1885,
“Manifest D estiny.” H e gloried in the magnificent future of
American industrial productivity and anticipated Mahan with a
statement on “that sovereignty of the sea and . . . commercial
supremacy.” But Fiske was primarily concerned with the blood
less world-wide triumph of American federal institutions. This
jovial, three-hundred-pound popularizer of the Good Life
deprecated naked force, praying that “the victory of the in
dustrial over the military type of civilization” would be shortly
forthcoming. Unlike Mahan, Fiske saw American industrial
power creating a world of peace, not friction that would flame
into wars. It is a little-noted but significant fact that, when
Fiske had to follow his expansive ideas to their conclusions and
Ninettes, and Afterwards (Lawrence, Kan., 1961), especially 1-16, 159-

161.
64 Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 172, 174; Curti, Growth of American
Thought, 670-671; Puleston, Mahan, 171.
100 The New Empire
decide for or against the extension of the beneficent American
political institutions to the Philippines in 1898, he had an ex
tremely difficult time making up his mind.55
The popularization of the Anglo-Saxon mystique through
such writings as Fiske’s was a harbinger of the increasing co
operation between the State Department and the British For
eign Office. Many expansionists in Congress could not resist
twisting the Lion’s tail to delight their constituents; but others,
like Mahan and Adams, who were not bothered by biennial elec
tions, recognized the value of the developing Anglo-American
alliance. T hey found it easier to go along with British policy
in other parts of the world, moreover, once the Foreign Office
had granted recognition of United States dominance in Latin
America during the Venezuelan affair in 1895-1896. Mahan
would not agree to an Anglo-American arbitration treaty, since
he feared this would weaken the military preparedness of both
nations, but he eloquently described the importance of the tw o
great “islands,” England and N orth America, putting their sea
power in tandem in order to civilize the rest of the world.
Brooks Adams, though an avowed Anglophobe when discussing
British bankers, agreed with Mahan’s ideas of Anglo-American
cooperation in world politics, especially affairs in Asia.56
As the United States became more certain of its dominance
in Latin America, American policy makers could afford to con
centrate more of their attention on Asia. Each of the four men
discussed in this chapter believed that the Orient was destined
to be the next great theater of American overseas expansion,
though Adams and Mahan stressed this belief more than Turner
55 John Fiske, American Political Ideas Viewed from the Standpoint

of Universal History (N e w York, 1885), 125, 138-139, 143-146, 148-151,
152; John Fiske, The Letters of John Fiske, edited by his daughter Ethel
F. Fiske (N e w York, 1940), 673; Hofstadter, Social Darwinism , 176-
178; Higham, Strangers in the Land, 32-33.
56 For Adams, see Beringause, Brooks Adams, 170; for Mahan’s views,
see Mahan to Coionel John Sterling, Feb. 73 , 1896, April 27, 1897, and
Mahan to B. Clark, Jan. 17, 1896, Mahan MSS.
The Intellectual Formulation iOl
or Strong. But they could not debate just the matter o f Asia.
T hey knew that the Orient could be controlled only after the
United States had completed several very difficult intermediate
steps. Turner, who wrote of this process less than the other three,
believed the development of the frontier had already fulfilled the
prerequisites, but the others were much less sanguine. T hey
pleaded for spiritual regeneration at home, increased efficiency
of farms and factories, the building of a strong military power,
and the taking of outlying islands in order to build a solid base
for America’s Asian empire.
Like Seward, they demanded a stable and prosperous Ameri
can continent to serve as a springboard for conquests beyond
the seas. But they also trapped themselves in the same dilemma
which had ruined Seward’s plans in the 1850’s. On the one
hand, they wanted a new empire to solve domestic problems of
crisis proportions. On the other hand, they realized that only
a nation which was spiritually, economically, and politically
sound could create and maintain such an empire. American his
tory has many paradoxes, but perhaps none is more important
— or strange—than this paradox of the i8ço’s.
Turner, Strong, Adams, and Mahan, faced with the necessity
of providing an immediate solution, could offer only expansion.
Although they disagreed with each other on some points, all
agreed on this conclusion. Their answer might seem trite,
since expansion of one type or another characterizes all periods
of American history. As used by these four men, however, this
solution masked internal dynamics in American society which
indicated a turning point in the nation’s history. A t the same
time, their answer led the United States into the international
power politics of the early twentieth century. T hey defined
the paradox, then offered a solution which, though inadequate,
nevertheless made the 1890’s the watershed period o f American
history.
Ill
The Strategic Formulation
IN the hundredth year after George W ashington had taken the

oath as President of a new ly reorganized American government,
Benjamin Harrison repeated the now hallowed words and as
sumed the responsibility for starting the nation on its second cen
tury of existence. As the first hundred years had been distin
guished by fantastic continental expansion and internal economic
development, so the second century would have as its primary
characteristic the attempt of the American people to grapple with
the whirling complexities of involvements around the globe. The
first ten years of this new century, 1889-1899, indicated the
course the nation would follow . During this decade the United
States entered not only a new century chronologically speaking
but a virtually new world which ripped up the assumptions of
the previous century and forced the American people to face the
inexorable consequences of a lost security and a forfeited free
dom of action. Fittingly, the first administration of the new cen
tury expressed many of the motivations and outlined the foreign
policies that characterized the nation’s broadening involvement
in world affairs. Benjamin Harrison and his ambitious Secretary
of State, James G. Blaine, formulated the strategy the builders
of the new empire follow ed during the remainder of the 1890’s.
Í0 2
The Strategic Formulation 103
These tw o men agreed on the essentials of the new empire,
though a growing personal estrangement deprived their policies
of much of the ordered symmetry which the tidy historian might
desire. Harrison, the grandson of President W illiam H enry
Harrison, had risen through the ranks o f the Republican party
primarily because of his splendid war record, an unshakable
devotion to the party, and his ability as a conscientious, hard
working, and self-contained Indiana lawyer. His intelligence
was matched only by a forbidding reserve, which led one un
thawed visitor to remark that Harrison was the only man he
ever knew w ho could carry a piece of ice in each pants pocket
on a July afternoon and never lose a drop. Blaine, on the other
hand, had dominated the Republican party for nearly tw enty
years with warmth, charm, and a political acumen few men could
match.
Because of Blaine’s influential friends and political standing,
Harrison named him to the premiership of the cabinet, but the
new President did so only after much pressure was exerted by
such powerful Republicans as Murat Halstead, Stephen B. Elkins,
Patrick Ford, and W hitelaw Reid. Harrison’s distrust o f Blaine’s
political ambitions and disputes between the tw o men on mat
ters o f patronage cooled their relations as early as 1890. This
estrangement, combined w ith crippling attacks o f what Blaine
called lumbago and the Secretary’s intense suffering over the
deaths of his three eldest children in 1891 and early 1892, led to
the Secretary of State’s resignation in June, 1892, nearly a year
before the administration finished its duties.1
During the three previous years, however, their views had
coincided so closely that during the long months when Blaine
1 The Correspondence between Benjamin Harrison and James G .

Blaine, 1882-1893, collected and edited by Albert T . V olw iler (Phila
delphia, 1940), 2-4, 6-17, 296, 299; S. B. Elkins to Gen. L. T . Michener,
March 21, 1888, Benjamin Harrison papers, Library o f Congress, W ash
ington, D.C.; Patrick Ford to Harrison, N ov. 29, 1888, and W hitelaw
Reid to Harrison, N ov. 30, 1888, Harrison MSS; see also Hale to Blaine,
N o v . 21,1888, Blaine MSS.
lO/f The New Empire
lay bedridden, Harrison could conduct much of the diplomatic
correspondence in a manner which would arouse few disputes
between the tw o men. Many of the administration’s ambitious,
expansive policies which have been ascribed to Blaine should in
fact be more rightly credited to the President. Harrison has
never received proper recognition as a creator of the new em
pire. H is realization of this at the time widened the breach
between himself and his Secretary of State. The President re
marked with asperity to Senator Shelby Cullom in early 1892
that, although the W hite House had prepared foreign policy for
more than a year, Blaine had insisted on taking the credit.2
The Assumptions and Objectives

The search for foreign markets dominated the administration’s
foreign policies. Campaigning in Indiana in 1888, Harrison had
emphasized the protective tariff as the guardian of the home mar
ket. H e attacked low tariff advocates, who, he insisted, wanted
to replace the more valuable domestic market with the cheaper
foreign variety. But several days later he remarked that, al
though the American markets must be preserved for American
producers, “w e do not mean to be content with our own mar
ket. W e should seek to promote closer and more friendly com
mercial relations w ith the Central and South American states.” 3
A fter a year in office, Harrison found his administration be
sieged by both a panic which had originated in Europe and the
embittered western cries of the Farmers’ Alliance. W arned by
his campaign manager that depressed agricultural prices threat
ened Republican victory hopes in the 1890 and 1892 elections,
Harrison further dedicated himself to the philosophy of an ex
panded foreign trade. In his 1890 annual message, he assured
Congress that, since he had been inducted into office, he had
2 Correspondence of Harrison and Blaine, 3-4; Shelby M. Cullom, Fifty
Years of Public Service: Personal Recollections of Shelby M. Cullom
(Chicago, 1911), 252-253.
8 Benjamin Harrison, Speeches of Benjamin Harrison . . . (N e w York,
1892), n o , 66, 68.
The Strategic Formulation 10$
spared no effort in “the development of larger markets for our
products, especially our farm products.” In his 1891 message he
candidly informed Congress that the United States had been
saved from severe economic troubles only by the quickened flow
of surplus agricultural goods into foreign markets.45
Harrison’s words in 1890 and 1891 sounded like an echo of
the policies which Blaine had w idely publicized during the pre
vious decade. In accepting the Republican nomination for the
W hite House in 1884, the Plumed Knight had belittled the
foreign market as compared with the great American home mar
ket. But he sandwiched this paragraph between tw o sections
that sketched the amazing growth of foreign commerce under
previous Republican administrations. Blaine then contrasted the
old colonialism of Europe and one facet of the new empire of
the United States: “W hile the great powers of Europe are
steadily enlarging their colonial domination in Asia and Africa
it is the especial province of this country to improve and ex
pand its trade with the nations of America.” 6
On other occasions Blaine warned his countrymen that they
had little choice in this question of extending their foreign trade.
As Secretary of State in 1881 he had stressed the necessity of
extracontinental involvements since the nation’s “own vast re
sources fail to give full scope for the untiring energy of its citi
zens.” The follow ing year he described his foreign policy as one
which had attempted to bring peace to, and increase American
trade in, Latin America: “T o attain the second object the first
must be accomplished.” But he made his most direct statement
on the motivations and tenets of the new empire in a speech at
W aterville, Maine, on August 29, 1890:
4 L. T . Michener to Halford, N ov. 26, 1889, Harrison MSS; Messages

and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 122-123, 206-207. T he Ocala Platform
of the new Populist party asked for the abolition of all national banks,
a revenue tariff, increased currency, and nationalized communication and
transportation systems.
5 James G. Blaine, Political Discussions, Legislative, Diplomatic, and
Popular, 1856-1886 (N orw ich, Conn., 1887), 425-426.
io6 The New Empire
I wish to declare the opinion that the United States has reached a
point where one of its highest duties is to enlarge the area of its
foreign trade. Under the beneficent policy of protection w e have
developed a volume of manufactures which, in many departments,
overruns the demands of the home market. In the field of agricul
ture, with the immense propulsion given in it by agricultural im
plements, we can do far more than produce breadstuffs and pro
visions for our own people. . . . Our great demand is expansion. I
mean expansion of trade with countries where w e can find profitable
exchanges. W e are not seeking annexation of territory. . . . A t the
same time I think we should be unwisely content if w e did not seek
to engage in what the younger Pitt so well termed annexation of
trade.6
Although both Blaine and Harrison agreed on the necessity of

expansion into foreign markets because of domestic overproduc
tion, the Plumed Knight moved beyond the President in formu
lating systematic policies which would secure these desired ob
jectives, especially markets in Latin America. The Secretary of
State considered not only commercial expansion but also the non
economic implications of such expansion. H e thought in terms of
a hemispheric system based on peaceful intercourse, arbitral
procedures for the settlement of disputes, and conferences that
would deal with general inter-American issues. Blaine, more
than any other statesman, personified the momentous change
of his nation’s attitude toward Latin America. Formerly con
cerned primarily with the exclusion of European powers, the
United States now assumed a positive and constructive role in
order to garner the benefits of peace and prosperity for the en
tire hemisphere, and especially for itself.7
6 David Saville Muzzey, James G. Blaine: A Political Idol of Other

Days (N e w York, 1935), 365; Blaine to Morgan, June 1, 1881, Foreign
Relations, 1881, 761-762; Blaine, Political Discussions, 411. For the W ater-
ville speech see N ew York Tribune, Aug. 30, 1890, 1:6. T yler, Foreign
Policy of Blaine, 362-365 has an excellent assessment of Blaine as a tran
sitional figure in American diplomatic history.
7 Blaine, Political Discussions, 411-419.
Blaine also delineated the relationship which would have to
ensue between Europe (especially England) and Latin Amer
ica if the United States hoped to fulfill its manifest destiny in the
hemisphere. H e enjoyed a reputation as one of the most adroit
twisters of the British Lion’s tail in American politics, no mean
achievement at this time. H e once told a British Minister, “Eng
land as against the United States was always wrong,” and
Blaine’s friends freely circulated this and similar remarks at elec
tion time, especially among the Irish.8
Blaine, however, carefully controlled his anti-British passion
in order to obtain maximum results. In defining the British threat
to Latin America in 1882, he slighted its strategic aspects and
emphasized England’s increasing hold on Latin-American com
merce. H e feared that this wedge could lead to a British-
controlled Isthmian canal and a European-inspired hemispheric
alliance against United States interests. “If these tendencies are
to be averted,” Blaine warned, “if the commercial empire that
legitimately belongs to us is to be ours, w e must not lie idle and
witness its transfer to others.” 9
Since he defined this battle in commercial terms, he believed
the battle would be w on or lost through economic efficiency and
commercial advantages, not by vigorous finger waving under
the British nose. Immediately after the 1888 election, Blaine ad
vised Harrison to deal with England peacefully and patiently on
the thorny questions of the Canadian fisheries and the seals in the
Bering Sea. The Bering Sea dispute was finally solved after
Blaine refused to meet the threat of British force with Ameri
can force and instead restrained American sealers until a modus
vivendi could be agreed upon. British Minister Sir Julian Paunce-
fote informed Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, o f an
even more shocking example of Blaine’s attitude. A fter hearing so
much about the Secretary of State’s famed Anglophobia,
•M uzzey, Blaine, 425, n. 1; Murat Halstead to Harrison, D ec. 7, 1888,

Harrison MSS.
•B laine, Politial Discussions, 418-419; M uzzey, Blaine, 195-196.
io8 The New Empire
Pauncefote was astounded when Blaine arranged a “splendid”
and “brilliant” party at Mount Vernon, complete with British
flag and British national anthem, in Sir Julian’s honor. Blaine
maintained this conciliatory policy in spite of urgent requests
from politicians who demanded anti-British pronouncements for
home consumption. Blaine’s treatment of England, together with
his more constructive approach to hemispheric problems, amply
indicates how he was no longer implementing the Monroe D oc
trine with belligerent threats, but with a peaceful yet energetic
policy of commercial expansion.10
The Secretary of State shared with the President tw o other
ideas for the enlargement of foreign markets for American goods.
A t the request of N ew York businessmen and “friends in Con
gress,” Harrison sent an American agent abroad in 1890 to lay
the ground work for an international bimetallist agreement. The
administration hoped that such an agreement would increase the
nation’s foreign trade and thus raise domestic prices and solve
American difficulties in international exchanges. Blaine had
earlier observed that the increased use of silver would be neces
sary in view of the “increasing commerce of the world,” es
pecially in Asia. Harrison began to de-emphasize this policy in
1891, however. N ot only had the European powers refused to
negotiate such an agreement, but after the Sherman Silver Pur
chase A ct failed to raise the price of the metal in the United
States, silver advocates began to espouse more radical measures
which were repugnant to the administration.11
Harrison and Blaine also argued that an enlarged, subsidized
10 Blaine to Harrison, N ov. 9, 1888, Harrison MSS; Blaine to Harrison,

April 29, 1891, and March 6, 1892, Correspondence of Harrison and
Blaine; Charles S. Campbell, Jr., “T he Anglo-American Crisis in the
Bering Sea, 1890-1891, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVIIl
(December, 1961), 393-414; Pauncefote to Salisbury, May 10, 1889, Salis
bury papers, Christ Church College, Oxford, Eng.
11 Harrison to Blaine, Aug. 15, 1890, Correspondence of Harrison and
Blaine; Blaine, Political Discussions, 433; Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, IX, 194; Harrison, Speeches, 288-289.
American merchant marine would greatly increase the flow of
goods to foreign markets. The President reiterated this point in
his 1888 campaign and in his four annual messages. As befitted
a representative of Maine, Blaine had long championed the
cause of an improved merchant marine. H e believed that no mat
ter how cheaply a nation produced its goods, it had to have
“special trade relations by treaty” and a great carrying fleet in
order to retain foreign markets. A fter meeting with a committee
of steamship owners in October, 1889, Harrison supported tw o
bills in Congress: one granted mail subsidies to American steam
ship lines; the other promised bounties to American-owned ves
sels of more than five hundred tons which were built in the
United States and used in foreign trade. The bills encountered
sneering remarks from free traders such as Senator George G.
V est of Missouri, who sarcastically asked the protectionist
Harrison-Blaine supporters: “W hat has become of the home
market . . . ? N ow there is a change as sudden and marvelous
as that which came upon the great Apostle Paul as he journeyed
from Jerusalem to Damascus. N ow w e must have free trade, the
home market w ill not do.” Congress passed the mail subsidy bill,
but the House killed the bounty measure. Harrison and Blaine
continued to insist on the rejected proposal, warning that with
out a great merchant marine the new reciprocity agreements
would be “retarded and diminished.” 12
A ll these measures envisioned commercial, not landed, em
pire. As Secretary of State in 1881, Blaine had clearly enunci
ated his belief that the United States now viewed landed ex
pansion as incompatible with its general interests. There were,
however, tw o exceptions to this rule. H e continued to hope for
the annexation of Canada. Harrison summarized the second ex-
12 Blaine, Political Discussions, 423-424, 416-417, 300-310, 186-193;
Aaron Vanderbilt to Harrison, Oct. 23, 1889, Harrison MSS; John G. B.
Hutchins, The American Maritime Industries and Public Policy 1789-
1914: An Economic History (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), 437-438; Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 56-58, 124-125, 322; Congressional Rec
ord, 51st Cong., ist Sess., 6907-6909, 6916-6918.
no The New Empire
ception to the rule in a personal letter to Blaine in October, 1891:
“You know I am not much of an annexationist; though I do
feel that in some directions, as to naval stations and points of in
fluence, w e must look forward to a departure from the too con
servative opinions which have been held heretofore.” 13
T he President had first outlined this strategic bases philosophy
in his Inaugural Address when he declared that the United States
would not use “coercion” in obtaining “convenient coaling sta
tions” and “other trading privileges,” but “having fairly ob
tained them . . . our consent w ill be necessary to any modi
fication or impairment o f the concession.” Blaine told Harrison
that he fully agreed w ith this approach: “I think there are only
three places that are of value enough to be taken, that are
not continental,” the Secretary of State wrote in 1891. “One
is Hawaii and the others are Cuba and Porto R ico.” The last tw o
would not be taken “for a generation. Hawaii may come up for
decision at any unexpected hour and I hope w e shall be prepared
to decide it in the affirmative.” The administration also con
sidered the acquisition o f the Danish W est Indies, Samaná Bay
in Santo Domingo, Môle St. N icolas in Haiti, and a naval base
at Chimbóte, Peru. But when the Minister to France, W hitelaw
Reid, approached the administration with an offer from Portugal
of naval bases in Africa and on the Indian Ocean in return for
American protection of Portuguese interests, Harrison told Reid
that “it would be so flagrant a departure from the settled and
traditional policy o f this Government” that it could not “be
thought of.” 14
13 Blaine to Morgan, June 21, 1881, Foreign Relations, 1881, 768; Blaine
to Harrison, Sept. 23, 1891, and Harrison to Blaine, Oct. 1, 1891, Corre
spondence of Harrison and Blaine.
14 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 10; A. T . Volw iler, “Harri
son, Blaine, and American Foreign Policy, 1889-1893,” Proceedings of
the American Philosophical Society, LXXIX (N ovem ber, 1938), 637-
639; Blaine to Harrison, Aug. 10, 1891, Correspondence of Harrison and
Blaine; Reid to Harrison, Oct. 9, 1891, Harrison to Reid, July 12, 1891,
Harrison to Reid, Oct. 21, 1891, all in Harrison MSS. For Harrison’s
The Strategic Formulation Ill
These attempts to obtain strategic bases can be understood

only in terms of the administration’s belief that future American
commercial expansion would largely depend upon an American-
controlled Isthmian canal. A future passageway in Central
America would be the crucial link in the American chain of
being which began with the production of surplus goods and
ended in the dependence on foreign markets. T he Maritime
Canal Company had been organized in 1887 to construct a canal
through Nicaragua. Four years later, Harrison asked Congress to
take the major step of giving governmental guarantee of the com
pany’s bonds. In his annual message of 1891, the President even
quoted a leading Democrat, Senator John T . Morgan, who had
said that, regardless of the risk and cost, “the canal is the most im
portant subject now connected with the commercial growth and
progress of the United States.” It should be observed that Harri
son spoke of the canal in commercial, not strategic, terms. T o en
sure a more flexible and efficient policy in the area, Blaine pushed
through Congress a measure that authorized an additional Ameri
can Minister for Central America. N o w instead of a single min
ister for the entire area, one man was responsible for Costa Rica,
El Salvador, and Nicaragua, and another for Guatemala and
Honduras.1561
T he Harrison-Blaine approach posited American control of
this hemisphere. T he administration’s policies, climaxing in the
Cleveland-Olney success in the Venezuelan affair o f 1895-1896,
laid the necessary groundwork for the establishment of a strong
home base and the requisite freedom of action in the W estern
Hemisphere which allowed the M cKinley administration to
interest in opening up trade in the Congo basin in Africa, see Harrison

to Morgan, Feb. 8, 1892, Harrison MSS; on the Chimbóte negotiations
see Seward W . Livermore, “American Strategy Diplom acy in the South
Pacific, 1890-1914,” Pacific Historical Review, XII (March, 1943), 33-52.
16 Harrison to Blaine, Jan. 17, 1889, Harrison MSS; Blaine to Harrison,
A ug. 16, 1890, Correspondence of Harrison and Blaine; Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, IX, 188-189; W illiams, Anglo-American Isthmian
Diplomacy, 287.
112 The N e w Empire
move into Asia. The M cK inley-H ay policies for the Orient
could be seriously considered only after the Harrison-Blaine
policies had achieved success in the Americas. The Môle St.
Nicolas, Hawaii, and reciprocity were to Harrison what the
Philippines and the Open Door were to M cKinley.
Van-Americanism: “The Battle for a Market”

The quest of the Harrison administration for a new empire
may be adequately examined in its policies regarding the con
struction of a battleship navy, Haiti, Chile, Samoa, and Hawaii.
But perhaps Harrison and Blaine best demonstrated their grasp
o f the industrial revolution’s significance for American foreign
affairs when they formulated their Pan-American and tariff
policies. Blaine had called a meeting of the American nations
(w ith the exception of Canada) in 1881, but Frelinghuysen had
withdrawn the invitations. The idea of such a general conference
gained adherents during the decade, however. Congressmen
W illiam M cKinley of Ohio and James B. McCreary of Ken
tucky, Senators W illiam Frye of Maine and John T . Morgan of
Alabama, and such publicists as Hinton Helper and W illiam
E. Curtis kept the issue before Congress and the people. The
idea rapidly received popular, bipartisan support. In 1888 Presi
dent Cleveland issued a call for a conference of W estern Hemis
pheric nations (except Canada) to meet the follow ing year in
W ashington. H e hoped that it would consider the possibility of
a customs union, inter-American rail and steamship lines, trade
mark and copyright laws, common silver coins, and arbitration
treaties.18
Harrison and Blaine entertained high hopes for the proposed
conference. T hey chose the United States commission carefully;
16 International American Conference, Reports of Committees and
Discussion Thereon (W ashington, D.C., 1890), I, 7-8 (V , 293-375, con
tains an excellent summary of speeches and resolutions in the United
States Congress during the 1880’s); Blaine, Political Discussions, 403-406;
T yler, Foreign Policy of Blaine, 166-174; Arthur P. W hitaker, The
W estern Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, N .Y ., 1954), 77.
Blaine, for example, rejected the name of W illiam R. Grace, who
had widespread banking and shipping interests in Latin America,
because Grace was “too largely involved in Chilian and Peruvian
affairs to act as American Commr.” But the results of this first
Inter-American Conference proved disappointing. The delegates
early disposed of the customs union idea as impractical, and then
only seven delegations agreed to Blaine’s pet idea o f an arbitra
tion treaty. T he conference did agree on recommending an
inter-American bank (which Harrison unsuccessfully tried to
sell to Congress) ; an intercontinental railroad commission (which
after a slow start produced the beginnings of the railroad in the
twentieth century); and the establishment of the Commercial
Bureau o f the American Republics, which, in the words of
Blaine’s contemporary biographer, “became a permanent branch
of the State Department and a true intelligence office regarding
the W estern hemisphere.” G oodwill also gushed from a 6,000-
mile trip through forty-one American industrial centers. The
delegates enjoyed this excursion on a special train which was
modestly described as representing “a money value of $150,000,”
and “whose elegance, comfort, and luxury a fairy prince might
covet.” 17
One final result proved to be of most importance for the
Harrison administration. After rejecting the customs union idea,
the conference suggested reciprocity treaties. Some delegates,
especially those from Argentina and Chile, attacked this recom
mendation on the ground that the United States produced many
o f the same raw materials which Latin America possessed, and
this similarity, they believed, made impossible any real recipro
cal trade. A nyw ay, these delegates observed, at the very time
the conference was meeting, committees in the House of Repre
sentatives were busily jacking up the American tariff wall in
17 Blaine to Harrison, Aug. 25, 1889, Correspondence of Harrison and
Blaine; see also ibid., 101, 110-112; International American Conference,
I, 73, and III, 3-4; Public Opinion, April 13, 1889, 16-17.-T h e biographer
quoted is Gail Hamilton [Mary Abigail D odge], Biography of James G.
Blaine (N orw ich, Conn., 1895), 680.
order to discourage imports. The conference nevertheless rec
ommended such treaties. Blaine seized on this opportunity to re
vive his decade-old dream of rechanneling the Latin-Am erican-
European current of goods into a Latin-Am erican-United States
stream—to make the flow of trade run uphill, as one critic ob
served. Anticipating a mid-twentieth-century dilemma, Blaine
began worrying about his country’s unfavorable trade balance
with Latin America. The resulting deficit balance of payments
was depleting the United States gold reserves. H e believed in
creased exports to be the solution. American commercial journals
agreed with him and heartily endorsed the reciprocity recom
mendations of the conference.18
But Congress proved less enthusiastic. Although Blaine made
an impassioned plea for reciprocity to the House W ays and
Means Committee in February, 1890, the House passed the tariff
bill on May 21 without a reciprocity clause. T he Secretary of
State then joined battle in the Senate. On June 19, Senator
Eugene Hale of Blaine’s home state o f Maine proposed a far-
reaching measure (inspired by the Secretary of State) which if
passed would have included Canada as w ell as Latin America, and
also would have provided for virtually free trade in raw ma
terials. The amendment gained few adherents, and Hale himself
later disavowed it.18
Blaine began encountering problems which could not be
solved by a simple amendment. T o make advantageous reciproc
ity treaties he needed goods with which to bargain. Markets for
w ool and sugar would be especially attractive to the several
Latin-American nations that exported large quantities o f these
18 See International American Conference, I, 103-265, for the debates
and criticism of the American position on the tariff; Blaine, Political
Discussions, 418; see the summary o f press opinion on the Inter-American
Conference in Public Opinion, N ov. 2, 1889, 77-80, and in Bald, “Ex
pansionist Sentiment,” 13 5-13 7.
19Laughlin and W illis, Reciprocity, 178-179; Muzzey, Blaine, 444;
Senate Executive Document N o. i$8, 51st Cong., ist Sess. (serial 2688),
2-6; H ale’s position is given in Congressional Record, 51st Cong., ist Sess.,
6256, 6259; ibid., 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 6987.
The Strategic F annulation 115
tw o products. But in response to powerful lobbies, M cKinley,
who managed the bill through the House, raised the w ool tariff
virtually out of sight, thus serving notice that this duty was not
negotiable. This left only sugar as a possible bargaining card.
Again M cKinley dashed Blaine’s hopes by putting sugar on the
free list. This gave the Latin-American sugar-producing nations
free entry into the rich American market without the exaction
of any trade concessions in return. Blaine and Harrison believed
this to be economic idiocy. But the gift of free sugar in an elec
tion year, plus the fact that sugar revenues were largely respon
sible for the embarrassingly huge Treasury surplus, led Congress
to exalt its action as a choice example of political astuteness.
Staunch protectionists, meanwhile, attacked reciprocity as sub
version of high tariff principles. Free trade advocates, however,
complained that Blaine’s idea would not work extensively enough
to suit their tastes. In early June the chances for reciprocity grew
less and less.20
Making the last great political effort o f his career, Blaine re
fused to give up. As W ashington endured the dog days of July
and early August, the Secretary’s arguments slow ly but percep
tibly gained adherents. The major breakthrough occurred in
mid-June when the Senate Finance Committee hit upon a w ay
to obtain both free sugar and reciprocity. As Blaine phrased it
in a letter of July 23, reciprocity could be reconciled with free
sugar “by inserting a proviso that if . . . the States or Colonies
from which w e derive sugar shall not by their laws or by treaty
give us reciprocal advantages a duty shall go upon sugar from
such states.” It is difficult to determine whether Harrison, Blaine,
or a member of Congress divined this solution first. It was prob
ably Blaine. But there can be no doubt that it passed the upper
house principally because the President lobbied intensely for the
20Laughlin and W illis, Reciprocity , 180; Hamilton, Blaine, 683; M c

Kinley to Blaine, D ec. 9, 1891, Blaine MSS; Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, IX, 74; Congressional Record, 51st Congress, ist Sess., 9005,
9549-
n6 The N e w Empire
proviso. Harrison sweated through dinner parties and confer
ences planned to bring together congressmen chary of the reci
procity issue, while an ailing Blaine enjoyed the sea breezes at
Bar Harbor.21
The President received crucial support from three sources.
The Senate approved the amendment, but it still had to run the
gamut of obstacles in the House. Here M cKinley took control
and shepherded the amendment safely around the many pitfalls.
The Ohio Republican had been impressed with Blaine’s idea
after several meetings in the congressman’s Ebbitt H otel room.
As M cKinley saw the tariff rates rocket upwards, he became
fearful of the possible political consequences. H e ameliorated
conditions somewhat by including a proviso giving a 99 per cent
drawback on raw materials imported for the manufacture of
finished goods which would be, in turn, exported. Proclaiming
to foreign trade expansionists, “Here is the opportunity for
you,” M cKinley could naturally view reciprocity as the supple
ment of the free raw materials clause; it would provide the
markets for the final disposal of finished goods. Other protec
tionists in both houses lined up with the measure, including
Justin Morrill, who heretofore had sworn that the Executive
had no constitutional right to make reciprocity agreements. For
virtually the first time, high tariff advocates had taken reciproc
ity from the free trade arsenal (where European economists had
long assumed it belonged) and had forged it into a weapon
which projected surplus goods over the reinforced high tariff
wall and out into the markets of the world.22
21 Blaine to Harrison, July 19, 21, 22, 23, 1890, and Harrison to Blaine,
Oct. i, 1891, Correspondence of Harrison and Blaine; Laughlin and W illis,
Reciprocity, 178; Hamilton, Blaine, 687. For the contemporary debate
over w ho should have received credit for thinking of the reciprocity
amendment, see P. C. Cheyney to Gen. L. T . Michener, March 23, 1893,
N elson Aldrich papers. Library of Congress, W ashington, D.C.; also
comments o f A . T . V olw iler in Aldrich MSS, notes of Jeanette Nichols.
22 For a particularly effective speech on the values o f reciprocity, see
Gilbert Pierce’s long effort on Sept. 3, 1890, in Congressional Record,
51st Cong., ist Sess., 9605-9613. Pierce, w ho proposed a reciprocity
The Strategic Formulation u 7
Blaine had especially hoped that reciprocity would open mar
kets for the glut of agricultural goods flooding out of the
trans-Mississippi region. W hen agrarians realized the importance
of the amendment, they provided a second major source of sup
port. Concerned about the weakening of the Republican party
among western farmers because of the silver issue, Blaine com
plained in an open letter that, as reported out by the House
committee, not a line in the tariff bill would “open a market for
another bushel of wheat or another barrel of pork.” Instead,
“our foreign market for breadstuffs grows narrower.” Free
traders such as Senator George Vest of Missouri assailed as
ludicrous the idea that American farmers could find markets
in the great wheat and beef areas of Latin America. “Ail this
talk of reciprocity and pan-American conventions and brass
bands and terrapin and champagne is the merest froth and rot,”
V est blared. But another western free trader admitted, “Blaine’s
plan has run like a prairie fire all over m y district.” Officials of
the Farmers’ Alliance and other agrarian groups began to exert
pressure on behalf of the bill. As one senator explained, the
farmers wanted free sugar, but they also wanted wider markets.
Reciprocity promised both.23
amendment on July 18, began his discussion by noting that “someone”

had said: “W hoever commands the sea commands the trade, and whoever
commands the trade of the world commands the riches o f the world and
consequently the world itself.” Pierce believed the reciprocity amend
ment aimed at, “not to be too sanguine or hopeful, ultimately command
ing the world.” See also T . B. Reed to M cKinley, Jan. 30, 1892, W illiam
M cKinley papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. There is a
good discussion in H . W ayne Morgan, “T he Congressional Career of
W illiam M cKinley” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cali
fornia, Los Angeles, i960), 145-146, 148, 178-183. On the vital issue of
reconciling “most-favored-nation” clauses with reciprocity, see Harri
son’s pronouncement which settled the issue in Messages and Papers of
the Presidents, IX, 123.
23N ew York Tribune, July 15, 1890, 2:1; July 26, 1890, 1:5; Muzzey,
Blaine, 445-447; Hamilton, Blaine, 687-688; Laughlin and W illis, Rec
iprocity, 189-190; Congressional Record, 51st Cong., ist Sess., 7803-
7808, 9938.
i iS The N e w Empire
One “prominent W estern Republican,” as the N ew York T rib
une labeled him, insisted that reciprocity would not help the
farmer, but noted that he had received a letter from a harvester
manufacturer in his state who said that 2,800 of his company’s
harvesters had been sold in Argentina alone, and that the Latin-
American demand should now steadily increase. Industrial jour
nals agreed. Iron A ge, The Chattanooga Tradesman, American
Manufacturer and Iron W or Id, and the D ry G oods Economist
echoed the Age of Steel's virile belief that reciprocity would
“annex territories and markets from under the muzzles of its
competitors’ guns,” and be a “mapmaker” in expanding Ameri
can industrial power. Even the arch anti-imperialist Harper's
W eekly approved reciprocity because mature American indus
tries “look out into the world, and feel ready for its strife and
eager for its prizes.” Blaine played to this sentiment of manufac
turers in his open letters written during the summer of 1890.
This third major source of support provided much-needed help
when the bill reached its final stages in September.24
The reciprocity amendment was assured of passage when the
support of these forces became apparent in August. The Senate
passed the clause 37-28 with 19 abstentions. As M cKinley pre
pared to drive the measure through the House, the bill seemed
certain of success, but Blaine took no chances. In his most ex
plosive and brilliant speech on the subject, the Secretary of
State explained to a cheering W aterville, Maine, audience the
facts of American industrial life. Bragging that protectionist
policies had allowed the United States to reach “a point where
one of its highest duties is to enlarge the area of its foreign
24 See the testimonial signed by a long list o f N e w York merchants

representing $50,000,000 of investments which was given to Blaine in
appreciation of the Secretary’s fight for reciprocity, N e w York Tribune,
Feb. 28,1891, 1:4; also Chattanooga Tradesman, Feb. 15, 1891,48-49; Bald,
“Expansionist Sentiment,” 161-162; Laughlin and W illis, Reciprocity,
111-112, 205; Blaine to Harrison, July 24, 1890, Correspondence of Harri
son and Blaine. Blaine’s letter to the editor of the Boston Journal in N e w
York Tribune, Sept. 17, 1890, 1:6, stresses markets for leather products.
T he Strategic Formulation up
trade,” Blaine graphically described how mechanization was
producing a plethora of agricultural and industrial goods. Pro
duction could not be cut back; “it would not be an ambitious
destiny for so great a country as ours to manufacture only what
w e consume, or to produce only what w e eat.” The United
States wanted to find no more outlets through the annexation
of territory, but only through the “annexation of trade.” More
over, Blaine concluded, unless its foreign trade expanded, the
United States would have trouble with specie payments. Reci
procity treaties, especially with Latin America, would help to
solve all of these problems. The Secretary’s speech received a
warm welcom e from commercial journals.25
Harrison signed the tariff bill into law on October i. T he
reciprocity provision gave him the power to suspend by procla
mation the entrance of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides
from another country into the United States whenever he found
that the other country discriminated against American exports
in a manner which “he may deem to be reciprocally unequal
and unreasonable.” Blaine immediately notified the Latin-
American nations of the act. Under threat of exclusion of their
staple exports from the American market unless they signed
reciprocity treaties, all except Colombia, Haiti, and Venezuela
entered into such pacts. Harrison promptly reimposed the for
mer duties on the goods from these three nations.
Overall the agreements did little to increase American exports
or imports, although exact assessment is difficult because the
1890 depression and bad crops in Latin America from 1891 to
1893 hurt buying power. But in certain areas the treaties had a
most significant effect. T w o classes of exports—flour, grains,
and meat products, on the one hand, and railroad iron, building
materials, and machinery, on the other—greatly benefited. Trade
with Brazil and the W est Indies became especially more impor
tant. But nowhere did reciprocity have greater effect than in
25 N e w York Tribune , Aug. 30, 1890, 1:6. For a good summary o f the
reaction, see Bald, “Expansionist Sentiment,” 12 2-12 3.
Cuba. Its exports to the United States jumped from $54,000,000
in 1891 to $79,000,000 in 1893. W hen the 1894 tariff removed
the reciprocity provision, the Cuban economy collapsed and
became the spawning ground for the revolution which climaxed
in the Spanish-American W ar. The Harrison administration also
achieved some notable successes in opening the west-European
market to American goods. A reciprocity agreement with Ger
many allowed American pork into an area where it had pre
viously faced stiff discriminations. Hawaii, however, lost its
favored position granted by the reciprocity treaty of 1887. After
Harrison and Blaine unsuccessfully tried to restore the former
dispensation, Hawaii provided a preview of the later Cuban
situation by sliding into economic chaos and then into revolution
in i 893.2#
One of the more interesting results of the reciprocity battle
was its effect on Harrison’s views. In defending the home market
he had frequently declared, “If the farmer could deliver his
surplus produce to the consumer out of his farm-wagon his
independence and his profits would be larger and surer.” In
1891 the President set out on a long cross-country trip during
which this theme virtually disappeared in the wake of his en
thusiasm for the expansion of foreign trade.
A t Galveston, Texas, Harrison discussed the problem of tak
ing Latin-American markets away from the European powers,
bragged how the Inter-American Conference and reciprocity
pacts made a good start toward this end, and then concluded
that the job could be finished if the United States had a subsi
dized merchant marine and steamship lines. A t San Francisco
the President reiterated the need for a carrying fleet and put
26Laughlin and W illis, Reciprocity , 212-214, ch. vii; John L. Gignilliat,
“Pigs, Politics, and Protection: T he European Boycott of American
Pork, 1879-1891,” Agricultural H istory , X X X V (January, 1961), 3-12.
There are many letters in the Harrison MSS on the European discrimi
nations against American meat products; a summary is in Harrison to
Reid, Oct. 21, 1891.
new emphasis on the Nicaraguan canal project. W hile traveling

eastward, he constantly stressed the need to solve the problem
o f disposing of the nation’s surplus goods. A fter using the farm
wagon analogy when speaking to an Omaha, Nebraska, audience,
he then added, uW e have a surplus production in these great
valleys for which w e must seek foreign markets.” By the time
the Presidential Special had reached Vermont, Harrison was
proclaiming the need to do “battle for a market” throughout the
world. The United States coveted no territory, but “w e have
come to a time in our development” when surplus capital and
an overabundance of goods forced the nation to demand a
greater foreign commerce. “Larger foreign markets, . . . peace
ful relations with all mankind, with naval and coast defences
that w ill silently make an effective argument on the side of peace,
are the policies that I would pursue.” Harrison had confirmed
the assessment of Sir Alexander Galt, Canada’s leading financial
expert: “The American tariff is . . . an act of commercial
war.” 27
The Beginnings of the M odem Battleship N avy

Commercial war could easily flash into a military conflict.
This was the lesson Alfred Thayer Mahan taught in his influ
ential writings published after 1890. Between 1889 and 1892
other new empire expansionists arrived at the same conclusion
in a series of significant congressional debates. T he result was
the creation of the United States battleship fleet.
Although the modem navy had its origins in the appropria
tion act of 1883, this and follow ing measures authorized the
building of small, unarmored cruisers in the range of 7,000 to
7,500 tons, vessels capable only of hit-and-run destruction of
commerce. The argument, later associated with Mahan, for large
27 Harrison, Speeches, 287, 325, 388, 409, 415, 467-468, 499-500, 522,
540-541; also see the President’s commendation o f reciprocity in Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 313.
armored battleships which could enjoy a wide cruising range
and hold their ow n in pitched major naval battles on the high
seas found inadequate support.
A congressional consensus on the battleship theory occurred
after the arrival of Benjamin F. Tracy as Harrison’s Secretary
o f the N avy. The tw o events were directly related. T he
President-elect had named Tracy in an effort to m ollify com
peting Republican factions in N ew York, but Harrison had done
so only after receiving assurance from several close advisers that
Tracy could handle a post which the Chief Executive regarded
“as one of the most important in my Cabinet.” As the Boston
Journal reported, Congress was in a big-navy mood, and no
cabinet post promised “more to statesmen w ho are ambitious to
increase their reputations.” A leading lawyer and judge in N ew
York during the 1870’s and 1880’s, Tracy fully lived up to
expectations. Besides initiating the battleship fleet, he organized
the Bureau of Construction and Repair to eliminate much of
the red tape which had restricted the designing and building of
new ships. H e also established the Naval Reserve in 1891, issued
a contract for the first American submarine in 1893, presided
over the production of the first heavy rapid-fire guns, smokeless
powder, torpedoes, and heavy armor, and reversed a former
N avy Department decision in order to save the Naval W ar Col
lege, where Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon H istory
was gestating.28
T racy’s first annual report in December, 1889, set the new
battleship navy on its course, but the Secretary received much
help in properly arranging the stage for rapid congressional
action. W hile writing the report, he worked closely w ith Sena
tor Eugene Hale, a powerful big-navy advocate from Maine.
T he confrontation o f American and German naval units at
28 Harrison to Elkins, Jan. 18 and 21, 1889, Harrison MSS; “Private

Memoranda” in Correspondence of Harrison and Blaine, 300; Public
Opinion, Feb. 9, 1889, 364; Annual R eport of the Secretary of the N avy,
1892, 6-7; Volw iler, “Harrison, Blaine . . . 1889-1893,” 638.
T he Strategic Formulation 123
Samoa earlier in the year made some reticent Americans realize
the power implications of expansion into the closed frontiers of
the South Pacific. Finally, T racy’s report was follow ed by a
message from the Naval Policy Board, which made the Secre
tary’s paper seem almost antiexpansionist. Reiterating the con
cepts of the new empire theory, the naval officers on the board
noted that the United States wanted no colonies, but that the
nation would have to protect its expanding foreign trade. The
officers then asked for 200 ships, including a fleet of battleships
w ith a cruising range of 15,000 miles. Extreme expansionists,
including the leaders of the House Committee on Naval Affairs,
found in this report much ammunition for their arguments;
more moderate expansionists, such as Hale, disclaimed the paper
and used it to illustrate to their conservative colleagues just how
moderate T racy’s demands really were.29
Although it was moderate relative to the board’s report, the
Secretary’s 1889 message was nevertheless epochal. Tracy de
manded a fleet not for “conquest, but defense.” H e defined a
defensive fleet, however, quite differently from those who ad
vocated fast cruisers for purposes of hit-and-run destroying of
commerce. In words that could (and might) have been plagia
rized from Mahan’s manuscript, Tracy wrote: “W e must have
the force to raise blockades. . . . Finally, w e must be able”
to attack an enemy’s own coast, “for a war, though defensive
in principle, may be conducted most effectively by being of
fensive in its operations.”
H e then easily switched to the offensive: “The nation that is
ready to strike the first blow w ill gain an advantage which its
antagonist can never offset.” Tracy evidently believed defense
meant deterrent first-strike capability. H e realized such a navy
would be expensive, but “it is the premium’paid by the United
29 Hale to Tracy, Oct. 20, 1889, Benjamin T racy papers, Library o f

Congress, W ashington, D.C.; Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power ,
206-211; “Report o f Policy Board,” Proceedings of the United States
Naval Institute} X V I (1890), 201-273.
12 $ The N eto Empire
States for the insurance of its acquired wealth and its growing
industries.” The Secretary predicted that the theaters of future
naval action would be the G ulf of M exico and the Pacific, areas
where American interests had grown so rapidly and were “too
important to be left longer unprotected.” H e demanded two
fleets of batdeships, eight in the Pacific and twelve in the A t
lantic, and asked for eight such capital ships immediately. H e
also requested five more first-class cruisers and “at least five”
torpedo boats.30
Tracy momentarily dropped his efforts to drive these meas
ures through Congress when he lost his w ife and younger
daughter in a fire which swept their W ashington home in
February, 1890. But as Tracy grieved, big-navy advocates such
as Hale and Representatives Charles A. Boutelle of Maine and
H enry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts rapidly took up the cudg
els. In introducing the 1890 measure, which called for three
armored battleships, Boutelle explained that the Naval Affairs
Committee had had a choice of either larger, far-ranging ar
mored vessels which could “go to any part of the world,” or
armored 8,500-ton ships which could capably protect the coasts
of North and Central America. The committee chose the latter
in the belief that there should be “evolution” toward greater
battleships. This disarmed some opponents, as did Lodge’s shrewd
suggestion in committee that the ships be called “sea-going,
coastline battleships.” Opposition nevertheless appeared from
several factions: those who rightly termed the bill a “new de
parture” and refused to strike out on a course which might have
so many unpredictable consequences; those who believed that
for defensive “coastline” purposes old-fashioned monitors would
be more effective than battleships; fhose who stuck with the
commerce-destroying thesis and so wanted only smaller, cheaper
cruisers; those w illing to vote only for land defenses in harbors;
30 Report of the Secretary of the N a vy, 1889, 3-50; Sprout, Rise of
American Naval Power, 207.
and those wanting as little as possible on grounds of econom y.31
But these arguments made few inroads on a Congress which
had grown amazingly offensive-minded since 1888. Assuming
extracontinental commercial expansion as a fact of life, the big-
navy advocates proceeded to draw all the conclusions. T hey
sketched horrible pictures of a possible war with the great com
mercial competitor, Great Britain. Hale pointed out several
times that “w e have got to be so that w e can strike Bermuda,
the W est Indies, and Halifax . . . and the seas round about.”
Senator Joseph R. H aw ley of Connecticut added that when in
trouble with England “you can not negotiate without a gun.”
H aw ley was also among those who based his argument for bat
tleships on the necessity of safeguarding the future Isthmian
commercial thoroughfare.
W hen some Populists arose to dispute the arguments for a
powerful navy, they met quick challenges from other western
ers w ho had a better grasp of the situation. “W e have grown to
first rank among commercial nations,” proclaimed Jonathan
Dolliver of Iowa. “W e must have ships, not to make war on
anybody, but to keep other people from disturbing either our
prestige or our rights.” The recalcitrant westerners also received
a warning from W illiam A . M cAdoo o f N ew Jersey (destined
to be Assistant Secretary of the N avy under Cleveland, 1893-
1897) : “One month o f blockade of our ports on the seacoast and
you would bum more com in Kansas than you now do. One
month’s blockade on the Pacific coast and you would find your
trade with the Orient cut off.” W ith obvious sectional and
partisan divisions, Congress authorized the three first-class bat
tleships and a 7,300-ton cruiser. The new empire expansionists
had begun to acquire an adequate military arm.32
81 Congressional Record , 51st Cong., ist Sess., 3163-3164, 3166, 3170,
3258, 3267,5175, 5296. See the minority report o f the Senate Naval Affairs
Committee in Senate Report N o. 174, 51st Cong., ist Sess. (serial 2703),
especially 1-7.
82 Congressional Record , 51st Cong., ist Sess., 3167-3169, 5227-5228,
W hen Tracy returned to make similar requests in his 1890
report, he found a lame-duck Republican Congress reluctant to
cooperate. But in 1891 the Secretary submitted a report which
ranks w ith his famous 1889 paper. H e warned: “Commercial
supremacy by a European power in . . . the W estern Hemis
phere means the exclusion of American influence and the virtual
destruction, as far as that state is concerned, of independent
existence. W ith the great maritime powers it is only a step from
commercial control to territorial control.” Stressing the “rapid
extension o f commercial relations” in the area, Tracy predicted
“a great rivalry o f three or four nations in the Pacific for the
commerce of those seas.” In fact, he reported, “the rivalry has
already begun, and the signs are evident on every hand of sharp
competition.” The Senate, led by Hale and Frank H iscock of
N ew York, forced the House to accept one battleship. T he most
significant result, however, was the type of ship appropriated.
T racy later called it “seagoing battleship N o. 1” and noted how
its increased coal supply gave it a much greater “radius of ac
tion” than the ships appropriated in 1890 enjoyed. The 1892
vessel, which gained fame as the “Iowa,” was a most important
step upward in what Boutelle had termed the “evolution” of the
American navy.* 83
Harrison had fully backed his Secretary of the N avy, even
rephrasing T racy’s commercial arguments for a larger navy in
presidential messages. W hen Harrison and Tracy entered office
in 1889, the United States ranked between the tw elfth and
seventeenth notches among the navies of the world. W hen they
left W ashington four years later, the United States occupied
5288. There is an interesting note on the committee infighting in A . C.

Buell to Charles Cramp, Sept. 17, 1891, T racy MSS.
83 Annual Report of the Secretary of the N avy, 1891, 30-34. Andrew
Carnegie was ecstatic over T racy’s 1891 message; see Carnegie to Tracy,
D ec. 8, 1891, T racy MSS. T racy’s comment on the 1892 battleship is in
his Annual Report, 1892, 14, 4. Also Congressional Record, 52 nd Cong.,
ist Sess., 3222-3225, 3270, 3362,4357-4358, 3329, 4258, 4266. See H iscock’s
important speech in ibid., 4321-4322.
seventh place and was climbing rapidly. Tracy had boasted in an
interview in 1891: “The sea w ill be the future seat o f empire.
And w e shall rule it as certainly as the sun doth rise.” In prepar
ing the United States to occupy this “seat of empire,” Tracy had
few equals.84
The Haitian Revolution

W hen it entered office, the Harrison administration inherited
a marvelous opportunity to acquire a naval base in the Carib
bean for the N ew N avy and to gain added advantages for
American commerce as well. A revolution had erupted in Haiti,
and the nation had divided into a northern faction, headed by
the forces of H yppolite, and the southern group, led by Legi
time. The latter claimed control of the nation’s government. As
European, especially French, influence swung behind Legitime,
the Cleveland administration began to show marked favor to
ward the northern movement. This favor increased in Decem
ber, 1888, when H yppolite’s agents indicated to American
representatives that, if sufficient aid could be gathered to put
H yppolite into control, the United States would be rewarded
with a new commercial agreement and perhaps even the valuable
Haitian naval base o f Môle St. Nicolas. By January, 1889, the
representative of the Legitime regime in W ashington was com
plaining to Bayard that the State Department was not acting in
a neutral fashion in handling the Haitian situation.35
In 1882 Blaine had publicized his Latin-American policy
which, he claimed, aimed first at peace in the area and then com
mercial expansion. But in dealing with Haiti from 1889 to 1891,
the Secretary of State demonstrated that he cared more about
commercial expansion than about peace. In the early summer
o f 1889 Blaine bluntly demanded of the Legitime government a
84 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 200-201; Volw iler, “Har
rison, Blaine . . . 1889-1893,” 638-639, 648.
85 Nemours to Bayard, Dec. 21, 1888, Preston to Bayard, Jan. 2 and
Jan. 25, 1889, in N otes from Haitian Legation, N A , R G 59; John Bassett
Moore to Bayard, N ov. 15, 1888, Bayard MSS.
naval station and American representation of H aiti in European
capitals. A stunned agent of Legitime’s refused both requests.
Blaine indicated his displeasure by refusing to deal any longer
w ith the agent. The Secretary o f State then instructed the com
mander of the considerable American fleet in Haitian waters to
disregard the blockade with which Legitime had attempted to
strangle the H yppolite group. American supplies flowed un
hindered to the northern forces. In October, 1889, H yppolite
gained control of the nation. The Harrison administration mean
while prepared to collect for past favors.3®
W illiam P. Clyde, a wealthy American shipbuilder and mer
chant w ho enjoyed large interests in Haiti, also began his col
lection for favors rendered. Keeping closely in touch with the
Harrison administration through Secretary of the N avy Tracy,
Clyde had helped the H yppolite forces in every possible w ay.
H e assured Tracy that “the successful party now recognize who
their friends have been, and if our Government w ill go w isely
about it . . . w e can secure any thing, in m y opinion, which w e
should in decency ask.” For his reward in helping the victors,
Clyde asked for a steamship-line monopoly between the United
States and Haiti, accompanied by a subsidy of $480,000 spread
over ten years, from the new ly established government. H yp
polite, however, proved strangely reluctant to pay such a price
for Clyde’s help. H e also dawdled in response to Blaine’s hints
for Môle St. Nicolas. Under pressure from Clyde and Tracy,
and unnecessarily fearful of French intervention, the Secretary
o f State decided in December, 1890, to force a showdown with
H yppolite.37786
86 Memorandum, Adee to Harrison, Sept. 17, 1889, T racy to Blaine,

July 13, 1889, Gherardi to Tracy, July 10, 1889, all in Harrison MSS. See
George Boutwell’s condemnation o f Harrison’s course o f action in his
letter to the President, July 6, 1889; Preston to Blaine, March 28, March
30, April 18, 1889, N otes from Haitian Legation, N A , R G 59; Rayford
W . Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti ,
1776-1891 (Chapel H ill, N.C ., 1941), 408-425.
87 Clyde to Tracy, Oct. 15, 1890, May 31, 1889, T racy MSS; Blaine’s
The Strategic Formulation 12p
Blaine first verbally instructed the American Minister, Fred
erick Douglass, to sound out the Haitian Foreign Minister,
Anténor Firmin, on the possibility of obtaining Môle St. Nicolas.
The talks proved unfruitful, so in January, Blaine sent Rear
Admiral Bancroft Gherardi with special powers to negotiate
for a lease on the naval base. In return, Gherardi could guaran
tee that the United States would maintain the H yppolite gov
ernment in power against any enemy. Firmin again stalled. A t
this point Blaine sent the Squadron of Evolution, which in
cluded the most powerful ships in the navy, to make a show of
force off Port-au-Prince. The Haitian Minister in W ashington,
however, hurried a telegram to Firmin assuring him that the
administration would never use the force. Unfortunately for
Blaine’s well-laid plans, the cable message arrived before the
warships. On April 22 Haiti firmly rejected Blaine’s offer. Five
days later Gherardi returned to the United States. Clyde pan
icked, reminded Tracy that “I have half a million of dollars at
stake,” and demanded a reopening of the negotiations. Under
Clyde’s pressure, Douglass resigned in July, 1891. But Tracy
cabled to Clyde on September 10, “Can do nothing more.” 38 *
As Harrison had insisted during his campaign and after, the
United States wanted naval bases, but the administration would
not use coercion to obtain them. Coercion comes in several
forms. In using the term Harrison evidently meant military
coercion. In the Haitian incident his administration did not
hesitate to use other types it had available. N or did Blaine hesi
tate to encourage revolution in Haiti in order to bring a govern
ment to power which he considered more amenable to Ameri-
fear o f France is displayed in Pauncefote to Salisbury, Jan. 10, 1890,

Salisbury MSS.
38 Logan, United States and Haiti , 427-457; Clyde to Tracy, April 25
and May 27,1891, and T racy to Clyde, Sept. 10, 1891, T racy MSS. Oddly,
Clyde had wanted Firmin to remain in the Haitian cabinet in m id-1890
to hold off pro-French influences; see Clyde to Tracy, May 26, 1890,
T racy MSS.
iß o T he N e w Empire
can interests. A fter failing in Haiti, the Secretary of State did
not give up his quest for a naval base. Blaine began negotiations
with Santo Domingo for Samaná Bay. W hen the mere rumors
of the talks spread across the small nation, Santo Dom ingo’s
Foreign Minister had to flee into exile to escape the wrath of
his people. W hether measured by results or virtue, the story of
the Harrison administration’s attempts to obtain strategic bases
in the Caribbean is not a creditable one.
The Chilean Revolution

Although stopping short of military coercion in Haiti, Har
rison came very close to using such force against Chile in early
1892. Embittered at what he considered to be an inexcusable
Chilean attack on American sailors, the President nearly threw
over three years of patient building of the inter-American
system for a war to defend the national honor. But it is his earlier
course in dealing with the Chilean revolution, especially Blaine’s
response to the rapidly moving events in that Latin-American
nation, which provides the important clues concerning the ad
ministration’s expansive foreign policies. In focusing on the
drama of the “Baltimore” incident, historians have lost much of
the real importance of American-Chilean relations in 1890-1892.
Conditions were nearly perfect for trouble between the tw o
nations. As Secretary of State in 1881, Blaine had incurred
Chilean enmity by attempting to save Peruvian interests when
the W ar of the Pacific broke out between Chile and Peru. Then
and later Blaine publicly interpreted the conflict as British-
inspired, and during the 1880’s he openly criticized the growing
English investments in Chile. In 1886 the Balmaceda government,
more prone to a favorable view of the United States than
former Chilean governments had been, came to power. Blaine
attempted to build on this advantage by naming as American
Minister, Patrick Egan, a shrewd manipulator of the Irish vote.
W ith this single move, the new Secretary of State paid off cer-
tain political debts and openly declared war upon British influ
ence in Chile.39
In January, 1891, congressional forces revolted when Bal-
maceda attempted to usurp certain legislative powers. £gan
made it a point in his reports to Blaine during the next six
months to tie the rebels to European influences. The Minister
had some justification. T he insurgents displayed laudable fore
sight in first seizing rich nitrate fields and then establishing a
most profitable trade with British and German buyers. German
warships shortly appeared to ensure the continuance of this
trade. Realizing that United States aid was his only hope, Bal-
maceda courted American favor until Chileans assumed that
their President represented Yankee interests and vice versa.
Egan praised the embattled government for taking “prompt and
energetic steps” to protect United States citizens and property.
The State Department refused to sell to Balmaceda a warship
he had urgently requested, but Egan was able to procure addi
tional shipping facilities for the President.40
The fines were more firmly drawn when the rebel steamer,
the “Itata,” stoked with coal from English and German ships,
moved to the California coast to buy arms and ammunition.
Blaine had previously taken the correct neutral position of
allowing the United States to sell arms to both sides, but when
news reached W ashington of the “Itata” voyage in the first
w eek of May, 1891, Attorney General W arner Miller and
Secretary of the N avy Tracy ordered American naval units to
pursue and capture the insurgent ship. Blaine meanwhile lay ill
in the home of his son-in-law, W alter Damrosch, in N ew York
39V olwiler, “Harrison, Blaine . . . 1889-1893,” 639; T yler, Foreign

Policy of Blaine, 128-131; D evoy, Breslin, and Carroll to W harton Barker,
June 24,1888, Box 4, W harton Barker papers, Library o f Congress, W ash
ington, D.C.
40 Egan to Blaine, Feb. 13, March 17, April 21, April 23, 1891, Chile,
Despatches, N A , R G 59; H enry Clay Evans, Jr., Chile and Its Relations
•with the United States (Durham, N.C ., 1927), 138-139..
i^2 The N e w Empire
City. The Secretary of State might have follow ed a different
policy had he been in touch with the situation. A fter an exciting
pursuit down the coast of Central America, the insurgents
handed the “Itata” stores over to the American naval commander
off the rebel-held Chilean port of Iquique. The commander as
sured Tracy that “the appearance of a squadron of modem
vessels on this coast” explained “the compliance with the D e
partment’s demands” by the insurgents. The Balmaceda govern
ment profusely thanked the State Department for its efforts.41
The rebels, however, became rather surly over the affair, and
their displeasure with past American action grew more apparent
as they marched closer to victory. In late spring the State D e
partment considered offering its services in mediating the con
flict. Significantly, the Second Assistant Secretary of State,
A lvey Adee, advised against such a move on the grounds that it
would help the rebels. But when the slipping Balmaceda govern
ment hinted to Egan that it would appreciate such mediation,
the United States offered its friendly offlces. The insurgents
bluntly turned down the offer. Relations grew worse between
the United States and the rebels when the American naval com
mander tipped off the location of an insurgent invasion force to
Balmaceda’s shore batteries. N or did matters improve after the
rebels triumphed in late August when a United States court
confirmed their protests by declaring that the “Itata” should not
have been stopped by American ships; when the State Depart
ment hesitated several days before recognizing the new Chilean
government; and, finally, when Egan insisted on granting asylum
41 Memorandum dated March 8, 1891, Harrison MSS, tells the “Itata”

episode well; also Comm. G. £ . W ingate to Chief o f Bureau o f Naviga
tion, June iz, 1891, and McCann to T racy, June 13, 1891, Area 9 file, Box
15, N A , R G 45. T he response of the Balmaceda government is in Lieut.
Harlow to W . E. Curtis, June 9, 1889, Harrison MSS; that of the rebels
in McCann to T racy, June 22 and May 12, 1891, Area 9 file. Box 15, N A ,
R G 45; there is a good background in T yler, Foreign Policy of Blaine,
I3 5 -J4 I.
to Balmaceda’s supporters in spite of heated complaints from the
new government.42
Harrison meanwhile had developed little liking for the new
government. Greatly overworked during the sweltering W ash
ington summer, the President had been forced to deal with the
Bering Sea problem, the dangerous implications of the lynching
of eleven Italians in N ew Orleans, and the revolution in Chile.
H e had coped with such perplexities while his Secretary of
State lay incapacitated at Bar Harbor, while the Second Assistant
Secretary was “unwell” most of the summer, and while the
Third Assistant Secretary prepared to resign. As Harrison told
Blaine with admirable understatement, these events have “made
life here rather uncomfortable.” In the same letter the President
complained that the rebel government did not “know how to use
victory with dignity and moderation; and sometime it may be
necessary to instruct them.” 43
A t the same time both Egan and the commander o f the Ameri
can squadron off Valparaiso frequently informed the State and
N avy Departments of the intense hostility shown toward the
United States because of the administration’s support of the de
feated Balmaceda faction. Conditions in both Chile and the
United States could have been detonated at the slightest provo
cation. On October 16 fighting broke out between sailors from
the U.S.S. “Baltimore” and Chileans in the True Blue Saloon in
42 There is an excellent summary o f mediation and peace negotiations

in a memorandum dated March 8, 1891, Harrison MSS; Adee’s comment
is in letter to Harrison, May 28, 1891, Harrison MSS; W harton to Egan,
June i, 1891, Chile, Instructions, and Egan to Blaine, June 9, 1891, Chile,
Despatches, N A , R G 59; Brown to Tracy, N o v . 15, 1891, Area 9 file,
Box 16, N A , R G 45; Egan to W harton, Oct. 22, 1891, Harrison to Blaine,
Sept. 26, 1891, John W . Foster to W . H . H . Miller, Sept. 2, 1891, all in
Harrison MSS. For Chilean hatred for United States help to Balmaceda
see Robley D . Evans, A Sailor's Log: Recollections of Forty Years of
Naval Life (N e w York, 1901), 266-267.
43 Harrison to Blaine, Sept. 26, 1891, Correspondence of Harrison and
Blaine.
¡24 The N e w Empire
Valparaiso. T w o Americans were stabbed to death and seventeen
more injured. Six months of distrust and hatred had borne a
tragic climax.44
Chile moved slow ly in investigating the affair. Having no
doubts that it had been a flagrantly unjust attack on the Ameri
can uniform, Harrison warned in his annual message on Decem
ber 9 that the United States “expect full and prompt reparation.”
Three days later the Chilean Foreign Minister answered w ith
an inexcusable public note which maligned both Egan and
Harrison. V iew ing this act as an atrocious insult to the Ameri
can government, Harrison ordered the navy to prepare for
action. W hile hurrying the fleet into war preparations, Secre
tary Tracy also worked to unite the cabinet behind Harrison's
ultimatum of immediate apologies or severed diplomatic rela
tions. Blaine, however, stalled further presidential actions for
several weeks with the argument that the present Chilean gov
ernment was provisional and would shortly be replaced with,
perhaps, a more conciliatory cabinet.45
During the first three weeks of January, 1892, Blaine stopped
the sending of the ultimatum, although, as Harrison’s private
secretary recorded in his diary, “the President stated that all the
members o f the Cabinet are for war.” Matters worsened on
January 20 when Chile demanded Egan’s recall. On January 21,
bowing to Harrison’s militancy, the Secretary of State sent the
44 Schley to T racy, Oct. 30, N o v . 2, N ov. 28, 1891, all in Area 9 file.
Box 16, N A , R G 45. For Chilean animosity before the “Baltimore” inci
dent see Evans, A Sailor's Log; also Egan to Blaine, Sept. 24, Chile, D es
patches, N A , R G 59; Schley to T racy, Sept. 25, 1891, Cipher Messages,
Entry 19, 1888-1895, and Schley to T racy, D ec. 18, 1891, Area 9 file.
Box 16, N A , R G 45.
45 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 185-186; Egan to Blaine,
D ec. 12, 1891, Chile Despatches, N A , R G 59. For U.S. war preparations
see Rear Admiral George Brown to T racy, D ec. 14, 1891, Area 9 file.
Box 16, and a series of T racy’s telegrams to various commanders and N avy
Yard personnel between D ec. 22 and Jan. 13, in Cipher Messages Sent,
1888-1895, both in N A , R G 45. For Chilean preparation for war see Col.
Frederick D . Grant to Blaine, Jan. 7, 1892, Harrison MSS; Evans to
T racy, Jan. 17,1892, Cipher Messages, Entry 19, 1888-1895, N A , R G 45.
ultimatum. Four days passed without an answer. Then Harrison
laid the matter before Congress with a ringing message which
reviewed the assault upon the American sailors and the impudent
Chilean message of December 12. T he President concluded that
Congress, which under the Constitution had the sole power to
declare war, should take “such action as may be deemed ap
propriate.” Evidence exists which indicates that Blaine punctured
Harrison’s effort to whip up congressional enthusiasm by leak
ing the news to several congressmen that Chile had virtually
capitulated. If true, Blaine would not have had to resort to such
tactics to stop the outbreak of war, for within twenty-four
hours after Harrison sent the message, Chile backed down. She
finally paid a $75,000 indemnity for the “Baltimore” episode.46
This close brush w ith war resulted from the attack on the
American sailors in Valparaiso and Chile’s reluctance to offer a
suitable indemnity. These events, in turn, can be understood
only in the context of the souring relations between the United
States and the insurgents during the summer of 1891. Few
historians have stopped to ask the legitimate question: W hy did
the United States get involved with this revolution?
T he outbreak of the revolution posed the first major challenge
to the good intentions o f the Harrison-Blaine Pan-American
policies. W hen suddenly faced with a European-supported, anti-
American revolutionary force that was rapidly growing more
powerful, these good intentions dissipated. The administration
failed in its attempts to preserve the small foothold American
46 V olwiler, “Harrison, Blaine . . . 1889-1893,” 643-647; Adee to H al
ford, Jan. 13, 1892, Blaine to Egan, Jan. 16, 1892, M ontt to Blaine, Jan.
20, 1892, and typewritten memorandum of Harrison’s, not sent, same
date, all in Harrison MSS; Blaine to Egan, Jan. 21, 1892, Chile, Instruc
tions, N A , R G 59; Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 215-216.
For the fascinating story o f the Blaine “leak” see Hilary Herbert’s memo
randa for an autobiography, 310-313, in Herbert papers, University o f
N orth Carolina Library, Chapel H ill, N.C . It should be recognized that
Herbert wrote this a quarter century later. H e makes several obvious
errors in chronology. For the encouragement which W . R. Grace &
Company gave Blaine’s peaceful stand, see Evans, A Sailor’s Log , 277-278.
The N e w Empire
interests had obtained since 1886 under Balmaceda. T o solve
the resulting crisis, Harrison pushed for war. Blaine, however,
advocated a more moderate course in the hope that relations
could be restored and the United States could, as the Secretary
of State said later, “make a friend o f Chili—if that is possible.”
During the tense final week of the crisis, the N ew York Tribune,
the foremost administration mouthpiece, explained American
interest in Chile:
The danger to the United States in these crises arises from the dis
position of Europeans to interfere, the while pretending that they
are merely defending their own commercial interests. In Chili and
the Argentine, the most progressive commercial countries of South
America, we have permitted England to obtain monopoly of trade.
We have talked lustily about the “Monroe Doctrine” while Great
Britain has been building ships and opening markets. British sub
jects to-day hold a chattel mortgage over Chili and the Argentine.
. . . N o American who wishes his country to possess the influence
in commerce and affairs to which its position among the nations en
titles it can be pleased with this situation.47
The Chilean episode provided an example of the crises that

could occur when the Harrison-Blaine Latin-American policies,
working through nascent but vigorous American interests, faced
a severe setback at the hands of European-supported revolu
tionaries. An expansive Pan-American policy could engender
great risks as w ell as fond hopes.
The N e w Empire in the W estern Pacific, 1889-1892

These events in the W estern Hemisphere dominated the ad
ministration’s attention in foreign affairs, but Blaine found time
early in his term to advance the concepts of the new empire in
the far Pacific. In one instance, however, he changed one of
47 N e w York Tribune, Jan. 22, 1891, 5:3. T he Blaine quotation is in
Blaine to Harrison, Jan. 29, 1892; see also the letter o f Jan. 30, 1892,
Correspondence of Harrison and Blaine.
Seward’s tenets. For many years Blaine had outspokenly advo
cated the restriction of Chinese laborers from American shores.
The resulting ill w ill reduced correspondence between the State
Department and the Chinese legation to a trickle during the
1889-1892 period.48
But this anti-Chinese attitude also produced positive results
for the Plumed Knight’s foreign policies. W hile in Garfield’s
cabinet, Blaine had written the instructions which ordered
Commodore Robert Shufeldt to open Korea. Frelinghuysen and
Bayard had afterwards attempted to minimize Chinese influence
in the Hermit Kingdom in order to open new opportunities for
Americans. In 1888 and 1889 Horace Allen, the most active of
these Americans in Korea, had been approaching N ew York
capitalists to gather funds for the exploitation of the immense
Korean mineral riches. H e held out special hopes for help from
Blaine, whom Allen called “m y friend.” In formulating his
Korean policy, the new Secretary of State posited that nation’s
independence from China. H e assured Allen that, if American
concession hunters inveigled contracts from the King, the State
Department would “guarantee the parties—if of good standing
— to take measures looking to the success of their work.” Blaine
also indicated a readiness to work for a coaling station in order
to head off the Chinese and the Russians. But the Secretary of
State most tangibly demonstrated his interest by naming Allen
Secretary of the American Legation in Seoul.49
Greatly encouraged by Blaine’s actions and also by the prom
ise of extensive financial help from the large W all Street firm
of Morton-Bliss (headed by new ly elected Vice-President of
the United States, Levi P. M orton), Allen sped back to Korea
to gain control of the mineral wealth in north Pangyang, the
48 Blaine, Political Discussions, 216-235; T yler, Foreign Policy of Blaine,

ch. x.
49 Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” 184; Foreign Relations, 1881, 638; Har
rington, God, Mammon, and the Japanese, 134-135.
iß 8 The N e w Empire
richest gold mines in Asia. It took him five years to accomplish
his mission, but w ith Blaine’s help he had jumped off to a rou$
ing start.
T he Secretary o f State obtained more immediate results in
Samoa. Here German-American animosities, aggravated to
nearly the point of war, had suddenly lessened when a devastat
ing hurricane destroyed the American and German warships
which had been threatening each other in Apia harbor. A t the
tragic cost of many lives, the diplomatic atmosphere had cleared
only a month before British, German, and American representa
tives were to meet in Berlin to negotiate the Samoan problem.
Although Germany possessed the largest financial stake in the
islands, Chancellor O tto von Bismarck had decided not to risk
a war in order to protect them. Calling Samoa “this little mat
ter,” Bismarck began an orderly retreat from his previous mili
tant position.60
It was fortunate that Bismarck could thus change his policies,
for Blaine did not enjoy such freedom of action. In late January,
Congress had launched into a tirade which had ended in an
$100,000 appropriation for the strengthening of the United
States position at Pago Pago. The American press, especially in
the W est, follow ed the lead of the ultraexpansionist San Fran
cisco Chamber of Commerce, which demanded “a decided pol
icy on Samoa.” Realizing the intensity of public opinion on the
issue, Blaine had spent long hours studying the Samoan situation
before assuming office. Thus his instructions to the American
commissioners on April u , 1889, were not written in a spur-of-
the-moment fashion.61
H e principally demanded the harbor o f Pago Pago, because
“our interest in the Pacific is steadily increasing; . . . our com
merce with the East is developing largely and rapidly”; and05
50 Stolberg-W em igerode, Germany and the United States, 252-255,

260.
61 Ibid., 255-258; Sherman to Harrison, March 9, 1889, Harrison MSS;
Muzzey, Blaine, 398, n. 3.
there is “the certainty of an early opening of an Isthmian
Transit.” But significantly, Blaine backed down from Bayard’s
former demand for a virtual three-power protectorate over the
islands. T he new Secretary of State called this idea a “joint
protectorate” and wanted no part of such political obligations.
Blaine had nothing better to offer, however, so instructed the
commissioners to feel their w ay through the early negotia
tions.62
John Kasson, a leading exponent of “larger policies” in Ameri
can foreign affairs, led the United States commission; but com
pared w ith the other tw o members, W illiam W . Phelps and
George H . Bates, Kasson could be termed a moderate expansion
ist. Count Herbert von Bismarck refused to shake hands with
Bates because of an article which the American had written in
Century Magazine. Bates had attacked German claims to Samoa
and urged American control, since the islands provided the
“key of maritime dominion in the Pacific” and would open up
markets “more than sufficient to absorb our surplus production.”
W ith this tough-minded delegation working on Bismarck’s
earlier predilections of softening the German position, the
Americans were assured of obtaining most of their demands.
The final pact gave the United States its claims to Pago Pago and
minimized German influence, but Blaine did have to accept a
three-power protectorate. The only alternative was outright
partition of the islands; this would have meant even greater
political responsibilities.53
T he press in Paris and London believed that the United States
had scored a great victory. But in the United States some jour
nals expressed grave reservations. Harper’s W eekly feared the
pact took “the first step” in the American attempt “to adjust the
152Foreign Relations, 1889, 201; Ryden, U.S. and Sattioa, 434-442, 465-
4 66.
53 Younger, Kasson , 355-360; George H . Bates, “Some Aspects o f the
Samoan Question,” Century Magazine, XXXVII (April, 1889), especially
947; Phelps to Blaine, May 24, 1889, Blaine MSS; Blaine to Harrison,
May 20, 1889, Harrison MSS.
¡¿o The N e w Empire
governments and settle the domestic troubles of other semi-
civilized communities throughout the world.” W ithin a year
the Secretary of State learned that the Samoan business could
indeed be irksome. Skirmishes broke out between native fac
tions supported by German, British, and American officials.
Blaine disgustedly told the German Minister in August, 1890,
that he wished the United States could get out of Samoa—but
retain Pago Pago. Unfortunately for the Secretary’s peace of
mind, the tw o desires were contradictory.54
Samoan troubles plagued Harrison’s administration until its
close. As late as Novem ber 21, 1892, Blaine’s replacement, John
W . Foster, received word from the islands that the British had
their eyes on part of Pago Pago. Foster sent word to London
that the British would be wise to keep their distance. This warn
ing provided the fitting conclusion to the administration’s Sa
moan policy.55
In a larger historical context, the meaning of the events in
Berlin, Washington, and Samoa during these four years become
clearer. John Bassett Moore, who was Third Assistant Secretary
of State during the Berlin conference, looked back on the affair
a generation later and noted its importance: “N o incident in the
history of the United States . . . [better] prepares us to under
stand the acquisition of the Philippines, than the course of our
government toward the Samoan Islands.” 55
A Premature American Frontier in the Pacific

The United States now enjoyed tw o of the finest naval stations
in the Pacific. T o retain Pago Pago, Blaine, shouldering more
political responsibility than he desired, had entered into a three-
power protectorate. In an effort to consolidate American hold-
64 Younger, Kasson, 360; Dozer, “Anti-Imperialism,” 179; Phelps to
Blaine, Sept. 4, 1889, Blaine MSS; Stolberg-W ernigerode, Germany and
the United States, 267.
65 Foster to W hite, N ov. 21, 1892, Great Britain, Instructions, N A ,
R G 59.
56 “Autobiography,” Envelope II, Folder C, Box 207, Moore MSS.
ings in Hawaii, including the magnificent Pearl Harbor base,
the Secretary of State first attempted to obtain a protectorate in
1890. W hen this attempt failed, the Harrison administration
encouraged a revolution which, W ashington officials hoped,
would result in the annexation of the islands. Since other schol
ars have revealed this story with all its details,57 only the bare
outlines w ill be related here. The major concerns of the present
discussion are two: first, w hy did the Harrison administration
abandon the tenets of the new empire and attempt to assume full
political control over the islands; second, w hy did the adminis
tration fail in carrying through its annexationist plans. This
failure reveals much about the progress of the new empire as
o f 1893.
W hen Blaine re-entered office in 1889, the United States en
joyed a firm hold on Hawaiian affairs but none of the day-to-day
political burdens. As Secretary of State in 1881, he had empha
sized that “the material possession of Hawaii is not desired by
the United States,” though he did foresee circumstances which
might make American control necessary, such as the growing
power of Great Britain and Japan or the disintegration of the
native government. Blaine considered the islands as part of the
“American system,” a belief he made explicit when he unsuc
cessfully invited Hawaiian representatives to attend the Inter-
American Conference in 1889. H e further indicated his interest
by naming John L. Stevens as American Minister in 1889.
Stevens and Blaine had been close friends in Maine. T hey shared
the same inclination for an active foreign policy. A paucity of
instructions in the State Department Archives from Blaine to
Stevens indicates the Secretary’s concurrence and confidence
in his Minister’s views.58
U ntil the M cKinley tariff of 1890 the United States effectively
6TT he most complete account is W illiam Adam Russ, Jr., The Ha
waiian Revolution (,1893-1894) (Selinsgrove, Pa., 1959); see also Pratt,
Expansionists of 1898, and Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii.
58 Blaine, Political Discussions, 388-396; T yler, Foreign Policy of
Blainey 198-202.
i^2 The N e w Empire
controlled Hawaii through the reciprocity agreements which
had begun in 1876. As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
reported later, the 1875 treaty had been negotiated in order to
make the islands “industrially and commercially a part of the
United States,” and to prevent “any other great power from
securing a foothold there.” In these terms it had been brilliantly
successful. In 1891, the last year before the M cKinley measure
became effective, Hawaii exported 274,982,295 pounds of sugar
to the American mainland, but only 285 pounds to all other na
tions. Then the islands felt the heavy blow of the 1890 tariff.
W ith Harrison’s and Blaine’s prodding, M cKinley introduced a
bill that helped some Hawaiian products re-enter the American
market, but nothing could be done for sugar. The hold of the
United States was further shaken when in February, 1890, a
new native-backed, anti-American political party won a squeaky
victory in island elections.69
W hen the free sugar provision became a probability, Blaine
quickly acted. In late 1889 and early 1890 he attempted to negoti
ate a treaty that would have transformed the islands into a formal
American protectorate. In return for complete commercial
reciprocity and the possibility of enjoying any bounties Ameri
can sugar growers might receive, Hawaii would promise to sign
no treaties with foreign powers without American approval and
to allow United States military units to land at the State D e
partment’s discretion. T he cession of Pearl Harbor would be
made permanent as w ell as exclusive. The pact presaged nearly
all the famous articles of the later Platt Amendment except the
latter’s concern for Cuban sanitation. Evidence exists that Blaine
especially urged the guarantee of Hawaiian political independ
ence and autonomy, while at the same time he suggested the95
59 Russ, Hawaiian Revolution , 33, 12-15; Stevens to Blaine, Sept. 5,

1891, Harrison MSS. N ote that American exports to Hawaii did not fall
after 1890 as did American imports from Hawaii; see Laughlin and W illis,
Reciprocity , 104; Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 187-203.
limitation upon the islands’ treaty powers and the provision al
low ing the United States to land troops.60
T he later attempt of the Harrison administration to annex
Hawaii, and thus assume the political responsibilities which this
treaty avoided, can be understood only in the light o f Hawaii’s
failure to agree to the pact. Anti-American and native factions
amended the treaty until the United States found it unacceptable.
Blaine, Harrison, and Stevens pinned the blame especially on
certain Canadians who were close to both the Hawaiian mon
archy and Canadian Pacific Railroad interests. The incident did
nothing to alleviate Blame’s churlish distrust of Canadians.61
On January 29, 1891, the anti-American faction’s hold on the
islands’ government became more secure when Queen Lili-
uokalani ascended to the throne. A s Stevens warned the State
Department, the new Queen possessed “extreme notions of
sovereign authority.” The American Minister had dinned the
threat posed by foreign-supported groups into Harrison’s and
Blaine’s ears for tw o years, and now the Minister’s fears were
rapidly being confirmed. “I feel sure that American interests
there are in jeopardy,” the Chief Executive wrote Blaine in
September, 1891, “but just how far w e can go and what action
w e can take to thwart the schemes of those who are seeking to
bring the islands under the control of European powers I do not
yet see.” Throughout 1892 Stevens and the various American
naval commanders in Hawaii enhanced these fears of the Euro
pean bogeymen with long dispatches vividly describing the vari
ous threats to American interests.62
60 Blaine to Harrison, Sept. 16, 1891, Harrison MSS, also in Corre

spondence of Harrison and Blaine; Pauncefote to Salisbury, Jan. 10, 1890,
Salisbury MSS; Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 196-203.
61 Blaine to Harrison, Sept. 16, 1891, Harrison MSS; T yler, Foreign
Policy of Blaine, 205.
62 Harrison to Blaine, Sept. 18 and Oct. 14, 1891, Correspondence of
Harrison and Blaine. See Pauncefote’s summary o f Blaine’s attitude as
the British Ambassador explained it to Gresham, March 16, 1893, M emo-
in The New Empire
Stevens had the golden opportunity in mid-January, 1893, to
free the islands forever from the threat o f foreign domination.
B y the end of 1892 the Queen had succeeded in assuming some
o f the power formerly held by the legislature. Unsatisfied, she
moved to gather more control in January, 1893, with a success
ful political coup which resulted in an antiplanter ministry. T he
conservative planter interests probably would not have been able
to regain their former influence for some time if the Queen had
not then made a major blunder. On January 14, she attempted to
re-establish a constitution which would give her nearly absolute
power. T w o days later, after urgent advice from her ministers,
she repudiated this attempt. But it was too late.
A group of radical annexationists had formed the Annexa
tionist Club the previous year to prepare for the opportune
moment, and they were prepared to use force to create the
moment. The club’s representative in W ashington, Lorrin A.
Thurston, received encouragement from Blaine and especially
from Tracy. A month before the revolt occurred, both T racy
and the new Secretary o f State, John W . Foster, assured
Thurston that they realized the desirability of annexation. T he
final and most helpful encouragement came from American sail
ors of the U.S.S. “Boston,” who landed on the evening of Janu
ary 16 ostensibly to protect American property. Just a few hours
before, the annexationists had whipped up public meetings to
contest the Queen’s grab for power. The follow ing day the revo
lutionaries marched into the government buildings without op
position from the native forces, who feared that resistance
would lead to a battle with the sailors. On January 18 the new
government sent commissioners to W ashington to work out the
procedure for annexation. Harrison sent the treaty to the Senate
on February 15 with the justification that the revolution had
made it “quite evident that the monarchy had become . . . so
randum o f Conversation, N A , R G 59; N e w York Tribune , Jan. 23, 1891,

6:4; Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii , 193-203; Captain W iltse
to Tracy, Oct. 12, 1892, Area 9 file, Box 19, N A , R G 45.
weak and inadequate as to be the prey of designing and un
scrupulous persons.” N oting that the United States had a choice
between establishing a protectorate and “full and complete”
annexation, the President urged the latter.63
Harrison’s change of mind between 1890 and 1893 was
momentous. Moving away from the protectorate idea, he sud
denly confronted the American people with a historic choice:
would they assume political responsibilities over a chaotic popula
tion of about 88,000 natives and 2,000 white planters in order
that the United States might continue to derive the commercial
and strategic advantages which it had enjoyed without such
political burdens? The President answered with an unequivocal
“Yes” on his part. H e based his decision on several factors. First,
he and Blaine had unsuccessfully tried to establish a protectorate
in 1890. N ow a government much more amenable to American
interests had assumed power. But in view of the kaleidoscopic
events in Hawaiian politics during the previous three years, no
one could be certain how long the revolutionaries could maintain
their position. O nly annexation would finally solve the problem.
Harrison especially feared that the downfall of the revolution
ary government would bring renewed onslaughts from Canadian,
British, and Japanese influences on the islands. Immediately after
the revolution in mid-January, these powers had assured the
United States that they had no designs on Hawaii, but the ad
ministration remained uneasy. On February 4, the American
Minister in London sent the State Department a series of clip
pings which revealed that nearly every London newspaper had
acquiesced to the inevitability of United States annexation. Only
one, the Daily Telegraphy thought otherwise. A lvey Adee, the
Second Assistant Secretary of State, passed over all the friendly
editorials and marked the Daily Telegraph's comments in double
63 For the best rationale for the American position, see Foster to
Lincoln, Feb. 1, 1893, Great Britain, Instructions, N A , R G 59; W iltse to
Tracy, Jan. 18 and Feb. 1, 1893, Area 9 file, Box 19, N A , R G 45; Russ,
Hawaiian Revolution , 34-35; Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii,
203-229.
ijS The N e w Empire
red lines for the Department’s perusal. Such important journals
as the W ashington Post, Baltimore American, and the N ew York
Sun also exhibited such unfounded fears.64
More positively, the administration wanted Hawaii for its
riches of sugar and rice. These, however, were viewed as of less
importance than the islands’ value as a naval base to protect the
Isthmian route and as a coaling station on the avenues to Asia.
It is significant that with Blaine’s departure from the cabinet in
June, 1892, Tracy became the leading figure in urging a firmer
grasp on Hawaii. In order to round out his strategy of control
ling the sea, “the future seat of empire,” Tracy naturally looked
upon Hawaii as a key objective. But again, the unstable political
situation threatened the American hold on Pearl Harbor. T he
administration had urged m odifying the 1890 tariff, because it
feared that Hawaii might seize upon this change of commercial
relations as an excuse to abrogate the 1887 cession of Pearl Har
bor. T he w ildly fluctuating political scene offered too great an
opportunity to the w ily British and Canadians. This was the situa
tion Foster referred to in his Diplomatic Memoirs when he re
called his fear that, if the United States did not annex Hawaii,
“anarchy might have been created.” This, combined with his be
lief that, if the “Islands did not soon become American territory,
they would inevitably pass under the control of Great Britain
or Japan” (and anarchy could too easily lead to the ascendancy
o f such anti-American influence), explains the administration’s
motives and haste in February, 1893. Some journals urged annexa
tion for strategic reasons, that is, the necessity of controlling the
approaches to the California coast. But many combined the com
mercial and strategic arguments by stressing Hawaii’s excellent
location for advancing America’s foreign trade.65
T he N ew York Tribune best summarized these positive com-
64 Lincoln to Foster, Feb. 3 ,4 , 17, 1893, Great Britain, Despatches, N A ,

R G 59; Public Opinion, Feb. 4, 1893, 415-416.
65 John W . Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs (Boston and N e w York, 1909),
II, 166, 168; Public Opinion, Feb. 4, 1893, 415-417; Feb. 18, 1893, 464-465.
mercial-strategic reasons. It is useful to reiterate that the Tribune
was the most important journal which spoke for the administra
tion. The previous Novem ber its owner, W hitelaw Reid, had
been the vice-presidential nominee on the Republican ticket with
Harrison. On February 21 this journal wrote:
The views of the American people have grown with their growing
empire. . . . T oday w e produce of manufactures more than any
two nations o f Europe; of agriculture more than any three, and of
minerals more than all together. The necessity for new markets is
now upon us, and with it the necessity for cultivating close com
mercial and political relations with the rapidly growing nations of
South America and Australia and with the newly awakened empires
of China and Japan. As a prime condition of this extending influence,
the duty of controlling the Isthmian routes is clear to every intelli
gent mind. . . . T o render that control sufficient, the sovereignty
o f Caribbean territory and of Hawaii is absolutely necessary.6®
This editorial was particularly representative of the common

view that the Isthmian passageway was important for commer
cial rather than military reasons.
There was, however, another answer to the question of
whether the United States, should assume such political burdens.
Many antiannexationist journals are particularly valuable in de
tailing the reasons for a negative answer. V ery few papers de
rided American interests in the islands. The vast majority offered
a more realistic and subtle suggestion. “Annexation in any real
sense is not now necessary or desirable,” announced the N ew
York W orld in early February, 1893. A protectorate could se
cure “the interests of our citizens there and the convenience of
our commerce.” The Chicago Herald agreed: “W e are supreme
at Hawaii in the only w ay we desire to be supreme; w e control
its trade and w e w ill not suffer any other foreign power to in
vade or absorb the islands, as w e do not need to absorb and shall
not invade them ourselves. N o jingoism!” The Boston Herald,
««N ew York Tribune , Feb. 21, 1893, 6:4; also in Stevens, American
Expansion in Hawaii, 236.
i^S The N e w Empire
Chicago N ew s Record, Atlanta Constitution, and Boston Journal,
among others, agreed. The N ew Orleans Delta added another
reason: “It would seem that the United States has as much ter
ritory as can be properly handled.” 07
The large planters in Hawaii also preferred a protectorate
rather than annexation. The wealthiest of them, Claus Spreckels,
explained in May, 1893, that he would give the United States “a
place at Pearl Harbor in fee simple” in order that Hawaii might
be protected properly, but “the labor question is the all-important
one and constitutes my only objection to annexation.” Spreckles
knew that after annexation the United States would exclude
cheap oriental labor from the islands. This issue did not greatly
influence the smaller planters, who were playing the major role in
the annexationist movement. Finally, many Americans were
not certain that the majority of Hawaiians, that is, the natives,
wanted annexation. This question would especially trouble the
conscience of the incoming Cleveland administration.6 68
7
By the end of February sufficient Democratic votes had
gathered to stall the treaty of annexation until Grover Cleveland
assumed power. In another eight months the treaty would be
dead. In 1893 the United States refused to shoulder the burden
o f governing the multiracial Hawaiian population. This dis
inclination grew when the depression of 1893 struck. As eco
nomic chaos and social violence again upset the American scene,
many people wondered what business the nation had in so assidu
ously searching for new problems.
And there was another point. Before the United States could
enjoy the luxury of worrying about the highways to Asia, she
had to solve the top priority problem of dominating the high
ways to Mexico City, Buenos Aires, and Caracas. Latin-Ameri-
can questions would be uppermost until the European powers,
especially England, recognized that the Monroe Doctrine was
67 Public Opinion , Feb. 4,1893,415-417; Feb. 11, 1893, 439-441; Feb. 18,
1893, 466-467; Feb. 25, 1893, 489; March 11, 1893, 540.
68 Spreckels is quoted in Dozer, “Anti-Imperialism,” 220.
not simply a half-century-old antique. The Harrison adminis
tration’s Hawaiian policy is atypical when placed in the whole
of its foreign policy. Before early 1893, it had emphasized com
mercial expansion and had focused on Latin America. The Inter-
American Conference, Blaine’s reciprocity, the attempt to ob
tain strategic bases in Haiti and Santo Domingo, and the striking
at European interests in the Chilean revolution point up the prin
cipal features of the administration’s policy in foreign affairs.
Under the impetus of the depression, to which w e shall now
turn, the Cleveland administration would vigorously reassert
the tenets of the new empire in Latin America.
Hawaii would have to wait until the Venezuelan episode and
the war with Spain established American supremacy in the
W estern Hemisphere. O nly then would the State Department be
able to give the attention that area deserved. But as Frederick
Jackson Turner observed, “it is one of the profoundest lessons
that history has to teach, that political relations, in a highly de
veloped civilization, are inextricably connected with economic
relations.” 69 The Hawaiian policies of the United States could
not escape the logic of this dictum. W ithin six years after they
left office, the United States achieved many of the strategic goals
outlined by Harrison and Blaine in both Latin America and the
Pacific.
69 Turner, Early Writings , 61-62; see the analysis of Turner in Chapter

II. Much the same comment is specifically applied to the administration’s
Hawaiian policy in Harrison’s home-town newspaper, the Indianapolis
Journal, as quoted in Public Opinion, Feb. 25, 1893, 188-189.
IV
The Economic Formulation
T H E gap between outlining strategic objectives and obtaining

those objectives is crucial and often extremely wide. Policy
makers, no matter how astute, have frequently fallen in attempts
to take the intermediate steps. In the 1890’s, however, the United
States quickly traversed these middle steps in attaining the em
pire envisioned by the Harrison administration. O f these steps,
the most important were, first, the formation of a consensus by
important political and business leaders on the necessity o f a
more expansive foreign policy; second, the Venezuelan boundary
dispute o f 1895-1896; and, third, the Spanish-American W ar.
T he first event was most important for, to continue the meta
phor, if the first step had not been taken successfully, the second
and third steps would not have follow ed.
This consensus resulted from the depression which struck the
United States from 1893 to 1897. During these years concise and
conscious economic analyses by the Cleveland administration,
the business community, and leading congressional figures led
these three groups to conclude that foreign markets were neces
sary for the prosperity and tranquillity of the U nited States.
These groups also drew the corollary that British commercial
competition, especially in Latin America, endangered America’s
150
The Economic Formulation ifi
economic well-being. T he depression o f the mid-1890’s con
gealed the various explanations which had been offered for
America’s post-187 3 economic and social problems into a con
sensus that directed the consummation o f the new empire.
In their attempts to discover an antidote for the depression, the
Cleveland administration and the business community could use
fully draw on the facts of recent economic history. Crop failures
and the collapse of the Baring Brothers banking house in Eng
land had sent western Europe spinning into a severe recession
in 1890. Americans, however, had escaped the crisis by export
ing an abnormally large amount of their agricultural products.
These exports left at an opportune moment, for $70,000,000 of
gold had fled the United States during the first six months of
1891. Again in 1892 European crops failed. American farm ex
ports, finding excellent continental markets, once more reversed
the gold flow . Observers in business periodicals and in the Har
rison administration, including the President himself, warned
that only these exports shielded the United States from economic
embarrassment.1
During the first half o f 1893 exports dropped below 1892
levels and imports soared. European investments, one o f the
cornerstones o f the American industrial system, began to react
to the strain on the Treasury’s gold reserve by dropping off in
volume. As large amounts o f gold left N ew York banks to pay
the nation’s debts in Europe, Americans again turned to find
economic salvation in their agricultural exports. But this time
1 E. H . Phelps Brown w ith S. J. Handfield-Jones, “T he Climacteric

o f the 1890’s,” Oxford Economic Papers, n.s. (October, 1952), 266-307;
Seymour M. Lipset, “T he Background o f Agrarian Radicalism,” Class
Status and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification, edited b y Richard
Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset (G lencoe, 111., 1953); Alexander Dana
N oyes, Thirty Years of American Finance (N e w York, 1898), 1-6, 158—
159, 182-183, 161-164, 200; Max W irth, “T he Crisis o f 1890,” Journal of
Political Economy, I (March, 1893), 214-236; Albert H . Imlah, Economic
Elements in the Pax Britannica: Studies in Foreign Trade in the Nine
teenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 157-198; O tto C. Lightner,
The History of Business Depressions (N e w York, 1922), 188.
i¿2 The New Empire
European crops promised to be sufficient. The collapse o f the
Philadelphia and Reading Railroad in February and the failure
of the National Cordage Company in May touched off a wave
of withdrawals from both western and eastern banks. Panic
struck the nation.2
This business collapse had several important features. First,
the blow climaxed a long period of deflation; unlike most previous
panics it did not follow an era of inflation and speculation. Sec
ond, as James H . Eckels, Comptroller of the Currency, noted,
“the assets reported of the failed concerns have been largely in
excess of their liabilities.” Those firms having a “very moderate
or none” credit rating (according to Bradstreet’s assessments)
actually experienced a percentage drop in failures during the
depression, while the failures of those having a “very good”
rating or higher more than doubled. This commercial crisis did
more than merely squeeze the “water” out o f the system.8
A third feature of the panic appeared in the summer of 1893
when crops began moving toward eastern and European mar
kets. Some gold began flowing back into the United States, yet
m oney remained scarce. By the end of August, however, condi
tions changed. Forty-one million dollars’ worth of the yellow
metal entered N ew York that month. The premium on gold
disappeared, and m oney flooded commercial channels. N ow ,
2 N oyes, Thirty Years of American Finance, 200-201, 189-190; The
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Jan. 6, 1894, 4; Lightner, History
of Business Depressions, 188; Albert C. Stevens, “Phenomenal Aspects
o f the Financial Crisis,” Forum, X V I (September, 1893), 26-27; Horace
Samuel Merrill, Bourbon Leader: Grover Cleveland and the Democratic
Party (Boston, 1957), 146; John D . Hicks, The Populist Revolt . . .
(Minneapolis, 1931), 309-310; W . Jett Lauck, The Causes of the Panic
of 1893 (Boston, 1907), 101-103; Frank S. Philbrick, “T he Mercantile
Conditions of the Crisis o f 1893,” The University Studies of the University
of Nebraska (1894-1902), 304-306.
8 Stevens, “Phenomenal Aspects,” 26-29; Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, Jan. 6, 1894, 4; Lightner, H istory of Business Depressions,
186; James H . Eckels, “T he Financial Situation,” N orth American Re
view, CLVII (August, 1893), 129-139; Philbrick, “Mercantile Conditions
o f the Crisis o f 1893,” 300.
The Economic Formulation n s
however, no outlet could be found for surplus capital. Loan rates
dropped drastically, demand almost disappeared, and a deep de
pression replaced the panic. The home market had collapsed.
Secretary of the Treasury Carlisle noted in his annual report of
1893 that the country contained over $112,000,000 more in
circulating money than on December 1, 1892. H e reminded the
nation that “money does not create business, but business creates
a demand for m oney.” 4
The Goldbugs and Foreign Markets

The embattled administration first hoped to pry apart the
closing fingers of the depression by repealing the Sherman Silver
Purchase A ct.5 The repeal bill became law in early November,
and businessmen waited for the supposedly inevitable change for
the better to occur. But as one observer phrased it, the “stark,
irrefutable fact” was that the repeal did not restore prosperity
or even confidence.6
4 The Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register, XLVIII (September,

1893), 184-185—cited hereafter as Bankers' Magazine. Also Galveston
Export Commission Company to Grover Cleveland, June 26, 1893, Grover
Cleveland papers. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; James A.
Barnes, John G. Carlisle: Financial Statesman (N e w York, 1931), 295;
Alexander D . N oyes, “T he Financial Record of the Second Cleveland
Administration,” Political Science Quarterly, XII (December, 1897), 561;
Lauck, The Causes of the Panic of 1893, 108; Gerald Taylor W hite, “T he
United States and the Problem of Recovery after 1893” (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1938), 28; N oyes,
Thirty Years of American Finance, 194-196; Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, Sept. 16, 1893, 446; Annual Report of the Secretary of the
Treasury, 1893, lxxiv-lxxv.
6 This act provided for an automatic issue of $50,000,000 in Treasury
notes annually, based on silver. These notes could be exchanged for either
silver or gold, but so far they had been redeemed only in gold. After
being exchanged, the notes recirculated and again were redeemed in
gold. T he March, 1893, reserve in the Treasury amounted to barely
over the supposedly magic $100,000,000 figure. W hen the reserve dropped
below this figure, many financial observers believed the Treasury on
the brink of bankruptcy.
• Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 390-391. Commercial and
i^ The N e w Empire
The repeal had another consequence. The heated infighting
which occurred during the congressional debates revived the in
tensive struggle between goldbugs and silverites, a struggle which
would reach its climax in the Bryan campaign in 1896. The con
flict contained far-reaching implications for foreign policy, for it
forced the Cleveland administration and other goldbugs to claim
that overproduction, not the lack of money, was the prime cause
o f the depression. This glut of goods could be dissolved either
through a redistribution of products in the United States or
through finding additional foreign markets. W hen the adminis
tration and the business community chose the second alternative,
they also influenced the course of American foreign policy.
Before the 1893 panic, the silver-versus-gold argument had
largely revolved around tw o questions: the amount of circulat
ing m oney needed in the econom y and the plea o f debtors for
m oney to inflate prices, especially those of farm products. This
second question led naturally to another debate. If the ultimate
aim was to drive prices upward, this could also be accomplished
by finding additional markets for the overproductive grain lands
of the W est. Goldbugs and silver advocates both made this as
sumption. But the debate continued bitterly on the question of
whether the gold or silver standard would provide the most
help in finding and keeping these necessary foreign markets.7
The Cleveland administration, and others who advocated the
gold standard, used a two-edged sword; first, they argued that
the panic had demonstrated that the fear o f a silver standard
would frighten vital European investment away from the United
States; second, they believed that the gold standard best main-
Financial Chronicle, Jan. 6, 1894, 13; Merrill, Bourbon Leader, 183;

Bankers' Magazine, XLVIII (December, 1893), 405. One o f the few
humorous incidents o f the year occurred on Oct. 2, 1893, when W . H .
“Coin” Harvey invited Cleveland to become a subscriber to H arvey’s
silverite magazine (H arvey to Cleveland, Oct. 2, 1893, Cleveland M SS).
7 Davis Rich D ew ey, Financial History of the United States (10th ed.;
N e w York, 1928), 460-462; Edward C. Kirkland, A History of American
Economic Life (N e w York, 1951), 434-438.
The Economic Formulation iSS
tained a high credit rating in international trade and so enhanced
that trade. T he silverites did not dispute the first point, for they
wanted the United States to exile foreign capital anyway.8
N o one better explained the second part of the argument than
the Secretary o f the Treasury, John G . Carlisle. A t a banquet of
the N ew York Chamber of Commerce in late November, 1893,
the Secretary left no doubt that the administration thoroughly
understood the relationship between the m oney question and
international trade. H e told his distinguished audience: “Our
commercial interests are not confined to our own country; they
extend to every quarter o f the globe. . . . W ithout exception
these prices are fixed in the markets o f countries having a gold
standard.” The Secretary observed that American trade w ith
the silver countries of Latin America (excluding Brazil) and
Asia amounted to a comparatively smaller figure.9
T w o aspects of the goldbug stand are important. First, since
their argument defined overproduction as the predominant cause
of the depression, the remedy could be found in the markets o f
the world. This conclusion tied the monometalists to a policy o f
finding and keeping foreign markets, and, in turn, this became
an intimate concern o f the Cleveland administration’s foreign
policy. Second, by refusing to move closer to a silver standard
the goldbugs lessened the possibility o f increased American trade
with Asian and Latin-American markets which operated on the
silver standard. By changing from a gold to a silver or bimetallic
basis, the United States could have more easily undersold gold
nations (as Great Britain and France) in these silver standard
8 Roger V . Clements, “T he Farmers’ Attitude toward British Invest
ment in American Industry,” Journal of Economic H istory , X V (June,
151- 159>
1 9 5 5 )»
* Barnes, Carlisle, 299-302. It should be noted that Carlisle referred to
an American trade based on agricultural exports, not manufactures. For
a similar view o f the relationship o f gold to international commerce and
the American industrial glut, see Michael D . Harter, “Free Coinage, the
Blight o f Our Commerce,” Forum , XIII (M av, 1892), 282-284; David
A . W ells, “T he Downfall o f Certain Financial Fallacies,” Forumy X V I
(October, 1893), 131-149.
i ¿6 The New Empire
areas. In voluntarily refusing this advantage, the Cleveland ad
ministration had to find other means of encouraging and protect
ing American interests in these nations.10
Many persons, including prominent businessmen, scorned both
the silver and gold arguments and advocated bimetallism by
international agreement. This group emphasized, however, that
it did not want the United States to go on a bimetallist standard
alone, as most o f the silverites desired. H enry Clews, head of
one of N ew York’s largest banking houses, propounded the
bimetallism-by-international-agreement case to Cleveland him
self. Senator George F. Hoar represented the conservative poli
tician’s viewpoint, proclaiming in 1893 that bimetallism provided
a happy solution since outright repeal of the Sherman Silver Pur
chase A ct would lead to increased imports and would further dis
tress American manufacturers in world markets. Unfortunately
for these bimetallist advocates, Great Britain blocked an inter
national agreement. J. Pierpont Morgan attempted to negotiate
a secret bimetallist arrangement with the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Sir W illiam Harcourt, in the spring of 1893. W hen
Morgan asked Harcourt what Great Britain could do, however,
Sir W illiam bluntly replied, “N othing.” Morgan reported to
Cleveland that continued negotiations were useless. In his 1893
annual message the President excluded the possibility of any in
ternational bimetallist conference in the immediate future.11
10 For a summary o f how the silverites believed their standard would
lead to increased international trade, see H enry B. Russell, International
Monetary Conferences . . . (N e w York, 1898), 449-450; Barnes, Carlisle,
283-284; N ancy L. O ’Connor, “T he Influence of Populist Legislators
upon American Foreign Policy, 1892-1898” (unpublished Master’s thesis,
University of Oregon, Eugene, 1958), 39-40.
11 Charles Stewart Smith, Charles G. W ilson, James O. Bloss, H enry
Hentz, “T he Business Outlook,” North American Review, CLVII (O cto
ber, 1893), 392; H enry Clews to Cleveland, April 20, 1893, Cleveland
MSS; Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization
(N e w York, 1949), III, 225, 230; H enry W hite to Secretary of State
W alter Quintín Gresham, personal and confidential, May 31, 1893, N A ,
R G 59. See also J. P. N ichols, “Silver Diplom acy,” Political Science
Quarterly, XLVIII (December, 1933), 583-584; Elmer Ellis, Henry
The Economic Formulation 151
The bimetallists refused to concede. In fact, they picked up
influential support in 1894 and 1895. W illiam C. W hitney, a
paramount member of Cleveland’s first cabinet and the ‘W ar
w ick” of the 1892 election victory, constantly urged the Presi
dent to enter into a bimetallic agreement with England during
the m id-1890’s. A strong goldbug in 1893, W hitney became con
verted when Robert Barclay, a British economist, convinced
him that a bimetallic standard could best exploit the oriental
trade. Interestingly, when Cleveland coolly received these ideas
and when the American silver movement turned to more radical
solutions, W hitney began to soft-pedal his monetary theories
and urged instead a militant foreign policy in Venezuela and
Cuba.* 12
Henry Cabot Lodge and Thomas B. Reed also advocated a
bimetallic agreement on the grounds that it would stimulate
exports to Asia. This proposal can only be fully understood
within the context of Lodge’s delight in twisting the Lion’s tail,
Reed’s presidential aspirations, and both men’s desire to avoid
the low W ilson tariff at all costs. But it is important to note
that Lodge and Reed did not devise this plan themselves. T hey
merely advocated it. The idea and the supporting arguments
came from Brooks Adams’ bimetallist club in Boston. Adams
was “amused” at the w ay Boston merchants had discovered “that
there is money in this thing after all.” W hen Brooks informed
Lodge that “about half of State Street” had joined the organiza
tion, the Senator also applied for membership.13
Moore Teller: Defender of the West (Caldwell, Idaho, 1941), 228; Mes
sages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 444-445.
12 Mark D. Hirsch, William C. Whitney: Modem Warwick (N e w
York, 1948), 475-481; W . C. W hitney to Cleveland, Oct. 31 and N ov. 22,
1894, Cleveland MSS; W hitney to O lney, Sept. 28, 1895, Richard Olney
papers, Library o f Congress, W ashington, D.C.
13 “W ill There Be a Union of Protectionist and Free-Silver Forces?”
Literary Digest, June 16, 1894, 181; Reed’s interview is in Fortnightly
Review (L ondon), LXI (June, 1894), 837-838; Nevins, Grover Cleveland,
608-609; W illiam A. Robinson, Thomas B. Reed, Parliamentarian (N ew
York, 1930), 315-316; Brooks Adams to Lodge, May 6, April 11, 1894,
i¡¡8 The N e w Empire
Several aspects of the bimetallist scheme were of particular
significance. First, it appealed to Republican protectionists as a
means of selling surplus goods abroad without a modification of
high tariff principles; second, since this selling could most easily
be done in the silver standard nations in Latin America and Asia,
commercial attention focused on these areas; third, the proposal
singled out Great Britain as the obstacle to an international
bimetallist agreement. Believing foreign markets to be a tonic
for the nation’s economic illness, the bimetallists blamed England
for the inability o f the United States to reach these markets
through a bimetallist standard. This conclusion carried sharp
connotations for the bimetallists’ foreign policy.1451
The Cleveland administration answered such arguments by
also relating the monetary standard to international trade. In a
letter to the Chicago Business Men’s meeting in April, 1895,
the President emphasized that debased m oney would work only
if the United States was “isolated from all others.” But if it be
came commercially isolated, “American civilization . . . would
abjectly fail in its high and noble mission.” H e wrote a southern
governor, “I have never ceased to wonder w hy the people of
the South, furnishing so largely as they do products which are
exported for gold, should be willing to submit to the disadvan
tages and loss of silver monometallism.” 16
Secretary Carlisle rephrased Cleveland’s arguments when he
gave the Secretary of the Interior, H oke Smith, a lesson in inter
national finance in August, 1894. Smith, a Georgian who would
leave the Cleveland cabinet over the silver issue in 1896, asked
Carlisle w hy the government could not adopt free coinage of
silver. Carlisle wrote a long reply, of which more than half ex-
N ov. 24, 1893, Jan. 13, April 23, 1894, Lodge MSS. See also E. Benjamin
Andrews, “The Bimetallist Committee of Boston and N e w England,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, VUI (April, 1894), 319-327.
14 See, for example, Textile Record, April, 1894, quoted in Nation,
April 26, 1894, 3°3*
15 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, April 20, 1895, 690; Cleveland
to H on. J. M. Stone, April 26, 1895, Cleveland MSS.
The Economic Formulation ijp
plained the international trading aspects of the silver-gold con
troversy. If America w ent on a silver basis, Carlisle insisted, the
nation would receive payment for its goods in silver, but would
have to pay for purchases w ith gold. Carlisle repeated this same
argument in his annual report of 1894.16
The Tariff of 1894

As the argument continued, the depression worsened. The re
peal of the Sherman Silver Purchase A ct had not even acted as
an améliorant, let alone as a cure-all. By itself the goldbug argu
ment, no matter how handsomely dressed, was only a syllogism
whose attractiveness depended largely on whether the listeners
were creditors or debtors. As the goldbugs outlined the mono
metallist argument, their favorite standard had value, since it
attracted foreign investment to the United States and increased
American exports. In late 1893, when the monometallist stand
ard had little positive effect in helping the nation dispose quickly
o f its plethora of goods, the Cleveland administration turned
to the idea of a tariff measure whose predominant purpose would
be obtaining foreign markets for depression-plagued industries.17
In the 1892 campaign the Democrats had discussed the tariff
as a redistributive device rather than as a wealth-producing
agency. This approach was, of course, politically attractive.
Moreover, the Republicans claimed that their policy of reciproc
ity had already solved the problem of obtaining foreign markets
for American surplus goods. The Republican tariff plank at
tacked the Democrats for opposing reciprocity, “this practical
business measure.” In reality, the Democrats did not oppose
16 Carlisle to Smith, Aug. 11, 1894, Cleveland MSS; see also Carlisle’s
views in his Annual Report , 1894, lxxiii.
17 Prof. Frank W . Taussig has observed that most tariff controversies
in American history have been “concerned with the production o f wealth
rather than its distribution” ( “Rabbeno’s American Commercial Policy,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics , X [October, 1895], 109). For an ex
cellent summary o f this type o f tariff argument, see article by David
Ames W ells in the N e w York W orld , Aug. 8, 1893, in Bayard MSS.
iS o The N e w Empire
reciprocity. T hey simply criticized the Republicans for not tak
ing the idea to its logical conclusions. The Cleveland forces at
tacked “sham reciprocity” w ith the tw o telling points that, first,
the United States as an agricultural nation was, under Republican
reciprocity, encouraging trade relations with other agricultural
nations, and little could be gained from this; second, that the
retaliatory provision of the 1890 tariff had created ill w ill for
the United States in Latin America. But the Democratic tariff
plank was most emphatic in proclaiming that the Republican
tariff had been “a fraud” in that it enriched the very few . The
Democrats espoused a revenue-only tariff.18
Cleveland’s letter of acceptance dealt largely with the tariff
issue, but the statement displayed little concern with foreign
markets. Other Democratic spokesmen, including W illiam L.
W ilson of W est Virginia, who would lead the Cleveland forces
in the House should the Democrats win the election, also slighted
the foreign trade aspects of the tariff.19
The onslaught of the depression, however, drastically changed
these viewpoints. The three men most responsible for the success
of the administration’s tariff plan, Cleveland, W ilson, and Senator
Roger Q. Mills of Texas, began to emphasize in late 1893 that
the tariff’s main objective would be to help American manu
facturers compete in foreign markets. The President stressed
this aspect of the tariff measure in his annual message of 1893.
18 Republican Campaign Text-Book for 18¡>2, 9; Official Proceedings

of the Democratic National Convention, 1892,95-97; Laughlin and W illis,
Reciprocity, 233-234.
19 Democratic Campaign Book: Congressional Elections, 1894 (W ash
ington, D.C., 1894), 208-210; G. G. Vest, “T he Real Issue,” North Am er
ican Review, CLV (October, 1892), 401-406; Hilary A . Herbert, “R eci
procity and the Farmer,” N orth American Review, CLIV (April, 1892),
414-423; W illiam L. W ilson, “T he Tariff Plank at Chicago,” N orth Am er
ican Review, CLV (September, 1892), 280-286. A n exception to this gen
eralization about W ilson’s views is his article, “T he Republican Policy of
Reciprocity,” Forum, X IV (October, 1892), 255-256. This article looked
forward to an extension of foreign trade, but W ilson mostly emphasized
his objections to reciprocity for partisan and constitutional reasons.
H e began by declaring that one of the measure’s “most obvious
features should be a reduction . . . upon the necessaries of life.”
This argument occupied one paragraph of his paper. The next
three paragraphs then delineated Cleveland’s request that tariff
legislation provide free raw materials. “The world should be
open to our national ingenuity and enterprise,” the President
declared, and this would not occur as long as a “high tariff for
bids to American manufacturers as cheap materials as those used
by their competitors.” Cleveland tied this argument in with the
growing unemployment problem, pointing out that “the limited
demand for . . . goods” on a “narrow market” inevitably led
to the closing of shops and industries. This declaration that
foreign markets were to solve the double problem o f economic
stagnation and labor unrest was all the more remarkable since
Cleveland had never before emphasized this argument in an offi
cial message.20
Just as remarkable was W illiam L. W ilson’s change of em
phasis. In an article published in January, 1894, shortly after he
had introduced the tariff bill in the House, W ilson declared that
the measure served tw o purposes: it enabled American producers
to acquire foreign markets, and it reduced taxation on products
o f home consumption. H e mentioned first and most emphatically
the foreign trade aspect. Like Cleveland, he organized his argu
ment around the raw materials question, and also like the Presi
dent, he stressed that the labor problem could be solved by such
a program:
[The laborer’s] wages, his steady employment and his personal abil
ity to influence both are dependent on a full and expanding market
for the products of his labor and his skill. The remark of a great
20 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 459. Robert M cElroy,
Grover Cleveland: The Man and the Statesman (N e w York, 1923), II,
109, gives Cleveland’s views o f the income tax amendment. See also
Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 380-387. Cleveland mentioned the tariff as a
means to expand foreign trade only in passing during his first administra
tion and never developed the theme at any length. See Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, VIII, 589-776.
IÜ2 The N e w Empire
American statesman seventy years ago, that “the greatest want of
civilized society is a market for the sale and exchange of the surplus
of the produce of the labor of its members” was never as true of
any people as it is to-day true of the people of the United States.
There is not one of our leading industries that can find free and
healthful play within the limits of our home markets.
W ilson concluded by denying the charge that low er tariffs
would lose the home market for American industries. H e be
lieved that if an industry could invade the markets of other
countries, it certainly could hold its home market.21 Such an
argument marked a radical change from W ilson’s campaign
statements.
In an article which appeared a month after W ilson’s, Senator
Mills, who was expected to guide the tariff bill through the upper
house, also explored the advantages of free raw materials for
labor. H e noted that the “first thought” in the public mind was
to protect labor from excessive imports. Mills then abruptly
dropped the subject o f imports and emphasized the place of ex
ports in the American econom y. H e believed that “instead of
fencing in the genius and skill of our laborers w e should throw
w ide the gate-ways and permit them to enter every market.”
Mills wanted “every obstruction . . . swept out of the w ay o f
our products as they go to seek markets for their consumption.”
The first objective would be to obtain free raw materials. T he
Senator went beyond Cleveland and W ilson by insisting that
the United States would also have to remove British interests in
order to acquire those markets. Mills believed that, since Eng
land had but a “slender hold” on her markets, she “saw w ith
alarm the triumph o f Mr. Cleveland as the representative of
commercial expansion.” 22
Many American industrialists did not agree with such argu-
21 W illiam L. W ilson, “T he Principle and Method of the N e w Tariff

Bill,” Forum , X V I (January, 1894), 544~ 540.
22 Roger Q. Mills, “T he W ilson Bill,” N orth American Review , CLVIII
(February, 1894), 235-244.
ments. In hearings held in late 1893, some business representa

tives, notably those from the iron, steel, and agricultural imple
ment sectors, preferred the M cKinley tariff to anything the
Democrats might offer. The iron and steel representatives em
phasized that they wanted the M cKinley tariff retained, since
they valued the home market more than the foreign market.
The latter was “always trifling.” But several other comments
throw a revealing light on such statements. G . M. Laughlin of
the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation wanted the tariff kept as
it was, declaring that its real effect was to put iron and steel
products on a more favored basis in world trade. Andrew
Carnegie afterward filled in the details which Laughlin omitted.
Carnegie pointed out that the 1890 measure provided that 99
per cent of duty collected from raw material imports would be
refunded if these materials were used in manufacturing articles
for export. The 1890 tariff also reduced the duty on steel rails,
beams, nails, and other items from 20 to 30 per cent. Carnegie
concluded that the tariff “gave American manufacturers all the
benefits of free trade in their contests with foreign manufacturers
through the world,” and that “all things considered, the Mc
K inley bill was the wisest tariff reform measure ever framed.” 23
W ilson nevertheless argued that the Republican bill did not
go far enough. His viewpoint appeared when he cross-examined
Joseph W harton, Vice-President o f the American Iron and
Steel Association. W harton declared that he preferred the M c
Kinley tariff, since it protected American steel mills against the
advantage of the cheap labor which foreign steel manufacturers
employed. W ilson recalled W harton’s statement that the United
States consumed one-third o f the w orld’s steel. W harton cor
rected W ilson, saying, “N o, w e produce it.” W ilson retorted,
“That is a pretty far advanced civilization.” W harton admitted
23 House Miscellaneous Document No. 443, 53rd Cong., ist Sess. (serial
3156), 257-260, 324, 327, 329, 326; Andrew Carnegie, The Miscellaneous
Writings of Andrew Carnegie, ed. Burton J. Hendrick (Garden City,
N .Y ., 1933), II, 31-32.
/t>4 T he N e w Empire
that he had fallen into the trap by agreeing, “It is satisfactory.” 24
In spite of W ilson’s arguments, the majority of those appear-*
ing before the committee wanted to retain the 1890 measure.
H igh tariff arguments so loaded down the testimony, in fact,
that W ilson insisted that only a small portion of the hearings be
published.25 But the hearings had little bearing on the bill as it
was introduced into the House. W ilson and Cleveland had care
fully decided what would cure the illness of the American econ
omy. T he medicine was going to be given whether the patient
liked it or not.
The pall of economic stagnation overhung all the tariff de
bates. In presenting the measure on the House floor, W ilson ad
mitted that it had been devised “in the shadow and depression of
a great commercial crisis.” H e did not wish to discuss the causes
of the trouble, though “there seems to be some recurring cycle,”
but he asserted without a hint of doubt that the stagnation could
be lifted by lightening taxation and loosening “the fetters of
trade.” 26 The bill he presented promised to do just that.
The proposed tariff helped the sugar trust by reimposing a
duty of one-fourth cent per pound on refined sugar, and the bill
protected American petroleum with the only reciprocity clause
embodied in the bill. One distinct change appeared in the re
placement of specific rates w ith ad valorem tariffs. But most im
portant, the measure levied no duty on many raw materials
needed for manufacturing. This free list contained more than
340 subdivisions, including coal, lumber, iron ore, hides, raw
sugar, cotton, w ool, raw silk, and salt. W ilson indicated the
extent of reform when he noted that the average rate on imports
would drop about 18 per cent under these new provisions.27
24 House Miscellaneous Document No. 443, 53rd Cong., ist Sess. (serial
3156), 268-273.
25Festus P. Summers, William L. Wilson and Tariff Reform (N e w
Brunswick, N .J., 1953), 167-170; House Report No. 234, 53rd Cong., 2nd
Sess. (serial 3269), 1.
26 Congressional Record , Appendix, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 193.
27 In introducing the bill, W ilson said that his committee was not
The Economic Formulation IS }
T o regain this lost revenue, and as a sop to the Populists, an in
come tax was imposed on earnings above $4,000 annually. This
clause was the main target when the Senate later mutilated the
bill.
As explained by W ilson, the measure was based on tw o as
sumptions: that the United States now enjoyed a mature farm
and industrial economy, and that trade expansion would solve
the three major problems of the current stagnation—labor un
rest, farm surpluses, and inadequate revenue. Free raw materials
provided the key, since they would enable this mature industrial
system to acquire the necessary markets. W ilson summarized
the argument when he stated that free raw materials would result
in “the enlargement of markets for our products in other coun
tries, the increase in the internal commerce and in the carrying
trade of our own country.” A ll these factors would “insure a
growing home market.” In effect, W ilson was forecasting that
the United States would build its home market by enlarging its
foreign market. H e used iron and steel as an example. As far
as this industry was concerned, “W e could throw down to-day
our tariff walls and defy the world’s competition.” W ith better
tariff provisions “w e w ill not only supply our own country, but
w e w ill go out and build up other great countries with our
products.” This campaign need not be limited to iron and steel,
however, as the United States possesses “in many lines of pro
duction, the manufacturing supremacy of the world.” 28
Focusing upon this free raw materials clause, the minority
on the W ays and Means Committee launched a strong attack
against W ilson. These dissenters alleged that the provision would
injure laborers. N ot only would workers in industries which
“under any illusion as to its true character.” H e observed, “Reform is

beautiful upon the mountain top or in the clouds, but oft times very
unwelcome as it approaches our ow n threshold” (ibid.). See also Sum
mers, Wilson, 175-17 6.
28 F. W . Taussig, Tariff H istory of the United States (7th ed.; N e w
York, 1923), 308; Summers, Wilson, 172-174; Congressional Record,
Appendix, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 195-196.
used raw materials suffer, but the lost revenue would have to be
found in other areas where the tax “could only fall on the con
sumers and laborers.” Vigorously disagreeing, W ilson viewed
trade expansion as the solution for the unemployment problem.
Concern w ith labor unrest formed the center of the House de
bate on the tariff, so W ilson’s views are instructive:
W hat hope is there, Mr. Chairman, for a labor strike when produc
tion has outrun the demands o f the home market . . . ? D o w e
not know when supply has outrun remunerative demand, the em
ployer welcomes a strike . . . ? But with the world for a market,
with hundreds o f millions o f consumers for our iron and steel and
other products, with all our mills running and orders ahead, labor
can achieve its own emancipation and treat on equal terms for its
own wages.29
H e asserted that commercial expansion would also solve the

problems of farm surpluses and revenue. By reducing the costs
o f the farmers’ necessary expenses, they could compete more
cheaply in world markets. Farmers received no benefit from
tariffs, W ilson believed, for “the prices of their products are
fixed in the world’s market in competition with like products
produced by the cheapest labor of the w orld.” W ilson stressed
that the revenue deficit also would be cured by trade expansion,
for experience had proven that tariff reductions led to “such an
enlargement of commerce, or production and consumption, as
rapidly to make up any apparent loss of revenue threatened by
these reductions.” 30
W ilson’s statements regarding labor unrest, the agricultural
problem, and the inadequacy of reciprocity were debated vig
orously and at length on the House floor. Democrat Bourke
Cockran of N ew York and Populist Jerry Simpson of Kansas
29 House Report N o. 234, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (serial 3269), 5, 16,
20; Congressional Record , Appendix, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 196-197.
80 House Report N o. 234, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (serial 3269), 8, 10.
T he Economic Formulation 167
explained that freer trade would raise laborers’ wages. Cockran
declared: “W e want to raise the value o f labor in this country
by increasing its production. W e want to stimulate production
so that w e can get into the markets of the world and command
tribute from the people of every nation that finds a dwelling
place upon this globe.” But it was the Populist, Simpson, who
gave the most sophisticated argument for the reformers. H e
based his case on the fact that there had once been a “great and
boundless W est” where “surplus labor . . . could find an out
let.” N ow , however, since the frontier had closed, “there is no
more new country to be thus opened, and the great tide of popu
lation is turned back again upon the East.” Fortunately this oc
curred at a time when no other world power could match
American economic might. N o w “w e can safely tear down the
custom-houses and challenge the world for competition in its
markets.” Democrats Josiah Patterson and James C. McDearmon,
both from Tennessee, follow ed w ith passages even more purple.
Patterson concluded his speech by exclaiming, “Sir, restriction is
not progress; liberty is progress, and free trade points the w ay to
achieve the manifest destiny of the American people.” 81
Protectionist representatives declared that if W ilson really
wanted to help the farmers he should strengthen, not abolish,
reciprocity. T hey believed that “the achievements of reciprocity
mark the triumph o f American trade in the markets of the
w orld.” W ilson and his backers disagreed. T hey dissented, not
because they liked Republican reciprocity less, but because they
loved unlimited reciprocity more. Democrats attacked this
“sham” on three counts. T hey charged that it helped manu
facturers, but not farmers, since it was aimed at Latin-American
nations whose products were largely agrarian. Second, its re
taliatory measures had provoked ill w ill from several nations,
notably Colombia. Third, the President had been given this
81 Congressional Record , 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 945, 776, Appendix, 79.
power of retaliation to use at his discretion. The Democrats
claimed this gave him “the power to establish the commercial
policy of the first Napoleon.” 32
The bill passed 204-140 on February 1, 1894. As it left the
House, the measure specifically exempted all previous reciproc
ity treaties from abrogation. Moreover, it kept and strengthened
the reciprocity principle; raw sugar remained on the free list,
and this item had been the basis of most of America’s reciprocity
treaties. In effect, the Democrats tried to extract the trade bene
fits from reciprocity without straining diplomatic relations and
enlarging executive power. It was not a radical tariff. Senator
Mills called it “only a Sabbath D ay’s journey on the w ay to
reform.” Perhaps the best description was the nickname attached
when W ilson first introduced it: “The N ew England Manufac
turing Bill.” 33
During the next five months the Senate mangled the W ilson
measure beyond recognition. W hen it emerged from the upper
house, the over-all protection rates had risen only slightly, but
the free raw materials list contained only three items: w ool,
lumber, and copper. Most of the reasons for this result were
political. Five can be singled out. First, leadership in the Senate
passed out of the hands of Cleveland’s followers. Roger Q . Mills
and Daniel W . Voorhees agreed with the President and W ilson
as to the role free raw materials were to play in American foreign
trade. But due to Mills’ ineffectiveness and Voorhees’ age and
illness, other men, many of whom were enemies o f Cleveland,
assumed the leadership.34 Second, Cleveland made crucial polit
ical mistakes. His refusal to compromise on the silver repeal and
his determination to use all the patronage at his disposal to pass
the repeal, sadly depleted his power. H e alienated the tw o sena-
82 Congressional Record , 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1417-1418, Appendix,
826; Congressional Record , 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 681, 1422.
83 Ibid., 659; Laughlin and W illis, Reciprocity , 242; Barnes, Carlisle,
323; Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 564, Summers, Wilson , 174-175.
84 John R. Lambert, Arthur Pue Gorman (Baton Rouge, La., 1953),
201-203.
tors from N ew York because of personal incidents. An attempt
to ram a Supreme Court nomination down Senate throats led
to a rebellion and to Cleveland’s ultimate defeat on the nomina
tion. After rejecting conciliation late in the fight, the President
wrote a bitter letter, which was made public and consequently
stiffened the back of the Senate. After this W ilson found it im
possible to obtain compromises in the Senate-House confer
ences.3563
Third, representatives of the Sugar Trust, the National Lead
Trust, coal interests, Standard Oil, and other opponents of the
bill exerted their considerable influence on key senators. W ilson
had ignored these interests when writing the House measure, but
senators were more susceptible.38 The result was a hodgepodge
o f amendments protecting varied private interests, which the
depleted Cleveland forces were unable to override. Fourth, the
income tax provision alienated many influential businessmen who
could have exerted considerable pressure. Powerful Senator
David B. H ill of N ew York intensely disliked this part of the
tariff bill. Fifth, Arthur Pue Gorman of Maryland opposed
Cleveland more bitterly as the fight progressed. Gorman did
not rewrite the bill’s provisions in the Senate (James K. Jones
of Arkansas handled this), but he did control the votes, and so
was the man to win if Cleveland hoped to have his way. Gor
man’s golden rule was to keep the Democratic party united what
ever the cost. Believing that compromises on the measure were
permissible if in the end it could be passed by a majority of Demo
crats, Gorman climaxed the struggle when he castigated the
President on the Senate floor because Cleveland would not mod
erate his adamant stand for free raw materials.37
35 Ibid., 200-203; Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 568-572; Merrill, Bourbon

Leader, 176, 186; J. B. Moore recollected several interesting points in a
letter to C. C. Tansill, Sept. 16, 1940, Box 148, Moore MSS.
36 W hite, “United States and the Problem o f Recovery after 1893,”
66-67; Lambert, Gorman, 215; Summers, Wilson, 191.
37 Congressional Record , 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 5132; Barnes, Carlisle,
326; Lambert, Gorman, 210-213, 181, 199.
i jo The N e w Empire
W hile the Senate droned on, Democratic leaders worked be
hind the scenes to find acceptable compromises.38 In several con
ferences Cleveland insisted upon free coal and free iron ore. On
July 3 the Senate voted on the tariff. A ll free raw materials had
been removed except w ool, copper, and lumber. That morning
Senator Isham Harris told the President that the bill had to be
taken as it was or it would be tabled and killed. Cleveland again
requested free coal, free iron ore, and lower sugar rates, but
Harris said that such amendments could not be passed. Accord
ing to Harris, Cleveland capitulated. The measure squeaked by
the Senate 39-34 w ith tw elve members abstaining.39
W ilson refused to budge in the Senate-House conference
committee. Then on July 19 came the bomb from the W hite
House. On July 2 (one day before Cleveland allegedly gave his
approval o f the Senate bill to Harris), the President had written
a letter to W ilson. Its famous sentence that abandonment o f
tariff reform principles by Senate Democrats “means party per
fidy and party dishonor” created an uproar. But it is the remainder
of the message which should interest historians. First and foremost,
Cleveland devoted four paragraphs to the need of American in
dustry for free raw materials. H e concluded that on this subject
there “does not admit of adjustment on any middle ground.” Sec
ond, Cleveland asked for a higher tariff on raw sugar. This, he be
lieved, would adequately replace that lost from raw materials
admitted without duty.40
T he letter enraged leading Senate Democrats. Shortly after,
an amendment was proposed in the upper house providing for
88 For some o f the several Senate speeches w hich extolled reciprocity

and proclaimed the need for more foreign markets, especially in Latin
America, see Congressional Record, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 3621-3622,
3962-3993, 5436, 6995.
89 Nevins, G rover Cleveland, 572-574, 579; Lambert, Gorman, 217-218;
Congressional Record, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 7136.
40Ibid., 7191, 7712; Grover Cleveland, Letters of G rover Cleveland,
1850-1908, selected and edited by Allan N evins (N e w York and Boston,
1 9 3 3 ). 354- 357*
The Economic Formulation 77/
free iron, coal, w ool, and lumber; it was crushed 65-6. By the
middle of August, W ilson and the House Democrats had given
up the fight. The only remaining question was whether Cleveland
would sign the measure. H is concern for free raw materials did
not lessen. H e told a close friend in late July that “m y wonder
constantly increases at the seeming lack of appreciation of the
importance of being right on the free raw materials question.”
But he allowed the bill to become law without his signature. H e
revealed the reasons for his refusal to sign the measure in a letter
of August 27. T he last third of the letter lamented the loss of the
free raw material provisions. H e concluded that “when w e give
to our manufacturers free raw materials w e unshackle American
enterprise and ingenuity, and these w ill open the doors of foreign
markets . . . and give opportunity for the continuous and re
munerative employment of American labor.” 41
Everything considered, the 1894 tariff fulfilled the hopes of
most moderate tariff reformers. W ool, copper, and lumber
w ent on the free list, while the tariff dropped to 39.9 per cent.
The Supreme Court declared the income tax amendment uncon
stitutional the follow ing year. Several business journals which
appraised the measure in terms of what it would do for American
exports approved of the final result.42 Moreover, figures soon
demonstrated that with the exception of one or tw o special cases,
trade w ith South American countries did not fall off under the
new tariff. Trade increased in spite of a general price decline on
41 Congressional Record , 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 7804, 7891; Lambert,

Gorman, 232-237; Letters of Grover Cleveland, 363, 365-366; M cElroy,
Grover Cleveland, II, 114-115.
42 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Aug. 18,1894, 253-254; Bankers'
Magazine, XLIX (September, 1894), 170-171; “American Products
Abroad,” The Literary Digest, July 20, 1895, 331. A fter an extensive
analysis, W illiam H ill believed that the income tax amendment had to
bear the blame for the Senate’s mutilation of the bill. H ill concluded,
“N o sort of combination, comparison or analysis o f this vote can be
made to yield encouragement to the protectionists” ( “Comparison of
the V otes on the M cKinley and W ilson Bills,” Journal of Political Econ
omy, II [March, 1894], 290-292).
¡y 2 The N e w Empire
both continents. Even Cleveland praised the tariff in this respect.
In his final annual message he claimed that the bill “opened
the w ay to a freer and greater exchange of commodities between
us and other countries, and thus furnished a wider market for
our products and manufactures.” 43
The business journals and the President agreed on another
point. T hey believed that the tariff would provide a powerful
lever for the immediate revival of American factories.44 But such
hopes quickly withered. A minor wave of orders rippled through
the economy, and then the system sank into the deepest part of
the entire depression. Labor violence erupted. Questions began
to be raised about the fundamental assumptions of the American
political and economic system.
“Symptoms of Revolution”
On the first day of November, 1894, Cleveland’s good friend,
N ew York banker James Stillman, told the President that “con
trary to general expectation,” the tariff bill had “not produced
any great revival in business.” The depression was entering into
its deepest trough. Looking back a decade later, Cleveland com
mented that after December 1, 1894, there “followed a time of
bitter disappointment and miserable depression, greater than any
that had before darkened the struggles of the Executive branch
of the Government to save our nation’s financial integrity.” Con
ditions improved in February, 1895, when the Morgan-Belmont
syndicate stepped in to save the Treasury’s gold reserve. This
move ushered in several months of business improvement includ
ing a boom in iron and steel. But as the N ew York correspondent
of the London Economist warned in early fall, “business condi
tions in the United States have not even approximately returned
to their normal level.” Overproduction in iron and steel triggered
43Laughlin and W illis, Reciprocity , 266; Messages and Papers of the

Presidents, IX, 552-553, 741.
44 For the opinions of business journals, see W hite, “United States and
the Problem of Recovery after 1893,” 68-69.
The Economic Formulation m
a serious reaction in October. The American economy again
faced the task of rebuilding itself.45
Against this somber and darkening background, the unem
ployed and discontented acted out what the Secretary of State,
W alter Quintín Gresham, called “symptoms of revolution.” In
the three years of 1893 to 1895, almost everything occurred in
the w ay of class conflict which conservatives and liberals alike
had feared from the time of the Founding Fathers; almost every
thing, that is, except actual organized revolution. Laborers’ wages
had dropped drastically since 1890, and in 1894 one out
every six laborers received no wages at all. A basic change had
occurred in American society which made it particularly vulner
able to such a depression. The United States was no longer the
nation of self-sufficient farmers. Although the trend toward ur
banization had been evident for decades, in the ten years after
1880 the number of individuals engaged in manufacturing and
mechanical industries more than doubled to the figure of
4,712,00o.46
45 Stillman to Cleveland, N ov. 1,1894, Cleveland MSS; Letters of Henry

Adams prints Adams’ opinion o f April 28, 1894, that “the trouble is
quite different from any previous experience . . . but nobody diagnoses
it.” And then a typical Adams twist: “I prefer my Cuba, which is frankly
subsiding into savagery. A t least the problems there are simple.” See
also Economist (L ondon), March 30, 1895, 421; June 29, 1895, 852; Sept.
28, 1895, 1275-1276; Sept. 21, 1895, 1237; Oct. 26, 1895, 1404; Charles
Hoffmann, “T he Depression of the Nineties,” Journal of Economic His
tory, X V I (June, 1956), 137-149; W hite, “United States and the Problem
o f Recovery,” 92-94; Grover Cleveland, Presidential Problems (N e w
York, 1904), 142-143; Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 649.
46 Paul H . Douglas, Real Wages in the United States, 1890-1926
(Boston and N ew York, 1930), 389-391, 440; Bernard W eber and S. J.
Handfield-Jones, “Variations in the Rate o f Economic Growth in the
U.S.A., 1869-1939,” Oxford Economic Papers, n.s. (June, 1954), 101-
131; Arthur Mier Schlesinger, The Rise of the City, 1878-1898 (N e w
York, 1933), 77-80, 426; W hite, “United States and the Problem of Re
covery after 1893,” 37. Concern over the unemployed was great. In one
volume o f the Literary Digest covering November, 1893, to May, 1894,
there are references to at least sixteen articles on the problem and the
possible danger.
*74 N e w Empire
T he depression struck this wage-earning class with devastat
ing force. One contemporary observer later wrote: “Through
some curious psychological impulse, the notion of a general
crusade of squalor spread all through the country; and from
every quarter o f the W est and the Southwest, bands of ragged,
hungry, homeless men appeared.” Symbolically, labor armies, as
the Coxey and Hogan groups, began their slow march eastward
to W ashington—the movement which signaled that the great
American frontier no longer attracted but now repelled the dis
contented of the nation. The Nation exclaimed that “mobs”
controlled the entire state of California. The socialist wing came
within a breath o f taking the control of the American Federa
tion o f Labor away from Samuel Gompers’ moderate followers.
One business reporter cried, “The greatest industrial struggle
ever begun in this country, if not in the world, is in progress
here.” 47
T he depression thus not only forced the Cleveland administra
tion to face the towering problem of invigorating the econom y,
but to do so before serious political and social upheavals occurred.
T he administration became the focal point for the fire of radicals
and the fears o f conservatives. W ashington went into a turmoil.
Officers had leaves cancelled, the W ar Department, in the words
o f one official, was “in a ferment,” and the Treasury ordered
special troops for its subtreasuries in Chicago and N ew York.
47 Harry Thurston Peck, Twenty Years of the Republic, 1885-1905
(N e w York, 1907), 373; Alexander Dana N oyes, The Market Place:
Reminiscences of a Financial Editor (Boston, 1938), 107- 108; Samuel
Rezneck, “Unemployment, Unrest and Relief in the United States during
the Depression o f 1893- 1897,” Journal of Political Economy , LXI
(August, 1953), 326; American Federation o f Labor, Reports of Proceed
ings of the Annual Convention . . . 1893 (N e w York, 1894), 9 » Samuel
Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor: An Autobiography (N e w
York, 1925), II, 4- 5, 7, 522; George H . Knowles, “Populism and Socialism
with Special Reference to the Elections o f 1892,” Pacific Historical Re
view, XII (September, 1943), 295- 304; Economist, July 21, 1894, 893; the
best article on the uprisings in the W est is Frederick Jackson Turner,
“T he Problem of the W est,” Atlantic Monthly, LXXVIII (September,
1896), 296.
The Economic Formulation ns
Railroad magnate James J. H ill wrote the Secretary of W ar,
Daniel Lamont, that “the reign of terror . . . exists in the large
centres.” But when federal and state troops crushed several
strikes, leading businessmen and conservatives expressed a fear
o f such methods. The Bankers’ Magazine gravely pointed out that
Cleveland’s action in stopping the Pullman strike by force ex
tended the national power to its fullest. The President’s conduct
provided “a very dangerous precedent,” and the journal shud
dered to think how the precedent might be extended should the
“corporate combinations” or the “new Populist party” gain con
trol. The journal believed class conflict could result. Others, how
ever, advocated the use of force. David Starr Jordan, though a
leader in the world peace movement, congratulated the President
for “having done his plain duty” in smashing the Chicago strike.
T he President of the Farmers Loan and Trust Company of N ew
York notified Cleveland that in view of the recent “destructive
disturbances,” the standing army should be increased from 25,000
“to at least tw o hundred thousand men.” 48
Unaffected by the repeal o f the Sherman Silver Purchase A ct
and only temporarily slowed by the tariff bill, the depression
hurtled along, splintering and inflaming every economic, polit
ical, and social unit it touched. The administration, having failed
to blunt the destructive force with the w ell-w orn weapons of
the gold standard and the tariff, had reverted to armed force.
But Cleveland, Gresham, and Carlisle also believed that the ulti
mate solution lay in large measure in the discovery o f more
foreign markets. In 1894 and 1895 the American business com
m unity engaged in a momentous debate which concluded in an
agreement w ith the administration on the causes, solutions, and
the foreign policy implications o f the depression.
48 Barnes, Carlisle, 332-333; A. B. Farquhar to Cleveland, June 1, 1894,
David S. Jordan to Cleveland, July 18, 1894, R* G. Rolston to Cleveland,
July 27, 1894, all in Cleveland MSS; James J. H ill to Daniel Lamont,
July 7, Daniel Lamont papers, Library of Congress, W ashington, D.C.;
Bankers’ Magazine, XLIX (August, 1894), 85-86, and XLVIII (M ay,
1894), 809.
¡y 6 The N e w Empire
The American Business Community: Analysis

Social upheavals and labor violence intensified as the depres
sion entered its most critical period during the last months of
1894 and the first half of 1895. By the end of 1895, however,
the American business community had reached a consensus on
the causes of and solutions for the depression. Spokesmen for
this community displayed special concern with tw o immediate
problems: stopping the outflow of gold and halting the inflow of
American securities from Europe. These problems were, in turn,
subsumed in the larger challenge of increasing exports so that
plants could dispose of their surplus goods and resume full pro
ductivity and regular employment. The administration demon
strated its agreement w ith this analysis when Secretary of the
Treasury, John G. Carlisle, submitted a remarkable annual report
in 1894 which held that American exports were the chief hope
o f restoring economic prosperity in the United States.
Halting the outflow of gold and the inflow of American secu
rities from Europe were tw o sides of the same problem. Much
of the gold that left the N ew York subtreasuries went into the
pockets of panicky European investors. Business and political
experts soon viewed exports of merchandise as the solution for
both problems. Merchandise exports would stop gold exports
by bringing so much money to the United States that the flow
inward would overbalance the gold flow outward. Exports
would also solve the foreign investment dilemma: first, they
would invigorate American industries and so make the system
attractive to foreign investors; second, the exports would pro
vide the capital to replace any foreign investment which refused
to take another plunge into American securities.
This last point became a particularly fascinating feature of
the m id-1890’s. In his message requesting the repeal of the Sher
man Silver Purchase A ct, Cleveland expressed the hope that re
peal would revive interest in American investments and increase
the amount of money available. But after the repeal, European
The Economic Formulation m
money could not be found in any quantity. Instead, assistance
came from an unexpected source—American banking houses.
Capital, scarce in early summer of 1893, became so plentiful
during the latter part of the year that loan rates dropped to very
low levels. Some of this money bought out European investors
and put American firms, especially railroads, into American
banking hands.49*
The growing power of American bankers also affected United
States relations with other countries. The nation became steadily
more independent of foreign capital. Some American investors,
moreover, found the home market too narrow and unprofitable.
By 1896 their capital was moving into Caribbean and South and
Central American money markets. Financial spokesmen also be
gan noticing the relation of exports to investment capital. In
the few years before 1893, exports had managed to balance the
nation’s international debts, but had failed to help the country’s
economy expand, since withdrawals of European investments
more than offset the export gains. T o maintain an expanding in
dustrial economy, these amounts of exports were not enough.
Either exports had to be increased or European capital found;
otherwise the industrial expansion which had occurred since
1865 could not be maintained. W hen Europeans neglected the
American investment market from 1893 to 1896, business spokes
men expected exports to be important means of obtaining needed
capital.00 In other words, the United States would have to sell
enough merchandise on the international market so that the na
tion could balance the debt it owed to that same market and have
49 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 402; Commercial and

Financial Chronicle, Jan. 6,1894,13; C. K. Hobson, The Export of Capital
(N e w York, 1914), 150-151; W . W etherell, “British Investors and Ameri
can Currency Legislation,” Forum, X V I (January, 1894), 606-615; A. D .
N oyes, “Methods and Leadership in W all Street Since 1893,” Journal
of Economic and Business H istory, IV (Novem ber, 1931), 9.
60 Hobson, The Export of Capital, 152-155; see especially Carlisle’s
Annual Report, 1894, lxxii, lxxiii; also Hoffmann, “T he Depression o f
the Nineties,” 152-153.
ijS The N e w Empire
sufficient capital left over to finance the expansion o f home in
dustry.
This presented a gargantuan task. T he dimensions of the prob
lem became strikingly evident in m id-1894, when business jour
nals noted that during the 1894 fiscal year exports exceeded
imports by $259,567,000, yet gold had left the country in in
creasing amounts since January 1. Statistics for the 1894 calendar
year told the same story. Although exports of merchandise, gold,
and silver reached an enormous sum of $250,000,000, the Com
mercial and Financial Chronicle lamented, “Yet even at this
moment the outflow of gold is still in progress.” Bradstreet's
paradoxically termed such an enormous export surplus as “Our
Disappointing Foreign Trade.” The gold exports halted in mid-
1895 because of the manipulations of the Morgan-Belmont bond
syndicate, which was helping the Treasury maintain its reserve
by buying gold abroad. Business circles harbored no illusions,
however. T hey frankly admitted that the syndicate had “certain
limits” in supplying “the deficiency in natural media o f ex
change.” 51
Businessmen believed their chief hope lay in autumn crop
exports taking up where the syndicate left off. There were still
fond memories of the 1891 and 1892 export years. But, as one
business journal warned, if these exports failed to materialize
there would probably result “unfortunate consequences w hich
some of our contemporaries [the silverites] apparently delight to
describe.” By November, 1895, it became obvious that exports
were not sufficient to handle the job. T he N ew York corre
spondent for the Economist outlined the situation in detail. Over
$7,300,000 had left the Treasury’s gold reserve during the week
of Novem ber 23, and “most . . . has gone to pay our debts.”
If exports of cotton, wheat, provisions, and other staples could
continue in large amounts, gold would return to the country.
51 Bradstreet’s, Jan. 19, 1895, 36; May 26, 1894, 322-323; Aug. 31, 1895,
546; Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Jan. 19, 1895, 107-109; Econ
omist, Aug. 3, 1895, 1022; Public Opinion, Sept. 26, 1895, 397.
But when these exports could not match the import of foreign
goods and American securities returned by European investors,
“it is inevitable that gold w ill leave this country.” 52
As gold continued to flow outward, business circles cried that
they would have “to continue to suffer this sort of financial night
mare every time our international trade statistics indicate an
unfavourable trade balance.” One authority publicly prescribed
the cure which many businessmen were considering. A. S. Heidel
bach, the senior member of a large international banking firm in
N ew York, declared that in order to end the gold out-flow, the
balance of trade in merchandise would have to reach “at least”
$350,000,000 a year. Some disputed his figures, but few disputed
his solution.53
The selling of American securities not only endangered the
gold reserve but also threatened to stunt the growth of the in
dustrial econom y through financial starvation. Reports issued
by Bankers* Magazine and W orthington C. Ford, Chief of the
Bureau of Statistics, clearly explained the relationship between
foreign funds and American economic strength. The irony of
this situation lay in thç fact that surplus money glutted Amer
ican banks. Secretary Carlisle noted in his 1895 report that
money had been hoarded “until it nearly reached the proportions
o f a panic.” Business magazines concurred with this view. Much
o f this m oney abjured depression-ridden domestic securities and
moved into foreign markets. Americans actually increased their
investments abroad by almost $250,000,000 during the depres
sion. Most of this m oney w ent to Canada and Latin America.
N ot only did this movement o f capital leave American indus
tries in their stagnant condition, but it greatly aggravated the362
62 Bradstreet's, June 29, 1895, 403; Economist, Oct. 12, 1895, 1339-
1340; D ec. 7, 1895, 1592.
63 Economist, N ov. 2, 1895, 1435; Alfred S. Heidelbach, “W h y G old
Is Exported,” Forum , XVIII (February, 1895), 647-051; W orthington C.
Ford, “Foreign Exchanges and the M ovement of Gold, 1894-1895,” Yale
Review , IV (August, 1895), 137-138; Commercial and Financial Chron
iclet March 30, 1895, 542-543.
i So The N e w Empire
balance of payments by enlarging the American demand for
foreign exchange.64
Industrialists began to realize a harsh fact. As Bradstreet's
commented, money would flow into American factories only
when there would be “developments of commercial activity and
legitimate business in lines which, up to the moment, cannot be
clearly foreseen.” This journal added that “if business becomes
active,” European investors would also “at once come back to the
market.” Bankers’ Magazine agreed with this analysis. T o restore
this commercial activity, however, demand had to be found.55
By late 1895 the business community and the Cleveland ad
ministration agreed that exports provided one solution for the
economic problems. In the business community no one sum
marized this agreement better than H enry W . Cannon, President
o f the Chase National Bank. W riting in February, 1895, Cannon
stated that in order to prove to European investors that the
United States could maintain gold payments, “it is necessary
. . . that w e should compete in the markets of the world with
our goods and commodities, and also reconstruct our currency
54 Bankers' Magazine, XLIX (August, 1894), 97-98; XLIX (January,
1895), 156; Hoffmann, “Depression of the Nineties,” 156-157; James A.
Stillman to W illiam E. Curtis of the Treasury Department, July 31, 1894,
Cleveland MSS; N oyes, Thirty Years of American Finance, 217-218;
Bradstreet's, June 22, 1895, 388; W orthington C. Ford, “The Turning
o f the T ide,” N orth American R eview, CLXI (August, 1895), 188; Annual
Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, ¡895, lxix; Messages and Papers
of the Presidents, IX, 650; Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Jan. 5,
1895, 10; Robert W . Dunn, American Foreign Investments (N e w York,
1926), 2.
65 Bradstreet's, Sept. 29, 1894, 609; May 26, 1894, 323; Aug. 11, 1894,
499; Bankers' Magazine, XLIX (October, 1894), 245. For evidence o f
the recognition in 1894-1895 that the glut o f both goods and m oney
was deepening the depression, see W . P. Clough to Cleveland, March
23, 1894, Cleveland MSS; Charles Stewart Smith et al., “H om e Industries
and the W ilson Bill,” N orth American Review, CLVIII (March, 1894),
312-324; N e w York Journal of Commerce quoted in Public Opinion, Sept.
27, 1894, 623-624; Bankers' Magazine, XLIX (January, 1894), 489; Brad-
street's, Oct. 19, 1895, 659; the first three condensed articles in Literary
Digest, Jan. 6, 1894, 189-191.
system.” The N ew York reporter for the Economist stated the
proposition tersely in September, 1895: “Either goods or gold
must go abroad to pay for our purchases there, and thus far this
autumn our shipments . . . have not equalled expectations.” 50
The most significant and influential statement of this sort,
however, came from Secretary Carlisle in his annual report of
1894. H e noted at the outset that the United States had been
kept “almost constantly in the position of debtors.” Then in a
striking analysis of what he considered to be the American sys
tem’s dynamic, Carlisle observed that the nation’s “prosperity
. . . depends largely upon [its] ability to sell [its] surplus
products in foreign markets at remunerative prices” in order to
pay off loans and interest and to secure credit abroad. The Amer
ican economy, Carlisle warned, could survive the selling of se
curities by foreign investors in only tw o ways: “One is for our
people to export and sell their commodities in foreign markets
to a sufficient amount to create a balance of credit in their favor
equal to the amount to be withdrawn, and the other is to ship
gold, that being the only money recognized in the settlement of
international balances.” The latter course had been resorted to
since 1893, and the results had been disastrous. The Secretary’s
either/or alternative appeared to be the only escape out of the
depression.5 57
6
W ith recovery defined in such terms, the responsibility upon
American exporters was great. Unfortunately, this responsibility
came at a time when they could ill bear the burden. Exports for
the 1894 fiscal year had been surpassed only twice before in
American history, but ominously, the four leading staples—
breadstuffs, provisions, cotton, and petroleum—had fallen off
56 J. Sterling Morton, W illiam M. Springer, H enry W . Cannon, “T he

Financial Muddle,” N orth American Review, CLX (February, 1895),
129-156, especially 151; another banker, A. B. Farquhar, said essentially
the same thing to his good friend Grover Cleveland, N ov. 9, 1894,
Cleveland MSS; Economist, Sept. 21, 1895, 1244; “Comment,” Yale Re
view, III (Novem ber, 1895), 225-228.
57 Annual R.eport of the Secretary of Treasury, >894, lxxii, lxxiii.
i$ 2 The N e w Empire
in value almost six million dollars. In order to find outlets, their
producers had to accept very low prices, “in some cases,” one
journal declared, “the lowest ever made.” The Commercial and
Financial Chronicle and the Economist agreed w ith Bankers*
Magazine that “there has been a natural cause” for the worsen
ing depression; “small exports and agricultural depression, are
. . . now the chief remaining obstacles to a return of general
prosperity.” 68 U nlike 1891 and 1892, cotton and wheat exports
could not restore normal conditions.
Amid this gloom, W orthington C. Ford published an article,
“T he Turning o f the T ide,” in the summer o f 1895. H e entitled
it thus although exports had declined $75,651,000, although the
export balance had greatly decreased in comparison with 1894,
and although the export staples, especially wheat and cotton,
had suffered disastrous setbacks in the 1895 fiscal year. But Ford
was correct in terming it a “Turn,” for the figures in the export
tables of fiscal 1895 marked not only a turn in the depression but
a pivotal point in American commercial history. These figures
indicated that, although farm exports had slumped, industrial
exports had reached all-time highs. Iron and steel had especially
topped their previous high levels o f 1894 by nearly a m illion
dollars. Ford emphasized this change further by noting that the
nation imported less food in 1895, but that “more raw materials
for domestic industries, more partly manufactured articles and
more manufactures for consumption” arrived.69
In making this analysis, Ford simply repeated what some busi
ness journals had been proclaiming since early 1894. Bankers'
Magazine and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle echoed
Bradstreet's conclusion that the agricultural depression formed
“the worst obstacle to our general business recovery.” Another
68 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, July 21, 1894, 93-95; Jan. 5,
1895, 9; Bankers’ Magazine, XL 1X (Novem ber, 1894), 326; Bradstreet's,
Feb. 16, 1895, 99; Economist, July 27, 1895, 985; Aug. 31, 1895, 1148;
N oyes, Thirty Years of American Finance, 245-246; Annual R eport of
the Secretary of the Treasury , 189?, xxxi.
59 Ford, “Turning of the T ide,” 188, 193-195.
The Economic Formulation 1S3
journal observed that because o f new ly opened wheat lands in
Latin America and Russia “it is practically impossible for the
United States to compete w ith foreign exports o f wheat.” Out
o f this analysis arose a new evaluation o f international trade.
Several articles printed in Bankers' Magazine during the fall of
1894 best illustrate the new conclusions formed by these business
spokesmen.60
These articles postulated that a “great revolution in prices”
had occurred which made impossible a return to former price
levels. N o w “the cheapest” country would “win in the great
National, and International race for the commerce of its own
people [and] for that o f the world.” The journal lamented that
the nation’s agriculture, “hitherto regarded as the source of our
National prosperity,” would have to be sacrificed in this race.
But clearly, the American farmer could no longer compete in
world markets. H e could perform an even more vital function,
however, for the cheapness of foodstuffs, “together with cheaper
raw materials,” would provide “the foundation . . . of our fu
ture manufacturing supremacy over Europe.” Upon this new
industrial base “w e must soon depend for our nation’s prosperity,
instead o f upon her producers of food, feed, and raw materials.”
The visions arising from this premise were grandiose. There
would be no more boom times follow ed by depression, but “slow
and steady improvement . . . and our surplus manufacturing
capacity turned to the production of goods w e may be able to
export hereafter, at reduced cost and thus keep all our industries
permanently employed, as England does, having the world’s
markets in which to unload any accumulation.” 61
60 Bradstreefs, O ct. 26, 1895, 674; April 27, 1895, 259; D ec. 22, 1894,
802; D ec. i, 1894, 754; N ov. 2, 1894, 693; Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, July 21,1894,95; Jan. 5,1895,10; July 29, 1895, 90-91; Bankers’
Magazine, XLVIII (March, 1894), 649-650, and XLIX (December, 1894),
31-32; Economist, March 3, 1894, 273; Sept. 22, 1894, 1169; Dec. 1, 1894,
1473; Supplement, Oct. 13, 1894, 8.
61 Bankers* Magazine, XLIX (Novem ber, 1894), 326-328; XLIX (O cto
ber, 1894), 249; W orthington C. Ford, “Commerce and Industry under
¡s4 The N e w Empire
Corroborating this reasoning, industrial goods slow ly edged
upward on the export charts, accounting for 15.61 per cent of
the total exports in the fiscal year 1892, 19.02 per cent in 1893,
21.14 per cent in 1894, and jumping to 23.14 per cent in 1895.
This, plus the announcement in m id-1895 that a large shipment
of United States steel was to go abroad to compete in the highly
competitive European market, “attracted considerable atten
tion,” in the words of Literary Digest. Examining these events,
the N ew York Journal of Commerce, the N ew York Herald,
and the antijingoist Louisville Courier-Journal had their views
w ell summed up by the London iron and Coal Trades Review:
“The Americans themselves argue . . . that they must continue
to increase the export of their manufactured goods, since their
exports of food and other raw products must inevitably de
cline.” 62
*
Businessmen saw foreign markets as vitally important for their
economic welfare, but they also clearly saw and feared the social
consequences which would follow should their programs of com
mercial expansion fail to restore prosperity. Nowhere was this
stated better than in Bankers’ Magazine of February, 1894. This
article is certainly one of the most interesting printed during the
1890’s in business or popular journals. W ritten during the time
when Populism was reaching its peak and labor uprisings threat
ened, the article re-evaluated American society along the classic
lines of James Madison’s The Federalist, N o. 10.
The article opened by noting that business was severely de
pressed, and that destitute tramps symbolized the United States
of 1894. h then asked bluntly whether the American political
system had reached the end of its usefulness. The United States
Depression,” Bankers' Magazine, XLIX (March, 1895), 480-486. See

also Charles Stewart Smith and Francis B. Thurber, “W hat W ill Bring
Prosperity?” N orth American Review, CLXIV (Aprii, 1897), 428-430.
62 “Growth of Our Manufactured Exports,” Literary Digest, Sept. 7,
1895, 549; “American Products Abroad,” Literary Digest, July 20, 1895,
33I - 332» N e w York Journal of Commerce quoted in Public Opinion ,
Sept. 5, 1895, 315; Bradstreet's, July 20, 1895, 462.
The Economic Formulation iS s
had become secrionalized not only politically, but even more
dangerously, “on business and economic questions.” These “sec
tional differences are growing greater” as the people’s interests
grow more diversified. The article searched for the source of
this trouble: “Have w e grown too fast to consolidate our
strength; or, are the interests of new communities naturally an
tagonistic to those of older ones?” The political economist would
answer that “the greater the general good and prosperity, the
greater that of the individual.” But “neither the economics, nor
the ethics of our times are founded upon Humanitarianism,”
but “upon the cornerstone o f self, self-interest, self-aggrandize
ment, power and wealth, at the expense o f everybody else.”
These selfish interests have “become irreconcilable, by becom
ing so diversified” and so “have brought our National Govern
ment into its present im potency.” The journal did not believe
that Americans would admit that “we have grown too great, to
hold our wide Empire intact, by the bond of commonweal.”
But after all, the Roman Empire had disintegrated when it failed
to govern w ell a vast expanse of territory. The lesson was plain.
If the depression and its attendant economic discontent continued
to clog the political machine erected by the Founding Fathers,
only tw o possible alternatives presented themselves: follow the
British Empire and allow more local autonomy, or centralize to
a great extent so that the majority may govern without hin
drance.63 This was an analysis of a crisis. It rested on the hope
that improved economic conditions would end Populist and
labor unrest and enable the machine of 1787 to continue w ith
few repairs. But the importance of the article lay in the fact
that the spokesman for a vital segment o f the business commun
ity realized that the political penalty would be severe if the Amer
ican econom y continued to appear bankrupt.
63 Bankers9 Magazine, XLVIII (February, 1894), 563-565. For a British
observer’s analysis of a growing split between East and W est in the
United States “until they are now fairly in the attitude o f hostile com
munities,” see W . L. Alden, “W ar to the Knife,” The Nineteenth Cen
tury , X L (August, 1896), 199-204.
1S6 The N e w Empire
The American Business Community: Solutions

W orthington C. Ford’s article, “The Turning o f the T ide,”
not only observed the slow change from foodstuffs to manufac
tured products in American exports, but calculated that such
a change would switch the focus o f the nation’s commercial
interest. Ford noted that “the political consequences” o f the
change were displayed in the increasing trade w ith underindus
trialized areas such as South America, Oceania, and Africa and
a corresponding decrease of trade w ith Europe. Again, Ford
only summarized what American business and political circles
had realized for some time.
This did not mean that American manufacturers refused to
compete in European markets. In 1895 the entry of United States
iron ore and steel in British and continental markets excited W all
Street. American paper products invaded established European
markets. Even United States investment capital began flow ing
to Europe in increased amounts. But challenging European man
ufacturers in their ow n backyards was risky business. South
America and Central America, on the other hand, not only pro
vided a natural outlet for manufactures, but possessed geograph
ical advantages and also came under the political protection o f
the Monroe Doctrine. True, American trade w ith the nations
to the south approximated only one-seventh of the entire trade
which the Latin-American nations carried on, but this fact
merely strengthened American desires to obtain this market.
Latin America appeared to be a virgin prize w ell located for an
easy seduction.64 United States interest in Asian markets also
64 See especially the statement o f General I. W . A very, the commis

sioner sent b y the Cotton States and International Exposition to South
America in early 1895, in Public Opinion , April 25, 1895, 436-437; Ford,
“Turning o f the T ide,” 187-188; see also the observations o f an acute
French observer, Maurice D . de Beaumarchais, La Doctrine de M onroe
(Paris, 1898), 208-210. A lso Bradstreet's, June 29, 1895, 413-414; M ay 11,
1895, 296; N ov. 2,1895, 702. For American business and diplomatic corre
spondence which shows how much pressure certain European nations
The Economic Formulation i *7
increased after 1895, but this movement would not influence
State Department policy makers in an important w ay until
1897.65
American financiers and manufacturers moved into Latin
America with a conscious, concerted effort. As the Bankers'
Magazine insisted in early 1894, if “we could wrest the South
American markets from Germany and England and permanently
hold them, this would be indeed a conquest worth perhaps a
heavy sacrifice.” T he “sacrifice” this journal had in mind was
probably the American farmer. In any case, increasing numbers
o f investors moved into the Latin-American area to make this
conquest after 1893. In early 1894 a N ew York steamship com
pany opened a regular trade route between N ew York and the
Pacific coast o f South America. By 1896 business had grown so
profitable that the line increased its fleet, and a rival American
company entered the field. A group o f Chicago railroad capital
ists signed a contract in 1895 to construct an important railway in
Mexico. Several Denver financiers completed an important Costi.
Rican railway line in 1895. In Colombia a company composed
entirely o f Americans built and operated a railway along the
Atlantic coast. It purchased its locomotives and cars in the United
States. Another American-financed railway was under construc
tion in Guatemala. One railroad official noted the American
interest in Mexico when he remarked in early 1895 that “there
are fully three times as many Americans in Mexico this winter
looking up lands as were there last winter.” 66
A group o f N ew York G ty bankers obtained a dominant share
were exerting on American insurance companies and farm exports, see

John B. Jackson to Adee, Aug. 8, 1895, O lnéy MSS, and the corre
spondence w ith France and Germany in Foreign Relations, 1894,1, 402-
413, 428-453, 497-504.
65 For the Asian situation, see Chapter VII, below.
66Bankers’ Magazine, XLVIII (January, 1894), 483-484; Bureau o f
American Republics, Special [M onthly] Bulletin, August, 1896, 842, 839;
May, 1896, 626-627; September, 1895, 145; Callahan, American Foreign
Policy in Mexican Relations, 508; Bradstreet's, Jan. 5, 1895, 14.
i 88 The N e w Empire
of Santo Domingo’s finances in 1893 when they purchased the
nation’s debt from a Dutch company. Receiving the right to
collect all customs revenues, this syndicate could exert a power
ful influence on the Santo Domingo government. American
capitalists controlled a Salvadoran company which obtained a
government m onopoly over the Bay of Jiquilisco and built a
new port (E l Triunfo) in 1894-1895. The port soon exacted the
trade of the entire region, and by early 1896 coffee exports were
nearly doubling each month. United States capital in M exico,
Cuba, and the Caribbean area alone amounted to $350,000,000
by 1898.67
The investor moved southward with a minimum of fanfare.
The merchant and manufacturer, however, invaded Latin Amer
ica with the cheers of commercial manifest destiny ringing in his
ears. In 1889 James G . Blaine had led, and the businessmen had
w illingly followed. But after 1893 tîe businessmen played at
least an equal role in focusing attention southward and in some
instances blazed paths which the State Department follow ed in
formulating Latin-American policies. The Age of Steel echoed
Brooks Adams by declaring in 1895 that “there is no fixedness in
commercial supremacy. It has come and gone from one nation
to another.” Bankers’ Magazine added, “There is no reason w hy
our manufactures should not find an enlarged market in the
southern half of this hemisphere.” Bradstreefs noted that the in
dustrialists were responding with an aroused interest in Latin
America by late 1894.68 This interest took many forms—renewed
demands for an Isthmian canal, increased attention given to
reciprocity, the enthusiasm displayed by cotton and woolen tex-
67 W hen news spread in Santo Dom ingo of the concession to the Amer
icans, the population grew restless and a revolution seemed imminent.
N one occurred, however. See N e w York Tribune, Feb. 21, 1893, 1:2;
David Y. Thomas, One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine (N e w
York, 1927), 219-220; Lewis Baker, American Minister to Nicaragua,
to Olney, Feb. 22, 1897, Area 9 file, N A , R G 45; Hoffmann, “Depression
o f the Nineties,” 156-157; Dunn, American Foreign Investment, 2.
68 Bradstreet'sy April 27, 1895, 270; N ov. 10, 1894, 711; Bankers’ Maga
zine, XLIX (March, 1895), 498; Public Opinion , May 17, 1894, *59*
tile manufacturers in developing Latin-American markets, the
growth of and interest in industrial expositions held in the
southern United States, the development o f commercial mu
seums, and, finally, the formation and growth of the National
Association of Manufacturers.
Bradstreet's mirrored much business opinion when it wrote that
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty should be formally abrogated as
soon as possible, though this should be done “within the bounds
of international courtesy.” The Economist's N ew York corre
spondent observed that “considerable interest is taken in the out
look for the construction of the Nicaragua Canal,” and then
added an anti-British note that became more prominent as the
depression progressed, “and particularly because of the attention
directed to the control of that canal in recent British publica
tions.” Bradstreet's published a long summary of a paper by
Em ory R. Johnson, which emphasized the commercial, not the
strategic, advantages of such a passageway. A canal, Johnson
reported, would give the United States “a decided advantage
over other nations” in “the future development of the South
American and Oriental countries.” 69
A renewed interest in reciprocity appeared in early 1895 just
as the W ilson-Gorman tariff went into operation. Three key
business organizations especially displayed some inquisitiveness
in the possibility of renewing the reciprocity amendment of
1890. The new ly organized National Association of Manufac
turers and the National Board of Trade expressed particular in
terest in negotiating reciprocity pacts with Mexico, Central
America and South America, and the Spanish-American colonies.
Andrew Carnegie published an article in which he termed reci
procity “the best step” in obtaining foreign trade otherwise un
obtainable.70
®9 Economist, Sept. 7, 1895, 1179; Bradstreet's, Dec. 28, 1895, 820. A
further discussion of the canal is found in Chapter V , below.
70 Bradstreet's, N ov. 10, 1894, 711; “Legislative Demands by Business
Interests,” Literary Digest, Feb. 8, 1896, 423; Andrew Carnegie, “W hat
W ould I D o with the Tariff,” Forum, XIX (March, 1895), 18-28.
iyo The N e w Empire
Cotton and woolen textile manufacturers displayed intense
interest in southern markets. W orthington C. Ford noted that
the cotton industry was moving into the southern United States
not only for cheaper labor, but because “geographically the
South is nearer what are considered the natural markets of the
United States— Central and South America.” Ford further ob
served that in the past tw enty years (1874-1894), the output of
American cotton mills had jumped in volume five times. T he
greatest increase in exports had gone to South America and Asia,
and this trade had expanded in spite of stiff competition from
British and German agents. Meanwhile, the Boston Commercial
Bulletin reported that woolen manufacturers worried about the
“falling off of the export demand” which set the mills to “manu
facturing for the home rather than the foreign market.” These
industrialists regretted especially the abrogation of reciprocity.
Their exports were 11,000,000 yards less than in the previous
several years, and 8,000,000 yards of this had formerly gone
under reciprocity treaties to Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Brazil.71
Southern businessmen hoped to alleviate the depression in
their section by developing Latin-American markets. Believing
it to be “only a question of time when the United States w ill hold
a practical m onopoly of the trade of South America,” the Chat
tanooga Tradesman urged that if “the South shall push her ad
vantages . . . her ports w ill soon have a m onopoly of many lines
of trade” w ith Central America and South America. Good rea
sons for such optimism could be found in several industrial ex
positions held in the South during the mid-1890’s. T he largest
and most publicized of these was the Atlanta Exposition of 1895.
President Cleveland and several members of his cabinet found
time to visit this affair. In inviting Secretary of State Richard O l-
ney, Chairman J. W . A very commented, “The foreign trade idea
71 Ford, “Commerce and Industry,” 483-484. Secretary of the Treasury

Carlisle agreed with Ford’s observations; see Carlisle’s Annual Report ,
1896, xc; Ford, “Turning o f the T ide,” 190-191; Boston Commercial
Journal quoted in Bradstreet's, Sept. 28, 1895, 622.
is the basic and uppermost feature of the Exposition, both w ith

our own people and the foreigners.” Earlier, A very had been
sent to Latin America by the Atlanta business community to
drum up interest in the exposition. Secretary of State Gresham,
O lney’s predecessor, assisted A very’s expedition by writing
letters of introduction for the agent to all the United States
ministers in South America. The letters instructed the ministers
“to cooperate in his purposes.” Commercial ties between Atlanta
businessmen and groups in Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Mexico
soon appeared.72
American commercial museums provided another approach to
obtaining more Latin-American trade. Stimulated by the exhibits
at the Chicago W orld’s Fair in 1893, the full bloom of this move
ment appeared in the flowering of the Philadelphia Commercial
Museum in the 1894-1897 period. Secretaries of State Gresham
and O lney displayed active interest in this undertaking. W illiam
Pepper, the President o f the museum, wrote O lney in 1895 that
he had “been surprised and gratified at the rapid spread of in
terests” shown by American manufacturers for the project.
Speaking at the museum’s national opening in June, 1897, Olney
outlined the inevitability o f W estern Hemispheric economic
solidarity. “Trade does not of course go, like kissing, by favor,”
the Secretary declared. “Its sure and only basis is selfish interest.”
“Intimate commercial intercourse” between N orth and South
America, he insisted, was “inevitable.” N ew York City soon fol
lowed Philadelphia’s example and constructed its own commer
cial museum.73
Perhaps the most publicized and concerted movement for the
extension o f foreign markets and control of Latin-American
72 Bradstreet’s, July 7, 1894, 43°> D ee. 21, 1895, 808; J. W . A very to

Olney, N ov. 8,1895, O lney MSS; Public Opinion, April 25, 1895,436-437.
78 W illiam Pepper to Olney, Aug. 2 and N ov. 29, 1895, O lney MSS;
Bradstreet’s, N ov. 2, 1895, 693; Philadelphia Commercial Museum, The
Philadelphia Commercial Museum: W hat It Is, W h y It Is (Philadelphia,
1899); Philadelphia Commercial Museum, Proceedings of the Interna
tional Advisory Board (Philadelphia, 1897), 6; June *897» O lney MSS.
ip 2 The N e w Empire
trade began w ith the formation of the National Association of
Manufacturers in January, 1895. T he depression operated as a
direct cause o f this movement. As one student of the organization
has written, “it was apparent to the manufacturers w ho had
struggled through the depression years o f 1893 and 1894 that
some positive action was necessary to enlarge domestic and
foreign markets.” 74 T he opportunity for such positive action
came in the fall o f 1894 when a southern trade paper, Dixie,
threw out a suggestion to manufacturers to display their wares in
a Mexico G ty industrial exhibition. Dixie was deluged w ith
letters. The response so overwhelmed the journal’s owners that
they suggested that interested manufacturers band together and
“have a meeting . . . in some central city.” Several southern
and several Cincinnati firms planned a convention for January,
1895. T he invitations outlined a basic seven-point program, w ith
three o f these points directly related to foreign trade: a thorough
development of foreign commerce including exhibition ware
houses, a merchant marine, and reciprocity.75
W hen the convention opened in Cincinnati, W arner Miller,
former Senator and President of the Nicaragua Canal Company,
set the tone by noting that the panic of 1893 and the ensuing
depression had created much interest in new markets outside the
United States.76 The featured speaker of the convention, Gover
nor W illiam M cKinley of Ohio, brought the delegates to their
feet with a trade pronouncement which embodied nearly every
thing the nascent organization desired.
W e w an t our o w n markets for our m anufactures and agricultural
products; w e w an t a tariff fo r our surplus products w h ich w ill n ot
surrender our markets and w ill n ot degrade our labor to hold our
markets. W e w an t a recip rocity w h ic h w ill g iv e us foreign markets
74 Albert Kleckner Steigerwalt, “T he National Association of Manu

facturers: Organization and Policies, 1895-1914” (unpublished Ph.D. dis
sertation on microfilm, University of Michigan, 1953), 24.
75 Bradstreet's, D ec. 1, 1894, 759; Steigerwalt, “N .A .M .,” 25-26, 28-29.
™lbid., 38.
The Economic Formulation *93
for our surplus products and in turn that will open our markets to
foreigners for those products which they produce and which we do
not.77
Charles Heber Clarke, Secretary of the Manufacturers’ Club
of Philadelphia, follow ed M cKinley and localized the new or
ganization’s interest. Devoting his speech almost exclusively to
Latin America, he concluded that this area “ought to belong to
us in a commercial sense.” H e highlighted his speech by asking
for an international money order system to replace the payments
which now went through London. This statement was signifi
cant, for it implied that the United States now believed that it
had sufficient economic power to assume control of international-
payments from Great Britain. Clarke also asked for bimetallism,
for he believed that the gold standard drove up the prices of
American manufactured goods in South American silver areas.78
M. E. Ingalls, President of the “Big Four” railroad system,
stressed another point at the convention, a point that has been
noted earlier in this chapter. Since the American farmer was
losing the European market, Ingalls explained, outlets for indus
trial goods would have to be found in Latin America and the
Far East. Ingalls proposed raising the tariff so high that Amer
ican manufacturers would be able to dump their surplus at rock-
bottom prices in foreign markets. This, in effect, repeated the
Bankers’ Magazine's idea that the nation’s farmers would have
to be sacrificed on the altar of American industry.79
Several general themes emerged as the convention proceeded.
One emphasized the need for foreign and especially Latin-Amer
ican markets. A second m otif was a strong anti-British feeling.
Pointed references were made to Britain’s control of interna
tional trade and finance. The N .A .M . asked the federal govern
ment for assistance which would enable American industries to
compete on more equal terms with the British. A third theme
appeared as the organization also requested other extensive favors
from the national government. Iron Age later criticized the con-
77 Ibid., 32. 78 Ibid., 32-34. 79 Ibid., 34-37.
12 4 The N e w Empire
vention for “relying solely upon extraneous help.” A pro-
N .A .M . journal sarcastically informed Iron A ge that, after all,
the government was “the servant of the people.” These three
themes were embodied in the preamble to the N .A .M . Constitu
tion. Every objective in this preamble looked to the government
to improve market conditions and trade, as it asked for reciproc
ity, a “judicious system of subsidies” to build a merchant fleet, a
Nicaraguan canal, and the rebuilding of internal waterways.80
A fter the convention, a series of circulars were sent to influen
tial industrialists and politicians. T he first circular outlined the
association’s “Purposes.” It listed fourteen of these, eight of them
directly connected with foreign trade. One large section stressed
the importance o f “The Promotion of Spanish-American Trade.”
This part noted, “T he trade centres of Central and South Amer
ica are natural markets for American products,” and the develop
ment o f this trade “promises to be one of the most effective and
most valuable lines o f work undertaken by the National Asso
ciation of Manufacturers.” In early 1896 the N .A .M . sponsored a
“party o f representative American business men” who visited
Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. T he visitors hoped to learn
more o f the “resources of the countries” and “to indicate the
means by which the trade between the nations interested can be
enlarged and extended.” Venezuela attracted special attention as
the N .A .M . erected its first sample warehouse in Caracas. T his
occurred during and immediately after the United States settle
ment o f the Venezuelan boundary dispute with England.81
The purposes o f the N .A .M . were not lost on the business
world. T he St. Louis A ge of Steel and the Pittsburgh American
Manufacturer believed this organization to be “the beginning of
an intelligent, organized effort to extend our foreign trade in
80 Ibid., 51-53, 41-42.
81 National Association o f Manufacturers, Purposes of the National
Association of Manufacturers, June 15, 1896; National Association o f
Manufacturers, A Commercial Tour to South America, April 25, 1896;
National Association o f Manufacturers, Sample Warehouse for American
Goods in Caracas, Venezuela (2nd ed.), May 25, 1897.
The Economic Formulation 19S
manufactures . . . with the neighboring nations of Spanish
America.” The Chattanooga Tradesman, however, pointedly
remarked that several o f the leading exporting interests—cotton
and woolen manufacturers, coal mine owners, and lumbermen—
had not attended the N .A .M . meeting. By omitting these three
interests, the Tradesman commented, the discussion at Cincinnati
“was not as wise as it might have been.” 82
Great Britain watched these movements w ith unconcealed
fear. The London Chamber of Commerce Journal noted that
even in British colonies American goods were becoming domi
nant; everywhere “the markets are flooded w ith all descriptions
o f American manufactures” which endeavor to drive out British
goods w ith “what amounts to quite an alarming promise of suc
cess.” This journal could have especially pointed to the changes
which had only recently occurred in Honduras’ trade. American
commercial influence had grown so large in that British colony
that Honduras adopted the United States gold dollar as its mone
tary unit in 1894. Am ong the several British papers which noted
the revival of the Monroe Doctrine fetish in America during
the summer and fall o f 1895, the British Trade Journal observed
that “it is all very w ell to ignore and ridicule America’s Monroe
Doctrine in its purely political aspects,” but there is “surely an
unwritten Monroeism working like yeast in the commercial
world of America,” and this “we must combat— or take the con
sequences o f our fatuity.” French observers also noted the growth
of this “unwritten Monroeism.” 83
82 Quoted in Public Opinion, Jan. 31, 1895, 101 » quoted in Bradstreet's,
D ec. i, 1894, 766, and March 23, 1895, 190*
83 Bureau of American Republics, Special [M onthly] Bulletin , October,
1896, i o n ; July, 1896, 3; Bradstreefs , March 16, 1895, 168; April 20, 1895,
254; Sept, i, 1895, 548; Oct. 26, 1895, 686; Bureau of American Republics,
Special [ M onthly ] Bulletin , August, 1895, 96. Beaumarchais noted the
new emphasis on the Doctrine in his chapter, “La Doctrine de Monroe
sur le terrain économique” in La Doctrine de Monroe , 191-211. H e
noted especially the growth of the N .A .M . and the Philadelphia Com
mercial Museum. See also “Diplomatic Complications and the Monroe
Doctrine,” Literary Digest, April 6, 1895, 661-663.
i¡)6 The N e w Empire
American newspapers quickly replied in kind to such remarks.
The N ew York Tribune proclaimed that, while the United
States had depended on “a phrase” in the Monroe Doctrine,
Europeans had moved into South America and converted these
nations “into commercial dependencies.” The Atlanta Constitu
tion warned that the United States had to draw the line or “suffer
imperialism to overrun Central and South America.” But vastly
more important, the Cleveland administration formulated a
foreign policy which attempted to obtain and protect the ob
jectives that the American business community’s spokesmen had
delineated. This policy climaxed in the Venezuelan crisis of 1895.
V
Reaction: Depression Diplomacy,
1893-1895
A S the depression worsened after 1893, important spokesmen

for the American business community agreed with the solution
advocated by the Cleveland administration during the tariff fight
in early 1894. The stagnation could be ameliorated, the adminis
tration forces claimed, by shipping the industrial and agricul
tural surpluses into world markets. This, it was agreed, would
have to be accomplished quickly if the labor and agrarian dis
content was not to burst into a social revolution. If foreign mar
kets were to provide the remedy, the State Department must
help and protect American interests in these markets. W alter
Quintín Gresham, who was Cleveland’s Secretary of State from
March, 1893, until May, 1895, was by nature, experience, and
political philosophy cognizant of both the crises of these years
and the necessity of finding markets for the nation’s glut of
Born near Lanesville, Indiana, in 1832, Gresham had been a

Civil W ar hero at Vicksburg and again at Atlanta, a distinguished
lawyer and judge, and a member of President Arthur’s cabinet.
m
iÿ 8 T h e N e w Empire
U ntil 1892, political observers usually categorized him as a R e
publican. H e had endorsed Cleveland in 1892, but Gresham’s
nomination to the State Department nevertheless came as a sur
prise. The President-elect had first considered his name for the
Treasury, but Cleveland’s close adviser, Daniel Lamont, doubted
whether the former Republican would accept any office in a
Democratic administration. T he President offered Gresham the
State Department portfolio after W illiam C. W hitney and
Arthur Pue Gorman strongly urged the nomination.1
Gresham’s sense o f the 1890’s as a crisis period in American
history largely explains the motivations of the administration’s
foreign policy during its first tw o years in office. In a key posi
tion as United States District Court Judge during the strikes o f
1877, Gresham had moved rapidly to end the tie-up. Shortly
afterwards he freely expressed his fear o f the degradation o f
American political democracy and the threat which irresponsible
and unemployed laborers posed to the nation’s institutions.2
Throughout the 1880’s he attempted to allay labor discontent.
As a federal judge in the latter part of that decade, Gresham was
conspicuously considerate of labor, so much so that the workers*
representatives at the Populist convention in 1892 hoped to pre
sent his name for the convention’s presidential nomination.
Gresham rejected this offer, but the event presaged a turning
point in his life. Four years before, he had been a leading con
tender for the Republican nomination. By late 1892, however,
he believed so fervently that American economic salvation lay
in a low tariff that he endorsed Cleveland. H e believed that in so
doing, as he said, “I have committed political suicide. Some peo
ple are unable to understand that a man can deliberately do that.”
Gresham’s actions are understandable only when placed in the
1 Memorandum, D ec. 7, 1892, Daniel Lamont papers, Library o f Con

gress, Washington, D.C.; Diary-Memoranda, 1894, Moore MSS; Matilda
Gresham, The Life of W alter Quintín Gresham , ¡832-18$$ (Chicago,
1919), II, 685-687.
2 See page 14, above.
Reaction: Depression Diplomacy ip p
context of his long-tim e apprehension of violent labor-employer
conflicts.8
T he 1893 economic disaster set in motion the forces which he
most feared. As early as July, 1893, he insisted that the Sherman
Silver Purchase A ct was not the only cause o f the depression.
Gresham believed that “there is plenty o f money. . . . Our
country is richer than it ever was.” It was, in fact, this glutted
wealth that nearly obsessed him. In August, 1892, he had ob
served, “W e are living under new conditions utterly unlike
anything in the past” because “labor-saving machinery” gives
“capital an advantage that it never possessed before.” The great
problem is: “W hat is an equitable division of the joint product
o f capital and labor, and who is to decide the question?” H e
feared that “the settlement of the controversy w ill be attended
with serious consequences.” This question constantly played on
his mind after he became Secretary o f State. In long discussions
w ith British Ambassador Sir Julian Pauncefote, Gresham came
back again and again to the “greatest question of the age . . .
that o f capital and labor.” H e parried with Pauncefote the prob
lem of the surplus and how full employment could be main
tained in the face o f such conditions.4
During the first year of the depression, Gresham received let
ters from friends in the Midwest which warned him that “the
President and Congress do not comprehend even in a moderate
degree, the threatening and portentous conditions o f the coun
try.” On a cool Sunday morning in May, 1894, Gresham sat on a
park bench near the Arlington H otel and gravely informed
•Frederick E. Haynes, James Beard W eaver (Iowa City, 1919), 313;

Gresham to W . B. Slemons [? ], Oct. 1, 1894, Gresham to Joseph Medill,
N o v . 7, 1892, Gresham MSS.
4 Letters of G rover Cleveland , 466; Gresham to Judge D . P. Baldwin,
Aug. 17, 1893, Gresham to F. P. Schmitt, Aug. 16, 1893, Gresham to
General F. M. Force, Aug. 30, 1893, all in Letterbook (March 9, 1893-
April 12, 1895)—cited hereafter as Letterbook—Gresham MSS; Gresham
to Morris Ross, Aug. 1, 1892, Gresham MSS; Gresham, Life of Greshamt
II, 802-803.
young John Bassett Moore that “the assembling of bands of men
all over the country” seemed to him “to portend revolution.” “If
a man of courage should assume leadership of them, there was
no telling where the trouble might end.” The Secretary wrote
to a close friend: “I am not a pessimist, but I think I see danger
in existing conditions in this country. W hat is transpiring in
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and in regions west of
there, may fairly be viewed as symptoms of revolution.” 6
It was by this route that Gresham arrived at a conclusion simi
lar to that of the business community’s. H e analyzed the problem
and the solution in tw o remarkable letters written in July and
May respectively of 1894.
Sparse as our population is, compared with that of other countries,
we can not afford constant employment for our labor. . . . Our
mills and factories can supply the demand by running seven or eight
months out of twelve. It is surprising to me that thoughtful men do
not see the danger in the present conditions.6
Then Gresham presented his solution.
There is undoubtedly an element of danger in the present condition
of society. . . . Our manufactures of all kinds should have free raw
materials. . . . This would lower the cost of the manufactured
article and enable our people to compete in foreign markets with
Great Britain. Sir Julian Pauncefote said to me the other day that
he feared it would be an evil day for Great Britain when the United
States changed its economic policy.7
The Secretary of State thus had concluded that foreign mar
kets would provide in large measure the cure for the depression
and its attendant labor troubles. T o say that he was a commer
cial expansionist, however, does not mean that Gresham was a
colonialist. H e did not favor the annexation of Hawaii or other
6 Judge S. R. Davis to Gresham, March 23, 1894, Gresham MSS; Diary-
Memoranda, May, 1894, M oore MSS; Gresham to W ayne MacVeagh,
May 7, 1894, “Personal and Confidential,” Letterbook.
6 Gresham to Colonel John S. Cooper, July 26, 1894, Letterbook.
7 Gresham to Judge Charles E. Dyer, May 2, 1894, Letterbook.
Reaction: Depression Diplomacy 20 t
outlying territories. In this respect, Gresham provides the purest
example of the economic expansionist, anticolonial attitude of
the new empire. H e gave political reasons for his anticolonialism:
“A free government cannot pursue an imperial policy. W e ac
quire territory with the sole expectation of bringing it into the
Union as a State.” Reiterating a common theme of the period,8
he feared that noncontiguous possessions would kill the Ameri
can republic just as they had destroyed the Roman republic. H e
did, however, like most anticolonialists and procolonialists of
his day, see the “inevitable drift” of Canada into the American
orbit.9
The primary problem nevertheless remained the averting of
economic and political disaster at home by commercial expan
sion abroad. Carl Schurz, a friend of Gresham’s, most effectively
described this idea in an article entitled “Manifest Destiny,” in
Harper1s N e w Monthly Magazine in October, 1893. Frequently
alluded to as a prime example of the antiexpansionist attitude
which emerged from the debates over Hawaii during 1893, the
article was actually nothing of the kind. Schurz summarized his
position this way:
T h ere is little doubt that w e can secure b y amicable negotiation

sites for coaling stations w h ich w ill serve us as w ell as if w e possessed
the countries in w hich th ey are situated. In the same manner w e
can obtain from and w ithin all sorts o f com m ercial advantages. . . .
[A n d ] all this w ith ou t taking those countries into our national house
hold on an equal footin g, . . . w ith ou t assuming any responsibilities
for them .10
Gresham wrote Schurz, “It is the best article of the kind that I
have seen.” 11
8 See the conclusion of Chapter II, above.

9 Gresham, Lije of Gresham, II, 797-798; Bluford W ilson to Gresham,
July 24, 1893, Gresham MSS.
10 Carl Schurz, “Manifest Destiny,” Harper's N ew Monthly Magazine,
LXXXVII (October, 1893), 737-746.
11 Gresham to Schurz, Oct. 6, 1893, Gresham MSS. For an opposing
Besides Gresham, other members of the administration rec
ognized the need for commercial expansion. One of the more
important groups was the Bureau of American Republics which
had been established by the Inter-American Conference to co
ordinate commercial relations in the W estern Hemisphere. By
4891 the bureau had become an integrated part of the State D e
partment and served principally as a collector of commercial in
formation for American businessmen. The director of the
bureau reminisced in 1895 that the United States had originally
backed the bureau in 1890 in order “to extend what was aptly
termed ‘Reciprocity with a Club.’ ” In its December, 1893, re
port, the bureau noted the “increased interest” displayed by
American businessmen in Latin-American trade during the past
year. The demand for its informational pamphlets was so great,
in fact, that the bureau had to begin charging a “slight expense”
because of its mounting printing costs.*
12
Cleveland’s 1893 annual message evidenced the increased in
terest of the United States in its southern neighbors. The Presi
dent noted that “during the past six months the demands for
cruising vessels have been many and urgent.” Revolutions had
endangered “American interests in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa
Rica, Honduras, Argentina and Brazil.” Ships were even taken
from the Bering Sea fleet for service in Latin-American waters.13
For many decades the United States had been attacking British
commercial supremacy in Latin America with nothing more than
verbal brickbats. N ow , however, as American business and
diplomatic attention turned increasingly to the areas to the south,
a direct confrontation became possible. In January, 1894, a Lon
don journal declared that Britain’s “chief danger for the mo
ment” came from the intense American efforts “to monopolize
view of Gresham, see Alfred Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten
Staaten in der W eltpolitik (N e w York, 1935), 1918.
12 Clinton Furbush to Olney, O ct. 1, 1895, O lney MSS; Bureau o f
American Republics, Annual Report of the Director of the Bureau of
American Republics, 1893 (W ashington, D.C., 1893), 15, 10-11.
13 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 450.
Reaction: Depression Diplomacy 203
the trade o f South America.” The anti-British attitude o f such
business groups as the National Association o f Manufacturers
confirmed the fears of this journal.14
These, then, were the elements which were mixing into a po
tion highly explosive for American foreign policy: Gresham’s
views of the necessity for economic expansion into foreign areas,
views w ith which the business community could agree; increased
official State Department support of such commercial ventures;
and the depiction of Great Britain as the harridan who blocked
the approaches to the sorely needed Latin-American markets. As
w ill become evident in this chapter, Gresham’s views exempli
fied not only the first characteristic but the other tw o as w ell.
T he second Cleveland administration, far from being a hiatus in
the development of American empire, formed a vital, natural,
and most interesting link between the blueprints of Harrison and
Blaine and the achievements of M cKinley and H ay.
Hawaii
Cleveland’s and Gresham’s attitude toward Hawaii w ell il
lustrated the tenets of the new empire. B y discounting Har
rison’s fears o f British encroachment or a successful native
uprising against the provisional government, the President and
his Secretary of State could enjoy the luxury of preserving and
even tightening the American hold on the islands while at the
same time righteously rejecting the burdens of governing a poly
glot population located tw o thousand miles from the mainland.
Moreover, when the United States would annex Hawaii in 1898,
it would occur within the pattern of expanding American inter
ests in Asia. In 1893 these interests were still nascent. During the
Cleveland administration attention focused southward, not west
ward.
Shortly after entering office in March, 1893, Cleveland with
drew Harrison’s annexation treaty from the Senate. The Presi-
14 Bureau o f American Republics, Special [M onthly] Bulletin (Jan
uary, 1894), 30.
dent told close friends that he had not decided for or against
annexation, but that “we ought to stop, look and think.”
Gresham, however, was already averse to annexation, partly be
cause of his intense personal dislike of Benjamin Harrison.
Gresham expressed a second and stronger reason for his opinion
in a personal conversation with the Russian Minister to W ash
ington on March 16, 1893. The administration, the Secretary of
State said, “would not favor principles and policy looking to
the acquisition of foreign territory.” 15 That Gresham made such
an unequivocal statement at this early date is particularly inter
esting in view of Cleveland’s indecisiveness.
Five days before, the President had named James H . Blount of
Georgia, former congressman and chairman of the Foreign A f
fairs Committee, to investigate the situation on the islands. In
early August, Blount informed Cleveland and Gresham that the
Harrison administration and the American naval units had acted
unjustly during the January revolution, and that without this
help the Queen would not have been overthrown. This informa
tion settled the annexation matter in Cleveland’s mind. A fter tw o
more months of Gresham’s prodding, the President decided to
help the Queen regain her throne if this could be accomplished
without bloodshed and if the Queen would promise to abide by
“all obligations created by the Provisional Government.”
W hen the American Minister informed the former ruler of
this offer, she astounded the diplomat with the reply that she
would settle for nothing less than the heads of the provisional
government’s leaders. After several more sessions, however, she
agreed to Cleveland’s offer. But when the American Minister
then approached the Dole government, that regime, assured by
its representative in W ashington that the Cleveland administra
tion would not resort to force, flatly refused to discuss the propo
sition. Faced with this impasse, Cleveland dumped the matter
15 Memoranda of Conversations, March 16, 1893, June 16, 1893, N A ,

R G 59; Gresham, Life of Gresham, II, 732; Stevens, American Expansion
in Hawaii, 245-246, 267-269.
(but not the annexation treaty) back into the hands of Congress
on December 18, 1893. Here the issue reposed, though frequently
responding fitfully when touched by certain expansive-minded
congressmen, until it was resurrected by the M cKinley adminis
tration.16
Gresham was the key figure in the administration’s Hawaiian
policy; he held firm when the President wavered. The Secretary
of State constantly reiterated that annexation should not be
carried through because such a transaction would corrupt the
republic by transforming the United States into an imperial
power. Annexation would, moreover, condone a government
which had assumed power with the unlawful aid of American
forces. Gresham was buttressed in these beliefs by a long letter
from A lvey Adee, Second Assistant Secretary of State, which,
after an exhaustive survey of the situation in Hawaii, concluded
that “the islands w ill never maintain a voting population sufficient
to confer a rightful claim to state-hood.” 17 Advanced in the con
text of the labor and agrarian upheavals of Homestead, the Pull
man Strike, and Coxey’s Army, this was a persuasive argument.
But it is crucial to note that Gresham did not follow a hands-
off policy in Hawaii. As Carl Schurz had pointed out in his
H arpefs article, a refusal to assume political responsibilities did
not mean a refusal or abnegation of strategic and commercial
16 Gresham to W illis, Dec. 2, 1893, Cipher Messages Sent, 1888-1895,

N A , R G 45; W illis to Gresham, N ov. 16, 1893, an(f Dec. 9, 1894, Cleve
land MSS; W illis to Gresham, Dec. 20, 1893, Hawaii, Despatches, N A ,
R G 59; Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 460-463. Olney had
some influence in shaping Hawaiian policy; see Olney to Gresham, Oct.
9, 1893, Gresham MSS.
17 Gresham to Colonel John S. Cooper, Feb. 5, 1894, and Gresham to
John Overmeyer, July 25, 1894, Letterbook; Personal letter from Adee
to Gresham, March 10, 1893, Memoranda of Conversations, N A , RG
59; Gresham to Senator Roger Q. Mills, Jan. 23, 1895, Gresham MSS.
Ernest R. May has noted that Cleveland’s “message against the annexa
tion . . . had not been a brief against imperialism so much as an indict
ment of the methods used” (imperial Democracy . . . [N ew York,
1961 ]. 37)-
2 o6 T he N e w Empire
benefits. It is obvious but significant that, though the Secretary
o f State hastily withdrew in a political sense, he did not w ith
draw or even weaken the American grasp on Pearl Harbor; nor
did he want to loosen the commercial connection w ith Hawaii.
In fact, both claims were reaffirmed.18
In the light of this observation, several other events become
more significant. W hen the administration approached the Queen
with its offer of restoration, Gresham not only hedged the of
fer by demanding a promise from the Queen that she would as
sume the obligations of the provisional government (w hich meant
guaranteeing the supremacy of the planters), but he also in
formed her that she would have to include in her ministry mem
bers o f the provisional government, including President D ole.
Another of Gresham’s actions is important in this context. W hen
the American Minister approached the D ole government w ith
the plan o f restoring the Queen, the Hawaiian Foreign Minister
bluntly told the State Department that the United States could
not exert such authority over Hawaiian officials. Gresham re
torted that the State Department could remonstrate w ith Hawaii,
since American force had “subverted” the Queen. G iven this
assumption, Gresham could logically conclude that the U nited
States could interfere in the affairs of the provisional government
as long as the latter remained in power.19
18 A fter losing their sugar bounty in the 1894 tariff bill, domestic sugar
growers attempted to abrogate the Hawaiian treaties of 1875 and 1887.
Senators Morgan, Chandler, and Perkins led a fight to retain the trea
ties. T h ey effectively argued that Bayard had remarked in 1887 that if
the treaty o f reciprocity was repudiated, the U nited States w ould lose
its rights to Pearl Harbor. T he Morgan forces maintained the reci
procity treaty with a crushing 57-11 vote of confidence (D ozer, “A nti-
Imperialism,” 234-236).
19 Gresham did not hesitate to interfere and threaten die use o f force
to protect American citizens implicated in revolutionary activities against
the Hawaiian government during an 1895 uprising; see Gresham to
W illis, Feb. 26, 1895, Hawaii, Instructions, N A , R G 59; Stevens, Am er
ican Expansion in Hawaii, 276-277; W illis to Gresham, D ec. 9, 1893,
Cleveland MSS.
The 1894 tariff considerably simplified Gresham’s task. By
abolishing the sugar bounty and restoring the Hawaiian plant
ers’ favored position in the American market, the W ilson-
Gorman bill alleviated the islands’ economic problems. The meas
ure had also tightened the economic interdependence of the tw o
nations. Realizing the importance of these developments, many
planters w ho had warmly endorsed or equivocated on the
question of annexation, now strongly opposed the union. Bene
fiting from both the American market and the immigration of
coolie labor (w hich annexation would terminate), the influ
ential planters had the best o f both worlds. The American
Minister informed Gresham of these developments in 1894.20
Gresham and the planters enjoyed such latitude in their ac
tions only because outside powers did not pose a threat to the
de jacto American protectorate. Jingoist congressmen, expan
sionist-minded naval officers, and militant-minded newspaper
editors frequently attempted to conjure up the specter of British,
Japanese, or even Russian control of the islands. The State D e
partment was not alarmed. In a series o f private conversations
conducted shortly after he entered office, Gresham told the
British Ambassador and the Japanese and Russian Ministers that
the United States would tolerate no outside interference in the
islands. T hey, in turn, remarked that they had been directed by
their foreign offices to assure the Secretary that their respective
governments had no aspirations regarding Hawaii.21
W hen the British Minister to Hawaii became too ambitious
in advancing English and Canadian interests, Gresham promptly
asked Great Britain to replace its representative with someone
“who had no entangling relations with the natives or with aliens,
^ W illis to Gresham, May 24, 1894, July 21, 1894, Sept. 20, 1894, all
in Gresham MSS; Scrapbook, Box 240, M oore MSS; Stevens, American
Expansion in Hawaii, 281.
21 Pauncefote to Rosebery, May 6,1893, Archives o f the Foreign Office,
Public Record Office, London—cited hereafter as F.O. follow ed by
record and message number—5/2189; Memoranda o f Conversations,
March 16, 1893, N A , R G 59; Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, 125-127.
2 o8 The N e w Empire
prosecuting business at Honolulu” (italics added). Gresham and
the Secretary of the N avy, Hilary Herbert, also shrewdly kept
British warships away from Hawaii by assuring London that the
United States would protect British lives and properties on the
islands. W hen one American naval officer misunderstood his
instructions, refused to guarantee British property, and then re
ported a British warship steaming back into the Hawaiian area,
Herbert gave the officer a severe reprimand.22 The United
States wanted a monopoly in those waters.
Richard Olney took much the same approach when he became
Secretary of State after Gresham’s death in May, 1895. W hen
the Japanese began exerting pressure on Hawaii because of im
migration problems in 1896, the Hawaiian Minister to the United
States asked Olney for help. The Secretary of State replied that
he doubted whether Japan would push too far in the face of
strong American claims to priority on the islands, but if the Japa
nese did do so, the United States would, Olney intimated, become
directly involved. The Hawaiian Minister reported to Honolulu
that the Secretary had, in effect, stretched the Monroe Doctrine
to touch Hawaii.23
The N ew York Evening Tost had given a good summary of
the administration’s policies in 1893 when the journal advised
Hawaiians, “Go on, therefore, sending us your sugar and other
tropical products, and sitting under your own fig-trees, in the full
assurance that none w ill dare make you afraid.” The rationale
for this policy was outlined tw o years later, in 1895, by a State
Department official. W riting a series of anonymous articles on
Cleveland’s foreign policy, Frederic Emory devoted special at
tention to Hawaii. H e recalled that during the President’s first
term, Bayard and Cleveland had persevered to advance “Amer
ican influence” there. “The obvious course was to wait quietly
22 Memoranda of Conversations, March 16, 1893, N A , RG 59; W illis

to Gresham, December, 1893, Cleveland MSS.
23 W illiam A. Russ, Jr., The Hawaiian Republic , 1894-1898 (Selins-
grove, Pa., 1961), 132.
Reaction: Depression Diplomacy 20p
and patiently, and let the islands fill up with American planters
and American industries until they should be w holly identified”
economically and politically with the mainland. But “a handful
of adventurers” had upset the calculation. W ithout political de
mocracy the “islands have nothing in common with this coun
try . . . ; at best, they could be only a colonial dependency,
and that is something entirely alien to our institutions.” 24
The United States had refused to annex Hawaii in 1893 for
three reasons. First, the administration believed that the provi
sional government had assumed power undemocratically and
with the illegal aid of American naval units. Second, annexation
would break the hallowed tradition of not attempting to stretch
American political institutions over extracontinental territory.
This tradition became especially important during the political
and social turbulence suffered by the United States during the
depression. Many Americans, especially Gresham, feared that
so much flexibility had gone out of these institutions that fur
ther stretching would snap them completely. Third, Hawaii’s
only value lay as a sugar producer and defensive outpost. These
values the United States already enjoyed without assuming
tiresome political burdens.
W ithin five years each of these reasons would be cancelled
out. By m id-1894 Cleveland recognized the provisional govern
ment as a strong body, “clearly entitled to our recognition with
out regard to any of the incidents which accompanied or pre
ceded its inauguration.” 25 Three years later, the disappearance
of the depression would re-establish Americans’ confidence in
their political institutions. Four years later, Hawaii would obtain
a new value in the eyes of the State Department and the business
community; it would be viewed as a way station to China. The
islands would then be annexed.
24 Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 236-239; Clipping from

Baltimore Sun, May 27, 1895, Bayard MSS.
25 Interview given by Cleveland in 1894, dated Jan. 6, 1895, Cleveland
MSS.
The Brazilian Revolution of 1894

Gresham had preserved American interests in Hawaii b y
warning the provisional government and the major powers that
the United States would brook no interference in its rights, either
commercial or strategic, on the islands. A ll parties had respected
his wishes. During the winter o f 1893-1894, however, the Sec
retary o f State tried to preserve increasing American commercial
interests in Brazil while a European-supported revolutionary
movement attempted to terminate these interests. W hen the
moment of truth arrived, as it does during all revolutions,
Gresham did not hesitate to use United States warships to de
feat the insurgents and maintain in power the pro-American,
established Brazilian government.2®
Although it has since faded in importance in American diplo
matic history, this rebellion was front-page news at the time.
The United States was particularly interested because it had
signed a reciprocity agreement w ith the new ly formed Brazilian
republic on February 5,1891. This agreement became one o f the
most important reciprocity treaties signed under the M cKinley
tariff. T he pact, however, received a cool reception in Brazil.
O nly resolute stands taken by several Brazilian presidents, es
pecially Floriano Peixoto, had prevented that nation’s legislature
from repudiating the agreement. T he rebellion was led by politi
cal enemies of Peixoto, some of whom bitterly opposed him on
the issue of this treaty.2
27
6
26 This section o f the present study was first published in more de
tailed form as “United States Depression Diplom acy and the Brazilian
Revolution, 1893-1894,” in the Hispanic American Historical Review,
X L (February, i960), 107-118.
27 Gresham, Lije of Gresham, II, 777; Laughlin and W illis, Reciprocity,
208, Joâo Pandiá Calógeras, A History of Brazil, translated and edited
b y Percy Alvin Martin (Chapel H ill, 1939), 290-291; Lawrence F. H ill,
Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil (Durham,
N.C ., 1932), 265-272. T he best account o f the revolution and American
participation in it is in H ill, United States and Brazil, 265-281. John
Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law . . . (W ashington, D.C.,
Elements of the Brazilian navy formed the core o f the in
surgents. Led by Admiral Custodio de M ello, the rebels boarded
three warships and a number o f merchant vessels and set siege to
the harbor of Rio de Janeiro. Land forces fought pitched battles
in southern Brazil, but the rebellion was to be decided in this har
bor. Admiral de M ello’s strategy was simple: keep as many for
eign ships as possible away from the harbor so that the customs
houses, upon which the government largely depended for reve
nue, would soon become bankrupt. Gresham thus had to do tw o
things. H e had to get American ships into the harbor for the
double purpose of keeping American trade flowing and strength
ening the pro-United States elements in Brazil. Further, he had
to withhold belligerent status from de Mello or else the United
States would be forced, by declaring a position of legal neu
trality, to allow de M ello to blockade the harbor, stop trade, and
probably overthrow the Peixoto government. Gresham’s trou
ble was compounded when it appeared that several European
nations, especially Great Britain, were clandestinely helping the
insurgents.
T he American Minister to Brazil, Thomas S. Thompson, ob
served strict neutrality at the outset. H e refused to confer with
1906), II, 1113-1120, covers the period from Jan. 11 through Feb. 1,
1894, in detail. Adequate accounts are Charles A. Tim m , “T he Diplo
matic Relations between the United States and Brazil During the Naval
R evolt o f 1893,” Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly, V
(September, 1924), 119-138; also Charles E. Martin, The Policy of the
United States as Regards Intervention (N e w York, 1921), 118-123. Tim m
relies on the printed volumes o f United States Foreign Relations, while
Martin uses M oore’s Digest as his principal reference. A good Brazilian
account is Calógeras, History of Brazil, 290-294. Also see Pedro Calmon,
Historia de la civilización brasileña, traducción del original de Julio E.
Payró (Buenos Aires, 1937), 390-392, which considers mostly the fighting
on the mainland and neglects foreign participation. Pedro Calmon,
Brasil e America: Historia de urna política (R io de Janeiro, 1944), 79,
mentions and passes judgment on American actions during the revolt.
See also citations in H ill, United States and Brazil, 280, 208-313. N on e
o f these accounts, American or Brazilian, attempts to explain the reason
for the American policy adopted after Jan. 6, 1894.
Peixoto, but did call for American ships to protect United States
commerce and citizens. This was the only time Thompson was
neutral throughout the revolution, however, for, influenced by
the American business interests in Rio, he soon took a strong
pro-Peixoto position. H e asked United States naval commanders
to bring American goods to shore even if force had to be em
ployed in accomplishing the task.
His requests were based upon instructions from Gresham
which arrived on October n , though the Secretary of State
had carefully refrained from mentioning the use of any force.
As a result of Thompson’s requests, a split ensued between him
and the American commander, Rear Admiral Oscar F. Stanton,
who disagreed on the use of force to protect American goods.
Stanton then overstepped his bounds when he visited de Mello
on board an insurgent ship. He was promptly recalled.28
His replacement, Commander Henry Picking, followed Stan
ton’s policy, splitting with Thompson and with the American
Consul General in Rio, W illiam T . Townes, over the attitude
to be taken toward the insurgents. Gresham stepped into the
breach. On October 25 he refused an insurgent request for bel
ligerent status. This was follow ed by a statement of policy on
November 1. Since there had been no belligerent status ac
corded, and since there was “no pretense” that Rio was block
aded, Gresham declared that American ships could land their
cargo on lighters which could go on into shore provided that
the lighter “in doing so does not cross or otherwise interfere
with Mello’s line of fire.” In this note, Gresham developed the
policy which could achieve both his objectives: he provided for
the landing of American goods, but he also maintained at least
a semblance of neutrality by saying that the goods should not
28 Gresham to Minister Thomas S. Thompson, Oct. 11, 1893, Brazil,
Instructions, N A , R G 59; Thompson to Gresham, N ov. 10, 1893, Brazil,
Despatches, N A , R G 59; Secretary of N avy Hilary Herbert to Rear
Admiral Oscar F. Stanton, Oct. 23, 1893, Cipher Messages Sent (1888-
1895), N A , R G 45.
land if in landing they interfered with the course of the revolt.
This loophole was to cause Gresham much trouble. For longer
than a month, this policy worked satisfactorily. American ves
sels had little trouble landing their cargo, though other nations
met some difficulty. As the goods rolled through the customs
houses, de Mello’s chances grew dim. By late November he had
suffered losses in land skirmishes and had lost prestige.29
In general the American press backed up Gresham’s attitude,
though it put his policy in more active terms than he had him
self. The Springfield Republican, the Boston Daily Advertiser
and the Philadelphia Recorder agreed with the N ew York Trib-
une, which stated that the “plain duty of the Cleveland Adminis
tration” was to support the existing government and so discour
age such “revolutionary outbreaks and political anarchy.” But at
least one newspaper, the Detroit N ew s, believed that Washing
ton was “not so neutral” as “it wanted the public to believe it
was”; not only was the administration helping Peixoto through
trade, but N ew York shipyards were busy building a “formida
ble” navy for him. This, the N ew s feared, was “more suggestive
of the w ay the Confederate N avy recruited its navy-yards dur
ing our war.” 30
In early December the rebel cause was suddenly strengthened
by the defection of Admiral Saldanha da Gama. H e previously
had been a neutral, and, since he had strong monarchical tend
encies, he brought with him many who wanted to restore the
pre-1889 rule. Although the State Department knew about the
strengthening of the insurgents through the defection of da
29 United States Consul General W illiam T . Tow nes to Commander
H enry Picking, N ov. 6, 1893, Area 4 file, N A , R G 45; Gresham to
Thompson, Oct. 25, N ov. 1, 1893, Brazil, Instructions, and Thompson
to Gresham, N ov. 23, 1893, Brazil, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
30 Literary Digest, N ov. 25, 1893, 277; Public Opinion, N ov. 2, 1893,
117; Jan. i i , 1894, 352. See also H ill’s citations of newspaper opinion.
United States and Brazil, 280; Public Opinion, Jan. 4, 1894, 329; Feb. 22,
1894, 495; Literary Digest, N ov. 25, 1893, 277; and the Nation's strong
denunciation of any possible American intervention, Jan. 4, 1894, 3.
2ij. The N e w Empire
Gama, Gresham did little until January 6, 1894. The Secretary
o f State evidently feared that the insurgents were gaining in
power, and he wanted to be on the right side when the battle
ended.31
But Gresham was soon shaken from this wait-and-see attitude.
H e received word from Thompson that the Brazilian govern
ment had tw o affidavits showing that Great Britain was helping
the rebels, and that this pro-da Gama policy was being follow ed
in the hope that the insurgent leader would reinstall the mon
archy once he overthrew the Peixoto regime. The Brazilian
Minister in W ashington confirmed this information. Gresham
especially feared the withdrawal of the British fleet protection,
for he believed it would be a prelude to recognizing da Gama’s
belligerency.32
This rumored British action only pointed up a more important
threat to American interests, however. If the insurgents, en
couraged directly and indirectly by British elements, eventually
overthrew the Peixoto government, American trading interests
would be in serious danger. Many of the insurgent leaders could
not see advantages for Brazil in the 1891 reciprocity agreement.
If helped to power by European interests, these leaders would
certainly discriminate against American products. A t this same
time, December, 1893, this agreement was being abrogated in
the United States Congress. The proposed substitute, however,
the so-called W ilson tariff, was being framed with the express
intention of obtaining even more South American markets.
Gresham’s beliefs coincided with the philosophy of the W ilson
31 On that day, he again refused da Gama’s request for belligerent

status (Gresham to Thompson, Jan. 6, 1894, Brazil, Instructions, N A ,
R G 59).
32 Gresham to Ambassador to Great Britain, Thomas F. Bayard, D ec.
18, 1893, Great Britain, Instructions, N A , R G 59. Also, M ontgomery
Schuyler, “W alter Quintín Gresham,” The American Secretaries of
State and Their Diplomacy, edited by Samuel Flagg Bemis (N e w York,
1928), VIII, 253-254.
Reaction: Depression Diplomacy 21 y
tariff. The success o f the Brazilian insurgents and the loss of
much of the Brazilian market would be a serious setback if Gresh
am’s remedy was to revive American industry.33
American exporters to Brazil concurred with the Secretary’s
analysis o f the situation. In late December and early January
the State Department received numerous letters and telegrams
from these exporting firms. One of the most influential requests
for aid came from W . S. Crossman & Brothers. This had a per
sonal letter attached from Isidor Straus, one of Gresham’s close
friends. Perhaps the most urgent request was a message received
from W illiam Rockefeller, President o f the Standard O il Com
pany. Rockefeller’s company was undergoing a vigorous and
bitter competitive war with Russian oil throughout the world.
Standard O il’s attention had turned southward, especially to
Cuba and Brazil. N o w the trade w ith Brazil was threatened.84
On January 6, Gresham assured Straus that American interests
in Brazil would be protected. The Standard O il request arrived
at the State Department on January 8. On January 10, Gresham
sent instructions to Thompson which stated that unless all for
eign shipping suffered common restrictions, “no substantial in
terference with our vessels, however few , w ill be acquiesced in.”
These orders were coupled with a change of naval commanders,
Rear Admiral Andrew E. K. Benham replacing Picking. T he
“San Francisco” (Benham’s flagship) and the “N ew York” ar
rived shortly after, and the American navy became the most
powerful fleet in the harbor.85
33 See discussion of the tariff in Chapter IV , above. For Gresham’s
views o f the need for expanding trade to ameliorate the depression con
ditions, see the first section o f this chapter. For an excellent analysis o f
how Gresham viewed the relation of the new tariff to increased trade
with Brazil see Em ory’s article in Baltimore Sun, May 27, 1895, also in
Bayard MSS.
34 Gresham to Isidor Straus, Jan. 6, 1894, Letterbook; W illiam Rocke
feller to Gresham, Jan. 4, 1894, Area 4 file, N A , R G 45.
35 Gresham to Isidor Straus, Jan. 6, 1894, Letterbook; Herbert to
Picking, Jan. 6, 1894, Cipher Messages Sent (1888-1895), N A , R G 45;
2 i6 The N e w Empire
Benham told da Gama on January 24 that the rebels had no
right to establish a blockade and warned that “American vessels
shall not be molested in any manner whatever.” T he new United
States commander then told American merchants to begin land
ing their goods. On January 29, da Gama challenged this new
policy. Benham, warned of da Gama’s move, sent the “Detroit”
alongside a merchant vessel which was moving for shore. An
insurgent ship fired a blank shell at the bow of the merchant
vessel, and the “Detroit” responded with a shell, not a blank,
into the side of the rebel ship. The “Detroit” commander then
told the insurgents if they fired again, “I w ill sink you.” There
was no more firing. On February 1, Gresham approved Benham’s
action, cabling Thompson, “I trust you are in accord with Ben
ham for he has acted within his instructions.” 36
From this point on, the rebellion drifted into oblivion. Ben
ham’s action brought the other naval commanders into accord
with his policy. T hey had no choice, for it was either get on the
side which was obviously being strengthened by the American
policy, or stop the United States convoying by force. T w o more
times da Gama asked for belligerent status, but the requests were
refused by Gresham. The European powers, led by Britain, fol- 83*
Gresham to Thompson, Jan. 9, 1894, Brazil, Instructions, N A , R G 59;

Gresham to Thompson, Jan. 10, 1894, Area 4 file, N A , R G 45. In Moore,
Digest, II, 1113, this instruction is dated Jan. 11, 1894.
38 Benham to da Gama, Jan. 24, 1894, Area 4 file, and Benham to
Herbert, Feb. 1, 1894, Cipher Messages Received (1888-1895), N A ,
R G 45; Gresham to Thompson, Feb. 1, 1894, Brazil, Instructions, N A ,
R G 59. Benham’s policy (and Gresham’s approval o f it) has been con
demned in all the accounts which pass judgment on American policy
that this writer has found. On the vital point of the United States in
reality ending the rebellion, see Calmon, Brasil e America, 79; John W .
Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy (Boston and N e w York,
1902), 466-467; H ill, United States and Brazil, 291; A. Curtis W ilgus,
The Development of Hispanic America (N e w York, 1941), 327. A d
miral de Mello later declared that Benham’s interference provided the
turning-point of the revolt. See Public Opinion, March 29, 1894, 615.
See Adee’s detailed discussion in a memorandum of 1901 in J. B. Moore
MSS, Box 214.
lowed Gresham’s example. The State Department, however, took
no chances. During the month of February, five of the American
South Atlantic Squadron’s fleet of six ships were stationed in
Rio harbor, remaining there in spite of yellow fever which was
scourging the area and which had forced all the other foreign
ships, w ith the exception of one Portuguese vessel, to leave. The
insurgents put up token resistance throughout April, then left
for refuge in Portugal.37
T w o interpretations have been suggested regarding this action.
President Cleveland, in his annual message in 1894, asserted that
from the revolution’s outbreak, the administration realized that
the situation called “for unusual watchfulness.” Consequently,
the American naval force was strengthened, and “this precaution,
I am satisfied, tended to restrict the issue to a simple trial of
strength between the Brazilian Government and the insurgents.”
Cleveland believed that “our firm attitude of neutrality was main
tained to the end.” 38
Historians and international lawyers who studied this episode
in later years disagreed with Cleveland. T hey concluded that
the American action taken during January, 1894, determined
the winner of the Brazilian revolt. In the five days of January
6 to January 10, there took place an almost complete reversal in
the American wait-and-see policy of September through D e
cember, 1893. Mrs. Gresham in her biography is clear in attribut
ing the cause of this policy change to business pressure.39 The
Secretary of State realized in early January that American trade
was suffering and that, if the insurgents won, it would suffer
87 Thompson to Gresham, Feb. 1, 1894, Brazil, Despatches, Gresham

to Thompson, Feb. 5, 1894, Brazil, Instructions, Bayard to Gresham,
Feb. 7, 1894, Great Britain, Despatches, N A , R G 59; newspaper clipping,
London Times, March 2, 1894, enclosed in Bayard to Gresham, March
2,1894, Great Britain, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
88 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 524.
89 H ill, United States and Brazil, 280; Foster, A Century of American
Diplomacy, 466-467; see also authorities listed in note 35 and Gresham,
The Life of Walter Quintín Gresham, II, 778.
2 iS T he N e w Empire
even more. Such an occurrence could impair and discourage vital
segments of the American econom y, hamper recovery, and breed
those “symptoms of revolution” which Gresham feared.
Thompson agreed w ith this assessment. H e wrote Gresham
on February i, 1894, that Europeans, especially the English,
sympathized w ith the insurgents. H e accounted for this “partly
through the gradual increase of American trade w ith Brazil, and
the corresponding decrease of their ow n.” H e believed that it
could not be denied that the reciprocity agreement between the
United States and Brazil had given American merchants “a
leverage o f which all Europeans are extremely jealous.” 40
T he Bureau o f American Republics issued similar statements
to the American business community. It noted that the American
naval action in Brazil would “lead to still closer commercial re
lations between the tw o nations, and to a considerable increase
in their commerce w ith each other.” It concluded that “Amer
ican merchants and manufacturers have now an undisputed ad
vantage in the competition” for Brazilian markets. T he German
Minister to Brazil phrased the same thought more tersely: “T he
American dollar started to roll in order to break off the mon
archist point of the revolution.” 41
Replacing the British in Nicaragua

Several months after ending the Brazilian revolt, Gresham be
came deeply involved in Nicaragua’s domestic problems. One
aspect of this affair centered around the importance of the pro
posed Nicaraguan canal. Another aspect was more subtle, yet
more important; Gresham maneuvered England out of its stra
tegic position in Nicaragua and led the United States into the
40 Thompson to Gresham, Feb. 1, 1894, Brazil, Despatches, N A , R G

59-
41 Bureau o f American Republics, Special [.Monthly ] Bulletin , II
(March, 1894), 22-26; Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten,
1699-1700; Pauncefote to Rosebery, Feb. 9, 1894, F.O. 5/2234. See also
David N . Burke, Minister to Brazil, to Cleveland, June 11, 1894, Cleve
land MSS; Burke fully agreed w ith the bureau’s opinions.
new ly created political vacuum to replace the British. A third
feature o f this policy defined the relationship of the State D e
partment to American business interests in Nicaragua. The de
partment assumed a protective role, one which burdened it w ith
explicit responsibilities. Finally, the bitter reaction from the
American press and Congress to these affairs illustrated that public
opinion was becoming very tender about European actions in
strategic areas of the W estern Hemisphere.
The Nicaraguan affair was played out in the midst o f increas
ing American interest in an Isthmian canal. In 1887 the Maritime
Canal Company had obtained from Nicaragua a concession for
the construction o f a canal. General J. S. Zelaya, who became
Nicaragua’s President after the revolution of 1893, opposed this
scheme because he wanted the American government, not a
private company, to do the job. Under a measure proposed by
Senator John Morgan of Alabama, the government would prac
tically do this by guaranteeing the bonds of the subsidiary Mari
time Canal Company, the company which would handle the
actual construction. Morgan’s plan enjoyed much public sym
pathy. Chambers of Commerce passed numerous favorable reso
lutions, while a National Nicaragua Canal Convention met in St.
Louis in 1893 w ith three hundred delegates from thirty states
and territories. A similar convention was held in N ew Orleans.42
Morgan and other congressmen were not reticent in explain
ing their interest. T he Alabama Senator stressed that “there can
not be anything done for the Southern people of equal advantage
to the building of the Nicaragua canal, so as to give us access to
the eastern Asiatic countries for our cotton.” If this trade could
be taken from the British, “w e shall find that w e shall harvest
that wealth o f the Indies about which w e have heard so many
romantic statements made in past times.” Morgan supported his
point by reading similar arguments in letters sent to him b y the
42 Congressional Record , 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1526, 1529, 1530;

Lindley Miller Keasbey, The Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe D oc
trine . . . (N e w York, 1896), 455-461.
President of the N ew Orleans Board of Trade and the Secretary
of the N ew Orleans Cotton Exchange. These letters declared
that increased trade with Asia provided the solution to ending
the depression in the South. In the House, Congressman George
D . W ise of Virginia proposed a special canal committee, noting
that a canal would solve “the burning question of a foreign mar
ket for surplus home production.” W hen the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce reported on the canal bill
in early 1894, declared, “W e seek to found no colonies, w e
covet no dependencies,” but the United States could not “lag
superfluous” while her rivals staked claims to “the rich commer
cial territory of the W estern Pacific.” Congress finally dispatched
a commission to gather further information on the canal com
panies and the feasibility of the Nicaraguan project itself.43
Before the commission could act, a serious dispute arose be
tween the United States and Great Britain in the Mosquito Res
ervation in Nicaragua. This reservation was a key strategic area,
for it controlled the eastern entranceway to the proposed canal.
The native Mosquito Indians were ostensibly independent, but
they actually had been controlled by the British since the Treaty
of Managua in i860 and a subsequent arbitration in 1881. But
a third force had entered the picture in the form of American
commercial interests. United States citizens established flourish
ing banana plantations and a lucrative trade with the interior of
Nicaragua. By 1893, ten years after the first shipment of Amer
ican bananas had left the reservation, American interests had
43 Congressional Record, 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 561-562, 650-662;
1513—ï5ï8; House Report N o. 226, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (serial 3269),
1-4; House Report N o. 1201, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (serial 3272), 11-12;
Senate Report N o. 331, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (serial 3183), 7-13; Keasbey,
The Nicaragua Canal, 470-472; August C. Radke, “Senator Morgan and
the Nicaraguan Canal,” Alabama Review, XII (January, 1959), 5-34. For
the Cleveland administration’s view o f the validity o f the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty, see a memorandum prepared by O lney in June, 1894,
O lney MSS. Olney wanted the pact abrogated only with England’s
consent.
mounted to $2,000,000, while the over-all trade with the United
States approximated $4,000,000 per year. The American Minister
estimated that between 90 and 95 per cent of the total wealth of
the reservation lay in American hands.44
Faced with an empty treasury after the 1893 revolution, Presi
dent Zelaya coveted the rich reservation area. In early 1894 he
sent troops into the territory for the ostensible purpose of pro
tecting the Indians from Honduran troops. T he Indian Chief
Clarence promptly protested to the British Foreign Office, a
development duly noted by the American State Department.45
British troops promptly landed and disarmed the Nicaraguan
soldiers. A provisional government was organized with several
Americans occupying high official places. The Americans, how
ever, withdrew from one government and expressed dissatisfac
tion with another. This reaction by American interests in Mos
quito provides a key to the State Department actions taken from
March through July, 1894. These interests preferred British to
chaotic Nicaraguan control over the reservation, but the Amer
icans desired United States protection even more.4®
The American consul at Bluefields opposed Nicaraguan en
croachment and struggled to regain the former autonomy of the
reservation. Gresham, however, had more foresight. H e cor-
44Lindley Miller Keasbey, “T he Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe
Doctrine,” Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, VII
(January, 1896), 21-23; Schuyler, “W alter Quintín Gresham,” 254-256;
Rising Lake Morrow, “A Conflict between the Commercial Interests of
the United States and Its Foreign Policy,” Hispanic American Historical
Review , X (February, 1930), 2-13.
45 Foreign Relations, 1894, Appendix , 287-288; Morrow, “Conflict be
tween the Commercial Interests of the United States and Its Foreign
Policy,” 5; Baker to Gresham, Feb. 9, 1894, Nicaragua, Despatches, N A ,
R G 59*
46 For a differing interpretation, see Morrow’s article. See especially
the State Department Memorandum, “Course o f Events in Nicaragua,”
April 30, 1894, N A , R G 59—cited hereafter as “Course o f Events in
Nicaragua.” See also Foreign Relations, 1894, Appendix, 238; Baker to
Gresham, March 6 and 8, 1894, Nicaragua, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
iectly equated autonomy with the restoration of British suprem
acy. From this assumption the Secretary of State set out to
achieve the double objectives of removing the British from the
strategic area and at the same time assuring the American com
mercial interests in the reservation that they would be fully pro
tected from unjust acts o f the new Nicaraguan government.47
One overtowering implication emerged from this policy. In
achieving these objectives Gresham would commit the U nited
States to interference in Nicaraguan affairs whenever American
commercial or strategic interests were threatened.
This policy received strong support from the Americans in
the reservation. Lewis Baker, the American Minister in Managua,
revealed the American community’s true feelings when he re
ported that though “no American here has denied to Nicaragua
the sovereign power over this territory,” the Americans nonethe
less feared that the Zelaya government might take away certain
navigational rights from them and give these rights to “a com
pany of favorites, partly composed of foreigners but not Amer
icans.” Thus if Nicaraguan replaced British control, Baker wrote,
the Americans believed that “they have a right to appeal to the
Government o f the U nited States . . . for the protection o f
their vested rights in this territory, and for securing to them a
local government which shall protect them.” 48
W ith this support from the Americans in the reservation,
Gresham began pressuring the Foreign Office in London. W hen
the American Ambassador to London, Thomas F. Bayard, san-
guinely reported that Great Britain coveted “no protectorate in
substance or form,” Gresham replied that this guarantee was
not enough. The Secretary wanted neither “foreign intervention
in the government of the reservation” nor resident aliens con
trolling the administration o f affairs. Gresham also repeated his
47 Baker to Gresham, March 8, April i, June 5, 1894, Nicaragua,

Despatches, N A , R G 59; “Course o f Events in Nicaragua,” N A , R G 59;
Foreign Relations, 1894, Appendix, 243-244, 253, 256-258.
48 Ibid., 273-275.
view to Baker that Nicaragua had “paramount rights” in the
region.4*
Gresham’s policy moved along smoothly and subtly in March
and April. British influence was waning in the reservation. Then
Nicaragua struck at the most fragile link in the American policy.
Taking Gresham’s affirmations of Nicaraguan sovereignty at
face value, Zelaya’s officials began to discriminate against Amer
ican interests in the belief that they could do so w ith impunity.
Gresham, moving quickly, initiated the second part of his policy,
that o f protecting American property and lives in the area w ith
direct intervention if necessary. W hen in April an American
was murdered in the reservation, Nicaraguan authorities dis
played laxity and negligence in tracking down the killer. In
mid-May a highly impatient Gresham ordered the American
naval commander at Blueflelds to inform Nicaragua that it must
capture the murderer quickly. If the authorities failed to press
the inquiry, the commander was to “use all the force at your
command” to close the matter.60
More important than this crime, however, was the increasing
danger to American canal interests. This danger appeared at a
delicate time, for the State Department was trying to set an ex
ample for the British b y refusing to interfere in Nicaraguan
affairs. In April, Nicaragua issued notice of its intention to ter
minate the entire concession on grounds o f nonfulfillment of
contract. Gresham first shrewdly put the British on the defensive
by intimating to Bayard that British intrigue had instigated this
Nicaraguan act. T he American Minister promptly reported this
49 Bayard to Gresham, March 15 and 29, 1894, Great Britain, Des
patches, and Gresham to Bayard, April 30, 1894, Great Britain, Instruc
tions, N A , R G 59; Foreign Relations, 1894, Appendix , 271-272; Morrow,
“Conflict between the Commercial Interests o f the United States and
Its Foreign Policy,” 11-12; M cAdoo to W atson, May, 1894, Cipher
Messages Sent, 1888-1895, N A , R G 45; Gresham to Baker, June 13,
1894, Nicaragua, Instructions, N A , R G 59.
80 M cAdoo to W atson, M ay 14, 1894, Cipher Messages Sent, 1888-
1895, N A , R G 45; Baker to Gresham, June 11, 1894, Nicaragua, D es
patches, N A , R G 59.
to the Foreign Office and received assurance that Lord Kimber
ley, the Foreign Minister, wanted to “act in line” with the United
States.51
W ith the immediate British danger lessened, Gresham con
ferred with the Nicaraguan Minister to W ashington, while Baker
exerted pressure on Zelaya and Foreign Minister José Madriz.
In a conference with Madriz, Baker accused Nicaragua of jump
ing “on us with both feet and [spitting] in our faces.” Baker
emphasized his point by observing that State Department interest
in regaining the concession “is evidenced by the presence of tw o
powerful war steamers on your eastern coast.” By the first of
July, Nicaragua had withdrawn the threat of forfeiture.52
American diplomacy had thus achieved a notable double vic
tory in removing the dominant British interest from Mosquito
and giving the Maritime Canal Company another chance at build
ing the canal. Then the scene again became complicated. On
July 5 the Indians overthrew the Nicaraguan authorities. Sig
nificantly, this time American marines, not British troops, landed
to keep order. W hen Americans entered into the new native
government, Gresham was embarrassed, but Nicaragua was em
bittered. T he Secretary reassured both the British and the N ic
araguan governments that “so far as American rights o f person
and property in the reservation are concerned, this Government
can not distinguish them from like rights in any other part of
Nicaragua, and should they be invaded w e could only look to
the territorial sovereign for redress.” 5336*1
61 The State Department knew that Baker was actively interested in

overriding the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and in building a canal con
trolled by the U.S. Government; see Gresham to Bayard, May 2, 1894,
Letterbook; Bayard to Gresham, May 22 and 28, 1894, Great Britain,
Despatches, N A , R G 59.
52 Senate Document N o. 184, 54th Cong., 2nd Sess. (serial 3471), 9 6-
102; Gresham to Baker, June 2, 1894, Nicaragua, Instructions, and Baker
to Gresham, June 3, 4, 5, 30, 1894, Nicaragua, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
63 Foreign Relations, 1894, Appendix, 302-305, 316-318, 311-312; Keas-
bey, “Nicaragua Canal,” 24; Commander Charles O ’N eill to Herbert,
July, 1894, Area 8 file, N A , R G 45; Gresham to Bayard, July 19, 1894,
Reaction: Depression Diplomacy 22$
W hen in August, Zelaya restored his control over the reser
vation, he also tested Gresham’s new affirmations regarding
Nicaraguan sovereignty. Madriz informed Baker that several
Americans had been implicated in the revolt in July and then
announced his intention of weeding out those Americans who
had anti-Nicaraguan prejudices. Gresham showed his displeasure
with this announcement by increasing the United States naval
force at Bluefields. The Secretary then exerted pressure on the
Zelaya government to allow tw o Americans, who had been exiled
from Nicaragua for their participation in the revolution, to re
turn to the reservation. Zelaya finally surrendered, despite the
fact that substantial evidence, including the testimony of the
American naval commander at Bluefields, directly implicated
the tw o Americans in the revolt against Nicaraguan authority.54
Although Gresham was thus not consistent with his concep
tion o f Nicaraguan sovereignty, he had been consistent and suc
cessful in his anti-British policy. H e obtained everything he
wanted from both Great Britain and Nicaragua. The British had
left the strategic entrance to the proposed waterway. Gresham
had restored the rights of the Maritime Canal Company in spite
of a recalcitrant Nicaraguan government. American commercial
interests had been protected by the mere flourishing of the United
States N avy. Lastly, Gresham had maneuvered the release of tw o
Americans who had been leaders in the rebellion against the rec
ognized sovereign government of the reservation. The Secre
tary’s success was crowned when in December the reservation
formally became incorporated into Nicaragua. The new munic-46*
Great Britain, Instructions, and Baker to Gresham, July 27, 1894, N ic

aragua, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
64 Baker to Gresham, Aug. 11, Aug. 29, Sept. 2, 1894, Nicaragua, Des
patches, and Gresham to Baker, Aug. 4 and 29, 1894, Nicaragua, In
structions, N A , R G 59; Foreign Relations, ¡894, Appendix, 326-327;
Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. C. Matus, to Captain Sum
ner enclosed in Sumner to Herbert, Aug. 28, 1894, Area 8 file; see the
testimony of Commander O ’N eill in O ’N eill to Herbert, Oct. 30, 1894,
Area 8 file, N A , RG 45.
ipal government included tw o American officials, one o f whom
was the Alcalde, or Mayor. The acceptance of offices by Amer
icans signified that now American business interests were con
fident of United States protection from Nicaraguan injustice.65
By late 1894 only one matter still clouded the Nicaraguan pic
ture. Along with the tw o Americans, the Zelaya regime had de
ported the British Pro-Consul. T he British Foreign Office did not
match Gresham’s finesse in persuading Nicaragua to see the
necessity of yielding. In late November, Gresham received word
that British warships were steaming to Bluefields to demand an
indemnity and apology for the Pro-Consul’s arrest. The Secretary
immediately realized that Britain could use this pretext to re
cover its lost authority in the reservation area. Matters drifted
until February, 1895, when the Foreign Office suddenly broke
off relations with Nicaragua and handed that country an ulti
matum. W hen a panicked Nicaragua turned to the United States
for help, it found only advice.66
Convinced that Great Britain had a good case, Gresham ad
vised Nicaragua to end the crisis by paying the indemnity im
mediately. H e refused to invoke the Monroe Doctrine. In a
memorandum written during the height of the crisis in April,
Gresham expressed fear of one thing: “Suppose Great Britain
demands a money indemnity which Nicaragua is unable to pay,
and, as a consequence, territory is then demanded.” This would
be a tight situation for the Monroe Doctrine and also for Gresh
am’s own Nicaraguan policies. T he Zelaya government tried
unsuccessfully to stall off the demands. The result was the occu
pation of Corinto by British troops on April 27. Five days later5
55 O ’N eill to Herbert, Oct. 30, 1894, Area 8 file, N A , R G 45; Baker

to Gresham, D ec. 4, 1894, Nicaragua, Despatches, N A , R G 59; Mary
W ilhelmine Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy , 1815-191$
(W ashington, 1916), 297-298.
66 Bayard to Gresham, N ov. 24, 1894, Feb. 27, 1895, N ov. 27, 1894,
Great Britain, Despatches, and Gresham to Bayard, N o v . 24, 1894, Great
Britain, Instructions, N A , R G 59; Gresham to Bayard, D ec. 24, 1894,
Letterbook, Gresham MSS.
the crisis ended when England accepted Salvador’s offer of help
ing Nicaragua pay its indemnity within tw o weeks.57
T he American press and expansionists in Congress enjoyed
a field day in blasting the British policies at Corinto. Albert Shaw
of the R eview of R eviews wrote, “The Monroe doctrine has
never been so much discussed since its first promulgation.” Sen
ators Shelby Cullom of Illinois and W illiam Stewart of Nevada
supported Senator John Morgan’s statement to Richard O lney
that “I am not an Anglophobist, or anything like it [but British]
history in Central American diplomacy is only a series of ex
ploits to gain the control of the Isthmus.” Few could agree with
Morgan’s definition of himself, but few Americans disagreed
with his view of Britain’s diplomatic objectives.68
W atching the British-Nicaraguan dispute attentively from the
sidelines, the State Department believed that it saw a distinctively
anti-American trend in the diplomacy of Britain’s new Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister, Lord Salisbury. In November,
1895, Salisbury refused to allow an American to become a third
member o f the arbitral commission which was to settle the
Corinto problem; he did this in spite of earlier assurances to the
contrary. On the dispatch which informed W ashington of Salis
bury’s decision, A lvey Adee wrote neatly in red ink: “Mr. Sec
retary: This is an important indication o f the drift o f British
67 Memorandum enclosed in State Department’s files with Baker to
Gresham cable of April 13, 1895, N A , R G 59; also Memorandum pre
pared by the State Department for Richard Olney, Aug. 10, 1895, Olney
MSS. In the tw o months after O lney replaced Gresham as Secretary o f
State (July and August), State Department personnel compiled a series
o f memoranda which filled in the minute details o f the Nicaraguan
problem for Olney. See also Bayard to Gresham, Feb. 27, 1895, Great
Britain, Despatches, N A , R G 59; Foreign Relations, 189$, 696, 1033-
1034.
58Review of Reviews , XI (June, 1895), 621-622; Public Opinion,
May 9, 1895, 502; N elson M. Blake, “Background o f Cleveland’s V ene
zuelan Policy,” American Historical Review , XLVII (January, 1942),
264; Archibald Ross Colquhuon, The Key to the Pacific: The Nicaragua
Canal (N e w York, 1898), 293; Morgan to Olney, March 6, 1895, O lney
MSS.
policy.” 59 Although the problem was soon settled, Adee’s note,
written just tw o weeks before the Venezuelan crisis was made
public, indicated State Department anxiety over British move
ments in Latin America.
The United States had gained much in Nicaragua in tw o years,
and the State Department guarded these gains with care in 1896
and 1897. W hen Nicaragua threatened to reopen the whole
Mosquito question over the British claims problem, Bayard lec
tured the Nicaraguan Minister to London so severely that the
plan was squashed. In April and May of 1896 a revolt broke out
in the Corinto area, but this time American marines landed to
restore order, though British ships and troops were waiting off
shore. W hen in January, 1897, Nicaragua again threatened to
terminate the canal contract, Secretary of State O lney and Sena-
ator Morgan met with a Central American representative in
W ashington. Morgan ended the session by telling the stunned
visitor: “Our people intended to have a water way . . . and no
government, not even their own could refuse their demand on
just grounds. T hey would even go to war to secure their rights.”
Shortly after, Zelaya sent assurance that the canal company
would not be bothered.60
Perhaps most important to the understanding of American
diplomatic history during this period was the fact that the State
Department was w illing to assume explicit responsibilities for
the purpose of protecting and encouraging American commer
cial expansion into Latin America. Gresham revealed this policy
during the peak of the Mosquito controversy. W hen the British
Minister to W ashington insisted that under the i860 treaty Eng
land was bound to see that Nicaragua did not oppress the Mos
quito Indians, the Secretary of State simply replied, “W e w ill
60 Baker to Olney, N ov. 18, 1895, Nicaragua, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
00 Bayard to Olney, Dec. 2, 1895, Great Britain, Despatches, N A , R G
59; Memorandum of meeting-between Rodriguez, Morgan, and Olney,
Jan. 25, 1897, and Hiram Hitchcock, President o f the Maritime Canal
Company to Morgan, April 9, 1897, Morgan MSS.
see that she does not.” 61 Gresham had replaced England’s con
trol of the crucial reservation area with a de jacto American
protectorate.
Depression, Expansion, and the Battleship N avy

Because of increased commercial interest and self-defined po
litical responsibilities, the United States was becoming more and
more involved in Latin-American affairs as the decade o f the
1890’s progressed. Such crises as the Chilean affair of 1891, the
Brazilian and Nicaraguan problems of 1893-1895, and the more
dangerous Venezuelan episode of 1895-1896 convinced admin
istration and congressional leaders that American claims in Latin
America would only be as strong as the military force behind
them. Consequently, as American stakes in Central and South
America increased, so also did American military strength. The
most significant and revealing aspect of this developing military
power was the rise of the American battleship navy between
1890 and 1896.
Congress had appropriated the funds for the first three battle
ships in 1890. T w o years later a fourth such ship was authorized.62
In view of later events, these debates are especially interesting,
for they reveal the attitudes of Hilary Herbert of Alabama and
W illiam A. M cAdoo of N ew Jersey. In 1893-1897 Herbert
would serve as Secretary of the N avy, and M cAdoo would be
Herbert’s chief assistant. In 1890 Herbert still preferred cruisers
to battleships. M cAdoo attempted to replace the proposed battle
ships with outdated low-board monitors, although he finally
agreed on the battleship clause when his amendment was crushed.
The ideas of both men were to change considerably in the next
few years. In the Democratic Congress of 1892, Herbert, acting
61 W ilfrid Hardy Callcott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States,
1890-1920 (Baltimore, 1942), 77-78; Keasbey, “Nicaraguan Canal,” 25-
26.
62 See Chapter III for a discussion of the origins o f the battleship fleet
in the 1890-1892 period.
2 ^0 The N e w Empire
as chairman o f the House Committee on N aval Affairs, sub
mitted a report cutting naval appropriations more than $3,500,000
from the level of the previous year. T en months later Herbert
submitted his first report as Secretary of the N avy. A fter para
phrasing Mahan’s arguments for a battleship navy, the report
concluded by requesting “at least one battle ship and six torpedo
boats” and an increase of $3,000,000 over the 1893 appropria
tions, even though Treasury conditions had worsened during the
year.63
This document unveiled the naval policy which the new
Cleveland administration would follow , a policy of creating a
large battleship navy which could protect not only home shores,
but American commercial interests as far away as Asia. The re
port also revealed H ilary Herbert’s rather startling transforma
tion into an advocate of a battleship navy. T he reasons for this
metamorphosis appear to be several. First, and perhaps most im
portant, he not only began reading Mahan’s writings, but also
carried on a correspondence w ith the distinguished Captain. In
one o f these personal letters Herbert assured Mahan that the
N avy Department would follow the capital-ship (battleship)
policy, the only policy which, as Mahan had taught, could pro
vide sound protection for an expanding commercial empire. In
his 1893 report the Secretary even retold the story of the naval
battles o f the French Revolution in phrases which Mahan had
used in his epic The Influence of Sea Power upon H istory. H er
bert had changed many o f his ideas since his commerce-destroy
ing days of 1889.64
Another aspect of Herbert’s altered views was evident in the
Secretary’s concern w ith distant areas of the globe. H e especially
63 Congressional Record, 51st Cong., ist Sess., 3271-3272, 3168, 3257,
3321, 3223-3224; ibid., 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1877; Report of the Secre
tary of the N a vy} 1891, 33-34; Report of the Secretary of the N avy y
i 893> 39. 59*
64 Herbert to Mahan, Oct. 4, 1894, Mahan MSS; Report of the Secre
tory of the N avy > ¡899, 37.
noted the Asian and Latin-American areas as places of immediate
interest:
Our close interests with China and Japan; . . . our geographical
and political relations with the islands of the Pacific; our multifarious
interests along the whole South and Central American coasts, now
more or less in a state of political unrest . . . would be sufficient
to tax nearly all of our present naval strength in the Pacific Ocean
alone. Indeed, the continent to the south of us, and both oceans,
as I have said before, now demand the presence of American ships
of war to a greater extent than ever before, and this demand is not,
in my judgment, a temporary one, but one that will steadily in
crease.65
Herbert’s expansive policies met an unmovable obstacle in the
depression-scared Congress of 1894. N o t only was Congress
reluctant to appropriate additional funds at a time when the
Treasury faced steep deficits, but President Cleveland empha
sized in his annual message of 1893 that depression conditions
made new shipbuilding unadvisable.66
In the follow ing year Cleveland abruptly changed this opinion.
W hen in 1894 Herbert moved far beyond his first report by
recommending the building o f three additional battleships and
ten or twelve torpedo boats, Cleveland fully supported his Sec
retary. The President declared in his annual message of 1894,
“If w e are to have a navy for warlike operations, offensive and
defensive, w e certainly ought to increase both the number of
battle ships and torpedo boats.” 67 Congress cooperated by au
thorizing tw o battleships and narrowly missed the appropriation
o f m oney for a third. Since it occurred in just one year, this
change o f administration policy merits close analysis.
Four factors can be distinguished which caused this resurgence
65 Ibid., 41.
66Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 451; Congressional
Record, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 4636-4637, 7210.
67 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 540-541.
2^2 The New Empire
of interest in the navy. First, the American fleet in the South
Atlantic and the Pacific had been remarkably busy during the
previous tw o years. Cleveland noted in his 1893 message that
ships had even been taken from the Fish Commission and the
Revenue Marine to supply the demand “in Nicaragua, Guate
mala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Argentina, Brazil” and Hawaii.
Affairs in Brazil and Nicaragua could have alone fully occupied
the navy. Mahan complained to a British friend that the Amer
ican fleet could never get together for maneuvers, for “just as
w e expect them to begin, a bobbery starts up in Central or South
America, or H ayti, or elsewhere, and away go one or tw o
ships.” 68
A second general cause for the renewed interest centered
around Mahan’s growing influence and the increasing prestige
of other naval officers. Mahan had followed his historic book of
1890 with a series of articles which applied the lessons of history
to America of the 1890’s. In 1893 he emphasized the need for
control of the canal route. In 1895 Mahan analyzed the rising in
terest in the Monroe Doctrine. H e emphasized that “reduced to
its barest statement . . . the Monroe Doctrine . . . formulated
an idea to which in the last resort effect could be given only
through the instrumentality of a navy.” Mahan believed that this
laid bare the weakness of the frequently advanced argument that
America needed a navy only “for the defence of our own
coasts.” 69
In the m id-1890’s naval officers enjoyed their most popular
days since the Civil W ar. The navy exhibition at the W orld’s
Fair in Chicago in 1893 proved to be a tremendous attraction to
visitors. W hen a navy review was held in N ew York in August,
1893, the N ew York Herald reported that “it was a sight to stir
68 Ibid., 450-451; Mahan to J. R. Thursfield, N ov. 21, 1895, Mahan
MSS.
69 Mahan, “T he Isthmus and Sea Power,” 102-105; Mahan, “T he
Future in Relation to American Naval Power,” 152, 156, 158-159. Both
articles are reprinted in The Interest of America in Sea Power . This
work is discussed in Chapter II, above.
men’s souls, to send the blood tingling through their veins.” 70
Naval officers used this new ly found popularity to advance their
views on naval expansion.
In almost every instance these officers called for a battleship
navy which would be able to protect America’s growing com
mercial interests abroad. In 1896, Lieutenant John M. Ellicott
published an article calling for strict enforcement of the Monroe
Doctrine and a battleship fleet. H e made the cardinal mistake,
however, of declaring that the United States ought to be ready
to fight a defensive war, that the best weapon in such a war was
commerce destroying, and that a navy loaded with monitors
(along with battleships) could best defend American coastlines.
Commander C. F. Goodrich attacked this position vigorously,
arguing Mahan’s thesis that wars were decided only when battle
ships went far out to sea and destroyed entire fleets. Goodrich
received strong support from Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce,
founder of the W ar College and in 1895 President o f the Naval
Institute at Annapolis. Luce believed that by 1898 the United
States would need eighteen battleships, with “other classes of
ships, in proportion.” H e justified such an estimate by repeating
Mahan’s history of commercial sea lanes.71
The depression provided the reason for the third and fourth
causes of revived interest in the battleship navy—the need to
provide jobs for American laborers, and the impulse to find and
70 Frank M. Bennett, The Steam Navy of the United States . . .

(Pittsburgh, 1897), 764-767; clippings of the N ew York Tribune and
the N ew York Herald, both dated April 28, 1894, in Mahan MSS. If
Charles A. Beard were alive in the present space age, he would no doubt
be amused by a quotation he once used: “As a celebrated English states
man once remarked, if you give any service o f a government a free rein
it will exhaust the budget, and fightingmen, in their search for strategic
frontiers and naval bases, will want to annex the moon” (quoted in The
Navy: Defense or Portent? [N ew York and London, 1932], 74).
71 John M. Ellicott, “T he Composition o f the Fleet,” Proceedings of
the United States Naval Institute, XXII ( 1896), 537- 559; S. B. Luce,
“As to Navy-Yards and Their Defense,” Proceedings of the United
States Naval Institute, XXI ( 1895), 688.
2%4 T he N e w Empire
protect markets for American surplus goods. T he last cause was
frequently supplemented with the argument that commercial
and territorial rivalry threatened to bring war w ith England.
These were the tw o most immediate and important factors that
affected Congress in 1895 and 1896.
W hen in his report of December, 1894, Herbert requested
three battleships and twelve torpedo boats, he based this request
on tw o factors—the need o f domestic industries for work, and
the belief that the battleship was necessarily superior over a
cruiser in warfare. Speaking during the deepest trough o f the
entire depression, the Secretary disclaimed any intention of advo
cating paternalistic government, but he warned that unless Con
gress immediately authorized more ships many large shipyards
would have to “be entirely disbanded.” T he navy would lose a
large corps of skilled workmen, and the national defense w ould
suffer.72*37
Congressmen happily realized that government contracts w ith
home industries stimulated their chances of re-election, especially
during depression, debt-ridden times. W hen the House Com
mittee on Naval Affairs reported, it fully endorsed Herbert’s
three battleships and twelve torpedo boats. T he committee empha
sized that mechanics and skilled laborers working in shipbuilding
should not be unemployed. Republican Jonathan Dolliver from
Iowa fully backed this Democratic report, as he declared “that
in these times of poverty, idleness and misfortune it is w ell for
the country to continue” the machine shops which the N ew
N avy had “called into existence.” Remembering the plague of
surplus Iowa farm products, Dolliver also advocated outright
subsidization o f American carrying trade. For such hearty co
operation, Dolliver succeeded in having tw o of the torpedo boats
built at Dubuque, Iowa.78
72 Report of the Secretary of the N a vy , 1894, 49-51.

73 A survey o f the bill’s passage through Congress can be found in
Congressional Record , 53rd Cong., 3rd Sess., 2310, 3047, 3049, 3123-3124,
3232-3237; see especially 2248-2250, 2459.
More extended debate resulted when Congress discussed the
commercial and political implications o f the battleship provision.
Several big-navy senators began their argument w ith an examina
tion of the consequences arising from the closed frontier. An
thony Higgins of Delaware declared: “W e have already arrived
at the end o f our land for homesteads. . . . T o-day the needy
American youth . . . w ill have to seek his fortune in some other
field, and to manufacturers and to commerce, rather than to agri
culture, w ill our growing population have to apply itself.” Like
Mahan, H iggins concluded that such commercial expansion
would result in conflict w ith other commercial nations. H e be
lieved that this rivalry had already brought about the necessity
of Benham’s action at Rio de Janeiro. Senator Orville Platt of
Connecticut declared, “It is to the ocean that our children must
look, as they have once looked to the boundless W est.” H e
believed, “The future of this country, so far as growth, develop
ment, progress, and civilization are concerned, lies outside o f us
largely.” 74
Other senators and representatives left no doubt that they
related American prosperity to a great battleship navy. N elson
Aldrich of Rhode Island believed that the navy did not exist for
“any purpose o f warfare,” but for its “commercial uses.” Sena
tor John Morgan declared that Captain Mahan had established
“as a proposition o f universal political econom y” that sea power
provided great nations w ith “their principal wealth and prog
ress.”
Representative Thomas A . E. W eadock o f Michigan defined
future American prosperity as follows: “Our future growth lies
in the success of our commerce, and no great commerce has ever
been built up without the assistance o f a navy to protect the
merchant marine and enforce the rights o f merchants and
traders.” Representative John O. Pendleton o f W est Virginia
minced no words in stating that if American surplus farm prod
uce and cotton exports suffered from a naval blockade, then
74 Ibid., 3109, 304J.
2^6 The N e w Empire
western and southern agrarians would find almshouses as their
only source of relief.75
Latin America received special attention. Representative
Robert Adams, Jr., of Pennsylvania emphasized that the Monroe
Doctrine “has now become not merely a political principle, but
a cardinal doctrine of the American people that w e w ill brook
no foreign interference either in the political affairs or the com
mercial relations of this hemisphere.” H e pointed to American
interference in Brazil as a specific example: “W hen that shot
was fired it was understood that the United States stood ready
to maintain that doctrine; and thereupon the rebellion collapsed.”
W hen J. Fred Talbott of Maryland, chairman o f the House
Committee on Naval Affairs, defended his committee’s bill, he
also recalled Rear Admiral Benham’s actions at Rio harbor. T al
bott then added: “But I go beyond that; away beyond that. I
claim that it is the province of good American citizenship and
statesmanship that the American fleet shall dominate . . . the
western waters of the Atlantic Ocean and the eastern waters of
the Pacific.” If any man disputed this fact, he was “not w orthy to
represent his people in this Congress.” 76
Many o f the congressmen coupled Asia with Latin America
as another aspect of the same problem. W eadock observed that
not only had revolutions in Latin America involved American
interests, but the war in Asia had “put in jeopardy the property
and lives o f our citizens and the large commerce we have in
both these nations.” Lodge viewed the upsurge of Japan with
alarm. H e quoted a London journal’s report that the Japanese
were building tw o battleships and planned to contract for tw o
more. The Massachusetts Senator concluded, “There they are,
our nearest neighbor on the Pacific; there they are, with Hawaii
lying halfway between us.” Higgins said that he feared not
only Japan, but also China. The Delaware Senator prophesied
that when China “shall have arisen out of the ashes of her defeat,”
™Ibid., 1889, 1950, 3054, 3043, 2259, 3107, 2246-2247.
76 Ibid., 2307, 2311.
Reaction: Depression Diplomacy 2$ 7
she would be “likely to become the dominant military power of
the globe.” 77
As the principal threat to American interests, however, Japan
and China ranked far behind Great Britain. Chairman Talbott
proclaimed that “Great Britain never arbitrates with anybody
except one who is ready to fight her.” Representative Hernando
de Soto M oney of Mississippi admitted that in 1890 he had
heatedly opposed the authorization of a single battleship. Since
then, however, he had learned that war “is the inevitable thing.
. . . There are no great nations of Quakers.” M oney warned
that the principal threat would come from Great Britain. John
Van Voorhis of N ew York stated that “we can take care of our
selves,” but added that he wanted battleships to protect Latin
America as well. H e spent much time elaborating on the instances
when Britain had insulted American interests in Honduras, N ic
aragua, Venezuela, and Brazil during the previous thirty years.78
Populists led the opposition to additional battleships. “Sock
less” Jerry Simpson believed a navy useless until the nation had
its own merchant marine. Senator W illiam Peffer, noting that
fourteen American states had recently been under martial law
because of labor discontent, feared that the naval armaments were
being created “to suppress rebellion and insurrection and revolu
tion amongst the common people.” Non-Populist opposition
came from Senators David B. H ill of N ew York and Redfield
Proctor of Vermont. H ill did not care for increased taxation to
pay for the ships, and Proctor observed that Mahan’s theories
were useless without colonies, a commodity the United States
did not have.79
Despite such opposition, Congress appropriated the money for
tw o battleships. The bill becomes most meaningful when viewed 17
71 Ibid., 2261, 3107-3110.

78 Ibid., 2310-2311, 2252-2255, 3105-3106, Appendix, 325-327; Report
of the Secretary of the N avy, 1894, 17.
79 Congressional Record, 53rd Cong., 3rd Sess., 2241-2244, 3095, 3044,
3112-3113, 3103.
2$8 The N e w Empire
as a complement of the American business community’s con
temporary conclusions regarding expansion. It should be em
phasized, moreover, that these battleships were authorized before
the Corinto and Venezuelan episodes. Thus, although the battle
ship measure in part emanated from past American involvement
in far-flung areas of the world, the measure itself formed a part
of a general, growing, and emphatic feeling that the political and
commercial health of the United States depended on such distant
areas as Latin America and Asia.
W hen Cleveland and Herbert again asked Congress for naval
appropriations in December, 1895, Corinto had become history,
but the Venezuelan crisis was still imminent. Cleveland again
noted how, during the year, American vessels protected Amer
ican interests in places as distant as Turkey. T he President struck
a new note by declaring that “Cuba is again greatly disturbed,”
thus pointing out another area in which American naval forces
were needed. Herbert follow ed the President’s message w ith a
report requesting tw o more battleships “and at least tw elve tor
pedo boats.” Citing his previous arguments, Herbert also noted
that “the lessons taught at Yalu and W ei Hai W ei” (battles
of the Chinese-Japanese war) proved the value o f these tw o types
of vessels.80
W hen the House Committee on Naval Affairs submitted its
report in March, the Venezuelan incident had occurred, though
the report only briefly noted this event. T he committee wanted
to give Herbert $2,000,000 more than the Secretary had thought
necessary. The committee also asked for four battleships and
fifteen torpedo boats. Chairman Charles Boutelle justified this
large increase by alluding to the “remarkable decrease in the cost
of the construction o f modern war ships,” and to the need of
“providing employment for vast numbers o f our own people.”
But he closed his report w ith the comment that the United States
should set “afloat a navy that . . . may prove in peace the mes-
80 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 626-655, especially 640;
Report of the Secretary of the N a vy , 1895, xxxiv-xxx, lvii.
sengers of good w ill to other lands and show to us and to the
world again that ‘commerce follow s the flag.’ ” 81
In an amazing display of unanimity, the House supported
Boutelle’s request for four battleships. Phillip B. Low of N ew
York admitted that “we are confronted with a depleted Treas
ury. But what has that to do with it?” Amos Cummings of N ew
York spoke for the Democrats w ho backed Boutelle, as he
stressed that “in view of the war cloud on the horizon . . . this
is an exceedingly economical bill.” 82
T he House measure ran into trouble in the Senate. Arthur
Gorman proposed that the number of battleships be cut to tw o.
Matthew Quay immediately asked that it be raised to six. Gor
man had his w ay. W ith the aid o f all the Populists plus men such
as Proctor, who feared that a big navy would lead to taking colo
nies, Gorman squeezed his amendment through 31-27 w ith 31
abstentions. W hen the measure came back to the House, Bou
telle became so bitter that the Speaker had to remind him that
it was highly improper for one house of Congress to describe the
other house in such language.83
Despite the efforts by Lodge, H aw ley, and Quay to persuade
the Senate to agree w ith the House, the deadlock continued
throughout May and early June. Another factor entered the
controversy. The Senate wanted to limit the price o f armor to
$350 per ton, thus taking away much o f the profit which the
Bethlehem Steel and Carnegie works had received by selling
armor to the government at figures as high as $550 per ton. The
House objected to setting a definite limit. On June 9 the bill
finally passed. It provided for three battleships and disposed of
the armor controversy by directing the Secretary of the N avy
to make an investigation and then recommend to Congress the
price he believed to be fair.84
61 Congressional Record, 54th Cong., ist Sess., 3193- 3194; House Re
port N o. 904, 54th Cong., ist Sess. (serial 3460), 1.
82 Congressional Record, 54th Cong., ist Sess., 3196, 3195.
**lbid., 4511-4512, 4519, 4565, 4653, 4799-4804.
84 Ibid., 6195, 6326.
In his last message as President, Cleveland boasted that in
March, 1893, the United States N avy had only tw o armored ves
sels. Since then, three first-class and tw o second-class battleships
and two armored cruisers had been placed in commission. The
“Iowa” (the battleship authorized in 1892), would be ready in
early 1897. Besides these, there had been five battleships author
ized under his administration. But Herbert wanted more. In his
1896 report, the Secretary feared that the navy was not yet in
“a satisfactory condition.” H e suggested three more battleships
and twelve torpedo boats. Interestingly, Herbert asked for battle
ships which would have less than twenty-three feet draft so that
they might enter American harbors in the G ulf of Mexico. A ll
of the previously authorized battleships had drafts of tw enty-
three to twenty-five feet and so could not enter these ports.85
Congress did not grant Herbert’s request, but for immediate
American history this refusal was irrelevant.86 The fleet that
would defeat Spain in 1898 had been set afloat. It had been
constructed at a time when the theme of overseas commercial
expansion and conflicts arising from this expansion had stimu
lated Congress to accept Mahan’s capital-ship theory and all that
this theory implied for America’s political and economic respon
sibilities for the future.
The environment in which the N ew N avy had been created
was described by Richard O lney. In a speech which opened the
Philadelphia Commercial Museum on June 2, 1897, O lney de
clared that American businessmen could ask the government for
tw o favors: free access to the markets o f the world, and the
right to conduct foreign trade in American bottoms.
Sea-power—as an officer of the United States Navy demonstrates
in a recent treatise conferring almost equal lustre upon himself and
his country—sea-power is an essential element both of national
85 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 733; Report of the Secre
tary of the N avy , 1896, 4-5, 7, 9, 56.
86Boutelle analyzed the reasons w hy Congress did not act in Con
gressional Record , 54th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2115.
security and national greatness. The fact seems to be now thor
oughly implanted in the popular mind and is largely responsible for
the birth of our navy. . . . Yet it is not to be forgotten that men-
of-war for a nation that is without the vessels of commerce is al
most an incongruity and that the true basis of a navy is a merchant
marine. The business man of this country, therefore, who longs to
see its foreign trade conducted to a reasonable extent at least under
the stars and stripes, . . . who objects to one great power sequester
ing the highways of the ocean, . . . that man is not to be regarded
as a mere sentimentalist.87
Olney missed the vital point that American bottoms were not
necessary to stimulate American exports. A ll that was needed
was the ability to outproduce other manufacturing or agricul
tural countries, plus a navy to protect both distant markets and
the merchant ships that carried this surplus. This statement never
theless shows that Olney appreciated Mahan. It also demon
strates that he realized the value of “free access to the markets of
the world,” and that he resented “one great power sequestering
the highways” to these markets. That the Cleveland adminis
tration thought about these factors, and that it viewed any busi
nessman who wanted to obtain overseas markets as more than
“a mere sentimentalist,” can be illustrated not only in this speech
of its Secretary of State, but also in the way the administration
countered British encroachments in Venezuela.
87 Speech is dated June 2, 1897, Olney MSS. Dexter Perkins ties in

the growing concern for the Monroe Doctrine with the growth of the
navy in his Monroe Doctrine , 7^7-7^07, 225-226.
VI
Reaction: The Venezuelan Boundary
Crisis o f 1895-1896
IN the development of the new empire, only the economic effects

o f the 1893-1897 depression and the battle o f Manila Bay in
1898 rank in importance w ith the Venezuelan boundary crisis
o f 1895-1896. T he boundary episode is crucial for several rea
sons. First, it indicated the explosive potential o f the conclusion
reached by American political and business leaders that overseas
commercial expansion could solve the economic stagnation and
the attendant social unrest. These leaders considered Latin Amer
ica as the most promising area for this expansion to occur. Thus
when the Cleveland administration enunciated the so-called
“O lney extension” of the Monroe Doctrine in 1895, the admin
istration emphasized the positive aspect o f that doctrine; namely,
that the W estern Hemisphere was to be under American com
mercial and political control, not European.
Two aspects of the crisis substantiate this first conclusion. The
State Department did what it thought would most benefit Amer
ican interests, not what Venezuela necessarily wanted. The
United States cared little for Venezuelan opinion or advice on
242
Reaction: Venezuelan Crisis 243
the situation. Moreover, the timing is significant. Since this
boundary dispute had simmered for over a half-century, it
should be noted w hy the United States chose 1895 as the op
portune moment to end the controversy and assert its control
over the W estern Hemisphere.
These observations lead to another conclusion. American ac
tion came as a direct answer to British encroachments in Latin
America. Congressional critics, American businessmen, and the
press had made Great Britain the scapegoat for troubles in the
United States. The depression of 1893 quickened this tendency
when English investors worsened the panic by unloading their
American securities. This was follow ed by ominous British moves
in Brazil, Nicaragua, and the small island of Trinidad, which was
located off the Brazilian coast. T he State Department became
anxious over these movements and finally forced a showdown
struggle on the issue of the Venezuelan boundary.
Lighting the Fuse

T he boundary difficulties had begun in 1841 when a British
surveyor, Robert Schomburgk, mapped the western limits of
British Guiana. H e included Point Barima inside Guiana’s bound
aries. Venezuela immediately protested, for Point Barima con
trolled the mouth of the Orinoco River, and that river was the
trade artery for the northern third of South America. In the
1840’s and again in the 1880’s, Great Britain offered to relinquish
its claims to Point Barima if Venezuela would concede much of
the remaining area within the Schomburgk line. Venezuela re
fused, asking that the entire disputed territory be settled by
arbitration.
Venezuela had unsuccessfully attempted to bring the United
States into the argument-while Hamilton Fish was in the State
Department. In the late 1880’s, however, the Secretary of State,
Thomas F. Bayard, became interested. The British Foreign Office
increased its claim in the disputed area from 76,000 square miles
to 108,000 square miles and capped its new demand by announc-
7yjyj The New Empire
ing that Point Barima was British territory. Venezuela broke off
diplomatic relations with England. Bayard then sent America’s
first emphatic protest to Great Britain, but E. J. Phelps, the
American Minister in London, thought the time inopportune and
did not deliver the message.1
The United States did little else until Venezuela began plead
ing its case with the new ly installed Cleveland administration in
1893. By this time Venezuela was desperate. Her government was
tottering and her economy was in shambles. She could not re
open diplomatic relations with England because of the fear that
this would force the payment o f huge debts to British citizens,
debts which the bankrupt Venezuelan Treasury could not afford
to honor. Finally, acute unrest permeated the eastern section of
the country where the boundary dispute lay. If the government
surrendered the boundary claim, open revolution would be sure
to follow . These growing pressures forced Venezuela to step
up its appeals to the State Department. Gresham responded with
a message of July 13, 1894, to Bayard, now American Ambassa
dor to England. The Secretary of State noted that British claims
had “been silently increased by some 33,000 square miles” and
now embraced “the rich mining district of the Yuruari,” one of
the wealthiest gold stores on the continent. The American Am
bassador, who had grown to dislike the Venezuelan character as
1 Paul R. Fossum, “T he Anglo-Venezuelan Boundary Controversy,”
Hispanic American Historical Review , VIII (August, 1928), 300-304;
Theodore Clarke Smith, “Secretary O lney’s Real Credit in the V ene
zuela Affair,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society , L X V
(1932-1936), 112-147; H enry James, Richard Olney and His Public
Service (Boston, 1923), 221-222; Foreign Relations, 1888, I, 698-702.
Parts of this chapter were presented in greatly condensed form in “T he
Background of Cleveland’s Venezuelan Policy: A Reinterpretation,”
American Historical Review^ XLVI (July, 1961), 947-967. Venezuela
gave concessions to American speculators in the middle o f these gold
fields. Vagts believed that the monetary situation affected Cleveland’s
Venezuelan policy, for the policy not only silenced silverite expansionists
temporarily, but also kept England away from gold stores which the
U.S. Treasury could use ( Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in
der Weltpolitik [N ew York, 1935], 510, 1257).
much as he loved the Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition, delayed
taking the instruction to the Foreign Office and finally presented
a weakened version of the note.2
American interest markedly increased in December, 1894.
Gresham again asked Bayard to protest England’s new claim.
Cleveland follow ed by declaring in his annual message that he
would “renew the efforts heretofore made to bring about a res
toration of diplomatic relations . . . and to induce a reference
to arbitration.” In January, 1895, Gresham sent several instruc
tions to Bayard asking him to sound out Great Britain on the
tw o points Cleveland had mentioned. These incidents in D e
cember and January marked the beginnings o f full-fledged
American participation in the boundary dispute. Events soon
occurred in the United States and Latin America which picked
up the momentum of American interest and speeded it first to
O lney’s epochal declaration of July, 1895, and finally to Cleve
land’s dramatic pronouncement in December.3
Five general factors can be analyzed to indicate the back
ground and immediate causes of these tw o messages: (1) new
European encroachments in Latin America; (2) vigorous reac
tion by American public opinion to these encroachments; (3)
the entry of commercial arguments into the American case, es
pecially (4) the view that the Orinoco River was the vital pawn
in the dispute; (5) the arrivals of Richard Olney into the United
States State Department and Lord Salisbury into the dominating
position in British politics.
Commercial interests and politicians in the United States had
interpreted the Brazilian incident o f 1893-1894 as an American
action to halt European commercial and political infiltration of
2 Foreign Relations, ¡894, 803-805; Tansill, Foreign Policy of Bayardy

661-663; Partridge to Gresham, N ov. 15, Oct. 17, 1893, Venezuela, Des
patches, and Gresham to Bayard, July 13, 1894, Great Britain, Instruc
tions, N A , R G 59.
8 Gresham to Bayard, Dec. 1, 1894, Jan. 3, 1895, Great Britain, N A , R G
59; Bayard to Gresham, April 5, 1895, Cleveland MSS; Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, IX, 526.
Brazil. The Mosquito incident in 1894 seemed to be another in
stance of British interests appearing in an area where they had
no right to appear. Both these events, however, paled beside the
potential threat posed by the Corinto episode. T he landing of
British troops on Nicaraguan soil incited American public opin
ion and official circles to strong anti-British sentiments. This feel
ing became explicit during the naval debates of 1895 and 1896
and during the discussions carried on by the business community
in 1894 and 1895. T he outbreak of the Cuban revolution in the
spring o f 1895 heightened American interest in the Caribbean
area.4
Other European threats to the rights o f nations in the W estern
Hemisphere appeared in 1895. England alone was staking out
so many claims that the Second Assistant Secretary of State,
A lvey A . Adee, exclaimed to O lney in August, 1895, that the
British were playing a “grab game” throughout N orth and South
America. In December, 1894, the United States received word
that the legislative chamber of British Guiana had passed a meas
ure which authorized the construction of a road uniting the
upper Barima w ith either the Cuyuni or the Yuruari areas in the
heart of the disputed territory. T he Cuyuni and the Yuruari
had been the scenes o f recent gold rushes. In mid-summer Great
Britain occupied a small island six hundred miles off the coast of
Brazil for use as a cable station. Although the island was small
and uninhabited, Brazil had claimed it. American public opin
ion quickly became interested in this trivial affair. Adee told
O lney that “the newspaper men are w ild about the Trinidad
business.” The State Department maintained its interest until the
dispute was settled in m id-1896.5
The United States also viewed France as a threat in Latin
America. A large area encompassing 155,000 square miles of
4 See Chapters IV and V , above; also “D id England Assist the Brazilian
Insurgents?” in Literary Digest, May 26, 1894, 115.
6 Adee to O lney Aug. 2 and 19, 1895, O lney MSS; Adee to Bayard,
Aug. 30,1895, Great Britain, Instructions, N A , R G 59; Foreign Relations,
i$94, 84t- 843»
Reaction: Venezuelan Crisis HI
Brazil had been claimed by France, though she had never at
tempted to occupy it until gold was found there in 1894 and
1895. W hen French soldiers tried to move into the area, fighting
broke out in May, 1895. T he dispute paralleled the Venezuelan-
British controversy in several respects. Both areas not only con
tained gold, but also provided a valuable entrance into the in
terior of South America. In Brazil the disputed area controlled
the northern estuary of the Amazon River. Although the United
States did not become immediately involved, both Bayard and
O lney closely watched French-Brazilian relations. Bayard, in
fact, wrote O lney regarding the contingencies which might oc
cur “in the assumption of the United States o f a supervision of
Brazilian boundaries, should French interests or ambitions
prompt their invasion.” Bayard further warned the French Am
bassador in London that the United States had a “serious in
terest” in Latin America and that these states would not be
allowed to “become an element in European politics.” From this
single incident it is plain that American interest in the Venezuelan
boundary dispute did not develop in a diplomatic vacuum.®
France also became involved in tw o other areas o f the hemi
sphere. Venezuela had broken off diplomatic relations with
France over alleged insults by the French Minister to the Vene
zuelan government. The United States stepped into the argu
ment and worked to restore relations. Bayard revealed the
importance o f the dispute: it was “of present interest especially
when viewed in [its] connection w ith the status of the existing
Anglo-Venezuelan Boundary dispute.” T he United States be
came more actively interested in French claims in an affair over
the Santo Domingo customs houses in 1894 and 1895. There
the French threatened to use force to obtain reparation for the
murder of a French citizen. The State Department became in
volved when the Santo Domingo Improvement Company of N ew
York requested help. This company had been incorporated by a
•Bayard to Olney, Oct. 25, 1895, Great Britain, Despatches, N A , R G
59-
2^.8 The N e w Empire
group of N ew York bankers and had bought Santo Domingo’s
debt. It had then taken over the customs houses in order to
guarantee payment of the debt. The French delivered an ulti
matum demanding that these customs houses “must respond
. . . and guarantee the payment of the sums specified.” A French
squadron arrived at Santo Domingo. T he United States re
sponded by sending an American ship to the scene with instruc
tions to “watch carefully” over American interests. Fortunately,
the matter was soon adjusted.7
An observer writing in Forum noted the significance of these
several conflicts. Looking back at O lney’s and Cleveland’s ac
tions in the Venezuelan dispute from the perspective of April,
1896, this writer aptly commented: “The thunderbolt o f last
December may have come out o f a seemingly clear sky, but
nimbus clouds had long been hovering over Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, and the Spanish Main. W ise international weather
prophets had discerned the threatening storm.” 8
Aggressive public and congressional opinion in the United
States provided more thunder and lightning for international
weather in the spring o f 1895. Congressional critics of the ad
ministration displayed the most interest in foreign affairs. In al
most every issue o f foreign relations—Hawaii, the battleship
navy, Nicaragua, an Isthmian canal—Great Britain was the tar
get for the congressional onslaught.®
Henry Cabot Lodge exemplified this sentiment. In tw o articles
written during the first half o f 1895, Lodge warned that, al
though England, Germany, and France were attempting to sur-
7 Bayard to Olney, Aug. 8, 1895, Great Britain, Despatches, N A , R G
59; Explanatory Memorandum sent by Dominican Chargé in W ashington
to the State Department, Feb. 5, 1894, Acting Secretary of State Edwin
Uhl to Secretary of N avy Hilary Herbert, Feb. 13, 1895, and Herbert to
Rear Admiral R. W . Meade, March 9, 1895, Confidential Correspondence,
N A , R G 45. For the background see Foreign Relations, 1S95,1, 397-402.
®J. W . Miller, “Rumors o f W ar and Resultant Duties,” Forum, XXI
(April, 1896), 239.
•Blake, “Background o f Cleveland’s Venezuelan Policy,” 260-262;
also Chapter V , above.
Reaction: Venezuelan Crisis 24p
round the United States with colonial dependencies, the Amer
ican people would not “give up their rightful supremacy in
the W estern Hemisphere.” Interestingly, Lodge attacked Cleve
land for trying to end the depression by expanding overseas
commerce through the means of free trade. Lodge believed that
the President had devoted so much time to trade expansion that
the administration had ignored vital foreign policy problems.
The Massachusetts Senator wanted to use the Monroe Doctrine
in Venezuela to exclude British interests, but he quickly made a
caveat concerning the Doctrine: “The Monroe Doctrine has no
bearing on the extension of the United States, but simply holds
that no European power shall establish itself in the Americas or
interfere with American governments.” 10
In February, 1895, Congress officially announced its opposi
tion to the British claims in Venezuela. Representative Leonidas
F. Livingston of Georgia proposed a resolution on February 6,
1895, which asked for “friendly arbitration” in the boundary dis
pute. W hen some weak opposition appeared, it was quickly
stilled by the remark that “large American interests w ill be
promoted by a friendly settlement of this question.” Livingston
emphasized the threat posed to the Orinoco River; if Great Brit
ain controlled that artery, she would “revolutionize the com
merce and political institutions of at least three of the South
American Republics.” Livingston clinched his argument by re
marking bluntly: “This relates to a matter on our [sic] continent.
Our trade and other relations w ith those people are involved in
this settlement.” 11 It is difficult to find much altruistic concern
for Venezuela in this debate.
Other Americans also noted the European movements in
Latin America. R. A . Alger wrote Lodge that he read the Sen-
10 H enry Cabot Lodge, “England, Venezuela and the Monroe Doctrine,”
North American Review, CLX (June, 1895), 657-658; Lodge, “Our
Blundering Foreign Policy,” Forum, XIX (March, 1895), 13-16. Dexter
Perkins offers some excellent observations on Lodge’s place in die history
o f the 1890’s in The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907, 149.
11 Congressional Record , 53rd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1832-1834.
2$o The N e w Empire
ator’s articles to a Cincinnati audience, and “could you have
heard the noise . . . you would know that [foreign policy]
more than anything else, touches the public pulse of today.”
From his W ashington social parlors, H enry Adams prophesied
that “a direct trial of strength w ith England” was imminent.
Adams thought “it time that the political existence o f England
should cease in N orth America,” and “particularly on the
Orinoco.” Toward that, “all m y little social buzz has been di
rected since September, 1893.” 12
A n important and vocal part o f American public opinion
believed that European threats to Commercial markets in Latin
America provided an adequate reason for American interven
tion. Econom ic arguments played a large part in successfully
passing the congressional resolution on Venezuela in February,
1895. A speech by D on Dickinson in May, 1895, was perhaps the
most w idely publicized commercial argument for American in
tervention in Latin America. Dickinson controlled the Dem o
cratic party in Michigan. H e was, moreover, a close friend of
President Cleveland, and it is significant that he made the ad
dress immediately after a long conference w ith the President.
It thus should be emphasized that this speech was one o f the most
blatant expressions o f American commercial manifest destiny
made in the 1890’s. Dickinson’s words were more than a play to
the jingoes in the galleries; they exemplified a wide and strongly
held opinion that the U nited States needed additional foreign
markets for its prosperity.
Dickinson began his speech by noting that the danger of war
would always be with the world. Like Mahan, he believed that
wars arose out o f commercial competition. Dickinson empha
sized that this meant that the U nited States would have to face
the danger of many conflicts, for America stood “in the w ay of
the settled policy o f Great Britain.” Since the U nited States
assumed this position, English actions would have to be watched
12 R. A . Alger to Lodge, June 11, 1895, Lodge MSS; Letters of H enry
Adams, II, 69.
.R eaction: Venezuelan Crisis 251
closely, especially “the most extraordinary claims and move
ments . . . in Nicaragua and Venezuela.” A fter reviewing the
several bloody chapters of Anglo-American history, Dickinson
reached a flaming peroration:
W e are a great nation of producers; we need and must have open
markets throughout the world to maintain and increase our pros
perity. . . . Whereas our interests in the early days were largely
at home, our material interests today depend upon the markets
abroad. We have entered the lists in the great contest of live and
let live with commercial Europe, and our diplomacy should be alert
to secure and protect favors and advantage from all peoples that
buy and sell or have a port our ships can enter.13
Since Dickinson’s intimacy w ith Cleveland was w ell known,
the speech aroused much comment. Most revealing, however, is
the President’s reaction. H e wrote Dickinson on July 31, 1895
(eleven days after O lney sent his note to England), that he had
read the speech “with much interest” and was “glad you wrote
it.” Cleveland sagely added, “In due time it w ill be found that
the Administration has not been asleep.” 14
A key factor in such commercial arguments, and indeed a
vital influence in the shaping o f American diplomacy during the
Venezuelan troubles, was the controversy over the control of
the Orinoco River. Oddly, historians have paid little attention to
this important aspect of the negotiations.15 It appears from study
ing the chronology of events, however, that the British exten
sion of their claim to the mouth of this river triggered the more
vigorous policy which the State Department pursued from the
spring o f 1895 t0 Cleveland’s message in December. As early
as 1885, Great Britain hinted that the Schomburgk line included
13 Blake, “Background of Cleveland’s Venezuelan Policy,” 267; clipping
in Cleveland MSS from the Detroit Free Press, May 10, 1895.
14 Nevins, G rover Cleveland, 632; Cleveland to Dickinson, July 31,1895,
Cleveland MSS. Dickinson summed up the favorable public opinion which
greeted his speech in a letter to Cleveland, May 15, 1895, Cleveland MSS.
15 A n exception is N evins’ G rover Cleveland, 631, which mentions the
Orinoco question without elaboration.
the Orinoco’s mouth, but England’s first overt move into the
area occurred in 1894, when British Guiana began to build a
railroad into the Cuyuni gold fields. The rumor that England
claimed this area was confirmed on April 5, 1895, when Lord
Kimberley, the British Foreign Minister, showed Bayard a map
on which the terminal point of the Schomburgk line ran a short
distance inside the mouth of the river. Kimberley stated that
this area had been “conclusively proven and established as a Brit
ish possession, and would not be submitted to arbitration.” Fi
nally, on May 13, 1895, the State Department received a note
from the Venezuelan Foreign Minister reporting that England
had withdrawn her offer of 1890 to renounce her claim to the
mouth of the Orinoco in exchange for other concessions.16
The United States had shown interest in keeping the Orinoco
open to American shipping during the early months of 1895. In
October, 1894, Venezuela unconditionally closed all but one of
the river’s entrances in an alleged effort to end smuggling.
Gresham exerted pressure to reopen the river, and Venezuela fi
nally complied in early 1895 by opening one of the key ports on
the Orinoco. American official circles wondered whether V ene
zuela had closed the ports to show the United States how Ameri
can interests would suffer if England controlled the river. Brad-
street's printed the story and added the comment that “the fact
is made clear, however . . . that Venezuela relies largely upon
the mediation of the United States” in the boundary dispute.17
Venezuela played its Orinoco trump card for all it was worth.
In notes to the State Department, the Venezuelan Foreign Min
ister, P. Ezequiel Rojas, emphasized that the boundary trouble
“is almost as serious and important to the great Republic of the
16Fossum, “T he Anglo-Venezuelan Boundary Controversy,” 322-323;

Bayard to Gresham, April 5, 1895, Great Britain, Despatches, N A , R G
59; see also British and Foreign State Papers, 1894-1895, LXXXVII (L on
don, 1900), 1062-1063; Foreign Relations, 1895, II, 1482-1483.
17 P. F. Fenton, “T he Diplomatic Relations of the United States and
Venezuela,” Hispanic American Historical Review, VIII (August, 1928),
299“329'> Foreign Relations, 18¡>4, 800; Bradstreet's, April 27, 1895, 257
Reaction: Venezuelan Crisis *53
North as it is to Venezuela herself.” N ot only was the Monroe
Doctrine at stake, but, Rojas believed, “England’s control over
the mouth of our great fluvial artery, and over some of its tribu
taries, w ill be the cause of permanent danger to industry and
commerce throughout a large portion of the N ew W orld.”
Venezuela next granted a concession of land 125 miles by 15
miles located at the mouth of the Orinoco to a group of wealthy
Americans. The concession, enormously rich in minerals and
wood, lay in the heart of the disputed area.18
W illiam L. Scruggs, former American Minister to Venezuela,
had been hired as special agent by Venezuela for the purpose of
interesting American opinion in the boundary controversy.
Scruggs stressed the importance of the Orinoco in an influential
pamphlet, British Aggressions in Venezuela or the Monroe
Doctrine on Trial. A fter reviewing the history of the dispute,
Scruggs concluded that Great Britain had unlawfully encroached
on tw o areas. One of these was the mouth of the Orinoco, “the
key to more than a quarter of the whole continent,” which Eng
land could use “to work radical changes in the commercial rela
tions and political institutions of at least three o f the South
American republics.” The second place of British encroachment
was the small island of Patos which controlled “the most avail
able entrance” to the Orinoco and was “the key to the gulf which
commands the Orinoco delta.” The pamphlet went through four
printings. Scruggs sent copies to congressmen, governors, public
libraries, and newsstands. O lney received a copy in June, 1895,
while Scruggs wrote Cleveland to remind the President that
the controversy was not settled. It was Scruggs, moreover, who
induced Leonidas Livingston to propose the Venezuelan reso
lution in Congress in February, 1895.1®
18 Haselton to Gresham, Jan. 15, 1895, Venezuela, Despatches, and
Bayard to Gresham, April 5, 1895, Great Britain, Despatches N A , R G
59; G. H . D . Gossip, “England in Nicaragua from an American Point
o f V iew ,” Fortnightly R eview , LVIII (December, 1895), 829-842.
1®W illiam L. Scruggs, The Monroe Doctrine on Trial (2nd ed.;
Atlanta, Ga., 1895), 24-25; Theodore D . Jervey, “W illiam Lindsay
2 f4 T he N e w Empire
Venezuela and Scruggs could have conserved their energies.
Cleveland and other leading Americans fully realized the value
o f the Orinoco. Just before his speech in May, D on Dickinson
made a midnight call on the hard-working Chief Executive.
Cleveland w ent to the trouble of displaying a large map w hich
showed the area o f the boundary dispute. The President told
Dickinson that Great Britain had previously offered to negotiate
its claim to the mouth o f the Orinoco, but now Kimberley had
retracted that offer, and that he (Cleveland) was alarmed since
the control of the river meant the control o f the interior.*
20 Con
sidering the tenaciousness o f Dickinson’s speech, Cleveland
must have made a forceful impression on the Michigan Dem o
crat.
This new British claim stimulated Gresham to urge again arbi
tration of the dispute. On January 16, 1895, the Secretary of
State w rote Bayard that recent information indicated that “the
British boundary claim is variable and is expanded westward
from time to time as expedience or interest may counsel.” Again
on the last day of March, and after the State Department had re
ceived rumors that Britain claimed the Orinoco’s mouth, Gresham
told his Ambassador in London that the British position was
“contradictory and palpably unjust.” T he Secretary o f State
added, “If Great Britain undertakes to maintain her position on
that question, w e w ill be obliged, in view of the almost uniform
attitude and policy o f our government to call a halt.” W ritten
eleven days after the cabinet discussed the situation, Gresham’s
letter reflected the administration’s opinion.21 Interesting also is
the indication that, as early as January and March, Gresham
Scruggs—A Forgotten Diplomat,” South Atlantic Quarterly , X X V II

(July, 1928), 292-309; Scruggs to O lney, June 17, 1895, O lney MSS.
20 Nevins, G rover Cleveland , 631 ; for other references to the Orinoco
see Lodge, “England, Venezuela and the M onroe Doctrine,” 657-658;
Gossip, “England in Nicaragua,” 833.
21 Gresham to Bayard, Jan. 16, 1895, Great Britain, Instructions, N A ,
R G 59; Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine , /£67-/907, 145.
Reaction: Venezuelan Crisis 2$5
showed the same disgust with the British position as O lney dis
played in July.
Gresham initiated a tw o-point policy. In May he exerted pres
sure on Venezuela to renew diplomatic relations w ith Great Brit
ain; the United States would then “be in a position” to urge Great
Britain to arbitrate the problem. Venezuela finally informed the
State Department in August that it had decided to follow Gresh
am’s wishes. By this time, however, the O lney note had ren
dered meaningless the Venezuelan decision. Second, Gresham
began composing a note to the British Foreign Office. H is un
tim ely death on May 28 prevented the sending of this note. T he
contents of the message are unknown since it cannot be found
in his papers or his biography. Mrs. Gresham remarks that “there
was to be no ultimatum as m y husband had prepared it.” Judg
ing, however, from the Secretary of State’s growing impatience
w ith the British position, it was no doubt a stern note and might
w ell have produced the same results as O lney’s July 20 dispatch.22
Cleveland clearly expected some trouble to arise from the situ
ation. In April and May he asked friends for suggestions of
candidates to fill the vacated ministerial post to Venezuela. H e
noted that Venezuelan affairs were “liable to assume a condition
calling on our part for the greatest care and good management,”
and he wanted “to send someone there o f a much higher grade
than is usually thought good enough for such a situation.” A fter
several men refused the offer, the post was given to Allen
Thomas, the American Consul at La Guayra.23
Shortly after Gresham’s death, Richard O lney became Secre
tary of State. O lney had been one o f the best-paid railroad law
yers in N ew England before he accepted the post of A ttorney
General in 1892. H e possessed tw o beliefs which must be under-
22 A cting Secretary o f State U hl to José Andrade, May 25, 1895, and
Andrade to Olney, Aug. 10,1895, O lney MSS; Gresham, Life of Greshcmty
11, 794-795*
23 Letters of G rover Cleveland, 392; John E. Russell to Cleveland, April
12, 1895, and G . L. Rives to Cleveland, May 9, 1895, Cleveland MSS.
stood in order to comprehend American actions in the dispute.
H e had changed his views concerning the cause o f the depres
sion during the course of 1893 and 1894. In 1893 he attributed
the depression to a normal turn of the business cycle. By June,
1894, however, his understanding of the economic picture had
matured to the point where he interpreted the depression as a
great “labor revolution” resulting from the introduction of ma
chine technology into the economy. H e hoped that this revolu
tion would be confined to “peaceful and moderate channels.”
W hen, during the Pullman strike a month later, labor violence
overflowed these channels, O lney did not hesitate to use force
to end the strike. The Attorney General regarded Eugene Debs,
the leader of the Pullman strikers, with contempt. O lney declared
that “no punishment he is likely to get . . . w ill be commen
surate with his offense.” 24
O lney’s second major belief concerned his view of the course
of American history. H e believed that r!~ United States of the
1890’s had emerged from its century ol internal development
into a full-fledged world power. Olney holds a prominent place
in American history because he believed that the United States
in 1895 was by necessity expanding outward, and that it was
rapidly developing the power to clear away obstacles which lay
in its path. From 1895 t0 March, 1897, O lney possessed and
vigorously used the instruments of power which could remove
these obstacles. H e fervently believed that the American Century
began during his years as Secretary of State.
In several notable statements that O lney issued after leaving
the State Department, he outlined the philosophy of his foreign
policy. In an article for Atlantic M onthly, O lney attacked the
common belief that W ashington’s Farewell Address envisioned
eternal isolation for the United States. H e pointed out that W ash-
24 N ew York Tribune, June 8, 1895, 1:2; remarks prepared for Harvard

Commencement Dinner, June 28, 1893, and clipping from Philadelphia
Daily Evening Telegraph , June 20, 1894, Olney MSS; O lney to Edwin
W alker, Aug., 1894, Olney Letterbook, O lney MSS.
ington had said merely that America should stay out of world
affairs until it was strong enough to command its own fortunes.
O lney believed that this time had arrived. H e declared that “it
behooves us to accept the commanding position” the United
States had “among the Powers of the earth.” H e noted that “this
country was once the pioneer and is now the millionaire.” After
asking what is “the present crying need of our commercial in
terests,” O lney answered, “It is more markets and larger markets
for the consumption and products o f the industry and inventive
genius of the American people.” In his address at the opening of
the Philadelphia Commercial Museum on June 2, 1897, Olney
emphasized his belief that Latin America provided the natural
market for American products.25
In a remarkable article written after 1900, he predicted that
future historians would call the events of 1898 the turning point
of American history. H e then flatly stated that these chroniclers
would be mistaken. O lney believed that the change had occurred
earlier in the 1890’s, and that “the change was inevitable, had
long been preparing, and could not have been long delayed.” H e
observed that the American people
had begun to realize that their industrial and com m ercial develop
m ent should n ot be check ed b y the lim itation to the demands o f
the hom e market, but m ust be furthered b y free access to all mar
kets; that to secure such access the nation m ust be form idable not
m erely in its w ants and w ishes and latent capabilities but in the
means at hand w h erew ith to readily exert and enforce them .26
25 Richard O lney “International Isolation o f the United States,” Atlan

tic Monthly , LXXXI (M ay, 1898), 577-588. A fter the outbreak o f the
Spanish-American W ar, Olney wrote Cleveland that American expan
sionist sentiment had gone too far ( Letters of Grover Cleveland, 503).
But Cleveland told a friend in 1900 that Olney “is largely responsible
through his ‘Atlantic’ article for the doctrine o f expansion and conse
quent imperialism” (James, Olney , 187). See also “Speech at National
Opening o f the Philadelphia Commercial Museum,” June 2, 1897, Olney
MSS.
26 Richard Olney, “T he N ation’s Parting o f the W ays,” Harvard Grad
uate Magazine, XIII (September, 1904), 48-51.
2$8 T he N e w Empire
These remarks do not place O lney in the colonialist camp.
Like Gresham, he despised the thought of a colonial empire and
strenuously opposed the acquisition o f the Philippines.27 T he
attempt to ensure America’s “free access to all markets” and the
flexing of the fully developed muscles of one o f the “powers
of the earth” nevertheless envisioned a kind o f vigorous foreign
policy which even Lodge and Roosevelt could heartily endorse,
as they did after O lney’s July 20 note became public. Such a
philosophy furthermore envisioned the extension o f American
responsibility abroad far beyond any previous limits.
N ot the least of O lney’s characteristics were his bluntness and
stubbornness. As early as 1894 his vigorous statements and deter
mination made him the most powerful member o f Cleveland’s
cabinet. Shortly after he became Secretary of State, a man with
similar characteristics rose to power in England. Lord Salisbury
re-entered office in July, 1895, as both Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister. Since the retirement of Bismarck, he was the dominant
European statesman. Swept into office in July, 1895, w ith the
largest majority any government had enjoyed in the House of
Commons since 1832, Salisbury’s vigor was abetted by the power
both to carry out his decisions and to compel Parliament to abide
by them.28 T he clashing on the international diplomatic scene of
tw o men such as O lney and Salisbury promised to be not only
exciting, but explosive.
O lney’s interesting personal traits and the blustering language
of the July 20 note often make one lose sight o f the fact that
President Cleveland greatly influenced the formulation o f the
Venezuela policy. Some historians claim that Cleveland made
the key decision o f sending the July message and that he outlined
the tone o f the policy. It is definitely known that the President
warmly endorsed O lney’s first draft o f the message, though he
27 Richard O lney, “Growth o f Our Foreign Policy,” Atlantic M onthly ,

L X X X V (March, 1900), 289-290.
28 Aubrey Leo Kennedy, Salisbury, 1830-190$ . . . (London, 1953),
2j 1-257.
proposed “a little more softened verbiage here and there.” In a
letter to his Secretary o f State, Cleveland called the message “the
best thing of the kind I have ever read and it leads to a conclu
sion that one cannot escape if he tries—that is if there is any
thing o f the Monroe Doctrine at all.” T he President declared in
this letter that O lney had shown that there was “a great deal”
in the Monroe Doctrine, and that the Secretary of State had
placed “it I think on better and more defensible ground than any
o f your predecessors— or m ine? This letter indicates that Cleve
land endorsed not only the language of the note, but also O lney’s
key point that the United States could intervene in the dispute
because it was affected by events occurring elsewhere in the
W estern Hemisphere. Other than the President, the Secretary of
the N avy, Hilary Herbert, the Secretary o f the Treasury, John
Carlisle, and the new A ttorney General, Judson Harmon, read
and endorsed the message before it was sent to Salisbury. Sev
eral weeks later the Secretary of W ar, Daniel Lamont, added his
blessings. N o record has been found of any cabinet member who
disagreed w ith the note.2*
T he Explosion
O lney began the July 20 message by reviewing the respective
claims.2
30
9 H e concluded that neither party stood for a boundary
line “predicated upon strict legal right.” The Secretary of State
then turned his fire directly on Great Britain for its attempt to
move “the frontier of British Guiana farther and farther to the
westward” o f the Schomburgk line. O lney noted the vital point
29 George Roscoe Dulebohn, Principles of Foreign Policy under the

Cleveland Administration (Philadelphia, 1941), 20; Alfred L. P. Dennis,
Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906 (N e w York, 1928), 22;
Cleveland to Olney, July 7, 1895, Cleveland MSS (italics used in the
original); telegrams from O lney to Harmon, Herbert, and Carlisle, July
18,1895, O lney MSS.
80 O lney to Bayard, July 20, 1895, Great Britain, Instructions, N A , R G
59; also in Foreign Relations, 189s, 1, 545-562. T he best historical criticism
o f the note is Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907, 153-168.
26o The N e w Empire
that these British moves included tw o recent advances: one by
Salisbury in 1890 which “fixed the starting point of the line in
the mouth of the Amacuro west of the Punta Barima on the
Orinoco,” and one by the Rosebery government in 1893.a1
Venezuela had offered to arbitrate these claims, but Great Britain,
so Olney claimed, had consistently refused. The Secretary closed
this first section of the message by noting that to all this “the
United States has not been, and indeed, in view of its traditional
policy, could not be indifferent.”
Olney then reached the transition to the next section, which
concerned the Monroe Doctrine:
By the frequent interposition of its good offices at the instance of
Venezuela . . . the Government of the United States has made it
clear to Great Britain and to the world that the controversy is one
in which its honor and its interests are involved and the continuance
of which it can not regard with indifference.
This phrase provides the key to the remainder of the note, for
O lney then tried to fit the Monroe Doctrine into the meaning
of this sentence. The Secretary of State made a bad fitting, but
this is irrelevant to the understanding of O lney’s intention and
to the aims of the administration’s foreign policy. O lney ad
vanced the argument that American interests as w ell as V ene
zuelan territory were at stake. In essence he was interpreting the
Monroe Doctrine as the catchall slogan which justified protecting
what the United States considered as its own interests. If the
Monroe Doctrine had not existed, O lney’s note would have been
written anyway, only the term American Self-Interest would
have been used instead of the Monroe Doctrine.3 32
1
31 In protesting against the advancement of British claims, O lney failed

to note that the Venezuelan government had advanced claims w hich
were also without foundation and, moreover, that Venezuela had granted
concessions in the disputed area which violated former agreements w ith
the British (ibid., 154).
32 Albert Bushnell Hart compared O lney’s argument to an Oxford
undergraduate’s account o f a football game: “It would have been just
O lney asked rhetorically whether the United States had a
right to intervene in the dispute. H e emphatically answered that
it did and gave the involvement of American interests as the
reason: according to “the admitted canon of international law ,”
the United States could interfere in a controversy concerning
tw o or more other nations “whenever what is done or proposed
by any of the parties primarily concerned is a serious and direct
menace to its [the United States] own integrity, tranquillity
or welfare.” O lney believed this right was spelled out in tw o
forms “peculiarly and distinctively American,” W ashington’s
Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine.
The note emphasized that the Monroe Doctrine was positive
as w ell as negative. Monroe’s declaration did “not content itself
with formulating a correct rule for the regulation of the relations
between Europe and America. It aimed at also securing the prac
tical benefits to result from the application of the rule.” Further,
the Doctrine was a “distinctively American doctrine of great
import to the safety and welfare of the United States.” Olney
advanced the thesis that the “safety and welfare of the United
States” could be affected in tw o ways. One stemmed from the
fact that the Latin-American nations were “friends and allies,
commercially and politically, of the United States.” Thus, “the
subjugation of any of them by an European power . . . signifies
the loss of all the advantages incident of their natural relations
to us.” O lney then moved beyond this in elaborating his second
point: “But that is not all. The people of the United States have
a vital interest in the cause of popular self-government.” Using
sentences which sound much like the phrases W oodrow W ilson
used in 1917 when he proclaimed the ideal of extending the
American form of democratic self-government to the world,
O lney pronounced the extension of this form of government to
Latin America as the most important factor to be protected if
the self-interest of the United States was to remain unharmed. A
as good a fight without the ball; the ball was only in the w ay” ( The
Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation [Boston, 1916], ¿03-204).
further insight into O lney’s thinking can be gained from his
implicit distinction between British democracy and American
democracy.
O lney coupled this closing reference to political ideals, how
ever, with the more mundane matter of the Orinoco River. First,
however, he wrote the famous phrase:
T o d a y the U n ited States is practically sovereign on this continent,
and its fiat is law upon the subjects to w h ic h it confines its inter
position. W h y ? It is n ot because o f the pure friendship or g o o d w ill
fe lt fo r it. . . . It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its
infinite resources com bined w ith its isolated position render it mas
ter o f the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all
other pow ers.
O lney did not include this declaration in the message as a debat

ing technique. As his speeches prove, he earnestly believed that
the United States possessed a commanding position among the
powers of the world. From this double assumption that the
United States had the right to intervene in Latin-American affairs
whenever its rights were endangered, and further, that it had
the power to protect its rights, O lney asked the crucial question
whether American interests were involved in the Venezuelan
boundary dispute to the extent that the United States could
legitimately intervene. H e answered with an emphatic affirma
tive: “The political control at stake . . . is of no mean impor
tance, but concerns a domain of great extent . . . and if it also
directly involves the command of the mouth of the Orinoco, is
of immense consequence in connection w ith the whole river
navigation of the interior of South America.” A fter denying that
Great Britain could qualify as an American state, O lney con
cluded the message by declaring that “peaceful arbitration” was
the “one feasible mode” o f determining the boundaries.
Bayard did not relish the task of reading the note to Salisbury.
H e nevertheless impressed upon the Prime Minister that O lney
wanted a reply as quickly as possible. The Secretary of State’s
notes to Bayard during the fall revealed an increasing nervousness
over the coming diplomatic battle. Due partly to a misunder
standing o f the time Cleveland’s message was to be sent to Con
gress, partly to the fact that Salisbury was inundated by other
matters, and partly to the Foreign Office’s underestimation of the
dispute’s significance in American minds, the British reply did
not arrive at the State Department until five days after the Presi
dent’s annual message had been delivered.33
The State Department, meanwhile, endeavored to keep the
note secret. Vigilant journalists nevertheless began reporting
rumors of the message as early as September 2. The American
public became especially aroused over these rumors when, in
October, Great Britain sent an ultimatum to Venezuela. In
January, Venezuela had seized and held for questioning eight
members of the British Guiana police stationed on the right
bank o f the Cuyuni River. Salisbury demanded a reparation of
fifteen hundred pounds. H e gave Venezuela three months to
com ply or Britain would “adopt other means for obtaining satis
faction.” The British press interpreted the Foreign Office as
saying in effect that “Venezuela is to run on all fours w ith N ic
aragua,” and that like Corinto, the Monroe Doctrine would be
“evaded, not defied.” Bayard sent these clippings to W ashington
for O lney’s attention. The British Foreign Office quickly assured
Olney, however, that the ultimatum had “no reference what
ever” to the boundary dispute.34
T w o other events further disconcerted the State Department
in the autumn of 1895. In October, the British Ambassador to
the United States, Sir Julian Pauncefote, told a reporter that
Great Britain would not think of submitting its “well-defined”
83 Bayard to Cleveland, Sept. 10, 1895, Cleveland MSS; pencil notation
to Adee, undated, probably August, 1895, Adee to Olney, Aug. 14, 1895,
Bayard to Olney, N ov., 1895, O lney MSS; Public Opinion, Oct. 31,1895,
554-
84 Adee to Olney, Sept. 2, Aug. 30, 1895, Andrade to Olney, D ec. 11,
1893, Bayard to O lney, O ct. 21, 1895, O lney MSS; Cleveland to Olney,
Oct. 16, 1895, Cleveland MSS; Bayard to Olney, Oct. 22, 1895, Great
Britain, Despatches, N A , R G 59. Venezuelan pleas to the State Depart
ment can be found in Foreign Relations, i8ps> II, 1483-1488.
territory in Venezuela to arbitration, especially that area which
contained British settlements. O lney feared that this interview
was a “foreshadowing” of the British reply from Salisbury on
Venezuela.35
O lney also became concerned over British actions in N ic
aragua. Bayard reported in early November that the British had
“reserved their rights” in the whole Nicaraguan affair. Later in
November, the British-Nicaraguan indemnity treaty was made
public. The pact expressly stipulated that no American could
serve as the third commissioner on the arbitration board. Eng
land wanted to settle directly with Nicaragua. Adee believed
that such an obviously anti-American provision was “an impor
tant indication of the drift of British policy.” 36
Adee’s fear was mirrored in the American press and political
circles throughout the fall and early winter of 1895. During
October and November journals freely expressed the opinion
that Cleveland would present a vigorous interpretation of the
Monroe Doctrine in his December address. Many of these papers
fervently hoped for such a message. Politicians recognized that
many constituents were intensely concerned with Latin-Amer-
ican affairs. Representative Thomas M. Paschal from Texas
wrote Olney, “Turn this Venazuelan [«V] question up or down,
North, South, East or W est, and it is a ‘winner.’ ” “W hy, Mr.
Secretary,” Paschal exclaimed, “just think of how angry the an
archistic, socialistic, and populistic boil appears, on our political
surface. . . . One cannon shot across the bow of a British boat
in defense of this principle w ill knock more pus out o f it than
would suffice to inoculate and corrupt our people for the
next tw o centuries.” Other congressmen, as Representatives Joe
W heeler of Alabama and Charles H . Grosvenor of Ohio and
Senator W illiam E. Chandler of N ew Hampshire, published ar-
35 Olney to Bayard, Oct. 8, 1895, Great Britain, Instructions, N A , R G
59-
36 Bayard to Olney, D ec. 2, 1895, Great Britain, Despatches, and Adee’s
notation on Baker’s despatch to Olney, N ov . 18, 1895, Nicaragua, Des
Reaction: Venezuelan Crisis 26$
tides stressing the importance of the Orinoco River within the
context of the necessity to expand the foreign commerce of the
United States.87
Salisbury’s reply finally arrived at the State Department on
December 7, five days too late for Cleveland’s annual message.
The answer consisted of tw o letters. One message bluntly re
futed the validity of the Monroe Doctrine as international law,
while the other answered O lney’s defense of the Venezuelan
position and the Secretary of State’s request for arbitration.
In his consideration of the Monroe Doctrine, Salisbury simply
disclaimed the relation of the hallowed dogma “to the state of
things in which w e live at the present day.” But he went beyond
this generalization. Olney’s “novel prerogative,” the Prime Min
ister observed, in effect asserted an American protectorate over
Latin America. This was something which Monroe’s “sagacious
foresight would have led him energetically to deprecate.”
Salisbury emphasized this vital point in another way. H e chal
lenged O lney and Cleveland to admit explicitly that the Amer
ican economic and political system could not remain a viable
system if it was forced to remain within the continental bounds
of the United States. Salisbury declared that “the United States
have no apparent practical concern” with the controversy. The
adjectives are important. Olney had mentioned that American
“honor and . . . interests” were involved. Salisbury had demon
strated that historically the Monroe Doctrine had no relevance
to the affair. If the United States then rested its case on some-73
37 Bradstreet’s, Oct. 19, 1895, 657; Economist, N ov. 30, 1895, 1563;
quotations in Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, ¡867-1907, 169-171; H enry M.
Stanley, “Issues between Great Britain and America,” Nineteenth Cen
tury, XXXIX (January, 1896), 1; N ew York Tribune, N ov. 26, 1895, 6:3;
Public Opinion, N ov. 7, 1895, 585-586; Blake, “Background of Cleveland’s
Venezuelan Policy,” 270-271; Thomas M. Paschal to Olney, Oct. 23, 1895,
Olney MSS; Joseph W heeler and Charles H . Grosvenor, “Our D uty
in the Venezuelan Crisis,” North American Review, CLXI (Novem ber,
1895), 628-633; Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 637. See also the stormy
congressional debates in early December in Congressional Record, 54th
Cong., ist Sess., 24-25, 28, 36, 114-126.
thing beyond the tradition of the Doctrine, namely the nation’s
honor and interests, Salisbury demanded to know what these in
terests were. The Prime Minister emphasized this point w ith a
touch o f sarcasm. T he United States, he wrote, ‘‘is not entitled
to affirm as a universal proposition, w ith reference to a number
of independent States for whose conduct it assumes no respon
sibility, that its interests are necessarily concerned in whatever
may befall those States simply because they are situated in the
W estern Hemisphere.”
Salisbury capped his argument by making a tactical conces
sion. H e admitted that, if American interests were involved or
threatened, the United States had a right, “like any other nation,
to interpose in any controversy” which endangered these rights.
The Prime Minister granted that the United States was entitled
to “judge whether those interests are touched, and in what meas
ure they should be sustained.” H e merely wanted O lney and
Cleveland to define these interests. Unless his allegations could
be controverted, Salisbury denied that the United States had a
right to demand arbitration in the dispute.38
The second note, dealing w ith the boundary controversy
proper, began by again declaring that the British government
believed the boundary dispute “had no direct bearing on the
material interests of any other country.” Salisbury cited histor
ical facts which ripped apart Olney’s argument for the V ene
zuelan case. A t one point Salisbury sarcastically commented, “It
may reasonably be asked whether Mr. O lney would consent to
refer to the arbitration o f another Power pretensions raised by
the Government of Mexico on such a foundation to large tracts
o f territory which had long been comprised in the Federation
[of the United States].” The Prime Minister steadfastly refused
to submit to arbitration those claims of British subjects “who have
for many years enjoyed the settled rule of a British Colony.” 88
Bayard immediately wrote Cleveland to praise Salisbury’s
88 Salisbury’s first note is printed in Foreign Relations, i8$s, I, 563-567.
89 Salisbury’s second note is in ibid., 567-576.
notes as being “in good temper and moderate in tone.” The
American Ambassador believed that “our difficulty lies in the
w holly unreliable character of the Venezuelan rulers and people.”
Neither Cleveland nor Olney, however, was in a frame of mind
to listen to Bayard’s eulogies of Salisbury’s diplomacy. Cleveland
was “mad clean through.” H e later wrote that it would have been
“depressing” and “unpleasant” for the United States to learn
that the great Monroe Doctrine was really “a mere plaything
w ith which w e might amuse ourselves.” 40
O lney released his anger by drafting the President’s message of
December 17. Cleveland later asserted that O lney’s draft “en
tirely satisfied m y critical requirements”; in fact, “I have never
been able to adequately express m y pleasure and satisfaction over
the assertion of our position.” The draft was never submitted to
the other members of the cabinet. This was unfortunate, for Car
lisle and the Secretary of Agriculture, Sterling Morton, later
expressed disagreement with the bluntness of the message.41
O lney and Cleveland thus unloaded their fury unmolested, and
on December 17 the world heard of the American challenge to
the British Empire.
The President’s message was, in essence, a succinct summary of
O lney’s July 20 note. Cleveland’s declaration is significant, how
ever, because it emphasized and amplified O lney’s crucial point
that the United States was becoming involved in the controversy
not for the sake of Venezuela, but for the welfare of the United
States. It directly replied to Lord Salisbury’s charge that, since
the Monroe Doctrine was inapplicable “to the state of things in
which we live at the present day,” the United States had no right
to become involved in the dispute.
A t the beginning of his message Cleveland quoted and then
40 Bayard to Cleveland, D ec. 4, 1895, Cleveland MSS; Perkins, Monroe
Doctrine y 1867-1907, 183; Grover Cleveland, Presidential Problems (N e w
York, 1904), 268; O lney to Pauncefote, D ec. 10, 1895, O lney MSS.
41 Cleveland to Olney, D ec. 3, 1895, Cleveland MSS; George F. Parker,
Recollections of Cleveland (N e w York, 1909), 197, 199; Nevins, G rover
Clevelandy 641.
attacked these words of the British Prime Minister. The Monroe
Doctrine was “strong and sound,” the President declared, “be
cause its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a
nation and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and
the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of govern
ment.” Such a principle could “not become obsolete while our
Republic endures.” This was an emphatic definition of the Mon
roe Doctrine as a doctrine of self-interest. Cleveland so defined
the Doctrine explicitly: “The Monroe doctrine finds its recog
nition in those principles of international law which are based
upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected
and its just claims enforced.”
Cleveland and his Secretary of State did believe that American
interests were greatly endangered. N othing better illustrates
their beliefs than Cleveland’s statements in the closing part of
his December 17 message: “The duty of the United States [is]
to resist by every means in its power, as a willful aggression upon
its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any
lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any ter
ritory which after investigation we have determined of right be
longs to Venezuela.” Cleveland emphasized the importance he
placed on this sentence by then declaring, “In making these rec
ommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred and
keenly realize all the consequences that may follow .” 42 H e
italicized the sentence, as it were, by saying that the United
States would risk war in order to preserve the principle contained
in the statement.
In a letter to Ambassador Bayard in late December, Cleveland
again underscored the fact that the United States was entering
into the boundary imbroglio to protect its own interests. The
President also emphasized that the controversy had been ger
minating for some time. The administration had not suddenly
leaped upon the issue in m id-1895 for domestic political gains.
Cleveland wrote:
42 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 656-658—italics added.
Reaction: Venezuelan Crisis 26p
Events accompanying the growth of this Venezuelan question have

recently forced a fuller examination of this question upon me and
have also compelled us to assume a position in regard to it.
I am entirely clear that the doctrine is not obsolete, that it should
be defended and maintained for its value and importance to our
government and welfare, and that its defense and maintenance in
volve its application when a state of facts arises requiring it.
The President assured Bayard that no political motives lay be
hind the message. Cleveland admitted that he could not under
stand w hy Great Britain had not “yielded or rather conceded
something” to “stem the tide of ‘jingoism’ ” in the United States.
The President carefully prefaced these remarks, however, with
the comment that Great Britain’s failure to do this was “entirely
irrelevant to the case and . . . has had absolutely nothing to do
with any action I have taken.” 43
In failing to consult Venezuela’s wishes in the affair, Cleve
land and O lney further emphasized that they entered into the
boundary controversy to protect American interests. Venezuelan
authorities learned the contents of O lney’s July note only after
newspapers published the message on December 18, 1895. N o
evidence has been found which indicates that O lney consulted
Venezuelan officials in W ashington before or during the time he
drafted the President’s message. A British observer, writing dur
ing the peak of the dispute, informed his countrymen that they
would be wrong if they thought “that any partiality for V ene
zuela has inspired these utterances” by Cleveland.44
Although the President intimated that he would risk war to
protect American interests, he neither wanted war nor believed
43 Cleveland to Bayard, Dec. 29, 1895, Cleveland MSS; also in Letters

of Grover Cleveland, 417-420—italics in the original.
44 George B. Young, “Intervention under the Monroe Doctrine: T he
O lney Corollary,” Political Science Quarterly, LVII (June, 1942), 251-
252, 260; Thomas M. Spaulding, “Allen Thomas,” Dictionary of Amer
ican Biography, XVIII, 420; Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and
South America: The Western Republics (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 160-
161; Stanley, “Issue between Great Britain and America,” 4.
2*¡o T he N e w Empire
that war would result from the dispute. T he December message
embraced many qualifications and opportunities for retreat.
Cleveland’s declaration that an American commission would
investigate the boundary controversy was a diplomatic means to
gain time and allow tempers to cool. It would take the commis
sion at least one year, and probably several years, to investigate
all the relevant facts and write a report. On the other side of
the Atlantic, Salisbury and his leading cabinet members appre
ciated the safety-valve features o f Cleveland’s address. T he Brit
ish officials did not react in haste or panic. But they did at last
react, and this was what Cleveland and O lney wanted.45
Aftermath
Expansionist-minded Americans heartily endorsed the Presi
dent’s message, though most of them also fully shared his hopes
that no war would result. In its lead editorial Public Opinion
declared, “It is doubtful if there was ever before witnessed in
the United States so nearly unanimous an expression o f press
approval o f any Administration.” 46 In Senate proceedings, how
ever, H enry Cabot Lodge and other ultraexpansionists toned
down their belligerence. T he House had responded to Cleve
land’s message by quickly whipping through an appropriation
measure for a boundary commission. T he Senate, while standing
firm on the principles o f the Monroe Doctrine, nevertheless asked
that the Committee on Foreign Relations carefully consider the
measure before the entire upper house voted upon it. There was
a minimum o f indulgence in the popular congressional game of
45 See especially the last three paragraphs o f die message; also Young,
“Intervention under the Monroe Doctrine,” 259-260. Both nations alerted
their military planning experts. See Rear Admiral H . C. Taylor, “T h e
Fleet,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, XXIX (D ecem
ber, 1903), 799-808; and J. A . S. Grenville, “Great Britain and the Isthmian
Canal, 1898-1901,” American Historical Review, LX 1 (October, 1955),
51, for relevant comment.
46 Public Opinion, D ec. 26, 1895, 837; N e w York Tribune , D ec. 18,
1895, 6:5; for m idwestem opinion, see Chicago Times Herald , D ec. 18,
1895,6:2; N e w York World , D ec. 18,1895,2:2-8, and D ec. 19,1895,3:3-4.
Reaction: Venezuelan Crisis 27 1
twisting the Lion’s tail. T w o factors probably account for this
attitude. As Senator Roger Q . Mills of Texas declared, “It w ill
be no child’s play, Mr. President, when w e engage in a conflict
w ith Great Britain.” The impending stock market break pro
vided a second moderating influence.47
T he effect on the stock market and the reaction of the Amer
ican business community to Cleveland’s message deserves de
tailed analysis. Historians have pictured this reaction as one o f
panic. From this, it may be inferred that businessmen vigorously
opposed extending American control or responsibility in Latin
America, especially when such action would run the risk of
conflicting with European interests in the area. In reality, busi
ness opinion was more complex.48
Some financial leaders, especially bankers in N ew York, Bos
ton, and Chicago angrily criticized the Chief Executive’s state
ment as ending any hope of immediate business recovery. Peter
B. O lney reported from N ew York to his brother in the State
Department that “there is an undercurrent of sentiment among
bankers and businessmen of considerable strength, that censures”
the message. Critics included Charles Stewart Smith, former
President of the N ew York Chamber o f Commerce, Frederick
D . Tappen, President o f the Gallatin National Bank, and J.
Edward Simmons, President of the Fourth National Bank. In an
informal poll taken at the Union League Club “practically every
body” expressed disgust “over the whole business.” In Boston,
the N ew England Free Trade League and important members of
the Boston Stock Exchange agreed w ith Edward Atkinson’s
views. Atkinson, President of the Boston Manufacturers Mutual
Fire Insurance Company and one o f the popular economists of
the day, shouted to an inquiring reporter, “This is ridiculous,
47 Congressional Record, 54th Cong., ist Sess., 234-235, 240-247, 255-

265, 420, 529-531, 294.
48 T he follow ing section appeared in a revised and enlarged version
as “T he American Business Community and Cleveland’s Venezuelan
Message,” in Business H istory Review, X X X IV (W inter, i960), 393-402.
212 T h e N e w Empire
ridiculous, ridiculous!” A t each word his voice rose until he
almost shrieked.49
These were influential voices, but they were soon balanced
by the views of business leaders in N ew York, Boston, and the
Midwest. T w o opinion polls, one published by the N ew York
W orld and one conducted by Bradstreet's, outlined this fact.
A fter interviewing twenty-three boards o f trade, chambers of
commerce, and commercial exchanges, the W orld concluded
that all but one group approved the message. The single organ
ization which did not, the Richmond, Virginia, Chamber of
Commerce, had not polled its members and thus refused to com
ment. Bradstreefs survey o f leading merchants and manufac
turers in tw enty cities revealed an identical trend o f opinion.50
Even on W all Street imperfect unanimity existed. John A .
Stewart of the United States Trust Company, Oscar Straus, and
Chauncey D epew endorsed the President’s stand on the Monroe
Doctrine. Andrew Carnegie was especially pleased, since the
crisis provided him with the perfect opportunity to publicize tw o
o f his pet projects: the disposal by Great Britain of her colonial
empire in the W estern Hemisphere, and international arbitra
tion. Many members of the Boston business community, includ
ing the Boston Board of Trade, approved the message. The Presi
dent o f the Massachusetts State Board o f Trade proclaimed, “I
believe that this nation has reached a period in its history when
it is of sufficient importance that no national wrong or injustice
should be disregarded, and w e should demand, in justice to our
mercantile interests, that respect to which w e are entitled.” T he
49 Peter B. O lney to Richard Olney, D ec. 20, 1895, Abram S. H ew itt to
Olney, Jan. 8, 1896, O lney MSS; N e w York W orld, D ec. 21, 1895, 1:8,
4:1, and D ec. 20, 1895, 1:8, 2:1; Wall Street Journal, D ec. 19, 1895, 1:4;
Boston Morning Journal, D ec. 18, 1895, 4:6; W all Street Journal, D ec.
20, 1895, 1:2; N e w York W orld, D ec. 21, 1895, 5:1.
60 N ew York W orld, D ec. 20, 1895, 2:3-5; Bradstreet's, D ec. 21, 1895,
813. T he W orld denounced Cleveland’s course o f action on its editorial
pages and displayed its bias by headlining this survey, “ t r a d e d e p r e s s e d
b y m e s s a g e , ” although not a single reply to the opinion poll could be
construed in this manner.

Reaction: Venezuelan Crisis m
rush of many Boston bankers to Cleveland’s support provided a
most surprising occurrence. H . J. Jaquith, President of the
Traders’ National Bank, N . P. Hallowell, President of the N a
tional Bank of Commerce, and Eben Bacon, President of the
W ashington National Bank, expressed views more common to
their ardent Massachusetts expansionist, Henry Cabot Lodge, or
to western silverite jingoists.51
The absence of immediate panic on the N ew York Stock Ex
change indicated a lack of concern in financial circles over
Cleveland’s policy. W hen word of the message reached the floor
of the Exchange, the bear contingent cried “War! W ar!” and
selling began. In a very few minutes, however, market prices
began to climb. The bears rushed to cover their shares. One dis
gusted bear trader was heard to complain, “Ugh! Is this the
whole bloody war?” The next day the market actually strength
ened. Industrials led the w ay upward while the investors neg
lected the bond market. This was not the w ay a frightened
financial community usually acted.52
The crash finally occurred on the morning of December 20.
Losses ran upward to $170,000,000. Five firms failed, though all
of them were small. A new shipload of gold totaling $3,400,000
left the depleted Treasury stocks for Europe. But the panic
lasted less than one day. By the afternoon of December 20, “good
buying” featured the trading. Other than its short duration, two
other factors of the crash deserve notice. First, British investors,
N ew York W orld, Dec. 20, 1895, 1:8, 2:1, and Dec. 18, 1895, 1:7, 2:3;
Boston Morning Journal, Dec. 18, 1895, 4:6, 5:3, and Dec. 19, 1895, 4:3i
Bradstreet’s, Dec. 21, 1895, 813; Straus to Cleveland, undated, but prob
ably Dec. 18, 1895, Oscar Straus papers, Library of Congress; Carnegie
to the Duke of Devonshire, Dec. 26, 1895, Andrew Carnegie papers,
Library of Congress, W ashington, D.C. Carnegie saw the crisis as an
opportunity to obtain a large order for steel from the United States N avy.
See Carnegie to John G. A. Leishman, President of the Carnegie Steel
Company [no specific date, but after the Cleveland message], Dec., 1895,
Carnegie MSS.
52N ew York W orld, D ec. 18, 1895, 2:2, 13:1, and Dec. 19, 1895, 11:1;
W all Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1895, 2:1.
not American, touched off the downward surge of stock prices.
But it was American buyers who firmed the prices in the after
noon. The N ew York W orld examined the day’s activities and
bragged that the afternoon events demonstrated the “ability of
American finance to take care o f itself.” The rapidly maturing
N ew York financial community was beginning to demonstrate
that it could play an important independent role in international
finance.63
Second, factors other than the diplomatic crisis undermined
the stock market. In his annual message of December 2, 1895,
Cleveland had warned that the gold reserve in the Treasury had
dwindled to a dangerous point. W hen on December 20 the
President asked Congress for emergency measures to deal w ith
this gold crisis, he thus dealt w ith a long-term problem w hich
had been accelerated by the Venezuelan crisis. Business maga
zines realized this. Financial periodicals agreed w ith R. G . Dun
& Company’s W eekly R eview of Trade, which reported that
the Venezuelan message had little direct effect on the market,
since “business was remarkably dull” anyway.64
Farther removed from the hypnotic influence of the N ew
York exchanges, business groups in Fall River, Massachusetts,
Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Baltimore, and Trenton warmly approved
the President’s stand. Commercial bodies speaking for the mid-
western business communities o f Kansas C ity (M issouri), St.
Paul, Milwaukee, and Indianapolis also expressed wholehearted
support of the message. Most interesting was the Chicago scene,
where the bankers attacked Cleveland, but men in the indus
trial-merchant group, such as Marshall Field and P. D . Armour,
gave equally strong endorsements. Armour even added, “In fact,
63 N e w York W orld, D ec. 21, 1895, 1:7-8; W all Street Journal, D ec.
20, 1895, 2:1; N e w York Journal of Commerce, D ec. 19, 1895, 5:1, and
D ec. 23, 1895, 1:3. B y D ec. 24 the gold exports had dwindled, buying o f
gilt-edged securities had increased, and general optimism prevailed.
64 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 645; N e w York W orld,
D ec. 17, 1895, 1:1; Chicago Times Herald, D ec. 21, 1895, 14:3; Bankers’
Magazine, LII (January, 1896), 107.
Reaction: Venezuelan Crisis 21$
there are a great many of us republicans [ mV] who like Mr. Cleve
land.” Gncinnati and Cleveland led midwestern support for the
message. The Chambers of Commerce and conservative financial
journals in both cities applauded the President’s position.
Southern and western commercial centers such as Memphis,
Atlanta, San Francisco, and Helena backed the American policy
also.65
Trade journals divided on the issue. Businesses whose stocks
fluctuated w ith every smile and frown of British investors ex
coriated Cleveland’s policy. The Railway G azette. American
W ool and Cotton Reporter, and Engineering and Mining Jour
nal were among the spokesmen for these disenchanted groups..
But many journals, especially those published in industrial and
in iron and steel centers, supported the President. The American
Manufacturer, published in Pittsburgh, was usually not a pro-
Cleveland paper, since it advocated high tariffs. But in discussing
the Venezuelan situation this journal reasoned that England was
in a tight situation because “the markets of the world are being
wrested from her,” and so she “seeks to extend her commercial
influence in South America.” In this light the President’s course
was correct. The Manufacturers' Record, the Farm Implement
N ew s (a bimetallist journal), and the Bulletin of the American
Iron and Steel Association warmly endorsed the President’s mes
sage.66
65 Bradstreet's, D ec. 21,1895, 813; N e w York W orld, D ec. 20,1895, 2:3-

5; N e w York Evening Post, D ec. 23, 1895, 3:4; Chicago Times Herald,
D ec. 19, 1895, 5:3, 4, and D ec. 21, 1895, 3:3, 4; N e w Orleans Times-
Democrat, D ec. 20, 1895, 2:5; Milwaukee Sentinel, D ec. 18, 1895, 9:4;
Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, D ec. 18, 1895, 4 :I* D ec. 19, 1895, 4:2,
and D ec. 21, 1895, 1:1-2; Memphis Commercial Appeal, D ec. 18, 1895,
4:1-2.
66 Literary Digest, Jan. 4, 1896, 278; Railway Gazette, D ec. 27, 1895,
858; Public Opinion, D ec. 26, 1895, 843; American Manufacturer and
Iron W orld W eekly, D ec. 28, 1895, 919; Farm Implement News, D ec. 26,
1895, 18; Bulletin of the American Iron and Steel Association, Jan. 10,
1896, 12:1, and Jan. 1, 1896, 1:1; Northeastern Lumberman and Manu
facturers's Gazette, Dec. 28, 1895, 3:3.
This analysis of the business community suggests several con
clusions. First, a split occurred between N ew Y ork-Boston-
Chicago banking circles and the remainder of the business
community. N ot even some leading Boston bankers agreed with
their fellow financiers. Industrialists and merchants almost unan
imously backed the President. Second, several monetary weak
nesses in the American econom y contributed as much to the
panic of December 20 as did the Venezuelan crisis. Most im
portant, British security holders triggered the decline, while
American investors displayed considerable financial power in
stemming the tide and stabilizing stock prices.
T w o weeks after Cleveland’s message, even the more appre
hensive businessmen could begin to relax. On January 2, 1896,
the German Emperor sent a telegram to President Kruger of
the Transvaal Free State and offered congratulations for Kruger’s
capture of the Jameson raiders. An intense anti-German feeling
erupted in Great Britain, and the Venezuelan difficulty was rele
gated to the background. Six days later the American Embassy
in London learned that Salisbury had “very considerably modi
fied his views in regard to the Venezuelan question . . . and was
prepared to ‘trim’ his views” to meet the requests of the United
States.67
This new British attitude resulted in concrete proposals when
on January 12, Lord Playfair, a former Liberal cabinet minister,
came to see Bayard as an intermediary for Salisbury and Joseph
Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary. Playfair offered three pro
posals. First, an international conference should be called to
clarify the Monroe Doctrine. Second, all British settlements in
the disputed area should be exempt from arbitration. Third, the
Court of Arbitration should consist of tw o or three persons from 75
57Tansill, Foreign Policy of Bayard , 738; Bayard to Cleveland, Jan.

29, 1896, Cleveland MSS. Bayard’s despatches and letters indicate that
the Kruger telegram had a greater influence on British policy and opinion
than some historians have thought.
Reaction: Venezuelan Crisis ¿77
England and a like number from Venezuela and the United
States.58
O lney’s reply to these proposals is most revealing. H e “highly
appreciated” Playfair’s suggestions, but flatly refused to submit
the Monroe Doctrine to an international conference where a
large number of European nations could outvote the United
States. As for the settlements, O lney insisted that they be sub
mitted to an arbitral board just like the remainder of the boundary
line. Finally, the Secretary of State offered a counterproposal for
the arbitral board by suggesting that tw o members from the
American commission be joined by tw o named by Great Britain.
These four could name a fifth member if necessary. Olney’s
proposal not only excluded Venezuela from the commission, but
no evidence has been found which indicates that Olney consulted
with Venezuela before making this suggestion.59
T he American reply presaged the final settlement. Great Brit
ain abandoned the idea of a conference on the Monroe Doctrine.
A compromise was reached on the settled districts which ex
empted titles more than fifty years old or others which had been
legally held for a reasonable number of years. Finally, the treaty
which Pauncefote and O lney signed on November 12, 1896,
established an arbitral tribunal consisting of tw o Americans, tw o
British citizens, and a Russian authority in international law. N o
Venezuelan was included. Salisbury had not accepted these terms
without a struggle. H e had been especially adamant on the issue
of the settled districts. But diplomatic difficulties elsewhere,
especially in the Middle East, pressure from Sir W illiam Har
court, leader of the Liberal party, and the growing realization in
Great Britain that the United States was a sizable power to be
68 Bayard to Olney, Jan. 13 and 15, 1896, Great Britain, Despatches,
N A , RG 59; Tansill, Foreign Policy of Bayard, 740-741; W em yss Reid,
Memoirs and Correspondence cf Lyon Playfair (N e w York, 1900), 405-
409.
59 O lney to Bayard, Jan. 14, 1896, Great Britain, Instructions, N A , R G
59-
2j 8 The N e w Empire
courted, not abused, forced the Prime Minister to accept most
o f O lney’s points.60
One other aspect of the settlement merits attention. Venezuela
ratified the treaty only after the police crushed threats of street
rioting in Caracas. T he cause of these riots could be traced to an
early statement o f O lney’s. H e did not wish, the Secretary wrote
Bayard in January, 1896, to have Venezuela “consulted at every
step.” O lney had scarcely consulted Venezuela at all. Author
ities in Caracas knew nothing o f the treaty’s contents until D e
cember 7, 1896, when the pact was published. Venezuelans were
especially enraged when they learned that they were not to
have a seat on the arbitral tribunal and that O lney had agreed
on the fifty-year occupation clause in the settled areas dispute.
Venezuela had fought for unrestricted arbitration since 1840;
now her position had been compromised without her knowledge.
T he Latin-American nation finally was allowed to name a mem
ber to the tribunal, but the ill w ill resulting from the American
actions played a large part in creating Venezuela’s strong pro-
Spanish attitude during the war in 1898.61
Venezuela’s pained reaction strikingly illustrates the veracity
o f Cleveland’s statement that the United States interfered in the
controversy in order to protect its ow n rights and interests. For
in the final settlement England received most o f the disputed
territory, but the United States obtained its tw o principal ob
jectives: Venezuela retained control o f the Orinoco River, and
England submitted the dispute to an arbitral commission. B y so
doing, Great Britain recognized O lney’s claim o f American
dominance in the W estern Hemisphere.
American historians have offered three interpretations to ex-
60 Tansill, Foreign Policy of Bayard, 776; Smith, “O lney’s Real Credit,”
145.
01 O lney to Bayard, Jan. 22, 1896, O lney MSS; London Times, Feb. 5,
1897, 5: i, and Feb. 15, 1897, 6:1; Young, “Intervention under the Monroe
Doctrine,” 276-278; O lney to Pauncefote, Feb. 1, 1897, O lney Letterbook,
O lney MSS; José Andrade to Olney, D ec. 7,1896, Cleveland MSS; Fenton,
“Diplomatic Relations o f the U nited States and Venezuela,” 354.
plain the Cleveland administration’s policy in the boundary dis
pute. The most popular explanation states that Cleveland brought
about the crisis in response to domestic political attacks on the
general policies of his administration.62 A second thesis traces
the policy’s roots to O lney’s bellicose, stubborn temper.63 A
third interpretation declares that a “psychic crisis” struck in
fluential segments of American opinion in the 1890’s and that
a new spirit of manifest destiny emerged from this “crisis.” 64
There can be little doubt that Cleveland took domestic political
pressures into account, but defining these pressures as major
causative elements leaves key questions unanswered and raises
many others. Cleveland’s bellicose policy could not have perma
nently w on political enemies to his side. The Republican jingoists
and the Democratic silver bloc led the cheering for the December
17 message. N either of these groups would have agreed with the
President on national political objectives. Cleveland actually alien
ated many o f his strongest supporters, especially the eastern
bankers who had once saved the gold reserve and who, at Cleve
land’s request, repeated the rescue operation shortly after the
December message. In other words, the administration’s V ene
zuelan policy attracted groups which were irreconcilable in
domestic politics and repelled some of the administration’s
staunchest supporters. Cleveland obviously realized that such
maneuvers did not win national elections. W ar might have united
the nation behind him, but the President certainly did not plan
to turn the controversy into a war.65
62 Blak t, “Background o f Cleveland’s Venezuelan Policy,” 275-276;

Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten, 510-511.
63 Tansill, Foreign Policy of Bayard, 776; also see Vagts, Deutschland
und die Vereinigten Staaten, 1918.
64 Richard Hofstadter, “Manifest Destiny and the Philippines,” in
America in Crisis, edited by Daniel Aaron (N e w York, 1952), 173-200,
especially 176, 178.
65 W all Street Journal, D ec. 21,1895, 2:3. T w o weeks before the special
Venezuelan message H enry Villard personally pleaded with the President
to prevent American “arguments with Europe” until the treasury reserve
was restored (Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten, 512,1702).
28o The N e w Empire
N o reliable proof exists that Cleveland hoped the Venezuelan
episode would rebound to his personal political benefit. It is
extremely doubtful that with his conservative conception of the
Chief Executive’s duties and responsibilities he would have
broken the third-term tradition even if he had possessed the
support. E. C. Benedict, who handled Cleveland’s investments
in stocks and bonds, testified three weeks before the Venezuelan
message that the President had repeatedly said that he was “im
patient to lay aside all official cares and [was] utterly averse to
their prolongation.” 64
An interpretation which stresses O lney’s bellicose character
misses tw o important points. First, Gresham worked on a diplo
matic note which concerned the Venezuelan situation several
months before O lney assumed the top position. Judging from
Gresham’s letters in the late winter and early spring of 1895, this
note was probably quite militant. Second, Cleveland initiated the
dispatch of the Olney note, reworked the draft, and heartily
endorsed his Secretary of State’s language. The President played
an extremely important part in the formulation o f the policy,
especially during the crucial incubation period o f April-July,
1895.67
A thesis which emphasizes that Cleveland bowed to the pres
sure of jingoism and a mass psychological need for vicarious
excitement helps little in understanding the whole of the ad
ministration’s foreign policy. After all, Cleveland defied these
public pressures when they were exerted (often in even greater
force) for Hawaiian annexation, the application of the Monroe
Doctrine in the Corinto dispute, and compromises in the silver
repeal act and the 1894 tariff. There is no reason to believe that
he suddenly bent to the winds of jingoism in 1895, unless he had
better reasons than pleasing irreconcilable political enemies. It
M W all Street Journal, N ov. 27, 1895, 1:2.

67 Cleveland, Presidential Problems, 257-259; Letters of G rover Cleve
land, 392; Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United
States: An Historical Interpretation (N e w York, 1943), 119.
should be further noted that it is impossible to put Cleveland and
O lney in those social groups which supposedly were undergoing
this psychological dilemma.
O lney and Cleveland acted because they feared that United
States interests were in jeopardy. Both men emphasized this
point at the time, and there is no reason to doubt their word.
The Venezuelan dispute threatened American interests in three
areas. As Lodge noted in his Senate speech of December 30,
1895, British military control o f the Orinoco would make the
Caribbean a “British lake.” Second, if England controlled the
entrance to this river, she could regulate the commercial traffic
flowing into and out of the upper third of the South American
continent. Third, if Great Britain either militarily or diplo
matically coerced Venezuela into accepting the British position,
not only would the Monroe Doctrine have become an empty
shell, but the United States would have moved far in forfeiting
its rights to, what O lney termed in his July note; “the practical
benefits” which resulted from the “application” of the Monroe
Doctrine.
Obviously, neither domestic political pressure nor mass psy
chological complexes could have endangered such interests.
Rather, the danger would have had to come in the explicit form
of European encroachments and threats to Latin America. These
occurred in 1894 and 1895. In this short space of time, Great
Britain and France made ominous moves in Venezuela, Nicara
gua, Trinidad, Santo Domingo, and Brazil. Cleveland, Olney,
and Adee carefully studied these moves. Even Bayard, the fore
most apostle of Anglo-American friendship, admitted in January,
1896, that there were good reasons to “fear that there was an
indefinite plan of British occupation in the heart of America.” 68
The gravamen of the problem is, of course, that the Cleveland
administration considered American interests to be endangered
by such encroachments. Again, the time element is important.
The United States had entered into the deepest trough of the
68 Nevins, G rover Cleveland , 644.
depression in late 1894 and early 1895. Cleveland noted these
factors in his annual message on December 2, 1895. T he Amer
ican commercial community believed that an expanding overseas
commerce would revive the American econom y. Cleveland and
Secretary of the Treasury Carlisle expounded this commercial
philosophy in its most detailed form throughout 1894. Secretary
o f State Gresham, w ho reopened the Venezuelan question in
1894, also emphasized the importance o f foreign markets if the
repressive w eight o f industrial glut was to be lifted from the
American econom y.6®
Richard O lney entered the State Department in June, 1895,
with the tw o elements needed to touch off the explosion. H e had
realized in 1894 that the depression was no ordinary turn o f the
business cycle, but a “labor revolution” which marked a new era
in American econom ic history. Second, he had a profound sense
that the United States had matured to a point where it could
exert its influence on the world stage. O lney naturally wanted to
use this power to benefit American interests.
T he tw o currents of economic overseas expansion and O lney’s
realization that the United States possessed the means to protect its
interests converged into the Venezuelan controversy. A feeling
o f manifest destiny existed, but it was not a type of mob excite
ment which Cleveland and O lney would have disparaged. It was
a rational opinion that American interests in Latin America
would have to be expanded and protected. A n official in the
State Department wrote several anonymous articles in the spring
o f 1895 which keenly analyzed this opinion. “T he commercial
instinct,” Frederic Em ory wrote, “is beginning to assert itself
once more among the American people. Our manufacturers are
reaching out, at last, for foreign trade.” “T he time has com e,”
he concluded in his second article, “when our manufacturers must
69 It is significant to note that contemporary observers saw Cleveland’s
Venezuelan policy as creating fertile grounds for American econom ic
expansion into Latin America. A m ong these observers was the Bureau
o f American Republics in the State Department. See the bureau’s Special
[M onthly] Bulletin, March, 1896, 523; Literary Digest, M ay 30,1896,152.
help to swell the volume of our export trade. . . . It has been
the task of Mr. Cleveland’s foreign policy to prepare the w ay
for them, to insure a hospitable reception for them.” 70 One may
speculate that Cleveland had the ideas of this article in mind
when he told a close friend in late 1896 that the Venezuelan affair
was not a foreign question, but the “most distinct of home ques
tions.” 71
70 Clippings from the Baltimore Sun, May 26, 27, 28, 1895, in Bayard
MSS.
71 Parker, Recollections of Cleveland, 195. This conclusion differs from
Vagts’s belief that Cleveland’s policy was one o f “negative imperialism,”
or what Vagts describes as “eager for rule but not for gain” ( Deutschland
und die Vereinigten Staaten, XI, 1416, 1701, 1702).
VII
Reaction: Mew Problems,
Mew Friends, Mew Foes
T H E Harrison-Blaine strategy, the consensus formed in 1894-

1895 by the business community and political leaders, and the
Venezuelan crisis of 1895-1896 are of paramount importance in
understanding the expansive tendencies which swept the United
States into war with Spain in 1898. In the three years immediately
preceding that war, however, new factors appeared which built
upon these earlier developments. A revolution in Cuba, as Cleve
land noted in his annual message of 1895, once again disturbed
hemispheric tranquillity. During this same year the balance of
power in the Far East, ever teetering precariously, suddenly
swung in the direction of Japan. Germany and Russia attempted
not only to restore the balance, but to expand their own interests
to the particular disadvantage of Japan, Great Britain, and the
United States. W hen the State Department became more active
in protecting American interests in the Far East, the United States
found itself forced to sympathize with British policies and to
condemn those of Russia and Germany. Such action strengthened
284
Reaction: New. Problems 285
the growing Anglo-American informal alliance and led to a his
toric break in the century-old Russian-American friendship and
the decades-old German-American ties.
In this chapter these three new developments that affected post-
1895 American policy formulation—the Cuban revolution, the
threat to American interests in the far Pacific, and the momentous
realignment of old enmities and friendships—w ill be briefly ana
lyzed as they unfolded during the 1895 to March, 1897, period.
In early 1897 tw o new agents appear, the new ly elected McKin
ley administration and an American business community rapidly
dredging itself up from the depths of the depression. Their re
actions to events in Cuba and the Far East in 1897-1898 w ill be
described in the next chapter. The point should be re-emphasized
here that the actions of this new administration and the business
community in 1897-1898 cannot be understood unless placed in
the over-all framework of 1895-1898, and these last three years,
in turn, are comprehensible only when inserted into the context
of American foreign policy after the 1850’s. The months of 1897
and early 1898 marked not a break but a culmination of nearly
half a century of commercial expansion into extracontinental
areas.
The Cuban Revolution, 1895-1897

A revolution erupted in Cuba’s Santiago Province on February
24, 1895. During the next tw o years the Cleveland administra
tion, motivated by the belief that the warfare gravely threatened
American interests in Cuba and economic and political tranquil
lity in the United States, moved ever closer to a policy of inter
vention. The administration first hoped that Spain would retain
its sovereignty but would grant to Cuba a large measure of
autonomy. O lney initiated the next policy phase in April, 1896,
when he offered to aid Spain in persuading the rebels to accept
the reforms. The final stage was marked by Cleveland’s annual
message of 1896, in which the President warned that “higher
obligations” than the maintenance of neutrality might compel
the United States to use more vigorous means to end the revolt.
Throughout the tw o years, however, tw o factors constantly re
strained Cleveland and Olney. First, they refused to consider
policies which might climax with the island’s being annexed by
the United States. The administration already had enough prob
lems without assuming those of the Cubans. Second, throughout
much of his final year in office, Cleveland realized that interven
tion would lead to a war which either silver Democrats (w ho had
repudiated him) or Republicans would have the honor of finish
ing. Such a thought was not com forting to gold Democrats, w ho
nursed the hope of regaining power in 1900.
A group of Cuban exiles in the United States had long awaited
the proper moment to free their homeland from Spanish rule.
T he opportunity arose in 1895 when the W ilson-Gorman tariff
suddenly removed Cuba’s favored position in> the American
sugar market. Already ground between the millstones of Spanish
taxes, corrupt governments, and bad transportation, the loss of
this rich market was the final blow for the sugar growers. As
plantations discharged workers in late 1894 and early 1895, dis
content and rebel bands grew in force. In February sporadic
uprisings were reported, and in April the Maceo brothers, José
Marti and Máximo Gómez, assumed control of the insurgent
groups. In the United States, the Cuban Junta with headquarters
in N ew York and a “Cuban Legation” in the Raleigh H otel in
W ashington supported the revolution with a bankroll supposedly
amounting to almost $1,000,000. This war chest was constantly
replenished with contributions from Cuban Leagues which spread
throughout the country, Cuban exiles, and wealthy American
supporters. The Junta received considerable help especially from
the Cigar Makers’ Union, which agreed to support Junta activi
ties in return if the numerous Cuban workers in cigar factories
joined the union. In 1895 the American Federation of Labor, led
by Samuel Gompers, who had received his union initiation in the
Cigar Makers’ organization, passed a resolution at its national
Reaction: N e w Problems ¿87
convention which called for supporting the Cuban revolution
aries. Bolstered by such American encouragement, the revolu
tion had progressed to such a point by September 13, 1895, that
delegates adopted a constitution for an independent Cuban gov
ernment.1
A t the outset of the revolution the Cleveland administration
wanted Spain to retain sovereignty of the island, but hoped that
Cuba would receive enough autonomy to puncture the rebel cry
that Spain ruled despotically. This policy found support from
many prominent Americans. Edwin F. Atkins, millionaire sugar
grower in Cuba and a close friend of fellow Bostonian Richard
O lney, urged that the administration refuse to recognize the
rebels as belligerents, since such recognition would free Spain
from the responsibility of protecting American property. This
factor of property protection was one major reason w hy Ameri
can investors in Cuba opposed congressional attempts to give
the rebels belligerent status. H enry Clews, a N ew York banker
who frequently corresponded with Cleveland, publicly declared
that he did not desire American annexation of Cuba, since “w e
really gain all the advantages through existing trade relations.”
Former congressman John D eW itt Warner of N ew York agreed:
since “w e practically control the trade, it strikes me that w e have
the milk and the other nation the shell, of the cocoanut.” W illiam
Graham Sumner, having no taste for “Cuban Senators, either
1 French Ensor Chadwick, The Relations of the United States and

Spain: Diplomacy (N e w York, 1909), 406-407; the causes o f the revolt
are w ell outlined in Elbert J. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy
of the Spanish-American W ar (Baltimore, 1908), 22-24; and Hannis
Taylor, “A Review o f the Cuban Question in Its Economic, Political
and Diplomatic Aspects,” N orth American Review , CLXV (Novem ber,
1897), 610-635. Also Bradstreet’s, Sept. 22, 1894, 593» and Sept. 29, 1894,
622, and Jan. 12, 1895, 17; Horatio S. Rubens, “T he Insurgent Govern
ment in Cuba,” N orth American Review, CLXVI (M ay, 1898), 561;
G eorge W . Auxier, “T he Propaganda Activities o f the Cuban Junta in
Precipitating the Spanish-American W ar, 1895-1898,” Hispanic-Amer
ican Historical Review, X IX (August, 1939), 293-298.
¿88 T he N e w Empire
native or carpet-bag,” nevertheless wished for conditions which
would be conducive to an expanding commerce with the island.?
Moving from these assumptions and having to devote much
time to preparing its case on the Venezuelan boundary dispute,
the administration steered a conservative course around the Cuban
problem during the first half of 1895. On June 12, 1895, Cleve
land issued a neutrality proclamation which recognized a state
of insurgency. Although this appeared to be a formality, the
pronouncement had certain obligations attached, for it declared
that American relations with the insurgents would be regulated
by the neutrality laws. Qeveland did not, of course, mention
the more important step of belligerent status for the rebels. By
late fall, however, the revolutionaries had formed a provisional
government, expanded their base of military operations, and had
clearly demonstrated that they possessed much greater strength
than they had exhibited during the previous Ten Years’ W ar of
1868-1878. This display of rebel strength compelled the Cleve
land administration to re-evaluate its policies toward the rebellion.
This re-evaluation led to C lney’s April 4, 1896, offer of media
tion, an offer which marked a distinct break with previous pol
icies.2
8*
The Secretary of State opened this new phase with a long letter
to the President on September 25, 1895. Reporting that he had
discussed the problem at length with “one o f the largest landed
proprietors of Cuba, a man of great wealth,” O lney was now pre-
2 Edwin F. Atkins, Sixty Years in Cuba . . . (Cambridge, Mass., 1926),

208-209; Callcott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 80; C. E.
Akers to Olney, May 5, 1895, Olney MSS; “Ought W e to Annex Cuba?”
Literary Digest, July 20, 1895, 337-338; Public Opinion, July 11, 1895,
43; W . G. Sumner, “T he Fallacy of Territorial Extension,” Forum, XXI
(June, 1896), 414-419. N o t even leading jingo newspapers wanted to
consider annexation in 1896; see Joseph E. W isan, The Cuban Crisis as
Reflected in the N ew York Press, 1895-1898 (N e w York, 1934), 184-185.
8 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 591-592; Benton, Inter
national Law and Diplomacy, 34-36; Adee to Ramon O. W illiams, Con
sul General o f the United States at Havana, Aug. 3 t, 1895, O lney MSS.
A similar letter on Cuban belligerency w ent to Atkins.
Fraction: N e w Problems 28p
pared to state flatly that “Spain cannot possibly succeed” in
quelling the revolt. H e insisted that the administration would
have to assume a more active role in the Cuban situation in view
of the “large and important commerce between the tw o coun
tries” and the “large amounts of American capital . . . in Cuba.”
Olney therefore proposed that an agent be sent to the island to
investigate the conditions there. If the rebels proved to be only
“roving banditti,” then the State Department would protest
against the cruel warfare. But if, as Olney suspected, the revolu
tionaries had “a substantial portion of the community” with them,
the;\ the Americans should “put ourselves in a position to intel
ligently consider and pass upon the questions of according to the
insurgents belligerent rights, or of recognizing their independ
ence.” 4
O lney advocated taking a position which neither the Cleveland
administration during its remaining months nor the M cKinley
cabinet in its first year in office dared to assume. H e clearly be
lieved than an agent would discover strong insurgent support and
that a recognition of belligerency or even Cuban independence
would follow . The Secretary of State refrained from mentioning
that such recognition would almost certainly lead to war with
Spain, but perhaps the letter is more remarkable because it so
blandly neglected such a conclusion.
Replying on September 29, 1895, Cleveland wrote that he had
also spoken with Peter Brooks, the Cuban planter to whom O lney
had referred. Brooks’s statements, the President remarked, “im
pressed me very much,” but the Chief Executive wanted “to
think your proposition over a little.” A fter tw o weeks of re
flection, Cleveland decided to reject O lney’s idea. It was logical
that the President did so. A war with Spain and the towering
problems of annexation could not easily be glossed over. T he
Venezuelan dispute promised to provide enough excitement with
out searching for new diversions in Cuba. Finally, as Cleveland
announced in his annual message in 1895, Spanish-American re-
4 Olney to Cleveland, Sept. 25, 1895, Cleveland MSS.
2 ÿo The N e w Empire
lations were amiable. Several thorny problems involving Ameri
can rights in Cuba had been settled in the administration’s favor.
T he President saw no reason to m odify his attitude toward Spain.®
During the next twelve months, however, his views rapidly
changed.
Several factors shaped the new administration position in 1896;
among them were congressional pressure, public opinion, and
changing conditions in Cuba. As O lney observed in his letter of
September, politicians were “setting their sails . . . to catch the
breeze” o f rebel popularity in the United States. Prorebel argu
ments were stuffed into the Congressional Record by Populists
w ho hoped that war with Spain would force the impoverished
United States Treasury to coin silver to pay for the war. Con
gressmen such as W ilkinson Call of Florida and W illiam Sulzer
o f N ew York, who had close ties w ith the Junta, supported the
Populists’ militancy.
These debates especially noted the growing involvement of
American economic interests in the rebellion. Senators John T .
Morgan of Alabama and D on Cameron of Pennsylvania intro
duced resolutions requesting recognition o f Cuban belligerency
and recognition of Cuban independence, respectively. Morgan,
Cameron, and their supporters stressed the necessity of ending
the conflict in order to allow American commerce and invest
ments to operate safely on the island. Jefferson Caffery of Louis
iana objected that the resolutions would open “the door to foreign
conquest, and that opens the door to annihilation of the Re
public,” but the Senate swept the Morgan resolution over Caf-
fery’s objections by the vote o f 64-5.®5
5 Cleveland to O lney, Sept. 29, 1895, Oct. 6 and 9, 1895, and O lney to
Cleveland, Oct. 8, 1895, Cleveland MSS. A ll the letters cited in notes
4 and 5 may be found in Letters of G rover Cleveland. Also see Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 636; W isan, The Cuban Crisis, 100.
* Congressional Record, 54th Cong., ist Sess., 1065-1066, 1970-1972,
1317, 2066, 2249-2250; Senate Report N o. 141, 54th Cong., ist Sess. (serial
3362), 1-3. John Bassett M oore publicly charged that the men w ho spon-
Reaction: N e w Problems 2pl
Morgan’s proposal paled beside the resolution submitted to the

House by Robert H itt of Illinois, a Republican who was chair
man of the Foreign Affairs Committee. H itt asked for recog
nition of belligerent rights and “intervention if necessary.” In
arguing for this proposal of war, H itt neglected humanitarian
motives and mentioned the “immense commerce” and “enormous
investments” of Americans which were being destroyed in Cuba.
H itt’s resolution passed 262-17,an<îts passage threw both Wash
ington and Madrid into a dilemma. Canovas del Castillo, Prime
Minister of the Spanish government, told the N ew York W orld
that “the situation now is one of extreme delicacy.” Cleveland
considered moves to stall Senate action. But the upper house
defeated the H itt resolution, although the proposal found much
support from such important legislators as John Sherman. The
venerable Ohio Senator declared that if the resolution made it
appear that “a m oney consideration” motivated American inter
vention, the House might change the language, but, he empha
sized, “in substance it is true.” “The only trouble,” he candidly
continued, “is it is better not always to speak of m oney and prop
erty and property interests when the rights of millions of people
are involved.” Under the threats of a filibuster, especially from
some southern senators who feared the racial question which
would arise from possible intervention, the Senate defeated the
sored the resolutions to recognize rebel belligerency realized that Spanish

searching of American vessels would lead to open conflict between the
tw o nations in short time. See M oore’s “T he Question of Cuban Bel
ligerency,” Forum , XXI (M ay, 1896), 298-299. In supporting the bellig
erency resolution, Lodge listed a number o f reasons for American
intervention and concluded that the most important was the “higher
ground of humanity.” In a private letter of March 12, 1896, he outlined
five reasons w hy he wanted the United States to control Cuba, and
none o f them encompassed humanitarian motives. Three o f them em
phasized the economic rewards to be gained; one noted the threat o f
European intervention; the other mentioned the extension o f democratic
government (Lodge to Pickman, March 12, 1896, Lodge Letterbooks,
Lodge M SS).
House resolutions. Both houses then agreed on a proposal which
requested belligerent rights and the offering of friendly offices
by the Executive.7
Pressure for intervention increased as conditions in Cuba
worsened. General Valeriano W eyler y Nicolau replaced Gen
eral Martinez Campos in February, 1896, and promptly an
nounced that he would institute no reforms until peace had been
restored. Fitzhugh Lee, the American Consul General in Havana,
summarized the Cuban feeling when he reported that autonomy
and home rule would no longer satisfy the rebels. H e also ob
served that Spain was erecting new fortifications around Havana
and that many of the guns “point to the sea and not to the in
surgents.” 8
Searching for a compromise solution, Olney and Cleveland
found some hope in a speech made by the leader of the Spanish
opposition party which requested American aid in applying some
reforms in Cuba. On April 4, 1896, Olney made such a proposal
to Spain. Commenting caustically on “the inability of Spain to
prolong the conflict,” the Secretary of State nevertheless urged
that the Spanish not abandon the island, since “a war of races
would be precipitated.” H e then gave four reasons w hy the
struggle concerned the United States: first, Americans’ favor
toward “any struggle anywhere for freer political institutions”;
second, the inhumanity of the war; third, the desire of the United
States for a “noninterruption of extensive trade relations”; and
fourth, “the wholesale destruction of property,” which “is ut
terly destroying American investments.” O lney proposed a plan
7 Congressional Record, 54th Ceng., istSess., 2342-2343, 2346-2347,2355,

2359, 2485-2486, 2719-2720, 2728, 2826-2827, 2970-2971, 3541, 3628; Chad
wick, United States and Spain, 439, 445, 446; Summers, Cabinet Diary of
William L. Wilson, 35-37; Olney to Hale, March 17, 1896, Olney MSS.
8 Recently named to the post, Lee had the approval of the jingo press
in N e w York; see W isan, Cuban Crisis, 141, 66-67; also Chapter VIII,
below; Chadwick, United States and Spain, 431-432; Fitzhugh Lee to
Olney, Jan. 24, 1890, Olney MSS.
Reaction: N e w Problems m
of pacification which would retain Spanish sovereignty.0 The
administration was trying to stop the rebellion before one of two
things occurred. Spain might be driven from the island and an
archy (or worse, a biracial war) ensue, or the United States might
have to intervene to stop the revolution and then be forced to as
sume political responsibility for the island. As anticolonialists,
Cleveland and Olney feared the latter alternative as much as the
former. The April proposal, if accepted by Spain, would in
geniously short-circuit the possibility of American annexation.
Unfortunately for the administration’s hopes, Spain rejected
the offer in a note of May 22, 1895. The Duke of Tetuán, the
Spanish Foreign Minister, moreover accused the American gov
ernment of encouraging the revolution, since Tetuán claimed
the administration refused to enforce adequately the neutrality
laws. This Spanish reply angered Cleveland and Olney. W hen
Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish Minister in Washington, attempted
to discuss Spain’s reply with Olney, he found the Secretary of
State “very reserved.” O lney ominously hinted, “The situation
here and in Cuba must be bettered.” A t this point, the adminis
tration entered the last phase of its Cuban policy.10
From July, 1896, when his record was repudiated by the
silverite-controlled Democratic Convention, until the end of his
term of office, Cleveland preserved American freedom of action
until a new administration could assume the reins of foreign
policy. But both the Chief Executive and his Secretary of State
became more militant in their attitude toward Spain. In mid-July
the President deprecated Fitzhugh Lee’s “style of rolling inter
vention like a sweet morsel under his tongue,” but several days
before, Cleveland had written Olney, “I am thinking a great
9 A copy o f the note is in the Olney MSS and also in Spanish Diplo
matic Correspondence and Documents, 1896-1900 . . . [translation]
(W ashington, D.C., 1905), 4-8.
10 Taylor to Olney, April 6 and 4, 1896, O lney MSS; Spanish Diplo
matic Correspondence and Documents, 3-4, 8-13; de Lome to Olney,
June 17, July 2, 1896, O lney MSS.
deal about Cuba, but am as far as ever from seeing the place where
w e can get in.” Purchasing Cuba might mean “incorporating” the
island “into the United States system,” and this, the President
feared, “would be entering upon dangerous ground.” On the
other hand, “it would seem absurd for us to buy the Island” and
allow the Cubans to run their country.11
During the summer and fall, Spanish actions further exasper
ated the President. O lney spent much of his time protesting
against Spanish regulations which penalized American persons
and property. In October, General W eyler announced the bru
tal reconcentrado policy. But the most spectacular threat to
American interests came from the disclosure in August that the
Duke of Tetuán had asked the European powers to help Spain
prevent American intervention in Cuba. Learning of the pro
posal from the British Ambassador in Madrid, Hannis Taylor,
the American Minister, immediately demanded an explanation
from the embarrassed Spanish government. T he Duke of Tetuán
justified the move by explaining his fear of “future political
changes which might take place in the United States” that would
bring a less friendly government to power. This justification did
little to lessen O lney’s and Cleveland’s anger. T aylor aptly
handled the delicate situation and obtained from the Spanish
Minister the promise that the notes would not be sent w ithout
further consultation with American authorities. In October, Spain
dropped the scheme.12
A sidelight of this incident merits consideration. T he Spanish
note had attempted to w in support from European powers by
11 Cleveland to O lney, July 13, 1896, O lney MSS; Cleveland to O lney,
July 16, 1896, Cleveland MSS. Both letters are in Letters of G rover
Cleveland, 446, 448-449.
12 For O lney’s vigorous policies to protect American interests, see
O lney to Taylor, July 9, O ct. 15, 1896, and Feb. 12, 1897, Spain, Instruc
tions, N A , R G 59; O lney to Taylor, July 7, 1896, O lney MSS; Orestes
Ferrara, The Last Spanish War: Revelations in Diplomacy, translated
from the Spanish by W illiam E. Shea (N e w York, 1937), 33-45, 59-62;
T aylor to Olney, A ug. 8 and 13, 1896, Spain, Despatches, N A , R G 59;
T aylor to Olney, Aug. 11,1896, O lney MSS.
Reaction: N e w P roblem *9S
reminding them that the United States, relying on “the daily more
absorbent and expansive Monroe Doctrine,” threatened their
interests as w ell as Spain’s. But in assuming that the major Eu
ropean governments would unhesitatingly assist him, the Duke
of Tetuán made a major miscalculation. If his plan was to suc
ceed, he needed at least the passiveness o f the British navy and
the active participation of Russia. England, however, was re
vising her American policies in view of the Venezuelan incident
and her growing isolation in the Far and Middle East. Russia also
refused to become involved, since she had now turned her at
tention to the Far East and wanted nothing to harm Russian-
American relations. Ironically, American expansion in the Carib
bean and the Far East prevented Spain from obtaining the help
o f the tw o nations she needed for the success of her plan to halt
just such American expansion.
Spain must have spent little time in considering the effect of
this proposal on the volatile minds of O lney and Cleveland.
Relations were not improved when Taylor informed the Secre
tary o f State in a personal letter that Spain was hurrying its prep
arations for war. T he United States responded in several ways.
T he Secretary of the N avy, Hilary Herbert, declared in late
October, 1896, that “in the improbable contingency o f a war
w ith Spain plans w ill have been perfected and officers designated
to carry them out” before the end of the year.18
Cleveland’s annual message in December provided the most
striking evidence of the administration’s concern and anger. The
President began by intimating that Spain was incapable of regain
ing complete control of Cuba. The rebels, however, provided “a
government merely on paper.” He warned that this condition
could no longer continue, for the chaotic situation endangered
American interests, which Cleveland described as “by no means
of a wholly sentimental or philanthropic character.” Enumer-
18 T aylor to Olney, Aug. 18, 1896, O lney MSS; O lney to J. W alter
Blandford, May 29, 1897; Herbert to W illiam L. W ilson, Oct. 27, 1896,
Cleveland MSS; Memoranda for Autobiography, 342, Herbert MSS.
2 ÿ6 The N e w Empire
ating in detail American investments in and trade with Cuba,
the President demanded the cessation of the war, which threat
ened to ruin “the industrial value of the island.” Rejecting any
grant of belligerent rights to the rebels, the recognition of Cuban
independence, or the possibility of purchasing the island (since
Spain, Cleveland declared, refused to sell), the President added
that outright intervention could not be considered at present.
H e advocated his favored solution c f “genuine autonomy” and
advised Spain to take advantage of this American offer. H e
warned that the past “expectant attitude o f the United States
w ill not be indëfinitely maintained.” Rather, “a time may arrive”
when the desire to save Cuba “from complete devastation, w ill
constrain our Government to such action as w ill subserve the
interests thus involved and at the same time promise to Cuba
. . . the blessings of peace.” 14
These closing passages were an explicit threat and warning to
the Spanish, but it is significant that in the first draft of the mes
sage, Cleveland considered the use o f even more belligerent
phrases. The original draft included an ultimatum to Spain in the
form of a time limit. Cleveland refused to define a time when
the United States should undertake the restoration of the “bless
ings of peace” to the island, but he immediately added in this
draft: “It would seem safe to say, however, that if by the coming
of the N ew Year, no substantial progress has been made towards
ending the insurrection either by force of arms or otherwise, the
conclusion that Spain is incompetent to successfully deal w ith it
would be almost inevitable.” 14 Since Spain was “incompetent”
to stop the bloodshed, Cleveland thus clearly indicated when
“higher obligations” might force the United States to assume the
task of restoring adequate protection to American interests.
14 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 716-722. It is doubtful
if Cleveland wanted to buy Cuba. T he problems o f annexation w ere
still present. T he President was on safe ground in saying that Spain would
reject such an offer.
16 T he original draft was sent to O lney, w ho made pen corrections in
November, 1896. This draft is in the O lney MSS.
Reaction: N e w Froblems 291
Cleveland’s message of December 2 is important for several
reasons. T he President clung to the hope that Cuban autonomy
would be the best solution for “all concerned,” though he ig
nored the aspirations of the Junta at this point. H e recognized
that Spain insisted on pacifying the island before granting auton
omy; on this vital question he com pletely agreed with the
insurgents’ belief that the Spanish position was absurd and dan
gerous. The grave threats at the end of the message warned Spain
that she must quickly change her policy and accede to the Amer
ican request. It would be too late when either the rebellion
com pletely devastated the island or American sentiment forced
M cKinley to intervene and possibly annex the island.
The message also preserved American freedom of action in
case Spain refused to grant autonomy. The Chief Executive
clearly and simply informed Spain that if she did not end the re
bellion soon the United States would have to intervene. H e
might have declared this in order to pressure Spain into granting
immediate reforms, but the fact remains that the message was an
unveiled threat of intervention. Cleveland rationalized American
intervention in Cuba and gave his administration’s support for
it (under certain conditions) tw o years before a Republican
President led the nation into war. Olney re-emphasized this threat
when he submitted his departmental report in 1896. After a de
tailed analysis of American commercial interests on the island,
which O lney estimated as at least $50,000,000 ($33,000,000
would probably have been more accurate), the Secretary of State
warned that “the time may not be far distant” when American
“rights and interests” may call “for some decided change in the
policy hitherto pursued.” 16
Militant members of Congress wanted an immediate change in
policy. Shortly after the President’s message, Lodge observed
16 Foreign Relations, 1896, lxxxvi. T he jingo press in N ew York never

theless attacked Cleveland’s views on Cuba, while the conservative, anti
jingo papers, along with the business community, approved the message;
W isan, The Cuban Crisis, 240-244.
2ç 8 The N e w Empire
that “an explosion may happen any day and force our hands.”
Lodge, Don Cameron, and Roger Mills of Texas led the inter
ventionist forces. Cameron’s resolution, which requested recog
nition of Cuban independence, aroused the most interest. Several
factors evidently motivated Cameron’s and Lodge’s espousal of
this measure. President-elect M cKinley had informed Lodge of
his desire that the crisis “be settled one w ay or the other” before
the new administration entered office. Lodge agreed with Mc
Kinley, for he feared that the prolongation of the rebellion would
further unsettle business conditions and undermine the Republi
can victory cry of coming prosperity. A n unsettled econom y
would also increase the strength of the silver blog. A final influ
ence derived from Lodge’s and Cameron’s friendly ties with the
Junta in N ew York City.17
On December 19, as Cameron prepared to introduce his mea
sure on the Senate floor, Olney killed the resolution’s chances of
success by informing a W ashington Star reporter that if passed
the measure would have no binding effect on the administration.
The Senate promptly dropped the resolution. O lney had made
this dramatic move for tw o reasons. H e feared that the debates
on the measure would precipitate another financial panic. T he
administration also wanted to avert war with Spain. If the United
States had recognized Cuba as independent, the Monroe Doctrine
would have come into effect. T he State Department would then
have had to intervene in order to prevent a European power from
acquiring territory in the W estern Hemisphere. O lney realized
that, after the administration’s adamant stand on the Venezuelan
dispute, the United States would be compelled to enforce the
Doctrine in Cuba. The administration would go to war because
17 Lodge to Fairchild, D ec. 11, 1896, Lodge to E. M. W eld, D ec. 19,
1896, Lodge to H enry Lee, D ec. 21, 1896, Lodge to E. A . Adams, Dec.
23, 1896, Lodge to Morgan, D ec. 21, 1896, Lodge Letterbooks, Lodge
MSS; Congressional Record , 54th Cong., 2nd Sess., 39; W isan, The Cuban
Crisis, 251; Auxier, “T he Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta ”
290-291.
Reaction: N e w Problems 299
of “higher obligations,” but not because the Senate forced the
Executive’s hand.18
Throughout January and February, 1897, O lney continued to
seek a solution. On February 5, Cánovas sent a list o f reforms
which resembled the unacceptable suggestions of early 1895. The
Cuban insurgents attacked Cánovas’ offer with derision, and the
Spanish press cried that the reforms gave “everything to the
Cubans.” During the last week of February, Cleveland asked
Frederic R. Coudert to try to reach a solution with Spanish
authorities in Cuba, but the distinguished N ew York lawyer re
fused the appointment.19
As he prepared to leave the W hite House, Cleveland could be
satisfied that he had attempted to enforce the neutrality laws,
protect American property, bring about Spanish reforms in Cuba,
and, above all, that he had maintained the peace. The adminis
tration’s actions were of more significance than this, however.
O lney’s April note had informed Spain that American interests
were deeply involved in the rebellion and that the United States
would be forced to protect those interests. The April offer of
mediation was the first American effort to interject the United
States officially into the struggle.
18 N e vins, G rover Cleveland, 717; for press discussion o f Olney’s con

stitutional right to lay down such a rule, see Literary Digest, D ec. 26,
1896, 225-226; also Hale to Olney, Jan. 4, 1897, O lney to Clifton R.
Beckinridge, Jan. 25, 1897, O lney to A . M. Straw, Dec. 24, 1896, O lney
MSS; for the fears of businessmen, see T he Commercial Club o f Chicago
to H enry T . Thurber, Cleveland’s private secretary, D ec. 30, 1896, Cleve
land MSS.
19 Chadwick, United States and Spain, 487; O lney to Lee, Jan. 18, 1897,
T aylor to Olney, Jan. 26, 1897, Olney MSS; Taylor to Olney, Jan. 27,
1897, Cleveland MSS; Lee to Olney, Feb. 18, 1897, O lney MSS; Spanish
Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 19-24; O lney to de Lome,
March 7, 1897, O lney MSS. Coudert had been one o f the earliest ex
ponents of ending Spanish rule and annexing Cuba to the United States.
Cleveland doubtless knew o f Coudert’s opinion. Coudert’s view is in
Public Opinion, July 11, 1895, 43; Cleveland’s thoughts on the project
are partially revealed in a letter to Olney, Feb. 28, 1897, Cleveland MSS.
5oo The N e w Empire
In December, Cleveland had carried this policy one step far
ther. American interests were so involved in this conflict, he had
declared, that the United States had an unquestioned right to
intervene in order to pacify the island. Since Spain refused to
grant the right of American intervention in any form, the carry
ing out of the President’s policy could only have resulted in war.
Cleveland and Olney thus restrained American intervention for
a time, but they also contributed to the causes for war in 1898;
they emphasized the involvement of American material interests
and provided a rationale for the right to use force, if necessary,
to protect these interests.20
The Far East

A ny attempt to understand the background of the 1898 war
with Spain and the immediate results of that war must include
an analysis of the developing American interest in Asia during
the early and middle 1890’s.21 T o neglect the Far East, or to be
gin the study of United States relations with that area only with
the Kiaochow incident in late 1897, distorts the picture of the
new empire in the post-1890 period. The United States had large
material interests in both Cuba and the Orient; a revolution
threatened these interests in the former area, and internal dis
content and the imperial grasp of European powers threatened
holdings in the Far East. Cuba deserved primary attention, of
course; but increased American trade, concession hunting, and
20 See Chadwick, United States and Spain, 465-466, for a similar inter
pretation; also James, Richard Olney , 166; and Pratt, Expansionists of
1898 , 2 1 2 .
21 N o historian has adequately analyzed the links between American
expansion in the Far East from 1895-1898 and the growing United States
involvement in world affairs overall, especially the links between the
Caribbean and Far Eastern policies. This work attempts to remedy this
lack in a minor way. T he definitive work on the topic should be available
when Thomas McCormick of Ohio University publishes his ‘“ Fair
Field and N o Favor’; American China Policy during the M cKinley Ad
ministrations” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University o f W isconsin,
i960).
Reaction: N e w Problems 3oi
missionary activity in China, Korea, Japan, and Manchuria forced

the State Department to devote much attention to these grow
ing interests. In 1899 and 1900, with the Cuban problem settled,
the United States would give Asia top priority, but this would
be merely an acceleration of a policy which had long character
ized America’s handling of its oriental affairs. Both Cuba and
the Far East were different manifestations of the expansion of
the new empire in the 1890’s, and each was dealt with in turn
by the State Department. N ot the least important link between
the tw o was the effect which the realignment of American in
terests in the Far East had upon United States relations with the
major European powers in both the Orient and Cuba.
In a speech in 1894, the Assistant Secretary of the N avy,
William McAdoo, noted that the demand for American ships in
the Pacific area was so great “that we could almost use the entire
fleet in those waters alone.” In contrast, he noted, “W e are rep
resented by only one ship in Europe.” 22 The American interests
these ships protected in Asia fell into two categories, business
and missionary.
The belief that the fabled and long-awaited Asiatic market was
at last a reality dominated the United States’ dealings with the
Far East in the 1890’s. After hovering around the 5 per cent mark
of the nation’s total trade during the last half of the century,
American trade with Asia suddenly spiraled in the mid-1890’s.
Exports to China, which had approximated $4,000,000 annually
in the early part of that decade, jumped to $6,900,000 in 1896
and soared to $11,900,000 in 1897. Exports to Japan evidenced
the same inflationary figures; reaching $3,900,000 in 1894, they
moved to $7,600,000 in 1896 and nearly doubled to $13,000,000
the follow ing year. American exports led those of all other na
tions in the potentially rich Manchurian area. Such statistics were
not lost on market-hungry American businessmen during these
depression years. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle re-
22 W illiam M cAdoo, “T he N avy and the Nation,” Proceedings of the
United States Naval Institute, X X (1894), 420-421.
$02 The N e w Empire
marked in the autumn of 1894 that the effects of the Sino-Japanese
war on the Orient should “give an entirely new character to our
W estern coast.” 28
Concession seekers were as active as exporters, but they did
not enjoy the same measure of success. Charles Denby, the Amer
ican Minister to China, listed the Cramp Shipbuilding Company,
U nion Iron Company, American China Development Company,
the Bethlehem Iron Company, and a railroad and banking syndi
cate as some of the American firms interested in obtaining con
cessions from China. The American Trading Company of N ew
York G ty , headed by James R. Morse, was also active through
out the Far East. In order to help these companies as much as
possible, D enby literally strained at the leash which the State
Department held on him. These businessmen, the Minister re
ported, “expect that this legation w ill do everything necessary
or conceivable to carry out their views, and they are not disap
pointed. Except that I do not take China by the throat and de
mand concessions” as the Europeans do. And D enby had no
illusions about the Chinese. H e had reported to the department
earlier: “The foreigner in China holds his position by force alone.
. . . W e must therefore recognize the fact that kindness to this
people goes for little.” 24
T he State Department fully approved of all aid which D enby
might provide American concessionaires, but W ashington offi
cials admonished him not to play favorites among the Americans.
Gresham lectured him much as one would a young virgin about
o go to the big city: “You w ill likely be beset by Americans
28 Dennett, Americans in the Far East, 580-581; Commercial and Fi

nancial Chronicle, Sept. 22, 1894, 496-497; see also Thomas R. Jemigan,
U.S. Consul General to China, “Commercial Trend o f China,” N orth
American Review, CLXV (July, 1897), 63-69.
24 D enby to O lney, May 25, 1896, China, Despatches, N A , R G 59;
N e w York Tribune , Sept. 24, 1896, 7:4; D enby to Olney, N o v . 25, 1895,
O lney MSS; for D enby’s statement on the Chinese, see D enby to Bayard,
Sept. 6,1888, Bayard MSS. See also Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten
Staaten, II, 960-961.
Reaction: N e w Froblems 303
anxious for valuable concessions from China, and knowing your
generous and obliging nature I sent you the second telegram
today. . . . You may compromise yourself in the minds of
strangers. O f course, you will understand that this admonition
is a friendly one.” Since Washington would not allow Dénby
more freedom to pick and choose, Americans were divided, then
conquered, by European capitalists who enjoyed the full sup
port of their own governments. Thus the American Trading
Company lost the opportunity to loan China a large amount of
the war indemnity to be paid to Japan in 1895-1896, and thus
the American China Development Company lost a fat railroad
concession to a Russian-Belgian group. The United States refused
to follow the European methods of mixing business and politics.
Denby reported on May 24, 1897, “The ominous suspicion that
European politics are figuring in commercial concessions in China
is not promising for Americans.” The United States would some
how have to counter this European influence, and within two
years the State Department decided upon a course of action—a
reaffirmation of the open door bolstered by an avowed pro-
British, pro-Japanese, and anti-Russian policy.25
Americans were more successful in Japan and Korea. As Amer
ican trade with Japan rocketed upward after 1894, Japan doubled
her purchases of American cotton in 1895 to 11,000,000 pounds;
she approached Great Britain as the best customer of United
States growers. Eleven American firms were conducting business
in Kobe, and one of them, the China and Japan Trading Com
pany, boasted the largest business in the city. W hen Japan began
expanding her navy in the mid-1890’s, agents from the Cramp
Shipbuilding Company and the Union Iron Works were among
the first on the scene, and, as the American Minister reported in
26 OIney to D enby, D ec. 10, 1896, Letterbook, O lney MSS; Gresham
to D enby, April 12,1895, Letterbook, Gresham MSS; D enby to Gresham,
M ay 12, 1895, and U hl to D enby, May 14, 1895, Cleveland MSS; M c
Cormick, “ ‘Fair Field and N o Favor,* ’* 61-62, 68-74; Edward H . Za-
briskie, American-Russian Relations in the Far East: A Study in Diplo
macy and Power Politics, 1899-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), 33, 38-39.
late 1895, these “gentlemen left Japan fairly well satisfied with
their reception,” since they won several contracts. Secretary of
State Olney cooperated by ordering a survey to find “the pros
pects of competition by American manufacturers for contracts
in the Japanese Empire.” Denby, among others, returned a de
tailed and highly encouraging report of the prospects.29
In the Hermit Kingdom, Horace Allen was energetically di
recting American economic and political moves from his post as
Secretary of the American Legation in Seoul. In 1895, after he
had plotted five years to win the concession, Allen was suddenly
offered by the Korean King the Un-san mines, probably the rich
est gold mines in the Far East. Never one to let an opportunity slip
by, Allen coolly directed an astonishing intrigue to reorganize
the Korean cabinet so that pro-Japanese elements could not block
the grant. Allen then gave the concession to James R. Morse, who
in turn sold it in 1897 to another group of American financiers.
For the next forty-two years this American company mined the
Un-san concession to the tune of nearly fifteen million dollars
in profits. For an encore Allen won the streetcar concession in
Seoul for yet another American company.2627
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle could point to these
and similar events as substantiation for its sweeping statement,
“W e, more than any other Power, are to have the Pacific trade
—the trade with China and Japan.” But Horace Allen exempli
fied another side of American interest in the Far East, for he had
been a missionary before becoming an intermediary for Ameri
can entrepreneurs. An American naval officer reported in 1891,
“Since my last visit to China, fourteen years ago, I find that the
Missionary cause has made most extraordinary progress. . . .
Their number is constantly increasing, and there seems to be no
limit to the money that is behind them.” Using the sharp wedge
26 Area 10 file, Box 8, April-June folder, N A , R G 45; Ford, “Turning

o f the Tide,” 190; Dun to Olney, N ov. 23, 1895, Japan, Despatches, N A ,
RG 59*
27 Harrington, G od, Mammon, and the Japanese, ch. ix.
provided by the 1858-1860 treaties, which opened the Chinese
interior and the Yangtze River and included provisions for re
ligious toleration, by 1898 the missionaries had touched all eight
een provinces plus Manchuria and had set the pattern their
activities would follow for the next thirty years.28
The forces which intensified missionary activity in the Far
East during the 1880’s and 1890’s emanated from several sources.
Christianity had always been an expansive doctrine, a religion,
as one missionary phrased it in 1896, “that will not keep.” This
characteristic was accentuated in the 1890’s when, as a partial
response to the onslaughts of Darwinism, the church reacted
emotionally, yet confidently and expansively. College campuses
were set ablaze with missionary fervor. An intercollegiate Student
Volunteers for Foreign Missions mushroomed in membership.
Henry Luce, Horace Pitkin and Sherwood Eddy were among
the many who flocked under this society’s unmodest slogan,
“The Evangelization of the W orld in this Generation.” The
industrial revolution affected missions not only by providing
angels of finance to pay costs, but also by spawning beliefs such
as Andrew Carnegie’s Gospel of Wealth, which urged men to
gain as much wealth as possible in order to help others. Rev.
Russell H . Conwell’s Acres of Diamonds, one of the most pop
ular lectures in American history, advanced the formula suc
cinctly: “T o secure wealth is an honorable ambition, and is one
great test of a person’s usefulness to others.” Such a definition of
blessings in a secular, rather than a religious, sense hid a subtle
but significant danger to the missionary outlook. The strong racist
beliefs of the day channeled this outpouring of emotion and fi
nance especially into the nonwhite areas of the world. Such ar
ticles as “The Anglo-Saxon and the W orld’s Redemption” were
28 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Aug. 18, 1894, 256-257; also
see Bradstreet’s, May 18, 1895, 311; Commander F. M. Barber to Belknap,
D ec. i, 1891, Area 10 file, Box 8, N A , R G 45; Kenneth Scott Latourette,
A History of Christian Missions in China (N e w York, 1929), 360-361;
Paul Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats . . . (Princeton, 1958),
12-14.
ßo6 T he N e w Empire
not uncommon, and Josiah Strong, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and
John Fiske bolstered this racism with their popular writings.29
Increased American economic and political interests, the Sino-
Japanese W ar of 1894-1895, and the fact that the area was non
white made the Far East a natural target for missionary enthu
siasm. Reiterating the classic theme, mission advocates could
claim in 1890, “As in all the past, so now the indications of Prov
idence all point Westward.” But the work would have to be
accomplished quickly: “China is open to the Gospel now; it
may not be so when she becomes strong enough to dictate the
terms of her treaties.” This sense of urgency was intensified by
the fear that unless China assimilated Western morality quickly,
she would either become an amoral industrial giant or would be
absorbed by Russia to form, as one missionary wrote, “the most
powerful Empire ever known among men.” Alfred Thayer
Mahan especially publicized his fear of these possibilities and
helped to implant that fear into the minds of Theodore Roose
velt and Henry Cabot Lodge.30
These dynamic changes in American thought and action
largely explained the burgeoning missionary success in China in
the 1890’s. In 1893 Protestant missionaries claimed 55,093 com
municants; in five years the figure jumped 50 per cent to 80,682.
Missionaries reported that they were embarrassed by the crowds
who sought instruction. In 1890 the different Protestant groups
had held their second general meeting (the first had been called
to order in 1877) to coordinate their activities and to make a
plea for saving “the present generation.” The missionaries hoped
that one thousand men would come to China to help the churches
within the next five years; 1,153 actually arrived before 1895.
Americans predominated in this Protestant movement. O f the
29 Ibid., 3,51-57; Ralph H enry Gabriel, The Course of American Demo

cratic Thought (2nd ed.; N e w York, 1956), 156-158. For a good dis
cussion on the influence o f racist beliefs, see Bald, “Expansionist Senti
ment,” ch. iii.
80 Varg, Missionaries, 77-85; Public Opinion, Feb. 8, 1890, 432.
445 participants in the 1890 meeting, 230 were United States
citizens and 193 were British.31
American political and economic influences often followed the
missionaries. Some churchmen abroad desired protection only
from nationals in case of outbreaks in the interior, but others
demanded and received protection from American ships and
troops. A few publicly claimed that they were trying not only
to influence spiritual life, but also to “shape political life and de
velopment.” W ith some help from Horace Allen, American
missionaries in Korea devoted their considerable political skills
to the maintenance of Korean independence in the face of Chi
nese, Japanese, and Russian incursions. W hen Allen became
Minister to Korea in 1897, the missionary movement in that
country had, in effect, received carte blanche from the State
Department.32
N or were the economic influences of the missionaries neg
ligible. The fabled China market would become much greater as
all Chinese adopted western food, clothes, and customs, as well
as spiritual values; the missionaries dispensed all four. Missionaries
bragged of their commercial prowess, partly no doubt in order
to attract support from industrialists and financiers, but also be
cause many believed what they were saying. The Congregational-
ist could tersely announce, “Commerce follows the missionary.”
One missionary who had labored in China in the 1890’s spelled
this out:
If I were asked to state what would be the best form of advertis
ing for the great American Steel Trust or Standard Oil or the Bald
win Locomotive Works . . . or the Singer sewing machine . . . I
should say, take up the support of one or two or a dozen mission
stations. . . . Everyone thus helped would be, consciously or un
consciously, a drummer for your goods, and the great church they
represent at home would be your advertising agents.812
81 Latourette, H istory of Christian Missions, 402-405, 413-415, 494-496.

82 Bald, “Expansionist Sentiment,” 92, 106-109; Harrington, G od,
Mammon, and the Japanese, 98-102.
ßo8 T he N e w Empire
Charles Denby, who wasted little love on the missionaries, never
theless valued them precisely because of this economic influence.33
Within five years these various American interests were nearly
engulfed by European ambitions and antiforeign movements in
China. These threats had first become apparent to American
policy makers during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Sec
retary of State Gresham measured his reactions to this crisis with
one rule of thumb; he feared, as he informed the Japanese Minis
ter to Washington, that if Japan “continues to knock China to
pieces, the powers, England, France, Germany and Russia, under
the guise of preserving order, will partition China.” If this oc
curred, the open door would be slammed shut. The doctrine of
the new empire, moreover, had no provision for controlling a
slice of China as an American protectorate. Gresham thus re
fused to cooperate in joint mediation efforts with the European
powers. “W hen we act at all in such matters,” the Secretary of
State informed Pauncefote, “we prefer to act alone.” Gresham
had no intention of jeopardizing his nation’s freedom of action
in the Orient, especially if this meant giving consent to the under
mining of traditional American interests. The United States did,
however, offer its good offices and exert pressure on both bellig
erents to stop the fighting before the other powers could step
in. W hen Japan finally agreed to peace, her surprisingly success
ful warfare had already frightened Russia, France, and Germany
into taking drastic steps to check the claims Japan made on China.
Gresham’s fears had been well founded.34
Reporting the termination of hostilities on April 18, 1895, the
33Plesur, “Looking Outward,” 180-181; Bald, “Expansionist Senti

ment,” 95-99; Isaac Taylor Headland, Some By-Products of Missions
(Cincinnati, 1921), 33-34.
34 T yler Dennett, “American ‘G ood Offices’ in Asia,” American Journal
of Intematio?ial Law , X V I (1922), 19-20; Gresham, Life of Gresham,
II, 788-789; Gresham to Denby, N ov. 24, 1894, China, Instructions, Con
versation between Pauncefote and Gresham, July 9, 1894, Memoranda of
Conversations, and Dun to Gresham, April 25, 1895, Japan Despatches,
N A , R G 59.
Reaction: N ew Problems 309
American Minister to Japan wrote: “Thus has ended one of the
most remarkable wars of the nineteenth century. . . . The
changed conditions to ensue will be far reaching, not only upon
China and Japan, but upon the entire world as well.” The Cleve
land administration moved rapidly to adjust to these “changed
conditions.” The N avy Department doubled the size of the
American fleet in Chinese waters, and Gresham pleaded with
Herbert for more ships. In spite of this increase, however, “as a
military force the N avy is not counted,” wrote one young Amer
ican naval officer from China. “I make numerous reports on ves
sels of the Charleston's tonnage that could ‘lick’ us while we were
spitting on our hands.” 35
Olney’s action to protect American missionaries in the interior
was more forceful. When bloody massacres erupted in Szechuan
in 1895, the Secretary of State agreed with Denby’s decision not
to evacuate the missionaries, but to protect them with all possible
American authority. W hen Chinese officials refused to allow a
United States investigating commission to travel to the scene of
the riots, the Secretary of State warned the Chinese to reverse
their decision or the United States would correct the wrongs
to their citizens “by such means as it may find most expeditious
and effective.” T o emphasize his concern, Olney attempted to
impress the Chinese by refusing to allow the American com
mission to travel by water; he forced the commission to make a
laborious overland journey. H e did, however, allow the com
mission to return by water. Olney was determined to “get” the
former Viceroy of Szechuan, who had permitted the outbreaks,
and the Secretary of State succeeded. The State Department,
Olney believed, had convincingly paraded before the European
powers the two dominant American policies in China: first, by
refusing to cooperate with the British in the investigating com
mission the United States had demonstrated its basic disagreement
35 Herbert to C. C. Carpenter, Sept. 24, 1894, Area 10 file, Box 10,

N A , R G 45; Morison, Sims, 42; Herbert to Cleveland, Oct. 7, 1894,
Cleveland MSS.
ß io The N e w Empire
with European policies; second, the State Department could
move quickly (and ostentatiously) to protect American inter
ests.30
The State Department hoped to exact a price for its efforts in
helping China through mediation and for refusing to cooperate
with European claims after the war. The State Department no
tified Denby on June 8, 1895, “This country will expect equal
and liberal trading advantages— certainly in Korea and presum
ably in China—as the result of the war, and all your efforts, so
far as they may be properly put forth, should be exerted to se
cure expanded privileges of intercourse, trade and residence in
which our citizens may share.” T w o weeks later Olney demon
strated that this instruction was not mere rhetoric, for he changed
long-standing policy in order to strengthen the position of Amer
ican concession seekers in China. N o longer would Denby have
to report each concessionaire’s plan to the State Department be
fore supporting the plan. N o w Denby could save valuable time
by formally introducing any American, “of whose character and
responsibility you are satisfied,” to the Chinese government with
out clearance from Washington. Olney also took advantage of a
Chinese-French agreement to help American missionaries en
large their property holdings in the Chinese interior.37
These two State Department actions, especially the granting
of enlarged powers to Denby, dramatized the growing realiza
tion in Washington that in order to preserve present holdings
and to encourage new interests to move into Asia, the growing
aggressiveness of the European powers would have to be coun
tered with stronger policies by the United States. During the de
pression years of 1895 and 1896, the apparently bottomless China
market seemed well worth the effort. W hen the State Depart-
86 Dun to Gresham, April 18, 1895, Japan, Despatches, and O lney to
Denby, Sept. 20, 1895, Adee to Denby, Aug. 12, 1895, O lney to Denby,
N ov. 21, 1895, Olney to Denby, Sept. 19, 1895, China, Instructions, N A ,
RG 59.
37 Uhl to Denby, June 8, 1895, O lney to D enby, July 18, 1895, O lney to
Denby, June 22, 1895, China, Instructions, N A , R G 59.
ment’s Bureau of Foreign Commerce spoke hopefully of “what
may be termed an American invasion of the markets of the world”
in 1896, it noted that China was “one of the most promising.”
The State Department attempted to make the promise come true
by working for peace in 1894-1895, by refusing to cooperate
with the aggressive forces of the European powers who wanted
to make territorial demands, and by moving quickly to preserve
and enlarge American interests in the area. “Under these cir
cumstances,” a State Department official wrote of America’s Far
Eastern policy in May, 1895, “The opening up of China to the
commerce of the world, which was one of the conditions of
peace, cannot fail to be of special value to the United States.” 88
But in the Far East, the fruits of the new empire refused to fall
so easily.
N e w Friends
Since the late 1870’s when William Evarts occupied the top
State Department post, the United States had attempted to keep
the open door in Asia ajar through unilateral dealings with China,
Japan, and Korea. Seward’s approach, which posited cooperation
with the European powers, especially England, was replaced by
policies attempting to preserve American freedom of action.
Until 1895 American policy makers operated from a double
assumption: first, that they had or would soon have adequate
economic power to win the battle for Far Eastern markets; sec
ond, that the maintenance of the open door would allow the
strongest economic power to be the first to cross the threshold
into the dreamland of the vast Asian market.
But by late 1895 these assumptions were crumbling. Japan
first attempted to combine military and political force to win
economic and territorial concessions which would cancel out
88 A . W hitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States

(N e w York, 1938), 56-57, quotes the Bureau of Foreign Commerce state
ment. T h e clipping from Baltimore Sun, May 27, 1895, is enclosed in
Frederic Emory to Bayard, May 28, 1895, Bayard MSS.
%i2 The N e w Empire
superior American industrial mechanization and the open-door
policy. Then Russia, France, and Germany exerted strong po
litical pressure on China and Japan to expand their economic and
territorial control in South China, North China, Manchuria, and
Korea. By 1896 and 1897 American policy makers began to real
ize that unilateral action in Asia, unsupported by adequate mili
tary force (which the United States lacked), would not main
tain the open door. Friends were sought who shared American
objectives and who occupied a more advantageous power posi
tion to defend the goals. These friends were found in Japan and
Great Britain.
It was ironic to befriend Japan so soon after she had attempted
to win exclusive favors from China. But the sweeping action of
the continental powers, which forced Japan to surrender her
hard-won gains of the 1894-1895 war, also forced Nippon’s
leaders to realize that they needed time and friends if they hoped
to oppose successfully the grasping hands of Russia, France, and
Germany. The United States offered one possibility. Astounded
by Japan’s naval successes, American military men sang the praises
and publicized the power of the Island Kingdom’s newly found
might. In a series of lectures delivered at the Naval War College
in 1895, Captain Richard Wallach declared that Japan “must no
longer be regarded only in the light of tea-houses, quaint art and
gentle manners. . . . Japan is at once the England and the Ger
many of the Far East.” 39
Japan promised to be a welcome ally. Militarily strong and
inclined, after her 1895 experiences with the European powers,
to favor an open-door approach, she did not seem to many Amer
icans to offer an industrial challenge to the United States. The
Baltimore Sun believed that it would be “some years yet” before
Japan could compete with the American cotton industry. John
Barrett, United States Minister to Siam, wrote in the N orth
39 R i c h a r d W a l l a c h , “ T h e W a r in t h e E a s t ,” Proceedings of the United

States Naval Institute, X X I ( 1 8 9 5 ) , 7 3 4 - 7 3 6 ; F r a n k M a r b l e , “ T h e B a t t le
o f Y a lu ,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute , X X I , 4 7 9 - 5 2 2 .
Reaction: N e w Problems 3*3
American R eview that the American exporter would always
find large markets in Japan. The Overland Monthly declared
flatly that the Japanese had “no decided manufacturing taste or
aptitude.” Japan indeed promised to be a perfect partner in the
Far East.40
Japan responded by sending one of its most distinguished dip
lomats, Shinichiro Kurino, as Minister to Washington. The State
Department meanwhile negotiated a new commercial treaty
which restored some of the rights extracted from Japan in 1866.
More important, Olney severely reprimanded Horace Allen and
John M. B. Sill, the American Minister to Korea, for opposing
Japanese attempts to control the Hermit Kingdom in 1895. In
view of the continental powers’ shabby treatment of Japan after
the war, Olney apparently believed that the Japanese would
better cooperate with American interests in Korea than would
the aggressive Russians.41
But the developing Japanese friendship was distinctly less im
portant and less dramatic than the historic realignment of Amer
ican and British interests. The settlement of the “Alabama” claims
in 1871 probably marked the beginning of the end for the
century-old enmity between the two nations. During the follow
ing three decades intermarriage and cultural exchange on the
Newport-Brighton level increased. Americans learned the stories
of Disraeli and Kipling and admired the tortured logic of Herbert
Spencer. The difficult problem of pelagic sealing in the Bering
Sea, which had severely strained Anglo-American relations in
1890-1892, had so receded in importance by 1897 that Sir Charles
Dilke could write that only one member of the House of Com
mons, “who is not myself,” even bothered to try to understand
the issue. By the mid-1890’s the importance of the divisive Irish
40 Public Opinion , April 2, 1896, 427-428, and June 11, 1896, 763-764.
41 There is a good sketch o f Kurino in the W ashington Post, Aug. 7,
1894. See also Kurino to Gresham, N ov. 18, 1894, Gresham MSS. Allen’s
reprimand is in O lney to Allen, N ov. 20, 1895, Area 10 file, Box 14, N A ,
R G 45.
question in American politics had also considerably dwindled.
The British thoroughly disliked the American high tariff policy,
and this dislike tainted their opinion of William McKinley in
1896. But a mounting fear of Bryan and free silver soon over
came their qualms on the tariff, and McKinley entered the W hite
House in 1897 with the best wishes of most of the British people.
The last gasp of the silver advocates in 1896 removed one of the
gravest threats to Anglo-American relations. The silverites had
long railed against Anglo-American cooperation, since, accord
ing to the 1896 Democratic platform, the gold standard had
“brought other nations into financial servitude to London.” Fi
nally, the growth of Canadian-American trade and the settlement
of several outstanding questions had lessened animosities between
the two great nations of North America. This change was a
prerequisite for a meaningful rapprochement between London
and Washington.42
These were important contributions, but the key reasons for
the rapprochement lay in three other areas. First, Americans be
gan to appreciate their historic economic ties with Great Britain.
W hen the Venezuelan crisis flared on December 18, 1895, the
N ew York W orld struck its blow for peace by detailing the
amount of American goods the British consumed and the $3,193,-
500,000 the English had invested in United States corporations.
In numerous popular articles during the mid-1890’s, Edward A t
kinson emphasized the economic links that stretched across the
Atlantic. British and American businessmen kept a wary eye on
each other’s moves in Latin America (the British especially feared
the National Association of Manufacturers), but after the settle
ment of the Venezuelan problem in 1896, this commercial ex
pansion did not threaten to precipitate armed conflict. In March,
42 T he Dilke quote is in the N e w York W orld , D ec. 12, 1897, 35:1; for
Canadian relations see Pauncefote to Salisbury, May 15, 1896, F.O.
5/2290; also Journal of Commerce, N ov. 10, 1897, 4:2, for a good anal
ysis of trade relations with Canada; and also despatches in F.O. 5/2423
in April, 1898; Charles S. Campbell, Jr., Anglo-American Understanding,
1898-1903 (Baltimore, 1957), 3, 4, 7.
Reaction: N e w Problems SIS
1896, one American writer could even advocate an Anglo-
American alliance (with the superior American economic power
serving as senior partner) for the development of the “swiftly
expanding commerce” to the south. A State Department official
could justifiably conclude in mid-1895, “For ‘business reasons’
alone, w e ought to cultivate friendly relations with Great Brit
ain.” 43
British recognition of the State Department’s claims in the
Venezuelan episode decreased American apprehension of Eng
land’s commercial expansion into Latin America; the results of
the Venezuelan crisis provided a second major reason for Anglo-
American friendship. W hen Salisbury informed the United States
on January 9 that he was “prepared to ‘trim’ his views to meet
the requests of the United States Government,” the Cleveland
administration had scored a signal victory in assuring a dominant
American position in hemispheric affairs. Ambassador Bayard,
pro-British as he was, could nevertheless brag that the Venezue
lan crisis had made the “doctrine of European abstention” from
colonialism in Latin America “a fixed fact.” Henry W hite, who
knew British society and politics as well as any American of his
day, concurred with Bayard’s assessment. The prime example of
this change of British attitude toward Latin-American affairs was
Whitehall’s evolving policies toward the Cuban revolution. In
August, 1895, the London Times threatened that Spain should
maintain control over Cuba: “For obvious political reasons, the
annexation of Cuba to the United States would be regarded with
little favour by British statesmen.” W ithin two years her new
43 N e w York W orld , D ec. 21, 1895, 3:3-4; Edward Atkinson to Rev.
Josiah Strong, May 19, 1896, Box 147, J. B. Moore MSS. T he British
analysis of the N .A .M . is proudly printed in an N.A .M . circular of May
12, 1897, “A n English V iew of the National Association of Manufac
turers,” which contains a long editorial from the London Financial N ew s ,
March 23, 1897; the alliance idea is in Sidney Sherwood, “An Alliance
with England the Basis of a Rational Foreign Policy,” Forum , XXI
(March, 1896), 89-99; the same idea is in Emory’s anonymous article
in the Baltimore Sun, May 27, 1895, sent to Bayard, May 28, 1895, Bayard
MSS.
%i6 The N e w Empire
evaluation of American power, her loathing of Spain’s reconcen
trado policies, and her own growing isolation in world affairs
would force Great Britain to assume a position directly contrary
to the tone of this editorial.44
This attitude toward American rights in the Western Hemi
sphere was also influenced by events in a third area, Asia. Here
Great Britain found her strong position undermined by aggres
sive Russian-German policies. England had an immense stake in
maintaining the open door, for she controlled 70 per cent of
China’s trade, and this in turn accounted for one-sixth of total
British commerce. British officials and publicists had often hinted
that they would appreciate open American support in the Far
East. Sometimes the United States responded. In 1894 China at
tempted to restrict imports of foreign machinery. England pro
tested strongly and then asked the State Department to support
the protest. Gresham assured Pauncefote that United States views
“were quite in accord” with those of the Foreign Office. Usually
the United States was reluctant to cooperate, however, since it
believed its traditional policies were working properly. The Sino-
Japanese War and its aftermath destroyed most of this illusion.
Then State Department concern about British incursions in
Hawaii hindered the development of a common policy in the
Pacific. By 1897 British reassurances had removed this obstacle.
Finally, when conditions worsened in Cuba, Americans were
forced to solve this more immediate problem before becoming
deeply involved elsewhere. But they did not exclude all interest
in the Far East. The growing activity of the State Department
44 Salisbury’s sentiment is in David D w ight W ells to Bayard, Jan. 9,

1896, Bayard MSS; Bayard’s comment is in letter to Moore, Feb. 25, 1896,
Box 5, Gen. Correspondence, J. B. Moore MSS; see also Allan Nevins,
Henry W hite . . . (N ew York and London, 1930), n o , and Bemis,
Latin American Policy of the United States, 122; on England aiding the
U.S. in Latin America, see Boston Herald, Jan. 2, 1898, 12:5; on British
attitude on Cuba in 1895, Bayard to Olney, Aug. 23, 1895, Great Britain,
Despatches, N A , R G 59; a good analysis of Britain’s 1897 attitude is in
W oodford to McKinley, Aug. 10, 1897, M cKinley MSS.
Reaction: N e w Problems 3 l7
and American business interests in Asia, and the development of
the Anglo-American friendship during the 1895-1897 period,
laid the basis for deep American involvement in the Orient after
18 9 8 «
Manifestations of this friendship appeared before 1898, how
ever. As a result of the Venezuelan crisis, Pauncefote and Olney
had negotiated a general arbitration treaty. Salisbury apparently
had little interest in the treaty, but he hoped that it would help
smooth over the differences which had arisen from the boundary
dispute. The overwhelming majority of vocal American opinion
strongly supported the pact. But the Senate weakened the treaty
with amendments and then killed it outright by voice vote in
the spring of 1897. The Senators expressed concern that the pact
would make the Monroe Doctrine and the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty liable to arbitration. T hey also feared that the Senate
might lose some of its precious control over foreign relations.
The virulently anti-British silver bloc found that mutilating the
treaty was a happy release for their postelection frustrations.4546
The defeat of the treaty was misleading as an indication of
Anglo-American relations. As Richard Olney wrote Joseph
Chamberlain in September, 1896, since England had recognized
United States rights in the Western Hemisphere, Americans
wanted “to stand side by side and shoulder to shoulder with Eng
land.” Alfred Thayer Mahan, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Theodore
Roosevelt, who had opposed the arbitration treaty, could never
theless agree with Olney’s statement. Mahan, constantly warn
ing his British friends against the German threat, pleaded for an
informal Anglo-American alliance to solve common problems
in the Far East and Latin America. The war in 1898 would, as
45 Pauncefote to Kimberley, July 3, 1894, F.O. 5/2234; Campbell,

Anglo-American Understanding, 12; Lionel Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-
American Friendship . . . (London, 1938), 5; Marder, Anatomy of Brit
ish Sea Power. 252.
46 The best analysis is N elson M. Blake, “T he Olney-Pauncefote Treaty
of 1897,” American Historical Review, L (January, 1945), 228-243;
O lney’s analysis is in a letter to H enry W hite, May 14, 1897, Olney MSS.
ß i8 The N e w Empire
Henry Adams bragged, bring “England into an American sys
tem.” But events in the international exchanges, Latin America,
and the Far East had momentously changed relations between the*
tw o nations from distrust to warm friendship in the several years
before that war.47
N e w Foes
Like the balancing pans of a scale, as the hopes for Anglo-
American relations rose, Russo-American relations began to sink.
It was not coincidental that a century of friendship between the
United States and Russia cooled at the moment the century of
distrust between Americans and British began to disappear. The
cordial relations which Washington enjoyed with St. Petersburg
had depended upon the absence of conflicting interests and a
common anti-British attitude.48
For more than half a century Russia had bowed to the demands
of American expansion. The Czar’s government had placated
John Quincy Adams in 1824 by abandoning its claim to the
Pacific coastline south of 540 40'. Forty-three years later Russia
sold Alaska, her last stronghold on the North American continent,
to the United States. Throughout the last half of the nineteenth
century, Russian foreign ministers gladly recognized American
predominance in Hawaii. Americans misinterpreted the visit of
the Russian navy to N ew York City in 1863 as a demonstration
of the Czar’s support for the North. The fleet was actually search
ing for a suitable refuge in case war broke out between England
and Russia.
During the fur seal dispute in the early 1890’s, the Russians,
who possessed material interests in the matter, had been con-
47 Garvin, Chamberlain, III, 300; Mahan to J. R. Thursfield, D ec. 1,
1897, Mahan MSS. See also Letters of Cecil Spring-Rice, I, 248-249.
48 Pauline Tompkins comments: “Thus the decade of the nineties was
an auspicious one. . . . T he conditions for friendship existing between
1800 and 1870 had vanished, and without them the tradition o f friendship
was meaningless” ( American-Russian Relations in the Far East [N e w
York, 1949], 14-15).
Reaction: N e w P roblem 3*9
spicuously friendly to the American arguments. As the 1890’s
dawned, there were few indications that this would be the tran
sition decade in relations between the two nations. Americans
raised $77,000,000 to help famine victims in Russia in 1891; the
Czar offered a large gold loan (which the United States refused)
to help the stricken American Treasury in 1893; and the Carnegie
steel works and the Cramp Shipbuilding Company were busy
filling large Russian orders.49
But these events were misleading. A growing American ab
horrence of Russian autocratic methods, especially its anti-Jewish
pogroms, had begun to undermine the century-old friendship. A
review in 1889 of W . T . Stead’s Truth about Russia had noted
that “except in time of war, there never was, perhaps, a greater
interest taken in the Russian Empire”; then the reviewer de
scribed Russia as “that distant and darkly mysterious hot-bed at
once of despotic inhumanity, indescribable horrors, Nihilism, and
disturbance to the peace of Europe.” In more moderate terms,
Andrew Dickson W hite, United States Minister to Russia in the
early 1890’s and a respected and widely read author, could agree.
Believing that “Russia’s strong point is not adherence to her treaty
promises,” W hite severely criticized her statesmen and concluded,
“The atmosphere of Russian autocracy is fatal to greatness in any
form.” George Kennan’s Siberia and the Exile System became the
most popular presentation of this viewpoint. W ith strong sup
port from Mark Twain, James Russell Lowell, and Julia Ward
H ow e, Kennan traveled throughout the United States to publi
cize his book and to tell of the horrors of Russian oppression.
The Philadelphia Ledger responded by proclaiming that “civi
lized nations” could have nothing to do with such “cannibals.”
But the anti-Czarist forces in Russia found little American sym
pathy either. This opposition was becoming too radical for
49 Russian assurances on Hawaii are found in Memorandum on D iplo

matic Day, Feb. 2, 1893, Harrison MSS; gold loan in Gresham to W hite,
M ay 3, 1893, Cleveland MSS; business relations in Carnegie to Blaine,
M ay 9, 1891, and Schwab to Carnegie, March 7, 1898, Carnegie MSS.
%20 The N e w Empire
middle-class taste in the United States. Many anti-Russian spokes
men in the 1890’s, including Kennan, would fight for the Keren-*
sky government of 1917, but bitterly oppose the Bolsheviks.50
“But the circumstance that presented the greatest danger,”
Walter Quintin Gresham told John Bassett Moore in 1894, “was
the Jewish question.” Russia had begun an anti-Jewish cam
paign in the 1870’s; by the 1890’s American Jews who were in
Russia for family visits or business were also being persecuted.
Harrison and Blaine bent to the political uproar in the United
States and sent strong protests to St. Petersburg. Harold Frederic,
a N ew York Times reporter, added to the bitterness with a vivid
description of the pogroms in his N e w Exodus, published in
1892. These feelings reached a climax in 1892-1893 when the
Cleveland administration attempted to pass a new Russian extra
dition treaty through the Senate. Such influential journals as the
N ew York Times, N ew York W orld, Louisville Courier-Journal,
Philadelphia Record, Chicago Herald, and Washington Star con
demned the treaty and freely used the terms “despotic” and
“despotism” in discussing the Czar’s regime.51
These bitter feelings promised trouble if American and Russian
claims ever conflicted in any area of the international arena. And
in the mid-1890’s the conflict appeared to be taking shape in the
Far East. Determined to exert “control over the entire movement
of international commerce in Pacific waters,” as Count W itte,
50 Andrew Dickson W hite, Autobiography . . . (N e w York, 1905),

II, 27, 51. Max M. Laserson notes that W hite’s acquaintances were largely
limited to the pro-American groups in Russia; see The American Impact
on Russia—Diplomatic and Ideological, 1784-1917 (N e w York, 1950),
298-299, 302-303; there is a good discussion of Kennan, 304-319. T he
Stead review is in Public Opinion, March 2, 1889, 475; see also Feb. 22,
1890, 468.
61 T he Gresham statement is in Diary, May, 1894, J. B. Moore MSS;
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 188. For the political impor
tance see J. S. Clarkson, chairman of the Republican National Committee
to Halford, Feb. 23, 1892, Harrison MSS. See also Public Opinion, June
*7» *893, 263-264; Feb. 11, 1893, 441; March 25, 1893, 593; April 29, 1893,
93- 94; July 8, 1893, 330-331.
the Russian Finance Minister, declared in 1892, the Russians had

surrendered their claims in North America in the middle of the
nineteenth century in order to concentrate on affairs in the Far
East. T hey had taken their major step in 1895 by forcing Japan
to leave the Liaotung Peninsula and then establishing new levers
of power in Korea, China, and especially Manchuria. W ith
staunch support from the German Emperor, the Czar moved
steadily toward his goal of replacing British dominance in the
Far East with Russian power.52
But as the State Department recognized, a threat to the British
position was also a threat to American interests. Only Great
Britain, and possibly Japan, shared the American enthusiasm for
the open door. This common Anglo-American stake in the area,
combined with the implicit new agreement on Latin America,
removed at a stroke the traditional grounds of Russian-American
friendship. N o w Russian and American interests threatened to
conflict, and unlike 1824 or 1867 neither side entertained thoughts
of retreating. As for the once-shared anti-British feelings, the
Russians held on grimly— and alone.
When American financiers failed to win the Chinese indemnity
loan in 1895, an<^ when the American China Development Com
pany lost a prize railroad concession in 1897, United States offi
cials were quick to place the blame on the Russian-Chinese Bank.
This bank, controlled by Russian and French capital, was fully
backed, in fact manipulated, by the Czar’s government. Denby
abhorred such governmental intervention, especially since he
could not convince the American government to use such meth
ods. A similar rivalry developed in Korea. Here Horace Allen
had worked with the Russians in opposing Japanese influence in
1895 and 1896. By early 1897, however, Allen was convinced
that Russia was attempting to drive out the Americans and con-
62 B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, 1892-1906 . . . , translated by

Susan W ilbur Jones (Leningrad, 1928), 2, 50-61; Breckinridge to
Gresham, Feb. 18, 1894, Russia, Despatches, N A , RG 59; Zabriskie,
American-Russian Relations, 27-29, 30-31.
trol the Hermit Kingdom. Allen fought the Russians with all
the considerable intrigue and power at his command. By N o
vember he thought “the jig is up,” and when the Russians sud
denly and wonderfully left Korea in April, 1898, Allen warned
that they would be back soon and “then come for good and all.”
H e believed that only a Japanese-British alliance or “an alliance
between the U.S. and England” could preserve American in
terests.53
If Russia consolidated her power in the Far East, and her power
would be immense after the completion of her Trans-Siberian
Railroad, she could close the open door at will. Faced with this
dilemma, Americans differed on the proper solution. For a short
time Denby apparently wanted to cooperate with the Russians,
confident that the Russian-Chinese banking group would allow
Americans to help in the division of the Chinese melon. H e was
partially disabused of this hope when his fellow countrymen lost
the indemnity and the railroad concessions. Ethan A. Hitchcock,
McKinley’s Ambassador to the Czar’s government, nursed sim
ilar hopes of working with the Russians; he especially wanted
American firms to fulfill the Trans-Siberian’s demand for steel
rails.54
Others were not so sanguine. An American naval official pub
lished an essay which predicted a gigantic war between the Slavs
and the Aryan race. Theodore Roosevelt confided to a close
friend that “indeed Russia is a problem very appalling.” Henry
Adams worried: “Russia is omnipotence. . . . I fear Russia
much! ” John R. Proctor, an official in the Cleveland administra
tion and a close friend of Roosevelt’s, wrote in the Forum in Sep
tember, 1897, that “the cotton-growers of the South, the wheat-
growers of the W est, the meat-producers on our plains, and
63 Zabriskie, American-Russian Relations, 34-37; John Foster to W ilson,

Aug. 16,1895, James Harrison W ilson papers, Library of Congress, W ash
ington, D.C.; Denby to Olney, July 8, 1895, Olney MSS; Harrington,
God, Mammon, and the Japanese, 296-301.
54 Zabriskie, American-Russian Relations, 34, 41-42.
Reaction: N e w "Problems 323
manufacturers and wage-earners all over our land” must realize

“that exclusion from Asian markets will be disastrous to their
best interests,” and “the expansion of Russia in Asia . . . will
extend the Russian system of exclusion.” Another article in the
same issue of that magazine predicted that perhaps a “sudden
revolution” would overthrow the Czar; if this failed to occur,
“great evil” would engulf the world.55
Clifton R. Breckinridge, Cleveland’s Minister to Russia, sum
marized the change in Russian-American relations in November,
1896. N oting that Russians had lost almost all interest in American
friendship, he blamed this loss on inadequate trade relations and
especially on the new Anglo-American alliance. H e promised
to maintain polite relations during his remaining months in St.
Petersburg, but he would “predicate nothing more upon tra
ditional friendship or any other matters of that kind.” 56
German-American relations paralleled the course of Russian-
American affairs. The United States had warmly supported the
German cause in the Franco-Prussian W ar of 1870, but by the
1890’s this support had turned to disdain. The clash of the new
empire with German ambitions in Samoa had set off a chain re
action of bad feelings. Justifiably, Americans began to fear Ger
man penetration into Latin America in the 1890’s. W hen in 1897
Germany gave Haiti eight hours to pay an indemnity for the
arrest of a German citizen, the State Department did nothing, but
the Kaiser’s ultimatum did little to increase his popularity in the
United States. The N ew York W orld attacked the action as “a
first step toward aggression and the acquisition of territory on
65 R. P. Hobson, “A Summary of the Situation and Outlook in Europe,”
Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, XXI (1895), 350-351*
Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, I, 555; Letters of Henry Adams, II, 70;
John R. Proctor, “Hawaii and the Changing Front of the W orld,” Forum,
X X IV (September, 1897), 34-45; Thomas Davidson, “T he Supremacy
o f Russia,” Forum, X X IV , 67-68; Thomas R. Jernigan, U.S. Consul
General to China, “Commercial Trend o f China,” North American
Review, CLXV (July, 1897), 63-69.
66 Breckinridge to Olney, N o v . 11, 1896, Cleveland MSS; quoted in
part in Zabriskie, American-Russian Relations, 37.
this side of the ocean.” German discriminations against American
meat products and fruit were returned with interest by the pas
sage of the Dingley tariff of 1897, which discriminated against
German sugar producers.57
The two greatest points of friction were American attacks on
German militarism and “aristocratic classes,” and the growing
conflicts in the Far East and Latin America. Articles in the Forum
and the N orth American R eview blistered the German Emperor
for his alleged attempt to restore the H oly Roman Empire in
order “to govern his subjects as absolute sovereign—their bodies
through the army, their souls through the Church.” Murat Hal
stead, a leading Republican and an adviser to both Harrison and
McKinley, predicted a war pitting the democratic powers (Eng
land and the United States) against the despotic nations (Ger
many and Russia). Halstead also warned his fellow countrymen
against German ambitions in Latin America. The Kaiser, many
Americans felt, apparently had not learned the lesson of the
Venezuelan incident and so had to be closely watched. Surveying
affairs in the Far East, these Americans tended to add “and Ger
many” where they read “Russia.” The two powers, in American
eyes, were working together in order to abolish the open door
and weaken the British. German actions in Samoa, her hesitancy
over recognizing American ascendancy in Hawaii, and her anti-
British policy elsewhere in the world strongly substantiated these
fears.58
67 Clara Eve Schieber, The Transformation of American Sentiment

toward Germany, 1870-1914 (Boston, 1923), 86-88. German complaints
about American commercial aggressiveness in Samoa are in Public Opin
ion, Oct. 8, 1896, 461; N e w York W orld , N ov. 30, 1897, 6:2. See also
Journal of Commerce, Jan. 26, 1898, 16:1; and Vagts, Deutschland und
die Vereinigten Staaten, I, 618-621, 780-797.
58 W illiam L. Langer, The-Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 (N e w
York and London, 1935), 447; Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten
Staaten, I, 608-617, 964-968; Mahan to J. R. Thursfield, Jan. 25, 1898,
Mahan MSS; Thomas Davidson, “T he Imperialization o f Germany,”
Forum, XXIII (April, 1897), 246-256; Poultney Bigelow, “T h e German
Press and the United States,” North American Review, CLXIV (January,
Arriving as American Ambassador to Germany in 1897, An
drew Dickson W hite could remark that the “changes in public
sentiment since my former stay as minister, eighteen years before,
were great indeed.” The press, the intellectuals, the agrarians had
become strongly anti-American. The intellectuals, W hite re
called in 1904, spoke so strongly that “some of their expressions
seemed to point to eventual war.” W hite had noted a similar
break in the traditional friendly relations between America and
Russia in i 894.59
The United States was realigning its traditional friends and
foes in the course of its expansion into Latin America and Asia.
Some of this reordering of friendships had been caused by matters
extraneous to the new empire, such as the Jewish pogroms and
the disdain for Russian and German autocracy. But the dynamics
of the new empire in Latin America, Samoa, and especially in the
Far East played a crucial role in this realignment, a realignment
that had begun to be evident in the 1890’s and became increas
ingly important in the early years of the twentieth century.*69
1897), 12-23; Murat Halstead, “American Annexation and Armament,”

Forum, X X IV (September, 1897), 56-66.
69 W hite, Autobiography, II, 144-148, 168-170. W hite notes that
officially Germany treated the United States fairly during the war with
Spain.
VIII
Reaction: Approach to W ar
IN the eight years between Benjamin Harrison’s ascendancy to

power in 1888 and the success of the next Republican presidential
nominee in 1896, the United States transformed its foreign re
lations. The speed and intensity with which this transformation
reached its climax in the 1890’s is, from the vantage point of sixty
years, quite amazing. Gently urged by Harrison, Blaine, and the
McKinley tariff and then frightened by the economic and social
maladjustments of the 1893-1897 depression, many of the most
powerful American industries began to believe that their survival
depended upon the markets of the world. Walter Quintín
Gresham, Richard Olney, and Grover Cleveland had used the na
tion’s foreign policy to aid the aspirations of the business com
munity. Renewed commercial and investment interests in the Far
East, plus the flouting of open-door principles by the continental
European powers, forced the United States to change long-stand
ing Asiatic policies, increase State Department support of these in
terests, and reorder the list of the nation’s traditional friends and
enemies. Little wonder that Josiah Strong and Henry and Brooks
Adams looked about them and concluded that history was step
ping up its pace to the uppermost tempo of human endurance.
These far-reaching changes had only been initiated when W il-
$26
Reaction: Approach to W ar 327
liam McKinley entered office in March, 1897. “Business con
ditions,” the new Chief Executive reported in his Inaugural
Address, “are not the most promising.” These conditions were
not improved by a bloody Cuban revolution which consumed
investments and trade and touched the tender hearts of American
politicians. McKinley assumed power with the promise of re
storing prosperity and the hope of ending the Cuban struggle.
The President would find that the two issues were not discon
nected. In the realm of foreign affairs, he would also have to deal
with new events which intensified the previous threats to the
open door.
Fortunately, however, the administration would not fight these
battles alone. An American business community that had learned
to think in world-wide terms during the 1890’s would also devote
its attention to restoring good times, stifling the Cuban disturb
ance, and maintaining the open door. These three problems could
not be separated, although the administration could, and did,
assign priorities to them. McKinley and the business community
would work in tandem. The President would emphasize this
point many times. Business, reorganizing itself after a half century
of industrial revolution and a quarter century of depression,
would provide the dynamic. A friendly government would pro
vide the leadership. And inside that government the center of
power would be found at the W hite House.
M cKinley
William McKinley came into the W hite House equipped with
the two qualities all presidents need for political survival: an un
derstanding of the social and economic realities of his time and the
political talents needed to cope with these realities. His political
abilities were particularly noticeable. Always adequate in the
political arena, he could at times be superb. Anyone who could
survive the tough school of Ohio politics in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century was indeed an uncommon political ani
mal. As a congressman in the 1880’s, McKinley worked closely
ß28 The N ev) Empire
with the John Sherman faction, but he shrewdly broke away long
enough in 1884 to back Blaine in the Republican Convention.
By 1889 the Sherman forces had been splintered by Harrison’s
nomination the year before; “Fire Alarm Joe” Foraker, the leader
of the other Republican faction in Ohio, had been well smeared
in the gubernatorial campaign; and McKinley, moving nimbly
from one to the other, walked unscathed out of the wreckage of
both factions. He had also found a new friend, Marcus Hanna,
Cleveland industrialist and political operator extraordinary.
The elections of 1890 appeared to mark the end of the Mc
Kinley luck. W ith his district gerrymandered by a Democratic
legislature for the third time in his career, McKinley suffered
defeat by the thin margin of 300 votes. The Democrats swore
that he should have lost by 3,000 votes. But this told the lesser
part of the story, for Ohio Republicans and independents pro
claimed the defeated congressman as a martyr sacrificed to the
foul gods of the Democracy and promptly elected McKinley as
Governor of Ohio in 1891. Frank Carpenter, the acute observer
of the Washington scene, could conclude a detailed description
of the Ohioan’s nose by remarking, “It is a watchful nose, and
it is a nose that watches out for McKinley.” And Henry Adams,
who said few nice things about anybody who held power after
1828, nevertheless believed McKinley’s “judgment of men was
finer than common in Presidents,” and even described him as a
“marvellous manager of men.” McKinley also, Adams observed,
chose several manipulators to help him (such as John H ay).
McKinley, however, was always equal to manipulating the
manipulators.1
Major McKinley (a rank received for bravery in the Civil
W ar) had early accepted Rutherford B. Hayes’s advice that a
thorough knowledge of the tariff was the key to a successful po
litical career. In the 1880’s he became a leading spokesman on
this issue, showing unshakable devotion to high tariff principles.
1 Morgan, “Congressional Career of M cKinley,” ch. iii, 80-81, 189-
192; A d am s, Education, 373-374.
Reaction: Approach to W ar 32$
The McKinley tariff was the culmination of his work. But he
had just begun to grasp the prodigious meaning of the industrial
revolution.
The post-1893 depression gave him a thorough education on
the nature of the American economy and society. H e had always
been a close friend of the working man. Samuel Gompers fondly
recalled that he and the Major had been friends “for many years”
before 1897. As Governor, McKinley had begun to comprehend
some of the same labor-management problems which troubled
Walter Quintin Gresham. The Ohioan responded by encourag
ing the formation of unions and whipping through the state legis
lature an industrial arbitration bill. This measure proved some
what effective in the strike-ridden years of 1894-1895. But when
the threat of violent strikes began to spread across the state, Mc
Kinley did not hesitate to order out in force the state militia,
believing, as he remarked later, that when a brigade met a division
there would be no battle. His prompt action avoided the blood
shed and the bitter feelings which wracked Illinois and Pennsyl
vania that year. As was usual with most of his policies, his action
did not tarnish his reputation with either labor or management.2
W hen he entered the W hite House in 1897, the depression
surged on “entailing idleness upon willing labor and loss to use
ful enterprises,” as the new President phrased the problem in an
early speech. McKinley had no intention of allowing the business
cycle to take its course. One of the more striking themes which
emerged from his post-1896 speeches was his emphasis on the
necessity for an active national government to cooperate in
friendly fashion with the businessman. McKinley’s first Inaugural
Address outlined this position. If the nation could not promptly
restore “the prosperity of former years,” McKinley declared,
“we can resolutely turn our faces in that direction and aid its
return by friendly legislation. However troublesome the situa
tion may appear, Congress will not, I am sure, be found lacking
2 M argaret L eech, In the Days of McKinley (N ew Y ork, 1959), 53-55;
G om pers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, I, 522-5*3.
in disposition or ability to relieve it as far as legislation can do so.”
In fact, the new President proclaimed, “the restoration of con
fidence and the revival of business . . . depend more largely
upon the prompt, energetic, and intelligent action of Congress
than upon any other single agency affecting the situation.” On
several later occasions, McKinley severely deprecated the idea
that Congress could best serve the people by packing as rapidly
as possible and leaving Washington. H e stressed these beliefs in
his several appearances before the National Association of Manu
facturers, especially in his speech to the N .A .M . convention in
January, 1898.a
Perhaps the controlling words of the passage quoted above
from the Inaugural were “friendly legislation.” McKinley con
demned bad corporations, those “organized in trusts or otherwise,
to control arbitrarily the condition of trade among our citizens.”
But very few Republicans— or Democrats—seriously contem
plated a rigid enforcement of the antitrust legislation in the 1890’s.
The President wanted to stimulate, not regulate. Production had
to climb, financial stability had to be ensured, and markets had to
be found. Government could become a partner with business in
achieving these objectives.
Government could help considerably, for example, by settling
the question of the monetary standard. The Republicans had won
on a strong gold platform in 1896, but their presidential nominee
did not belong in the extreme monometallist camp. Throughout
his congressional career McKinley had advocated bimetallism.
Enticed by the vision of an enlarged foreign trade with Latin-
American and Asian nations on the silver standard, he had helped
Blaine secure a silver trade dollar at the 1889 Inter-American
Conference and had promised in 1896 to send a bimetallist dele
gation to Europe if he was elected. True to his word, he sent a
commission, but it promptly ran into a stone wall of British and
French opposition. Fortunately, a rising export trade and dis-
8 W illiam M cK inley, Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley ,
from March t, 1897, to May 30, 1900 (N e w Y ork, 1900), 23, 62. 8.
Reaction: Approach to W ar
coveries of gold in Alaska had eased the monetary situation. Mc
Kinley, however, in the hope of allaying political discontent and
finding foreign markets for American products, had considered
the alternative.4*6
Conditions in the 1890’s changed his mind about the tariff as
well as the monetary standard. “M y fellow-citizens,” McKinley
told a joint meeting of the Philadelphia Museums and the Manu
facturers’ Club in June, 1897, “there is no use in making a product
if you cannot find somebody to take it. The maker must find a
taker. You will not employ labor to make a product unless you
can find a buyer for that product after you have made it.” The
President thought he had found the key to the doors of foreign
markets in the formula of reciprocity. As the handmaiden to pro
tection, reciprocity did not disturb McKinley’s devotion to his
traditional high tariff views. But his stress on the law of supply
and demand in the 1896 campaign, and his belief that the work
ings of reciprocity would ferret out crucial foreign demand
needed to balance the two points of this law, indicated that a
significant change of emphasis had occurred in his thinking dur
ing the 1890’s. McKinley had worked for Blaine’s ideas in 1890,
but the Ohioan became a fervent disciple of reciprocity only
after the economic crisis of 1893.®
A t the first N.A.M . convention in 1895, McKinley outlined
the perfect trade program: “our own markets for our manufac
tures and agricultural products” and “a reciprocity which will
give us foreign markets for our surplus products.” In his Inaugu
ral, the new President boasted of the aid given American foreign
trade by the 1890 provision and declared, “The end in view al
ways [should] be the opening up of new markets for the products
of our country.” After three months in office he could remark
4 Morgan, “Congressional Career o f M cKinley,” 166; Chandler to W il

liam R. D ay, Oct. 6, 1897, Aldrich MSS; H ay to M cKinley, Oct. 11, 1897,
M cKinley MSS; Gage to W infield N . Burdick, Aug. 20, 1897, Letter-
book, Lyman Gage papers, Library o f Congress, W ashington, D.C.
6 M cKinley, Speeches, 1897-1900, 28; Leech, Days of M cKinley, 142.
The N e w Empire
that “no worthier cause can engage our energies at this hour”
than the enlargement of foreign markets; these markets allow
“better fields for employment, and easier conditions for the
masses.” Seven months after entering the W hite House, Mc
Kinley told the Commercial Club of Cincinnati: “N o subject
can better engage our attention than the promotion of trade and
commerce at home and abroad. Domestic conditions are sure to
be improved by larger exchanges with the nations of the world.”
He noted hopefully, “W e are already reaching out with good
results.” Nearly a year after assuming the presidential powers,
McKinley warned the N.A.M . that the depression had not yet
fully lifted because “of their present insufficient facilities for
reaching desirable markets.” These remarks substantiate Robert
LaFollette’s recollection that McKinley told him in 1897 that he
(McKinley) hoped to crown his presidency with American con
trol of the markets of the world.6
The President’s abilities were fully appreciated by close asso
ciates and observers of the passing scene. John H ay visited Mc
Kinley during the 1896 campaign after “dreading” the visit for
a month, since “it would be like talking in a boiler factory.” But
McKinley had taken Hay into a quiet upstairs room and “calmly
and serenely” discussed political matters for two hours while the
howling mob trampled the lawn below. Hay, a full-fledged Mc
Kinley admirer now, told Henry Adams of his marvelous ex
perience at Canton and ended, “And there are idiots who think
Mark Hanna will run him.” After the election, Mayo Hazeltine
wrote in the N orth American R eview that political observers
agreed that “one thing . . . is certain and obvious,” namely,
that McKinley would control foreign affairs with an iron hand.
Theodore Roosevelt, after discussing foreign and naval policies
with the President, remarked with wonderment, “He shows an
astonishing grasp of the situation.” Roosevelt would not always6
6 Steigerwalt, “N .A .M .,” 32; M cKinley to Curtis, D ec. 2, 1895, Letter-

books, M cKinley MSS; Congressional Record , 55th Cong., ist Sess., 3;
M cKinley, Speeches, 1897-1900, 54; Leech, Days of M cKinley, 62, 142.
admire McKinley, but it should be noted that Roosevelt’s later
pique was chiefly due to McKinley’s control over a situation
which Roosevelt found unendurable—not because the President
had lost control. Senator Shelby Cullom’s assessment of McKinley
agrees with these observations and has particular relevance to an
interpretation of the causes of the Spanish-American War. “W e
have never had a President,” the Illinois Senator recalled, “who
had more influence with Congress than Mr. McKinley.” In fact,
Cullom continued, “I have never heard of even the slightest fric
tion between Mr. McKinley and the party leaders in Senate and
House.” 7
McKinley’s contemporaries recognized his talent as a politician.
His analysis of the depression problems of the mid-1890’s may
not have satisfied an erudite classical economist, but the Presi
dent’s views put him in the mainstream of American economic
expansion. These abilities were the tools he used in chipping away
the three obstacles to American economic prosperity—the Cuban
revolution, the threatening situation in the Far East, and the lack
of adequate demand for the glut of American goods.
Cuba, 189J to March 17, 1898

Much evidence supported the views of those pundits who fore
cast that the new administration would employ a more aggressive
policy toward Cuba than had the Cleveland cabinet. Republicans
had led the Cuba Libre cries in Congress since 1895; and the par
ty ’s 1896 foreign policy plank, although denying intentions of
military intervention, had asked that the United States “actively
use its influence and good offices” in obtaining independence for
the Cubans. W ithout Spanish assent any such action, of course,
would have ended in war with Spain. The Democratic plank,
7 H ay to H enry Adams, Oct. 20, 1896, John H ay papers, Library o f
Congress, Washington, D.C.; Mayo W . Hazeltine, “T he Foreign Policy
o f the N e w Administration,” N orth American Review , CLXIV (April,
1897), 479-486; Roosevelt to Long, June 18, 1897, Letterbooks, Roosevelt
MSS; Shelby M. Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service . . . (Chicago,
1911), 275-276.
334 N e w Empire
on the other hand, merely extended “sympathy” to the Cubans.
The election was not waged on this issue and the results of the
campaign were certainly not a mandate for a more vigorous
foreign policy, but the difference between the two planks signaled
a basic difference in attitude.89
There were other indications that McKinley would pursue a
militant foreign policy. Each new day of the warfare devastated
more American investments and trade. These investments had
mushroomed to more than $33,000,000 since the conclusion of
the Ten Years’ War in 1878. United States trade had soared to
new heights after the 1890 tariff had opened Cuban markets to
American flour and industrial goods and had made mainland con
sumers dependent upon the Cuban sugar grower. These economic
links, along with the inhumanities of the reconcentrado policies,
added to the rising cry that the revolution had to end quickly.
If Spain could not terminate the warfare, the United States would
have to intervene.®
McKinley’s Secretary of State had taken precisely this view
as a member of the Senate. Once in the State Department, how
ever, John Sherman began to waver. Rapidly becoming senile,
his forgetfulness, indecisiveness, and growing distrust of associ
ates were, as John Foster noted, “pitiable in the extreme.” One of
McKinley’s close friends from Ohio, Judge William R. Day,
became Assistant Secretary of State and assumed the most im
portant responsibilities of the department. D ay did not share
Sherman’s earlier tendencies toward a belligerent Cuban policy.10
D ay’s moderate opinions, however, did not typify the first
months of the administration’s actions. After proclaiming in his
Inaugural that “peace is preferable to war in almost every con-
8 Proceedings of the Republican Convention (1896), 84; Pratt, Expan

sionists of 1898, 212. M cKinley fully backed Cleveland’s stand on the
Venezuelan controversy; see N e w York W orld, D ec. 18, 1895, 2:1.
9 For the causes of the increased American investments in Cuba after
1878, see page 38, above.
10 Foster to Porter, Aug. 11, 1897, and Sherman to M cKinley, Feb. 15,
1897, M cKinley MSS.
Reaction: Approach_to War 335
tingency,” M cKinley adopted a policy toward Spain which
ended in a virtual ultimatum in early autumn, 1897. The adminis
tration thus moved to the edge of conflict half a year before ac
tually declaring war on Spain. O nly the promise of Spanish
reforms in October and November brought M cKinley back from
the precipice. It should be especially noted that neither the yellow
journals nor a towering wave of public opinion, so often viewed
as the sole causes of the ultimate war, significantly influenced the
administration’s policies during these months. As defined by the
State Department in 1897, America’s interest in the revolution
was derived from more than humanitarian sentiment. The de
velopment of, and the reasons for, this policy deserve emphasis.
In the late spring of 1897, Canovas resigned as Spanish Prime
Minister. The State Department hoped that a more liberal minis
try would assume power, but these hopes were dashed in June
when the Queen renamed Canovas after expressing, as Hannis
Taylor noted in a dispatch from Madrid, “unqualified approval
o f present Cuban policy.” Shortly afterward Spain answered
Sherman’s protest of the reconcentrado policy by denying that
brutal methods were used; the reply then awkwardly compared
Spain’s campaign in Cuba with General W . T . Sherman’s march
to the sea during the American G vil W ar. T he comparison did
not exactly appease the Secretary of State, who happened to be
the brother of the famous general.11
In the face of this Spanish intransigence, Sherman and Mc
K inley approved the basic instructions of July 16, which were
to be sent to Stewart L. W oodford, the new Minister to Spain.
A fter stating bluntly that Spain could never again subdue the
island, the State Department demanded that somehow the revo
lution must be immediately halted. The serious danger posed to
American material interests (interests which were “not merely
theoretical or sentimental”) necessitated the immediate cessation
11 Taylor to Sherman, June 3 and 7, 1897, Spain, Despatches, “M emo

randum” o f D ay’s, June 8, 1897, and de Lome to Sherman, Aug. 26, 1897,
N otes from Spain, N A , R G 59.
2%6 The New Empire
of warfare. These material interests were more than direct in
vestments in, and trade with, Cuba. The “chronic condition of
trouble and violent derangement” on the island, the State D e
partment warned, “keeps up a continuous irritation within our
borders, injuriously effects the normal functions of business, and
tends to delay the condition of prosperity to which this country
is entitled.” Spain would have to end the disturbance immediately,
perhaps through the good offices of the United States, or the
President would have to take a “course of action which the time
and the transcendent emergency may demand.” The note may
be summarized, then, as, first, a notice to Spain that the State D e
partment had no confidence that Spanish officials could regain
control of the island; second, a definition of American involve
ment in the conflict on the grounds of economic interests and
the threat the struggle posed to the social, economic, and political
tranquillity of the United States; and third, a notice to Spain that
she must accept American good offices, immediately terminate
the revolution by other means, or face the intervention of the
United States.12
As W oodford traveled to Madrid with this note, relations
further deteriorated. Spain again refused to discuss the recon
centrado orders. The State Department failed in efforts to release
American citizens held in Cuban jails. Spanish authorities on the
island were slow in protecting American property from rebel
depredations. After surveying the situation, the Department ad
vised Tasker H . Bliss, W oodford’s military attaché, not to take
his family to Spain because of the possibility of war. The Presi
dent, about to replace the energetic Fitzhugh Lee with a more
pacific Consul General, changed his mind. In spite of a warning
from former President Cleveland that Lee’s presence in the Cuban
capital was a threat to any moderate approach, M cKinley re
tained the Virginian in Havana. It remains an interesting enigma
w hy the President, who sincerely wanted to avoid a conflict, re
tained such a militant-minded representative (and lifelong Dem-
12 Sherman to W oodford, July 16,1897, Spain, Instructions, N A , R G 59.
ocrat) in one of the most sensitive overseas posts. McKinley prob
ably did so in 1897 because he wanted an experienced man at the
key Cuban position in the event that war broke out.13
Then, on August 8, the situation dramatically changed. W ood
ford sent a hurried cable that Canovas had been assassinated by an
anarchist. The State Department, however, did not immediately
discern the full significance of the event. An interim conserva
tive ministry assumed the reins. The Liberal party, which had
urged far-reaching Cuban reforms in June, remained out of the
policy-making circles. Adee, discounting the change, wrote a
long memorandum which extensively discussed the possibility
of intervention. Day called in John Bassett Moore on September
11 to discuss the legal niceties of whether Congress or the Execu
tive had the power of intervening in Cuba, “should such inter
vention be undertaken, on the ground of protecting American
property in the island.” Moore recorded in his diary that “it
occurred to me that the President probably was thinking” of this
alternative.14
But in the first week of October, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta led
a Liberal party cabinet into power. In June, Sagasta had promised
far-reaching reforms in Cuba should his party assume leader
ship. W ithin tw o months after becoming Premier he fulfilled
his promises. By March, 1898, the M cKinley administration
would be bitterly disappointed because of the moderate nature
of these reforms. In view of the complex problems confronting
Sagasta in late 1897, however, it is amazing that he satisfied
American demands as fully as he did.
T w o factors worked in Sagasta’s favor. The Conservative party
had been disrupted by Cánovas’ murder and so presented less op
position than it might have. Also, wealthy Spaniards who held
property in Cuba had concluded that their holdings could be
13 Offner, “M cKinley and Origins of Spanish-American W ar,” 96-97,
149-151; Lee to Lamont, Feb. 3, 1897, Lamont MSS; N ew York W orld,
N ov. 6, 1897, 1:8.
14 Adee to Sherman, Aug. 19, 1897, M cKinley MSS; Diary-Memoranda,
1897, Moore MSS.
33# The N e w Empire
preserved only if the United States aided Spain in pacifying the
island. But the obstacles to the success of Sagasta’s program were
immense. T he rebels displayed little inclination to compromise
after tw o years of hard fighting, especially when the McKinley
administration evinced some interest in the objectives for which
they were fighting. Factions of Sagasta’s own party disagreed on
the extensiveness of his reforms, and he was forced to name a
weak cabinet for the sake of political expediency. N or could
the new Prime Minister look for help from friendly European
powers. Sagasta, apparently more frightened by the tone of the
American requests than the Duke of Tetuán had been, attempted
to outflank the Americans by asking the powers to form a coali
tion in support of Spain. W eakened by lack of preparation in
Madrid and indecision in the European capitals, especially Lon
don, the Spanish venture was not fruitful. State Department
emissaries on the continent, constantly keeping their fingers on
the pulses of the European foreign offices during the autumn,
returned reassuring reports that the major powers had concluded
they would do nothing unless the United States approved or in
vited outside aid. Rumors even began to spread in Madrid that
the United States and Great Britain were closely cooperating on
the Cuban problem. The British Ambassador angrily reported to
London that W oodford was encouraging this falsehood at every
opportunity.15
T he American Minister in Madrid had “serious apprehension,”
as he reported to M cKinley, “that m y efforts w ill fail” in main
taining peace. Hannis Taylor did not encourage W oodford by
predicting that “the outside limit” of the new Minister’s stay in
Spain would be one hundred days. W oodford was doubtlessly
burdened by these feelings when he faced the Duke of Tetuán,
15 W olff to Salisbury, A ug, 12 and 18,1897, N o v . 12,1897, F.O. 72/2035;
N e w York W orld, Oct. 5, 1897, 7:1; Oct. 23, 1897, 7:3; W oodford to
Sherman, Aug. 30, 1897 (from Paris), Spain, Despatches, and Porter to
Sherman, July 13, 1897, France, Despatches, N A , R G 59; Dugdale, Ger
man Documents , II, 496; W olff to Salisbury, Jan. 12, 1897, From Spain,
1897, Salisbury MSS; Ferrara, Last Spanish W ar, 82.
Reaction: Approach to W ar 3^
Foreign Minister of the interim Conservative Government, in
their first formal meeting on September 18. W oodford first read
most of Sherman’s July instructions. In the conversation which
follow ed he emphasized that the American people could no longer
tolerate the continuance of the revolution. “I therefore suggested,
in bringing our interview to an end, but without pointing out any
formula, that the Spanish Government should give to me before
the first of Novem ber next such assurance as would satisfy the
United States that early and certain peace can be promptly se
cured”; otherwise the United States would take its own steps to
restore “the general tranquility.” T w o weeks later W oodford
rather proudly wired the State Department that “that interview
probably changed the M inistry.” 16 Considering the pressures of
the Spanish political situation, W oodford claimed too much
credit. Sagasta, nevertheless, now worked under the shadow of
an ultimatum.
During the first three weeks of October, as Sagasta organized
his cabinet, American patience wore thin. On October 1, D ay
renewed American offers of good offices. Five days later W ood
ford wrote D ay that although Sagasta was planning reforms,
“this Ministry . . . may have come in too late.” O nly “complete
independence w ill induce the insurgents to lay down their arms.”
Sir H enry Drummond W olff, the knowledgeable British Am
bassador in Madrid, reported to Salisbury late in October that
W oodford had been talking about the “ ‘richest slice of earth,’ ”
which the United States was determined to have. “As things ap
pear drifting much more rapidly than I anticipated,” Sir Henry
wrote, “the time for palliatives seems passed.” 17
W olff had underestimated Sagasta’s ability. In mid-October,
Spain sent General Ramón Blanco y Arenas to replace W eyler.
16 W oodford to M cKinley, Sept. 6 and 3, 1897, W oodford to Sherman,
Sept. 20, 1897, W oodford to'D ay, Oct. 6, 1897, Spain, Despatches, N A ,
R G 59.
17 W olff to Salisbury, Oct. 25 and 26, 1897, From Spain, 1897, Salisbury
MSS; D ay to W oodford, Oct. 1, 1897, Spain, Instructions, and W oodford
to Day, Oct. 6, 1897, Spain, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
340 The New Empire
Blanco had gained an excellent reputation as an efficient but
humane soldier while quieting the revolution in the Philippines
the year before. Sagasta followed the dispatch of Blanco with
promises that the reconcentrado orders would be moderated. On
November 17 Spain began releasing American prisoners held in
Cuba; eleven days later Spanish officials informed W oodford
that no American subject remained imprisoned on the island. A
month later Spain revoked an order which had discriminated
against tobacco exported to the United States. But most impor
tant, on October 26, five days before the Novem ber 1 deadline,
Spain handed W oodford a program designed to bring into effect
the reforms promised by Sagasta in June. Military operations
would not be interrupted, but the Cubans would be granted self-
government in all areas except foreign relations, the army, the
navy, and the administration of justice, “which involve national
requirements or needs.” This notice occupied only half the mes
sage. The last eight pages of the fifteen-page memorandum ex
pressed the sincere wish that the United States would cut off
aid to the Junta and to the numerous Cuban filibustering expe
ditions which used American ports. Only then, the message said,
would this grant of autonomy be effective. After a bitter debate
in the Cortes, the Queen Regent signed the reforms into law on
November 25.18
Sherman replied to the Spanish announcement of the reforms
with a long note which praised the changes, although he observed
that Spain “is silent as to the manner and form in which the
. . . United States might exert good offices.” H e fervently de
nied that the administration was shirking its responsibility under
the neutrality acts. The tension was broken. Spain had acceded
to, and would now be allowed to carry out, the American de
mands of reform. But Spain would have only seven weeks for
18 N ew York W orld, Oct. 3, 1897, 9:4i W oodford to Sherman, N ov.

13, 28, and 15, Dec. 31, Oct. 30, 1897, Spain, Despatches, and Sherman to
W oodford, N ov. 6, 1897, Spain, Instructions, N A , R G 59.
this immense project before the tension would mount again.
Even those seven weeks between November 25 and January 12
would be weeks of only relative calm. Former Minister Hannis
Taylor set off an intense debate in newspaper columns and lec
ture platforms by publishing a long article in the N orth American
R eview asking for intervention. American financial pages printed
the news that some large property holders in Cuba had little
faith in the new reforms and had decided to work for American
annexation. The question of war or peace indeed revolved around
the success of the Spanish reforms. Few responsible persons in
the M cKinley administration evinced any optimism. By late
December the President had become so concerned that he re
fused to allow W oodford to return to the United States for urgent
private business. The N avy Department, meanwhile, had quietly
sent out orders instructing Squadron commanders to retain all
men whose enlistments were to expire shortly.10
Rumors even began to spread that in his annual message of 1897
M cKinley would give Spain a time limit for the successful appli
cation of the reforms. The President stopped short of that ex
treme, but tw o passages presaged later events. M cKinley rejected
the possibilities of recognizing insurgent belligerency, Cuban
independence, or intervention, and refused to consider annexa
tion, which “by our code of morality would be criminal aggres
sion.” H e rejected recognition of belligerent rights, however,
on other grounds. Spain would gain all the advantages, the Presi
dent warned, since she would be able to keep Americans away
from Cuban waters. The creation of similar advantage to the
Cubans, however, “through aid or sympathy from within our
domain would be even more impossible than now.” Interpreted
literally, M cKinley’s words were encouragement to those Amer
icans aiding the revolutionary cause. The other notable passage,91
19 Sherman to W oodford, N ov. 20, 1897, Spain, Instructions, N A , R G

59; Taylor, “Review of the Cuban Question,” 610-635; Offner, “McKinley
and the Origins of the Spanish-American W ar,” 181-182.
reminiscent of Geveland’s words of December, 1896, began w ith
M cKinley’s assurances that he wished to give the reforms ade
quate time, but if they appeared not to be successful in the near
future, the United States would take action “without misgiving
or hesitancy in the light of the obligation this Government owes
to itself, to the people who have confided to it the protection of
their interests and honor and to humanity.” W oodford re
ported that the Spanish response to the message was “simply
acquiescent and not cordial.” 20
T he reforms never had a chance of demonstrating their effec
tiveness. T w o of the three most important groups in Cuba, the
insurgents and the conservative landholding and capitalist in
terests, had by the end of 1897 refused to accept the reforms.
Upon first hearing of the Sagasta program, Lee had warned D ay
that “the Insurgents w ill accept nothing but independence.”
Equally important, the conservative interests were beginning to
fear that the reforms might breed a radical, w holly Cuban gov
ernment. Lee wrote Day, “It is known that all classes of the Span
ish citizens are violently opposed to a real or genuine autonomy
because it would throw the island into the hands of the Cubans
— and rather than that they prefer annexation to the United States
or some form of an American protectorate.” T he American
Consul at Santiago also noted an important reason for this grow
ing tide o f opinion. H e reported that although the reconcentrado
prisoners had been freed to work in American- and Spanish-
owned sugar, coffee, and manganese ore industries, they could
accomplish nothing, since the insurgents would not allow any
production. As for the over-all effect of the revocation of the
reconcentrado orders, Lee commented in early December that
since in some places cats “are used for food purposes, selling at
30 cents a piece,” he believed it “a fair inference” to conclude
that Spanish officials would be able to do little to relieve the
20 N e w York W orld , N o v , 23, D ec. 8,1897; Congressional Record , 55dl

Cong., 2nd Sess., 3-5; W oodford to M cKinley, D ec. 18, 1897, Spain, Des
critical situation. “It certainly cannot be done by proclamations,”
Lee remarked.21
In mid-January the third group, the Spanish army, joined the
other tw o key groups in reacting against autonomy, and by so
doing set off a chain reaction of events which within three
months climaxed in war. On the morning of January 12 a group
of Spanish army officers destroyed the presses of a new Havana
newspaper which had been attacking W eyler. Havana authori
ties carefully pointed out that, since the Constitutional Unionists,
the foremost autonomist party, had helped suppress the riots
which follow ed, the incident could not be construed as the col
lapse of the reform program. American officials did not so in
terpret the incident. Lee reported that the riots proved the
ineffectiveness o f autonomy and added that he had heard from
a credible source that Blanco considered the carrying out of the
reform program impossible. D e Lome was quite shaken by the
administration’s reaction. H e informed Madrid that M cKinley
had noticeably cooled toward the reforms after hearing of the
riots. T he Spanish Minister warned that the outbreak had “pro
duced deep disgust among the moderate and those disposed to
accommodate differences.” 22
For several reasons these riots marked the beginning of the end
o f any chances for peace. T hey demonstrated to M cKinley’s sat
isfaction that the autonomy scheme was crumbling. T hey also
indicated that Spanish officials could not have complete confi
dence in their army. T he N ew York Tribune commented, “T he
army is hereafter a dominant political force in Cuba,” and be
lieved that the army’s opposition stifled any chances the autonomy
program might have had. Finally, the riots spread the fear in the
United States that Havana was in such a combustible condition
21 Lee to D ay, N ov. 17, D ec. 7,1897, Consular, Havana, and P. F. H yatt
to D ay, Jan. 12, 1898, Consular, Santiago, N A , R G 59.
22 Barclay to Salisbury, Jan. 14, 1898, F.O. 72/2062; Lee to Day, Jan.
12, 13, 14, 15, 1898, Consular, Havana, N A , R G 59; Spanish Diplomatic
Correspondence and Documents, 63-67.
that American life and property were not safe. After consulting
M cKinley the day before, Representative Robert H itt of Illinois
rose in the House on January 18 and expressed concern that,
since the reform program had not worked, the United States
would have to intervene to protect American citizens and prop
erty. The same day that H itt spoke with M cKinley, Secretary
Long began reordering the fleet in the South Atlantic, since, as
he wrote in secret orders, “Affairs are very disturbed at Cuba.”
The administration decided on the twenty-fourth to send the
armored cruiser “Maine” to Havana. The Spanish Minister fully
supported the decision to send the vessel. The ostensible purpose
of the sailing of the “Maine” was to resume friendly visits of
American ships to Spanish ports.23 In the context of M cKinley’s
reaction to the Havana riots and Long’s maneuvering of the fleet,
however, the sending of the “Maine” was an attempt to discourage
future outbreaks on the island and to provide notice of the ad
ministration’s concern over the inadequacy of the Spanish re
forms.
The Pittsburgh Press observed that the sailing of the “Maine”
had led to “a strong popular suspicion that the administration is
preparing for intervention,” a rumor which D ay promptly de
nied. But the Journal of Commerce noted “as a matter of interest
that the United States now has assembled near K ey W est the most
formidable fleet of warships that has gotten together in our home
waters for many years.” The most discouraged—and frightened
—reaction occurred in Madrid. There, the British Chargé re
ported, the decision to send the “Maine” was believed to be “in
opportune and dangerous.” The Chargé noted that the decision
was especially inopportune since the Philippine situation had
recently quieted, the new Cuban reforms had just begun, the
United States and Spain had after a long delay initiated friendly
negotiations on a commercial treaty, and, finally, General Juan
23 N ew York Tribune, Jan. 17,1898, 1:4; Long to Chester, Jan. 17, 1898,
Ciphers Sent, 1888-1898, N A , R G 45; Lee to Day, Feb. 12, 1898, Con
sular, Havana, N A , R G 59.
Massó and 110 of his men had voluntarily deserted the revolution
ary cause. Massó had been especially close to Máximo Gómez,
and the desertion buckled rebel spirits. In Spanish minds, the
sailing of the “Maine” threatened to cancel out these vestiges of
progress.2452
The Spanish regime expressed its concern at the American
reaction when W oodford met with the Queen and then with
Segismundo Moret, Spanish Minister for Colonies, on January
15 and 16, respectively. Repeating the Queen’s assurances, Moret
said that Blanco had the situation in Cuba w ell in hand and that
W eyler would never return to the island. The Spanish Minister
then added that, since “we have done all that you asked or sug
gested,” would W oodford “urge the President to do something
that shall show the Cuban rebels that they had better accept
autonomy and give up their struggle? I feel that we are entitled
to this after what we have done.” He then recalled that the Cleve
land administration had offered to do this if Spain granted auton
omy. W oodford’s reply was significant in revealing the American
position. Since “our American idea is that Governments de
rive their just authority from the consent of the governed,” the
American Minister retorted, the United States could not interfere
“to keep a people under monarchical rule, who are seeking to es
tablish a republic.” In reporting this to M cKinley, W oodford
made explicit the assumption of such an American position:
“W hen it becomes clear that [Blanco] cannot succeed or that
the United States must intervene, the Queen w ill have to choose
between losing her throne or losing Cuba at the risk of war with
us.” W oodford believed Spain would try to save the dynasty.20
The American Minister was apparently attempting to under
mine Spanish influence in Cuba in every possible way. One of his
24 Pittsburgh Press, Jan. 25, 1898, 1:1; Journal of Commerce , Jan. 25,
1898, 1:3; Barclay to Salisbury, Jan. 26, 1898, F.O. 72/2062. W oodford
to Sherman, Jan. 24, 1898, Spain, Despatches, N A , R G 59, contains in
formation on the commercial treaty.
25 W oodford to McKinley, Jan. 17,1898, Spain, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
best opportunities for doing this was through a new commercial
treaty which he was negotiating with Spain. In late January
he commented: “I regard the successful and early consum
mation of this treaty as very important. It seems to me vital. U n
less some accident shall occur, such a treaty should obtain for us
the practical control of the Cuban market.” On February 4, how
ever, W oodford notified Sherman that the discussions had re
vealed that the commercial privileges given to Cuba in the reform
program were not as extensive as the American Minister had first
thought. Cubans could only offer suggestions, “while the actual
making of the treaty is to be under the control of Spain.” This
interpretation of the reform program not only detracted from
Cuba’s autonomy, but it allowed merchants in Spain, who were
bitterly anti-American, to influence the final terms o f the
pact.26
Five days after W oodford’s report, another episode profoundly
weakened not only American hopes for a favorable commercial
treaty, but the administration’s confidence in Spain’s good faith
in all realms of diplomacy. John J. McCook, a dapper, handsome,
and wealthy N ew York lawyer of the venerable firm of Alex
ander & Green, had often called in 1897-1898 on his good friends
from Ohio, M cKinley and D ay. The President had considered
McCook as a possibility for Secretary of the Interior, a post
which McCook rejected because it did not give full rein to his
interest in foreign affairs. M cKinley refused to offer the N ew
Yorker the Attorney General’s post because, as the President
remarked to a caller, “I do not understand Col. McCook’s interest
in Cuban affairs.” McCook had become deeply involved in the
N ew York Junta, so much so, in fact, that he had created an
international syndicate to purchase Cuba from Spain and present
it to the Junta. His ties with M cKinley and w ith American busi
nessmen in Cuba had proved invaluable in this venture, but the
26 W oodford to M cKinley, Jan. 28, 1898, and W oodford to Sherman,

Feb. 3 and 4, 1898, Spain, Despatches, N A , R G 59; Barclay to Salisbury,
Feb. 8, 1898, F.O. 72/2062.
plan foundered on Spain’s unwillingness to discuss the matter.27
On the morning of February 9, McCook walked into D ay’s
office and handed to the Assistant Secretary the original of a letter
which Dupuy de Lome had written. The Spanish Minister, w ho
had gained an apparently unwarranted reputation as the “Spanish
Fox,” had in a few brief moments in December delivered himself
of his opinion that M cKinley was a weak, vacillating, and venal
politician. McCook’s associates in the Cuban Junta had discovered
the letter, and now the N ew Yorker “had the satisfaction,” as he
wrote James Harrison W ilson the follow ing day, of putting the
damning note “in the hands of the President and . . . D ay.”
W ilson, another businessman closely tied with the Junta and the
cause of intervention in Cuba, called it “a master stroke.” That it
certainly was from McCook’s and W ilson’s point of view. D e
Lome was immediately replaced by a new minister, but the dam
age had been done. A ny faith the moderate American press and
the administration had invested in Spanish goodwill was now
badly shaken.28
Sherman revealed the full significance of the de Lome letter
in a message to W oodford on February 23. T he Spanish Minis
ter’s usefulness was “utterly destroyed,” Sherman wrote, not only
because of his statements about the President, “but more gravely
still by reason of the want of candor which appeared to underly
the proposition for a reciprocity arrangement with the auton
omous government of Cuba” and the disparaging and sarcastic
references to the entire reform program which the letter con
tained. T he administration’s fears about the limitations of the
27 W ilson to McCook, D ec. 5, 1897, W ilson MSS, contains M cKinley’s

statement; see Reid to M cKinley, March 8, 1898, M cKinley MSS.
28 M cCook to W ilson, Feb. 10, 1898, W ilson MSS; Sherman to W o o d
ford, Feb. 23, 1898, Spain, Instructions, N A , R G 59; W ilson to McCook,
Feb. i i , 1898, Letterbook, W ilson MSS. It is noteworthy that there is
no significant material on the incident in Correspondencia diplomática
de la delegación cubana en Nueva York durante la guerra de indepen
dencia de 189s * (Publicaciones del Archivo Nacional de Cuba; 5
vols., Havana, 1943-1946).
The N e w Empire
reforms were apparently justified, at least they were justified if
de Lome was representative of his nation’s statesmen.29
Seven days after McCook delivered the de Lome letter, word
flashed from Havana that the night before, the fifteenth, the
“Maine” had been shaken by a terrific explosion and then had
settled at the bottom of Havana harbor. More than tw o hundred
fifty men had been trapped in the flaming wreckage. Jingo papers
and militant congressmen now screamed for war, convinced that
the explosion had been caused by an outside, that is, Spanish,
source. But war did not come for more than tw o months. The
fact remained that neither the yellow journals nor the United
States Senate controlled American foreign policy. That control
rested in the hands of M cKinley and Day, and it would be another
five weeks before they would decide to use American military
force to stop the bloodshed in Cuba.
During the next four weeks M cKinley carefully prepared his
course of action. H e would demand an indemnity from Spain if
the N avy Department’s investigation concluded that the ex
plosion had occurred outside the “Maine.” Meanwhile, with the
unlikely assistance of such interventionists as H enry Cabot Lodge,
the President prevented the Senate from taking precipitate ac
tion. H e considered, then rejected, a proposal to send a special
mission to Spain. The President was serious when he told Senator
Charles W . Fairbanks of Indiana, “I don’t propose to be swept
off my feet by the catastrophe.” 30
M cKinley’s thinking was perhaps closely approximated by the
views of W oodford. At the close of February the American
Minister continued to hope that something might be salvaged
from autonomy, although he was no doubt more optimistic on
this score than M cKinley or Day. But W oodford had become
29 Sherman to W oodford, Feb. 23, 1898, Spain, Instructions, N A , R G

59-
30 Reid to M cKinley, March 14, 1898, M cKinley MSS; Olcott, M c
Kinley, II, 12-13; Garraty, Lodge, 188.
concerned about a remark which Moret had dropped in a conver
sation on March 1. The Spanish Minister had given notice that
the Sagasta government would convene the new Cortes and the
Cuban Parliament on April 25 instead of earlier, as Sagasta had
previously planned. Moret explained that the Cuban Autonomist
party needed more time. W oodford noted in his despatch to
M cKinley that perhaps Spain was setting a trap, for the rainy
season would begin before the twenty-fifth, and this would make
operations during the summer impossible. Spain consequently
must “so far crush the rebellion by the ist of May” as to satisfy
“the common sense of our people” in the United States. “If the
United States must,” W oodford continued, “for the protection
o f the health of our coast next summer and for the protection
o f our great financial interests, practically intervene about the
ist of April,” is the American position “sufficiently clear and
definite as to justify effective action” before the rainy season
begins?31
That the President’s thinking was moving along the same lines
was indicated by several administration moves during the first
week of March. M cKinley called Joe Cannon, chairman of the
House Committee on Appropriations, to the W hite House on
Sunday night, March 6. Cannon later recalled the President’s
saying: “I must have money to get ready for war. I am doing
everything possible to prevent war but it must come, and we are
not prepared for war. W ho knows where this war w ill lead us;
it may be more than war with Spain.” Cannon agreed to propose
a $50,000,000 emergency military appropriation in Congress. The
measure went through more easily than expected. M cKinley had
tightened his control of Congress, but the effects of the measure
did not stop there. W oodford reported that the appropriation
“has not excited the Spaniards—it has simply stunned them. T o
appropriate fifty millions out of money in the treasury, without
31 W oodford to McKinley, March 2, 1898, Spain, Despatches, N A , RG
59-
3J0 The N e w Empire
borrowing a cent, demonstrates wealth and power. Even Spain
can see this.” 32
But W oodford’s comment was misleading in the light of an
other repercussion of the appropriation measure. Secretary of the
N avy Long began hurriedly building an American military
power by buying vessels abroad, and he ordered the battleship
“Oregon” to leave her dock at Bremerton, W ashington, to sail
around the tip of South America, and to move into the Caribbean
as soon as possible. If the administration hoped that these actions
would deter further warlike moves by the Spanish, it was badly
mistaken. W oodford reported on the same day the commander of
the “Oregon” received his orders, March 12, that Spain was inten
sifying its preparations to send a fleet of torpedo boats to bolster
naval units in Cuban waters. This news, combined with Spain’s
refusal to rescind its announcement that the Cortes would not
bother meeting to discuss the worsening situation until April 25,
indicated that the intensified American preparations for war had
not intimidated Spain.33
Finally, there was another result of the appropriation measure
which was of special importance. T he congressional action had
killed all lingering hopes that the autonomist forces in Cuba might
resolve the situation. T he rebels had now received too much en
couragement to settle for any compromise.34
Sherman and D ay vividly described the situation in messages to
W oodford on March 1 and 3. The key to Sherman’s long instruc
tion of the first was the acid comment, “So far as m y opportunities4832
82 L. W hite Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon: The Story of a Pioneer Amer

ican (N e w York, 1927), 187. See also the remarks on M cKinley’s leader
ship in N e w York Tribune, March 8, 1898, 1:6; W oodford to M cKinley,
March 9, 1898, Spain, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
83 Long to “Oregon” and to “Brooklyn,” March 7, 1898, Ciphers Sent,
1888-1898, N A , R G 45; D ay to W oodford, March 12, 1898, Spain, In
structions, N A , R G 59.
84 See W oodford to M cKinley, March 9, 1898, Spain, Despatches, N A ,
R G 59; for the Junta’s reaction to the appropriation (that the action in
dicated either war or preparation for w ar) see Correspondencia diplo
mática) V , 124-126.
Reaction: Approach to W ar ß$i
of observation and knowledge go I am as yet unable to discern
the favorable advances which were gladly anticipated from [the
Sagasta r e fo r m s ]T h e Secretary of State noted that tw o months
had elapsed since the reforms had been instituted; Sherman evi
dently believed that period had given the reforms ample time to
demonstrate their effectiveness. H e then made four observations.
First, he admitted that Spanish troops had committed “few er re
grettable excesses,” but Sherman then promptly turned this on
the debit side of the Spanish ledger: “Indeed, their operations have
not appeared, during the past three months, to have been as ener
getic as before.” Second, Sherman observed that the grant of au
tonomy was “circumscribed in its operations” and hamstrung by
a lack of finances. Third, autonomy had been opposed not only by
insurgents but by the “Spanish element” in Cuba as w ell.
“Fourthly, the Condition of the island in its financial and produc
tive aspects” had worsened.
This message marked a toughening of American policy. Before
March i the United States had emphasized the necessity of reforms
which would lead to autonomy. It had condemned harsh military
action and demanded social and political remedies. N o w Sherman
decided “that autonomy is of itself, and unaided by military suc
cess, capable of winning over the insurgent element remains a
doubtful proposition.” The State Department had lost faith in the
reform program, refused to allow the continuance of harsh mili
tary measures (many of which the rebels used with effectiveness),
and asked Spain to pacify the island immediately by fighting
guerrilla bands with orthodox military methods. A month later,
the United States would add the demand of an immediate armis
tice. In the face of these American demands, the wonder is not
that war finally began in mid-April, but that hostilities did not
begin at least six weeks earlier.35
86 Sherman to W oodford, March i, 1898, and D ay to W oodford,

March 3, 1898, Spain, Instructions, N A , R G 59; also Ernest R. May,
Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power
(N e w York, 1961), 149.
,
The Far East ¡897 to March 1898 ,
The growing involvement of the United States in the Cuban
straggle was matched, although in a less intensive manner, by
American concern with events in the Far East. The United States
did not suddenly realize the value of the far Pacific area after
D ew ey’s victory at Manila on May 1. U ntil the de Lome letter
incident and the “Maine” sinking in mid-February, events in Cuba
shared prime newspaper space with stories relating Russian and
German threats to the open door in China and Manchuria. This
interest in the Far East trailed off only in a relative fashion after
March 1.
The M cKinley administration continued O lney’s attempts to
open new areas of China for American merchants and mission
aries. An important result of this policy was the first movement
of American missionaries into the rich Hunan province in 1897.
In a long report to Washington, Denby reiterated his belief that
the trader would follow the missionary into Hunan, listed the
limitless economic possibilities of the province, but strangely ne
glected the religious significance of the event. After State D e
partment prodding, Hangchow was also opened to American
merchants for the first time.36
Such State Department action, along with the opening of new
concession and trading areas by the major European powers, en
couraged American concessionaires and exporters to pay close
attention to the Far Eastern scene. T w o of the more prominent
and colorful promoters were W harton Barker and James Harri
son W ilson. Barker, a Philadelphia banker and publisher, had been
an agent of the House of Baring until the 1890 crash. H e had
worked closely with the Russians since 1878, when he had been
knighted by Alexander II, and he never tired of quoting Tocque-
ville’s phrase regarding “the tw o great nations in the world which
seem to tend toward the same end.” W ith Russian cooperation
he had nearly succeeded in selling the Chinese a $20,000,000 tele-
36 McCormick, “ ‘Fair Field and N o Favor,’ ” 130-132.
graph, telephone, and banking project in 1887. Ten years later
Barker was passionately advocating bimetallism and working with
Chinese and Russian agents to obtain railroad concessions in the
Orient.37
W ilson agreed with Barker that China was a “Russian pro
tectorate.” W ith assistance from John J. McCook and Jacob
Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, W ilson attempted to work
through St. Petersburg to obtain rail and mining rights in Man
churia and China. But W ilson concerned himself more with the
fundamentals of the situation than did Barker. W ilson, McCook,
Schiff, Theodore Search of the N .A .M ., Theodore Roosevelt, and
Lodge, among others, visited the W hite House to urge McKinley
to place McCook in the cabinet, Roosevelt in the N avy Depart
ment, W ilson in St. Petersburg as American Minister, and to ap
point W illiam W . Rockhill, an expert on Asiatic affairs and an
intimate of W ilson’s schemes, as Minister to China. O nly Roose
velt received the desired position; the others fell before the Presi
dent’s distrust of McCook’s and W ilson’s Cuban schemes and
M cKinley’s desire for an even geographical distribution of pa
tronage. The President’s decision marked the last opportunity
for pro-Russian sentiment to appear in policy-making circles.38
Other promoters enjoyed more success than did Barker or
W ilson. The American China Development Company had lost
a rich railroad concession to a Belgian group in 1896, but within
four years after its founding in 1895, the American company
boasted a $1,000,000 war chest and listed Rockefeller representa
tives, Schiff, E. H . Harriman, the American Sugar Refineries
37 Memorandum, Box 7, and Li W in g to Barker, Feb. 25, 28, March

3, 4, 16, 23, 1898, in W harton Barker papers, Library o f Congress, W ash
ington, D.C.
38 W ilson to McCook, Oct. 28 and 6, 1896, W ilson to McKinley, Feb.
22, 1897, W ilson to John H ay, N ov. 14, 1896, W ilson to McCook, May
26,1897, W ilson to Roosevelt, Aug. 5, 1897, W ilson to McCook, Aug. 10,
1897, Letterbooks, W ilson MSS; Roosevelt to D . C. Gilman, June 17,
1897, and Roosevelt to Othniel C. March, June 17, 1897, Letterbooks.
Roosevelt MSS.
T he N e w Empire
Company, Carnegie Steel Company, and several American rail
w ay companies as active members. On April 14,1898, it received
its first concession, the right to build a railway between Hankow
and Canton.3®
American exporters had a far larger stake in oriental markets
than did the concession hunters. T he exporters also had more to
fear from European threats to the open door. Cotton goods in
dustries had especially become dependent on Asian consumers;
exporting $1,741,942 worth of goods to China in 1895, by 1897
they had increased their exports to $7,489,141. One Alabama
plant, built with half a million dollars of Boston capital, sold its
entire product to China in 1897. The oriental consumer of cotton
goods became especially important, when, as one commercial
journal noted, over-all business failures increased in early 1897,
and “the whole increase in failures [occurred] in the cotton in
dustry.” Other products, especially kerosene, wheat flour, and
iron and steel, were increasingly dependent on Asian markets.
T he N ew York Commercial Advertiser noted in January, 1898,
that since “civilized markets are developed,” it has become “su
premely important that w e should retain the free entry into the
Chinese market which w e enjoy to-day. . . . W e cannot sub
mit to being excluded from trade in that territory.” 40
But American trade faced just such a threat. On November
18, 1897, Germany seized the key port of Kiaochow on the
Shantung Peninsula. The seizure menaced the large American
exports flowing into Manchuria and N orth China through Shan
tung and threatened to set off a series of European attempts to
carve China into exclusive spheres of interest. Denby became
apoplectic, insisting in cables to the State Department that “par
tition would tend to destroy our markets,” and hinting that out
right American intervention would be the only remedy. Sherman,
89 C h a r le s S . C a m p b e ll, J r ., Special Business Interests and the Open

D oor Policy ( N e w H a v e n , 1 9 5 1 ) , 2 1 - 2 2 .
40 Ibid., 1 9 - 2 4 ; C h a t t a n o o g a Tradesman , D e c . 1 5 , 1 8 9 7 , 5 9 ; Public
Opinion, M a y 13 , 1 8 9 7 , 6 0 2 : Commercial Advertiser, J a n . 2 6 , 1 8 9 8 , 6 : 5 .
Reaction: Approach to W ar $$$
at first unconcerned about the turn of events, assured Denby and
troubled businessmen that the German Ambassador had guaran
teed free and equal access through Kiaochow to all nations.41
Businessmen who had cherished the hope of a great Asian mar
ket had long feared that European powers might partition the
area. Sherman’s assurances now did little to quiet these fears.
James Harrison W ilson sadly reported to friends that he had
spoken with Charles Denby, Jr., who had “expressed the greatest
discouragement as to the future of China and as to the possibility
of exploiting American business in that part of the world.” 42
Ambitious Americans such as W ilson, however, refused to give
up the battle. Throughout the first three months of 1898 they
emphasized that American surplus goods were becoming in
creasingly dependent on Asian markets and then urged that, if
necessary, the United States should cooperate with England in
order to counterbalance the German and Russian threat to the
open door.
The Kiaochow incident and Sherman’s mild reaction to that
event led commercial journals and business groups to explain
forcefully and fully to both the State Department and the public
the dangers which American interests faced in the Far East.
Some journals compared the situation with that in Madagascar
three years before. Americans had held large interests on that is
land until France had moved in and abolished equal trading rights
with effective political discriminations. As the Committee on
American Interests in China informed the State Department, “w e
certainly do not wish to have our experience of exclusion from
Madagascar practised in a greatly enlarged scale in the case of
China.” 43
The committee which authored this petition had been organ-
41Dugdale, German Documents, III, 4; D enby to Sherman, Jan. 31,
1898, China, Despatches, and Day to Adee in note appended to H itchcock
to Sherman, Jan. 19, 1898, Russia, Despatches, N A , R G 59; McCormick,
“ ‘Fair Field and N o Favor,’ ” 141-143.
42 W ilson to Rethick, D ec. 23, 1897, Letterbooks, W ilson MSS.
43 Boston Herald, Feb. 12, 1898, 6:3.
2$6 The New Empire
ized on January 6, 1898, when Clarence Cary and John Foord
of the Journal of Commerce met with representatives of the.
Standard Oil Company, Frazer and Company (a large American
trading house in China), Deering, Milliken and Company (cot
ton exporters), and the Bethlehem Iron Company. The meeting
was a direct response to the Kiaochow incident. It was also a
manifestation of the increasing fear that the M cKinley adminis
tration did not comprehend the meaning of events in China. “It
is felt,” the Journal of Commerce explained, “that we stand at the
dividing of the ways between gaining or losing the greatest mar
ket which awaits exploitation.” The State Department simply was
not moving rapidly enough to suit the more ambitious members of
the American business community.44
These businessmen made their voices heard in several ways.
On February 2 the N ew York City Chamber of Commerce sent
a petition to the State Department demanding immediate action
in China. A second petition from this group explained in detail
the extent of American trade and investment in China. One inci
dent in the Chamber’s meeting strikingly revealed the realign
ment of allies and enemies. A member arose and asked that the
Chamber move slowly. After all, he reminded his fellows, such
action as the petitions demanded goes “against our old friends,
Russia, Germany and France.” England, on the other hand, had
been the “persistent and vigilant foe of this country. She tried to
enslave us in ’76.” A t this point the speaker was interrupted by an
aroused membership, and the chair promptly ruled his remarks
out of order. Chambers of Commerce in Boston and San Francisco
and the Philadelphia Board of Trade followed the example of
the N ew York petitions. The China and Japan Trading Com
pany, large cotton exporters, sent a note demanding “immediate
action” to the Secretary of the Interior, Cornelius N . Bliss, a
partner in Bliss, Fabyan and Company, which also exported cot
ton to China. John Foord later declared that shortly after these
44 Campbell, Special Business Interests, 30-31; Journal of Commercet
D ec. 31, 1897, 1:1.
petitions were sent “the whole subject of American interests in
the Far East began to assume a position of national promi
nence.” 45
Commercial journals printed numerous articles and editorials
asking for a stronger American stand in Asia, cooperation with
England, and the containment of Russia and Germany. In early
January the N ew York Commercial Advertiser had been unable
to see any threat of discriminations, but at the end of that month
the journal wrote an editorial which included all the themes—
the threat of the surplus, pro-British views, and the desire for the
open door:
The time is not far distant when probably all of the principal in
dustries of the Republic will be either compelled or in a position
. . . to seek outlets for their products abroad, and Great Britain,
by her resolute stand for free and equal opportunity in the markets
o f the Orient, is paving the way for their easy and rapid conquest
by the United States.
The Philadelphia Manufacturer urged a triple alliance of the

United States, England, and Japan to offset Germany and Rus
sia. The Cincinnati Commercial Tribune noted that, since the
British were fighting American battles in China, the United
States should assist England, “not because we love that nation
for w e do not, but because our material and selfish interests
coincide with hers.” As could be expected, John Foord’s Journal
of Commerce led all other periodicals in pointing to the multifold
dangers which threatened the open door. This periodical be
lieved that the Russian policy of sealing off territory (which the
Russians were forced to do, the Journal explained, since they
were incapable of competing with the United States on equal
terms) “is the greatest danger which our expanding commerce
has to fear.” 46
45 Journal of Commerce, Feb. 3, 1898, 1:7; Campbell, Special Business
Interests, 24-31; N ew York Tribune, Feb. 4, 1898, 2:5.
46 Commercial Advertiser, Jan. 26, 1898, 6:4; Jan. 5, 1898, 6:1; Jan 10,
1898, 6:2; Baltimore Sun, Jan. 19, 1898, 4:2; Cincinnati Commercial
The N e w Empire
Pro-British views could also be found in circles close to the
administration. In early January, Charles Em ory Smith’s Phila
delphia Press, one of the leading administration mouthpieces, had
been cool to cooperation with England in Asia. By the last week
of that month, however, this journal noted that Germany, France,
and Russia had apparently decided on strong colonial policies;
the Press then warned, “W here the United States and Great
Britain are publicly agreed the rest of the world w ill hesitate to
oppose their policy.” Cushman Davis, chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, told a reporter that a coalition with Eng
land would be possible since “it is not to be expected that if our
commercial interests were threatened abroad that w e would sit
with folded hands and make no sign.” H enry Cabot Lodge told
British friends that he would welcom e an Anglo-American al
liance in Chinese affairs. Ambassador John H ay made his own
and Lodge’s views, which coincided, known to British officials.* 47
In early February, Joseph Chamberlain, British Colonial Sec
retary, instigated a formal request that the United States co
operate with England in preserving the open door in Asia. W hite
hall had approached Russia with a similar offer the previous month
and had been met w ith a flat refusal. The British gambit might
have been a spur-of-the-moment idea, a desperate reaction after
the Russian refusal. But Americans could not deny that several
of their officials had been encouraging just such an approach
throughout January. The State Department, however, could not
afford to be so encouraging. D ay informed Pauncefote that the
United States would have to refuse the offer, but the Assistant
Secretary added that the President thoroughly sympathized with
the British position in China. T he war in Cuba simply made it
impossible for the administration to devote such attention to the
Tribune, Jan. 20, 1898, 6:1; Feb. 7, 1898, 6:1; Journal of Commerce, Feb.
7, 1898, 6:1-2; Boston Herald, Feb. 8, 1898, 6:3; Public Opinion, Jan. 6,
1898, 4-6; N ew York Tribune, Jan. 23, 1898, 6:1.
47 Philadelphia Press, Jan. 7,1898,6:4; Jan. 23, 1898, 8:4 and 6:2; Camp
bell, Anglo-American Understanding, 15-16,18; Garraty, Lodge, 204-205.
Far East. The British then turned to Germany. The Kaiser, trust
ing neither British motives nor dependability, refused the ad
vances.48
D ay’s refusal did not mean that the State Department had de
serted the Far East. It could hardly have done so in view of the
business clamor for action and in view of the rumor, assiduously
circulated by the Journal of Commerce, that the world money
markets were sinking not only because of the Cuban crisis but
also because of the dangers in China. The M cKinley administra
tion first demonstrated its interest in the Far East when it changed
its ministerial appointment for the Chinese post. The appoint
ment of Charles Page Bryan, an inexperienced diplomat (the
Journal of Commerce always condescendingly referred to him
as “the young Mr. Bryan”) had aroused little opposition until the
Kiaochow incident. But in December, the editors of those com
mercial journals that had apotheosized the China market attacked
the nomination. M cKinley, working rapidly, withdrew Bryan’s
name from the Senate. Senator Frye later recalled that James
Harrison W ilson appeared to have the President’s approval, then
Bryan’s backers changed to Edwin Conger, Minister to Brazil,
in order to block W ilson. Bryan went to Brazil. Conger, an ex
perienced and older diplomat, was welcomed by the special
China interests. The Journal of Commerce viewed the appoint
ment as an indication that M cKinley had gained “a growing per
ception . . . of the gravity of the situation in the Far East in
respect to its bearing on the future of American trade.” Meeting
in March with the Committee on American Interests in China,
Conger “decidedly impressed” his listeners with the statement
that he “regarded commerce and not politics as the best guide in
diplomacy.” The committee departed “with the idea that the care
of American interests in China had been committed to eminently
safe and capable hands.” 48
48 Pauncefote to Salisbury, March 17, 1898, F.O. 5/2361; Dugdale,

German Documents, III, 21-24.
49 Journal of Commerce, March 14, 1898, 1:1 and 6:3; Jan. 12, 1898,
%6o The N e w Empire
M cKinley also began fortifying American naval power in the
Pacific. In mid-December, 1897, the cruiser “Raleigh” moved
from the Mediterranean to the Asiatic Squadron, a change which
“has excited much comment here,” as the N ew York W orld
reported, since it seemed to indicate a stronger American ap
proach to the Far East crisis. But the N avy Department focused
its attention on another Pacific area besides the Asian mainland.
W hen the Philippine insurrection erupted in 1896 (with, it seems,
much Japanese help and encouragement), the United States dis
played more than passing interest in the affair. The commander
of the Asiatic Squadron told Secretary Herbert that “the most
credible reports of the situation that I have seen are those taken
from the American newspapers.” The general public was evi
dently better informed than the commander of the American
Asiatic fleet. The N avy Department quickly remedied this lack
of information. In late 1896 Lieutenant W illiam W . Kimball, an
officer in Naval Intelligence who was a vigorous proponent of
Mahan’s ideas, formulated a battle plan for offensive warfare
against the Philippines. W orking through the Naval Attaché in
Madrid, the Department also kept close watch on Spanish naval
strength in the South Pacific.*
60
Secretary Long, aided and abetted by his overenergetic assist
ant, Theodore Roosevelt, intensified Herbert’s vigil and prepa
rations in the Philippine area. Roosevelt had cooperated with
W ilson’s pro-Russian schemes earlier in the year, but by August,
1897 (doubtless after long conversations with Brooks Adams and
Mahan), the Assistant Secretary concluded that “Russians and
Americans, in their individual capacity, have nothing whatever
in common”; Russia, in fact, would offer “a very much more
serious problem than the Germans” to later generations of Anglo-
1:3; March 7, 1898, 1:3; N e w York W orld , Dec. 23, 1897, 7:1; Frye to
W ilson, March 5 and Jan. 13, 1898, W ilson MSS.
60 N ew York W orld , D ec. 19, 1897, 8:1; W olff to Salisbury, Jan. 4,
1897, F.O. 72/2033; N cN air to Herbert, Area 10 file. Box 15, Oct.-Dec.,
1896, folder, N A , RG 45; Long, N ew American N avy, 168-169.
Saxons. Roosevelt watched Far Eastern events closely. H e told
the W ar College in June, 1897: “The enemies we may have to
face w ill come from Asia. . . . Our interests are as great in the
Pacific as in the Atlantic.” Roosevelt also communicated such
thoughts, no doubt with characteristic vigor, to President Mc
Kinley when the tw o men enjoyed long rides through W ashing
ton parks on warm autumn afternoons. The President and the
Assistant Secretary became close friends in late 1897. In a conver
sation in 1898 M cKinley, as hoary legend relates, could not es
timate within a couple thousand miles where those “darn” islands
were. H e nevertheless could, after his long conversations with
Roosevelt, judge their location closely enough to agree to N avy
Department orders of December, 1897, which instructed Com
modore George D ew ey to strike the Philippines should war oc
cur between the United States and Spain.51
Papers in the M cKinley manuscripts indicate that the W hite
House followed the course of the Philippine insurrection in early
1898. Thus when Roosevelt, taking advantage of Long’s absence
on the afternoon of February 25, ordered D ew ey to prepare for
war, it is not strange that M cKinley and Long did not bother
to countermand the orders. Historians have too long overlooked
this crucial aspect of Roosevelt’s order-sending spree. Although
the President and the Secretary of the N avy rescinded more than
half of Roosevelt’s other plans, they allowed D ew ey to prepare
to strike Manila. The Assistant Secretary’s actions, moreover,
did not result from a sudden inspiration; Roosevelt acted after
months of conversations with Mahan, Adams, Lodge, and, be it
not forgotten, M cKinley.662
1
T w o weeks later Long received a letter from a Boston lawyer
who urged seizure of the Philippines, noted rumors of “a good
61 Theodore Roosevelt, “W ashington’s Forgotten Maxim,” Proceed

ings of the United States Naval Institute, X X I I I ( 1 8 9 7 ) , 4 4 7 - 4 5 6 ; Letters
of Spring-Rice, I, 2 3 1 ; Leech, Days of McKinley, 1 6 1 - 1 6 2 .
62 Otis to Adjutant General, D ec. 31, M cKinley MSS; Roosevelt to
D ew ey, Feb. 2 5 , 1 8 9 8 , Ciphers Sent, 1 8 8 8 - 1 8 9 8 , N A , R G 4 5 .
3 62 T he N e w Empire
understanding” between England and the United States in the
Far East, and concluded, “I do not think w e can too carefully
provide for the great future of those Pacific interests of ours.”
The administration had already arrived at much the same con
clusion. Naval Intelligence maintained a close surveillance on
Spanish fleet movements in the Pacific. T he American Asiatic
Squadron was hurriedly strengthened with the giant “Baltimore”
in mid-March. W ith these events in mind the result of the Battle
of Manila Bay can hardly be termed a lucky accident. The threat
o f war with Spain in Cuba, combined with the dangerous threat
to the open door in Asia, had constrained the administration to
make thorough preparations for offensive operations in the
Pacific.68
Hawaii
In the context of this intensified attention on the Far East,
M cKinley submitted a treaty to annex the Hawaiian Islands in
1897. Congress later passed a joint resolution, but the Hawaiian
debate, which raged for a year follow ing the President’s re
quest for ratification, offers several insights into the policies
which shaped the new empire during the months preceding
the war with Spain. First, strong Japanese protests destroyed key
assumptions of the Cleveland-Gresham argument against annex
ation and forced new empire expansionists to change their Ha
waiian policies. Second, the annexation treaty nearly passed
Congress in the early months of 1898, before the war with Spain,
because expansionists had begun to emphasize the relationship
between formal control of Hawaii and maintenance of the Amer
ican commercial rights in the Far East.
As early as 1891 M cKinley had fought for the retention of
Pearl Harbor and had worried about the encroachment of foreign 35
53 John Davis Long, Papers of John Davis Long, 1897-1904, selected

and edited by Gardner W eld Allen (Boston, 1939), 69-70; memorandum
by Crowninshield for Office of N aval Intelligence, March 10, 1898, Area
10 file, Box 16, N A , R G 45; Long, N ew American N avy, I, 172-173.
Reaction: Approach to War 363
powers in Hawaii. Political observers had predicted in 1897 that
the new administration would attempt to annex the islands. But
when the President submitted the treaty in June, 1897, many of
these observers were surprised at the amount of opposition which
suddenly appeared. O f tw enty newspapers polled by Public
Opinion, more than half condemned the treaty; most of the op
ponents raised the old cry of “no colonialism.” The American
Federation of Labor, little concerned with foreign expansion
until now, split on the Hawaiian issue, but for the most part op
posed annexation. The railroad brotherhoods and the iron work
ers saw the islands as a virgin frontier for their trades, but most
members of the labor federation feared Hawaii’s unskilled labor,
contract labor, and especially the large number of Orientals.
Senator Stephen M. W hite of California summarized the oppo
sition arguments in an article published in August, 1897. H e
stressed that annexation would require a large military establish
ment, raise new racial problems, and propel the republic to a
suicidal colonial policy. W hite emphasized that Americans al
ready controlled the trade of the islands. Moreover, he insisted,
“There is no danger of foreign interference.” 64
But such danger did exist, and this threat severely shook the
antiannexationist argument. Germany wanted to protest, but she
was forced to drop the project when Great Britain stalled and
then refused to cooperate in a joint note. Japan, however, pre
sented a strong protest, probably the strongest protest Japan had
ever issued to another power up to that time. T okyo disclaimed
designs on the islands, but warned that the rights of Japanese
citizens in Hawaii must be protected. The State Department
could not brush off this protest. Japanese accounted for one-
quarter of the total Hawaiian population. T okyo demonstrated
64 Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 284-286; Public Opinion,

June 24, 1897, 771-773; John C. Appel, “American Labor and the Annex
ation of Hawaii: A Study in Logic and Economic Interest,” Pacific
Historical Review , XXIII (February, 1954), 5; W hite, “T he Proposed
Annexation o f Hawaii,” Forum, XXIII (August, 1897), 723-736.
4- The N e w Empire
that it meant to protect the rights of these citizens when it dis
patched a cruiser to Honolulu in July. Japanese newspapers bit
terly attacked the annexationist pact.55
The State Department flatly rejected the Japanese protest, but
the administration did not let the matter rest at that point. Both
Long and Roosevelt were, in Roosevelt’s words, “strong” be
lievers “in our taking possession of Hawaii in some shape or
other.” On July io the N avy Department ordered American
sailors to prepare to land and take Hawaii by force if the Japanese
made threatening moves. Three days later, Long sent the “Ore
gon,” perhaps the strongest ship in the fleet, to Hawaii. The
American press, rather unconcerned about Hawaii in early June,
suddenly came alive with strong anti-Japanese editorials. The
Democratic Baltimore Sun summarized many of these editorials
in a phrase: “It is Japan that w ill seize the islands if we do not.”
Cushman Davis and Roosevelt criticized the Japanese in public
statements during late summer. Roosevelt gave the Naval W ar
College a special war problem: “Japan makes demands on Ha
waiian Islands. This country intervenes. W hat force will be nec
essary to uphold the intervention. . . . Keeping in mind pos
sible complications with another power on the Atlantic Coast
[Cuba].” Assistant Secretary of State Day had attempted to pla
cate the Japanese from the beginning of the crisis, however, and
the Kiaochow incident in November, which presented a much
more immediate threat to her interests, finally forced Japan to
accept assurances. These six months had been a hiatus in Japanese-
American friendship, but by December, 1897, good relations had
been restored.666
5
65 Dugdale, German Documents, II, 483-493; Dun to Sherman, April

12, June 21, 1897, Japan, Despatches, N A ; R G 59; Stevens, Expansion
in Hawaii, 282-284. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 613, remarks
about the lack of precedence for the Japanese protest. T he best analysis
is in W illiam Adam Russ, Jr., The Hawaiian Republic, 1894-1898 . . .
(Selinsgrove, Pa., 1961), ch. iv.
66 Roosevelt to Hartwell, June 7, 1897, Letterbooks, Roosevelt MSS;
The Kiaochow incident had also affected American interests
in the far Pacific. In early 1898 a rash of articles and editorials
appeared linking the Hawaiian and Chinese problems. The is
lands, as James Harrison W ilson wrote in the N orth American
Review , would serve as a “naval station and a halfway house” to
the “commerce of the Pacific islands and of the countries be
yond.” The Philadelphia Press, a journal close to the administra
tion, agreed with W ilson: the annexation question “presents the
broad issue of entering into the world’s competition for enlarged
commerce, or of renouncing all serious effort for commercial
expansion.” The Louisville Commercial tied the opportunity in
Hawaii with markets in the Far East, as did the Cincinnati Com
mercial Tribune and the Pittsburgh Press. Senator Frye an
nounced that annexation should be quickly accomplished so “the
whole world w ill accept that as the first step in the direction of
exercising our moral influence to preserve the integrity of China.”
The N ew York Tribune argued, “Recent events in China have
put a new face” on the annexation issue. A day later this journal
noted that the United States “by nature and by situation [is] fitted
to enjoy the major share of all Pacific commerce,” but then
warned that “Hawaii is the commercial key to the whole Pa
cific.” C7
Important spokesmen for the business community agreed with
these assessments. BradstreePs, the N ew York Commercial, and
the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce wanted annexation of
Sherman to Dun, June 25, 1897, Japan, Instructions, N A , R G 59; Long

to “Oregon,” July 13, 1897, Confidential Correspondence, N A , R G 45;
Public Opinion, July 1, 1897, 6; Garraty, Lodge , 199; Roosevelt to G ood
rich, May 28, 1897, Letterbooks, Roosevelt MSS.
57 W ilson, “America’s Interests in China,” North American Review,
CLXVI (February, 1898), 128-141; Philadelphia Press, Jan. 8, 1898, 6:2;
Feb. 7, 1898, 6:2; Louisville Commercial, Jan. 3, 1898, 4:2; Cincinnati
Commercial Tribune, N ov. 30, 1897, 6:2; Pittsburgh Press, Jan. 10, 1898,
1:1; N e w York Tribune, Jan. 6, 1898, 7:5; Jan. 7, 1898, 6:2; Campbell,
Special Business Interests, 17.
$66 T he N e w Empire
the islands, and the Journal of Commerce became a strong ad
vocate after the turmoil began in China in late 1897. In a speech
frequently punctuated by applause, Senator Frye told the N a
tional Association of Manufacturers’ annual convention on Jan
uary 28, 1898, that, although the home market was a great one,
“four years ago w e had a new teacher,” the depression, w hich
taught Americans to undertake “a determined advance arid march
upon the foreign market.” “The first market you are trying to
reach,” Frye continued, “is the market of the Orient. You don’t
propose to leave that to be closed against you.” In this context
the Nicaragua canal project and the annexation of Hawaii were
crucial policy steps. Drawing a horrible picture of what would
result if Great Britain controlled Hawaii, Frye cried to his au
dience, “N ow , w ill you help us in the Senate? [Cries of ‘Yes, yes:
w e w ill!’] W e only lack tw o or three votes, and if you w ill help
us w e w ill get them.” 68
M cKinley had preceded Frye on the rostrum and had seen the
response to the Maine Senator’s enthusiasm for annexation, but
the President needed no urging on the issue. W hile conversing
w ith senators earlier in January about matters of patronage, M c
K inley had used the opportunity to sound them out on their
position on Hawaii. One W hite House reporter who knew much
about these conversations commented: “The Administration is
beginning to view the growing power o f Japan with keen in
terest. . . . [Annexation] would also, [the President] thinks, do
wonders in increasing the trade of the United States w ith the
east.” Another friend quoted the President as saying: “W e need
Hawaii just as much and a good deal more than w e did California.
It is Manifest D estiny.” W hen the beet sugar lobby appeared to
be making headway against the treaty, the Secretary o f Agri
culture, James W ilson, w ho had previously opposed annexation,
sent a thick pile o f papers to the Senate, proving with statistics
that Hawaii could not injure the American beet sugar interests.
68 T he best survey is in Pratt, Expansionists of ¡898, 254-263; the Frye
speech, and the reaction, is in N e w York Tribune , Jan. 28, 1898, 2:2-4.
T he administration was obviously intent on obtaining annexa
tion.«»
T he treaty had been signed w ith Hawaiian representatives on
June 17, 1897, but debate in the Senate did not begin until mid-
January, 1898. Perhaps the primary theme of the debates ap
peared in the opening argument over whether the bill should be
considered in executive session or not. T he annexationists urged
that a closed session was necessary, since many remarks would
have to be made about other foreign powers now involved in
China, remarks which would not w in friends for the United
States if they appeared in the Congressional Record. T he annex
ationists carried their point. Initiating the debate in executive
session, Cushman Davis, chairman of the Foreign Relations Com
mittee, emphasized tw o aspects of the issue, both related to the
Orient. First, he referred to the commercial utility of the islands.
Second, he mentioned Hawaii’s “military importance,” which
had been made manifest by “the opening of a new condition of
affairs in the Far East.” T he islands would be of special strategic
importance also in safeguarding “that great gateway of com
merce,” the proposed Isthmian canal.60
Other senators amplified these themes to such an extent that
George F. Hoar became worried. The Massachusetts Senator
wanted Hawaii, but he did not want this action to initiate a w ide
spread American colonial policy in the western Pacific. H e re
called in his memoirs that so many of his colleagues were tying
Hawaii in with the Far Eastern situation that he became con
cerned that the Hawaiian question “could not be separated, at
least in debate, from the question of entering upon a career of
conquest in the Far East.” Hoar went to M cKinley for assurances.
The President told him that the administration had no ideas about
getting “our share of China,” and then M cKinley emphasized the
B9W ashington Evening Star, Jan. 12, 1898, 4:2; Jan. 19, 1898, 14:1;
Russ, The Hawaiian Republic, 240.
60 N e w York Tribune, Jan. 11,1898,1:1; Jan. 13,1898,4:4; Feb. 2, 1898,
1:1; W ashington Evening Star, Jan. 13, 1898, 14:1.
Japanese danger. The Chief Executive no doubt was talking
about territorial, not commercial, shares. Hoar went away satis
fied and provided influential support for the treaty, but a year
later he exhibited more than a little bitterness when M cKinley
forced him to take a stand on the annexation of the Philippines.81
Many other points of the Hawaiian discussion, both inside and
outside of Congress, presaged the Philippine debate of 1899. Few
of the antiannexationists spoke about commercial benefits; they
tended instead to emphasize the constitutional and racial argu
ments. W hen they did mention commercial advantages, they
believed that control of Pearl Harbor and the present trading ar
rangements would suffice to keep the trade in American hands.
The annexationists polished off that argument by noting that
Pearl Harbor was useless against an enemy unless the United
States controlled the hinterland of the naval base as w ell. As for
the trading arrangements, any foreign power which gained in
fluence over the island government could abrogate the commer
cial treaties at w ill. W hen the antiannexationists urged the con
tinuation of a de jacto protectorate instead of assuming new and
unknown political responsibilities, the W ashington Evening Star
printed the rebuttal: “A protectorate is a half and half measure,
involving endless complications with the other strong powers
which are soon to develop active competition for the possession
and control of the Pacific ocean.” A ll these questions would arise
in the Philippine discussion, and the answers would be nearly the
same.82
The Japanese threat and the renewed concern over Far East
ern events nearly provided enough impetus to drive the annexa
tion treaty through the Senate in February and March, 1898.
The de Lome letter and the “Maine” catastrophe focused primary
ei George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (N e w , York,
1903), II, 306-308.
82 W ashington Evening Star, Jan. 24, 1898, 9:6. For a similar argument
on the weaknesses of protectorates, see the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee’s majority report on Hawaiian annexation, Senate Report
N o. 681, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess. (serial 3267), 1-119.
attention on Cuba, and the beet sugar lobby exerted much in
fluence on wavering senators, but at one point in late February,
Cushman Davis believed that he had all but four of the sixty
votes necessary for ratification. The administration forces then
suddenly switched tactics. On March 16 the Foreign Relations
Committee reported a joint resolution for annexation, which
required only a majority of both houses. The resolution appeared
to be so certain of quick passage that the next day, the seven
teenth, sugar prices broke sharply downward on the N ew York
Stock Exchange. Again, affairs in Cuba prevented debate. But in
June the House passed the resolution 290-91 amidst arguments
eulogizing the bottomless Asian markets and the necessity of
preserving American interests in the far Pacific. On July 6 the
Senate passed the measure 42-21 and M cKinley made annexation
official the follow ing day.63
The President proclaimed that the annexing of Hawaii marked
the “inevitable consequence” of three-quarters of a century of
American interest in those islands. Few if any events in history
are inevitable. Certainly the Cleveland administration had proven
that the issue of Hawaiian annexation was not blessed with kismet
in 1893. But during the next five years American policy makers
began to view the matter in a new light. Both Cleveland, during
his later years in office, and M cKinley accepted the D ole regime
as a stable government; the United States forgot about the meth
ods which that government had employed to assume power.
Second, Americans lost much of their fear of bringing new races
into the Union, especially when a third factor became evident—
a Japanese threat posing a danger with which Cleveland and
Gresham had not been forced to deal. Finally, and most impor
tant, the United States had decided that its interests in the far
Pacific could be preserved only if the Hawaiian Islands were po
litically stabilized and if American naval and commercial hold
ings were freed from all foreign threats. T he Battle of Manila
63 Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 290-29^; W ashington
Evening Star, March 17, 1898, 2:7.
ß jo The N e w Empire
Bay raised this last argument into full prominence, but the argu
ment had been popularized many months before D ew ey con
jured up new visions o f the Asian market during the dawn o f
that May morning.
The American Business Community before

the W ar w ith Spain, 1897 to February, 1898
During the eighteen months before the United States went to
war with Spain, American businessmen began their most in
tensive search for foreign markets. A Mexico City newspaper
marveled, in fact, that “enterprising manufacturers” in the United
States “are able, by unremitting effort, to overcome the obstacles
raised by the legislators at W ashington.” T o outdistance the
M cKinley administration in the quest for foreign markets re
quired some hard running. A t approximately the same time the
M exico City journal printed its comment, M cKinley was de
claring that he wanted to climax his career by making the United
States supreme in the markets of the world. These tw o factors—
the intensive search by American producers for foreign markets,
and the M cKinley administration’s urgent desire to aid the busi
ness community in this venture— are the tw o clues to under
standing the economic aspects of the new empire in 1897 and
i 898.64
The annual convention of the National Association of Manu
facturers in January, 1898, offered a case study of these factors.
The N .A .M . had grown from three hundred members in 1895
to over nine hundred, and, as its President boasted, “in capital
invested, in value of products and in number of hands employed
the membership . . . probably represents a larger aggregate
than any other business organization in the world.” Certainly no
other group of businessmen could have matched the association’s
drive for foreign markets during the 1895-1898 period. On Jan
uary 27 the convention welcomed back the man who had been
the featured speaker at the first convention, W illiam M cKinley.
84 Public Opinion , July 8, 1897, 37; Leech, Days of M cKinley, 141.
Reaction: Approach to W ar 57/
The President recalled those depression days of three years be
fore:
It was a cold day. You had lost everything but your pluck, or
thought you had. . . . Your speeches and resolutions at that first
convention were directed mainly to the question of . . . how to
stop further loss. But your object now, as I gather it, is to go out
and possess what you have never had before. You want to extend,
not your notes, but your business. I sympathized with your pur
poses then; I am in full accord with your intentions now.65
A s M cKinley spoke, statisticians were calculating that 1897
had been the greatest year in history for American exports. An
enormous amount of agricultural goods had entered foreign
markets as a substitute for ruined European crops. But business
journals slighted these agrarian exports and emphasized the in
dustrial sector. T hey could do so with good reason. Industrial
exports had soared from $258,000,000 in 1896 to $311,000,000
in 1897. T hey would rise another $23,000,000 in 1898 and, as
in 1897, approximate one-third of all exports. The most notable
upsurge had occurred in iron and steel. Pig iron manufacturers,
happily driving British producers out of some new area of the
globe virtually every month, increased their exports from $471,-
803 in 1896 to $2,331,771 in 1897. Steel ingots, bars, rods, and
especially rails follow ed suit. Oil, copper, and cotton manufac
tures surged ahead. Railroad equipment and electrical goods be
gan to control European markets. Although this export drive
was occurring in industries throughout the nation, some o f the
most rabid economic expansionists could be found in the South.
Textile and iron and steel industries in this section threatened to
outstrip their older northern competitors in the quest for foreign
markets. In the 1889 to 1891 issues of the Chattanooga Trades
man, few articles referred to foreign markets. In 1898 a single
65 Annual Report of the President of the National Association of
Manufacturers, Feh. i, 1897 (Philadelphia, 1897); M cKinley, Speeches,
1891-1900, 61. For the opening in Caracas of the N .A .M . warehouse for
industrial goods, see Chattanooga Tradesman, May 1, 1898, 48.
issue of this journal included articles entitled, “American Iron in
Europe,” “Our Foreign Trade,” “The Development of Southern
Seaports,” “American Trade in the Baltic,” “Expansion of South
ern Export Trade.” 66
But the Tradesman provided only one example of the interest
of commercial periodicals in foreign markets. The topic was so
common that business journals soon reached an agreement on the
bases and objectives of this commercial expansion. The first as
sumption was pulled innocently out of Brooks Adams’ theories.
Businessmen had replaced soldiers and priests as the dominant
forces in the world; “the world belongs to the producers and
distributers.” The “spirit of trade” and “not religious feeling
. . . is the ruling force of national and social action.” “The chief
object of domestic government is to encourage production and
facilitate exchange. . . . The chief object of diplomacy is to
extend profitable markets for home industry.” 67
If commercial expansion was the dominant fact in the world of
the 1890’s, then, as Commercial America commented, in this
“international strife of today that simmers below the surface,”
the United States must take “a pronounced pre-eminence because
of her vast supremacy as a manufacturer among nations.” Cen
turies of world history had been a mere preparation for this
American supremacy. “A ll former centuries had outlets for dis
content,” the N ew York Commercial Advertiser, explained. N ow
all these frontiers had been “exhausted” and the “safety valve”
for “every discontented and restless fellow ” had closed. This
point had been rammed into the American consciousness by the
depression of the 1890’s. The Journal of Commerce and the
Boston Herald (the spokesman for the Boston Chamber of Com-
M Ibid ., Jan. 1, 1898; Bullock, W illiams, Tuckner, “Balance o f Trade,”

228-229; Journal of Commerce , Dec. 14, 1897, 6:4; Oct. 8, 1897, 1:1. For
the growing power of American finance capital in international centers,
see W hite to Sherman, Jan. 21, 1898, Great Britain, Despatches, N A , R G
59-
67 Journal of Commerce , N ov. 12, 1897, 4:2; Commercial Advertiser ,
Jan. 27, 1898, 6:2.
merce) agreed with the President of the N.A.M. The depression,
insisted Theodore Search, had been a “valuable experience” in
teaching Americans the value of foreign markets.6869
But fate could not receive all the credit. American producers
had prepared for their conquest of world markets, according to
the N ew York Commercial Advertiser, by learning to produce
goods so cheaply “that w e can undersell Europe and still enjoy
a profit.” Labor-saving machines developed by the United States
had doomed British exporters, as one American manufacturer of
machinery explained happily to the London Times. W ith grow
ing agreement on this point, fewer cries arose for a subsidized
merchant marine. “Cheap transportation” would always be a
“dominating factor,” noted one commercial journal, but of much
more significance would be technological advances and prox
im ity of raw materials to mills. “This is our new status; this is our
manifest destiny,” proclaimed the Journal of Commerce, “and it
means a cheapness that w ill open to us the markets of the
world.” 68
Echoing the arguments of Grover Cleveland and William W il
son in 1894, business spokesmen prophesied that expanded foreign
trade would be the balm for both international and domestic ills.
But in 1897 domestic problems were still uppermost. The shock
waves of the depression were still rattling through American
society in the form of low prices and labor discontent. In Sep
tember, 1897, one of the worst strikes of the decade ended with
twenty-one Hazleton, Pennsylvania, coal miners gunned down
by a sheriff's posse. Throughout the summer M cKinley had is
sued warnings that the econom y still had to make a long upward
68 Commercial America quoted in Boston Herald, Feb. 25, 1898, 5:3;

Commercial Advertiser, Feb. 27, 1898, 6:1-2; Chattanooga Tradesman,
Jan. i, 1898, 99; Journal of Commerce, Sept. 22, 1897, 4:2; Dec. 11, 1897,
6:2.
69 Commercial Advertisery Jan. 13, 1898, 6:1; Chattanooga Tradesman,
Oct. 15, 1897, 78; Boston Herald, Feb. 27, 1898, 12:5; N.A .M . circular,
“Foreign Trade o f Argentine, Uruguay and Brazil,” [n.d.], vi-vii;
Journal of Commerce, Feb. 15,1898, 6:1-2; N o v . 24,1897,6:2.
£7^ The N e w Empire
climb before prosperous conditions returned. But the tremendous
wheat exports in late 1896 and 1897 had quieted the Populist
complaints in the W est and South, and when industrial employ
ment began to rise in late 1897, observers quickly gave the en
larged foreign markets much of the credit. “Most significant of
all the favorable conditions,” the Louisville Ccmmtercial declared
on the last day of 1897, is that “the United States is to be the
supply depot for increasing territory on both continents. . . .
There is no room in America for the pessimist at the beginning of
1898.” 70
Thus the business community shaped its outlook at the close
o f 1897. T he destinies of commerce swayed the destinies of the
world. The closing of the frontier, cheap depression prices, and
increased use of laborsaving machinery had given American busi
nessmen the golden opportunity to control this commerce. W ith
this control, markets could be found for the industrial and agri
cultural surpluses. The resulting impetus to employment would
end labor discontent and restore prosperous conditions.
T he control of foreign markets provided the key link in the
philosophy. The export tables proved that American producers
were most ambitious to conquer these markets. Other incidents
pointed to the same conclusion. M cKinley called a special session
o f Congress to consider the tariff in 1897. N elson D ingley of
Maine and Albert J. Hopkins o f Illinois had been holding hear
ings throughout 1896 in preparation for the next tariff bill. W hen
Hopkins held a special hearing for business opinion on a possible
reciprocity clause, the session turned into a prolonged chant on
the benefits of foreign trade. The National Board of Trade, N ew
York Board of Trade and Transportation, N ew Yrirk State
Chamber of Commerce, and Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce
70 Higham, Strangers in the Land , 89-90; Curtis to Charles W . Dabney,

Jr., W . E. Curtis papers, Library o f Congress, W ashington, D.C.; Gage
to Robert Benson, N ov. 2, 1897, Gage MSS; Louisville Commercial, D ec.
31, 1897,4:1.
Reaction: Approach to W ar 3^3
first appeared before the committee to proclaim: “A t no time in
the history of our country has a commercial question of equal
importance presented itself. . . . The necessity of finding new
markets is an imperative one.” 71
These groups were follow ed by particular business interests.
The Illinois Steel Company, which had discounted the need for
foreign markets in 1894, now declared that increased foreign
trade'through reciprocity was absolutely necessary if the com
pany was to maintain full employment. The Baldwin Locomotive
W orks reported that if the entire nation was prosperous all loco
motives made in the country could find markets at home. “Such
a condition, however, never has existed for more than a year or
tw o at a time. O nly once in the last twenty-five years, viz., about
fifteen years ago, have all the locomotive builders been fully
em ployed.” The Farquhar Farm Implement Company and Mo
line Plow Company emphasized that the key to full employment
and high wages was the exporting of “half of our product.” The
American milling industry, still staggering under the impact of
the repeal of the reciprocity provision in 1894, noted that most
of the 18,470 mills in the United States were either idle or run
ning half time. This industry insisted: “W e do not believe that
over 50 percent of the wheat produced in this country can be
absorbed in our domestic markets.” J. C. A yer Company, speak
ing for some drug, medicine, and chemical firms, commented,
“Our observation leads us to believe that were it not for the out
let given by exportation to foreign countries the competition for
the United States market would be disastrously felt by manu
facturers.” A leading manufacturer of freight and street-railway
cars asked for “a dumping ground for the excess of our manufac
ture beyond our needs.” Representatives from the wire and steel
industry, buggy companies, the American Paper Makers’ Asso
ciation, the National Cash Register Company, and the National
71 House Report N o. 2263, 54th Cong., ist Sess. (serial 3466), 312, 147—
148, 176, 178.
2j 6 The N e w Empire
Live-Stock Exchange repeated these statements. The one group
which denied the benefits of reciprocity and expanded foreign
trade was the Board of Trade of Tupelo, Mississippi.72
The tariff debates of the next spring revealed that a striking
change had occurred since the days of James G. Blaine. N ow the
businessman blazed trails to new foreign markets; the politician
dragged his feet. Although the Republicans had written a strong
reciprocity plank in the 1896 platform, although M cKinley had
emphasized reciprocity at every opportunity, and although D ing-
ley and Hopkins stressed the necessity of increased foreign trade
in their introductory statements to the special session, the reci
procity amendments of 1897 were a weakened version of the
1890 clause. Sugar and hides—the key to the success of the 1890
provision—went off the free list in order to placate western,
prosilver interests and to bring more revenue into the Treasury.
Coffee, tea, tonka beans, and vanilla beans now comprised the
free items. N o agreements could be made with Latin-American
countries on the basis of these offerings. A second clause was
aimed at western Europe. The United States offered to set lower
rates on argols, tartar, wine, brandies, champagne, paintings, and
statuary in order to open France, Germany, Italy, and Spain to
American exports. A third type of reciprocity most excited trade
expansionists. The bill authorized the President to conclude
treaties with any nation for general reductions on any duty up
to 20 per cent. But there was a joker; the entire Congress had to
approve such pacts. N o treaties of this sort became law.73
Disappointed in their hopes for an effective reciprocity treaty,
the business community was similarly disappointed when it be
gan a drive for consular reform in 1897. Cleveland had taken a
step forward when he had issued an executive order in 1895 which
provided that consular candidates would be required to take ex-
72 Ibid., 20, 265-267, 384-385, 382-383, 428-429, 430-431, 27-28, 442,

471-472,20,474-478,180-181,488-490,162, 52.
73 Congressional Record, 55th Cong., ist Sess., 133-136; Laughlin and
W illis, Reciprocity, 278-281; Taussig, Tariff H istory, 332-333, 352-354.
aminations. But in spite of an intensive drive by leading business
spokesmen, including the N ew York Board of Trade (Oscar
Straus was particularly active here), the N ew York Journal of
Commerce, the Baltimore Journal of Commerce (which noted
that “the merchants and manufacturers of the country are plead
ing for a reorganization of the consular service”), the National
Business Men’s League, the N .A .M ., and numerous chambers of
commerce, the federal government refused to move. N ew York
Business noted the reason for this upsurge of business interest:
competition abroad “is continually increasing” and consular re
form must be obtained “if the United States is to extend its com
merce so as to finally hold the commercial supremacy of the
world.” 74
Even without governmental assistance the American business
man was conquering world markets. Search boasted in February,
1898, that the $1,032,998,880 export trade of fiscal 1897 had
been “without an equal in the annals” of the country. N o one
realized the significance of these figures any more than the Eu
ropean businessmen and statesmen who watched the lengthening
shadow which the American entrepreneur was throwing over
world markets. European journals and politicians had seethed
over this competition throughout the 1890’s, but the combination
of the D ingley tariff, which excluded many European goods,
and the continuing success of cheap American products in inter
national trade finally caused an anti-American explosion in late
1897.75
On November 20,1897, Count Agenor Goluchowski, Minister
74 Public Opinion , July 15, 1897, 91; N ov. 18, 1897, 666-667; W illiam
Barnes and John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United
States: Origins, Development, and Functions (W ashington, 1961), 149-
150; Journal of Commerce , Jan. 26, 1898, 8:2; Commercial Advertiser ,
Jan. 27, 1898, 6:3.
75 Quotation o f Iron Trades Review of London in Journal of Com -
merce , Oct. 7, 1897, 4:4; Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten,
346; Sherman to T ow er, Dec. 14, 1897, Austria, Instructions, N A , R G
59-
of Foreign Affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, declared in
a formal address that Europe was engaged in a life-and-death
commercial struggle w ith “countries beyond the seas.” H e urged
all European nations to “fight shoulder to shoulder against this
common danger” and to “go into this contest armed w ith every
weapon o f defense that their resources can afford.” T he State
Department interpreted this speech as more than a declaration
of commercial war. In the summer of 1896 O lney had believed
that Goluchowski had inspired Spain’s attempts to line up a com
mon European front against the United States. Perhaps Golu
chowski was now making another such attempt. The Journal of
Commerce interpreted the Minister’s speech as another indication
o f the growing Russian menace. Austria, the Journal premised,
was only “third-rate” commercially; thus Goluchowski must be
acting as front man for the grasping Czar. But although Ameri
cans worried about the political meaning o f Goluchowski’s
speech, few were concerned about the throwing down of the
gauntlet if this meant commercial warfare. As the Gncinnati
Commercial Tribune commented in a direct reply to G oluchow
ski, “A power higher than that o f thrones and ministries has
decreed that Europe shall play second fiddle to U ncle Sam in
the commerce of the world, and you fight against fate when you
try to prevent it.” TÄ
As the United States entered the new year o f 1898, new syn
dicates and lobbying groups were organizing to advance Amer
ican economic interests in the Orient. The Bureau o f American
Republics was having difficulty in meeting the mounting demand
from businessmen who sought information and aid in finding new
Latin-American markets. In March, 1898, the N ew York Com
mercial Advertiser could justifiably brag of the existence of “a
new Monroe doctrine, not o f political principles, but of com -67
76 T ow er to Sherman, N o v . 24, 1897, Austria, Despatches, and T aylor

to Olney, Aug. 13, 1896, Spain, Despatches, N A , R G 59; Journal of Com
merce, N ov. 30, 1897, 6:1-2; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune , N o v . 24,
1897, 6:1.
mercial policy. . . . Instead of laying down dogmas, it figures
up profits.” 77 The Chattanooga Tradesman lost all restraint in
proclaiming, “The Baltic trade properly belongs to the Ameri
cans, especially to those in the South.” 78 In summary, the Amer
ican business community would not suddenly discover the ad
vantage of and need for foreign markets during and after the
Spanish-American W ar. Indeed, the American businessman’s
quest for these markets was one of the most striking characteris
tics of the national scene in the months immediately preceding
the war with Spain. The results of this war provided these busi
nessmen with new opportunities for further economic expansion.
But the war did not provide the impetus for this expansion. The
impetus had been provided by the impact of the industrial revo
lution, especially the depression that follow ed the panic of 1893.
The Decision for W ar

T he long-range importance of the m ultiplying American in
terests in the Far East and the expansive tendencies o f the business
community would only become apparent after the summer of
1898. Throughout the first six months of that year Americans
would consider the Cuban revolution as the paramount problem
of their foreign policy. Before the turn of the next century, de
velopments in these three areas would blend into a single, con
certed, expansionist movement, but in February and March, 1898,
the de Lome letter, the destruction of the “Maine,” and the grow
ing preparations for war in both Spain and the United States
turned all eyes to the Caribbean theater. Actually, the M cKinley
administration had not diverted its attention from Cuba since
Sherman had sent the somber instructions to W oodford in July,
1897. The promise of Spanish reforms in Novem ber and Decem
ber did little to allay M cKinley’s apprehension, an apprehension
which mounted rapidly after the Havana riots of January 12. In
77 Joseph P. Smith to M cKinley, July 31, 1897, and Smith to Porter,

D ec. i, 1897, M cKinley MSS; Commercial Advertiser, March 7 ,1 898,6:2.
78 Chattanooga Tradesman, Jan. 1, 1898, 102.
ßSo T he N e w Empire
the immediate aftermath of these riots, the administration decided
to send the “Maine” to Havana harbor. From that time, Spain
and the United States marched toward war with the regularity
o f drum taps.
The President and State Department officials could not, how
ever, devote exclusive attention to the devastated island. A t the
very time the administration debated the desirability of toughen
ing its demands, Russia and Germany gravely challenged the
open-door principles. During the last week of February, Ger
many refused to allow an Anglo-American syndicate to build
a railway from Tientsin to Tsingkiang on the grounds that the
track would pass through Shantung, a German sphere of influ
ence. This was certainly not the w ay the United States inter
preted the open door. But even more disheartening events were
in the offing.79
On March 6 Germany received a formal ninety-nine year lease
on the strategic tip of Shantung. France and Japan used the Ger
man move as an opportunity to advance their own interests in
South China and in Fukien respectively. But affairs at Port Arthur
and Talienwan most concerned the State Department. These
ports provided the main channel for the mushrooming number
of American exports to reach North China and Manchurian
markets. On March 8 both cities fell under the control of the Czar.
In a cable to Sherman, Denby called the Russian move “tortuous
treachery. . . . International intercourse does not contain an epi
sode of greater moral baseness than this.” John H ay wrote from
England that British officials smelled “an understanding between
Russia, France and Germany to exclude, as far as possible, the
trade of England and America from the Far East, and to divide
and reduce China to a system of tributary provinces.” Sherman
asked desperately for German and Russian assurances that the
open door would be preserved. The Wilhelmstrasse blandly gave
such a promise, but the Russians proved extremely reluctant to
79 W hite to Sherman, Feb. 23, 1898, Great Britain, Despatches, N A , R G
59-
do so. W hen the Czar at last complied, the State Department had
been rocked by the news that the British, having failed in their
search for assistance in maintaining the open door, had entered
the scramble for territory by seizing W ei-H ai-W ei. The United
States, apparently, was now isolated in the Far East.80
Spokesmen for American commercial groups interested in
China and Manchuria reacted sw iftly. T he N ew York City
Chamber of Commerce signed a common petition with Ameri
can merchants in Shanghai and rushed the document to W ashing
ton. T he week before M cKinley sent in his Cuban war message,
D ay had to reply to a letter of the Boston Chamber of Com
merce which demanded that, since Boston and N ew England
interests in the China trade were so large, “fullest protection”
was required from the State Department. D ay assured the Cham
ber that his department was giving the subject “the most careful
consideration.” The Boston Herald, strongly against intervention
in Cuba, commented, “It is easy to conceive of conditions under
which it would be both our right as w ell as interest” to offer
“physical aid” to England “in preventing the closing of those
far-away markets.” T he Pittsburgh Press, spokesman for the
area’s steel interests, doubted whether the “Muscovite is much
better than the Mongolian,” asked “how much of the Chinese
trade w ill [w e] get under European auspices,” and concluded,
“W hat the United States should do is to arm itself as soon as
possible against European aggression.” The Philadelphia Press,
a journal close to the administration, worried in February that
England would be unable to handle the Russian-German threat.
The Press then declared that this observation should influence
American actions, since “the future must not be put in peril.
. . . China holds one-fourth the human race. Its free access to
80D enby to Sherman, March 19,1898, China, Despatches, H ay to Sher

man, March 25, 1898, Great Britain, Despatches, Sherman to W hite,
March 16, 1898, Great Britain, Instructions, and Sherman to H itchcock,
March 16, 1898, Russia, Instructions, NA, R G 59; McCormick, “ ‘Fair
Field and No Favor,* ** 145-146, 153-154.
¿82 The N e w Empire
our trade and manufactures is vital to our future.” The N ew
York correspondent of the Economist reported “much talk” in
business circles about an alliance with England to maintain “open
ports in China against the combined influence of Russia and
Germany.” On April 4 W hitelaw Reid ordered the N ew York
Tribune's editor to watch the Orient closely; “as soon as Cuba is
out of the w ay the present Chinese complications are likely to
develope a great deal of interest for us, particularly if England
should get involved in war over the conflicting claims.” Clarence
Cary wrote optimistically from W ashington on March 18 that
the capital was “beginning” to understand how British friendship
provided the key to both American freedom of action in Cuba
and the preservation of United States interests in the Far East.81
In commenting upon this crisis, journals provided evidence of
how these new involvements were realigning the nation’s friends
and enemies. The Cincinnati Commercial Tribune and Foord’s
Journal of Commerce warned that Russia had “goaded” England
into the territorial scramble. England’s power still represented the
last, best hope for the open door. T he N ew York Tribune spoke
more passionately: “As between Russian rule and Japanese rule,
a large share of the civilized world would choose the latter every
time. Slav-Tartar-Cossack rule means tyranny, ignorance, re
action. Japanese rule means freedom, enlightenment, progress.
If in a contest between the tw o opposite principles the latter does
not win the human race w ill suffer a dire catastrophe.” 82
In dealing with these complex problems in the Orient, the State
and N avy Departments had to concern themselves first with the
Spanish force in the Philippines. As early as December, 1897,
M cKinley had agreed to attack these islands if war was declared
81 Journal of Commerce, March 19, 1898, 1:1; Boston Herald , March

8, 1898, 6:4; Pittsburgh Press, April 11, 1898, 4:1; Reid to N icholson,
April 4,1898, Letterbooks, Reid MSS; Congressional Record , 55th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 3204-3205, also 3222.
82 Commercial Tribune , April 9, 1898, 6:3; Journal of Commercef
March 7, 1898, 6:1; March 19, 1898, 1:1; N e w York Tribune , March 18,
1898,6:4.
Reaction: Approach to W ar ß8ß
against Spain. But there are indications—no more than that—
that some members of the administration were thinking of Amer
ica’s Far Eastern interests in larger terms. Alfred Thayer Mahan
dominated the three-man Naval W ar Board, which formulated
the general blueprint for operations in the Pacific. Mahan had
long coveted the China market, and his recent writings had re
vealed a rapidly increasing interest in the far Pacific. Albert Shaw
could correctly observe in m id-1897 that Mahan “is as much in
evidence these days, through his discussion of naval matters, as
was ever Perry or John Paul Jones through naval victories.”
And Theodore Roosevelt, who had explained the Far Eastern
situation to M cKinley during the autumn and winter of 1897,
had in turn been schooled on the importance of the Orient by
Mahan. There were other signs of a larger American interest.
On May 5 the London Times reported that the United States had
searched for naval bases north of Shanghai before the war with
Spain. Commodore G . W . Melville, Chief Engineer of the United
States N avy, published an article in the N orth American R eview
in March, 1898, which quoted Seward on American destiny in
the Pacific and noted that an increasing amount of the “swelling
tide” of United States exports would have to find markets in the
Orient.83
This interest in the Far East was in the background—but the
immediate background—when, in late March, M cKinley decided
to make ultimate demands of Spain. Sometime between March
18 and 27 the President decided that war was inevitable unless
Spain was prepared to surrender Cuba, an action which the Sa-
gasta ministry could not take without threatening its own politi
cal life and that of the Spanish monarchy. Several developments
forced M cKinley to make this decision at this time. The adminis-
83 Review of Reviews, X V (March, 1897), 331; Leech, Days of M c
Kinley, 161-162; Seward W . Livermore, “American Naval-Base Policy
in the Far East, 1850-1914,” Pacific Historical Review, XIII (June, 1944),
IÏ3-I35, contains the Times comment; G. W . Melville, Chief Engineer,
U.S. N avy, “Our Future on the Pacific—W hat W e Have There to H old
and W in,” N orth American Review, CLXVI (March, 1898), 281-296.
tradon had concluded that the Sagasta reform program, hardly
three months old, was a failure. Another reason was the Presi
dent’s fear that after the publication of the report of the “Maine”
investigating commission Congress would be uncontrollable.
This factor, however, probably played only a minor role when
M cKinley formulated his final policy. T w o other factors were
o f greater importance: the fear of political repercussions on the
Republican party, and, perhaps most important, the growing be
lief of many sections of the business community that somehow
the disturbances on the island would have to be terminated be
fore the United States could enjoy full prosperity.
Elections in 1897 had not gone w ell for M cKinley’s party, nor
had more recent elections in N ew York and Kentucky. During
the first three months of 1898 the President and other Republican
leaders received many letters which drew bleak pictures of the
party’s future if the administration failed to deal w ith Cuba im
mediately. M cKinley’s letters on this point were capped with a
long message from H enry Cabot Lodge on March 21. Lodge had
recently returned from taking a private poll of Massachusetts
opinion. The Senator first assured M cKinley that the masses were
firmly behind the administration. But, Lodge continued, “if the
war in Cuba drags on through the summer with nothing done w e
should go down in the greatest defeat ever known before the cry
‘W hy have you not settled the Cuban question.* ” Clarence
Cary, who opposed a strong Cuban policy, wrote in the Journal
of Commerce in late March that mail was pouring in “even from
conservative city districts” warning of the Republican losses
which would inevitably result if the Democrats could “proclaim
from every stump that it was they who forced the hand o f the
Republican President and with the aid o f a few Republicans se
cured the liberty of Cuba.” These letters, Cary concluded, were
having a “potent effect.” 84
Most of the “conservative city districts” which Cary men-
84 Lodge to M cKinley, March 21, 1898, M cKinley MSS; Journal of
Commerce, March 30, 1898,1:5.
tioned had long opposed war with Spain.85 There were excep
tions, however. The American business community was by no
means monolithic in its opposition to war. T o say as a generaliza
tion that businessmen opposed war is as erroneous as saying that
businessmen wanted war. It is possible to suggest, however, that
by the middle of March important businessmen and spokesmen
for the business community were advocating war. It is also pos
sible to suggest that at the same time, a shift seemed to be occur
ring in the general business community regarding its over-all
views on the desirability of war.
Financial journals which advocated bimetallism had long urged
a stronger attitude toward Spain in the hope that the resulting
conflict would force the Treasury to pay expenses in silver. More
important, business spokesmen in such midwestem and western
cities as Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, Chicago, San Francisco,
and especially Pittsburgh were not reluctant to admit that they
would welcome war. The Louisville Commercial believed, “Only
a few of the eastern newspapers are pessimistic as to the business
outlook at the beginning of war. . . . Everywhere in the west
and south there is a disposition among businessmen . . . to keep
their feet, and their heads, too.” This journal was not reticent
in providing its own viewpoint: if war occurred, transportation
lines would prosper, “other enterprises would find more profit
and securities would go up all along the line. N or would the
credit of the United States be in the least impaired.” The Pitts
burgh Press, mouthpiece for that area’s booming steel interests,
strongly supported the Cincinnati businessmen’s resolutions that
asked for war. The Press added, “It is not to be doubted that this
expresses the feeling of the real business interests of the country.
. . . The mistake made in some quarters is supposing that the
stock jobbers are the business interests.” 86
85 Julius Pratt discusses this opposition in detail in ch. vii o f his Ex
pansionists of 18$8; see also Boston Herald, March 6, 1898, 12:13; ^ d
Journal of Commerce, April 1, 1898, 6:2-3.
8«Louisville Commercial, April 14, 1898, 4:1; March 5, 1898, 4:2;
The Pittsburgh Press represented one of the special interests
that would benefit from war. T he Pittsburgh Chamber of Com
merce also advocated the use of force, and the Chattanooga
Tradesman suggested one reason why: the “small prospect” of
conflict, the Tradesman noted on March i, “has decidedly stim
ulated the iron trade.” This journal, which did not want war, also
commented, “Actual war would very decidedly enlarge the
business of transportation,” especially railroads. W illiam E. Curtis
wrote from W ashington that the “belligerent spirit” which had
infected everyone in the N avy Department, with the possible
exception of Secretary Long, had been encouraged “by the con
tractors for projectiles, ordnance, ammunition and other supplies,
who have thronged the department since the destruction of the
M aine” These contractors, Curtis charged, had also assisted “cor
respondents of sensational newspapers in manufacturing canards
and scare news.” 87
A strong possibility exists that the antiwar commercial jour
nals in N ew York spoke for the less important members of that
financial community. Russell Sage, claiming that he spoke “not
only m y own views on this point, but those of other moneyed
men with whom I have talked,” demanded that if the “Maine”
was blown up by an outside force “the time for action has come.
There should be no wavering.” If war did occur, “There is no
question as to where the rich men stand”; they would buy gov
ernment bonds as they had during the G vil W ar and do all in
their power to bolster the nation’s war resources. W . C. Beer,
w ho attempted to make a thorough survey of leading business
men’s opinion, concluded that “the steady opponents of the war
among financiers were simply the life insurance men and small
bankers.” Beer found such giants as John Jacob Astor, John
Gates, Thomas Fortune Ryan, W illiam Rockefeller, and Stuy-
Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, March 30, 1898, 10:1; Pittsburgh Press,

March 30, 1898, 4:1; Pratt, Expansionists of 18¡>8, 243-244.
87 Tradesman, March 1, 1898, 58; Journal of Commerce, April 7, 1898,
6:3. Curtis’ statement is in the Pittsburgh Press, March 16, 1898, 1:1.
vesant Fish “feeling militant.” On March 28 J. Pierpont Morgan
declared that further talk of arbitration would accomplish
nothing.88
Beer’s findings can be supplemented with an analysis of the
membership of the Cuban League of the United States. This
organization began advertising in early 1897 that it would gladly
receive donations to finance its efforts to free Cuba from Spanish
control. As a part of these efforts, the league sold bonds for the
Cuban Junta. This organization included such militants as Theo
dore Roosevelt, Colonel Ethan Allen, and Charles A. Dana. But
the follow ing conservative businessmen were among the V ice-
Presidents: J. Edward Simmons, former President of the N ew
York Stock Exchange, President of the Fourth National Bank of
N ew York; Thomas F. Gilroy, builder and real estate operator
in N ew York City; Chauncey M. Depew, railroad president and
director of numerous railway and banking corporations; Thomas
L. James, Chairman of the Board of Lincoln National Bank in
N ew York City, President of the Lincoln Safe Deposit Company;
John R. Dos Passos, N ew York lawyer who engaged in banking,
corporate, and financial law and who had been active in the for
mation of large business amalgamations, including the sugar trust.
Seated on the Board of Directors were General Daniel Butter
field, G vil W ar hero, bank president, and Executive Officer of
the Steam Boat and Ferry Company; and Colonel John Jacob
Astor.89
A group of interests that depended upon Cuban trade formed
another category of business support which demanded that the
revolution be terminated. A group of importers, exporters, bank
ers, manufacturers, and steamship and vessel owners sent McKin
ley a petition in February, 1898, which noted that the fighting had
created a loss of one hundred million dollars a year in business
88 N e w York Tribune, Feb. 27, 1898, 5:1; Thomas Beer, Hanna (N e w

York, 1929), 199-200.
80 Review of Reviews, X V (February, 1897), 137; W ho Was W ho in
America, I (1897-1942) (Chicago, 1943).
conducted directly with the island, not to mention the destruc
tion of American properties on the island. The petition demanded
peace before the rainy season in May; otherwise, the sugar crop
of 1898 and 1899 would be ruined. Those who signed this pe
tition included “a large number of well-known and influential
firms” in N ew York City, the N ew York Tribune noted, and
also the names of businessmen in Philadelphia and Mobile.90
The petition noted the immense losses suffered by property
owners and merchants who had invested in the island itself. By
early 1898 these persons were becoming alarmed about something
other than the day-to-day destruction of property, although this
was certainly troublesome. The State Department began re
ceiving reports that, as Fitzhugh Lee phrased the problem, “there
may be a revolution within a revolution.” Conservative interests
feared that continued Spanish rule or autonomy, no matter how
developed, would result in Cuban radical forces gaining control
of the government. A strong feeling was growing which de
manded American intervention to end this threat. The American
Consul in Santiago summarized this feeling on March 23, 1898:
“Property holders without distinction of nationality, and with
but few exceptions, strongly desire annexation, having but little
hope of a stable government under either of the contending
forces. . . . [B ]ut such a move would not be popular among
the masses.” These interests, the Consul reported, regretted that
Americans did not favor outright, immediate annexation. M c
Kinley learned of this sentiment from a letter written by “a
gentleman of high standing, who has close personal relations
with influential Cubans who have favored the rebellion,” as Levi
P. Morton, former Vice-President under Harrison and a wheel-
horse of the Republican party, described the author. This letter
warned that the rebellion had to end quickly or the radical classes
would come to power. The writer believed that educated and
wealthy backers of the rebellion now wanted either annexation
or autonomy under American control. “T hey are most pro-
90 N e w York Tribimey Feb. 10, 1898, 2:3.
nounced in their fears,” he continued, “that independence, if ob
tained, would result in the troublesome, adventurous and non-
responsible class” seizing power.91
Many of these businessmen in Cuba hoped that annexation
could be accomplished through peaceful means, but they found
themselves trapped when they realized that Spain would not
surrender her sovereignty on American terms without war.
Among those who were so trapped was Edwin F. Atkins, one
of the largest American investors in Cuban plantations. H e dep
recated the possibility of war on behalf of the insurgents, espe
cially since the protection provided by Spanish troops enabled
his plantations to continue their harvests throughout the revo
lution. But as early as January, 1897, Atkins had written Lodge
that the best thing that could happen would be the annexation
of Cuba by the United States. Other investors, however, evaded
this trap by hoping for, or openly advocating, forceful Amer
ican intervention. Fitzhugh Lee wrote D ay in January, 1898,
“The Spanish merchants and property holders generally favor
some form of intervention on the part of the United States, but
are prevented from an open expression on the subject lest they
be disturbed by the soldier element.” The N ew York Tribune
noted in a front-page story on March 14, 1898, that European,
especially British, capital had been flowing into Cuba in the be
lief that the United States would shortly replace Spain as the
sovereign power. “Large enterprises welcome peace or forcible
intervention as the means of freeing them from burdens,” the
article continued. “The Government [of Cuba] owes every
body,” the Tribune observed, especially the large utility and rail
road companies.92
91 Lee to Day, N ov. 27, 1897, Consular, Havana, and H yatt to Day,
March 23, 1898, Consular, Santiago, N A , R G 59; enclosure in Levi P.
Morton to M cKinley, March 20, 1898, M cKinley MSS.
92 Atkins’ views are in Lodge to Charles Francis Adams, Jan. 22, 1897,
Letterbooks, Lodge MSS; Lee to Day, Jan. 18, 1898, Consular, Havana,
N A , R G 59; N ew York Tribune , March 14,1898,1:6; Barrington to Salis
bury, N ov. i i , 1897, Salisbury MSS.
ßpo T he N e w Empire
Perhaps the American business community exerted the most
influence on the administration during the last tw o weeks in
March when influential business spokesmen began to welcome
the possibility of war in order to end the suspense which
shrouded the commercial exchanges. Although other historians
have touched briefly on this important change,93 it should be
noted that some important business spokesmen and President
M cKinley apparently arrived at this decision at approximately
the same time.
During the first tw o months of 1898 the United States began
to enjoy prosperous conditions for the first time in five years.
T he de Lome and “Maine” incidents affected business condi
tions only in the stock exchanges, and even there the impact
was slight. Business improved, especially in the W est and N orth
west. In early March very few business journals feared a return
of depression conditions, and with the gold influx resulting
from discoveries in Alaska and from the export surplus, even
few er business observers displayed anxiety over the silver
threat.94
But in mid-March financial reporters noted that business in
commodities as w ell as stocks had suddenly slowed. H enry Clay
Frick had been optimistic in his business reports to Andrew
Carnegie, who was vacationing in Scotland. But on March 24,
Frick reported that “owing to uncertainty . . . of the Cuban
trouble, business is rather stagnant.” A W all Street correspond
ent wrote on March 22 that “the last tw o days have been the
dullest for many a month.” On March 26 the Commercial and
Financial Chronicle summarized the situation. N o “sudden and
violent drop in prices” had occurred. But the rapid progress in
trade had stopped and now “frequent complaints are heard. The
93 See especially Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, 246-247.

94 Bradstreet’s, March 12, 1898, 161, 170; March 19, 1898, 186; March
26,1898,202; Economist, March 5,1898, 356; Journal of Commerce , March
26, 1898, 6:5.
Reaction: Approach to W ar ßpi
volume o f trade undoubtedly remains large, but the reports
speak of new enterprises being held in check.” 96
Businessmen had been particularly influenced by the speech
o f Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont on March 17. Proctor
was known for his conservative, antiwar disposition, an atti
tude he shared w ith his intimate friend, W illiam M cKinley.
But the Senator had just returned from a visit to Cuba, a visit
that had profoundly shocked him. Proctor discounted Spanish
reforms as “too late,” but he advised against going to war over
the “Maine.” The United States should use force, Proctor inti
mated, only to deliver the Cuban people from “the worst mis-
government o f which I ever had knowledge.” Conversations
with businessmen in Cuba had provided him with most of his
information; these men had declared “without exception” that
it was too late for any more schemes of autonomy. T hey wanted
an American protectorate, annexation, or a free Cuba. Although
Proctor did not say so explicitly, none of these solutions was
immediately possible without war with Spain. This speech
deeply impressed almost all o f the conservative and business
journals which had opposed war. Many of these journals did
not overlook Proctor’s role as one of M cKinley’s “most trusted
advisors and friends.” T w o weeks later the N ew York Com
mercial Advertiser looked back and marked this speech as the
turning point in the road to war.96
This journal had steadily attacked the jingoes throughout
January and February. But on March 10 it began to rationalize
intervention not for “conquest,” but for “humanity and love
of freedom, and, above all, [the] desire that the commerce and
industry of every part of the world shall have full freedom of
development in the whole world’s interest,” especially “in that
95 Frick to Carnegie, March 24, 1898, Carnegie MSS; Economist, April
5, 1898, 356; Commercial and Financial Chronicle, March 26, 1898, 590.
96 T he speech is in Congressional Record , 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2916-
2919; Public Opinion , March 24, 1898, 358-360; Commercial Advertiser ,
April 2, 1898.
The N e w Empire
of nations in position to trade with it.” In the week follow ing
Proctor’s speech, important business opinion, tired of what the
Economist's correspondent termed “the sudden revolutions of
sentiment,” began to fall into line back of the Commercial A d
vertiser. The Wall Street Journal noted that Proctor’s speech
had “converted a great many people in W all Street” who had
formerly opposed war. The Journal of Commerce asked for “one
result or the other” to end the “present uncertainty,” and wanted
to present Spain with an ultimatum. The Pittsburgh Press noted
business indecision on March 19, then remarked, “The sooner
the administration executes its Cuban program the better.” The
Philadelphia Press, which was quite close to the administration,
reported on March 21 that M cKinley would make his final de
cision during the next few days. On the same day as this Press
report, Lodge wrote M cKinley a long letter assuring the Presi
dent: “I talked with bankers, brokers, businessmen, editors,
clergymen and others in Boston,” Lynn, and Nahant, and “every
body” including “the most conservative classes” wanted the
Cuban question “solved.” “T hey said,” Lodge reported, “for
business one shock and then an end was better than a succession
o f spasms such as we must have if this war in Cuba went on.” 97
Perhaps the most influential note the President received that
week was a telegram from W . C. Reick, a trusted political ad
viser in N ew York City and city editor of the N ew York Herald.
This message arrived at the W hite House on March 25: “Big
corporations here now believe we w ill have war. Believe all
would welcome it as relief to suspense.” On March 27, the N ew
York Tribune ran a front-page article which indicated that
Reick’s evaluation also applied to the London Stock Exchange,
a financial institution which some American investors considered
of more importance than the N ew York Exchange. “W hat is
97 Ibid., March 10, 1898; Economist, April 9, 1898, 556; Pratt, Expan
sionists of 1898, 246; Journal of Commerce, March 14, 1898, 6:2-3; March
23, 1898, 6:1; Pittsburgh Press, March 19, 1898, 1:1; Philadelphia Press,
March 21,1898,6:2; Lodge to M cKinley, March 21,1898, M cKinley MSS.
wanted first of all is relief from the suspense. . . . Even a dec
laration of war would be preferred by bankers and stockbrokers
to the continuance o f a stagnant market, with hourly flurries,
caused by sensational journalism and the rumors of impending
hostilities,” the Tribune reported. If war occurred, a “specu
lators’ movement” might result in a “temporary flurry in Amer
ican stocks.” But other investors would hold their securities “in
confident expectation that these w ill rise with the increased
movement of railway traffic caused by war.” 98
T w o days after the receipt of Reick’s telegram, M cKinley
and D ay presented an ultimatum to Spain. This move climaxed
a week of hurried consultations and policy changes. Before
March 20 the President had considered purchasing the island
or attempting to work out a plan which would ensure American
control while maintaining the trappings of Spanish sovereignty.
Spain refused to sell the island, however, and the Junta and the
rebels on the island would not listen to the second proposal. N ow
in the new climate created by Proctor’s speech and the changing
ideas o f the business community, M cKinley prepared to take
more forceful steps. For the first time in the crisis the President
called in a number o f Democratic senators for consultations on
March 22. Doubtlessly reflecting the changed attitudes of both
M cKinley and some business spokesmen, the war party in the
Senate now claimed for the first time a majority of the forty-
three Republicans, including representatives of the large cor
porations. These changes threatened to provoke Congress into
its most belligerent outbursts on March 29 and 30."
88 Reick to John Russell Young, March 25, 1898, M cKinley MSS; N e w

York Tribune, March 27, 1898, 1:6. T he Tribune reported on March 25,
1898, 1:1, that a movement had begun on Lombard Street to stop the
war by helping Spain pay an indemnity to the United States. American
bankers were reported to be organizing the drive, supposedly with help
from the Rothschilds. Diplomats doubted whether the bankers would
achieve any success.
89 Leech, Days of M cKinley , 183,184; Journal of Commerce , March 30,
1898, 1:5; W ashington Evening Star, March 23, 1898, 1:1
Tfo Ata Empire
The President, however, was a week ahead of the war party
on Capitol H ill. On March 20 Day instructed W oodford to
ask Spain to restore peace in Cuba promptly and make a “full
reparation” for the “Maine.” N oting that “feeling in the United
States very acute,” D ay declared that “April 15 th is none too
early date for accomplishment of these purposes” and threatened
to lay the question before Congress if Spain did not respond
properly. The Spanish government asked that these demands
be delayed until the Cuban parliament met, that is, until the
rainy season began. W oodford replied that such a delay was
not possible. W hen the Spanish Foreign Minister, Pió Gullón,
expressed surprise “at the apparent change in the attitude of the
United States,” W oodford said that there had been no change;
the American government had always wanted peace. The Amer
ican Minister then outlined four reasons w hy this peace had
to come immediately: first, the terrible suffering in Cuba in
which “during little more than three years” the deaths “had
exceeded the births by nearly four hundred thousand”; the
danger of sanitary conditions breaking down and plagues and
diseases threatening the United States; the American depend
ence upon Cuban sugar and commerce; and, finally, “the large
amounts of American capital invested in Cuba.” “I emphasized,”
W oodford reported to M cKinley, “the tremendous pecuniary
loss which the people of the United States suffer and must suffer
until peace is restored.” 100
Despite Spain’s reluctance to meet D ay’s demands, W oodford
cabled W ashington on March 25 that he believed that Spain would
grant a truce which would lead to negotiations with the rebels. If
these negotiations did not result in peace by mid-September, Spain
and the United States would “in such event jointly compel both
parties in Cuba to accept such settlement as the tw o Governments
should then jointly advise.” W oodford’s comments on this offer
100 D ay t0 W oodford, March 20, 1898, Spain, Instructions, N A , R G 59;

Barclay to Salisbury, March 28, 1898, F.O. 72/2068; W oodford to M c
Kinley, March 22 and 24, 1898, Spain, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
Reaction: Approach, to W ar
are especially crucial in view of what was to occur on April 9 and
10. The proposition, the American Minister told M cKinley, “has
the advantage of immediate truce and of practical recognition
by Spain of an insurgent government with which the insular
congress can deal. It also admits and even invites possible inter
vention by the United States. It may lead to the recognition of
Cuban independence during the summer.” On the same day,
W oodford wrote the President: “A truce once established and
negotiations begun, I see but tw o possible results. The one w ill
be the independence o f Cuba. The other may be annexation to
the United States. Truce and negotiations in Cuba mean, in m y
respectful judgment, that the Spanish flag is to quit Cuba.” 101
A t this point the Spanish government refused to put forward
such an offer formally. T w o weeks later, however, Spain would
take the initiative in offering such an armistice, and W oodford’s
comments on the meaning of a truce would again be relevant.
On March 26 D ay attempted to prod the Sagasta regime by
demanding that Cuban independence be worked out with Amer
ican mediation during an armistice period. The follow ing day
the Assistant Secretary of State issued the first points of an
ultimatum: first, an armistice until October 1 during which time
the President would use his friendly offices to bring permanent
peace to Cuba; second, “immediate revocation of reconcentrado
order.” The next day, W oodford reminded D ay that under the
Spanish Constitution the Ministry was powerless to recognize
Cuban independence or nominal sovereignty. O nly the Cortes
could act on these issues, and this body would not meet until
April 25. D ay replied that the United States demanded the im
mediate promise of Cuban independence. On the 29th D ay
cabled that negotiations for an armistice must be concluded by
March 31.102
101 W oodford to M cKinley, March 24, March 25, Spain, Despatches,

N A , R G 59.
102 D ay to W oodford, March 26, 27, 28, 1898, Spain, Instructions, and
W oodford to Day, March 28, 1898, Spain, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
3p6 The N e w Empire
T he Spanish reply of March 31 renounced the reconcentrado
orders (the Spanish further modified their position on this aspect
of the negotiations on April 4 and 5), but would not promise an
armistice at Spain’s initiative. W oodford grieved over this last
point as “a question of punctilio,” forced upon the Spanish
government by “Spanish pride” and the threat of revolution
inside the nation. T he Ministry realized, the American Minister
reported, “that armistice now means certain peace next autumn.”
W oodford continued his efforts and on April 4 D ay received
a copy of the latest Spanish plan for Cuban autonomy. The As
sistant Secretary tersely informed W oodford, “It is not armi
stice,” but a Spanish appeal “urging the insurgents to lay down
their arms and to join with the autonomy party. . . . T he Presi
dent’s Message,” D ay concluded, “w ill go in W ednesday after
noon.” M cKinley did not send in his war message for another
six days, however. H e granted Fitzhugh Lee’s request for time
in order to remove American citizens from Havana.103
On April 9 Spain granted a suspension o f hostilities “in order
to arrange and facilitate peace on the island.” W oodford cabled
immediately that this move would mean “immediate and per
manent peace in Cuba by negotiations” if Congress gave the
President authority to conduct such discussions and full power
to use the army and navy to enforce the results o f the negotia
tions. The American Minister told M cKinley that the talks
would result in autonomy which the insurgents could accept,
or complete independence, or cession of the islands to the United
States. “I hope,” W oodford asked, “that nothing w ill now be
done to humiliate Spain as I am satisfied that the present G ov
ernment is going and is loyally ready to go as fast and as far as
it can.” D ay replied that the President-, “must decline to make
103 W oodford to M cKinley, March 31 and April 1, 1898, Spain, D es

patches, D ay to W oodford, April 4, 1898, Spain, Instructions, and W o o d
ford to Day, April 4, 1898, Spain, Despatches, N A , R G 59. See also
comment of Leech, Days of M cKinley, 180; and Barclay to Salisbury,
March 30, 31, April 1, 1898, F.O. 72/2068.
further suggestions” to Spain, but “that in sending in his Mes
sage tomorrow the President w ill acquaint Congress with this
latest communication.” M cKinley did append the Spanish offer
to the end of his war message. Both the administration and Con
gress then proceeded to overlook the significance that W ood
ford attached to the offer. During the next nine days Congress
debated the means, not the question, of intervention.104
M cKinley had had the choice of three policies which would
have terminated the Cuban revolution. First, he could have left
the Spanish forces and the insurgents fight until one or the other
fell exhausted from the bloodshed and financial strain. During
the struggle the United States could have administered food and
medicine to the civilian population, a privilege which the Span
ish agreed to allow in March, 1898. Second, the President could
have demanded an armistice and Spanish assurances that negotia
tions over the summer would result in some solution which
would pacify American feelings. That is to say, he could have
followed W oodford’s ideas. Third, M cKinley could have de
manded both an armistice and Spanish assurances that Cuba
would become independent immediately. If Spain would not
grant both of these conditions, American military intervention
would result. T he last was the course the President followed.
Each of these policy alternatives deserves a short analysis. For
American policy makers, the first choice was the least acceptable
of the three, but the United States did have to deal, nevertheless,
with certain aspects of this policy. If Spain hoped to win such
a conflict, she had to use both the carrot of an improved and
attractive autonomy scheme and the stick of an increased and
effective military force. Spain could have granted no amount
o f autonomy, short of complete independence, which would
have satisfied the rebels, and whether Americans cared to admit
104 W oodford to Day, April 9, 1898, Spain, Despatches, D ay to W o o d

ford, April 10, 1898, Spain, Instructions, “Memorandum” handed to D ay
from Spanish Minister on April 10, 1898, N otes from Spain, and W o o d
ford to M cKinley, April 10, 1898, Spain, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
2 ÿ8 The N e w Empire
it or not, they were at least partially responsible for this ob
stinacy on the part of the insurgents. The United States did
attempt to stop filibustering expeditions, but a large number
nevertheless reached Cuban shores. More important, when the
Spanish Minister asked D ay to disband the N ew York Junta,
the financial taproot of the insurgent organization, the Assistant
Secretary replied that “this was not possible under American
law and in the present state of public feeling.” W oodford had
given the Spanish Queen the same reply in mid-January. It was
perhaps at this point that Spain saw the last hopes for a negotiated
peace begin to flicker away.105
Seemingly unrelated actions by the United States gave boosts
to the rebel cause. The sending of the “Maine,” for instance,
considerably heartened the rebels; they believed that the warship
diverted Spanish attention and military power from insurgent
forces. W hen the vessel exploded, the N ew York Junta released
a statement which did not mourn the dead sailors as much as it
mourned the sudden disappearance of American power in Ha
vana harbor.100 The Junta interpreted the passage of the $50,-
000,000 war appropriation measure during the first week of
March as meaning either immediate war or the preparation for
war. Under such conditions, it was not odd that the rebels were
reluctant to compromise their objective of complete independ
ence.
If the insurgents would not have accepted autonomy, no mat
ter how liberal or attractive, then Spain might have hoped to
suppress the rebels with outright force. T o have done so, how
ever, the Spanish government would have had to bring its army
through the rainy season with few impairments, resume to a
large extent the reconcentrado policies, and prevent all United
105 Spanish Correspondence and Documents, 91-92; Ernest May com
ments, “W hen even this personal appeal to M cKinley produced no re
sults, the Queen and her ministers had to face the fact that the United
States would not help to bring about a negotiated peace” (Imperial
Democracy , 162-163).
ios N ew York Tribune , Feb. 17, 1898, 10:1.
Reaction: Approach to War 39p
States aid from reaching the rebels. The first objective would
have been difficult, but the last tw o, if carried out, would have
meant war with the United States. The State Department could
not allow Spain to reimpose methods even faintly resembling
W eyler’s techniques, nor could the Department have allowed
the searching of American vessels. M cKinley and the American
people hoped that S p in would stop the revolution, but they
also insisted on taking from Spain the only tools with w hich
that nation could deal with the Cubans.107
Having found this first alternative impossible to accept, M c
K inley might have chosen a second approach: demand an armi
stice and ultimate pacification of the island, but attempt to
achieve this peacefully over several months and with due respect
for the sovereignty of Spain. This was the alternative W ood
ford hoped the administration would choose. H e had reported
during the tw o weeks before M cKinley’s message that the
Spanish had given in time and time again on points which he
had believed they could not afford to grant. In spite of the
threat of revolution from the army, the Queen had granted a
temporary truce. T he American Minister continued to ask for
more time to find a peaceful settlement. On April 11, the day
the war message w ent to Congress, W oodford wrote the Pres
ident, “T o-day it is just possible that Moret and I have been
right [in our pursuit of peace], but it is too soon to be jubi
lant.” 108 T he American Minister sincerely believed that the
negotiations during the period of truce could, with good faith
on both the American and Spanish sides, result in Spain evacu
ating the island. This would have to be done slow ly, however.
107 Chadwick denies “that the desolation o f Cuba was w holly or even
mainly the work o f the Spanish administration” and justifies “the right
under international law” of Spain to use the reconcentrado policies to
stop the revolution. On the other hand, Chadwick believes American
feeling correct in protesting the Spanish carelessness in feeding and car
ing for the reconcentrados ( United States and Spain, 486-503).
ios W oodford to M cKinley, April 11, 1898, Spain, Despatches, N A , R G
59-
N o sovereign nation could be threatened with a time limit and
uncompromising demands without fighting back. The fact that
Spain would not grant M cKinley’s demand for immediate Cuban
independence makes the Spanish-American W ar which began
in April, 1898, by no means an inevitable conflict. A ny conflict
is inevitable once one proud and sovereign power, dealing with
a similar power, decides to abandon the conference table and
issue an ultimatum. The historical problem remains: which
power took the initiative in setting the conditions that resulted
in armed conflict, and were those conditions justified?
By April 10 M cKinley had assumed an inflexible position.
The President abjured this second alternative and demanded not
only a truce, but a truce which would lead to a guarantee of
immediate Cuban independence obtained with the aid of Amer
ican mediation. H e moreover demanded such a guarantee of
independence before the Cortes or the Cuban parliament, the
tw o groups which had the constitutional power to grant such
independence, were to gather for their formal sessions.109
The central question is, o f course, w hy M cKinley found him
self in such a position on April 10 that only the third alternative
was open to him. The President did not want war; he had been
sincere and tireless in his efforts to maintain the peace. By mid-
March, however, he was beginning to discover that, although
he did not want war, he did want what only a war could provide:
the disappearance of the terrible uncertainty in American po
litical and economic life, and a solid basis from which to resume
the building of the new American commercial empire. W hen
the President made his demands, therefore, he made the ultimate
demands; as far as he was concerned, a six-month period of
negotiations would not serve to temper the political and eco
nomic problems in the United States, but only exacerbate them.
T o say this is to raise another question: w hy did M cKinley
109 W ashington Evening Star, April 11, 1898, 2:3, has an interesting
comment from an unidentified cabinet member on the meaninglessness of
the Spanish truce offer.
arrive at this position during mid-March? W hat were the factors
which limited the President’s freedom o f choice and policies at
this particular time? The standard interpretations of the war’s
causes emphasize the yellow journals and a belligerent Congress.
These were doubtlessly crucial factors in shaping the course of
American entry into the conflict, but they must be used care
fully. A first observation should be that Congress and the yellow
press, which had been loudly urging intervention ever since
1895, did not make a maiden appearance in March, 1898; new
elements had to enter the scene at that time to act as the catalysts
for M cKinley’s policy. Other facts should be noted regarding
the yellow press specifically. In areas where this press supposedly
was most important, such as N ew York City, no more than one-
third of the press could be considered sensational. The strongest
and most widespread prowar journalism apparently occurred
in the Midwest. But there were few yellow journals there. The
papers that advocated war in this section did so for reasons other
than sensationalism; among these reasons were the influence of
the Cuban Junta and, perhaps most important, the belief that
the United States possessed important interests in the Caribbean
area which had to be protected. Finally, the yellow press ob
viously did not control the levers of American foreign policy.
M cKinley held these, and he bitterly attacked the owners of
the sensational journals as “evil disposed . . . people.” An in
terpretation stressing rabid journalism as a major cause of the
war should draw some link to illustrate how these journals
reached the W hite House or the State Department. T o say that
this influence was exerted through public opinion proves nothing;
the next problem is to demonstrate how much public opinion
was governed by the yellow press, how much of this opinion
was influenced by more sober factors, and which of these tw o
branches of opinion most influenced M cKinley.110
110 There is an excellent discussion of this point in Offner, “M cKinley

and the Origins of the Spanish-American W ar,” 69-74; see also George
W . Auxier, “Middle W estern Newspapers and the Spanish-American
Congress was a hotbed o f interventionist sentiment, but then
it had been so since 1895. T he fact was that Congress had more
trouble handling M cKinley than the President had handling
Congress. T he President had no fear of that body. H e told
Charles Dawes during the critical days of February and March
that if Congress tried to adjourn he would call it back into ses
sion. M cKinley held Congress under control until the last tw o
days of March, when the publication of the “Maine” investiga
tion forced Thomas B. Reed, the passionately antiwar Speaker
o f the House, to surrender to the onslaughts of the rapidly in
creasing interventionist forces. As militants in Congress forced
the moderates into full retreat, M cKinley and D ay were waiting
in the W hite House for Spain’s reply to the American ultimatum.
And after the outbreak on March 31 M cKinley reassumed con
trol. On April 5 the Secretary of W ar, R. A . Alger, assured
the President that several important senators had just informed
him that “there w ill be no trouble about holding the Senate.”
W hen the President postponed his war message on April 5 in
order to grant Fitzhugh Lee’s request for more time, prowar
congressmen w ent into a frenzy. During the weekend of April
8 and 9, they condemned the President, ridiculed Reed’s im
potence to hold back war, and threatened to declare war them
selves. In fact, they did nearly everything except disobey
M cKinley’s wishes that nothing be done until the follow ing
week. N othing was done.111
W hen the Senate threatened to overrule the President’s orders
that the war declaration exclude recognition of the Cuban in
surgent government, McKinley whipped the doubters into line
and forced the Senate to recede from its position. This was an
all-out battle between the W hite House and a strong Senate
faction. M cKinley triumphed despite extremely strong pressure
exerted by sincere American sentiment on behalf of immediate
W ar, 1895-1898,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, X X V I (March,

1940), 524, 532.
111 Alger to M cKinley, April 5, 1898, M cKinley MSS; Offner, “M c
Kinley and the Origins o f the Spanish-American W ar,” 289-300.
Cuban independence and despite the more crass material in
terests of the Junta’s financial supporters and spokesmen. The
President wanted to have a free hand in dealing with Cuba after
the war, and Congress granted his wishes. Events on Capitol H ill
may have been more colorful than those at the W hite House,
but the latter, not the former, was the center of power in March
and April, 1898.
Influences other than the yellow press or congressional bel
ligerence were more important in shaping M cKinley’s position
of April i i . Perhaps most important was the transformation of
the opinion of many spokesmen for the business community who
had formerly opposed war. If, as one journal declared, the
M cKinley administration, “more than any that have preceded
it, sustains . . . close relations to the business interests of the
country,” then this change of business sentiment should not be
discounted.112 This transformation brought important financial
spokesmen, especially from the Northeast, into much the same
position that had long been occupied by prointerventionist busi
ness groups and journals in the trans-Appalachian area. McKin
ley’s decision to intervene placated many of the same business
spokesmen whom he had satisfied throughout 1897 and January
and February of 1898 by his refusal to declare war.
Five factors may be delineated which shaped this interven
tionist sentiment of the business community. First, some business
journals emphasized the material advantages to be gained should
Cuba become a part of the world in which the United States
would enjoy, in the words of the N ew York Commercial A d
vertiser, “full freedom o f development in the whole world’s
112 Chicago Times-Herald quoted in Cincinnati Commercial Tribune ,

D ec. 28, 1897, 6:2. T h e Chicago paper was particularly close to the ad
ministration through its publisher’s friendship with McKinley. T he pub
lisher was H . H . Kohlsaat. Ernest May remarks, regarding M cKinley’s
antiwar position in 1897 and early 1898, “It was simply out o f the ques
tion for him [M cKinley] to embark on a policy unless virtually certain
that Republican businessmen would back him” (Imperial Democracy ,
118). T he same comment doubtlessly applies also to M cKinley’s actions
in March and April.
j¿04 The N e w Empire
interest.” The Banker’s Magazine noted that “so many of our
citizens are so involved in the commerce and productions of the
island, that to protect these interests . . . the United States w ill
have eventually to force the establishment of fair and reason
able government.” The material damage suffered by investors in
Cuba and by many merchants, manufacturers, exporters, and
importers, as, for example, the groups which presented the
February 10 petition to M cKinley, forced these interests to
advocate a solution which could be obtained only through
force.113
A second reason was the uncertainty that plagued the business
community in mid-March. This uncertainty was increased by
Proctor’s powerful and influential speech and by the news that
a Spanish torpedo-boat flotilla was sailing from Cadiz to Cuba.
The uncertainty was exemplified by the sudden stagnation of
trade on the N ew York Stock Exchange after March 17. Such
an unpredictable economic basis could not provide the spring
board for the type of overseas commercial empire that McKin
ley and numerous business spokesmen envisioned.
Third, by March many businessmen who had deprecated war
on the ground that the United States Treasury did not possess
adequate gold reserves began to realize that they had been argu
ing from false assumptions. The heavy exports of 1897 and the
discoveries of gold in Alaska and Australia brought the yellow
metal into the country in an ever widening stream. Private
bankers had been preparing for war since 1897. Banker’s Maga
zine summarized these developments: “Therefore, while not de
siring war, it is apparent that the country now has an ample coin
basis for sustaining the credit operations which a conflict would
probably make necessary. In such a crisis the gold standard w ill
prove a bulwark of confidence.” 114
113 Commercial Advertiser, March 10, 1898, 6:3; Bankers’ Magazine,
LVI (April, 1898), 519-520.
114 Bankers’ Magazine, LVI (March, 1898), 347-348; LVI (April, 1898),
520; Pittsburgh Press, April 8, 1898, 4:1; Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, April 23, 1898, 786.
Reaction: Approach, to W ar 405
Fourth, antiwar sentiment lost much strength when the na
tion realized that it had nothing to fear from European interven
tion on the side o f Spain. France and Russia, who were most
sympathetic to the Spanish monarchy, were forced to devote
their attention to the Far East. Neither of these nations wished to
alienate the United States on the Cuban issue. More important,
Americans happily realized that they had the support of Great
Britain. The rapprochement which had occurred since the V ene
zuelan incident now paid dividends. On an official level, the
British Foreign Office assured the State Department that noth
ing would be accomplished in the w ay of European intervention
unless the United States requested such intervention. The Brit
ish attitude made it easy for M cKinley to deal with a joint Euro
pean note of April 6 which asked for American moderation
toward Spain. The President brushed off the request firmly but
politely. On an unofficial level, American periodicals expressed
appreciation o f the British policy on Cuba, and some o f the
journals noted that a common Anglo-American approach was
also desirable in Asia.118 The European reaction is interesting
insofar as it evinces the continental powers’ growing realization
that the United States was rapidly becoming a major force in
the world. But the European governments set no limits on Amer
ican dealings with Spain. M cKinley could take the initiative and
make his demands with little concern for European reactions.
Finally, opposition to war melted away in some degree when
the administration began to emphasize that the United States
enjoyed military power much superior to that of Spain. One pos
sible reason for M cKinley’s policies during the first tw o months
o f 1898 might have been his fear that the nation was not ade
quately prepared. As late as the weekend of March 25 the Presi
dent worried over this inadequacy. But in late February and51
115 Dugdale, Germ an Documents , II, 500-502; Porter to Sherman, April

8,1898, France, Despatches, and H ay to Sherman, March 26, 28, 29, April
i. Great Britain, Despatches, N A , R G 59; Public Opinion , March 24,
1898, 360-361.
¿¡.o6 The N e w Empire
early March, especially after the $50,000,000 appropriation by
Congress, the country’s military strength developed rapidly. On
March 13 the Philadelphia Press proclaimed that American naval
power greatly exceeded that of the Spanish forces. By early
April those who feared a Spanish bombardment of N ew York
G ty were in the small minority. More representative were the
views of W inthrop Chanler who wrote Lodge that if Spanish
troops invaded N ew York “they would all be absorbed in the
population . . . and engaged in selling oranges before they got
as far as 14th Street.” 116
As the words of M cKinley’s war message flew across the wires
to Madrid, many business spokesmen who had opposed war had
recently changed their minds, American military forces were
rapidly growing more powerful, banks and the United States
Treasury had secured themselves against the initial shocks of war,
and the European powers were divided among themselves and
preoccupied in the Far East. Business boomed after M cKinley
signed the declaration of war. “W ith a hesitation so slight as to
amount almost to indifference,” Bradstreefs reported on April
30, “the business community, relieved from the tension caused
by the incubus of doubt and uncertainty which so long controlled
it, has stepped confidently forward to accept the situation con
fronting it oweing to the changed conditions.” “Unfavorable
circumstances . . . have hardly excited remark, while the stim
ulating effects have been so numerous and important as to sur
prise all but the most optimistic,” this journal concluded.117 A
new type of American empire, temporarily clothed in armor,
stepped out on the international stage after a half century of
preparation to make its claim as one of the great world powers.
116 Leech, Days of M cKinley, 176; Philadelphia Press, March 13, 1898,
8:3; Garraty, Lodge, 191.
117 Bradstreet’s, April 9, 1898, 234, also April 30, 1898, 272, 282.
Epilogue
IN his classic autobiography, H enry Adams recalls sitting at

John H ay’s table and discussing “the Philippines as a question
of balance o f power in the East” with members of the British
cabinet. Adams suddenly realized “that the family work of a
hundred and fifty years fell at once into the grand perspective
of true empire-building, which H ay’s work [in the Far East]
set off with artistic skill.” In less than a century and a quarter
the United States had developed from thirteen states strung along
a narrow Atlantic coastline into a great world power with pos
sessions in the far Pacific.
U ntil the middle of the nineteenth century this had been, for
the most part, a form of landed expansion which had moved over
a large area of the N orth American continent. The Louisiana
Purchase in 1803 had been follow ed by further important acquisi
tions in 1819, 1848, 1853, and 1867. But when W illiam H .
Seward entered the State Department in 1861, the nature of
American expansion had begun to change. Under the impact of
the industrial revolution Americans began to search for markets,
not land. Sometimes the State Department seized the initiative
in making the search, as in the Harrison administration. Fre
quently the business community pioneered in extending the in-
407
4q8 The N e w Empire
terests of the United States into foreign areas, as in M exico in
the 1870’s and in China in the 1890’s. Regardless of which body
led the expansionist movement, the result was the same: the
growth o f economic interests led to political entanglements and
to increased military responsibilities.
Americans attempted to build a new empire, an empire w hich
differed fundamentally from the colonial holdings of European
powers. U ntil 1898 the United States believed that its political
insitudons were suitable only for the N orth American continent.
Many policy makers and important journalists warned that extra-
continental holdings would wreck the American republic just as
they had ruined the Roman republic. Such sentiment helped to
prevent the acquisition of Hawaii in 1893.
In 1898, however, the United States annexed Hawaii and de
manded the Philippines from Spain. These acquisitions were not
unheralded. Seward had pushed his nation’s claims far out into
the Pacific w ith the purchase of Alaska and the M idway islands.
Fish, Evarts, Bayard, Blaine, and Cleveland had maintained a
tight hold on Pago Pago in Samoa, although they strongly dis
liked the political entanglements w ith England and Germany
which were necessarily part of the bargain.
One striking characteristic tied these acquisitions to the new
territory brought under American control in 1898 and 1899,
immediately after the war w ith Spain. The United States ob
tained these areas not to fulfill a colonial policy, but to use these
holdings as a means to acquire markets for the glut of goods
pouring out of highly mechanized factories and farms.
The tw o acquisitions which might be considered exceptions
to this statement are Alaska and Hawaii. It is most difficult, how
ever, to understand the purchase o f “Seward’s Icebox” without
comprehending the Secretary o f State’s magnificent view o f the
future American commercial empire. This view did not premise
a colonial policy, but assumed the necessity o f controlling the
Asian markets for commercial, not political, expansion. As the
chairman o f the House Foreign Affairs Committee commented
Epilogue fo p
in 1867, Alaska was the “drawbridge” between the N orth
American continent and Asia.
Hawaii had become an integral part of the American econ
om y long before Harrison attempted to annex it in 1893. Mis
sionaries had forged strong religious and secular links between
the islands and the mainland, but of much more importance were
the commercial ties. A fter the reciprocity treaty of 1875 the
United States possessed a virtual veto power over Hawaii’s rela
tions with foreign powers. American capital, especially attracted
by the islands’ fertility during the depression years that plagued
the mainland in the 1870’s and 1880’s, developed sugar planta
tions whose prosperity depended upon the American consumer.
Exports of finished industrial goods left United States ports in
increasing amounts for Hawaiian consumers. W hen the 1890
tariff severely retarded the export of Hawaiian sugar, American
exports moved without abatement into the islands. The eco
nomic expansion of the United States, in terms of both capital
and goods, had tied Hawaii irrevocably to the mainland.
By 1893 only the political tie remained to be consummated.
The United States enjoyed the benefits of Hawaiian trade with
out the burdens of governmental responsibilities. But in five years
the situation changed. Regaining confidence in American polit
ical institutions as the depression lessened in severity, and fearful
of Japanese control, the M cKinley administration attempted to
annex the islands in 1897-1898. But one other factor was also
of prime importance. American interests in Asia suddenly as
sumed much significance. And in this new framework, the
Isthmian canal project gained added importance and support,
for many expansionists believed the canal to be absolutely neces
sary if the eastern and G ulf states hoped to compete in Asian
markets. As Senator John T . Morgan, Alfred Thayer Mahan,
and Senator Cushman Davis noted, Hawaii was essential if the
United States was to safeguard the Pacific approaches to the
canal. W hen the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued its
majority report in March, 1898, which advocated annexation by
joint resolution, the committee argued that the strategic position
o f Hawaii was “the main argument in favor of the annexation’
plan. This, the report explained, meant not only the shielding of
the western coast of the United States, but the “efficient protec
tion” o f American commerce as well. This report also noted
the irrelevance of one of the antiannexationist arguments, then
combined the strategic factor with the fear of Japanese encroach
ment as reasons for annexation: “The issue in Hawaii is not be
tween monarchy and the Republic. That issue has been settled
. . . The issue is whether, in that inevitable struggle, Asia or
America shall have the vantage ground of the control of the
naval ‘Key of the Pacific,’ the commercial ‘Cross-roads of the
Pacific.’ ” 1
The administration forces finally w on their objective during
the summer of 1898. By July both the business community and
policy makers had fully realized the value of Asia as a potential
area for American financial and commercial expansion. T he
operations of Admiral George D ew ey in the Philippines had,
moreover, taught Americans that Hawaii was absolutely essen
tial as a coaling station and naval base if the United States hoped
to become a dominant force in the Far East.
The Philippines marked the next step westward. In 1899 the
Secretary of the American Asiatic Association analyzed the rea
son for the annexation of these islands in a single sentence: “Had
we no interests in China, the possession of the Philippines would
be meaningless.” Mark Hanna, a somewhat more objective ob
server of the Far East than the gentleman just quoted, also de
sired “a strong foothold in the Philippine Islands,” for then “w e
can and w ill take a large slice of the commerce o f Asia. That is
what we want. W e are bound to share in the commerce of the
1 Senate Report N o. 681, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess. (serial 3627), 1-119,
especially 31; Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 297-299; James
Harrison W ilson, “America’s Interests in China,” N orth American Re
view, CLXVI (February, 1898), 140; Commercial Advertiser, Feb. 8,
1898, 6:3; clipping o f London Times, June 17, 1897, enclosed in H ay to
Sherman, June 17, 1897, Great Britain, Despatches, N A , R G 59.
Epilogue 411
Far East, and it is better to strike for it while the iron is hot.”
The interests of missionaries and of investors who believed the
islands had great natural wealth no doubt encouraged M cKinley
to demand the Philippines. But it should be noted that, when
the President first formulated his peace terms, he wanted the
islands to “remain with Spain, except a port and necessary ap
purtenances to be selected by the United States.” H e changed
this view only when convinced that Manila would be insecure
and indefensible unless the United States annexed the remainder
of the islands. Mahan had follow ed similar reasoning to reach
the same conclusion. The key to the Philippine policy of both
men was their view of Manila as a w ay station to the Orient.2
Throughout the 1890’s, debate had raged around the desir
ability of annexing yet another outlying possession. The growing
desire for an American-controlled Isthmian canal partially ex
plains the interest Hawaii held for some Americans. But it should
be emphasized that in the 1890’s, at least, Americans did not de
fine their interests in a future canal as military; they termed
these interests as economic. Policy makers viewed the control
of strategic areas such as Hawaii or Guantánamo Bay in the
same light as they viewed the Philippines, that is, as strategic
means to obtaining and protecting objectives which they defined
as economic. Few persons discussed the military aspects of the
canal, and to interpret American expansion into the- Pacific and
the Caribbean as expansion for merely strategic objectives dis
torts the true picture. Most of those who were concerned with a
canal agreed with M cKinley’s statement in his annual message
o f 1897: the Nicaragua canal would be of “utility and value to
2 Campbell, Special Business Interests, 16; memorandum o f M cKinley’s

terms. D ay to H ay, June 4, 1898, copy in Box 185, and H ay to Day, May
18, 1898, Box 185, J. B. Moore MSS; Economist, June 11, 1898, 877; F. F.
Hilder, “T he Philippine Islands,” Forum, X X V (July, 1898), 534-545;
Truxtun Beale, “Strategical Value of the Philippines,” North American
Review, CLXVI (June, 1898), 759-760; Livermore, “American Naval-
Base Policy in the Far East, 1850-1914,” 116-1x7; Philadelphia Press, June
29, 1898, 6:3.
/f.12 The N e w Empire
American commerce.” The foremost advocate of a Central
American passageway, Senator Morgan, constantly discussed
the canal’s value in economic terms.3
American control of these areas followed logically if tw o as
sumptions were granted: first, the general consensus reached by
the American business community and policy makers in the mid-
1890’s that additional foreign markets would solve the economic,
social, and political problems created by the industrial revolu
tion; and, second, the growing belief that, however great its
industrial prowess, the United States needed strategic bases if
it hoped to compete successfully with government-supported
European enterprises in Asia and Latin America. The Journal
of Commerce summarized opinion on the first point when it
remarked in early 1895 that “within the last half century” the
industrial and transportation revolutions had made it a fact that
“we are a part of ‘abroad.’ ” Commenting upon one aspect of
the frontier thesis, this journal warned that the nation was no
longer “a vast public domain awaiting agriculture”; as a result
of this transformation, Americans could not afford “to imagine
that we can maintain ourselves in isolation from the rest of the
commercial world.” 4
Almost all Americans agreed on this first assumption. It was
only on the second (how the United States could best protect its
commercial interests abroad), that important disagreement flared.
W alter Quintín Gresham, Edward Atkinson, and Carl Schurz
were three of the leaders of the antiannexationist cause, but they
were also strong advocates of increased commercial expansion.
This point became evident when Atkinson and Schurz had to
defend their ideals after the Spanish-American War. Atkinson
presented his case through the pages of his periodical, The A nti-
3 Public Opinion, May 26,1898, 646; Congressional Record, 55th Cong.,

2nd Sess., 6 and 3222; Melville, “Our Future on the Pacific,” 293-294.
There is a good discussion of the canal issue in Campbell, Special Business
Interests, 14-15.
4 Journal of Commerce, Jan. 22, 1895, 4:2-3; also Chapter IV , above.
Epilogue 4.1$
Imperialist. H e admitted at the outset that “the export demand is
the balance-wheel of the whole traffic of this country,” but he
believed that the largest demand would be found in Europe,
not in the Pacific area. H e had to face the fact, however, that
many Americans did believe the Far East to be o f great impor
tance, and he attempted to destroy their premises by pointing out
that the Philippines bought only (100,000 worth of goods from
the United States each year. This was quite beside the point as
far as the new empire expansionists were concerned. Atkinson
began to see the weakness of his argument and countered with an
attack which struck closer to the annexationists’ theme: the
Philippines, Atkinson remarked, could be maintained as a “sanc
tuary of commerce” without American involvement. Once he
had gone this far, however, he had granted the M cKinley forces
their major assumption.5
Schurz developed his case in more detail. In a speech of August
19, 1898, he noted a report from the Foreign Commerce desk
o f the State Department which demanded more foreign markets.
“I fully agree,” Schurz said. “W e cannot have too many. But
can such markets be opened only by annexing to the United
States the countries in which they are situated?” This was his
first mistake. Few people, other than some missionaries, viewed
the Philippines as a great market. Certainly the M cKinley ad
ministration did not. Schurz then made his second mistake when
he repeated his staple argument that if the Philippines remained
neutral, “we shall not only be able to get coaling-stations and
naval depots wherever w e may want them, but w e shall qualify
ourselves for that position which is most congenial to our demo
cratic institutions.” Other Americans were not as certain that
such naval bases could be protected in the face of European en
croachment, and this doubt had become stronger since the con
tinental powers had shown their hands in China in late 1897
and early 1898. Annexationists could legitimately ask Schurz
8 The Anti-Imperialist, I, 16, 26-32, 45-46.

The N e w Empire
what power the United States could use if other nations used
force or disciminatory methods to exclude Americans from
Asian markets. Schurz replied in a letter to M cKinley on
June i, 1898, that the nation could use the immense moral
power inherent in posing as “the great neutral Power of the
w o r ld ” H e could find no better answer, and to these policy
makers, schooled in the theories of Mahan, the answer was in
sufficient. In their eyes Schurz had granted the common premise
o f the necessity for commercial expansion, and then had made
the tw o crucial errors of, first, utterly confusing the strategic,
new empire policies of M cKinley with the colonial policies of
European powers; and, second, believing that such commercial
expansion could be continued without defensible strategic bases.®
Thus when the debates began on the annexation of Hawaii
and the Philippines, the antiannexationists had ironically under
cut their ow n argument. W hen the minority of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee declared that “political dominion”
over Hawaii “is not commercially necessary,” the majority re
port replied that a continuation of a protectorate meant respon
sibility without control, but by annexation the United States
“would assume no more responsibilities, and would acquire ab
solute control.” Under a protectorate, Hawaii would still re
main an incubator o f international friction. And when Senator
V est introduced a resolution condemning the annexation of the
Philippines, probably the most important of the antiannexationist
moves in the Senate, he made the mistake o f saying that the
federal government could not annex a w hole area as a colony,
“except such small amount as may be necessary for coaling sta
tions.” The M cKinley administration could accept this argu
ment and then ask how the coaling station of Manila, for example,
could be useful w ithout Luzon, and how Luzon could be de-
6 Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz, edited

b y Frederic Bancroft (N e w York, 1913), V , 489-490, 473, 476. T he same
anti-imperialist approach may be found in Oscar Straus to A . D . W hite,
Aug. i, 1898, papers o f Andrew Dickson W hite, Ithaca, N e w York.
Epilogue 41 j
fended or maintained without the remainder of the Philippines.
The principal antiannexationist argument, that the Constitu
tion and traditional American society would be ruined by ex
panding to noncontiguous areas, was, in fact, quite irrelevant
granted the common assumption of the need for commercial ex
pansion. By agreeing that a constantly expanding trade was also
vital to the economic and political well-being of the nation, the
antiannexationists had opened themselves to the devastating
counterargument that this trade could not find the crucial mar
kets in Asia and Latin America without the security which the
Philippines and Hawaii would provide.7
A s for the annexationist forces, Lodge could espouse “large
policies,” but correctly argue, “I do not mean that w e should
enter on a w idely extended system of colonization.” W hen
Alfred Thayer Mahan urged the State Department to demand
only Manila in the summer of 1898, he differed little from many
antiannexationists. His studies had convinced him, however, that
a naval base could be strong and secure only when the hinter
land o f the base was strong and secure. H e would accept the
political burdens of the hinterland if this was necessary in order
to safeguard the naval base and the trade which depended upon
that base. M cKinley apparently arrived at the same conclusion
in much the same way. The President actually occupied a middle-
of-the-road position on the issue, for by the early summer of
1898 some business periodicals, military experts, and such poli
ticians as “Fire Alarm Joe” Foraker of Ohio urged the annexation
o f other Pacific islands and wanted to renege on the Teller
Amendment in order to annex Cuba.8 The administration’s Cuban
7 Fred Harvey Harrington, “T he Anti-Imperialist Movement in the
United States, 1898-1900,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII
(September, 1935), 211-212; House Report N o. 13$$, part 2, 55th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (serial 3721), 1-2; Senate Report N o. 681, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(serial 3627), 1-119. Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., 20, con
tains V est’s resolution.
8 Lodge’s statement is given in Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii,
279; on Mahan, see Chapter II, above; on the business views, see Pratt,
Expansionists of 1898, 274-275.
q.i6 T he N e w Empire
policy is one of the best examples of the new empire approach.
N ot wanting the political burdens or the economic competition
inherent in annexation, the problem was neatly solved by the
Platt Amendment, which gave the Cubans their independence;
but the measure also gave to the United States the Guantánamo
Naval Base as a safeguard for American interests in the Carib
bean, created a Cuban tariff which opened the island to Amer
ican agricultural and industrial products, and recognized the
right of American military intervention in the event that Cuban
political life became too chaotic.
It may be suggested that one fruitful w ay to approach the
“imperialist versus anti-imperialist” clash in the 1890’s is to view
the struggle in terms of a narrow and limited debate on the
question of which tactical means the nation should use to obtain
commonly desired objectives. Schurz’s view of overseas empire
differed from that of Mahan’s in degree, not in kind. Few Amer
icans believed that the Latin-American and Asian markets were
o f little importance to the expansive American industrial com
plex. On the other hand, few agreed with Foraker’s intimation
that the United States should claim and occupy every piece of
available land in the Pacific. The mass opinion fell between these
tw o views, and within that consensus the debate was waged. The
fundamental assumptions of the consensus were never fought
out. The grace note to this was appropriately supplied by W il
liam Jennings Bryan, who first successfully urged that the Phil
ippine annexation measure be passed by Congress, and then tried
to use the Philippine issue in the 1900 presidential campaign. H e
discovered on election night that, whatever the effect of other
issues in the campaign, the issue of “imperialism” was apparently
o f little importance to the voters. M cKinley, having solved this
problem during the tw o previous years, had moved so far ahead
of Bryan that the distance could be measured in political light
years.
By 1899 the United States had forged a new empire. American
policy makers and businessmen had created it amid much debate
Epilogue 4 1j
and with conscious purpose. The empire progressed from a
continental base in 1861 to assured pre-eminence in the W estern
Hemisphere in 1895. Three years later it was rescued from a
growing economic and political dilemma by the declaration of
war against Spain. During and after this conflict the empire
moved past Hawaii into the Philippines, and, with the issuance
o f the Open-Door N otes, enunciated its principles in Asia. The
movement of this empire could not be hurried. Harrison dis
covered this to his regret in 1893. But under the impetus of the
effects of the industrial revolution and, most important, because
of the implications for foreign policy 'which policy makers and
businessmen believed to be logical corollaries of this economic
change, the new empire reached its climax in the 1890’s. A t this
point those who possessed a sense of historical perspective could
pause with H enry Adams and observe that one hundred and
fifty years of American history had suddenly fallen into place.
Those who preferred to peer into the dim future of the twentieth
century could be certain only that the United States now domi
nated its ow n hemisphere and, as Seward had so passionately
hoped, was entering as a major power into Asia, “the chief
theatre of events in the world’s great hereafter.”
Selected Bibliography
THE following is by no means an inclusive bibliography. Here are

listed all manuscript and archival sources used, the most frequently
cited unpublished dissertations, articles and books frequently cited,
and those works which have been most valuable in the research.
PERSONAL PAPERS AND MANUSCRIPTS

(Unless otherwise noted, the personal papers and manuscripts of
the following men may be found in the Library of Congress, Wash
ington, D.C.)
Nelson Aldrich, Wharton Barker, Thomas F. Bayard, James G.

Blaine, Andrew Carnegie, William E. Chandler, Grover Cleveland,
William Augustus Croffut, William E. Curtis, Cushman Davis (St.
Paul, Minnesota), Donald M. Dickinson, John W . Foster, Lyman
Gage, Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil (Third Marquis of
Salisbury) (Christ Church College, Oxford, England), Walter Quin-
tin Gresham, Benjamin Harrison, John Hay, Hilary Herbert (Chapel
Hill, North Carolina), Daniel Lamont, Henry Cabot Lodge (Bos
ton, Massachusetts), Robert M. McElroy, William McKinley, Al
fred Thayer Mahan (Library of Congress and Flowers Collection,
Durham, North Carolina), Louis Michener, John Bassett Moore,
John T. Morgan, Richard Olney, Joseph Pulitzer, Whitelaw Reid,
Theodore Roosevelt, George Washburne Smalley, John Coit
418
Bibliography 41 g
Spooner, Oscar Straus, William Sulzer (Ithaca, N ew York), Ben
jamin Tracy, Andrew Dickson White (Ithaca, N ew York), James
Harrison Wilson.
ARCHIVES (UNPUBLISHED)
Great Britain, Records of the Foreign Office, Public Records Office.
London.
United States, Records of the Department of State and Department
of the Navy, National Archives. Washington, D.C.
PUBLISHED ARCHIVAL AND OTHER

GOVERNMENTAL RECORDS
A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-
1897. By James D. Richardson. 10 vols. Washington, D.C., 1900.
Congressional Record. Washington, D.C.
Correspondencia diplomática de la delegación cubana en Nueva
York durante la guerra de independencia de 189$ a 1898. (Pu
blicaciones del Archivo Nacional de Cuba.) 5 vols. Havana, 1943-
1946.
German Diplomatie Documents, 1871-1914. Selected and translated
by E. T. S. Dugdale. 4 vols. London, 1928-1931.
International American Conference, Reports of Committees and
Discussions Thereon. 4 vols. Washington, D.C., 1890.
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. . . .
Washington, D.C.
Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 1896-1900:
Presented to the Cortes by the Minister of State. Translation.
Washington, D.C., 1905.
UNPUBLISHED DISSERTATIONS AND THESES

Bald, Ralph Dewar, Jr. “The Development of Expansionist Senti
ment in the United States, 1885-1895, as Reflected in Periodical
Literature.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1953.
Dozer, Donald Marquand. “Anti-Imperialism in the United States,
1865-1895: Opposition to Annexation of Overseas Territories.”
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1936.
McCormick, Thomas Joseph. “ ‘A Fair Field and N o Favor/ Amer-
420 Bibliography
ican China Policy during the McKinley Administration, 1897-
1901.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin, i960.
Morgan, H. Wayne. “The Congressional Career of William McKin
ley.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles,
i960.
Offner, John L. “President McKinley and the Origins of the Spanish-
American War.” Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State Univer
sity, 1957.
Plesur, Milton. “Looking Outward: American Attitudes toward
Foreign Affairs in the Years from Hayes to Harrison.” Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Rochester, 1954.
Smith, Joe Patterson. “The Republican Expansionists of the Early
Reconstruction Era.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago,
1930.
Steigerwalt, Albert Kleckner. “The National Association of Manu
facturers: Organization and Policies, 1895-1914.” Ph.D. disserta
tion, University of Michigan, 1952.
Stutz, Frederick H. “William Henry Seward, Expansionist.” Mas
ter’s thesis, Cornell University, 1937.
White, Gerald Taylor. “The United States and the Problem of Re
covery after 1893.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley, 1938.
ARTICLES
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A cknowledgments
T H E follow ing provided the financial help which enabled me

to complete the manuscript: a research fellowship from the U ni
versity of W isconsin Graduate School, a faculty research grant
from Cornell University, and a grant for summer research from
the American Philosophical Society. In a book which emphasizes
the importance of economic factors, it is perhaps unnecessary for
me to elaborate upon m y debt to these institutions. Thanks are
due to the American Historical Association for assistance in pub
lishing this book and to the Committee on the Albert J. Beveridge
Award for 1962 and its chairman, Professor Charles Gibson of
the State University of Iowa, for the constructive criticism the
committee offered.
J. F. A. Mason of Christ Church, Oxford, graciously permitted
me to use the Marquess of Salisbury manuscripts. The Henry
Cabot Lodge papers were opened to me through the kindness of
George Cabot Lodge, Jr. Research was made easier because of
the helpfulness of the staffs of the Cornell University Libraries,
the W isconsin State Historical Society, the Library of Congress
Manuscript Division, the Foreign Affairs and Naval Affairs
branches of the National Archives, the British Public Record
Office, the University of N orth Carolina Library, and Duke
4*1
428 Acknowledgments
University Library. I want to extend special thanks to Ron Heise
of the Foreign Affairs branch of the National Archives, Kate
Maclean Stewart and David C. Mearns of the Library of Congress
Manuscript Division, and Evelyn Greenberg of Cornell Univer
sity Libraries. I appreciate the care with which Mrs. John Quincy
Adams (sic) typed the manuscript. I wish to thank the editors of
the American Historical Review, Mississippi Valley Historical
Review, Hispanic A?nerican Historical Review, and Business
History R eview for allowing me to use material from articles
which I have published in their journals.
I owe personal and professional debts to the follow ing men
for encouragement and for constructive criticism: Knight Bigger-
staff, David B. Davis, Paul W . Gates, and Curtis P. N ettels, all of
Cornell; Thomas A . Bailey, of Stanford University; Robert E.
Bowers, of Hanover College; and Cushing Strout, of California
Institute of Technology. David Pletcher of Hamline University
was very kind in allowing me to examine his important research
on the foreign policies of the Garfield and Arthur administra
tions when his work was still in manuscript form.
I owe my largest debts to Fred Harvey Harrington, now the
President of the University of W isconsin, who read about half
of this book when it was a thesis, and whose tolerance and kind
ness as a supervisor of doctoral dissertations must be unequaled;
William Appleman W illiams of the University of W isconsin;
Thomas McCormick of Ohio University; and Lloyd Gardner
of Rutgers University. I would not care to acknowledge pub
licly all the ideas which I have stolen from them. I can only plead
that the extenuating circumstances are friendships which have
been for me the nicest result of m y professional life. The fifth
person to whom I owe a special debt is m y w ife Sandra, who
somehow found time from her full-time duties as w ife, mother,
and student to spend nearly as many hours as I did on the manu
script, and who endured both of us—the book and me—with
awesome patience.
Index
Adams, Brooks, 61-62, 80-85, 95- Allen, Horace, 57,137-138, 304, 307,
101, 188, 326, 372; and westward 313, 321-322
movement of empire, 26; and J. Allen, W illiam F., 96
Strong, 79, 80; and A. T . Mahan, American Asiatic Association, 410
93-95; leads bimetallist club in American China Development
Boston, 157; views o f Asia, 360- Company, 303, 321, 353
American Federation of Labor, 174,
361
Adams, Charles Francis, 81 286, 363
Adams, H enry, 14, 24, 31, 75, 83, American Historical Association,
96, 250, 318, 322, 326, 328, 332, 70-71
407, 417 American Interests in China, 355
Adams, John Quincy, 1, 54, 80, 95, American Socialist party, 14
318; influence on Seward, 25, 27 American Sugar Refineries Com
Adams, Robert, Jr., 236 pany, 353
Adee, A lvey A ., 132, 205; fears American Trading Company, 303
Great Britain, 145-146, 227-228, Anglo-Saxon mission, 73; J.
246, 264 Strong’s views of, 78-79; and in
Africa, i, 52-53, 76, 78, n o , 186 tellectuals, 98-99; and mission
Agriculture, 9-10,20-21,27, 34,104- aries, 305-306; see also Manifest
105, 117, 151, 160, 165-172; disap destiny
pearance of self-sufficient farm Annexationist Club, 144
er, 173; to be sacrificed for in Argentina, 48, 113, 118, 136, 232
dustrial power, 182-183; see also Armour, P. D ., 274-275
Cotton, Tobacco, and W heat Arthur, Chester A ., 47
Alaska, 318, 390; Seward’s purchase Asia, i, 9, i i , 23; as the “Far W est,”
and views of, 28-29, 31, 404, 408 5; and U.S. in 1850’s, 24; Seward’s
Aldrich, Nelson, 235 views of, 26-31; Grant’s and Fish’s
Alger, R. A ., 249, 402 views of, 35-36; and U.S. desire
Allen, Col. Ethan, 387 for foreign markets, 41, 186-187,
430 Index
Asia ( cont .) Bates, George H ., 139
190, 219-220, 321; Evarts’ views Battleship fleet, see United States
of, 43-46; and Isthmian canal, 49; N avy
and Cleveland administration’s Bayard, Thomas F., 68; and Cana
views of, 1885-1889, 53-58; F. J. dian reciprocity, 1887, 34; as Sec
Turner’s views of, 71; J. Strong’s retary or State, 1885-1889, 53-58;
views of, 74, 78-79; B. Adams’ and Haiti, 1889, 127; and Samoa,
views of, 84,94-95; A. T . Mahan’s 139; and Hawaii, 208; and N ic
views of, 86, 96; as noncolonial aragua, 222, 228; and Venezuela,
area, 91; intellectuals place em 243, 244-245, 247, 252, 262-264,
phasis upon, 100-101; and bimet 266-269, 278, 315
allism, 108, 157-158; M cKinley’s Beard, Charles A ., 6
and Harrison’s views of, 111-112; Beer, W . C., 386
and 1890 naval debates, 125; and Belgium, 23, 52-53, 303
Hawaiian revolution, 1893, 148; Bellamy, Edward, 15
and U.S. gold policies, 155; and Benedict, E. G , 280
U.S. N avy, 230-231; and expan Benham, Rear Admiral Andrew E.
sion of U.S. N avy, 236; and Sino- K., 215-216, 235, 236
Japanese W ar, 1894-1895, 238; Bering Sea dispute, 107, 135, 313,
U.S. involvements in, 1894-1897, 318
284-285, 300-311; and Cuba, 295; Beringause, Arthur F., 85
and Anglo-American relations, Berkeley, Bishop George, 74, 86
316-317; and Russian-U.S. rela Berlin Conference, 1884, 52
tions, 318-325; and U.S., 1897- Bethlehem Iron [Steel] Company,
1898, 330, 333, 352-362, 365-367, . 239» 35<5
378, 379- 383» 4 0 5 » 4 0 7 » 4 0 9 ». 4 ! 0- Bimetallism, 83, 108, 155-156, 193,
417; see also China, Hawaii, Ja 330-33r; see also Silver
pan, Korea, Open-Door N otes, Bismarck, Count Herbert von, 139
and Open-door policy Bismarck, Otto von, 98, 258; mod
Astor, John Jacob, 386-387 erates stand on Samoan issue, 138-
Atkins, Edwin, 38, 287, 389 140
Atkinson, Edward, 271-272, 314, Blaine, James G., 20, 36, 46, 68, 86,
412-413 188, 284, 320, 376; and foreign
Atlanta Exposition of 1895, 190-191 policies o f Harrison administra
Australia, 147, 404 tion, 1889-1893, 102-149; outlines
Austro-Hungarian Empire, 378 anticolonial and trade policies,
A very, J. W ., 190-191 105-106; and Haitian revolution,
127-130; and Chilean revolution,
Bacon, Eben, 273 130-136; and Asia, 1889-1891,136-
Baker, Lewis, 222-225 138; and Samoa, 1889-1892, 138-
Baldwin Locomotive W orks, 307, 140; and Hawaii, 1881-1893, 140-
375 149; and M cKinley, 328, 331
Balmaceda government, 130-136 Blanco y Arenas, Gen. Ramón, 339-
Banks, Nathaniel P., 29 340, 343, 345
Barclay, Robert, 157 Bliss, Cornelius N ., 356
Baring Brothers (H ouse of Baring), Bliss, Tasker H ., 336
1 5 1 * 352 Blount, James H ., 204
Barker, Wharton, 352-353 Boutelle, Charles A ., 124, 126, 238-
Barrett, John, 312-313 239
Index W
Brazil, 43, 48, 190; and U.S. tariff Butler, Ben, 34
act of 1890, 119; revolution in, Butterfield, Gen. Daniel, 387
1893-1894, 210-218, 229, 232, 236-
237; and Venezuelan boundary Caffery, Jefferson, 290
crisis, 243, 246-247 California, 174, 366; as gateway to
Breckinridge, Clifton R., 323 Asia, 7; Seward’s vision of, 29;
British Guiana and Venezuelan and Hawaii, 1893, 146
boundary crisis, 243-282 Call, W ilkinson, 290
British W est Indies, 48-49 Cameron, James Donald, 290, 298
Brockett, Linus P., 12, 13 Campos, Gen. Martinez, 292
Brooks, Peter, 289 Canada, 3, 9, 23, 28, 39, 112, 314;
Bryan, Charles Page, 359 and Grant administration, 32-34;
Bryan, W illiam Jennings, 13-14, 83, Evarts’ views of, 41; as proposed
314; and antiexpansionism in 1900 U.S. frontier, 68; fisheries and
election, 416 Blaine’s policies, 107; and 1890
Bryce, James, 65, 80 reciprocity, 114; and Hawaii, 143,
Bureau o f Foreign Commerce, 311 145, 207-208; Gresham’s desire
Bureau of the American Republics, for, 201
113, 202, 218 Canadian Pacific Railroad, 143
Burgess, John W ., 97, 99 Cannon, H enry W ., 180
Burke, Edmund, 1 Cannon, Joseph G., 349
Burlingame Treaty, 27, 30 Canovas del Castillo, Antonio, 291,
Business, U.S., 62, 81-82, 150, 407- 299» 335. 337
408; attitudes and policies, 1865- Caribbean area: and Seward’s views,
1889, 16-24; and issuance o f 28, 31; and Grant administration’s
monthly consular reports, 41; and policies toward, 36-39; impor
Asia in 1880’s, 56; trapped in ten tance for Hawaii and Isthmian
ets of Social Darwinism, 97-98; canal, 147; U.S. expansion into,
supports reciprocity, 1890, 114, 401,41 r, 416; see also Haiti, Latin
119; and 1893-1897 depression, America, and Santo Domingo
150-196; views o f on tariff o f Carlisle, John G.: analyzes 1893-
1894, 162-164, 171-172; fears so 1897 depression, 153, 155, 181; at
cial crisis of 1893-1894, 175-176; tacks bimetallism, 158-159; notes
analyzes causes o f 1893-1897 de hoarding of money, 179; and
pression, 176-185; advocates solu Venezuela, 259, 267; urges eco
tions for depression, 186-196; in nomic expansion, 282
Brazil, 215; in Nicaragua, 219- Carnegie, Andrew, 8-9, 390; Gospel
229; and U.S. N avy, 238, 241; and of W ealth of, 17, 305; “Law o f
Venezuela, 242-243, 271-276, 279, Surplus” of, 17; and Social Dar
282; and Asia, 1894-1897, 300-311; winism, 98; and tariff o f 1890,
and M cKinley’s views of depres 163, 189; and U.S. N avy, 239; and
sion, 326-327; and Cuba, 341; and Venezuelan boundary crisis, 272,
Asia, 1897-1898, 352-354, 355-362; 273n; and Russia, 319; and Asia,
and Hawaii, 1897-1898, 365-366; 354.
and search for markets, 1897-1898, Caroline Islands, 92
370-379; and approach of war, Carpenter, Frank, 328
384-393, 400, 403-406; and U.S. Cary, Clarence, 356, 382, 384
expansion in 1890’s, 412; see also Central America, 4, 28, h i , 124;
Finance capital, U.S. see also Latin America
432 Index
Chamberlain, Joseph, 276, 317, 358 Colonialism, 68; impact o f on anti
Chandler, W illiam E., 264 expansionist thinking, 1865-1869,
Chandler, Zachariah, 34 31-32; U.S. aversion to in 1880’s,
Chanler, W inthrop, 406 60-61; and Turner’s frontier the
Chile, 42,48, 229; opposes 1889 rec sis, 68-69; and J. Strong’s views,
iprocity proposal, 113; revolution 78; and A. T . Mahan’s views, 91-
in and Harrison administration, 93; Blaine’s and Harrison’s views
130-136, 149 of, 105, 109-111; and U.S. Naval
China, 231, 380-383, 408; and U.S. Policy Board report o f 1889,123;
before i860, 5, 7; as a market for and Hawaiian annexation, 140-
U.S., 21; and treaty of 1868 with 149, 363-370; Gresham’s abhor
U.S., 27; Seward’s visions of, 30; rence of, 200-201; Cleveland ad
Evarts’ views of, 43-46; and ministration’s views of in Hawai
Cleveland administration, 1885- ian debate, 1893-1895, 203-209;
1889, 56-58; and Harrison ad and Isthmian canal, 220; and U.S.
ministration, 137; and Hawaii, N avy, 237; O lney’s view of, 258,
209; fear of, 236-237; and U.S., 293; summary o f U.S. attitude to
1894-1897, 301-311; and U.S., ward, 408-417
1897-1898, 352-362; see also Asia Commerce, see Exports, U.S.
China and Japan Trading Com Commercial Bureau o f the Ameri
pany, 303, 356 can Republics, 113, 202, 218
Cigar Makers* Union, 286 Committee on American Interests
Civil Service reform, 17, 23 in China, 359
Civil War: influence o f on U.S. Comte, Auguste, 97
foreign policy, 2, 5, 6-7, 37; re Conger, Edwin, 359
tards U.S. economic growth, 6; Congo, African, 52-53, 70; see also
impact o f on U.S. merchant Africa
marine, 19; and Seward’s diplo Congress, see United States Con
macy, 25, 31 gress
Clay, H enry, 3-4 Consular Service, 23,376-377
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 50-51, 189, Conwell, Russell H ,, 305
3*7 Corinto, see Nicaragua
Cleveland, Grover, 85; administra Costa Rica, h i , 191, 232
tion of, 1885-1889, and foreign Cotton, 9 -1 0 ,1 3 ,1 8 ,2 1 -2 2 ,1 6 4 ,181-
policies, 22-23,5°» 53"58,112,127; 182, 190, 195, 235; and the Asian
and Asia, 45-46, 300-311; and market, 219-220, 303, 354, 356
Hawaii, 148-149, 203-209, 362, Coudert, Frederic R., 299
369; and depression of 1893-1897, Coxey’s Army, 174, 205
150-283; views of on gold stand Cramp Shipbuilding Company, 303,
ard and American commercial 3*9
mission, 158; and Brazil, 210-218; Crossman & Brothers, W . S., 215
and Nicaragua, 218-229; and U.S. Cuba, 39, 48-49, 215; and U.S. be
naval expansion, 229-241; and fore i860, 4; and T en Years’
Venezuelan boundary crisis, 242- W ar, 1868-1878, 37-38, 288; ex
283; and Cuba, 284-300, 342, 345 panding U.S. interests in, 1878-
Clews, Henry, 156, 287 1895, 38; Blaine’s desire for, n o ;
Clyde, W illiam P., 128-129 and 1890 tariff, 119-120; W .
Cockran, Bourke, 166-167 W hitney’s views of, 157; imports
Colombia, 43, 48, 119, 167, 187 textiles from U.S., 190; new re-
Index 433
Cuba {corn.) 149, 150-283 (espec. 192, 230-240,
volt in, 1895, 23&» 284-300; and 242-243, 256), 327, 329-333, 372,
Venezuela, 246; and Asia, 301; 373-374, 390; see also Industrial
and Great Britain, 315-318; and revolution
Ü.S., 1897-1898, 327, 333-352, 364, D ew ey, Commodore George, 352,
368-369, 379-406,415-416 361, 410
Cuban League of the United States, Díaz, Porfirio, 42
286, 387 Dickinson, Don, 250-251, 254
Cullom, Shelby, 104,227, 333 Dilke, Sir Charles, 313
Cummings, Amos, 239 Dingley, Nelson, 374, 376
Curtis, W illiam £ ., 112, 386 Dodge, Grenville M., 42
D ole government o f Hawaii, 204,
Dana, Charles A., 387 206, 369
Danish W est Indies, 31,110 Dolliver, Jonathan, 125, 234
Darwin, Charles, 82,86 Dos Passos, John R., 387
Darwinism, 305; see also Social Dar Douglass, Frederick, 129
winism
Davis, Cushman, 84, 358, 364, 367- Eckels, James H ., 152
369 Eddy, Sherwood, 305
Dawes, Charles, 402 Egan, Patrick, 130-136
Day, W illiam R., 334, 337, 342, 344, Elkins, Stephen B., 103
346-348, 350-351, 358-359, 364, Ellicott, Lieut. John M., 233
381, 389, 394- 396, 398, 4°2 El Salvador, 48,111,188, 227
Debs, Eugene, 68, 256 Emory, Frederic, 208-209, 282-283,
D efoe, Daniel, 86 3”
Democracy, American: threat to England, see Great Britain
by 1877 strike, 14; views of in Europe, 9, 371; J. Strong’s fear of,
1877, 16; John H ay’s view of in 74; Blaine’s attitude toward, 114;
1880’s, 17; and dependence upon threatens intervention in Cuba,
expanding frontier, 65-67, 68, 95; 294-295, 338, 405; and Asia, 300-
J. Strong’s views of, 77, and so 311, 354-362; see also individual
cial crisis of 1894, 184-185; views nations
Russia, 319; views Germany, 324- Evarts, W illiam M., 36, 39-46, 311;
325; threatened b y expansion, summary o f foreign policies of,
1898-1899, 415 4 I"42
Democratic party: views on tariff Exports, U.S.: in 1838-1849 period
in 1892, 159-160; and Venezuelan compared with 1850-1873, 1-2; in
boundary crisis, 279-280; and i860 and 1897, 18; agricultural
Cuba, 286, 333-334; and Grover and industrial exports compared,
Cleveland, 293; British views of, 21-22; necessity for, 40-41; to
314; in Ohio, 328 Latin America, 42-43, 49-50; to
D enby, Charles, 56, 302-310, 322, Asia, 45, 300-311, 354; Blaine’s
352, 354-355 opinions on, 46-47; relationship
Denby, Charles, Jr., 355 or to closed landed frontier, 71;
DePew, Chauncey, 272, 387 A. T . Mahan’s views of, 88-89;
Depressions, causes and results of, Harrison administration’s views
6, 19-21; 1873-1878, 8-9, 14, 34, of, 104-112; and Pan-American
35; 1882-1886, 14-15, 20,65; 1893- policy of Harrison administra
1897, 61, 64-65, 81-83, 88, 148- tion, 112-121; and U.S. interests
434 Index
Exports, U.S. ( cont.) 63-64; and Federalist, N o . 10, 68;
in Samoa, 138-140; relationship of B. Adams’ view of, 83-84; A . T .
to economic problems of 1890- Mahan’s view of, 88-90; and the
1897, I 5i - i 55> *77- , 79. l8 4; “ “ideological consensus,” 95-101;
1897» 371* 374-377 U.S. desire for no more landed
areas, 147-148; and 1894 tariff de
Fairbanks, Charles W ., 348 bates, 167; repels Americans in
Farmers’ Alliance, 104, 117 1893-1895, 174; and U.S. naval
Federalist, N o . 10,184; and frontier expansion, 235; business journal
thesis, 68 view of, 372, 412; see also W est,
Field, Marshall, 274 American
Finance capital, European: in U.S., Frye, W illiam P., 78, 112, 359, 365-
1874-1895, 18; and Monroe D oc 366
trine, 36-37; in U.S., 1892-1893,
151; Cleveland favors, 154; need
for in U.S., 176-185, 314-315 Galt, Sir Alexander, 121
Finance capital, U.S., 314-315; Gama, Admiral Saldanha da, 213-
change of flow of from U.S. to 218
Europe, 9; in Mexico, 36, 42; in Garfield, James, 46
Cuba, 38, 287, 289, 296-297, 334; Garland, Hamlin, 15-16
in Latin America, 51-52, 186-188; Gates, John, 386
Harrison’s view of, 121; increases Germany, 23, 84,120, 218, 248, 284-
in strength after 1893, 177-180; in 285, 317, 360, 376; and U.S. in Pa
Nicaragua, 218-229; in Asia, 1894- cific area, 35; in Latin America,
1897, 300-311; see also Business 36-37, 131; and Samoa, 55, 122-
Firmin, Anténor, 129 123, 138-140, 187; and Venezue
Fish, Hamilton, 32-39, 243 lan boundary crisis, 276; and
Fish, Stuyvesant, 386-387 Asia, 308, 312, 316, 321, 352, 355,
Fiske, John, 77,99-100 357, 358-359; relations with U.S.
Flower, Benjamin Orange, 15 cool, 1890-1898, 323-325; and Ha
Foord, John, 356-357, 382 waii, 363
Foraker, Joseph B., 328,415-416 Gherardi, Rear Admiral Bancroft,
Ford, Patrick, 103 129
Ford, W orthington C., 179, 182, Gilroy, Thomas F., 387
186, 190 Godkin, E. L., 22,97
Foster, John W ., 49, 140, 144-148, Gold: U.S. losses, 1889, 114; and
334 U.S. economic problems, :89o-
France, 30-31, 45, 92, 127, 155, 195, 1895, 151-196; U.S. business com
246-248, 308, 310, 312, 330, 355, munity view of, 176-185; and
358, 37<5, 405 Venezuelan boundary crisis, 273-
Frederic, Harold, 320 274; impact o f on 1898 war, 404
Frelinghuysen, Frederick T ., 36, Goluchowski, Count Agenor, 377-
46- 53» 57-58 378
Frick, H enry Clay, 390 Gómez, Máximo, 286, 345
Frontier, American, 9-16; supposed Gompers, Samuel, 174, 286, 329
closing in 1880’s, 12-13; and an Goodrich, Commander C. F., 233
nexation of Canada, 33; and Ha Gorman, Arthur Pue, 169-172, 198,
waii, 35; F. J. Turner’s views of, 239
63-72; supposed closing in 1890’s, Gould, Jay, 14, 42
Index 435
Government, U.S.: role in expand ezuela, 244-255, 280, 282; and
ing trade, 20, 22-23; Evarts’ view Asia, 302-303, 308-309, 316; views
o f as agent for expanding U.S. Russia, 320
markets, 40-41; to act as agent for Grosvenor, Charles H ., 264
businessmen in Africa, 52; and J. Guatemala,42, h i , 191,232
Strong’s ideas of continued cen G ulf of Mexico, 124
tralization, 75; and B. Adams’ Gullón, Pio, 394
theories on centralization of so
ciety, 81-82, 84; danger to noted
b y journal, 185; N .A .M . wants Haiti, 39, 119, 149, 323; revolution
more help from, 193-194; M cKin in, 1889-1891,127-130
ley ’s views of, 329-330 Hale, Eugene, 114,122-126
Grace, W illiam L., 113 Hallowell, N . P., 273
Grace, W illiam R., & Company, Halstead, Murat, 103, 324
*35« Hanna, Marcus, 328, 332,410
Granger movement, 13 Harcourt, Sir W illiam, 156, 277
Grant, Ulysses S., 32-39 Harmon, Judson, 259
Great Britain, 2, 9, 23, 41-42, 107- Harriman, E. H ., 42, 353
108, 155, 158, 162, 185, 330; as Harris, Benjamin W ., 59
competitor o f U.S. in Latin Harris, Isham, 170
America, 21-22, 36-37, 42, 53, Harrison, Benjamin, 284, 320, 328,
130-131, 136, 150, 187, 195, 202- 407; administration’s foreign poli
203, 216, 218-229; as enemy of cies analyzed, 1889-1893, 102-149;
U.S. commercial expansion, 24; background of, 102-103; chang
and Canada, 33-34; fears U.S. in ing views of on industrial revolu
Pacific area, 35; and Hawaii, 35, tion, 120-121; initiates battleship
141,145-146, 207; and Asia, 44-46, navy, 126; and Haiti, 127-130; and
284-285, 303-310, 356-357, 358- Chile, 130-136; and Asia, 136-138;
359, 380-383; and Clayton-Bulwer and Samoa, 138-140; and Hawaii,
Treaty, 50-51; and Samoa, 55-56, 140-149, 203-204, 409; concept of
138-140, 408; J. Strong’s views o f empire, 149; warns about gold
as declining power, 78; U.S. in outflow, 151
tellectuals’ views of, 98-100; and Harvey, W illiam H . ( “Coin”), 65
U.S. N avy, 125, 234-240; attacked Hawaii, 1, 5, 46, n o , 112, 201, 232;
by N .A .M ., 193-194; and Vene viewed as gateway to Asia, 7, 29,
zuelan boundary crisis, 243-283; 31, 54, 91; U.S. treaty of 1875
and Spain, 295; growing A nglo- with, 35; and U.S., 1885-1889, 53-
American alliance, 313-318; and 54; and tariff of 1890, 120; and
Cuba, 338, 405 Harrison administration, 140-149;
Greeley, Horace, 12, 32 and Cleveland administration,
Gresham, Matilda (Mrs. W alter 1893-1895, 203-209; and Japan,
Q uintín), 217 236; and Great Britain, 248, 316;
Gresham, W alter Quintín, 14, 68, and Venezuelan boundary crisis,
191, 329; on the crisis o f' 1893- 280; and Germany, 324; and U.S.,
1895, 173, 197-201; as anticolo 1897-1898, 362-370; reasons foj
nialist, 200-201, 412; summary of annexation of, 408-411,414,417
views of, 203; and Hawaii, 203- H awley, Joseph R., 125, 239
209, 362, 369; and Brazil, 210-218; H ay, John, 17, 92, 93, 328, 332, 3^8
and Nicaragua, 218-229; and V en- 380, 407
436 Index
Hayes, Rutherford B., 328; admin and U.S. economic supremacy,
istration’s foreign policies, 39-46 373-374
Haymarket Riot of 1886,15 Inter-American bank, 113
Hazeltine, Mayo, 332 Inter-American Conference, 1889,
Heidelbach, A. S., 179 48, 112-114, 120, 141, 149, 330
Helper, Hinton, 112 Interstate Commerce Commission,
Herbert, Hilary, 93, 208, 229-240, »7
259» 3° 9»360 Investments, see Finance capital
Herder, Johann Gottfried, 97 Irish vote in U.S., 33
Higgins, Anthony, 235-236 Isolationism, U.S.: myth of, 2; de
H ill, David B., 169 fined in 1880’s, 60-61; F. J. T ur
H ill, James J., 175 ner’s attack upon, 69-71
Hiscock, Frank, 126 Isthmian canal project, 36, 366;
H itchcock, Ethan A., 322 Seward’s views of, 28; Hayes ad
H itt, Robert, 291, 344 ministration’s views of, 40, 43;
Hoar, George F., 156, 367-368 relationship of to reciprocity
H ogan’s Army, 174 proposals, 1882-1885, 48-49; J.
Holliday, Ben, 39 Strong’s views of, 79; Mahan’s
H om e Missionary Society, 72-73 emphasis upon, 91; and Blaine’s
Homestead A ct, 7 fears o f Great Britain, 107; Har
Homestead Strike, 205 rison administration’s views of,
Honduras, h i , 195,221, 232 h i ; and 1890 naval debates, 125;
Hopkins, Albert J., 374, 376 and Samoa, 139; relationship of to
Hosmer, James K., 99 Hawaii, 146-149, 367; and grow
H ow e, E. W ., 15 ing U.S. interests, 1893-1897, 188-
H ow e, Julia W ard, 319 189; urged by N.A .M ., 194; and
Howells, W illiam Dean, 15-16 Nicaraguan incident, 1894-1895,
Hunt, William, 59 219-228; and Great Britain, 248;
Huntington, Collis P., 42 and Asia, 411-412
Hyppolite, 127-129 Italy, 23, 376
Imports, American, 18
Industrial revolution in U.S., 415, James, Thomas L., 387
417; significance of for U.S. for Japan, 30, 43-46, 76, 231, 284, 301-
eign policy, especially 1860-1889, 304, 306-311; as U.S. market, 21;
6-24; and resultant depressions of and Korea, 1876-1889, 56-58; and
1873-1878 through 1893-1897,8-9; Hawaii, 141, 145, 146, 207, 363-
in South, 1865-1877, 10-11; threat 365; as U.S. friend, 311-313; and
to democracy, 17; need for for open door, 321, 382; and Philip
eign markets, 1883-1885, 19-21; pines, 360
impact on agriculture by, 21-22; Jaquith, H . J., 273
and exports to Latin America, 43; Jefferson, Thomas, 1, 3-4
J. Strong’s views of, 74-80; A. T . Jews in Russia, 319-320
Mahan’s views of, 88-90; J. Fiske’s Johnson, Andrew, 40,47
views of, 99; Blaine’s views of, Johnson, Emory R., 189
119; and Hawaiian revolution, Jones, James K., 169
147; importance o f noted in 1894, Jordan, David Starr, 175
183-185; Gresham’s views of, 199- Junta, Cuban, 37, 286-287, 290, 298,
200; O lney’s views of, 256-257; 340, 346-347, 393, 398,401,403
Index 437
Kasson, John A., 46, 52, 59, 139 W . C. Ford, 186; viewed by
Kennan, George, 319-320 N .A .M ., 193-195; renewed U.S.
Kiaochow, 300, 354-355, 356, 359, interest, 202-203; and U.S. N avy
364-365 in 1890’s, 229-231, 236; and Great
Kimball, Lieut. W illiam W ., 360 Britain, 317-318; and Germany,
Kimberley, John W odehouse, First 323-324; and U.S. expansion,
Earl of, 224, 252, 254 1898-1899,415-416; see also Mon
Kipling, Rudyard, 313 roe Doctrine and individual na
Korea, 307, 312; Seward’s policies tions in Latin America
toward, 30-31; and American in Laughlin, G. M., 163
terests, 1876-1889, 56-58; J. Lee, Fitzhugh, 292, 336-337, 342,
Strong’s views of, 76; and Harri 343» 388, 389,402
son administration, 137-138; and Legitime, 127-128
U.S., 1894-1897, 301-311; and Leopold II, King of Belgium, 52
Russia, 321-322 Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 43
Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, 353 Libby, W illiam Herbert, 23-24
Kurino, Shinichiro, 313 Liberal Republican party, 39
Liliuokalani, Queen, 143-144, 204,
Labor, American, 14, 27, 40-41, 68, 206
161-172, 172-175, 198-200, 373; Livingston, Leonidas F., 249, 253
see also American Federation of Lodge, H enry Cabot: and Brooks
Labor Adams, 84-85; views o f colonial
LaFollette, Robert, 332 ism, 91; and Mahan on issue of
Lamont, Daniel, 175, 198, 259 Philippine annexation, 92; and
Latin America, 1,9, 20,44, 314; and growth o f U.S. N avy, 124, 239;
U.S. before 1865, 3-5; as market views bimetallism, 157; attitude
for U.S. industrial goods, 1860- toward Asia, 236, 358; fears Eu
1889, 21-22; Seward’s views of, ropean powers in Latin America,
27-28; as area for colonial expan 248-249; and Olney, 258; attitude
sion, 31, 91; and Grant adminis toward Venezuelan boundary
tration, 32, 36-39; Evans’ views crisis, 270, 273, 281; and Cuba,
of, 42-43; Blaine’s policies and at 290-29in, 297-298, 348, 384, 389,
titudes toward, 46-47, 105-108; 392, 406; fears Russia and China,
Frelinghuysen’s views of, 47-52; 306; views of Great Britain, 317;
and U.S. N avy in 1880’s, 59; as views of Philippine annexation
proposed American frontier, 68; and limiting American expansion,
mentioned by F. J. Turner, 70; 361, 415
and J. Strong’s views o f “mis Lome, Enrique Dupuy de, 293, 343,
sion,” 78; A . T . Mahan’s views of, 344» 346-348. 352» 368, 390
86; markets in envisioned by Long, John D ., 344, 350, 360, 361,
Harrison, 104; and reciprocity 364, 386
debate o f 1889-1890, 114-121; Low, Phillip B., 239
viewed as great potential market, Lowell, James Russell, 22,319
147, 186-196; and U.S. gold pol Luce, Henry, 305
icies, 1893, 155; and 1894 tariff, Luce, Rear Admiral Stephen B., 233
167; trade w ith increases under
1894 tariff, 171; and U.S. finance Madagascar, 2,41,355
capital in 1890’s, 177; competes Madison, James, 1,68,184
w ith U.S. wheat, 183; noted by Madriz, José, 224-225
438 Index
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 61-62, 121, Cuba, 1897-1898, 333-352* 379-
232, 235, 250; and J. Strong, 78, 406; and Asia, 352-362, 379-406;
80; and B. Adams, 80, 85; life and and Hawaii, 362-370,409-410; and
views summarized, ideas on mer decision for war, 1898, 383-406;
cantilism analyzed, place in intel and Philippine annexation issue.
lectual consensus of 1890’s sug 411; views Isthmian canal, 4 ri
gested, 85-101; attitude toward 412; in debate over expansion.
Philippine annexation, 92, 360, 1898-1900, 413-416
361, 383, 411, 415-416; influences Meade, Commander Richard W ., 35
T racy’s 1889 report, 123; influ Mello, Admiral Custodio de, 211-
ences Herbert, 230; attacked by 218
Proctor, 237; fears Russia and Melville, Commodore G. W ., 383
China, 306; views Great Britain, Mercantilism, 85-95
317; views expansion in 1898- Merchant marine, American, 19,
1899,4*4 87-88, 89-93, IO9, 112-113, 120,
“Maine,” U.S.S., 344-345» 348» 352> 187, 194, 241
368, 390, 394,402 Mexico, 4, 28, 42, 43, 46, 48, 50, 51-
Manchuria, 301, 305, 352-354» 38°* 52, 78, 187, 191, 248, 266, 408
383; see also Asia M idway Islands, 29, 31,408
Manifest destiny: cited b y London Miller, W arner, 131, 192
Times , 51; and tariff of 1894, *67; Mills, Roger Q., 160-162, 168, 271,
in Latin America, 188; and V en 298
ezuelan boundary crisis, 279, 282; Missionaries, 5, 57, 72-80, 301, 304-
noted b y M cKinley, 366, 369; 308, 310, 352, 411
and Hawaii, 366; in U.S. com M ôle, St. Nicolas, n o , 112, 127-
mercial expansion, 373; see also 130
Anglo-Saxon mission M olly Maguires, 68
Manning, Daniel, 22 M oney, Hernando de Soto, 237
Marcy, W illiam , 7 Monroe Doctrine, 3, 136; O lney’s
Maritime Canal Company, 111,219- reinterpretation o f in 1895, 4; at
228 time o f Civil W ar, 5; Grant
Martí, José, 286 administration and nontransfer
Massó, Gen. Juan, 344-345 principle of, 36-37, 39; and A f
M cAdoo, W illiam, 59-60, 125, 229, rica, 1884-1885, 53; and Samoa,
301 55; mentioned by F. J. Turner,
McCook, John J., 346-348, 353 70; Blaine’s implementation of,
McCormick, Cyrus M., 39 108; and Hawaii, 148,208; viewed
McCreary, James B., 112 as protection for U.S. commer
McDearmon, James C., 167 cial expansion into Latin Amer
M cKinley, W illiam , 111-112, 285; ica, 186; resurgence o f noted by
administration admires B. Adams, Great Britain and France, 195-
85; tariff views o f praised by Ma 196; and Nicaragua, 226, 280; Ma
han, 86; views colonialism, 91; han’s views of, 232; and U.S.
supports Inter-American Confer N avy, 233, 236; and Venezuelan
ence, 112; manages 1890 tariff boundary crisis, 242, 253, 259-268,
bill, 115-119; speaks to N .A .M ., 270, 276-277, 281; H . C. Lodge
1895, 192-193; and Cuba, 1896, views, 249; and Cuba, 295, 298;
298; relations w ith British, 314; in commercial expansion o f 1898,
background of, 327-333; and 378-379
Index 439
Moore, John Bassett, 140, 200, 320, N e w York Stock Exchange, 273
337 Nicaragua, i n ; U.S. proposes vir
Moret, Segismundo, 345, 349, 399 tual protectorate, 50-51; and U.S.,
Morgan, J. Pierpont, 156, 387 1894- 1895, 218-229; and U.S.
Morgan, John T ., 52, h i , 112, 219, N avy, 232; and Venezuelan
227-228,235,290,412 boundary crisis, 243, 246, 248,
Morgan-Belmont syndicate, 172, 251, 263-264, 280; see also Isth
178 mian canal project
Mormons, 77 Nietzsche, Friedrich W ilhelm , 98
Morrill, Justin, 32-33,116 Norris, Frank, 15
Morse, James R., 304
Morton, Levi P., 137, 388 Olney, Peter B., 271
Morton, Sterling, 267 Olney, Richard: reinterprets M on
Mosquito Reservation, 220-228, 246 roe Doctrine, 4; Venezuela note
Mun, Thomas, 86 of, compared w ith W ashington’s
Farewell Address b y J. Strong,
National Association o f Manufac 79; and Atlanta Exposition, 190;
turers, 189,191-195, 203. 3*4» 33°. and commercial museums, 191;
332» 3<56,370-371, 377 and Hawaii, 1895-1896, 208; and
National Board of Trade, 189,374 Nicaragua, 227-228; discusses
National Cordage Company, 152 A . T . Mahan and U.S. N avy,
National Lead Trust, 169 240-241; and Venezuelan bound
National Nicaragua Canal Conven ary crisis, 242-283; background
tion, 219 and views of, 255-256; and Cuba,
Nativism, 20 1895- 1897,285-300; and Asia, 300-
Naval Advisory Board, 1881,59 311; policies toward Japan and
Naval Policy Board, 1889,123 Korea, 313; views England, 317
Naval W ar Board, 383 O pen-Door N otes, 92-93, 311-313,
Naval W ar College, 59,94,122,233, 4*7
312, 361, 364 Open-door policy, 30,43-44, 52, 54»
N avy, U.S., see United States N avy 69-70, 72, 92-93, 112, 316-318,
N e w empire: concept o f defined, 1; 352-362, 380-383
historical background of in U.S., Orinoco River, 243-244, 246, 249-
3-5; and Canada, 33; formal be 255,260, 262, 278,281
ginnings of in central and south
ern Pacific, 35-36; and Latin Page, W alter Hines, 70
America in 1870’s, 36; Freling- Pago Pago, see Samoa
huysen’s role in, 47; Blaine’s state Panama, 43, 51, 248; see also Isth
ment of, 105; differs from Euro mian canal project
pean views, 408, 414; summary Pan-American movement, 112-121;
of, 416-417 see also Inter-American Confer
“N e w N avy,” see United States ence
N avy Panics o f 1837, 1857, 1873, 1882-
N e w York City Chamber of Com 1883, 1890, 1893, see Depressions
merce, 40, 52, 356 and Industrial revolution
N e w York Commercial Museum, Paschal, Thomas M., 264
191 Patterson, Josiah, 167
N e w York State Chamber o f Com Pauncefote, Sir Julian, 107-108,199-
merce, 21, 374 200,263-264, 316-317,358
440 Index
Peffer, W illiam, 237 Railroad strike of 1877: G rêsham’s
Peixoto, Floriano, 210, 214 reactions to, 198
Pendleton, John O., 235 Railroads, U.S., 12, 13, 14, 27, 31,
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 42 40,42,56,65,75,112-113,177,187
Pepper, W illiam, 191 Raw materials: importance o f to
Perry, Commodore Matthew G , 5, expanding exports, 22-23; Ffe~
383 linghuysen’s views of, 48; Ma
Peru, 42, n o , 130 han’s desire for, 88; and reciproc
Phelps, Prof. Austin, 77 ity debate in 1889-1890, 113-114,
Phelps, E. J., 244 116; and tariff o f 1894, 161-172;
Phelps, W illiam W ., 139 W . C. Ford’s views of, 182;
Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Gresham’s views of, 200
Company, 152 Reciprocity, 21, 112; and Hawaii,
Philadelphia Commercial Museum, 29; Morrill’s views o f regarding
191, 240 Canada, 33; and Canada, 34; Fre-
Philippine Islands, 112, 360; A. T . linghuysen’s efforts for, 48-49;
Mahan’s reluctance to annex, 92; U.S. capital offsets defeat of,
J. Fiske’s views on annexation of, 1884-1885, 52; success of in 1890,
100; annexation of similar to ear 53, 149; renewed with Hawaii,
lier policies in Samoa, 140; O l- 53-54; wanted by Mahan, 86; tied
ney’s views of, 258; and Cuba, to merchant marine, 109; and
344; and M cKinley administra Harrison administration’s Latin-
tion before 1898 war, 361-362; American policies, 112-121; 1890
and Hawaii, 368; U.S. attacks, tariff and Hawaii, 141-143;
382-383; reasons for annexation Blaine’s proposal of for Hawaii,
of, 408,410-411 ,413,416-417 1890, 142; 1890 clause debated in
Picking, Commander H enry, 212 1894, 159-172; new interest ap
Pierce, Gilbert, n 6 n pears, 1895, 189-190; “with a
Pitkin, Horace, 305 club,” 202; in 1897, 376
Platt, Orville, 235 Reconstruction era in U.S., 9-14,
Platt Amendment, 142,416 29,58-59
Playfair, Sir Lyon, 276-277 Reddaway, W . F., 63-64
Point Barima, see Orinoco River Reed, Thomas B., 157,402
Populists, 13, 65-68, 70, 125, 165, Reick, W . C., 392-393
175,184,198, 237, 239,290 Reid, W hitelaw, 103,110,147, 382
Portugal, n o Republican party, 25, 117, 157, 159-
Proctor, John R., 322 160,279-280,286, 333, 384,393
Proctor, Redfield, 237, 391-393 Rockefeller, W illiam, 23, 215, 386
Puerto Rico, 48-49,110 Rockhill, W illiam W ., 353
Pullman strike, 175, 205, 256 Rojas, P. Ezequiel, 252-253
Roman Catholicism, 77
Quay, Matthew, 239 Roman Republic and Empire, 96,
Queen Regent of Spain, María Cris 185, 201,408
tina, 340, 345, 398-399 Roosevelt, Theodore, 32, 387; and
F. J. Turner, 64, 71-72; and
Racism, 306; U.S. fears o f in Cuba, Brooks Adams, 84-85; views co
38; U.S. fears in Santo Domingo lonialism, 91; reviews Mahan’s
and Haiti, 38-39; J. Strong’s views writings, 93; and Olney, 258;
of, 78-79; and Hawaii, 363 fears Russia and China, 306, 322,
Index 44*
Roosevelt, Theodore (cont.) Scruggs, W illiam L., 253-254
360-361; views Great Britain, 317; Seal dispute, see Bering Sea dispute
and M cKinley, 332-333; and J. J. Search, Theodore, 353,373, 377
McCook, 353; and Hawaii, 364; Senate, U.S., see United States Con
and Asia, 383 gress
Rostow, W alt W ., 6 Seward, Frederick W ., 28-29
Russia, 284-285; Seward’s attitude Seward, George F., 31
toward, 30; interested in Korea Seward, W illiam, 1,11, 32, 383,407;
in 1880’s, 57; Brooks Adams fears, in 1850’s, 5, 7; and Asia, 5, 311,
84; competes with U.S. wheat, 417; background and foreign pol
183; Gresham confers with Min icies of, 24-32; influences Evarts,
ister from, 204; and Hawaii, 207; 40; ideas of revived in 1880’s, 56;
and Spain, 295; and Asia, 303, and continentalism, 101; Blaine
307, 308, 312, 316, 352-362, 380- changes policies of, 137
383; relations with U.S. cool, 318- Shaw, Albert, 93, 227, 383
325; and Goluchowski speech, Sherman, John, 291, 328, 334, 340-
1897, 378; and 1898 war, 405 341, 346, 347-348, 350-351, 354-
Russian-Chinese Bank, 321-322 355» 379-380
Ryan, Thomas Fortune, 386 Sherman, Gen. W illiam T ., 335
Sherman Silver Purchase A ct, 108,
Sagasta, Práxedes Mateo, 337*340, *53» 156, 159* *76, 199
342, 349, 383-384, 395 Shufeldt, Commodore Robert W .,
Sage, Russell, 42, 386 52, 57-58, 137
Salisbury, Robert Arthur Talbot Sill, John M. B., 313
Gascoyne-Cecil, Third Marquis Silver: B. Adams’ views of, 83; and
of, 107, 227, 245, 258, 262-263, 1889 Inter-American Conference,
265-270, 276, 315, 339 112-113; and depression of 1893-
Samoa: origins of U.S. interests in, 1897, 154-195; and Anglo-Ameri
35-36; markets in, 41; and Cleve can relations, 314, 317; McKin
land administration, 1885-1889, ley’s views of, 330; influence in
55-56; viewed as gateway to Asian approach o f 1898 war, 385, 390;
market by Bayard, 1887, 55-56; see also Democratic party and
and U.S. isolation in 1880’s, 61; Populists
mentioned by F. J. Turner, 70; Simmons, J. Edward, 271, 387
and U.S. N avy in 1889, 112-123; Simpson, Jerry, 166-167, 237
and Harrison administration, 138- Smith, Charles Emory, 358
140; and German-American rela Smith, Charles Stewart, 271
tions, 323-324; U.S. hold on, 408 Smith, Goldwin, 16
Santo Domingo, 39, 48, n o , 149, Smith, H oke, 158
247-248; and Seward, 31; and Social Darwinism, 97-100
Grant administration, 38-39; and Socialism, 77
Blaine, 130; N e w York bankers South (U .S.): and U.S. foreign pol
control finances of, 187-188; im icy, 1865-1877, 9-16; displays in
ports textiles from U.S., 190 creased interest in overseas mar
Santo Domingo Improvement Com kets, 190-191, 371-372; and Isth
pany, 247-248 mian canal, 219
Schiff, Jacob, 353 South America, see Latin America
Schomburgk, Robert, 243 Spain: and T en Years’ W ar, 37- 38;
Schurz, Carl, 201, 205,412-416 reciprocity agreements with in
442 Index
Spain ( cont .) Tariff, U.S.: during Civil W ar, 7;
1880’s, 49; B. Adams’ views of Seward’s views of, 27; Mahan’s
war with, 84-85; and Cleveland views of, 86; o f 1890, 141-146,
administration, 1895-1897, 284- 160, 163, 409; of 1890 and Brazil,
300; and Cuba, 1897-1898, 327, 210-215; of 1894, 157, 159-172.
333-352* 376, 378,379-406,408 214-215, 280; of 1894 and Hawaii,
Spencer, Herbert, 97-98, 313 207; o f 1894 and Cuba, 286; and
Spofford, Tileston & Company, 39 Great Britain, 314; M cKinley’s
Spreckels, Claus, 148 views of, 328-332; o f 1897, 374-
Spring-Rice, Cecil, 96 377; with Cuba, 416; see also
Standard Oil Company, 23-24, 169, Reciprocity
215» 307* 356 Taylor, Hannis, 294, 295, 335, 341
Stanley, H enry M., 52 Teller Amendment, 415
Stanton, Rear Admiral Oscar F., Tetuán, Duke of, 293-295, 338
212 Thomas, Allen, 255
Stead, W . T ., 319 Thompson, Thomas S., 211-218
Stevens, John L., 141-146 Thurston, Lorrin A ., 144
Stewart, John A., 272 Tobacco, 18, 340
Stewart, W illiam, 227 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 74, 352
Stillman, James, 172 Tow nes, W illiam T ., 212
Strategic bases: Frelinghuysen’s Tracy, Benjamin F., 94, 122-127,
views of, 49-50; A. T . Mahan’s 128-129, 131-134, 144-146
views of, 91-93; Harrison ad Transvaal Free State, 276
ministration’s policies in regard Treaties: with China, 1844, 5, 30;
to, n o -1 1 1 ,127-130; Hawaii, 140- with China, 1868, 27, 30; with
149, 204-209, 362-370; Schurz’s England and Canada, 1871, 34;
desire for, 201,413-414 with Hawaii, 35, 54, 142, 409;
Straus, Isidor, 22, 215 w ith Samoan native chiefs, 1878,
Straus, Oscar, 22, 272, 377 35-36; with Colombia, 1846, 43;
Strong, Josiah, 61-62, 72-80, 85, 95- with Japan, 1878, 44-45; with
101, 326 China, 1880, 44-45; w ith N ic
Student Volunteers for Foreign aragua (Frelinghuysen-Zavala),
Missions, 305 1884, 49-50; with Great Brit
Sugar: and 1875 treaty with H a ain ( Clayton-Bulw er), 1850, 50-
waii, 35; and 1890 tariff bill, 115- 51, 189, 317; with Korea, 1882,
119; Hawaiian dependence upon, 56-57; proposed arbitration trea
142, 366-367, 369; in 1894 tariff ties at 1889 Inter-American Con
debate, 163-170; and Cuba, 334, ference, 112-113; with Brazil,
342 1891, 210-215; of Managua, i860,
Sulzer, W illiam, 290 220, 228; proposed Anglo-Am eri
Sumner, Charles, 39 can arbitration treaty, 1896-1897,
Sumner, W illiam Graham, 97, 287- 317; proposed commercial treaty
288 with Spain, 1897-1898, 346-347
Supreme Court, see United States Trinidad, 243
Supreme Court Turkey, 238
Turner, Frederick Jackson, 61,
62-72, 74, 80, 85, 88, 95-101,
Talbott, J. Fred, 236, 237 149
Tappen, Frederick D ., 271 Twain, Mark, 15-16, 319
Index 443
Union Iron W orks, 303 origins and results o f boundary
Union League Club, 271 crisis, 100, h i , 149, 150, 157, 228,
United States Congress: and for 242-283, 288, 314, 324; and 1890
eign policy during Civil W ar, tariff, 119; N .A .M . builds sample
6-7; rejects Frelinghuysen-Zavala warehouse in, 194; and U.S.
Treaty, 50; rejects agreement of N avy, 229, 238
Berlin Conference, 1884-1885, 52- Vest, George, 109,117,414
53; and Hawaiian reciprocity Voorhees, Daniel, 168
treaty, 54; uses Mahan’s ideas,
93-94; and reciprocity proposal
of 1889-1890, 114-121; and Chil W alker, Francis A., 22
ean revolution, 1892, 135; and Sa W allach, Capt. Richard, 312
moa, 1889,138; and tariff o f 1894, W ar of Pacific, 42
159-172; and Nicaragua, 219; and Warner, John D eW itt, 287
development of U.S. N avy, 231- W ashington’s Farewell Address, 79,
240; and Venezuela, 243, 270- 256-257, 261
271; and Cuba, 298, 337, 349-350; W eadock, Thomas A. E., 235
and Anglo-American arbitration W eaver, Gen. James B., 13
treaty, 317; almost annexes Ha W ebster, Daniel, 7
waii, 366-369; and 1897 tariff, W ells, David Ames, 19, 22
374-376; and approach to war W est, American, 9-16; Seward’s
w ith Spain, 393-406; annexes H a views on, 27; impact of on anti
waii, 409-410; and expansion, expansionist thinking, 31-32; and
1898-1899, 414-415; see also G ov frontier thesis, 63-72; J. Strong’s
ernment, U.S. views on, 72-80; B. Adams views
United States N avy, 3, 43; in Asia, Asia as Far W est, 84; desire o f
44, 309, 312, 360, 361-362, 382- for Samoa, 138; starting point for
383; influences Latin-American labor unrest, 1893-1895, 174; see
policies of U.S., 48; in Panama, also Frontier, American
1885, 51; origins of m odem navy, W estward movement of empire,
58-60; influence of Mahan upon, concept of, 25-26, 74, 77-78, 83-
85, 88, 93; development of, 1889- 84, 306
1892, 121-127; and Haitian revo W eyler, Gen. Valeriano y Nicolau,
lution, 1889-1891, 127 -130; and 292, 294, 339, 343, 345, 399
Chilean revolution, 1891-1892, W harton, Joseph, 163
130-136; and Brazilian revolt, W heat, U.S., 9-10, 12-13, 18, 21,
1893-1894, 210-218; and N ica 119,181-183,354
ragua, 224-225; development of, W heeler, Joseph, 264
1893-1897, 229-241; and Great W hite, Andrew Dickson, 80, 319,
Britain, 248; and Spain, 341; and 325
sinking of the “Maine,” 348; and W hite, H enry, 315
Cuba, 350; and Hawaii, 1898, 364; W hite, Stephen M., 363
and Philippines, 382-383 W hitney, W illiam C., 59,157,198
United States Supreme Court, 85, W ilhelm II, Kaiser, 276, 323-324,
169, 171 359
W ilson, James, 366
W ilson, James Harrison, 56, 347,
Van Voorhis, John, 237 352-353» 355» 359. 365
Venezuela: trade w ith U.S., 42-43; W ilson, W illiam L., 160-172, 373
m Index
W ilson, W oodrow , 71,261 W orld’s Fair o f 1893,65, 232
W ise, George D ., 220 W right, Carroll D ., 8
W itte, Count Sergei, 320-321
W olff, Sir H enry Drummond, 339 “Yellow Press,” 348,401
W oodford, Stewart L., 335-336, Young, John Russell, 44
338, 342» 345- 35*. 379. 394- 397.
399 Zelaya, Gen. J. S., 219-228

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THE NEW EMPIRE

An Interpretation of American Expansion

The original clothbound edition, an

International Standard Book Number 0-8014-9048-0

M y Mother and Father

T H IS monograph attempts to examine the crucial incubation

T H IS monograph attempts to examine the crucial incubation

I Years o f Preparation, 1 8 6 0 - 1 8 8 9 ....................................1

III T he Strategic F o r m u la tio n ...........................................102

IV The Economic Formulation . . . . 150

V Reaction: Depression Diplomacy, 1893-1895 . . 197

VI Reaction: The Venezuelan Boundary Crisis of 1895-

V II Reaction: N ew Problems, N ew Friends, N ew Foes 284

VIII Reaction: Approach to W ar 326

E p ilo g u e .......................................................... . . 407

Selected Bibliography . . . . . 418

M O DERN American diplomatic history began in the 1850’s and

1 C. J. Bullock, J. H . W illiams, and R. S. Tuckner, “T he Balance o f

The Roots of the N e w Empire

2 For an excellent summary of the American empire in the nineteenth

The Industrial Revolution

•T hom as C. Cochran, “D id the Civil W ar Retard Industrialization?”

7 Thomas C. Cochran and W illiam Miller, The Age of Enterprise (N e w

W estward the Course of Empire—and Discontent

9 Fred Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier . . . (N e w York, T o ­

10 For a good discussion of the South’s industrial development, see

13 Billington, W estward Expansion, 731-732; Shannon, Farmer’s Last

16 There is a good discussion o f Brockett in Literary History of the

18 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 53.

The Reaction of American Business

22 Ralph H enry Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought

28 Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age, 296-301.

29 T he quotations are given in Bald, “Expansionist Sentiment,” 121,

81Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” 3-7; Plesur, “Looking Outward,” 28;

86 See H . M. Flagler to Senator W ilkinson Call o f Florida, July 23,

Seward offered concrete suggestions to realize this base of

41 Ibid., Ill, 618, IOQ, 616.

43 Frederic Bancroft, “Seward’s Ideas of Territorial Expansion,” N orth

Grant and Fish

501bid. y 1-3; Albert K. W einberg, Manifest Destiny . . . (Baltimore,

63 Sylvester K. Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1898

67Nevins, Fish, 179-182, 194-200, 295-296, 354-359, 615-637.

69 Nevins, Fish, *50-257, 263-264, ch. xii.

The question which now preemptorily challenges all thinking minds

81 T he best accounts are Chester Leonard Barrows, William M. Evarts,

62 Barrows, Evarts, 167, 375-378; Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age,

64 Barrows, Evarts, 402; D yer, Evarts, 234-235.

e7Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” 158; Bald, “Expansionist Sentiment,”

60 T yler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (N e w York, 1941), 512-

Blaine and Frelinghuysen

T0 Edward Younger, John A . Kasson . . . (Iow a City, 1955), 295;

T1A . Curtis W ilgus, “James G. Blaine and the Pan-American M ove­

77 Blaine to Lowell, June 24, 1881, James G. Blaine papers, Library o f

Bayard and the Pacific

82Pletcher, “Awkward Years,” ch. xvii; Younger, Kasson, 292-295,

89 For German and British reaction, see Stolberg-W em igerode, G er­

91 Treat, U S . and Japan, II, 218-219; Dennett, Americans in Eastern

The Beginning of the M odern American N a vy

92 John D . Long, The N ew American N avy (N e w York, 1903), I

9 Fred Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier . . . (N e w York, T o

T1A . Curtis W ilgus, “James G. Blaine and the Pan-American M ove

89 For German and British reaction, see Stolberg-W em igerode, G er

52 Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Bos

20Laughlin and W illis, Reciprocity , 180; Hamilton, Blaine, 683; M c

60 Blaine to Harrison, Sept. 16, 1891, Harrison MSS, also in Corre