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doi:10.1093/schbul/sby154
Advance Access publication 2 November 2018
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It has been proposed that the brain uses this mechanism experience and discuss the neural circuits related to altered
of belief updating to infer the hidden states of the world information processing in psychosis.
from incomplete and noisy sensory data.12 In a Bayesian
sense, the term belief is not exclusively used for higher-
level cognition but also refers to a probability distribution Computational Models of Reinforcement Learning
over some unknown environmental or internal state and Alterations in Psychosis
may or may not be consciously accessible.13 The mean of Computational models of reinforcement learning (RL)
this distribution denotes the most expected state, whereas have been frequently applied to data from individuals
its variance denotes the uncertainty of the belief (and the performing tasks reliant on the ability to process and
inverse variance its precision). Critically, if a belief is held learn from feedback, and to decide based on representa-
with high uncertainty (ie, low precision), mismatching tions of value.11,24 While the in-the-moment experience
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prior assumptions about informational uncertainty and exploration have been found to contribute to impairments
is, in turn, modulated by higher-level beliefs regarding in learning and motivation in schizophrenia patients.25,47
the volatility of the environment, encoded at higher Further evidence points to roles for glutamater-
levels of neural computation including the prefrontal gic neurotransmission (eg, via NMDA receptors) and
cortex (PFC) and hippocampus (figure 1).54 A computa- GABAergic inhibition in encoding the precision of learn-
tional framework that models this hierarchical structure ing signals in hippocampal and cortical networks (fig-
of belief updating is the Hierarchical Gaussian Filter13 ure 1). While the signaling of precision-weighted PEs has
(figure 2). This approach extends RL accounts and pro- not been investigated in schizophrenia patients thus far,
vides a broader framework that goes beyond learning of the administration of the NMDA receptor antagonist
beliefs about reward-related value expectation. Using this ketamine, to healthy controls, was found to be associated
framework, a recent model-based fMRI study of associ- with both a reduced ability to use confidence (precision)
ative audiovisual learning found that high-level beliefs estimates to regulate RL parameters and altered fronto-
regarding the strength of dynamic cue-target contingencies parietal activity.62
relied on hippocampus and orbitofrontal cortex, whereas Finally, dopamine has also been implicated in hippo-
the representations of low-level conditional target prob- campus-dependent novelty detection and novelty seeking
abilities was associated with early visual cortex activity.19 behavior in both humans and rodents.54,63–65 Of course,
The idea that dopaminergic transmission contributes merely because a stimulus is “novel” does not necessarily
to the signaling of the precision of learning signals also mean that it would be involved in belief updating. Rather,
suggests a mechanism by which dopamine may influence it has been proposed that a stimulus must be both novel
higher-level decision making. Specifically, representations and salient to impact belief, and that prefrontal-hippo-
of uncertainty have been shown to drive exploratory be- campal dynamics thought to underlie novelty detection
havior.58–60 It is therefore noteworthy that dopamine interact with dopaminergic salience signals16,54 to bring
synthesis capacity in the striatum has been found to be about relevant memory incorporation.54
associated with the extent to which participants used a Regarding neurobiological correlates of the symptoms
goal-directed learning strategy, in the context of a com- of psychotic illness, positive symptoms are thought to be
plex cognitive task,61 and that deficits in goal-directed mediated by dopamine hyper-responsivity, with cognitive
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symptoms arising via frontal cortical dysfunction, and symptoms—possibly via elevated striatal dopamine syn-
negative symptoms via impaired function of fronto- thesis72—especially in those with elevated genetic liability
striatal circuits, cingulate cortex, and the amygdalae.66,67 for, or social vulnerability to, psychotic illness.73–75 As yet,
While decades of research have revealed that dopamine no studies of individuals at elevated genetic or environ-
can have different actions depending on its projection mental risk for psychosis have examined the precision in
site,54,68,69 one central aspect of dopamine function seems encoding of prior beliefs, or influence of priors on deci-
to be the signaling of salience or, in Bayesian terms, of sion making. Regardless of whether they are driven by
the precision during information processing. psychosocial or primary neurobiological factors, mal-
adaptive inferences related to sensory and high-level
processing may ultimately implicate the same circuits in-
Sensory Information Processing and Its Association volved in the comparison of prior beliefs and new sensory
With the Formation and Maintenance of Delusions information. Such neural circuits include temporo-limbic
Insufficient precision in the encoding of low-level prior brain regions involved in executive control and stress
beliefs relative to sensory input could occur either due to reactivity.23,54
the faulty acquisition of prior beliefs, or due to a reduced Importantly, different levels of neural processing may
ability to appropriately use prior beliefs in perceptual be differentially involved in false inferences underlying
inference. The acquisition of prior beliefs could be faulty psychotic experience; Schmack and coworkers76 observed
if sensory information is misleading, if the detection and/ that delusional ideation in both healthy volunteers and
or encoding of relevant sensory information are per- schizophrenia patients is associated with reduced per-
turbed (or excessively stochastic),54 or if the detection ceptual stability during the viewing of ambiguous visual
and/or computation of higher-level PEs are perturbed or stimuli that represent informational uncertainty,76,77 which
insufficiently precise.16,21 A reduced ability to appropri- points to a weaker influence of perceptual priors built up
ately use prior beliefs in perceptual inference could occur at previous encounters with the same visual information.
if high-level beliefs include false assumptions regarding This observation is in line with the well-known finding of
the volatility of a novel environment. reduced susceptibility to some visual illusions in schizo-
These considerations are consistent with the view that phrenia, pointing to reduced precision of prior beliefs at
both genetic and psychosocial factors contribute to the low hierarchical levels.21,78 Interestingly, the finding of a
development of psychosis. While it is still necessary to decreased influence of such lower-level perceptual beliefs
differentiate among the various forms of stress, a mecha- was accompanied by an increased influence of higher-level
nistic understanding of stress effects on neural circuits is cognitive beliefs on sensory processing. Belief-related con-
emerging, indicating, eg, that stress can elevate microglial nectivity between regions encoding high-level beliefs in
activity in hippocampus70 and increase striatal dopamine the orbitofrontal cortex and visual brain areas encoding
release.71 Experiences of both acute and early-life stress visual motion perception was increased in delusion-prone
have been shown to engender and exacerbate psychotic individuals and schizophrenia patients.76,79 Accordingly,
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reduced precision of perceptual beliefs encoded at low the cell body of the pyramidal neurons and have greater
levels (eg, in sensory cortices) may be compensated by influence on overall activity.91 Compared with the total
increased precision of more abstract conceptual beliefs GABAergic interneuron population, the number of
encoded in higher-level brain circuits (figure 2).79 In this PV interneurons is small, so that measuring overall
case, such a disambiguating top-down signal may reflect GABA concentrations will not give a precise picture of
a belief in low volatility of the environment, as previ- excitability.
ously suggested.16 In the context of social interactions, Findings of systematic relationships between gluta-
an individual may falsely categorize ambivalent social matergic concentrations in brain regions of interest and
interactions as threatening if informational uncertainty PET measures of dopamine synthesis92 suggest that per-
regarding social cues is wrongly disambiguated by delu- turbations of excitatory glutamatergic neurotransmission
sion-congruent top-down signals (thereby contributing contribute to dopamine system abnormalities observed in
deficits99 (see supplementary section 2.3). On the other corresponding to the magnitude, valence, and precision
hand, when phasic dopamine release is associated with of predictions and violations thereof. This would allow
stressful or chaotically coinciding stimuli, salience can us to assess relationships among molecular measures of
be attributed to these otherwise random co-occurrences, neurochemical concentration and function and measures
thus contributing to delusional perceptions and delusion of neural circuit function.
formation.26,100 Bayesian posteriors may be further shifted Thirdly, Bayesian models of decision making should
toward sensory input by circular inference, thus amplify- make increasing use of more formalized approaches
ing certain information aspects at the expense of others to dynamic interactions between brain areas, such as
(supplementary section 3). dynamic causal modeling and laminar neuroimaging
methods. Dynamic causal modeling has already helped
to identify subgroups of schizophrenia patients based on
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