AD -A.

277
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 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
1
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t. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave hbnk)

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andt the Ofie8~Mngmnadlde. Paeowoark Feduction Prowec(0704.O1U). Washington
2. REPORT DATE 3.REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
=C293.

ksfamatoe
cAltuy El4 ona a rdPigtisbrdn o ahigo ledqatitSnrcs Oet0ae6rifomtin-erton0n4-pU2 .515Jffro
-. i
I Mardi 1994 Fli31l. Oct 91--Sep 93
*4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE S. FUNDING NUMBERS
AMY 1l1sW ClaMs Evaluation P'ocedries 40061-304-U72

C AUTHOR(S)

Wmaiiu P.Wright

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADORESRES) I. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER
b.s. Army Researh Lixy'mar
ATT': AMSRL-WT-NC
Aberdeem Pving Ground. MD 2100D5-5066

9. SPONSORING IMONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESSRES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING

AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army ReWserch AI4,aruwY
ATMN: AMSRU O-CI-B (Tcrh Lib) ARL-MR-131
MeWe hoving Ground, MD 21005-5066

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

Approvel for publIC MOe distriuMion is unlimited.

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

TIh US. Amy engages in &fi activities on Army Mvatim thugho the United States. Then activities an
essenia for research, equipmet performanc verification tests. persounie nktring and doe disposal of obsolet ammuniton
Unforftely. persons who reside neaby am subjected io side effects in the form of noi, virations, nd occasimny,
Property damage. When a purticular Ary reservation is infomwd t prperty damage has occud, ft Army advises
thm a claim for restitu can be submitted. The clism is then processed though a procedme which leads mo final
settlement. Tis repo is concerned with describing dte major facets of fte gehnical review prmo which has been
instituted to delop an opinion as to Army responsibility.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

blast effects, muzle blast, civilian damage, sound agabon, ground shock
16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSF ID UL
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prewe b ANSI Std 139J.16
296-102
INTENTIONALLY LE" BLANK.

ii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author thanks Mr. Richard E. Lottero, chief of the Blastllbermal Effects Branch and
Mr. Robert J. Raley, leader of the Field Experiment Team for their continuous support; and
Dr. Kevin S. Fansler, chairman of the APG Blast and Shock Evaluation Committee, for the technical
review. Accesion For
NTIS CRA&I

DTIC TAB
Unannounced
Justification
Justification
.,......... . ..............

By
Distribution.
Availability Codes

Avail and / or
Dist Special

!ili,
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

pate

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................. iii

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................. vii

LIST OF TABLES ................................................... ix

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................... I

1.1 -urpose............................................................ 1
1.2 Types of Firing Activity ................................................ 1
1.3 Types of Property Damage .............................................. 1

2. BLAST DAMAGE MECHANISMS ........................................ 2

2.1 Overpressure Due to Detonations .......................................... 2

2.1.1 Effects Attributable to Meteorological Conditions ............................ 5
2.1.2 Perkins Procedure for Predicting Overpressure in the Far Field .................. 10
2.1.3 Current Procedure in Use for Predicting Overpressure in the Far Field ............. 12
2.2 Overpressure Due to Muzzle Blast ........................................ 17
2.3 Ground Motion Due to Detonations ....................................... 20

3. DAMAGE CRITERIA FOR RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY ....................... 22

3.1 Damage Thresholds Attributable to Overpressure .............................. 22

3.1.1 Threshold for Structural Damage ....................................... 22
3.1.2 Window Glass .................................................... 23
3.1.3 Damage Levels for Selected Structural Components .......................... 23
3.1.4 Damage Attributed to Falling Objects .................................... 25
3.2 Damage Threshold Attributable to Ground Motion ............................. 25

4. TECHNICAL EVALUATION PHILOSOPHY ................................ 25

5. DATA REQUIRED FOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION ........................ 26

6. SUM M ARY ....................................................... 28

7. REFERENCES ...................................................... 29

8. BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................... 31

DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................ 35

v
INTENTIONALLY LEFF BLANK.

vi
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Pate

1. Pressure-time waveform in the near field due to an explosion ...................... 3

2. Pressure-time waveformn in the far field due to an explosion ....................... 4

3. Sound wave propagation from a detonation on the earth suface with zero atmospheric
temperature gradient and no wind ........................................ 6

4. Sound wave propagation from a detonation on the earth surface with a negative sound
velocity gradient .................................................... 7

5. Sound wave propagation from a detonation on the earth surface with a positive sound
velocity gradient .................................................... 8

6. Sound wave propagation from a detonation on the earth surface with a positive sound
velocity gradient below a negative sound velocity gradient ....................... 9

7. Sound wave propagation from a detonation on the earth surface with a negative sound
velocity gradient below a positive sound velocity gradient ....................... 9

8. Peak free field overpressure vs. distance due to the detonation of a 0.454-kg (1-Ib) charge
of TNT at sea level: a) near field and b) far field ............................ 13
9. Peak overpressure vs. distance due to the detonation of a 0A54-kg (l-lb) TNT charge
in free air with enhancements due to meteorological effects ..................... 15

10. W eight correction factor ............................................... 16

11. Burial correction - peak overpressure level vs. scaled depth ....................... 17

12. Direction pattern of muzzle blast for a 155-mm howitzer a) without a muzzle brake and
b) with a muzzle brake ............................................... 19

13. Overpressure due to muzzle blast from a 120-mm gun as a function of distance at the
00 azimuth angle (front) .............................................. 19

14. Overpressure due to muzzle blast from a 155-mam howitzer ....................... 20

15. Worst-case overpressure due to muzzle blast from selected army weapons as a function
of distance .................................. ..................... 21

vii
ITEYNTONALLY LEFT BLANK.

viii
 LIST OF TABLES

1. Spectrum of Claimed Property Damage ...................................... 2

2. Perkins' Multiplication Factors for Detennining Overpressure Enhancement ........... 11

3. Efficiency Factors for Calculating Equivalent TNT Weights ...................... 13

4. Common Demolitions and Their Equivalent TNT Weights ....................... 14

5. Overpressure Threshold Criteria for Structural Damage .......................... 24

6. Minimum Firing Range Data Required ..................................... 28

ix
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.
 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 rv The United States Army engages in firing activities on Army reservations throughout
the United States. These activities are essential for research, equipment performance verification tests,
personnel training, and the disposal of obsolete ammunition. Unfortunately, these firing activities subject
nearby residents to noise and can damage their properties. When a particular Army reservation is
informed that property damage has occurred, the Army advises that a claim for restitution can be
submitted. The claim is then processed through a procedure which leads to final settlement. This report
describes the technical review process which has been instituted to assess Army responsibility.

1.2 TvYes of Firing Activity. The Army firing activities consist of aerial bombings, artillery firings
of live and inert ammunition, and detonations of high explosives (HEs). Artillery weapons are fired for
testing performance capability, but most firings are for the purpose of training both regular and reserve
forces. The sizes of weapons range from 105-mm caliber rounds up to the 8-in rounds. Blast effects are
produced by detonations of HE rounds in designated impact areas and by propellant gases escaping from
muzzles of weapons at their firing points. Bombing exercises are conducted for training purposes. The
primary bomb used is the MK-82 which weighs about 500 lb and contains 192 lb of explosives.

In addition, for training purposes, the Army Corp of Engineers perform demolition exercises.
Especially at ammunition plants, the Army has the task of disposing of obsolete ammunition and other
explosive waste. This is accomplished by performing what is referred to as a demilitarization (DEMIL)
operation which consists of detonating explosives in earth pits with several feet of dirt cover.

On occasion, various miscellaneous firing activities are conducted that are not a part of any regular
training or testing program. The most important of these is the necessity to dispose of old, obsolete
munitions found on and off of Army reservations. These munitions, being old and unstable, are dangerous
and must be prepared for detonation with a minimum of movement. Therefore, the process is
accomplished in place if possible. On several occasions, fishing vessels in the Gulf of Mexico have
snagged old bombs in their nets. These bombs are usually detonated in place.

1.3 Tvnes of Property Damage. The spectrum of the variation in damage claims is broad. However,
a fairly systematic procedure for evaluating arbitrary claims has been developed which ensures reasonable
consistency. Damages to private properties are categorized as structural or displacement. Structural

I
includes ill damages to integral parts of homes or business properties. Displacement includes the
knocking or jarring of items from shelves, wall attachments, or racks. In these cases, the initial
displacement can lead to collateral damages when displaced items impacts other vulnerable articles.
Table I lists examples of damage which have been cited by claimants as caused by Army firing activities.

Table 1. Spectrum of Claimed Property Damage

Structural Damage

Thermoplane windows/doors seal ruptures

Window/door glass panes cracks/shattered
Interior walls cracks, nail popping, paint peeling
Interior/exterior brick work cracks
Basement walls, foundations & footings cracks
Patio/walks/slabs/swimming pools cracks
Wells/cisterns cracks
Skylights cracks

Displacement

China closet glass shelves dislodged

Objects displaced from shelves/racks
Mirrors/pictures dislodged from walls
Mobile homes displaced
Structures/porches/doors misalignment

2. BLAST DAMAGE MECHANISMS

2.1 Overpressure Due to Detonations. A potential mechanism for causing damage to property are
vibrations created by the imposition of a low-level air overpressure pulse. Overpressure is a level of force
exerted on the surface of structures. As the name of this parameter implies, it is a measure of atmospheric
pressure above the ambient level. In reality, the parameter of interest is overpressure exerted over a period
of time called the "applied pulse." But, since the duration of the typical pulse is relatively constant, it is
feasible and convenient to relate damage directly to overpressure levels.

2
 The overpressure in question can be caused by a detonation of some kind of HE. initially, the
detonation produces a concentrated high-pressure volume of gases which subsequenty expands radially
in all directions from the point of origin (assuming no obstructions). As the gases expand, the forward
edge of the expanding volume interacts with the ambient air such that a highly compressed layer of air
is ceated-called the "shock front." A typical pressure waveform for the phenomenon is presented in
Figure I. The overpressure curve at the shock font is almost discontinuous between the ambient pressure
level preceding the front and the peak overpressure at the from. However, there is a short period-called
the "rise time"-between ambient and the peak value at the front. Behind the shock front, the
overpressure adually declines as a function of distance toward the center of the explosion and eventually
drops below the ambient pressure. That point marks the end of the positive phase duration. The negative
phase reflects the reduced air density caused by the air having been swept from the volume during the
creation of the shock front. Thus, in the near field (close to the energy source), the disturbance has the
form of a classical shock wave where the disturbance includes the massive outward flow of air particles
from the center of detonation.

F6

a.C
U-i
. I.
Ll RSEIM

POSITIVE PHASE NEGATIVE PHASE DURATION

DURATION TIME

Figure 1. Pressure-time waveform in the near field due to an explosion.

3
 The classical shock wave is rather quickly transformed to a sound wave. Its waveform is
demonstrated in Figure 2. Unlike the shock wave in the near field where damage is caused by materials
yielding directly to the applied overpressure, the wave in the far field causes damage by creating structural
vibrations. Civilian properties associated with damage claims are usually located in the far field (miles
from the source or center of detonation). Consequently, the phenomenology involved with regard to a
typical claim consists of induced vibrations caused by an applied overpressure pulse.

RISE T1ME

POSNOIE PHASE
DURA71ON

Figure 2. Pressure-time waveform in the far field due to an explosion.

In the near field, the unit used to express overpressure is normally the pound per square inch (Ib/in2),
or, if in the metric system, the kilopascal (kPa). But, in the far field, the unit used is the Pascal (Pa), due
to the low overpressures involved. The practicality of this convention can be realized on considering that
I psi equals 6,895 Pa and the levels involved for most claims range from a few Pascals up to 1,000 Pa
in extreme cases. Since the subject of this report is closely related to sound propagation, severs-I
discussions involve the unit decibel (db) which is most appropriate to the study of sound. Conversion
from Pa to db can be accomplished by using the following relation:

4
 Pdb - 20 log 10 [IoP / PO . (1)

Where:
Pdb is the overpressure expressed in db,
Pp. is the overpressure expressed in Pa, and
Po isareferenceoverpressurefor0db=20x 106 Pa.

2.1.1 Effects Attributable to Meteorological Conditions. The characteristics of overpressure-wave

propagation in the far field varies significantly as the result of existing meteorological conditions. For
example, the disturbance can be perceived at a given location from the center of detonation as being very
intense in one instance and at another time hardly noticeable at the same location after a similar
detonation. In effect, the disturbance in question in the far field is essentially a sound wave and, therefore,
the physics involved in its propagation through the atmosphere are those associated with sound
propagation. The meteorological conditions existing throughout the area at the time of the detonation
determines the wave's propagation velocity at various altitudes. The most important parameter affecting
the propagation is the change in the velocity of sound as a function of altitude (velocity gradient). The
sound wave is refracted to produce magnification or reduction at specific distances on the ground
measured from the center of detonation. In turn, the pertinent atmospheric variables which affect sound
velocity are temperature and wind velocity (humidity has a small effect, but can be neglected).

In the absence of wind, sound velocity can be determined by the following expression:

C - 72.228 FK (ki/h) (2)

where K is the absolute temperature. This equation defines the relationship of sound velocity with
absolute temperature, which is a nondirectional parameter. Wind effects on the sound velocity are
directional. That is, in the downwind direction, the sound wave velocity is increased by the wind velocity
and, in the upstream direction, the opposite effect occurs with sound velocity being reduced. More
precisely, sound velocity with respect to the ground (at any given altitude) can be determined by the
following equation:
V = C + U cose (3)

5
where C is sound velocity as determined by Equation 2, U is the wind velocity for the altitude of interest,
and I is the angle between the downwind direction and the direction for which the sound velocity is
desired.

A representation of the propagation of the overpressure wave under the atmospheric condition of a
constant temperature with altitude and no wind is shown in Figure 3. The wave is considered to be made
up of a number of rays (sound rays) propagating from the center of detonation with departure angles above
the horizon distributed equally in space. As the diagram indicates, the sound rays will, under these
conditions, propagate radially out in all directions with equal speeds. Sound velocity is, in this case,
constant with respect to altitude; thus, the velocity gradient is zero. To first order effects, the sound wave
intensity (overpressure) will be degraded as a function of increasing distance only due to spreading
(inverse square law). The situation is different if the sound velocity gradient is positive, negative, or if
several gradients are present.

SOUND
RAYS
WAVE
FRONT

V-V
I -

CENTER OF
DETONATION

SOUND SPEED

Figure 3. Sound wave propagation from a detonation on the earth surface with zero atmospheric
temperature gradient and no wind.

6
 The sound my refraction for the case where a single negative sound velocity gradient is present is
din Figure 4. The interaction is such that all sound rays are turned upward, and, within a
relatively short distance from the center of the detonation, there are no effects. That is, the disturbance
cannot be heard or felt.

SOUND RAYS WAVE FRONT AT

INTERMEDIATE
11ME/
- - -I• *

I S

VERTICAL PLANE CENTE OF

DETONATION

Figure 4. Sound wave proyagation from a detonation on the earth surface with a negative sound
velocity zradient.

Figure 5 presents a case where a single positive sound velocity gradient is present. All of the sound
rays in this case will be turned by the gradient back to the earth's surface. The ray with the smallest
departure angle will reach the earth's surface first and at the shortest distance from the center of the
detonation. All other rays must follow a longer path and, therefore, will reach the earth's surface after
longer times and at greater distances as their departure angles above the horizon increase. The returning
sound rays will reflect from the earth's surface, propagate in a curved path, and again return. While the
rays lose intensity on reflection, they are refracted again by the positive velocity gradient and combine
with other rays whose initial departure angles are greater. This combining of sound rays constitutes an
enhancement of detonation effects (greater overpressure) in the far field. The amount of energy lost by
the rays on reflection depends on the type of terrain present. The most energy is lost when the terrain
features include such things as grass, trees, and buildings. Practically no energy is lost when the terrain
is water, hence, the perception that sound travels well over a water surface. Whenever there is a situation
where the sound rays are tumed back to earth, it is said that an atmospheric inversion is present.

7
 WAVE FRONT AT
WTERMEDIATE
SOUND TOME
RAYS

SOUNDSPEED DETONATION

Figure 5. Sound wave propagation from a detonation on the earth surface with a positive sound
velocity gadient.

Figure 6 presents the case where a positive sound velocity gradient is present next to the earth's
surface with a negative sound velocity gradient above. In this case, the rays are turned earthward while
traveling in the positive gradient and will reflect providing they do not reach the negative gradient. On
reaching the negative gradient, the rays will turn upward and will not reflect. Consequently, a distance
from the detonation center will exist beyond which none of the rays will return to earth. That distance
is referred to as the "limiting range." The determining factor as to whether a ray will reach the negative
gradient is its departure angle.

Another type of atmospheric condition is presented in Figure 7. In that case, a negative sound velocity
gradient is present, above which is a positive gradient. All of the sound rays will be refracted upward
away from the earth's surface while propagating through the negative gradient After which they will be
refracted back down toward the earth's surface by the positive gradient. While propagating again through
the negative gradient, the rays will tend to spread outward away from the center of detonation. The
combined effect of departure angle and thicknesses of the gradients will cause many of the rays to reach
the earth's surface at the same distance from the center of detonation. This can constitute a large

8
 WAVE FRONT AT SOUND RAYS
INTERMEDIATE

TIM
4c

SOUND &SPEED CENTER OF

DETONATION

Figure 6. Sound Dromagation from a detonation on the earth surface with a positive sound velocity
gradient below a negative sound velocity gradient.

SOUND RAYS

SOUND & SPEED CENTER OF VERTICAL HALF PLANE

DETONATION

Figure 7. Sound ymnation from a detonation on the earth surface with a negative sound velocit
gradient below a positive sound velocity gradien.

9
enhancemen of intensity at that location. This result is referred to as a "focus" and the action is referred
to as "focusing." This condition is the most severe enhancement of the sound intensity. As a consequence
of this type of condition, there is a region of relative silence between the center of detonation and the
focus.

2.1.2 Perkins Procedure for Predicting Overpressure in the Far Field. The problem of predicting
overpressure in the far field due to detonations was studied by Beauregard Perkins in the early 1960s
(Perkins and Jackson 1964). After describing the physics of sound travel, he indicated overpressure
multiplication factors that could be used in increasing the prediction above base values calculated under
the assumption the sound velocity gradient were zero. Table 2 presents those multiplication factors for
each type of gradient combination. For a single negative gradient, the overpressure intensities of the wave
will be reduced from base values to zero in the far field, because all of the sound waves will be reflected
up away from the earth's surface; hence, the multiplication factor for this case is zero. For a positive
gradient with a negative gradient above, the multiplication factor was deemed to be 5 at all ranges up to
the limiting range. In the event a zero gradient exists next to the earth's surface with a positive gradient
above, a broad focus of sound rays will be cmeated at which the multiplication factor was deemed to be
10 in the focal area. A weak positive gradient with a strong positive gradient above causes a more
concentrated focus at which the intensity factor was deemed to be 25. The most severe level of
enhancement is caused by a combination consisting of a negative gradient, above which exists a strong
positive gradient In that case, the multiplication factor at a concentrated focus was deemed by Perkins
to be 100. These multiplication factors were derived on the basis of several years of experience. The
determinations were made by noting the distance to a particular type of damage and, assuming the
minimum overpressure known to produce such damage, a maximum multiplication was calculated. These
are approximate factors and there are differing opinions concerning the general correctness of their
magnitudes.

The location of the focus (distance from the center of detonation) can be estimated by employing
sound ray propagation theory. Perkins and Jackson (1964) used the theory to generated ray paths for the
gradient combinations described in Table 2. A complete range of possible sound velocity slopes and
gradient combinations for meteorological conditions up to 5,000-ft altitude (87 different cases) were
considered. To utilize this database, the initial step is to calculate a sound velocity distribution for the
case in question with Equations 2 and 3 and temperature and wind velocity distributions for altitudes up
to 5,000 ft (which is provided by the Army reservation against whom the claim is made). With the

10
 Table 2. Perkins' Multiplication Factors for Determining Overpressure Enhancemient

Single negative gradient 0 - From origin to limit of observation.

Positive gradient near surface with 5 - Origin to limiting range.
negative above
Zero gradient near surface with strong 10 - Focal area only.
positive gradient above
Weak positive gradient near surface 25 - Focal area only.
with strong positive gradient above
Negative gradient near surface with 100 - Focal area only.
strong positive gradient above

slopes of the sound velocity distribution an appropriate case can be chosen from the Perkins' database.
If the sound velocity slopes do not correspond to a presented case (the most likely event), the correct focal
distance can be ascertained by interpolation. If the distance between the center of detonation and the
claimant's damaged property match the predicted focal distance, then the final prediction of overpressure
is taken to be the predicted overpressure at that distance assuming no meteorological effects (a base curve)
multiplied by the appropriate multiplication factor. If the two distances do not match, then the final
predicted overpressure requires additional subjectivity concerning overpressure enhancement or reduction
of the base curve prediction outside the focal area.

Several difficulties exist in the utilization of this approach for estimating overpressure. One is that
meteorological data up to 5,000-ft altitude are usually not available and, if a set of data are provided, there
is usually some question concerning the data's validity. Assuming the meteorological data provided are
valid, the execution of the procedure is long and laborious (this could be corrected by computerizing the
procedure). Then once the focal distance has been estimated, further error is introduced if the focal
distance does not match the actual distance between the claimant's property and the center of detonation.
Finally, the multiplication factors suggested by Perkins appear to be too high for the practical purposes
of evaluating most claims. The basis for this conclusion is that on those occasions when sound
measurements are available in the far field, the Perkins multiplication factors causes the predictions to be
much higher than the measurements.

11
 2.1.3 Qurent Procedure in Use for Predicting Overpressure in the Far Field. The current procedure
used to predict overpressure in the far field due to detonations is essentially that reported by Raspet and
Bobak (1988). The approach is to initially estimate an overpressure level at the appropriate distance (the
distance between the detonation and the claimant's damaged property) for a 0.454-kg (1-1b) TNT charge,
and then to adjust the overpressure level for total charge weight, type of chaige, gound reflection for a
surface burst, and finally, a reduction if the charge is buried. The advantages of the procedure, from the
claims evaluation perspective, are completeness and simplicity. A prominent feature of the total approach
is the deliberate intention to predict overestimates to ensure that the claimant has received the benefit of
any doubt.

- Free Field Overpressure Due to 0.454-kg TNT Charge. In the near field, the peak overpressure as
a function of distance from the center of the detonation has been measured extensively and is well
established. A curve of free-field overpressure versus distance for a 0.454-kg charge of TNT for the near
field is presented in Figure 8 (a) (Lehto and Larson 1988). Free field is defined to mean that the blast
propagation is not obstructed or enhanced by atmospheric conditions and there are no physical effects from
obstructions or boundaries such as a ground surface. This base curve can be scaled to other charge
weights by multiplying the distance (range) for a desired overpressure by the cube root of the ratio of the
charge weights. For example, if the distance corresponding to a specific pressure level is desired when
the charge weight is 454 kg (1,000 lb), then the distance given in Figure 8 (a) for that overpressure needs
to be multiplied by the cube root of 454/0.454 or 10. Figure 8 (b) presents overpressure levels in the far
field which were obtained by extrapolating the near field data theoretically. The curve was extended
further on the basis of data obtained in the Project BANSHEE HE test.

* Accounting for Arbitrary Explosive Type. For explosives other than TNT, it is necessary to convert
from the type of charge in question to an equivalent weight of TNT prior to using Figure 8. This is done
by multiplying the charge weight by a value referred to as the "efficiency factor" (overpressure). Table 3
presents a number of various types of explosives and their corresponding efficiency factors relative to
TNT. Similarly, Table 4 presents some common demolitions used by the Army and their total equivalent
TNT weights.

* Charge Weight Increase Due to Ground Surface Reflection. Since the basic curve in Figure 8 is
for a free-air burst, the charge weight needs to be corrected to account for the effect of blast reflection
when the charge is detonated on the ground surface. The magnitude of correction needed can be

12
 10 100

10s 10."

10e I 10"
I , 4

10 1* is 10 ' 10' 10 10'

DISTANCE (METERS) DISTANCE (METERS)

Figure 8. Peak free field ovemrssure vs. distance due to the detonation of a 0.454-kE (1-lb) charme of
TNT at sea level: a) near field and b) far field.

Table 3. Efficiency Factors for Cakulating Equivalent TNT Weights

Exp•ive Efficn-y
TNT 1.00
Tetrytol Ml.M2 1.20
Composition C3. hO, M5 1-34
Cmposition C4, MSA1, M112 1.34
Ammonium nitrate (cratering charg) 0.42
Sheet explosive, M186, MI1s (demolition Charg) 1.14
Militas dynamite (DYN), MI 0.92
Straight DYN; (Corn.) 40%., 50%., 60% 0.65,0.79,0.83
Ammonia DYN; (Con.) 40%, 50%, 60% 0.41, 0.46,0.53
Gelatin DYN; 40%, 50%, 60% 0A2, 0.47, 0.76
PETN 1.66
TeW 1.25
Composition B 135
Amatol 80/20 1.17
Blawk powder 0.55
Nitro__h 0.80
Pentolite 1.27

13
 Table 4. Common Demolitions and Their Equivalent TNT Weights

Demolition Kit, Bangalore Torpedo

MIAI 4.1 kg AmatoA0.5 kg TNT Booster 15.2 kg (33.5 lb)
M2A2 4.8 lb Comp B4/0.5 kg A-3 Booster 7.0 kg (15.4 lb)

Charge Demolition: Block. 40-lb Cratering

13.6 kg Ammonium Nitratel4.5 kg TNT 10.3 kg (22.7 lb) + Booster Charge

Shaped Charge Demolition

M2A3 (15 lb) 4.3 kg Comp B/0.9 kg Pentolite 6.9 kg (15.2 lb)
M2A4 (15 lb) 5.2 kg Comp B/0.05 kg A3 7.0 kg (15.4 lb)
M3 (40 lb) 12.8 kg Comp B/0/8 kg Pentolite 18.3 kg (40.3 lb)
M3AI (40 lb) 13.8 kg Comp B/0.05 kg A3 18.6 kg (41 Ib)

visualized by noting that when a detonation occurs on a perfectly reflecting surface, resulting overpressure
levels as a function of distance are such that the charge weight appears doubled. In reality, however, a
typical ground surface is not a perfectly reflecting surface because some of the energy is lost in the
cratering process; thus, the correction factor should be less than 2. It has been estimated that for a typical
surface the factor is about 1.8, and, if the surface is soft, the correct factor might be more nearly 1.5. In
the evaluation procedure, the assumption taken is that the ground surface is typical, thus the charge weight
is multiplied by 1.8. On rare occasions, the value of 1.5 might be used. In the event the charge is
assumed to be buried, then the ground surface reflection correction is not applicable, and the charge weight
is not changed.

• Peak Overpressures for Free-Air 0.454-kg Burst. The peak overpressure level in decibels as a
function of distance in kilometers curves for a free-air detonation of a 0.454-kg (1-1b) charge of "standard"
TNT are presented in Figure 9. The base curve constitutes those levels when meteorological effects are
not considered. The probable focus curve relative to the base curve, is a factor of 1.8 in the range of 0
to 27.4 km (0 to 90 kft), a gradual change in factor from 1.8 to 3 in the range of 27.4 to 45.7 km (90 to
150 kft), and a factor of 3 in the range of 45.7 km (150 kft) and further. The maximum overpressure
curve relative to the base curve is a factor of 2 in the range of 0 to 0.61 km (0 to 2 kft), factor of 4 in
the range of 0.61 to 3.05 km (2 to 10 kft), factor of 8 in the range of 3.05 to 45.7 km (10 to 150 kft), and
a factor of 15 in the range of 45.7 km (150 kft) and further.

14
 IS.
1400
MAXIMUM OVERPRESSURE CURVE
-. 130,

S110-_•

100 BaSE CURVE

70,-
6I0II II
0.1 0.s 1.0 50 10.0 50.0
DISTANCE (KM)

Figure 9. Peak overpressure vs. distance due to the detonation of a 0.454-ka (Q-4b)TNT charge in
free-air with enhancements due to meteorological effects.

For most claims, it is assumed the claimant's property was subjected to maximum focus conditions
and, therefore, the maximum overpressure curve is used. This helps to ensure that the overpressure level
obtained is a worst-case prediction. The other curves are used when specific information is provided
which indicates that the maximum overpressure curve should not be used. Such information could be a
reliable meteorological data curve that indicates a single negative or a single positive sound velocity
gradient was present. Once the decision is made as to which of the curves to use in an evaluation, an
overpressure level is read at the distance equal to that between the center of detonation and the claimant's
property.

- Peak Overpressure Level Adjusted to an Equivalent TNT Charge Weight. The next step is to add
a factor to the overpressure level to account for the total charge weight. This is accomplished by using
Figure 10, which contains a plot of the correction factor in decibels vs. the equivalent charge weight in
kilograms. As mentioned above, if the detonation is a surface burst, then the charge weight is increased
by a factor of 1.8 to account for ground surface reflection; but, if the charge is buried, that is not done.
To account for the type of charge detonated, the charge weight is multiplied by the appropriate efficiency
factors as given in Tables 3 or 4. This adjusted overpressure estimate constitutes the predicted
overpressure level at the claimant's property provided the charge is not buried.

15
 20-

150

•-,10"

S.0--

.5.0.

0I I I

0 1 10 100
DECIBEL CORRECTION

Figure 10. Weight correction factor.

* Peak Overpressure Level Adjusted to Account for Depth of Burial. The estimation of a conrction
factor for buried charge detonations which is subtracted from the peak overpressure is based on Figure 11
and the depth of burial. Figure 11 presents a curve which represents a reduction in peak overpressure
1 /1),
level (dB) as a function of a scaled depth (d/wO where d is the depth in meters and w is the equivalent
TNT charge weight. The parameter d is the depth from the ground surface to the top of the charge.

* Conclusion. This concludes the procedure for predicting the overpressure pulse as a consequence
of detonations on the surface of the ground or if the charge is buried. Other factors such as detonation
distance above the ground surface or significant terrain features are accounted for subjectively if the
analysis indicates further refinement is needed. Such a refinement might be considered justified in those
cases where the predicted overpressure level at the claimant's property is near the damage threshold for
the specific damage claimed. That is, if the predicted overpressure level is slightly below the threshold
which would mean the claimant would not be compensated, collateral technical factors could be considered
to justifiably increase the predicted overpressure level above the threshold.

16
 30-

20

10

I I I I
5 1.0 1.5 2.0

SCALED DEPTH dl(w) 1/3 m1qt) 143

Figure 11. Buried correction - peak overoressure level vs. scaled dedt

2.2 Overpressure Due to Muzzle Blast. There are three sources for air disturbance to be generated
during the firing of artillery pieces: (1) detonation of the projectile on impact (if it is an HE shell),
(2) bow wave cause by the interaction of the shell with the atmosphere as it moves at supersonic speeds,
and (3) muzzle blasm The procedure for predicting overpressures in the far field due to detonating HE
shells is that used for any other HE detonation and which has already been described. The magnitude of
the overpressures generated as a consequence of the hypersonic bow wave formation can be significant
in the region between the firing point and the impact point which confines that component within the areal
bounds of the Army reservation, and therefore is of no consequence. Thus, only muzzle blast is discussed
further in this section.

Muzzle blast is caused by the sudden release of gases from the muzzle following the departure of the
round being fired. These gases are formed as a consequence of the burning of propellent in the weapon's
chamber and are under a very high pressure, which is required in order to propel the round to its target.
The levels of overpressure as a function of distance beyond the weapon's muzzle reach their highest values
in the direction the weapon is firing. Taking the direction of fire as 00, the overpressure decreases as the
angle increases to 1800 (back of weapon). However, in those cases when a muzzle brake is employed,
the magnitude of the overpressure in the 0W (direction of fire) is less and values at other directions are

17
greater. This is demonstrated by Figure 12 (Schomer. Little, and Hum 1979). Figure 12 (a) presems the
overpressure level magnitudes for the towed 155-mm howitzer which does not deploy a muzzle brake.
The levels are greatest toward the direction of fire. Figure 12 (b) presents the same data for the
self-propelled howitzer which does deploy a muzzle brake. The overpressure magnitudes are essentially
the same in all directions. To be more certain that the prediction will not be underestimated in the claims
evaluation process, the procedure for predicting muzzle blast is based on data measured in the direction
of fire from a weapon without a muzzle brake.

The procedure described below for predicting overpressure in the far field is essentially that presented
by William Taylor (unpublished). Taylor discussed a series of gun firings conducted to ascertain
relationships between overpressure as a function of distance as affected by propellant charge weight and
gun tube variables. The gun tube variables included length, elevation, and azimuth (angle in the horizontal
plane). A portion of the data consisted of overpressure measurements taken during the firing of a 120-mm
gun. These selected data were collated according to the overpressure levels (db) as a function of
distance (kcm) above which 1% and 50% of the measurements fell. Figure 13 presents the two curves
which represent these results. The curves are designated as 1% Exceedance and 50% Exceedance,
respectively. In the generation of these data, the weapon caliber, propellent charge weight, and azimuth
angle of the gun tube were constant, so that the variation of overpressure measurements at specific
distances were due to variations in meteorological conditions and gun tube elevations. In the evaluation
procedure, we must predict the maximum overpressure possible because of our inability to account for the
many variables involved. Therefore, the 1% exceedance curve was chosen as the basis for predicting
overpressure levels at the claimant's property.

The results of the prediction procedure are maximized even further by considering data from 155-mm
howitzer firings conducted at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. In that case, 100 inert rounds were
fired in a period during which no other firing activity was in progress. Overpressures were measured at
approximately 9 km distance from the muzzle and in a 390 azimuth angle. This experimental data point,
consisting of the average peak overpressure measured, is a level which exceeds the 1% exceedance curve
for the 155-mm howitzer as is shown in Figure 14. The 1%exceedance curve was obtained by scaling
from the data for the 120-mm gun by the ratio of calibers. This scaling procedure is plausible because,
for replica scaling, length varies as the caliber. Since the data point in question exceeded the
1% exceedance curve, further maximization was achieved by translating the 1% exceedance curve onto
the 155-mm data point to create another curve referred to as "maximum muzzle blast." None of the test

18
 a b

Figure 12. Direction pattem of muzzle blast for a 155-mm howitzer, a) without a muzzle brake and
b) with a muzzle brake.

140'

010-

50%
Exosedui

1110-

Figure 13. Overoressure due to muzzle blast from a 120-mm mm as a function of distance at the
00 azimuth anyle (front).

19
 10

110 10)

Figure 14. Overpressum due to muzzle blast from a 155-mm howitr.

measremens were made over water. However, because of the strong bias toward choosing the maximum
overpressure data as the database, it is believed that peak overpressure predictions when water is involved
are fair to the claimants in those cases. Figure 15 presents maximum muzzle blast (worst case) prediction
curves for four different size weapons. These were obtained by scaling the 155-mm maximum muzzle
blast curve to the others. The use of these data in overpressure calculations yields predictions which are
considered to be worst cases in favor of the claimants.

2.3 Ground Motion Due to Detonations. Another mechanism which theoretically has a potential for
causing damage is vibrations due to ground motion. The parameter used to gauge the strength of such
a disturbance is particle motion measured in inches per second (in/s). At locations close to the energy
source, the particle motion level can be very high, but the ground shock strength dissipates rapidly as it
propagates through the earth and becomes negligible prior to reaching a typical claimant's residence.
Ground motion can also be created by energy transfer from an air overpressure shock wave propagating
over the ground surface. But in that case, to have significant ground motion, air overpressure levels would
have to be extremely high, a situation not possible in the far field. Therefore, although included in the
technical analyses, ground shock is seldom, if ever, the cause of damage to private property.

20
 10 31
,,

10.

10-

10- 1 10 10 1PO
Rang. Oun)

Figure 15. Worst-case overpressure due to muzzle blast from selected army weavons as a function of
distance

To predict ground motion levels due to a surface detonation, the following equation derived from
empirical data is available (Siskind et al. 1980):

PPV - 5.349X10 1 5 (RlW 1/3)-5354 (4)

Where:
PPV = Peak particle velocity
R = distance from ground zero (ft),
W = high explosive charge weight (lb), and
PPV = peak particle velocity (in/s).

For ground motion, where the charge is entirely buried with no venting, the following equation is used
(Johnson et al. 1988):

27
PPV =1,200 (R/W/)" .(5)

21
Whene:
PPV = peak particle velocity (cm/s).
R = distance from ground zero (m), and
W = high explosive charge weight (kg).

Equation 5 was the result of analyzing the measurements from a series of tests done during the 1980s
where the explosives were buried in soft limestone and chalk. It was found that these tests conducted in
soft material provided higher ground motion levels than predicted by relations which were based on tests
conducted in harder material. As a consequence of these higher predictions, it was decided to use
Equation S whenever no atmospheric venting is assumed for buried detonations.

3. DAMAGE CRITERIA FOR RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY

3.1 Damage Thresholds Attributable to Overpressure.

3.1.1 Threshold for Structural Damage. The U.S. Army has not studied to any appreciable extent
damage occurring in the far field due to artillery or demolitions. Consequently, outside sources of data
and information have been exploited for the purpose of establishing acceptable air overpressure damage
criteria for residential property. This includes aircraft sonic boom studies, since the damage effects from
sonic boom are similar to those from blast overpressure pulses.

In order to reduce the amount of time required for performing many technical evaluations, a threshold
level for structural damage is sought. The determination of a threshold for structural damage to residential
property in the far field has not been a precise or easy task. It has been reported that despite widely
varied source characteristics, assumptions of damage probabilities, experimental designs, and differing
interpretations, there appears to be a consensus that damage is improbable below approximately 205 Pa
(140 db) (Siskind et al. 1980b). However, for purposes of damage claim evaluations, 138 Pa (136.5 db)
is assumed to be the threshold for structural damage. Therefore, in an evaluation of a claim of structural
damage when the predicted overpressure level to which the property could have been subjected is less than
138 Pa (136.5 db), the analysis is terminated and the conclusion is drawn that the Army was not
responsible. If the predicted level is above 138 Pa, then additional factors are considered to reach a final
conclusion.

22
 3.1.2 Window Glass. Numerous claims submitted include window glass breakage. The sizes of
window panes involved have ranged from the usual sizes found in residential property up to large plate
glass windows found on business properties. The dimensions of interest include width, length, and
thickness. In addition to dimensional parameters, the vulnerability of window panes depends on glass
quality and installation methods. Breakage can be affected by how loose the window pane is relative to
the window sash and its stress level at the time it is being subjected to the induced vibrations caused by
the overpressure pulse. Due to the many variables involve, it has been difficult to develop a systematic
procedure for evaluating claims which include glass breakage. However, a definite procedure for
estimating a safe overpressure threshold for window glass is required in order to maintain consistency and
to conserve evaluation time. Consequently, it was decided to depend on the following criterion for
window breakage which is based on sonic data (Siskind et al. 1980b):

po (alh)2 k 0.8 x lop f 2 (6)

Where:
Po = overpressure 0b/f 2 ),
a = side of an approximately square window, and
h = window thickness (same units as a).

With a/h generally less than 330, the safe maximum overpressure is 360 Pa (145 db).

3.1.3 Damage Levels for Selected Structural Components. A summary of threshold levels for specific
kinds of damage are presented in Table 5. Most of the results are due to sonic boom tolerance tests
conducted at White Sands, NM, with several values due to sonic boom tests conducted in Oklahoma City.
Also included are thresholds levels for damage due to material fatigue where the overpressure must be
applied continuously for periods extending into numbers of minutes. These are significant with regard
to civilian damage claims because many times the claimant believes damage was due to repeated
applications of some kind of Army-caused vibrations. Since overpressure pulses caused by Army firing
activities are always concluded in time periods in the order of milliseconds, these data shows that such
a view is usually not valid. The data provided in Table 5 serve as a basis for evaluating claims, but many
times the residential component cited is not listed. In those cases the item must be compared with a
similar item in the table and a subjective judgement made.

23
 Table 5. Overpressure Threshold Criteria for Stzctuwal Damage

Interior Pascals (Pa)

Plaster on wood lath 160
Plaster on Gyplath 360
Plaster on expanded metal lath 765
Plaster on concrete block 765
Plaster, new 260
Plaster, cured 500
Nail popping 250
Gypsum board (old-cracks) 220
Gypsum board (old-loose paint flaking) 460
Gypsum board, lf2-in (nail popping) 510
Gypsum board (new-cracks) 765
Bathroom tile (old) 213
Suspended ceiling (new) 186
Exterior
Brick (cracks) 896
Glass door (loosened) 896
Mullions (twisted) 427
Molding (popped) 896
Stucco (new) 234
Light-weight superstructure 10,000
Concrete 34,000
Wood frame wall (fatigue, 80 min.) 285
Roof (fatigue, 20 min.) 360
Concrete wall, 8-in thick (fatigue, 10 min.) 900

24
 3.1.4 Damage Attributed to Falling Objects. Air oveqessure pulses can cause cyclic movement of
residential walls referred to as "midwall motion." Accelerations hat can cause light objects to rattle and
be displaced vary from 0.1 to 1.0 g. depending on shape, center of gravity, and natural frequencies of the
vibrating items. A wall acceleration of 0.5 g, which corresponds to approximately 75 Pa (133 db), is
considered sufficient to shake such items (Siskind et aL 1980b). However, in the evaluations of damage
claims due to displacement of fight objects, it is assumed that a 68-Pa overpressure level is sufficient to
judge that the Army was responsible.

3.2 Damage Threshold Attributable to Ground Motion. A comp ve discussion of residential

structura response and damage produced by ground vibration from HE detonations was provided by the
Bureau of Mines (Siskind et al. 1980a). The discussion points out that rather than considering ground
motion in terms of displacement and acceleration for predicting damage, that a superior physical parameter
is particle velocity in inches/second (in/s). The reason stated was that paiticle velocity is more
independent of the blast wave frequency. It reiterated a result, taken from an earlier study, that 2.0 in/s
particle velocity is a safe value damage criterion for residential damage and that this value is frequency
independent over the wide range of 2.5 to over 400 Hz. It was remaked in the discussion that 0.75 ins
is a good minimum criteria for modem construction and that the 2.0 in/s is justified for high-frequency
blasts which is the case in the general firing activities by the Army. However, in evaluating claims, the
policy is to use I in/s particle motion as the threshold for structural damage, which means that if the
ground motion or particle velocity predicted does not exceed that value, the analysis is terminated and the
conclusion made that the Army was not responsible for the claimed damage.

4. TECHNICAL EVALUATION PHILOSOPHY

The basic philosophy governing technical evaluations is to always apply a conservative approach such
that the Army can easily defend its decision if the claimant decides to appeal. This conservative stance
is maintained by utilizing a procedure which maximizes overpressures (or ground motion) at the claimant's
damaged property (in the far field); that minimizes the sure-safe damage thresholds; and finally, whenever
there is uncertainty in reported circumstances or the result is marginal, the decision is to favor the
claimant.

Initially a worst-case analysis in favor of the claimant is performed. That is, using the distance
between the claimant's damaged property and the Army activity, the overpressure level is predicted with

25
the assumption that meteorological conditions are worst case. That oveipessure level is compared to the
threshold for the type of damage claimed. If the predicted worst-case overpressure level is less than the
threshold overpressure (or ground shock) for that type damage, then there is no point in continuing the
analysis, because further analysis cannot result in a greater overpressure. For that result, the conclusion
is drawn immediately that the Army was not responsible. If the predicted level exceeds the threshold, then
an attempt is made to improve the prediction for the purpose of achieving a more accurate result (than
worst case) in fairness to the Army. The continuation would consist of incorporatng additional factors
such as meteorological data. If a repeat comparison with the thresholds shows that the prediction falls
below the threshold, then the conclusion is drawn that the Army was not responsible. If the new
prediction falls above the appropriate threshold, then characteristics of the damage claimed must be studied
with respect to the available threshold database and a specific conclusion drawn. At times the final
conclusion requires considerable subjectivity, but the policy is always to favor the claimant. In instances
of unusual circumstances, the evidence might be apparent that the Army was responsible for the claimed
damage. These are rare, because the Army is continually monitoring its firing activities to find ways to
reduce levels of disturbance to surrounding communities.

5. DATA REQUIRED FOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The technical evaluation consists of applying the methodology described above to data provided by
the claimant and Army personnel from the Army reservation involved. Army policy, procedures, and
information required for the purpose of conducting a technical evaluation are described in Department of
the Army Pamphlet 27-162. The claimant describes the basis for the claim on Army Form 95-107.
Instructions on the form ask for a brief statement of known facts and circumstances surrounding the
damage, identification and location of the property involved, and suspected cause. The claimant is asked
to give the date and time the incident occurred in order that the Army can determine the precise firing
activity which was in progress when the damage occurred. In some claims, the damage is presumed by
the claimant to have occurred in an accumulative fashion over a period of time which might extend to
several months or years. The brief information provided by the claimant can be supplemented with a
personal interview and damage inspection by an Army representative. This interview serves to clarify the
description of the damage, verify when the damage occurred, and ascertain physical evidence. An
important form of physical evidence is photography, which can be enhanced by a supplementary physical

26
description of die damage. In the cue of window glass breakage, the size and thickness of the window
panes must be provided to determine the safe overpressure threshold. In general, the more detail provided,
the greater the probability the technical evaluation will yield a final conclusion which is fair to both the
claimant and the Army.

It is essential that the technical evaluator know the relative positions of the claimant's damaged
property and the Army firing activities. The most convenient method is for the Army to provide an
official map of the Army installation involved and the surrounding amas. The claoimnt's damaged
property, artillery firing points, artillery impact areas, and demolition areas must be identified on the map.
Once a map of a particular Army reservation has been provided, then only coordinates of positions need
be supplied in subsequent claims involving that reservation.

Actual Army firing activities conducted during the time period in question are required. The mont
difficult aspect of this, in practice, is when only a copy of the firing range record is provided. The quality
of these records varies greatly from one Army installation to another. In many cases, a kind of symbolism
is used which only local firing range personnel are able to interpreL The evaluation process could be
enhanced if appropriate firing record information were provided in clear, unmistakable terms.

Table 6 lists information which must be extracted from fruing records or obtained in some other
manner. In all cases, weather conditions such as cloud cover, temperature, and wind velocity should be
included. In the case of artillery, the size rounds fired, firing positions, impact areas (if rounds are not
inert), and time intervals between firings should be provided. Demolition activities require knowing the
total charge weight of each detonation (including detonator), number of individual charges, relative
position between charges, and time interval between detonations. For DEMIL operations, the depth of
burial, weight of charges, relative locations of charges, and time intervals between detonations are needed.
In the event there are information gaps, the evaluator must assume the most likely scenario and, in general,
make choices tending to favor the claimant.

27
 Table 6. Minimum Firing Range Data Required

Artillery Demolition

Size roinds fired. Weight and type of explosive.

Firing positions (for muzzle blast effects). Number of charges.
Impact area (live rounds). Tune intervals between detonations.
Tune interval between firings.
DEMIL Meteorological Data

Depth of burial. Temperature and wind velocity up to

Weight and type of explosive. 5,000-ft altitude.
Number of charges.
Tune interval between detonations.

6. SUMMARY

Technical evaluations of private property damage claims against the Army are based upon a
philosophy designed to place the Army in good defensive posture in the event the decision is appealed.
This is reflected in overestimating predicted overpressures and underestimating damage criteria which
inherently causes the evaluation to favor the claimant. The tendency is further enhanced by giving the
claimant the benefit of the doubt whenever uncertainty in available facts exist.

The evaluation procedure described is referred to as the "current procedure," because for two reasons
it will change in the future. It is certain that change will occur when new information or understanding
is obtained by the evaluator. Also, when a new evaluator is chosen, change will be necessary to reflect
the new evaluator's opinions, understanding, and preferences, because these must be respected if this
approach for resolving damage claims is to be successful.

28
 7. REFERENCES

Johnson, et aL "Underground Storage in Unlined Rock Tunnels; Rock Mechanics Considerations in

Estimating Damage Levels." Minutes of the Twenty-Third Explosives Safety Seminar. vol. II,
pp. 1815, Hyatt Regency Hotel, Atlanta, GA, Sponsored by Department of Defense Explosives Safety
Board, Alexandria, VA, August 1988.

Lehto, D. L., and R. A. Larson. "Long Range Propagation of Spherical Shockwaves from Explosions in
Air." NOLTR 69-88, U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, MD, 1988.

Perkins, B. Jr., and W. F. Jackson. "Handbook for Prediction of Air Blast Focussing." BRL Report
No. 1240, U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, February 1964.

Raspet, R., and M. T. Bobak. "Procedures for Estimating the Flat-Weighted Peak Level Produced by
Surface and Buried Charges." USA-CERL Technical Report N-88/07, Construction Engineering
Research Laboratory, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Champaign, IL, August 1988.

Schomer, P. D., L. M. Little, and A. B. Hunt. "Acoustic Directivity Patterns for Army Weapons." CERL
Interim Report N-60, Construction Engineering Research Laboratory, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
January 1979.

Sis•Jnd, D. E., M. S. Stagg, Kopp, J. W., and C. H. Dowding. "Structure Response and Damage
Produced by Ground Vibration from Surface Mine Blasting." RI 8507, Bureau of Mines Report of
Investigation, 1980.

Siskind, D. E., V. J. Stachurs, M. S. Stagg, and J. W. Kopp. "Structure Response and Damage Produced
by Air Blast From Surface Mining." Bureau of Mines Report of Investigation/1980, RI 8485, 1980.

Taylor, W. J. "Criteria For Blast Damage From Distant Gun Fire and Explosions." U.S. Army Ballistic
Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, unpublished.

29
INTEmNIONALLY LEFF BLANK.

30
 8. BIBLIOGRAPHY

American National Standard. "Estimating Air Blast Characteristics for Single Point Explosion in Air, With
a Guide to Evaluation of Atmospheric Propagation and Effects." ANSI S2.20-1983 (ASA 20-1983),
Standards Secretariat. Acoustical Society of America, New York, NY, March 1983.

Baker, W. E., et al. "A Short Course on Explosion Hazards." Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio,
TX, 12-16 June 1978.

Buell, C. E. "Variability of Sound Propagation Prediction Due to Atmospheric Variability."

NASA CR-61160, NASA - George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL, January 1967.

Darby, R. A., et al. "Feasibility Study of Implementing a Blast Noise and Propagation Loss Monitoring
System for Kahoolawe and Other Navy Training Ranges." NSWC TR 79-430, Naval Surface
Weapons Center, Dahlgren, VA.

Duvall, W. I., et al. "Review of Criteria for Estimating Damage to Residences from Blasting Vibrations."
RI-5968, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1962.

Essenwanger, 0. M. "Resume on Concepts and Methods for the Establishment of Contingency Tables
with Pertinent Atmospheric Characteristics." RR-TR-66-3, U.S. Army Missile Command, Redstone
Arsenal, AL, February 1966.

Evans, H. C., et al. "Concept Paper - Aberdeen Proving Ground - Acoustics." JAYCOR, Alexandria, VA,
May 1982.

Fittipaldi, J. J., et al. "Procedures for Conducting Installation Compatible Use Zone (ICUZ) Studies."
USA-CERL TR N-88/19, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Construction Engineering Research
Laboratory, Champaign, IL, August 1988.

Friedman, M. P. "A Description of a Computer Program for the Study of Atmospheric Effects on Sonic
Booms." NASA CR-157, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC, February
1965.

Friedman, M. P., et al. "Behavior of the Sonic Boom Shock Wave Near the Sonic Cutoff Altitude."
NASA CR-157, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC, December 1965.

Hilton, D. A., et al. "Sonic-Boom Exposures During FAA Community-Response Studies over a 6-Month
Period in the Oklahoma City Area." National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington,
DC, December 1964.

iiosking, P. C. "Blast Effects on Residential Properties Outside the Property Limits of the Naval
Ammunition Depot, Crane IN." Letter Report No. E71278, Naval Ammunition Depot, Crane, IN.

Johnson, W. J., et al. "Underground Storage in Unlined Rock Tunnels; Rock Mechanics Considerations
in Estimating Damage Levels." Minutes of the Twenty-Third Explosives Safety Seminar, vol. II,
pp. 1815, Hyatt Regency Hotel, Atlanta, GA. Sponsored by Department of Defense Explosives Safety
Board, Alexandria, VA, 9-11 August 1988.

31
Kingery, C. N., et al. "Peak Overpressure Versus Scaled Distance for TNT Surface Bursts (Hemispherical
Charges)." BRL-MR-IS18, U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground,
MD, April 1964.

Kingery, C. N., et al. "Airblast Parameters from TNT Spherical Air Burst and Hemispherical Surface
Burst." BRL-TR-02555, U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD,
April 1984.

Kingery, C. N., et al. "Enhanced Blast as a Function of Multiple Detonations and Shape for Bare Pentolite
Charges." BRL-MR-3539, U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD,
July 1986.

Knight, D. K. "Artillery Study, A Report on the Possible Effects of Fort Carson Artillery on Private
Residences in Pueblo, Colorado." U.S. Army Engineer District, Omaha, Corps of Engineers, Omaha,
NE, May 1965.

Lehto, D. L., et al. "Long Range Propagation of Spherical Shockwaves from Explosions in Air."
NOLTR 69-88, U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, MD, 22 July 1969.

Manhart, J. K., et al. "An Acoustical Study of the KIWI B Nuclear Rocket." NASA CR-270, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC, January 1966.

Nicholls, H. R., et aL "Blasting Vibrations and Their Effects on Structures." PB-231 971, Denver Mining
Research Center, Bureau of Mines, USDI, Denver, CO, 1971.

Niedzwiecki, A., et al. "Subjective Loudness of Sonic-Boom N-Wave and Minimized (Low-Boom)
Signatures." UTIAS TN No. 215, Institute for Aerospace Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto,
Canada, November 1977.

Niedzwiecki, A., et al. "On the Loudness of sonic Booms and Other Impulsive Sounds." UTIAS TN
No. 236, Institute for Aerospace Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, November 1978.

Nyborg, W. L., et al. "Review of Sound Propagation in the Lower Atmosphere." WADC TR 54-602,
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Odell, B. N., et al. "Blast Forecasting Guide for the Site 300 Meteorology Center." UCID 17822,
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Washington, DC, 1 June 1978.

Pater, L. L. "Gun Blast Far Field Peak Overpressure Contours." NSWC TR 79-442, Naval Surface
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Pater, L. L., et al. "Techniques for Reducing Gun Blast Noise Levels: An Experimental Study." NSWC
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Perkins, Jr., B., et al. "Forecasting the Focus of Air Blasts Due to Meteorological Conditions in the Lower
Atmosphere." BRL-R-1960, U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground,
MD, October 1960.

32
Perkins, Jr., B., et al. "Handbook for Prediction of Air Blast Focussing." BRL-R-1240, U.S. Army
Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, February 1964.

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33
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Siskind, D. E., et al "Structure Response and Damage Produced by Ground Vibration from Surface Mine
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BRL-TR-3231, U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, April 1991.

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Van Dolah, R. W., et al. "Abatement of Noise From Explosives Testing." Report of Investigations 6351,
U.S. Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of Interior, Washington, DC, 1964.

34
No.o No.o
£~COuif Omanzation
2 Adnminator I Commander
Defense Technical Info Center U.S. Army Missile Command
ATIN: DTIC-DDA ATTN: AMSMI-RD-CS-R (DOC)
Cameron Station Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898-5010
Alexandria, VA 22304.6145
1 Commander
Commander U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command
U.S. Army Materiel Command ATTN: AMSTA-JSK (Armor Eng. Br.)
ATTN. AMCAM Warren, MI 48397-5000
5001 Eisenhower Ave.
Alexandria. VA 22333-0001 Directr
U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Command
Director ATIN: ATRC-WSR
U.S. Army Research Laboratory White Sands Missile Range, NM 88002-5502
ATTN: AMSRL-OP-CI-AD,
Tech Publishing arey)1 Commandant
2800 Powder Mill Rd. U.S. Army Infantry School
Adelphi, MD 20783-1145 ATrN: ATSH-CD (Security Mgr.)
Fort Benning, GA 31905-5660
Director
U.S. Army Research Laboratory ('u GaY) 1 Commandant
ATIN: AMSRL-OP-CI-AD, U.S. Army Infantry School
Records Management ATIN: ATSH-WCB-O
2800 Powder Mill Rd. Fort Benning, GA 31905-5000
Adelphi, MD 20783-1145
1 oIMNOI
2 Commander Eglin AFB, H. 32542-5000
U.S. Army Armament Research,
Developmet, and Engineering Center Aberdeen Proving Ground
Ar N: SMCAR-TDC
Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000 2 Dir, USAMSAA
ATFN: AMXSY-D
Director AMXSY-MP, H. Cohen
Benet Weapons Laboratory
U.S. Army Armament Research, 1 Cdr, USATECOM
DevelopmentL and Engineering Center ATrN: AMSTE-TC
ATIN: SMCAR-CCB-TL
Watervliet, NY 12189-4050 1 Dir, ERDEC
ATTN: SCBRD-RT
Director
U.S. Army Advanced Systems Research 1 Cdr, CBDA
and Analysis Office (ATCOM) ATTN: AMSCB-CUI
ATTN: AMSAT-R-NR, M/S 219-1
Ames Research Center I Dir, USARL
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000 ATTN: AMSRL-SL-I
5 Dir, USARL
ATTN: AMSRL-OP-CI-B (Tech Lib)

35
No.0o No.(i
g Onizatin Cope Oranzation
Commander 1 Commander
USA Chemical and Military Police Tobyhanna Army Depot
Centers and Fort McClellan ATTN: Clauns Officer (Ms. Pinack)
ATTN: ATZN-JA II Midway Road
Buckner Circle, Building 63 Tobyhanna, PA 18466-50540
Fort McClelan, AL 36205-5000
1 Commander
Commander 7th Infantry Division (Light) and Fort Ord
U.S. Army Missile Command ATTN: AFZW-JA
ATIN: AMSMI-GC-JA 12th Street and I th Avenue
Goes Road, Building III Fort Ord, CA 93941-5888
Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898-5120
1 Commander
Commander National Training Center and Ft. Irwin
6th Infantry Division (Light) ATTN-. AFZJ-JA
ATIN: AFVR-FG-JA Building 230
Building 501 Fort Irwin, CA 92310-5000
Fort Greely, AK, APO AP 96508-5300
1 Commander
Commander U.S. Army Intelience Center and Fort Huachuca
69h Infantry Division (Light) ATTN." AT.S-JAC
ATIN: AFVR-JA Hatfield Drive, Building 51102
Building 600 Fort Huschuca, AZ 85613-6000
Fort Richardson, AK 99505-5300
1 Commander
Commander Fort Benning
6th Infantry Division (Light) ATTN: ATZB-JA
ATTN: APVR-FW-JA Vibbert Avenue, Building 5
Gaffney Stret, Building 1562 Fort Beaning, GA 31905-5000
Fort Wainwright, AK 99703-5300
1 Commander
Commander 24th Infanby Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart
4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) ATTN: AFZP-JA
and Fort Carson Carrington Road, Building 37
ATTN: AFZC-JA Fort Stewart, GA 31314-5000
Woodfield Street, Building 6285
Fort Carson, CO 80913-5003 1 Commander
XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg
Commander ATTN. AFZA-JA
U.S. Army Garrison Building 2-1133
Yuma Proving Ground Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000
ATI'N: STEYP-JA
Building 452 1 Commander
Yuma Proving Ground, AZ 85365-9102 U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Dix
ATTN: ATZD-JAZ
Commander Building 5214
U.S. Army Aviation Center and Fort Rucker Maryland and First Street
ATTN: ATZQ-JA Fort Dix, NJ 08640-5000
Quartermaster Street, Building 406
Fort Rucker, AL 36205-5000

36
No. of No. of
£c Ora nizatia Covies Organization
Commander 1 Commander
U.S. Army Communication-Electronics Cmd U.S. Army Garrison
ATTJN: AMSEL-LG-JA Fort Sam Housto
Tinton Avenue ATTN: AFZG-JA
Fort Monmouth, NJ 07703-5010 Stanley Road, Building 1029
Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234-5000
Commander
U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill I Commander
ATThN: ATZR-J U.S. Army Garrison
Hamilton Road, Building 462 Fort Buchanan
Fort Sill, OK 73503-5100 ATTN: AFZK-B-JA
Building 204
Commander Fort Buchanan, PR 00934-5025
U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground
ATN: STEDP-JA I Commander
Headquarters Building 5450 I Corps and Fort Lewis
Dugway, UT 84022-5000 ATTN: AFZH-JA
Building 1033
Commander Fort Lewis, WA 98433-5000
U.S. Army Training Center and Fort Jackson
ATTN: ATZJ-SJA 1 Commander
Building 9475 Fort McCoy
Kemper and Kershaw Saee ATFN: AFZR-XO-JA
Fort Jackson, SC 29207-5045 Building 1347
Fort McCoy, WI 54656-5000
Commander
Tooele Army Depot 1 Commander
ATTN- SDSTE-LEG U.S. Army Signal Center Fort Gordon
Building 1002 ATTN: ATLH-JA
Tooele Army Depot, UT 84074-5008 Lane and Rice Roads, Building 32402
Fort Gordon, GA 30905-5280
Commander
U.S. Army Air Defense Center and Fort Bliss I Commander
ATUN: ATZC-JA U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Building 13, 2nd Floor and Fort Leavenworth
Fort Bliss, TX 79916-5201 ATTN: ATZL-JA
Building 244
Commander Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-5060
MI Corps and Fort Hood
ATTN: AFZF-JA 1 Commander
Building 1001 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Riley
Headquarters Avenue ATTN: AFZN-JA
Fort Hood, TX 76544-5056 Building 200
Fort Riley, KS 66442-5017
Commander
U.S. Army Garrison I Commander
ATTN: AFKA-ZQ-JA U.S. Armor Center and Fort Knox
Fort Indiantown Gap ATTN: ATZK-JA
Building T-O-1 Calumet Road, Building 6626
Annville, PA 17003-5011 Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000

37
No.ao No. of
Cooief Organiat £ s Oranization
Commander I Commander
5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry)
and Fort Polk and Fort Drum
ATTN: AFZX-JA ATTN: AFZS-JA
Building 4551 Building T113
Fort Polk, LA 71459-5000 Fort Drum, NY 13602-5100

Commander 1 Superintendent
U.S. Army Engineer Center and U.S. Military Academy
Fort Leonard Wood ATITN- MAJA
ATTN: ATZT-JA Building 606
Building 1706 West Point, NY 10996-1781
East Eighth Saweet
Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-5000 1 Commander
U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe
Commander APO AE 09166-5346
USA Soldier Support Center and
Fort Benjamin Harrison 1 Commander
ATTM: ATZI-JA U.S. Army Fort Belvoir
Building 664 ATTN: ANFB-JA
Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN 46216-5050 Building 257
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5186
Commander
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 1 Commander
and Fort Campbell U.S. Army Transportation Center and Fort Eusti
ATTN: AFZB-JA, Bldg 4 ATMN: ATZF-JA
Ohio Sareet and Chafee Avenue Madison Avenue, Building 2732
Fort Campbell, KY 42223-5000 Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5030

Commander 1 Commander
U.S. Army Garrison U.S. Army Combined Arms Support
Fort George G. Meade Command and Fort Lee (Provisional)
ATTN: AFKA-ZI-JA ATIN: ATCL-JA-C
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-5030 1st Street, Building 1108
Fort Lee, VA 23801-5010
Commander
U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Devens I Commander
ATIN: AFZD-JA Fort Monroe
Sherman Avenue, Building P3 ATTN: ATZG-JA
Fort Devens, MA 01433-5050 Building 77, Room 202
Fort Monroe, VA 23651-6050
Commander
U.S. Army White Sands Missile Range I Commander
ATIN: STEWS-JA U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service, Korea
Building 1870 APO AP 96205-0084
White Sands Missile Range, NM 88002-5075

38
No.d

1 Commander
U.S. Army South
ATIN: SOJA
Building 154
APO AA 34004-5000

1 Chief
U.S. Army Pacific Claims Service
Building T102
Fort Shafter, HI 96858-5100

5 Commander
U. S. Army Claims Service, OTJAG
ATTN: JACS-TC
Fort G=er G. Meade, MD 20755-5360

Aberdeen Proving Ground

35 Dir, USARL
ATTN: AMSRL-WT-TA, G. Bulmash
AMSRL-WT-PB, K. S. Fansler
AMSRL-WT-NC,
W. P. Wright (30 cps)
R. E. Lotero
R. J. Raley
K. 0. Opalka

1 Cdr, USATECOM
ATTN: AMSTE-JA

39
INTENIONALLY LEFF BLANK.

40
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