Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

Two renowned theorists of Civil-Military Relations, Professor Samuel P.

Huntington and Morris Janowitz, agree that the world of military officials and that of civilians
are far different from each other. They both have a firm belief that there is a huge difference in
values and attitudes between them. The military represents conservative ideas, the civilian
population is liberal.

“MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC”

Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan – Colonial Legacy

Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan have grown under a political culture. So, it continues the
colonial legacy of government structures and traditions. The British colonial government was
based on a revenue-exploiting structure that relied heavily on state coercion at the same time.

Dependence on the military, bureaucracy and feudal landlords was at the heart of colonial rule.
This was also replicated in the government structure of the new Pakistani state. As initial
invaders had built garrison towns in Sub-Continent, the British had also created a much similar
governance structure. Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Sub-Continent enjoyed the second
rank preceded by Viceroy.

Civil-Military Relations in Act 1935 and after 1947

In fact, according to the Act of India 1935, he was so powerful that he announced participation
in WWII without any intervention of government. After independence in 1947, India changed its
C-in-C position to 25th but unfortunately, Pakistan couldn’t do it.

Causes of Military Intervention in Pakistan

As per the 1973 constitution, which is valid to date with some amendments, Pakistan is a
parliamentary democracy. In the early years of the 1940s and 1950s, the 1948 war on Kashmir
settlement fears were mounting everywhere. Everyone used to think that this independence
would be undone by India soon.

This happened because of internal conflicts between provinces. The inept, corrupt and weak state
persuaded the military to take account of all matters into its hands. Nevertheless, arguments say
that repressive military regimes did not strengthen political and social institutions. Judiciary,
media, and legislature were forced to legitimize military rule.
Public Stance over Military Rule the general populace did not oppose the
military’s abolition of the constitution as governmental institutions did. Due to poor literacy rates
and public ignorance of the rule of law, there was an apparent disparity. Public Stance
over Military Rule
The general populace did not oppose the military’s abolition of the constitution as
governmental institutions did. Due to poor literacy rates and public ignorance of
the rule of law, there was an apparent disparity.

Pakistan has swung

between civilian and military rules

Re-balancing Civil-Military Relations in

Pakistan – A Case Study of Turkey
In a parliamentary government, civil and military institutions have clearly
defined borders. As a result, Pakistan doesn’t need significant structural
adjustments.

To restore the balance of civil-military relations in Pakistan, it is necessary to

reconsider military mentorship. Right now, it is ineffective because of its
informal state control mechanisms.
As a result of Copenhagen’s requirements for accession to the European Union
(EU), Turkey started its institutional reforms in February 2002.

This harmonization legislation served as a foundation for allocating both organs

of civil and military relations in Turkey in favor of the country’s elected
government.

Also read: What NATO Countries Have Nuclear Weapons?

MGK and CCNS

The National Security Council (MGK) was established under the military regime
to provide the Turkish armed forces with a formal role in the nation’s
government.

The National Security Council (MGK)’s composition and role were altered by the
AKP administration. This also gave its opinions advisory status rather than a top
priority.

While in Pakistan, the military had long wished to have an institutional role in
the administration of the nation.

In 1998, the Pakistan Muslim League government fired the army chief for
suggesting the creation of a national security council along Turkish lines in a
letter.

However, in 2013, the same administration formalized de facto military

supremacy over matters of national security by reconstituting the Defence
Committee of Cabinet (DCC) as the Cabinet Committee of National Security
(CCNS).

In contrast to CCNS, where uniformed personnel constituted a permanent

component of the cabinet committee, the services chiefs in DCC were only invited
as necessary.
This raised questions about the democratic legitimacy of the cabinet committee
in CCNS.

Another significant development made by the APK administration was the 1982
constitutional revision that allowed military officials to be convicted in civil
courts for offenses against the constitution.

Consequently, approximately 200 military personnel were detained and under

investigation for allegedly conspiring to overthrow the elected government.

The proactive response from the Erdogan administration to the military’s 2007
cautions over the eligibility of political candidates included a reminder to the
military that it lacked the power to advise the government on its business.

Recommendations
1. Instead of involving the military in judicial, executive, and law enforcement
concerns, Pakistan’s democratic government ought to strengthen state
institutions to improve civil-military relations in Pakistan.

2. To prevent any further military participation in politics, Pakistan must take a

lesson from the Turkish instance and punish those who violate the constitution
accountable for breaching their oath and doing so.

3. To oversee, manage, and supervise the activities of espionage agencies, a

parliamentary committee headed by the prime minister should be established as
a legal entity modeled after the US congressional committee on intelligence.
There should be more possibilities for public servants to join intelligence agencies
and be promoted to top roles.

4. For more civilian control over defense issues, the ISI should be reorganized as
a civilian organization led by a civilian bureaucrat or a retired military leader.

5. Paramilitary troops should be completely under the jurisdiction of provincial

governments.
6. It should also be possible for paramilitary force ranker officers to advance to
higher positions.

IPRI JOURNAL  2021 1 Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for an Ideal Balance Brig. (R) Raashid
Wali Janjua * Abstract This paper is an attempt to explain the impact of factors like sociopolitical
environment, governance, quality of democracy and military’s institutional dynamics on the civil-military
relations in Pakistan’s context. The objective is to help identify the necessary measures to bring about
the best possible balance in the relations. Samuel Phillips Huntington, an American political scientist,
adviser and academician, and an ardent supporter of civilian control over military has suggested
objective and subjective control approaches to render the military subservient and politically sterile role
viz-a-viz the civilians. Another approach is of Morris Janowitz, who suggests greater value convergence
and interaction between the civil and military components of the state through change in the military’s
role from traditional armies towards a more democratically inclined constabulary model. There are other
theorists like Feaver and Desch also who suggest military’s subordination to the civilians as an internally
accepted canon regardless of the environmental considerations. Similarly, Theorists like Finer and
Lasswell warn of a domination of politics by the military on account of its organisational strength and the
ideological fervour viz-a-viz weak civilian political institutions and leadership. Rebecca Schiff also
proposes a concordance of values and interests between the people, the armed forces and the political
leadership based on certain well-defined * Brig. (R) Raashid Wali Janjua is a PhD candidate at Center for
International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST). He is
currently serving as Acting President/Director Research at Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI),
Islamabad. Brig. Janjua is specialising in Peace and Conflict Studies. He can be reached at
[email protected] ___________________ @2021 by the Islamabad Policy
Research Institute. IPRI Journal XXI (1): 1-26 https://doi.org/10.31945/iprij.210101 Brig.(R)Raashid Wali
Janjua 2 IPRI JOURNAL  2021 indicators. An analysis of those indicators in this paper prognosticates a
positive trajectory of the civil-military relations. The benchmarking of the quality of civil-military
relations in Pakistan on the Geneva-based Security Center for Governance’s Democratic Control of
Armed Forces criteria also indicates reasonably strong fundamentals for a right balance in the relations
except two areas i.e., the expertise of the civilians in the military affairs and weakness of civilian
oversight institutions. The paper suggests the need for bridging the intellectual and ideological gap in
civil-military relations through intellectual and organisational reforms. It recommends attaining political
legitimacy through effective governance and achievements of desired concordance between the people,
the military and the political leadership focused on civilian oversight structures, reforms in Higher
Defence Organisation and the ceding of right constitutional space to the civil and military components of
the state. Some useful lessons from the case studies of civil-military relations in countries like Indonesia,
Israel, Turkey, Venezuela and Bolivia have also been culled to highlight the salience of environmental
factors and the internal military ethos of voluntary subordination to the constitutionally instituted
civilian governments. Keywords: Civil-Military Relations, Balance of Power, Supremacy, Reforms,
Governance, Armed Forces, Leadership Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for an Ideal Balance
IPRI JOURNAL  2021 3 Introduction ivil-Military relations in a country are an ideal barometer of the
quality of democracy and institutional harmony. The quality of democracy and governance is determined
not only by the form of the government but the degree of the governance.1 An apt example is the
French Third and Fourth Republics that vested authority in National Assembly and national bureaucracy.
When in 1950s, the effete nature of National Assembly and bureaucracy failed to ensure dissolution of
the French Empire, the military stepped in to fill the governance vacuum leading to Charles de Gaulle
era.2 The traditional and relatively simple political systems are not as resilient while encountering the
forces of democratic modernisation compared to mixed systems of democratic and oligarchic fusion.3
According to Paul Staniland, a complex interaction between the nature of threat, political
institutionalisation and government legitimacy determines the nature of civil-military relations in a
country.4 Anocracies are democracies in transition where the democratic institutions have not
developed strong roots and are, therefore, prone to the interventions of non-democratic forces like the
bureaucracy, violent nonstate actors, and the military.5 The civil-military relations are, therefore, a
function of the strength of democratic institutions, the external threats, and the internal security
environment. The optimal civilian control of the military has been the holy grail of civil-military scholars
and statesmen to ensure that a military is strong enough to do what its civilians’ principals 1 Samuel. P.
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (London: Yale University Press, 1973),1. 2 Ibid.,19. 3
Ibid.,19. 4 Paul Staniland, Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and
Pakistan in Comparative Perspective, Security Studies, 17:322-362(Routledge, 2008), 340. 5 Regan,
Patrick M., and Sam R. Bell, “Changing Lanes or Stuck in the Middle: Why Are Anocracies More Prone to
Civil Wars?” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 63, no. 4, 2010, pp. 750. JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/25749246. Accessed 11 May 2021. C Brig.(R)Raashid Wali Janjua 4 IPRI JOURNAL 
2021 ask it to do, and weak enough to do the bidding of those civilian principals.6 Scholars like Harold
Laswell with his Garrison State theory and S.E. Finer with his ‘man on horseback’ notion have cautioned
against a military with strong organisational strength, discipline and ideological orientation, eclipsing
civilian political institutions while operating in a high threat environment.7 There are theorists who have
linked harmonious civil-military relations with military efficacy, suggesting thereby the salubrious nature
of the civil-military harmony to be the bedrock of military effectiveness in wars.8 The civilian control of
the military component of state has been linked to dialectics between the external and internal threats
to the state by Peter Feaver. According to Feaver, the best civilian control is exercised when a state is
beset with high external but low internal threats. In Pakistan’s case, however, the above theory is belied
because of our historical experience. Paul Staniland’s notion of strong political culture and robust
political institutions, acting as bulwark against non-democratic forces, is worth examination in greater
detail in case of weak democracies.9 For democracies like Pakistan, the notion of ideal balance between
civilian and military components of the state is worth examination in order to discover an ideal balance
between the civilmilitary components of the state. What is the most puissant form of control can be
examined by analysing the effectiveness of several notions of control suggested by scholars like Samuel
Huntington, Lasswell and Rebecca Schiff. The perspective of scholars on Pakistan’s civil-military relations
would also be highlighted alongwith pertinent lessons from some case studies of different countries to
understand the nature of civilmilitary relations and the problems arising out of the imbalance in the 6
Feaver, Peter D, The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian
Control, Armed Forces and Society (Vol 23, Iss.2):149-178, 149. 7 Harold Dwight Lasswell, Essays on the
Garrison State ed. Jay Stanley (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishing, 1997), 24. 8 Suzanne C. Nielsen,
Civil Military Relations, Theory and Military Effectiveness, Public Administration and Management,
Volume X, Number 2(2005):74. 9 Paul Staniland, “Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political
Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective,” Security Studies, 17:322-362(Routledge,
2008), 328. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for an Ideal Balance IPRI JOURNAL  2021 5
relations. Some prescriptive remedies would also be suggested to reduce that imbalance in order to
improve the quality of civil-military relations. Theories Relevant to Civil-Military Relations Though
scholars like Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz gave their own interpretations on civil-military
relations, yet both agreed on the fundamental principle of suggesting pathways to most efficacious
civilian control of the armed forces. While Huntington, in his notion of objective and subjective control,
viewed the civilian control from the prism of external threats; Morris Janowitz examined the same from
the lens of a value convergence between the armed forces and civilians.10 Huntington’s notion of
objective control means ceding of maximum professional autonomy to the armed forces by the civilians’
in return for the military’s political neutrality.11 The objective control is dependent upon military
professionalism, which Huntington defines as a combination of “expertise, responsibility and
corporateness.”12 The military professionalism as per Huntington has two imperatives i.e., functional
and societal. The functional imperative is to protect the state from external and internal threats, while
the societal imperative is to remain wedded to societal values and ideology.13 The challenge with
military professionalism is to retain a healthy balance between functional imperative to protect the state
from threats and the societal imperative to protect its values. In democracies this gets translated into
military’s voluntary obedience to the civilian oversight in return for its professional autonomy. The
subjective control was another approach of exercising civilian control wherein the military leadership
was involved in the civilian governance functions with an attempt to civilianising the military with a
purpose to build adequate stakes in the system for the military. Morris Janowitz had expressed concern
over an apolitical military drifting 10 Patricia M Shields, Civil-Military Relations: Changing Frontiers,
Public Administration Review 66, no. 6 (2006): 926. 11 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State:
The Theory and Practice of State-Society Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 82. 12 Amos
Perlmutter, Political Roles and Military Rulers (New York: Routledge, 2019), 288. 13 Samuel P.
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of State-Society Relations (New York:
Vintage Books, 1957), 83. Brig.(R)Raashid Wali Janjua 6 IPRI JOURNAL  2021 away from societal values
and amassing too much power through autonomy. He had suggested military role to be always
“responsible and circumscribed to civilian authority.”14 Military’s incorporation into the civilian decision-
making functions was to serve two purposes; one to dissuade military from direct take overs, and second
to bridge the gap between the values of civilian society and the military. In doing so, reduction in the
professional autonomy and power of the military, viz-aviz the civilians, is recommended.15 Another
notion that is apposite in case of civil-military relations in Pakistan is the notion of Garrison State. The
concept is close to the definition of a National Security State given by Nelson Pallmeyer and the Warrior
State by T.V. Paul. As per Pallmeyer, the military would dominate the civilian institutions alongwith the
definition of threats and religious narrative serving national security interests.16 T.V Paul considers
states, which privilege national defence and spending over human development, as warrior states. He,
however, differentiates between the national security or praetorian states and garrison states, confining
the former to the subordination of national policies to military considerations and the later to
subordination of policies, as well as national values.17 The Garrison State notion was given by Harold
Lasswell, according to which such a state would emerge in modern industrial societies where the experts
in violence would dominate the national policy formulation due to their better organisational strength
and monopolisation of the coercive apparatus of the state.18 In such a state, the society would be kept
indoctrinated by an ideological narrative against a ubiquitous external threat and the armed forces kept
in a constant state of battle readiness. The development and human security would be subordinated to
military centric view of national security. 14 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and
Political Portrait, 343. 15 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of
State-Society Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 84. 16 Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, Brave New World
Order: Must We Pledge Allegiance? (New York: Orbis Books, 1992), 35-36. 17 Thazha Varkey Paul, The
Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 72. 18
Harold Dwight Lasswell, Essays on the Garrison State ed. Jay Stanley (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishing, 1997), 59-60. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for an Ideal Balance IPRI JOURNAL 
2021 7 At an aspirational level, there are patterns of civil-military relations identified by scholars such as
Huntington. Five patterns of civilmilitary relations are classified on the basis of pro-military and
antimilitary ideology of a state having two variables of degree of political power and professionalism.19
The anti-military ideologies have two patterns. The first represents low military professionalism and high
political power indicating either backward countries or modern ones with the sudden emergence of
threats. The second represents anti-military ideology in countries having armies with low military
professionalism and low political power like the totalitarian states e.g., WW II era Germany. The third are
the countries with anti-military ideology with a military having low political power and high military
professionalism like USA. The fourth category comprises countries with pro-military ideology where
military holds high political power and high professionalism e.g., Israel and Pakistan. The fifth type is pro-
military ideology with low military political power alongwith high professionalism e.g., Great Britain.20
At an aspirational level, a country should emulate the fifth pattern. The need for military to voluntarily
internalise the ethos of subordination to civilian authority is highlighted by two scholars, who in a
departure from the deterministic behavioural argument, advanced by the structuralist theory of Michael
Desch, argue for civil-military harmony based on an institutional norm that recommends subordination
of the military to civilian principals under all conditions. Peter Feaver’s Principal-Agent framework
according to which the civilians act as the principals to whom the agents i.e., military should pay
obeisance under all conditions. He even goes so far as to propose an intrusive monitoring mechanism
based on the modern communication means to ensure civilian oversight. According to Feaver, the
civilians are best suited to take policy decisions and that the military should always act in support of their
principals regardless of the circumstances.21 The concordance theory propounded by Rebecca Schiff
reiterates the above alongwith deepening the integrative nature of balanced civil-military relations. As
opposed to Huntington’s theories that celebrate separation of the civil and military 19 Huntington, The
Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of StateSociety Relations, 96. 20 Ibid., 21 Feaver, Armed
Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-military Relations, 300. Brig.(R)Raashid Wali Janjua 8 IPRI JOURNAL
 2021 spheres, the concordance theory celebrates the integration of the political institutions, armed
forces and the citizenry. A complete concordance between the political elite, armed forces and the
people can be achieved if the policy making is left to the civilians.22 Military interventions in the politics
can be avoided as per concordance theory, if the trinity of citizen, political leadership and the military
achieves consensus on the four indicators i.e., social composition of the military officers’ class, political
decision-making processes, recruitment methods and the military style.23 We shall see if that
concordance was achieved in case of Pakistan to strengthen the civil-military relations. Evolution of Civil-
Military Relations in Pakistan Pakistan’s civil-military relations grew under a political culture that retained
the colonial overhang of governance structures and traditions. The British colonial governance was
based on revenue extraction structures with a heavy concomitant reliance on coercive instruments of
state. The reliance on army, bureaucracy and the feudal landlords was the centerpiece of colonial
governance, which was replicated in new Pakistani state’s governance structures.24 Just as the earlier
invaders had created a network of garrison towns in India, the British had also created a similar network
that gave rise to a garrison town like governance structure.25 The pre-eminence enjoyed by the
Commander in Chief (CinC) in the British colonial era was unparalleled, compared to democratic
countries. The CinC enjoyed the title of His Excellency and ranked second only to Viceroy. He was also a
member of the Viceroy’s Executive Committee and upper legislature as per the Government of India Act
1919. Most of the powers enjoyed by him were retained in the Government of India Act 1935.26 CinC
was so strong that he had declared participation in WWII 22 Rebecca L. Schiff, The Military and Domestic
Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Routledge, 2009),82. 23 Ibid.,13. 24
Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State: Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947 (New
Delhi: Sage Publications India, 2005), 23. 25 Ishtiaq Ahmed, Pakistan: The Garrison State - Origins,
Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011) (Karachi: Oxford University Press Pakistan, 2013), 11. 26 Hasan
Askari Rizvi, "The Military & Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997," (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2011),
42. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for an Ideal Balance IPRI JOURNAL  2021 9 without the
government’s27 clearance. The Indian government changed the colonial warrant of precedence to place
its CinC at 25th position, but the same practice could not be followed in Pakistan.28 In Pakistan’s civil-
military literature there are writers like Fazal Muqeem, Altaf Gauhar, G. W. Chaudry, Pervez Iqbal
Cheema, Pervez Musharraf, Gul Hasan and Samuel Huntington who justify military intervention in
politics on the grounds of civilian incompetence and weak political institutions. Samuel Huntington goes
so far as regarding military intervention of General Ayub Khan as a positive modernising experience for
Pakistan.29 Scholars like Aqil Shah, Saeed Shafqat, Sher Ali Pataudi, Saadia Toor, Christine Fair, Ayesha
Siddiqa, Nasim Zehra, T.V Paul, Ishtiaq Ahmed, Asghar Khan, Sher Baz Mazari and Ayesha Jalal, however,
take an alternative view and regard military interventions in politics as a reason of military’s ambitions
for political power. There is another category of structuralists like Hamza Alavi, Muhammad Waseem,
Aitzaz Ahmed and Lawrence Ziring who believe an over developed structure of colonial state, external
threats and the weakness of political institutions as responsible for military ascendancy in national
politics. Hamza Alavi for instance, regarded the conflict between an over developed post-colonial state
and the weak indigenous bourgeoisie class as responsible for the ascendancy of military centric world
view in national polity. Ayesha Jalal differs with Alavi’s diagnosis and considers an overweening military
ambition as a result of military’s rise as a political force,30 whereas Ishtiaq Ahmed ascribes the same to
military’s ideological orientation and a high threat environment in the country.31 27 Major General (R)
Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, "The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan," (Lahore: Wajidalis,
1978), 395. 28 Ayesha Jalal, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and
Historical Perspective," (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1995), 43. 29 Ejaz Hussain, "Military Agency,
Politics, and the State in Pakistan," (New Delhi: Samskriti Publishers, 2013), 70. 30 Ayesha Jalal,
Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Lahore: Sang-
e-Meel Publications, 1995), 43. 31 Ahmed, Pakistan: The Garrison State - Origins, Evolution,
Consequences (1947-2011), 8-9 Brig.(R)Raashid Wali Janjua 10 IPRI JOURNAL  2021 Since Pakistan was
confronted with an external aggression right from independence, its political leadership had to rely
disproportionately on the military leadership for important national security decisions. The Indian
aggression in Kashmir and then Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s interaction with the British CinC
convinced him of the need for indigenisation of the officers’ corps. The failed opportunities in the
Kashmir War in 1947-48, also created a disaffected group within Pakistan’s officers’ corps that viewed
civilian decision-making during the war with undisguised contempt.32 A group of military officers in
collaboration with some civilians attempted a coup in 1951 due to grievances over the inept handling of
the Kashmir War by the civilians. The leader of the coup was the Chief of the General Staff Major General
Akbar Khan, who was once admonished by Quaid-e-Azam for suggesting a policy change about
promotions in the army.33 After the early departure of the Quaid-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan, the
bureaucrats like Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza edged out politicians by forming an alliance
with the military. Failure of the civilian component of the state to frame a constitution through the
Constituent Assembly, allowed the bureaucrats to consolidate their hold on power. The military
leadership initially remained apolitical, as per its British legacy of political conduct, but was slowly sucked
into national politics by a scheming bureaucracy. The first serious jolt to constitutionalism was the
dismissal of the constituent assembly in 1954 by the Governor General and the illegal endorsement by
the judiciary.34 Military was involved in politics by the bureaucracy for its ulterior motives of utilising its
coercive powers for personal aggrandizement.35 Military was a reluctant partner in the political game as
CinC General Ayub had clearly refused the offer of a military takeover and framing of a constitution by
Governor General Ghulam Muhammad in 1953, after the dismissal of Muhammad Ali Bogra’s 32 Ibid., 33
Mohammad Asghar Khan, My Political Struggle (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3. 34 Shuja
Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008),
126. 35 Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zufikar Ali Bhutto To Benazir Bhutto
(Lahore: Pak Book Corp, 1997), 9. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for an Ideal Balance IPRI
JOURNAL  2021 11 government.36 The die was cast, however, in 1954, when General Ayub Khan
accepted the offer of Governor General Ghulam Muhammad to become Minister of Defence in the
cabinet of Prime Minister Chaudry Muhammad Ali as a serving general.37 Military had actually assumed
the reins of government without imposing martial law at that time.38 This was the point of no return for
military, which kept getting sucked in politics due to overweening ambition of bureaucrats and weak
civilian politicians. Pakistan had seven prime ministers and eight cabinets between 1947 and 1958,
whereas only one CinC.39 This was bound to result in an institutional imbalance that resulted in Ayub’s
imposition of Martial Law in 1958. After Ayub’s deposition in 1969, reins of the power were again
handed over to military leadership. Lack of inclusive polity and political polarisation resulted in the
separation of East Pakistan in 1971, through active abetment by India.40 A democratic interlude of Prime
Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto failed to achieve the desired results in politics, as well as civil-military
relations, due to the authoritarian proclivities of Prime Minister Bhutto. Though, he tried to
institutionalise the national security decision-making by restructuring the Higher Defence Organisation
and introduction of the appointments of Chiefs of Staff of services alongwith a Chairman Joint Chiefs of
Staff Committee. The initiatives could not achieve the desired results due to his political pre-occupations
and changed priorities. Introduction of the Defence Committee of Cabinet and Defence Council, as a
higher decision-making forum for national security decision-making, could not make much difference
due to above reasons.41 Bhutto had failed to develop sustainable political institutions capable of
resolving the country’s political and economic problems.42 36 Qudrat Ullah Shahab, Shahabnama
(Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1990), 588. 37 Aitzaz Ahsan and Meghnad Desai, Divided by
Democracy (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2005), 77. 38 Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's
Political Economy of Defence, 182. 39 Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan, 80. 40 Kuldip Nayar,
Distant Neighbours: A Tale of the Subcontinent (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1972), 170. 41 Shah,
The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan, 35-36. 42 Rizvi, The Military & Politics in Pakistan
1947-1997, 224. Brig.(R)Raashid Wali Janjua 12 IPRI JOURNAL  2021 Pakistan’s subsequent political
journey featured more military interventions in the shape of Zia and Musharraf’s era when punctuated
weak democratic interregnums were followed. Despite a tradition of democratic politics, Pakistan failed
to democratise its politics due to institutional interests of political elite and their inability to transcend
those interests.43Weak civilian institutions and poor governance act as a magnet that invites non-
democratic interventions.44 Military, apparently imbued with a heightened sense of patriotism,
combined with strong organisational strength and an institutional memory has been fulfilling the
vacuum left over by the civilian component of the state with regular intervals in the past. The current, as
well as the previous two civilian governments’ tenures, however, indicate a change in the civil-military
relations favouring democratic continuity as a national interest. Though an analysis of precedent
conditions for balanced civil-military relations in the subsequent part of the paper would yield
interesting conclusions about stability in those relations, yet a quick appraisal of four indicators of
Rebecca Schiff’s four indicators of concordance theory will identify the future prospects of our civil-
military harmony. The first indicator of concordance theory i.e., social composition of officers’ class,
shows clear diversification now compared to the past. With increased number of Sindhi, Balochi and ex-
tribal area officers, the base has been sufficiently broadened. The second indicator i.e., political decision-
making processes has also shown improvement through democratic continuity and consolidation,
though there is still room for improvement. The third indicator i.e., recruitment base also shows
significant improvement in terms of its broadening. The fourth indicator i.e., military style is also
showing changes from the British era obsession with rank, hierarchy and status45 with reduction of
ranks and file gulf in the armed forces. The above indicates that the civil-military relations of the country
are on an upward trajectory, though several improvements are still required. 43 S Akbar Zaidi, Military,
Civil Society and Democratization in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2011), 18. 44 Noel Israel Khokhar,
"Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Musharraf's Era (1999-2003)" (PhD Doctoral Dissertation, National
Defence University 2016), 78. 45 Schiff, The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of
CivilMilitary Relations,87. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for an Ideal Balance IPRI JOURNAL 
2021 13 DCAF Criteria and Pakistan’s Civil-Military Relations First amongst the seven key features of the
democratic control of armed forces include civilian authorities’ control over military’s “mission,
composition, budget and procurement policies.”46 Pakistan’s civilian leadership has de-jure control over
all of the above as per the constitution, but the degree of control differs according to the form of
government and quality of the governance. It is for the civilian governments to improve their oversight
capacity through proper structures and processes instead of outsourcing these functions to the armed
forces alone.47 Second feature is the oversight of military performance by democratic parliamentary and
judicial institutions, a strong civil society and an independent media.” 48 On this score too, the de-jure
reality of Pakistan’s civil-military relations features satisfactory control of the civilians. We have fairly
active parliamentary committees, a vibrant civil society and an independent media that could hold the
military accountable to people, as well as the government, bringing an element of transparency to the
national security policy making process. Once again the quality of oversight is the weak link, wherein the
parliamentary committees need to perform more efficaciously by asking tough questions and
contributing positively towards defence affairs.49 Third feature is the civilian expertise in the defence
affairs. This is an area where there is a need of significant improvement on part of the civilians to
improve capacity to provide effective policy guidance to 46 DCAF Backgrounder. DCAF is a centre for
security development and the rule of law set up as an initiative of Swiss confederation. The center
contributes to security sector reforms. Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2008), 1-
2.https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/55845/17_bg_dem_control_armed_forces.pdf. 47 Lieutenant General
(R) Naeem Khalid Lodhi (Former Defence Minister and Secretary), interview by Author, July 4, 2019 48
DCAF Backgrounder. DCAF is a centre for security development and the rule of law set up as an initiative
of Swiss confederation. The center contributes to security sector reforms. Democratic Control of Armed
Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2008), 1-
2.https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/55845/17_bg_dem_control_armed_forces.pdf. 49 Major General (R)
Athar Abbas (Former DG ISPR), interview by Author, March 13, 2020. Brig.(R)Raashid Wali Janjua 14 IPRI
JOURNAL  2021 armed forces.50 The third feature of DCAF criteria is the non-interference by military in
domestic politics.51 On this score also, the constitutional position is clear and the armed forces in
Pakistan abide by the constitutional provisions. Problem arises when the civilian authorities themselves
suck the military in politics by involving it in civilian affairs.52 The role of the expansion of a military
employed in aid of the civil government as a natural phenomenon should be curbed by limiting the
military’s employment on non-military tasks.53 The fifth criterion is the ideological neutrality. On this
criterion, the score is even, as the military and civil components of the state in Pakistan normally are in
harmony over the ideological orientation of the country, except that the armed forces sometimes appear
more conservative in ethos viz-a-viz the society. That gulf can be bridged through greater civil-military
interaction and reforms in professional military education. The sixth criterion is the minimal role of the
military in the national economy. The military may be one of the largest employers of the country, or
may be contributing significantly to national economy, but it needs to exercise care not to disturb the
civilian industrial sector because of its economic interests and activities. In Pakistan, there are critical
voices that cite military’s corporate interests as a destabilising influence over the national economy54
but the reality is different. The military in Pakistan has not negatively impacted economic output as its
involvement in industrial activities is limited to welfare projects of ex-servicemen and their families. The
role of organisations like National Logistics Cell and Frontier Works Organisation is also limited to the
improvement of 50 Lieutenant General (R) Asif Yasin (Former Defence Secretary), interview by Author,
March 11, 2020. 51 DCAF Backgrounder. DCAF is a centre for security development and the rule of law
set up as an initiative of Swiss confederation. The center contributes to security sector reforms.
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2008),
1- 2.https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/55845/17_bg_dem_control_armed_forces.pdf. 52 General (R) Ehsan
ul Haq (Former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee), interview by Author, October 5, 2019. 53 S. M.
Zafar, History of Pakistan Reinterpreted (Lahore: Manzoor Law Book House 2019), 635. 54 Taha Siddiqi,
“Poor Nation Rich Army”, Foreign Policy, Mar 21,2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/author/taha-siddiqui/
Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for an Ideal Balance IPRI JOURNAL  2021 15 national logistics
and communications infrastructure in areas where no civilian firm likes to venture due to terrain,
weather and security hazards. The accusations of state subsidies to such organisations by critics such as
Ayesha Siddiqa are not well-founded, as all such organisations are run as per best corporate practices
and tax compliances.55 The seventh criterion is the presence of an effective chain of command within
the military that goes up to civilian commander in chief in order to ensure military’s accountability. In
Pakistan, during the military rule, this criterion was applied by default and presently exists as per the
constitutional arrangement wherein the military is answerable to the President as well as the Prime
Minister, with the Prime Minister holding effective authority over armed forces as a constitutional head
of the government. The eighth criterion is the democratic rights of the armed forces personnel. In
Pakistan, due to frequent military take overs in the past, this aspect remained overshadowed by the
military’s own institutional and legal environment. Under present democratic environment, the armed
forces’ personnel enjoy their democratic rights within the limits set by the military’s legal regime. An
overall evaluation of Pakistan’s civil-military relations, in the light of DCAF criteria, indicates the presence
of the right structures and rules for an ideal balance between the two. However, there is a need for
improvement in the quality of civilian oversight to provide effective policy guidance and leadership to
the military. Lessons from Civil-Military Relations of Different Countries Israel Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)
follow universal conscription model and exercise significant influence in the national defence and foreign
policies. Like Pakistan, it is a democratic state which is beset with high external 55 Ayesha Siddiqa,
Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2017), 75-76. Brig.(R)Raashid Wali
Janjua 16 IPRI JOURNAL  2021 threats, as well as internal threats. Due to highly ideologised nature and
heightened threat profile, the IDF’s recommendations on national security matters frequently supersede
political and economic considerations.56 Due to the proportional representation system of the country,
the political ministers do not respond effectively to the prime minister and, therefore, the IDF retains
very strong policy planning capability being answerable more to the Minister of Defence than the
ministry itself.57 The members of policy planning staff of IDF frequently participate in diplomatic parleys,
enjoying a lot of influence in national policy formulation. The Israeli Chief of the General Staff, who
heads IDF, attends all cabinet meetings and exercises a lot of influence in national policy formulation.
Despite IDF’s disproportionate influence in the national policy formulation, the Israeli officers’ corps has
not displayed propensity to take over the reins of the government. The reason for above restraint is the
exercising of subjective control over armed forces by the civilian government by integrating them in
civilian policy formulation and governance. The conditions that weaken democracy like weak political
parties, weak political institutions, and lack of common ideological purpose between armed forces and
civilians58 are not present in Israel. There were, however, issues like over politicisation of national
security decisionmaking, due to proportional representation system and coalition cabinets. The Israeli
Ministers of Defence are usually ex-armed forces officers due to universal conscription model and hence
more clued up about defence affairs.59 The absorption of IDF ex-officers in government, as well as semi-
government jobs, is also institutionalised after retirement which disincentivises the military leadership
from direct intervention in politics while in service. 56 Branch Kimmerling, “Political Subcultures and
Civilian Militarism in a SettlerImmigrant Society,” in Command with Security: Learning from Israel’s
Experience, ed, Daniel Bar-Tal Dan Jacobson, and Klierman (Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1998),395-416.
57 Charles D Freilich, "National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and
Strengths," The Middle East Journal 60, no. 4 (2006):659. 58 Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in
Israel (London: Frank Cass & CO. LTD.,1969), 123. 59 Freilich, "National Security Decision-Making in
Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths," 663. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for an Ideal
Balance IPRI JOURNAL  2021 17 Bolivia and Venezuela Bolivia and Venezuela both had socialist
governments that were unacceptable to the capitalist countries and were, therefore, subjected to
destabilisation sponsored by these countries.60 Bolivia’s President Evo Morales was deposed in a coup
supported by the United States. The civilmilitary relations in Bolivia were discordant due to cleavages
sponsored through a hybrid war imposed upon it. The leadership of both army and police were trained
by the famous school of Americas, played along the script of USA due to their pro-western orientation.
The popular Morales, despite the public support, had to quit power because of the active opposition of
army and police to his rule. The same model of coup making, however, could not be repeated in
Venezuela despite the best attempts by around 50 countries, including the United States to support the
insurrection against popular President Nicolas Maduro. It was a fusion of civil and military power in the
civil-military relations’ model of Venezuela, which saved Maduro. In a series of reforms starting in 1990s,
the power of military leadership was fragmented by creating segmentation in the unified structure of the
armed forces. That system, wherein a coupmaker had to get cooperation of independent commanders,
served the purpose of democratic control till 1992.61 After 1992, economic incentives in pay and perks
ensured the democratic control till an ex-military officer, i.e., Hugo Chavez was elected as a President. He
ensured a strong chain of command by controlling the postings and promotions of the armed forces’
leadership. The civil-military concordance resulted in the defeat of intended coup against President Hugo
Chavez on April 11, 2002, and he was restored to power through pubic and armed forces support after
47 hours. Thus appropriate incentivising of armed forces and fragmenting their leadership in multiple
commands, all directly controlled by the elected president, proved to be important lessons for effective
democratic control of the armed forces. 60 Jeb Sprague, "Top Bolivian coup plotters trained by US
military’s School of the Americas, served as attachés in FBI police programs," The Grayzone (November
13 2019). https://thegrayzone.com/2019/11/13/bolivian-coupplotters-school-of-the-americas-fbi-police-
programs/. 61 Harold A Trinkunas, "The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to
the Fifth Republic," Latin American Research Review 37, no. 1 (2002): 43. Brig.(R)Raashid Wali Janjua 18
IPRI JOURNAL  2021 Turkey The Turkish model of civil-military relations in the past has relied on a
democratic system with a strong role for the armed forces as guardians of constitution, as well as
territorial frontiers which some scholars like Varol consider a check on the negative aspects of
democratic majority.62 The Turkish Army had retained a strong influence in the national politics due to
its role in the Turkish War of Independence. When in 1960, the armed forces launched a coup they
included provisions in the constitution that institutionalised their role through a National Security
Council in 1961. After giving back the powers to the civilian government in 1961, the army launched
another coup in 1980. Membership of the National Security Council was changed with five equal
members from army and the civilian government, with a decisive vote with the President, who normally
sided with the army.63 Army’s involvement in politics continued for next 17 years when another coup
was staged in 1997, when the civilian prime minister was given a list of reforms by army, to which he did
not agree and resigned.64 The political parties improved their performance under the charismatic
leadership of Justice and Development Party of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The pro-democracy conditions of
the European Union, and Turkey’s desire to join the European bloc, created a pro-democracy
environment which combined with improved governance and economic performance increased public
support for the civilian government. The balance so shifted, when in 2011, the Turkish military
leadership developed differences with the government; it resigned itself instead of launching a coup.
Lessons from the Turkish civil-military relations include the importance of good governance for the
politicians, especially in the economic sphere and the need to keep armed forces away from the civilian
political affairs and decision-making. Indonesia In Indonesia, Soekarno presided over a guided
democracy, maintaining delicate balance between various ethnic communities. The army, however,
launched a coup in 1967, and under Suharto’s rule institutionalised a political role for itself in the
national politics under the concept of Dwi 62 Ozan O. Varol, "The Turkish “Model” of Civil–Military
Relations," International Journal of Constitutional Law 11, no. 3 (2013): 730. 63 Varol, "The Turkish
'Model' of Civil–Military Relations," 732. 64 Ibid., 746 Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for an
Ideal Balance IPRI JOURNAL  2021 19 FungShi (Dual Role).65 The army was allowed to keep its presence
in central as well as provincial and district legislatures, alongwith the incentives of participation in
lucrative businesses. Despite this, the army got factionalised in pro-democratic reforms and conservative
factions. The pro-reforms faction was led by Generals Wiranto and Yudhoyano, who tried to depoliticise
the army. Some reforms were introduced, reducing army’s presence in legislature, but its clout continued
even in pro-civilian President Abdul Rehman and pro-army President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s reign.
Army, despite democratic consolidation, still retains strong influence in the Indonesian politics due to its
Dwi FungShi role. Due to weak political and judicial institutions, and reliance of the civilian government
on military for internal security and governance tasks, the military still retains disproportionate influence
in the Indonesian politics to the detriment of the civilian democratic control of the armed forces.66 The
lessons from the Indonesian example are the need for the armed forces to remain away from active
involvement in politics and governance, even under an institutionalised role. There is more necessity of
strong and independent institutions like judiciary and the parliament. Analysis of Civil-Military Balance in
Pakistan The strong political institutions, enthusiastic public participation in politics and high political
legitimacy, make military interventions difficult in politics.67 Repeated elections under strong judiciary,
independent election commission, and an independent media would ensure strengthening of
democratic forces in national polity, bringing about the much-needed balance in the civil-military
relations.68 The successive elections and smooth democratic transition are essential for erasing the 65
Iain Henry, "Civil-Military Relations in Post-Suharto Indonesia and the Implications for Democracy Today:
A Preliminary Analysis," Australian Army Journal 2, no. 2 (2004): 150. 66 Edmund McWiliams,
"Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report," The Foreign Service Journal, no. May (2018): 4. ,8,
https://www.afsa.org/democracy-indonesia-progress-report. 67 Paul Staniland, "Explaining Civil-Military
Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective," Security
Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): 328. 68 Dr. Rifaat Hussain, interview by Author, March 17, 2020. Brig.(R)Raashid
Wali Janjua 20 IPRI JOURNAL  2021 institutional memories of the military coups for the armed forces
also.69 According to Ejaz Haider, the civil-military relations in Pakistan suffer a structural malady wherein
the civilians create conditions and encourage military’s participation in national politics. In order to
discourage their participation, they need to govern well.70 Under the current environment, when the
threat of hybrid warfare has raised the stock of internal threats more than the external threats, the
theory of Michael Desch gives salience to the military viz-a-viz civilians in national policy formulation.71
In such an environment, the civilian leadership shows unwillingness to take charge of the strategic
decision-making and military fills the vacuum.72 The states confronted with perennial threats are likely
to morph into a Garrison State.73 In Pakistan’s case, high threat environment and weak political
institutions raise the risks of the emergence of a Garrison State, but the emergence of an independent
judiciary, a vibrant civil society and unrestrained social as well as mainstream media mitigate those risks.
The notion of Garrison State according to Shuja Nawaz is a creation of politicians in countries like
Pakistan, as they create a system that provides benefits to both, by shifting the burden of governance
towards the military.74 Due to their political weakness, the civilians employ military to provide stability
to their government by employing it into non-military tasks. This tendency, amply highlighted by the case
studies of Indonesian and Turkish civil-military relations, needs to be kept in check for a balance in the
civil-military relations. In Pakistani context, the civil-military relations can achieve ideal balance through
the performance legitimacy of the civilian leadership.75 The increased involvement of the military,
except under constitutionally defined 69 Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State
(London: Routledge, 2008), 98. 70 Ejaz Haider, "Our Terrible Binary," The Express Tribune, January 11,
2012. 71 Michael C Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 1-2. 72 Kamal Davar, "Tryst with Perfidy: The Deep
State of Pakistan," (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2017), VIII. 73 Harold Dwight Lasswell, Essays on the
Garrison State ed. Jay Stanley (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishing, 1997), 24. 74 Shuja Nawaz,
interview by Author, June 10, 2019. 75 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Civil-Military Relations," The Express Tribune,
October 17, 2016. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for an Ideal Balance IPRI JOURNAL  2021 21
parameters, in aid of civil power, leads to an imbalance in the civilmilitary relations and should,
therefore, be avoided.76 The political systems suffering from political legitimacy, borne out of
performance and concomitant public support, are prone to political interventions.77 In Pakistan’s case,
this has been the greatest problem shadowing our civilmilitary relations. Pakistan beset with economic
polarisation, and low social cohesion, has been badly served by weak political parties relying on the
military to prop up their rule in the past.78 The moral and intellectual element of the civil-military
imbalance consists of a gulf between the grooming, educational qualifications and moral values of the
politicians and the military officers. The military in Pakistan, enjoying a deified status due to its image as
the defenders of the nation, sedulously nurtures its officers’ class, morally and intellectually, to
undertake the leadership challenges both on and off the battlefield. A sizeable segment of civilian
politicians do not pass muster on above qualities and are, therefore, bereft of moral and intellectual
capital, required to inspire the desired respect in the military officers.79 Military dominates the civilian
leadership in Pakistan due to its intellectual and moral superiority.80 The inability of the political
leadership to move and make way for the younger lot results in low quality of political leadership that
contributes towards the civil military imbalance.81 According to Ayesha Siddiqa, “the top political
leadership of all political parties has willingly turned their organisations into patronage platforms,
negotiating resources from the Pakistani establishment on the one hand, and 76 Hasan Askari Rizvi,
interview by Author, October 2, 2019. 77Gavin Kennedy, The Military in the Third World (London: Charles
Scribner, 1974), 25. 78 Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of
Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities," 388. 79 General (R) Ehsan ul Haq (Former Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee), interview. 80 Ayaz Amir, "The Debt We Owe the Army and PAF," The News,
November 18, 2014, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/88611-the-debt-we-owe-the-armyand-paf. 81
Adnan Rehmat, "Nowhere else do you have politicians clinging to top positions for decades like they do
here: Ayaz Amir," Herald, December 4, 2017, http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153925. Brig.(R)Raashid
Wali Janjua 22 IPRI JOURNAL  2021 supporting kleptocratic redistribution of the country’s resources on
the other.”82 According to Staniland, a high threat environment, weak political institutions, and low
legitimacy of the political elite with the people of Pakistan resulted in frequent praetorian interventions
in the past.83 The civilian leadership needs to develop the expertise in defence affairs and barring a few
national security workshops, that too on the insistence of the military leadership, there is hardly any
grooming regimen for the civilian politicians in the national security and defence affairs.84 There are
structural issues of civil-military imbalance, like weak political oversight over defence affairs. Lack of
institutionalised decision making structures underline the cause. The top tiers of civilian oversight are
the parliamentary committees. Regrettably, they do not have effective expertise in defence and security
affairs. The Cabinet Committee of National Security in its present form needs to have more civilian
members, alongwith a strong secretarial support. The present National Security Division does not have
the requisite expertise in hardcore military matters and needs capacity enhancement. The Ministry of
Defence also does not have an effective role in providing meaningful civilian oversight over the military.
The Strategic Planning Division, charged with nuclear planning, also needs a strong civilian oversight
mechanism in the shape of civilian experts in nuclear strategy, preferably located in the Prime Minister’s
Office. The appointment of National Security Advisor (NSA) also needs to be properly resourced to
include experts in traditional as well as non-traditional aspects of national security, including nuclear
strategy. 85 In keeping with the Venezuelan and Turkish examples, there is a need to disaggregate the
military power politically. Interestingly, this objective can be achieved in a manner that could enhance
the operational efficiency of the armed forces. A strong 82 Ayesha Siddiqa, "Pakistan’s long-ailing
democracy is now completely dead, thanks to its political parties," The Print (January 28 2020).
https://theprint.in/opinion/pakistans-long-ailing-democracy-is-now-completelydead-thanks-to-its-
political-parties/355257/. 83 Staniland, "Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political
Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective," 323. 84 Lieutenant General (R) Javed
Hasan (Former Commander FCNA), interview by Author, December 19, 2019. 85 Lieutenant General (R)
Naeem Khalid Lodhi (Former Defence Minister and Secretary), interview. Civil-Military Relations in
Pakistan: Quest for an Ideal Balance IPRI JOURNAL  2021 23 Joint Staff Headquarters, headed by a Chief
of Defence Staff, who exercises effective operational control over tri-services, can achieve both the above
purposes.86 Recommendations The moral, intellectual and structural shortcomings inhibiting an ideal
balance in civil-military relations, identified above, need to be addressed at priority. The ideal model for
Pakistan would be Huntington’s fifth model of civil-military relations with low military political power and
high professionalism, operating within a pro-military ideology.87 In order to achieve above, Pakistan
would have to make a transition towards a development state from a national security state. That can be
achieved by shaping the environment to attenuate the external, as well as internal threats, through
inventive diplomacy and better governance. It is by above transition that Pakistan can attain Rebecca
Schiff’s recommended concordance between the government, the military and the people. With
attenuated threats and better governance, space could be created for increased spending on human
security and development, building stakes for common people in the creation of a civil-military harmony.
A combination of objective and subjective civilian control needs to be exercised instead of a standalone
version of the two. While sufficient professional autonomy needs to be given to the military, it is also
necessary to involve it in a few aspects of national policy planning, in order both to build stakes for the
military in the political system and to bring value convergence between the civilian and military
components of the state. There is a need for military officers to get exposure to the complexities and
challenges of the civilian organisations. One way of doing so is to send officers to the civilian universities
and colleges to acquire degrees in management, social sciences and economy besides giving them
opportunities to serve in the civilian departments on deputation. Similarly, inclusion of subjects
pertinent to national security and defence in the civilian colleges and universities should be ensured to
86 General (R) Ehsan ul Haq (Former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee), interview. 87
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of StateSociety Relations, 96. Brig.
(R)Raashid Wali Janjua 24 IPRI JOURNAL  2021 build a basic knowledge base. This could be improved
further through private study and selected exposure to the military subjects. Political parties should
improve their human capital and democracy within the parties, by following democratic practices to
select the right leadership material for the onerous task of governance. The political processes and
structures for decision making and consultation should be transparent and merit-based with easy access
to the people to tap the right leadership talent. A system of shadow cabinets should be instituted by
political parties to train the potential National Security Advisors, Ministers of Defence and Parliamentary
Committees’ heads, for shouldering their future responsibilities with confidence. Armed forces should
not be employed on non-military tasks beyond matters of routine.88 The role expansion in the civilian
spheres should be studiously avoided by the armed forces in the best tradition of objective control;
otherwise military would develop a tendency to operate beyond its constitutional remit to the detriment
of balanced civil-military relations. The military needs to develop a healthy respect for the civilian
institutions and avoid a tendency to intervene in politics, whenever it finds a weak public attachment for
those institutions.89 Tendency to develop an institutional role in politics, like in case of Indonesian and
Turkish armed forces, should be eschewed by the armed forces to achieve the desired balance in the
civil-military relations. The military professional education, starting from the military academy till
national security and war courses, should be so tailored as to develop a habit of voluntary obedience to
the civilian leadership. The civilian leadership, on its part, should avoid personalised and non-
institutionalised decision making, especially in the national security affairs. The civilian leadership should
benefit from strong oversight structures and institutions for institutionalised decision making. Absence
88 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (Lahore: Sang-eMeel Publications, 2003), 22.
89 Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London and Dunmow: Pall
Mall Press, 1962), 21. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for an Ideal Balance IPRI JOURNAL  2021
25 of such institutions leads to undesirable policy vacuums, which are inexorably filled by the military.90
After narrowing of moral and intellectual gap, the structural deficit of decision making structures should
also be addressed. In the parliamentary oversight committees of Senate and National Assembly and the
political parties should get experts on defence and security matters with sufficient practical experience,
elected in the parliament, to provide strong oversight capacity to the government. The Cabinet
Committee on National Security should comprise important cabinet ministers and services chiefs’
alongwith National Security Advisor and coopted members, amongst civil and military experts on
national security. The civilian presence on the committee should be enhanced. The National Security
Advisor should serve directly under the Prime Minister and should have a council of experts in the
military affairs, economy, diplomacy, nuclear strategy, and non-traditional security subjects. The NSA
should exercise effective control over the coordination of defence and foreign policy inputs feeding into
national security options for the Prime Minister. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) should be properly
resourced to provide meaningful policy guidance and administrative oversight over the armed forces. A
permanent cadre of defence bureaucracy needs to be created from amongst the civilian bureaucracy, as
well as armed forces’ officers. The oversight by MoD should be meaningful with an effective Minister of
Defence, providing policy guidance about tri service organisation, budgeting, force readiness, research,
procurements, postings, promotions, threat assessment and response options. The Higher Defence
Organisation (HDO) should be reorganised by creating a unified tri service command in Joint Services
Headquarters, headed by a Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), who besides acting as the principal military
advisor to the prime minister, should exercise operational control over the three services, alongwith
enjoying powers of promotions and postings of senior officers of the three services. The reorganisation
of HDO would disaggregate the power of the officers’ corps like in case of Venezuelan 90 Shireen M.
Mazari, "Autocratic Rulers," The News, March 30 2017, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/195322-
Autocratic-rulers. Brig.(R)Raashid Wali Janjua 26 IPRI JOURNAL  2021 army. This will better civilian
control of the military in achieving operational synergy and economy, while employing members of the
three services as per the dictates of future battlefield. Conclusion A healthy balance in the civil-military
relations is absolutely essential for a democratic control of the armed forces in countries like Pakistan. An
analysis of DCAF criteria for democratic control of the armed forces brings to the fore the fact that the
civil and military components of the state are operating under the desired constitutional limits. The
improvement, however, is required in the quality of response to all eight DCAF indicators of the civilian
control. In order to effect a qualitative change in the civil-military relations both the civilian and military
components of the state have to take steps at moral, intellectual and structural planes, to build
capacities that contribute towards a healthy balance in civil-military relations. The definition of that
balance is best captured by Peter Feaver, who thinks that a military should be strong enough to do
anything the civilians ask it to do, while being subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorise it
to do.91 The steps suggested for building respective capacities and redressing shortcomings by armed
forces, as well as civilian political leadership, promise to bring about a qualitative change in the civil-
military relations resulting ultimately in improved professionalism and democratic consolidation in the
country. 91 Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian
Control,” 149.
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HOME → OPINION → THE REASONS BEHIND THE COMPLICATED CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN
WRITTEN BY BRIGADIER SYED MUSHTAQ AHMED• FEBRUARY 8, 2023• 9:13
PM• OPINION, PUBLISHED CONTENT
The Reasons Behind the
Complicated Civil-Military Relations
in Pakistan
In most third-world countries, after the colonial period, civil-military relations
(CMR) were characterized by military interventions in politics and insubordination
to civil control. In that, it had either been instrumental in providing stability and
prolonging the ruling regimes or had been in power themselves. Brigadier Syed
Mushtaq Ahmed examines the reasons for the widespread influence of the armed
forces in the domestic political scene. He also explores how civilian regimes have
attempted to ensure the subordination of the military to their authority.
About the Author(s)

Brigadier Syed Mushtaq Ahmed

+ posts
Brigadier Syed Mushtaq Ahmed (Retd) has extensive experience in areas of national security, intelligence and
strategic issues. He has worked as a Senior Research Analyst in a strategic organisation and has a niche for
writing research articles and analytical assessments, specializing in counterintelligence, counter-terrorism and
nuclear security.

Introduction
Army,     there     is    neither    independence    nor  civil  liberty.” – Napoleon Bonaparte In
any sovereign state, the maintenance of internal law and order and the necessary provision for
protection against external threats are the prime responsibility of the state which delegates the
authority to its defence forces to discharge this responsibility and hence their significance. The
paradox to this imperative is Edmund Burke’s warning, “Armed discipline body is in essence,
dangerous to the liberty, the potential threat to an incumbent administration and to the society at
large”.
“Without    an   
Harnessing this armed body to deliver and to remain subservient to civil rule is in essence what
the objective of ideal civil-military relations (CMR) ought to be. Civil-military relations can be
broadly termed as the relationship and distribution of power between the armed forces and the
civilian authority, which ironically, in Pakistan has remained in the state of disequilibrium
mutating into an abiding civil-military conflict and an object of scathing diatribe in the public.

Record & Trends

One place in the world where there had been military rule aplenty is the African continent, where
about a quarter of the countries in Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa are governed in one
form or another by their armies, either through direct military rule or through naturalization into
the power structure and in other cases through indirect influence.

Except for Tanzania and Zambia where there is some semblance of civil-military relations, in
other countries, these have been lopsided with a military bias. The rate of coups within the region
on average had been three successful coups per annum during the past three-quarter century.

“The overall number of coup attempts in Africa remained remarkably consistent at an average of

around four a year in the four decades between 1960 and 2000″. For instance, Egypt faced a coup
in 1952 and 2013, Sudan in 1958, 1969, 1971, 1985, 1989, 2019, and 2021 (for every successful
coup there had been two unsuccessful ones); Uganda in 1971, Nigeria had eight coups between
1966 and 1993.
However, comparatively speaking, coups have been less prevalent in Southern Africa than in
Central and East Africa, perhaps because of the way they were decolonised. “Overall, Africa has
experienced more coups than any other continent. Of the 16 coups recorded globally since 2017,
all but one – Myanmar in 2021 – have been in Africa”.

Pakistan has not been an exception to this trend and is almost a mirror image of the African
fable, as the military has been virtually in the business of running the country in its various forms
of direct, indirect, or hybrid dispensation. Bonapartism has remained a favorite vocation of
military generals resulting in decades of military rule (1958-71, 1977-1988, and 1999-2008),
often solemnized and greeted by the public.

The practice of changing regimes began with the toppling of the elected government of Prime
Minister Feroz Khan Noon in 1958 by President General Sikandar Mirza, who in turn was shown
the door by General Ayub and it has continued ever since. However, since the abdication of the
presidency by General Musharraf, the military was tempted to take over, but abstained, as in
each of its four previous military rules, the Pakistan Army was left discredited and unpopular
even though some monumental development and nation-building efforts.
Also Read:  A Conversation with SP Amna Baig

More importantly, the military saw the futility of direct military rule when it can have its way
through manipulative coercive levers and have de facto control over the government, especially
on the nuclear programme, key foreign policy issues, military financing, and national security
decision-making.

Causes and Consequence

The question arises that why and under what circumstances the military intervened and whether
or not there is a commonality with African countries. In the African case, the factors range from
ethnic rivalry, economic crises, governmental repression and corruption, perpetual poverty and
public unrest, personal and corporate ambitions etcetera.

Barring the first factor, the remaining, among others have more or less been the cause of military
interventions in Pakistan, justified in the name of the country’s survival and sanctified through
the implementation of the doctrine of necessity. Such usurpations of power and prolonged
military rule contributed to lasting political instability in the majority of the countries as well as
Pakistan, as also the transformation of the country into a security and a praetorian state.

It also induced a fear psychosis among the political leadership that while wary of the military
junta also beseech the praetorian oligarchs to climb back to the corridors of power on the
purported pretext of invariable corruption, nepotism, cronyism, bad governance, and security
risk, among others.

Civil Quest for Dominance

While the dictum of civilian control has a universal appeal, given our sham democratic system,
low moral political moorings, and inept governance, such norms are illusory and farfetched.
Nonetheless and possibly in retaliation, asserting civilian control over the military has remained
the latent desire of the political leadership, letting no event pass to take a swipe at the
establishment through innocuous yet devious means and measures.

Nawaz Sharif’s perpetual attempts to rein in the military chiefs, ending in his abortive attempt to
replace General Musharraf; PML (N)’s later vindictive swipe on the military exposed in the
Dawn Leaks; Nawaz Sharif and Maryam’s harangue on the former general chief and General
Faiz for overthrowing their government; Zardari’s memo gate and open virulent threat to the
generals; Imran Khan’s tiff with the military over the replacement of then DG ISI Faiz Hameed
and asset leaks of the former chief’s family from FBR. All these have been rooted in their deep-
seated grudge against the military.

The on–off slurring diatribe by the civilian leadership on the military and the latter’s attempt to
have a subservient political dispensation is a sordid tale of getting even, with near complete
indifference towards the burgeoning foreign, domestic, and economic challenges. The
deteriorating civil-military relations have taken Pakistan to the brink of economic disaster having
serious implications for national security.

The African recipe of asserting civilian authority is reflected in the Tanzanian case, where the
ruling party, after the mutiny of 1964, cemented civilian control by integrating the military into
the country’s elite bargain. As the armed forces became ideologically and materially intertwined
with the regime, they developed a stake in the latter’s survival.

Much of the same has been in vogue in our case, however with a difference, as this time round,
the composition in the playbook of yesteryears is being orchestrated with a vengeance and
vendetta. The hobnobbing of the political cronies (PDM) and the deep state is directed against a
common political nemesis (PTI and its leadership), perceived as a system outcast and a threat to
the status quo, who thus needs to be banished from the political chessboard – no matter what the
cost.

Also Read:  Non-local Voting in J&K: Eradicating Kashmiri Identity

The indifference or the lack thereof on the economic meltdown is perplexing nonetheless
economic stability will remain an important variable that may quickly change the prevailing
courtship. Pakistan is facing an existential crisis with the debt surmounting over $274 billion
amidst unrelenting plunder of state institutions/infrastructure and mortgaging these for seeking
more loans, reducing fiscal independence and drastically impacting sovereign decision-making.

David O Smith’s assumption, “The  military may have finally realized  that the true centre of
gravity of Pakistan National Security lies in its economy and not in the military capacity alone”,
hopefully must have been reckoned with in its entirety. Or we will mercilessly and in
bewilderment see the ship sinking and do nothing in the name of neutrality.
Intriguing though it may appear, the neutrality notion contextualization by Amir Zia says it all,
“Many view the fall of the Imran Khan’s government amid this buzz of ‘neutrality’ as
a switching of sides by the army, or worse, abject surrender to the much-tried, tested and failed
corrupt political dynasties in this country”.

Intended Purpose and Objectives

Resultantly, the unfortunate conflagration of hatred and rift between the society and the state (sic
the military) – a fervent desire of the inimical forces, which ironically have been callously
choreographed by none other than the political cartel in its internecine struggle and lust for
power with such purported objectives, as:

 Propping up the dwarfing image of the political elite, marred by corruption scandals
(Panama leaks, money laundering, etc.).
 Drawing the military down from the high moral pedestal and deriding its iconic
image of being a guardian of national interest.
 Yield space to the US and bring the military establishment under control.
 A more confident and emboldened political establishment, having regained space,
endeavor a more intrusive and searching role in affairs of the military, curtailing its
freedom of action on particularly strategic and nuclear issues.
 Make the military accomplice in state dispensation and when needed apportion
blame, making the military a scapegoat for its inept handling of important foreign
and domestic issues.
 Silence the political dissent and disarray the political opposition by insinuating a
military hand in the ongoing political unrest.
 If all else fails, eventually, provoke the military in taking any unconstitutional step to
remove the government and become a political martyr yet again to improve political
stature.
 Let the military/caretaker government deal with the difficult multifarious socio-
economic challenges and clean the Augean stables.

Modus Operandi
 While appearing to play a second fiddle to the military, let the military have a say on
issues of national import, with their own perfidious characteristic indifference to
national affairs.
 Keep the military leadership in good humour through obliging and appeasing actions
of routine nature, while continuing to guard and advance their political and
commercial interests.
 Through astute political brinkmanship consolidate their rabid dispensation by
appeasing the political allies, shrinking the space for the political opponents, and
precluding the possibility of any Bonapartist corrective course by the military.
 Create organized chaos, turbulence, and disorder and induce a managed economic
collapse to an extent that holding of elections appears of secondary importance and
redundant – thereby seeking more time for consolidating political rule on the pretext
of propping up the faltering economy.

Diminishing Military Support

A stock check of the entire situation and the current state of the civil-military relations in
Pakistan reveal one straight fact i.e. the military seems to be the principal loser in this ongoing
fratricide. Over the years, the fraternal bond of love, affection, and reverence that the military so
painstakingly built with the populace with its blood and sweat, emerging as a saviour in almost
every national crisis, has come crashing down.

Also Read:  The Relevance of Neorealism in Understanding the Kashmir Conflict

The ensuing animus between the Pakistan Army and the people has affected national unity
drastically. All this is perhaps due to the inadvertent misstep of becoming indifferent and aloof
(apolitical) – as a consequence, ushering in a corrupt political cartel and then turning a blind eye
to the flagrant incompetence, misgovernance, mishandling, and rampant loot and plunder.

The romance with the military has been a dream gone sour, which could only be re-lived, if the
miltablishment lives up to its image, understand people’s aspiration, and dole out an even hand,
ensuring transparency, fair play, and nudges the stakeholders to sort out the political impasse –
rather than leaving an impression of political vicitimisation or a witch-hunt against its erstwhile
political master.

The panacea of prevailing crises is hence none other than adherence to the constitution and the
rule of law by all state organs without prejudice and distinction and an earnest recourse to the
free-fair polls.

Considering Possibilities
While the time of much talked about and expected possibility of sending the political order
packing and replacing it with a technocratic government (otherwise a non-starter) to institute a
reformative political and economic agenda is gone, there is no other alternative at hand than the
resort to bring in a legitimate political dispensation.

The present turn of events suggests the following immediate remedial and imperatives:

 First and foremost is a perception reset – the battered and sullied image of the
military in public eyes needs to be restored.
 Undertake a Public Relations (PR) initiative to win the hearts and minds of the
people.
 Notwithstanding the government tactics of distancing itself from the episode, ensure
that the inquiry into Arshad Sharif’s murder and Imran Khan’s killing attempt is
conducted justly and in earnest – and in that, if there is a need for internal
institutional reshuffles – it ought to be done!
  With malice towards none, the military needs to live up to its resolve of remaining
apolitical and stop, shun, and refrain from political engineering, eschewing playing
the favorites. The image, however, of the COAS and the would-be caretaker Chief
Minister of Punjab together at the Kaaba’s doorsteps didn’t serve well, sullying the
impression of impartiality further.
 Being the only institution that has a lien over other state organs (Judiciary, FIA,
NAB, IB, Election Commission, et al), yields its influence to enable, empower and
engender a righteous course for instituting a just and fair system.
 Inducement of political pressure on the government to bring in some semblance of
political order.
 Let the situation be taken over by events, while the military continues lending a
helping hand on important foreign, domestic, and nation-building issues.
 Nudging the government for sustainable foreign, defence, and economic policies, as
these are potential instability triggers, which indirectly affect the deterrence
capability.

Last Word
The founding father was categorical in defining the military’s role – stating, “Don’t forget that
the armed forces are the servants of the people. You don’t make national policy; it is the
civilians, who decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out these tasks with which you are
entrusted” – ironically, however, the dictum has been trampled time and again in the name of
national interest and progress.

The genius of military leadership demands that it lives up to the abiding aphorism and for a
change finally go back to the barracks, but not before cleaning the Augean stables. If you have
started it, you ought to finish it also!

If you want to submit your articles and/or research papers, please check
the Submissions page.
The views and opinions expressed in this article/paper are the author’s own and do not
necessarily reflect the editorial position of Paradigm Shift.

← PREVIOUS STORY
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Becoming a Civil Servant in PakistanM A R C H 18, 2023

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Time for a new beginning

Ahmed Bilal Mehboob Published September 26, 2022

   

24
The writer is president of the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development
And Transparency.
LISTEN TO ARTICLE1x1.2x1.5x

FORMER prime minister Imran Khan may have his own reasons to lash
out at the ‘establishment’, but the fact is that the subject of civil-military
relations has been around for a long time. However, it has never been
discussed so openly in Pakistan as the PTI chairman has done recently.

Editorial: Khan’s gamble

The candour and bitterness of his narrative has continued to intensify with
each rally and media appearance. While he has indirectly complained about a
number of issues over the past five months, he has specifically criticised the
establishment for making him accept the name of the present chief election
commissioner for appointment to that post by giving personal assurances.
He also acknowledged the use of agencies in nudging his parliamentary allies
to vote for certain bills and the annual budget in the National Assembly —
although it is difficult to decide whether this phenomenon reflected more
poorly on Mr Khan, his former allies or the agencies.

A similar stir was created when another former prime minister, Nawaz
Sharif, spoke publicly on the subject about two years ago and shocked
everyone, including his allies in the Pakistan Democratic Movement, by not
only strongly criticising but also naming names within the establishment.

Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif are not the only prime ministers who have
publicly expressed dissatisfaction about relations with the establishment.
Former prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s “There can be no state within the
state” speech in the National Assembly in 2011 was an expression of extreme
exasperation in his dealings with the establishment.

Even prime minister Muhammad Khan Junejo who was handpicked by Gen
Ziaul Haq developed differences with him to a point that he was sacked by the
general. In addition to what might have transpired behind closed doors or in
confidential communications, the military has also publicly criticised the
government of the day on several occasions.

During the ‘Dawn Leaks’ saga in 2017, the DG ISPR’s infamous tweet saying
“rejected” to a notification of the Prime Minister’s Office may be cited as a
low-water mark although, thankfully, the tweet was ‘withdrawn’ about 10 days
later.

There is a need to discuss in a strategic manner all the issues affecting civil-
military ties.

Although mainstream media has generally been circumspect about public

expressions of these differences, social media content on the subject has
grown manifold, not only in terms of volume but in its intensity and, in some
cases, ugliness too. The occasional but regularly repeated schism between the
elected national leadership and the establishment is no more a topic of
drawing room discussions. It is out there in the open, with people taking and
expressing strong positions, sometimes even being critical of the
establishment.

If opinions critical of the establishment in reference to civil-military relations

resonate today, it is because so much has happened, and has been said and
written on the subject during the past 70 years or so. Imran Khan may just be
capitalising on the feeling that was already prevalent in the public.

The military coups/ takeovers of 1958, 1969, 1977, 1999, and the so-called
emergency of 2007, and some disastrous decisions such as the Kargil war,
contributed to the rise of adverse opinions among the public.

Retired Lt Gen Hameed Gul, former DG ISI, publicly admitted that he and his
organisation were instrumental in creating the IJI alliance to defeat, or at least
blunt the possible victory of, Benazir Bhutto in the 1988 election. Then there
was the affidavit submitted by retired Lt Gen Asad Durrani, another former DG
ISI, about the organisation’s involvement in disbursing funds among certain
favoured politicians in the 1990 election, allegedly on the directions of the
then COAS, Gen Aslam Beg.

The continued baggage of the past and the current state of civil-military
relations is creating serious divisions within almost all segments of society,
including those which are too sensitive to be exposed to any such divisions.
Pakistan also can’t afford to weaken its armed forces. Although the tension
has hurt the country for a good chunk of its history, sadly there has been
hardly any tangible effort to resolve it in a strategic manner. Even now, most
of the discussion is about how Imran Khan can be persuaded or pressurised to
stop raising the issue in public.

Read: Civil-military relations

There is a real need to discuss all the issues affecting civil-military relations in
a strategic and dispassionate manner considering both sides’ views and with
the Constitution as the basis of the dialogue. Fortunately, Pakistan has the
institutional infrastructure in the form of the National Security Committee to
start discussing the subject. As a first step, the civil and military leadership
represented in the NSC should be willing and prepared to initiate a series of
interactions on the subject. The committee, in due time, may extend a special
invitation to some opposition leaders like Imran Khan also to take part in
some of the sittings to enhance the effectiveness of the engagement. One
should be under no illusion that these problems can be resolved in one or a
few sittings. The objective may require hard work, especially on the part of the
NSC Secretariat and continuous engagement of members extending possibly
over several months.

The perceived or real encroachment of the establishment on decision-making

regarding key national matters, the weaknesses of the civilian side which
prompt such encroachment and the short- and long-term effects of these
encroachments on the state, may be the key items on the agenda of such a
strategic dialogue. Perceived ‘interference’ in political and electoral matters
may also need to be discussed. The objective of the engagement should be
that both the political leadership and the establishment end up strictly abiding
by the roles demarcated for them in the Constitution.

With the next general election due within a year and a new military leadership
about to take charge, this may be the right time to start conceptualising and
preparing to address issues relating to civil-military relations like a mature
society.

The writer is president of the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And

Transparency.

[email protected]

Twitter: @ABMPildat

Published in Dawn, September 26th, 2022

   

24

Read more
Khan’s gamble

Past PMs too had problems with establishment, says Nawaz

Civil-military relations
On DawnNews
 ‫ٓاڈیو لیکس کمیشن کیس‪ :‬وفاقی حکومت کا بینچ پر اعتراض‪ ،‬چیف‬
‫جسٹس سمیت ‪ 3‬ججز کے خالف درخواست‬

‫بلوچستان میں چائلڈ لیبر کی شرح کو کیسے کم کیا جاسکتا ہے؟‬

‫بچے گرمیوں کی چھٹیوں میں کیا کریں؟‬

‫‪DAWN NEWS ENGLISH ‬‬
“Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability Created A Balance In
South Asia”

Is Imran Khan’s Time Up?

Imran Khan Says No Doubt PTI Women Mistreated

After Rana Sanaullah’s Press Con
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Misogyny runs deeply across institutions in Pakistan:
Zoha Waseem

“Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability Created A Balance In

South Asia”

Is Imran Khan’s Time Up?

 Imran Khan Says No Doubt PTI Women Mistreated
After Rana Sanaullah’s Press Con

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Misogyny runs deeply across institutions in Pakistan:

Zoha Waseem

“Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability Created A Balance In

South Asia”
 Is Imran Khan’s Time Up?

Imran Khan Says No Doubt PTI Women Mistreated

After Rana Sanaullah’s Press Con

Week Ends With Mixed Performance For Global Stocks

 “People Investing In Currency, Gold Over Real Estate”
Comments (24) Closed
PopularNewestOldest
M. Emad
Sep 26, 2022 07:51am
A Dominant military & a Weak civil relationship creates a Violent, Unstable
system with revolving governments.
Recommend 70
Justice
Sep 26, 2022 10:13am
While neighboring India's military takes directions from Defense Minister, why
does Pakistan's military operate independently? It sounds like a pseudo
democracy.
Recommend 33
SHAHID SATTAR
Sep 26, 2022 11:49am
Your headline gives the impression that both sides are equal, which is
absolutely incorrect, as proved many times in the past.
Recommend 0
READ ALL COMMENTS

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 On 12 October 1999, Gen Musharraf who was on a flight on his way back from Sri

Lanka was unceremoniously replaced with another handpicked Lieutenant (Lt) Gen Zia

ud Din Butt, the then Director General (DG) of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). This

decision triggered events which unfortunately led to fourth military take over and the

country relapsed into the déjà vu paradigm.45 After announcing the appointment of new

COAS, Nawaz Sharif realised that COAS designate would need time to consolidate his

command, the flight control staff on behest of Nawaz Sharif was ordered not let the

deposed COAS land in Pakistan and when that was not possible they were asked to

direct his aircraft to Nawab Shah and he should be detained there. The military reacted

in favour of Gen Musharraf and took political control of the flight operations to safely

land the commercial airliner which was running low on fuel and simultaneously seized

political control which some termed as a ‘counter coup’.46 Gen Musharraf ruled till his

resignation on 18 August 2008. His rule lasted for nearly nine years.Copyright © 2023, Dawn

Scribe Publishing Platform

THE GUARDIAN

Imran Khan’s political games leave him isolated as Pakistan

army destroys party
Allies desert former prime minister amid disappearances and torture as
powerful military reasserts control
Hannah Ellis-Petersen in Delhi and Shah Meer Baloch in Islamabad
Sat 3 Jun 2023 07.00 BST




I n recent days, Imran Khan has cut an increasingly isolated figure. Since

Pakistan’s former prime minister was released from jail, after a brief but
explosive attempt to arrest him last month, his return has been marked by a
mass exodus of the top leadership of his party, on a scale that has surprised
even his critics.
Late on Thursday night, Pervez Khattak, the former chief minister and defence
minister, became the latest high-profile resignation from
Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. He followed in the path of
Khan’s former finance minister, his former human rights minister, his former
information minister and his former shipping minister, who all stepped down
from senior posts or left PTI altogether in recent weeks. Dozens of other
federal and state ministers have followed suit.
Most of those who have not defected are now behind bars. On Thursday night,
the president of PTI, Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi – who recently said he would
stand behind Khan during these “difficult times” – was arrested by anti-
terrorism police at his home in Lahore. Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Khan’s
former foreign minister, still remains in prison after his arrest in May, along
with several other key ministers and thousands of rank and file PTI members.
There is little question among analysts who is orchestrating the arrests and
resignations. Since Khan’s relationship with the all-powerful military
establishment fell apart and led to his fall from power, he has been on a
crusade against the army leadership. He has accused them of attempting to
assassinate him and of being behind his arrest in May, before he was released
when the courts declared his detention illegal.
In response, say analysts and PTI members, the army chief is now trying to
systematically break up Khan’s party, before arresting him and putting him on
trial in a military court. The likelihood of Khan being allowed to contest
Pakistan’s next election, due by October, is considered by most to be very slim.

“This dramatic crackdown is a clear strategy by the military to break down all
the support structures that Khan has,” said Avinash Paliwal, an associate
professor in international relations at Soas University of London. “Once
THE ECONOMIST DATED JUNE 01,2023

Imran Khan loses his battle with Pakistan’s army

The generals have gone to war with the country’s most popular politician

Jun 1st 2023 | ISLAMABAD

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Not long ago Imran Khan looked like a man who had defied Pakistan’s all-powerful generals and
got away with it. After his arrest by paramilitary goons on May 9th, the former prime minister
was freed by a Supreme Court order—even though his outraged supporters had had the temerity
to smash up military installations around the country. As Pakistan’s most popular politician, with
a legion of committed activists and apparently no fear of the army, Mr Khan looked odds-on to
win a general election due later this year.
Barely three weeks later, the political walls have caved in on him. The generals have in effect
dismantled the party Mr Khan founded in 1996, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (pti). Scores of its
senior leaders have defected and thousands of its supporters have been arrested. The government
of Shehbaz Sharif is openly mulling banning the party. Mr Khan, who faces dozens of charges
including corruption and blasphemy, could be tried by a military court—and perhaps expect a
long political exile at best. Pakistan’s beleaguered civilian institutions appear, for now, to be
firmly back under the army’s sway.
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AsiaJune 3rd 2023

 Who will be Taiwan’s next president?
 Narendra Modi is rebuilding New Delhi
 Imran Khan loses his battle with Pakistan’s army
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