1

Network Participation and Accessibility of

Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Blockchains: A
Cross-platform Comparative Analysis
Jiseong Noh , Donghwan Kwon , Soohwan Cho and Neo C.K. Yiu , Member, IEEE

Abstract—The comparative analysis examined eleven Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus-based blockchain networks to assess their
openness based on five indicative metrics. These metrics include those of decentralization-related aspects, such as the number of
arXiv:2305.13259v1 [cs.CR] 22 May 2023

validators and capital concentration, and participation-related aspects, including entry capital requirements and economic network
stability. This is to assess and characterize the openness of Proof-of-Stake blockchain networks. The analysis suggested that networks
with higher openness included Solana and Avalanche, while BNB Chain, Klaytn, and Polygon measured with lower levels of openness.
According to the comparative analysis, Ethereum scored high on network openness in terms of the number of participants and the cost
of running the chain, but scored relatively low on capital concentration and staking ratio, which is likely due to the low ratio of staked ether
(ETH) to circulating supply and the significant stakes in staking pools like Lido. Permissioned blockchains such as Klaytn and Polygon
have limited openness, which suggests the need to take the level of openness into account when transitioning into a permissionless
blockchain architecture with a more decentralized setting.

Index Terms—Proof-of-Stake, Blockchain Network Openness, Blockchain Network Accessibility, Blockchain Consensus, Network
Participation

1 I NTRODUCTION

I N this article, the openness levels of different blockchain

networks running on a Proof of Stake (PoS) [1] [2] con-
sensus basis are analyzed, identifying their strengths and
participation. Considering whether anyone can join as a
validator, create and verify blocks, and how much each net-
work participant can contribute to be important, it also looks
weaknesses, and suggesting ways to increase their open- at how reliably a network can be operated and maintained
ness. against potential security attacks or any malicious actions
Proof-of-stake is a method of creating blocks and achiev- from the network participants. These factors help measure
ing consensus based on the number of assets staked. Typi- the openness of a blockchain network.
cally, it uses a consensus method proportional to the stake Meanwhile, decentralization focuses on how evenly
(therefore the “Proof of Stake”), which means that validators functions, control and information could be distributed
with a larger stake have more influence on block creation amongst participants on a blockchain network. Openness,
and consensus process. The problem with this approach is in other words, related to a concept of decentralization but
that some validators with a large stake can become more has a broader meaning.
powerful. To mitigate this, some blockchain networks limit While there has yet been a standard for assessing the
the usage of stake to validator qualifications and achieve openness of a blockchain, we can look into decentralization
consensus in proportion to the number of validators. Once factors such as the number of network participants, the
you become a validator on such a network, you can par- number of meaningful participants, accessibility, sustain-
ticipate in the consensus process on the same footing as ability and network security from an economic perspective.
other validators, regardless of the size of your stake on the In this article, we would like to compare the openness levels
blockchain network. of blockchains based on the following seven metrics.
The openness of a blockchain is related to decentraliza-
tion to some extent, but not exactly the same [3]. First of all, 1) The number of validators: The number of validators
openness focuses on the accessibility to blockchain network refers to the number of nodes that directly par-
ticipate in a blockchain network and create and
validate blocks, and it can serve as one of the im-
• Jiseong Noh is with Klaytn Foundation and TEEware, E-mail:
[email protected] and [email protected]
portant indicators of network openness. In general,
• Donghwan Kwon is with Klaytn Foundation, E-mail: the number of validators on an open blockchain is
[email protected] higher than that of validators on a permissioned
• Soohwan Cho is with Klaytn Foundation, E-mail: blockchain.
[email protected]
• Neo C.K. Yiu is with Klaytn Foundation and Department of Engineer- 2) The capital required for participation: The capital re-
ing, University of Cambridge, U.K., E-mail: [email protected] quired to participate is closely related to the open-
and [email protected] ness of a blockchain network. Networks with lower
Manuscript first submitted for preprint on May 16, 2023. capital requirements for participation become more
 2

economically accessible, and this can help broaden a decentralization index to measure the level of decentral-
the base of users participating in running validators. ization of public blockchains.
3) Capital concentration: A blockchain with an even Several studies have investigated various aspects of
distribution of staked capital can maintain high Proof of Stake networks. [11], [12], [13], [14], and [15]
security through a consensus with a large number have focused on wealth distribution in different blockchain
of validators. Proof-of-Stake blockchains often de- networks and linked it to potential security threats due to
termine consensus in proportion to staked capital. asset centralization. Proof of Stake and its variants have
If too many stakes are clustered in particular val- been described and analyzed in [1] and [2]. Many studies
idators, a block can be created with the consensus have investigated various attack scenarios against Proof of
of only a few validators, which is not appropriate Stake networks: [16] argues that a 51% attack on Proof
for an open network. Therefore, we could conclude of Stake is unlikely, and [17] investigates double-spend
that the more evenly staked capital is distributed, attacks on Proof of Stake chains and measures their prob-
the more open the blockchain is. ability. [18] identifies attack vectors against the consensus
4) Operating costs: The lower the cost of running val- algorithm of Proof-of-Stake and compares several Proof-of-
idators, the more users can be encouraged to partic- Stake blockchain networks in terms of their resistance to
ipate as validators on an ongoing basis. these attacks. [19] determines the economic value required
5) Network stability from an economic perspective: The to launch a 51% attack on a blockchain, and [20] provides
economic stability of a blockchain network plays insights into the Sybil attack and the double-spend attack.
an important role in protecting the network from In the realm of permissionless blockchains, [4] sug-
external attackers. There are two factors to consider gests that permissionless blockchains have more poten-
for network stability; tial than permissioned blockchains. [5] elaborates on
6) Staking ratio: The higher the percentage of staked the differences between permissioned and permissionless
assets in circulation, the more stable the network. A blockchains while [21] elaborates on the performance and
higher staking ratio can make it harder for attackers cost evaluation of public blockchains with a case study
to acquire the native tokens they need to disrupt a on NFT marketplace applications. Regarding the openness
network. of blockchain networks, [19] argues that the Nakamoto
7) Cost of attack: The cost for an attacker to compro- coefficient can be utilized as a metric to measure the de-
mise a network is an important factor for network centralization of blockchain networks.
stability. The higher the cost of an attack, the more
economically disadvantageous it is to attack the
network, which may decrease the chance for the
attacker to make such an attempt. 3 M EASURING O PENNESS L EVELS
This paper is a cross-platform comparative analysis and 3.1 The Number of Validators
systemization of knowledge in decentralization, participa-
tion and economic aspects of existing permissionless and First, let’s look at the number of validators: the more valida-
permissioned blockchains in the blockchain industry, it cov- tors a network has, the more open it is, as the opinions of
ers the analysis of nine permissionless blockchain networks more participants can be taken into account. In general, we
[4] [5] and two permissioned blockchain networks that may expect that an open blockchain network would have a
plan to gradually transform to become permissionless and higher number of validators than a permissioned blockchain
measure and analyze the levels of openness respectively. network because it is structured to be open to anyone.
This comparative study will first look at the related work
in measuring the levels of openness and its participation-
related aspects. It will then cover the mechanism and opera-
tion of measuring the openness level of different blockchains
and its summary concluding from the comparative analysis
with the suggested future work for improvement in levels
of openness and participation of different blockchain proto-
cols.

2 R ELATED W ORK
Several studies have been conducted to evaluate and com-
pare different blockchain platforms. [6] investigates how to
measure the decentralization of blockchain networks, while
[7] compares different blockchain platforms in the context of
their ecosystems. In a similar vein, [8] performs an analysis
of different blockchain platforms with a focus on comparing
consensus protocols. Furthermore, [9] argues that public
blockchain networks are becoming increasingly centralized.
Finally, [10] provides a comprehensive summary of research TABLE 1: Number of validators by blockchain network as of
work in blockchain decentralization, highlighting the use of March 2023
 3

For instance, Bitcoin, one of the open blockchains, has

about 17,000 nodes. In contrast, EOS, one of the permis-
sioned blockchains, has only 21 validators.
The difference in the number of validators between per-
missionless and permissioned blockchains is summarized
in Table 1. It also depicts that the number of validators
varies among open blockchains. This is due to different
factors such as conditions for validator participation and
the maximum limit of validators.
According to the summary on the number of validators
on different blockchain networks as demonstrated in Fig. 1,
BNB Chain is a permissionless blockchain, but it limits the
maximum number of validators to 29. Like BNB Chain,
many open blockchains adopt a strategy of limiting the
maximum number of validators to increase reliability, even TABLE 2: Minimum capital to be qualified as a validator as of
if it means restricting some openness. the end of March 2023

BNB Chain has a relatively high minimum capital re-

quirement, which suggests that it values trust toward se-
lected operators more than openness compared to other
blockchains. Neither Cosmos Hub nor Algorand has a min-
imum staking requirement, so they can be considered more
open in terms of minimum staking requirements. While
Solana has no minimum capital requirement to participate
as a validator, but it has a unique structure that should
consider gas fees incurred from its consensus process. With
the adoption of this strategy, Solana has removed the barrier
to entry of having to initially stake a large amount of capital.
The amount of capital staked as a collateral by validators
with the least capital among the validators participating in
each network is summarized in Table 2. This suggests an
Fig. 1: Number of validators on different blockchain networks idea of how much capital is required to participate in a
blockchain network as a validator.
For blockchains with multiple validator nodes operating
To become a validator on the blockchain networks such
with a single client, such as Ethereum, it is important to
as BNB Chain and Aptos, one is required to rank in the
consider whether such multiple validators should be con-
top validators, which requires much more capital than the
sidered as multiple objects or one object when assessing
minimum staking requirement. In other words, one would
their openness. For the purposes of this article, all validators
need to stake a much larger amount of capital than the
running on a single client are considered one validator
minimum staking requirement to participate in a blockchain
because if a client is down for some reason, all validators
network as a validator. Ordinary users could find it difficult
connected to the client could thus be shut down simultane-
to become validators on the blockchain networks with such
ously. Therefore, this analysis article indicates the number
demanding capital requirements, hence they may need help
of Ethereum clients instead of the number of its validators.
and support from blockchain foundation of the blockchain
networks and other related organizations.
3.2 Capital Requirement for Participation Blockchain networks such as Avalanche, Ethereum, and
The capital required to participate has a significant impact Solana do not limit the number of validators, so anyone
on the openness of a blockchain. The lower the initial capital could participate in the blockchain network as a validator as
cost, the lower the barrier to entry, giving more network long as they meet the minimum staking requirements. These
users the opportunity to participate as validators, which blockchain networks have a large number of validators with
would enhance openness. However, lower initial capital re- a relatively small staking amount. This allows more users
quirements can also lead to the enhanced risk of a malicious to serve in the blockchain network as validators and helps
act. One of the key approaches to prohibit such malicious increase the openness of the network itself. Ethereum has set
behaviors could be "slashing", but a lack of capital to slash both the minimum and maximum staking amount equally
could weaken the effectiveness of the restriction and allow at 32 ETH. Ethereum has a large number of validators on
malicious actors to try committing an attack with a lower the main-net because those well-funded groups operating
opportunity cost. multiple validator nodes, each of whom is staking 32 ETH.
Table 2 indicates that each blockchain network has a dif-
ferent minimum capital requirement to serve as a validator, 3.3 Capital Concentration
which provides some insights into the openness levels of The openness of a blockchain network is related to the
blockchain networks. distribution of staked capital. Particularly if stakes are
 4

concentrated on a few validators or parties participating

in a blockchain network where a consensus is reached in
proportion to staked capital, a particular validator may have
too much influence over the consensus process. This reduces
the openness of the network and may lead to centralization
and control over the blockchain network [11], [13], [14],
[15]. The more evenly staked capital is distributed, the more
balanced power and control exist amongst validators, and
we could conclude that the blockchain network is highly
open.
For blockchain networks that use a consensus mecha-
nism proportional to the number of validators, the influence
is more evenly distributed among validators, and more
validators are required to reach a consensus. Therefore,
these networks are relatively more open in terms of capital Fig. 2: The corresponding Nakamoto Coefficient of different
concentration. blockchain networks

of a small number of validators. However, Ethereum would

need a sufficiently large number of clients for consensus.

3.4 Operational Costs

The cost of operating validator nodes could pose a sig-
nificant impact on the openness of blockchain networks.
Lower operating costs could enhance network openness by
lowering barriers to participation. Higher operating costs
could discourage participation by making it more expensive
to retain validators. In addition, to offset operating costs,
validators could face increased pressure to cash out the
tokens they are rewarded with. This leads to an increased
supply of the tokens, which could affect the token price.

TABLE 3: Number of validators with significant influence on

consensus by blockchain network

Table 3 demonstrates that a blockchain network utilizing

a consensus mechanism proportional to the number of val-
idators has a relatively lower Nakamoto coefficient than that
of a network using a consensus mechanism proportional
to the number of validators, as listed in Fig. 2. When a
small number of validators have a large stake in a con-
sensus mechanism proportional to their stake, they exercise
a large influence on the network, and any problem with
their behavior could compromise the network stability. For
instance, a considerable amount of stake in Ethereum is in
staking pools like Lido, which appears that more than 1/3
of the capital is concentrated on a few groups. On the other
hand, blockchains that is based on a consensus mechanism
proportional to the number of validators could provide a
relatively higher level of decentralization with a smaller
number of validators due to the fact that all validators have TABLE 4: Validator minimum specifications and monthly
an equal amount of voting power. hardware costs* (unit: USD)
When we look at the number of validators required to
reach consensus, it does not vary much. While Solana has Table 4 summarizes the monthly hardware costs based on
over 2,000 validators, the number of validators required AWS EC2 instances according to validator minimum spec-
to reach a consensus is around 130, or 7% of the total. ifications of different blockchain networks. The hardware
While a network which reaches a consensus proportional specifications are quoted from each network’s websites. Ac-
to the stake seems to have a large number of participating cording to Table 4, hardware specifications for validator op-
validators, the network could operate with the consensus erations vary by the blockchain network, so do the monthly
 5

hardware costs. This would enable a rough comparison

of the operating costs to participate as a validator in the
blockchain network.

TABLE 5: Initial investment required to cover the cost of

running validators as of March 2023* (unit: USD)

Fig. 3: The hardware operation cost (in USD) of different

erating costs can be expected only from running multiple
blockchain networks
validators on a single client.

As high-performance blockchain networks [19] are opti- 3.5 Network Stability from an Economic Perspective
mized for high throughput and performance, their operat-
It is generally believed that Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains
ing costs are relatively high. They require more CPU cores
require a higher cost for a double-spend attack than Proof-
and memory as well as having a relatively high number
of-Work (PoW) blockchains due to the higher cost of staking.
of transactions per block, increasing the block size hence
To commit a double-spend attack on a PoS blockchain, an
requiring more storage space; as such, the total operating
attacker is expected to acquire over the majority of the
costs could go up. Fig. 3 indicates that networks categorized
staked native tokens, which is largely costly. In addition,
as a high performance blockchain such as Aptos, Klaytn,
a blockchain with a high staking ratio can be considered a
and Solana have relatively high operating costs. This indi-
relatively secure network, as it becomes more difficult for
cates that high-performance blockchains could be relatively
an attacker to obtain the native tokens needed to launch an
weaker in terms of openness. In addition, high-performance
attack.
blockchains in general have short block times and process The value of a network can be considered proportional
many transactions per block, which means that a lot of data to the circulating amount of its native tokens [23]. This is be-
needs to be transferred and synchronized among validators cause the higher the circulation, the more active the network
in a short amount of time. Thus, the network transmission is considered to be. But if a permissionless blockchain has a
costs are also likely to be relatively higher. low staking ratio to the circulating supply, an attacker could
If so, we can estimate how much upfront capital is potentially attack the network [18] by purchasing a large
needed to cover operating costs with the rewards for run- number of tokens in circulation [16] [19]. For instance, on
ning a validator. If these costs are low and the rewards a Proof-of-Stake blockchain that achieves consensus propor-
are sufficient, this could be an incentive to participate as tional to the stake, a double-spend attack [20] becomes pos-
a validator [22]. Of course, this estimate is based on the sible if an attacker acquires 2/3 of the total staked amount
reward level and a native token price at the moment, which needed for consensus [17]. On the other hand, a blockchain
can change at any time. network that uses consensus proportional to the number
The estimated initial investment costs and annual re- of validators may require less than 2/3 of the total staked
ward rate for operating each network validator is summa- amount because consensus can be made when reaching 2/3
rized in Table 5. In this table, a single consensus node is con- of the number of validators sorted by ascending staking
sidered a validator, and the costs of proxy nodes required amount. Therefore, an attacker may be able to launch an
for node operations are excluded. Some networks such as attack at a relatively low cost.
Klaytn require a proxy node to be installed to participate in To compare network resistance to attacks, we calculated
running a validator, but since this table calculates the cost of the required staking ratio to the tradable quantity for con-
operating with a single node, it may differ from the actual sensus by each network as described in [Table 6]. As the
operating costs, and the annual reward levels may also vary. definition of tradable quantity slightly differs by network,
Cosmos Hub and Klaytn, for instance, offer over 10% we have defined it as the quantity that can be secured
APR while other chains offer lower rewards. In terms of through normal transactions, which is total supply or cir-
upfront investment, hundreds of thousands of dollars of culating supply in here. And the quantity already minted
capital should be staked on most chains to expect profits but designated as a reserve or burnt is excluded from the
over the costs of running validators. tradable quantity.
In the case of Ethereum, the amount that can be staked Table 6 shows each network’s total circulating supply and
per validator is fixed (32 ETH), profits exceeding the op- the minimum staking amount for consensus divided by the
 6

This makes the Celo network relatively resistant to attacks

from an economic standpoint.
Moving on, let’s analyze how much capital an attacker
would actually need to disrupt a blockchain network. This
will help estimate how much capital is needed for an attack
and assess the resistance of a blockchain network to an
attack.
Assuming that the attacker is unable to take the amount
staked, the attacker then would need to purchase and stake
the number of native tokens from the market for an attack,
which would be at least 50% of the current staking amount
according to the proportional consensus method. This is
because as soon as the attacker stakes half of the current
staking amount, the attacker’s stake becomes 1/3 of the
TABLE 6: Staking quantity for consensus out of the total total staking amount. Therefore, if we know the price of
circulating supply as of Apr 21 2023 the native token and the amount staked, one could roughly
estimate the amount of capital an attacker would require to
attack the target blockchain network.
total circulating supply. If a network has a large circulating
supply of its native tokens and small staking amount, an
attacker could make a large profit from a successful attack.
In this case, a double-spend attack can be attempted even at
the risk of enormous costs to attack. From this perspective,
blockchains with a high staking ratio such as Aptos, Cosmos
Hub, and Solana can be considered relatively secure against
double-spend attacks.
As described in Fig. 4, on a network with consensus
proportional to the number of validators, the amount of
native tokens needed for consensus may be less than 2/3
of the amount staked. As Algorand, BNB Chain, and Klaytn
need a relatively small quantity of native tokens for consen-
sus, an attacker can attempt an attack to seize a network
such as a double-spend attack if acquiring nearly 10% of
the circulating supply. However, committing such an attack
would be based on the assumption that the attacker can
acquire a sufficient number of validators; otherwise, such
an attack would be deemed impossible.
TABLE 7: Quantity of native tokens and capital required to
attack a network as of April 21 2023

Table 7 demonstrates a rough idea of how economically

attack-resistant each blockchain network is. It indicates that
an attacker would need a very large amount of capital
to disrupt a blockchain network which is proportional to
stake, which confirms that Proof-of-Stake based blockchain
networks have a high level of attack resistance. In the case of
Ethereum, the cost of an attack was estimated to be at least
$18 billion, making it the most resistant blockchain among
those analyzed.
On the other hand, networks with their consensus mech-
anism which is proportional to the number of validators
Fig. 4: The staking ratio and amount of staking for consensus of have relatively lower level of resistance to security attacks.
different blockchain networks This is because the quantity required for an attack is
proportional to the least staked validator. Therefore, these
Celo blockchain uses a consensus method proportional networks need to either limit the maximum number of
to the number of validators but needs a relatively large validators or increase the minimum staking amount to im-
amount of native tokens for consensus, which means staking prove attack resistance, thereby properly maintaining their
amount is relatively evenly distributed among validators. accessibility to participation, stability, and reliability.
 7

4 R ESULTS OF C OMPARATIVE A NALYSIS ON N ET- relatively low. Given the fact that both Klaytn and Poly-
WORK O PENNESS L EVELS gon blockchains have been permissioned blockchains, their
openness scores do not mean much, but if they transition
The actual cost of a network attack can vary depending on
into a permissionless blockchain, they could likely be less
a variety of factors, including market conditions and price
open. The radar chart [24] depicted in Fig. 5 visualizes
fluctuations, so the analysis results should be considered a
the openness levels of six blockchain networks out of the
rough indicator.
eleven blockchain networks bench-marked in this study. It
is suggested that the relatively highly-open Ethereum and
Solana taking up a larger area, while BNB Chain and Klaytn
occupy a relatively small area. This chart helps compare and
assess the openness levels of the networks at a glance.

5 C ONCLUSIONS
In this comparative analysis, we compared the openness
levels of different Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain networks
and summarized with the following insightful results.
1) Proof-of-stake networks could be categorized by 2
evaluation methods: proportional to staking and
proportional to the number of validators.
TABLE 8: A relative level of openness among blockchain 2) Networks with proportional staking have a rela-
networks (minimum 1, maximum 5) tively large number of validators and are relatively
highly-stable with high potential for capital concen-
The scores of the relative openness levels among the tration.
eleven blockchain networks analyzed is summarized in 3) Networks with consensus proportional to the num-
Table 8, in which each score closer to 5 indicates a higher ber of validators are relatively highly-open in terms
level of openness while a score closer to 1 indicates a lower of capital concentration but could be vulnerable to
level of openness. network attacks if there are large variations in the
Solana and Avalanche networks were assessed to be amount staked.
highly open, with relatively high scores in the number of 4) Some blockchain networks are with high initial capi-
validators, initial capital cost, and capital concentration. tal requirements, making it difficult to participate as
These factors were combined to contribute to increasing a validator without support from the corresponding
their openness. foundation of the blockchain networks.
As Algorand does not disclose the exact number of 5) High-performance blockchains require high hard-
validators, the exact result is not available, but it is assumed ware specifications, resulting in relatively high op-
to be highly open based on a combination of data sources. erating costs.
While Ethereum scored high in several metrics, it scored low 6) Algorand, Avalanche, Celo, and Solana demonstrate
in the areas of capital concentration and network stability, a higher level of network openness.
which means that there are some limitations to the openness 7) Cosmos Hub, Ethereum, and NEAR Protocol are
of the Ethereum network. moderately open.
8) Ethereum scored very high on many metrics, in-
cluding the number of validators, initial capital,
and operating costs, but scored lower on capital
concentration and staking ratio.
9) The openness of permissionless networks that re-
quire an extremely large initial capital is found
to be not significantly different from permissioned
blockchain networks.
The results summarized in this comparative analysis can
help understand how openness and stability of blockchain
networks affect each other and could match with which
strategy to adopt in order to improve the openness of a
permissionless network. Also, so as to transition a permis-
sioned blockchain network into an effectively permission-
less blockchain, the following could be taken into account.
1) Choose a suitable consensus method for a network
Fig. 5: Openness Level Radar Chart between a mechanism of proportional to stake and
that of proportional to the number of validators
Aptos and BNB Chain scored lower in initial capital 2) Properly set the number of validators, initial capital
cost and decentralization, and their total scores were also cost, and operating costs
 8

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blockchain generations,” Available at SSRN 4377849, 2023. core protocols. He is currently the Lead of
[6] M. Dotan, Y.-A. Pignolet, S. Schmid, S. Tochner, and A. Zohar, core project at Klaytn Foundation. Previously, he
“Survey on blockchain networking: Context, state-of-the-art, chal- tested the security of enterprise systems as a
lenges,” ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 1–34, white hacker. He received a master’s degree in
2021. Information Security from KAIST.
[7] F. Irresberger, K. John, P. Mueller, and F. Saleh, “The public
blockchain ecosystem: An empirical analysis,” NYU Stern School
of Business, 2021.
[8] Y. Xiao, N. Zhang, W. Lou, and Y. T. Hou, “A survey of distributed
consensus protocols for blockchain networks,” IEEE Communica-
tions Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 1432–1465, 2020. Dr. Soohwan Cho is currently a Research Engi-
[9] A. R. Sai, J. Buckley, B. Fitzgerald, and A. Le Gear, “Taxonomy neer at Klaytn Foundation. He previously worked
of centralization in public blockchain systems: A systematic liter- at a blockchain research institute and an operat-
ature review,” Information Processing & Management, vol. 58, no. 4, ing system company. Dr. Cho received his Ph.D.
p. 102584, 2021. in Computer Science from Sogang University.
[10] L. Zhang, X. Ma, and Y. Liu, “Sok: Blockchain decentralization,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.04256, 2022.
[11] A. R. Sai, J. Buckley, and A. Le Gear, “Characterizing wealth
inequality in cryptocurrencies,” Frontiers in Blockchain, vol. 4,
p. 730122, 2021.
[12] L. Kogan, G. Fanti, and P. Viswanath, “Economics of proof-of-stake
payment systems,” 2021.
Dr. Neo C.K. Yiu IEEE is an experienced tech-
[13] F. Irresberger, “Coin concentration of proof-of-stake blockchains,”
nology leader focusing on distributed intelligent
Leeds University Business School Working Paper, no. 19-04, 2018.
system R&Ds. Neo is currently the Head of Tech-
[14] B. Kusmierz and R. Overko, “How centralized is decentral- nology at Klaytn Foundation. Formerly the Group
ized? comparison of wealth distribution in coins and tokens,” in Blockchain Lead at De Beers Group, Neo has
2022 IEEE International Conference on Omni-layer Intelligent Systems also been the Director of Technology at Oxford
(COINS), pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2022. Blockchain Society and the Technical Advisor
[15] R. Fritsch, M. Müller, and R. Wattenhofer, “Analyzing voting for UCL-CBT and other organizations in the in-
power in decentralized governance: Who controls daos?,” arXiv dustry. Neo holds a Ph.D. in Engineering (in
preprint arXiv:2204.01176, 2022. view) from University of Cambridge and a MSc
[16] H. Huang, W. Kong, S. Zhou, Z. Zheng, and S. Guo, “A survey of in Computer Science from University of Oxford.
state-of-the-art on blockchains: Theories, modelings, and tools,”
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 1–42, 2021.