United States v. Will - 449 U.S. 200 (1980) - Justia US Supreme Court Center
United States v. Will - 449 U.S. 200 (1980) - Justia US Supreme Court Center
United States v. Will - 449 U.S. 200 (1980) - Justia US Supreme Court Center
200
(1980)
Syllabus
Case
No. 79-983
Syllabus
Held:
1. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, providing for appeals
to this Court from judgments holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil
action to which the United States is a party. And the District Court had jurisdiction over the
actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), which confers on district courts and the Court of
Claims concurrent jurisdiction over actions against the United States based on the
Constitution when the amount in controversy does not exceed $10,000, none of the
individual claims here having been alleged to have exceeded that amount. Pp. 449 U. S.
210-211.
2. Title 28 U.S.C. § 455 -- which requires a federal judge to disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned or where he has a
financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or is a party to the proceeding -- by
reason of the Rule of
Necessity does not operate to disqualify all federal judges, including the Justices of this
Court, from deciding the issues presented by these cases. Where, under the circumstances
of these cases, all Article III judges have an interest in the outcome, so that it was not
possible to assign a substitute district judge or for the Chief Justice to remit the appeal, as
he is authorized to do by statute, to a division of the Court of Appeals with judges who are
not subject to the disqualification provisions of § 455, the common law Rule of Necessity,
under which a judge, even though he has an interest in the case, has a duty to hear and
decide the case if it cannot otherwise be heard, prevails over the disqualification standards
of § 455. Far from promoting § 455's purpose of reaching disqualification of an individual
judge when there is another to whom the case may be assigned, failure to apply the Rule of
Necessity in these cases would have a contrary effect by denying some litigants their right
to a forum. And the public might be denied resolution of the crucial matter involved if first
the District Judge and now all the Justices of this Court were to ignore the mandate of the
Rule of Necessity and decline to answer the questions presented . Pp. 449 U. S. 211-217.
3. The statutes in question in Years 1 and 4, but not in Years 2 and 3, violated the
Compensation Clause. Pp. 449 U. S. 217-230.
Co pe sat o C ause. p. 449 U. S. 7 30.
(a) In each of the four years in question, Congress intended in effect to repeal or postpone
previously authorized salary increases for federal judges, not simply to consign such
increases to the fiscal limbo of an account due but not payable. Pp. 449 U. S. 221-224.
(b) Since the statute applying to Year 1 became law on the first day of the fiscal year, by
which time the salary increases already had taken effect, it purported to repeal a salary
increase already in force, and thus "diminished" the compensation of federal judges. That
the statute included in the salary "freeze" other federal officials who are not protected by
the Compensation Clause did not insulate a direct diminution in judges' salaries from the
clear mandate of that Clause. Pp. 449 U. S. 224-226.
(c) But the statutes applying to Years 2 and 3 became law before the scheduled salary
increases for federal judges had taken effect, i.e., before they had become a part of the
compensation due Article III judges, and hence in no sense diminished the compensation
such judges were receiving. Pp. 449 U. S. 226-229.
(d) Even though the statute applying to Year 4 referred only to "executive employees, which
includes Members of Congress," and did not expressly mention judges, it appears that
Congress intended to include Article III judges. Accordingly, where such statute, similarly
to the statute applying to Year 1, purported to revoke an increase in
judges' compensation after the statutes granting the increase had taken effect, it violated
the Compensation Clause. Pp. 449 U. S. 229-230.
No. 70-983, 478 F. Supp. 621, and No. 79-1689, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined,
except BLACKMUN, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases.
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