Asian Studies Review

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Moderate Muslims and Democratic Breakdown in

Indonesia

Jeremy Menchik

To cite this article: Jeremy Menchik (2019): Moderate Muslims and Democratic Breakdown in
Indonesia, Asian Studies Review, DOI: 10.1080/10357823.2019.1627286

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ASIAN STUDIES REVIEW
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2019.1627286

Moderate Muslims and Democratic Breakdown in Indonesia

Jeremy Menchik
Boston University

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
For much of the 2000s, scholars and activists lauded Indonesia’s Democracy;
surprisingly successful transition to democracy. Recent years, how- authoritarianism; Indonesia;
ever, have made imperfections visible to the point where the Islam; moderates
breakdown of Indonesian democracy is imaginable if not yet
under way. This article investigates the conditions under which
moderate Islamic organisations support non-democratic values
and actors, and by doing so contribute to Indonesia’s democratic
decline. Drawing on original survey data and interviews, as well as
case studies in which the preferences of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and
Muhammadiyah leaders have become visible, this article argues
that these organisations’ values are compatible with both democ-
racy and authoritarianism. While NU and Muhammadiyah exem-
plify the civic associational ties and democratic culture that are
necessary for making democracy work, civic pluralism is not their
only value. NU and Muhammadiyah have a hierarchy of values that
they promote and defend, and are willing to forgo civic pluralism
in order to combat blasphemy against Islam, ensure Muslim con-
trol over overwhelmingly Muslim regions, and limit political
expression concerning heterodox approaches to Islam or non-
Muslim involvement in matters of aqidah (faith). NU and
Muhammadiyah also operate within the country’s political patron-
age system, and their material interests can lead them away from
supporting democratic values.

Introduction
In the twenty years since Indonesia’s democratic transition and consolidation, scholars
have pointed to mass Islamic organisations as a crucial reason for the country’s relative
success. While other Muslim-majority democracies – including Egypt, Turkey, Senegal,
Pakistan and Nigeria – have backslid into authoritarianism, Indonesia has remained
a largely successful democracy, according to indicators from Polity as well as most
scholars (Liddle & Mujani, 2013; Künkler & Stepan, 2013). In comparison to its region,
too, Indonesia is a surprising success: Thailand and the Philippines have reverted to
authoritarianism, while durable authoritarianism reigns in Singapore, Vietnam,
Cambodia and Burma (Slater, 2010). Although facing major challenges with regard to
corruption, rule of law, sectarianism and economic inequality, Indonesia continues to
hold successful elections with alternations of power, and state policies are largely crafted
and implemented by broadly accountable elected representatives (Aspinall, 2015).

CONTACT Jeremy Menchik [email protected]

© 2019 Asian Studies Association of Australia
2 J. MENCHIK

Central to Indonesia’s democratic transition and relative success have been the giants
of Indonesian Islamic civil society: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. These
organisations run tens of thousands of schools, hundreds of universities, hospitals and
health clinics, and women’s wings, youth wings and other civil society organisations
that build strong associational ties (Bush, 2009; Hicks, 2012). Dedicated to promoting
Islam and improving the social welfare of society, these civil ties are what many scholars
point to as the reason why NU and Muhammadiyah have helped make Indonesian
“democracy work” (Hefner, 2000; Künkler & Stepan, 2013; Lussier, 2016; Lussier &
Fish, 2012; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993).
Yet, in recent years, imperfections in Indonesian democracy have become visible to
the point where the breakdown of democracy is imaginable, if not yet under way
(Warburton & Aspinall, 2017). While scholars have devoted considerable attention to
the role of moderate Muslims in supporting democracy, and the role of Islamic
extremists and autocrats in undermining it, less attention has been paid to the role
that moderates such as NU and Muhammadiyah have themselves played in under-
mining democracy (Schäfer, 2017). This gap deserves attention if scholars are to
understand the role of Islam in democracy. Normatively, too, this gap merits attention
in order to combat the backsliding of the country into authoritarianism. As a result, this
article investigates the following questions: which of NU and Muhammadiyah’s values
support democracy, and which values support authoritarianism? Under what political
conditions do these organisations support democrats, and under what conditions do
they support autocrats and Islamists?
Drawing on original survey data and interviews, as well as case studies that reveal the
preferences of NU and Muhammadiyah leaders, this article argues that their values are
compatible with both democracy and authoritarianism. This argument builds on Robert
Hefner’s canonical book, Civil Islam (2000), which presciently unearthed a pluralist
movement among Islamic intellectuals. This movement celebrated mutual respect,
individual autonomy and volunteerism, thereby providing the social infrastructure for
Indonesia’s democratic culture.
Yet, while NU and Muhammadiyah exemplify the civic associational ties and demo-
cratic culture that are necessary for making democracy work, civic pluralism is not their
only value. NU and Muhammadiyah have a hierarchy of values that they promote and
defend, and they are willing to forgo civic pluralism in order to oppose blasphemy
against Islam, ensure Muslim control over overwhelmingly Muslim regions, limit
political expression concerning heterodox approaches to Islam or non-Muslim involve-
ment in matters of aqidah (faith), and gain patronage. While NU and Muhammadiyah
are interested in the maintenance of an open democratic political system, they have
other priorities too, which means that under certain circumstances they do not defend
democratic institutions or values. Such a hierarchy of values is not exceptional; it is the
norm among political actors and a reoccurring component of democratic breakdown
(Linz, 1978, p. 4).
In that respect, NU and Muhammadiyah are “contingent democrats”, a term that Eva
Bellin (2000) coined to describe how capital and labour’s enthusiasm for democracy varies
with their dependence on the state and their position vis-à-vis the aristocracy. Where
capital and labour are independent from the state and socially ambivalent about the ruling
class, they support democratisation. Where capital and labour are dependent on the state
 ASIAN STUDIES REVIEW 3

and tied to the ruling class, they oppose democratisation. Likewise, when NU and
Muhammadiyah see the material and ideological interests of the Muslim community as
being served by democracy, they support it. But when their material and ideological
interests are better served by aligning with Islamists and autocrats, they do so.
The remainder of the article elaborates these points. The next section delves into the
scholarship on Indonesia in order to pinpoint the place of Islamic civil society in the
country’s democratic transition and consolidation. The following section makes the argu-
ment for NU and Muhammadiyah as “contingent democrats” who support Islamists and
autocrats under specified conditions. This is followed by three case studies over the past ten
years that have helped to reveal NU and Muhammadiyah’s diverse preferences, as well as
original interviews and survey data from NU and Muhammadiyah leaders. The case studies
demonstrate the contingency of NU and Muhammadiyah’s commitment to rule of law,
minority rights and government policies that reflect public preferences. The concluding
section elucidates the implications of that contingency for democratic decline and break-
down in Indonesia.

Civil Islam Revisited

Civil Islam (Hefner, 2000) has provided the foundation for discussions of Islam and
democracy in contemporary Indonesia. Drawing on decades of field research, Hefner
argued that Islamic civil society could provide the backbone for democracy to develop
and thrive in the Muslim world. At a time when scholars worried that Indonesia would
fall apart like Yugoslavia, and prominent scholars such as Samuel Huntington (1996)
were arguing that non-Protestant “civilisations” lacked the values necessary for democ-
racy, Hefner argued that Islamic civil society could enable the country to democratise:
For civil structures to become effective precedents for civil ideals, at least three additional
conditions must be met. First, native intellectuals have to look into their own social
experience and derive from it a model of political culture that affirms principles of
autonomy, mutual respect, and volunteerism. Second, and equally important, influential
actors and organizations must then work to generalize these democratic values and
organizations beyond their original confines to a broader public sphere. Third and last,
if these principles are to endure, they must be buttressed by an array of supporting
institutions, including those of the state (Hefner, 2000, pp. 35–36).

Hefner argued that these civic values helped provide the political culture necessary for
democratic political institutions to thrive in Indonesia as well as the broader Muslim
world. Hefner’s argument was grounded in normative arguments made by NU leader
Abdurrahman Wahid and Muslim activist Nurcholish Madjid, as well as in the demo-
cratic sensibilities of Muhammadiyah leaders Syafi’i Anwar and Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif.
Hefner’s argument is sometimes presented as saying that Indonesian Muslims are
essentially pluralist or that radical movements are absent in Indonesia. This is
a misreading of the book. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on radical organisations such as
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII; Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Council) and
anti-pluralist actors, including Mohammad Natsir, Anwar Harjono, Ahmad Sumargono
and Lukman Harun. Likewise, Civil Islam does not contend that NU and
Muhammadiyah are coterminous with civil Islam: the preface and Chapter 3 focus on
anti-pluralist behaviour in NU’s past, such as its involvement in the mass killings of
4 J. MENCHIK

1965–66. Nevertheless, NU and Muhammadiyah are certainly key players in the

normative Muslim politics Hefner cites as essential for Indonesian democracy’s con-
tinued success. Empirically, they satisfy Hefner’s first two conditions, and since the
early 2000s they have taken up the mantle of providing Indonesia’s masyarakat madani
(civil society). Their writings, advocacy, organising and political networking have
proven crucial to making Indonesian democracy work.1
As a result, other scholars have expanded upon Hefner’s theoretical framework.
The democratic theorist Alfred Stepan (2000) has demonstrated that all religious
traditions are “multi-vocal” and contain a diversity of beliefs and practices. Some
beliefs and practices bolster democracy, and some do not. Stepan demonstrated
empirically that hundreds of millions of Muslims living in democracies like India,
Indonesia, Senegal, Albania and Tunisia support democratic governance (Stepan &
Robertson, 2003). With Mirjam Künkler, he published an interview with the
former leader of Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais, about the reform movement that
overthrew Suharto and led to democratisation in Indonesia, inviting Rais to make
theologically grounded arguments for democracy in order to provide support to
other Islamic movements working to democratise their own countries (Stepan &
Künkler, 2007).
Looking beyond Indonesia, Norris and Inglehart (2011) have further countered
Huntington by demonstrating that support for democracy is just as high in the Muslim
world as in Christian-majority countries. Muslims are not exceptional in their views of
democracy, tolerance or the place of religion in modern life (Fish, 2011). More recently,
Menchik (2016) has demonstrated that NU and Muhammadiyah’s vision of tolerance is
compatible with democracy, but not necessarily the secular kind that some scholars take for
granted. He has also suggested that India, Switzerland, Romania, Hungary and Greece offer
better templates to understand Islamic civil society’s vision for a “soft separation” between
mosque and state (Menchik, 2018).
That said, there are still scholars who question Islam’s compatibility with democracy
on empirical and theoretical grounds (Fish, 2002; Hamid, 2016). Empirically, over the
past 15 years, a number of prominent Muslim-majority countries have lapsed into full
authoritarianism, stalled or backslid. And some scholars continue to stress Islam’s
“exceptionalism”, albeit on theoretically unconvincing grounds (Hamid, 2016). Recent
scholarship on NU and Muhammadiyah has also mapped their internal heterogeneity
(Brown, 2019), raising the question of under what conditions more conservative
clusters come to shape their policy.
This article suggests that the debate over whether or not Islam is compatible with
democracy has occluded other, more empirically grounded and less polemically
charged questions: which of NU and Muhammadiyah’s values support plural democ-
racy, and which support authoritarianism? Under what empirical conditions are
Islamic organisations likely to support democratic institutions, and under what
conditions do they support anti-democratic actors such as Islamists and authoritar-
ian strongmen? Democratic theorists have long recognised that democracy is
unlikely to be supported unconditionally by any social actor (Linz, 1978, p. 12).
The most pressing question, then, for empirical social scientists, is when and why
moderate Islamic organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah stop supporting
democracy.
 ASIAN STUDIES REVIEW 5

Argument: Indonesia’s Contingent Democrats

This section argues that the values of NU and Muhammadiyah are compatible with
democracy as well as with a specific type of authoritarianism. While NU and
Muhammadiyah exemplify the civic associational ties and democratic culture that
Hefner argues are necessary for making democracy work, civic pluralism is not their
only value. NU and Muhammadiyah have other values that they promote and defend,
and they are willing to forgo civic pluralism in order to defend against the blasphemy of
Islam and to protect Muslim leadership in overwhelmingly Muslim regions of the
country.
More specifically, the democratic values of NU and Muhammadiyah include opposi-
tion to a monolithic Islamic state, autonomy, communal tolerance and volunteerism.
These values enabled Indonesia’s democratic transition and consolidation. Survey
research suggests that Indonesian Muslims are neither unusually supportive of democ-
racy nor exceptionally tolerant, compared to Muslims elsewhere (Menchik & Trost,
2018). The country is exceptional, however, in that Indonesians – and hence Indonesian
Muslims – are unusually well organised (van Bruinessen, 2013). The leaders of those
organisations are more tolerant than their members and their co-religionists abroad
(Menchik & Trost, 2018). In that respect, NU and Muhammadiyah are important
contributors to the country’s relative stability and continued resilience against more
anti-democratic forces.
That said, not all leaders of NU and Muhammadiyah are equally committed to
Hefner’s principles of “autonomy, mutual respect and volunteerism”. Research on
the conservative forces within NU and Muhammadiyah is underdeveloped, but three
decades of behaviour suggests that the democratic commitments of leaders including
Ma’ruf Amin, Adian Husaini, Yunahar Ilyas, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Hasyim Muzadi,
Amien Rais and Din Syamsuddin are weak at best (Assyaukanie, 2009, pp. 185–188;
Burhani, 2013, pp. 124–125; Husaini, 2006; ICG, 2008). All have formal or informal
ties with conservative Muslim organisations or Islamists, such as Front Pembela
Islam (FPI; Islamic Defenders Front), DDII, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI;
Indonesian Council of Ulamas) and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB; Crescent Star
Party). And all have acted in anti-democratic ways. For example, despite Rais’ public
commitments to democratic pluralism (Künkler & Stepan, 2013), he also has a long
history of disrespect toward Christians. In the 1990s, Rais lambasted the spreading
influence of Christianity in Indonesia and called for jihad against Christians in the
country’s outer islands (Sidel, 2006, p. 183). In 2014, he campaigned for the strong-
man Prabowo Subianto on the grounds that Prabowo would combat an alleged
Jewish–Christian conspiracy against Indonesia (Persatuan Islam, 2014). And in
2016, Rais, alongside Amin and Syamsuddin, helped cripple the election campaign
of a Christian of Chinese ethnicity by falsely claiming that the candidate had
committed blasphemy against Islam.2 At times, Rais has supported democratic values
by making theologically grounded arguments for religious tolerance, egalitarianism
and modern political institutions instead of an Islamic Caliphate. At other times,
however, he has undercut democratic values by engaging in demagoguery and by
allying with Islamists and autocrats in order to win political power. This, too, is
Islamic civil society.
6 J. MENCHIK

To resolve this seeming paradox, it is important to recognise that NU and

Muhammadiyah hold values other than the principles of “autonomy, mutual respect and
volunteerism”. The non-democratic values of NU and Muhammadiyah include
a commitment to the defence of Islam, opposition to blasphemy, limitations on non-
Muslim control over overwhelmingly Muslim regions, and limitations on political speech
about substantive issues such as heterodox approaches to Islam or non-Muslims’ demon-
stration about matters of aqidah (faith) (Menchik, 2016, pp. 138–146). NU and
Muhammadiyah are opposed to having a non-Muslim political leader in regions that are
overwhelmingly Muslim (such as Banda Aceh and Jakarta) or as president. NU and
Muhammadiyah are opposed to the building of churches in overwhelmingly Muslim
areas, especially rural areas. They are vehemently opposed to the proselytising of
Muslims by non-Muslims. They are against non-Muslims teaching Islamic studies in
schools, whether public or private, and they are opposed to non-Muslims engaging in
protests on issues that are seen as germane only to Muslims, such as matters of Islamic law
and interfaith marriage. These are seen as issues of aqidah, and hence inappropriate for
non-Muslims to interfere in. Likewise, it is seen as inappropriate for Muslims to intrude in
the faith matters of Christians, such as by celebrating Christian holidays. As Syamsul Maarif
of the NU branch in Bangil, East Java, noted in an interview, “If we pray for humanity there
is no problem. But if we pray for akidah then we have problems. The same is true for tauhid
[oneness of God]” (interview, 29 July 2010).
The literature on patronage has tended to stand apart from the literature on civil
Islam. Yet, another mechanism by which Islamic civil society has contributed to
democratic decline is through interests, rather than values. NU and Muhammadiyah
operate within the same political patronage system as other actors, and material
concerns have long shaped their behaviour. This was especially apparent for NU in
the mid-1950s, when it broke ranks with the other Muslim parties in order to win more
cabinet seats and opportunities for its students to fill the ranks of the Religious Affairs
offices (Fealy, 1998, pp. 123–129). Today, NU’s strong backing for Amin, the architect
of mass intolerance toward Ahmadi Muslims as well as a key player in the downfall of
the Christian governor of Jakarta, has earned the organisation significant patronage
from Joko Widodo’s administration (Fealy, 2018). NU has gained this patronage at
a significant cost to minority Christians, Ahmadis and Shiites, who have fared poorly
under Amin’s rise to power. As in the 1950s, NU’s material interests have led it away
from supporting democratic values.
The fact that NU and Muhammadiyah hold non-democratic values and interests is not
inherently problematic for Indonesian democracy. In any free society, portions of the public
inevitably hold views that run counter to democratic ideals. Yet, if institutionalised, these
values may truncate the criteria laid out by Robert Dahl, Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz for
political institutions to be considered democratic: freedom to form and to join organisations;
freedom of expression; the right to vote; eligibility for public office; the right of political
leaders to compete for support and votes; alternative sources of information; free and fair
elections; institutions for making government policies depend on voting and other expres-
sions of preference; a democratic constitution that respects fundamental liberties and offers
considerable protections for minority rights; and a democratically elected government that
rules within the confines of the constitution and is bound by law and a complex set of vertical
and horizontal institutions that help to ensure accountability (Dahl, 1971, pp. 1–3; Linz, 1978,
 ASIAN STUDIES REVIEW 7

p. 5; Stepan, 2000, pp. 38–39). For example, NU and Muhammadiyah’s desire to defend Islam
against blasphemy has led them to back restrictions on free expression. Their overt support
for truncating the rights of unrecognised groups, and their implicit opposition to the rights of
non-Muslim political leaders to compete for support, likewise violate these criteria. In the
following sections I pay closest attention to other aspects of the values of NU and
Muhammadiyah that lead them to back anti-democratic actors and policies.
The alliance between NU, Muhammadiyah and anti-democratic actors could lead to
further democratic breakdown. If NU and Muhammadiyah compromise other demo-
cratic values, then we are likely to see a further democratic decline. If the state crosses
red lines by putting in place policies that are against Islamic civil society’s material and
ideological interests, then we are likely to see NU and Muhammadiyah not just criticise
the state, which they should and often do, but further support autocrats and Islamists
who implement increasingly anti-democratic policies. In that respect, Indonesia’s mod-
erate Muslims are akin to white American evangelical Christian supporters of Donald
Trump, who care so much about abortion and the Supreme Court that they back
a populist demagogue (Beckman, 2016).

Case Studies
The three case studies in this section, drawing on original interviews, survey data and
newspaper reports, provide empirical evidence to support the argument that NU and
Muhammadiyah align with anti-democratic actors under certain conditions. The first
case study dates from the early 2000s, when Islamist vigilante groups began attacking
a small, socially marginal Islamic sect known as Ahmadiyah. Some Ahmadiyah
followers believe that their sect’s founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was a prophet,
a belief that differs from the beliefs of many Sunni Muslims, including the leaders of
NU and Muhammadiyah.3 Despite their opposition to the violence, NU and
Muhammadiyah aligned with Islamists in calling for restrictions on minority rights to
prohibit the Ahmadis from proselytising or otherwise spreading their views. The second
case study continues the focus on Ahmadiyah by showing how, at a constitutional court
hearing in 2010, leaders of NU and Muhammadiyah again allied with Islamists in
support of maintaining the country’s law against penodaan agama (defamation of
religion), further truncating freedom of expression. Finally, the third case study focuses
on the contentious 2016 Jakarta gubernatorial race, which saw NU and Muhammadiyah
choosing to oppose blasphemy against Islam over supporting the Christian governor, at
the expense of rule of law and minority rights. And since 2016, NU has continued to
back Amin in order to gain patronage. In sum, each case study demonstrates the
conditions under which moderate Muslims align with anti-democratic actors due to
shared values or interests.

Case 1: Persecution of Ahmadiyah

Since the early 2000s, Islamist vigilante groups have been verbally and physically
attacking members of a small, socially marginal Muslim sect called Ahmadiyah. Two
Ahmadiyah mosques in Manis Lor, Kuningan (West Java), were attacked on
23 December 2002 (Alfitri, 2008, p. 3, n. 15, n. 23), following the decision of the local
8 J. MENCHIK

government of Kuningan on 3 November to prohibit the activities of Ahmadiyah

(Crouch, 2010, p. 11). Attacks followed across the archipelago, including in East
Lombok, Tasikmalaya, Sintang, Wajo, Ciaruteun, Cianjur, Ranowila, Sadasari and
Sebanga. Public critiques of Ahmadiyah came to a head on 29 July 2005, when MUI,
Indonesia’s foremost state-sponsored Muslim body, issued a fatwa (edict) declaring the
Ahmadiyah to be sesat (having deviated from core Islamic doctrine). The fatwa against
Ahmadiyah was a success for Indonesia’s small but vocal radical groups, notably the FPI
and Amin Jamaluddin’s Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (LPPI; Institute for
the Study and Research of Islam), and offered a boost to their campaign against
apostasy. Violence followed the fatwa. Ahmadiyah mosques were burned down across
Indonesia, and Ahmadiyah followers were driven from their homes by mobs.
The government made an effort to stop the violence while also stopping short of
criticising MUI. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued a series of ambiguous
statements about the need for both Ahmadis and the militants to adhere to the
Indonesian constitution, but did not state that Ahmadis have freedom of expression and
the right to form organisations or that they otherwise merit protection. Likewise,
Indonesia’s Attorney General, Hendarman Supandji, called for the violence to stop, but
meanwhile called for Ahmadis to stop all religious activities or face legal prosecution
(Jakarta Post, 2008).
When the attacks began, many scholars and activists expected NU and Muhammadiyah
to step in and defend the Ahmadis, just as they would Christians, Hindus, Buddhists or
Confucianists. Instead, NU and Muhammadiyah supported the government’s decision to
use the blasphemy law to prohibit the Ahmadis from proselytising or otherwise spreading
their beliefs. The elected chair of NU, Hasyim Muzadi, came out against the violence but
condemned Ahmadiyah as deviant. Like Yudhoyono, he said that both Ahmadiyah and the
FPI were guilty of breaking the law (Nahdlatul Ulama, 2008a). And at a plenary session of
the NU executive board’s Syuriah (Islamic law) council, NU issued a statement confirming
Ahmadiyah’s deviance from Islam, and called on the government to be firm with both
Ahmadiyah and the perpetrators of violence (Nahdlatul Ulama, 2008bb). Nasaruddin
Umar, a member of NU’s executive board and one of Indonesia’s most renowned propo-
nents of pluralism, led the government’s investigation of the beliefs of Ahmadiyah.
The chair of Muhammadiyah backed the government on slightly different grounds.
Din Syamsuddin made a distinction between the Ahmadiyah Qadiani and the
Ahmadiyah Lahore, and said the former should return to proper Islamic belief or
declare themselves to be a new religion. They did not have the right to form and join
organisations and were not entitled to the same protection as other minorities. They
could not be permitted to continue practising their faith. Syamsuddin upheld the
government’s right to ban Ahmadiyah and encouraged the state to dissolve the
Qadiani branch (Detiknews, 2005).
In sum, NU and Muhammadiyah did not want the Ahmadis imprisoned or killed,
but, like the FPI, they supported forced reeducation of the Ahmadis into proper belief
and severe limitations on Ahmadi organisations. This demonstrates that NU and
Muhammadiyah did not feel that Ahmadis merit the same protection as members of
religions recognised by the Indonesian state, and were willing to ally with the FPI in
order to ensure that policing of heterodoxy is a state mandate.
 ASIAN STUDIES REVIEW 9

The issue of Ahmadiyah broke onto the national scene again a few years later. In
response to the violence in Kuningan in 2003, a group of liberal political activists began
researching victims of religious violence and the laws that were being used to persecute
religious minorities, and gathering material to petition the constitutional court to strike
down those laws. The liberals’ campaign gained steam, paradoxically, due to a violent
attack on the Aliansi Kebangsaan Untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan
(AKKBB; National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief), a network of repre-
sentatives from more than seventy Indonesian organisations including Abshar Abdalla’s
Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL; Liberal Islamic Network), the Wahid Institute, Persekutuan
Gereja-Gereja Indonesia (PGI; Indonesian Communion of Churches), Jemaah
Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI; Ahmadiyah Indonesia Congregation) and others. On
10 May 2008, the AKKBB published a full-page advertisement in multiple Jakarta
newspapers calling for a return to the values of the constitution and the Pancasila,
including respect for Ahmadiyah. The Pancasila is the basis of Indonesian national
ideology. Its five principles are belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity, social
justice and democracy as expressed through representatives of the people. The signa-
tories included prominent religious and political leaders. Then, on 1 June 2008, AKKBB
held a rally in central Jakarta to mark the 63rd anniversary of the Pancasila and again
call for the protection of religious minorities.
Instead of celebrating pluralism, however, the attendees were attacked with clubs and
sticks by 400 members of hardline groups including the FPI, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia
(HTI; Party of Liberation, Indonesia), Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (FUI; Islamic
Community Forum) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI; Indonesian Mujahidin
Council). Upwards of 70 of the AKKBB demonstrators were injured, with some
requiring surgery (Crouch, 2010, p. 13). A spokesperson for HTI claimed the group
was neither directly nor indirectly involved in the attack on the AKKBB (Yusanto,
2010). The International Crisis Group, like Crouch, suggested otherwise (ICG, 2008).
Until that point, most of the violence toward Ahmadiyah was in Indonesia’s geo-
graphic and political periphery. It came as no surprise that eight days after the violence
in Jakarta, the Minister of Religion, the Attorney General and the Minister of Home
Affairs attempted to resolve the issue of Ahmadiyah with a surat keputusan bersama
(SKB; joint ministerial decree). The SKB warned citizens not to support groups whose
activities deviate from the teachings of an official religion; warned followers of
Ahmadiyah not to promote deviant teachings; informed followers of Ahmadiyah who
did not comply with the warning that they would be liable to penalties; and warned the
public not to resort to vigilantism (Crouch, 2010, p. 5).
Once again, NU and Muhammadiyah supported restrictions on the rights and liberties
of Ahmadiyah. Muhammadiyah chair Din Syamsuddin said that Ahmadiyah’s views could
not be tolerated because they pertained to aqidah. Similarly, NU’s Rais Aam Habib Luthfi
bin Ali bin Yahya said that Ahmadiyah followers should be invited to follow true Islam.
In doing so, they reflected the views of an overwhelming majority of their leaders.
Table 1 presents survey data from a representative sample of NU and Muhammadiyah
leaders at the branch (cabang) level across Indonesia. The data was collected in 2010 at
the national meetings of the organisations. Table 1 demonstrates that most NU and
Muhammadiyah leaders are not willing to allow Ahmadiyah members the same rights
as Christian minorities on the issues of constructing new buildings, holding political
10 J. MENCHIK

Table 1. NU and Muhammadiyah Elites’ Opposition to Ahmadiyah

Survey Question Christians Ahmadiyah
New Christian churches/Ahmadiyah buildings should be prohibited in Jakarta 46% (967) 74% (973)
Christians/Ahmadis should be prohibited from being mayor [governor] in Jakarta 48% (970) 67% (971)
Christians/Ahmadis should be prohibited from teaching math at pesantren 31% (986) 48% (981)
Note: Differences between groups are significant at p <0.01 using a two-sample test of proportions.
Percentage refers to respondents who agree or strongly agree. Sample size is in parentheses.

office and teaching in pesantren (Islamic boarding schools). In sum, while NU and
Muhammadiyah oppose the Islamists’ use of violence, they share a belief that deviance
from Islam is a problem that the state should solve. Unlike blasphemy laws on the
books in democracies such as Ireland and Greece, which are not enforced, NU and
Muhammadiyah want Indonesia’s blasphemy laws enforced to combat religious hetero-
doxy. Their vision for pluralism and their commitment to democratic values do not
extend to heterodox Muslims, and they are willing to ally with increasingly influential
anti-democratic actors, such as MUI and Islamists, in order to shape policies on the
issue of defamation of Islam and truncate the influence of what they see as a deviant
movement (Hicks, 2014; Iskandar, 2016; Rethel, 2017; Schäfer, 2015).

Case 2: Blasphemy trial

In 2009, the liberals’ petition against the 1965 blasphemy law that was used to restrict
Ahmadiyah reached the constitutional court. Muhammadiyah supported maintaining
the blasphemy law to truncate the freedom of expression of some minorities: “Islam
teaches mutual respect and freedom to practise, but not by mixing religions and not by
insulting the religious beliefs of others” (Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia,
2009). Abdul Mu’ti, currently Muhammadiyah’s Secretary General Umum, has written
a book with the title KrisMuha, an abbreviation of “Christian Muhammadiyah”, that
describes the curriculum of Muhammadiyah schools in areas where the local population
and the students at Muhammadiyah schools are overwhelmingly Christian or Buddhist.
Teachers of any faith can provide instruction in secular subjects to students of any
religion, while the doctrines of each specific religion are taught by a member of that
religion (Mu’ti & ul Haq, 2009). In a 2009 interview, former Muhammadiyah chair
Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif touted Mu’ti’s research as an example of the group’s tolerance,
while also making it clear that there would never be a book titled “AhMuha” or
“Ahmadiyah Muhammadiyah” (interview, 30 September 2009).
Muhammadiyah’s first testimony in the court case, by Dr. Saleh Partaonan Daulay,
certified that the central board supported maintaining the blasphemy law, with a clear
reference to its support for the ban on Ahmadiyah:
Muhammadiyah believes that freedom of religion or religious freedom is not freedom
without limits. . . Muhammadiyah’s view is that desecration of religion is done where there
are interpretations and religious practices deviating from the points of religious doctrine
believed by all religious people involved, or at least by a majority of the people of the
religion. For example, the entire Islamic Ummah believes that the Prophet Muhammad is
the final prophet; therefore, if there is someone or some group of persons claiming to be
prophets after the Prophet Muhammad then it is a form of desecration and sacrilege
(Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, 2009).
 ASIAN STUDIES REVIEW 11

Abdul Mu’ti testified that Islam and Muhammadiyah have long recognised and cele-
brated religious diversity. He then read the “Guide to an Islamic Life for Members of
Muhammadiyah”, issued by the Central Executive Board of Muhammadiyah in
Yogyakarta on 5 February 2001, and signed by the chairman Prof. Dr. H. Ahmad
Syafi’i Maarif and Secretary Dr. H. Khaidar Nasir, M.Sc., in order to demonstrate
Muhammadiyah’s tolerance.
NU took a similar position, with the chair Hasyim Muzadi saying, “We have to be able to
differentiate between democracy and moral deviation” (cited in Christanto, 2010). Outside
the courtroom, Muzadi has been a vocal critic of the vigilante group FPI, and has refused its
repeated requests to engage in dialogue; but inside the courtroom, FPI and NU were on the
same side.
In court hearings, Syafi’i Maarif and the late Abdurrahman Wahid supported the
petitioners, while the leaders of Muhammadiyah and NU, and thus the formal policy of
the institutions, favoured retaining the 1965 blasphemy law. Would their policy have
changed if Wahid or one of the new generation of NU leaders such as Masdar Mas’udi
was leading NU instead of Hasyim Muzadi? I posed this question to the lawyer for NU
and a close friend of Mas’udi, Arsul Sani.

Interviewer: What would change in NU’s policy regarding the blasphemy law if Masdar
became Ketua Umum [chair] of PBNU?

Sani: Nothing.

Interviewer: But he has been more supportive of tolerance to the Ahmadiyah [than Hasyim
Muzadi], right?

Sani: Yes, of course. But he would be surrounded by other people whose opinions need to
be considered (interview, 17 March 2010).

Even though Assyaukanie, Mas’udi, Maarif, Wahid, Mulia and Abshar Abdalla sup-
ported revoking the blasphemy law, the bulk of opinion in NU and Muhammadiyah
was against them. The majority of NU and Muhammadiyah leaders favoured restric-
tions on freedom of expression in order to combat heterodox interpretations of Islam.
After administering the survey mentioned above, I frequently chatted informally
with respondents. In conversation, Muhammadiyah leaders would often differentiate
between Christians and Ahmadis in a way that illustrates how they tend to disavow
intolerance while still marginalising Ahmadiyah: “We respect Christians because they
pray to God. But Ahmadiyah are incorrect in their belief and they damage religion”. By
emphasising their tolerance, they place the onus on the Ahmadis for their own exclu-
sion for breaking Islam (conceived of as an institution) and undermining the state’s
structure of support for Islam (interviews, Yogyakarta, 5–8 July 2010).
By the end of the trial the outcome was certain: the justices, NU, Muhammadiyah
and the overwhelming majority of witnesses and experts came out in support of the
status quo. In private conversation, Sani expressed frustration with the government for
presenting a wide array of hardline groups rather than engaging with the moderate NU
and Muhammadiyah. But like Muzadi, he took the official position of PBNU in the
courtroom. Rather than view the law as an inappropriate intervention of the state in
12 J. MENCHIK

private religious matters, or an abrogation of the state’s duty to protect free expression,
a consensus emerged that the state should prioritise the prevention of blasphemy.
This section has demonstrated that there are aspects of the values of NU and
Muhammadiyah that align with those of the Islamists. While not solely responsible
for democratic breakdown in Indonesia, this overlap means that NU and
Muhammadiyah are willing to partner with non-democratic actors in order to advance
their values on the issues of freedom of expression, blasphemy and minority rights. NU
and Muhammadiyah do not feel that heterodox Muslims or non-Muslims should be
permitted to engage in public speech about topics that are germane to orthodox
Muslims’ faith or belief. Table 2 shows that an overwhelming majority of their leaders
oppose Christians undertaking demonstrations in Monas (Jakarta) against the Shari’a
bylaws in Aceh or in favour of interfaith marriage. They are less opposed to Christians
demonstrating about secular issues such as the price of gasoline. But given their views
on the limits of freedom of expression, it should not come as a surprise that NU and
Muhammadiyah aligned with Islamists to keep the state’s blasphemy law in place.
Indeed, when those issues become highly salient, we can expect them to ally with
Islamists to the detriment of democratic institutions. The result is the further strength-
ening of conservative actors such as MUI and of limitations on minorities.

Case 3: Persecution of Ahok

On 19 November 2014, Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama was inaugurated as governor
of Jakarta, after Joko Widodo resigned in early October in order to become president of
Indonesia. Ahok had been elected Widodo’s vice governor in 2014. As governor, he was
the first Chinese–Indonesian to hold that office in the country’s history, and only
the second Christian governor, following Henk Ngantung, who held the office from
1964 to 1965. He proved a popular governor, whose berating of corrupt bureaucrats
earned him praise from the populace as well as consistently high levels of satisfaction in
public opinion surveys, and he ran for re-election in 2017.
On 30 September 2016, Ahok was on the campaign trail in Pulau Seribu giving
a speech to civil servants. He stated that those who cited the Quran verse Q4:144,
known as Surat Al-Maidah 51, to support their view that Christians should not hold
high office, were being deceitful. An edited video of his speech, which made it appear as
though Ahok was criticising those who followed the Quran, was posted online. The
video went viral. The NU and MUI cleric Ma’ruf Amin issued a statement calling for
the government to combat blasphemy and the defamation of Islam, and for law
enforcement to arrest Ahok (Detiknews, 2016). Islamist vigilante groups seized on the

Table 2. NU and Muhammadiyah Elites’ Opposition to Non-Muslim Speech about Islam

Survey Question Agree or Strongly Agree
Christians should be prohibited from . . .
. . . demonstrating in Monas (Jakarta) against the Shari’a bylaws in Aceh. 68% (977)
. . . demonstrating in Monas in favour of interfaith marriage. 60% (978)
. . . demonstrating in Monas. 22% (974)
. . . demonstrating in Monas about the price of gasoline. 13% (976)
Note: Differences between issues are significant at p <0.01 using a two-sample test of proportions.
Sample size is in parentheses.
 ASIAN STUDIES REVIEW 13

moment to rally against the Christian governor and in support of Ahok’s opponents in
the 19 April election. One of Ahok’s opponents, Anies Baswedan, who once had
a reputation as a moderate, saw the benefits of demagoguery and publicly allied with
the FPI (Topsfield, 2017). The FPI pressured the police, then the North Jakarta District
Court, to charge Ahok with blasphemy, and called on the public to rally against the
Christian governor.
The rallies were some of the largest in Indonesian history. The 4 November 2016
rally in Monas attracted an estimated 200,000 people and was led by the hardline FPI,
and supported by HTI and the conservative MUI. It drew participants from the Islamic
recitation groups Majelis Rosulullah (Council of the Prophet) and Majelis Dzikir
Nurussalam (Nurussalam House for Dzikir) (Mudhoffir, 2016). The second rally, on
2 December 2016, was attended by upwards of 750,000 people. Organised by a coalition
of hardline groups called the National Movement to Safeguard the Indonesian Ulema
Council’s Fatwa, the rally was a show of force by Islamists. While not all of the
attendees wanted the state to be governed by Islamic law, or to restrict minority rights,
they clearly wanted Ahok punished for blasphemy against Islam (Fealy, 2016).
Not surprisingly, the election results were overwhelmingly in favour of Baswedan,
who won by polarising Jakarta along ethnic and religious lines. Non-Muslims over-
whelmingly voted for Ahok, while between 65 and 70 per cent of Muslims voted for
Baswedan (Warburton & Gammon, 2017). Ahok was brought up and convicted on
blasphemy charges despite the recognised fact that the video had been edited in
a misleading way. Rather than following the rule of law, the judges bowed to public
pressure from MUI, Islamists and demonstrators.
As in the other two cases, NU and Muhammadiyah prioritised defence of Islam,
alongside Muslim leadership in Jakarta, over adherence to rule of law or minority
rights. An overwhelming majority of NU and Muhammadiyah leaders do not believe
that a Christian should be allowed to be the mayor in a majority Muslim area such as
Banda Aceh or to be the president of Indonesia. 48 per cent of leaders oppose
a Christian being allowed to be the governor of Jakarta. Table 3 demonstrates that
they support Christians holding elected office, but only in areas that are predominantly
Christian, such as Manado, or in an unspecified office and region. Other surveys of the
elites and mass membership of NU and Muhammadiyah (Bush, 2014), as well as
surveys of broader Muslim public opinion (Mujani, 2003), suggest that the leaders of
these organisations are more tolerant than either the membership or the Muslim public

Table 3. NU and Muhammadiyah Elites’ Opposition to Christian Elected Officials

Survey Question Agree or Strongly Agree
Christians should be prohibited from . . .
. . . becoming the mayor in Banda Aceh. 77% (971)
. . . becoming the president in Indonesia. 68% (971)
. . . becoming the mayor [governor] in Jakarta. 48% (970)
. . . becoming the mayor in Manado, North Sulawesi. 17% (972)
. . . holding government office. 11% (974)
Note: Differences between regions are significant at p <0.01 using a two-sample test of proportions.
Sample size is in parentheses.
14 J. MENCHIK

at large. Yet even they do not support a Christian becoming governor of Jakarta, which
shows that Ahok always faced an uphill battle.
The leader of NU, Said Aqil, invited Ahok to some events but also criticised him for
his comments about the Quran and his critiques of Amin, the NU and MUI cleric who
accused Ahok of blasphemy. NU did not mobilise in favour of Ahok, and it is not clear
that it could have. Most NU leaders dislike Islamists but not enough to rally support for
a Christian governor. Muhammadiyah was similar: chair Haedar Nashir condemned the
anti-Ahok rallies and urged Muhammadiyah members not to join them. But Amien
Rais was very vocal in condemning the allegedly blasphemous act committed by Ahok
and was featured prominently as a speaker in the rallies. Din Syamsuddin condemned
Ahok’s action and said he would lead a “resistance” movement should Ahok not be
brought to justice.
NU’s behaviour since the Ahok case has further affirmed the strength of the organisa-
tion’s non-democratic values. Amin is a prominent NU cleric, and it was always unlikely
that NU would publicly break with Amin in favour of Ahok. Since 2017, moreover, Widodo
has actively cultivated Amin and channelled state resources to NU in order to guarantee the
organisation’s support in the April 2019 presidential election (Fealy, 2018). Amin’s ability
to deliver patronage to NU has proven more important to the organisation’s leadership
than supporting mutual respect. Patronage politics are not new to NU: scholars in the 1950s
and 1960s frequently explained NU’s political behaviour on the basis of crass opportunism
(Lev, 1966, p. 125, p. 272, pp. 280–281; Samson, 1968, p. 1003). Today, both material and
ideological interests appear to be driving NU toward support for Amin, and away from
supporting democracy.
This most recent case again demonstrates that many leaders of NU and Muhammadiyah
are contingent democrats who hold non-democratic values in addition to democratic ones.
From the standpoint of empirical democratic theory, such a hierarchy of values is unsur-
prising, albeit worrisome given the implications for democratic breakdown.

How Indonesian Democracy Dies

While the literature on civil Islam demonstrates that NU and Muhammadiyah sup-
ported Indonesia’s democratic transition and consolidation, this article has demon-
strated that they are also willing to ally with anti-democratic Islamists and autocrats on
certain issues. Specifically, they ally with anti-democratic actors in order to combat
blasphemy against Islam, non-Muslim speech on matters pertaining to Islamic faith,
and non-Muslim political control over majority-Muslim regions of Indonesia. Other
“red-line” issues include the building of churches in overwhelmingly Muslim areas,
non-Muslims teaching Islamic studies in schools, whether public or private, and
proselytising of Muslims by non-Muslims.
This finding has three important implications. First, this article has demonstrated
that while NU and Muhammadiyah are opposed to the creation of an Islamic state,
many of their leaders and members support politicians such as the demagogue Anies
Baswedan and the military strongman Prabowo Subianto when the alternative means
sanctioning policies to which they are viscerally opposed. They also support conserva-
tives from within their own ranks, such as Amin, when their material interests are
served. The result has been a strengthening of anti-democratic actors, and a weakening
 ASIAN STUDIES REVIEW 15

of the quality of Indonesian democracy: court decisions are often swayed by public
opinion rather than the rule of law, minority rights are too frequently dependent on
majority support rather than citizenship, and unelected actors such as MUI have
become more powerful than elected officials (Crouch, 2016). At these moments,
Indonesia resembles authoritarian Pakistan or Malaysia rather than a consolidated
democracy.
Second, this article provides an alternative narrative to the most common interpreta-
tion of the Ahok case. The common view is that the defeat and imprisonment of Ahok
boded ill for Indonesian democracy. Pundits argue that it is an omen of increased
minority oppression, the rising power of Islamists ahead of the 2019 presidential
election, and a judiciary swayed by the emotions of the mob rather than the letter of
the law (Kurniawan, 2017).
This article suggests that such a view is overly positive in its assessment of
Indonesian democracy prior to the Ahok case, overstating the religious and political
freedom of Christians and other minorities before Ahok. There are implicit and explicit
red lines in Indonesia that minorities know not to cross: publicly criticising Islam,
interfaith proselytising, and supporting Christian leaders in Muslim-majority areas.
These are areas where society and the state are structurally oppressive toward mino-
rities. In that respect, Indonesia is a lot like the US, where African–Americans make up
13 per cent of the overall population but 40 per cent of the incarcerated population.
African–American males are six times more likely to be incarcerated than white males.
Racial minorities are more likely than white Americans to be arrested; once arrested,
they are more likely to be convicted; once convicted, they are more likely to face stiff
sentences (NAACP, 2017). In other words, the US criminal justice system is structurally
oppressive toward racial minorities. It is a feature of the American system in the same
way that the Indonesian state is oppressive of religious minorities.
The third implication is less theoretical and more akin to a normative proposition.
Although this article provides a warning about the limits of NU’s and Muhammadiyah’s
commitment to democracy, their values could be articulated with greater emphasis on
social welfare, education, anti-corruption, national sovereignty and pluralism, to name
a few. If these issues were more central to public deliberation, then we might see less
Islamist mobilisation and a return to the era when civil Islam set the terms for debate in
Indonesia (van Bruinessen, 2013). Linz notes that extremist appeals can be marginalised
if leaders committed to democracy actively oppose anti-democratic actors (Linz, 1978,
p. 12). A coalition of moderates such as Joko Widodo, former president Susilo
Bambang Yudhyono, NU leaders such as Masdar Farid Mas’udi and Ahmad Mustofa
“Gus Mus” Bisri, and Muhammadiyah leaders such as Abdul Mu`ti and Haedar Nashir,
working alongside minority groups and mainstream political parties, could truncate the
appeal of autocrats and advance democratic reforms.
How might such a coalition emerge? It is difficult to imagine democratic deepening
at a time of rampant patrimonialism, and when demagogues such as Subianto,
Baswedan and Amin dominate politics. Here again, Bellin’s work is instructive (2000,
p. 205). As political and economic conditions change, moderate Muslims may shift their
alliances. The biggest menace to moderate Muslims is not blasphemy; it is the country’s
astonishing levels of corruption and the weak social-welfare institutions that hamper
socioeconomic development. Politicians who pledge to fight corruption, improve public
16 J. MENCHIK

infrastructure and develop schools and healthcare are likely to find support from
moderate Muslims. NU and Muhammadiyah activists can themselves increase the
ability of their organisations to back democratic reforms by strengthening policies
mandating that members who run for political office resign their institutional positions.
Greater distance from party politics would make the organisations less dependent on
patronage and its polluting effects. After all, their contingency presents the possibility
for democratic development, as well as democratic breakdown.

Notes
1. The prominent pluralist intellectuals from NU and Muhammadiyah are too numerous to
list exhaustively here, but among the most influential since democratisation have been Ulil
Abshar Abdalla, Tutty Alawiyah, Luthfi Assyaukanie, Azyumardi Azra, Achmad Mustofa
Bisri, Arief Budiman, Sandra Hamid, Syafi’i Maarif, Sahal Mahfudz, Masdar Mas’udi,
Husein Muhammad, Abdul Mu`ti, Siti Musdah Mulia, Haedar Nasir, Lies Marcoes
Natsir, Quraish Shihab, Said Aqil Siradj, Maria Ulfah, Nasaruddin Umar, Abdurrahman
Wahid and Habib Luthfi Yahya.
2. Ahok’s conviction was based on comments he made on the campaign trail, when he said
that those who cited a Quranic verse to support their view that Christians should not hold
high office were being duplicitous. An edited video of his speech posted online was made
to appear as though Ahok was criticising those who follow the Quran. The video went
viral. Islamist groups seized on the moment to rally against the governor and in support of
Ahok’s opponents in the 19 April election. Their movement propelled Ahok’s opponent,
Anies Baswedan, into the governor’s mansion. And they propelled Ahok into prison.
3. The two major sects of Ahmadiyah, Qadiani and Lahore, differ on the question of the
finality of the prophethood of Muhammad. This article focuses exclusively on the Qadiani
since they have been the subject of controversy in Indonesia. “Ahmadiyah” thus refers to
the Qadiani.

Acknowledgments
I am grateful for thoughtful feedback from Donald Emmerson, Robert Hefner and Kaija Schilde.
I am especially thankful to Gustav Brown and Amelia Fauzia for organising this special issue, and
to the editor David Hundt and the two anonymous reviewers for outstanding advice on how to
improve the manuscript. This article is dedicated to the memory of Alfred Stepan.

ORCID
Jeremy Menchik http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5331-073X

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