Credit Management Strategies and Loan Performance of Selected Deposit Money Banks in Ogun State, Nigeria
Credit Management Strategies and Loan Performance of Selected Deposit Money Banks in Ogun State, Nigeria
Credit Management Strategies and Loan Performance of Selected Deposit Money Banks in Ogun State, Nigeria
ISSN No:-2456-2165
Abstract:- The banking industry is important as it Banks mobilize deposits to extend to book risk assets
contributes to the financial performance of numerous in form of credit facilities with the aim of collecting back
sectors of the economy. Banks provide deposit services, such loans with interests that form the bulk of their revenue.
advisory as well as loan facilities. The exchange rate is However, when such loans given out by the banks are not
currently rising and this in turn affects banks’ interest paid at the required time or not paid at all, they become non-
rates and adversely reduces the purchasing power of performing loans (NPL) or bad loans. Credit management
citizens. The objective of this study was to examine the analyzes the pace at which the loans are funded and the risk
effect of credit management on the loan performance of or cost of default to enable administrative decision be made.
selected deposit money banks in Ogun State, Nigeria. A credit facility is deemed non-performing when; interest or
This study adopted cross-sectional survey research principal is past due for more than 90 days; or interest past
design. The examined independent variable is credit due for 91 days or more have been capitalised, rescheduled
management, measured by credit terms and conditions, or rolled over into a new loan; or off balance sheet
credit collection policy, credit policy, credit control, obligations crystallise (CBN 2019).According to Computer
credit appraisal/documentation, and credit monitoring and Enterprise Investigations Conference (CEIC), Nigerian
while the dependent variable is loan performance, non-Performing loans (NPL) stood at 11.4% as against
measured by timely loan repayment rates, number of 6.01% at the end of the fourth quarter in 2020. However,
loans closed by customer and number of loans extended. this is still 20% above the regulatory limits of 5% set by the
Primary data for the variableswere sourced from country’s apex bank.
questionnaires and analysis was run with SPSS (IBM
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). The findings Kure, Adigun and Okedigba (2017) revealed that
of the study revealed that there was a significant effect of credit expansion, inflation, and lending rates were the main
credit management on loan performance of selected NPL causing factors. They suggested that improvements in
DMBs in Ogun, Nigeria excluding the moderating the production environment may be able to slow the increase
variables. The results of the study further revealed that of NPLs, given the evidence of a negative inverse
credit management negatively affected loan relationship between economic growth and NPLs. They also
performance, inclusive of moderating variables in submitted that, decline in credit and bank assets, increase in
Nigeria. The study concluded that credit management risk taking by banks and reduction in economic growth
have a positive relationship on the loan performance of affect the going concern of banks.Abubakar, Suleiman,
selected DMBs in Ogun, Nigeria. It was recommended Usman and Mijinyawa (2018) opined that credit risk is a
that the CBN ensure the adequate monitoring of major risk that impends the going concern of banks and
borrowers on a database. The study also recommended other financial institutions that engage in disbursing loans.
that public and private stakeholders should ensure the Kalui and Kiawa (2015) agreed that if credit risk
properly utilization and repay their loan facilities. management is weak it would pose a key reason of several
corporate disasters. Credit management incorporates the
Keywords:- Credit Management, Loan Performance, systems, procedures, and controls which banks enforce for
Nigeria, Deposit Money Banks. the collection of loans effectively and efficiently and thus
minimizes the menace of non-performing loans. Credit risk
I. INTRODUCTION exposes banks through direct lending and duties to issue
credit facilities, letters of guarantee, letters of credit,
Banks have continually performed the intermediary of securities purchased under reverse repurchase agreements,
mobilizing funds from the surplus to deficit sectors thereby bank deposits, brokerage activities, and irrevocable fund
enhancing saving-investment function in the economy. transfers to third parties via electronic payment systems that
Nigeria's financial system consists of a compendium of is prone to settlement risk (Zenith Bank, 2016).
markets, tools, operators, and institutions that interact to
provide financial services to their varied customers.The Akinselure and Akinola (2019), Alobari, Naenwi,
country’s financial system comprises of 2991 bureau de Zukbee and Grend (2018); and Uwalomwa, Uwuigbe and
change, 22 commercial banks, 6 development finance Oyewo (2015) agreed that a major risk affecting banks and
institutions, 5 discount houses, 20 finance Companies, 5 its environments is credit. Davis and Ngozi (2019) studied
merchant banks, 975 micro-finance banks, 3 non-interest credit risk and economic growth in Nigeria and concluded
banks, 33 primary mortgage institutions and 3 payment that lending and borrowing are activists of growth of the
service banks (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2021). economy. Credit management, according to Kolapo, Ayeni,
Trusted individuals or close affiliates sometimes Opportunities for insider abuse can occur because of
breach their fiduciary duties and trade on inside information, the ease of accessing information and the complexity of
seized opportunities, engaged in deals or used the bank organizational structures and unfortunately, organizational
information for personal advantage. An example of insider structure cannot predict such (Puspithaa, &Yasab, 2018).
abuse includes granting loans in excess of the regulated Justification by management, employees, and those in
amount. It also includes a wider range where an insider acts charge of governance, enables them to engage or detect
or fails to act when the bank is harmed, takes on additional fraud (Statement of Auditing Standards 99, 2002). In this
risk or loses an opportunity and where the insider somehow case the organizational structure would have to change.
benefits because of his position (Clarke, 1988). Okafor and Organizational restructuring means changes in the
Asuzu (2018) added that the high exposure of some governance structure for increasing efficiency and
Nigerian banks was could be attributed to poor credit effectiveness of the employee operating in such working
management practices, due to excessive exposure to the environment. Thus, achieving desired result depend on the
stock market, non-performing loans, weak internal control, behaviour of the employee toward the restructuring process
insider abuse and lack of adequate disclosure. (Idris & Abu-Abdissamad, 2018).
Insider abuse occurs when an insider benefits Organizations restructure is to improve from a
personally from some actions he/she takes as part of his/her negative condition. Changes in the structure of organizations
position at the bank (the violation must be accompanied by can be done through conscious management action aimed at
personal gain to the insider to be considered abusive). achieving personal, financial, strategic and/or operational
Insider fraud is a criminal act such as embezzlement, objectives (Idris& Abu-Abdissamad,2018). Organizational
falsifying documents, and check kiting, but insider abuse restructuring involves significant changes in the institutional
and insider fraud are distinct and should not be mistaken frameworkof the firm, including redesigning of boundaries,
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1994). flattening of management levels, spreading of the span of
control, reducing product diversification, revising
Ajao and Oseyomon (2019) opined that the increase in compensation, reforming corporate governance, and
high non-performing loans was as a result of gross insider downsizing employment.
abuses, non-adherence to established credit policies, the
Credit Control
Number Of Loans Closed
Credit
Appraisal/Documentation
Credit Monitoring
Cost of Funds
Insider Abuse
Organisational Structure
β1 represents the coefficient connecting the The study employed mean, maximum, minimum,
independent variable (X) to the outcome (Y), when the standard deviations, Cronbach Alpha statistic, and
moderator (Z) = 0, β2 is the coefficient relating the questionnaires for the dependent, moderating and
moderator (Z), to the outcome, when X = 0, α0 is the independent variables. The main objective of the
intercept in the equation, and µi is the residual in the studyexamined the effect of credit management on the loan
equation. performance of selected deposit money banks in Ogun State,
Nigeria. The result of the analysis showed that banks
The hypotheses were tested at 95% confidence interval understood the importance and implication of credit terms
using moderated (hierarchical) multiple regression analysis. and conditions, credit collection policy, credit policy, credit
The apriori expectation was anchored on a positive and control, client appraisal, documentation and credit
significant moderating effect of cost of funds, insider
Credit Management and Loan Performance of SELECTED Deposit Money Banks in Ogun State
Dear Respondent,
I am a postgraduate student in the Department of Finance at Babcock University, researching the above topic. Your consent is
highly needed in the completion of this study by filling the questionnaire. All information given will be treated
withconfidentiality. Kindly return the questionnaire at your earliest convenient time.
Please answer the following questions by ticking the one you consider most appropriate among the alternatives.
Thank you for your sincere cooperation
Nkemjika Maduemem
SECTION A:
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Instruction: Please answer the statement below by ticking (√) the option which best describes your agreement.
1. Gender: Male [ ] Female [ ].
2. Age: (a) 20- 24yrs[ ] (b) 25-30 [ ] (c)31-35 [ ] (d) 36-40 [ ] (e) 41-45 [ ] (f) 46-50 [ ] (g) 51-55 [ ]
(h) 56-60 [ ] (i) 61 – 65 [ ].
3. Marital Status: Single ( ) Married ( ) Divorced ( ) Widow/Widower ( ).
4. Educational Qualification:(a) OND/NCE [ ] (b) B.Sc. /HND [ ] (c) M.Sc. /MBA [ ] others please specify
…………………………………………................
5. Rank: (a) Lower level manager [ ] (b) Middle level manager [ ] (c) Senior manager[ ].
SECTION B
Kindly mark the suitable columnthatexpresses your judgement on the objects stated in all variables.
VH = very high, H = high, MH = moderately high, ML = moderately low, L = Low, VL = very low.
A Credit terms/Condition VH H MH ML L VL
1 Clear credit terms are disclosed
2 Credit terms on amount are known
3 Terms are spelt out in loan repayment schedules
4 Terms/Condition indicate type of interest charged
5 Terms indicate collateral and guarantees for loans
6 Terms spelt out other charges imposed on loans
B Credit Collection Policy VH H MH ML L VL
1 Collection policy is in place to manage receivables
2 There are incentives and rewards for early repayment
3 Penalties exist for late/missed repayment schedules
4 New/poorly performing loans have tighter collection terms
5 Customers are notified when repayments are due
C Credit Policy VH H MH ML L VL
1 Credit policy in place to manage credit risk
2 Credit policy determines the loan limit
3 Policy regulate the volume of credit issue
4 Credit policy looks at cash flow over years
5 Policy considers customers’ market
D Credit Control VH H MH ML L VL
1 Account receivable turnover ratio
2 Promise to pay
3 Collection effectiveness
4 Average age of Debt or Days sales outstanding
5 Profit per account
E Client Appraisal/Documentation VH H MH ML L VL
1 Obtain credit history report of the borrower
2 Borrower’s ability to repay
SECTION C
Kindly mark the suitable columnthatexpresses your judgement on the objects stated in all variables.
VH = very high, H = high, MH = moderately high, ML = moderately low, L = Low, VL= very low.
A Loan Performance VH H MH ML L VL
1 Loan recovery rates
2 Timely repayment rates
3 Loan reapplication rates
4 Number of loans closed per consumer
5 Number of loans extended
B Cost of Fund (Affordability) VH H MH ML L VL
1 Loan valuation cost
2 Loan charge
3 Loan hidden charges
4 Loan collateralization cost
5 Loan realization cost
6 Loan restructuring
C Insider Abuse (related party) VH H MH ML L VL
1 Manipulation in sale/purchase of loan pools
2 Inappropriate or fraudulent loan arrangements
3 Fictitious loans
4 Bribes/kickbacks arising from lending
5 Loans tied to favours for friends/family
D Organisational Structure VH H MH ML L VL
1 Shared value system
2 Pragmatism
3 Uncertainty Avoidance
4 Corporate collectivism
5 Adaptability capacity
APPENDIX II
ANALYSIS 1 - CM AND LP
Variables Entered/Removeda
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method
b
1 CREDIT MANAGEMENT . Enter
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. All requested variables entered.
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 .704a .496 .493 .54168
a. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT
b. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) .730 .289 2.526 .013
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .768 .064 .704 12.072 .000
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
Residuals Statisticsa
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N
Predicted Value 2.5474 5.3380 4.1747 .53569 150
Residual -1.48515 1.72724 .00000 .53986 150
Std. Predicted Value -3.038 2.172 .000 1.000 150
Std. Residual -2.742 3.189 .000 .997 150
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 .747a .558 .540 .51586
a. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MONITORING, COLLECTION POLICY, CREDIT
TERMS, CREDIT CONTROL, CREDIT POLICY, CLIENT APPRAISAL
b. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 48.130 6 8.022 30.145 .000b
Residual 38.053 143 .266
Total 86.184 149
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MONITORING, COLLECTION POLICY, CREDIT TERMS,
CREDIT CONTROL, CREDIT POLICY, CLIENT APPRAISAL
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) .961 .288 3.337 .001
CREDIT TERMS -.026 .065 -.030 -.401 .689
COLLECTION POLICY .126 .070 .132 1.782 .077
CREDIT POLICY .042 .086 .048 .492 .624
CREDIT CONTROL .134 .070 .151 1.914 .058
CLIENT APPRAISAL .071 .083 .085 .852 .396
CREDIT MONITORING .395 .075 .476 5.293 .000
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
Correlations
LOAN CREDIT
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
LOAN PERFORMANCE Pearson Correlation 1 .704**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 150 150
CREDIT Pearson Correlation .704** 1
MANAGEMENT Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 150 150
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Correlations
LOAN CREDIT COLLECTION CREDIT CREDIT CLIENT CREDIT
PERFORMANCE TERMS POLICY POLICY CONTROL APPRAISAL MONITORING
LOAN Pearson 1 .424** .517** .559** .574** .595** .712**
PERFORMANCE Correlation
Sig. (2- .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
tailed)
N 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
CREDIT TERMS Pearson .424** 1 .411** .643** .481** .549** .523**
Correlation
Sig. (2- .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
tailed)
N 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
COLLECTION Pearson .517** .411** 1 .543** .587** .411** .519**
POLICY Correlation
Sig. (2- .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
tailed)
N 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Model Summary
Change Statistics
Adjusted R Std. Error of R Square
Model R R Square Square the Estimate Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change
1 .704a .496 .493 .54168 .496 145.725 1 148 .000
2 .761b .579 .573 .49709 .082 28.742 1 147 .000
3 .773c .597 .589 .48762 .019 6.767 1 146 .010
a. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT
b. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, COST OF FUNDS
c. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, COST OF FUNDS, CM*COF
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 42.758 1 42.758 145.725 .000b
Residual 43.426 148 .293
Total 86.184 149
2 Regression 49.860 2 24.930 100.891 .000c
Residual 36.323 147 .247
Total 86.184 149
3 Regression 51.469 3 17.156 72.156 .000d
Residual 34.714 146 .238
Total 86.184 149
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT
c. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, COST OF FUNDS
d. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, COST OF FUNDS, CM*COF
Excluded Variablesa
Collinearity
Partial Statistics
Model Beta In t Sig. Correlation Tolerance
1 COST OF FUNDS .333b 5.361 .000 .404 .743
CM*COF .397b 4.863 .000 .372 .443
2 CM*COF -1.418c -2.601 .010 -.210 .009
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT
c. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, COST OF FUNDS
Variables Entered/Removeda
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method
1 CREDIT MANAGEMENTb . Enter
2 INSIDER ABUSEb . Enter
3 CM*IAb . Enter
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. All requested variables entered.
Model Summary
Change Statistics
Adjusted R Std. Error of R Square
Model R R Square Square the Estimate Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change
1 .704a .496 .493 .54168 .496 145.725 1 148 .000
2 .736b .542 .536 .51802 .046 14.827 1 147 .000
3 .753c .567 .559 .50533 .025 8.475 1 146 .004
a. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT
b. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INSIDER ABUSE
c. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INSIDER ABUSE, CM*IA
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 42.758 1 42.758 145.725 .000b
Residual 43.426 148 .293
Total 86.184 149
2 Regression 46.737 2 23.369 87.084 .000c
Residual 39.447 147 .268
Total 86.184 149
3 Regression 48.901 3 16.300 63.833 .000d
Residual 37.283 146 .255
Total 86.184 149
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) .730 .289 2.526 .013
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .768 .064 .704 12.072 .000
2 (Constant) .316 .296 1.065 .289
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .797 .061 .731 12.996 .000
INSIDER ABUSE .124 .032 .216 3.851 .000
3 (Constant) -1.557 .705 -2.208 .029
CREDIT MANAGEMENT 1.200 .151 1.101 7.950 .000
INSIDER ABUSE .893 .266 1.560 3.356 .001
CM*IA -.167 .057 -1.359 -2.911 .004
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
Excluded Variablesa
Partial Collinearity Statistics
Model Beta In t Sig. Correlation Tolerance
1 INSIDER ABUSE .216b 3.851 .000 .303 .985
CM*IA .197b 3.458 .001 .274 .977
2 CM*IA -1.359c -2.911 .004 -.234 .014
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT
c. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INSIDER ABUSE
Variables Entered/Removeda
Variables
Model Variables Entered Removed Method
b
1 CREDIT MANAGEMENT . Enter
2 ORGANIZATIONAL CULTUREb . Enter
3 CM*OCb . Enter
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. All requested variables entered.
Model Summary
Change Statistics
Adjusted R Std. Error of R Square
Model R R Square Square the Estimate Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change
1 .704a .496 .493 .54168 .496 145.725 1 148 .000
2 .713b .508 .502 .53684 .012 3.678 1 147 .057
c
3 .719 .517 .507 .53415 .008 2.484 1 146 .117
a. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT
b. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
c. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, CM*OC
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta T Sig.
1 (Constant) .730 .289 2.526 .013
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .768 .064 .704 12.072 .000
2 (Constant) .720 .286 2.514 .013
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .723 .067 .663 10.759 .000
ORGANIZATIONAL .053 .028 .118 1.918 .057
CULTURE
3 (Constant) -1.073 1.173 -.915 .362
CREDIT MANAGEMENT 1.111 .255 1.019 4.358 .000
ORGANIZATIONAL .588 .341 1.311 1.727 .086
CULTURE
CM*OC -.114 .072 -1.360 -1.576 .117
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
Excluded Variablesa
Collinearity
Partial Statistics
Model Beta In t Sig. Correlation Tolerance
1 ORGANIZATIONAL .118b 1.918 .057 .156 .880
CULTURE
CM*OC .125b 1.782 .077 .145 .680
2 CM*OC -1.360c -1.576 .117 -.129 .004
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT
c. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
Variables Entered/Removeda
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method
1 CREDIT MANAGEMENTb . Enter
2 ORGANIZATIONAL CULTUREb . Enter
3 INSIDER ABUSEb . Enter
4 CM*OC*IAb . Enter
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. All requested variables entered.
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 42.758 1 42.758145.725 .000b
Residual 43.426 148 .293
Total 86.184 149
2 Regression 43.818 2 21.909 76.021 .000c
Residual 42.365 147 .288
Total 86.184 149
3 Regression 46.857 3 15.619 57.985 .000d
Residual 39.327 146 .269
Total 86.184 149
4 Regression 46.874 4 11.719 43.226 .000e
Residual 39.309 145 .271
Total 86.184 149
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT
c. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
d. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, INSIDER ABUSE
e. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, INSIDER ABUSE,
CM*OC*IA
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) .730 .289 2.526 .013
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .768 .064 .704 12.072 .000
2 (Constant) .720 .286 2.514 .013
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .723 .067 .663 10.759 .000
ORGANIZATIONAL .053 .028 .118 1.918 .057
CULTURE
3 (Constant) .339 .299 1.135 .258
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .779 .067 .714 11.613 .000
ORGANIZATIONAL .019 .029 .043 .667 .506
CULTURE
INSIDER ABUSE .116 .034 .202 3.359 .001
4 (Constant) .273 .397 .689 .492
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .782 .068 .717 11.447 .000
ORGANIZATIONAL .033 .061 .073 .537 .592
CULTURE
INSIDER ABUSE .130 .066 .227 1.973 .050
CM*OC*IA -.001 .003 -.047 -.253 .800
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
Variables Entered/Removeda
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method
1 CREDIT MANAGEMENTb . Enter
2 INSIDER ABUSEb . Enter
3 COST OF FUNDSb . Enter
4 CM*IA*COFb . Enter
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. All requested variables entered.
Model Summary
Change Statistics
R Adjusted R Std. Error of the R Square F Sig. F
Model R Square Square Estimate Change Change df1 df2 Change
a
1 .704 .496 .493 .54168 .496 145.725 1 148 .000
2 .736b .542 .536 .51802 .046 14.827 1 147 .000
3 .768c .590 .582 .49170 .048 17.157 1 146 .000
4 .782d .611 .600 .48071 .021 7.754 1 145 .006
a. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT
b. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INSIDER ABUSE
c. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INSIDER ABUSE, COST OF FUNDS
d. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INSIDER ABUSE, COST OF FUNDS, CM*IA*COF
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 42.758 1 42.758 145.725 .000b
Residual 43.426 148 .293
Total 86.184 149
2 Regression 46.737 2 23.369 87.084 .000c
Residual 39.447 147 .268
Total 86.184 149
3 Regression 50.885 3 16.962 70.156 .000d
Residual 35.299 146 .242
Total 86.184 149
4 Regression 52.677 4 13.169 56.989 .000e
Residual 33.507 145 .231
Total 86.184 149
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT
c. Predictors: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INSIDER ABUSE
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) .730 .289 2.526 .013
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .768 .064 .704 12.072 .000
2 (Constant) .316 .296 1.065 .289
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .797 .061 .731 12.996 .000
INSIDER ABUSE .124 .032 .216 3.851 .000
3 (Constant) .406 .282 1.439 .152
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .630 .071 .578 8.922 .000
INSIDER ABUSE .069 .033 .120 2.059 .041
COST OF FUNDS .218 .053 .278 4.142 .000
4 (Constant) -.826 .521 -1.584 .115
CREDIT MANAGEMENT .764 .084 .700 9.089 .000
INSIDER ABUSE .351 .107 .614 3.295 .001
COST OF FUNDS .374 .076 .477 4.916 .000
CM*IA*COF -.015 .005 -.620 -2.785 .006
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
Excluded Variablesa
Collinearity
Partial Statistics
Model Beta In t Sig. Correlation Tolerance
1 INSIDER ABUSE .216b 3.851 .000 .303 .985
COST OF FUNDS .333b 5.361 .000 .404 .743
CM*IA*COF .232b 4.024 .000 .315 .931
2 COST OF FUNDS .278c 4.142 .000 .324 .624
CM*IA*COF .187c 1.151 .252 .095 .118
3 CM*IA*COF -.620d -2.785 .006 -.225 .054
a. Dependent Variable: LOAN PERFORMANCE
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT
c. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INSIDER ABUSE
d. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INSIDER ABUSE, COST OF FUNDS
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
.858 6
CCP
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
.791 5
CP
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
.927 5
CC
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
.873 5
CM
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
.943 5
LP
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
.859 5
COF
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
.949 6
IA
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
.976 5
OC
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
.910 4