Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 189343               July 10, 2013

BENILDA N. BACASMAS, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 189369

ALAN C. GAVIOLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 189553

EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before us are three consolidated cases: (1) Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 dated 16 September
2009 (G.R. No. 189343), (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 dated 15 September 2009 (G.R. No.
189369), and (3) Petition for Review on Certiorari 3 dated 12 October 2009 (G.R. No. 189553). All
assail the Decision4 in Crim. Case No. 26914 dated 7 May 2009 of the Sandiganbayan, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, accused Alan C. Gaviola ("Gaviola"), Eustaquio B. Cesa ("Cesa"), Benilda N.

Bacasmas ("Bacasmas") and Edna J. Jaca ("Jaca") are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and are sentenced to suffer in prison the penalty
of 12 years and 1 month to 15 years. They also have to suffer perpetual disqualification from holding
any public office and to indemnify jointly and severally the City Government of Cebu the amount of
Nine Million Eight Hundred Ten Thousand, Seven Hundred Fifty-two and 60/100 Pesos (Php
9,810,752.60).5 (Emphasis in the original)

The Petitions also question the Resolution 6 dated 27 August 2009 denying the Motions for
Reconsideration7 of the Decision dated 7 May 2009.

ANTECEDENT FACTS
All the petitioners work for the City Government of Cebu. 8 Benilda B. Bacasmas (Bacasmas), the
Cash Division Chief, is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189343. 9 Alan C. Gaviola (Gaviola), the City
Administrator, is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189369. 10 Eustaquio B. Cesa (Cesa), the City Treasurer,
is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189553. 11

By virtue of their positions, they are involved in the process of approving and releasing cash
advances for the City. The procedure is as follows:

A written request for a cash advance is made by paymaster Luz Gonzales (Gonzales), who then
submits it to Cash Division Chief Bacasmas for approval. Once the latter approves the request, she
affixes her initials to the voucher, which she forwards to City Treasurer Cesa for his signature in the
same box. By signing, Bacasmas and Cesa certify that the expense or cash advance is necessary,
lawful, and incurred under their direct supervision. 12

Thereafter, the voucher is forwarded to City Accountant Edna C. Jaca (Jaca) for processing and pre-
audit. She also signs the voucher to certify that there is adequate available funding/budgetary
allotment; that the expenditures are properly certified and supported by documents; and that
previous cash advances have been liquidated and accounted for. She then prepares an
Accountant’s Advice (Advice).13

This Advice is returned with the voucher to the Chief Cashier for the preparation of the check. After it
has been prepared, she affixes her initials to the check, which Cesa then signs. Afterwards, City
Administrator Gaviola approves the voucher and countersigns the check. 14

The voucher, the Advice, and the check are then returned to the Cash Division, where Gonzales
signs the receipt portion of the voucher, as well as the Check Register to acknowledge receipt of the
check for encashment.15

Upon receipt of the check, Gonzales encashes it at the bank, signs the voucher, and records the
cash advance in her Individual Paymaster Cashbook. She then liquidates it within five days after
payment.16

A report of those cash advances liquidated by Gonzales is called a Report of Disbursement (RD). An
RD must contain the audit voucher number, the names of the local government employees who
were paid using the money from the cash advance, the amount for each employee, as well as the
receipts. The RDs are examined and verified by the City Auditor and are thereafter submitted to the
Cash Division for recording in the official cash book. 17

On 4 March 1998, COA issued Office Order No. 98-001 creating a team to conduct an examination
of the cash and accounts of the accountable officers of the Cash Division, City Treasurer’s Office of
Cebu City.18

This team conducted a surprise cash count on 5 March 1998. 19 The examination revealed an
accumulated shortage of ₱9,810,752.60 from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998 from the cash
and accounts of Gonzales.20 The team found that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca failed to
follow the above-mentioned procedure, thus facilitating the loss of more than nine million pesos on
the part of the city government. Specifically, the team said in its report that there were irregularities
in the grant, utilization, and liquidation of cash advances; shortages were concealed; and inaccurate
and misleading pieces of information were included in the financial statements. 21 These irregularities
were manifested in the following: additional cash advances were granted even if previous cash
advances had not yet been liquidated, cash advance vouchers for salaries were not supported by
payrolls or lists of payees, and cash advances for salaries and wages were not liquidated within five
days after each 15th day or end-of-the-month pay period. 22

The report stated that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca not only signed, certified, and approved
the cash advance vouchers, but also signed and countersigned the checks despite the deficiencies,
which amounted to a violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160; Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1445;
and the circulars issued by the Commission on Audit (COA), specifically COA Circular Nos. 90-331,
92-382 and 97-002.23 According to the COA, the violation of the foregoing laws, rules, and
regulations facilitated the loss of a huge amount of public funds at the hands of Gonzales. 24

Hence, an Information25 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 30 July 2001 against Bacasmas,
Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca, to wit:

That on or about the 5th and subsequent thereto, at Cebu City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, ALAN C. GAVIOLA,
EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, BENILDA N. BACASMAS and EDNA J. JACA, public officers, being then the
City Administrator, City Treasurer, Cash Division Chief and City Accountant, respectively, of the
Cebu City Government, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to Office, conniving
and confederating together and mutually helping with each other [sic], with deliberate intent, with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and with gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there allow
LUZ M. GONZALES, Accountant I, Disbursing Officer-Designate of the Cebu City Government, to
obtain cash advances despite the fact that she has previous unliquidated cash advances, thus
allowing LUZ M. GONZALES to accumulate Cash Advances amounting to NINE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED TEN day of March 1998, and for sometime prior THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
FIFTY-TWO PESOS AND 60/100 (₱9,810,752.60), PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, which remains
unliquidated, thus accused in the performance of their official functions, had given unwarranted
benefits to LUZ M. GONZALES and themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government,
particularly the Cebu City Government. 26

The prosecution presented the testimonies of the COA Auditors who had conducted the examination
on the cash and accounts of Gonzales: Cecilia Chan, Jovita Gabison, Sulpicio Quijada, Jr., Villanilo
Ando, Jr., and Rosemarie Picson.27 The COA Narrative Report28 on the results of the examination of
the cash and accounts of Gonzales covering the period 20 September 1995 to 05 March 1998 was
also introduced as evidence.29

Bacasmas testified in her own defense. She said that she could not be held liable, because it was
not her responsibility to examine the cash book. She pointed to Jaca and the City Auditor as the
ones responsible for determining whether the paymaster had existing unliquidated cash advances.
Bacasmas further testified that she allowed the figures to be rounded off to the nearest million
without totalling the net payroll, because it was customary to round off the cash advance to the
nearest amount.30

Cesa averred that Jaca was the approving authority in granting cash advances. Hence, when he
signed the vouchers, he merely relied on Jaca’s certification that Gonzales had already liquidated
her cash advances. Besides, he said, he had already delegated the function of determining whether
the amount stated in the disbursement voucher was equal to the net pay, because it was humanly
impossible for him to supervise all the personnel of his department. 31

Jaca admitted that cash advances were granted even if there were no liquidations, so that salaries
could be paid on time, because cash advances usually overlapped with the previous one.
Additionally, she acknowledged that when she affixed her signatures to the vouchers despite the
non-attachment of the payrolls, she was aware that Gonzales still had unliquidated cash advances. 32
Lastly, Gaviola claimed that when he affixed his signatures, he was not aware of any anomaly.
Allegedly, he only signed on the basis of the signatures of Cesa and Jaca. 33

The Sandiganbayan, in its Decision dated 7 May 2009, did not give credence to the defense of the
accused, but instead afforded significant weight to the COA Narrative Report submitted in evidence.
It found that the accused, as public officers, had acted with gross inexcusable negligence by
religiously disregarding the instructions for preparing a disbursement voucher and by being totally
remiss in their respective duties and functions under the Local Government Code of 1991. 34 Their
gross inexcusable negligence amounted to bad faith, because they still continued with the illegal
practice even if they admittedly had knowledge of the relevant law and COA rules and
regulations.35 The Sandiganbayan held that the acts of the accused had caused not only undue
injury to the government because of the ₱9,810,752.60 shortage, but also gave unwarranted benefit
to Gonzales by allowing her to obtain cash advances to which she was not entitled. 36 Lastly, it found
conspiracy to be present in the acts and omissions of the accused showing that they had
confederated, connived with, and mutually helped one another in causing undue injury to the
government through the loss of public money.37

Gaviola, Cesa, Bacasmas, and Jaca individually filed their Motions for Reconsideration of the 7 May
2009 Decision.38 Their motions impugned the sufficiency of the Information and the finding of gross
inexcusable negligence, undue injury, and unwarranted benefit. 39 To support their innocence, they
invoked the cases of Arias v. Sandiganbayan,40 Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan,41 Sistoza v.
Desierto,42 Alejandro v. People,43 and Albert v. Gangan,44 in which we held that the heads of office
may rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates. 45 The Motion for Reconsideration of Jaca also
averred that her criminal and civil liabilities had been extinguished by her death on 24 May 2009. 46

The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution 47 promulgated 27 August 2009 denied the Motions for
Reconsideration of the accused. It ruled that the Information was sufficient, because the three
modes of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 commonly involved willful, intentional, and conscious
acts or omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the public official or
employee.48 Furthermore, the three modes may all be alleged in one Information. 49 The
Sandiganbayan held that the accused were all guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. Claiming that
it was the practice in their office, they admittedly disregarded the observance of the law and COA
rules and regulations on the approval and grant of cash advances.50 The anti-graft court also stated
that the undue injury to the government was unquestionable because of the shortage amounting to
₱9,810,752.60.51 It further declared that the aforementioned cases cited by the accused were
inapplicable, because there was paucity of evidence of conspiracy in these cases. 52 Here, conspiracy
was duly proven in that the silence and inaction of the accused - albeit ostensibly separate and
distinct  indicate, if taken collectively, that they are vital pieces of a common design. 53 Finally, the
Sandiganbayan decided that although the criminal liability of Jaca was extinguished upon her death,
her civil liability remained.54 Hence, the Motions for Reconsideration were denied. 55

Thus, Bacasmas, Gaviola, and Cesa filed their respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari, in which
they rehashed the arguments they had put forward in their Motions for Reconsideration previously
filed with the Sandiganbayan.

We resolved to consolidate the three Petitions on 23 November 2009. 56 The Office of the Special
Prosecutor was required to comment on the three Petitions, 57 after which petitioners were instructed
to file a Reply,58 which they did.59

Petitioners, through their respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari and Comments, bring these
two main issues before us:
 I. Whether the Information was sufficient; and

II. Whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019

We deny the Petitions.

I.

The Information specified when the crime was committed, and it named all of the accused
and their alleged acts or omissions constituting the offense charged.

An information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) the name of all the accused; (b)
the designation of the offense as given in the statute; (c) the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; (d) the name of the offended party; (e) the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and (f) the place where the offense was committed.

Cesa and Gaviola question the sufficiency of the Information on three grounds: first, it did not specify
a reasonable time frame within which the offense was committed, in violation of their right to be
informed of the charge against them; second, not all of the accused were named, as Gonzales was
not charged in the Information; and third, the Information did not specify an offense, because
negligence and conspiracy cannot co-exist in a crime.

The Sandiganbayan earlier held that the Information was sufficient in that it contained no inherent
contradiction and properly charged an offense. We uphold its ruling for the following reasons:

First, it is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was committed, except when it is
a material ingredient thereof.60 The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as
near as possible to the actual date of its commission. 61 Here, the date is not a material ingredient of
the crime, not having been committed on one day alone, but rather within a period of time ranging
from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998. Hence, stating the exact dates of the commission of the
crime is not only unnecessary, but impossible as well. That the Information alleged a date and a
period during which the crime was committed was sufficient, because it duly informed petitioners that
before and until 5 March 1998, over nine million pesos had been taken by Gonzales as a result of
petitioners’ acts. These acts caused undue injury to the government and unwarranted benefits to the
said paymaster.

Second, the Information charges petitioners with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, to wit:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful.

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

Cesa contends that Gonzales should have been included in the Information, because the latter
incurred cash shortages and allegedly had unliquidated cash advances. 62 Cesa is wrong. The
Information seeks to hold petitioners accountable for their actions, which allowed Gonzales to obtain
cash advances, and paved the way for her to incur cash shortages, leading to a loss of over nine
million pesos. Thus, the Information correctly excluded her because her alleged acts did not fall
under the crime charged in the Information.

Third and last, the Information sufficiently specified the offense that violated Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019, the essential elements of which are as follows:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

functions;

2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and

3. The action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of the
functions of the accused.63

The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature and cause of the
accusation against petitioners,64 namely the violation of the aforementioned law. The use of the three
phrases – "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "inexcusable negligence"  in the same
Information does not mean that three distinct offenses were thereby charged but only implied that
the offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes provided by the law. 65 In
addition, there was no inconsistency in alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross
inexcusable negligence, because the latter was not simple negligence.

Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional, and conscious indifference to the
consequences of one’s actions or omissions.66

II.

Petitioners’ gross negligence amounting to bad faith, the undue injury to the government,
and the unwarranted benefits given to Gonzales, were all proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Petitioners do not controvert the first element of the offense but assail the Sandiganbayan’s finding
of gross inexcusable negligence, undue injury and unwarranted benefit. Nevertheless, their
contention must fail.

Petitioners committed gross

negligence amounting to bad faith
when they approved and disbursed
the cash advances in violation of law
and rules and regulations.

Petitioners  being the Cash Division Chief, City Treasurer and City Administrator – have to comply
with R.A. 7160, P.D. 1445, and COA Circulars 90-331, 92-382, and 97-002 on the proper procedure
for the approval and grant of cash advances. These laws and rules and regulations state that cash
advances can only be disbursed for a legally authorized specific purpose and cannot be given to
officials whose previous cash advances have not been settled or properly accounted for. 67 Cash
advances should also be equal to the net amount of the payroll for a certain pay period, and they
should be supported by the payroll or list of payees and their net payments. 68
However, petitioners failed to observe the foregoing. We quote hereunder the findings of the COA
team as contained in its Narrative Report:

A. Granting, Utilization and Liquidation of cash advances:

1. During the period, September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998, records and verification
documents show that additional cash advances were granted (Annex 13), even if the
previous cash advances were not yet liquidated.

It resulted in excessive granting of cash advances, which created the opportunity to

misappropriate public funds since excess or idle funds were placed in the hands of
the paymaster under her total control and disposal. This is in violation of Section 89,
PD 1445; Section 339, RA 7160 and paragraph 4.1.2 of COA Circular No. 97-002.

2. The amounts of cash advances for salary payments were not equal to the net
amount of the payroll for a pay period in violation of par. 4.2.1. COA Circular No. 90-
331. Section 48 (g), COA Circular No. 92-382 and par. 4.2.1, COA Circular No. 97-
002. In fact, all cash advance vouchers for salaries were not supported by payrolls or
list of payees to determine the amount of the cash advance to be granted, and that
the face of the disbursement voucher (sample voucher marked as Annex 14) did not
indicate the specific office/ department and period covered for which the cash
advance was granted in violation of par. 4.1.5 COA Cir. No. 90-331, Section 48(e)
COA Cir. 92-382 and par. 4.1.7 and 4.2.2 COA Cir No. 97-002. The amount of the
cash advance could therefore be in excess of the required amount of the payroll to
be paid since it can not be determined which payroll, pay period and department
employees are going to be paid by the amount drawn. Consequently, the liquidations
which were made later, cannot identify which particular cash advances are
liquidated, considering that there are other previous cash advances not yet
liquidated, thus resulting in the failure to control cash on hand.
1âwphi1

3. Cash advances for salaries and wages were not liquidated within 5 days after
each 15 day/end of the month pay period in violation of par. 5.1.1 COA Cir. 90-331
and 97-002 and Section 48 (k) of COA Cir No. 92-382. In fact, the balance of
unliquidated cash advance as of December 31, 1997 per audit, amounted to P
10,602,527.90 consisting of ₱6,388,147.94, ₱3,205,373.16 and P 1,009,006.80 for
General, SEF and Trust Fund (Annex 15) respectively, in violation of Par. 5.8 COA
Cir Nos. 90-331 and 97-002 and Section 48 (o) COA Cir. No. 92-382. However, the
balance shown was understated as of December 31, 1997 by ₱2,395,517.08 as
discussed in items D.2 pages 15 & 16.

Records showed that part of the total cash advances of ₱12,000,000.00 appears to have been used
to liquidate partially the previous year’s unliquidated cash advance/balance of ₱10,602,527.90 since
the accountable officer liquidated her cash advance by way of cash refunds/returns from January 8-
14, 1998 in the total amount of ₱8,076,382.36 (Annex 15 E) in violation of par. 4.1.5 COA Cir. 90-
331, Section 48 of COA Cir 92-382 and par. 4.1.7 of COA Cir. 97-002.

The concerned City Officials (refer to Part III of this report) signed, certified and approved the
disbursements/cash advance vouchers, and signed and countersigned the corresponding checks
despite the deficiencies which are violations of laws, rules and regulations mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs.
The accountable officer was able to accumulate excess or idle funds within her total control and
disposal, resulting in the loss of public funds, due to the flagrant violations by the concerned city
officials of the abovementioned laws, rules and regulations.

On the other hand, the verification and reconciliation of the paymaster’s accountability cannot be
determined immediately because the submission of financial reports and its supporting schedules
and vouchers/payrolls by the Accounting Division was very much delayed (Annex 16), in violation of
Section 122, PD 1445, despite several communications from the Auditor to submit said reports,
latest of which is attached as Annex 16.a.

xxxx

D. The following practices of the Office of the City Accountant resulted in inaccurate and misleading
information in the financial statements including the balance of unliquidated cash advances in
violation of Section 111 and 112 of PD 1445:

1. Cash returns made on January 8 to 14, 1998 were recorded in the accounting
records as credits to Mrs. Gonzales accountability in December 1997 amounting to
₱8,075,382.36 as shown in the subsidiary ledger (Annex 20. 1-4) and as evidenced
by the official receipts (Annex 20a. 1-6) as follows:

xxxx

2. Some liquidations/ disbursements in January 1998 were included as credits to

accountability or a reduction of the paymaster's accountability as of December 1997
amounting to ₱2,395,517.08.

xxxx

3. Verification of accounting records maintained in the Accounting Division revealed

that the index cards (Annex 21) as a control device in the processing of cash
advance voucher recorded only cash advances granted to Paymaster. It failed to
show the liquidations/ disposition of public funds. Hence, unliquidated balance of
cash advances can not be determined at a glance when a cash advance voucher is
being processed by the accounting personnel.

E. Other Deficiencies:

1. There were two claimants who alleged that they did not receive the financial aid
intended for them as fire victims. However, payroll showed that there were
initials/signatures indicated therein acknowledging receipt of said claim.

2. There were two (2) cash advance vouchers (Annex 22b. 1-2) which bear no
approval of proper official in BOX marked as "C" hereof, yet checks were issued in
violation of Section 4.5 of PD 1445 which provide that disbursement or disposition of
government funds of property shall invariably bear the approval of the proper
officials. x x x

3. Accounting records showed that JV #354 under Trust Fund in the amount of
₱147,200.00 was a liquidation on December 31, 1997. x x x one payroll supporting
the JV was signed by only one (1) person x x x. The other two payrolls supporting the
 JV were not signed/ approved by the concerned officials, which means that the
payrolls were not valid disbursements.69 (Emphases supplied)

The above findings of the COA cannot be any clearer in thoroughly describing the illegal and
anomalous practices of the accused which led to the loss of ₱9,810,752.60 in people’s money.

When he testified before the anti-graft court, Bacasmas admitted that she did not consider the net
pay, which was lower than the amount requested, when she affixed her signature to the vouchers,
because it was supposedly common practice for the paymaster to round off the
figures.70 Furthermore, she signed the vouchers after relying on the representation of Jaca, Cesa,
and Gaviola.71

During his direct and cross-examination, Gaviola admitted that he had affixed his signature to the
vouchers, because they had already been signed by Bacasmas, Cesa, and Jaca despite the
incompleteness thereof – the periods covered by the vouchers were not stated; the employees who
were to be paid by the cash advance were not specified; no supporting documents were attached to
the cash advances requested; and there was no determination of whether the amounts requested
were equivalent to the net pay.72

Cesa said that because it was impossible for him to supervise all the personnel, he instructed
Bacasmas to examine and check the documents before signing them. 73 Thus, once Cesa saw the
signature of Bacasmas, he immediately assumed that the documents were in order, and he then
signed the vouchers.74

These facts show that petitioners failed to act in accordance with their respective duties in the grant
of cash advances. Moreover they repeatedly failed to do so. Bacasmas signed 294 requests for cash
advance, 11 disbursement vouchers, and 7 checks. Cesa signed cash advance requests and 299
disbursement vouchers. Gaviola approved 303 disbursement vouchers and signed 355 checks.

All these acts demonstrate that petitioners, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, were guilty of
gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Gross and inexcusable negligence is characterized by a
want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation in which there is a duty to act 
not inadvertently, but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar
as other persons are affected. 75 Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence.76 It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong,
a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of
fraud.77

Petitioners were well aware of their responsibilities before they affixed their signatures on the cash
advance vouchers. Yet, they still chose to disregard the requirements laid down by law and rules
and regulations by approving the vouchers despite the incomplete information therein, the previous
unliquidated cash advances, the absence of payroll to support the cash requested, and the disparity
between the requested cash advances and the total net pay. What is worse is that they continue to
plead their innocence, allegedly for the reason that it was "common practice" in their office not to
follow the law and rules and regulations to the letter. For them to resort to that defense is
preposterous, considering that as public employees they are required to perform and discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. 78 The law and
the rules are clear and do not provide for exceptions.

Petitioners’ acts show that they were

unified in illegally approving
irregular cash advance vouchers in
order to defraud the government.

As found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners’ acts not only show gross negligence amounting to bad
faith, but, when taken together, also show that there was conspiracy in their willful noncompliance
with their duties in order to defraud the government.

In order to establish the existence of conspiracy, unity of purpose and unity in the execution of an
unlawful objective by the accused must be proven. 79 Direct proof is not essential to show
conspiracy.80 It is enough that there be proof that two or more persons acted towards the
accomplishment of a common unlawful objective through a chain of circumstances, even if there was
no actual meeting among them.81

A cash advance request cannot be approved and disbursed without passing through several offices,
including those of petitioners. It is outrageous that they would have us believe that they were not in
conspiracy when over hundreds of vouchers were signed and approved by them in a course of 30
months, without their noticing irregularities therein that should have prompted them to refuse to sign
the vouchers. Clearly, they were in cahoots in granting the cash advances to Gonzales. By these
acts, petitioners defrauded the government of such a large sum of money that should not have been
disbursed in the first place, had they been circumspect in performing their functions.

Not only were petitioners unified in defrauding the government, but they were also unified in not
reporting the negligence of their cohorts because of their own negligence. Cesa himself admitted
knowing that Gonzales had unliquidated cash advances, yet he signed the vouchers. He also failed
to inform the other officials that they should not sign the vouchers and tolerated their negligence
when they affixed their signatures thereto. Petitioners, through their admissions before the
Sandiganbayan, all knew that there were irregularities in the vouchers; still they failed to correct one
another, because they themselves signed the vouchers despite the glaring irregularities therein.

Petitioners cannot hide behind our declaration in Arias v. Sandiganbayan 82 that heads of offices
cannot be convicted of a conspiracy charge just because they did not personally examine every
single detail before they, as the final approving authorities, affixed their signatures to certain
documents. The Court explained in that case that conspiracy was not adequately proven, contrary to
the case at bar in which petitioners’ unity of purpose and unity in the execution of an unlawful
objective were sufficiently established. Also, unlike in Arias, where there were no reasons for the
heads of offices to further examine each voucher in detail, petitioners herein, by virtue of the duty
given to them by law as well as by rules and regulations, had the responsibility to examine each
voucher to ascertain whether it was proper to sign it in order to approve and disburse the cash
advance.

Petitioners wrongly approved Gonzales’ cash advance vouchers, thereby causing a loss to the
government in the amount of ₱9,810,752.60.

The third element of the offense is that the action of the offender caused undue injury to any party,
including the government; or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his or her functions. Here, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioners both brought
about undue injury to the government and gave unwarranted benefit to Gonzales. It is not mistaken.

Undue injury means actual damage. 83 It must be established by evidence84 and must have been
caused by the questioned conduct of the offenders. 85 On the other hand, unwarranted benefit,
advantage, or preference means giving a gain of any kind without justification or adequate reasons. 86
When a cash examination is conducted, the paymaster should present her cashbook, cash, and
cash items for examination.87 Upon assessment thereof in the instant case, it was discovered that
₱9,810,752.60 was missing, as plainly evidenced by the COA Narrative Report, from which we
quote:

Balance last cash examination, September 20, 1995 P 2,685,719.78

Add: Cash Advances received – September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998

Gen. Fund 193,320,350.00

SEF 107,400,600.00

Trust Fund 3,989,783.00 304,710,733.00

Total: P 307,396,452.78

Less: Liquidations – September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998

Gen. Fund 187,290,452.66

SEF 105,243,526.99

Trust Fund 2,750,722.51 295,284,752.16

Balance of Accountability, March 5, 1998 P 12,111,700.62

Less: Inventory of Cash and Cash Items Allowed 2,300,948.02

Shortage P 9,810,752.60 88

(Emphasis supplied)

It is beside the point that no one complained about not receiving any salary from the city
government. The fact remains that more than nine million pesos was missing – public funds lost, to
the detriment of the government.

This undue injury was brought about by petitioners’ act of approving the cash advance vouchers of
Gonzales even if they lacked the requirements prescribed by law and rules and regulations, and
even if Gonzales had failed to liquidate her previous cash advances, thereby clearly giving her an
unwarranted benefit.

No less than the Constitution declares that public office is a public trust. 89 Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people and serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.90 Petitioners, by intentionally approving deficient cash advance
vouchers, have manifestly failed to live up to this constitutional standard.

III.
 The indeterminate penalty of 12 years and one
month as minimum to 15 years as maximum is fully justified.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by a special law such as R.A.
3019, the trial court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by this law, and the minimum term shall not be less than
the minimum prescribed by the same law. The penalty for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 is
"imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual
disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any
prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful
income." Hence, the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 month as minimum to 15 years as
maximum imposed by the Sandiganbayan in the present case is within the range fixed by law.

However, we are aware that if the range of imposable penalty under the law were to be divided into
three tiers based on the length of imprisonment, the penalty imposed in this case would be on the
highest tier. Hence, the Sandiganbayan should have explained the reason behind its imposed
penalty, for while Section 9 of R.A. 3019 seems to grant it discretion over the indeterminate penalty
to be prescribed for violation of Section 3(e), this Court finds it only proper that the anti-graft court
justify the latter’s imposition of the highest possible penalty. Otherwise, the exercise of this discretion
would appear to be whimsical – something that this Court will not tolerate. After all, it is our duty to
be vigilant in ensuring the correctness and justness of the ultimate adjudication of cases before us.

Nevertheless, we find the imposition of the highest range of imposable penalty in this case to be fully
justified.  In Jaca v. People of the Philippines,91 promulgated on 28 January 2013, the Court
1âwphi1

convicted the very same petitioners herein of exactly the same kinds of violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 as those in the present case and imposed therein the indeterminate penalty of 12 years
and 1 month as minimum to 15 years as maximum. The violations in that case arose from acts of
gross inexcusable negligence similar in all respects to those committed in this case, except for the
amount of cash shortages involved and the identity of the paymaster who benefitted from the acts of
petitioners. Even the period covered by the COA audit in Jaca – 20 September 1995 to 5 March
1998 – is exactly the same as that in the present case. It is therefore clear that the Court has
previously determined these identical acts to be so perverse as to justify the penalty of imprisonment
of 12 years and 1 month as minimum to 15 years as maximum. Hence, we adopt the same penalty
in this case.

Indeed, the penalty imposed is justified, considering the extent of the negligent acts involved in this
case in terms of the number of statutory laws and regulations violated by petitioners and the number
of positive duties neglected. The Court emphasizes that petitioners violated not just one but several
provisions of various regulations and laws namely: Sections 89 and 122 of P.O. 1445, Section 339 of
R.A. 7160, paragraphs 4.1.2, 4.1.7, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 5.1.1 of COA Circular No. 97-002, paragraphs
4.2.1, 4.1.5, and 5.1.1 of COA Circular No. 90-331~ and Section 48 (g), (e), and (k) of COA Circular
No. 92-382. Worse, they admitted being aware of these regulations. These circumstances. coupled
with the number of times such instances of violations and negligence were wantonly and
systematically repeated, show that their acts bordered on malice. Hence, we are convinced that the
penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan is warranted.

Furthermore, we take judicial notice of the need to stop these corrupt practices that drain local
government coffers of millions of pesos in taxpayers' money, which could have been utilized for
sorely needed services. In fact, as discussed in its Narrative Report, the COA team found instances
where fire victims alleged that they did not receive the financial aid intended for them and yet the
payroll showed that there were initials/signatures indicated therein acknowledging receipt of said
claim. This diversion of people's money from their intended use has to end.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 07 May 2009 Decision and 27 August 2009 Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 26914 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189343), pp. 4-24.

2
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189369), pp. 3-52.

3
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189553), pp. 12-79.

4
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189343), pp. 26-63.

5
 Id. at 62.

6
 Id. at 65-83.

7
 Id. at 65.

8
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189343), p. 4; (G.R. No. 189369), p. 6; (G.R. No. 189553), p. 16.

9
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189343), p. 4.
10
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189369), p. 6.

11
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189553), p. 16.

12
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189343), p. 38.

13
 Id.

14
 Id.

15
 Id. at 38-39.

16
 Id. at 39.

17
 Id.

18
 Id. at 37.

19
 Id.

20
 Id. at 39.

21
 Id. at 40-43.

22
 Id.

23
 Id. at 39-40.

24
 Id.

25
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189553), pp. 144-146.

26
 Id. at 144-145.

27
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189343), pp. 27-30.

28
 Rollo, (G.R. No 189553) pp. 198-228.

29
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189343), p. 29.

30
 Id. at 31-32.

31
 Id. at 32-34.

32
 Id. at 34-36.

33
 Id. at 36-37.

34
 Id. at 45-50.
35
 Id. at 53-54.

36
 Id. at 55-58.

37
 Id. at 59-61.

38
 Id. at 65.

39
 Id. at 66-70.

40
 259 Phil. 794 (1989).

41
 310 Phil. 14 (1995).

42
 437 Phil. 117 (2002).

43
 252 Phil. 412 (1989).

44
 406 Phil. 231 (2001).

45
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189343), p. 76.

46
 Id. at 69.

47
 Id. at 65-83.

48
 Id. at 70-73.

49
 Id. at 73.

50
 Id. at 73-75.

51
 Id. at 75.

52
 Id. at 76-77.

53
 Id. at 77-78.

54
 Id. at 81-82.

55
 Id. at 83.

56
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189343), p. 88; (G.R. No. 189369), p. 189; (G.R. No. 189553), p. 504.

57
 Id. at 90; 191; 511.

58
 Id. at 136; 229; 549.

59
 Id. at 137, unpaginated; unpaginated; unpaginated.
60
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, Sec. 11.

61
 Id.

62
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189553), p. 33.

63
 Albert v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164015, 26 February 2009, 580 SCRA 279, 289-290.

64
 People v. Anguac, G.R. No. 176744, 05 June 2009, 588 SCRA 716.

65
 Soriquez v. Sandiganbayan, 510 Phil. 709 (2005).

66
 Albert v. Sandiganbayan,supra.

67
 P.D. 1445, Sec. 89 (1978).

 COA Circular No. 90-331, par. 4.2.1, 5.1.1; COA Circular No. 92-382, Sec. 48. g, k; COA
68

Circular No. 97-002, par. 4.1.2, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 5.1.1.

69
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189343), pp. 40-43.

70
 Id. at 52.

71
 Id.

72
 Id. at 50-51.

73
 Id. at 52.

74
 Id.

75
 Albert v. Sandiganbayan, supra at 290.

76
 Cojuanco Jr. v. CA, 369 Phil. 41 (1999).

77
 Id.

78
 R.A. 6713, Sec. 4 (b) (1989).

79
 People v. Jorge, G.R. No. 99379, 22 April 1994, 231 SCRA 693.

80
 Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 34, 106 (2003).

81
 Id.

82
 Supra note 40.

83
 Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, 350 Phil. 820 (1998).
84
 Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 331 Phil. 1 (1996).

85
 Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50691, 05 December 1994, 238 SCRA 655.

86
 Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, 201 Phil. 379 (1982).

87
 COA Circular 97-002, par. 9.2.2.

88
 Rollo (G.R. No. 189343), p. 56.

89
 CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 1.

90
 Id.

91
 G.R. Nos. 166967, 166974, 167167; 28 January 2013.