SHORT FACTS (the way you would recite it)

ISSUE/S (related to CrimPro)

RULING/DOCTRINE/DISPOSITIVE

Note:
1. Please don’t use different fonts. Format: Arial, 11,
justified

SAMPLE:

a.Chance v. State, 202 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1967)

FACTS:
ISSUE/S:
RULING:
DISPOSITIVE:

3. Warrantless Arrest

a. In Flagrante Delicto

iv. Alih v. Castro151 SCRA 279 (1987)

FACTS:
● a contingent of more than 200 Philippine marines and elements of the home defense
forces raided, without search warrant or warrant of arrest, the compound occupied by
the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms,
ammunition and other explosives.
○ The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona"
○ The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion
with a burst of gunfire.
○ The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number
of casualties.
● The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male
occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed
over their objection.
● The military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle
grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the premises.
ISSUE/S:
WON the arrest was lawful under in flagrante delicto

RULING:
No, the arrest was not lawful.

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a
crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, there was no crime. There is
no allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under
the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge
of the ground therefore as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby
declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence
against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia
legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the
petitioners.
vii.People v. Araneta, 634 SCRA 475 (2010)

FACTS: On July 5, 2002, between 3-3:0, a confidential informant arrived at the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Pasig City Police Station to report to Officer-In-Charge SP04
Numeriano de Lara the alleged peddling of illegal drugs of live-in couple, Boton and Malou. The
SDEU formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. Before dispatching, the team members
were informed of the alleged illegal activity of the couple. SP02 Damasco was designated as the
poseur buyer giving him a marked money of Php 100 bill.

The team proceeded to the location when the informant confirmed the presence of the accused
at ROTC Street, Putol, Brgy Rosario, Pasig City. A short conversation transpired between the
informant and the accused. The informant introduced P02 Damasco saying that he will “score”
some drugs from the accused-appellant. Malou called her live-in partner and handed the
marked money. Botong then gave Malou a plastic sachet which she handed to PO2 Damasco.

P02 Damasco and the rest of the team rushed to the scene and Botong was frisked. Several
plastic bags containing crystalline substance and a plastic bag of marijuana were seen in his
pocket. Laboratory tests confirmed that 9 sachets were shabu while the other one was
marijuana.

The RTC ruled that all the elements for the prosecution of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs
were present during the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers. These were: 1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller; 2) the object of the sale and the consideration; and 3) the
delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. the RTC held that the defense of denial, frame-
up, forcible entry, and extortion could not prevail over the positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses. The accused filed a motion for reconsideration based on two (2)
grounds, to wit: 1) inadmissibility of the seized items; and 2) credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.

Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the prosecution evidence met the standard for the "objective
test" through the testimony of its witness, PO2 Danilo Damasco, who acted as poseur-buyer
and who related how the informant introduced him to the accused; how the transaction was
consummated through the exchange of marked money and the sachet of shabu; and how the
accused was arrested by the entrapment team.

The CA noted that the accused were arrested in flagrante delicto and that other contraband
materials were recovered from them during the ensuing search. It concluded that the corpus
delicti was duly established.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating sections 5
and 11 of Article II, R.A. 9165.
2. WON the seized items were admissible evidence
RULING:

1. YES.

After due consideration, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient enough to sustain the
verdict of conviction. It is morally convinced that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged against them. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight are
given high respect if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued,
misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which, if
considered, will alter the outcome of the case. In this case, the CA found no such inculpatory
facts and circumstances and this Court has not stumbled upon any either.

Doubtless, the prosecution was able to establish all the necessary elements required in the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, namely: 1) the identity of the buyer and seller; 2)
the identity of the object of the sale and the consideration; and 3) the delivery of the thing sold
upon payment.

The Court stresses that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of
the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal
drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not
through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and
the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced
to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however,
examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused’s
predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency,
recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at
all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they
are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement

2. YES.

The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search warrant or warrant of
arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust operation and the accused were caught in
flagrante delicto in possession of, and selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was
definitely legal for the buy-bust team to arrest, and search, them on the spot because a buy-bust
operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing
the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal
and has been proven to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.

In People v. Villamin, involving an accused arrested after he sold drugs during a buy-bust
operation, the Court ruled that it was a circumstance where a warrantless arrest is justified
under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court. The same ruling applies to the instant case.
When carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, it is a judicially
sanctioned method of apprehending those involved in illegal drug activities. It is a valid form of
entrapment, as the idea to commit a crime comes not from the police officers but from the
accused himself. The accused is caught in the act and must be apprehended on the spot. From
the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant does not make the arrest
illegal.

The illegal drugs seized were not the "fruit of the poisonous tree" as the defense would like this
Court to believe. The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a
lawful arrest under Rule 126, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides:

A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows that the search was also
valid, and a warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the August 29, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02308, is AFFIRMED.

B. When an offense has just been committed

Posadas v. Ombudsman, 341 SCRA 380 (2000)

FACTS: Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was
killed in a rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. Petitioner
Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the
crime.

In response to the request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group
of the NBI, and his men went to U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed
positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang,
Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the
Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina.

Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty.
Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of
arrest with them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the
next day. As a result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI
agents on that day.
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners with
violation of P.D. 1829, which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders.

ISSUE: WON the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made
without a warrant?

RULING: No.

In the case at bar, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days
after the commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might
indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the
supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the
arrest without a warrant by the NBI.

Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of
the crime. When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the
latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion
that they were doing anything illegal. On the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the
supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the
violence on the campus.

For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural requirements, we
hold that their attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant was illegal.

DISPOSITIVE: “WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents
are hereby prohibited from prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829 §l(c) as a result
of the incident complained of in Criminal Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED
to dismiss the information in Criminal Case No. 22801 against petitioners.”

People v. Escordial, 373 SCRA 585 (2002)

People v. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174 (1992)
Pestilos v. Generoso, 739 SCRA 336 (2014)

FACTS: On February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between
the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay
Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso resides.

Atty. Generoso called the police to report the incident. Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl
Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to
the scene of the crime and to render assistance. SP02 Javier, together with augmentation
personnel arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and
they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the
police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.
The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. At the inquest
proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.
Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. Hence, they
were charged with the crime of attempted murder.

Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that:
1. They had not been lawfully arrested.
2. No valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal
knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime.
3. They were just “invited” to the police station. Hence, the inquest proceeding was
improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been
performed.

ISSUE: WON petitioners were validly arrested pursuant to Section 5 (b), Rule 113.

RULING: YES. As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure are:
1. An offense has just been committed; and
2. The arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

Discussion:
The first element connotes immediacy. In other words, it involves a time element, such that an offense has
just been committed.

The second element consists of two parts:

1st part: Probable cause for warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113.
2nd part: Personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the
crime.

Probable cause:
 The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting officer
shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining
whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his fair
inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing
probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may
rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may
rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting
officer need not verify such information.

The arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to
be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the arrest.

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, or an actual belief or reasonable ground of
suspicion, based on actual facts.

Personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the
crime. (IMPORTANT !!!)

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. "
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the
police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if,
based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could
determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed
the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or
circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to
comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required
element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time
element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the
circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time
to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to
the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to
external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination
of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered
as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the
requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police
officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
 In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a
valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise
of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances
within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the
reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate
against unreasonable arrests.

In this case, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less
than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where
Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as
those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners; and Atty. Generoso lived almost
in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the
arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso,
although they narrated a different version of what transpired.

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the
crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, it is reasonable to conclude that the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless
arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and
evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal
observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby
AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby
ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987)

Roberts v. CA, 254 SCRA 307 (1996)

Fuentes v. Sandiganbayan, 495 SCRA 784 (2006)

Villaflor v. Vivar, 349 SCRA 194 (2001)

Facts:

● Respondent Vivar mauled Petitioner Villaflor outside a bar in Muntinlupa City

● So, an Information for slight physical injuries was filed
● When the injuries sustained by petitioner turned out to be more serious, an Information
for more serious physical injuries, was then filed
● So, the earlier charge of slight physical injuries was withdrawn.
● At the same time, another Information for grave threats, was filed against respondent
Vivar
● Respondent Vivar posted a cash bond of P6,000 in the case for serious physical injuries
● Respondent Vivar, instead of filing a counter-affidavit as required by the trial court, filed
a Motion to Quash the Information in the case for grave threats
● Respondent Vivar contended that the case of serious physical injuries should have
absorbed the threat, having been made in connection with the charge of serious physical
injuries.
● Thus, he concluded, the case of GRAVE THREATS should be dismissed, as the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
● In an Order dated April 28, 1997, in the case of GRAVE THREATS, the MTC denied the
Motion to Quash, as follows:
○ Considering that jurisdiction is conferred by law and the case filed is grave
threats which is within the jurisdiction of this Court and considering further that a
motion to quash is a prohibited [pleading] under the rule on summary procedure,
the motion to quash filed by the accused counsel is DENIED.
● The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Respondent was denied by the MTC
● Thus, he was duly arraigned in in the case of GRAVE THREATS, and he pleaded not
guilty.
● On July 18, 1997, respondent VIVAR filed a Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of
Muntinlupa City.
● On July 20, 1998, after the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the RTC
issued the assailed Order, which reads as follow:
○ "The Judicial Officer appears to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in declaring and denying the MOTION TO
QUASH as a prohibitive motion.
○ The same should have been treated and [should have] proceeded under the
regular rules of procedure.
○ The MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION filed without preliminary
investigation is therefore granted and these cases should have been dismissed.

Hence, this Petition.

Issues

Can the court order the dismissal of two (2) criminal cases for serious physical injuries
and grave threats on the ground that the public prosecutor failed to conduct a
preliminary investigation?

Other issue:

Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation be considered
a ground to quash the criminal Informations for serious physical injuries and grave threats filed
against the accused-respondent?

The Court Ruling

The Petitioner is meritorious.

First Issue:

Lack of Preliminary Investigation

● Preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether sufficient

ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial."17
● A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a
statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial.
● To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full
measure of their right to due process.
● However, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective.
● Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for quashing the
information.20
● The trial court, instead of dismissing the information, should hold in abeyance the
proceedings and order the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.

● Hence, the RTC in this case erred when it dismissed the two criminal cases for serious
physical injuries and grave threats on the ground that the public prosecutor had failed to
conduct a preliminary investigation.

Preliminary investigation was conducted.

● The Court does not agree that a preliminary investigation was not conducted.
● In fact, the assistant city prosecutor of Muntinlupa City made a preliminary investigation
for slight physical injuries.
● The said Information was, however, amended when the petitioner's injuries turned out to
be more serious and did not heal within the period specified in the Revised Penal Code.

New preliminary investigation was not necessary

 ● The Court believe that a new preliminary investigation cannot be demanded by
respondent.
● This is because the charge made by the public prosecutor was only a formal
amendment.
● The filing of the Amended Information, without a new preliminary investigation, did
not violate the right of respondent to be protected from a hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution; an open and public accusation of a crime; or from the trouble,
the expenses and the anxiety of a public trial.
● The Amended Information could not have come as a surprise to him for the simple and
obvious reason that it charged essentially the same offense as that under the
original Information.
● Moreover, if the original charge was related to the amended one, such that an inquiry
would elicit substantially the same facts, then a new preliminary investigation was not
necessary.

Second Issue:

Motion to Quash

● The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information
or otherwise render it defective.
● Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground
for quashing the information.
● Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the grounds on
which an accused can move to quash the complaint or information.
● Nowhere in the section is there any mention of a lack of a preliminary investigation as a
ground for a motion to quash.
● In the present case, the RTC therefore erred in granting herein respondent's Motion to
Quash.

Note:

● The failure of the accused to assert any ground for a motion to quash before
arraignment, either because he had not filed the motion or had failed to allege the
grounds therefor, shall be deemed a waiver of such grounds.
● In this case, he waived his right to file such motion when he pleaded not guilty to the
charge of grave threats.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City are REVERSED. No costs.

Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 354 SCRA 651 (2001)

Sales v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 293 (2001)
FACTS: PETITIONER, the incumbent town mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, fatally shot the
former mayor and his political rival, Atty. Rafael Benemerito, in an alleged shootout in Barangay
Caparispisan of said municipality after a heated altercation between them. After the shooting
incident, petitioner surrendered and placed himself under the custody of the municipal police
then asked that he be brought to the Provincial PNP Headquarters in Laoag City.

The next day, POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR CRISPIN AGNO and PRIVATE RESPONDENT
THELMA BENEMERITO, wife of the victim, filed a criminal complaint for Murder against
petitioner at the MCTC of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 127, presided by Judge Melvin U.
Calvan.

JUDGE CALVAN then conducted a preliminary examination of the witnesses, in accordance

with Section 6 (b), Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, found "the existence of
probable cause," and thereafter issued an order for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
petitioner with no bail recommended. By virtue of the warrant of arrest, PETITIONER was
transferred from the Provincial PNP Headquarters to the Provincial Jail.

JUDGE CALVAN, after conducting a "preliminary investigation Procedure," issued a resolution

forwarding the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Norte for
appropriate action. In addition to the records transmitted by Judge Calvan, there was also
submitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Norte an NBI "Parallel Investigation" Report.

Subsequently, PETITIONER received a subpoena from the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos

Norte directing him to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other
supporting documents within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. This petitioner did the following
day.

While the foregoing proceedings were ongoing, PETITIONER filed a petition for habeas corpus
with the CA alleging that: 1) the order and warrant of arrest for which petitioner was detained is
null and void for being issued by respondent judge who was disqualified by law from acting on
the case by reason of his affinity to private respondent Thelma Benemerito; and 2) the
preliminary examination by respondent judge was so illegally and irregularly conducted as to
oust the said judge of jurisdiction over the case.

The APPELLATE COURT granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of
petitioner from detention subject to the outcome of the proper preliminary investigation.

Meanwhile, after receipt of the records of the case from Judge Calvan as well as petitioner-
accused's counter-affidavits, the Ilocos Norte PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, instead of
conducting a preliminary investigation of his own, merely forwarded the said records to the
OMBUDSMAN for the latter to conduct the same.

It appears that PETITIONER was only apprised of the foregoing inaction on the case by the
Provincial Prosecutor when he received on September 10, 1999 a Memorandum dated
September 2, 1999,11 filed by private respondent's counsel, requesting that the case, "be
remanded to Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and, thereafter, for the
prosecution of the appropriate indictments before the Sandiganbayan."
On January 27, 2000, PETITIONER received a notice from the Ombudsman directing him to file
his counter-affidavits. Considering that petitioner had already submitted his counter-affidavits to
the Ilocos Norte Provincial Prosecutor as far back as August 20, 1999, he found the directive
superfluous and did not act on it.

On May 25, 2000, GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II CYNTHIA V. VIVAR issued a

Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Murder against petitioner and four
others before the Sandiganbayan. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman.

It appears that petitioner belatedly received a copy of the foregoing Resolution of the graft
investigation officer only on June 21, 2000, and because he was thus effectively prevented from
seeking a reconsideration thereof, he then filed a Motion To Defer Issuance Of Warrant Of
Arrest pending determination of probable cause dated June 22, 2000.16 The motion was denied
by SANDIGANBAYAN'S FOURTH DIVISION in the challenged Resolution of July 13, 2000.

Owing to the urgency of the matter, petitioner opted to directly resort to this recourse eschewing
the filing of a motion for reconsideration

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman followed the proper procedure in conducting a
preliminary investigation.

RULING: NO. The proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not
followed, for the following reasons:

FIRST, the records show that the supposed preliminary investigation was conducted in
installments by at least three (3) different investigating officers, none of whom completed the
preliminary investigation. There was not one continuous proceeding but rather a case of passing
the buck, so to speak, the last one being the Ombudsman hurriedly throwing the buck to the
Sandiganbayan.

SECOND, the charge against herein petitioner is Murder, a non-bailable offense. The gravity of
the offense alone, not to mention the fact that the principal accused is an incumbent mayor
whose imprisonment during the pendency of the case would deprive his constituents of their
duly-elected municipal executive, should have merited a deeper; and more thorough preliminary
investigation. The Ombudsman, however, did nothing of the sort and instead swallowed hook,
line and sinker the resolution and recommendation of Graft Investigation Officer II Cynthia V.
Vivar, among them the finding that, "aside from the averment of respondent that the victim fired
at him and he was only forced to fire back, no other evidence was adduced to indicate that such
was what happened."

There are, however, four affidavits on record which state in categorical terms that it was the
victim who first fired at petitioner with his Armalite rifle and that petitioner merely returned fire.
The Ombudsman, however, neither called for the production of the firearm and the empty shells,
nor did he ask for the production of the ballistic and laboratory examinations of the bloodstains
on the Armalite rifle despite the statement by the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte that these
pieces of evidence were all available.

There are, furthermore, other dubious circumstances which should have prompted the
Ombudsman to take a second, deeper look instead of adopting in toto the recommendation of
GIO II Vivar. Among these is the matter of the two (2) different autopsies on the cadaver of the
victim, one indicating that the victim sustained two (2) wounds only and the other showing that
the victim had three (3) wounds. The significance of this fact was not appreciated by the
Ombudsman who likewise glossed over the adamant refusal of the private respondent to
subject the cadaver of the victim to a paraffin test, despite the claims of the accused's witnesses
that the victim fired the Armalite rifle.

Given the foregoing circumstances, the Ombudsman for all practical purposes did an even
worse job than Judge Calvan for, by adopting in its entirety the findings of the investigating
officer despite its obvious flaws, he actually did nothing at all and, in effect, threw everything to
the Sandiganbayan for evaluation.

THIRD, a person under preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman is entitled to file a motion
for reconsideration of the adverse resolution.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation
proper. There is no dispute that the Information was filed without first affording petitioner-
accused his right to file a motion for reconsideration. The denial thereof is tantamount to a
denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone already renders preliminary
investigation conducted in this case incomplete. The inevitable conclusion is that the petitioner
was not only effectively denied the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's final resolution but also deprived of his right to a full preliminary investigation
preparatory to the filing of the information against him.

As stated earlier, it appears that petitioner belatedly received a copy of the May 25, 2000
Resolution of Graft Investigation Officer II Cynthia V. Vivar only on June 21, 2000. Because he
was thus effectively precluded from seeking a reconsideration thereof, he then filed a Motion To
Defer Issuance Of Warrant Of Arrest pending determination of probable cause. The
Sandiganbayan denied the motion in its challenged Resolution and forthwith ordered the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against petitioner. Suffice it to state in this regard that such a
deprivation of the right to a full preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the
information warrants the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for the completion thereof.

FOURTH, it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the Ombudsman's
certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts of this case much more so in the face of
the latter's flawed report and one-sided factual findings. In the order of procedure for criminal
cases, the task of determining probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is a
responsibility which is exclusively reserved by the Constitution to judges.

All told, the Court cannot accept the Sandiganbayan's assertions of having found probable
cause on its own, considering the Ombudsman's defective report and findings, which merely
relied on the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and disregarded the evidence for
the defense.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated July 13, 2000 and the
Resolution of Graft Investigation Officer II Cynthia V. Vivar dated May 25, 2000 in
Criminal Case No. 26115;
2) Ordering the Sandiganbayan to QUASH the warrant of arrest it issued against petitioner;
3) REMANDING the case to the Ombudsman for completion of the preliminary
investigation.
Hegerty v. CA, 409 SCRA 285 (2003)

FACTS: Respondent Allan Nash alleged that petitioner Rodney Hegerty, together with the
deceased Don Judevine and James Studenski, invited him to invest in a foreign exchange
scheme. In December 1997, Hegerty informed Nash that all his investments had been lost after
he lent a portion of the investment to Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., of which he was a
stockholder. Hegerty offered to return to Nash half of his total investment, but later on withdrew
the offer.

Nash filed a complaint-affidavit against Hegerty before the City Prosecutor of Manila for estafa
under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Hegerty denied making any invitation to
Nash to invest his money in any foreign exchange scheme. Neither did he divert any portion of
such investment to the Swagman Group of Companies.

The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Upon receipt of a
copy of the said resolution on June 16, 1999, counsel of Nash filed a motion for reconsideration.
On May 8, 2000, Nash himself received a copy of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration.

On May 19, 2000, Nash filed an appeal with the Department of Justice, however, the same was
dismissed for having been filed out of time. Nash filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied again for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of ten (10) days.

Nash filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that the DOJ acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed his appeal and denied his
motion for reconsideration. The CA granted the petition and directed the City Prosecutor to
prosecute Hegerty for the crime of estafa.

Hegerty contends that since Nash’s appeal with the DOJ and his motion for reconsideration
were both filed out of time, the prosecutor’s resolution had become final and executory.
Consequently, the DOJ and the CA never acquired jurisdiction over the case. Corollarily, the CA
does not have the authority to order the filing of a case in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the prosecutor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the criminal complaint for estafa against Hegerty.

RULING: NO

The Supreme Court ruled that the City Prosecutor had the duty to determine whether there was
a prima facie case for estafa based on sufficient evidence that would warrant the filing of an
information. A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a
criminal information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient
evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner.

The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is

recognized as an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. Thus, the determination of
the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with discretion
in the discharge of this function.
The Supreme Court further ruled that the remedy of mandamus does not lie to compel the City
Prosecutor to file an Information against Hegerty. There being no showing of grave abuse of
discretion which will warrant the reversal of the dismissal of the complaint against Hegerty, there
is also no ground to issue a writ of mandamus. In the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove
that the City Prosecutor gravely abused his discretion when he dismissed the complaint for
estafa filed against Hegerty.

The rule is settled that the Supreme Court’s duty in an appropriate case is confined to
determining whether the executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, although it is entirely possible
that the investigating fiscal may erroneously exercise the discretion lodged in him by law, this
does not render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Manila, which
dismissed the complaint against petitioner for estafa, and the Resolution of the Department of
Justice which denied respondent’s appeal, are REINSTATED.

Ocampo v. Abando, 715 SCRA 673 (2014)

FACTS

(These are 4 consolidated cases, the petitioners in each case are: Saturnino C. Ocampo,
Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis, Vicente P. Ladlad)

On Aug. 26, 2006 a mass grave was discovered by Philippine Army at Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte. The grave contained skeletal remains of individuals believed to be victims of
"Operation Venereal Disease" launched by members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines / New People’s Army / National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP). An investigation was conducted, then the Inter-Agency Legal Action Group
(IALAG) came up with the names of 10 possible victims. Now, the relatives of the alleged filed a
complaint.

Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring the petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits.
Subsequently, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of
multiple murder. Judge Ephrem S. Abando then issued an Order finding probable cause "in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged

Petitioners argued that they were denied due process because they did not receive the
subpoena due to false address and they did not also received the copy of the complaint and the
attached documents or evidence

ISSUE

Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary investigation

RULING (NO)
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to protect the innocent from
the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary
investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a
component of due process in the administration of criminal justice

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint
based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts
to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing
evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil
underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the
named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only
because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that they
were not served copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence

WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED.

Estrada v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212140, 21 January 2015