Chair’s Cases 2022

Civil Law
Emily L. San Gaspar-Gito
Associate Justice
Court of Appeals
Professor of Law, MCLE and Bar Lecturer
 WAY TO PASS THE BAR
Codal Provisions

Doctrinal Cases

Chairman’s Ponencias

Cases at least five years before the bar

Persons and Family Relations
 Republic vs. Melvin T. Villacorta
G.R. No. 249953, 23 June 2021
(wife’s concealment of pregnancy)
FACTS:
In April 2001, Melvin learned that his girlfriend Janufi was pregnant. Although Melvin had
doubts on the paternity of the child, Janufi assured him that he was the only person she had
sexual intercourse with.
On December 1, 2001, Janufi gave birth to a baby girl. Janufi and Melvin started living
together, and after almost three years on August 14, 2004, they finally got married.
In 2010, the couple had a quarrel where the recurring issue of the child’s paternity was
brought up. Melvin finally decided to take a DNA test. The DNA results revealed that there
was 0.0% probability that Melvin was the father of the child.
Melvin filed a petition for annulment of marriage before the RTC. The RTC annulled the
marriage on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) in relation to Article 46 (2) of the Family
Code. The OSG appealed the decision but the CA dismissed the appeal.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the concealment of

pregnancy that occurred three (3) years prior
to the celebration of marriage constitutes
fraud that warrants the annulment of
marriage.
 HELD:
• No. Concealment of the fact of pregnancy that occurred years before the
time of marriage (i.e. the concealed pregnancy did not exist at the time of
the celebration of marriage) does not constitute fraud as a ground for
annulment. The Court has held that not all fraudulent acts can be invoked to
annul a marriage. The circumstances of fraud under Article 45 (3) and
Article 46 of the Family Code are exclusive and restrictive, and the wife’s
purported fraud does not fall squarely under Article 46(2) which is
“concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage,
she was pregnant by a man other than her husband.”
 People vs. Camenforte and Lastrilla
G.R. No. 220916, 14 June 2021
(civil case considered prejudicial question even filed after the criminal case)

• FACTS:
Three (3) criminal cases for Falsification were filed for the alleged forgery of Deeds of Sale.
While the criminal cases were pending, the children of the vendors in the Deeds of Sale
filed a civil case, a Complaint for Nullification of Title and Deeds with Damages against Lastrilla. They
alleged that the subject Deeds were falsified and hence null and void.
The trial court dismissed the Complaint. It was proved that the signatures were not forged.
An appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was also dismissed and an Entry of Judgment was
thereafter issued.
 ISSUE:

Whether or not the findings in the civil

case that the signatures are genuine would
constitute a prejudicial question that would
bar the prosecution of the criminal case that
preceded the civil case.
 HELD:
Yes, the categorical finding that the forgery is baseless is determinative of the
guilt of the accused in the criminal case filed before the civil action.

Although the facts involve a criminal action which preceded the institution
of the civil action, a prejudicial question nevertheless exists because the strict
sequence of the institution of the two actions is more directory than
mandatory, and must give way to whether or not the actions involve prejudicial
issues and facts that are similar or are otherwise intimately related so that a resolution
in one concludes the resolution in the other. Since the pivotal issue of forgery has
been settled in the civil case with finality, the prosecution of the very same issues in
the pending criminal cases should be barred.
 3.
Spouses Cueno v. Spouses Bautista
G.R. No. 246445, March 02, 2021
(Sale of property without consent of wife under the Civil Code: voidable not void)
FACTS:

In 1967, before the effectivity of the Family Code and during the effectivity
of the Civil Code, Hubby sold his share to Buyer without Wifey’s consent.
Thereafter, Buyer sold the property to another.
 ISSUE:

Whether the sale of the property without

the consent of the wife is void or voidable
under the Civil Code provisions regarding
sale of conjugal property by the spouse.
 HELD
The sale executed by the husband during the effectivity of the Civil Code
(before the Family Code) without marital consent is voidable and not void. The
requirement of marital consent under Article 166 of the Civil Code should be read in
relation to Article 173 which provides that “[t]he wife may, during the marriage, and
within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment
of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her
or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.”

The remedies and limitations provided under Article 173 are completely
inconsistent with the nature of void contracts, which are subject to collateral attacks
by interested parties, do not prescribe, and have no force and effect.
 Perez, Jr. v. Perez-Senerpida
G.R. No. 233365, 24 March 2021
(consent of the spouse to donation, required even if the marriage is void)

FACTS:
Spouses Eliodoro and Adelita were the registered owners of a parcel of land.
Prior to his marriage with Adelita, Eliodoro was married and had several children, one
of whom was Nicxon Perez, Sr., who sired Nicxon, Jr.
In 1995, Adelita executed a Renunciation and Waiver of Rights in favor of Eliodoro.
In 2004, Eliodoro donated the parcel of land to the petitioner Nicxon Jr..
In 2005, Eliodoro filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Art. 36 of the Family Code. The court eventually declared the marriage between
Eliodoro and Adelita void ab initio.
 ISSUE

Whether or not consent to the

donation of property acquired during the
cohabitation of a man and a woman under a
void marriage is required just like in a
lawfully married couple.
 HELD
Yes. For a couple living under a void marriage, consent of the other party is
required for the donation of property acquired during cohabitation under a void
marriage.
Article 147 of the Family Code covers the exclusive cohabitation of a man and
woman as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.
While it is true that Article 147 provides that the property acquired during the
cohabitation shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership, the same provision also
states that "[n]either party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation."
Spouses Anastacio v. Heirs of the Late Spouses Coloma et al.
G.R. No. 224572, 27 August 2020
(presumption of conjugal ownership)
FACTS:
Spouses Juan and Juliana Coloma owned a parcel of land. The certificate of title
shows that the husband Juan is the registered owner since 1965, with the certificate
also showing that he is married to Juliana. When both Juan and Juliana died, they left
the respondents Rudy Coloma and Marcela Reyes as their legitimate heirs.
Petitioner Spouses Anastacio claimed right of ownership over the subject property
by virtue of an alleged Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Juan during his lifetime.
 cont.
The Heirs of Spouses Coloma argued that the Deed of Absolute Sale is void because
their mother, Juliana, did not give her consent to the alleged sale.
However, petitioner Spouses Anastacio make the following arguments:
(a) that the consent of Juliana was not necessary to effect a valid sale since the subject
property was the sole property of Juan as stated in the certificate of title and also according
to the testimony of Juan’s paramour who lived with him after the acquisition of the subject
property; and
(b) that Heirs of Spouses Coloma have the burden to prove that the subject property was
owned by both Juan and Juliana, having made that allegation in the Complaint.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the burden to

prove that the property acquired
during the marriage is conjugal lies
on the party making such allegation.
 HELD

No. Once the fact that the properties were acquired during the marriage is proved, there
is a presumption that such properties are conjugal until the contrary is proved. Article 116 of the
Family Code provides that “[a]ll property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears
to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved.” In 1965, the prevailing property regime between husband and
wife was the CPG.
In this case, the burden of proof is on petitioner Spouses Anastacio who are alleging that the
parcel of land is exclusively owned by Juan. The mere registration of the property in the name of Juan
does not rebut the presumption that the parcel of land acquired during the marriage is conjugal.
Petitioners could not have established that the subject property was purchased with the
exclusive money of Juan through the testimony of his paramour because she testified that she became
his live-in partner only beginning which was after the acquisition of the subject property by Juan
 Meneses v. Lee-Meneses
G.R. No. 200182, 13 March 2019
(Article 36, psychological incapacity)
Is a spouse who considers money and material needs as the essence of
marriage psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations to warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code?
 HELD

The petition was denied because of the failure of the petitioner to

prove juridical antecedence.
While Dr. Lopez attributes the gravity of Linda's disorder to her
alleged unhealthy childhood, none of the informants whom he interviewed
claims to have known Linda since childhood. Moreover, neither Marife nor
Ronilo appear to have known Linda prior to the marriage in question. This
significantly impairs the weight of Dr. Lopez's findings, insofar as they are
based on the informants' narration of Linda's childhood events and
circumstances which they appear to have no personal knowledge of.
 Cynthia A. Galapon v. Republic
G.R. No. 243722, 22 January 2020
(petition for recognition of foreign divorce)
FACTS
Cynthia Galapon, a Filipina, and Park, a South Korean national, got married in the City
of Manila, Philippines on February 27, 2012. When their relationship turned sour, they filed
a divorce by mutual agreement in South Korea.
After the divorce was confirmed by the Cheongju Local Court, Cynthia filed before the
RTC a Petition for the Judicial Recognition of a Foreign Divorce. The RTC granted the Recognition
Petition.
The OSG appealed the decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals, in granting the
OSG’s appeal, held that the divorce decree in question cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction insofar as Cynthia is concerned since it was obtained by mutual agreement or
at the instance of both spouses.
 ISSUE

Whether or not a divorce

obtained by mutual agreement
abroad can be judicially recognized in
the Philippines.
 HELD
Yes. In the recent case of Manalo, the Court en banc extended the scope of
Article 26(2) to even cover instances where the divorce decree is obtained solely by the
Filipino spouse. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."
Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there
be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the
alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26 (2) applies to mixed
marriages where the divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the foreign spouse; (ii)
obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by
the Filipino spouse.
Obligations and Contracts
 Spouses Rodriguez vs. Export and Industry Bank, Inc.
(Formerly, Urban Bank, Inc.)
G.R. No. 214520, 14 June 2021
(extinctive novation)
FACTS:
In 1997, Urban Bank granted individual credit accommodations called “ReadyCheck Mortgage Lines” (RCMLs)
to Spouses Rodriguez in the amounts of P3 M and P2M, respectively. Mortgage contracts were executed covering their
agricultural land in Negros Occidental and their residential property in Makati.
In 1999, Urban Bank granted Rolando an increased RCML amounting to P6M. The terms and conditions are
written in a Letter-Agreement which includes the following clause, among others.
13. This facility shall CANCEL the individual RCML of Ms. Cynthia C. Rodriguez for P3,591,000.00 with
Account No. 7255-00017-0 and the individual RCML of Mr. Rolando C. Rodriguez with Account No. 7255-
00016-4. The Negros property securing the existing individual RCML of Ms. Cynthia C. Rodriguez shall also
be released.
Spouses Rodriguez executed and Additional Mortgage Agreement covering the Makati property.
EIB acquired the assets of Urban Bank through a merger. In 2002, EIB demanded payment pertaining to the 1997
individual RCML of Rolando. EIB argued that the individual RCMLs were still in effect and were merely consolidated in
the 1999 RCML. Spouses Rodriguez contend that the individual RCMLs were already extinguished.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the term “cancel,” in

the absence of a qualifying stipulation,
should be construed to effect a complete
extinguishment of the previous obligations
in lieu of the new one.
 HELD

Yes. EIB’s written demands were ineffective as they pertained to

obligations extinguished by the 1999 RCML. Novation is the
substitution or alteration of an obligation by a subsequent one which
may be total/extinctive or partial. In the absence of any qualifying
stipulation, the term “cancel” in Clause 13 should be interpreted in the
literal sense, and should be construed to effect a complete cancellation
and extinguishment, through extinctive novation, of Spouses Rodriguez’s
individual RCMLs and the creation of the 1999 RCML in lieu thereof.
 Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Plast-Print Industries, Inc. and
Reynaldo Dequito
G.R. No. 199308, June 19, 2019
(no total novation)
FACTS:
Plast-Print applied for credit facilities with RCBC in order to have a bigger working
capital and for expansion. The credit facilities were secured by a real estate mortgage. Plast-
Print failed to settle its obligations despite repeated demands.
RCBC filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the properties covered by Plast-
Print’s real estate mortgage. After the first auction sale was conducted, Plast-Print obtained
an order from the SEC for a 30-day suspension of payments.
Negotiations ensued between Plast-Print and the creditors that led to the execution of a
Restructuring Agreement. Sec. 2 and Sec. 15 of the Agreement provide the following
stipulations:
Cont.
Section 2. Restructuring commitment/Consequence of Restructuring. The DEBTORS
commit to fully pay the Restructured Loans including interests accrued thereon subject
to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. This [Restructuring] Agreement, once
effective as of the Restructuring Date, shall exclusively control and govern the mutual
rights and obligations of the DEBTORS and each CREDITOR with respect to the
debts owing to the latter. The existing agreements as to such debts shall be
deemed superseded by this [Restructuring] Agreement.
Section 15. Security for the Restructured Loans. To secure the prompt and full
repayment of the Restructured Loans and the compliance by the DEBTORS with any
and all of its obligations under the Credit Documents, the CREDITORS agree to
maintain the status quo vis-a-•vis each of the collaterals of whatever nature
presently mortgaged in their favor without any arrangement for consolidation or
sharing of such collaterals.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the loan

restructuring agreement which
mentions the “superseding” of
“existing agreements” constitute
extinctive novation.
 HELD
No. While the provisions of the Restructuring Agreement had the
effect of "superseding" the "existing agreements" as to Plast-Print's loans, the
changes contemplated in said agreement merely modified certain terms
relating to such contracts.
These modifications, while significant, do not amount to a total
novation of Plast-Print's outstanding loans so as to extinguish the real estate
mortgage constituted to secure such loans, or nullify the foreclosure of
properties conducted before these modifications had taken effect. By the very
terms of the Restructuring Agreement, Plast-Print and its creditors agreed to
maintain the status quo vis-a-vis the subsisting mortgages constituted in
favor of its creditors, including RCBC.
 Yujuico v. Far East Bank and Trust Company
(Now Bank of the Philippine Islands)
G.R. No. 186196, 15 August 2018
(no extinctive novation, change of donomination peso to dollar)
FACTS:
Yujuico, as surety, and Far East Bank signed a Loan Restructuring Agreement (LRA), the
subject of which was GTI's outstanding balance on its Omnibus Credit Line in the amount of
P25M., with a request for the re-denomination of its loan obligation to US dollars. After the
signing of the restructuring agreement, GTI, reiterated its request for the re-denomination of its
loan obligation to US dollars. Far East Bank, however, denied the request.
GTI filed against appellant bank a Complaint for Specific Performance with the RTC, alleging
that during the signing of the loan restructuring agreement, Yujuico and GTI were assured by the
officers of appellant bank that GTI's peso loan would be converted to US dollars.
The RTC ruled that appellant bank indeed agreed to convert to US dollar appellee GTI's peso
loan obligation. The conversion also resulted in the novation of appellee GTI's loan obligation. As a
result, Yujuico was accordingly released from his obligations as surety pursuant to Article 1215 of
the New Civil Code in conjunction with paragraph 1 of Article 1291 of the same Code.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the Loan Restructuring

Agreement constitutes an implied novation
of GTI’s loan obligation, and as result,
releases the obligations of the surety.
 HELD:
No, there is no substantial incompatibility between the obligations of the parties under the
restructuring agreement and the agreement to convert the loan as to warrant a finding of an implied novation.
Implied novation necessitates that the incompatibility between the old and new obligations be total on
every point such that the old obligation is completely superseded by the new one.

This is not the case here.

The only modification that the conversion agreement introduced was that GTI's and
petitioner Yujuico's loan obligation would be payable in US dollars instead of Philippine pesos. These
alterations do not suffice to constitute novation. The well- settled rule is that, with respect to obligations to pay
a sum of money, the obligation is not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old, changes only
the terms of payment, adds other obligations not incompatible with the old ones, or the new contract merely
supplements the old one. Hence, the agreement to convert the Peso-denominated restructured loan into a US
Dollar-denominated one is an implied or tacit, partial, modificatory novation. There was merely a change in
the method of payment.
 Pineda v. Zuñiga vda. de Vega
G.R. No. 233774, April 10, 2019
(demand: extra-judicial or judicial)
FACTS;
Petitioner Pineda alleged that respondent borrowed from her P500K payable within one year
with an interest rate of 8% per month. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage. On the
loan’s maturity, respondent failed to pay despite the respondent’s receipt of a demand letter.
Petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC against respondent for the payment of the principal
obligation and the interest thereon or, in default of such payment, the foreclosure of the property
subject of a real estate mortgage. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. The CA did
not find any competent proof that respondent actually received the demand letter. The
CA concluded that for failing to prove the requisite demand under Article 1169 of the Civil
Code, respondent could not be considered in default and petitioner's case must fail.
 ISSUE

Whether or not delay on the

part of the obligor or debtor can
only be triggered by an extrajudicial
demand by the obligee or creditor.
 Held
NO. Demand may be judicial — if the creditor files a complaint against the debtor for the
fulfillment of the obligation — or extrajudicial — if the creditor demands from the debtor the
fulfillment of the obligation either orally or in writing.

While delay on the part of respondent was not triggered by an extrajudicial demand because
petitioner had failed to so establish receipt of her demand letter, this delay was triggered when
petitioner judicially demanded the payment of respondent's loan from petitioner.
The CA failed to acknowledge that when petitioner filed her complaint dated June
10, 2005, such filing constituted the judicial demand upon respondent to pay the latter's
principal obligation and the interest thereon.
Industrial Personnel and Management Services, Inc. v. Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation
G.R. No. 194126, October 17, 2018
(autonomy of contracts)

FACTS:
Due to the monetary advances of IPAMS to the nurse applicants that it will be deploying in
the United States, the nurses were required to post surety bond. The Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation and IPAMS agreed to provide bonds for the said nurses.
In the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), the parties stipulated various requirements for
collecting claims from Country Bankers, namely: two demand letters requiring the nurse
applicants to submit complete documents, and affidavit stating the reason of any
violations, a Statement of Account, and a Transmittal Claim Letter.
On the basis of the MOA, IPAMS submitted its claims under the surety bonds. However,
Country Bankers started to not settle the claims and insisted for the production of official
receipts from IPAMS on the expenses of the nurses. IPAMS opposed this due to its
impossibility considering the US authorities did not issue official receipts.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the parties

intended to agree on an exclusive
list of requirements as stipulated in
the Memorandum of Agreement.
 HELD
Yes. Under the principle of autonomy of contracts, the contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.
Petitioner IPAMS and respondent Country Bankers in essence made a stipulation to the
effect that mere demand letters, affidavits, and statements of accounts are enough
proof of actual damages — that more direct and concrete proofs of expenditures by the
petitioner such as official receipts have been dispensed with in order to prove actual losses.
As to why the parties agreed on the sufficiency of the listed requirements under the
MOA goes into the motives of the parties, considering that the processing of applications of
nurses in the
U.S. are generally not subject to the issuance of official receipts by the U.S. government
and its agencies.
 Redentor Catapang and Casiana Catapang Garbin v. Lipa
Bank
G.R. No. 240645,
(no meeting of minds)
FACTS:
Spouses Alejandro and Rosalinda Catapang. Parents of Redentor, obtained a loan from Lipa Bank. The
loan was secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the Spouses Catapang’s property. The Spouses
Catapang failed to pay the loan and consequently, the mortgage was foreclosed. Thereafter, the property was
consolidated in the name of Lipa Bank.
Lipa Bank refused to negotiate with the Spouses Catapang and instead offered Redentor to buy the
subject property. Out of the required P400,000 downpayment, only P200,000 was paid.
Allegedly, without petitioner Redentor's knowledge and consent, respondent Lipa Bank successfully
convinced his Aunt Casiana, to sign a Promissory Note dated June 30, 1999 for a P270k loan and a
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated August 6, 1999 over the subject property for P1.4M. Petitioners
Redentor and Casiana alleged that the execution of the aforesaid Promissory Note and Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage was tainted with fraud, undue influence, and trickery.
 ISSUE

Whether or not there is a meeting of the

minds as to the Promissory Note and Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage entered into
between Casiana and Lipa Bank.
 HELD
No. Casiana had no intention whatsoever to borrow any money from Lipa
Bank. It was simply her understanding that petitioner Redentor had already obtained
a loan from respondent Lipa Bank and that she merely was aiding her nephew by
providing a "garantiya" to the loan by way of lending her owner's duplicate
certificate of title to petitioner Redentor so that the latter could show it to
respondent Lipa Bank.
It was also clear to her that giving the title as "garantiya" was different, and
did not mean that it would be used as collateral for Redentor's loan. This shows that
there was no meeting of the minds as to the subject matter of the supposed
contracts. Hence, where the contracting parties do not agree as to the subject matter
of the contract, consent is absent, making the contract null and void.
• A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service. There can be no contract unless all of the following requisites
concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the
subject matter of the contract; and (3) the cause of the obligation which is
established. When one of the elements is wanting, no contract can be
perfected.
• ART. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is
in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the
person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been
fully explained to the former.
• Article 1332 was intended for the protection of a party to a contract
who is at a disadvantage due to his illiteracy, ignorance, mental
weakness or other handicap. This article contemplates a situation
wherein a contract has been entered into, but the consent of one of
the parties is vitiated by mistake or fraud committed by the other
contracting party.
 Domestic Petroleum Retailer Corporation v. Manila International
Airport Authority
G.R. No. 210641, March 27, 2019
(solution indebiti)
FACTS:
Petitioner Domestic Petroleum Corp. (DPRC) entered into a Contract of
Lease with Manila International Airport Authority whereby DPRC leased from
MIAA a parcel of land and a building. DPRC was obliged to pay monthly
rentals. On April 1998, MIAA passed Resolution Nos. 98 -30 and 99-11
increasing the rentals, but the resolutions were nullified by the Supreme Court
in another case for non-observance of notice and hearing requirements. DPRC
demanded the refund of its overpayment of rentals based on the nullified
resolution.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the overpayment

of rentals by the lessee and its receipt
by the lessor constitute the quasi-
contract of solution indebiti.
 HELD
• No, there is no solution indebiti. In order to establish the application of solutio
indebiti in a given situation, two conditions must concur: (1) a payment is made
when there exists no binding relation between the payor who has no duty to pay,
and the person who received the payment, and (2) the payment is made through
mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause.
• In the instant case, the Court finds that the essential requisites of solutio indebiti are
not present. There exists a binding relation between petitioner DPRC and
respondent MIAA, there was no payment by mistake. MIAA and petitioner DPRC
are mutually bound to each other under a Contract of Lease, and petitioner DPRC
deliberately made the payments in accordance with respondent MIAA's Resolution
No. 98-30, albeit under protest.
Sales and Lease
 Spouses Beltran vs Spouses Cangayda Jr.
GR NO. 225033, August 15, 2018
(contract to sell: contract of sale)
FACTS:
Respondents verbally agreed to sell the disputed property to petitioners for P35k. After making an
initial payment, petitioners took possession of the disputed property and built their family home thereon.
Petitioners subsequently made additional payments, which, together with their initial payment, collectively
amounted to P29k. Despite respondents' repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay their remaining
balance of P5k. They amicably settled before the barangay but still petitioners failed to pay within the
said period. Nearly 17 years after the expiration of petitioners' period to pay their remaining balance,
respondents served upon petitioners a "Last and Final Demand" to vacate the disputed property within 30
days from notice. This demand was left unheeded.
Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages (Complaint) before the RTC.
Respondents alleged, among others, that petitioners had been occupying the disputed property without
authority, and without payment of rental fees. the RTC characterized the oral agreement between the
parties as a contract to sell. The CA affirmed the finding that the oral contract is a Contract to Sell.
 ISSUE

Whether the CA erred when it

affirmed the RTC Decision characterizing
the oral agreement between the parties as
a “contract to sell.”
 HELD
The agreement between the parties is an oral contract of sale. As a
consequence, ownership of the disputed property passed to petitioners upon its
delivery.
In a contract of sale, title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the
thing sold; whereas in a contract to sell, by agreement the ownership is reserved in
the vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of the price.
In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership
until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell,
title is retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price.
Based on the foregoing distinctions, the Court finds, and so holds, that the
oral agreement entered into by the parties constitutes a contract of sale and not a
contract to sell.
 Contract of Sale
A contract of sale is consensual in nature, and is perfected upon the concurrence
of its essential requisites thus: The essential requisites of a contract under Article 1318
of the New Civil Code are:
(1) consent of the contracting parties;
(2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and
(3) cause of the obligation which is established.
Thus, contracts, other than real contracts are perfected by mere consent which
is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause which are to constitute the contract. Once perfected, they bind other contracting
parties and the obligations arising therefrom have the force of law between the parties
and should be complied with in good faith.
 Spouses Agustin v. De Vera
G.R. No. 233455, April 03, 2019
(contract of sale: contract to sell)
FACTS:
De Vera was the owner of a parcel of residential land spouses. He entered into
a "Contract to Purchase and Sale“ with Spouses Agustin. As agreed, the Agustin
spouses paid the partial payment of P15,000.00 and immediately took
possession of the land. They had since constructed thereon their residential
house and paid the real estate taxes. Considering that De Vera had not yet
delivered the title, Spouses Agustin caused the annotation of an adverse claim
on TCT. De Vera later on sold the property to Romana. Gregorio died on the
same year.
 ISSUE

Whether the Contract to

Purchase and Sale entered into by
De Vera and Spouses Agustin is a
contract of sale or a contract to sell.
 HELD

The CA erred in finding that the Contract to Purchase and Sale is a

mere contract to sell; it is a contract of sale. Spouses Agustin has a better
claim on the property. According to Article 1458 of the Civil Code, by a
contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
the ownership and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.Accordingly, the elements
of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are:
(1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and
(3) price certain in money or its equivalent.
Cont.

It must be stressed that upon the execution of

the Contract to Purchase and Sale, De Vera ceded the
possession of the subject property to Spouses Agustin.
It is not disputed that petitioner Spouses Agustin
immediately took possession of the subject property,
had constructed thereon their residential house, and
paid the real estate taxes upon the subject property.
 Lolita Mendoza and Spouses Gutierrez v. Spouses Palugod
G.R. No. 220517, June 20, 2018
(presumption of consideration in a deed of absolute sale)
FACTS:
Lolita and Jasminia were closed friends. They bought a parcel of land. Later
Jasminia got cancer and subsequently died in 2004. Before her death in 2004,
Jasminia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Lolita, who eventually
mortgaged the subject property to Spouses Gutierrez as a security for a loan.
When she was nearing her death, Jasminia told her mother, Natividad Palugod,
that her house and lot shall go to her brother Ramonito Palugod, but Jasminia
shall be allowed to stay therein.
 ISSUE

Whether the CA erred in not

upholding as applicable to the case the legal
principle that a written contract is for a valuable
consideration despite the utter failure to prove
that there was indeed no consideration
 HELD

In the situation, Spouses Palugod have the burden of proof in the

present case. The rule is that if neither party was able to make out a case,
neither side having established his/her cause of action, the Court can only
leave them where they are and it has no choice but to dismiss the complaint,
as the lower courts should have done. Consequently, the DAS executed by
Jasminia in favor of petitioner Lolita over the subject property is valid,
the presumption that it has sufficient consideration not having been
rebutted. The same holds true regarding the Real Estate Mortgage between
petitioner Lolita and petitioners spouses Gutierrez.
Spouses Gaspar v. Disini, Yu, Legacy Lending Investor and Salita
G.R. No. 239644, February 03, 2021
(effect, illicit object of sale)

FACTS:
• Marquez is the registered owner of a Pajero. He mortgaged it to Legacy
Lending Investor, owned by Yu, with Salita as the latter’s employee. Marquez
failed to pay his loan, leading Legacy to seize the Pajero. To facilitate the
disposal of the Pajero, Marquez executed and signed a Deed of Sale in blank.
Spouses Gaspar who are engaged in the business of buying and selling
second-hand vehicles, purchased the subject Pajero from Legacy and sold it
to Disini. Disini filled in his details and signed the Deed of Sale previously
executed by Marquez,
 YU

SPOUSES GASPAR
LEGACY
LENDING CO.

MARQUEZ

DISINI
 ISSUE

Did the CA err in dismissing the third-party

complaint filed by Spouses Gaspar against Yu?
Did the CA err in holding that Yu and Salita
are not liable to pay Spouses Gaspar attorney's
fees?
 HELD
YES, the CA erred. The Court finds Yu solely liable to reimburse Spouses
Gaspar the unpaid portion of the purchase price of the subject Pajero with
legal interest. Yu's liability is anchored on the nullity of the COS he executed
with Spouses Gaspar. In addition, Yu is liable to pay Spouses Gaspar attorney's
fees as he unjustifiably refused in bad faith to satisfy the latter's valid claim.
Salita is not liable as she is only an employee and she acted only for and in
behalf of Yu.
Evidently, Yu had no right to transfer the ownership of the subject Pajero at
the time it was delivered to Spouses Gaspar, as the object of the COS is
clearly illicit.
 By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself or
herself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the
other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. In turn, the
elements of a valid contract of sale are: (i) consent or meeting of the minds;
(ii) determinate subject matter; and (iii) price certain in money or its
equivalent. With respect to the second element, it is further required that
the thing which is the subject matter of the contract must be licit, and
that the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the
time it is delivered.
 Here, the object of the COS turned out to be a vehicle stolen from the
Office of the President which was immediately confiscated when Disini was
cited for illegal parking. As a general rule, the possession of movable
property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. This general rule,
however, does not apply in cases where the owner of said movable
property has been unlawfully deprived of the same, as in this case where
the vehicle subject of the COS had been stolen.
 The implied warranties against hidden
defects and eviction do not apply.
• The implied warranty against hidden defects pertains to defects which render the thing sold unfit for
the use for which it is intended, or should diminish its fitness for such use to such an extent that, had
the vendee been aware thereof, would not have acquired it or would have given a lower price. 46 As its
nomenclature suggests, hidden defects pertain to imperfections or defects of the object sold. Such is
not the case here, where the subject Pajero, albeit stolen, was in working condition, and was in fact
being used by Disini for its intended purpose when it was confiscated by the authorities.
• On the other hand, a breach of the warranty against eviction presupposes the concurrence of the
following requisites: (i) the purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the thing sold; (ii) this
eviction is by a final judgment; (iii) the basis thereof is by virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the
vendor; and (iv) the vendor has been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the
instance of the vendee. 47 Here, Disini was not deprived of possession on the basis of a final
judgment. In fact, based on the records, it would appear that Disini did not contest the confiscation of
the subject Pajero when he was informed that it had been stolen from the Office of the President.
 Since the warranties do not apply but the contract is null
for having an illicit object, third-party complaint is not barred
by the 6-month prescriptive period; it is imprescriptible.
• Since none of the foregoing warranties apply, the six-month prescriptive
period under Article 1571 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. As the third-
party complaint filed by Spouses Gaspar assumes the nature of an action to
declare the inexistence of a contract due to its illicit object, said complaint is
imprescriptible under Article 1409. The CA thus erred when it dismissed the
third-party complaint on the ground of prescription.
(Spouses Gaspar v. Disini, Jr., G.R. No. 239644, [February 3, 2021])
 Spouses Sy v. De Vera-Navarro
G.R. No. 239088
(equitable mortgage)
FACTS:
Petitioners borrowed P3.7M from respondent, secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage Contract (Mortgage Contract) over a four-storey building.
Immediately after the execution of the Mortgage Contract, as per usual
practice, respondent asked petitioners to execute an undated Deed of
Absolute Sale with a stated consideration in the amount of P5M, supposedly
for the purpose of providing additional security for the loan. The payment of
the loan was supposed to be taken from the rentals coming from the four-
storey building. To the surprise of petitioners, respondent executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of BHTLI.
 ISSUE

Whether the contract between

petitioners and respondent is a
contract of sale or an equitable
mortgage.
 HELD
The purported contract of sale between petitioners and respondent
is an equitable mortgage and not a legitimate contract of
sale.
An equitable mortgage is defined as one which although lacking in some
formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute,
nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as
security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. Its
essential requisites are: (1) that the parties entered into a contract
denominated as a contract of sale; and (2) that their intention was to
secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage
 In case of doubt, favour a lesser
transmission of rights and interest.
FOUR BADGES OF EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
First, it is not disputed by any party that the supposed vendor of the subject
property, petitioners, remain to be in possession of the subject property.
Second, the purchase price is inadequate.
Third, the evidence on record shows that respondent retained for herself the
supposed purchase price.
Fourth, from the evidence presented by petitioners, it is established that the real
intention of the parties is to merely secure the payment of their debt owing to
respondent
 Heirs of Corazon Villeza v. Aliangan Sisters
G.R. No. 244667, December 02, 2020

FACTS:
Corazon was the registered owner of three (3) parcels of land. During her
lifetime, she sold the subject properties to sisters Elizabeth and Rosalina. She
executed a Deed of Conditional Sale with respect to the Centro property
but the sales of the Bunay and Poblacion properties are simply done
orally. Corazon died without executing any deed of conveyance in the sister’s
favor and despite full payment of purchase price of the Bunay and
Poblacion properties. The sisters thus filed an Action or specific
performance and damages. The RTC ruled in their favor.
 ISSUES

Whether or not there is a perfected sale.

Should the heirs of Corazon be required to execute the Deed of

Absolute Sale?

Are oral contracts unenforceable?

 HELD
• AS TO CENTRO PROPERTY: Given the stipulation: "[t]hat the
corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale [(DAS)] shall be executed by the
VENDORS upon full payment of the balance," the CA correctly
characterized the DCS as a “contract to sell.” As defined in Article 1458
of the Civil Code, a contract of sale is a contract whereby one of the
contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership and to deliver
a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or
its equivalent. It may be absolute or conditional. In a contract of sale, the
seller transfers the property sold to the buyer for a consideration called the
price, which means ownership is transferred to the buyer upon its execution
through any of the modes of delivery or tradition.
 On the other hand, in a “contract to sell,” the seller merely "agrees to
transfer" the property object of the sale to the buyer for a consideration called
the price, which implies that ownership is not right away transferred to the
buyer. Pursuant to Article 1478 of the Civil Code, even if the object of the
sale is delivered to the buyer upon the execution of the contract, the parties
may still stipulate that the ownership in the thing shall not pass to the
purchaser until he has fully paid the price.
 As the sellers, it was incumbent upon the heirs of Corazon to comply with
their obligations under Article 1458 of the Civil Code which are "to transfer
the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing," and Article 1495, which
provides that "[t]he vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver,
as well as warrant the thing which is the object of the sale."
What if the land still belongs to another at
the time DCS was executed?
Like a contract of sale, a contract to sell is consensual. It is perfected at the
moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of
the contract and upon the price. At this stage, the seller's ownership of the
thing sold is not an element in the perfection of the contract of sale. It is,
therefore, not required that, at the perfection stage, the seller be the owner of
the thing sold or even that such subject matter of the sale exists at that point in
time. Thus, under Article 1434 of the Civil Code, when a person sells or
alienates a thing which, at that time, was not his, but later acquires title thereto,
such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee. This is the same
principle behind the sale of "future goods" under Article 1462.
 However, under Article 1459, at the time
of delivery or consummation stage of the sale, it is required that the seller
be the owner of the thing sold. Otherwise, he will not be able to comply with
his obligation to transfer ownership to the buyer. It is at the consummation
stage where the principle of nemo dat quod non habet [(one cannot give
what one does not have)] applies.
 Statute of Frauds
• The Statute of Frauds embodied in Article 1403, paragraph (2), of the Civil
Code requires certain contracts enumerated therein to be evidenced by some
note or memorandum in order to be enforceable.
• Note, the contract is not invalid; it is just unenforceable.
 NOTE:
• Even if the requirement of a note, memorandum or writing in Article 1403 (2)
is not met, contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds become enforceable when
they are ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of oral
evidence to prove the same, or by acceptance of benefits under them
according to Article 1405 of the Civil Code.
• It is the well-established rule that the Statute of Frauds is applicable only to
executory contracts and not to partially or totally consummated ones, and
the basis of this rule is the fact that in consummated contracts, there is already
a ratification of the contract by acceptance of benefits within the meaning of
Article 1405
 Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court does not apply because said section
presupposes that there is no controversy as to the contract contemplated therein

• Section 8, Rule 89 presupposes a pending probate or administration

proceeding for the testate or intestate estate of a decedent.
The heirs of Corazon have not initiated a special proceeding for the
settlement of her estate where an administrator has been appointed. Without
such special proceeding, respondents are not required to make an application
to authorize the administrator to convey the subject properties according to
the contracts that Corazon entered into but was unable to execute due to her
death.
As correctly observed by the CA, subject to settled exceptions not present in the
instant three cases, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to
the determination of questions of ownership, and similarly, a
court of administration proceedings cannot determine questions which arise as to
the ownership of property alleged to be part of the decedent's estate, but claimed
by some other person to be his or her property, not by virtue of any
right of inheritance from the decedent, but by title adverse to that of the decedent
and the latter's estate. The institution by respondents of the actions for specific
performance was thus the proper recourse because petitioners dispute the
validity of the conveyances over the contested properties. (Heirs of Villeza v.
Aliangan, G.R. Nos. 244667-69, [December 2, 2020])
 Uy, substituted by his heirs v. Heirs of Uy-Renales
G.R. No. 227460, December 05, 2019

FACTS:
(effect of notarization)
In his Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages, Uy
maintains that upon the death of his mother, Labnao, in 1995, as the surviving offspring of
Labnao, he became the owner of one-half share of the subject lot and subject building owned
by his deceased mother, with the other half pertaining to the respondents, Heirs of his sister
Uy-Renales, as co-owners.
However, Uy discovered that the subject lot was allegedly fraudulently sold by his mother
Labnao in 1990 in favor of the respondents Heirs of Uy-Renales through a Deed of Absolute
Sale. Uy asserted that the signature of Labnao in the Deed of Absolute Sale is a patent
forgery. The CA relied heavily on the fact that the Deed was duly notarized and
therefore has in its favor the presumption of regularity.
 ISSUE

Whether there was a contract of sale

that was entered into between the parties'
predecessor-in-interest, Labnao, and the Heirs
of Uy-Renales, transferring ownership over
the subject lot in the latter's favor.
 HELD

The Deed of Absolute Sale was not properly notarized. Because

the Deed of Absolute Sale was not properly notarized, it cannot be
presumed to have been regularly executed. Even if there is a document
that purports to be a contract of sale, if there is strong countervailing
evidence establishing the want of consent or meeting of the minds, there is
no contract of sale. In Spouses Salonga v. Spouses Concepcion, it was held that
the notarization of a document does not guarantee its validity because
it is not the function of the notary public to validate an instrument
that was never intended by the parties to have any binding legal effect.
 NOTE!

Simply stated, the existence,

veracity, and authenticity of a notarized
written deed of sale do not conclusively
determine whether all the essential
requisites of a contract are present.
EASEMENT
 Spouses Garcia v. Spouses Santos
G.R. No. 228334, June 17, 2019
Land and house
originally owned by
Spouses Santos but
the house was later on
sold to Spouses Garcia
who have been residing
thereat for 11 years
LOT 1
Spouses Santos constructed a building affecting the light, air, and
view of Spouses Garcia
 ISSUE

Whether the Sps. Garcia have

acquired an easement of light and
view with respect to Lot 1 owned
by the Sps. Santos.
 HELD
YES. While it is a general rule that a window or opening situated on the
wall of the dominant estate involves a negative easement, and, thus, may only be
acquired by prescription, tacked from the time of the formal prohibition upon the
proprietor of the servient estate, it is not true that all windows or openings situated
on the wall of the dominant estate may only be acquired through prescription.
Aside from prescription, easements may likewise be acquired through title.
The term "title" does not necessarily mean a document. Instead, it refers to
a juridical act or law sufficient to create the encumbrance. One such legal
proviso which grants title to an easement is found in Article 624 of the Civil
Code.
 The mode of acquiring an easement under Article 624 is a "legal
presumption or apparent sign." Article 624 finds application in situations
wherein two or more estates were previously owned by a singular owner, or
even a single estate but with two or more portions being owned by a singular
owner. Originally, there is no true easement that exists as there is only one
owner. Hence, at the outset, no other owner is imposed with a burden.
Subsequently, one estate or a portion of the estate is alienated in favor of
another person, wherein, in that estate or portion of the estate, an apparent
visible sign of an easement exists.
 ARTICLE 624

According to Article 624, there arises a title to an

easement of light and view, even in the absence of any formal
act undertaken by the owner of the dominant estate, if this
apparent visible sign, such as the existence of a door and
windows, continues to remain and subsist, unless, at the time the
ownership of the two estates is divided, (1) the contrary should be
provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or (2) the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed.
 Article 624 is an exception.

Jurisprudence has recognized that Article 624 is an

exception carved out by the Civil Code that must be taken
out of the coverage of the general rule that an easement of
light and view in the case of windows opened in one's own
wall is a negative easement that may only be acquired by
prescription, tacked from a formal prohibition relayed to the
owner of the servient estate.
 Three-meter distance rule apply.

The three-meter distance rule is embodied in Article 673 of the

Civil Code, which states that whenever by any title a right has
been acquired to have direct views, balconies or belvederes
overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the servient
estate cannot build thereon at less than a distance
of three meters, not two meters, from the property line, to
be measured in the manner provided in Article 671.
 Art. 673 of the Civil Code

ART. 673. Whenever by any title a right has been

acquired to have direct views, balconies or belvederes
overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the servient
estate cannot build thereon at less than a distance of three
meters to be measured in the manner provided in Article
671. Any stipulation permitting distances less than those
prescribed in Article 670 is void.
 Art. 673 is an exception.

Article 673 is the exception to the general rule. In a situation wherein

an easement is established or recognized by title or prescription, affording
the dominant estate the right to have a direct view overlooking the adjoining
property, i.e., the servient estate, which is the exact situation in the instant
case, the two-meter requirement under Article 670 is not applicable. Instead,
Article 673 is the applicable rule as it contemplates the exact circumstance
attendant in the instant case, i.e., wherein an easement of view is created by
virtue of law. (Spouses Garcia v. Santos, G.R. No. 228334, [June 17, 2019])
DONATION
 Camarines Sur Teachers and Employees Association, Inc. v. Province of
Camarines Sur
G.R. No. 199666 October 07, 2019
(automatic revocation:donation)

FACTS:
The Province of Camarines Sur is the registered owner of a parcel of land. In 1966, the
Province, thru its Governor, donated a portion of said property to the Camarines Sur Teachers'
Association, Inc. (CASTEA) by virtue of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, subject to the
condition.
In 2007, the Province executed a Deed of Revocation of Donation thru Governor Villafuerte,
Jr. and served a copy thereof to CASTEA on October 17, 2007. On October 23, 2007, the
Province sent a demand letter to CASTEA for the latter to vacate the premises of the property
in question within 10 days from receipt of the letter. Therefafter, the Province filed an
Unlawful Detainer case against CASTEA.
•
 Conditions of the Donation
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above described
portion of the land subject of the present donation for no other purpose except the
construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named
DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc.,
in connection with its functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers'
Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED
FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or [e]ncumber the property
herein donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party and
Provided, lastly that the construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall be
commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation,
otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked and voided and of no
further force and effect
 ISSUES

Is the automatic revocation proper?

Should the unlawful detainer case prosper?

 HELD

It must be emphasized that the right to rescind or resolve by the

injured party is not absolute as the third paragraph of Article 1191
authorizes the court to fix a period; thus, rescission will not be granted in the
following cases: (1) where the breach is only slight or casual; (2) where there
has been substantial compliance; 66 and (3) where the court finds valid
reason for giving a period of fulfillment of the obligation. 67 Likewise, the
courts may deny revocation of a donation based on non-fulfillment of
"conditions" under Article 764 when the unperformed part is insignificant.
 Why not substantial?
• First, while an unregistered lease for more than one year is an encumbrance,
the encumbrance was not perpetual as it is time-bound to only 20 years,
which is not an unreasonable period.
• Second, the lease did not cover the entire donated 600-square meter lot and
the building that CASTEA constructed.
• Third, the rentals that were being collected were being given to members of
CASTEA as mutual aid and death benefits, as supported by evidence on
record.
• Fourth, CASTEA had already complied with its main prestation, which is the construction
of the intended building, and based on the language of the Deed of Donation.
• Fifth, the building constructed by CASTEA and the donated lot continue to be owned by
CASTEA and continue to house its offices pursuant to the mandate of the Deed of
Donation because only a portion of the building was leased to Bodega Glassware.
• Sixth, if the prohibited acts: "sell, mortgage or [e]ncumber" are to be interpreted in the light
of the objective or "condition" of the donation as quoted above, then in order for the breach
to reach the threshold of substantiality and fundamentality, the breach by CASTEA should be
of a permanent character as to totally and perpetually deprive CASTEA of the use of the
donated lot and the building that it constructed.
 In fine, the revocation of the Deed of Donation by the
Province is improper and lacks legal basis. However, given
that CASTEA disregarded the provision of the Deed of
Donation not to encumber the donated property, the Court
awards nominal damages in favor of the Province in an
amount equal to one half of the total rentals that CASTEA
received from Bodega Glassware.
MORTGAGE
 Atty. Bulatao v. Estonactoc
G.R. No. 235020 December 10, 2019
(although mortgage was ruled valid and effective, foreclosure
proceedings not given effect due to unconscionable loan interest)
FACTS:
Estonactoc executed a Deed of Mortgage of Real Property [(DMRP)] in
favor of Atty. Bulatao covering a parcel of land located as security for a loan in
the amount of P200k. When Estonactoc defaulted in her obligation, Atty.
Bulatao] foreclosed the mortgage and petitioned the court for the sale of the
subject property in a public auction. The Notice of Sale on Extra Judicial
Foreclosure of Property was issued.
 By reason of the impending sale of the subject property, Estonactoc filed a
Complaint for Injunction, Annulment of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Damages
against Atty. Bulatao.
She asserted that Atty. Bulatao, in grave abuse of her rights, took advantage
of her financial distress and urgent financial needs by imposing in the [DMRP]
an interest of five percent (5%) per month which is excessive, iniquitous,
unconscionable, exorbitant and contrary to public policy, rendering the contract
null and void. She also alleged that she only received P80,000.00 from Atty.
Bulatao
 ISSUE

What is the effect of the

unconscionable interest to
the validity of the REM?
 HELD

In the consolidated cases of Rivera v. Sps. Chua30 and Sps.

Chua v. Rivera, the Court affirmed the finding of the CA that 5% per
month or 60% per annum interest rate is highly iniquitous and
unreasonable; and since the interest rate agreed upon is void, the rate
of interest should be 12% per annum (the then prevailing interest rate
prescribed by the Central Bank of the Philippines for loans or
forbearances of money) from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand.
 As correctly observed by the CA. However, while the terms of the
Real Estate Mortgage remain effective, the foreclosure proceedings cannot
be given effect. In the Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale and in the Certificate of
Sale, the amount designated as mortgage indebtedness amounted to
P560,000.00. Likewise, in the demand letter, defendant-appellee demanded
from plaintiff-appellant the amount of P540,000.00 for the unpaid loan.
Since the debt due is limited to the principal of P200,000.00 with 12% per
annum as legal interest, the previous demand for payment of the amount of
P540,000.00 cannot be considered as a valid demand for payment.
 Prudential Bank v. Rapanot,
G.R. No. 191636, January 16, 2017
(bank, negligent as a mortgagee)
• FACTS:
• Golden Dragon is the developer of Wack-Wack Twin Towers Condominium.
Rapanot paid Golden Dragon the amount of ₱453k as reservation fee for a
unit in said condominium. The Bank extended a loan to Golden Dragon
amounting to P50M to be utilized by the latter as additional working capital.
To secure the loan, Golden Dragon executed a Mortgage Agreement in favor
of the Bank, which had the effect of constituting a real estate mortgage over
several condominium units owned and registered under Golden Dragon's
name. Among the units subject of the Mortgage Agreement was Rapanot’s
Unit.
 Rapanot and Golden Dragon entered into a Contract to Sell covering Unit.
Rapanot completed payment of the full purchase price of said unit amounting
to Pl.5M. Golden Dragon executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Rapanot of the same date. Thereafter, Rapanot made several verbal demands
for the delivery of the Unit. Prompted by Rapanot's verbal demands, Golden
Dragon sent a letter to the Bank, requesting for a substitution of collateral for
the purpose of replacing Unit with another unit with the same area. However,
the Bank denied Golden Dragon's request due to the latter's unpaid accounts.
Because of this, Golden Dragon failed to comply with Rapanot's verbal
demands.
 ISSUE

Is the Bank a mortgagee in

good faith?
 HELD

NO. The CA is correct when it held that the bank cannot be

considered a mortgagee in good faith. Contrary to the Bank's assertions, it
cannot be considered a mortgagee in good faith. The Bank failed to ascertain
whether Golden Dragon secured HLURB's prior written approval as
required by PD 957 before it accepted Golden Dragon's properties as
collateral. It also failed to ascertain whether any of the properties offered as
collateral already had corresponding buyers at the time the Mortgage
Agreement was executed.
 In loan transactions, banks have the particular obligation of ensuring that clients
comply with all the documentary requirements pertaining to the approval of their loan
applications and the subsequent release of their proceeds.
If only the Bank exercised the highest degree of diligence required by the nature of its
business as a financial institution, it would have discovered that (i) Golden Dragon did not
comply with the approval requirement imposed by Section 18 of PD 957, and (ii) that Rapanot
already paid a reservation fee and had made several installment payments in favor of Golden
Dragon, with a view of acquiring Unit 2308-B2. The Bank's failure to exercise the diligence
required of it constitutes negligence and negates its assertion that it is a mortgagee in good
faith.
PRESCRIPTION
 Gatmaytan vs. Misibis Land Inc.
G.R. No. 222166 June 10, 2020
(action for reconveyance, prescriptible/imprescriptible)
FACTS:
Petitioners purchased from Spouses Garcia a parcel of land in Misibis, Albay. Armed with the original owner's duplicate
copy, they attempted to register the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds of Albay (RD). They were
successful in having the 1991 DOAS duly annotated on the TCT but they were not able to cause the transfer of the Torrens title
in their name.
When petitioners were processing the transfer of the Torrens title to their names, they discovered that the disputed lot
had been consolidated by Misibis Land, Inc. (MLI) with other adjoining lots in Misibis, Upon further investigation, Petitioners
learned that their TCT had been stamped "cancelled", and replaced by subsequent Torrens titles. Petitioners immediately
caused, on September 1, 2010, the annotation of their Affidavit of Adverse Claim on MLI's Torrens titles.
On December 10, 2014, petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC (Complaint) against Spouses Garcia, DAA Realty
and MLI, as well as Philippine National Bank (PNB) to whom the disputed lot had been mortgaged. It was dismissed on the
ground of prescription.
 ISSUE

Whether Petitioners' Complaint should

be allowed to proceed for trial on the merits.

Whether or not the sale of the property

is valid.
 HELD
The property may be reconveyed to the true owner, notwithstanding the
TCTs already issued in another's name. The issuance of a certificate of title in
the latter's favor could not vest upon him or her ownership of the property;
neither could it validate the purchase thereof which is null and void.
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land
registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. Being
null and void, the sale produces no legal effects whatsoever. Whether an action for
reconveyance prescribes or not is therefore determined by the nature of the action, that
is, whether it is founded on a claim of the existence of an implied or constructive trust,
or one based on the existence of a void or inexistent contract.
 Spouses Cueno et.al. v. Spouses Bautista et.al.
G.R. No. 246445 March 02, 2021
(Article 173 Civil Code/Prescription)
FACTS:
Flora Bonifacio Cueno was married to Eulalio Cueno. Eulalio sold their land to his
father-in-law Luis Bonifacio, without Flora's consent. This sale was covered by an Escritura de
Venta12 dated December 4, 1963. As a consequence, a TCT was issued solely in the name of
Luis.
In a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 12, 1977, Luis allegedly sold the property to herein
respondents. Hence, a new TCT was registered in the name of Spouses Bautista. Spouses
Bautista donated the land to their four (4) children, to whom separate TCTs were issued.
Thereafter, respondents took possession of the property and built improvements on the
same.
 Cont.
Allegedly deprived of their share in the property through fraud, Spouses Cueno
filed a Complaint for recovery of shares and participation in the subject property, recovery of
possession, declaration of nullity of the sales and donation, and cancellation of the TCTs issued in
the names of the Bautista children.
They claimed that:
1) they never sold their share to Luis and the sale was invalid for lack of Flora's
consent, and
2) Flora's father, Luis, never sold the subject property to herein respondents
For their part, respondents claimed that that they constructed their houses on said
lot and continuously possessed the same for over 30 years without objection or
protest from petitioners.
 ISSUE

Whether or not the sales of the land is

null and void.

Whether or not the dismissal of the

complainant is proper.
 HELD
Pursuant to Article 173, Flora's action to annul the contract accrued
upon the execution of the sale in 1963 and she had 10 years from the
questioned transaction to file an action to annul the same. Unfortunately,
she failed or refused to exercise her right within the 10-year period. As
her right to annul the second sale prescribed in 1973, the action
commenced on January 14, 2009 was filed out of time. In view thereof,
petitioners have no more right to question the subsequent sale by Luis in favor
of respondents.
 Heirs of Lutero Romero et al. v. Sombrino
G.R. No. 241353, January 22, 2020
(requisites of tenancy)
FACTS:
In the prior case of Teodora Saltiga de Romero, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (De Romero
v. CA), the Supreme Court already held that Lutero is the true and lawful landowner of
the subject property, having exclusively acquired the subject property after successfully
applying for a homestead patent over the land in 1967.
The court did not affirm the fact that Lutero merely held the subject property in
trust for the benefit of the heirs of his father Eugenio since the latter was actually the
one who first applied for the homestead, but such application was denied because
Eugenio was already disqualified to apply for a homestead, having previously applied for
a homestead over another parcel of land with the maximum limit of 24 hectares.
 Respondent Sombrino failed to successfully assert her right to possess the
subject property before the RTC, she sought recourse before the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Iligan City by
filing a Complaint for Illegal Ejectment and Recovery of Possession (PARAD
Complaint) against the petitioners Heirs of Lutero.
According to the CA, respondent Sombrino sufficiently established by
substantial evidence the essential elements of tenancy. Thus, the CA held that
the petitioners Heirs of Lutero are bound to respect the leasehold relationship
between the Sps. Romero and respondent Sombrino
 ISSUE

Whether there exists an agricultural

leasehold tenancy relationship between
the petitioners Heirs of Lutero and
respondent Sombrino.
 HELD
The following indispensable elements must be proven in order for a tenancy
agreement to arise:
a) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
b) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
c) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
d) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
e) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
f) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
The absence of any of the requisites does not make an occupant, cultivator, or a
planter a de jure tenant which entitles him to security of tenure under existing tenancy laws.
Cont.
In sum, with the finality of De Romero v. CA, it can no longer be
disputed that the Sps. Romero never became the owners of the subject
property. Neither did they become the lessee, usufructuary or legal
possessor of the subject property. Hence, the Sps. Romero had no
capacity whatsoever to install respondent Sombrino as a leasehold tenant
on the subject property. Consequently, neither could the heirs of the Sps.
Romero (aside from Lutero) validly enter into any tenancy agreement over the
subject property.
 NOTE!
Security of tenure may be invoked only by tenants de jure and not by
those who are not true and lawful tenants but became so only through
the acts of a supposed landholder who had no right to the landholdings.
Tenancy relation can only be created with the consent of the landholder
who is either the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the
land. (Romero v. Sombrino, G.R. No. 241353, [January 22, 2020])
D.M. Ragasa Enterprises, Inc., v. Banco de Oro Inc. (Formerly Equitable
PCI Bank)
G.R. No. 190512 June 20, 2018
(effect of pre-terminating the lease)
FACTS:
Ragasa and then Equitable Banking Corporation (Equitable Bank) executed a Contract of Lease over a
commercial building for a period of five (5) years. Pursuant to the Lease Contract, Equitable Bank paid the
three months advance rentals, and three months rentals as security deposit.
Equitable Bank entered into a merger with Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank)
thereby forming Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. The latter would eventually, pending the present case, merge with
Banco de Oro, Inc. to form the respondent bank.
For this reason, the bank sent a notice dated May 28, 2001, informing Ragasa that the former was pre-
terminating their Lease Contract effective June 30, 2001 (Notice of Pre-termination). Ragasa responded with a
demand letter dated June 20, 2001for payment of monthly rentals for the remaining term of the Lease
Contract from July 1, 2001 to January 31, 2003. Then the bank vacated the subject premises without heeding
Ragasa's demand for payment.
•
 ISSUE

What is the liability of the

bank, if any, for its act of pre-
terminating the Lease Contract?
 In the present case, there is an express stipulation in item 8 (p) of the Lease
Contract that "[b]reach or non-compliance of any of the provisions of this Contract,
especially non-payment of two consecutive monthly rentals on time, shall mean the
termination of this Contract." The validity of an automatic termination clause such as
the one quoted above is well-settled. Pursuant to the automatic termination clause of
the Lease Contract, which is in furtherance of the autonomy characteristic of
contracts, the Lease Contract was terminated upon its unauthorized pre-termination
by the bank on June 30, 2001.

Ragasa is, thus, precluded from availing of the second option which is to
claim damages by reason of the breach and allow the lease to remain in force. With the
lease having been automatically resolved or terminated by agreement of the parties,
Ragasa is entitled only to indemnification for damages.
 Saclolo v. Marquito
G.R. No. 229243, Jun 26, 2019
(10-year prescriptive period, equitable mortgage)
FACTS:
Saclolo borrowed money from Marquito, using as collateral her father’s land.
Marquito started occupying the land. Additional amounts were borrowed and she
continued to use as collateral her aliquot part of the land. On October 2004, Saclolo
verbally informed Marquito of her intention to "redeem" the land. On November 2004, a
written offer to redeem the property was made but Marquito refused.
Thus, Saclolo was constrained to file a Complaint for Redemption of mortgaged
properties. During the proceedings, she manifested her willingness to deposit the amounts
due on their loan obligation for the purpose of redemption. Marquito, on the other hand,
alleged that in 1984, Saclolo sold the subject property for P1,000.00 under a
Memorandum of Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase. Since then, Marquito had been
in actual possession of the property in the concept of owner and even introduced
improvements thereon worth P120,000.00.
 The RTC found that the true transaction between the parties was one of
equitable mortgage. However, it hold that the period for the redemption of the
property had lapsed as it was filed beyond the four year period under Article
1606 of the Civil Code. Thus, it dismissed the complaint.
 ISSUE

Has Saclolo’s right to

redeem the property
already prescribed?
 HELD
Both the RTC and the CA held that while the true transaction was one of equitable
mortgage under Articles 1602 and 1603 of the Civil Code, Saclolo could no longer
"repurchase" or "redeem" the subject property. This is erroneous. An equitable
mortgage, like any other mortgage, is a mere accessory contract "constituted to
secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation. Since the true transaction between
the parties was an equitable mortgage and not a sale with right of repurchase, there
is no "redemption" or "repurchase" to speak of and the periods provided under
Article 1606 do not apply. Instead, the prescriptive period under Article 1144 of
the Civil Code is applicable. In other words, the parties had 10 years from the time
the cause of action accrued to file the appropriate action. Saclolo’s cause of action to
recover the subject property can be said to have accrued only in 2004, that is, when
Marquito rejected Saclolo‘s offers to pay and extinguish the loan and to recover the
mortgaged property as it was only at this time that respondents manifested their intention
not to comply with the true agreement of the parties. Undoubtedly, the filing of the
complaint in 2005 was made well-within the 10-year prescriptive period.
 Selerio v. Bancasan
GR No. 222442, June 23, 2020
(effect of compromise)
On September 18, 1993, Selerio executed a Deed of Transfer and Waiver of Rights over a
parcel of land in favor of Bancasan. Selerio supposedly sold the subject land to Tregidio
for P200k and Selerio acknowledged to have received fifty percent (50%) of the amount
from the latter
In the Deed, the parties agreed that the fifty percent balance shall be paid only when
Selerio and her family shall have vacated the subject premises which shall not go beyond
April 30, 1994.
Consequently, on February 28, 2007, Bancasan filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession, Damages and Attorney's Fees. He claimed he is entitled to the possession of the
property by virtue of the Deed executed in his favor.
Cont.
Selerio argued that Bangcasa's cause of action had already
prescribed; that in effect, he is enforcing a written contract which
prescribes in 10 years from the time the right of action accrued; that
as stipulated in the contract, Selerio had to vacate the property not
later than April 30, 1994; and that since he filed his Complaint only
on March 14, 2007, he had slept on his rights for more than 12
years.
 ISSUE

Whether or not
respondent's cause of
action has prescribed.
 The period to enforce the Deed has not prescribed. The 10-year period,
which commenced on May 1, 1994, was interrupted when the parties executed the
Compromise Agreement on September 2, 1997. This interruption wiped out the
period that already elapsed and started a fresh prescriptive period from September
2, 1997 to September 2, 2007. Thus, the written extrajudicial demand sent by
respondent on February 2, 2007 was made within the prescriptive period. In fact,
said written demand likewise interrupted the prescriptive period, which commenced
anew when petitioners received said demand. Undoubtedly therefore, the Complaint
filed on February 28, 2007 was made within the prescriptive period.
TORTS AND DAMAGES
 Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. Menez
G.R. No. 209906. November 22, 2017
(proximate cause:evidentiary)
FACTS:
Menez ordered pizza and a bottle of "Sprite“ at his favorite restaurant. When he drank from
the straw the contents of the Sprite bottle, he noticed that the taste of the softdrink was not one
of Sprite but of a different substance repulsive to taste. The substance smelled of kerosene. He
then felt a burning sensation in his throat and stomach and could not control the urge to vomit.
After vomiting, he picked up the bottle of Sprite and brought it to the place where the
waitresses were and angrily told them that he was served kerosene. Meñez even handed the bottle
to the waitresses who passed it among themselves to smell it. All of the waitresses confirmed
that the bottle smelled of kerosene and not of Sprite.
The incident was reported to the police and recorded in the Police Blotter. The bottle of
Sprite was examined and it was found out that the contents of the liquid inside the bottle as pure
kerosene. As a result of the incident, Meñez filed a complaint and prayed for the actual, moral,
and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees
 ISSUE

Whether the CA erred in

awarding moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees to
Meñez.
 ART. 2187. Manufacturers and processors
of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods
shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any
noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the
consumers.
 HELD
YES. The CA erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages as well
as attorney’s fees to Meñez. Article 2220 provides the following additional legal
grounds for awarding moral damages: (1) willful injury to property if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due; and (2)
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Unfortunately, Meñez has not presented competent, credible and
preponderant evidence to prove that he suffered physical injuries when he
allegedly ingested kerosene from the "Sprite“ bottle in question. Nowhere in the
CA Decision is the physical injury of Meñez discussed. Consequently, in the
absence of sufficient evidence on physical injuries that Meñez sustained, he is not
entitled to moral damages.
 As to exemplary or corrective damages, these may be granted in quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with
gross negligence pursuant to Article 2231 of the Civil Code. Meñez has failed to establish that CCBPI acted with
gross negligence. Other than the opened "Sprite" bottle containing pure kerosene allegedly served to him at the
Rosante Bar and Restaurant, Meñez has not presented any evidence that would show CCBPFs purported gross
negligence.
The Court agrees with the RTC's finding that there was failure on the part of Meñez to categorically
establish the chain of custody of the "Sprite" bottle which was the very core of the evidence in his complaint for
damages and that, considering that the "Sprite" bottle allegedly contained pure kerosene, it was quite surprising why
the employees of Rosante did not notice its distinct, characteristic smell. Thus, Meñez is not entitled to exemplary
damages absent the required evidence. The only evidence presented by Meñez is the opened "Sprite" bottle
containing pure kerosene. Nothing more.
Lastly, based on Article 2208 of the Civil Code, Meñez is not entitled to attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation because, as with his claim for exemplary damages, he has not established any other ground that would
justify this award.
Spouses Ermino v. Golden Village Homeowner’s Association,
GR No. 180808, August 15, 2018
(article 20 and 21, NCC, conscious and deliberate)

HILLTOP
ALCO
CITY HOMES
SUBD. GOLDEN
ALCO
VILLAGE
HOMES
SUBD.

EB
VILLAROSA
• The RTC found E.B. Villarosa and GVHAI jointly and severally liable for the
damages to Spouses Ermino's properties. Only GVHAI appealed to the CA.
Thus, the trial court's decision attained its finality as regards E.B. Villarosa.
The CA reversed the RTC's Decision and found no liability on the part
of GVHAI. The CA held that indeed, GVHAI exercised its proprietary
rights when it constructed the concrete fence and that it was also not
negligent.
 ISSUE

Whether the CA erred in ruling

that GVHAI was not responsible
for the damage to Spouses
Ermino's properties.
 HELD
• NO. Malice or bad faith, at the core of Articles 20 and 21, implies a
conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity. Records of the case reveal that while GVHAI
replaced the steel grille gate with a concrete fence, the construction was not
intended to obstruct whatever waters that may naturally flow from the higher
estates. The concrete fence was made to ward off undesirable elements from
entering the subdivision. Thus, for purposes of Articles 20 and 21, the
construction of the concrete fence is not contrary to any law, morals, good
customs, or public policy. There was also no negligence on the part of
GVHAI.
 Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

• As correctly found by the CA, when GVHAI decided to construct the concrete
fence, it could not have reasonably foreseen any harm that could occur to
Spouses Ermino. Indeed, the act of replacing the steel grille gate with a
concrete fence was within the legitimate exercise of GVHAI's proprietary
rights over its property. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established
by law. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "every owner may
enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or
dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon
 Nunez v. Moises-Palma
G.R. No. 224466, March 27, 2019
(damages, breach of contract)
FACTS:
Moises-Palma bought a parcel of land from Vito. Instead of paying cash,
she executed a Promissory Note. She later executed an Acknowledgement of Debt.
Despite repeated demand no payment of the purchase price was made and
worse, she was able to register the land in her name. Vito filed a petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Adjudication and Sale, Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title, Recovery of Ownership and/or Possession and Damages.
 ISSUE

Whether the CA erred in

deleting the award of attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, moral
damages and exemplary damages
 HELD
YES. The non-payment of the entire purchase price, despite repeated
assurances by Moises-Palma to pay the same clearly constitutes a substantial
and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in
making the agreement. In contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if
the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner pursuant to Article 2232 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2219, moral
damages may be recovered with respect to acts and actions referred to in
Article 21: "Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
• As provided in Article 2208, as to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, they cannot be recovered in the absence of
stipulation, except: when the defendant's act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest; where the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy
the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim; and in any
other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In all cases, they
must be reasonable.
 VDM Trading, Inc. et al. v. Carungcong et. al.
G.R. No. 206709, February 6, 2019
(proximate cause; quasi-delict)
WACK WACK

CARUNGCONG

VDM
 ISSUE

Whether the CA erred in

reversing the RTC’s decision
granting damages and/or requiring
restoration.
 HELD

NO, the CA did not err in denying award of damages. To

constitute quasi-delict, the alleged fault or negligence committed by
the defendant must be the proximate cause of the damage or
injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result
would not have occurred. Such was not proven by VDM.
 Why?
First, as correctly observed by the CA, the subject plumbing
works are isolated in the balcony area of Carungcong’s unit.
Second, aside from the unsubstantiated self-serving testimony
of Atty. Villareal, there was no evidence presented to show that the
supposed widespread leak of soapy water in the various parts of the
Unit was caused by plumbing works on Carungcong’s balcony.
Lastly, in 1996, way before the installation of the subject
plumbing works in Unit 2308B-l, they had already discovered water
leaks in the Unit which damaged the interiors thereof.
 Chevron Phil. Inc. (Caltex) v. Mendoza
G.R. No. 211533, G.R. No. 211533. June 19, 2019
(moral and exemplary damages, factual basis)
FACTS:
Mendoza applied with Caltex for dealership. Pursuant to the selection
procedure of Caltex, Mendoza made a successful defense of his business
proposal. The dealer selection board of Caltex, however, awarded the dealership
to the Spouses Francisco. He wrote a Letter-Protest to the President of Caltex.
He was informed that it has been decided that the Caltex dealership be awarded
to the site which offers a more strategic location and is more accessible to the
target market. He also wrote to the Country Manager and insisted that the
dealership should be awarded to him but to no avail. He then filed a complaint
for torts and damages. The RTC denied Mendoza’s claim and instead awarded
damages to Chevron.
 ISSUE

Whether Chevron is
entitled to moral and
exemplary damages.
 HELD

No. Chevron is not entitled to the award of damages. A

corporation is not as a rule entitled to moral damages because, not being a
natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as
wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish and moral shock. The only
exception to this rule is where the corporation has a good reputation that is
debased, resulting in its social humiliation. Here, no evidence was
presented by Chevron to establish the factual basis of its claim for
moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be
substantiated by clear and convincing proof.
 Considering that Chevron is not entitled to moral damages,
necessarily, it is likewise not entitled to exemplary damages. As made
clear under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff must show that
he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the
court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded. Hence, exemplary damages are merely
ancillary with respect to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages.
WILLS AND SUCCESSION
 Heirs of Spouses Satramdas and Kishnibai Sadhwani and
their children v. Spouses Gop and Kanta Sadhwani
G.R. No. 217365, August 14, 2019
(alien’s acquisition of land and succession)
FACTS:
Spouses Satramdas and Kishnibai are Indian Nationals. They bought a
parcel of land and a condominium unit. The titles were in the name of Spouses
Gop and Kanta as they held such properties in trust for their parents Spouses
Satramdas and Kishnibai and their siblings.
Later, the other children of Spouses Satramdas and Kishnibai filed a
Complaint for Reconveyance, Partition, Accounting, Declaration of Nullity of Documents
etc. against Spouses Gop and Kanta, UCPB, PSB, and Register of Deeds of
Makati in accordance with the purported express trust agreement.
 ISSUE

Do the other children of

Spouses Satramdas and Kihnibai
have a cause of action against their
sibling Gop and his wife Kanta?
 HELD
NO. After a judicious examination of the allegations in the complaint, the Court
finds that petitioners failed to sufficiently allege the basis for their purported right
over the subject properties. Since the Sps. Sadhwani were prohibited from
owning land in the instant case, they were likewise prohibited from
transmitting any right over the same through succession. As the Sps.
Sadhwani were Indian nationals, the laws of succession under the Civil Code
do not apply. Therefore, the complaint should have alleged, at the very least,
that petitioners were legal heirs of their parents and were entitled to inherit
the Ritz Condominium Unit under the laws of the Republic of India.
PROPERTY
 Miranda v. Spouses Mallari, Spouses Reyes
G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018
(levied property owned by another)
FACTS:
In an action for damages , Spouses Mallari obtained a favourable judgment
against Spouses Reyes in 2000. A Writ of Execution was then issued by the
court and later, a Notice of Levy, was issued covering a parcel of land in the
names of Spouses Reyes. After due notice, a public auction was held whereby
the subject property was sold to the Spouses Mallari, as highest bidders. They
caused the Certificate of Sale to be annotated in their favour.
Learning that Miranda was in possession of the property as an owner,
having bought the same in 1996, the Spouses Mallari filed the suit for recovery
of possession against Miranda.
 ISSUE

Whether Spouses Mallari

has a better claim of
ownership over the property.
 HELD
The Deed of Absolute Sale between Spouses Reyes and Miranda was executed
in March 1996 and possession was already transferred to Miranda, through
constructive delivery when the Deed of Absolute Sale, a public instrument,
was executed conformably to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, and through real
delivery when actual possession was turned over to Miranda pursuant to
Article 1497 of the Civil Code. Since ownership of the subject property
had been transferred to Miranda in 1996, it ceased to be owned by
Spouses Reyes as early as then. Not being owned by Spouses Reyes, the
subject property could not therefore be made answerable for any
judgment rendered against them.
•
 Article 1477

The ownership of the thing sold

shall be transferred to the vendee
upon the actual or constructive
delivery thereof.
LTD
 Logrosa v. Spouses Azares,
G.R. No. 21761, March 27, 2019
(indefeasibility of the Torren’s Title)
FACTS:
All the TCTs for the 8 parcels of land indicate that Logrosa, together with the Spouses
Azares are co-owners of the subject properties. Petitioner alleged that in 1987, the original
owner of the subject properties, one Benjamin A. Gonzales, sold the subject properties
collectively to them. The records show that a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by
the parties, bearing their signatures.
Spouses Azares contended that while it may be true that petitioner Logrosa's name
appeared in the titles of the properties aforementioned, however, they belied petitioner
Logrosa's claim that he is a co-owner of the same, as he never contributed as to its
acquisition and never contributed for their maintenance, much less paid the taxes due thereon.
 ISSUE

Whether the dismissal of Logrosa’s

complaint for partition on the ground that
he is not a co-owner and is a mere trustee
of the subject properties is correct.
 HELD

The court notes that Logrosa does not rely merely on his own testimony
to prove that he is a co-owner of the subject properties. It is a fundamental
principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land.
Such principle of indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it
is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the
doctrine finds no application. In the instant case, there is no accusation
whatsoever that petitioner was included as co-owner in the TCTs
through means of fraud or bad faith.
 Aside from the foregoing, it is also not
disputed by any party that a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed by all the parties,
wherein it clearly states without ambiguity that one
of the vendees of the subject properties is Logrosa.
 Republic v. Heirs of Cabrera
G.R. No. 218418, November 8, 2017
(reclassification of land, executive task)
FACTS:
Sometime in 1971, Meynardo filed an Application for Free Patent concerning an 8k
square- meter parcel of land. In said application, Meynardo alleged that he had been in
possession of such parcel of land since 1936, through his predecessor-in-interest Marcelo
Cabrera. In the same year, the Bureau of Lands (BOL) issued Free Patent No. 516197 in favor
of Meynardo. On the basis of said patent, the ROD issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. RP-132 (P-9193) covering both lots in Meynardo's name.
Later, the Republic filed against the Respondents a complaint for the annulment and/or
cancellation of Free Patent No. 516197. Respondents averred that the land area which had
been purportedly reclassified as forest land was not properly identified since the Republic failed
to present the technical description corresponding thereto.
 ISSUE

Whether the CA erred when it held

that a positive act of government is
necessary to evince the reclassification of
land from alienable and disposable to forest.
 HELD
The CA did not err when it affirmed the RTC Decision, as the Republic
failed to establish that the Roxas Properties were classified as forest land at the
time Free Patent No. 516197 was issued. The classification of unclassified lands
of the public domain, and the reclassification of those previously classified
under any of the categories set forth in the 1987 Constitution (such as the
Roxas Properties), are governed by Commonwealth Act No. 141.
 SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into — (a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber, and (c) Mineral
lands, and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one
class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
Since the power to classify and reclassify land are executive in nature,
such acts, effected without executive authority, are void, and essentially
ultra vires.
 The State bears the burden of proof!
Owing to the nature of reversion proceedings and the outcome which a favorable decision
therein entails, the State bears the burden to prove that the land previously decreed or
adjudicated in favor of the defendant constitutes land which cannot be owned by private
individuals. The Republic presented the following pieces of evidence to support its complaint
for reversion: (i) DENR Final Report; (ii) NAMRIA certifications; and (iii) LC Map 209. However,
these documents, whether taken individually or collectively, do not evince a positive act of
reclassification by the Executive Department. Ultimately, the Republic failed to prove that the
Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) were classified as forest land when they were decreed in
Meynardo's favor in 1971.
OTHER DOCTRINAL CASES
ENSURE YOU READ THESE!
 Article 26, Family CODE
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)
 What if in a mixed
marriage the divorce is
obtained by the Filipino
Spouse, may it be given
recognition by our courts?
 Republic v. Manalo
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
ISSUE:
Whether under Article 26 of the Family Code, a
Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding
abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his
or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
The meaning of the law should be
consistent with the intent of the
lawmakers.

It would be the height of injustice of

Manalo would be considered as still
married to the Japanese national who in
turn is no longer married to her.
 YES
Purpose of the law is to avoid the absurd situation.

Provision is a corrective measure.

The law is clear, it does not require the foreigner to be the one to initiate
the divorce.

Whether it is the Filipino or the foreigner who initiated, the result is the
same.

Unjustly discriminating
 RULE!

Even if the divorce is obtained

by a Filipino, the same may be
recognized.
 Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it
only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be
the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is
the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
Verba legis non est recedendum.
What if the divorce is by
mutual consent?
 Morisono v. Morisono
G.R. No. 226013, July 2, 2018
FACTS:

Luzviminda married Ryoji in Quezon City in 2009. While living

in Japan, their marriage turned sour due to Ryoji’s philandering ways.
Thus, they submitted a “Divorce by Agreement” before the City
Hall of Mizuho-ku in Nagoya, Japan.
Later, Luzviminda filed a Petition for Recognition of Foreign Divorce. It
was denied because it was Luzviminda, a Filipino who initiated the
divorce.
 RULING:

Foreign divorce decree may be

recognized in the Philippines,
regardless of who between the
spouses (the foreigner or the
Filipino) initiated the divorce.
 JUEGO-SAKAI v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018
FACTS:
The CA already granted the Petition for Recognition but
had a change of mind. This is because the divorce herein
was consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the
parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a
Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said
divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines.
 RULING:
• The issue before has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of
Republic v. Manalo, the facts of which fall squarely on point with the
facts herein.

• JUSTICE CAGUIOA:
- concurred only in the result
-Unlike Manalo, this one is a joint act of the Filipino and the
Japanese.
 REQUISITES for PETITION TO BE
GRANTED:

Proof of divorce as a fact

Proof of its conformity to foreign

law
RACHO v. TANAKA,
G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018
• Divorce by Agreement
• The prohibition on Filipinos from participating in
divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own
nationals. Verily, therefore, even though it was
petitioner herself or jointly with her husband who
applied for and obtained the divorce decree in this case,
the same may be recognized in our jurisdiction. So
must it be. Petitioner is decreed capacitated to
remarry.
In Re: Takahashi (MORANA v. REPUBLIC)
G.R. No. 227606, Dec. 5, 2019

• Divorce by mutual agreement. Divorce Report (DR) and Certificate of all

Matters (COAM)were submitted.
• RTC: Dismissed the Petition. The DR and the COAM cannot take the place
of Divorce Decree. Authenticated DC NOT PART OF FOE and also a
mere photocopy. CA affirmed RTC.
• SC: Citing Racho-Tanaka, prohibition on Pinoys participating in divorce is
discriminatory; Acknowledged no Divorce Judgment so no DD; DR issued
by Mayor’s office therefore Act of Official Body in Japan; DR or whatever
name it is called is equivalent to DD -Remanded to RTC to prove JCC
 Rohaina Sumagka v. Abdulgani Sumagka, G.R.
No. 200697, June 10, 2019

The Muslim Code governs Muslim spouses who first wed under
Muslim Law rites and decides to wed again under Civil Law rites.
Thus, A Muslim man can divorce his Muslim wife under the so-called
“instant Divorce or “Talaq” even if they were also wed in Civil Rites.

What if they were wed under Civil Rites first?

ARTICLE 13 of the CODE OF MUSLIM
PERSONAL LAWS
ARTICLE 13. Application. — (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in
any part of the Philippines.
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal
impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and custody of minors,
support and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to
marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between
husband and wife, parental authority, and the property relations between husband and wife
shall be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim laws.
ARTICLE 36, FAMILY CODE
 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,
268 SCRA 198 (1998)
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favour of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

1) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the

celebration of the marriage. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex.

4) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

5) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Article 220, 221, and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision

6) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given respect by our courts.

7) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be
 Santos v. Court of Appeals
240 SCRA 20, January 4, 1995

(a) gravity,

(b) incurability; and

(c) juridical antecedence.

*The phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses.

* It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support.

*The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.
 TAN-ANDAL v. ANDAL
G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021

“Psychological incapacity” is not a medical concept, but

rather a legal concept. It refers to a personal condition that
prevents a spouse to comply with fundamental marital obligations
only in relation to a specific partner. Such condition may exist at
the time of the marriage ceremony but may have revealed itself
afterwards. The grounds for psychological incapacity do not need
to be based on a mental or personality disorder, neither does it
need to be a permanent or incurable condition.
The testimony of psychologist or
psychiatrist is not mandatory in all
cases. The totality of the evidence
must show clear and convincing
evidence to cause the declaration of
nullity of marriage.
 SC’s OBSERVATION

restrictive, rigid and

humane, resilient intrusive to our
and on a case to case
liberty, autonomy
basis
and human dignity
 Victor Andal’s flaws

• Addicted to marijuana and shabu

• Cannot handle finances, Cannot manage the business
• Always unaccounted and with friends
• Hyper at night
• Paranoid
• FOUND BY PSYCHOLOGIST to be suffering from Narcissistic Anti-Social
Personality Disorder and Substance Abuse Disorder
• Psychologist interviewed petitioner Rosanna, their child Samantha and Rosanna’s
sister among others.
 KEY POINTS
1. Republic v. Molina must be modified as it violates the right to liberty, personal
autonomy, and human dignity of Filipinos.

2. Psychological incapacity need not be grounded on a particular psychological illness.

3. Psychological incapacity may be established without a psychological assessment or

clinical diagnosis.

4. Psychological incapacity may be established on the basis of testimonial evidence.

 KEY POINTS (cont.)

It must still be incurable, but incurable in a legal sense, not in a medical sense.

Article 36 is not violative of the separation of church and state.

Expert testimony may be considered competent even if respondent is not interviewed.

Availability of grounds for legal separation will not preclude the granting of petition.

Psychological incapacity maybe relative to the couple.

 NOTE:

From preponderance of
evidence, the quantum of
proof now is clear and
convincing evidence.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY is not
“MENTAL INCAPACITY”

Lack of
understanding of the
Vice of consent
essential marital
obligation
Psychological incapacity is not a “personality
disorder”

Do not pathologize a
person!
 Personality structures

Manifested through clear acts of dysfunctionality that

undermines the family

These personality structures must make it impossible

for him to understand and comply with the essential
marital obligations due to “psychic causes.”
INCURABILITY must be in a “legal sense.”

This means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a
specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective
personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of
the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.

"[A]n undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be a present, loving,

faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so as to
demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the
spouse relative to the other."
 Art. 41, FAMILY CODE

• ARTICLE 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of

a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
• For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
 Republic v. Nilda B. Tampus
G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
FACTS:
On November 29, 1975, Dante, the husband of Nilda, went to
Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned as a member of the AFP. Since
then, no news was heard from him.
In 2009 or 33 years after, Nilda filed a Petition to declare Dante
presumptively death for the purpose of remarriage. Nilda inquired
from his parents, relatives and neighbors as to his whereabouts.
 “well-founded belief ”

Proof that the belief of the present spouse

was the result of diligent and reasonable
effort to locate the absent spouse.

Necessitates exertion of active effort, not a

passive one.
 NOTE:

Lack of news, failure to communicate

or general presumption - not sufficient.

Mere inquiries from parents, relatives

and neighbors -not sufficient
 NOTE:
Courts judgment in the judicial proceedings for
declaration of presumptive death is final and
executory, hence, unappealable

Certiorari is the remedy (Republic v. Cantor)

 Strict Standard Prescribed Under
Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit
 TADEO-MATIAS v. republic
G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
• FACTS:

Tadeo-Matias filed a Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death after more

than three (3) decades after the disappearance of her husband who is a
member of the Phillipine Constabulary. Her purpose is to comply with a
requirement of the PVAO and AFP for her to be able to claim the death
benefits of her husband.

The RTC granted the Petition under Article 41 of the Family Code.
 May a person file a petition
for declaration of presumptive
death even if his or her
purpose is not to remarry?
NO. A petition for
declaration of presumptive
death under article 41 of
the family code cannot be
filed if the purpose is not
for remarriage.
 What if the bases of the
petition are articles 390 and
391 of the civil code?
 Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-
five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may
be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing
for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.
NO. Rules, such as Article 390 and 391,
creating a presumption of death is merely one
of evidence that—while may be invoked in
any action or proceeding—cannot be the lone
subject of an independent action or
proceeding.
 Masbate v. Spouses Masbate,
G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018
FACTS: Grandparents v. biological father
Renalyn and Ricky James were live-in partners. They were blessed with
a daughter named Queenie. When their relationship ended, Renalyn went
to Manila and Queenie was left to the care and custody of Ricky James.

Thereafter, Spouses Masbate, the maternal grandparents took Queenie

from the school where she was enrolled. When Ricky James demanded for
her return, they refused and showed a SPA from Renalyn.

Ricky James filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Child Custody.
 RULING:
ISSUE: Who should exercise custody over Queenie?
NOTE: The case was hastily dismissed by RTC but the CA
declared that the dismissal is not supported by the Rules. Case
remand to RTC for reception of evidence.
Article 176 of the Family Code has effectively disqualified the
father of an illegitimate child from exercising substitute parental
authority under Article 216 even if he were the actual custodian of
the child.
However, the court cannot adopt a rigid view, without running
afoul to the primary consideration in custody cases, which is the
best interest of the minor.
“Best interest of the child”
• the totality of the circumstances and
conditions as are most congenial to the
survival, protection, and feelings of security
of the minor encouraging to her physical,
psychological and emotional development.
It also means the least detrimental available
alternative for safeguarding the growth and
development of the minor.
IMPORTANT:

The child’s welfare being the most

important consideration is not bound
by any legal right of a person over the
child.
SUPPORT
May filiation be established in
the same proceeding for
support?
RICHELLE P. ABELLA, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR
DAUGHTER, MARL JHORYLLE ABELLA V. POLICARPIO
CABAÑERO
G.R. No. 206647, August 09, 2017

FACTS:
• Petitioner filed a complaint for support against
respondent, the rapist who caused her to be
impregnated and gave birth to Marl Jhorylle.
• The complaint was denied on the ground that
the filiation should have been first established
in a separate proceeding.
Dolina v. Vallecera 653 Phil. 391 (2010)

- clarified that since an action for compulsory

recognition may be filed ahead of an action
for support, the direct filing of an action for
support, "where the issue of compulsory
recognition may be integrated and resolved,“
is an equally valid alternative:
 Filiation must be established for a child to
claim support from a putative father. When "filiation is
beyond question, support follows as [a] matter of
obligation.”
To establish filiation, an action for compulsory
recognition may be filed against the putative father
ahead of an action for support.
In the alternative, an action for support may be
directly filed, where the matter of filiation shall be
integrated and resolved
Filiation
 Miller v. Miller,
G.R. 200344, August 28, 2019
FACTS:
• The legitimate heirs of John Miller filed a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of
Live Birth of Joan Espenida Miller, claiming she was not recognized by
their father. They wanted her to use her mother’s surname. Joan claimed
that she was recognized by John and she enjoyed open and continuous
recognition by her father during his lifetime. She said he sent her to
school and donated 1/8 of his estate to her. She invoked RA 9255.
• The RTC ruled in favour of Joan and denied the Petition. She was allowed
to continue on using the surname “Miller.”
• The CA sustained the RTC, and went further in ruling on the filiation. It
held that the recognition in the will sufficiently established John’s
paternity.
 Ruling:

The legitimacy and filiation of a

child cannot be collaterally attacked
in a petition for correction of
entries in a certificate of live birth.
Parental Authority
 Does guardianship divest other
persons the right to institute a
criminal case against the
guardians for the abuse
committed against a ward?
 Sister Pilar Verzosa v. People et al.
G.R. No. 184535, September 03, 2019
• FACTS:

A Nursery supervisor of a child caring agency filed a case of Violation of

RA 7610 against the Aguirre Spouses, the guardians, of a 24-year old ward
Larry with mental deficiency for subjecting the latter to bilateral vasectomy.
Respondents argued that the Aguirre Spouses' appointment as Larry's legal
guardians divested petitioner of the authority to file a criminal case for child
abuse. They further argue that the parental authority and responsibility over
Larry were transferred to the Aguirre Spouses, to the exclusion of all others,
including the child-caring agency that took in Larry as a ward.
 Parental authority
To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their means;

To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;

To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift,
stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times ;

To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and
prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

To represent them, in all matters affecting their interests;

To demand from them respect and obedience;

To impose discipline on them as may be required under a the circumstances; and

To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (Emphasis supplied)
 Parental authority

Taken together, the exercise of

parental authority should be
understood more as "a sum of
duties" to be exercised in favor of the
child's best interest.
The title of a parent or guardian is
not a magic word to be wielded with
immunity.
Adoption
MAY FOREIGNERS ADOPT
UNDER THE DOMESTIC
ADOPTION ACT?
 SPOUSES JOON HYUNG PARK v. LIWANAG
G.R. No. 248035, November 27, 2019
(foreigner adopting under the domestic adoption act)

RULING:

We note that petitioners, who are both American citizens, have been residing and have been gainfully
employed in the Philippines since the year 2007 (in the case of petitioner Park) and since 2009 (in the
case of petitioner Lee), and are thus living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to
the filing of the petition for adoption, as required by the Domestic Adoption Act.

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that petitioners' Petition for Adoption was appropriately filed
under the Domestic Adoption Act in order for the appropriate Family Court or RTC to take cognizance
thereof.
 whether or not the illegitimate child
of the spouse of an adopting alien falls
within the ambit of the clause "relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree" contained in Section
7 (b) (i) and (iii), Article III, of Republic
Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF JAN AUREL MAGHANOY
BULAYO, SPOUSES MARY JANE and YUICHIRO KIMURA,
G.R. NO. 205752, October 1, 2019

FACTS:
Mary Jane, a Filipina, has an illegitimate child, Jan Aurel. After marrying
Yuichiro Kimura, they filed a Joint Petition to Adopt Jan Aurel.
The RTC denied the petition for adoption because Yuichiro, being a Japanese
citizen, did not comply with the requirements laid down under Section 7 of R.A.
No. 8552 and Section 7 of Administrative Matter No. 02-6-02-SC.
The RTC observed that Yuichiro was not exempt from the residency and
certification requirements under Section 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8552 because Jan Aurel
was the illegitimate child of co-petitioner Mary Jane.
 Section 7, R.A. No. 8552
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has
been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that
he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government
allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further,
That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her
country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; x x x.
(Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
“An illegitimate child is a relative within the first civil
degree of consanguinity of his biological mother.
Unlike a nephew and niece, an illegitimate child
belongs to the direct maternal lineage, which is
never uncertain, and which is not as remote as the
nephew and niece.”

Article 966, Civil Code

• “In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus,
the child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the
grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.”
SURNAMES
Whether or not legitimate
children have the right to use
their mothers' surnames as their
surnames.
 ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS III, V. CA,
G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020
FACTS:

Anacleto filed a Petition to change his name by dropping the surname

of his father “Alanis .” He wanted to use the surname of his mother “Ballaho”
on the pretext that he has been using her mother’s surname in his school records
and that it was his mother who singlehandedly raised him. He also wanted to
change his first name from “Anacleto” to “Abdulhamid.”

The RTC denied the Petition on the ground that to drop his last name
was to disregard the surname of his natural and legitimate father, in violation of
the Family Code and Civil Code, which provide that legitimate children shall
principally use their fathers' surnames.
 Indeed, the provision states
that legitimate children shall
"principally" use the surname of
the father, but "principally" does
not mean "exclusively."
Surname of a married woman
 Article 370 of the Civil Code

Article 370. A married woman may use:

• “(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her
husband’s surname, or

• “(2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname or

• “(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word

indicating that she is his wife, such as “Mrs.”
 “Under the present article of our Code,
however, the word “may” is used, indicating that the use
of the husband’s surname by the wife is permissive
rather than obligatory. We have no law which provides
that the wife shall change her name to that of the
husband upon marriage.

She has the option but not the duty, to use the
surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by
this Article.”
 Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs
G.R. No. 169202, March 05, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine
passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to
Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: "Rallonza" as
her surname, "Maria Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as her middle name.

Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still
subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her
maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.
It was denied.
 Whether petitioner, who originally
used her husband's surname in her
expired passport, can revert to the use
of her maiden name in the
replacement passport, despite the
subsistence of her marriage.
 NO.
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt
her husband's surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to
adopt her husband's surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires
the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if
she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will
not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.[17]

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her

husband's surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden
name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances
are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4)
nullity of marriage. Since petitioner's marriage to her husband subsists, she
may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated,
a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only
on the severance of the marriage.
Civil registry
 Bartolome v. Republic
G.R. No. 243288, August 28, 2019.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Petition under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. He
wanted his name “Feliciano Bartholome” which appears in his
Birth Certificate be changed to “Ruben [Cruz] Bartolome,” the
name he has been using since childhood.

The RTC denied his petition for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies, insufficiency of evidence, and improper venue.
 Summary of THE RULE

A. RA 9048 as amended by RA 10172

A person seeking to change his or her first name, to correct a

clerical or typographical errors in the civil register, to change/correct the day
and/or month of his or her date of birth, and/or to change/correct his or her
sex, where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or
mistake, must first file a verified petition with the local civil registry office of
the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or
changed is kept, in accordance with the administrative proceeding provided
under R.A. 9048 in relation to R.A. 10172.
A person may only avail of the
appropriate judicial remedies under
Rule 103 or Rule 108 in the
aforementioned entries after the
petition in the administrative
proceedings is filed and later denied.
 B. RULE 103, rules of court

A person seeking 1) to change his or her

surname or 2) to change both his or her first
name and surname may file a petition for
change of name under Rule 103, provided
that the jurisprudential grounds discussed in
Republic v. Hernandez are present.
 Republic v. Hernandez,
323 Phil. 606, 1996
x x x Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being
sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change
will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e)
when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody;
and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that
the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.
 C. RULE 108, rules of court

A person seeking substantial cancellations or corrections of

entries in the civil registry may file a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries under Rule 108. As discussed in Lee v. Court
of Appeals (419 Phil. 392 (2001). and more recently, in Republic v.
Cagandahan (586 Phil. 637, 647-648 (2008), "removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register."
 Grounds under rule 108

Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in

the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriage; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of
a minor; and (o) changes of name.
 THANK YOU
AND I WISH YOU ALL THE BEST

Justice Emily