Satan in The Old Testament - Rivkah Schärf Kluger

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Studies in Jungian Thought
James Hittman, General Editor
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Satan in the
Old Testament
Rivkah Scharf Kluger 7

Translated by Hildegard Nagel
Northwestern University Press

Evanston 1967
COPYRIGHT (©) 1967 BY NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 67—15935
Composed in Janson and Melior types, printed, and bound by
Kingsport Press, Inc., Kingsport, Tennessee
The original German-language edition of SATAN IN THE OLD

TESTAMENT was published in 1948 by Rascher Verlag of
Ziirich under the title “Die Gestalt des Satans im Alten Testa-
ment,” as Part III of the volume by C. G. Jung, Symbolik des
Geistes.
Man sagt, Gott mangelt nichts,
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CONTENTS
Foreword
Preface to the American Edition
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
Problem and Method of Approach
Survey of the Literature on the Problem
The Concept of “Satan” and Its Development in the
Old Testament
Etymology of the Word “Satan”
The Concept of “Satan” in the Profane Realm
The Concept of “Satan” in the Metaphysical Realm
The mal’ak Yahweh as Satan in the Story of Balaam
(Numbers 22:22 ff.)
Occurrence and Theological Significance of the
mal’ak Yahweh in the Old Testament
The mal’ak Yahweh in Numbers 22:22 ff.
Satan as One of the bené ha-elohim
The Age of the Concept
The Age of the Text
Occurrence and Nature of the bené ha-’elohim in
the Old Testament 98
Satan as One of the bené ha-’elohim in the Book
of Job (1:6-12 and 2:1-7) 118
Babylonian Traits in the Image of Satan in the
Book of Job 133
Satan as Opponent of the maPak Y abweh (Zechariah
3:1 ff.) 137
- Satan as Independent Demon (I Chronicles 21:1) 149
Index 163
vii
FOREWORD
ibe THE PSyCHoLocy of the unconscious advances, it seems

to move into ever deeper realms. Perhaps this is to be expected
from “depth” psychology. But this descent also compels psy-
chology to investigate the dark and demonic aspects of the
psyche which lie below collective life and within our personal
problems. As the investigation in depth proceeds through a
psychotherapeutic analysis, that which begins as a personal
problem sooner or later tends to reveal demonic or mythologi-
cal characteristics. In the language of C. G. Jung, at the core of
every personal complex is something mythical, something
archetypally collective, which both constellates personal
troubles to be enacted and re-enacted in set forms and gives to
these problems their drama and their meaning.
For this reason, and for others too, “getting to the bottom”
of a psychological issue requires research into the fundamen-
tals of the psyche. Not only do we need to observe its demonic
depths through case material and psychopathological behav-
for
ior; we also need to know how the psyche operates in and
itself at levels beyond personal consciousness. Myths, folk-
tales, and religious texts present just such operations of the
psy-
psyche at its impersonal objective level. In this kind of
chological material the influences of personal conscio usness
the
have been purified out through the filters of time while
effect of
essentials have been retained through the crystallizing
to give
tradition. Further, religious myths and tales continue
be re-
meaning to psychological events. They continue to
today
flected in the spontaneous dreams and visions of people
religious
who may never have been directly influenced by
it
. dogma or practice. The deepening of psychology involves
its
inescapably with religion. The history of religion—even
ix
xX FOREWORD.
archaeology and philology—takes on new significance in the

light of its new role: that of amplifying the background for
understanding the archetypal depths of the psyche. No longer
is it a matter of psychologizing religion and reducing religious
events to “only psychological” case studies. Rather, psychol-
ogy cannot get to the bottom of its own field without help
from research in religion.
The issue of evil, for instance, lies not only in the province
of moral philosophy and theology. Evil is involved in practi-
cal psychology, in clinics and consulting rooms, since it is
just because something has gone “wrong” or is no longer
“good” that a person goes to psychotherapy in the first place.
Within the personal complexes of what is “wrong” or “bad”
and the ills and devils that beset us is concealed the age-old
“question of what is evil—and what is its relation to God, to the _
world, and to man. A study of the figure of the biblical Satan
becomes necessary in our search for answers.
In this monograph, Rivkah Scharf Kluger investigates Satan
from a psychological viewpoint which leads to far-reaching
reflections on the nature of the God-image in the Old Testa-
ment. Her research achieves two major aims. First, it shows
how the image of Satan goes through a development which
can be seen as a development of consciousness within the Old ~
Testament image of God. Second, this study illumines the
significance of the inner enemy and accuser. Satan interferes, _
opposes, and accuses. As an instrument of conflict he is funda-
mental to consciousness, which arises from tension. Further,
Satan, while representing that demonic archetypal process as-
sociated with the Godhead that sets destruction going, is
revealed through this study to have a final purpose which is
not just evil in the usual sense. An aspect of this finality may
be the development—in both God and man—of self-limitation
through self-opposition.
This monograph formed a separate section in one of Jung’s
books, Symbolik des Geistes, the other three parts of which
are now in Volumes IX, XI, and XIII of his Collected Works.
Jung did much work in collaboration with other scholars. The
xi FOREWORD
writings of these collaborators are not included in the Col-

lected Works of C. G. Jung, yet, if his spirit is to be truly
represented in the English language, the writings of his co-
workers should also be available. It is with this aim also in
mind that we are pleased to bring this study to the English-
reading public as a volume in the series “Studies in Jungian
Thought.”
James HILLMAN
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PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN
EDITION
lee work originally appeared in German in 1948 as a part

of C. G. Jung’s volume Symbolik des Geistes, published by
Rascher Verlag, Ziirich. .
Since then it has often been suggested that I publish it in
English, because its subject is of immediate relevance to the
religious and psychological problems of our age. But time
and circumstances did not, until recently, allow me to focus
on this endeavor. However, the intervening years have not
appreciably changed the spiritual and psychological problem
with which this work is concerned; it has, if anything, be-
come intensified, and, although some slight glimmerings of
progress are beginning to be discernible, the solution is still
far off.
The lines of thought which have directed my understand-
ing of the material I owe to the psychology of C. G. Jung,
to whom I feel most deeply indebted. If I have succeeded in
coming nearer to the meaning of this great material, it is due
to his psychological and particularly his religious-psychologi-
cal insights, which have given me the key to it
An examination of the more recent literature has con-
vinced me that my thesis has not become outdated. (See
especially the article “Satan,” by Th. H. Gaster, in The
Interpreters Bible [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1963], and
the bibliography cited there; and Koehler-Baumgartner,
Lexikon in veteris testamenti libros [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958],
sub verbo.) This encourages me to present my conclusions in
' the English language to interested readers.
refer-
In order not to burden this book with additional
xiv PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION
ences, I have added only such views and material as are of

primary importance to my subject.
I have used the King James translation for Bible quotations,
except in certain instances, duly noted, where it is not as ac-
curate as other versions. In all cases, however, the term “the
Lord” has been replaced by the original Hebrew designation
of the name of God, “Yahweh,” and the term “angel of the
Lord” by “mal’ak Yahweh,” which seems preferable in a work
dealing with theological categories.
Quotations from French and German have been translated.
All Hebrew, Arabic, and Syrian words have been transcribed.
Transcriptions contained in quotations have been left in the
form chosen by their authors. Hebrew names from the Old
Testament are given in the form used in the quoted trans-
lations of the Bible.
Los Angeles RivKAH ScHARF KLUGER

February, 1967
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
De THIs AMERICAN EDITION goes to press I wish to express

my gratitude to my dear friend Alice Crowley for her great
interest, encouragement, and assistance, both moral and
material, in the preparation of this translation. I also wish to
thank Fowler McCormick for generously helping defray the
costs involved in enabling this book to appear. I am grateful
to Dr. James Hillman for his warm and active interest in this
English-language edition and seeing it through to completion.
To Hildegard Nagel go my special thanks for the personal
devotion and great care with which she translated this book.
I am indebted to Mrs. Janet Dallett for her secretarial as-
sistance and especially for her painstaking preparation of the
Index. Last and not least I want to express my thanks to my
husband, whom I consulted throughout the preparation of
this American edition, for his generous-advice and assistance.
R.S. K.
XV
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BZAW Beihefte zur Zeitschrift fiir die alttestamentliche

Wissenschaft. 1896 :
HSAT* Die Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments.
Trans. E. Kautzsch et al. Ed. A. Bertholet, in
connection with the previous collaborators and
Prof. Eissfeldt. 2 vols. ‘Tiibingen: Mohr, 1922.
KAT Eberhard Schrader, Die Keilinschriften und das
Alte Testament. Ed. H. Winckler and H. Zim-
mern. 3d ed. Berlin, 1903.
RGG? Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.
Handwérterbuch fiir Theologie und Religions-
wissenschaft. Ed. Hermann Gunkel and Leopold
Zscharnak, in connection with A. Bertholet ez al.
5 vols. Tiibingen: Mohr, 1927-31. 2d ed., 1928.
ZAW Zeitschrift fiir die alttestamentliche Wiaissen-
schaft. Berlin, 1881——.
ZDMG Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlindischen
Gesellschaft.
Introduction
1. Problem and Method of Approach
WE LIVE in a time which has seen evil darkening the world
and manifesting a hitherto unsuspected power, evoking St.
John’s apocalyptic vision of Satan unchained after his thou-
_sand years’ bondage (Rev. 20:2, 3, 7, 8) as an adequate image
of immediately experienced reality. The nature and origin of
this force has become a terribly actual problem in our time.
So it may not be meaningless to trace the image of the devil
back to its origins.
This presupposes, however, that such mythologems be un-
derstood as spontaneous expressions-of psychic reality, as
symbols which are able to give adequate expression to what is
beyond the grasp of reason. The assembling of all the state-
ments concerning such a mythological figure as Satan permits
us to perceive its structure and thereby the psychological
content of which it is the symbolic expression. Such an un-
derstanding of mythologems rests on the further premise that
the human psyche is not to be viewed as something inherently
different from the “superhuman” (and also not from the
“subhuman”), but as an organ corresponding to these spheres,
which contains these nonhuman, super- and subhuman forces
within itself. My subject will not be God and devil, not their
essence as such—that would be metaphysical speculation—but
the psychological contents and the experiences of the super-
‘human in a religiously creative time, whose expression they
are. Not metaphysical entities, but their image in man’s
3
4 SATAN IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
of the
soul—God and the devil as primal images, archetypes
human psyche, will be the object of my observ ations . I base
my conception on the fundamental views of C. G. Jung
to The Tibeta n
concerning this problem. In his Introduction
Book of the Dead * he says in this regard:
Metaphysical assertions, however, are statements of the
n
psyche, and are therefore psychological. To the Wester
sates its well-k nown feeling s of re-
mind, which compen
sentment by a slavish regard for “rational” explanations,
this obvious truth seems all too obvious, or else it is seen as
an inadmissible negation of metaphysical “truth.” When-
ever the Westerner hears the word “psychological,” it
always sounds to him as “only psychological.” For him the
“soul” is something pitifully small, unworthy, personal,
subjective, and a lot more besides.
And in Psychology and Alchemy * he writes:
However we may picture the relationship between God
and soul, one thing is certain: that the soul cannot be
“nothing but.” On the contrary it has the dignity of an
entity endowed with, and conscious of, a relationship to
Deity. Even if it were only the relationship of a drop of
water to the sea, that sea would not exist but for the
multitude of drops. . . . As the eye to the sun, so the soul
corresponds to God... . It would be blasphemy to assert
that God can manifest himself everywhere save only in the
human soul. Indeed the very intimacy of the relationship
between God and the soul automatically precludes any
devaluation of the latter. It would be going perhaps too
far to speak of an affinity; but at all events the soul must
contain in itself the faculty of relation to God, ie., a
1. C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion: East and West, in Collected

eta (Bollingen Series XX [New York, Pantheon Books]), XI (1958),
511 f.
2. C. G. Jung, Psychology and Alchemy, in Collected Works (Bol-
lingen Series XX), XII (1953), 10-11.
3. “The fact that the devil too can take possession of the soul does
not diminish its significance in the least” (ibid., p. 11, n. 1).
5 Introduction
correspondence, otherwise a connection could never come

about. This correspondence is, in psychological terms, the
archetype of the God image.
This correspondence alone, as it found its expression in

biblical texts, will be my subject of discussion. And insofar as
these texts depict a development in the concept of God, one
may, in this sense, speak also of God’s fate in the human soul,
without this being misinterpreted as a blasphemy. Moreover,
this study, which is dedicated to a scholarly investigation, will
leave untouched the ultimate metaphysical question as to
whether there is a metaphysical reality corresponding to the
inner-psychic process of a developing God image.
It might perhaps be said here, however, that through the
breadth and depth of Jung’s concept of the soul—it is for him
of “limitless range and unfathomable depth” *—the ancient
problem of transcendence and immanence has lost acuteness,
since immanence, so understood, includes the effects, the
imprint, or whatever we want to call it, of that which extends
beyond the human; that is, of the transcendent. The tran-
scendent is met from the background of one’s own psyche.
But whatever position is taken in regard to the transcendence
problem, a scientific investigation must necessarily limit itself
to the phenomenon of the God image as it emerges from the
texts. From the transcendental standpoint too, God can only
be apprehended in the existential form of a psychic content,
in the refraction of human vision. Even if the opposition
between the “immanent” and the “transcendent” conception
of God is considered as essential and valid, it ceases to exist in
the realm of science, i.e., in the attention directed to the
phenomenon of the image of God. In this phenomenon,
which is all that man can grasp, these two planes of concep-
tion, i.e., immanence and transcendence, overlap.
Such an understanding of the development of the God
image in the human psyche presupposes an unprejudiced
4. Ibid., p. 13.
consideration of all statements referring to this phenomenon

with all its pertinent connections. Where suprapersonal con-
tents have acquired the quality of personality, as is the case in
the Old Testament, they can be understood only in terms of
personality structure and its whole pattern of interrelations.
The figure of Satan, which concerns us here, can therefore
never be grasped “‘in itself,” but only in its relation to God.
Its nature can become clear only in relation to God in all his
aspects. It is, for instance, altogether inadequate to rest con-
tent with having established that, in the story of Job, Satan is
subordinate to God. That is one single aspect of the relation
between Satan and God in the Old Testament. It remains a
colorless statement as long as the nature and degree of this
dependence, itself depending on the nature of God and of
Satan, is not brought to light out of the total biblical text.
Hence the questions arise: How does Satan appear in the
Old Testament? How did this concept _come_ about? And
what is its significance in Old Testament theology?
Methodologically, the later, post-Old Testament develop-
ment of Satan, though it may motivate the investigation, can-
not be its point of departure. It is true that if we approach our
material with questions from “outside,” from later or parallel
connections, like the one mentioned before—whether or not
Satan is subordinate to God—it will answer us. But the nature
of Satan will not be disclosed by such a procedure. My aim is
to put the questions arising from the material itself, to look at
the statements about Satan as pieces of mosaic that must be
carefully fitted together to form a picture. And every es-
tablished character trait will be studied for its significance to
the material as a whole.
2. Survey of the Literature on the Problem

SATAN APPEARS as a distinct mythological personality in only a
few Old Testament passages (Job 1:6-12 and 2:1 ff.; Zech.
3:2 ff. and II Chron. 21:1) which, especially the passages in
Job, have been discussed by numerous commentators. The
present study will refer to them when dealing with the indi-
a Introduction
hes
vidual passages and critically evaluate their conclusions. How-

ever, the vastness of the theme and the extensive literature on
each of the exegetic problems that will concern us preclude my
mentioning all the available material.
In recent years only a few monographic studies have been
devoted to this problem. Among the older ones, Gustav Ros-
koff’s Geschichte des Teufels * especially must be mentioned.
The chapter on the Old Testament Satan ° may well be called
a small monograph.’ In spite of the orientation to his main
theme of dualism in religions, Roskoff in many respects does
justice to the specific character of the Old Testament Satan
and contributes notably to the understanding of the principal
aspect of the problem. For instance, at the very outset_he
affirms that the figure of Satan in the Book of Job “shows a
significant turning point in the Hebrew concept”—an obser- os
vation sufficient in itself to make it impossible “to believe this
ae if
writing to be one of the oldest in Hebrew literature.” * In the

f
Ve
Satan of I Chronicles 21, Roskoff sees the “destructive quality

_of Jahwe already separated from himself. . . while in earlier ©
passages it was still identified with him.” ° Correspondingly, *
in contrast to many a later author (see below, p. 45, nn. 85,
86), he is aware of the essential difference, on the one hand ©
between Satan and Azazel (to whom he devotes the preced-
ing chapter *°) and, on the other, between the Sédim, Se ‘trim,
and Lilith. The latter are ghostly beings, such as play a role
among other peoples, too; while the significance of Satan is to
be sought in his relation to Yahweh. Roskoff believes that a
5. G. Roskoff, Geschichte des Teufels, 2 vols. (1869).
6. Ibid., 1, 186-99.
7, A more recent parallel to Roskoff’s work is a book by Edward
Langton, Satan, a Portrait: A Study of the Character of Satan through
All the Ages (London, 1945 ). Langton provides, in condensed form, a
good survey of the concepts of Satan during the course of the
centuries. In the wide frame of his book the Old Testament is given so
little space that this reference should be sufficient in our context.
8. Roskoff, op. cit., p. 186. On this problem, see below, pp. 82 f.
9. Ibid., p. 188.
10. Ibid., pp. 177 ff.
11. Ibid., p. 196.
Persian influence on the Satan figure is possible, but lays stress

on the essential differences between it and the Persian Angra
Mainyu. In his view the Persian influence is made ineffective
by the supremacy of Yahwism.”
Although important contributions toward the understand-
ing of the Old Testament Satan and his position within
Yahwism are present in Roskoff’s broadly conceived Ge-
schichte des Teufels, other aspects of the Satan problem which
are not immediately related to its main theme of dualism are
naturally missing. In particular, the origin and the character
of the Satan concept in the Old Testament itself and the
detailed exegetic research which would have to go with it are
not considered. Roskoff contents himself with the statement
that there is no mention in the Old Testament of “how Satan_
became what he is,” although a thorough study of the
passages concerned offers much toward a solution of the prob-
lem. Roskoff’s merit lies mainly in his dealing with questions
of principle. He is directed toward an essential understanding
of the Satan concept within Yahwism and attempts to per-
ceive an inner-Yahwistic development of this figure (Azazel
as the personification of impurity, Satan as inculpator in the_
Book of Job and as accuser and angel of retribution in Zech-
Cariah 3), always with due, yet not one-sided, considera-
tion of the religious-historical aspect. Even though I do not
always agree with his every statement,” Roskoff seems to me
to be a pioneer of a modern phenomenological approach
which the present study will also endeavor to follow.
Hans Duhm—although his work, “Die bésen Geister im
Alten Testament,” ** deals with all the material related to the
ret p- 197. On the problem of Persian influence, see below, pp.
155 f .
13. Ibid., p. 189.
14. Ibid., p. 197.
15. I cannot, for example, entirely agree with this line of develop-
ment. In my opinion the development of the Satan figure does not
begin with Azazel, but in the premythological use of the Satan concept.
Its beginning can be understood only through the analysis of the
concept throughout the Old Testament, an analysis lacking in Roskoff.
16. Diss., Tiibingen, 1904.
9 Introduction
problem and provides a good summary of it—does not work

through to a grasp of the phenomenon “Satan” or even of evil
in the Old Testament. Any real understanding is hampered at
the outset by his purely external classification of the various
figures. He groups the demonic figures according to their
outer appearance, as theriomorphic, anthropomorphic, or of
indistinct form. According to him, Satan belongs to the last
group and therefore has no special significance. Such an
~external approach throws no light on the nature of the phe-
nomena, so it is not surprising that Duhm’s main conclu-
sion—at least insofar as Satan is concerned—is incorrect. He
writes: “One could think away the sum total of cacodemonic
concepts in the Old Testament without receiving the impres-
sion that the character of even the old folk religion, let alone
that of the prophets, would thereby be essentially altered.” *
This conclusion stops short at the outermost periphery of the
problem. The fact that evil in the Old Testament is not
primarily expressed in cacodemonic figures is precisely what
brings up the essential problem of how it is expressed and
what this form of expression means in regard to the essence of
Old Testament religion. Duhm lays stress, as a positive factor,
on the sober good sense of the Israelite-people, which, in all
essentials, was resistant to cacodemonic concepts. “The reli-
gion, not only of the prophets, but of all free men, was lived
in the sober light of day, and had that conscious or uncon-
scious moral tendency which granted only limited play to
anything mystical.” * And in another place: “. . . but the
ancient peasant folk, as long as it was still intact, had little fear
of malicious beings; in most cases it ascribed misfortune, too,
to the anger of its God.” ” But Duhm here fails to see that
this was only possible for this people because it experienced
the demonic in its God, and not because it denied the de-
monic in the world and the soul.” Thereby he belittles the
17. Hans Duhm, op. cit., p. 65.
18. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
19. Ibid., p. 65.
20. His underestimation of the significance of the cacodemons is
justly contested by H. Kaupel (Die Dimonen des Alten Testaments
10 SATAN IN*THE OLD TESTAMENT
problem in favor of a morally evaluated “sober good sense.”

Paul Volz, in his fine monograph Das Déamonische in
Jahwe, has penetrated far more deeply into the problem.” He_
arrives at the essential conclusion, fully supported by biblical_
texts, that Yahweh was originally a demonic god, capable of
assimilating, to some extent, many of the cacodemons which
previously existed in popular belief. Accordingly, what is
specific is not the absence of the demonic in the realm
of Old
Testament religious experience but the concept of an ambiva-
lent god, the mingling of light and dark, of good and evil, in _
the one divine personality. Hence, monotheism in its essence
is not unity against multiplicity as its absolute opposite; it is >
rather the unity of multiplicity. Multiplicity is at one and the
same time overcome by and contained in unity. To be sure,
the concept of a single divine personality is the outstanding
achievement of the Old Testament, but this concept has had
its own special fate, interwoven with the origin and further
development of the Satan concept, as I shall try to show in
what follows.
A Catholic counterpart of Hans Duhm’s work may be seen
in Heinrich Kaupel’s Die Dimonen des Alten Testaments.”
This author scores a point initially by putting the principal
question of the meaning of Satan in the Old Testament
framework itself, in conscious opposition to an exclusively
religious-historical orientation. He refers to the “pattern of
evolution” * still so obstinately rooted in the Old Testament
field in which it has almost become a dogma; and he justifia-
bly criticizes Hans Duhm’s work as showing “very little real
[1930], p. 23; for further discussion of this book, see below). Even
from the standpoint of religious and cultural history, it is doubtful
whether the psychic disposition of the Jordan peasants was a different
one. The prohibitions from Leviticus to Chronicles point to the con-
trary: “In all these passages, strong inclinations of the people are taken
for granted; one does not go on and on rubbing in the same laws on
account of insignificant things.”
21. P. Volz, Das Diémonische in Jabwe (1924).
22. Kaupel, op. cit.
23. Ibid., p. 7.
11 Introduction
appreciation of the belief in Satan.” * But in the end we are

equally disappointed with this author, for, along with the
all-too-leveling religious-historical standpoint, he also discards
the assumption of any development in the Satan concept in
question. By this opposite form of one-sidedness, Kaupel ar-
rives at conclusions which have no more connection with
questions arising from the material found in the Old Testa-
ment itself than do those of Duhm, though in his case the
“external” approach is more from the side of dogma. Thus,
his investigation leads to the thesis that the Satan of the Old
Testament was, from the beginning, the same figure that is
encountered in the New Testament, only not yet so clearly
defined.” It is not surprising that he often takes questionable
liberties with the material in order to prove this point. (For
his thesis in detail see below.) However, in spite of the fact
that Kaupel’s investigation misses the point, as it seems to me
it does, it contains certain valuable observations which shall
be referred to in the relevant context. His comprehensive
discussion of the literature on the subject is also of value.
In Anton Jirku’s work, Die Damonen und ihre Abwebr im
Alten Testament,” we find the religious-historical and “‘abso-
lute” standpoints side by side in unconcerned unrelatedness.
“Yahweh,” he says on page 22, “was at all times always the
same,” and “.. . at the beginning we see clearly and dis-
tinctly the miracle when as if from Heaven there came to a
little desert people a God who would in time conquer half the
24. Ibid.
25. See ibid., p. 99: “The author of the Book of Job has surely
brought to expression this position of Satan (i.e., as adversary of man
and God) which is drawn in even sharper outline in the New Testa-
ment.” And on p. 117: “There is every ground for the assumption that
the Tempter of the first of mankind and Satan are identical.” “In
Genésis 3 it says, not Satan, but serpent, only because the serpent was
more generally familiar as a destructive and seducing being.” Kaupel is
probably not aware to what extent his interpretation rests upon the
rationalistic assumption of an “author” manipulating this purely mytho-
logical story as seems to him best. Regarding the relation of the
Paradise serpent and Satan, see below, pp. 49 f.
26. A. Jirku, Die Dimonen und ibre Abwebr im Alten Testament
(1912).
world.” Any demonic traits in Yahweh are categorically de-

nied, as a rule, by quite naively begging the question. For
instance, in regard to Numbers 12, where Moses’ sister Mir-
iam falls victim to leprosy, Jirku comments: “It is Yahweh
who calls it down upon her. Naturally, what is meant is that
he permits it.” ** According to Jirku, the attack on Moses
(Exod. 4:24+26) is not to be ascribed to Yahweh either. “AI-
though in its present form the story expressly names Yahweh
as the one who attacks Moses and seeks to slay him, yet
originally this would have referred, not to Yahweh, but to a
night demon.” ** And further: “It cannot be assumed that the
man who was the first to make Yahweh so wholly and com-
pletely the God of his people, who so to speak had daily
intercourse with Yahweh, that this is the man of whom it is
told that this very Yahweh sought to slay him.” * The deep
problem of divine ambivalence which appears in this story
remains hidden from Jirku’s all too narrow vision. That de-
monic actions are ascribed to Yahweh at all, Jirku says, is due
to the existence of ancient demonic legends, “but . . . to the
reviser the existence of other spirits beside Yahweh seemed
impossible” and so “in pious zeal the demon was simply
turned into Yahweh. . . .” *° This process could not have
been quite so “simple,” however, even if it had really been a
mere matter of a conscious literary procedure. If such ex-
pressly demonic traits could “simply” be ascribed to Yahweh,
and that “in pious zeal,” this again would be only another
expression of the immer reality which Jirku would like to
explain away, namely, that an identification of Yahweh with
the ancient demons could be tolerated!
The greatest conceivable contrast to this “absolute” ap-
proach of Jirku’s is shown by the rationalism of his explana-
tion of the origin of belief in demons. “The terrors of the
night led to the concept of night demons,” ** “the memories
27. Ibid., p. 48.
28. Ibid., p. 31.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.,p. 23.
31. Previously exemplified by Jirku in Gen. 32:23 ff. (ibid., p. 28).
13. Introduction
of the life spent in the wilderness to that of wilderness de-

mons.” *? “The sudden incursions of disease gave rise to belief
in disease demons, as the appearance of wild beasts to that in
animal demons.” ** To Jirku, Satan figures as one of the
disease demons because, in the Book of Job, “he appears as the
creator of the various diseases which befall Job.” ** He con-
cedes, however, that “Satan cannot be regarded as a mere
demon of disease.” But his conjecture that “he seems more to
have been an evil spirit with special power over such demons”
only goes to show that Jirku’s point of departure cannot
really come to grips with the problem of the Old Testament
Satan.
Albert Brock-Utne, in his article “Der Feind,” * pursues
his investigations on quite different grounds from those of the
aforementioned works. As is shown by the subtitle, “Die
alttestamentliche Satansgestalt im Lichte der sozialen Verhilt-
nisse des nahen Orients,” he sees the roots of the Satan con-
cept in the social sphere. He starts from those Old Testament
texts where “Satan” indubitably refers to a man. Brock-
Utne’s undertaking is prejudiced by the fact that he does not
“approach these early passages impartially but sets out-to prove
that the metaphysical concept of Satan derived from Job and
“Yechariah and, restricted to the function of “accuser,” was
_already present in the human sphere, with the end result that
_ this definite human type of “accuser” was later transferred to .
the heavenly sphere. The social situation which gave rise to
the type “Satan” is described by Brock-Utne as follows:
Palestine—except for short intervals—was during all of
antiquity a state fought over by great powers. The Pales-
32. Ibid., p. 33, with reference to Azazel.
33. Ibid., p. 96.
34. Ibid., p. 49. The text speaks of only one sickness. ‘The other blows
come from Yahweh, not from Satan. In reference to this passage, see
below, p. 125.
35, A. Brock-Utne, “Der Feind,” Klio, Beitrige zur Alten Ge-
schichte, XXVIII (1935). I am indebted to Professor W. Baumgartner
_ of Basel for pointing out this work to me, as well as other literature
“buried” in periodicals which relate to my theme.
14 ee IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
tinian princes were dependent upon this or that great king,

or were under his influence; and the peace and prosperity
of these princes and their realms were in many ways
dependent upon the favor they could acquire with the
great kings of Egypt or the countries along the Euphrates.
Such a small Palestinian prince could therefore meet with
great misfortune if some opponent defamed or accused
him before the great king.*°
Brock-Utne gives examples from the El-Amarna letters to
support this view.” Hence these small princes lived in con-
stant fear of the “slanderer.” It was by slander before the
great king that one princeling would try to eliminate another
whose power he coveted. Brock-Utne gives a really imagina-
tive description, substantiated by no text, of what such a
slanderer was like:
The slanderers were for the most part ambitious and
ready-tongued nobles, whose abilities facilitated their ad-
mission to the court. They were mainly strong and coura-
geous characters. One must picture them as aggressive and
bold adventuring knights who acted with the wiliness that
the situation demanded and the self-confidence befitting
their noble origin.**
This mere conjecture becomes so much a certainty to Brock-
Utne that he goes on to state: “Such men in particular were
called ‘satans.’” Such a “satan” was Hadad, who fled to
Egypt and attained great favor with Pharaoh (I Kings
11:14 ff.); and a second was Rezon, who later became King of
Damascus (I Kings 11:23 ff.). Jeroboam is accounted a third,
in spite of his never being directly referred to as “satan.” The
first example raises doubts, since the Hadad story says noth-
ing at all about any slanderous activity at Pharaoh’s court but
speaks only of this Edomite king’s open enmity toward Solo-
mon, which does not allow any other conclusion than to
understand “satan” in this sense, ie., as a military foe. The
36. Ibid., p. 221.

37. Ibid., pp. 221-22.
38. Ibid., p. 222.
15 Introduction
further example of Rezon makes Brock-Utne’s interpretation

altogether improbable. Aside from the fact that, from the
context in this passage, the word Satan cannot mean anything
other than “military adversary,” * there is another circum-
stance to consider. Before these “satans” rise up against Solo-
mon, he has already written to Hiram, King of Tyre (I Kings
5:4): “But now Yahweh my God hath given me rest on every
side, so that there is no adversary [literally “Satan” ] nor evil
occurrent.” Here, too, it is clear that it is a question of
military threat. Furthermore, Solomon would hardly recom-
mend himself to another king of whom he wants something
by asserting that no “satan,” in Brock-Utne’s sense, was
against him. This would be a totally unsuitable argument, if
only because he could not possibly know about it. It is in the
nature of slander that the slandered learn of it only later, if
ever; how can anyone know at a particular moment whether
or not someone is intriguing against him?
Equally unconvincing is Brock-Utne’s interpretation of
satan in I Sam. 29:4. According to him the Philistines are
afraid that David will ingratiate himself with Saul at their
expense. But it is clear from previous history that their dis-
trust of David arises from the fact that he was formerly Saul’s
vassal. He might become their “adversary”; that is, he might
desert to their adversary, Saul. Similar objections can be
raised against Brock-Utne’s interpretations of other passages.*°
Apart from these, a very important “satan” passage, namely
Num. 22:22, cannot possibly be pressed into the accuser pat-
tern. Brock-Utne refers to it, but without taking note of the
doubt it throws on his theory.** Taking those passages in the
39. “And God stirred him up another adversary, Rezon the son of
Eliadah, which fled from his lord Hadadezer king of Zobah: And he
gathered men unto him, and became captain over a band . . . and they
went to Damascus, and dwelt therein, and reigned in Damascus. And he
was an adversary (satdn) to Israel all the days of Solomon . . ree
Kings, 11:23 1f.).
40. Sitna, Ezra 4:6, as a very late passage, cannot serve as a proof of
Brock-Utne’s thesis. On II Sam. 19:22, see below, pp. 35 ff.
41. Brock-Utne, op. cit., p. 227, n. 1.
Psalms (27:12; 71:13; 109:4, 20, 29) where the Satan concept
occurs to be King-Psalms,” he uses them as a bridge to reach
~-theconclusion_“‘that.the Satan figure has its roots in the
political situation and in the cult of the kings.” He-sees the
celestial Satan as simply a reflection of the political Satan:
Yet in the course of time Yahweh himself became a great
king. He was pictured as sitting in Heaven, surrounded by
the court of the Sons of God; and it was natural that this
court also acquired its figure of Satan. And, in conformity
with the situation on earth, this Satan at the court of Yahweh
was thought of as similar to the satans at earthly courts,
namely, as. a powerful noble—in this case a “Son of God”—
who with self-assurance and eloquence traduces mankind.**
Brock-Utne here completely fails to recognize the mytholog-
ical background of “the Sons of God.” Another reason to
doubt his conclusions is presented by the analogy, inescapable
to every unprejudiced mind but ignored by him, between the
situations in the Job Prologue and in I Kings 22:19 ff. The
latter shows a prefiguration of the Job Satan which has noth-
ing whatever to do with accusation.
Furthermore, Brock-Utne is overrationalistic in ascribing
Satan’s later importance to the fact that he was well suited to
serve as a compromise between the trend inspired by the
rophets, which saw all good and evil coming from Yahweh,
and the belief of the broad primitive masses that evil was
brought about by independent demons. It suited the monothe-
ists to have Satan completely dependent on Yahweh; the rest
of the people were satisfied by the nature of his functioning
(“He went about and brought evil upon land and people” **),
Brock-Utne’s book is of principal importance, it seems to
me, in that it attempts to trace the concept and image of Satan
through the earlier texts, that is, in the human sphere. But the
attempt fails, in my opinion, because it projects a criterion
42. Brock-Utne bases his argument here largely on Birkeland, Die

Feinde des Individuums in der israelitischen Psalmenliteratur (1933).
43. Brock-Utne, op. cit., pp. 225 f.
44. Ibid., p. 227.
\7 Introduction
derived from later texts—that of the “accuser” significance of

Satan—into the earlier ones. Brock-Utne also deals in an all
too simple manner with the problem of the Satan concept
changing from the political into the celestial sphere. When he
states that “the transition from human being to demon may
have been helped along by the small chieftains, who, in their
rage and fear, endowed their accusers with demonic traits,” *
he is merely going around in a circle. However, in principle
his approach to the problem from the human sphere touches
upon one of the most essential points in the problem of the
Old Testament Satan. For this reason his attempt has some
importance in spite of the inconclusiveness of his results.
Gerhard von Rad’s point of departure is closely related to
that of Brock-Utne.* He, too, derives the Satan concept from
the social sphere, on the basis of an analysis of the word
resulting in the meaning “foe, adversary.” But, unlike Brock-
Utne, he finds its origin in judiciary procedures rather than in
political situations. According to his interpretation, Satan is in he
-a very specific sense the accuser before the court of justice.
“Like Brock-Utne, who applies the slanderer concept to the
‘earlier Satan passages, von Rad applies to them the accuser
“concept in its judicial form. The foes of Israel have a specific
function before Yahweh: They are accusers of Israel. To von
Rad this idea justifies the understanding of the satans whom
Yahweh arouses against Solomon, not merely in the sense of
“adversaries” but, here too, as possessing a definite juridical
Solo-
meaning: In the opinion of the Deuteronomic historian,
is in connection with this guilt that the
mon had sinned, and it
Von Rad bases the concept of
satans arise during his reign.*’
(mazkir ‘awon) on Ezek. 21:23 ff.
the adversary as “accuser”
as
(Hebrew text, 21:28), which refers to Nebuchadrezzar
where the Egyptians are called
mazkir ‘awon, and Ezek. 29:16,
to
mazkir ‘@won (i.e., the person who brings their iniquity
45. Ibid., n. 2.
gisches W érterbuch
46. G. von Rad, art. “ 6.480dos ,” in Kittel, Theolo
- gum Neuen Testament (1933), Il, 71-74.
47. Ibid., p. 72.
18 SATAN IN. THE OLD TESTAMENT
remembrance with God). Aside from the fact that in these

passages it says Satan, and not mazkir ‘awon, and that there is
no other foothold in this simple historic account for the
theological problematics which von Rad has in mind, the
same principal objections as were raised against Brock-Utne
are valid here. Von Rad, too, takes from the Job Prologue
what he assumes to be the decisive, specific meaning of the
Satan concept, and then makes it appear as a mere analogy to
situations on earth. “Like the earthly order, the heavenly
order has likewise an organ in the High Court of God which
assumes the office of a judicial accuser.” “ To von Rad the
Satan in the Book of Job is “by no means a demonic being; he
is the heavenly state official. . . .”*° But he finds himself
immediately obliged to limit this statement. “However, the
concept of Satan in Job already implicitly contains the ele-
ments which later bent the line so deeply downward.” *
Going further still, in reference to the blows of fate dealt to
Job by Satan, von Rad asserts: “Hence he is not de facto
merely accuser, but has competences which reach beyond his
juridical function. And here is an essential point where the
analogy to the earthly mazkir ‘awon fails.” *
In order to reconcile Num. 22:22 with his theory, von Rad
sees himself compelled to assume that perhaps the term Satan
was not always applied to the same figure, so that in principle
any one of the bené ha-’elohim could be appointed accuser. In
Num. 22:22 it is even the Angel of Yahweh who comes to
Balaam as Satan. Von Rad overlooks the fact that the accuser
, theory does not apply at all to the situation in the Balaam
‘story. He does not, like Brock-Utne, simply evade the diffi-
culties involved, but, as he considers the difficulties, he moves
on increasingly shaky ground. He perceives, for instance, the
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid. To me it seems that the demonic elements in the Book of
Job are very much in the foreground. See below, pp. 118 ff.
51. Ibid.
19 Introduction
close inner connection of the r#ab concept in I Kings

22:19 ff. to the Job Prologue, and states:
The difficulty consists in the fact that the very clear
basic element of the accuser has next to nothing to do with
the persecutor. . . and it is possible that in Israel there was
the concept of an adversary who in certain situations was
not only de jure associated with human sin but embodied
the threat to their total existence.”
I Chron. 21:1 should have led von Rad to give up his thesis
altogether, had he not allowed the problem to dissolve into a
literary question. “T Chronicles 21, however, cannot be inter-
preted without further ado, since the context did not origi- -
nally refer to Satan, but this concept came into the text only
secondarily as a correction due to religious scruples.” ** In my
opinion, it is just this change which opens up an unusually
interesting problem (see below, pp. 160 f.). Yet von Rad
himself sees in this passage a “difficult paradox which adheres
to all belief in devils,” and acknowledges that “this correction
would hardly have been carried out in this way if the concept
of Satan had not undergone a rather decisive transfor-
mation.”
Thus von Rad’s basic thesis ofSatan as juridical accuser is_
shown by the process of his own research to be insufficient. It
would seem that he was ready for a far deeper comprehension
of the Old Testament Satan than can be concluded from his
article, when we find him making such profound formula-
tions as the following: “Satan incorporates the threat to men
from God, whether as accuser of their moral and_religious
failures or as a demonically destructive principle firmly an;
rchored in the plan of salvation.” ©
Much the same approach as that of the two last-mentioned
writers is shown by H. Torczyner in his article “How Satan
52. Ibid., p. 73.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
Came into the World,” * and by Adolphe Lods in his study

“Les origines de la figure de Satan, ses fonctions a la cour
céleste.” °* Though the mythological realm is their point of
departure, they give primary attention to the problem of the
earthly prototype and see the origin of the Satan figure in the
historical situation. However, since they concern themselves
mainly with the Job Prologue and Zech. 3:1 ff—Torczyner
seeing the origin of the Satan concept in Job and Lods leaning
toward Zechariah—they do not really belong to this sum-
mary. We will return to them at the appropriate place (see
below, pp. 30 ff.; pp. 135 f., ete.). Here I will mention only
/briefly the conclusions they reach. Torezyner sees in the Satan
_ of the Book of Job a secret emissary of the Heavenly Court,
corresponding to the secret emissaries of earthly kings, who
7 _come and go and report on the behavior of subjects. He bases
his view primarily on the derivation of the name Satan from
the verb S22, “to wander about”—an assumption which will be
gone into exhaustively later (see below, pp. 30 f.). Lods sum-
marizes the result of his research as follows: “1. Satan, in the
vision of Zechariah, did not play the role of general advo-
cate—since the judicial organization of the ancient Middle
East did not seem to have had an official of that sort—but
rather of the occasional accuser.” (Opposed to this, see pp.
135 f.) “2. In the Job Prologue, the function of the satan is
that of an agent of the divine police.” °° He advances the
latter concept in direct reference to Torczyner’s aforemen-
tioned article, but without taking over that writer’s etymo-
logical argument. He relies for the most part on historical
parallels, which will be discussed later (see below, pp. 135 f.).
56. H. Torcezyner, “How Satan Came into the World,” Expository

Times (1936-37), pp. 563 ff. This article also appeared as “Wie Satan in
die Welt kam,” Mitteilungsblatter der Hebriischen Universitat Jerusa-
lem (January, 1938), pp. 15 ff.
57. A. Lods, “Les Origines de la figure de Satan, ses fonctions 4 la
cour céleste,” Mélanges Syriens offerts a M. R. Dussaud (1939), pp.
649-60.
58. Torczyner, op. cit., p. 16.
59. Lods, op. cit., p. 660.
21 Introduction
If we consider these works as a whole, they may perhaps be

said to represent one-sided presentations of intrinsically im-
portant points of view. So perhaps it may be justifiable to
attempt to assemble in one study the different points of view
necessary for grasping the total phenomenon, in order to
achieve a new phenomenological view of the whole, while
naturally using as a basis the results of these previous investi-
gations.
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The Concept of “Satan”
and Its Development
in the Old Testament
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1. Etymology of the Word “Satan”
IN THE worLp of the Old Testament, names are not “sound
and fume,” but they-have magic power; they are, so to speak,
substantial and therefore, in effect, identical with the nature
of their bearers. For example, in the creation story (Genesis 1
and 2), the giving of names to things is at the same time a
bestowal of existence and essence. The power of names is also
shown in the refusal to reveal one’s name (Exod. 3:14; Gen.
32:29), because he who knows the name has power over him
who bears it. This all suggests that with the figure of Satan,
too, we inquire first into the meaning of his name.
It is generally accepted * that the name “Satan” comes from _.
the verb Satan, “to persecute, be hostile to” and also, more
specifically, “‘to accuse.” In opposition to this there is found
the opinion (in the Historische Grammatik der hebriischen
Sprache, by H. Bauer and P. Leander ”) that the noun belongs
to the descriptive words with the suffix -an (> on). Gerhard
von Rad ° sets beside this deduction, which he refers to, the
“other possibility of a simple nominal formation q@tal, but he
emphasizes that even in the latter case the verb Satan is proba-
1. See esp. Gesenius-Buhl, Hebriisches und aramiisches Handworter-

buch tiber das Alte Testament (1915) and Koehler-Baumgartner, Lexi-
kon in veteris testamenti libros (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958).
2. 1922, p. 500 t. Neuen
3, Art. “sr4@oros,” in Kittel, Theologisches W orterbuch zum
Testament (1933), Il, 71.
A;
bly denominative. It is true that the verb appears only five

times in the Old Testament, and those exclusively in the
Psalms, in reference to “adversaries”; * that is, it appears in
later passages than the noun,-which seems to support the_
assumption that the noun is the original and that the verb is
derived from it. On the other hand, this theory is contro-
verted by the circumstance that the secondary form of the
verb Satan, Satam, is also found in five Old Testament passages:
once in the Psalms,® once in the Book of Job,° and three times
in Genesis,” in both Yahwistic and Elohistic passages.* The
premise of the denominative is therefore not tenable, and with
it von Rad’s conclusion that the word “accordingly expresses
a quality, not a function,” loses its foundation. The noun Sitna
also seems to me to offer evidence for the functional charac-
ter of the word, since it can scarcely be interpreted otherwise
than as an abstract noun of the function. The reference Gen.
26:21, where the word appears as the name of a well, proba-
bly of ancient origin, apparently derived from the verb Satan,
again controverts the denominative theory of Bauer and
Leander and von Rad. Moreover, aside from the question of
4. Ps. 38:20: “They also that render evil for good are mine adversar-
ies [yiStendni, literally, “the ones who turn against me”].” Ps. 71:13:
“Let them be confounded and consumed that are adversaries to my soul
[Sotné nafsi]....” Ps. 109:4: “For my love they are my adversaries
[yistendini]. . . .” Ps. 109:20: “Let this be the reward of mine adversar-
ies [pe‘ullat Sotnai].. . .” Ps. 109:29: “Let mine adversaries [fdtnai] be
clothed with shame. . . .”
5. Ps. 55:3: “. . . for they cast iniquity upon me, and in wrath they
hate me [wbe-af yiStemtini]... .”
6. Job 16:9: “He teareth me in his wrath, who hateth me [’appo taraf
wai-yisteméni). .. .”
7. Gen. 27:41: “And Esau hated Jacob [wai-yistém ‘esiw ’et
ya‘aqob] because of the blessing wherewith his father blessed him.”
Gen. 49:23: “The archers have sorely grieved him, and shot at him, and
hated him [wai-yistemihu ba‘alé hissim].. . .” Gen. 50:15: “And when
Joseph’s brethren saw that their father was dead, they said, Joseph will
peradventure hate us [/@ yisteménu yoséf] and will certainly requite us
all the evil which we did unto him.”
8. In reference to these passages, see Die Heilige Schrift des Alten
Testaments, trans. E. Kautzsch (4th ed., A. Bertholet, 1922), referred to
hereafter as HSAT +.
27. The Concept of “Satan”
grammar, the functional concept can be supported by individ-

ual study of the passages in question (cf. below, p. 57,
concerning Num. 22:22).
Satam, as the apparently older, secondary form, also offers a
better starting point for investigating the word’s fundamental
meaning. The sense of “to persecute, to pursue,” which
emerges especially in Gen. 27:41 and 49:23, originally meant
most concretely “to entrap,” in the sense of setting a snare or
a trap, or putting fetters on the feet.° The only Old Testa-
ment evidence for this basic meaning is in Hos. 9:8. There it
says (of the prophet): pab yaqos ‘al kol derakaw mastéma
be-bet ’elohaw (“a snare of a fowler in all his ways, and
hatred [astéma] in the house of his God”).
Thus mastéma appears in strict parallelism to pah, the bird-
catcher’s net. For this reason Guthe* translates it with
“snares,” 4 in agreement with Gesenius.” However, a diffi-
culty arises from the fact that 2astéma appears also in verse 7,
and is made parallel to ‘awon, which would indicate a figura-
tive meaning for mastema, too. Guthe translates it with Side
(“sin),” as does the Ziirich Bible. The latter, with its transla-
tion of ‘awon by Anfeindung, i.e., “persecution” (“hatred” in
the King James version), adapts verse 8 to verse 7. But a
figurative meaning in verse 8 disturbs the clear parallelism of
the images. Wellhausen therefore deletes verse 8.** Gesen-
Testa-
9. Gesenius, Thesaurus Linguae Hebraeae et Chaldaeae Veteris
r persecu-
menti (1840), col. 1327: “satam = insidiatus est alicui, hostilite
ferreo
tus est eum. ... Origo est in laqueo, vel potius decipulo
ponendo, quo pedes prehend antur. . . 53
10. HSAT 4, II, 15.
p. 73.
11. Similarly, Karl Marti, Das Dodekapropheton (1904),
us, col. 1327: “masté ma = compes, decipu lum ferreum
12. Thesaur
pedes alicuis prehendens.” for this
13. Die kleinen Propheten (1898), p. 123. A real basis
deriva-
the
deletion is lacking, however. Wellhausen expressly rejects us, again
tion of mastém a from “snare,” as given in Geseniu s, Thesaur
translation of
without giving his reason, insists upon “hatred” as the
invalid for verse 8.
mastéma, according to verse 7, and declares it to be
to verse 8, for,
He closes the gap with verse 9a: “he‘miqu Sibeta belongs se than by
. following pah yaqos it cannot possibl y be translat ed otherwi
‘they have dug him a deep ite
ius-Buhl * leaves the question of its authenticity open, but

notes that to assert it would necessitate the deletion of verse 7.
Marti *° assumes that mastéma is not the original word in the
passage, with very good grounds, since mastéma, even when
taken as Anfeindung, is not a good parallel to “awon and may
easily have slipped in from verse 8 in the place of some similar
word. He believes this to have been Hatta tam.** Starting from
the same principles, Guthe * arrives at a similar conjecture,
and Ernst Sellin likewise grants verse 8 primary authen-
ticity.* In my own opinion, the authenticity of verse 8 is
supported in any case by the completeness of the parallel
character of the images, for which maStéma is structurally in-
dispensable, while in verse 7 it is only loosely appended and
does not seem absolutely necessary in the context of the
meaning.
In this connection it is very interesting that, parallel to the
noun Satan, mastéma also became a name of the devil in late
Judaism, as, for instance, in the Book of Jubilees (11:3 ff.;
17:16; 19:28; 22:16 ff.). He is the monarchical head of the
evil spirits and plays essentially the role of the Old Testament
Satan in his later development.”
The assumption of the authenticity of verse 8 gains support
from the Syrian Setam Pa. = compedivit, vinxit,” which Sel-
lin also points out (see above, n. 18), and Sutma = compes,
14. Op. cit., s.v.

15. Marti, op. cit., p. 73.
16. Ibid. hatt@a is in fact a usual parallel to ‘awdn; see the following
verse, 9b: “therefore he will remember their iniquity [‘awdndm], he
will visit their sins [hatz’dtam].”
17. HSAT 4, II, 14, note to verse 7: “for mastéma (= hatred) probably
crept in from verse 8, read hatta’teka.”
18. E. Sellin, Das Zwélfprophetenbuch (1921), p. 73: “mastéma is
found only here [ie., verse 7] and in verse 8, but just after the latter
passage the meaning of setting snares or persecution can be accounted
as assured, chiefly according to the Syrian, probably in the concrete
sense of fetters or sling.”
19. See Bousset-Gressmann, Die Religion des Judentums im spathel-
lenistischen Zeitalter (1926), p. 333.
20. See Gesenius, Thesaurus, s.v.; cf. also Thesaurus Syriacus.
29 The Concept of “Satan”
vinculum pedum.* Now Arabic has the same meaning for

$atana, which corresponds to the Hebrew Satan. It means,
among other things, “to resist someone, to deter him from
some intention, to bind him with the cord” (Satz).”
Consequently, by means of the basic meaning of the sec-
ondary form Satam and the Arabic Satana as parallel form to
satan, it can be concluded that the primal meaning of the verb
satan is persecution by hindering free forward movement; i.e.,
it means “to hinder, to oppose, an existing intention.” This
original meaning can probably be seen most clearly in Num.
22:22, where the mal’ak Yahweh literally crosses Balaam’s
intentions by standing in his way, /e-satan 16. The translation
of the noun Satan by Widersacher (“adversary”) in most
passages by both the Ziirich Bible and Luther therefore comes
closest to the original meaning. Harry Torczyner, in his
translation of the Bible,”* renders the word as Widergeist
(“adverse spirit”), which, it seems to me, is a concept derived
from the much later mythological figure and not from the
original, profane meaning of the word.
A number of earlier writers ** advocated the thesis, already
refuted by Gesenius and others,” that satan is to be derived
from Sat, “to rove about.” ** That this thesis had, in the last
21. See Gesenius, Thesaurus; also Thesaurus Syriacus; Brockelmann,
Lexicon Syriacum; and Gesenius-Buhl, op. cit., s.v. mastéma: “But if
verse 8 is genuine, a derivation from the Syrian $etam Pa., to bind with
ropes . . . immediately suggests itself.”
22. Adolf Wahrmund, Handwérterbuch der arabischen und deut-
schen Sprache (Giessen, 1877). Compare also the dictionaries of Lane,
Belot, Kazimirski. The conjecture by Barth (Etymologische Studien
[1893]) that Satan derives from Satama = “to slander,” has already been
rejected by Gesenius, Thesaurus.
23. H. Torczyner, Die Heilige Schrift, neu ins Deutsche tibertragen
(1937).
24, Herder, Geist der hebriischen Poesie, I, 19; Ilgen, De libro Jobi,
pp- 125 ff.; Simonis lex., ed. Eichhorn (see Gesenius, Thesaurus).
25. D. von Coelln, Bibl. Theologie (1896), I, 421, n. 35; Hengsten-
berg, Christologie des Alten Testaments, I, 34 (see Gesenius, Thesau-
TUS).
ndi,
26. So, for example, Ilgen, op. cit., p. 128, n.: “Ex illo circumeu
- cursum per aliquod spatium conficiendi significatu, ortum est novum
nomen Satan, ex hoc verbum Satan.”
analysis, to do with the theological interests of these older

writers is shown clearly in Hengstenberg’s refutation. Ac-
cording to him, they tried to show
that the Satan of the Book of Job was not the Satan of the
later books, but rather a good, pure angel, who merely had
the office of an accuser, fiscal solicitor, or informant;
basing their view upon the author’s counting him, too,
among the children of God; and that it was unfair to
project the hatefulness of the office upon the person.”
Hengstenberg rejects this derivation upon grammatical
grounds but in principle demonstrates the same theological
interest in not tolerating Satan as such, i.e., as “adversary,”
among the angels. He merely makes it easier for himself by
declaring that Satan could never have appeared among the
angels; that was only a “poetic fiction,” intended no more
seriously by the author of the Book of Job than the idea that
Yahweh should need to have a human being tested by Satan!
The derivation of the noun Satan from Sat has also been stated
by the Jewish scholar Samuel David Luzzatto: 8 “tebilat
geria@’to Satan mis-Sut ba ares.” More recently this has again
been taken up by Harry Torczyner.” His argument, how-
ever, is not convincing. Along with other evidence, Torczy-
ner cites the Arabic form Saitan, in which, according to him,
the diphthong of the first syllable still shows its connection
with a verb Sat, and not with stn. However, since the Arabic
word is probably a borrowed biblical term, as will be shown
(see pp. 32 ff.), it does not come into question as far as the
origin of the concept is concerned. Torczyner continues:
On the other hand, it is conceivable that the accusing
activity of Shaitan [Torczyner takes § as the original
form and refers to the change between § and $ in Hebrew
27. Hengstenberg, op. cit., I, 35-36.

28. Erliuterungen tuber einen Teil der Propheten und Hagiographen
(Lemberg, 1876), p. 197. I am indebted for this reference to Rabbi S.
Speier, Zurich.
29. “How Satan Came into the World,” Expository Times, XLVIII
(1936-37), 564.
and also between Hebrew and Arabic] or Satan led to the

formation of a new verb, stm, which means “accuse, be
hostile,” and from which later a substantive, sitna, “accusa-
tion,” developed.*°
This statement, however, falls to pieces in the face of the fact
that the derivation of the noun Satan from Sat and the con-
cept of Satan as the roving messenger is taken from the
relatively late Book of Job and the so-called folktale cannot,
‘according to most scholars, be dated earlier than 600 B.c. (cf.
pp. 95 ff.). But the noun fatan appears in much older texts
_(Num. 22:22; I Sam. 29:4; I Kings 5:18; 11:14, 23). This does
not contradict the possibility of there being a conscious pun
with the words $a and Satan, perhaps even based on one of
those false folk etymologies which are not uncommon in the
Old Testament.
As was mentioned before, A. Lods, who accepts Torczy-
ner’s conception of the Job Satan as a roving divine “secret
police agent,” also draws the line at the latter’s etymological
disquisitions (“. . . without accepting the adventurous ety-
mological hypothesis of Mr. Torczyner. . .”) * In his argu-
ments, which I had not seen prior to my own analysis of
med
Torczyner’s hypothesis, I found my standpoint confir
and supported by further evidence:
Is it likely that the verb satan, “to be opposed,” and the
be
substantive sitna, “opposition,” which are verified to
a well
from very early times, for example by the name of
in the desert (Gen. 26:20), would be derived from a noun
designating a police agent and consequently implying the
existence of a centralized and organized State? The con-
currence of the name of satin and the verb Sout, “to
circulate,” in Job 1:7 maybe, if it is intentional, a simple
play on words_by assonance, of which the Hebrew authors
“and writers were fond.”
30. Ibid.
fonctions 4 la
31. A. Lods, “Les Origines de la figure de Satan, ses (1939), pp.
cour céleste,” Mélanges Syriens offerts a M. R. Dussaud
. 649-60.
32. Ibid., pp. 658-59.
Beyond that, however, it can be demonstrated that_the

noun Satin belonged originally to the profane sphere. It is
used with its profane meaning in texts older than those which
depict the mythological Satan. This fact, which will be
shown in what follows to be of far-reaching theological sig-
nificance, is seemingly contradicted by another fact, namely,
that the Arabic word Saitan does not turn up for the first time
in the Koran, as a designation of the devil along with Iblis,
but is also found in pre-Islamic writings as a synonym for the
term ginn. This is also true for the plural form. Ignaz
Goldziher gives evidence of ginn and Saitan being used with
the specific meaning of the poet’s daimonion.® Franz Praeto-
rius believes it probable, on these grounds, that the Judeo-
Christian Satan is of Arabic origin.** In this he opposes
Wellhausen, who regards Saitdén as a Christian term which
penetrated Arabic from Abyssinia,*° and D. H. Miiller, who
holds the Arabic Saitan to be one of the oldest derivatives of
the Hebrew Satan.*° A. S. Tritton mentions that the Arabic
philologists held Saitan to be an Arabic word.” They derived
it from the root sh-t-n; a few, however, leaned toward the
root sh-y-t.* Tritton, however, believes it probable, since the
concept is clearly borrowed, that the word—a regular Arabic _
form—is also borrowed, and that from the Ethiopian word
which is in turn derived from the Hebrew. Sditan is also the.
name of a serpent.”
The purely philological and etymological factor does not
seem to suffice for the solution of this problem. In my opinion,
33. Abhandlungen zur arabischen Philologie (Leiden, 1896), p. 106;
“Die Ginnen der Dichter,” ZDMG, XLV, 685 ff.
34, “Aethiopische Etymologien,” ZDMG, LXI, 615-24.
35. Reste arabischen Heidentums? (1897), Ds lois tie Be
36. Zur Geschichte der semitischen Zischlaute, p. 10. Unfortunately
this work was not available to me.
37. The Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. Shaitan (Leiden: Brill, 1934) =
Handwérterbuch d. Islam (1941), pp. 671 ff.
38. Cf. also Lane, An Arabic Lexicon (London, 1863-93), s.v. Some
of the grammarians saw in shaitan the type fai‘al of Satana, while others
regarded the j as radical, hence as the type fa‘lan of Sata.
39. Cf. Lane, op. cit., s.v. i
33 The Concept of “Satan” E
the assumption that the biblical concept penetrated into the

Arabic, either directly or through Abyssinia, is more
plausible than that of the reverse influence. This is in no way
incompatible with a transformation of the concept corre-
sponding to the aforementioned Arabic-pagan conceptions
(plural, synonym for ginm). Satan in his final Old Testament
form and especially in his Christian form is of demonic nature
and could easily have been taken over by the Arabs for their
own, pluralistic, form of demonism. Moreover, the plural of
Satan is found already in Judaic apocryphal literature, where_
“Satan is lord of a host of spirits, hence again appearing as split oe
into a multiplicity, for instance in I En. 65:6 and 40:7.° In
view of the fact that the Koran contains many elements of
apocryphal Old and New Testament writings—for instance,
~ the very Iblis concept of the Koran is derived, not from the
Old Testament Satan, but from apocryphal legends of the
Fallen Angel **—it seems to me not impossible that the plural-
istic conception of Satan, also, was taken by Arabic paganism
of
from this same source. With the extreme differentiation
late Judaic angelology and demonol ogy, the Jewish world of
religious concepts acquire d a “polythe istic” feature that may
of
have made it easily assimilable for the primitive demonism
the pre-Islamic Arabs. The name of the serpent, too, is per-
the
haps not uninfluenced by the much earlier equation with
n gives positive expressi on
serpent in Paradise.*? Enno Littman
to this conjecture:
the
Satan, the adversary, accuser... is Hebrew; since
shaitin , which is derived from the Abyssi n-
Arabic form
also means “serpen t,” it has been conjec tured that
ian,
\
“serpent” was the original meaning of Satan; but, more
times,
probably, the Arabs learned the word in ancient
s and demons of every sort, and it is
applying it to serpent
t-Gressmann,
40. See also Bk. Jub. 23:29 and 50:5, quoted by Bousse
op. Cit., p. 333. 8; XX:
3; XVIII:4
41. Koran, Suras II:32; VII:10; XV:31f.; XVII:6
- 115; XXVIII:74 f.
42. See Wisd. of Sol. 3:24.
only since Mohammed that it has been used again in its

original sense.**
In any case, a reverse influence is hardly conceivable, because
Satan would then appear only as a borrowed demonic being.
The original Old Testament profane meaning of the Satan
concept would lack any possible explanation. In view of the
uncertain situation in the purely philological field, this crite-
rion based on the Old Testament itself should decide the prob-
lem.
The exact meaning of the profane concept, its “place in
life’—if I may borrow for this different context a useful
phrase of Gunkel’s in regard to the study of the Psalms—must
be pursued with the aid of these passages, since it can be
assumed that these fundamental meanings continue to play a
part in the later mythological concept.
2. The Concept of “Satan” in the Profane Realm

In I Sam. 29:4 the princes of the Philistines turn against their
king, Achish, because he wants to take David with him to
fight against Saul, ro a “. «let him [David] not go
[literally, Satan] to us.’” "The same meaning of adversary irin

war appears in Kings. In I Kings 5:4 Solomon says in his
message to Hiram: “But now Yahweh my God hath given
me rest on every side, so there is neither adversary [Satan]
nor evil occurrent.” Then, I Kings 11:14: “And Yahweh
stirred up an adversary [Satan] unto Solomon, Hadad the
Edomite: he was of the king’s seed in Edom.” And similarly
in I Kings 11:23 “And God stirred up another adversary
[Satan], Rezon.” Immediately following, in verse 25, it says of
the same Rezon, King of Damascus: “And he was an adver-
sary [Satan] to Israel all the days of Solomon.” These pas-
sages, however, contain a deeper nuance which transcends the
concrete meaning of Opponent in actual warfare and already
gives a subtle intimation of the future extension of the con-
43. Morgenlindische Wérter im Deutschen? (1924), pp. 31-32.

cept into the metaphysical realm. This is most clearly seen in

I Kings 5:4. The adversary constitutes the opposite to rest, to
undisturbed peace in this life, to a condition of safe and
fulfilled prosperity.* And the word Satan is made parallel to
the “stroke of fate” (pega‘ ra‘). Apparently this connection
was already held by the ancients not to be accidental. Dal-
man interprets pega‘ as meaning, in addition to “event” and
“misfortune,” also “evil demon.” “© Solomon has established
his kingdom and now sets out to build his temple. No foe, no
“adversary” is in sight, who could cross his plans. But then
God stirs up such an adversary against him, who will not let
him alone as long as he lives. It is God who sends him this —
adversary. Here one already senses the fateful, metaphysical
background behind the adversary who still appears here as a_
human _being. Behind the profane sphere already appear
flashes of the metaphysical one which breaks through com-
pletely in Num. 22:22. The concept is used with the same
twofold connotation in II Sam. 19:22. There David, after his
return to Jerusalem as king, turns against the sons of Zeruiah,
who want to prevent him from granting Shimei his life,
forfeited by his previous cursing of the king. “What have I to
do with you, ye sons of Zeruiah, that ye should this day be
adversaries [Satin] *® unto me?” Here the sons of Zeruiah
become “the adversary” of an inner, positive, impulse. It is
tempting to assume that we already have here, in this passage,
the concept of an inner adversary, which is used symbolically
in reference to the sons of Zeruiah. It is therefore understand-
able that the Ziirich Bible here translates Satan by “tempter.”
44. Compare also Karl Marti, “Zwei Studien zu Sacharja,” Theolo-
gische Studien und Kritiken (1892), pp. 217f., on these passages:
“Therefore those also who oppose themselves to the quiet and undis-
turbed governing and the peaceful development of a state are called
Satans os.”
45, Aramiisch-Neubebriisches Wérterbuch, s.v. According to For-
ster, in his article “setyev” in Kittel, Theol. Worterbuch zum Neuen
Testament (1933), p. 13, pega‘, in Tannaitic Judaism= “the attacker”
(rare).
"46, The Ziirich Bible here translates “Satan” as “tempter.” See the
remarks which follow.
36 SATAN IN-.THE OLD TESTAMENT
Luther in this passage writes “Satan,” thereby presumably

taking the same position; that is, he had in mind the fully
formed figure of Satan, used as an image for the men oppos-
ing David. However, it seems to me questionable whether, in
this relatively old text, such an interpretation and a corre-
sponding translation is possible. It presupposes not only the
figure of Satan, who appears only-later in the Old Testament,
but even the still later conception of late ~Judaism—which R
‘went beyond the Old Testament—of Satan as the evil drive
(yeser ha-ra‘) in the human soul. Could not this passage also
be explained in the sense of an inimical attitude, an opposi-
tion, a contradiction, of David’s intention of letting justice
give way to mercy in the case of Shimei? All the more so
since the same situation is already presented in II Sam.
16:10 ff., where David is fleeing before Absalom. Here, too,
David resists the demand of the sons of Zeruiah to slay
Shimei, who has cursed him, with the words: “What have I
to do with you, ye sons of Zeruiah?” (without the additional
phrase of II Sam. 19:22, “that ye should this day be Satan to
me”). He simply separates himself from the standpoint of the
sons of Zeruiah and withdraws into his own inner, independ-
ent attitude, which shows a remarkable magnanimity:
so let him curse, because Yahweh hath said unto him,
Curse David. Who shall then say, Wherefore hast thou
done so? And David said to Abishai, and to all his servants,
Behold, my son, which came forth from my bowels, seek-
eth my life; how much more now may this Benjamite do
it? Let him alone, and let him curse, for Yahweh hath
bidden him. It may be that Yahweh will look on mine
affliction, and that Yahweh will requite me good for his
cursing this day.
And most impressively it continues:
And as David and his men went by the way, Shimei went
along on the hill’s side over against him, and cursed as he
went, and threw stones at him, and cast dust. And the king,
and all the people that were with him, came weary [to the
Jordan] and refreshed themselves there.
37. The Concept of “Satan”
Such a magnanimous attitude cannot always be taken for

granted, even for a David. It would have been very possible
for David to regress to a “more normal” need for revenge
when, in II Sam. 19:22, he returned to Jerusalem as reinstated
rightful king, and Shimei came to beg forgiveness for his
iniquity. The standpoint of Zeruiah’s sons might now have
been even more of a temptation, and this time he does not
forgive as a humble human being standing before God alone
but as a great-hearted king who bestows amnesty to celebrate
his return. “What have I to do with you, ye sons of Zeruiah,
that ye should this day be adversaries [Satan] unto me? shall
there any man be put to death this day in Israel? for do not I ©
know that I am this day king over Israel?”
Thus, even though in my opinion one cannot think here of
the later meaning of Satan as “tempter,” this passage, too,
nevertheless goes beyond the external, concrete opposition of
<Satan as enemy, insofar as the opposition is met on the psy-
chic plane and is expressed in the image of the outer foe. The
profane concept of Satan comes to be an image of an imner
opposition. However, such an interpretation does not as yet
presuppose the mythological Satan figure.*”
47. Cf. also Henry Preserved Smith, The Book of Samuel (“Interna-
tional Critical Commentary” series) (1912), pp. 363 f.: “David again
disclaims fellowship with the sons of Zeruiah who would be his ad-
versary, hindering him from doing what he would. Today a man shall
be put to death in Israel? Evidently conciliation was to be the order of
the day, for the king had the confidence that he was fully restored to
his throne. The acclaim of the people has moved him to this generos-
ity.” And further (p. 364): “... the Philistines contemplated the
possibility of David’s becoming a satan, a traitor in the camp: in much
the same light David views the sons of Zeruiah here.” The word Satan
here is also taken as a profane concept by Karl Marti (“Zwei Studien
zu Sacharja,” p. 218); and by Caspari in his commentary on The Books
of Samuel (Sellin-Kommentar, p. 595, n. 4). Kaupel, too (Die Dimonen
is
des Alten Testaments [1930], p. 123), sees that a human adversary
meant here, but tries, though hesitatingly, to bring Satan into the old
text as a metaphysical entity by remarking on the above passage:
to
“Might one not now and then, when calling an adversary Satan, wish as
make a tacit comparison between the supernatural adversary of man,
“well as of God, and the immediate opponent?” This corresponds to his
Old
view, for which there is no evidence in the text, that in the
.
general
It is a quite different story if we consider this passage as a

profane parallel to the judgment scene at the divine court in
Zechariah’s vision, chapter 3:1 ff. Here it is to some extent a
conflict in the divine realm, in heaven: the mal’ak Yahweh
proclaims mercy and commands Satan—who is clamoring for
justice and the punishment of Joshua, the high priest—to be
silent, just as David commands silence of the sons of Zeruiah.
To this extent, here, too, the metaphysical background be-
comes visible. Behind the moral conflict of man there stands
in reality the divine conflict, the judgment in heaven. It is also
a fine example of what I tried to make clear in the Introduc-
tion about the relation between God and the human soul.
What happens in David’s soul and in his actual situation is
somehow a reflection of what is happening in the divine
sphere. But as yet these are two streams that do not meet, are
not united in a conscious mind. David experiences this divine
drama in himself, but does not yet know its divine character.
3. The Concept of “Satan” in the Metaphysical

Realm
Tue pivine and the human planes meet for the first time ina
most significant way in Num. 22:22. Here it is an angel who
stands in the way of Balaam, the human being, as Satan, as
adversary. He is by no means as yet the demonic figure called
“Satan,” but the mal’ak Yahweh, who blocks Balaam’s path,
le-Satan-lo, “for an adversary to him.” The term Satan is used
here only in apposition to maPak Yahweh: he stands in Ba-
laam’s way as adversary.
The Balaam passage, as it relates to the development of the
Satan figure, will be discussed in more detail later (see pp.
72 ff.). Here it is only important to establish the fact that a
divine being stands as “adversary” in the way of a human
being. That which crosses human plans and wishes comes
from the divine sphere; that is, the human experience of this
Testament Satan was already the archenemy of God and man (see
above, p. 11).
( 39 The Concept of “Satan”
world has expanded in human consciousness to a metaphysical
experience.
The “resistance” comes.ultimately from God. But
Satan is not yet a mythological figure; Satan is, as in the —
‘preceding passages, a functional concept, not a proper name.
The story told in Job 1:6 ff. and 2:1 ff. represents a further
stép in this development. Again, as in Num. 22:22, tsi
matter of the divine realm. Here, too, the adversary is an
angel, one of the bené-ha~elohim, the sons of God, or divine
_beings. What is new, however, is that the adversary is not
merely God’s messenger; he stands over against God in a
dialectical relation. Here he has become a personal figure in
“the divine realm, but here, too, he is the personification of a
divine function.
Differing in content, yet the same in form, we find the
concept of Satan in Zech. 3:1 ff. Here again Satan stands
opposite God, ie., the malak Yahweh. Thus, it is not a
personality essentially differentiated from Yahweh who con-
fronts the mal’ak Yahweh, but rather two aspects of God
who confront each. other.
In only_one Satan passage of the Old Testament—the latest
one—in I Chron. 21:1, the word Satan appears without an
article as a proper name. There it is said: “And Satan stood up
against Israel, and provoked David to number Israel.” This
passage receives great theological significance because of its
correspondence to IL Sam. 24:1, where it says: “And again
the anger of Yahweh was kindled against Israel, and he moved
David against them saying, Go, number Israel and Judah.”
~Here Satan is an independent personality, who ina particular
function appears instead of God. Torczyner’s translation,
“And a satan stood up against Israel,” *“ seems to me for this
reason incorrect. The close correspondence to II Sam. 24:1
demands an equally defined personality, aside from the fact
that such indefiniteness would leave the sentence theologi-
cally hanging in the air. Who is this “one” adversary from the
divine realm supposed to be, since there is nowhere else any
_mention of a plurality of such satans? The term can refer
48. “How Satan Came into the World,” p. 18.
only to the figure which alone has been mentioned so far, the
hypostatized divine function of “opposition” which has be-
come an independent personality.® ;
From what has been said so far it is not difficult to see the
evidence for a further development of the personified func-
tion into the independent personality “Satan.” Theologically,
however, it cannot be ignored that it is just through the
exchange of the divine persons that their intrinsic identity
becomes especially clear. Satan does nothing other than what
God himself does in other contexts, This will be discussed
more closely later.
The result of our research in regard to the name “Satan”
can be summarized as follows:
Satan is a functional concept which has its root in the
meaning of the verb “to oppose inimically” and which in a
few passages appears as nomen appelativum with a profane
meaning; in other, exclusively later passages, it occurs as a
mythological figure. The passage in Numbers where the con-
cept Satin appears in the divine realm, but not yet as a
mythological figure, represents a bridge between the profane
and mythological meanings. As the nomen proprium of an.
independent demon standing opposed to God, the concept
‘appears in only one, and that the latest passage: I Chron. 21: ir
From this we can already draw a fundamental conclusion
concerning the nature of Satan. He is no demonic residue
from pre-Yahwistic time who, as such, leads a more or less
degraded, shadowy existence beside Yahweh. Karl Marti, too,
is of the opinion that Satan cannot be subsumed among the
old demons, “for Satan looks rather strange in the midst of
the Se‘irim ... , the ghostly figures that tussle about all
over the wilderness. In their circle, he is an alien figure, not
only by the way he appears in Zechariah, but also by his
name.” °° A comparison with other remnants of this sort from
49. On the views of Kaupel and Kugler, according to whom it is not

a demon but a human enemy of David’s who incites him to count the
people, see below, p. 155, n. 14.
50. K. Marti, “Zwei Studien zu Sacharja,” p. 227.
(
\ 41. The Concept of “Satan”
pre-Yahwistic religions will serve to support this statement.

The first thing that strikes us is that these other figures are
designated by names or generic concepts which for the most
part denote their foreign origin.
In the case of Azazel, the desert demon in Leviticus 16:8,
10, 26 (RSV), who presents the closest analogy to Satan, the
etymology is uncertain. The theory of the Jewish exegesists
(Targum, Raschi, Pseudojonathan, Kimchi), according to
which Azazel is the name of a place in the desert, rules itself
out, since its juxtaposition to the name of Yahweh obviously
points to a personal being.” Hans Duhm ” refers to the fre-
quently advanced ® idea that Azazel derives from ‘azal and is
to be translated by “completely doing away with.” This
theory is based on the translation of LXX: daromouraios.”*
A similar etymology is advanced by Robert Fisler.®’ He trans-
lates ‘aza’zél with “off-going, departing male goat” (‘az =
‘éz), corresponding to Symmacho’s Greek translation: tpayos
amohvouevos. The principal objection to this interpretation is
that in Leviticus 16 it is not the scapegoat sent into the
wilderness that bears the name Azazel, but a being of the
wilderness to whom the goat is sent. In disagreement with
Eisler, I do not believe that the supposition of a wilderness
demon can be avoided. The derivation from ‘azdz and ’éI,
referred to by Roskoff,* seems to me more plausible and to
offer clues toward a more comprehensive meaning. In that
51. See Benzinger, “Azazel,” Encyclopaedia Biblica; cf. also on the
passage HSAT*, Roskoff, Geschichte des Teufels (1869), I, 179; Alfred
Bertholet, “Leviticus,” Marti-Handkommentar z. A.T. (1901).
52. “Die bésen Geister im Alten Testament” (diss., Tibingen, 1904),
oO:
: 53. Among others by Merx, Bibl. Lex., I, 256 (see Encycl. Bibl.,
Satan,”
“Azazel,” p. 395); also William Caldwell, “The Doctrine of
and
Biblical World, XLI (1913), 30; and George A. Barton, “Demons
Spirits,” Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (13 vols.), ed. James
Hastings (1925 ye
Ewald
54. According to Roskoff, op. cit., I, 179, it goes back to H.
hen
(Kritische Grammatik, p. 243; Ausfiibrliches Lehrbuch der hebriaisc
Sprache, 6th ed., § 158c).
55. Arch. f. Religionswissenschaft, XXVII (1929), 177 ff.
56. Op. cit., I, 183.
case ‘aza’zél would mean “the strong one of God.” In support

of this Roskoff cites First” and Diestel,°** who adduce a
number of names of divinities which are formed with ‘aziz.
Above all, there is a Phoenician god, ‘aziz, to whom the
powerful effects of the sun are ascribed. This would, by the
way, suffice to explain the desert character of Azazel without
having to go back directly to Seth, to whom sacrifices of
atonement were brought. It is conceivable that this Phoenician
god had already assimilated traits of Seth, in view of the close
connection between Egypt and Canaan in the Amarna Period,
especially since the designation Seth-Zaphon for the Syrian
god Baal-Zaphon has been found on an excavated stele of
that period (around 1300 B.c.). In any case, to restrict this
figure completely to Egyptian influence, as Roskoff does,
leaves the Semitic name unexplained. Further, there also oc-
curs the name of a god, bél-‘aziz, “Bel the Strong”; then there
is the promontory, Marti Rusaziz, i.e., r65-‘aziz, “The Head of
the Strong One,” on the Punic Coast; the Mars of Edessa is
called “Atijos' = “the Strong One, the Powerful One.”
Baudissin thinks it possible that a foreign god with this name
may have changed into a demon. Gesenius-Buhl also voices
the conjecture that there has been a merging of ‘azaz and
el. But its meaning is considered unknown.” Further litera-
ture is found in Koehler-Baumgartner; ” they, however, do
not consider plausible any of the derivations they mention.
But for our context it is of essential importance that we deal
57. Hebr-chald. Handwérterbuch, s. v. “Azazel.”
58. “Set-Typhon, Asahel und Satan,” Zeitschrift fir die historische
Theologie, XXX (1860), No. 2. For further discussion of this article,
see below, pp. 83 ff.
59. See G. Seippel, Der Typhonmythus (1939), p. 20.
60. Baudissin, Studien zur Semitischen Religionsgeschichte, I, 141.
61. To enter into more of the literature cited there in regard to the
name Azazel would lead us too far in this context.
62. Lexikon, s.v. From these references I would like to mention only
Hubert Grimme (“Das Alter des israelitischen Werséhnungstages,”
Archiv fiir Religionswissenschaft, XTV, 1911), whose conception differs
in principle from those mentioned above. According to him, “ ‘aza’zél”
means “the little hairy one,” and stems from a word occurring in
Ethiopian: g“ezag"ez = “shaggy fleece.”
43 Ihe Concept of “Satan”
with a demon of foreign origin and that, in the opinion of the

majority, ‘azd’zél represents a proper name.
In the case of Lilith, the Babylonian origin is beyond doubt
(Isa. 34:14). Gesenius-Buhl and Koehler-Baumgartner refer
to the Akkadian Jilu, from Jilitu = “evil demon.” ©
- For Leviathan, the cosmic dragon-beast in Job 3:8 (RSV) |
\
iand elsewhere, Koehler-Baumgartner in addition to the deri-
vation from the Hebrew Jiwja = “wound,” © adduce a refer-

= . 66
ence to the Egyptian Itn.
:
Behemoth, the name of a hippopotamus-like monster (Job
40:15) is considered by many to be of Egyptian origin.
Budde ® believes with Spiegelberg that Jablonski’s derivation
_ from the Egyptian p-ehe-mod (“water buffalo”) is correct.”
Others, among them Cheyne ® and W. Max Miiller,” disagree
“a
with this opinion.

_ As for Rahab, derived from the Akkadian ra‘abu, rababu
(“to be tempestuous”), Gunkel and others assume a Babylo-
nian origin.” According to Gunkel she is the “personification
63. According to Lenormant (La Magie chez les Chaldéens, p. 36, cit.
Duhm, op. cit., p. 51), lil and Jilit mean “incubus” and “succubus,” and
derive from the Babylonian Jildtu= “evening.” According to Gese-
nius-Buhl, however, Lilith became thought of as a night demon only
through folk etymology. Cf. also Bruno Meissner, Babylonien und
Assyrien, (1925), Il, 201: Lil#tu forms with Lild and the “maid of
Lila” (Ardat Lil?) a triad. “Originally they were probably storm
demons who, however, as the result of a false etymology were finally
thought of as night spirits.”
64. Pss. 74:14; 104:26.
65. See also Gesenius-Buhl. Gunkel gives the derivation: liwya4=
“wreath”; liwydtin = “the wreath-like,” i.e. the ocean, “which winds
its girdle of waves around the lands” (Schépfung und Chaos (Gottingen,
1895], p. 46).
66. W. Baumgartner (Theol. Rundschau [1941], p. 162) mentions
that Jn already exists in Ugaritic. Cf. also G. Seippel, op. cit., p. 137.
67. Karl Budde, Das Buch Hiob (“Géttinger Handkommentar zum
Alten Testament”) (1913), p. 257.
68. Mentioned in Koehler-Baumgartner, Lexikon.
69. Encyclopaedia Biblica, ed. T. K. Cheyne and J. S. Black (1899-
1907), I, 519 (cit. Budde, op. cit., p. 257).
70. Gesenius-Buhl, s.v.
' 71, See Koehler-Baumgartner and Gesenius-Buhl, s.v.
72. Gunkel, op. cit., pp. 30 ff.
of tehom, of chaos.” * He mentions further that in one of the

numerous variants of the Tiamat myth, Tiamat bears the
name of ribbu (= ribhu =rabab), a reading, however, which
is not fully established.“
The cherubim are also probably of Babylonian origin.”
According to Gesenius,” the bull colossi are called Karibati,
“the blessing ones,” ” in Assyrian inscriptions from Susa. In
other Assyrian inscriptions they are called Kuribi (from the
same Assyrian root karabu, “to bless”).™
For the seraphim (Isa. 6:2, 6; probably from the Akkadian
sarapu, “to kindle, to burn up”) there has been substantiated,
along with the usual association with Sarrapu-Nergal,” an
Egyptian provenance: late Egyptian srrf, “dragon, griffin,
serpent.” *
Firmly established is the Babylonian origin of the sédim
(Deut. 32:17; Ps. 106:37). According to Zimmern and others
it is probably derived from the Assyrian sédu = “bull-god,
good and evil demon.” **
The name of the Se‘irim, the goat demons, is Hebrew, from
Sa%r, “the hairy one, the he-goat.” However, from the con-
text in which they appear, they are characterized as having
been, to begin with, exclusively demonic beings. In Isa. 13:21
they are dancing satyrs; in Isa. 34:14 they people the desert,
where Lilith also dwells. The wilderness was already in the
Babylonian conception the abiding-place of demons. This is
73. Ibid., p. 32.
74. Ibid., p. 29.
75. Gesenius-Buhl and Koehler-Baumgartner, s.v.
76. Hebr. u. aramiisches Worterbuch, 14th ed., cit. in regard to Gen.
3:24 by Gunkel, Genesis (4th ed., 1917), p. 25.
° 77. For further literature see Koehler-Baumgartner and Gesenius-
uhl, s.v.
4 Robert H. Pfeiffer, Journal of Biblical Literature, XLI (1922),
249 f.
79. In opposition to Zimmern, KAT, 415; see Gesenius-Buhl, s.v.
80. Gesenius-Buhl, s.v. According to Spiegelberg (Der aegyptische
Mythos vom Sonnenauge [1917], p. 39), from the demotic srrf, Egyp-
tian srf = “to be warm” (Koehler-Baumgartner, s.v.).
81. According to Koehler-Baumgartner (referring to ZAW, LIV,
291 f.), from jasad, Ar. iswadda = “to be black.”
shown by the following incantation against the evil Alt: ®
Evil Ala, go to the desert place!
Your dwelling is a destroyed ruin... .
The listing-together of wild beasts and demons as desert

inhabitants in Isaiah, to which Kaupel refers,® finds an anal-
ogy among the Arabs, who also think of the ginns as being
closely connected to the wild animals. In Lev. 17:7 it is
forbidden to sacrifice to the fe%rim; and in II Chron. 11:15
they appear with the calves as images in the idol worship of
Jeroboam. Baudissin is therefore presumably justified in call-
ing them a “residue of ancient Hebrew paganism.” ™*
~All these residues of pre-Yahwistic religion have either
remained outside the Yahweh religion, like the sédim, Se‘irim,
and Lilith, or they have been included as his attributes in the
personality of Yahweh, like the seraphim and cherubim who
stand about him in Isaiah 6 (see also below, p. 105), or
Behemoth and Leviathan, who appear in the Book of Job
(chapter 40) as symbolic images of his nature. 1 of #62
~ Azazel seems to be an exception; he belongs to the cult and
is at the same time opposite Yahweh. This demonic figure
therefore deserves special attention in our connection, be-
cause its opposition (in my opinion only apparent) to Yah-
weh has led many scholars to see him as identical to the Old
‘Testament Satan © or as a previous form of him.” Aside from
82. Ungnad, Die Religion der Babylonier und Assyrer (1921), p. 290.
83. Kaupel, Die Dimonen des Alten Testaments (1930), p. 10, in
opposition to the opinion of W. R. Smith (Religion of the Semites
[1956], p. 120), who for this reason holds all the animals mentioned
there to be demons.
84. Op. cit., p. 137.
85. Galling (RGG ? [1928], Il, 964) says: “He is, as the receiver of
sins, a sort of opponent of God, a figure corresponding to Satan.” In
this he is followed by Kaupel (op. cit., p. 91). The identification of
Azazel and Satan and Serpent in Genesis 3 is already found in Origen
(see Caldwell, n. 53, above).
- 86. Benzinger (op. cit., p. 395) accepts Reuss’s assumption that “the
conception of Azazel lies on the way which led later to that of the
46 SATAN IN .THE OLD TESTAMENT
Azazel, in _
the indication of the proper name which shows
old, it must
contrast to Satan, to have been a demon from of
we obvio usly have to do here with an
be considered that
is suppo rted by Drive r: “No doubt
ancient ritual. This view
anoth er stage of popul ar belief ,
the ritual is a survival from
ated to the sacrif icial syste m of
engrafted on and accommod
draws atten-
the Hebrews... .” * Referring to Frazer 88 he
of the ritual , which has many
tion to the primitive character
ff.)
analogies in the Old Testament itself (Lev. 14:4 ff., 49
age of
and in other countries.® Further indication of the great
the ritual is advanced by Max Loehr .”
of
Asasel, the Holy Tabernacle, above all the “camp”
Israel, are signs seeming to point back to the period before
rd
the settling in Canaan, to an existence in the shephe
of southe rnmost Palesti ne. Perhap s the sendin g of a
steppes
of
goat to Asasel is a pre-Mosaic ritual of atonement of one
unkno wn reasons was
the Lea tribes, which for some
adopted into the cult of Yahweh when Yahwism arose.
a
A close examination of the obviously ancient ritual shows
peculiarity which proves to be decisiv e with regard to our
question: The demon Azazel does not appear as an opponent |
¢to Yahweh, as a power which really stands in opposition to_
him; ‘This is shown above all by the fact, already pointed out
by Justinus * and emphasized by Roskoff * and most other
modern scholars, that Leviticus 16 does not relate to a_
s
devil” (Geschichte der Heiligen Schriften des Alten Testament
15.
[1890], p. 501). Cf. also Roskoff, op. cit., p. 197; see above, p. 8, n.
87. Art. “Azazel,” Dictionary of the Bible (1923), I, 207 f.
88. Golden Bough, 3d ed. (1919), II, 182 ff.; see also H. Grimme,
op. cit.
89. Dictionary of the Bible, s.v. “Azazel.”
90. “Das Ritual von Lev. 16. Untersuchungen zum Hexateuchpro-
blem III,” Schriften der Kénigsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft (1925), p.
is
91. Dialog mit Tryphon 40, p. 4; cit. Kaupel, op. cit., p. 87.
92. Op. cit., p. 186.
93. Among others, J. Gutmann, “Asasel,” Encycl. Judaica; Eichrodt,
Theologie des A.T. (1906), II, 120; B. Stade, Theologie des A.T.
(47. The Concept of “Satan”
sacrifice. In my opinion, Roskoff’s view can be largely fol-

lowed:
Azazel is not a power to whom a sacrifice would be offered

in atonement, and the dualism which suggests itself
through him is only shadowy. He is merely the qualifica-
tion of abstract impurity as against the absolute purity of
Yahweh; he is only a shadow image without reality against
the solely real power of Yahweh.”
The Azazel ritual seems to me to offer a unique insight into

a definite phase in the development of the monotheistic con-
cept of God, a “snapshot” of the process-of repressing the
ancient demonic deities. In a way it catches a picture of the
repression process itself. Azazel, originally probably an. an-
cient demonic deity (see above, pp. 41 ff.), is now nothing
“more than a concept, still extant as such, but largely hollowed
out.
He is no more than a symbol of the desert.” He is ban-
ished to the place where there is no more life. The opposite of
“the desolate Azazel wilderness is the “Holy Tabernacle,” the
dwelling-place of the Living God. Corresponding on the
human plane to God’s becoming a holy God is the demand on
men for sanctification. Hence, within the psyche, too, there is
a splitting-off corresponding to the divine process. If one
looks at the human side of the ritual psychologically, the
he-goat can serve very well as the symbol of the animal libido
in the human being. This force is split; there are now two
goats. One must be sacrificed to Yahweh, and the other must
disappear into the wilderness. The lot decides which is meant
for Yahweh and which for Azazel. Hence, as such they are
(1906), I, 188 ff.,; E. Kautzsch, Bibl. Theologie des A.T. (1911), pp. 20,
347; G. Hélscher, Geschichte der israelitisch-jidischen Religion (1922),
59.9.
94. Op. cit., p. 186.
95. Compare to the passage HSAT*,iy 185, note c: “The sending out
of Azazel, who is laden with the sin of the people, must be considered
as simply the symbolic removal of sin and impurity from the land holy
to Jahwe to the realm of the impure and the unholy.”
in
identical. It is the same instinctual energy which must be
part sacrificed to Yahweh and in part done away with. So
only a portion of the libido is sublimated; the other is rejected
as sin, is repressed. The sinful libido goes back to its “origin,”
into the wilderness; that is, it sinks into the unconscious,
which, because of the splitting-off, has the character of
wilderness. The unconscious is burdened with the sin. So, in
a later period, when Azazel again achieved significance as a
demon, a Midrash says: “The sins are sent to Azazel, so that he
may carry them.” *°
Psychologically, though on another plane, what happens in
the Azazel ritual is similar to what happens in Zechariah’s
vision of the woman in the ephah (5:11).*" Here, as there, the
sinispushed away, to a place identified with it: in the early
period, to the wilderness; later, to the heathen Babylon.
Leonard Rost offers a study on the concept risa.°* Although
he admits “that the meaning of the rare expression 77}‘ah is
established in other passages only in a wider, not in the older
purely forensic sense,” ® he nevertheless applies the latter
interpretation to Zech. 5:8. According to this, 7is“a is the
condemnation to exile. He finds the continued use of the
curse in Haggai and hinted at in Zech. 8:10 ff., in the failure
of the crops: “The empty granary, into which the personified
sentence of judgment has entered, departs from the land.”
The sentence of condemnation is then carried to Babylon, the
seat of the oppressive power, in the empty ephah which
characterizes the failure of the crop. I cannot subscribe to
Rost’s conclusions. They are contradicted, above all, by ear-
lier evidence for the meaning “wickedness, godlessness,” as,
96. Midrash Abchir (Jalkut Gen. $44), cit. Gruenbaum, “Beitrage

zur vergleichenden Mythologie aus der Hagada,” ZDMG, XXXI
(1877), 226 (italics added).
97. The comparison between the two passages is drawn, among
others, by Benzinger, “Asasel,” Encycl. Biblica, p. 395; J. Gutmann,
“Asasel,” Encycl. Judaica; Eichrodt, Theologie des A.T., Il, 120.
98. “Erwagungen zu Sacharjas 7. Nachtgesicht,” ZAW, LVII-
LVIII (1939-41), 224 ff.
99. Ibid., p. 226.
for instance, in Isa. 9:18: “For wickedness [risa] burneth as

the fire,’ and Ezek. 18:27: “Again, when the wicked man
turneth away from his wickedness [#-beswb rasa‘ méris‘ato].”
Here a translation in the forensic sense as “pronouncement of
judgment” is quite impossible (aside from the immediately
following parallel use of pesa‘). A comparison should also be
made with Mal. 1:4, where Edom is called the “border of
wickedness” (gebdl rif‘a), which gives a very close parallel to
our passage, where the 7is‘a is carried to Babylon as its perma-
nent abiding-place. Least of all is there any explanation in
Rost’s thesis for the personification of the 7is‘a as a woman.
It seems very significant for our context that in Zechariah a
woman should appear as the incarnation of sin. Woman is by—
nature closer to the earth and to the darkness of the uncon-
scious. This is shown most markedly in the Chinese Yang-Yin
polarity, as it is presented, for example, in one of the oldest
_books, the J Ching, or “Book of Changes.” *° The Yahweh
religion, more masculine in character, represents, as it were,
the ascent of consciousness from the maternal primal womb of
the nature religions. This shows, for example, in the symbolic
content of the revelation on Sinai after the liberation from
Egyptian bondage. In the Old Testament, Egypt is frequently
identified with Rahab, which points up its symbolic feminine
quality, in contrast to which the light-theophany on Sinai can
mean literally “illumination,” the beginning of consciousness.
We may think also of the image of Yahweh overcoming
_Rahab, which has its prototype in Marduk’s battle with Tia-
mat.
In this masculine religion, woman could, even necessarily
must, become the symbol of the “sinful” libido detached from
Yahweh. Looked at from the point of view of the history of
ideas, it seems to me that even in the Old Testament a connec-
tion is hinted at between woman and Azazel and Satan, which
later led to an identification of the two figures in the Apocry-
pha. Even if it is false to speak also of a gemetic identity of
-100. The I Ching or Book of Changes, trans. Richard Wilhelm,

rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes (1950).
25 ), there
Satan with the Paradise serpent (see above, p. 11, n.
still exists a connection of nature between them, as will be
with
shown later (see below, p. 131). Just as Eve makes a pact
shows
the serpent against God, so, unconsciously, Job’s wife
a
“herself on the side of Satan (see below, p. 113). Not until
separa-
later time had the process of differentiation led to a
nt sides of the Godhea d, thus effecti ng a
tion of the differe
revitalization of pre-Ya hwisti c demons in the form of good
and bad angels. Eric Stave 101 sneaks of the fact that in these
evil powers “a residue of the nature religion repressed by the
preaching of the prophets, to be sure under the influence of a
it
different religious conception, was awakened to new life, as
went, so to speak, in the
were.” Thus, the development
direction of a new polytheistization of Yahwism, on a higher
level. Only in this time did Azazel become one of the fallen
angels in the Book of Enoch, and interchangeable with Satan.
The same process is shown by the fact that 2aStéma, in Hos.
9:7 (see above, pp. 27 f.), became a name of Satan in the Book
of Jubilees. Such a developmental phenomenon is more proba-
ble here than a mere misinterpretation of the name, as Gunkel
/ \ assumes.’ The connection, still hidden in the Old Testament, _
/ between Satan and woman, on the one hand, and the Azazel
ritual and Zechariah’s woman in the ephah, on the other,
comes clearly to the surface in the Book of Enoch: Azazel-_
Satan seduces the women to sin by teaching them how to_
_ make cosmetics. Here (through the parallel to Genesis 6,
where the sons of God unite with the daughters of men) the
relation between women and Satan is implied, since in the
Book of Job Satan is also one of the sons of God (see below,
pp: 98 ff.).
From all this it should become clear that Azazel and Satan,
who were identified in postbiblical times, have nothing to do
with each other genetically. Thus, Azazel does not change
anything in the picture concerning a definite discrimination
101. Ueber den Einfluss des Parsismus auf das Judentum (Haarlem,
1898), p. 269.
102. “Teufelsglaube,” RGG 2. V, 1062.
between the Satan figure in the Old Testament and pre-

Yahwistic demons.
The following points can now be established with respect
to Satan, as against all those residues from other religions
which have been discussed.
1. He had no proper name to begin with, but is called by a
_Hebrew nomen appellativum, which only in the latest passage
becomes a proper name. Moreover, it is a nomen appellativum
which, as such, does not designate demonic beings, like the
sédim, for example, but also. occurs in regard to the profane
realm. In the case of the fe‘irim:—a term which verbally is
analogous to “Satan” insofar as thisconcept is also used
partly in the profane sense (ordinary goats) and partly in the
demonic meaning—the context in which it is used has decisive
weight; the Se‘irim appear together with other pre-Yahwistic
demons and so belong to a category of appearances which are
expressly opposed to Yahwism and are combated by it.
2. Satan, in contrast to the real cacodemons, belongs to the
_divine realm. And in contrast to the mythological figures of
the seraphim, the cherubim, Leviathan, and Behemoth, he
does not represent the nature side of God (witness their
‘animal shapes!) but is a spiritual demon who stands in a
dialectical confrontation with God (see below, pp. 104 ff.).
The animal attributes (horns, goat’s feet, tail) “grew” on him
only later. C. G. Jung writes about this:
The Church has the doctrine of the devil, of an evil

principle, whom we like to imagine complete with cloven
hoofs, horns, and tail, half man, half beast, a chthonic deity
apparently escaped from the rout of Dionysus, the sole
surviving champion of the sinful joys of paganism. An
excellent picture, and one which exactly describes the
grotesque and sinister side of the unconscious; for we have
never really come to grips with it and consequently it has
reinained in its original savage state.
103. C. G. Jung, “Psychology of the Transference,” The Practice of

Psychotherapy, in Collected Works (Bollingen Series XX), XVI, 191.
}
personified_
The Old Testament Satan, however, is still a
step by step
function of God, which, as we shall see, develops
Seen from this.
and detaches itself from the divine personality.
including Satan
-angle, Hans Duhm’s basic error in simply
is again made visibl e in its whole
among the cacodemons
al classi ficati on, as has already been
import. His purely extern
essent ial point. Satan is in no way
mentioned, misses the
theolo gical pheno menon which
understood as the important
he represents.
a concept
This implies at the same time that he is also not
It does not by any means
adopted from a foreign religion.
er traits of alien neigh borin g
exclude the question of wheth
nce could
gods may adhere to his image. But such an influe
process
find adequate expression only through an inner-divine
Relig ious figure s are not
within the Yahweh religion itself.
a need which as yet lacks
simply adopted; they correspond to
n of why
expression. Otherwise there would be no explanatio
had not made itself felt
such an influence, say the Babylonian,
. Only when the
much earlier or to a much greater extent
n-
Satan figure was ripe enough to detach itself from the perso
ous
ality of God could traits of similar figures in the religi
probl em will
“environment become associated with it.*°* This
be pursued in detail later (see below, pp. 133 ff.).
First, however, we must corroborate in detail what we have
learned from the analysis of the names and concepts and must
delineate and complete the image of Satan in its further
characteristics.
104. Cf. Gerhard von Rad, “Eschatologische Erwagungen zu den

LVIIL (1940-41), 219: “If Yahwism includes
K6nigspsalmen,” ZAW,
in its conceptual world something originally foreign to it, the premises
this
for this must have already existed within itself.” Von Rad shows
beautifully through the example of the King-Psalms, whose form,
borrowed from the Oriental court style, became a vessel for its own
content, the Messianic kingdom. Compare also Forster’s article
t,
“slur,” in Kittel, Theol. Worterbuch zum Neuen Testamen
which emphasiz es for the later time also “that Judaism has adopted
nothing for which the ground had not already been prepared within
itself” (p. 16).
The immediate question is: In what forms of divine mani-

festation does Satan appear, and what do they signify? We
will return to the story of Balaam, as the first Old Testament
passage where the Satanic function appears in the divine
realm.
hy i
iin
”
a
fy , j = mal
ae
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<> aa sy eeeawe ey a
’ 4 ; soy
ates. eae nig thio rere ont
a Tr a TF : —ee ye Lae ie canenew
x Si a oa Nagaieee sees
« 2 }aa® =< ) inggasthags " 3
exten es Fad ae rax*

: p are Pins
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ten rapiealh > ae:sie 1g Core

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wae 7
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is. i cat ok"iy r<,
ar wi ae apa wattsnts _ one. a Pg

:a f P
7 ee
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ny
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5s
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)
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ba a
fj = oS snail iReel mdinate §we a De oe
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erete er at ee
yes : ay Savina #
Fives
F he MIPS ‘Si hough Jett
Re
Gel naste” eee

ee ce ANS ee an
vs ae z
‘ ' he ee & =- eek BG: Pras
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aT te j > jnlbna
£ a ine
i f tay iio an Ae ekiceWARN

¢’ POE OF : ne
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~ ‘Qa anes as pe
a TRAY im = ,
ee AyPet ag
‘ ‘ :
op yi
The mal’ak Yahweh
as Satan in the Story
of Balaam
(Numbers 22:22 ff.)
ts INTERMEDIATE POSITION of this story in the develop-
ment of the Satan concept has already been pointed out. Here
Satin is not yet the designation of, or even the proper name
of, a mythological person, but the concept is already applied
to a familiar mythological figure, the maak Y ahweh, defin-
ing more closely one of its qualities. The concept has here a
meaning entirely and exclusively derived from the profane
realm; it is “enemy, adversary,” without further differentia-
tion of this inimical quality into “accuser,” as in Job and
“Zechariah, or as “provoker,” as in Chron. 21:1. Yet, what
“makes the Numbers passage significant is that this function
from the profane sphere is met with for the first time in the
divine sphere. Num. 22:22 is, in a way, the point of inter-
section, where the profane and the divine phenomena cross,
or, to use another image, the place where the profane concept
changes into the mythological concept. Satan, adversary, is
“here a quality of the maPak Y.ahwebh. Hence, the transition of
the Satan concept from the human to the divine realm is
shown in the mal’ak Yahweh. It is true that Hans Duhm
refers to this passage,” but only among the “profane” exam-
ples of Solomon and David, without consideration of the
significant “changes of scene” from the human to the divine
1. Hans Duhm, “Die bésen Geister im Alten Testament” (diss.,

Tiibingen, 1904), p. 16.
57
realm. From our point of view, however, this passage is most

elucidating and significant. It demands of us nothing less than
the understanding of the Satan concept in relation to that of
the mal’ak Yahweh.
1. Occurrence and Theological Significance of

the mal’ak Yahweh in the Old Testament
Mal ak is a Hebrew nominal form, occurring also in Phoeni-
cian; i.e., in Ugaritic, “an ancient Canaanite dialect of the sec-
ond millennium B.c. which is closely related to Phoenician.” *
It derives from the stem l’%k, which cannot be traced in
Hebrew; Arabic Ia@aka, “to send on a commission.” * MaPak
Yahweh is therefore “the emissary of God.” It is important in
our context that he carriesout functions which in other
passages, often even in the same story, are assumed by Yah-
weh himself. For instance, in Gen. 16:10, the mal’ak Yahweh
says to Hagar: “I will multiply thy seed exceedingly. .. .” *
Here he makes a promise which in another passage (Gen.
15:5) is given by Yahweh himself. In Exod. 3:2 the maPak
Yahweh appears to Moses in a thorn bush, but in verse 4 it is
Yahweh himself who speaks to Moses from the bush. In
Jacob’s dream (Gen. 31:13) the mal’ak Yahweh expressly
states his identity with Yahweh: “I am the God of Bethel,
where thou anointedst the pillar, and where thou vowedst
a vow unto me.” Equally clearly he identifies himself with
Yahweh in Judg. 2:1-3: “And the maPak Yahweh . . . said,
I made you to go up out of Egypt, and have brought you
unto the land which I sware unto your fathers. . . .” Just as
in Exod. 13:21 Yahweh goes before Israel as a pillar of cloud,
so does the malak Yahweh in Exod. 14:19. Immediately
2. W. Baumgartner, “Zum Problem des ‘Jahwe-Engels,” Schweiz.
Theol. Umschau (14th year, Oct., 1944), No. 5.
3. See Gerhard von Rad, art. “&yyedos,” in Kittel, Theologisches
Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament, I, 75-79..See also Gesenius-Buhl,
Hebr. und aram. Handwéorterbuch tiber das Alte Testament (1915),
s.v., and Koehler-Baumgartner, Lexikon in veteris testamenti libros
(Leiden: Brill, 1958), s.v.
4. See also Gen. 21:18.
59 The mal’ak Yahweh as Satan
following, in Exod. 14:24, it is again Yahweh himself who at

the time of the morning watch “looked unto the host of the
Egyptians through the pillar of fire and the cloud and
troubled the host of the Egyptians.” Yahweh and his angel
also show identical behavior in other passages. Just as in Gen.
32:29 Elohim, who wrestles with Jacob, will not give Jacob
his name, and as Yahweh keeps his name hidden from Moses
(“I am that I am”), so the mal’ak Yahweh in Judg. 13:17-18
says to Manoah: “Why askest thou thus after my name, see-
ing it is secret?” And after the malak Y.ahbweh has vanished in
the flame of the altar, Manoah says to his wife (verse 22):
“We shall surely die, because we have seen God” (italics
added). In the same way Gideon (Judg. 6:22) fears to die
because he has seen the mal’ak Yahweh “face to face.” > The
passage is in a still wider sense revealing with respect to the
nature of the mal’ak Yahweh. It says: “And when Gideon
perceived that he was the malak Y abweh, Gideon said, Alas,
O Lord Yahweh! for because I have seen the mal’ak Yahweh
face to face. And Yahweh said unto him, Peace be unto thee,
fear not: thou shalt not die.”
From this and other passages mentioned above, it is clear
that the 7al’ak Yahweh is identical with Yahweh; for only in
that case is Gideon’s fear that he must die justified. At the
same time Gideon differentiates him from Yahweh. His cry
of lamentation that he has seen the mal’ak Yahweh is directed
to Yahweh. Does this not make beautifully clear that the
malak Yahweh is identical with Yahweh and yet is not Yah-
weh in his all-embracing totality? He is Yahweh in a definite
function, as his manifestation. He is the side of Yahweh
turned toward man as a hypostasis, as it were, his function of
relationship.® So the mal’ak Yahweh is Yahweh, but only one
side, one aspect of his being. That is why he can appear as
5. Compare Exod. 33:20, where Yahweh says to Moses: “Thou canst

not see my face: for there shall no man see me, and live.”
6. This is especially clear in the aforementioned passage of Exod. 3:2
and 4. In verse 2 the mal’ak Yabweh is Yahweh appearing to Moses, as
can be seen plainly in verse 4.
60 SATAN IN -THE OLD TESTAMENT
God himself, yet in another place is clearly his messenger, as

his name also tells us.’
What is the significance of this peculiar identity of func-
tion of the maP’ak Yahweh and Yahweh? This question very
early became the subject of theological consideration. Con-
cerning the more ancient conceptions (Philo, Church Fathers,
and others), see below (p. 71, n. 33). Gunkel, commenting on
Gen. 16:7, tries to surmount the difficulty “by religious-
historical considerations”:
The oldest legends speak very naturally of visions of God:
Yahweh appears in person, one hears his steps, sees his
form, and hears his voice. But a later time would feel it as
a profanation if anything so human were reported of
Yahweh himself. For this reason it relates that it was not
Yahweh himself who appeared, but a subordinate divine
being, his “messenger.” This law of development, that
certain predicates of the Godhead become offensive as
religion progresses and are then bestowed upon a lower
divine being, plays a great part elsewhere, too, inside and
outside Israel. . . . Just because of this reflected origin the
" figure of Yahweh’s messenger “has always remained an
insubstantial phantom” (Ed. Meyer, Israeliten, 216).
7. It has been suggested (by Vatke, de Wette, Reuss, Bertheau,

Wellhausen, and others; see Hermann Schultz, Alttestamentliche Theo-
logie [Géttingen, 1896], p. 476, cf. also Adolphe Lods, “L’Ange de
Jahve et l’Ame extérieure,” BZAW No. 27, p. 277, who in addition
mentions Procksch as a representative of this view) that the word
really means “message, mission.” According to its meaning, this cannot
be denied; the mal’ak Yahweh is, so to speak, the functional expression
of God, which is received by man as message. But it is scarcely possible
to assume that such an abstraction is at the bottom of this concept. Its
very personification speaks against it.
8. Gunkel, Genesis (4th ed., 1917), p. 187. Concerning this interpreta-
tion Fridolin Stier (Gott und sein Engel im Alten Testament [1934], p.
6, n. 16) cites also the following authors: S. M. Lagrange, “L’Ange XK
Jahvé,” Revue Biblique, XI (1903), 212-25; B. Stade, Biblische Theolo-
gie des Alten Testaments, I, 96 ff.; R. Kittel, HSAT 4, I, 380, note c, on
Judges 6:11; Frey, “L’Angelologie juive au temps de Jésus-Christ,”
Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques (1911), p. 90, n. 4;
and A. Schulz, Das Buch der Richter und das Buch Ruth (1926), p. 40,
on Judges 6:11.
This, however, would have to be verified by proving (which

would be difficult) that the mzal’ak Yahweh is in every case an
interpolation. Gunkel himself admits, however, that the
figure of the angel, thus created, is not so very late (Hos. 12:5;
also Gen. 24:7; 48:16), so that in any case it is not permissible
simply to expunge mal’ak from the texts as secondary in 16:7
and in related passages.’ I can therefore see no solution to the
problem in the interpolation theory.
Recently W. Baumgartner has devoted a basic study to the
problem of the mal’ak Yahweh from a philological and literary
standpoint, which in principle moves in the same direction
but arrives at more differentiated results (see above, p. 58, n.
2). A comprehensive research of all the malak Yahweh pas-
sages leads him to the conclusion that the designation malak
Yahweh does not differentiate this angel from the others. But
it does differentiate the divine messenger, the messenger of
Yahweh, from the ordinary messenger, as is shown by the
much more frequent profane use of the term malak in the
Old Testament. Malak Yahweh, therefore, in his view, does
not designate a particular angel as distinguished from other
angels, but God’s messenger as distinguished from the ordi-
nary messenger, hence simply, the angel. As a precise parallel,
Baumgartner mentions the term bét Yahweh, “Yahweh’s
house.” Sometimes it is spoken of as “the house” or “my (thy,
his) house,” meaning the Temple as distinguished from an
ordinary house. Consequently, he concludes that the transla-
tion “Angel of Yahweh (of God),” current since Jerome’s
time, should be discarded as incorrect.” I cannot, however,
completely agree with Baumgartner’s far-reaching conclusion
that with this reinterpretation “the basis is removed for the
concept of the malak Y abweh as an angel with defined
qualities.” * In my opinion, this would be justified only if
the concept by itself would explain the qualification. But the
relation of the mal’ak Yahweh to Yahweh is also a qualifying
9. Gunkel, loc. cit.
10. Baumgartner, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
11. Ibid., p. 100.
factor; the frequent manifestations of an identity with Yah-

weh seem to be one of his qualities, which cannot be under-
stood by the explanation of the concept alone. Baumgartner,
like Gunkel (see above, p. 59), holds it “an error to regard
this development as merely a historical process of textual
changes, as has happened on occasion, which would entail
simply deleting mal’ak wherever the word occurred.” ”
Baumgartner discriminates between the antiquity of the con-
ception, which is attested to by Hos. 12:5 ** and by the
Elohist’s preference for angels,“ and the age of the literal text.
In this regard he draws attention to the fact that one must
reckon with various changes, not only in the transmitted
writings, but even in earlier times. So, according to him, this
angel who alternates with Yahweh is certainly not earlier, but
later, than the other “angels” found in ancient Israelite belief,
that is numina of varying provenance who were originally
independent and later subordinated to Yahweh."* With all
these essential, philological-exegetic statements of Baum-
gartner, the real theological problem posed by the iden-
tity of Yahweh and his angel persists. According to Baum-
gartner they make “all speculative interpretations of the
mal ak Yahweh untenable,” but I believe this does not hold
for the phenomenological formulation of the problem: What
does it mean that—sooner or later, whether it be in the verbal
or only in the later written transmission—there ensued an
equalization between Yahweh and his angel?
A further attempt to solve the malak Yahweh problem is
presented in Fridolin Stier’s monograph, Gott und sein Engel
im Alten Testament.® For him the identity problem is re-
duced, to begin with, to a question of style. The utterances of
the angels in the Old Testament are messages like those of the
12. Ibid., p. 101.

ie “Yea, he [Jacob] had power over the angel [2mal’ék] and pre-
vailed.... .”
14. Baumgartner, op. cit., p. 102.
15. Ibid.
16. F. Stier, op. cit., p. 158.
prophets, but, in contrast to the latter, they lack the form of a

message. Stier advances various reasons for this: 7
1. A psychological factor: An unconscious slipping of the
writer from the “he” style to the “I” style because of habitua-
tion to the “IT” form. For example, in Deut. 29:6, in the middle
of Moses’ words, it says: “I am Yahweh thy God!” The
writer “forgot” for a moment who was speaking and slipped
unconsciously into the style of Yahweh’s speech.
2. A text-historical factor: mal’ak may have been interpo-
lated in front of the original “Yahweh.”
3. A stylistic factor, upon which Stier places the most
weight. It is a matter of the abbreviated form of the ancient
oriental heraldic style. The herald speaks as if he were the
sender of the message. For this Stier also gives extrabiblical
examples. In the Babylonian Adapa myth” the messenger
speaks without including the phrase: “So speaks Anu.” “Since
naturally interpolation does not come into question here, it is a
matter of the short and pithy way the Oriental can deliver
a message.”*®A condensed stylization of the herald’s message is
also shown in the dialogue between Ashurbanipal and a priest
of Nebo. The priest says to the king: “Be not afraid, Ashur-
banipal! Long life will I give thee, good breath will I ordain
for thy soul.” ” From all this Stier deduces that the mal’ak
Yahweh is a “creaturely” angel, and that the “idea of iden-
tity” is “completely excluded.” Stier, however, overlooks two
essential factors:
1. The identity problem cannot be reduced to a mere
stylistic problem, if only because the identity is by no means
exclusively expressed in spoken messages, but also in actions
which are sometimes carried out by Yahweh and at other
times by his mal’ak (e.g., see above, pp. 58 f.).
2. The stylistic abbreviation itself has a psychological
17. Ibid., pp. 17 ff.
18. Among others Stier (ibid., p. 19, n. 37) refers to A. Ungnad, Die
Religion der Babylonier und Assyrer (1921), pp. 128 ff.
19. Stier, op. cit., p. 19.
20. H. Pinckert, Hymnen und Gebete an Nebo, No. 2, pp. 16 ff. (cit.
Stier, op. cit., p. 20, n. 40).
background. If there were no likeness of nature implied, or at

least thinkable, the language would surely have made a point
of
of explicitly setting the two apart. The same may be said
the exchange of person assumed by Stier (see above, pp.
59f.). Such an exchange between God-ego and God-
messenger would not be possible unless the subjects had some
essential connection with each other. What is psychologically
important is that one is and can be taken for the other. Such
an exchange is an unconscious identification.
Stier, moreover, overlooks the fact that such an “identity”
exists, not only with the malak Yahweh but even with the
prophets, “the men of God,” in the sense that they are the
mouthpiece of Yahweh. It is as if their human individuality is
extinguished at the moment of their message. The same must
be assumed for the above-mentioned priest of Nebo.
Stier’s objection on principle to the “theory of identity,”
pointing out that one ought not to apply modern concepts to
old material, I find absolutely correct, as such. He says very
pertinently:
The historian tries to feel himself understandingly into the
carriers of religious concepts, in order to catch what these
concepts really meant to them. One may not speak in a
western way before one has seen in an oriental way. The
. .. quoted formulations show plainly that the Graeco-
Roman impress on our thought and point of view only too
easily becomes an unsolicited interpreter who tries contin-
uously to interpose himself between us and the word of the
source. Religious history is a superior art of translation,
and as such is only genuine and true when it is a reproduc-
tion of the original mode.”+
However, an essential restriction seems necessary to me. To
be sure, one must let one’s ideas grow out of the material, not
put them into it. But in the process of grasping the material,
one cannot ignore all the possibilities of understanding which
have been crystallized during the subsequent cultural devel-
opments. For instance, to understand archaic thinking, as such,
21. Stier, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
does not mean to think archaically oneself. Distance, not

identification, is just what makes understanding possible. To
be sure, on a deeper level, modern man, too, is archaic; and
unless this primal human experience in ourselves is touched, a
living approach to this material is not possible. However, our
understanding of the material must necessarily go beyond the
self-understanding of a past era, for old material contains
more meaning than was conscious at the time of its origin.
Can we ourselves fully grasp our own nature and the spiritual
content of our time? We must immerse ourselves in the
material in as unprejudiced a manner as possible, or better,
with the greatest possible awareness of our own preconcep-
tions. But we cannot avoid expressing the meanings we have
grasped in the cognitive terms which our culture has created
since. Concepts like “hypostasis,” “manifestation,” “identity,”
and the like can therefore be applied with full legitimacy to
an Old Testament context, even though they are not Old
Testament concepts themselves. Even the phenomenological
approach, however, does not guarantee a final “objective
truth,” but it does represent an optimum. Objective truth is
perhaps, in any case, an ultimate concept. The student in any
discipline can only strive to come closer to it. This, in the last
analysis, is probably due to the fact that the spirit has many
strata and that its light breaks into many facets.
From the standpoint of religious history, Stier sees the
origin of the malPak Y abweh in the Egypto-Babylonian “vi-
zier.” It would carry us too far afield to enter in detail upon
Stier’s discussion of this point. I shall mention only the end
result of his investigation. He points to the Babylonian Nebo
and the Egyptian Thoth as celestial viziers corresponding to
the viziers on earth. Nebo is called nabiu Anu = “Anu’s
Herald.” ” As herald of the gods he bears the name Pap-sukal,
22. Jastrow, Die Religionen Babyloniens und Assyriens, I, 119 (cit.

Stier, op. cit., p. 135). I am indebted to Prof. W. Baumgartner of Basel
for pointing out that this translation is extremely doubtful. In the first
place, it does not say “herald of Anu,” but “he who is called by Anu,”
and secondly, there is still another meaning of nabd, namely “shining,”
which means “highest or holy messenger.” * ‘The stereotype

title for Thoth is “representative of Re.” Therefore the vizier
is an intermediate being who acts as agent between God and
man. According to Stier, this also holds for the Old Testa-
ment 7al’ak. But even this religious-historical basis for the ap-
pearance of the malik Yahweh in the Old Testament is not
sufficient to lay the ‘“Gdentity ghost.” Nebo and Thoth are
gods with well-defined characteristics and specific functions
(see above, p. 65). Just this cannot be said of the mal’ak Yah-
aveh, as will be shown later (see pp. 70 f.). The mal’ak Yahweh
neither has a proper name of his own, nor does his function
give him a distinctive character. The very concept receives
its designation from Yahweh, and he has no function that
Yahweh himself does not carry out in other passages. This
fact alone is enough to dispel the idea of the vizier as an
image for the malak Y abweh.
A more satisfying explanation of the malak Yahweh has
been contributed by Adolphe Lods in his article “L’Ange de
Jahve et l’Ame extérieure.” * He holds it to be a primitive
concept, a theory that seems justified not only by the prepon-
derance of the mal’ak Yahweh in the older texts but also by
the numerous parallels in primitive concepts which he cites.
According to these, the elements of a personality can detach
themselves from it without ceasing to be connected with it.
They can even constitute its life principle without the per-
sonality itself ceasing to exist. That, for example, is the case
during sleep, when the soul or its double can betake itself to a
distance.” This concept is found in the Old Testament, too;
which fits very well with the god of the planet Mercury, stilbon. (Cf.
P. Jensen, “Texte z. assyr.-babylon. Religion,” Keilschriftliche Biblio-
thek [1915], Vol. VI, No. 2, p. 16.)
23. Stier, op. cit., p. 123.
24. Lods, op. cit., pp. 265-78. According to Van der Leeuw, also, the
angels belong in the category of the “exterior soul” (“Geister,” RGG ?,
II, 961). Cf. also idem, Phinomenologie der Religion (1933), $816 and
42,7.
25. For this primitive concept of the “ame extérieure,” Lods refers
particularly to Frazer, Golden Bough (3d ed.), II, 441-564.
thus Ezekiel feels himself carried to Jerusalem, while his body

lies in Tel-abib. In a wider sense, all the stories of mana-laden
objects—like Elisha’s staff, with which his servant Gehazi is
to bring the son of the Shunammite woman back to life (II
Kings 4:29-31), the mantle of Elijah which enables Elisha to
cross the Jordan and so forth—contain the same idea. In its
most primitive conception, a name is also such an “exterior
soul.” It contains the essence. Therefore, whoever gives away
his name delivers himself up. This holds true for men as well
as gods. For this reason Yahweh, too, keeps his name secret
(Exod. 20:7). Hence Lods says: “Transfer this notion of
‘primitive’ psychology to a divine being and you have con-
cepts which strongly resemble the concept of malak.” He
cites, in particular, Exod. 23:20-21, where Yahweh says to
Israel: “Behold, I send an Angel before thee, to keep thee in
the way... . . Beware of him, and obey his voice. . . for my
name is in him.”
In this way the mal’ak Yahweh comes close to the fravashis
of the Iranian religion. “The fravashi of the Lord is the Lord
himself; thus the epithets which pertain to Ahura are attri-
buted, in Yasna 26, to his fravashi.” *°
According to Lods, the Roman conception of the genius,
both divine and human, was of a similar character. It was be-
lieved that the gods visited, by means of their geniuses, the
many shrines where they were invoked. Lods gives an exam-
ple of this: Statius (Silvae III. 1. 28) makes this plea to
Hercules, for whom a temple had been built: “Huc ades et
genium templis nascentibus infer.” And he points to the fact
that this trait of the Roman genius pertains to the mal’ak
Yahweh. Indeed, one of his main functions is to be present at
the “birth” of sanctuaries (Lachai-Roi, Beersheba, and Ophra,
in the story of Manoah).
I cannot agree with Lods’s opinion that this concept was
“atilized” in historic times to solve two theological difficul-
26. Nathan Soederblom, Les Fravashis (Paris, 1899), p. 56 (cit. Lods,

Op. Cit., p. 276).
of
ties, first in order to reconcile the idea of Sinai as the seat
(Exod. 23:33) and
Yahweh with his manifestations in Canaan
Pales-
later to explain that Yahweh could be effective outside
and the authors cited
tine as well.” This assumption of Lods
the maPak Yahwe h
below is improbable, not only because
e for solving the
concept would not have been at all suitabl
is
aforementioned theological difficulties, but also because it
altogether too rationalistic to assume that such concep ts were
consciously created for a definite purpose. Lods speaks ex-
pressly of the “creators of the idea.” ** His evidence for the
primitive characters of the concept is in itself sufficient proof
that it simply was there and would preclude such a “theologi-
cal problem” from coming up. Such concepts are not “made”
by man any more than dreams are; they arise in him, as an
expression of his inner nature. It seems that the presence of
Yahweh in Sinai as well as Canaan was not the problem to the
ancient Hebrews that it is to their modern interpreters,
caught in their materialistic-spatial way of thinking.
An essential question, of which Lods takes no account in
his clarifying article, presents itself: What does it signify
theologically that Yahweh is represented as a person with an
“exterior soul”? This is surely an extraordinarily important
27. Further advocates of this view (cit. Stier, op. cit., p. 132) are
Eduard Meyer, B. Stade, R. Smend (Lehrbuch der Alttestamentlichen
Religionsgeschichte [2d ed., 1926]), and G. Westphal. Meyer (Die
Israeliten und ibre Nachbarstimme [1906], p. 216) considered the
malak Yahweh as the product of a naive theology which attempted to
mediate between Yahweh’s confinement to Sinai and his appearance in
Canaan. According to Meyer, “he always remained an insubstantial
phantom, which had significance only as a theological formula, by
which it was attempted to find a way out of the contradiction between
the religious postulate and the cultic practice.” According to B. Stade
(op. cit., I, 97) the idea that Israel is led by an angel sent by Yahweh
mediates between the ancient belief that Yahweh dwells on Sinai and
the belief that, where Israel is, there Yahweh is also. G. Westphal
(Jabwes Wobnstitten nach Anschauung der Hebrier, p. 31) also
considered the mal’ak Yahweh, as a single being opposed to the popular
concept of the plurality of angelic beings, to be a product of theologi-
cal reflection.
28. Lods, op. cit., p. 278.
fact, for it demonstrates the germ of a differentiation process

in the divine personality which unfolds increasingly in the
Old Testament. This process is there, quite apart from the
historical inquiry as to whether the various hypostatized sides
of Yahweh’s being are “melted-in” ancient demons or not.
The melting process could easily have taken place in such a
way that the elements, as such, would no longer be visible.
That they are visible is a part of the Yahweh phenomenon
which cannot be grasped from the aspect of religious history
alone. Precisely the mal’ak Yahweh seems to me to be a
direct expression of the differentiation tendency inherent in
the divine personality. The malak Yahweh has no individual-
ity of his own; in a way he exists only inasmuch as he is
Yahweh’s self-expression, a form of his being. His functions
can therefore be most diverse: he brings revelation, protec-
tion, threat, everything which Yahweh does himself. Where a
function is very distinct, the zalak is named after it, like the
mal ak ham-mashit, who embodies the destructive function of
Yahweh. Yahweh himself, at midnight, smites all the firstborn
of Egypt; but he speaks of the “destroyer” who will do this
(Exod. 12:23). In II Sam. 24:16 it is the mal’ak ham-mashit,
who sends a pestilence upon the land. That we have here a
further differentiation of the mal’ak Yahweh concept, and not
something different in essence,” is plainly shown in this pas-
sage, for in the same sentence the mal’ak ham-mashit is im-
mediately afterward called the mal’ak Yahweh. In the same
way it is the mal’ak Yahweh who, in II Kings 19:35, slays
185,000 Assyrians in one night.”
It seems to me that the above-mentioned passage in II Sam.
24:16 hints at the nature of this differentiation. There it says:
“And when the angel stretched out his hand upon Jerusalem
to destroy it, Yahweh repented him of the evil, and said to
the angel that destroyed the people [mal’ak ham-mashit ba-
‘am], It is enough: stay now thy hand. And the malak Yah-
29. See Duhm, op. cit., pp. 14f.

30. Cf. Isa. 37:36.
weh was by the threshing place of Araunah the Jebusite.”

The walak Yahweh is therefore the instrument for carrying
out the divine will, the activity of God, but it is as if there
arose a conflict in God, which is followed by an inner
change; he repents his stern judgment. He is no longer identi-
cal with his destructive function; he opposes it by command-
ing the malak Y ahweh to stay his hand. Here we have
already a confrontation within God himself, which takes a
more pronounced form in the later Scriptures. The mal ak
Yahweh, as is shown most plainly here, is not a being with a
will of his own. He rages automatically, until Yahweh stops
him. As Yahweh detaches himself from his own function,
however, it becomes discernible, at least in form, as something
separate from him. It is this “split” which makes the function,
as such, visible. What was said previously (see pp. 68 f.) in
regard to the relation of this immanent differentiation process
to the historical problem is very well illustrated here. Even if
behind the mal’ak ham-mashit there were an ancient demon
of pestilence who had been assimilated into the Yahweh per-
sonality, this happened in a way that lets this demon appear as
an immediate characteristic of Yahweh himself, which is
shown by his identity with the malak Yahweh. What is
important in our context is that this virtually melted-down old
demon becomes visible again as an aspect of Yahweh and
thereby also demonstrates for us the differentiation process in
the divine personality.
What has been said in regard to the mal’ak Yahweh can be
summarized as follows.
1. He is not an autonomous being with a will of his own.
He is identical with Yahweh, or with definite, delimited
functions of Yahweh and sides of his nature. “God operating
in a concrete place and at a definite time is called the angel of
God.” ** He therefore has no personal traits of his own. He is
31. See Hitzig, cit. Hermann Schultz, op. cit., p. 476. Stier (op. cit.,
pp. 45) cites the following authors as holding the same opinion:
Kautzsch, Baudissin, and Knobel. Kautzsch (Bibl. Theologie des Alten
Testaments [1911], pp. 83 ff.) states that the mal’ak Yahweh is “a form
71. The mal’ak Yahweh as Satan
the enacted will of God which detaches itself from the Yah-
weh personality in the process of actualization, hence the
hy postasis of God’s active intervention.”
2. This activity of God expressed through the mal’ak Yab-
weh is not fixed in content. It covers the whole range of
God’s activities and partakes of his ambivalent character.
3. For the actions and words of the mal’ak Yahweh, as we
have seen, parallels can be found in the actions and words of
God himself; therefore he can be declared identical with God
in his actions and words.”
of appearance of Yahweh himself, his transitory plunge into visibility,
differing from him only in that he [the mal’ak Yahweh] cannot exhibit
the full majesty of his nature.” W. Baudissin (Kyrios als Gottesname
im Judentum und seine Stelle in der Religionsgeschichte [1926-27], p.
681) sees in the angels Yahweh’s form of manifestation up to the Exile.
August Knobel (Die Biicher Exodus u. Leviticus [1880], p. 25) holds
that “. . . he [the mal’ak Yahweh] is the divinity of Yahweh, insofar as
it manifests itself, reveals itself, and has effects, so far as it enters the
world of appearances and brings about something definite.” Cf. also
George B. Gray, Numbers (“International Critical Commentary” se-
ries; 1912), p. 333: “The angel of Yahweh, ie., a temporary appearance
of Yahweh in human form.”
32. Also J. Rothstein (Kommentar zum 1. Buch der Chronik, ed.
D. J. Hinel [1927], p. 380) sees the “angel of Yahweh” as the “hypostasis
of a particular side of the effectiveness of the divine nature.”
33. Hermann Schultz (op. cit., p. 474) remarks on this: “That was so
markedly beyond all doubt that the early church liked to see in this
angel of God the personality of the Logos, that is, the self-revealing
God himself, which here provided a prototype for the ‘incarnation.’
_. ” The identification of the mal’ak Yahweh with the Logos, the
divine Word, is already found in Philo (see W. Baumgartner, op. cit.,
p- 1, and F. Stier, op. cit. p. 1). Justinus was the first to relate him to
Christ (Dialogus cum Tryphone; cit. Stier, op. cit., p. 1), and this
identification became the common property of patristics. (For the
pertinent passages see Stier, op. cit., p. 1, n. 3.) This train of thought
will later prove not to be irrelevant in our context. The angels, and
especially Satan, have much to do with the mythologem of God
becoming man. However, this process seems to start only with the
angels as they are characterized in the concept bené-hd-elohim and
who, to a certain extent, represent a further development .of this
differentiation process in the divine personality, as will be shown later.
It
But the mal’ak Yahweh can be seen as the nucleus of this process.
that the
- seems to me of extraordinary importance in this connection
human form of the angel is stated in a number of Old Testament
passages: indirectly in Judg. 6:11, “And there came the mal’ak Yab-
2. The mal’ak Yahweh in Numbers 22:22 ff.

In Num. 22:22 the mal’ak Yahweh appears in a specific nega-
tive function; he stands as an adversary in the path of the
human being Balaam. However, the picture we have gained
of the mal’ak Yahweh permits us to conclude that it is God
himself who stands as an adversary in Balaam’s path.
The inconsistency with which God at first gives his con-
sent to Balaam’s going to Balak, then flames into anger when
he goes, may well be explained, as Mowinkel convincingly
points out, by the existence of two different sources for the
story. Examples of such unpredictability on God’s part can be
found elsewhere in the Old Testament; but that here it is
really a matter of two different sources is shown by God’s
words to Balaam in verse 32: “. . . behold, I went out to
withstand thee, because thy way is perverse before me.”
What is happening here? The man Balaam does something
according to his own will, unknowingly against the will of
God; and then God obstructs his way as an adversary, as a
hindrance to carrying out his own human will. The man does
weh, and sat under an oak... ,” and directly in Josh. 5:13, where
”
it speaks of a man who stands before Joshua with a drawn sword and
later calls himself “captain of the host of Yahweh.” Here, too, belong
the three men who foretell to Abraham the birth of Isaac (Gen.
18:2 ff.). In Dan. 8:16, Gabriel has the appearance of a man (geber),
and a divine human voice (qol ’adim) bids him explain the vision to
the man Daniel (ben ’adam). In Dan. 10:5 the angel again appears as a
man (’i5). (Cf. J. Rothstein, op. cit., p. 382.) In the Kabbala, one of the
ten angelic categories associated with the Sefiroth is called sim, and
indeed it is the lowest, which stands closest to the human realm. In
reverse, the fact that a human being can be called divine mal’ak throws
an interesting light on the inception of the theologem of God becom-
ing man. In Isa. 44:26 and II Chron. 36:15, 16 the prophets of Yahweh
are called his mal’akim, and in Mal. 2:7 the priest is spoken of as mmal’ak.
Probably mal’aki is not the personal name of the writer of the book
Malachi; it rather refers to the functional term mal’ak. See HSAT* to
the passage.)
34. “Der Ursprung der Bileamsage,” ZAW (1929-30), pp. 233-71. Cf.
also Holzinger, Numeri (1903), p. 104.
73. The mal’ak Yahweh as Satan
not see God, but his instinct, the she-ass,* sees him. And now
God himself opens the mouth of the she-ass so that she shall
warn Balaam. Every detail of this passage is so significant in
our context that I shall quote it in full:
Then Yahweh uncovered ** the eyes of Balaam, and he
saw the mal’ak Yahweh standing in the way, and his sword
drawn in his hand: and he bowed down his head, and fell
flat on his face. And the mal’ak Yahweh said unto him,
Wherefore hast thou smitten thine ass these three times?
behold, the ass saw me, and turned from me these three
times: unless she had turned from me, surely now also I
had slain thee, and saved her alive.
God appears here in his double aspect, as both helpful and
threatening. He stands as a threat in Balaam’s path, ready to
slay him if he does not obey; but he helps him by opening his
eyes so that he is able to obey. God puts himself in man’s path
in order to hinder him, but his purpose is that man comes up
against him, becomes aware of his presence. Here is a mortal
threat to man, but its aim is life, a life related to God. Man is
literally hemmed in by God on the path of his own will; he is
blinded by his own will, and it requires an act of God—the
opening of his eyes—to make him perceive the will of God.
G. Westphal lays stress on the warlike character of the
malak Yahweh in this passage.” He sees him as warrior of the
Heavenly Host, similar to the $ar-seba#-Yahweh in Josh. 5:14.
riding
35. There are many examples in fairy tales and dreams of the
as a symbol of the instincts carrying man and of the helpful
animal
cf, Gunkel,
animal in general as the symbol of instinct. For our context
Volksbii-
Das Mirchen im Alten Testament (‘“Religionsgeschichtliche
cher,” 2d ser., Nos. 23-26; 1917), p. 31.
here, I have
36. Since the exact meaning of the word seems important thus
red.” Gala = “to uncover ,” to take
replaced “opened” by “uncove in our passage
something away from the eyes which hindered vision;
is not perceived, one
the vision of God. Since it is the divine will which ed
is confirm
can see the blinding factor as being human self-will. This again used in
word is
by Num. 24:4, 16 and Ps. 119:18, where the same
the sense of opening up the vision of the divine. fiir Theodor
37. “seb® has-Samaim,” Orient. Studien Il, Festschrift
Néldeke, p. 725.
Psychologically this would be an expression of the bellicose,

“martial” Yahweh, who announces his demands like an
“enemy in war,” a role which is in full agreement with the
profane meaning of the Satan concept, as we saw previously
(see above, pp. 34 ff.). However, in our context the symbolic
significance of the sword must also be considered.
The drawn sword seems to me to be here the symbol of
discrimination evoked by the conflict between the divine and
the human will. It is the symbol of knowledge. The drawn
sword recalls the “flaming sword” in Gen. 3:24, where it is
not carried by an angel but appears as an independent divine
hypostasis. There, too, it embodies the discriminating knowl-
edge of good and evil which separates man forever from the
animal-like, innocent condition of life, for it is the Tree of Life
that the sword guards. Man is cut off from the Tree of
Life by his knowledge of good and evil, made manifest by the
“flaming sword.” * The maPak Yahweh appears also in II
38. Karl Budde (Die biblische Paradiesesgeschichte [1932], p. 84)

sees lahat ha-hereb ham-mithappehet as lightning. Correspondingly, the
cherubim represent thunderclouds to him. The cherub with the sword
in his hand is nothing other than thundercloud and lightning. Gunkel
(Genesis, pp. 24f.) goes beyond this natural-mythological conception,
which, in a narrow sense, is inadequate, if only for the reason that it
relates exclusively to those passages where the cherubim form Yahweh’s
throne ( I Sam. 4:4; Ps. 18:10 [Hebrew text, 18:11]; Ezek. 10:2) and
not to the more frequent passages where they have the function of
guardians (in addition to Genesis 3, see Exod. 37:5-9; I Kings 6:23-27;
Ezek. 28:16: “the covering cherub” keritb has-sdkék). Gunkel points to
the universality of the motif of guarding the sanctuary: sphinxes at
Egyptian temples and hybrid figures at the entrances to Babylonian
temples. According to him the biblical cherubim are probably directly
connected with these. He also sees in the flaming sword a mythical
concept taken over from a foreign source. He mentions as a parallel the
magic fire that surrounds Briinnhilde and—closer to the Old Testa-
ment—the brass “thunderbolt” erected by Tiglath-pileser I on the site
of a destroyed city (Inscr. Tigl. Pil. I KB I, 36f., 11. 15 ff.) which
Thureau-Dangin has associated with the flaming sword (Revue
a’histoire et de littérature religieuse, I, 146 ff.). And on Old Testament
ground itself: Zech, 2:5, where Yahweh himself, as a wall of fire,
watches over the future Jerusalem. Cf. also A. Jeremias (Das Alte
Testament im Lichte des Alten Orients [1930], p. 111), who interprets
hereb not as “sword” but as “magic fire,” since it also means “dryness”
Sam. 14:17 in explicit connection with the knowledge of good

and evil. The woman of Tekoah says, “Then thine handmaid
said, The word of my lord the king shall now be comforta-
ble: for as the mal’ak ha-elohim (G* and &: malak Yahweh),
so is my lord the king to discern good and badors..”
In Num. 22:22, therefore, something significant happens,
namely, the resistance to human will does not come from an
earthly foe—as in the Solomon passages, for instance—but
from God; that is, behind that which crosses the human will
stands the divine will. The adversary is God himself. Here,
and “heat.” Because of the much more frequent meaning “sword”

(from the Arabic harib, “sharp”; harbat, “lance”, barb, “war” ) this
interpretation does not seem plausible to me, especially in view of the
parallel of our passage in Num. 22:22 ff., where the sword also appears
in conjunction with a divine being.
W. Zimmerli (1. Mose 1-11. Die Urgeschichte [1943], pp. 232 ff.)
also points out the lightning character of the “flaming sword,” yet,
unlike Budde, has in mind not the natural phenomenon of lightning,
but, like Gunkel, the mythologically documented protective character
of fire or lightning. The closest parallel for this view is given by
H. Vincent (Revue biblique, XXXV [1926], 481 ff., cit. Paul Humbert,
“Ftudes sur le récit du Paradis et de la chute dans la Genése,”
Mémoires de Puniversité de Neuchdtel [1940], p. 40). The cherub
corresponds to the Mesopotamian Kéribu, and the flaming sword to the
lightning which forbids the way into a place and is the equivalent of
the lamassu (labmu). The two expressions in Gen. 3:24 would there-
fore correspond to the “inseparable couples: lamasu-K4ribu posted as
sentinels on the grounds of royal or divine dwellings in ancient
Mesopotamia.” Such a mythological classification of a motif, however,
is not sufficient for a grasp of its meaning. Lightning and flame are in
themselves symbols of spiritual contents. See the frequent fire symbol-
wall
ism for Yahweh (pillar of fire, Exod. 13:21; the above-mentioned
of fire in Zech. 2:5; and his word as inner fire in Jer. 20:9. See also love
as the flame of Yahweh [Salhevet-Jah] in the Song of Sol. 8:6 [the
light-
translation of the Authorized Version is not literal here]). And
ning is by its very nature the symbol of sudden enlightenment; think of
the expression “flash of thought.” Hence, the flaming sword symbolizes
discriminating enlightenment. Looked at psychologically, too, it is the
impossi-
watchman of Paradise. It is, itself, that which makes a return
according
ble. It seems to me most interesting in this connection that,
to Tabari and others, Iblis is the guardian of the Garden of Eden!
n
(See Leo Jung, “Fallen Angels in Jewish, Christian, and Mohammeda
Literature,” Jewish Quarterly Review, XV, XVI [Philadelphia, 1926],
34).
76 SATAN IN.THE OLD TESTAMENT
behind the mal’ak Yahweh is disclosed a dark aspect of God

of a quite different kind from that seen in the maPak bam-
mashit. One can recognize here a demand of God on man
which manifests itself as a threat to life and forces man to
bow to this apparently destructive will.
A very similar story from Central Asia referred to by
Gunkel ® is interesting in this context. It tells of Taktabai
Margin, whose horse recoils abruptly when it sees the devil
Ker Jupta. The youth, perceiving nothing, twice asks the
horse what it has seen; finally it answers, “Look above, look
below” (italics added).
Behind the close interrelation of the human and the divine
will in the story of Balaam there lies, it seems to me, a
profound meaning of universal human significance. In experi-
encing an opposition to his own will, man really knows that
he has a will. By this he is lifted out of the animal into the
human realm, i.e., into the experience of individual existence.
The human will becomes conscious through its collision with
the divine will, by coming up against the adversary. Thus,
behind the deadly threat of the divine opposition there is also
hidden a positive, purposeful aspect; the adversary, as such, is
at the same time the creator of individual consciousness. But
why must the human will be broken at the moment when
man first becomes aware of it, or be apprehended only to be
broken? The answer is not yet apparent from our passage. It
only gives a hint that a problem of life is at stake, perhaps the
problem of man’s life; for Balaam’s disobedience would have
led to his death. That for God, too, it is not merely a question
of prestige whether or not man obeys him, but a fateful
decision, can only be dimly sensed at this point. It will be-
come clear as we proceed, however. In my opinion this whole
context of ideas provides the premise for the further develop-
ment of the adversary as a mythological figure in the story
where he first appears as “Satan,” and which tells us the most
about him: the framing story of the Book of Job.
39. Das Miarchen im Alten Testament, pp. 31f. (cit. Leo Frobenius,
Im Zeitalter des Sonnengottes [1904], pp. 133 f.).
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1. The Age of the Concept
Our THEsIs that the figure of Satan represents the result of
a process of development within the divine personality itself
would seem to be controverted by the one passage which has
made the Old Testament Satan generally known: the framing
story of the Book of Job, the so-called popular Book of Job.
~ In general, the figure of Satan in the Book of Job is viewed
as an ancient demon of popular belief, as, for example, by
Hans Duhm.* This view is shared alike by those who assume a
great antiquity for the framing story and those who, though
placing it at a later time, still consider that the figure of Satan
stems from an old folk tradition. The fact already discussed,
that the figure of Satan has as yet no proper name in the Book.u ~~ 1p
of Job but acquires-it only in a later work, the Chronicles, ‘
speaks strongly against the assumption of the great age of this
figure. Moreover, as we have seen, the significance attached
to it is very different from that of the true cacodemons in
the Old Testament. These play a peripheral role. They hop
about here and there like will-o’-the wisps. Though there is
evidence that offerings were still made to them in the time of
the prophets, this only proves that their place was outside the
Yahweh religion (see above, pp. 35 ff.). But the Satan of the
1. “Die bésen Geister im Alten Testament” (diss., Tiibingen, 1904),
p- 17: “The most ancient form of this being must be recognized in the
Satan of the popular book of Job.” For this Hans Duhm cites Bernhard
Duhm, Das Buch Hiob, pp. vii.
79
80 (SATAN IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
Book of Job stands face to face with God in a dialectical.

discussion. It has been repeatedly pointed out* that he is
subordinate to Yahweh, but this statement does not give the
‘full picture as long as the power possessed by this demon,
who is subordinate in rank to Yahweh, is completely over-
looked. After all, he is able to incite Yahweh to turn against
Job, to cause him to make a momentous decision. Yahweh lets
himself become involved in a serious discussion with this
demon and be influenced by him. It is true that Yahweh
continues to have faith in Job; but, looked at psychologically,
is there not, in the very acceptance of the wager, a concession
to Satan’s doubt? If there had been no secret uncertainty to
rouse his interest in the outcome of this truly immoral wager
at the expense of his servant Job, he would most probably
have refused to engage in it.
The difficulties which this passage gives contemporary re-
searchers may be illustrated by one example. Bernhard Duhm
writes about it in his Hiob-Kommentar:
If it is really too offensive to assume that the author of
Job ascribed Job’s misfortune to a weakness of Yahweh,
who lent credence to the first-come suspicion, one should
probably conceive of the writer’s train of thought as fol-
lows: Yahweh has indeed the personal conviction that his
2. For example, by Hans Duhm, op. cit., pp. 19-20: “The relationship
of Satan to Yahweh, of the ben ha-’eldbim to the highest God, may be
compared to the relationship between vassal and great king. Yahweh
alone has the power in his hands; without his sanction Satan is
powerless.” He assumes that “an older concept giving more free play to
Satan must have had to adapt itself gradually to the basically monotheis-
tic character of the Yahweh religion, which was becoming more
powerful. As long as Yahweh was not yet such an unlimited, absolute
monarch, Satan could still carry on his dangerous game to his own
liking. . . . But more and more he lost his independence. The Yahweh
religion subordinated him, like the rest of the demons, to the highest
God. From then on he had to restrict himself to playing the role of
denouncer before the highest judge, and, on occasion, of penal official,
in order to satisfy his appetites at least in this way.” Similarly Gunkel
writes (Das Marchen im Alten Testament [1917], p. 84): “This figure,
which may be of Babylonian origin, may have originally carried on its
wild play on its own account before the Yahweh religion put it into
the service of this god.”
81 Satan as One of the bené ha-’elohim
servant Job is righteous from the heart and not out of

self-interest, but Satan is right in claiming that an objec-
tive, decisive proof, valid also for a third party, is so far
lacking. Satan (and the public opinion of the low-minded
people he represents) has a right to demand a test before
he, too, is convinced; and God’s justice and impartiality
compel him, against his inclination, to accede to the in-
quiry and submit his favorite to torture. Job is made
unhappy because God is just; just, that is, also toward the
opinion of subordinate beings whom he does not brutally
suppress by his superior knowledge.? (s../\«
This explanation does not seem to me in any way to “save”
the situation. Such a concession to Satan and “the public ~",
opinion of the low-minded people he represents” would sug-
gest the idea of weakness rather than justice, quite apart from__
the fact that Duhm’s argumentation is nowhere supported by
the text. If God’s superior justice would induce him to give
_way, how is his reproach to Satan, for moving him to destroy
_Job without cause; to be explained? Can one really still see in
the fact-that Yahweh gives Satan permission to destroy Job
an expression of the sovereignty of God? It is true that,
according to his rank, Satan is a servant of Yahweh, with no
independent power to act on his own, but seen psychologi-
cally, he is really the stronger. He is the servant who can
persuade his master. Yahweh’s reproach becomes quite evi-
dent in chapter 2:3: “. . . thou movedst me against him, to
destroy him without cause.” He accuses Satan of having
_seduced him to an act which he really repents—only to allow
himself to be “incited” by Satan on a further occasion toward
even more far-reaching decisions! It is scarcely possible to
regard this as a demonstration of Yahweh’s omnipotence. An
old Talmud teacher seems to me to have had a finer sense for
the atmosphere of the story than those who belittle the signif-
icance of Satan in this text. He remarks, in regard to chapter
2:3 (“Thou movedst me against him, to destroy him without
cause”): “If it were not in the Bible, one would not be
3. B. Duhm, op. cit., p. 9.
82, SATAN IN.THE OLD TESTAMENT
allowed to say it”; for God is represented “like a man who

lets himself be seduced by another.” * Gunkel must also have
sensed the atmosphere given in this situation. He writes:
This wager sounds as if it had not originally been agreed
to by a servant and a master high above him, but much
more as if concluded between two equals, This impression
is also supported by the fact that in this story Yahweh and
Satan speak together without regard for the immeasurable
distance between them.?
He explains this as possibly being due to the fact that the
story may be derived from an old fairy tale. “Such words are
more easily understandable if they are exchanged between a
man’s guardian deity and his evil demon.” But that for
Gunkel, too, this does not answer the problem of the theolog-
ical significance of these words is shown by a further explana-
tion, which, however, is unsatisfactory because it starts from
the very assumption it intends to prove: “The Job-poet may
have then inserted them [these words] because in this way he
could depict the insolence of Satan, which allowed him such
irreverent language against the Most High.” But why did he
have to depict this “insolence”? What is significant is that
there is room in the Yahweh concept for this impudent Satan
who is permitted to address Yahweh in such fashion; in other
words, that this idea of Satan is theologically tolerable.
Hence, compared to the ancient demons in the Old Testa-
ment, Satan has an important and new significance. Quite
apart from the development of his name and the fact that the
concept has its origin in the profane realm, it can surely be
stated that Satan cannot possibly be a figure of long standing
in the Yahweh religion.® He is a theological novelty, only to
4. Jochanan Bab. Bathra 16a, cit. Isaak Wiernikowski, “Das Buch
Hiob nach der Auffassung des Talmud und Midrasch” (diss., Breslau,
1902), p. 36.
5. Gunkel, op. cit., p. 85.
6. Roskoff (Geschichte des Teufels [1869], I, 186) has already said of
the Book of Job, as was mentioned earlier (see above, p. 7), that it
shows “an important turning point in the Hebrew view. ... The
ancient Hebrew belief ascribes all power only to Yahweh.” He sees in
be explained by the development of the concept of God

already shown. Had there been no change in the concept of
God, such a story could never have come into being. It would
simply have been incompatible with the older image of Yah-
weh. In Amos 3:6 it says: “. . . shall there be evil in a city and
Yahweh hath not done it?” And even in Deutero-Isaiah (Isa.
45:5-7) we find the particularly forceful formulation: “I am
Yahweh, and there is none else. . . . I form the light, and
create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I Yahweh do
all these things.” Of this the story of Job itself is another
proof. In the consciousness of the pious Job in the framing
story, there is as yet no room for the concept of Satan. Job
himself ascribes to Yahweh the misfortunes that assail him, a
most important point in our context, which will be dealt with
further.
Yet, though Satan cannot be proved an ancient demon in
the Old Testament, we would not have dealt adequately with
the question of the age of this concept if we did not, by a
comparison with other sources, investigate the possibility of a
foreign influence upon its origin. We have yet to examine the
question whether there is any evidence in the phenomenology
of the Old Testament Satan for his kinship or even identity
with a deity outside the Old Testament.
An early attempt to derive the Old Testament Satan from
the Egyptian Seth—with no sequel in modern literature so
far as I could discover 7—is found in an article by Diestel:
“Set-Typhon, Asahel und Satan: Ein Beitrag zur Religionsge-
schichte des Orients.” ® From the rich material, which Diestel
has drawn chiefly from Plutarch, I shall mention only the
main features of what seems to him to prove his thesis that
Satan is Seth, as adopted by the Old Testament.
this an indication that this book cannot possibly be held to be one of
the oldest in Hebrew literature.
7. Cf., especially, Gerhard Seippel, Der Typhonmythus (1939). (See
below, p. 84, n. 12, and p. 86.)
8. Diestel, “Set-Typhon, Asahel und Satan: Ein Beitrag zur Reli-
,
ionsgeschichte des Orients,” Zeitschrift fiir die historische Theologie
XXX (1860), No. 2.
The opposition of Osiris and Seth, the beneficent and the

destructive, searing sun, had also very early accquired a polit-
ical connotation. Osiris is the guardian deity of Egypt; but
the opposite of Egypt is the world outside its borders, so Seth
appears in his capital as the god of foreign countries. He is
described as colorless, pale, yellowish.’ According to Diestel,
pale, yellowish figures on Egyptian monuments always depict
northern foreigners.”” Diestel believes that the Egyptian con-
cept of Seth evoked the idea of Satan as it must have appeared
in the first form of the Job legend. A close geographical
connection making such a transition possible seems to him to
be provided by the circumstance that the Land of Uz in the
Book of Job is most probably located in the south; while the
Egyptians, for their part, very early carried on mining opera-
tions in the Sinai peninsula, the border area between Judea
and the Nile land, which necessarily entailed extensive settle-
ments. Moreover, at a later period, Seth’s abode, as well as his
worship, was transferred to these northeasterly boundaries.
Here Diestel cites the mythological tales of Seth being
chained in the Sirbonian Sea™ and his flight to Syria and
Palestine.” It seems to him equally easy to prove the similar-
ity between the two figures of Seth and Satan, but at this
point certain doubts arise. First of all, he restricts the similar-
ity to Satan’s activities in the Book of Job in bringing the evils
about. He names all five of them: the raid of the Sabeans, the
fire of God, the raid of the Chaldeans, the wind from the
wilderness, and the boils. Without noticing that the first four
blows against Job do not proceed directly from Satan, and
although he himself says that, according to the analysis of
9. Plutarch De Iside et Osiride 33.
10. Op. cit., pp. 200 ff.
11. Herodotus III. 5; cit. Diestel, op. cit., p. 172.
12, Plutarch De Iside 19. 5; cit. Diestel, op. cit., p. 176. Cf. also
Theodor Hopfner, Plutarch tiber Isis und Osiris, Il, 143 ff. Hopfner,
however, like G. Seippel (see above, n.7) does not draw from the
Semitic relations of Seth the same conclusions as Diestel regarding the
Old Testament Satan.
Num. 16:35; I Kings 18:18; and II Kings 1:10 and 12, the
“fire of God” can mean only lightning, Diestel, citing Ewald,
interprets it as originally “a sudden sultriness and heat falling
from the air.” ** “It is a deadly, searing, fiery heat, which can
very quickly do away with men and beasts. Just this is the
most prominent characteristic of Set.”** Any doubt, how-
ever, about this “fire of God” coming from Yahweh, espe-
cially in view of the parallels mentioned by Diestel himself, is
scarcely possible. He further lays stress on the fact that Job’s
cattle were taken by robber hordes from the northeast and
southeast, that is, by foreigners. And Seth is the god of the
hostile outland, also precisely of the south and the north. For
Sethas a parallel to Satan, who is expressly characterized as
the bringer of boils, Diestel can find support only in a very
eneral statement from Plutarch that Seth is the bringer of
all inhibition, disturbance, and destruction.
Diestel’s conclusion, “It thus proves that almost all the
essential evils inflicted by Satan also constitute the activity of
Set,” * is therefore not convincing. But the failure of his
attempt shows most clearly when he construes an identity
between the names of Seth and Satan, “since the first may be
connected with sat, Sit.’** How this could become Satan,
Diestel explains as follows: “. . . in order to designate this
religious concept, in a Semitic country a strictly Semitic
word was adopted, which at least offered a similarity of
sound, together with fitting characteristics.” * Nothing could
be less likely, however, than just this, that $atin should,
because of a similarity of sound, be an arbitrarily selected
covering name for Seth.
According to Diestel, this adoption occurred very early. In
that case it would at least have been the result of an uncon-
13. Diestel, op. cit., p. 210.

14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 211.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
86 SATAN IN* THE OLD TESTAMENT
scious process. But this contradicts everything we have been

so far able to establish concerning the Satan concept and its
development, above all its originally profane usage.
Yet perhaps it is not for nothing that the figure of Seth is
brought into our context, if one does not, like Diestel, pin
down its influence on the Yahweh religion to Satan, but poses
the question in a more general way. Then the parallel to
Yahweh himself immediately becomes striking. Among other
animals associated with Seth, Diestel speaks.of the crocodile
and the hippopotamus.** Is it not perhaps here that in
Yahwism itself the trace of Seth can be found? For as Levia-
than and Behemoth—whose names, among others, have been
thought to be Egyptian (see above, p. 43)—they are attributes
of Yahweh in Job 38. Egyptian influence is perceptible in
several passages of the Book of Job, and for this reason it has
even been assumed that its author was an Egyptian.” In these
two mythological figures—Leviathan and Behemoth—appears
the wild nature-side of Yahweh. In addition, it is interesting
that Behemoth and Leviathan are also akin to the mythical sea
monsters and that one of these, Rahab, appears as a direct per-
sonification of Egypt (Isa. 30:7; 51:9; Pss. 87:4; 89: 10) cee,
as the turbulent sea. But in Egypt also Seth was held equivalent
to the sea. He is the sea “in which the Nile (Osiris) dissolves
as he flows out and disappears altogether.” *
Gerhard Seippel refers to another interesting trait shared
by Seth and Behemoth (not Rahab, as he assumes) in Job
40:18: “Seth’s bones are the iron which yields the material for
weapons and is symbolically equivalent to Seth’s fighting
ower.” * It is said of the hippopotamus which Yahweh has
made (Job 40:18 ff.): “His bones are as strong pieces of brass,
his bones are like bars of iron.” Satan, however, is not himself
18. Ibid., pp. 169-70; Plutarch De Iside 32.

19. See Gustav Hélscher, Das Buch Hiob (1937), pp. 7-8. Also Paul
Humbert, Recherches sur les sources égyptiennes de la littérature
sapientale d’Israél (1929), pp. 75 ff.
20. Plutarch De Iside 32; cit. Diestel, op. cit., pp. 169-70.
21. Seippel, op. cit., p. 136.
the dark nature force symbolized in all these images; he is

rather a spiritual differentiating principle in God which
causes God to become aware of his own nature side. This will
become still clearer with the further exegesis of the Book of
Job. Yahweh appears in yet other passages as the vanquisher
of Rahab, of Leviathan and Behemoth, also in the Book of
Job itself,?? but here what has been conquered has become an
aspect of his own nature. He overcomes his own nature side
by knowing about it. Here lies an eminent psychological
truth, which is experienced as a mythologem in the God
personality. On another plane, such a self-conquest of Yah-
weh also occurs in Zech. 3:1 ff., as will be shown later (see
below, p. 144).
The decisive factor of the originally profane usage of the
Satan concept also makes a Babylonian origin of the Satan
figure extremely improbable, at least for the first stage of
assimilation, i.e., for the unconscious adoption of Babylonian
Canaanite conceptions after the settlement in Canaan (see
above, pp. 103f.). It is still to be considered, however,
whether Satan may nevertheless be an ancient Babylonian
concept which became assimilated (though only after the
Exile; that is, in the second stage of Babylonian influence) as
an adequate expression of the Old Testament development of
the concept of God. A seemingly close parallel to the Book of
Job thrusts itself upon our attention, the “Poem of the Right-
eous Sufferer,” the so-called “Babylonian Job.”
A king is smitten with sickness.”? He describes his torments
22. Job 26:12. Cf. also Pss. 74:14; 104:26; Isa. 51:9.
23. Morris Jastrow assumes that it is a king (“A Babylonian Parallel
to the Book of Job,” Journal of Biblical Literature, XXV_ [1906],
135-91; see also his Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens [Giessen,
1912], Il, 106 ff., and particularly p. 121), on the basis of other examples
of “royal lamentations.” See also S. Landersdorfer (“Eine babylonische
Quelle fiir das Buch Job?” Bibl. Studien, XVI [1911], 55-59), who also
follows up the reasons for this assumption in detail; and likewise
Robert W. Rogers (Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament [2d ed.,
Abingdon Press, 1926], p. 164, n.1). St. Langdon (“Babylonian Wis-
_ dom,” in Babyloniaca: Etudes de philologie assyro-babylonienne, ed.
Ch. Virolleaud [1906-37], VII, 131-95: “The Babylonian Poem of the
in a great song of lamentation to the gods which, after he has

been freed from his suffering, ends in a hymn of praise to the
“Tord of Wisdom.” There is no doubt that the “pursuer” in
Tablet II refers to a demon of disease:
All day the pursuer followed me,
At night he granted me no respite whatever,
Through wrenching my joints were torn apart,
My limbs were shattered and rendered helpless.”
The first question that arises—whether with the Book of
Job and especially with the figure of Satan we have to do
with a direct literary borrowing—is answered in the negative
by both Jastrow * and Landersdorfer.” ‘The latter maintains
Righteous Sufferer”) does not share this general opinion of scholars,
but holds that the suffering hero of the poem was “simply an influential
resident of the ancient city of Nippur” (p. 135). For the most recent
English translation of this text, see “I Will Praise the Lord of Wis-
dom,” trans. R. Pfeiffer, Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old
Testament, ed. James B. Pritchard (2d ed., Princeton University Press,
1955).
24. Jastrow, “A Babylonian Parallel to the Book of Job,” p. 171.
Pfeiffer translates similarly in Near Eastern Texts ..., p. 435, vss.
37-40:
“All day a pursuer pursues me.
At night he does not let me draw my breath for a moment.
Through straining my sinews have been loosened,
My limbs are wrecked, hit aside.”
Cf. also Landersdorfer, op. cit., p. 24, vss. 66 ff.:
“The whole day the persecutor pursues me,
In the night he does not let me breathe a moment (in peace),
My joints are dissolved by maiming. . . .”
Similarly Ebeling, in Gressmann, Altorientalische Texte zum Alten
Testament, p. 276, vs. 104:
“The whole day the persecutor pursues me,
In the night he does not let me breathe a moment (in peace),
By tugging back and forth my sinews are torn apart,
My limbs are burst apart, and thrown aside.”
25. Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens, II, 133: “The presenta-
tion offered here of this section of Babylonian-Assyrian literature leads
to the conclusion that a direct influence of Babylonian-Assyrian songs
of lamentation and repentance Re upon biblical creations cannot
be spoken of.” Compare, though, his earlier, less assertive view, espe-
89 Satan as One of the bené ha-’el6him
that, “probably in one case as in the other, we have a more or

less free retelling of a folk legend, such as one finds by the
dozen in the literature of all culture groups.” His final con-
clusion is:
There is no basis for assuming any literary dependence,
direct or indirect, of the biblical Job upon the Babylonian
“Poem of the Righteous Sufferer,” since the similarities
shown by the two texts can be explained just as well, and
less arbitrarily, as stemming from the natural development
of the subject of the story, especially considering the great
number of important disparities and the lack of positive
proof of any dependence.”
The Indian parallel of King Harishchandra (see below, pp.
93 f.) and that of the Egyptian “Conversation of a World-
Weary Man with his Soul (Ba),” ** both of which likewise
raise the problem of the righteous sufferer, confirm Landers-
dorfer’s view that we have here a typical motif found in
many religions.
cially concerning the “Poem of the Righteous Sufferer” in his earlier
essay (“A Babylonian Parallel to the Book of Job,” pp. 190f.): “Liter-
ary influences, however, may be potent without necessarily pointing to
direct borrowing, . . . Literary influence, reinforced by the possession
in common of an indefinite amount of folklore, legendary lore, and
ancient traditions, suggests itself as a satisfactory solution of the prob-
lem involved in a comparison of the story of Tabi-utul-Bel, and the
treatment of the theme of human suffering there found, with the
strikingly parallel story of Job.”
26. Landersdorfer, op. cit., p. 126. Cf. Samuel Terrien, “The Book of
Job: Introduction and Exegesis,” The Interpreter’s Bible (Abingdon
Press, 1954), III, 881: “Since the Akkadian poem was well known
before the Babylonian exile (n.42: Several copies of it were made
during the seventh century B.c., and the existence of a philological
commentary explaining the archaisms of its language points to its
relatively wide circulation. The exact date of its composition is uncer-
tain, but it is considerably older than Job.), it is possible that the
biblical poet was acquainted with it, but no trace of literary depend-
ence can be demonstrated.”
27. Landersdorfer, op. cit., p. 138.
28. In A. Erman and F. Krebs, Aus dem Papyrus der kéniglichen
Museen zu Berlin (1899), p. 54; cf. “A Dispute over Suicide,” trans.
John A. Wilson, Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament,
ed. James B. Pritchard (2d ed., Princeton University Press, 1955), pp.
405-7.
However, neither the universality of the basic theme of

both poems nor the improbability of a direct dependence of
the Book of Job upon the Babylonian poem suffices to resolve
the problem of possible Babylonian influence. Might not the
sickness demon—to whom the sufferings of the king are as-
cribed in the Babylonian song of lamentation—represent an
ancient concept adopted during the Exile and finding expres-
sion in post-Exilic biblical writings, in our case in the Book of
Job? This possibility has led Hdlscher, as before him Hans
Duhm and others, to the conclusion that the Satan in Job “is a
demonic figure who is thought of as the originator of all evil,
especially of sickness.” * Yet it should already be clear from
what we have observed thus far that the Satan in Job is by no
means exclusively, or even primarily, a sickness demon. It
seems to me, moreover, that consideration of the inner con-
tent would lead us to exclude not only a literary dependence
of the Job Satan on the Babylonian lamentation, but also any
tale quale adoption of the “persecutor” concept. The essential
differences in theological structure and atmosphere between
the two poetic writings can become apparent only when seen
against the background of a complete picture of the character
of Satan in the Book of Job (see below, pp. 133 f.). Yet it
seems to me very probable that the Babylonian sickness
demon, as the primal image of one aspect of the Job Satan,
namely, as the bringer of sickness, forms a part of this picture.
In a respect he will concern us again later (see below, pp.
133 ff.).
Although our investigations have shown that Satan as a
complex phenomenon cannot be derived from any traceable
extrabiblical ancient demon, yet there is a quite different
aspect to the question of the age of the concept which must
be dealt with. Just as the motif of the Righteous Sufferer is
found in different religions (shown by Landersdorfer’s re-
search into the “Babylonian Job”), so also the motif of the
divine wager in myths and fairy tales is unmistakably wide-
29. Hlscher, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

spread. As was mentioned earlier (see above, p. 82), Gunkel *°

points out the fairy-tale character of this story. August
Wiinsche ” has followed up this particular motif. According
to him it stems from a twofold root: On the one hand from
the early Christian dogma of atonement, according to which
Satan’s defeat is represented as his being outwitted by the
Redeemer *—in that Christ, by his sacrifice, cheated Satan of
his rights toward men, won by the first man’s sin—and on the
other hand from old Germanic religious beliefs. Here it was
originally the giants who were outwitted by the gods. After
the spread of Christianity the giants were replaced by the
devil, who, in many Germanic tales, is stupid, as are they. As
is made plain by the many stories of various provenance about
the cheated devil which Wiinsche cites, the motif of the
wager as a test of strength between divine and demonic
potencies, is universal; psychologically speaking, it is arche-
typal. Wiinsche holds it to be a “migrating motif” (Wan-
derstoff), a theory controverted by the very examples he
gives. For the Christian wager motif could not possibly have
given rise to the Germanic versions, nor the latter to the
former. Wiinsche’s work itself demonstrates the inadequacy
of the “migration theory.” Wiinsche expressly rejects “Ba-
stian’s theory of elementary ideas which presupposes an inde-
pendent origin for the legendary tales out of the universality
of human nature,” although without giving his reasons. But
Bastian’s idea has long since been confirmed by C. G. Jung’s
concept of the archetypes and substantiated by him with an
abundance of mythological and dream material. The arche-
types are the expressions of primal human experiences, which
can occur everywhere on earth. The motif of the divine
30. Op. cit., p. 85.

ff.;
31. Cf. also Oskar Dahnhardt, Natursagen (1907), I, 177 ff. and 347
Johannes Bolte and Georg Polivka, Anmerku ngen zu den Kinder- und
und
Hausmirchen der Briider Grimm (1918) (to No. 189: “Der Bauer
der Teufel”), III, 355 ff.
32. A. Wiinsche, Der Sagenkreis vom geprellten Teufel (1905 Ne
33. The various versions in the New Testament Apocrypha and by a
number of Church Fathers; see ibid., pp. 3-9.
wager is also such an archetype; but what would it express? It

seems to correspond to a phase in the development of human
consciousness in which the opposites have separated and be-
come apparent but in which there is as yet no stability. It still
is uncertain who is the stronger. The good must still prove
itself stronger than the powerful evil, cleverness stronger than
stupidity, and consciousness struggling out of unconscious-
ness must maintain itself against the darkness of the uncon-
scious. This contest situation can be accounted the common
basis for the Germanic, Old Testament, and Indian wager
motifs.** Such archetypal motifs, however, are molded by
cultural-historical conditions into forms which can differ
widely. For example, in the Germanic legends and fairy tales
Wiinsche cites, where the devil is cheated of his wages, he is
usually stupid and is defeated by cleverness. Wiinsche says:
A kinship between the mythological sagas of giants and
the Christian legends about the devil is vouched for, above
all, by the stupidity which is characteristic of both. Just as
the giants, with all their strength and force, are clumsy,
stupid creatures who are outwitted and cheated by the
clever little dwarfs as well as by the intelligent gods, so in
most legends which show the devil entering into a wager,
he shows himself to be a stupid creature who does not
grasp the full range of the wager and so draws the short
end.®°
However, there is no such contrast between intelligence and
stupidity as far as God and Satan in the Book of Job are
concerned. As will be shown, Satan is an eminent spiritual
potency and a “divine being.” Furthermore, in its Christian
version, seen from the examples cited by Wiinsche, this motif
is greatly refined and deepened. The essentially different char-
acter of the Satan wager in Job from that of the Germanic-
Christian legends of the devil is involuntarily demonstrated
by Wiinsche when he lists it among the latter as a “small
34. For India, too, has its wager tales. See above, pp. 92 f.
35. Wiinsche, op. cit., p. 82.
deviation.” °° Of the “delightful humor” which Wiinsche

claims for the legend cycle of the cheated devil,” nothing is
to be sensed in either the early Christians forms of the motif
of the devil’s wager or in the Book of Job. Gustav Hélscher,
who in his Hiob-Kommentar also stresses the humor of this
motif, probably proceeded less from his own immediate feel-
ing experience when reading the Job story than, like
Wiinsche, from the impression made on him by the Germanic
legends of the devil, without noticing that here a very differ-
ent wind was blowing. God’s wager in Job is a desperately
serious matter, as I have already tried to show (see above, pp.
80 ff.).
There are two parallel stories which come closest in con-
tent to the wager episode in the Book of Job and, in addition,
have in common with it the motif of the piety test.
~~ 1, A Swahili legend relates that the archangels Gabriel and
Michael disagreed as to whether there was still compassion to
be found among men. Michael doubted it. They descended to
Earth, Gabriel as a very sick man and Michael as a physician.
Michael tells the sympathizing citizens that the sick man can
be cured only by a human sacrifice. A boy shows himself
ready for it, and now Michael’s doubts are overcome.*®
2. The Indian tale of the trials and wonderful patience of
King Harishchandra relates the following: ”
36. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
37. Ibid., Preface. Wiinsche does, however, mention that it is above
all the German legends which bring out this humor.
38. See Paul Volz, “Hiob und Weisheit,” Schriften des Alten Testa-
ments, (1921), p. 9. The legend is also given in detail by Carl Meinhof,
Die Dichtung der Afrikaner (1911), pp. 85 ff.
39, In the Markd4ndeya-Purana. See Paul Volz, op. cit., pp. 8-9. The
Buch
story is told in more detail by Konstantin Schlottmann (Das
Alte
Hiob [1851]), to whom Volz refers; see also A. Jeremias, Das
Testament im Lichte des alten Orients (1930), pp. 328-29, and others.
sur
(For complete references see Adolphe Lods, “Recherches récentes
le livre de Job,” Revue @histoire et de philosophie religieuses [1934],
in-
pp- 501-33.) Schlottmann (op. cit., p. 18) thinks, however, that an
fluence of Christian missionaries is not out of the question, since the
- scene in Heaven, which recalls Job, is not found in the older versions,
not even in the Puranas, but only in the later dramas.
Once the gods and the holy penitents were assembled in

Indra’s Heaven. An argument arose between them, whether
there existed on earth a completely virtuous prince. Va-
sishtha claimed that his student Harishchandra was such a
one, but Siva, who was present in the guise of Vismamitra,
answered angrily that the virtue of this man would not
stand a severe test. The gods deliver Harishchandra up to
him and Vismamitra goes to work. He does the king a
service for which he asks an enormous sum of money; and
Harishchandra promises to pay it to him. But because, again
and again, he is unable to pay it, he and his wife sink into
the deepest misery. Both finally become slaves, and the
king has to carry out the most despised task existing, that
of burying the dead. But he takes it all upon himself for
the sake of his promise, for “there is no higher duty for a
man than the duty of keeping his word.” Likewise, sup-
ported by his noble wife, he sustains the test until the end,
he gets back wife, child, and kingdom and along with all
his people is raised to heaven by the gods. So in the end, as
the poem says, the greatest suffering is turned to the great-
est joy.
The emergence of an archetypal motif and the form it
takes are thus, as these parallels show, not unaffected by
history. They are the expression of an inner process of devel-
opment, whether in the dreams of an individual or in the
myths and theological conceptions of a people. In our case
the mythologem of God’s wager is an expression of the
development in the divine personality of Yahweh, as will
become clearer later on. Were this not so, how could we
explain the fact that the Yahweh religion did not adopt a
great deal more from the vast store of legends and myths?
Why, for instance, in this land of the cult of fruitfulness par
excellence, where the idea of the hieros gamos was so alive
and present, was Yahweh never given a companion god--
dess? “© The reason is that such an acquisition would never
40. Elephantine cannot very well be taken as an example, since it
represents a relatively late, independent, special development of a
separated branch of the people’s totality, though as such it is indeed
most remarkable.
have been tolerated because it would have represented a

regression. to a pre-Yahwistic concept of God. It is most
important to discriminate between the first’stage of develop-
ment, the merging of a multiplicity of good and evil demons
in the divine personality of Yahweh, and a later stage of
development, in which the unity of this divine personality
re-enfolded into a multiplicity under the influence of the
polytheistic environment. But this influence was only possible
on the basis of the inherent development of the divine person-
ality. In the new multiplicity, however, the formerly es-
tablished unity is not lost, as is shown, for example, by the
fact that the angels are subordinate to God. It is this second
process to which, as was previously pointed out, the Satan
figure essentially belongs. Even if it were a matter of an
ancient demon figure alive at this stage, it would in any case
have become something altogether new and different as soon
as it became part of the concept of God. Hence the problem
is shifted from that of the age of the Satan concept, as such,
to that of the time of its appearance in relation to Yahweh.
(To put the problem in this form is justified since, as was.said
before, there is no evidence whatever in the Old Testament
\itself for the mythological concept of Satan outside his re-
_lation to Yahweh.
2. The Age of the Text
Tue GREAT MAJority of scholars regard the framing story of
the Book of Job as ancient, because of its folktale character,
but a few have begun to doubt it. Thus Holscher finds it
hardly possible to place the framing story far back, in a very
ancient time, merely on the basis of the differences between it
and the poem. An equally late composition of the framing
story is shown by its dependence on the Priestcodex (Job
42:17: “So Job died being old and full of days”) and by an
Aramaism like gibbél (Job 2:10).*
41. Hélscher, op. cit., p. 5. He cites K. Kautzsch (Das sogenannte
Volksbuch von Hiob Cap. 1; 2; 42:7-17[1900]), who (pp.of 24 ff. and
which he
40 ff.) points out a still later verbal usage on the grounds
The same view is held by Ernst Sellin, not for the whole
framing story, but in regard to the Satan passages,” which he
takes to be interpolations into the folktale by the author of
the poem. He draws especial attention to four points which
support his assumption:
1. From a purely textual standpoint the two Satan pas-
sages can be conceived of as interpolations (without this
counting as proof) because they can be omitted from the
context without leaving a gap. But of foremost significance to
Sellin is the fact that 1:13 connects directly with the last verse
before the Satan passage; that is, with 1:5. There it is told how
Job offered sacrifices, also having in mind the sins which his
children might commit. Then, if the Satan passage is omitted,
it goes on consistently: “And there was a day when his sons
and his daughters were eating and drinking SETI NEY
2. If the Satan story belonged to the original legend, the
Epilogue would have to refer back in some way to the wager
with Satan. Sellin says on this point: “In the folk legend it
would have been an absolutely essential element that God
considers erroneous the assumption that the poet of Job had before him
a “folk book.” He believes that the poem and the framing story stem
from the same hand. The latter may have been known to the poet as an
older oral tradition (p. 87). Kautzsch takes the Satan passages to be one
of the strongest pieces of evidence against the theory of the pre-Exilic
origin of the Prologue (p. 58). The post-Exilic origin of the Prologue,
in which Satan appears, is also assumed by Erik Stave (Ueber den
Einfluss des Parsismus auf das Judentum (Haarlem, 1898], p. 249 and
n.1), citing E. Kénig, Einleitung in das Alte Testament (1893), pp.
410 ff., $84, 2a. Cf. also W. F. Albright in his review of Hélscher’s
“Hiob-Kommentar,” in the Journal of Biblical Literature, LVII (1938),
227 f.; and J. Hempel, Die althebrdische Literatur (1930), p. 176.
42. E. Sellin, Das Problem des Hiobbuches (1919).
43. Cf. also Norbert Peters, “Das Buch Job,” Exegetisches Handbuch
zum Alten Testament (1928), p. 49*. Joh. Lindblom, also, considers it
certain that the Satan episode was inserted into the primitive story but
believes that the author of the Job poem found it already worked into
the ancient tale (in its Israelite traditional form, cf., below, p. 122, n.
85). He bases this on the fact that Satan is not mentioned in the
dialogue—failing, as I believe, to recognize the inner connection of the
Satan episode of the framing story with the essential problem presented
in its dialogue. (On this, see below, p. 124.)
Cz :‘Satan as One of the bené ha-’elohim
should have scolded him for his unjustified defamation, while

the poet was concerned only with a later enlightenment of
Job.” “
3. The reason for interpolating the Satan passages is a
theological one. The author needed them as an indispensable
element, now usually not appreciated, for building up his
theme.*°
4. Satan comes onto the scene exclusively in post-Exilic
times, and his appearance among the angels matches exactly
_that in Zech. 3:1 ff. The conception of Satan as the bringer of \ )
allevil to mankind does not agree with ancient Israelite
“thought, according to which everything whatever, good and.
bad alike, was the act of God (Amos 3:6, II Sam. 24: 1); orso
it can scarcely be looked for in an ancient folk legend.”
We can follow Sellin’s conception in detail only as we
come to analyze the text. It appears to me to do the most
justice to the facts and to receive further confirmation by the
name factor, which Sellin does not mention. In his theological
exposition of the inner connection between the framing story
and the poem, however, he arrives at conclusions with which
I cannot entirely agree. According to Sellin, Satan has the
function of unburdening God of evil, so to speak, which in
my opinion is seeing the problem too simply (cf. below, pp.
118 ff.). But Sellin’s principal statement seems to me of es-
sential significance here: that there exists a close connection
between the Satan figure in the framing story and the theo-
logical problem of the poem. Where, from my point of view,
this connection is to be found will be discussed later.
The foregoing may be summarized as follows: Most schol-
ars have separated the question of the age of the text from
that of the Satan concept and have been correct in doing so.
However, there is the further necessity to discriminate be-
44, Sellin, op. cit., p. 23.

45, Ibid.
46. Most clearly formulated in Isa. 45:7. Cf. above, p. 83.
47. Sellin, op. cit., p. 23.
48. Ibid., p. 36.
98 SATAN IN “THE OLD TESTAMENT
tween an older and a later stratum of the Satan concept. The

parallel motifs found in other myths and fairy tales have
shown us the primeval character of the basic concept (see
above, pp. 90 ff.). Sellin pays no attention to this factor. On
the other hand, those who emphasize the age of the concept
ignore the fact that it is ancient only in its primal form, as
archetype, and not in the very definite shape it has in the
Book of Job. They completely overlook the theological
novelty that this basic archetypal motif represents within the
Yahweh religion, while Sellin’s mistake is that he does not
recognize the archetypal character of the motif, treating it as
an invention of the author of the Book of Job. Each of these
one-sided points of view neglects something essential; the
supporters of the “ancient demon,” however, commit the
more serious omission. It seems to me necessary to combine
these two points of view: The story is a variation of an old
basic motif of popular belief. In the form given here it is not,
however, a theologically unimportant relic of a popular belief
that has been overcome by the Yahweh religion; it is rather a
mirror of an essential stage of development in that religion.
We must therefore ask: In what way is this archetypal
concept of demons “built into” the Yahweh religion?
The very fact that we are not dealing here with just some
indiscriminate figure, detached from Yahweh, that comes to
meet him by chance, but with one belonging to a specific Old
Testament category of divine beings, demonstrates the com-
plete recasting and further development of this archetypal
figure. For the Old Testament Satan is one of the bené
ha~eldhim. He is an angel. To understand his significance, we
must begin by inquiring into the nature of the bené
ha-’elohim.
3. Occurrence and Nature of the bené ha-’elohim

in the Old Testament
THE PRoBLEM of the bené ha-’eldhim is, if possible, still more
complex than that of the malak Yahweh. It would burst the
frame of this work to follow it into all its ramifications. Only

those points of reference will be studied which appear to be
relevant to Satan as one of the bené ha-’elohim in the Book of
Job. Let us turn first to the concept as such.
Gunkel, in his commentary on Genesis,“ refers to the
possibility that behind the concept there may be an older
polytheistic verbal usage which was applied in the literal sense
to sons of gods, that is, to beings begotten by gods. But he
gives preference to the other assumption derived from He-
brew usage, according to which the bené ha-’eldhbim should
be conceived of as “beings belonging to the category of
’elohim.” B. Duhm terms the ben ha-elohim “a single being
(Einzelwesen) in the divine sphere.” *° In connection with
the term for a species, in Hebrew an individual belonging to
this species is designated ben. Thus, ’adim means man in the
generic sense, hence mankind; ben ’adam refers to a single
creature of the species man, that is, the individual man, not
the son of man. Nevertheless this verbal usage remains an
interesting problem in itself. It is as if behind it there were a
primal image of the relation of the species to the individual,
and that is the relation of father to son. The species begets the
individual, so to speak. There is really behind it something
like a substantial Platonic idea, only personified in a graphic
image. This personified idea of the species is manifested in the
individual being, as is the father in the son. Seen from this
possibly underlying archetypal background, the translation
with “son” becomes meaningful again. The son of man is then
the idea “man” realized in the individual, and the son of God
is the realized manifestation of God.* In our context both
49. Gunkel, Genesis (4th ed., 1917), p. 17.
50. B. Duhm, op. cit., p. 6 (see n. 1, above).
51. From this point of view, there is meaning and weight to the idea
of the Paulicians or Bogomiles, a neo-Manichaean sect, according to
which it was not Christ but Satan who was the firstborn son of God.
Euthymius Zigadenus reports as follows: “Dicunt, daemonem, qui a
Servatore appellatus est Satanas, Filius esse ipsum quoque Dei Patris et
vocari Satanaél, et Filio Verbo natu majorem esse, praestantioremque,
“utpote primogenitum . . .” (Panoplia 23. See Migne, Patrologia Graeca,
CXXX, col. 1290; quoted in the Latin translation by Du Plessis from
meanings—ben as part of the species and as son—open up

interesting theological aspects and do not exclude each other;
but the concept “son” is more graphic and so more “alive.”
That this usage of the word is not confined to the theologi-
cally prominent concepts of “God” and “man,” which would
make the situation less conclusive, is shown, for example, by
the concept ben bagar: “a single member of the herd,” or
bené han-neb?im, which does not mean “sons of prophets”
but “those belonging to a group of prophets.” * It is there-
fore the designation of a single creature of the species in the
image of the son.
So the bené ha-’elahim, the sons of God, are divine beings,
“single beings of the divine sphere” (B. Duhm), parts of the
God-substance. Hence, like the 7al’akim, they may be under-
stood as a mythological expression of aspects of the divine
nature. However, while the mal’ak appears time after time as
God himself in carrying out the divine intention, the bené
ha~elohim are always around God. They are, in a way, the
substance of the inner divine totality divided into its single
elements. This is expressed by the fact that they surround
God as a “heavenly assembly.”
At the same time, however, there is a hint of an essential
difference between the bené ha-’elohim and the malak Yah-
weh. As the term bené ha-’eldhim shows in itself, this process
of divine partition is not associated with the individual name
of the God Yahweh but with the divine name of ’eldhim,
whose originally pluralistic form can still be recognized.
There is nowhere any mention of bené Yabweh. This sug-
gests the assumption that in the multiplicity of the bené
Christoph Ulrich Hahn, Geschichte der Ketzer im Mittelalter, I, 48,

n.1). The idea had already found an early formulation among the
Ebionites: “Duos ut iam dixi, a deo constitutos assereunt, Christum et
diabolum” (Epiphanius Panarium 30, published and translated by Fran-
ciscus Oehler [1859], I, 267).
52. I Kings 20:35; II Kings 2:3, 5, 7, 15; 4:1, 38; 5:22; 6:1; 9:1.
Gesenius-Buhl, Hebr. und aram. Handwérterbuch tiber das Alte Testa-
ment (1915), s.v., translates with “Angeh6rige der Prophetengenossen-
schaft”; the Ziirich Bible says: “Prophetenjiinger.”
ha-’elohim is expressed the original plurality of the concept of

God, i.e., that behind them are hidden ancient pre-Yahwistic
gods, a plurality of ’eldéhim. This assumption is beautifully
confirmed by two parallel passages. The closest connection is
given in Ps. 89:7, where the sons of God are called bené ’élim,
ie., divine beings or sons of gods; and ’élim, in contrast to
’elohim, can be understood only as plural. Moreover, ’é/ is an
ancient North Semitic name for a god. This leads to the
further parallel of Psalm 82, where they are simply called
“gods”: ’élohim. God, ’eldhim, stands in the congregation of
gods, ba-‘adat él, and “judgeth among the gods,” ’eldhim.
In the same psalm, verse 6, they are also called bené ‘elyon, a
name of God which probably designates an ancient deity of
Jerusalem (see Genesis 14, the god of Melchizedek). That we
are dealing here with what were originally pre-Yahwistic
deities, in whose designation, in contrast to the mal aikim, we
can still see not only the differentiation process but also the
merging process which preceded it, can be confirmed by still
further parallels.
The bené ha-’eldhim constitute, in their homogeneous mul-
tiplicity, the “host of heaven”: seba@ has-Samaim. The fact
that these two concepts can even be equated is shown in I
Kings 22:19, where, in the vision of Micaiah ben Imlah, the
heavenly court assembly is called seba@ has-Samaim in the
same situation where Job 1:6 and 2:1 speaks of the bené
ha~eldbim. We can see that probably behind this heavenly
host were originally ancient astral deities, since various pas-
sages speak of the sun, moon, and stars as the seba’ has-
amaim, to whose worship men should not let themselves be
seduced.™
53. For more on this subject see Julian Morgenstern, “The Mytho-
logical Background of Psalm 82,” Hebrew Union College Annual, XIV
(Cincinnati, 1939), 39, n. 22.
54. Deut. 4:19; 17:3; II Kings 17:16; 21:3, 5; 23:4; Zeph. 1:5; Jer. 8:2;
19:13; Job 31:26-28. In connection with the divine name Yahweh
seb@’6t, the seba@ has-Samaim has led to a discussion which, so far as I
-can see, has not yet reached an end nor found a satisfactory solution.
G. Westphal pursues the problem in a thorough study (“seb@ has-
r Noldeke [1906],
Samaim,” Oriental. Studien Il, F estschrift fiir Theodo
lly had to do with
pp- 719-28). He reaches the conclusion that it origina corresponding
a heavenl y warrior host that joins Yahweh in battle,
the “wild host” (wilden Heer) of German fairy tales,
more or less to y host that
n. It is from this heavenl
to which Gunkel calls attentio
Yahweh has the name Yahweh seba@’ot. Westphal bases his theory
is spoken of, who, as
chiefly on Josh. 5:14, where the Sar seb? Y: abweh
the “chief of the host of Yahweh,” approaches Joshua as the leader of
have been
the earthly army. The term seb@ Y.abweh, then, would out that those
applied to earthly armies only later. Westphal points a later date
are of
passages where the earthly host is obviously meant
particulars support
(Exod. 7:4; 12:17, 41=P; and Judg. 16:13). Many
, the place of
Westphal’s thesis, as, for example, the mahané ’elobim
host in Gen. 32:3. Also his unders tandin g of the chariot of fire
God’s much to
of Elisha (II Kings 2:11) in this sense has
and the horses
will not do. A
recommend it. Nevertheless his solution of the problem to find
weak point in his line of argument lies, above all, in his failure of the
satisfa ctory explana tion for the other, nonwar like functions
any the
seb@ has-samaim: “This expression, doubtless originating during
poraneous
period of the conquests, was then adapted to the contem
host’; so, in I
ideas about the duties and activities of the ‘heavenly
Kings 22:19 ff. the sebd’ has-Sa maim has an advisor y activity , later it is
ous praise of Yahweh , as in Pss. 48:2; 103:20 ff.
given the task of continu
n star worship
Then, when under Manassah the Babylonian-Assyria
had lost
penetrated into Judah and Jerusalem, the old expression, which
content , was found suitable for the designa tion of this new
most of its
nt in particul ar seems to me comple tely
cult object.” The last stateme
connec-
improbable. Westphal does not su ciently consider the close im.
tion of the seba’ has-samaim concept with that of the bené ha-elob
do justice to the greatly predom inatin g usage of seb?
Neither does he originat-
has-*amaim for the stars. His reference to the heavenly host as
of the
ing in meteorological powers, ie., the stars as auxiliary troops
the
thunder-god Yahweh (for which he chiefly cites Judg. 5:20, where
stars, from their courses in heaven, fight against Sisera) is far from
sufficient. The many passages which speak of star worship show plainly
that this had to do with the concept of stars as gods. A textual
observation by Schrader (Der urspriingliche Sinn des Gottesnamens
Jabwe Zebaoth. [n.d.]) weighs heavily against Westphal’s thesis;
namely, that the plural seba@’6t is only used for earthly armies, never for
the heavenly host. Schrader therefore holds the divine name Yahweh
seb@6t to be synonymous with “the God of the armies of Israel,”
in I Sam. 17:45, to which it forms an expressive parallel. Eichrodt
also refers to this (Theologie des Alten Testaments [1906], I, 94).
Another confirmation of the fact that Yahweh sebd’ét was originally
the designation of a war god is seen by Eichrodt in the circumstance
that this byname of Yahweh’s is always used in close connection
with the Ark (I Sam. 4:3-5 ff.; II Sam. 6:2), which for a long time
ty
served as a war palladium. But Eichrodt comes up against the difficul
that the war-god concept does not explain the verbal usage of the
Historically, as has already been mentioned in another con-

nection, the process probably has to be understood as an
absorption of a multiplicity of ancient deities, ie., all the
hypostatized forces of nature, into the divine figure of Yah-
weh. After this original merging process, these deities come
to constitute the elements of a new structure and find their
place in it. The historical imprint stemming from an ancient
context receives a new coloring in the new system, or else is
entirely recast. The example of the bené ha-’elohim nicely
illustrates the interesting fact. that ideas tabooed and fought
against as idolatry throughout the whole Old Testament be-
come “legalized” when at certain moments in the Yahwistic
development they can be assimilated unconsciously, so to
speak, and without friction, to serve as a fitting image for a
phase in the Yahwistic process of development. So, on the one
hand, the worship of stars is condemned as idolatry (see
above, p. 101 and n. 54) and, on the other, the image of the
heavenly host is reabsorbed very early (Josh. 5:14; I Kings
22:22). We can therefore justifiably assume that the concept
of the heavenly court and the divine council meeting could
only have been adopted because it was needed as a fitting
mythologem for the beginning of an inner process of differ-
entiation in the godhead. It arises, as it were, of itself, out of
the Babylonian-Canaanite ideas unconsciously absorbed after
the settlement in Canaan.
The Babylonian Exile is a second phase of assimilation,
which again must be thought of as an unconscious occurrence
prophets. He sees no other possibility than to assume that sebd@’dt does

not refer to specific armies, but to hosts, masses, multitudes in general,
the sum total of all earthly and heavenly beings, as it was also under-
stood in LXX: xdipios ray dSuvépewv. Perhaps we have here the actual
solution of the problem, especially in view of Genesis 2:1, where it
speaks of “the heavens and the earth and ... all the host of them.”
L. Koehler (Theologie des Alten Testaments [1936], p. 33) decides for
the assumption: Yahweh seb@ot means “Tord of the Stars,” which, ac-
cording to him, implies a negation of the pagan idea that the stars are
_gods. But this assumption again does not take into account that the
heavenly host never appears in the plural. So the problem appears to be
still unsolved.
104 SATAN IN°THE OLD TESTAMENT
in view of the conscious attitude of resistance to the enemy

conquerors and their culture during just that period. That an
unconscious infiltration nevertheless took place is best shown
by Ezekiel, who was the pillar of the exiles’ inner battle for
survival and whose vision, insofar as it is a spontaneous mani-
festation of the unconscious, is suffused with Babylonian con-
cepts. Such are probably the chariot of God, the vision of
vocation, the recording angel, and so forth, unless one follows
the presentation of Lorenz Diirr,® which is,.in my opinion,
too rationalistic. Diirr, in effect ignoring the vision character
of these contents, takes them rather as an expression of con-
scious theological deliberation, i.e., the transference of Baby-
lonian cult traits to Yahweh. This seems to me wide of the
mark. The infiltration of mythological contents is also shown,
perhaps especially clearly, in the visions of Zechariah in the
Priest Codex account of creation, where behind the Tehom
can still be recognized the Tiamat hidden within it, and
where Yahweh forming the cosmos out of chaos takes the
place of Marduk overcoming Tiamat and dividing her into
heaven and earth. To be sure, here, too, the reshaping into the
specifically Yahwistic becomes particularly clear; but the Bab-
ylonian mythologems are, as images, indispensable state-
ments about the nature of the Old Testament God. Zimmern **
also distinguishes two phases of Babylonian influence on
Yahwism when he derives the Old Testament concept of
the angelic host from the Babylonian one of the “Igigi (and
Anunnaki) assembled around the highest god, partly as an
advisory assembly and partly as a host of war.” He adds: “At
a later time, beginning with the Exile, the Israelite concept of
angels was again strongly influenced by Babylonian mythol-
ogy” (Zimmern’s italics).
In this way the bené ha-’elohim, originally stemming from
the pluralistic concept of God, ’eldhim, became, after the
smelting process, aspects of the nature of Yahweh. Hence the
55. Die Stellung des Propheten Ezechiel in der israelitisch-jtidischen
Apokalyptik (1923).
56. Schrader, KAT, p. 457.
105 Satan as One of the bené ha-’eldhim
meaning of their name should not be overvalued at this level.

They are no longer a plurality of separate nature powers but
are the power of nature in Yahweh himself, his aspect of
creative but also destructive nature, so to speak. Even more
plainly than in the “Host of Heaven,” whose mythological
character is not further described, this is shown by other
examples. The seraphim, for instance, who in Isaiah’s the-
ophany (chapter 6) surround the throne of God, correspond-
ing to the bené ha-’eldhim in the passages cited above, can
still be recognized as definitely mythological animal deities.”
They literally belong to the image of the appearance of God,
that is, to his totality. That at the same time they stand as
servants about the enthroned king shows that the divine per-
sonality has grown beyond the solely natural. He has become
the holy God. However, this holiness in him is not torn out
of nature but is rooted in it. And nature bows down to this
holiness, as seen in the “Holy! Holy! Holy!” of the seraphim
in Isaiah’s vision. Historically, it is the overcoming of the old
nature divinities by the spiritual God Yahweh, but it also
indicates Yahweh’s development from a nature god to the
holy God. This phenomenological wholeness is incomparably
expressed in the Isaiah vision.
Less closely connected than in Isaiah 6, and without the
completeness of a genuine vision capable of adequately ex-
pressing the whole of a living paradoxical unity, the same
phenomenon appears in the nebustan, which probably repre-
sents an ancient serpent deity. The difference between it and
the Isaiah vision is very revealing, however. The legend in II
Kings 18:4—that it is Moses’ brazen serpent—is intended to
57. Their origin has so far not been established with any certainty.
One is generally inclined to assume that it has to do with snakelike
fabulous animals (see Hans Duhm, op. cit., p. 4; Baudissin, “Die
Symbolik der Schlange,” Studien zur semitischen Religionsgeschichte, I,
282; Johannes Nikel, Die Lehre des Alten Testaments tiber die Cheru-
bim und Seraphim [1890], p. 88), as is suggested by the name Saraf,
which perhaps refers to the burning bite of the animal. A convincing
analogy, however, is given by the nehasim has-serafim, the seraphs of
the wilderness (Num. 21:4-6 and Isa. 30:6, where the flying serpent is
4-0
spoken of (Saraf me-‘oféf). On the name, cf. also above, p. 44.
106 SATAN IN: THE OLD TESTAMENT
the
strengthen its connection with Yahweh. Yahweh sends
t. That a
serpents and makes Moses erect the nehas nebdose
that
later, religiously more differentiated, time recognized
this connecting of the nehustin with Moses was merely a thin
veil thrown over what was originally a serpent cult is shown
by Hezekiah’s fight against it. He has the mebustan broken to
pieces, in the same “cleansing operation” in which he does
away with the holy high places, breaks the images, and
knocks down the Asherim.®* The link between the old ser-
pent divinity and Yahweh was not sufficiently close and
organic. As a separated nature cult it could not be tolerated
by the more developed Yahweh religion. At that period the
separation of Yahweh’s nature side and its independent wor-
ship really signified a regression to an earlier stage.
Corresponding to the seraphim in the Isaiah vision, the
cherubim in Ezekiel’s vision, grouped around God’s throne,
i.e., carrying it, constitute his living unity of nature and spirit.
They are also the guardians of Paradise, of the divine realm of
nature from which man was expelled. And in Ps. 18:10 a
cherub is the animal ridden by Yahweh: “And he rode upon a
cherub, and did fly: yea, he did fly upon the wings of the
wind.” In I Sam. 4:4 and II Sam. 6:2 Yahweh also appears
throned upon the cherubim.
So the cherubim and seraphim are a particularly clear ex-
ample of old nature deities which have become aspects of
Yahweh. By their parallel function they confirm our concep-
tion of the “heavenly host” surrounding Yahweh and of the
bené ha-elohim, who, by their function, are a close parallel
to it and who are our special concern here.
Hence, to be constantly surrounding Yahweh is the first
characteristic which differentiates the concept of the bené
ha-~elohim from that of the mal’ak. The mal’ak appears al-
most exclusively as a single figure. He is mainly, as his name
already shows, the emissary sent by God on particular occa-
sions. It should be noted that this holds also for almost all the
58. Sacred poles, set up near the altar; see Koehler-Baumgartner,
Lexikon in veteris testamenti libros (Leiden, 1958), s.v.
passages where the plural is used. In Gen. 28:12, too, the

mal akim are not described as surrounding God; they are also
his messengers or his heralds; they climb up and down the
ladder, thereby, so to speak, announcing the appearance of
God. Their character of messenger is very clear in Ps. 78:49:
Yahweh casts upon Egypt his “anger, wrath, and indignation,
and trouble, by sending evil angels” (azslabat maPaké
raim).° Mislabat, the mission, gives further support to the
messenger character already implicit in the term mal ak. This
becomes explicitly clear also in Ps. 91:11: “For he will give
his angels (mal'akim) charge over thee... .”
There are, however, two passages which suggest an earlier
association or partial equating of the two categories of angel:
1. The far seb? Yahweh in Josh. 5:14. According to the
concept, he might belong to the bené ha-elohim, but he
reminds us of the mal’ak Yahweh by his particular function,
by the sword in his hand of Numbers 22, but, above all, by
his stated identity with Yahweh which is characteristic of the
malik Yahweh, for he speaks almost the same words to
Joshua that Yahweh addresses to Moses in Exod. 3:5: “put off
thy shoes from off thy feet; for the place whereon thou
standest is holy ground.”
2. Gen. 32:2, where the mal’akim are spoken of as mabané
’elohim.* ;
In all other passages, however, such clearly differing char-
acteristics of the two concepts of angels can be recognized
that the two passages given above can only be evidence for
the beginnings of a fusion which, as has already been men-
tioned, was clearly completed in the later writings.
However, the bené ha-~elodhim also appear as messengers.
So in the vision of Micaiah ben Imlah it is the “spirit” that
is commissioned to entice Ahab; and in the Book of Job,
59, This passage is, by the way, one of the finest proofs that the
angels are “aspects of God’s being” and at the same time his “messen-
ers.”
: 60. Cf. also Pss. 103:20 and 104:4.
61. Cf. on these two passages, above, pp. 101 f., n. 54.
108 SATAN IN-THE OLD TESTAMENT
Satan also functions as messenger. It is precisely these ex-

amples, however, that bring out an essential difference, which
leads back to our main trail, that of Satan as one of the
bené ha-elohim. For even if one of the bené ha-’eldhim or the
seb has-Samaim undertakes to deliver a message, he is not,
like the mal’ak Yahweh, a blind instrument carrying out
Yahweh’s will—the arm that does Yahweh’s deed, so to speak,
or the mouth that speaks his word. He is more like a person,
more autonomous; he seems to have a will of his own. Yah-
weh has a relation to him; he talks with him. This is not the
case with the mal’ak, except in Zechariah, where the malak
Yahweh as angelus interpres exchanges question and answer
with God. But this is only, as it were, a form of the relation
of God to man. Here, too, the mal’ak Yahweh is a messenger;
it is not a matter of a truly dialectic conversation between
him and God. This is a subtle difference, but one of far-
reaching significance, as we shall see later. The difference
becomes plain if we look more closely at Micaiah’s vision (I
Kings 22:19 ff.):
I saw Yahweh sitting on his throne, and all the host of
heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left.
And Yahweh said, Who shall persuade [literally “entice,”
as in RSV] Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-
Gilead? And one said on this manner, and another said on
that manner. And there came forth a spirit, and stood
before Yahweh, and said, I will persuade him. And Yah-
weh said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go
forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his
prophets. And he said, Thou shalt persuade him, and pre-
vail also: go forth and do so.
What is interesting about this conversation in the heavenly
court is that there are obvious divergencies of intention.
Yahweh wants to entice Ahab. But he does not simply send a
malik to accomplish this; he seems, as it were, dependent on
one of the heavenly host’s offering to undertake it. The task
does not appear to be very desirable, for “one said on this
manner, and another said on that manner”; that is, most of
, 109 Satan as One of the bené ha-’elohim
them talked themselves out of it.’ One, the “spirit” (ba-

ruab; the very nomen appelativum is sufficient to show that
he is a being who stands out in the multiplicity of the
others“) declares himself ready. That God’s question as to
who shall entice Ahab is not just a matter of democratic
formality, but of a real need for the “spirit,” is shown by the
fact that Yahweh does not simply give a detailed command,
the volunteering messenger must also contribute the idea of
how to go about it.
This passage seems to me to offer an extraordinarily inter-
esting presentation of an inner conflict in the deity, which is
most enlightening in regard to the development of the God
62. This, it seems to me, is what the sentence implies and not, for
instance, that positive suggestions are brought forth from the side of
the bené ha-’elohim; for there can be only one answer to God’s definite
question, an equally definite declaration of readiness, which then ac-
tually follows, in a surely not accidental contrast to the indefinite
remarks of the others, on the part of the “spirit.”
63. J. Benzinger’s conception (Die Biicher der Konige [1899], p.
124): “By this spirit, who is among Yahweh’s servants, only that spirit
can be meant who in general inspires and drives the prophets,” seems to
me too abstract. Kittel expresses himself similarly (“Die Biicher der
K6nige,” Nowack-Handkommentar [1900], p. 175): “The divine spirit
of prophecy, with which the prophets are filled, becomes an independ-
ent person, similar, say, to the divine quality of wisdom which becomes
an independent hypostasis in Proverbs 8. As the judgment of God’s
anger is personified in the angel that destroyed the people (mashit), so
here the divine spiritual effect is personified in the ‘spirit.’” Kittel, after
all, does not overlook the personal character and the independence of
this spirit. The distinct individuality of the latter is justly given the
main weight by Julian Morgenstern (op. cit., p. 40, n. 25): “Haruah,
literally, ‘the wind’; actually in a number of biblical passages the winds
are designated specifically Yahweh’s ‘messengers’ or ‘angels’ (cf. Pss.
104: 3-4; 148: 8; also Ps. 18:11 [=II Sam. 22:11]; Job 30:22). However,
since it is clear beyond all question that here haruah has a certain
individuality and personality and is commissioned by Yahweh to per-
form, not a general and routine service, such as winds might normally
be expected to perform, but a very specific and realistic task, it
undoubtedly brings out the full implication of the passage to render
haruah here ‘the,’ or better ‘a certain’ spirit.” Kaupel’s argument: “If a
person were meant, one could not say that the lying spirit was put in
his mouth” (Die Dimonen des Alten Testaments [1930], p. 68), with its
‘unfortunate mixing-together of the real and the mythological plane,
can surely claim no more than a curiosity value.
discussion at
concept in the Old Testament. If we take this
(a con-
the heavenly court as representing a divine soliloquy
us make
clusion justified by the parallel in Gen. 1:26: “Let
assum ed that
man in our image,” where it is now generally
that in
God is speaking to the angels around him “), it is clear
at one with
this matter of Ahab’s enticement God is not
on that
himself. “And one said on this manner, and another
go along.
manner.” So one side of Yahweh does not want to
There is a conflict.”
He
However, the “spirit” wants to and also knows how.
appears like a person ificat ion of an evil though t of God. The
dark, demonic side of God begins to emerge from the ambiv-
a
alent mixture with his light side and to show itself as
so far there is only a conflic t in
distinctly dark “spirit.” But
of
the “heavenly host,” that is, between the different sides
en himsel f as consci ousnes s and
God’s being, and not betwe
any single tendency in him. This further stage is reached only
in the conception of Satan in the Book of Job. There we
witness a contest between Yahweh and Satan, and it is a
pointed dialectical encounter, a real speech by God and coun-
terspeech by the adversary. In contrast to the “spirit,” who is
distinguished only by his ad hoc function as “lying spirit,”
Satan is given a sharper outline by his more definite name and
also by his function. But phenomenologically the “spirit” in
64. This passage at the same time provides a valuable support for our
understanding of the essential sameness of God and his angels, i.e., the
identity of part and whole. A beautiful piece of evidence from Midrash
Gn Rabba VII on Gen. 11:7 is cited by Leo Jung (“Fallen Angels in
Jewish, Christian and Mahommedan Literature: A Study in Compara-
tive Folk-Lore,” Jewish Quarterly Review, 1924-25, p. 481): R. Ami
says: “God took counsel with his own heart.”
65. This, for example, raises Yahweh above Zeus, who carries out a
similar undertaking quite untouched by any moral consideration, by
sending Agamemnon a lying dream which, when it is followed, leads
the Greeks to destruction (Iliad ii. 5 ff.). But it also raises Yahweh
above himself, insofar as he at other times carries out acts of annihila-
tion exactly like Zeus. (For the many examples see Volz, Das Dimo-
nische in Jahwe [1924].) At the same time, the difference in motive
must be seen: in Zeus a so-to-speak divine, unpredictable whim; in
Yahweh the plan of salvation for Israel.
Micaiah ben Imlah’s vision may be regarded as a direct ante-

cedent of the Satan figure.
Here belongs also the evil spirit from God who troubles
Saul, after the (good) “spirit of God” as charisma has departed
from him. Two diametrically opposed effects of God replace
each other, thereby revealing their common root, the ambiva-
lent divine personality. That this alternation of the two as-
pects of God depends on the behavior of men gives this
passage special theological significance. And, as will become
apparent, it also connects this story with the story of Job (see
below, pp. 118 ff.).
In the fragmentary account in Gen. 6:1-4, the bené
ha-’elohim—though they do not appear as a distinct will,
separate from God himself—perform on their own an act
which is not commanded by God but is even contrary to his
will. They saw “the daughters of men that they were fair;
and they took them wives of all which they chose.” Hence
66. Cf. also Julian Morgenstern (op. cit., p.32)40. 7s he: fie, Satan]
represents here [i.e., Job 1:6-12 and 2:1-7a] a natural development
from the figure of baruah in I Kings 22:19-23.” A connection in the
development between the two figures, in which he includes the serpent
in Genesis 3, is seen also by G. Kittel (Geschichte des Volkes Israel
[1927], Ill, 141). Karl Marti (“Zwei Studien zu Sacharja,” Theologische
Studien und Kritiken [1892], p. 230) disagrees with this opinion. His
line of argument, that the “spirit” in I Kings 22 does not stand like
Satan in opposition to Yahweh, proceeds from the incorrect premise
(on this, see below, p. 152) that Satan appears for the first time
in Zechariah, and therefore he cannot weaken the point of view
expressed above. No more tenable is Kaupel’s negative position (op.
cit., p. 96, n. 1): “But if here were really the first step toward a belief in
Satan, one would expect that in II Chron. 17:22 ff. has-satan would
have been inserted in place of ha-raab.” It is another failure to
understand the connection of development, though in reverse direction,
when Friedrich Schwally (“Zur Qluellenkritik der historischen
Biicher,” ZAW, XII [1892], 159f.), basing himself on B. Stade (Ge-
schichte des Volkes Israel [1906], I, 531, n. 1), expresses the improbable
conjecture that in I Kings 22, instead of raah, “there had originally been
Satan or a real angel name, Michael or the like.”
67. On the basis of this passage Kaupel (op. cit., p. 136) denies the
angel character of the bené ha-’elohim. The term is supposed to mean
“the pious ones.” This opinion is already found in a Zadokite tradition
which was disseminated especially by Syrian authors since Ephrem,
They follow a de-

they represent an independent impulse. God’s
n kind. Behind
sire, a drive aiming toward the huma
n beings. From the
back, as it were, they unite with huma
sses a still unconscious
psychological point of view this expre
suggested by the
urge in God toward men, which is also
God. It is not a
multiplicity of the angels as aspects of o-
conscious incliningof God toward men, as in the later theol
ous urge. There-
gem of God becoming man, but an unconsci
later, in a God-man,
fore the union does not result, as it does
ge may be
but in monsters. Yet, psychologically, this passa
m.
claimed as a pre-form of the later theologe
It has often been point ed out as illogi cal that God did not,
instead punished
as was to be expected, punish the angels, but
the inner context
mankind by shortening its span of life.®? But
not
according to it, the bené ha-~elohim in the Book of Enoch were
their piety were called the
angels, but sons of Seth, who because of
God” (see Adolp he Lods, “La Chute des anges, origine et
“sons of
ation, ” Congré s d’Hist oire du Christianisme
ortée de cette specul
this assump tion is no evidence against
[1928], pp. 32-33). But the age of
ates the story of
its unscientific nature. It is a Midrash which elabor
Gen. 6:1-4, and not a scienti fic thesis.
Rothstein (“Die
As such, however, it is advanced also by J. W.
Genesis,” in Fest-
Bedeutung von Gen. 6:1-4 in der gegenwartigen ff.), but it is not
schrift fiir Karl Budde, BLAW No. 27 [1920], pp. 150
from other improba bilitie s he argues for, which it
convincing. Apart all misses the
would lead us too far to go into here, Rothst ein above
question, as well
typically mythological character of the fragments in
as the inner relation of the Dené ba’elohbim in this text to other
finally can find
statements about this category of angels. Kaupel, too, passage where
no other way out than to assume, in reference to the Job
of uniformity
the bené bi~elébim are beyond any doubt angels, a lack
in the use of words (0p. cit., p. 133).
Journal of
68. Cf. also C. H. Toy (“Evil Spirits in the Bible,” act
of Elohim’
Biblical Literature, IX [1890], 22): “. .. but the ‘sons
referen ce to the supreme God; .. .” Also Toy sees in their
without
and the mal ak:
independence an essential difference between them
s those superh uman intellig ences who
“While the term mal’ak describe
of affairs, the
act as agents or representatives of God in his control
not so much as
‘sons of God’ are mentioned in other connections,
s of the divine court, attenda nts on God
ministers, but rather as member
yet in a sort independent” (italics added).
had origi-
69. Cf. the view of Julian Morgenstern, that the passage
punish ment of the angels. See pp. 114 f.
nally told of the
seems to me to make this completely consistent: One side of

God wants to unite with man, the other does not want this at
all, since this would make man equal to God. Hence: “My
spirit shall not always strive with man. . . .” (Gen. 6:3). This,
too, illustrates beautifully how the bené ha-’eldhim are spirit
of God’s spirit. It is the same problem as in Gen. 3:1, where
the one side of God—namely the dark one, the serpent—
wants to seduce man so that he will become like God and
know good and evil; but the other side, for that very reason,
expels man from Paradise. The serpent was very early,” out of
a correct intuition, identified with Satan, although the text
gives no direct basis for it. But indirect hints unquestionably
are found in the Satan passages in the Old Testament. Such
an indirect connection is the one just observed between Gen-
esis 3 and Gen. 6:1-4, which leads us to the further one
between Genesis 3 and the Satan of the Book of Job, who is
also one of the bené ha-’elohim. Satan, like the serpent in
Paradise and the bené ha-’eldhbim in Gen. 6:1 ff., is set on
changing the relation of men to God. In the Old Testament,
God himself, through his dark side, works on man as “the
power that always wills the bad, and always creates the good.”
For although the sin of Adam and Eve is the sin par excel-
lence in the Paradise story, God depends on this very sin of
man, of knowing good and evil, to carry out his plan of
salvation. In the Job folktale, Satan is not able to seduce Job
directly into committing the planned sin; but in the Job
poem, Job is drawn deeply into a revolt against God which
borders on blasphemy, another factor showing the theologi-
cal connection between the Satan of the folktale and the Job
of the poem. Moreover, Job’s wife plays the same part as
Satan. She speaks to Job the words that exactly express Sa-
tan’s secret intentions: “Curse God and die.” Here is another
striking parallel to the serpent and Eve in the Paradise story,
as has been mentioned above (see p. 50).
_If we consider all this in relation to the nature of the bené
70. Wisd. of Sol. 2:24.

114. SATAN IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
feature is
ha-elobim, we find that their most distinguishing
as the negative
their belonging to God, in the positive as well
his court.
sense. They belong to his total nature; they form
of a will
But there is apparent in the bené ha-’elobim the germ
ality, which
of their own; a slight rift starts in God’s person
arose out
loosens the old “seams” and shows us that this unity
d the self-
of an original multiplicity. In other words, behin
of the
will of the bené ha-elohim the once subjugated will
alive again. This also becom es clear in the
old gods is coming
to explai n, in Isa. 24:21 -23, the so-
passage, otherwise hard
dee
called “Isaiah Apocalypse :
shall
And it shall come to pass in that day, that Yahweh
ones that are on high, and the
punish the host of the high
earth upon the earth. And they shall be
kings of the
d togethe r, as prisone rs are gathere d in the pit, and
gathere
shall be shut up in the prison, and after many days shall
they be visited. Then the moon shall be confounded, and
ot]
the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts [Yahweh seba#
shall reign in mount Zion, and in Jerusalem, and before his
ancients gloriously.
Here both elements must be recognized: the polemic

against the ancient astral divinities, but at the same time the
unishment of the revolutionary bené ha-elohim. Johann
Lindblom holds these verses to be a later addition inserted into
the Isaiah Apocalypse. This passage, he says, “Gs obviously
connected with late Jewish angelological and eschatological
ideas. The best commentary is given us by the Book of
Enoch.” ” This reference to a considerably later book can
scarcely serve as a valid explanation. A very interesting at-
tempt is made by Julian Morgenstern™ to show a direct
connection between Psalm 82 and our passage, as well as with
71. Joh. Lindblom (Die Jesaja-Apokalypse [Lund, 1938], p. 84)

places it in the fifth century B.c.; Bernhard Duhm (Das Buch Jesaja
[1914], pp. 147-48), in the second century B.c.
72. Lindblom, op. cit., p. 27. He refers in particular to En. 90:24, 88;
Of: 15, 545, etc.
73. Op. cit., pp. 29-126.
Gen. 6: 1-4 and Isa. 14:12: “How art thou fallen from Heaven,
O Lucifer!” ™ In brief his result is as follows: Ps. 82:6-7—“I
have said, Ye are gods; and all of you are children of the most
High. But ye shall die like men . . .”—throws a revealing
light on Gen. 6:4. We have here a myth of angels who united
with the daughters of men and were punished for it by their
very “living like men” from then on. Consequently, according
to Morgenstern, originally it was not mankind who was pun-
ished in Gen. 6:14 but the bené ha-elohim.” In the follow-
ing phrase in Ps. 82:7, “Lye shall] fall like one of the princes,”
a further myth is disclosed, that of the rebellious hélél ben
Sabar, who, because of his rebellion, was cast down.” In Isa.
74. This, too, is a later inserted passage, not stemming from Isaiah.
B. Duhm (Das Buch Jesaja, p- XIII) places it in the second to first
century B.c., Julian Morgenstern (op. cit., p. 110, n. 144) between 486
and 476 B.c.
75. That, however, the version as we have it, ie., the punishment of
men, is also not without meaning, I have tried to show above (pp. 112 f.).
76. According to B. Duhm (Das Buch Jesaja, p. 96), “an astral fable
about Mercury, the Greek legend of Phaéthon, plays a part here,
according to which Mercury wanted to climb into heaven with the sun
but (because he suddenly became invisible) was turned back.” See also
Gunkel (Schépfung und Chaos [1895], pp. 133-34): “The morning star,
the son of the dawn, has a peculiar fate. Brightly shining he speeds
toward heaven, but he does not reach the height; the sun’s rays make
him fade. This natural process the myth pictures as a battle of ‘Eljon
against Hélal, who once wanted to reach the height of heaven but had
to go down to the underworld. Very similarly the Greek myth speaks
of the early death of Phaéthon, son of Eos; Phaéthon, too, is the
morning star; ¢aéwy in its literary meaning is identical to hélél (shin-
ing).” This linguistic derivation, i.e., the translation by “morning star”
(in view of all the associated meanings in which the concept is
embedded), has much more in its favor than that by “moon,” which is
supported solely by the Arabic bila] = “new-moon crescent.” Cf. Zim-
mern in Schrader, KAT, p. 565, n.7, referring to Winckler, Geschichte
Israels (1895), Il, 24; idem, Altorientalische Forschungen (1898), Il,
388; Wellhausen, Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels (4th ed., 1895),
. 111, n.2. Also Gesenius-Buhl joins in this assumption. That Zimmern
Leh it necessary to assume in Isaiah 14 the waning moon, “whereby the
addition ben Sahar, as also the thought of Helal’s death, would be much
better explained,” only shows the difficulty of his point of view even
more. W. Baumgartner (“Israelitisch-griechische Sagenbeziehungen,”
Schweizerisches Archiv fiir Volkskunde [1944], pp. 11f.) draws atten-
tion, especially in reference to an analogous North American myth, to
King of
14:12 ff. it appears as the image of the arrogant
also relates
Babylon. Morgenstern believes that Isa. 24:21-24
to one of these myths, or to both of them.”
the direct
the universal character of this motif, and therefore doubts
identification of Hélal and Phaéthon.
to the King of
A similar myth also appears in Ezek. 28:11-19, applied
in Eden on the
Tyre, who, associated with the protecting cherub, was
of his
mountain of God and then was cast down to earth because
says
presumption. On the question of the origin of this myth, Gunkelfar no
so
(Schépfung und Chaos, p. 134): “In Babylonian there is
e of the name Hélal and the Hélal myth. Howeve r, this does
evidenc
not exclude a Babylonian origin. If Babylonian, the myth would
for a
probably relate to Mercury. If not, one would perhaps look
Phoenician source.”
the
The excavations at Ras Shamra have since thrown more light on
problem. Julian Morgenstern mentions that the figure of “Shahar”
appears already in the mythological literature of Ugarit as the son of El
and twin brother of Shalem. He refers to the myth, “The Birth of the
Gracious and Beautiful Gods,” 1, 51, in Montgomery and Harris, The
Ras Shamra Mythological Texts (1935), 38, 177, and in other places.
In W. Baumgartner (“Ras Schamra und das Alte Testament,” Theolo-
gische Rundschau [1940-41], Nos. 3-4, p. 90) we find the more pre-
and
cise statement that there is evidence for a divine pair, “Dawn”
second
“Sunset” (Shr and sm) in the Ugaritic pantheon as early as the
millennium B.c.
77. Starting from B. Duhm’s assumption (Das Buch Jesaja, pp. 147 f.)
that Isaiah 24-27 dates from the second century B.c., Erik Stave (op.
cit., p. 191) derives the motif of the fall of the angels from the Persian
conception, according to which the evil spirits are cast down at the end
of the world. He refers (p. 176) to Bundehesh 3, 26 (Sacred Books of
the East, ed. F. Max Miller [Oxford, 1895], V, 19): “And ninety days
and nights the heavenly angels were contending in the world with the
confederate demons of the evil spirit, and hurled them confounded to
hell; and the rampart of the sky was formed so that the adversary
should not be able to mingle with it.” Stave also understands the pas-
sage in Isa, 27:1, where the overcoming of the Leviathan and the Tan-
nin seems to be removed into the future, as eschatological in the
Parsistic sense.
Both mythologems, however—that of the fall of the angels and that
of the overcoming of the sea monster—are of much older origin, the
former (see above, n.76) being evidenced in the Ugaritic, the
latter going back to the Marduk myth. In the latter, the different strata
of foreign influences upon biblical conceptions become especially clear:
in a later time the ancient Canaanite-Babylonian mythologems become
a suitable image for the eschatological end fight between God and
devil, which for its part shows Persian influence. In the New Testa-
ment Satan of Revelation, the identification of the Old Dragon with
Morgenstern’s work, however, though extremely valuable

for the wide range of material and literature with which he
deals, suffers somewhat from the fact that he has drawn many
of his conclusions in regard to these inner connections from
later versions of the relevant myths found in apocryphal
writings. He does say expressly, however, that
nowhere in the biblical literature has Satan come as yet to
play the role which we find attributed to him in the form
of the myth recorded in the apocalyptic and N.T. writ-
ings, viz., that of the rebellious angel of high rank who
seeks to supplant God as the ruler of the universe. . .
Unquestionably the identification of Satan with Helel ben
Shahar took place only after the period of the Chronicler,
ie., speaking generally, at some time during the third
century B.c., and more probably during the second rather
than during the first half of the century.
What is significant in our context is that the rebelling astral
deities of an ancient myth have, in the Old Testament, be-
come (self-willed) aspects of the one divine personality of
Yahweh. As one of the bené ha-’elohim, the Satan of the Old
Testament is related to the mythological background of these
passages. It therefore might not be going too far to see in
them the real germ cells of the later concept of Satan as the
fallen Lucifer.” The “Luciferian” quality, as may already
Satan is found expressis verbis. The battle between Michael and his
angels on the one side and the dragon and his angels on the other ends
with “the dragon, that old serpent, which is the Devil, and Satan”
(20:2) being cast down to earth, in a close parallel, as we may agree
with Stave, to the Persian Angro Mainyu, to whom the same thing
happens in his unsuccessful attempt to penetrate into the closest entou-
rage of Ahura Mazda (Stave, op. cit., p. 199; see Bundehesh, 3, 10,
Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Miller [1895], V, 17, cited in
another connection below, p. 159, n.26). Here, in Rev. 20:1-3, the
concept hinted at in Isa. 24:21-23 finds its full development.
78. Morgenstern, op. cit., p. 110.
79. The translation of hélél ben saéhar with “Lucifer” in Isa. 14:12
goes back to the Vulgate. The identification of Satan with the “Luci-
fer” of Isaiah 14 by Tertullian and Gregory the Great, based on the
comparison with Luke 10:18, is therefore an error only from the
historical point of view; psychologically it should be evaluated as a
genuine intuition.
r in what
have become apparent and will become still cleare
y inhere nt in the nature of the Old Testa-
follows, was alread
ment Satan.
4. Satan as One of the bené ha-’elohim in the Book

of Job (1: 6-12 and 2:1-7)
of the
Ir, from the background of the picture just gained
eyes to the distinc tive meani ng
bené ba-’elohim, we turn our
Book of Job, it.is not difficu lt to
which this concept has in the
gone a furthe r differe ntia-
see that in this story it has under
tion. The bené ha-’eldhim are no longer an undivided multi-
ular
plicity; one among them, Satan, is entrusted with a partic
function.” This has been met with alread y in I Kings 22.
There, however, it is a matter of an ad hoc commis sion, while
80. Kaupel’s remark (op. cit., p. 96) that in Job 1:6-12 and 2:1-7
is too
Satan appears merely among the angels, hence is himself no angel, with the
ingenious to be consider ed. The writer avoids coming to terms
equally indubitable and painful fact of Satan’s presence at the heavenly
which
court by taking refuge in the argument of “poetic language,”
says nothing whatever . Accordi ng to him, this is also what, in Zech.
of God”
3:1 ff., makes it possible “to let Satan stay in the proximity
Satan
ibid.,p. 100). Similarly, Erik Stave (op. cit., p. 251) assumes that
in
does not belong “in his inner being” to the bené ha-~elohbim, but only
this
that he is subject to God and dependent on him. On betok in
and
passage, cf., in opposition to his view, Driver and Gray, A Critical
Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Job (“International Critical
infre-
Commentary” series) (Edinburgh, 1921), p. 11: “betok is not
of the
quently tantamount to: (one) of the number of, with others
10:10;
same class; see Gen. 23:10; 42:5; Num. 17:21, 26:62; I Sam.
Ezek. 29:12. But as in several of the passages just cited the person or
persons in question are peculiar or pre-eminent in the class to which
they are referred, so is the Satan here; he is one of the sons of the gods,
or angels, and as such subject to and under the control of Yahweh, and
incapable of acting beyond the terms of Yahweh’s permission; but there
are perhaps germs of the later idea of Satan, the opponent of God,
dividing with him the allegiance of men (Wisd. 2:24), in the freedom
he
with which he moves about in the earth, so that Yahweh asks where
has been (1:7; 2:2), in contrast to the angels who are sent to definite
,
persons and places.” Driver and Gray, therefore, from a quite different
-
linguistic starting point, arrive at the conclusion of a certain independ
the
ence of Satan vis-a-vis God. This, however, as I tried to show in
foregoin g, is already containe d in the characte r of the bené ha-elobi m.
In Satan this independence merely became fully visible.
here Satan’s function is already defined by his name. But the

important difference is that his own will, unlike that of the
“spirit” in the vision of Micaiah ben Imlah, consists not merely
in a decision about carrying out a plan of God but apparently
in opposing the will of God. He discusses with God, and
argues with him, and his arguments affect God. If we go
back to what was established about the relation of the bené
ha-elohim to God, namely, that they are the multiplicity
of the aspects of his being which are beginning to manifest
themselves as such, the question arises: What side of God’s
being is embodied in Satan as one of the bené ha-’elohim? He
is not merely a tool of the divine will, even though one aware
of itself like the “spirit” in I Kings 22. He embodies a side of
Yahweh which, like the “spirit,” belongs to him, yet is con-
scious of himself and known to God not only when called
upon. Here one of the bené ha-’elohbim has become more
autonomous; he is still more individual. He is an independ-
ently active side of God, who is in conflict with God’s total
personality, and by whose opposing will God is perturbed.
God accepts this side of himself and lets it have its way; yet
he is critical and uncertain about it. He gives way to it and at
the same time restricts it. His acceptance of this side consists
first of all in the fact that Satan is assigned a definite task: He
roams around on the earth as God’s “overseer” of men (on this
conception, see below, pp. 134 ff.). This very office is born of
suspicion; it is the él ganna —the jealous God of Exodus,”
who is jealously watching the people whom he has chosen for
his own to see if they are his in the way he demands. But here
we meet with a changed, more abysmal atmosphere. Whereas
elsewhere in the Old Testament God demands unbroken
piety and flames into wrath only when he does not meet with
it, here Job’s obedience does not satisfy him. There lurks in
him a secret doubt which in Satan, the separated side of his
being, is manifested fully. This whole pattern of interrelations
as an inner-divine process comes out beautifully in the details
81. See Exod. 20:5; 34:14.

of the text. Thus, for instance, Satan does not accuse Job on
his own incentive, but Yahweh provokes him by an insistent
emphasis on Job’s piety. It is here that his secret doubt comes
to light. He believes, yet does not believe, in Job’s piety, for
he needs to have it confirmed. The fact that he puts the
question, and its provocative form, can be reduced to the basic
meaning: Is Job really pious? And Satan’s answer is like a
voicing of God’s suspicion. Satan appears here as the mani-
sale e ae te He devaluates Job’s piety and causes
od to deliver Job up to him. That means that God has
succumbed to his doubt. There is no way to avoid this
conclusion. To be sure, Satan is not autonomous insofar as
God agrees to the destruction of Job’s happiness. Naturally,
in itself it would be conceivable that Satan would act on his
own, without regard to Yahweh. But that would mean the
complete tearing-apart of God’s personality, a total falling-
asunder. Moreover, Satan would have destroyed Job’s life
and therewith God’s creation. In other words, God’s doubt of
his creation would have won, manifested in a destruction of his
creation, and therewith, to speak figuratively, would have led
to God’s self-destruction. That the Old Testament God was
subject to such impulses is shown by the story of the Flood;
and that he was not immune to them even after the act of
grace he bestowed on Noah, in whom he saved the germ of
the new world, is shown in the covenant he makes with
Noah. He binds himself never again to annihilate mankind,
and he sets up a sign of the convenant to remind himself, too!
For it says expressly:
And I will remember my covenant, which is between me
and you and every living creature of all flesh; and the
waters shall no more become a flood to destroy all flesh.
And the bow shall be in the cloud; and J will look upon it,
that I may remember the everlasting covenant between
God and every living creature of all flesh that is upon the
earth.”
82. Gen. 9:15, 16 (italics added). That this sign has to do with the
rainbow rather than the crescent, as is often accounted a possibility,
The temptation of Abraham also belongs in this context. It

must be realized that God risks his whole plan of salvation,
and with it his creation, in order to assure himself of Abra-
ham’s piety. For Abraham was the carrier of salvation; with
him God had made a covenant (Genesis 15); to him he had
promised a son of his body and seed innumerable as the stars.
And God sealed this covenant with an archaic ritual. He
passed as a burning torch between the halves of slain animals
which he had previously commanded Abraham to cut in two
and subjected himself to the meaning of the archaic rite: Just
seems to me to follow out of this psychological situation. For the
rainbow is a connection between heaven and earth, God and man. It is
really a symbol of the relationship, of the covenant. It is, moreover, not
a regular occurrence, which as such would not be very suitable as a
symbol of remembrance. Beyond that, the rainbow usually appears
after a storm, that is, a divine impulse of wrath which carries in it the
danger of destruction. Here it is God who has need of the symbol of
remembrance, of the promise which he has given to man! But even if
one assumes, like A. Jeremias (op. cit., p. 155), that the “sign” origi-
nally was the sickle of the new moon, a “state of war” between
Yahweh and his people would be presupposed. Jeremias refers to the
Babylonian conception of the new moon as the weapon of the divinity
revealing itself in the moon (Virolleaud, L’Astrologie chaldéenne
[1905], 2d Suppl., VI, 7: Rastu*' Sin), and to the pre-Islamic Arabs, who
said of Kuzah that he shoots arrows and after the battle hangs his bow
in the clouds. It is interesting in our context that according to Tabari
(Tafsir) Kuzah’s bow later came to be called the bow of Shaitan
(Handwérterbuch des Islam, s.v. “Shaitan,” p. 671). Thus, the “state of
war” between Yahweh and his people would be closely associated with
the darkness of the new moon, which would fit well with the catas-
trophe of the Flood, and which can be looked at psychologically as the
extinguishing of consciousness; on the other hand, this would remain
the only “moon trait” of the Old Testament God, to whom elsewhere a
fiery nature is ascribed much more frequently. Jeremias thinks, by the
way, of a very early change-over of the image of the moon sickle into
that of the rainbow. He thinks it possible that the redactor already may
have effected the change from war bow to rainbow that came after the
Flood (op. cit. p. 270). Significant above all is his mention that the
Arabs, too, in connection with their arrow-shooting Kuzah, no longer
think of the moon crescent but of the iris (Joc. cit.). In any case, the
rainbow couception gains further support from the fact that the Old
Testament contains nothing corresponding to the Babylonian kastu''
Sin; the new moon is consistently called bodes, while the bow in the
clouds (qeset be-‘anadn) finds a parallel in Ezek. 1:28, where it unques-
tionably has to do with the rainbow (be-yom hag-gesem).
as these animals were cut apart, so shall it happen unto me if I

break the covenant. Here it may well be said that God—
expressed in the image of human psychology in which he
appears here symbolically—is staking his own life along with
the life of Isaac. Here God’s doubt, as it were, already goes to
the roots of his own existence. Again the religious instinct of
earlier times is shown when a Talmudic legend (Synh. 89b *)
and even earlier the Jubilees (chapter 18) relate that Satan
(called Mastema in the Jubilees) persuaded God to test
Abraham. The inner relation to the story of Job is evident,
yet there is an essential difference. It is to some extent a
question of different stages, different “standpoints” of God.
With Abraham, as with Noah, it has to do with the inception
of the divine plan of creation and redemption. It is, in a way,
natural that there should be some uncertainty. There is as yet
no tradition of adherence to Yahweh. But against the back-
ground of the revelation on Sinai and the people’s experience
of God in its history up to the time of the poet of the Book of
Job,®* God’s doubt appears in another light, all the more since
83. See A. Kohut, Ueber die jiidische Angelologie und Dimonologie
in ibrer Abhingigkeit vom Parsismus (1866), p. 67.
84. See Erik Stave, op. cit., p. 267. In the same way the Jubilees
ascribe to Mastema God’s threat to Moses (Exod. 4:24-26), the magic
of the Egyptian magicians, the hardening of the Egyptians, and the
slaying of the firstborn of Egypt (ibid., n.1).
85. That his time, not the ancient time in which the Job poet sets his
story, can alone determine its theological interpretation seems self-
evident to me. Torczyner’s view, that we have here to do with a
conversion story, in which Yahweh reveals himself to a “heathen,” an
Edomite (“Hiobdichtung und Hiobsage,” Monatsschrift fiir Geschichte
und Wissenschaft des Judentums [1925], pp. 234-48), does not seem
convincing, since it is just in the framing story, which contains the
reference to Edom and the archaic period (sacrifice), that the divine
name of Yahweh appears. Moreover, Job’s speeches are so permeated
with the knowledge of the ambivalent personality of God that, solely
from the inner motivation, they cannot proceed from a “novice.” His
experience of God is far too differentiated for that, as will be shown
later. Nevertheless, there seems to me to be something true in Torczy-
ner’s view: we are dealing here with a “conversion” to a new attitude
toward God and with it a change and further development of the
Yahweh religion.
In regard to the relationship of the Israelite and Edomite body of
Job fulfills the standard of piety valid up to that time. There-

fore the doubt cannot refer to an existing situation but is
connected with a claim of God which only becomes apparent
through the events induced by Satan’s doubt. For by God’s
doubt becoming manifest in Satan, and its effects on man,
God, too, is changed, as I shall try to show. This change is the
main issue. It is the driving force behind the doubt, it causes
God to submit to the doubt; he 77st submit to it, for his own
sake. The doubt here lies much deeper than in the story of
Abraham’s sacrifice. There it was to some extent justified.
Abraham had not yet proved himself. Only afterward does
God say: “Lay not thine hand upon the-lad, neither do thou
anything unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God”
(Gen. 22:12; italics added). But about Job, he really knows
from the outset that he is obedient (Job 1:8); the doubt is
apparently without grounds, yet God has to submit to it, so
to speak, as a matter of fate, in order to experience himself.
So Satan is the destructive doubt within God’s personality,
yet it has a mysterious existential necessity for God and man
and their relation to each other. That all this happens—even
though as yet incomprehensibly—because God needs man,
because he is drawn to man, is expressed in a deep presenti-
ment of Job’s when he says:
Oh that thou wouldest hide me in the grave, that thou
wouldest keep me secret, until thy wrath be past, that thou
wouldest appoint me a set time, and remember me! . . . all
the days of my appointed time will I wait, till my change
come. Thou shalt call, and I will answer thee: thou wilt
have a desire to the work of thine hands.
livre
traditions in our story, Joh. Lindblom’s view (La composition du
to
de Job [Lund, 1945]), for which he gives detailed evidence, seems
is
me to have much in its favor (the summary of his textual criticismlater
but was
on p. 29). “The legend of Job is of Edomite origin
Palestine ; there it was transfor med in conformi ty with
transmitted to
on of the
the spirit of the Yahweh religion, and became the foundati
foreign
considerable work which we call today the Book of Job. The a
received an Israelite imprint. ‘The Edomite Sheikh became
- work
biblical patriarch” (p. 6).
86. Job 14:13-15; italics added.
Sellin cites this passage and speaks of the “bold thought of

God’s longing love for the pious man.” ** This “bold
thought,” however, did not spring from the head but from
the heart, as a living religious experience of deepest content.
Now what is the change brought about by Satan, who is
the activated doubt of God? This must be traced in the
details of the text. Here it becomes absolutely necessary to see
the framing story and the poem as a whole, as was mentioned
before. But how can we solve the problem of the considerable
difficulties the text presents, which oppose such a view? In
the extensive literature on the subject the inconsistencies be-
tween the framing story and the poem have been pointed out
repeatedly, in particular the most significant one: that Job,
the patient sufferer of the framing story, cannot be the impa-
tient and rebellious Job of the poem. As has been said (see
above, p. 97), Sellin’s idea of the text seems to me to be the
most tenable. According to him, the author of the Book of
Job used an old folktale of the pious Job and worked it into
his poem. But this amalgamation was not carried through in
every section. The folktale, with its altogether different
point, was left in its entirety. Is it not possible to assume that
it was known to the author and inspired him to transform it
according to his own different religious situation? Sellin be-
lieves above all (as was mentioned above; see pp. 96 f.) that
the Satan passages in chapters 1 and 2 did not belong to the
original story, for otherwise God’s victory over Satan would
surely have been mentioned. But in connection with the poem
this circumstance can be explained. Satan is the instigator; but
in the end it is by no means any longer a primitive “either/
or” situation of a victory of God or Satan. By means of
Satan something new has come to pass; a new plane of inner
happenings has been reached within God and thus also within
man. Looked at from the point of view of the whole drama,
Satan is needed to give full expression to the divine impulse
which has set the whole process in motion.
87, Sellin, op. cit. (n. 42, above), p. 9.

125 Satan as One of the bené ha-’eléhim
If one reads the framing story from Sellin’s point of view,

without the Satan passages, the result is actually a closed tale
of a pious man who is afflicted and yet never wavers in his
loyalty to God. For this he is then richly rewarded by God.
Sellin’s theory also receives strong support from the fact
that all the blows directed against Job, except the last one, are
carried out by God himself. If the Satan passage (1:6-12)
belonged to the folktale, it would seem very striking that, in
verse 12, God delivers Job into Satan’s hands and Satan de-
parts to carry out his work of destruction, as one would
assume. But then, in what follows, there is no mention that it
is Satan who deals the blows. It is people, lightning (the fire
of God!), and storm which destroy the happiness of Job’s life
(cf., above, pp. 84 f.). Several Old Testament parallels show
that the last plague also, Job’s boils, the only one coming from
Satan, could just as well have stemmed from God. The same
bad boils appear in Exod. 9:9 as a plague sent by God through
Moses upon the Egyptians. And sara‘at, the word for leprosy,
according to Gesenius-Buhl literally means “blow, scourge of
God” (from sara‘, “knocking down”), because leprosy was
regarded as a punishment from God—his blows, as it were.
Several passages testify that God also sends pestilence; e.g.,
Exod. 9:3 (blow against the Egyptians), Lev. 26:25; Deut.
28:21.°°
The Epilogue, too, according to Sellin,® was obviously con-
nected to the poem subsequently. The three friends intro-
duced by the author (2:11-13) are mentioned again in 42:7-9.
But the “seam” is easy to see. In Sellin’s view, which seems
convincing to me, verse 10 of chapter 42 followed immedi-
ately after 2:10 in the old folktale: “In all this did not Job sin
with his lips.” Then, “And Yahweh turned the captivity of
TOs 2-0"
88. See Num. 12:10: the punishment of Miriam with leprosy.
89. Looked at in the light of these passages, Sellin’s view that Satan
represents an unburdening of God from evil is shown to be, in any
_ case, premature as far as Satan in the Book of Job is concerned (cf.
above, p. 97).
90. Op. cit., pp. 24 f.
How this folktale, complete in itself, came to be united

with the poem can probably no longer be determined. Nev-
ertheless, Sellin’s statement of the inner connection of the
Satan concept with the poem seems decisive to me, and the
fact that they appear interwoven, yet each still distinguishable
from the other, seems to express precisely the transition from
one attitude to the other.
Job of the folktale knows nothing about Satan. He unprob-
lematically accepts all blows as coming from God. He finds it,
so to speak, quite in order that God should take everything
away from him: “. . . shall we receive good at the hand of
God, and shall we not receive evil?” (2:10). Not so the Job
of the poem. He rebels. And he experiences the falling-apart
of the two sides of God. God splits apart in him. Satan does not
appear to Job as such; all the events having to do with Satan
take place in heaven, in the circle of the bené ha-’elohim. It is
an issue between divine beings, between God and Satan. But
the reflex, as it were, in the human realm is the split of the
God image in Job: God is no longer accepted unquestion-
ingly in his ambivalence; rather, this ambivalence is mani-
fested as such to Job through his experience. Job becomes
conscious of it, just as God, on the heavenly plane, be-
comes conscious of his own doubt when it opposes him. It is
really one identical process, in its divine and its human mani-
festations.
It is in the most pointed way, in the sharpest paradox, that
Job experiences the duality of God in his unity, the process in
God that is consummated mythologically with Satan’s separa-
tion from the “divine beings.” These are Job’s words (16:20,
21): “. . . mine eye poureth out tears unto God. O that one
might plead for a man with God . . .” (italics added). And
17:3: “Lay down now, put me in a surety with thee; . . .”
Job is sure of his “witness in heaven” (16:19) and at the
same time feels the uncanny awesomeness of the divine urge
toward destruction. He, the human being, reminds God that
in him he will be destroying his own creation (10:8-9):
“Thine hands have made me and fashioned me together round
about; yet thou dost destroy me. Remember, I beseech thee,

that thou hast made me as the clay; and wilt thou bring me
into dust again?” (Italics added.)
Job feels how monstrous the situation is, and he can no
longer accept it. He is beyond the naiveté of Abraham, who
obeyed without question. Job feels responsible for himself as
a created being and lays hold of God’s arm, who is about to
destroy his own creation. He is not able to endure this aspect
of God. It is not possible for him until the process within
God himself has reached a further stage. One must therefore
ask: What effect did Satan have upon God? Only by submit-
ting to his dark side in the conflict is God able to grasp its
nature. God consciously experiences his own unpredictabil-
ity. He not only is it; he knows about it. It is in this totality
that he wants to be apprehended by man. So he manifests
himself to Job in his terrible aspect of the power of nature.
God experiences his dark nature side in the tremendous im-
ages of Leviathan and Behemoth.” He is aware of his own
cruelty: “Will he [the crocodile] make many supplications
unto thee? Will he speak soft words unto thee?” (41:3). And
in terrifying self-irony he goes on: “Will he make a covenant
with thee? Wilt thou take him for a servant for ever?” (41:4).
Here the God of the covenant mocks the contract. He is
not the slave of man by the covenant he made with him. He
can do otherwise, too. He is also the dark nature god who can
destroy what he has created. It might be argued that God has
always been aware of his dark side. Many times he threatens
wrath and annihilation. He even experiences fear of himself
when he says to Moses (Exod. 33:3): “For I will not go up in
91. I do not want to enter here into the problem of literary criticism
as to whether or not these words of God are interpolations, because it
seems to me irrelevant in this context. Rudolf Otto (The Idea of the
Holy, trans. John W. Harvey [New York, 1958]) expresses the essen-
tial when he writes: “It is conjectured that the descriptions of the
hippopotamus (Behemoth) and the crocodile (Leviathan) in XL:15 ff.
are a later interpolation. This may well be the fact; but if so, it must be
‘admitted that the interpolator felt the point of the entire section
extraordinarily well.”
: lest I
the midst of thee; for thou art a stiffnecked people
ently:
consume thee in the way.” Volz comments very pertin
prefer ably avoid meetin g his own de-
“So Yahweh would
of an
monic nature; he is able to keep away from the cause
he has no contro l over the outbur st
outburst of wrath, but
itself.” °2 However, here and in other passages God’s unpre-
dictability is simply a given fact, not a problem. In God’s
speeches to Job it is a problem, insofar as God consciously
to
admits it, acknowledges the darkness in himself, and wants
be accepted with it by man. And Job does so accept him
because he has seen him, because God has revealed himself to
him anew. He no longer demands his rights; he bows to the
irrational God. “I have heard of thee by the hearing of the
ear: but now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore I abhor myself
and repent in dust and ashes” (42:5, 6; italics added).
Sellin, in spite of his important factual discoveries, proceeds
from wrong theological assumptions which lead to a misun-
derstanding of the end of the book. He holds the “capitula-
tion” of Job to be totally incomprehensible after his previous
“revolution,” and suggests that the author of Job inserted this
speech of God many years later, in his resigned old age.” In
contrast, Rudolf Otto has a beautiful and profound concep-
tion of this passage:
That is an admission of inward convincement and convic-

tion, not of impotent collapse and submission to merely
superior power. Nor is there here at all the frame of mind
to which St. Paul now and then gives utterance; e.g., Rom.
IX:20: “Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it,
Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power
over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto
honour, and another unto dishonour?” To interpret the
passage in Job thus would be a misunderstanding of it.
This chapter does not proclaim, as Paul does, the renuncia-
tion of, the realization of the impossibility of, a “theo-
92. Volz, Das Dimonische in Jahbwe, p. 33.

93. Sellin, op. cit., p. 39.
129 Satan as One of the bené ha-’elbhim
dicy”; rather, it aims at putting forward a real theodicy of

its own, and a better one than that of Job’s friends; a
theodicy able to convict even a Job, and not only to
convict him, but utterly to still every inward doubt that
assailed his soul. For latent in the weird experience that
Job underwent in the revelation of Elohim is at once an
inward relaxing of his soul’s anguish and an appeasement,
an appeasement which would alone and in itself perfectly
suffice as the solution of the problem of the Book of Job,
even without Job’s rehabilitation in Chapter XLII, where
recovered prosperity comes as an extra payment thrown in
after quittance has been already rendered.™
The nature of this satisfaction first became really clear to me

only through an illuminating comment of C. G. Jung: In his
great final speech God reveals himself to Job in all his fright-
fulness. It is as if he said to Job: “Look, that’s what I am like.
That is why I treated you like this.” Through the suffering
which he inflicted upon Job out of his own nature, God has
come to this self-knowledge and admits, as it were, this
knowledge of his frightfulness to Job. And that is what
redeems the man Job. This is really the solution to the enigma
of Job, that is, a true justification for Job’s fate, which,
without this background, would, in its cruelty and injustice,
remain an open problem. Job appears here clearly as a sacri-
fice, but also as the carrier of the divine fate, and that gives
meaning to his suffering and liberation to his soul.
This thought is further supported by the fact that in his
speech God represents himself as the union of the opposite
duality of Leviathan and Behemoth, for Leviathan is a sea
animal, and Behemoth a land animal. In later apocryphal
writings this opposition comes to light even more: In the
Ethiopian Book of Enoch, 60:7-8 (about second to first cen-
tury B.c.) they are spoken of as the female Leviathan of the
sea and the male Behemoth of the wilderness, who are divided
up at the end of days and served to the pious as a eucharistic
94. R. Otto, op. cit., p. 78.

also in the Syrian

meal of sorts. The same motif is found
d to third century
Apocalypse of Baruch, 29:4 (about secon
sents an antici-
A.p.). In a certain sense the Book of Job repre
the integra-
pation of the meaning of this symbolism, in that
as the coincident ia oppo sito rum occur s on the
tion of God
plane of Job’s consciousness.
alent divine
Yahweh has revealed himself to Job as an ambiv
his satisf ied existence of
personality. And Job, wrenched from
of life, has
unproblematic piety rewarded with the goods
ts not only the good
been transformed into one who accep
to a much deeper
God, but also the dark one, and so comes
liveth .” Otto, in my
certainty: “I know that my redeemer
chang e in Job,
opinion, is absolutely right in seeing this inner
38, as the final
effected by the divine revelation in chapter
gue of
significance of the poem, compared to which the Epilo
of the trans-
chapter 42 is an anticlimax. The standpoint
er 42. The
formed Job is totally different from that of chapt
grew the
Epilogue is the other half of the shell out of which
nal folkta le
poem proper, ith the concept of Satan. The origi
is actually only the shell, which is stripped off again.
in
If we now look back to ask what role Satan has played
this work of transformation, we find that, by means of the
doubt concerning Job, he is the spiritus agens of this change;
of
but he is also the destructive activity of God arising out
God’s doubt of man. As Satan, God destroys the man whom
he cannot use, whom he cannot trust, without its being clear
qwhy he mistrusts him or for what he needs him. This “why”
and “what for,” however, are closely connected. They must
have to do with some divine intention or inclination which
is already at work, though not yet apparent. At the end Job
is inwardly “expanded”; he is able to comprehend an experi-
ence of God which, if he still had been the simple, unproblem-
atic, pious Job, and if Satan had not driven him to come
to terms with the deus absconditus, would probably have
split him apart. One must therefore assume that it was this
being comprehended, this having room in man, which was
important for God. He obviously wants man to be the car-

rier of his (divine) self-knowledge. This high dignity of
man is shown in the unexpressed demands of God on him,
which incite God to such a passionate self-revelation. The
paradoxical depth of God’s speech in chapter 38 becomes
fully evident only when it is seen that this God, who is so
passionately wooing man, does so by describing to man his —
world-wide superiority as the power of nature. Man is noth-
ing over against this tremendous divine force, yet God needs
him in order to know this power. God needs man for the sake
of insight. Perhaps even the old Messianic, prophetic passage,
Isa. 11:1-11, belongs in this same context. It describes a
Messianic figure endowed with spiritual and ethical qualities.
“And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of
wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might,
the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of Yahweh” (Isa.
11:2). “They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy
mountain: for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of
Yahweh, as the waters cover the sea” (11:9; italics added). Is
it not, in a way, also a divine longing and need for redemption
that speaks in these words?
In the Book of Job God has, psychologically speaking,
advanced a long step further than in the story of Paradise,
where he still knows so little why he created mankind that he
casts them away from him because of their knowledge of
F good and evil. Here one can begin to sense that man’s know-
‘ing about good and evil is what really matters. Here Satan
brought it about, there the serpent—another “evil” idea of
God’s. It becomes clear, however, that this knowledge is
fruitful only when coupled with submission to God; other-
wise it turns to a hybrid “godlikeness.” In this connection it
becomes profoundly significant that in Job Satan acts in
agreement with God, not “behind his back” like the serpent
‘in Paradise.
™ If we now ask ourselves how Satan’s function in this story
can be connected with what we have learned of him up to
( 132 SATAN IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
of Job is a
now, it may be said that his function in the Book
pt he expresses.
further development of the functional conce
al foe of a
He appears here in full light, as the metaphysic
as a disturb-
peaceful life and worldly comfort. He intervenes
and steps in
ance and hindrance to the natural order of living
the path of
man’s way like the malak Yabweb as Satan in
rns the ex-
Balaam. However, while the Balaam story conce
of wills and blind obedi ence— a first reali-
perience of a clash
must be
zation, so to speak, that God’s will, not one’s own,
ssion
fulfilled—in Job’s case it is a matter of conscious submi
inner insigh t. Satan is here truly Lucif er,_
to God’s will, born of
of God,
the bringer of light. He brings man the knowledge
ing he inflict s on him. Satan is the
but through the suffer
the
_tmisery of the world which alone drives man inward, into
lf as
“other world.” It is Satan who drives man beyond himse
re of nature . In this very specif ic
animal being, as mere creatu
sense perhaps the (Mosaic) Law alrea dy had somet hing
Luciferian and “Satanic.” It was, one might say, the first form
y
in which the people of Israel was driven out of a merel
ise of anima l existe nce.
natural condition, out of the parad
Torn out of a merely natural state by the revelation on Sinai,
it became God’s possession; its life was no longer its own, it
y,
was not allowed any longer to run its course anonymousl
but obtained a meaning and a fate. It was given the impre ss
of God’s fate. The Law was to some extent a neces sary prior
stage before man could become a vessel for God.* Job is the.
ious man-who_ reaches, through suffering, a deeper piety
which is capable of enduring God in his light-dark aspect and
of surrendering himself to him.
95. The Law as attitude toward God had, in the Old Testament
itself, reached a great deepening, as is shown beautifully in Deut.
30:11-14: “For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is
not hidden from thee, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that thou
shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us,
that we may hear it, and do it? Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou
shouldest say, Who shall go over the sea for us, and bring it unto us,
that we may hear it, and do it? But the word is very nigh unto thee, in
thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it.” (Italics added.)
5. Babylonian Traits in the Image of Satan in

the Book of Job
Now that we have tried to answer the essential question of
the meaning of Satan in the Old Testament, especially as
evidenced in the Book of Job, it still remains to establish what
“threads” have been woven into the “basic pattern,” what —
particular traits in the image of Satan in the Book of Job can
presumably or surely be ascribed to foreign influence.
As was mentioned earlier (see above, p. 90), the disease-
inflicting function of Satan seems to be a reminiscence of the
Babylonian demon of sickness. But how peripheral its impor-
tance is in the total picture of the Satan in the Book of Job
can be seen by a comparison with the aforementioned “Poem
of the Righteous Sufferer” (see above, pp. 90 f.), which only
now can be carried through fully.
1. In contrast to Satan in the Book of Job, the demon of
the Babylonian poem is exclusively a sickness demon. The
Old Testament Satan, insofar as he can be called a sickness
demon, does not function specifically as such. On the con-
trary, this function connects him directly with Yahweh him-
self. It has already been pointed out that at other times
Yahweh himself sends sickness (see above, p. 125).
2. In the Babylonian poem the sickness demon is opposed
by the good god who overcomes him, while, in the Book of
Job, Satan acts with God’s permission! This mutual agree-
ment between God and Satan resulting from their confronta-
tion is, in comparison with the Babylonian demon, the new
and important factor in the Job Satan. With his doubt of Job
and his “tempting” of God, he moves onto a psychological
plane which removes him almost beyond any comparison
with the demon in the Babylonian poem. The specific factor
in the Satan of the Book of Job is his relation to Yahweh, his
origin in him, which I have tried to demonstrate by means of
the manifold examples of identical functions, as also by his
. bené ha-’eldhim character.”
96. The Babylonian example also makes it very clear that the fact of
difference be-
3. Perhaps the deepest and most essential
song the king
tween the two poems is that in the Babylonian
Job ascribes his
ascribes his suffering to the adversary, while
dualism of god
to God.” In the Babylonian conception the
n consciousness;
and demon reach down to the sphere of huma
the frame
in the Book of Job the opposites have not split apart
later develop-
of the one divine personality. (In view of the
bly the
ment one may perhaps say: not yet.) This is proba
again st the assum ption that the Old
most important evidence
Testament Satan was “take n over” from Babyl on.
y of
However, another trait of the Job Satan is undoubtedl
-
Babylonian origin, and is shown even more clearly in -Zecha
the Babylo-
iah: that is his character as accuser. According to
the
nian conception, the “accuser” was the polar opposite of
rn,® the idea of a special
guardian god. According to Zimme
divine guardian (il améli = “god of man”) and of a guardian
goddess (istar améli = “goddess of man”) was strongly devel-
an
oped in Babylon. This special guardian god and the guardi
goddess of a person intercede with the great gods. In the same
way, every individual has an “accuser” (bél dababi) and an
“accuser goddess” (bélit dababi), “‘persecutor,” and so forth.”
In the Book of Job it is more a matter of the latter nuance:
Satan’s subordination to Yahweh, which is generally regarded as specif-

ically inherent in the Old Testament, simply does not discriminate
Satan from the Babylonian demon. For, as demon, the latter is also
lower than the god.
97. The same difference between the Old Testament Satan and the
Persian Ahriman was already stated by M. C. de Harlez (“Satan and
Ahriman,” Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology, IX,
of
369): “It would not occur to anyone that Satan could be the cause
these evils. A Mazdean, however, could not hesitate a minute to
attribute the origin completely and exclusively to this evil demon. For a
sectarian of the Avestas, Angro-Mainyus alone is the author of all evil
things, be they moral or physical.”
98. In Schrader, KAT, pp. 454-55.
99. Ibid., p. 461. (I am indebted to Prof. W. Baumgartner of Basel for
pointing out to me the interesting fact that bél dababi became in Syrian
a borrowed term for the accuser and enemy in general [see Brockel-
mann, Lexicon Syriacum?, p. 83b]; also in Mandaean [see Néldeke,
Manddische Grammatik, 27.151].)
“persecutor, oppressor,” less outspokenly of the accuser,

although his investigatory rovings imply such an activity.
The function of accuser is explicit in Zech. 3:1 ff. It goes
back to the Babylonian concept taken from the profane court
procedures, according to which “the regulation of the rela-
tionship between God and man runs absolutely the same
course as that of the ordinary court procedure, where God is
the judge and man the seeker for justice.” *° In these court
proceedings between God and man, the accuser appears. That
this particular development of a Babylonian mythological
figure was probably a late acquisition in Yahwism is also
shown by the fact that the corresponding idea of the Babylo-
nian guardian god likewise appears very late in the Old Testa-
ment in the form of guardian angels; namely, only in Job 5:1
and 33:23 and in Pss. 34:8 and 31:11.
In this period, when the process of differentiation within
Yahweh had advanced further, the accuser quality of the
Satan figure could easily be assimilated. The restlessly roving
oppressor and persecutor of the Babylonian concept becomes
an adequate expression of the unrest, suspicion, and doubt i
Yahweh, as I have tried to show before. This Babylonian
characteristic is just what gives the figure of Satan a wider
meaning and depth and raises its significance far beyond that
of the Babylonian sickness demon. ;
It is not impossible that the accuser character of Satan,
especially in Zech. 3:1 ff., has been influenced in part also by
an institution of the Persian court, as has been pointed out
especially by Torcezyner ** and Lods.*” There certain royal
officials who traveled about the country were called the
“Eyes of the King.” Lods, however, draws attention to the
fact that the expression “eye of the king” was already used in
100. Ibid., p. 463.

101. H. Torezyner, “How Satan Came into the World,” Expository
Times (1936-37), pp. 563 ff.
102. A. Lods, “Les Origines de la figure de Satan, ses fonctions 4 la
‘cour céleste,” Mélanges Syriens offerts a M. R. Dussaud (1939), pp.
565 f.
Medea and Egypt.” Yet, what seems to me of the utmost

interest regarding our investigation, in which it became evi-
dent that the Old Testament Satan has his origin in a process
of differentiation within the deity, is Lods’s statement that the
official entitled the “Eye of the King” was also called “the
son” or “the brother of the king.” However, this Persian trait,
too, would have been ascribed to the Old Testament Satan
only as a ready-to-hand symbol for a distinct phase of this
very process of divine differentiation.
To summarize, it may be said: The alien influence for
which there is any real evidence proves to be late and does
not suffice to explain the whole complex of the figure of
Satan in the Old Testament. It is a matter of an organically
accreted, “accrystalized” *” trait, but the “entelechy” of the
whole appearance must be understood entirely from its con-
nection with the divine personality of Yahweh. The necessity
for this approach is expressed symbolically, with all possible
plainness, by the bené ha~elohim quality of Satan, by his
position in heaven, that is, in the inner realm of the godhead.
103. According to Alex. Moret, Histoire de Orient (Paris, Presses
Universitaires, 1936), II, 760.
104. For more complete details on the problem of the possible origin
of the ve Testament figure of Satan in the Persian religion, see below,
pp: 155 f.
105. See Gerhard von Rad, art. “S:48oros,” in Kittel, Theologisches
W
Grterbuch zum Neuen Testament, Il.
Satan as Opponent of
the mal’ak Yahweh
(Zechariah 3:1 ff.)
he = a
eA a “i
‘oy ‘
LS 7 .,
IkeTHE FOURTH vision of Zechariah, Satan appears as the
accuser at the right hand of the high priest Joshua:
And the mal’ak Yahweh? said unto Satan, Yahweh rebuke
thee, O Satan; even Yahweh that hath chosen Jerusalem
rebuke thee: is not this a brand plucked out of the fire?
Now Joshua was clothed with filthy garments, and stood
before the angel. And he answered and spake unto those
that stood before him, saying, Take away the filthy gar-
ments from him. And to him he said, Behold, I have caused
thine iniquity to pass from thee, and I will clothe thee
with change of raiment.
The historically conditioned background of the vision is
emphasized by J. W. Rothstein.’ He cites Ewald, who sees
the vision as occasioned “by an actual or only threatening
accusation at the Persian court.” Rothstein himself sees in the
procedure of the heavenly accuser a reflected image of a real
accusation, or at least a libelous attack against Joshua on
earth, in which “the earthly counterpart of the visionary
event has, however, a causal connection with the denuncia-
tion of the Jewish community to the Persian authorities.” *
1. The Hebrew text has “Yahweh,” but another manuscript (Syr-

iaca) has “mal’ak Yahweh” (see footnote to Hebrew text in Biblia
Hebraica, ed. Rudolf Kittel). The Ziirich Bible translates correspond-
_ ingly “Engel des Herrn.”
2. Die Nachtgesichte des Sacharja (1910), pp. 102 ff.
3, Ibid., p. 107. —
139
Here, as a matter of principle, it should be said that the

historical approach to a vision can easily be misleading, inso-
far as one considers it to be a real vision, as Rothstein also
does here.* It projects into it conscious reflection, while the
vision is a spontaneous revelation of something not known
before; that is, of something unconscious. The historical ele-
ment is merely an image for a new content, just as dreams
may be linked to events of the day but are not evoked by
them. (Otherwise, how could one explain why, out of the
multiplicity of the day’s events, just this particular one should
emerge in the dream?) Therefore it is already moving in the
direction of rationalistic prejudice to speak of the “historical
occasion for the vision,” as Rothstein does here. Certainly all
historical elements are attached to the figure of the high priest
Joshua, but the whole scene implies a symbolic and not a
concrete significance. It is the nature of a vision to be the
image of an inner, not an outer, situation. The fact that only
Joshua, not the people, is expressly spoken of is far from
proving that “it really is only a matter of Yahweh’s witness-
ing in favor of the priest Joshua personally . . . hence that
the accusation which is to be refuted concerns him alone,” as
Rothstein ° believes, in agreement with Ewald and others, and
in opposition to Baudissin,® Marti,” and Nowack.* What we
are really concerned with here is a new religious truth express-
ing itself in a political vision. It does of course arise out of the
situation of the time and is related to it as an answer, but not
in an external sense. It is as if the content of the vision
coincided with the historical data. Otherwise it would not be
a genuine vision but a consciously constructed allegory.
Moreover, certain details confirm its symbolic character by
their correspondence to other mythical material. Alfred Jere-
4. Ibid., p. 102.
5 1bid, pes:
6. Geschichte des alttestamentlichen Priestertums (1889), p. 252.
7. Das Dodekapropheton (1904), p. 408. Cf. also idem, “Zwei Studien
zu Sacharja. I. Der Ursprung des Satans,” Theologische Studien und
Kritiken (1892), p. 210.
8. Die kleinen Propheten (1904), p. 353.
| 141) Satan as Opponent of the mal’ak Yahweh
mias mentions various parallels to the motif of festive raiment

in which Joshua is to be clothed.® So the accused Adapa
“appears before the God of Heaven in mourning clothes and
receives a festal garment. The penitent Sumerian king in the
song “I will praise the Lord of Wisdom” is cleansed by angels
and led through the gates of the heavenly city." Gilgamesh,
after being rescued, is cleansed by the hero of the flood on
the island of the community of the gods, and so forth.
Karl Marti has made an interesting attempt toward a psy-
chological interpretation of the Satan in Zechariah." He sees
in him the carrier of the people’s self-accusations, which at
that time were a consequence of the law. This figure “is the
image of the inner voice projected to the outside, coming up
against the grace of God.” Marti shows here the right
feeling for the spiritual-psychological character of the Old
Testament figure of Satan. However, he diminishes the value
of his psychological conception, in itself noteworthy, by
assuming that Zechariah had himself “created this Satan
figure.” This is controverted, not only by the whole phenom-
enology of Satan, the rootedness of this concept in the whole
context of the Old Testament theological categories (his
angel nature, etc.), but also, above all, by the aforementioned
basic psychological fact that inner images are not made, but
happen. They are symbols of suprapersonal events in the
human soul. So the Satan in Zechariah’s vision is not, as Marti
assumes, “nothing but the carrier of the accusations, which
resulted necessarily from the law at that time,” ** but rather a
figure in the suprapersonal divine drama, as will become clear
in what follows.
9. Alfred Jeremias, Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients

(1930), p. 738.
10. This refers to the “Poem of the Righteous Sufferer,” which was
discussed above. (See H. Gressmann, Altorientalische Texte zum Alten
Testament, 2d ed. [1926], pp. 278 f.)
11. Marti, “Zwei Studien zu Sacharja. I. Der Ursprung des Satans,”
pp. 207-45.
12. Ibid., p. 235.
13. Ibid.
142 /SATAN IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
Satan appears here as the accuser before the court of justice.

It is the aforementioned Babylonian trial situation, where the
accuser stands on the right of the accused and the defender
on the left. He stands before the mal’ak Yahweh. If we
remember that in the Book of Job Satan stands out among the
bené ha~elohim, we can see that here there is a polarity
expressed by two angelic beings. Satan and the mal’ak Yah-
weh, two angels, two aspects of God, are fighting over man.
“One wants to annihilate him, the other to save him. The
opposition is more outspoken than in the Book of Job, where
Yahweh’s wavering still blurs the boundaries. To be sure,
there the wager maintains the opposition, but only in part;
for at the bottom, as we have seen, by entering on this wager
~God has moved to the plane of the “satanic” doubt. He
follows it: Fhe opposition is really upheld only by the restric-
tions on Satan. He is allowed almost to annihilate Job, but not_
entirely. _In Zech. 3:1 ff. the differentiation process has_ad-
vanced further. The separation of Satan, the dark side of
“God, is followed by the corresponding releaseof God’s light _
side. The two sides of God’s nature are no longer presented in
an indistinguishable mixture; they have become discernible as
such, and focused on man. It is a judgment upon man. Behind
it stands the moral demand on the human being, as it also
appeared as its last consequence in the Book of Job. This
situation provides a definite outline for the character of the
two sides. The one wants justice; the other grants mercy.
This seems to me one of the very great turning points in the
Old Testament concept-of God. Satan becomes what so far-
has been a positive quality of God, his_justice. God’s justice
literally becomes “devilish.” ** It becomes a hindrance and is.
14. Cf. Adolphe Lods, “Les Origines de la figure de Satan, ses

fonctions 4 la cour céleste,” Mélanges Syriens offerts a M. R. Dussaud
(1930), p. 650: “Hence, the Satan represents here the conscience, the
strict law which finds itself, in our case, in opposition to the compassion-
ate intentions of Jahwe, justice fighting with mercy,” a deep exegetical
insight, from which, however, Lods, in this work primarily directed
toward the historical, does not bring out the consequences concerning
the theological significance of the figure of Satan.
143 ate as Opponent of the mal’ak Yahweh
—
evaluated negatively because a higher principle is visualized:

the principle of Jove. Of course the love and compassion of
God have been spoken of before, as in Deut. 4:31: “For
Yahweh thy God is a merciful God [’el rahiim], he will not
forsake thee, neither destroy thee, nor forget the covenant of
thy fathers which he sware unto them.” And Ps. 86:15: “But
thou, O Yahweh, art a God full of compassion [’él rabim
we-hannun], and gracious, long-suffering, and plenteous in
mercy and truth.” Further, Isa. 54:10: “For the mountains
shall depart, and the hills be removed; but my kindness
[basdi] shall not depart from thee, neither shall the covenant
of my peace be removed, saith Yahweh that hath mercy on»
thee [7e-rabamék].” And Jer. 3:12: “. . . I will not cause
mine anger to fall upon you: for I am merciful [basid], saith
Yahweh, and I will not keep anger for ever.” But for the most
part these are words of promise, while our passage presents us
with the actual event of a merciful and conscious intervention
on the part of Yahweh. It is nowhere so conscious as here,
where it stands in opposition to its counterpole, justice. This
Also Erik Stave (Ueber den Einfluss des Parsismus auf das Judentum
[Haarlem, 1898], p. 254) finds himself really forced to see in Satan “a
personification of the justice of the holy God,” but then is unable to
maintain the thought because a later concept of Satan gets in his way,
namely, that Satan from the beginning appears “as a malicious spirit
who shows an inner pleasure and joy in being allowed to cause
suffering to men and to entice them to sin.” Stave is not able to bridge
this seeming contradiction. But to assume it at all leads away from just
the essential meaning of this passage. Diestel (“Set-Typhon, Asahel und
Satan: Ein Beitrag zur Religionsgeschichte des Orients,” Zeitschrift fur
die historische Theologie, XXX, No. 2 [1860], 213) has remarked
before this that it would not be justified “to ascribe to the Satan of Job
all sorts of evil purposes, wishes, and hopes about which there is no
word in the Prologue; this is done unjustifiably in order to bring his
figure closer to the New Testament concept; therewith one breaks the
law of historical strictness.” This can be applied without modification
to the consideration of the Satan in Zechariah. The “devilishness” does
not consist here in its opposition to justice, but in justice itself.
15. Cf. also Rothstein (Kommentar zum 1. Buch der Chronik, ed. D. I.
Hanel [1927], p. 380): “As the opposite to Satan, the representative of
divine justice . . . the mal’ak Yahweh is the carrier of divine mercy and
‘grace ...; he is the bypostatized effectiveness of Jabwe’s love, de-
tached from Yahweh’s personal being” (italics added).
144° SATAN IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
is made especially clear in Psalm 86, which has just been cited,
where justice and mercy appear side by side. In the Psalm
there is no problem in this respect. It could arise only after
the dark side had emerged and evoked its opposite. Only here
is the negative aspect of justice made manifest. It is solely
negative when it takes the place of love. And since love can
now become manifest, justice becomes the obstacle to be
overcome. Justice wants to punish man for his sins. If one
imagines what it would have meant if Yahweh had let Satan
have his way, one can grasp the “satanic” element in justice.
Stave says rightly of this passage: “So here Satan has become _
the adversary of God and of the whole plan of salvation.
. . .”16 Once more it is made very plain that he is the side of
God which had already demanded of Abraham the slaying of|
his only son; for there, too, God is his own adversary, as it
were—the opponent of his own plan of salvation.
‘The Satan in Zechariah’s vision demands the just punish-
ment of Joshua. But the mal’ak Yahweh rescues the “brand
plucked out of the fire.” Here Yahweh has mastered his dark
side.
This thought seems to me to represent the outermost edge
of the Old Testament, which can be looked upon as the Old
Testament premise for the idea of love in the New Testa-
ment. But the thought has also found a highly significant
further development in later Judaism, in the Sefiroth tree of
the Kabbala.” There the totality of spiritual essence is repre-
sented in ten spheres, which are levels of emanations of God
depicted as the branches of the tree of life, whose roots are
above and whose crown is below. In their polar correspond-
ences the nature of the world is expressed in all strata of
existence, from the highest to the lowest. Now in this system,
mercy or love (besed) ** is placed on the right (masculine)
16. Ibid., p. 251.
17. On this basic concept of the Kabbala see Gershom Scholem,
“Kabbala,” Encyclopedia Judaica, pp. 673 ff., Ernst Miller, Der Sobar
und seine Lehre (1923), p. 16; and others.
18. Nelson Glueck (“Das Wort hesed im alttestamentlichen Sprach-
gebrauche als menschliche und gottliche gemeinschaftsgemasse Ver-
( 145 Satan as Opponent of the mal’ak Yahweh
ee
side, and justice or judgment (dim) on the left (feminine)

side.** Mercy is associated with water, and justice with fire.
The streaming waters of mercy overcome the consuming fire
of judgment. The jealous God has literally gone to the “left”
side. Here a deep view opens up into the essence of the
process of divine development. It is only in his love that the
masculine, creative side of God is manifested. His unpredicta-
ble emotionality, his wrath, his justice, are feminine. This is,
psychologically speaking, the feminine side of God, which is
undifferentiated and chaotic. The spiritual God Yahweh had
struggled out of the maternal matrix of nature, the primal
ground of pagan nature religions. Thereby the feminine side
was necessarily suppressed but was manifested in his charac-
ter unconsciously and negatively. Here the connection be-
tween the feminine and Satan becomes visible again. The
_“anger of Yahweh,” in II Samuel 24 changes to “Satan” in I
haltungsweise,” BZAW No. 47, 1927) points out the original legal
character of hesed. In contrast to rabamim, to which it comes very close
in the later (prophetic) period, hesed “includes the idea of dutifulness,
which does not enter into rabamim” (p. 27; cf. also p. 66). W. F.
Lofthouse (“Hen and Hesed in the Old Testament,” ZAW [1933], pp.
29-35) by and large confirms Glueck’s conclusions. But
it seems
doubtful to me whether Glueck, as regards the later development, has
not stuck too close to the original meaning. The question is whether or
not, at least for the hesed of God, a distinct further development in the
sense of divine mercy and love took place. For instance, precisely in
the passage quoted above, Ps. 86:15, where hbesed appears as the
synonym of rahiim we-hannin, ’erek ’appaim: “But thou, O Yahweh, art
a God full of compassion, and gracious, long-suffering, and plenteous in
mercy and truth.” The purely formal connection seen by Lofthouse
between hesed and rahamim can hardly suffice: “This word signifies
yearning love; like that of a mother for the babe within her womb... .
But even rahamim is based on a tie, indeed, the closest imaginable. Here
hesed and rahamim are both in the nature of things” (op. cit., p. 35).
Cf. also the cited example of Jer. 3:12, in which Yahweh says of
himself: “I am hasid,” where the direct continuation, “I will not keep
anger forever,” may certainly be seen as a direct explanation of the
concept hasid. Surely this concept became in later Judaism the explicit
expression for the flowing grace of God, as is shown by just the
example in the Kabbala.
19. Cf. also the Chinese symbolism, where Yang is the light, Yin the
dark, principle; light and darkness, day and night, as the balance of
universal world forces in eternal movement.
146 \SATAN IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
Chronicles 21. In the same way, the “roaring lion,” as the Old
Testament image of the wrathful God (Hos._11:10;. Jer.
49:19), becomes the image of the-devil_in the New Testa-_
ment (I Pet. 5:8).
However, what is fruitful in the Kabbala in this respect,
and leading to further development, is that this feminine side,
although on the “left,” retains its whole dignity in the spirit-
ual world system. The feminine is not only overcome, but is
also accepted and retained in the sense of being preserved and
essential. God embraces both his sides; he is masculine and
feminine. He is the coincidentia oppositorum.
In Zechariah the conquering of justice by love is not yet
complete. It is still in process. Justice asa potency is still
embodied in Satan as the obstacle to God’s mercy and good-
ness. But in that the al’ak Yahweh opposes him, the way is
opened for God’s love to incline toward man. That God
appears who wants to save “the brand plucked out of the.
fire,” who has compassion for the people—sullied with sin and
tormented with suffering, almost destroyed—represented by
the high priest Joshua. For this live feeling, the dark emotion-
ality becomes so suspect and negative that it appears as Satan,
as a negative, destructive power. In view of this highly signif-
icant breakthrough of God’s intervention for man, it is per-
haps not sheer coincidence that the same chapter contains a
reference to the Messiah (Zech. 3:8): “Hear now, O Joshua
the high priest, thou and thy fellows that sit before thee; for
they are men that are a sign; for, behold, I will bring forth
My servant the Shoot.” *°
In still another sense this passage represents a further devel-
opment of the Satan concept in the Old Testament. We have
seen that Satan is the element of hindrance which disturbs and
20. Italics added. For reasons of greater faithfulness to the Hebrew

text this translation is taken from The Holy Scriptures: A New
Translation (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America,
1917). See also the Luther Bible: “. . . denn sie sind miteinander ein
Wahrzeichen,” and Ziirich Bible: “. . . ihr seid Manner der Vorbedeu-
tung.”
147 Satan as Opponent of the mal’ak Yahweh
obstructs the natural earthly life of men, that breaks their will
(Balaam, Job) and leads them to submit to the will of God.
But also this function now appears as limited. The religious
feeling has penetrated deeper; there is a situation where even
suffering is of no avail without God’s mercy, where mercy
must complete the work of suffering if God’s vessel, man, is
not to break. Satan, in his function of hindering, of breaking
the human will and transforming it to submission to the will
of God, has reached a limit where God must intervene to
preserve the vessel. The mal’ak Yahweh rescues the “brand
plucked out of the fire,” the consuming fire of Yahweh. The
loving God is able to protect man from the God of wrath.
Job’s prayer, “Lay down now; put me in a surety with thee,”
is here fulfilled, and with it his prophetic certainty: “I know
that my Redeemer liveth.” Joshua, the representative of the
whole sinful people, is no more delivered up to Satan, as Job
was. Does not this mean that man, once he has seen and borne
the dark side of God, is no longer delivered up to it to the same
degree?
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L, I CHRON. 21:1 it says: “And Satan stood up against Israel,
and provoked David to number Israel.” Satan appears here as
instigator of an impious action, whose nature we must first
establish.
That numbering
the people was considered taboo is already
shown in Exod. 30:11-16. There the census is not forbidden,
but it is tolerated by Yahweh only if atonement is made for it
at the same time:
When thou takest the sum of the children of Israel after
their number, then shall they give every man a ransom for
his soul unto Yahweh, when thou numberest them; that
there be no plague among them, when thou numberest
them.
In itself, therefore, it is against the divine will—even, as it
were, a mortal sin; for the lives forfeited by the counting
hhave to be redeemed by a ransom; otherwise they fall victim
(to a plague which, as shown in I Chron. 21:11-12, is fatal.*
David can choose the punishment for the numbering: famine,
destruction by enemies, or pestilence. The census of the
people must therefore imply a serious infringement of the
divine power which calls forth the wrath of God. The census
is by nature directed against the power of God because it
serves human interests, the power of an earthly king. It makes
him conscious of his power by putting it into his hands as a_
concrete, estimated value, and therewith only into his full
1. Cf. II Sam. 24:3, 4.
151
possession, as it were. Insofar as the census puts an emphasis

on human possessions and human arrangements and planning,
the census is a kind of disobedience to the ruling power of
God, which is atoned for by an actual (II Sam. 24:3 and I
Chron. 21:1) or symbolic (Exod. 30: 11-16) sacrifice of life.
This judgment of the census is very old and is found not only
in the Bible. In the last analysis it is based on a widespread
primitive idea, as J. G. Frazer has shown by many examples
from Africa, America, and Europe.’ Thus, the people in the
Congo are afraid of being counted because it would attract
the attention of evil spirits. Frazer mentions that a census
taken there in 1908 for purposes of taxation had to be carried
out by military force: “The natives would have resisted the
officer, but he had too many soldiers with him, and it is not
improbable that fights have taken place in other parts of
Africa, not that they resisted the taxation, but they objected
to be counted for fear the spirits would hear and kill them;’>*
For the most part the dread extends to the counting of
children, cattle, and other possessions. So, for instance, among
the Bakongo in the lower Congo territory it is considered
extremely unlucky for a woman to count her children—one,
two, three, and so forth—for the evils spirits will hear it and
take away some of them by death.* In East Africa the Masai
count neither people nor cattle, in the belief that this causes
death.’ And in Oran (North Africa)
the person who counts the measures of grain should be in a
state of ceremonial purity, and instead of counting one,
two, three, and so on, he says “in the name of God” for
“one”; “two blessings” for “two”; “hospitality of the
Prophet” for “three” . . . and so on, up to “twelve,” for
which the expression is “the perfection of God.” ®
2. J. G. Frazer, “The Sin of a Census,” Folklore in the Old Testa-

ment: eran in Comparative Religion, Legend and Law (1919), II, Ch.
9, 555 f .
3. Ibid., p. 556.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 558.
153 Satan as Independent Demon
Bertheau ’ and Curtis * point to the lustratio populi Romani,

established by Servius Tullius, which always took place on
the Field of Mars after the completion of the census.° In his
book Die Beduinen von Beerseba,”* Leo Hafeli reports on the
dread of a census among present-day Bedouins. The Gover-
nor of Beersheba, ‘Aref el-‘Aref, asserted that there were
around 70,000 souls under the jurisdiction district of Bir
es-Seba‘. ‘Some believe there are more than 100,000. God
knows what is correct!” Hafeli comments: “Allah a‘lam bis-
sawab or ‘ilm ‘ind Allah are well known and often repeated
formulations that bring to an end the discussion of a subject
about which it is believed to be a wrong toward God to wish
to investigate the exact facts.” Karl Budde formulates this
primitive idea very well as it relates to the sphere of the Old
Testament: “The census is a direct attack on Israel, on the life
of David’s subjects. For Jahwe gives and takes away life;
therefore he will not tolerate that one counts up his souls and,
should one do so, he erases the computation by sending a
great death.” *
In our text this dread of the census is expressed by Joab (I
Chron. 21:3): “Yahweh make his people an hundred times so
many more as they be: but, my lord the king, are they not all
my lord’s servants? why then doth my lord require this
thing? why will he be a cause of trespass to Israel?” ”
Does this not voice the same attitude as that of the Be-
douins of Beersheba? But David closes his ears to the gen-
uinely God-fearing reproach of Joab. He follows the 6c “sa-
7. Die Bucher der Chronik (Leipzig, 1873).

8. Curtis, The Books of Chronicles (“International Critical Commen-
tary” series) (1910), p. 247.
9. Varro De re rustica II; Livy I. 44, cf. II. 22; Dionysius IV. 22; cit.
Curtis, loc. cit.
10. (Lucerne, 1938), p. 25. I owe this reference to Prof. Zimmerli
(lectures on Old Testament Theology, Zurich University, 1944-45).
11. K. Budde, Die Biicher Samuel (1902), p. 205, n. 21.
12. Since in our investigation the focus is on the figure of Satan, I
- will base the following exegesis only on the Chronicles text in which
Satan is mentioned, although the Samuel text is older.
tanic” suggestion. However, his obsession, after the deed is

done, is followed by a sense of guilt and remorse, all the
deeper because of the cruel fact that the people have to pay
for his—David’s—guilt (I Chron. 21:17):
Is it not I that commanded the people to be numbered?
even I it is that have sinned and done evil indeed; but as
for these sheep, what have they done? let thine hand, I pray
thee, O Yahweh my God, be on me and on my father’s
house; but not on thy people. . .
It is this transformed David who then receives the com-
mand transmitted by Gad, the seer, to build Yahweh an
altar—out of which later arose the Temple—which stood on
the place where Yahweh commanded the angel who spread
the plague to sheathe his sword, because “he repented him of
the evil” (21:15). As with the Flood, the sacrifice of Isaac,
and the trial of Job, we see Yahweh here, too, almost on the
point of destroying his own creation. Again it is a matter of
testing the carrier of salvation, as in Genesis 22, and of an
inner transformation like Job’s, although this story is much
more primitive and is far from reaching the individual differ-
entiation and depth of the Book of Job. However, the parallel
is further expressed in the sparing of the future place of salva-
tion; Jerusalem is at the last moment saved from destruction.
If one thinks of the later central significance of Jerusa-
lem, its high symbolic value in Ezekiel and later in Christian-
ity, the importance of this passage can be fully recognized.
This Chronicles passage is also still more specifically con-
nected with the Book of Job by the fact that in both Satan is
the factor which sets destruction going. But what is new in
13. Cf. Karl Budde (op. cit., p. 326) on the corresponding passage II
Sam. 24:16: “Since now the sanctuary on Zion finally remained the
only sanctuary of Yahweh, and became the only legitimate one accord-
ing to the conviction of Israel, and then in its glorification and spiritu-
alization passed into the possession of Christianity and in the New
Testament Apocalypse was raised into the celestial world, one must
designate this passage as one of the most important in the Old Testa-
ment.” Cf. also Gerhard von Rad, art. “d.480AS°” in Kittel, Theo-
logisches Wérterbuch zum Neuen Testament, II, 73, n. 17.
the Chronicles is that Satan is divested of his character as a

divine function. He no longer appears, as in the Book of Job,
as part of the divine court; he is an independent figure,
“apparently separated from God, who.no longer stands in
“dialectic confrontation with God or his angel, as in Job and
Zechariah.. This is expressed linguistically by the fact that _
satan has here-become a proper name. In the divine process of —
differentiation, the detachment and becoming-visible of the
dark~side of God have now reached a state of complete
Separation. It appears now as a completely “autonomous |
complex,” a separate personality.“
This fact has in various quarters given rise to the idea of a
Persian influence. Gerhard von Rad * sees in it an “inner shift
14. In view of these highly meaningful connections, it is difficult to
bring any understanding to the attempt of F. X. Kugler (Von Mose bis
Paulus, Forschungen zur Geschichte Israels [1922], pp. 241-43) to see in
the Satan of the Chronicles a human adversary of David’s. But his
argumentation has so little to sustain it that it can scarcely be taken
seriously. To begin with, starting from a conception of God imposed
upon the text, it is simply decided that the tempting of David could not
have proceeded from God: “But can it be said of Yahweh jaset that ‘he
provoked [David]’? Certainly not in the sense that he is to be held the
instigator of sin. . . . Therefore it seems to me very improbable that
Yahweh is thought of here as the subject” (p. 242). Kugler grasps for a
way out by assuming another subject, namely, the indefinite “one.”
Thus: “One provoked David.” This, despite his admission that “ ‘one’ is
mostly expressed by the third person masculine plural and less fre-
quently by the third person masculine singular” (Joc. cit.). “Accord-
ingly David would have been under the influence of a bad adviser... .
He has probably accused the people to David of largely avoiding its
obligations, and as a reliable countermeasure put through a general
military [!] levy. So he became a Satan in the literal sense of the word,
an accuser and persecutor of Israel” (pp. 242-43). Kaupel (Die
Dimonen des Alten Testaments [1930]) has taken over this view of
Kugler’s and is not surpassed by him in the fantastic description of this
human “Satan.” I Chronicles 21 is supposed to refer to an “irresponsible
intriguer” (p. 10), a “dark wire-puller” (p. 108). “This secret malicious
agitator, against whose insinuations and machinations even Joab’s ur-
ent words to the king were of no avail, is called satan in I Chron.
21:1.” After this “solution” of the problem, Kaupel states with obvious
relief: “So the passage, which for many expositors has signified the high
_ point or at least an important step forward in the Old Testament Satan
concept, is eliminated from consideration of this subject.”
15. Op. cit., p. 74.
in the Satan concept which perhaps came about as the result

of newly penetrated Iranian ideas,” but he emphasizes that
“the Satan concept was by no means ‘taken over’ from the
Persians.” * In contrast to this view, Erik Stave™ sees in
Angra Mainyu the primal image of the Old Testament Satan,
thereby going further than his predecessor, Alexander Ko-
hut,!® who on the whole restricts the Parsistic influence to the
Satan of the Apocrypha and the Talmud. Stave, too, sees the
immanent factor along with the assumed Persian influence;
but with him the two points of view do not yet fuse into a
unified picture but remain occasionally—and this just in re-
gard to the problem of the origin of the Satan figure—in open
contradiction to each other.
In addition to all the results of our investigations which
speak against a “taking-over” of the Satan figure, as far as the
“Persian” thesis is concerned, a comparison of the basic struc-
tures of the two religions suffices for us to consider, with von
Rad and others, that such a “taking-over” is out of the ques-
tion.
If one looks at the two figures—that of the Old Testament
Satan and of the Angra Mainyu of the Persian religion—not
as separate entities but as embedded in the whole religious pat-
tern, a fundamental difference is apparent. Stave, too, starts
from the premise that the Old Testament Satan from the
outset did not have the same character as the Persian Angra
Mainyu. The latter is from the beginning an independent
power beside Ahura Mazda. In the Persian religion there
exists a primary opposition between Spenta Mainyu and Angra
Mainyu. Angra Mainyu, like Ahura Mazda, reigns over his
own realm, and the two wage war on each other. They also
share in the creation of the physical universe, since Angra
16. Cf. also Scheftelowitz, Die altpersische Religion und das Juden-
tum (Giessen, 1920), p. 51: “The assumption that the Jews have taken
this idea from the Persians is untenable.”
17. Ueber den Einfluss des Parsismus auf das Judentum (Haarlem,
1898).
18. Ueber die jtidische Angelologie und Dimonologie in ibrer Abhin-
gigkeit vom Parsismus (1866).
Mainyu participates in the creation. He is the creator of harm-

ful insects and animals.”® In Yasna 45, 2 it says: “Yea, I will
declare the world’s two first spirits. . .”; ”° in Farvardin-Yast
XXII, 76: “. . . when the two spirits created the world, the
Good Spirit and the Evil One.” * And in Yasna 30, 3 they are
called a pair: * “Thus are the primeval spirits who as a pair
. . » have been famed [of old].” *
Hence, for the Persian religion, dualism is the point of
departure. The cosmic-ethical conflict appears to have been
the fundamental experience of the Persians, giving their reli-
gion its shape. In contrast, it seems to me (as I have pointed
out earlier; see above, p. 10) that the specific creative
factor in the religion of the Israelite people was something
quite opposite: the personality-quality of God, as the unity
which embraces and resolves the opposites.
Departing from this basic consideration, any unprejudiced
observer will soon realize that an influence of Ahri-
man-Angra Mainyu upon the figure of Satan is eminently
present. It is not, however, at the Old Testament level, where
Satan is, as it were, born out of the Old Testament figure of
God, but at a further stage of development: the late Judeo-
Christian. Only in Satan as the adversary of the Messiah in late
Jewish writings, on the one hand, and in the New Testament,
on the other, can Angra Mainyu be recognized as the proto-
19. Vendidad, ch. 1. See Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Miller,
2d ed., IV: The Zend-Avesta (Oxford, 1895), p. 198, trans. James
Darmesteter.
20. Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Miiller, (Oxford, 1887),
XXXI, 125, trans. L. H. Mills.
21. Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Miiller, (Oxford, 1883),
XXIII, 198, trans. James Darmesteter.
22. Rendered “a pair of twins” by Fritz Wolff in his German
translation, Avesta: Die heiligen Bucher der Parsen, tibersetzt auf der
Grundlage von Chr. Bartholomae’s altiranischem W6rterbuch (1924),
p- 240: “Die beiden Geister zu Anfang, die sich durch ein
Traumgesicht als Zwillingspaar offenbarten. . . .”
23. Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Miller, (1887), XXXI, 29,
- trans. L. H. Mills.
158 SATAN IN’ THE OLD TESTAMENT
type of Satan. Here Satan has become an independent princi-

ple, the embodiment of evil as a world principle. Therefore
Gunkel-has some justification for discriminating the Old Tes-
tament Satan completely from Satan in the New Testament.”
He believes that the two figures are independent of each
other and derive from different origins, the New Testament
Satan stemming from Persian influence. Carried to this ex-
treme conclusion, his opinion becomes inaccurate, however.
It is indispensable to take both factors into account, that of
continuity and that of difference, and this is possible only by
means of the concept of development. It would be absurd to
assume, for a time and place shaped by Yahwism, the incep-
tion of a spiritual concept which had no relation to it; the
more so since the continuity of the name also presents an
indication, even though only an external one, for the inner
continuity of the Satan figure in the Old and New Testa-
ments.
It becomes clear, therefore, that only a differentiation in
the divine personality, almost tantamount to falling apart,
could form the prerequisite for a more penetrating Persian
influence, i.e., the end phase of the process of enfolding of the
Old Testament godhead, but not its beginning. To this extent
a Persian influence, such as von Rad also takes into considera-
tion, might perhaps be possible as early as the passage in
Chronicles.* Ahriman, in his polar opposition to Ahura
Mazda, may have been a prototype for the Old Testament
Satan detaching himself from the personality of God. Here
too, however, the decisive factor is the immanent develop-
ment as a prerequisite for such an influence. Only after this
differentiation process had taken place was the ground pre-
24. Gunkel, “Teufelsglaube,” RGG ?, V, 1063-64.

25. Cf. also G. Kittel (Geschichte des Volkes Israel [1927], Ill, 141),
who assumes a Persian influence already for the Satan of Zechariah,
although he does not hold “an independent inner Jewish further
development of the earlier concept” to be precluded. In my opinion
these two possibilities are not mutually exclusive.
pared for a further-reaching Persian influence, which can be

clearly traced in the texts.”
The detachment of Satan from God, who is then
_ “cleansed” of his darkness, carried tremendous consequences.
_It formed the premise for the New Testament development
of Satan_into the contrapersonality of God and for his com-
plete splitting-off, as this is expressed in the mythologem of _
_the “bound” dragon of the Apocalypse.
~ In the Old Testament as his “birthplace,” Satan’s connec-
tion with God is still discernible even in the Chronicles pas-
26. So in Wisd. of Sol. 2:24 Satan appears identical with the Paradise
serpent and death. Later Judaism also knows this conception. In the
Talmud, Satan is also the “Angel of Death” (Baba Bathra 16a; Jer.
Sabb. 2, 6; etc.; see Scheftelowitz, op. cit. p. 56, n. 7). And by the
rabbis the devil is also called han-nahas haq-qadmon (Weber, System
der altsynagogalen palastinensischen Theologie, pp. 211 f., cit. Stave, op.
cit., p. 266. Cf. also Kohut, op. cit., p. 66. The extremely interesting
contrast to Adam Kadmon cannot be dealt with here.) These traits
correspond very exactly to the Persian Ahriman. With him death
enters the world: “[Yea] when the two spirits came together at the
first to make life, and life’s absence. .. .” (Yasna 30, 4. See Sacred
Books of the East, ed. F. Max Miller [Oxford, 1887], XX XI, 30, trans.
L. H. Mills); and in the Vendidad, ch. 1, he has the standing epithet
“who is all death” (Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Miller
[Oxford, 1895], IV, 4ff.). About his serpent form, the Bundehesh,
chapter 3, says: “Afterwards, the evil spirit, with the confederate
demons, went towards the luminaries and he saw the sky; and he led
them up, fraught with malicious intentions. He stood upon one-third of
the inside of the sky, and he sprang like a snake out of the sky down to
the earth” (Pahlavi Texts in the Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max
Miiller, [1880], V, 17, trans. E. W. West). See further correspondences
between Ahriman and the late Jewish-Christian Satan in Scheftelowitz,
op. cit., pp. 55 ff.; Stave, op. cit., pp. 263 ff.; Kohut, op. cit., pp. 62 ff.;
Roskoff, Geschichte des Teufels (1869), pp. 190 ff.
Instructive in our context is the fact that there is evidence of the
direct adoption of a Persian demon in the post-Exilic period—not of
Satan, however, but of Asmodi in the Book of Tobit, which probably
originated in Persia. It is typical that here, as with the ancient Babylo-
nian demons, the name is also retained; according to the most general
view, Asmodi is the Persian Aeshma Daeva. According to Alexander
Kohut (ep. cit., p. 73), Aeshma is called “the violently seeking, desirous
spirit.” So the example of Asmodi in regard to the Persian stage of
assimilation, as well as that of the cacodemons of the Old Testament in
regard to the Babylonian, supports our conception of the Old Testa-
ment Satan as a phenomenon within the divine sphere.
sage. If our previous investigations of the Chronicles account

have already, by the parallels which offered themselves,
brought Satan in essence very close to Yahweh, this relation-
ship is revealed again with unexpected profundity in II Sam.
24:1 ff. In his independence in I Chronicles 21, Satan is no
longer related to God, because he is, aS it were, identical
with him. He does exactly what Yahweh himself does in
II Sam. 24:1. There it says: “And again the anger of Yahweh
was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against
them. . .” 2” (italics added). Thus in the Book of Samuel it is
clearly Yahweh who himself provokes the man David to sin
against him. From this background of the ambivalence of the
divine personality itself—which may be considered another ex-
press confirmation of the thesis of this book, that Satan embod-
ies a side of God’s being—the corresponding inner divine ten-
sion between Yahweh and Satan in the Chronicles becomes
fully apparent. The census is against the will of Yahweh, it is
hubris, disobedience of man, but, as Satan, Yahweh himself
27. It is probably not necessary in our context to go into the problem

of the literary connection between I Chronicles 21 and II Samuel 24.
Even if II Samuel 24 is not the source of the Chronicler, as assumed by
Rothstein (Kommentar zum ersten Buch der Chronik [1927],
pp- 285 ff.), J. Benzinger (Die Biicher der Chronik [1901], p. 62), and, to
a limited extent, also K. Budde (op. cit., p. 327)—-M. Noth has an
opposing view (Ueberlieferungsgeschichtliche Studien, 1 [1943], 138);
he even thinks that the Chronicler had nothing before him but the
Book of Samuel in the form which tradition handed down—this would
in no way affect the inner relation between the two passages, which
alone concerns us here. They present two stages of a theological
development. This is fully acknowledged by Rothstein, too, despite his
aforementioned judgment in regard to the literary problem, when he
says: “Here Satan corresponds to the wrath in Yahweh’s innermost
being which is enflamed against Israel and seductively incites David to
count the people. Thus, the divine wrath was, as it were, incarnated in
him, separated from Yahweh, and had become an independent person-
ality. This detachment of the wrathful reaction to sin in God’s divine
being from the divine personality as such, and its hypostatization in the
figure of Satan, naturally was not accomplished overnight; it needed a
process of development extending over a considerable time before it
became possible to reshape the old account in its beginning in the form
now offered us by the writer of Chronicles” (Rothstein, op. cit.,
pp: 379-80.)
—
leads man into this sin. If we think of the role established for
Satan so far, we may-also justifiably surmise a divine purpose
_in the temptation of David into sin. If in Genesis 3 we have
found this ambivalence of God, who does not want man to
eat of the tree of knowledge lest he become like God and yet_
through the serpent tempts him to do so—here still, so to speak,
“unconsciously” —because man’s godlike knowledge of good
and evil is just what God really desires (see above, pp. 130 f.);
and if, in the stories of Balaam and Job, we have seen Satan as
the force that, bybreaking man’s will, makes him conscious of
his own will in the clash with God’s, then we may here suspect
the same goal—namely, man’s becoming conscious—as the
“meaning of the sin.” David’s royal power is obviously deci-
mated as a result of the guilt effected by Satan. Only con-
sciousness of it creates room in David for the will of God and
makes David the carrier of revelation. Satan here really proves
himself to be a “demonic-destructive principle firmly an-
chored in the plan of salvation,” as von Rad formulates it so
well in reference to I Chronicles 21.” Even the Chronicler,
who usually has no great compunction about whitewashing
the sins of “good” kings (for instance, he never mentions the
Bath-sheba story *°) cannot avoid including David’s sin and his
emphatic confession of guilt. David’s confession of guilt goes
hand in hand with Yahweh’s command to the angel of pesti-
lence to desist. The enantiodromia in the human soul corre-
sponds to that in the divine personality. It is as if here were the
first small seed of the much Jater identification of the human
soul with the “heavenly Jerusalem.” For in medieval Christian-
ity the heavenly Jerusalem became the symbol of the redeemed
soul, and the walled city the symbol of the soul which had
come into its own and therewith, at the same time, to God.
David builds the altar from which the temple shall rise. In the
later stage of Job it is already the soul that finds itself in God.
Through David, Jerusalem becomes “the house of Yahweh the
28. Von Rad, op. cit., p. 7 4.

29. Cf. If Samuel 11 and i Chronicles 20.
God” (I Chron. 22:1); with Job it is the human soul. But this
is what we have already recognized to be the final, urgent goal
of the activity manifested in Satan: the human soul as “dwell-
ing-place” of the God becoming conscious of himself.
INDEX
Abraham, 72n, 121-23, 127, 144 Amos (book), 83, 97

Accuser, human, 13-20, 134n, Angel, 71n, 93, 95, 104, 110, 141;
155n. See also Satan as accuser as aspects of God, 50, 107n,
Achish, 34 110n, 112; of death, 159n; as
Adam, 113 exterior soul, 66n; fallen, 33,
Adam Kadmon, 159n 112-13, 115-17; guardian, 135;
Adapa myth, 63, 141 of pestilence, 161; recording,
Adversary, human, 14-15, 17-19, 104; Satan as, 8, 118n, 141. See
26, 34-37, 134n, 155n. See also also bené ha-eléhim; mal’ak
God as adversary; mal’ak Yab- Yahweh
qweh as adversary; Satan as ad- Angra Mainyu, 8, 117n, 134n,
versary 156-58
Aeshma Daeva, 159n Animal, 122, 129, 157; aspect of
Agamemnon, 110n God, 86-87, 105-6, aspect of
Ahab, 107-10 man, 76, 132; demons, 13, 44—
Ahriman. See Angra Mainyu 45, 51; as instinct, 48, 73. See
Ahura Mazda, 67, 117n, 156, 158 also Behemoth; Goat; Horse;
Albright, W. F., 96n Leviathan; Sea monster; Ser-
Altar, David’s, 154, 161 pent
Alu, 45 Anu, 63, 65
Ambivalence. See God: ambiva- Anunnaki, 104
lence of Apocalypse, 117, 154n, 159; of
163
Baruch, 130; Isaiah, 114. See 100-113, 119. See also Satan:
also Revelation (book) one of bené ha-’elohim
Apocrypha, 33, 49 91n, 114, 130, Benzinger, J., 41n, 45n, 48n, 109n,
156. See also Enoch; Jubilees; 160n
Tobit; Wisdom of Solomon Bertheau, E., 60n, 153
Archaic thinking, 64-65 Birkeland, H., 16n
Archetype, 91-92, 94, 98-99, God Black, J. S., 43n
as, 4, 5; Satan as, 4, 98-99, 156 Bogomiles, 99n
Ark, 102n Boils, 84, 125
Army, 102n Bolte, J., 91n
Ashurbanipal, 63 Bones, 86
Asmodi, 159n Bousset, W., 28n, 33n
Ass, Balaam’s, 73 Bow and arrow, 121n
Astral gods, 101, 114-15, 117 Brass, 86
Atonement: for census, 151; Brockelmann, K., 29n, 134n
dogma of, 91. See also Sacrifice Brocke-Utne, A., 13-17
Avesta, 67, 134n, 157, 159n Briinnhilde, 74n
Azazel, 7, 8, 45-50; etymology of Budde, K., 43, 74n, 153, 154n,
name, 41-43 160n
Buhl, F., 25n, 28, 42, 43, 58n,
Baal-Zaphon, 42 100n, 115n, 125
Babylon, 48-49 Bull colossi, 44
Babylonian Job, 87-90, 133-34, Bundehesh, 116n, 159n
141n
Balaam, 18, 29, 38, 72-76, 132, Cacodemons. See Demons
147, 161 Caldwell, W., 41n, 45n
Barth, K., 22n Calf, 45
Barton, G. A., 41n Caspari, D. W., 37n
Baruch. See Apocalypse of Ba- Census, 151-53, 160
ruch Chaldeans, raid of, 84
Bastian, A., 91 Chaos, 44, 104
Bath-sheba, 161 Chariot of God, 104
Baudissin, W. W., 42, 45, 70n, Charisma, 111
105n, 140 Cherubim, 44, 45, 51, 74-75n, 106,
Bauer, H., 25, 26 116n
Cheyne, T. K., 43
Baumgartner, W., 13n, 42, 43n,
Christ, 71n, 91, 99-100n
44n, 58n, 61-62, 65n, 71n, 116n,
134n
Christianity, 32, 33, 91-93, 154,
161. See also New Testament
Behemoth, 45, 51, 86-87, 127, 129; Chronicler, 117, 160n, 161
etymology of, 43 Chronicles, 6, 7, 10n, 19, 39, 40,
Bel, 42 45, 57, 72n, 79, 111n, 146, 151-62
Belot, J. B., 29n City, walled, 161
bené hi-elohim, 16, 18, 39, 50, Cleverness, 91-92
71n, 98-118, 142; autonomy of, Coelln, D. von, 29n
108-12, 114; etymology of, 98- Complex, autonomous, 155
100; as messenger, 107-8; mul- Conflict, 127, 157. See also God:
tiplicity of, 100-107, 109, 112, ambivalence of
118, 119; relation to God, 80n, Consciousness: development of,
165 Index
49, 92; extinguished, 121n,; Dionysius, H., 153n

God’s, 110, 127-31, 161, 162; Dionysus, 51
human, 76, 83, 127, 130, 131-32, Disease. See Demons: of disease
134, 161; as light, 49, 132 Divine realm. See Human realm
Conversion, 122n Dogma, 10; of atonement, 91
Counting. See Census Doubt: God’s, 119-24, 126, 130,
Court, divine, 20, 38, 101, 103, 135, 142; Job’s, 129
108-10, 112n, 114, 118n; and Dragon, 43, 116-17n, 159
human, 16, 17-20, 135, 139, 142 Dream, 73n, 94, 110n, 140
Covenant, 120-22, 127, 143 Driver, S. R., 46, 118n
Creation, 121, 122, 126, 127, 154; Du Plessis, 99n
story of, 25, 104, 156-57 Dualism, 8, 47, 134, 157
Crocodile. See Leviathan Duhm, B., 79n, 80-81, 99-100,
Cruelty. See God: dark, destruc- 114n, 115-16n
tive side Duhm, H., 8-10, 11, 41, 43n, 52,
Curtis, E. L., 153 57, 69n, 79, 90, 105n
Dirr, L., 104
Dahnhardt, O., 91n Dwarfs, 92
Daniel (book), 72n
Dark. See God: dark, destructive Earth. See Heaven
side; Light and dark principles Ebeling, E., 88n
Darmesteter, James, 157n Eden, 116n. See also Paradise
David, 15, 34-38, 39, 57, 151, 153- Edom, 49
54, 155n, 160-61 Eichhorn, E. J., 29n
Dawn, 115-16n Eichrodt, W., 46n, 48n, 102n
Death, 159n Eisler, R., 41
Demons, 7-10, 12-13, 33, 35, 40- El (él), 101, 116n, 119
52, 79-90, 98, 116-17n, 134n; El-Amarna letters, 14
anthropomorphic, theriomor- Elephantine, 94n
phic, 9; assimilated by Yahweh, Elijah, 67
45, 69, 70, 95; cacodemons, 9- Elisha, 67, 102n
10, 51, 79, 159n; of disease, 13, *Eljon, 115n
70, 90, 133-34, 135; Persian, ’elohim, 99, 100, 101
159n Elohist, 26, 62
Desert. See Wilderness Enantiodromia, 161
Destructiveness. See God: dark, Enemy. See Adversar
destructive side Enoch (book), 33, 50, 112n, 114,
Deuteronomy, 17, 44, 63, 101n, 129
125, 132n, 143 Eos, 115n
Development, inner: archetypes Epiphanius, 100n
express, 94; of Job, 130-31. See Erman, A., 89n
also God: development of im- Esau, 26n
age of; Satan: development of Etymology: of angel and demon
the concept names, 41-44; of bené ha-
Devil, 51, 76, 91, 92, 116-17n, ’elohim, 98-100; of mal’ak
146, 159n Yahweh, 58; of Satan, 25-34
Diestel, L., 42, 83-86, 87n, 143n Eucharist, 129
- Differentiation. See God: dif- Eve, 50, 113
ferentiation of Evil, 3, 9, 36, 125n, 134n, 158. See
also God: dark, destructive 125-30, 132, 142-44, 160-61;

side; Good and evil; Spirit: contains opposites, 16, 73, 97,
evil 126, 129, 134, 145-46, 157; dark,
Ewald, H., 41n, 85, 139 destructive side, 7, 9, 10, 12, 19,
Exodus, 12, 25, 58, 59, 67, 68, 69, 69-70, 73-76, 105, 110, 113, 119-
74-75n, 102n, 107, 119, 122n, 32, 135, 141-44, 154-55, 159-61;
125, 127-28, 151-52 development of image of, 5-6,
Eye of the King, 135-36 52, 83, 87, 94, 95, 98, 105, 109-
Ezekiel (prophet), 67, 104, 106 10, 123-24, 130-31, 145; dif-
Ezekiel (book), 17-18, 49, 74n, ferentiation of, 50, 69-70, 87,
116n, 118n, 121n, 154 101-3, 135, 136, 142, 155, 158;
Ezra (book), 15n justice and mercy in, 81, 142-
47; multiplicity of, 101-5; na-
Fairy tales, 92. See also Myths ture-side of, 51, 86-87, 103-6,
Fall. See Angel: fallen 127; power of, 80-82, 151; rela-
Fate, divine, 123, 129, 132 tion to ancient gods and de-
Feminine and masculine, 49-50, mons, 45-48, 69, 86-87, 95,
144-46 101-6, 117; relation to angels,
Fire: chariot of, 102n; of God, 58-71, 100-117; relation to man,
85, 121, 125, 146; justice as, 145, 3-5, 38-39, 72-76, 108, 112-13,
meaning of, 74-75n 120-23, 126-28, 130-32, 135,
Flood, 120, 154 142-47; relation to Satan, 6, 30,
Forster, W., 35n, 52n 40, 52, 80-82, 119-20, 124, 127,
Fravashi, 67 133, 136, 158-60; spiritual
Frazer, J. G., 46, 66n, 152 (holy), 47, 105, 145. See also
Frey, J., 60n El; ’eldhim; sar-seba@-Yahweh;
Frobenius, L., 76n Yahwism
First, J., 42 Goddess, 94-95, 134
Gods, ancient, 52, 67, 101-3, 114;
Gabriel (archangel), 72n, 93 astral, 101-3, 114-15; guardian,
Gad the Seer, 154 125; repression of, 47-48; ser-
Galling, K., 45n pent, 105-6; sun, 42
Genesis, 11n, 12n, 25, 26, 27, 31, Goldziher, I., 32
44n, 45n, 50, 58, 59, 60, 61, 72n, Good and evil: knowledge of,
74, 101-2, 107, 110, 111-13, 115, 74, 113, 131, 161; as opposites,
118n, 120-21, 123, 154, 161 92; source of, 16, 97; spirits,
Genius, 67 157
Gesenius, W., 25n, 27, 28, 29, 42, Grace, divine, 143n, 145n
43, 44, 58n, 100n, 115n, 125 Gray, G. B., 71n, 118n
Giant, 91, 92 Gregory the Great, 117n
Gideon, 59 Gressman, H., 28n, 33n, 88n,
Gilgamesh, 141 141n
Ginn, 32, 33, 45 Grimme, H., 42n, 46n
Glueck, N., 144n Gruenbaum, M., 48n
Goat, 41, 44, 46, 47-48, 51 Guardians. See Cherubim; Gods
God/Yahweh: as adversary, 72- Gunkel, H., 34, 43, 50, 60-61, 62,
76; ambivalence of, 10, 12, 39, 73n, 74n, 76, 80n, 82, 91, 99,
70, 71, 80-82, 109-13, 119-23, 102n, 115n, 158n
167 Index
Guthe, H., 27, 28 Humbert, P., 75n, 86n

Gutmann, J., 46n, 48n Humor, 93
Hadad, 14, 34 I Ching, 49

Hafeli, L., 153 Iblis, 32, 33, 75n
Hagar, 58 Idol worship, 45
Haggai, 48 Igigi, 104
Hahn, C. U., 100n Ilgen, P., 29n
Harishchandra, 89, 93-94 Iliad, 110n
Harlez, M. C. de, 134n Immanence and transcendence, 5
Harris, 116n Incarnation, 71n
ha-raah. See rial Incubus, 43n
Harvey, J. W., 127n Influence, foreign, on Old Tes-
Heaven: and earth, 104, 121n. See tament concepts, 8, 32-34 36-
also Court, divine; Host of 38, 65-66, 80n, 83-95, 101-3,
heaven; Human realm: relation 116-17n, 133-35, 155-59
to divine Instinct, 48, 73
Hélél ben Sahar, 115-17 Intelligence. See Cleverness
Hempel, J., 96n Iris, 121n
Hengstenberg, J. W., 29n, 30 Tron, 86
Herald. See Messenger; Vizier Isaac, 72n, 122, 154
Hercules, 67 Isaiah (book), 43, 44, 45, 49, 69n,
Herder, J. G., 29n 72n, 83, 86, 87n, 97n, 105, 106,
Herodotus, 84n 114-16, 117n, 131, 143
Hezekiah, 106
Hieros gamos, 94 Jablonski, P. E., 43
Hindrance, 132, 147. See also Ad- Jacob, 26n, 58-59, 62n
versary; Opposition; Persecu- Jastrow, M., 65n, 87-88
tor Jensen, P., 66n
Hippopotamus. See Behemoth Jeremiah (book), 75n, 101n, 143,
Hiram (King of Tyre), 15, 34 145n, 146
History, 64-65, 69, 70, 94, 140 Jeremias, A., 74n, 93n, 121n, 140-
Hitzig, F., 70n 41
Holiness, 47, 105 Jeroboam, 14, 45
Holscher, G., 47n, 86n, 90, 93, 95, Jerusalem, 154; heavenly, 161
96n Jirku, A., 11-13
Holzinger, H., 72n Joab, 153, 155n
Hopfner, T., 84n Job (man), 83, 97, 113, 119-32,
Horse, 76, 102n 147, 154, 161, 162; wife of, 50,
Hosea (book), 27-28, 50, 61, 62, 113
146 Job (book), 6, 8, 11n, 13, 16, 18,
Host of heaven, 73, 101-3, 105, 19, 20, 26, 30, 31, 39, 43, 45, 50,
106, 108-10 79-136, 142, 154-55; age of, 7,
Hubris, 160 31, 83n, 122n; folktale in, 31,
Human realm, relation to divine, 82, 89, 92-93, 95-97, 113, 123n,
13-20, 31-39, 51, 57, 126, 142 124-26, 130
' Humanity. See God: relation to Job, Babylonian. See Babylonian
man Job
Joshua (high priest), 38, 139-41, Law, Mosaic, 10n, 132

144, 146-47 Leander, P., 25, 26
Joshua (book), 72n, 73, 102n, 103, Leeuw, G. van der, 66n
107 Left and right, 144-45
Jubilees, 28, 33n, 50, 122 Legends. See Myths
Judges (book), 58, 59, 71-72n, Lenormant, F., 43n
102n Leprosy, 12, 84-85, 125
Jung, C. G., 4-5, 51, 91, 129
Leviathan, 45, 51, 86-87, 116n,
Jung, Leo, 75n, 110n 127, 129; etymology of, 43
Justice: God’s, 81; and mercy, 36,
Leviticus, 10n, 41, 45, 46, 125
38, 142-47
Justinus Martyr, 46, 71n Libido, 48, 49
Light and dark principles, 145n.
Kabbala, 72n, 144-45 See also Consciousness
Kaupel, H., 9n, 10-11, 37n, 40n, Lightning, 74n, 85, 125
Lilith, 7, 44; etymology of, 43
45, 46n, 109n, 111-12n, 118n, Lindblom, J., 96n, 114, 123n
155n
Kautzsch, E., 26n, 47n, 70n, 95- Littman, E., 33-34
96n
Livy, 153n
Kazimirski, A., 29n Lods, A., 20, 31, 60n, 66-68, 93n,
Ker Jupta, 76 112n, 135-36, 142n
Kimchi, D., 41 Loehr, Max, 46
King of Babylon, 116 Lofthouse, W. F., 145n
King James Bible, 27 Logos, 71n
King, Sumerian, 141 Love: God’s, 75n, 124; principle
King of Tyre, 15, 34, 116n of, 143-46
I Kings, 14-15, 16, 19, 31, 34, 74n, Lucifer, 115, 117, 132
85, 100n, 101, 103, 108-9, 111n, Luke (gospel), 117n
118-19 Luther Bible, 29, 36, 146n
Il Kings, 67, 69, 85, 100n, 101-2n, Luzzatto, S. D., 30
105
Kittel, R., 17n, 35n, 52n, 58n, 60n, Magic, 122n
109n, 111n, 136n, 139n, 154n,
Magic fire, 74n
158n
mahané ’eldbim, 107
Knobel, A., 70n
Koehler, L., 25n, 42, 43, 58n, 103n, Malachi (book), 49, 72n
106n malak ham-mashit, 69-70, 76,
Kohut, A., 122n, 156, 159n 109n i
K6nig, E., 96n malak Yahweh, 18, 38, 122, 143n,
Koran, 32, 33 144, 146-47; as adversary, 29,
Krebs, F., 89n 38-39, 57, 72-75; and bené ha-
Kugler, F. X., 40n, 155n ’elohim compared, 100, 106-8,
Kuzah, 121n 112n; as divine messenger, 58,
60, 61, 107-8; etymology of, 58;
Lagrange, S. M., 60n as “exterior soul,” 66-69; as
Landersdorfer, S., 88-89 function, 39, 59-60, 69-71, 72;
Lane, E. W., 29n, 32n identity with Yahweh, 58-75,
Langdon, S., 87n 107-8; opposes Satan, 139, 142,
Langton, E., 7n 146
169 Index
Man. See God: relation to man; Miller, D. H., 32

Human realm Miiller, E., 144n
Mana, 67 Miller, F. Max, 157n, 159n
Manichaeans, 99n Miiller, W. Max, 43
Mankind: ’4ddm as, 99 Multiplicity: of bené ha-~eldhim,
Manoah, 59, 67 100-107, 109, 112, 118-19; of
Marduk, 49, 104, 116n God, 101-6. See also Polythe-
Mars of Edessa, 42 ism; Unity and multiplicity
Marti, K., 27n, 28, 35n, 37n, 40, Mythologem: understanding of,
111n, 140, 141 3. See also Archetype; Motifs
Marti Rusaziz, 42 Myths: Arabic, 121n; Babylonian,
Masculine and feminine, 49-50, 87-89, 104, 116n, 121n; German,
144-46 91-93, 102n; Greek, 110n, 115n;
Mastema (mastémda), 27-28, 50, Indian, 89, 92, 93-94; Swahili,
122 93
mazkir ‘awon, 17-18
Meinhof, C., 93n Name: as “exterior soul,” 67;
Meissner, B., 43n significance of, 25
Melchizedek, 101 Nature, 49-50, 145; in God, 51,
Mercury, 66n, 115n 86-87, 103-6, 127; in man, 132
Mercy and justice, 36, 38, 142-47 Nebo, 63, 64, 65-66
Merx, E., 41n Nebuchadrezzar, 17
Messenger: bené ha-elohim as, Nebustan, 105-6
107-8; mal’ak Yahweh as, 58, New Testament, 3, 11, 33, 91n,
60-63, 106-8. See also Satan: 116n, 117, 143n, 144, 146, 154n,
as messenger 157-58, 159. See also Revela-
Messiah, 131, 146, 157 tion; Romans
Metaphysical realm. See Human Night demons, 12
realm Nikel, J., 105n
Meyer, E., 60, 68n Nile, 86
Micaiah ben Imlah, 101, 107-11, Noah, 120, 122
119 Noldeke, T., 134n
Michael (archangel), 93, 117n Noth, M., 160n
Midrash, 48, 110n, 112n Nowack, W., 140
Migne, J. P., 99n Numbers (book), 12, 15, 18, 29,
Mills, L. H., 157n, 159n 31, 35, 38-39, 40, 57ff., 72-76,
Miriam, 12, 125n 85, 105n, 107, 118n, 125n
Monotheism, 10, 16, 47, 80n. See
also Unity Oehler, F., 100n
Montgomery, 116n Opposites, 92, 134; in Kabbala,
Moon, 101, 114, 115n, 120-21n 144-45. See also Conflict; God:
Moret, A., 136n contains opposites
Morgenstern, J., 101n, 109n, 111n, Opposition: as divine function,
112n, 114-17 40, 76; inner, 36, 37. See also
Moses, 12, 59, 63, 105-7, 122n, Adversary; Hindrance; Perse-
125, 127 cutor
_ Motifs: archetypal, 90-94, 98; Origen, 45n
“migrating,” 91 Osiris, 84, 86
Mowinkel, S., 72 Otto, R., 127n, 128-29, 130
Paganism, 45 Rad, G. von, 17-19, 25-26, 52n,

Pap-sukal, 65 58n, 136n, 155-56, 158, 161
Paradise, 75n, 106, 132. See also Rahab, 43, 49, 86-87
Serpent Raiment, festive, 141
Paul, St., 128-29 Rainbow, 120-21n
Paulicians, 99n Ras Shamra, 116n
Persecutor, 88n, 90, 134-35, 155n. Raschi, 41
See also Accuser; Hindrance, Rationalism, 4, 68, 140
Opposition Redeemer, Redemption, 129, 130-
Pestilence. See Plague 31, 147, 161. See also Salvation
Peter, First Epistle of, 146 Reuss, E., 45n, 60n
Peters, N., 96n Revelation, 69, 129, 130-31, 161;
Pfeiffer, R., 44n, 88n on Sinai, 49, 122, 132; vision
Phaéthon, 115-16n as, 140
Phenomenology, 5, 8, 21, 62, 65 Revelation (book), 3, 116-17n,
Philo, 60, 71n 159
Piety: God’s wish for, 119-23, Rezon, 14-15, 34
124; Job’s, 123, 130, 132; test of, Right and left, 144-45
93-94 Righteous Sufferer. See Babylo-
Pinckert, H., 63n nian Job
Plague, 69-70, 125, 151, 154, 161 risa, 48-49
Platonic idea, 99 Rituals, 46-48, 121-22
Plutarch, 83, 84n, 85, 86n Rogers, R. W., 87n
Polarity. See Conflict, Opposites Romans, Epistle to the, 128
Police agent, Satan as, 20, 31 Roskoff, G., 7-8, 41-42, 46, 82n,
Polivka, G., 91n 159n
Polytheism, 33, 50. See also Mul- Rost, L., 48-49
tiplicity Rothstein, J. W., 71n, 72n, 112n,
Power: David’s, 161; God’s, 81- 139-40, 143n, 160n
82, 151-52; Satan’s, 80-82, 92 riah, 19; ba-ruab, 109, 111n
Praetorius, F., 32
Priestcodex, 95, 102n, 104 Sabeans, 84
Primal image. See Archetype Sacrifice, 42, 46-48, 93, 96, 122n,
Pritchard, J. B., 88n, 89n 129, 152, 154
Procksch, O., 60n St. John. See Revelation (book)
Profane realm. See Human realm St. Paul, 128-29
Prophets, 9, 16, 50, 64, 72n, 100, Salvation: carrier of, 121, 154;
103n, 109n plan of, 19, 110n, 113, 121-22,
Proverbs, 109n 144, 161. See also Redemption
Psalms, 16, 26, 44, 52n, 73n, 74n, I Samuel, 15, 31, 34, 74n, 102n,
86, 87n, 101, 106, 107, 109n, 106, 118n
114-15, 135, 143, 144 II Samuel, 35-37, 39, 69-70, 75,
Pseudojonathan, 41 97, 102n, 106, 145, 152, 154n,
Psyche, contents of, 3-5, 75n 160, 161n
Punishment, 112-17, 150 Sanctuary, 67, 74n, 154n
Puranas, 93n Sar-rapu-Nergal, 44
Purpose, divine. See Salvation, Sar-seba’-Yahweh, 73, 102n, 107
plan of Satan: as accuser, 8, 12-17, 20, 30,
Pursuer, 88 57, 134-36, 139, 142; as adver-
171 Index
sary, 11n, 29-30, 38-40, 57, 76, seb@ has-Samaim. See Host of
132, 155n, 157; as adversary of * heaven
God, 110, 144; as angel, 18, 30, sédim, Se‘irim, 7, 40, 44-45, 51
50, 97, 142; as one of bené ha- Sefiroth, 72n, 144-45
*elohim, 50, 98-99, 108, 113, 118- Seippel, G., 42n, 43n, 83n, 84n, 86
32, 133, 136; autonomy of, 39, Sellin, E., 28, 96-98, 12426, 128
40, 119-20, 155, 158; in Book of Seraphim, 44, 45, 51, 105, 106
Job, 7, 8, 13, 16, 18, 20, 30, 79ff., Serpent, 32, 44, 117n, 159n; bra-
143n; compared with other de- zen, 105-6; flying, 105n; Para-
mons, 41-52, 79-95, 113, 117, dise, 11n, 33, 45n, 50, 111n, 113,
131, 134n, 159n; development 131, 159n, 161
of the concept, 8, 10, 20, 83, Servius Tullius, 153
146-47, 158-59; as disease de- Seth, 42, 83-86; sons of, 112n
mon, 13, 90, 133-34; embodies Shaitan, 32, 121n
justice, 38, 142n, 144, 146; ety- Shimei, 35-37
mology of name, 25-34; and the Sickness. See Demon: disease
feminine, 49-50, 145; as func- Sin, 27, 47-50, 113, 147, 151-52,
tional aspect of God, 19, 39-40, 155n, 160n, 161
52, 87, 110, 118-27, 130-32, 146- Sinai, 49, 68, 84, 122, 132
47, 155, 199-61; as God’s son, Sisera, 102n
99n; as inner evil, 36, 141; Siva, 94
meaning of concept, 29; as Slanderer, 14-15, 29n
messenger, 20, 31, 108; in New Smend, R., 68n
Testament, 3, 11, 33, 116n, 117, Smith H. P., 37n
157-58, 159; Persian influence Smith, W. R., 45n
on concept of, 8, 135-36, 155- Snake. See Serpent
59; as proper name, 39, 40, 51, Soederblom, N., 67n
79, 110, 155; relation to God, Solomon, 14-15, 17, 34-35, 57.
6, 79-82, 92, 94, 95, 126, 134n, See also Wisdom of Solomon
142; as spirit, 51, 92, 111n; in Song of Solomon, 75n
Zechariah, 8, 20, 97, 111n, 139- Sons of God. See bené ha-elohim
47. See also Devil; Lucifer; Soul: evil in, 4n, 36; “exterior,”
Shaitan; Tempter 66-69; relation to God, 4-5, 38,
Satans (human), 13-16, 34-37 129, 141, 161-62
Satyr, 44 Spenta Mainyu, 156
Saul, 15, 34, 111 Spheres, 144
Scapegoat, 41 Sphinx, 74n
Scheftelowitz, J., 156n, 159n Spiegelberg, W., 43
Schlottmann, K., 93n Spirit, 106, 108-11, 119, 144; evil,
108-11, 152, 157. See also Satan:
Scholem, G., 144n
as spirit
Schrader, E., 102n, 104n, 115n, Stade, B., 46n, 60n, 68n, 111n
134n Stars, 101-3, 115-16n
Schultz, H., 60n, 70n, 71n Statius, 67
Schulz, A., 60n Stave, E., 50, 96n, 116n, 118n,
Schwally, F., 111n 122n, 143n, 144, 156, 159n
_ Sea, 86 Stier, F., 60n, 62-66, 68n, 70n, 71n
Sea monster, 86, 129; conquering Stilbon, 66n
of, 116n Storm, 121n, 125
Stupidity, 91, 92 Varro, M., 153n

Succubus, 43n Vasishtha, 94
Suffering, 129, 132, 133-34, 146. Vatke, W., 60n
See also Babylonian Job Vincent, H., 75n
Sun, 42, 84, 101, 114, 115-16n Virolleaud, C., 87n, 121n
Sword, 107; meaning of, 74-75 Vision: nature of, 139-41; of
Symmacho, 41 Ezekiel, 104, 106; of Isaiah, 105,
106; of Micaiah ben Imlah, 101,
Tabari, 75n, 121n 107-11; of Zechariah, 38, 48-49,
Tabernacle, holy, 46, 47 104, 139-41, 144
Tabi-utul-Bel, 89n Vismamitra, 94
Taktabai Margin, 76 Vizier, 65-66
Talmud, 81, 122, 156, 159n Volz, P., 10, 93n, 110n, 128
Tannin, 116n Vulgate, 117n
Targum, 41
Tehom. See Chaos Wager: in Book of Job, 80-82,
Tekoah, woman of, 75 94, 96-97, 142; motif of, 90-94
Temple, 61, 154, 161, Babylonian Wahrmund, A., 29n
and Egyptian, 74n; Roman, 67 War, 73-84, 102-3n, 121n
Tempter, 11n, 35, 37 Water, 145
Terrien, S., 89n Water buffalo, 43
Tertullian, 117n Weber, O., 159n
Theology, 62, 67-68, 82, 94, 97, Well, 31
98, 104, 128 Wellhausen, J., 27, 32, 60n, 115n
Thoth, 65-66 West, E. W., 159n
Throne, God’s, 74n Westphal, G., 68n, 73, 101-2n
Thunder, 74n, 102n Wette, W. M. de, 60n
Thureau-Dangin, F., 74n
Tiamat, 44, 49, 104
Wiernikowski, J., 82n
Tiglath-Pileser I, 74n Wild host, 102n
Tobit (book), 159n Wilderness, 13, 40, 41, 4445,
Torch, 121 47-48, 84, 105n, 129
Torczyner, H., 19-20, 29, 30, 31, Wilhelm, R., 49n
39, 122n, 135 Will: of bené ha-eldhim, 108,
Toy, C. H., 112n 111, 114; man’s vs. God’s, 72-
Transcendence, 5 76, 132, 147, 151-52, 161; Satan’s
Tree: of knowledge, 161; of life, vs. God’s, 119-20
74, 144-45; sefiroth, 144-45 Wilson, J. A., 89n
Tritton, A. S., 32 Winckler, H., 115n
Twins, 157n Wind, 84, 106, 109n
Wisdom of Solomon, 33n, 113n,
Unconscious, 48, 51, 92, 103-4, 118n, 159n
140, 145 Wolff, F., 157n
Ungnad, A., 45n, 63n Woman, 49-50. See also Feminine
Unity, 106, 126, 157; and multi- and masculine
plicity, 10, 95, 114. See also Wrath, God’s. See God: dark,
Monotheism destructive side
Uz, 84 Wiinsche, A., 91-93
173. Index
Yahweh. See God/Yahweh 108, 111n, 118n, 134-35, 139-47,

Yahweh seba’ot, 101-3n 155, 158n
Yahwism, 8, 9-10, 45, 49, 50, 51, Zephaniah (book), 101n
52, 80n, 82, 98 Zeruiah, sons of, 35-37
Zeus, 110
Yang and Yin, 49, 145n
Zigadenus, E., 99n
Zimmerli, W., 75n, 153n
Zimmern, H., 44, 104, 115n, 134
Zadokites, 111n Zion, 154n
Zechariah (book), 6, 8, 13, 20, 38, Ziirich Bible, 27, 29, 35, 100n,
39, 40, 48-49, 74n, 87, 97, 104, 139n, 146n
RivKAH ScuArr Kiucer received her
doctoral degree in Semitic Languages
and Religious History from the Uni-
versity of Ziirich. She was trained in
analytical psychology by C. G. Jung,
lectured regularly on psychology and
religion at the C. G. Jung-Institut,
Ziirich, and is currently engaged in
private practice in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia.
Hitpecarp Nacev has been interested

in depth psychology since 1918, and
has translated Jung materials for the
Analytical Psychology Club of New
York, W. W. Norton, and North-
western University Press.
Satan
1199
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SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY AT CLAREMONT
CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA
(hay PRINTED INU.S.A,

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School of Theology

teat ers sae

Rivkah Scharf Kluger 7

Northwestern University Press

The original German-language edition of SATAN IN THE OLD

ibe THE PSyCHoLocy of the unconscious advances, it seems

archaeology and philology—takes on new significance in the

writings of these collaborators are not included in the Col-

Sof win at ssieteaiann, er

aerrdtl: si vunge 2in wes

osiftye agate! lari pines aa paie M bis

eens hie Gytrny? A gPianow ea

Astieh +3asin Sa, att ThE

lee work originally appeared in German in 1948 as a part

ences, I have added only such views and material as are of

Los Angeles RivKAH ScHARF KLUGER

De THIs AMERICAN EDITION goes to press I wish to express

Deh si oneoh sb Sate Fai

BZAW Beihefte zur Zeitschrift fiir die alttestamentliche

1. C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion: East and West, in Collected

correspondence, otherwise a connection could never come

This correspondence alone, as it found its expression in

consideration of all statements referring to this phenomenon

2. Survey of the Literature on the Problem

vidual passages and critically evaluate their conclusions. How-

writing to be one of the oldest in Hebrew literature.” * In the

Satan of I Chronicles 21, Roskoff sees the “destructive quality

Persian influence on the Satan figure is possible, but lays stress

problem and provides a good summary of it—does not work

problem in favor of a morally evaluated “sober good sense.”

appreciation of the belief in Satan.” * But in the end we are

world.” Any demonic traits in Yahweh are categorically de-

of the life spent in the wilderness to that of wilderness de-

tinian princes were dependent upon this or that great king,

36. Ibid., p. 221.

further example of Rezon makes Brock-Utne’s interpretation

42. Brock-Utne bases his argument here largely on Birkeland, Die

derived from later texts—that of the “accuser” significance of

remembrance with God). Aside from the fact that in these

close inner connection of the r#ab concept in I Kings

Came into the World,” * and by Adolphe Lods in his study

56. H. Torcezyner, “How Satan Came into the World,” Expository

If we consider these works as a whole, they may perhaps be

co, apt wheyLaer . hdhte

fa Sethe oCsie wth Ba hados 5 ce acre ee

1. See esp. Gesenius-Buhl, Hebriisches und aramiisches Handworter-

bly denominative. It is true that the verb appears only five

grammar, the functional concept can be supported by individ-

ius-Buhl * leaves the question of its authenticity open, but

14. Op. cit., s.v.

vinculum pedum.* Now Arabic has the same meaning for

analysis, to do with the theological interests of these older

27. Hengstenberg, op. cit., I, 35-36.

and also between Hebrew and Arabic] or Satan led to the

Beyond that, however, it can be demonstrated that_the

the assumption that the biblical concept penetrated into the

only since Mohammed that it has been used again in its

2. The Concept of “Satan” in the Profane Realm

[literally, Satan] to us.’” "The same meaning of adversary irin