May 2023

The role of 4.5 in

democratization and
governance in Somalia
Implications and considerations for the
way forward

Policy brief: SDP.03

Somali Dialogue Platform The role of 4.5 in democratization and governance in Somalia  2

Overview
Amid the major changes to Somalia’s political landscape seen over the past
two decades, an abiding feature has been the reliance on clan-based power-
sharing models, including the ‘4.5’ formula. Despite the Somali Provisional
Constitution containing no reference to the formula, it continues to determine
the allocation of seats to clans in the Federal Parliament’s House of the People
(HoP) and Council of Ministers. Related clan power-sharing arrangements are
in place in the Upper House, within key national leadership positions, in the
political dispensation of the Federal Member States (FMSs), and at the local
level.

The 4.5 formula was first conceived in 1997 as a temporary arrangement for
managing political representation following Somalia’s civil war, assigning a full
share of power to four clans and a half-share to a consortium of other clans.
Formalized in 2000 at the Arta Peace Conference in Djibouti, the formula was
generally agreed among political stakeholders to be a stop-gap mechanism
until a new constitution set out the mechanisms for representation in the
country’s legislatures. In theory, the Provisional Constitution of 2012 brought
this transitional arrangement to a close, as Article 4 guarantees universal
participation in elections based on a political party system. More than ten
years after adoption of the constitution, however, no progress has been made
in moving past the supposedly temporary system. No referendums or direct
elections have been held, with representation in the HoP still based on 4.5.
Moreover, clan-based power-sharing remains prevalent more widely.

The 4.5 system’s enduring role has provoked significant controversy among
Somali political leaders and the wider public, with many arguing that
democratic governance will only be possible if clan-based power-sharing
mechanisms are set aside. Efforts to move past the system in recent years
have, however, failed, as different actors have conflicting views and interests
regarding when, how and to what degree this might be achieved.

This lack of consensus, coupled with a wider reliance on clan power-sharing,

is a major obstacle to continued political progress in Somalia, especially in
terms of deepening democratization and enabling effective, meritocratic
governance. Meaningful, inclusive dialogue directed at reaching agreement
on the issue is therefore essential. As such, this report aims to promote
and inform such discussions on 4.5, as well as clan-based power-sharing
arrangements more generally. With this in mind, it provides a summary of the
extensive research conducted by the Platform on the subject, including key
informant interviews with Somali experts; a review of relevant literature and
policy documentation; and analysis of how 4.5 is applied at the national level.
Below, the report sets out a brief overview of the historical development of
clan-based power-sharing in Somalia, before detailing how the 4.5 system has
been applied since the Arta Conference. Following this, the implications of 4.5
for Somalia’s political settlement and democratization processes are laid out,
with a number of options for going forward offered in the conclusion.
Somali Dialogue Platform The role of 4.5 in democratization and governance in Somalia  3

A short history of clan-based

power-sharing in Somalia
While there are some recorded examples of clan-based power-sharing
arrangements in Somalia’s pre-colonial period, there was generally little need
for such arrangements beyond a few coastal city states, as inter-clan disputes
were mostly managed via the xeer traditional justice system. The arrival of
European colonizers and the introduction of formal state structures, however,
changed the country’s dynamics. Following independence in 1960, the first
123-seat ‘National Assembly’ was established, with representation based
on multi-party elections. Although there was no formal clan-based power-
sharing system, some communities expressed concern that they were being
marginalized from political office (see Figure 1).1

Figure 1. Post-independence civilian government cabinet composition measured as a ratio of 4.5, 1960–19691

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Jul 1960 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.6

Jul 1961 1.4 1.8 0.7 0.7

Nov 1962 1.4 1.7 1.0 0.4

Sep 1964 1.4 1.1 1.4 0.6

May 1966 1.2 1.5 1.2 0.6

Jul 1967 1.7 0.9 1.4 0.5

May 1969 1.5 1.1 1.3 0.6

Oct 1969 2.4 1.2 0.9

  Darod      Hawiye      Dir      Digil/Mirifle

Upon coming to power in 1969, the Siyad Barre regime ostensibly made
attempts to destroy what it referred to as ‘tribalism’. In reality, the government
increasingly instrumentalized clan identity in the exercise of power, leading
to the marginalization of several groups (see Figure 2). Ultimately, the regime
accentuated the role of clan identity in politics, using state institutions to
consolidate power under Barre’s clan alliance and exact collective punishment
on clans perceived as opposed to the president’s authority.

1 Statistics based on Abdiwahid Haji Osman et al., Clan, Sub-clan, and Regional Representation in the
Somali Government Organization, 1960–1990, 1990. No members of 0.5 communities were included in
the post-independence civilian government cabinets.
Somali Dialogue Platform The role of 4.5 in democratization and governance in Somalia  4

Figure 2. Revolutionary government cabinet composition measured as a ratio of 4.5, 1969–1990

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Oct 1969 2.4 1.2 0.9

Apr 1970 2.0 1.3 1.3

Jul 1970 1.7 0.8 1.4 0.3 0.3

Aug 1971 1.9 0.7 1.4 0.2 0.2

Dec 1973 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.4 0.2

Dec 1974 1.5 0.9 1.5 0.6

Jul 1976 1.6 0.8 1.6 0.4

Feb 1977 1.6 0.7 1.6 0.4 0.2

Apr 1978 1.6 0.9 1.4 0.4 0.2

Feb 1980 2.0 0.8 1.0 0.2 0.5

Mar 1982 1.8 0.8 1.2 0.3 0.3

Jun 1984 1.8 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.3

Feb 1985 2.0 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3

Feb 1987 2.0 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.5

Dec 1987 1.8 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.4

Apr 1989 1.7 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.4

Feb 1990 1.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.2

Sep 1990 1.9 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.4

  Darod      Hawiye      Dir      Digil/Mirifle      0.5

Following the collapse of the state in 1991, a series of attempts were made to
re-establish civilian government. This involved grappling with how to approach
political representation in the context of civil war. The Sodere Conference in
Ethiopia from late 1996 to early 1997 marked the first time a cross-section of
communities, including what would come to be known as the ‘0.5’ groups, were
included in reconciliation processes. The conference led to the establishment
of a short-lived National Salvation Council, in which four clan families were
apportioned nine seats each, with the remaining five seats reserved for 0.5
communities.
Somali Dialogue Platform The role of 4.5 in democratization and governance in Somalia  5

Three years later, the 4.5 system was revived and formalized at the Somali
National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti, between May and August 2000.
The initial focus of the Arta Conference had been on establishing a new
legislature based on Somalia’s 18 pre-war regions, as well as agreeing on
representation at the conference itself. This approach proved complicated
due to conflicting interpretations of how regions should be delineated, in part
due to the significant population movements that had taken place during
the war, with multiple districts perceived as being occupied by other clans’
militias. As a result, a suggestion was made to base representation—at both
the conference and the Transitional National Assembly to be established at
it—entirely on clan. Despite the reported reluctance of the academics and
civil society members consulted, the suggestion was taken forward as the
most viable option for managing the country’s large-scale internal violence
and displacement.

Various iterations of clan-based power-sharing were discussed, with agreement

finally reached on the 4.5 principle: the four major clan families would each
receive 44 seats, while the 0.5 communities would collectively receive 24
seats. Women secured a further 25 seats, to be split evenly between the five
groupings. Thus, the four major clan families received a total of 49 seats and
the 0.5 communities 29 seats in a 225-seat legislature. This marked the formal
introduction of the 4.5 formula to Somali politics, since which time it has persisted
as an unwritten norm underpinning political representation in the country.

The application of 4.5 since Arta

National/federal leadership

Since the introduction of the 4.5 formula, convention has dictated that the
top two positions in government—the presidency and prime ministership—
rotate between the Darod and Hawiye clan families. Each time the president
has been elected from one of these two clan families, the position of prime
minister has gone to the other family. Similarly, the norm has been that the
speaker of the HoP comes from the Rahanwein clan family. The positions
of deputy prime minister and speaker of the Upper House have, since their
establishment, normally gone to the Dir/Isaaq clan family. The 0.5 group has
never held any of the highest positions in national leadership, but are usually
allocated the first deputy speaker of the HoP.

Figure 3. National/federal leadership positions by clan family, 2000–2022

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22
20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

President

Prime Minister

Speaker (HoP)

Speaker (UH)

Deputy PM

  Darod      Hawiye      Dir      Rahanwein

Somali Dialogue Platform The role of 4.5 in democratization and governance in Somalia  6

National/federal cabinets

Until 2009, the 4.5 formula was not strictly adhered to in allocating cabinet
positions–for example, Prime Minister Galaydh’s first Cabinet of Ministers
in 2000 largely bypassed the 0.5 communities. Over the following ten years
of transitional governments, however, adherence to the 4.5 formula grew
increasingly systematized, with growing representation for the 0.5 groups.
From Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke’s 2009 cabinet through to the cabinet
of Abdiweli Mohamed Ali ‘Gaas’ in 2011, the 4.5 formula was applied with
relative precision. Since the endorsement of the 2012 Provisional Constitution,
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) cabinets have adhered more closely to
a ‘5.0’ formula, often giving the 0.5 groups equal representation to the four
major clan families.

Figure 4. Transitional National Government, Transitional Federal Government, and Federal Government of Somalia
cabinet composition measured as a ratio of 4.5, 2000–2022

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Ali Khalif Galayd, 2000 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.2

Hassan Abshir Farah, 2002 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.3

Ali Mohamed Ghedi, 2005 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.3

Ali Mohamed Ghedi, 2006 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.4

Nur Hassan Hussein, 2007 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.3

Omar Abdirashid 'Sharmarke', 2009 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5

Mohamed Abdullahi 'Farmajo', 2010 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5

Abdiweli Mohamed 'Gaas', 2011 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5

Abdi Farah Shirdon, 2012 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9

Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed, 2014 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.7

Omar Abdirashid 'Sharmarke', 2015 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9

Hassan Ali Khaire, 2017 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9

Mohamed Hussein Roble, 2020 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9

  Darod      Hawiye      Dir      Rahanwein      0.5

Somali Dialogue Platform The role of 4.5 in democratization and governance in Somalia  7

National/federal legislatures

Following the Arta Conference, the 4.5 formula has consistently been
applied to the formation of transitional legislatures. Although the exact size of
parliament—and therefore the number of seats allocated to each clan—has
varied, a 275-seat structure for the HoP has been used since 2012, with a new
54-seat Upper House established in 2016/17 (which does not follow the 4.5
principle, but still loosely follows the principles of clan-based power-sharing).
Since 2016, the establishment of the FMSs has meant each parliamentary seat
is allocated to an FMS as well as a clan. A document released by the Office of
the President in October 2020 setting out the procedures for implementing
the September 2020 electoral agreement between the FGS and FMS leaders
provides one of the few formal documents outlining parliament’s current intra-
clan family composition. Using this and other official records, including a public
database established by the Office of the Prime Minister listing contested HoP
seats, it is possible to extrapolate a breakdown of seats by clan (see Table 1).

Table 1. Clan composition of the House of the People, 2022

0.5 Darod Dir Hawiye Rahanwein-Digil Rahanwein-Mirifle

Kulmis 11 Marehan 14 Isaaq 28 Haber Gedir 12 Dabare 3 Hadamo 4

Absame/
Bantu 7 12 Gadabursi 9 Abgal 9 Garre 3 Boqol Hore 3
Ogaden

‘Caste' 7 Majerten 12 Isse 8 Hawadle 8 Jido 3 Elay 3

Shanta
Benadiri 6 Dhulbahante 8 Biyomal 5 Murusade 7 3 Harin 3
Alemod

Lelkase 5 Surre 3 Gaaljecel 5 Tuni 3 Leysan 3

Warsangeli 5 Gadsan 2 Duduble 4 Bagadi 2 Luway 3

Awrtable 3 Bajamal 1 Badi'ade 3 Geledi 2 Ashraf 2

Fiqi
Dishishe 2 1 Sheikhal 3 Gelidle 2
Mohamud

Madalug 1 Udejeen 3 Hubeer 2

Qubays 1 Hilibi 1 Jilible 2

Wardey 1 Jidle 1 Jiroon 2

Ma'alin
Gurgure 1 Jijeele 1 2
Weyne

Moblen 1 Yantar 2

Silcis 1 Eylo 1

Wadalan 1 Gabaweyn 1

Wacdan 1 Garwale 1

Gasargude 1

Geledi 1

Haraw 1

Heledi 1

Reer Dumal 1

Wanjel 1
Somali Dialogue Platform The role of 4.5 in democratization and governance in Somalia  8

The representation of women in the 4.5 system

The 4.5 formula makes no special provision for the inclusion of women, many
of whom attended the Arta Conference in 2000 as members of a ‘sixth’
clan. Indeed, the resort to a clan-based system based on patriarchal and
patrilineal norms has tended to entrench women’s marginalization when it
comes to political participation. Following international pressure to implement
women’s quotas, certain seats—still tied to particular sub-clan groupings—
have been designated ‘women’s seats’. As a result (at least since 2016, when
the clan delegate college system was introduced), women have, barring
a few exceptions, only ever run against other women, leaving all the other
seats to be contended by men. According to Ladan Affi, when a 30 per cent
quota for women was first imposed during the 2012 elections, ‘the smaller
clans allocated a greater share of seats to women. This was not as a result
of a greater commitment to women’s issues by the smaller clans, rather the
larger clans pressured the smaller clans to appoint women, or lose the seat to
another minority clan willing to appoint a woman, in order for the gender quota
to be met.’2 This reluctance by the senior power brokers of the politically and
militarily strongest clans to accept women representatives is also apparent in
the Cabinet of Ministers. Since 2000, of the 29 ministerial portfolios assigned
to women at the beginning of a prime minister’s term, more than half (15) have
been given to 0.5 communities.

Figure 5. Number of women in the Cabinet of Ministers by clan family as a proportion of 4.5, 2000–2022

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

  Darod      Hawiye      Dir      Rahanwein      0.5

Seat rotation

While the 4.5 system provides a clear system for sharing power between clan
families, the allocation of seats within families and sub-clans has been more
fluid and subject to significant re-negotiation. This has occurred through
dialogue between clan elders, as well as interference by political leaders. For
the most part, each of the 275 seats in the current HoP is held collectively by
a number of sub-clans—generally between two and five—that acknowledge
relatively close lineage affiliation. Many collectively-held seats involve a
system of rotation agreed between clan elders, although this is rarely captured
in written documents. Such a system often benefits those clan groupings
that have greater military and financial power. Rotation rules also vary, both
between different sets of sub-clans and in different regions. Whereas in some
cases maintaining stable relations between sub-clans is contingent on rotation
taking place according to a set order agreed by relevant sub-clan leaders,
in others the decision may be taken on an ad hoc basis by more senior clan
representatives.

2 Ladan Affi, ‘The Old Men Who Hold Us Back’: Clan Elders, Elite Bargaining and Exclusionary Politics’,
Journal of Somali Studies 7/2 (2020).
Somali Dialogue Platform The role of 4.5 in democratization and governance in Somalia  9

The changing role of elders in clan power-sharing

In 2012, following the endorsement of the Provisional Constitution, 135

clan elders—split proportionally in accordance with 4.5 and appointed by
a Technical Selection Committee for the transition process—were formally
recognized as the traditional representatives of Somalia’s communities and
tasked with appointing a new 275-seat parliament. In 2016, the list of 135
elders was revised and the new set of traditional representatives tasked with
appointing 51 clan ‘delegates’ to each seat, who would then be eligible to vote
for competing candidates. There are multiple accounts of this process being
manipulated to ensure favourable outcomes for particular candidates, with
elders bribed to appoint particular delegates and/or delegates bribed to vote
in a particular way.

The list of 135 elders was abandoned for the 2021/22 electoral process.
Instead, far greater authority was given to FMS-level electoral implementation
teams appointed by, and largely serving at the behest of, their respective
presidents. Many of the FMS presidents were, in turn, deeply influenced by
the FGS. This time, ‘delegate selection committees’—comprised of three or
more elders per seat and at least two further civil society representatives—
were tasked with appointing 101 delegates. The new formula expanded the
number of clan elders involved in the electoral process from 135 to just over
700, though there was little overlap with the previous list used in the 2016.
Moreover, there were numerous claims that the ‘elders’ appointed had limited
if any authority among their clansmen. As a prominent peace activist consulted
for this study claimed, seats are now often only ‘nominally’ held by a particular
clan, with candidates from each pool of sub-clans hand-picked by FGS and
FMS leaders to represent their political interests. In addition, the legitimacy of
clan elders has been eroded by their role in the process.

Implications of 4.5 for

democratization and governance
The continued application of the 4.5 system has a number of significant
implications for the scope of democracy and good governance in Somalia.
Understanding these can inform considerations of the options going forward.

ɋ The role of the clan in Somali politics and representation is not fixed
and has changed over time. As such, there is no innate relationship
between clan and politics. While this creates opportunities for leaders to
instrumentalize clan identity, it can also offer a platform for Somalis to re-
imagine the role clan plays in politics.

ɋ Through ensuring a basic level of representation for many groups, the 4.5
formula is associated with a return to stability following Somalia’s civil
war in the 1990s. The introduction of the system arguably proved critical
in establishing the basic foundations upon which government institutions
could be rebuilt. Since then, violent conflict between clan groups has
consistently been lower than the levels reached during the civil war years.

ɋ Over time, the 4.5 continued use of the formula has become associated
with a top-down, elite-dominated politics. The resort to clan-based
power-sharing has narrowed the political landscape, allowing a small
group of leaders and traditional elders to dominate the political field. This is
Somali Dialogue Platform The role of 4.5 in democratization and governance in Somalia  10

especially the case when it comes to indirect election processes based on

the system, which have been subject to extreme political interference and
corruption. Although not the only factor, it has contributed to the citizenry’s
broader disenfranchisement from politics.

ɋ The 4.5 formula continues to present major obstacles to improving the

participation of women and youth in politics. Although the marginalization
of women and youth in Somali politics is due to a range of factors, the
continuance of a clan-based model of representation reinforces social and
political norms that benefit men, as well as older political leaders.

ɋ The 4.5 formula has also become associated with the marginalization
and exclusion of certain groups. This is clear, for example, in trends around
which groups have held the highest office in the land. Moreover, the system
of negotiation around seat allocations is increasingly prone to manipulation
by powerful groups at the expense of less powerful groups. It is important to
note, however, that dynamics of exclusion were apparent well before clan-
based power-sharing became central to Somali politics.

ɋ At the same time, it has been claimed the 4.5 system has protected
certain groups from domination by others. Some groups that have been
historically marginalized in Somali society—even more so during the civil
war—have pointed to the formula as ensuring they receive a certain degree
of representation. This creates a seemingly contradictory state of affairs,
with different marginalized groups regarding the same system as either
protecting or excluding them.

ɋ The resort to clan-based power-sharing has eroded the moral authority

of clan elders. With elders pulled ever more into the political sphere, their
role has become less and less distinct from other politicians and leaders.
As such, the credibility and legitimacy of their role in elections and political
processes has been increasingly lost, leaving such processes open to
political interference.

ɋ The continued use of the 4.5 system poses major challenges to one-
person-one-vote elections (OPOV) being rolled out in Somalia. Allocating
seats to specific clans contradicts the basic principles of OPOV. While it
may be possible to combine elements of clan-based power-sharing with
universal suffrage, this would rely on complex hybrid systems that may be
difficult or expensive to implement. Even then, they may still be perceived
as limiting the scope of democratization.

ɋ Clan-based power-sharing has had major impacts on effective institutions

and governance. Most political appointments and civil service recruitments
continue to be based on the 4.5 formula or related systems rather than
competence, making it difficult to establish an effective government
administration and increase meritocracy in governance. These practices
also mean government officials tend to be more accountable to their clan
constituents than the broader citizenry. This poses a major challenge to
effective and accountable statebuilding.

ɋ The 4.5 system is not the only determinant of representation and

marginalization. Holding a seat in parliament or some other office on
account of the 4.5 formula should not always be equated with genuine
representation. The system often enables tokenism, in which institutions
are equitable according to 4.5, but power is still concentrated in certain
groups informally. At the same, there are numerous instances of individuals
and groups accumulating significant power despite the marginalization of
their group under the 4.5 system.
Somali Dialogue Platform The role of 4.5 in democratization and governance in Somalia  11

Considerations for the

way forward
Below, in support of inclusive political processes capable of finding consensus
on the way forward, three high-level options on addressing the persistence
of the 4.5 system are presented for consideration. Regardless of the option
chosen, it will be essential for this to emerge from a consultative national
dialogue, that can also engage the public in pathways to change, to enable
their full participation and support in the process:

1. Transcend 4.5: Under this option, political leaders would commit to the
full abandonment of the 4.5 system at the next federal transition process,
and start preparations for the formal introduction of a multi-party system.
Political actors would need to return to the draft electoral bill, reach
consensus on matters still in dispute, and remove the elements of clan
power-sharing contained within it. If practical constraints make universal
suffrage impossible, it may still be possible to design a new indirect
election model that does not rely on the 4.5 system, with representation
based on geographical units. Further consideration would need to be
given to the implications of such a decision at the FMS assembly level, and
how FMS elections would be affected. Political appointments for cabinet
and elsewhere would need to be made as soon as possible without any
consideration of clan identity, while all civil service appointments would
have to be entirely meritocratic.

Assessment: Transcending 4.5 immediately could offer a means of

addressing the negative impacts of the system outlined in this report, opening
up avenues for greater political participation by women and marginalized
groups, and improving government capacity and effectiveness. At the same
time, such a rapid shift could prove de-stabilizing, and would likely increase
conflict as power balances change. Moreover, unless other social, political
and economic factors are addressed, there is a risk that the more powerful
groups will increase their dominance in the political system.

2. Hybridize 4.5: Under this option, Somalia would maintain elements of

clan-based power-sharing arrangements as part of a more traditional
liberal democratic system. A plethora of options are available as part of this
approach. For example, while parliamentary elections might not be based
on the 4.5 system, the selection of the national leadership and/or cabinet
could follow power-sharing conventions. Election models could combine
elements of the 4.5 system with OPOV, in the tradition of consociational
democracy. This may include an election model based on proportional
representation in which party lists are distributed according to clan power-
sharing conventions. The current election law could also provide a model
for combining first-past-the-post with the 4.5 system. Another alternative
may be to base representation in the HoP on multi-party elections, while
representation in the Upper House is based on clan.

Assessment: All these options throw up specific complexities and

challenges, but if one of them were agreed upon it would provide a route to
greater democratization while reducing the short-term risk of conflict. At the
same time, such approaches may be insufficient to disrupt the dynamics of
marginalization, nepotism and elitism that have become associated with
the Somali political landscape and contribute to conflict over the long term.
Somali Dialogue Platform The role of 4.5 in democratization and governance in Somalia  12

3. Transition from 4.5: Under this option, political leaders would commit to
the full abandonment of the 4.5 system in the long term, but take a phased
approach, incorporating elements of the hybrid option above for a limited
period. This could include interim improvements to the 4.5 system aimed
at managing some of its negative implications, while at the same time
planning for wider reform. Such improvements may include discussing
the marginalization of certain groups at various levels, with the formula
and more granular deals adjusted accordingly. Another approach could
be to return to the concept of the ‘6th clan’, whereby women are treated
independently from clan groups, or to explore new ways of re-applying the
30 per cent women’s quota within each unit of 4.5. Greater rotation and
inclusivity in top national leadership positions could also go some way to
increasing political inclusion. Restricting 4.5 clan power-sharing to the HoP
could also make way for more meritocratic recruitment in the civil service.

Assessment: This approach is likely to reduce short-term conflict risks in

a context of limited trust, as change would be incremental. At the same
time, it risks leaving many of the negative aspects of the system intact for a
protracted period.

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