Solution Manual For Modeling Monetary Economies 4th Edition Bruce Champ Scott Freeman Joseph Haslag

Modeling Monetary Economies, 4th Ed
Full chapter at: https://testbankbell.com/product/solution-

manual-for-modeling-monetary-economies-4th-edition-bruce-
champ-scott-freeman-joseph-haslag/
Chapter 1
Trade in a Model with no Frictions
Exercise 1.1 (a) Equation 1.1(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑖𝑛)𝑡 =
𝑁𝑡𝑦1 + 𝑁𝑡−1𝑦2
 Equation 1.2 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔)𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡𝑐1,𝑡
 Equation 1.3 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑙𝑑)𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡−1𝑐2,𝑡
 Equation 1.4 Feasibility constraint:
𝑁𝑡𝑐1,𝑡 + 𝑁𝑡−1𝑐2,𝑡 ≤ 𝑁𝑡𝑦1 + 𝑁𝑡−1𝑦2
With a constant population, we have,
𝑁𝑐1,𝑡 + 𝑁𝑐2,𝑡 ≤ 𝑁𝑦1 + 𝑁𝑦2
Dividing throughout by N, we have
 Equation 1.5 𝑐1,𝑡 + 𝑐2,𝑡 ≤ 𝑦1 + 𝑦2
 Equation 1.6 Assuming a stationary allocation, the per capita constraint

becomes
𝑐1 + 𝑐2 ≤ 𝑦1 + 𝑦2.
(b) (𝑐∗, 𝑐∗) → Golden Rule Allocation: allocation that maximizes the utility of future
1 2
generations.
C2
(y1 + y2)
* *
(c1 , c2 ) [golden rule allocation]
u
2
u
1
feasibility constraint pg. 10
(y1 + y2) C1
Exercise 1.2
- Bundle A: c1 = 6, c2 = 12
- Bundle B: c1 = 4, c2 = 10
- c1A >c1B & c2A >c2B ⇒ Bundle A is strictly preferred to Bundle B by assumption
#3 of “More is preferred to less”
Exercise 1.3 (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔)𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐1,𝑡)
Since the young consume half their endowment in every period, ie 𝑐1,𝑡 = 1 𝑦𝑡, we
2
can rewrite the above equation as:
1 𝑦𝑡
(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔)𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡 (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡) = 𝑁𝑡
2 2
(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑙𝑑)𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡−1𝑥𝑡∅𝑡−1
In equilibrium, we have,
𝑁 𝑥∅ = 𝑁 𝑦𝑡
𝑡−1 𝑡 𝑡−1 𝑡
2
1
𝑁 𝑦
=> 𝑥 =
∅𝑡−1 𝑁𝑡−1 2
Using, 𝑁𝑡 = 1.1𝑁𝑡−1 and ∅𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐1,𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑡 − 1 𝑦𝑡 = 0.55 𝑦𝑡, we

have,
1.05 1.1𝑁𝑡−1 𝑦𝑡
𝑥𝑡 = = 1.05
0.55𝑦𝑡 𝑁𝑡−1 2
Exercise 1.4
Economy A Economy B
pg. 11
y1 = 20 , y2 = 0 y1 = 20 , y2 = 0
pg. 12
c1 , c2= 10, 10 c1, c2 = 8, 12
(a) Since these choices maximize “lifetime welfare” → it maximizes the utility
of the current and future generations (Golden Rule Allocation) at the cost of
the initial old’s welfare. With a constant level of population and a stationary
allocation, the feasibility set for both economies is the same,
𝑐1 + 𝑐2 ≤ 20
However, as the preferences of the individuals are different, it implies that

we are going to be on two different sets of indifference curves for each of the
two economies. As such this situation is Pareto incomparable.
(b) These choices maximize “lifetime welfare” [Golden Rule Allocation] ⇒ it

maximises the utility of current and future generations and not the utility of
the initial old. If the utility of the initial old was to be maximized, we would
end up with a corner solution, implying that people consume nothing when
young and that would not maximise the utility of the future generations.
Exercise 1.5 (a) Constant marginal utility Indifference Curves are linear
C2
Indifference Curve
A C1
𝑀𝑢1 𝑑𝑐2 𝑑𝑐2 𝑀𝑢1

(b) = ⇒ =
pg. 13
𝑀𝑢2 𝑑𝑐1 𝑑𝑐1 𝑀𝑢2
pg. 14
If 𝑀𝑢1 > 𝑀𝑢2 → |𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒| > 1, we end up with a corner solution at A. Individuals
only consume in the first period of their lives
(c) If 𝑀𝑢1 < 𝑀𝑢2 → |𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒| < 1, we end up with a corner solution at B.
Individuals only consume in the second period of their lives.
pg. 15

Solution Manual For Modeling Monetary Economies 4th Edition Bruce Champ Scott Freeman Joseph Haslag

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Solution Manual For Modeling Monetary Economies 4th Edition Bruce Champ Scott Freeman Joseph Haslag

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Solution Manual For Modeling Monetary Economies 4th Edition Bruce Champ Scott Freeman Joseph Haslag

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Modeling Monetary Economies, 4th Ed

Full chapter at: https://testbankbell.com/product/solution-

Dividing throughout by N, we have

 Equation 1.5 𝑐1,𝑡 + 𝑐2,𝑡 ≤ 𝑦1 + 𝑦2

 Equation 1.6 Assuming a stationary allocation, the per capita constraint

Exercise 1.3 (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔)𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐1,𝑡)

(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑙𝑑)𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡−1𝑥𝑡∅𝑡−1

Using, 𝑁𝑡 = 1.1𝑁𝑡−1 and ∅𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐1,𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑡 − 1 𝑦𝑡 = 0.55 𝑦𝑡, we

However, as the preferences of the individuals are different, it implies that

(b) These choices maximize “lifetime welfare” [Golden Rule Allocation] ⇒ it

𝑀𝑢1 𝑑𝑐2 𝑑𝑐2 𝑀𝑢1

You might also like