Restoring Deterrence:

Coercion and Crises in Southern Asia

Glossary
Accidental escalation: A state unintentionally takes an action that crosses a threshold viewed as
significant by the other side. Accidental escalation can come in two forms, unauthorized or
mechanical or human error. (Lesson 3.2.1)

Assurances: A coercer's promise not to change the terms of the implicit bargain once the target
complies with the coercer's demand. (Lesson 1.3.3)

Assured Retaliation: An assured retaliation posture involves the development of secure second-
strike nuclear capabilities that enable a state to threaten certain nuclear retaliation should it suffer
primarily a nuclear attack. This posture has been adopted by India and China. (Lesson 4.2)

Asymmetric Escalation: An asymmetric escalation posture develops capabilities and procedures

that credibly enable the rapid and first use of nuclear weapon in the event of a conventional
attack. France and Pakistan have each, at some point, adopted this posture. (Lesson 4.2)

Blast: When a nuclear weapon detonates, it immediately forms a massive fireball. The extreme
heat from this fireball causes a rapid expansion of air, creating shock waves capable of flattening
surrounding buildings and infrastructure. (Lesson 2.1)

Brinkmanship: Thomas Schelling describes brinkmanship as the “threat that leaves something to
chance.” A brinkmanship strategy involves deliberately ceding control over the risk of war. This
may seem counterintuitive, but ceding control boosts the credibility of a threat. (Lesson 3.1.2)

Capabilities-intentions dilemma: A compellent state cannot credibly commit to making no

additional demands in the future because intentions change more quickly than capabilities. A
different leader might come to power a few years later and decide to change the status quo.
(Lesson 1.3.1)

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 Glossary

Catalytic: A catalytic posture, which consists of only a handful of nuclear weapons, threatens the
explicit breakout of nuclear weapons in the event the state’s survival is threatened in order to
compel—or catalyze—third-party intervention on the state’s behalf. For example, Israel and South
Africa adopted this posture for a significant portion of their nuclear histories. (Lesson 5.1.2)

Coercion: The act of getting an individual to do something it does not want to through the use of
force or threats. (Lesson 1.1.1)

Coercive Diplomacy: Compellence that takes places in situations short of ware, meaning limited
or no contact between rival forces. (Lesson 1.3.1)

Commitment: The target believes that the compeller is committed to carry out the threat if the

target does not comply or will not carry out the threat if the target does comply. (Lesson 1.1.1)

Communication: In coercion, it is necessary that communication is reasonably clear so that the

target understands both the threat and the demand. (Lesson 1.1.1)

Compellence: A coercive strategy in which an actor threatens the use of force to pressure the
target to perform a certain positive, visible action. (Lesson 1.1.2)

Compellence by denial: Compelling an adversary by degrading it capabilities, thus

demonstrating that maintenance of the status quo will not be feasible. (Lesson 1.3.1)

Compellence by punishment: Compelling an adversary by inflicting pain on its population, thus

convincing it that the costs of the preserving the status quo are too high. (Lesson 1.3.1)

Confidence-building measures (CBMs): Diverse arrangements—such as hotlines, people-to-

people exchanges, and prior notifications of military exercises—that can help reduce tensions and
promote good relations. (Lesson 3.3.1)

Controlled Pressure: A strategy in which a challenger believes that the defender's commitment is
soft, and therefore applies increasing pressure to convince the defender that the costs of fulfilling
its deterrent commitment are higher than it should be willing to bear. (Lesson 1.2.3)

Conventional level: This level refers to conflicts and capabilities that do not involve weapons of
mass destruction. (Lesson 3.1.1)

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 Glossary

Counterforce: A targeting strategy organized around the ability to target military capabilities. The
essential role of nuclear weapons, in this view, is to deny an adversary the ability to punish by
targeting opposing forces (also known as damage limitation). (Lesson 4.2)

Countervalue: A targeting strategy organized around the ability to retaliate against cities. The
essential role of nuclear weapons, in this view, is to punish—and hence, to deter—an adversary.
(Lesson 4.2)

Credibility: The target must assess that the compeller has the political will and military capability
to carry out a threat. (Lesson 1.1.1)

Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD): A nuclear strategy which integrates an NFU policy and an
assurance to retaliate if nuclear weapons are used against the nation. India currently has a policy
of CMD. (Lesson 4.2)

Declaratory policy: A public disclosure of the circumstances under which a state reserves the
option to use nuclear weapons. Declaratory policies vary state to state and can be dictated
through formal doctrine, informal documents, or public statements. (Lesson 4.2)

Deliberate escalation: A state intentionally takes an action that it knows crosses a threshold
viewed as significant by the other side. A state might do this in order to increase the likelihood of
achieving its objectives or, at the very least, to forestall defeat. (Lesson 3.2.1)

Deterrence by denial: Convincing the target that it will not physically achieve its objectives by
attacking. (Lesson 1.2.2)

Deterrence by punishment: Issuing a threat of retaliation that imposes greater costs on the
attacker than any gains that the attack intended to achieve. (Lesson 1.2.2)

Deterrence optimists: Those who argue that nuclear weapons actually reduce the likelihood
and/or intensity of interstate conflict. Deterrence optimists are unlikely to support full
disarmament. (Lesson 2.2.1)

Deterrence pessimists: Those who argue that the risk of deterrence breakdowns or nuclear
accidents is too much to bear. Deterrence pessimists are more likely to support disarmament.
(Lesson 2.2.2)

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 Glossary

Deterrence: Persuading an actor not to do something in order to maintain the status quo. (Lesson
1.1.2)

Electromagnetic pulse (EMP): A nuclear detonation releases electrons in a "pulse" that interacts
with the Earth's magnetic field. Depending on the method of detonation and a range of other
factors, an EMP can potentially destroy a range of electronic systems, including critical
infrastructure. (Lesson 2.1)

Emboldenment: Holds that a state's nuclear arsenal emboldens it to behave more recklessly than
it would otherwise because nuclear weapons shield it from retaliation. (Lesson 3.2)

Escalation: Escalation broadly refers to the intensification of conflict. This can be deliberate or
involuntary, and it can constitute either an increase in the intensity of military force employed (e.g.,

from limited airstrikes to a ground invasion) or a transformation into a different type of war (e.g.,
conventional to nuclear). (Lesson 3.2.1)

Escalation dominance: When one state enjoys military superiority over another state at each level
of conflict, including the sub-conventional, conventional, and nuclear levels. It is seen by some as
a deterrent to conflict because the inferior state will have no chance of triumphing at any level.
(Lesson 3.1.2)

Extended deterrence: Employed to deter attacks against a third party by threatening to retaliate
against any actor that attacks the third party. (Lesson 1.2.2)

Eye of the beholder problem: An action or threat that is seen as deterrence by one party may be
seen as compellence by another. The eye of the beholder problem arises from diverging
perceptions of the status quo ante. (Lesson 1.3.4)

Fait accompli: A strategy in which a challenger believes that the defender isn’t committed to
protecting the territory and people, and so the challengers launches a swift attack to give the
defender little or no time to change the course of action. (Lesson 1.2.3)

First Nuclear Age: The Cold War; characterized by nuclear bipolarity between the United States
and Soviet Union. (Lesson 4.1)

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 Glossary

First-use Doctrine: A nation with a first-use doctrine reserves the right to attack an adversary with
nuclear weapons first. The argument behind this policy is that by maintaining the right to
introduce nuclear weapons into a war first, a conventionally weaker nation can counter a
conventionally stronger adversary. (Lesson 4.2)

Full-spectrum deterrence (FSD): A nuclear strategy which allows a nation to use its nuclear
arsenal not only as a deterrence for strategic, nuclear level threats, but through the use of tactical
nuclear weapons, would allow the nations to deter conventional threats. This strategy was
developed by Pakistan in response to India’s Cold Start doctrine, which would see India engage in
limited incursions along the LoC below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. (Lesson 4.2)

Fundamental Attribution Bias: When adversaries take an action, we assume the worst of their

intentions—i.e., it was a deliberate attempt to undermine or threaten. When we or our allies take
an action, we ascribe the best intentions—i.e., we did it because we had the best interest of all
parties in mind, or because we had no other option. (Lesson 3.2.2)

General deterrence: Occurs in peacetime, in the long term, and is employed to prevent unwanted
activity in situations where neither side is considering mounting an attack. General deterrence
conditions may also be referred to as strategic stability/instability. (Lesson 1.2.2)

Groupthink: The tendency for the viewpoints of individuals to coalesce around one viewpoint in a
group setting. This occurs whether or not the individuals believe it to be correct or optimal, often
in the interest of group harmony. Groupthink discourages creativity and reduces the efficiency of
collective problem solving. (Lesson 3.2.2)

Heuristics: Mental short-cuts that are psychological ways for individuals to cope with complexity.
(Lesson 3.2.2)

Homeland/Central deterrence: Employed to deter attacks against one's own territory. (Lesson
1.2.2)

Horizontal escalation: Expanding the conflict across different fronts, including the boundaries of
the conflict, the locations of targets and/or bases, eliminating sanctuary, or violating neutrality.
(Lesson 3.2.1)

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 Glossary

Human or mechanical error accidental escalation: An actor or machine makes an error that
results in an action that crosses a threshold viewed as significant by the other side. (Lesson 3.2.1)

Immediate deterrence: Occurs during periods of crisis where one or both parties are considering
mounting an attack and is employed to prevent an imminent assault. Immediate deterrence
conditions may also be referred to as crisis stability/instability. (Lesson 1.2.2)

Inadvertent escalation: A state intentionally takes an action that it does not know crosses a
threshold viewed as significant by the other side. (Lesson 3.2.1)

Incentive mechanism: Incentive mechanisms involve a third party rewarding constructive

actions among combatants, for example through political approval or economic support, and

punishing escalatory decisions, for example through diplomatic pressure or sanctions. (Lesson
3.3.2)

Inducements: Inducements are rewards—the promise of some payoff for compliance. (Lesson
1.3.3)

Intervention mechanism: Intervention mechanisms involve a third party's direct engagement

with one or both rival states using military or diplomatic means to make war more difficult, for
example by targeting equipment or withholding supplies. (Lesson 3.3.2)

Information mechanism: Information mechanisms involve a third party's reduction of gaps in

knowledge between combatants by clarifying misperceptions, assigning responsibility for
actions, coordinating discussions, and proposing pathways for de-escalation. (Lesson 3.3.2)

Limited Probe: A strategy in which a challenger provokes a crisis to get a sense of the nature and
extent of the defender's commitment. (Lesson 1.2.3)

Massive Retaliation: A strategy committing a state to potentially disproportionate and

devastating nuclear retaliation to even marginal aggression by the adversary. (Lesson 4.2)

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD): A theory of nuclear security that revolves around the idea
that once both sides have a secure second-strike capability, military victory is impossible because
both sides would suffer nuclear annihilation in the event of a conflict. (Lesson 2.2.1)

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 Glossary

No first use (NFU) policy: A pledge by a nation to not use nuclear weapons in war unless first
attacked by an enemy using nuclear weapons. China currently maintains an NFU policy. (Lesson
4.2)

Nuclear Coercionist School: A school of thought on the role of nuclear weapons in international
crises which argues that nuclear weapons are effective tools of both deterrence and compellence
because nuclear weapons states, emboldened by their arsenals, can use brinkmanship to win
international conflicts. (Lesson 2.2.3)

Nuclear radiation: The fission products release by a nuclear explosion which can cause fatal
radiation sickness and longer-term health issues, including cancer and birth defects. (Lesson 2.1)

Nuclear risk-reduction measures (NRRMs): CBMs that are specific to reducing nuclear dangers.
(Lesson 3.3.1)

Nuclear Skepticism School: A school of thought on the role of nuclear weapons in international
crises which argues that although nuclear weapons are effective tools of deterrence, they are not
effective tools of compellence because it is not credible that a country will use nuclear weapons
to secure an objective that is not vital the nation’s continued survival. (Lesson 2.2.3)

Nuclear Triad: A state has a nuclear triad when its force posture includes delivery vehicle in all
three domains—land, sea, and air. (Lesson 4.2)

Power costs: Complying with a compellent demand, for example by conceding territory, can
make a state weaker. This would make it harder to resist future compellent demands, adding to
the costs of compliance. (Lesson 1.3.2)

Prospect Theory: We are motivated more by fear of losing than hope of winning; thus, leaders are
more risk acceptant when it comes to losses, and more risk averse when it comes to gains.
(Lesson 1.3.2)

Rational Actor Model: Sees states as unitary, purposive actors that make decisions based on cost-
benefit calculations. (Lesson 2.2.2)

Reputation costs: Complying with a rival state’s demands can be a humiliating public show of
weakness and demonstrate susceptibility to similar future threats. (Lesson 1.3.2)

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 Glossary

Resolve: An actor’s level of motivation to fight, or continue to fight, a conflict. (Lesson 5.1.2)

Second Nuclear Age: Following the Cold War, this age features nuclear multipolarity, which
many see as inherently less stable. (Lesson 4.1)

Security Dilemma: The idea that actions taken by one state to enhance its own security diminish
the security of others. (Lesson 3.1.1)

Signaling: States use signals to communicate the consequences of the target not complying with
a coercive threat. (Lesson 3.1.2)

Stability-Instability Paradox: A theory of nuclear security which holds that when there is stability

at the strategic (or nuclear) level due to mutually assured destruction, instability at lower levels of
conflict becomes possible because strategic stability precludes escalation to the nuclear level.
(Lesson 3.1.1)

Strategic level: The capabilities and activities designed to strike at the core of the adversary's
military, economy, or political power. Although strategic capabilities have often become
synonymous with nuclear capabilities, tactical nuclear weapon may fall below the strategic level.
(Lesson 3.1.1)

Sub-conventional level: This refers to political violence like a terror attack that falls below the
threshold of war. (Lesson 3.1.1)

Sunk cost fallacy: Mistakenly doubling down on a decision because you have already incurred
costs associated with executing that course of action. (Lesson 3.2.2)

Survivability: In order to deter, a state must credibly threaten that it will retaliate after absorbing a
first strike—that its forces are survivable. (Lesson 4.2)

Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR): Developed by Bernard Brodie, the theory is based on
the belief that nuclear weapons would fundamentally alter the way in which states interact and
the role and purpose of armed forces. Advanced by Robert Jervis and Kenneth Waltz, this theory
argues that the catastrophically destructive nature of nuclear weapons makes war less likely since
nations won’t risk their own annihilation. (Lesson 2.2.1)

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 Glossary

Thermal Radiation: The fireball release by a nuclear weapon release extreme heat and light,
which causes firestorms and increases the level of carbon dioxide gas in the air to such levels that
is causes nearby life to asphyxiate. (Lesson 2.1)

Unauthorized accidental escalation: An actor that is not authorized by the state to take a certain
action—for example, a military officer or a non-state actor—takes that action that crosses a
threshold viewed as significant by the other side. (Lesson 3.2.1)

Vertical escalation: Escalating the intensity of the conflict, including the types of weapons and/or
targets, frequency of attacks, and the number of targets. (Lesson 3.2.1)

Wartime Compellence: Compellence that takes place within the context of a conflict. (Lesson
1.3.1)

Yield: The amount of energy released when a weapon is detonated. (Lesson 2.1)