Politics in Indian ocean

30% of world maritime trade passes through Indian Ocean

Eighty percent of China's oil imports come through the Malacca Strait, the Indian Ocean's busiest
“chokepoint”. This reliance on maritime energy imports has led to more assertive securitization by
China.

Connect three continents: The Indian Ocean, which lies at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Australia

Warms water of Indian ocean

‌Choke points

 Babul mandab
 Malcca
 Harmuz

Alfert T Mahan: The one who have control on seas will be able to dominate the world

Nasir Janjua: Asia will be main center for attention of the world in 21 st century

‌What India is doing in Indian Ocean

Blue water navy:
A blue-water navy is a maritime force capable of operating globally, essentially across the deep waters
of open oceans. While definitions of what constitutes such a force vary, there is a requirement for the
ability to exercise sea control at long range.

Necklace of diamond:
India has been creating a “Necklace of Diamonds” to counter the “String of Pearls” created by China. Sri
Lanka, Maldives, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Somalia are some of the countries where China is
establishing maritime bases as a “String of Pearls” to improve its influence and military networks. The
“Necklace of Diamonds” comprises Changi Naval Base in Singapore, Chabahar Port in Iran, the
Assumption Islands in Seychelles, and Duqm Port in Oman. In addition to this, India is creating strong
ties with Vietnam and Mongolia to counter the Chinese “String of Pearls” strategy. China’s investments
in its String of Pearls exceed the investments made by India for its Necklace of Diamonds. Hence China’s
allies are likely to be stronger than India’s. China has invested US$60 billion in Africa under its String of
Pearls strategy, whereas India’s largest investment for its Necklace of Diamonds amounts to $8 billion, in
Chabahar Port. The only noteworthy investment made by India that affects China significantly has been
at Sabang, Indonesia, which is close to the Malacca Strait. Around 80% of China’s oil imports pass
through that strait, thereby making India’s presence in the region a point of concern for China.

Nuclearization of ocean:
India is fast developing the sea-leg of its nuclear triad, Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) that contributes to nuclearization of Indian Ocean. Indian Ocean was
nuclearized when major nuclear power nuclear submarines navigated through Indian Ocean waters.
Military base in Mauritius
Intrusion in Pakistan water
What is BECA?
The signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) will enable both the countries to
share geospatial information on maps and satellites for defence purposes. Geospatial information is
required while sailing a ship, flying an aircraft, fighting wars, locating targets, etc.

How will it benefit India?

1- The agreement will allow India to use the United State's advanced network of geospatial information.

2- It will also enhance the accuracy of automated systems and weapons like missiles, armed drones, etc.

3- Navigation and targeting can be enhanced with the help of topographical and aeronautical data.

4- With the signing of this agreement, the Indian military will have a high-quality GPS system to navigate
and missiles with real-time intelligence will hit the target with pin-point accuracy.

What is LEMOA?
The LEMOA or the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement is one of the three foundational
agreements between India and the US. It was signed between the two countries in August 2016 after a
decade long negotiation. It is the Indian specific version of the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA). The
agreement facilitates the military of both countries to use each other's bases for refuelling and
replenishment purposes.

This doesn't mean that U.S. troops will be stationed in India or vice versa. The agreement is purely
logistical. The agreement is useful for Navy-to-Navy Cooperation between the two countries and allows
India to use the string of U.S. facilities across the globe for logistical support. Similarly, the US also can
benefit from Indian facilities.

What is COMCASA?
The COMCASA or the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement is one of the four
foundational agreements between the US and India. It was signed between the two countries in
September 2018. It is the Indian specific version of Communications Interoperability and Security
Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and is valid for 10 years.

The agreement facilitates India to use the United States' encrypted communications equipment and
systems. Indian and the US military commanders, aircraft and ships can communicate through secure
networks in peace and war.

In addition to the above, it also paved way for the transfer of communication security equipment from
the US to India to facilitate interoperability.

What do the three agreements signify?

1- The LEMOA states that the one partner trusts the other and can expose its valuable assets.

2- The COMCASA states that one partner is confident enough that it can completely rely on the
encrypted systems provided by the other to connect militaries of both the countries.
3- The third agreement, BECA, means that highly classified information can be shared between the two
countries in real-time without the fear of data being compromised. ‌

What Pakistan is doing

AMAN-21, the 7th Exercise of the AMAN series was held from 11- 16 February 2021. The exercise is one
of the mega events of Pakistan Navy held biennially to signify the commitment towards making seas
safer for positive human activities while inviting regional and extra- regional navies.

The basic distinction is where those forces operate. Blue water navies operate in the open ocean, green
water near coats, and brown water in rivers and such. The hazards and missions in each of those
environments is different. For example, near a coastline, a surface ship must deal with forces on shore
(aircraft, guns, missiles), basic diesel submarines, and various small craft, none of which are issues in the
open ocean.

QUAD:
What does the Quad do?

The Quad, officially the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, is a group of four countries: the United States,
Australia, India, and Japan. Maritime cooperation among them began after the Indian Ocean tsunami of
2004. But today the countries—all democracies and vibrant economies—work on a far broader agenda,
which includes tackling security, economic, and health issues. Over the years, the Quad’s diplomacy has
waxed and waned. It is a loose grouping rather than a formal alliance. Japan initially emphasized the
democratic identity of the four nations, whereas India seemed more comfortable emphasizing
functional cooperation. Australian leaders have been reluctant about creating the impression that the
group is a formal alliance.

As of 2021, leaders in all four countries have become more aligned in their shared concerns about
China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the region and are more willing to define a constructive
agenda of cooperation. All four navies participated in their first joint exercise in over a decade in
November 2020. And in March 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden convened a virtual Quad meeting
attended by Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. They formed working groups on COVID-19 vaccines, climate
change, and technological innovation and supply-chain resilience.

What are U.S. interests in the Quad?

Working closely with these countries is natural for the United States. Australia and Japan are U.S. treaty
allies, and India is an important strategic partner. The Donald Trump administration worked closely with
these countries, and the Biden administration is expanding the Quad’s agenda.

The Indo-Pacific spans two oceans and several continents, making it important to U.S. maritime
interests. In 2019, $1.9 trillion worth of U.S. trade passed through the region. This year, 42 percent of
the world’s exports and 38 percent of global imports are expected to pass through, according to a UN
report.

China’s growing willingness to challenge the regional status quo worries Washington, and Beijing’s
challenging of democratic values over the past year has deepened other Quad partners’ concerns as
well. China’s pursuit of its regional interests—including its crackdown on Hong Kong’s freedoms and
criticism of nations that take issue with its actions—has not been slowed by the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, the Quad’s agenda is not all about China. Leaders of the four nations also see a need for a
more proactive approach to solving humanitarian and economic challenges caused by COVID-19.

What are Japan’s aims for the Quad?

Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was a strong believer in the Quad’s power to ensure a “free
and open Indo-Pacific.” Abe worked to persuade the Trump administration of the value of this coalition
approach across the Indo-Pacific.

Japan depends heavily on open sea lanes for its trade with the world. The U.S. and Japanese militaries
already work closely across the region, and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have slowly built relationships
with their Australian and Indian counterparts. Similarly, Japan has played an important role in
supporting investment in manufacturing, trade, and infrastructure development across the region.

Japan and its Quad partners share concerns about China’s role in the region and Beijing’s challenges to
the rule of law. Beijing’s assertion of its sovereignty in the South China Sea, as well as Chinese
provocations toward islands China and Japan both claim in the East China Sea, has made Tokyo wary of
China’s military build-up. Strategic consultations with other Quad partners are vital.

Similarly, Japan is watching carefully as China imposes economic conditionality on countries in the Indo-
Pacific, and it wants to offer Southeast Asian countries alternative sources of assistance and commerce
to offset China’s growing influence. Tokyo has joined with Washington and Canberra to deepen the
funds available for quality infrastructure. Bolstering the resilience of the Quad nations, especially for
critical supply chains for goods such as semiconductors, will also be a Japanese priority.

How has China responded?

China’s relations with each of the Quad members have become more tense during the pandemic. U.S.-
China tensions remain high; Beijing’s frustration was conspicuous when the new Biden foreign policy
team had its first meeting with its Chinese counterpart in Alaska in March. Australia continues to bear
the brunt of Chinese economic sanctions after suggesting a World Health Organization investigation into
the origins of COVID-19 last year. India and Japan have clashed with China over territorial disputes.
China’s ambassador to Tokyo has publicly criticized Prime Minister Suga, claiming that the new Quad
diplomacy reflects a “Cold War mentality” and that it is “100 percent outdated.” In addition, recent polls
have shown negative views of China have soared among publics across the region.

Yet, few policymakers in the Quad countries see an advantage in trying to contain Chinese influence
militarily. Instead, the Quad leaders have emphasized cooperation across areas of shared interest to
bolster confidence in the democracies’ ability to counter China’s assertion of regional influence. As long
as tensions with China remain, the Quad’s agenda is likely to expand as the democracies of the Indo-
Pacific seek to balance China’s growing power.

Blue dot network.

The Blue Dot Network (BDN) is a multi-stakeholder initiative formed by the United States, Japan,[1] and
Australia to provide assessment and certification of infrastructure development projects worldwide on
measures of financial transparency, environmental sustainability, and impact on economic
development, with the goal of mobilizing private capital to invest abroad. It was initially led by the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia.
The Bei Dou Navigation Satellite System is a Chinese satellite navigation system. It consists of two
separate satellite constellations. As Pakistan is buying Chinese defense equipment, it would be shifting
to and be fully integrated into Bei Dou. Gradually, Pakistan Armed Forces will completely switch to the
Bei Dou navigation system for all its critical military platforms, source said. Pakistan is on a defense
equipment buying spree from China to deploy it along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir region.
Be it armor, air defense, artillery, UAVs, ships, submarine and fighter aircrafts from China

Second strike capability of Pakistan Developed

Importance of South China sea
Natural reserves 2 trillion dollars

Us hegemony in south China sea

Claims of East Asian countries

Chinese Two islands

 Spratly
 Peresal

Pivot Asia policy:

President Barack Obama's East Asia Strategy (2009–2017) represented a significant shift in the foreign
policy of the United States. It took the country's focus from the Middle Eastern/European sphere and
began to invest heavily in East Asian countries, some of which are in close proximity to the People's
Republic of China.

Additional focus was placed on the region with the Obama administration's 2012 "Pivot to East Asia"
regional strategy, whose key areas of actions are: "strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening
our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional
multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and
advancing democracy and human rights."[3] A report by the Brookings Institution states that reactions
to the pivot strategy were mixed, as "different Asian states responded to American rebalancing in
different ways."

Indo-Pacific region:
Indo-Pacific, originally a geographic concept that spans two regions of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific
Ocean, is not a new concept in itself. 10 years ago, Gurpreet s. Khurana, who used the word" Indo-
Pacific Strategy" for the first time, was a marine strategist and executive director of the New Delhi
National Marine Foundation. Recently, he wrote in the Washington Post that the new term has changed
the new strategic mind map since China’s “reform and opening up” in the 1980s. “Asia Pacific” has
shaped the image of a community of interests linking the United States and East Asia. The " Indo-Pacific
" used by Trump means that India, the United States, and other major Asian democracies, especially
Japan and Australia, will join in curbing China in the new framework of growing "Cold War" influence.

Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Air University Press

The Indian Ocean has emerged as a critical conduit for trade, commerce, and energy. The waters of the
Indian Ocean Region (IOR) have become a home for economic developments, disputes, conflicts, and
competition for regional influence by regional and extraregional powers. All major powers, such as the
United States, Australia, Japan, United Kingdom, India, and China have sought stakes in the security of
the IOR. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union wanted direct access to the IOR; now, China is looking
for the same. The India Ocean remains a pivot, being the world’s busiest trade route. Around 80 percent
of the world’s maritime oil trade passes through the IOR. The rise of China across the maritime region
has compelled nations (including India) to reshape their maritime strategies. This commentary aims at
looking at the geostrategic importance of the IOR for India, China’s presence in the region, and
counterbalance strategies.

Geostrategic Importance of the IOR

The Indian Ocean, which lies at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Australia, houses a number of littorals
that play critical roles in the region. The IOR is a vital sea lane with choke points such the Strait of
Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Bab-el Mandeb, and so forth. These choke points are of immense strategic
importance, as huge volumes of trade pass through them. These choke points are exposed to piracy,
international disputes, political dissents, and accidents. To ward off such threats and to gain/maintain a
strong foothold in this resource rich region, regional and external powers flex their muscles. The islands
in the Indian Ocean also work significantly to shape security architecture of the IOR. These islands play a
vital role along the sea lines of communication (SLOC) by giving easy access to navies continued
presence and allowing them to patrol and secure SLOCs during the time of peace and war. The Indian
Ocean acts as an intersection for the transport of oil from the Middle East. This is also the reason why
external powers are trying to strengthen their footholds, making it a region for them to showcase their
vigor and potentiality. When talking about the geostrategic importance, “security dynamics” in the IOR
play an equally pivotal role. In the view of the same, the Persian Gulf in the Arabian Sea (northern Indian
Ocean) also plays an equally important role for the security perspective of India. The main aim of India in
this area is to protect the SLOCs, which are laden with piracy threats in the Horn of Africa and the Red
Sea. The Indian Navy has warships deployed in the Gulf of Oman and Persian Gulf to provide safe
passage for Indian-flagged vessels operating in the region. India has also set up the Information Fusion
Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC–IOR) to keep a close watch on the movement of ships in the region.
The IFC–IOR engages with partner nations to develop comprehensive maritime domain awareness and
share information on vessels of interest.

Chinese Presence in the Backyard

The Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean remains a major concern across the region. Beijing is eager to
have strong footholds in the IOR, Africa, and other island nations, through the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI). The presence of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and other Chinese commercial
vessels in the Indian Ocean, the Chinese interpretation of the United Nations Convention for the Law of
the Sea, and so forth remain challenges to those who subscribe to the ideal of a free and open Indo-
Pacific.1 The geopolitical theory of the “String of Pearls” explains China’s potentials and intentions of
establishing commercial and infrastructural projects in India’s backyard. China has invested in several
projects from the Horn of Africa to the ASEAN nations and the Pacific Island nations. The revival of the
Chinese Maritime Silk Route can be seen through China’s investment in the port of Hambantota in Sri
Lanka, which Beijing gained control of through debt-trap lending, and the development of Pakistan’s
Gwadar Port as a part of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).2 In the Maldives, China had financed
the China–Maldives Friendship Bridge, linking Malé to the island of Hulhumale and Hulhule. It is the first
sea-crossing bridge for the Maldives and could play a vital role in the island nation’s long-term economic
development. The Maldives has also leased an uninhabited island, Feydhoo Finolhu, to a Chinese
enterprise for 50 years at a price of around 4 million USD, with plans to develop infrastructure for
tourism.3 Along the African coastal belt, one-quarter of all Chinese investment is concentrated in
Nigeria and Angola. Nigeria has received relatively large funds from China for railways. Abuja also hopes
that China will support peacekeeping in the Niger Delta region, which would better secure oil
investments there. Beijing is backing two major rail projects—one from Lagos to Kano and the other
from Lagos to Calabar. China’s ambitious BRI,5 a 1 trillion USD investment project, is aimed at
infrastructural developments. However, many have criticized Beijing’s promises to build roadways,
railways, and ports to revive the trade route linking China to Asia, Africa, and Europe as based upon
debt-trap lending that financially burdens comparatively weak economies, allowing China to essentially
gain sovereignty over portions of these countries. The CPEC, which is a BRI project, has been a great
concern for India, as it passes through the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. China has often enticed leaders
from countries with unstable economies to allow Chinese investment in their territories. However, India
has always dissented against the same on grounds of security concerns.

Counterbalancing the Dragon on the Seas

The Chinese dragon might be obstructing India on land, disputing New Delhi’s claim of the Line of Actual
Control (LAC). However, Beijing’s predominant geopolitical strategy of the great game lies in the Indian
Ocean, where China has engaged in massive infrastructure projects for some time now. To counter the
rise of China, India needs to up its game in the maritime sphere. New Delhi has been increasing India’s
military investments since the Modi government first came to power in 2014. In the Bay of Bengal (BoB),
India has modernized facilities in the Andaman Islands and at a base in Campbell Bay in the Nicobar
Islands. In 2019, an infrastructure development plan worth 56.5 billion INR aimed at allowing additional
warships, aircraft, troops, and drones to be stationed in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was finalized.
On 24 January 2019, the Indian Navy commissioned the new naval station INS Kohassa in the BoB
islands.6 While there has been a lot of stir claiming that this upgrade was aimed at countering the
Chinese expansion at the IOR, Ding Hao, deputy director of the Asian–African Military Affairs Office of
the Foreign Military Studies Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Military
Sciences, said the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are overseas territories of the Dominion of India and
that it is a normal move for the Indian military to establish military bases there. Beijing has defended
China’s moves in the IOR by stating that it aims for peace and stability in the region. To counter the rise
of China in the Indian Ocean, India needs to emerge as a strong maritime power, which would be
possible with support from the island nations in the region. India has recently undertaken infrastructure
development projects with dual-use logistics facilities in Mauritius and Seychelles. India aims to upgrade
facilities on the Agaléga Islands of Mauritius. In 2015, India and Mauritius had signed a MoU to improve
air and sea facilities at the Agaléga Island.7 Even though the Agaléga islanders know that construction of
naval base would lead to their displacement, the Mauritian government have ignored this as they want
India to continue routing its money through Mauritius, which is their largest source of FDI. India can take
this to its advantage and get logistic helps from Mauritius as well. The 87 million USD project has been
awarded to two companies: Afcons Infrastructure Limited and Rail India Technical and Economic
Services (RITES) Ltd., a Government of India enterprise. As per a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
signed in 2015 by Indian prime minister Narendra Modi and his Mauritian counterpart, India would set
up infrastructure for improving air and sea connectivity.8 Even though construction of the naval base
would lead to the displacement of Agaléga Islanders, the Mauritian government is eager for India to
continue routing its money through Mauritius, as it represents the nation’s largest source of foreign
direct investment. New Delhi can use this to India’s advantage to gain logistical assistance from
Mauritius as well. With Seychelles, India has agreed on developing infrastructure on Assumption Island.
India has also helped Victoria with ocean mapping to protect Seychelles exclusive economic zone and
has donated aircraft and launched a radar project. However, it is also important to note that Mauritius
and Seychelles, being the small islands that they are, may not align with India to the point of isolating
China completely in the IOR. The United States, on the other hand, can definitely provide India with
logistics. The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) between Washington and New
Delhi would enable India to gain logistical support from the many US facilities located throughout the
Indo-Pacific. India is a part of several bilateral and multilateral military exercises in the Indian Ocean.
Naval Exercise MILAN, hosted by the Indian Navy and most recently held on 8 November 2019, was
attended by delegates from 17 foreign navies. The 2020 edition of the exercise has been postponed in
the wake of COVID-19 pandemic but is expected to be the largest iteration of the exercise, with the
projected participation of 30 foreign navies. Exercise Malabar is a trilateral maritime event between
India, Japan, and the United States and aims at strengthening cooperation and enhancing
interoperability among participants. In 2020, India prepared to expand the grouping by including
Australia as well. Previously, India had been reluctant to invite Australia as it would appear to be
connected to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), an informal strategic forum among these same
four nations, aimed straightforwardly against the China’s rise. However, given the June 2020 Sino-India
clashes at the LAC in eastern Ladakh’s Galwan Valley, India is expected to make the decision of inviting
Australia and in doing so enhance its strategic position vis-à-vis Beijing. Military exercises in the IOR are
significant due to the increasing Chinese threat. Separately, in June 2020, the Indian Navy increased its
surveillance and operational deployment in the IOR, with the Galwan clash as a backdrop. The Indian
Navy also held an important exercise with its Japanese counterparts in the IOR, where Chinese naval
vessels and submarines make persistent incursions. China’s ventures in the IOR are seen as one of the
most vital reasons for the Indian Navy to assert its preparedness to ward off security threats in the
region.

Conclusion
As a move to strengthen itself at the IOR, India has increased its military capacity from operating only in
the neighborhood to operating in the entire region—from the Malacca Strait to the waters off the
African coasts. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the world order is expected to witness a
geostrategic shift, India will aim at further strengthening its presence in the IOR. In this dynamic, India
will look forward to building up the gambit with Indian Ocean littorals such as Sri Lanka, Maldives,
Mauritius, and Seychelles to scrutinize the rise of China. India is also likely to develop a strategic plan
with the United States, without overtly professing such measures as “anti-Chinese moves.”The Indian
Ocean will remain one of the world’s most strategic locations, with more than 75 percent of the world’s
maritime trade and 50 percent of daily global oil transfers passing through the region. As a result, India’s
primary aim will be to maintain a stable and peaceful India Ocean, with a focus toward economic and
military alterations obviating the menacing Chinese threat.