Incremental Peace in Afghanistan Accord Issue 27

Accord
ISSUE 27
Logo using
multiply on
layers
Editors
an international review of peace initiatives Logo drawn as
seperate elements
with overlaps
coloured seperately
Anna Larson and
Alexander Ramsbotham
2018
Incremental peace
in Afghanistan
Accord
ISSUE 27
an international review of peace initiatives
Incremental peace
in Afghanistan
June 2018 // Editors

Anna Larson and Alexander Ramsbotham
Accord // ISSUE 27 // www.c-r.org

Published by Conciliation Resources, to inform and strengthen peace processes
worldwide by documenting and analysing the lessons of peacebuilding
Published by Acknowledgements
Conciliation Resources
We would like to give special thanks to Professor
Burghley Yard, 106 Burghley Road
Michael Semple for his extensive expert advice
London, NW5 1AL
and substantive editorial input and support for
www.c-r.org this Accord publication. Professor Semple's
experience, insights and ideas have been
Telephone +44 (0)207 359 7728
integral to conceptual development and practical
Fax +44 (0)207 359 4081
implementation throughout this Accord project.
Email [email protected]
We would also like to thank the following:
Charity registered in England and Wales Ali Wardak, Heela Najibullah, Christine Bell,
(1055436). Company limited by guarantee Charlotte Morris, Scott Worden, Sippi Azerbaijani
registered in England and Wales (03196482). Moghaddam, Jonathan Cohen, Ed Hadley, Chris
Sell, Jawed Nader, Noah Coburn, Erika Tarzi,
Editors Kate Clark, Emma Leslie, Veronika Tesarova,
Anna Larson and Alexander Ramsbotham Beatrice Liese, Timor Sharan, Sayed Abdullah
Ahmadi, Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Mohammed
Executive Director Munir Salamzai, Ali Hassan Fahimi, Shaharzad
Jonathan Cohen Akbar, Ahmad Shuja, Malais Daud, Rahmatullah
Director of Accord Hashemi, Sayed Ali Faisal, Lotfullah Najafizada,
Alexander Ramsbotham Amir Hussain Hussaini, Tahir Qadiri, Mohammed
Hussain Hasrat, Wali Naeemi, Hamish Nixon,
Director of Policy and Learning Francesc Vendrell, Tom Rodwell, Behrouz
Teresa Dumasy Afagh, Hameed Hakimi, Jenny Norton, Daud
Senior Advisor, Peace and Transition Processes Qarisadah, Marika Theros, Elizabeth Winter,
Zahbia Yousuf Christopher Langton, Kathryn Tomlinson
and Andrew Nethercott.
Senior Advisor, Gender and Peacebuilding
Sophia Close Special thank you to Veronika Tesarova for
her invaluable role throughout the project
Policy, Accord and Learning Officer and publication.
Felix Colchester
Opinions expressed by all contributors are
Accord, Policy and Practice Assistant their own.
Veronika Tesarova
This report is an output of the Political
Copyedited by Aaron Griffiths Settlements Research Programme, funded by
Designed and typeset by Soapbox UK aid from the Department for International
www.soapbox.co.uk Development for the benefit of developing
countries. The views expressed and information
© Conciliation Resources 2018 contained in it are not necessarily those of
Permission is granted for reproduction and or endorsed by DFID, which can accept no
use of the materials for educational purposes. responsibility for such views or information
Please acknowledge your source when using the or for any reliance placed on them.
materials and notify Conciliation Resources.
www.politicalsettlements.org
Cover photo: No matter how high the mountain, Twitter.com/PolSettlements
there will always be a way up. (Dari proverb)
View of a village in Nuristan province,
Afghanistan // © MohibNoor/iStock
ISSN 2397-5598
ISBN 978-1-905805-26-6
Contents
Acronyms 4
Foreword 5
Introduction 7
Section 1: Looking back – lessons from Afghanistan’s past 13
Afghanistan’s political history 15
Lessons from Bonn 20
Transformative politics in 20th century Afghanistan 25
President Najibullah and the National Reconciliation Policy 30
Taliban history of war and peace in Afghanistan 35
Peace in Afghanistan: a northern, non-Pashtun perspective 41
Section 2: Looking forward – peace initiatives 46

Elusive settlement in Afghanistan 48
Perspectives of leaders of five Taliban caucuses – interviews 56
Women’s participation in Afghan peace talks 63
Integrating a military and peace strategy – interview with Amb. Douglas Lute 68
Statement by the Taliban Political Office in Qatar 72
Brokering local settlements in Helmand 74
Local peacebuilding in Afghanistan 80
International support for a political process 85
Section 3: Looking forward – institutional change 91

Inclusive politics as a path to peace 93
Local perspectives on peace and elections – Herat Province 102
On elections and peace: Dr Habiba Sarabi – interview 104
Local perspectives on peace and elections – Nangarhar Province 106
On peace and political reform: Younus Qanooni – interview 109
Local perspectives on peace and elections – Balkh Province 113
Theses on peacemaking in Afghanistan 115
Local perspectives on peace and elections – Ghazni Province 119
Human rights, security and Afghanistan’s peace process 122
On war, peace and transition: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – interview 128
Institutionalising inclusive and sustainable justice in Afghanistan 132
Conclusion 138
Chronology 143
Glossary 147
Profiles 148
Key texts 152
References 154
Accord series 156
Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 3

Acronyms
ACJC – Anti-Corruption Justice Centre ISK – Islamic State of Khorasan
ADR – Alternative dispute resolution KHAD – State Intelligence Agency – Khadamat-e Aetla’at-e Dawlati
AIBA – A fghanistan Independent Bar Association MoJ – Ministry of Justice
AIHRC – A fghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission MoWA – Ministry of Women’s Affairs
ANA – A fghan National Army NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ANP – A fghan National Police NDS – N ational Directorate of Security
ANSF – A fghan National Security Forces NRP – N ational Reconciliation Policy
BAAG – B ritish & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group NUG – N ational Unity Government
BRI – B elt and Road Initiative OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
CDC – Community Development Council PDPA – People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
DDA – D istrict Development Assembly PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team
DDR – D isarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration SERC – Special Electoral Reform Commission
HIG – H ezb-i Islami-ye Gulbuddin SNTV – Single Non-Transferable Vote
HRSU – Human Rights Support Unit SSR – Security Sector Reform
HRU – H uman Rights Unit UN5PPP – UN five-Point Peace Plan
IEC – I ndependent Electoral Commission UNDP – U nited Nations Development Programme
INLTC – I ndependent National Legal Training Centre USIP – United States Institute of Peace
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force USV – U pper Sangin Valley
ISI – I nter-Services Intelligence
64° 66° 68° 70° 72° 74°

AFGHANISTAN
CHINA
UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
JAWZJAN
TURKMENISTAN KUNDUZ
BALKH TAKHAR
BADAKHSHAN
36°
36°
SAMANGAN
FARYAB BAGHLAN
R AFGHANISTAN
SARIPUL SIE Jammu
NJ
PA NURISTAN
ISLAMIC
BADGHIS
BAMYAN N and
PARWAN KAPISA KUNAR
MA
Kashmir
LAGH
WARDAK Kabul
34°
HER AT GHOR DAY LOGAR
NANGARHAR 34°
KUNDI Islamabad
REPUBLIC
PAKTYA
KHOST
GHAZNI
PAKISTAN
URUZGAN
FARA H PAKTIKA
32° ZABUL
32°
OF
National capital
IRAN
NIMROZ KANDAHAR International boundary

Provincial boundary
HELMAND
INDIA
0 50 100 150 200 250 km

30°
30°
Map: United Nations 0 50 100 150 mi
62° 64° 66° 68° 70° 72° 74°
4 // Accord // ISSUE 27
Foreword
Mohammad Kareem Khalili
His Excellency Mohammad Kareem
Khalili is Chair of the High Peace Council
of Afghanistan, having previously
served as Vice-President of Afghanistan
from 2002–14 during both the Interim
Administration and then under elected
Mohammad Kareem Khalili.
President Hamid Karzai.
The country known as ‘Afghanistan’ has been burning in Of course, questions remain as to the conditions under
the fire of war and violence for nearly forty years now. which peace can be achieved. But despite these questions,
These destructive wars have inflicted all kinds of injury Afghanistan’s political class is confident that peace
on every aspect of the country. From the widespread and offers the best way to escape the current crisis without
largescale slaughter of our people, to the destruction of precipitating a new one.
housing and economic infrastructure, to the degrading of
the natural environment, to the traumatised psychology Undoubtedly, peace in Afghanistan is intimately linked to
of the war-affected. From the violation of the rights and international peace. The problem of conflict in Afghanistan
freedoms of women and children, to the crumbling of the is a manifestation of contemporary global conflict.
rule of law. And from the emergence of all kinds of negative Therefore, progress towards peace in Afghanistan will not
phenomena in the domain of social relations, to the damage just save the residents of this country from the evils of war,
to the nation’s cultural life. These are all consequences it will also contribute to the solution of a global problem.
which the continuous wars have inflicted on the people Accordingly, while the peace process in Afghanistan is
of Afghanistan. Therefore, to extricate the country from Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, it requires the clear and
this horrendous, bitter state requires a transformational committed support from the countries of the region and
approach. This approach is peace and understanding! at the international level.
Only peace offers a sustainable and fundamental solution
to the Afghan crisis. In 2001, the international community achieved a rare unity
of action with regard to Afghanistan. It was thus able to
The necessity of achieving peace is one issue on which there transform positively the lives of millions of our people and
is no difference of opinion. Over the past ten months the turn a new page in the life of the country. That page is titled
Afghanistan High Peace Council has conducted broad-based ‘peace’ and ‘an end to war’.
consultations about peace across the political spectrum and
at all levels of society. These consultations have involved I want to express my appreciation for the unstinting efforts
national figures, the leaders of political parties, religious of the international community and the international
scholars, civil society activists, women’s rights defenders, partners of Afghanistan in the quest for peace. I am hopeful
media figures and people from other parts of Afghan society. that this cooperation will reach even higher levels and
The point on which all of these figures reached a consensus become stronger and more effective.
was the necessity of achieving peace in Afghanistan. They all
emphasised the point that any solution to the problems of The peace process faces multiple challenges. These
Afghanistan depends upon peace and understanding. challenges are not restricted to the practical domain.

Indeed, we must also continue our work in the theoretical I am pleased that the peace process in Afghanistan, which
and conceptual domain. On the other hand, we already since 2010 has been headed by the High Peace Council,
know that peace is not just a political phenomenon and does has achieved important and promising results. Now this
not merely imply an absence of war. Peace spans social, process is following a clear road map. Furthermore,
cultural, legal, psychological and economic dimensions. We structures and institutions have been established at the
can only talk of peace having taken hold in a society when the national and provincial level, which are competent to
members of that society properly comprehend the nature of cooperate with national and international forces and ensure
peace, when peace is accorded due respect as a universal that the pursuit of peace is a fundamental approach and
human-social value and when the structures required to permanent obligation.
facilitate and strengthen peace have been duly established.
The compilation and publication of this significant
The compilation of this volume required the dedication of volume can build upon the successes and achievements
a team of intellectuals, possessed of profound knowledge of the peace process. It can help to attract the
of Afghan affairs with a deep familiarity and a determination international attention to this important process, which
to elucidate the Afghan issue for today’s audience. I am we so clearly require.
grateful for the efforts of the contributors, who have
approached the issue of peace in Afghanistan in such With hope for the realisation of a sustainable peace
a scholarly and professional manner. Such endeavours in Afghanistan.
are required to facilitate the peace process, to nurture
new perspectives, broaden our horizons and stimulate
our people towards fresh political and practical initiatives.
Introduction
Progressive peace for Afghanistan
Anna Larson and Alexander Ramsbotham – with thanks to Professor Michael
Semple for substantive input, insights and ideas.
Dr Anna Larson is Senior Teaching Fellow in Development (Columbia, 2014), and holds a PhD in post-war recovery from the
Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University University of York.
of London, and before this worked as a researcher in Afghanistan.
She has been writing on politics, democratisation and peace in Alexander Ramsbotham is Director of Accord and Series Editor
Afghanistan since 2005, is co-author with Noah Coburn of Derailing at Conciliation Resources.
Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape
ABSTRACT
Accord editors Anna Larson and Alexander of Afghan and international men and women from
Ramsbotham introduce the publication, explaining its academia, the military, government, armed opposition
rationale, focus areas and structure. They identify the and civil society, many with direct experience of conflict
need for a radical change in approach to move beyond and peace in Afghanistan.
peace rhetoric in Afghanistan through a progressive,
step-by-step process towards political settlement, Section 1 looks back to historical lessons of
which builds stability, confidence and legitimacy over conflict and peacemaking to understand how
time. This would pursue two phased objectives: first, departures from established, violent political
short-term – to reduce violence which inevitably paths might be possible. Sections 2 and 3 look
involves a central role for the conflict parties, forward to possibilities for peaceful transition in
principally the Taliban and the Afghan government; and the future, with Section 2 considering priorities
second, long-term – to achieve a more broadly inclusive for peace initiatives and Section 3 examining
social contract representative of all Afghans which options for institutional change. In conclusion,
is only achievable with involvement and ultimately the editors draw lessons from these different
endorsement across Afghan society. contributions and put forward recommendations
for policymakers and peace practitioners.
This Accord is structured in three main sections.
Contributors span a range of perspectives and insights

Afghanistan faces two possible futures: an indefinite And second is the long-term objective of achieving a more
continuation of violent conflict, or incremental progress broadly inclusive social contract representative of all
towards sustainable peace. Drivers of both scenarios Afghans which is only achievable with involvement and
are documented in the contributions to this Accord ultimately endorsement across Afghan society.
publication. Drivers of conflict include a well-established
war economy, which fuels and funds violence. Both Short- and long-term objectives are distinct but also
main parties to the war – the Taliban and the Afghan interdependent. Creating conditions in which Afghans can
government – remain determined to fight on and have renew their social contract first requires a reduction of
secured sufficient external backing to do so. Underlying violence. As Michael Semple describes in this publication,
the violence are persistent political disputes over how an incremental approach in which agreement is phased
power is shared and how future reforms are configured. would allow for confidence-building over time to increase
Potential drivers of peace include war fatigue among the parties’ willingness to consider more ambitious
the Afghan actors, significant overlap between visions measures or embrace compromise. The cessation of
of a future Afghanistan espoused by many in the Taliban violence would represent the single most important
movement and pro-government Afghans, plus continued action to build confidence and help launch dialogue on
international interest in achieving peace. Virtually all core substantive issues. Such an approach recognises the
parties acknowledge that war can only end through a importance of rebuilding relationships between the parties
negotiated settlement. There is no military solution. in expanding the possibility of agreement. Rather than
involving a single text such as the 2001 Bonn Accords, an
President Ashraf Ghani’s February 2018 offer to the incremental peace in Afghanistan might consist of a series
Taliban of a political process provided a stark illustration of agreements sequenced from easy to hard, with agreed
of the dilemma inherent in Afghanistan’s current position. reforms and confidence-building connecting the parallel
Contributions to this Accord by different Taliban caucuses short- and long-term tracks over a period of years.
document that the idea of achieving some form of
political status without either surrendering or rejecting But initiatives to reduce violence must be linked to a more
their identity as Taliban has some resonance within the transformative agenda in order to broaden their legitimacy
movement. But publicly the Taliban leadership has been and appeal. The terms on which de-escalation measures
sceptical of the proposal, and violent attacks continue. are agreed should not close down space for more inclusive
Pro-government Afghans are also split. Interest in seeing transition and institutional reform subsequently. Heela
an end to fighting is offset by resistance to sharing political Najibullah in this publication describes a multilayered
space or fear of compromises on human rights that a approach to negotiating with armed opposition groups in
peace settlement with the Taliban is perceived to imply. Afghanistan in the late 1980s which combined practical
efforts to establish local non-aggression or peace
The way forward from rhetorical offers to actual protocol pacts with a pragmatic political strategy to
engagement in dialogue and a reduction in violence has so build domestic support and international legitimacy.
far been elusive. Indeed, a persistent theme of the Afghan International actors can play a role to help ensure that
conflict is the glaring gap between words and actions progress in violence reduction includes commitments
– with both sides talking peace while intent on waging to an inclusive settlement in the longer term. Ed Hadley
war. The resultant violent stasis has again intensified and Chris Kolenda in this publication lay out some options
with the 2018 Taliban spring offensive, while the Afghan for international support for a phased and multi-level
government and its international coalition partners political process in Afghanistan.
remain committed to increasing military pressure
on the insurgency. Evidence from past peace processes in Afghanistan
and elsewhere shows that settlements agreed among
Incremental peace battlefield elites do not inevitably progress to address
In order to move beyond the peace rhetoric a radical the root causes of the conflict, which can contribute to
change in approach is needed. An incremental, step- a return to violence. Christine Bell et al. writing in 2017
by-step process towards political settlement offers a assert that the success of peace agreements to resolve
potentially more effective way forward, which builds immediate violence has not been matched by longer-
stability, confidence and legitimacy in phases over time. term commitments to broader reform such as relating to
This must pursue two objectives. First is the short-term tackling gender exclusion. In fact, peace agreements have
objective of achieving a reduction in violence which tended to lead to uncertain and often impermanent peace
inevitably involves a central role for the conflict parties, and political stalemate. Astri Suhrke in this publication
principally the Taliban and the Afghan government. describes how the Afghan armed factions represented in
the 2001 Bonn talks were able to establish themselves in social contract. But the fact that the settlements were
positions of power and how such privileging of ‘warlords’ established outside any national peace framework meant
with records of serious human rights abuses led to the that not only did national authorities fail to follow through
securitisation of the post-Bonn new order that blocked the on locally-agreed commitments, but state institutions
advancement of stability and justice. like the National Directorate of Security actively opposed
efforts to implement them. All these local settlements
Sustainable progress towards peace also requires ultimately collapsed. Local peacemaking in Afghanistan
balancing centre–periphery or national–sub-national has also fallen foul of resistance by Taliban central
priorities for reconciliation. M. Nazif Shahrani in leadership. For example, government reconciliation and
this publication explains how many non-Pashtun reintegration programmes that effectively sought to ‘buy-
communities in northern Afghanistan see the war not off’ local Taliban fighters on terms akin to capitulation
between the government and the armed opposition, were seen as a threat by central leadership and failed to
but between ‘included’ Pashtuns and ‘excluded’ non- gain significant traction.
Pashtuns. Factionalisation within the Taliban, alienation
of many Taliban caucuses from the central leadership Practical steps
and increasing internal frustration with the armed An incremental approach to peace in Afghanistan could
campaign further suggest the potential of more localised start locally, reducing violence from the ground up. This
peacemaking options – for example engaging responsive responds to the fractured nature of the insurgency and
Taliban regional groups and local governance structures the high levels of violence in Afghanistan, as well as the
in joint violence reduction initiatives. inclination towards de-escalation demonstrated by some
Taliban caucuses, as described in this publication. It can
Previous sub-national peace efforts in Afghanistan also build on momentum of the recent groundswell of
have shown early signs of success but have ultimately pro-peace local activism such as the Helmand Peace
been undermined by active resistance from the centre. March Initiative. Practical steps could include reciprocal
Julius Cavendish in this publication describes how local measures for de-escalation towards ceasefire, locally-
peace settlements agreed in Helmand in 2006 and 2010 agreed provisional peace zones in which the terms of a
were effective in realising short-term reductions in more permanent ceasefire can be renegotiated, tangible
violence as well as some level of renegotiation of the local dividends and guarantees to convince local armed
Box 1: Peace and elections
Translating peace rhetoric into concrete gains for electoral monitoring and fraud prevention. These measures
both short-term violence reduction and a longer-term would represent active steps on the part of the Afghan
renegotiation of the social contract will require strategic government and international partners towards filling the
navigation of the existing political landscape – ensuring, substantial trust deficit that exists between Afghan citizens
for example, that potential spoilers within and outside the and the institutions and donors that orchestrate elections.
Afghan government do not have the opportunity to derail
In the longer term, following the presidential poll in 2019, the
progress towards either. The forthcoming electoral cycle,
newly-elected president and international partners should
with parliamentary polls scheduled for October 2018 and
commit to establishing a high-level consultative group on
presidential elections in 2019, presents a key moment
political reform, to be tasked with conducting nationwide
for such disruption by these spoilers – by preventing
consultations about the overhaul of the political system.
participation, thus undermining government legitimacy;
or by manipulating the electoral process towards the Commitment towards this kind of reform will be necessary
further entrenchment of their own interests. to help substantiate President Ghani’s offer to consider the
Taliban a legitimate political actor. At present within the
While it may be too late to incorporate elections formally
National Unity Government there is little space for formal
into any national-level peace process, it will be important
political opposition – and as both Thomas Barfield and Amin
to mitigate the efforts of spoilers as far as possible. One
Tarzi note in their Accord contributions, this has been the
way in which to do this in the short term would be to use
case historically also. If the Taliban are expected to see this
parliamentary and then presidential elections as pilot
offer as one worth taking up, the political system must allow
opportunities for commitments towards the de-escalation
for political actors of different ideological persuasions to
of violence in certain designated areas, alongside greater
have influence in government.
international commitments towards candidate vetting,

groups to engage in the absence of a broader Taliban Structure of the publication
commitment, or regionally tailored strategies to tackle In order to provide a solid analytical foundation for
local war economies – such as those relating to resource practical peace options in Afghanistan, this Accord
extraction and livelihoods. publication is structured in three main sections.
Contributors to these sections span a range of
Longer-term commitments to developing a perspectives, experiences and insights. They comprise
more broadly inclusive social contract also need to Afghan and international men and women, many of whom
make discernible progress on key issues such as have direct experience of conflict and peace in Afghanistan
relating to justice or women's political participation. – from academia, the military, government, armed
Practical steps could include: developing a high level opposition and civil society. The breadth of contributors
independent consultative group on political reform covers a diversity of views of how to move forward with
and renewal of the social contract, in which women’s Afghanistan’s transition from war. What unites them is
involvement is central; launching a National Peace their commitment to see change come about and their
Dialogue to address root causes of the conflict, suggestions for how this might happen – distinct as
involving consultations with communities; and each of these may be.
establishing a Peace and Security Commission of
“
senior national and international men and women
members charged with ensuring that security sector An incremental, step-by-step
reform efforts reinforce the peace process. process towards political
Support for President Ghani’s February 2018 offer of
settlement offers a potentially
a political process with the Taliban can help sustain more effective way forward,
momentum towards short- and long-term objectives
which builds stability,
for example by mitigating resistance from central
leadership to local peacemaking. This also provides confidence and legitimacy
a policy platform for international engagement with a in phases over time. ”
nationally-owned Afghan peace framework. Practical
steps could include: international affirmation of President
Ghani’s offer to boost its credibility, accountability and Section 1 looks back to historical lessons of conflict
resourcing; engaging branches of the central Taliban and peacemaking to understand how departures from
leadership in political dialogue and discussion of security established, conflictual political paths might be possible.
assurances; supporting intra-Taliban dialogue to broaden Afghanistan’s history contains important insights into
cross-movement consensus on de-escalation and factors influencing the country’s potential transition
potential areas for mutual accommodation; exploring from war today. These include how regional and broader
options for third-party mediation, such as identifying international interests in Afghanistan’s stability have
an appropriate mediator or establishing principles for prolonged violent conflict, how political legitimacy has
talks; and developing tailored peace support structures been secured by different leaders at different times, and
such as a hybrid International Contact Group that how opposition to these leaders has been excluded –
includes both state and non-state actors as a way to link pushed to the fringes or into exile, and thereby potentially
mediation tracks. into violence. Themes explored in Section 1 include a
history of political opposition in Afghanistan, lessons from
The incremental approach advocated here describes the Bonn process, transformative politics in 20th century
components of a domestic Afghan peace process. But Afghanistan, experiences of the National Reconciliation
violent conflict in Afghanistan has clear regional and Policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a Taliban history
global dimensions that need to be addressed head on. of war and peace in Afghanistan, and a non-Pashtun
Diplomatic support for an Afghan peace process is key perspective of political violence in northern Afghanistan.
to coordinate external involvement, but more direct
interventions are also likely to be necessary, such as Sections 2 and 3 explore possibilities for peaceful
efforts to isolate different Taliban caucuses’ reliance on transition looking ahead. Section 2 looks at priorities for
external regional economic and political support. The peace initiatives, which can represent critical junctures
various practical steps for progressive political settlement towards a different political future. Peace initiatives
in Afghanistan introduced here are developed in more need to be carefully planned and managed to seize
detail in this publication’s concluding chapter. opportunities appropriately, accommodating different
constituencies – armed and unarmed – with an interest in

Box 2: Armed groups and peace in Afghanistan
This publication focuses on possibilities for a peace holds some niche appeal among the most extreme
process between the Afghan government and the Taliban elements of the Afghan insurgency and the fact that it can
insurgency as the protagonists of the armed conflict in the still inflict such damage on soft but prominent targets like
country. But several armed groups are active in Afghanistan voter registration centres means that ISK maintains serious
alongside the Taliban, while the Taliban itself comprises a capacity to spoil peace efforts. A May 2018 report by the
number of sub-groups with varying levels of allegiance to United States Institute for Peace (USIP) listed three ways in
the central leadership. which ISK could disrupt any peace process in Afghanistan:
by attacking sensitive targets; by fuelling ethno-sectarian
Antonio Giustozzi in a 2017 report describes how the
tension; and by presenting themselves as more committed
organisation of the Taliban has become increasingly
to jihad than the Taliban.
fragmented since 2007, as the original political leadership
of the Quetta Shura has struggled to maintain control over While atrocities claimed by ISK show the group’s capacity
various regional commands. The Quetta Shura has also to cause harm and grab headlines, most commentators
been beset by internal power struggles and factionalisation. still question the level of threat that it poses to the Afghan
Ongoing fragmentation has meant that different Taliban government. Thomas Ruttig of the Afghan Analysts Network
Shuras began to develop along comparatively distinct in an April 2018 interview with Himal stressed that ISK is
trajectories, with varying degrees of militarism, internal strategically insignificant, confined to localised areas of
cohesion or attitudes to reconciliation with Kabul. particular Afghan districts primarily in Nangarhar in the
east. Small groups that have declared their affiliation to ISK
Michael Semple and Theo Farrell also writing in 2017
elsewhere in the country lack serious means or influence.
go further, describing the Taliban movement as being
‘in disarray’, with several factions vying for power, Many ISK are former Taliban who use the ‘fear factor’ of ISK
varying levels of morale, alienation of many Taliban from affiliation opportunistically. But Ruttig’s analysis stresses
their leadership and growing internal disaffection over that ISK failed to exploit the opportunity to recruit large
the armed campaign. Aspects of these analyses are numbers of disgruntled Taliban following the movement’s
echoed in the perspectives of different Taliban caucuses split after the announcement of the death of its founder
presented in this Accord. Mullah Omar in 2015. Deep ideological and religious gaps
exist between the two groups, and many of even the most
Islamic State in Khorasan (ISK) province is perhaps
ardent Taliban dissidents in 2015 refused to join ISK. ISK’s
the most notorious armed group currently operating in
lack of strategic strength means that they do not currently
Afghanistan. Islamic State (IS or Daesh) announced the
feature in any plans for peace talks.
establishment of ISK in 2015. Felix Kuehn in this publication
describes how ISK grew out of growing friction among USIP has suggested that the same dynamics that make
different jihadi and other militant groups. It has now ISK a potential spoiler may also provide common cause
developed into a significant rival of the Taliban, which has for the main conflict parties to support a peace process,
found itself in open conflict with ISK – although there are as the Afghan and US governments and the Taliban have
also instances of local collaboration between the two. all have invested human and other resources in fighting
ISK. Meanwhile, part of any de-escalation process with the
Devastating suicide bomb attacks in Kabul in early 2018
Taliban will involve the movement verifiably dissociating
demonstrated the intent of ISK to derail democratic
itself from ISK and other armed groups opposed to a
progress in Afghanistan and dissuade Afghans from
political process.
participating. The level of indiscrimination of ISK violence
their evolution and outcomes. The global political climate by different Taliban caucuses and by its Political Office
and the regional landscape have both shifted recently in Qatar; integrating military and political strategies;
for Afghanistan. The economy is growing and the broad brokering local political settlements; lessons of local
consensus on the military stalemate between the Taliban peacebuilding; and options for international support
and the government places emphasis on talks towards for a peace process.
a new political settlement. But discussions of peace
initiatives for Afghanistan have tended to lack practical Section 3 examines options for institutional change.
detail, and topics covered under Section 2 look to flesh Space exists in Afghanistan to diverge from past political
some of this out. The topics include: elements of a political patterns and choose new trajectories. For example,
settlement – priorities for peaceful progress; women’s reformulating Afghanistan’s political structure to
participation; perspectives on peace options presented facilitate broader inclusion and accommodate opposition

non-violently might offer a way to support sustainable figures; theses on peacemaking in Afghanistan; human
stability and insulate Afghanistan against regional political rights, security and Afghanistan’s peace process; and
change or interference. Forthcoming elections present institutionalising inclusive and sustainable justice.
opportunities in this regard – elections, while deeply
flawed in Afghanistan, remain popular with the general In conclusion, the editors draw lessons from these
public. Reform before the coming cycle is not likely, but different contributions and put forward recommendations
a large-scale overhaul of the political system is overdue for policymakers and peace practitioners, fleshing out
and a consultative process to initiate this could bolster the practical options for a progressive approach to peace in
legitimacy of a newly-elected president. Section 3 covers Afghanistan. More detailed descriptions of sub-themes,
themes of: inclusive politics as a path to peace; local contributors and articles are provided at the start of
perspectives on peace and elections from four provinces; each section.
reflections on peace and transition by significant Afghan

Section 1
Looking back
Lessons for peace from Afghanistan’s past
Section 1 of the publication explores lessons of conflict and peacemaking
from Afghanistan’s past as a way to better understand how departures from
established, conflictual political paths might be possible today.
Afghanistan today differs significantly from many of the power to Afghanistan’s regions could alleviate pressure
scenarios described in the different historical periods on the centre. But decentralisation has proved politically
covered in this section. But there are nonetheless common challenging in practice, not least in the context of the
themes that are as important today as they were previously. ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan today, and would still
These themes contribute valuable insights into ways in leave the core conflict challenge of how to introduce
which both an initial de-escalation of violence and a revised effective opposition politics.
social contract might be reached – and how the derailment
of either might be avoided. Recent political transition in Afghanistan has largely been
shaped by the 2001 Bonn Agreement. Dr Astri Suhrke
Key substantive themes include how regional and broader reviews lessons from the Bonn process, describing how
international interests in Afghanistan’s stability have post-9/11 core interests of the United States at Bonn in
prolonged violent conflict, how political legitimacy has been denying Afghanistan as a base for terrorism trumped
secured by different leaders at different times, and how political objectives to agree a functioning political system.
opposition to these leaders has been excluded – pushed Demilitarising Northern Alliance militias, justice or
to the fringes or into exile, and thereby potentially into human rights were not priorities. While Bonn’s iterative
violence. Key process themes include the importance of transitional framework included steps to broaden inclusion
establishing trust through active, tangible measures, the over time, armed factions represented at the talks have
critical need to allow time for results to become apparent, since entrenched themselves in power. Taliban were
the importance of broad-based consensus that reaches excluded from Bonn and subsequent opportunities to
beyond elite settlement and the prioritisation of Afghan accommodate amenable Taliban were rejected. A central
over external interests. lesson is that prioritising Afghan over external interests is
key to a peaceful and sustainable future.
Opening Section 1, Professor Thomas Barfield explores
how the lack of space for peaceful dissent has fomented Interest in political reform is not new in Afghanistan.
violent resistance in Afghanistan. Afghan political Dr Amin Tarzi provides unique insights into modernisation
culture has developed a highly centralised structure initiatives from the early 20th century led by Mahmud
in which power is concentrated in an individual ruler, Tarzi. Key factors undermining Mahmud Tarzi’s reform
constraining scope for political opposition – although agenda included: 1) imported reformist ideologies
local power-holders have sought de facto ways to resist that were alien to most Afghans; 2) failure to engage
central authority. Effective reconciliation requires influential landed tribal leaders or clergy with authority
strengthening governance and creating a political system and legitimacy; and 3) limited influence of Tarzi’s royal
that can accommodate dissidents peacefully. Devolving patron to impose changes domestically or garner support

externally. Some key impediments to change from the Tarzi While the Taliban comprises distinct groups with different
era are still undermining modernisation today, in particular views on national and international policy, the core
the inability of the government to promote reforms among message of the central leadership has wide societal
rural populations and the fact that transformational politics resonance: Afghanistan needs to return to law and order
are largely seen as an external agenda. and the Taliban are here to dispense security and justice
based on Islam. The movement’s resurgence in the 2000s
A similarly exceptional insider view is provided by Heela has mirrored their initial rise to power, facilitated by
Najibullah, who examines the fate of the Afghan National widespread public discontent with the new government.
Reconciliation Policy (NRP) – launched by President The Taliban’s narrative of the conflict in Afghanistan is not
Najibullah in the mid-1980s as the Soviet withdrawal from an alternative history, but rather a missing piece of the
Afghanistan approached. The NRP sought to negotiate an larger puzzle of how to administer the country peacefully.
end to conflict with the mujahidin and to establish terms for a
comprehensive political settlement. It combined traditional Ending this section Professor M. Nazif Shahrani discusses
Afghan socio-political practices for consultation and non-Pashtun views of conflict and peace in northern
decision-making with a pragmatic political strategy designed Afghanistan. Many non-Pashtun communities in the
to build domestic support and international legitimacy. The north see the war differently – not between the Afghan
collapse of geopolitical strategic interest in Afghanistan government and armed opposition, but between ‘included’
at the end of the Cold War meant that vital international Pashtuns and ‘excluded’ non-Pashtuns. This outlook
support to the NRP programme dwindled, fatally reflects broader ethnic divisions and centre–periphery
undermining it. Today, there is (some) international support splits derived from entrenched perceptions of a prolonged,
for reconciliation in Afghanistan, but the domestic political Pashtun-led project of ‘Afghanisation’ to centralise power
will to take a reconciliation process forward is lacking. in Kabul. Western efforts to support the government
are understood within the same worldview. A priority
Misconceptions of the Taliban have complicated efforts for effective transition from this perspective is to revise
to end the war in Afghanistan. Felix Kuehn considers commitments to centralised authority enshrined in the
how better knowledge of the ways in which the Taliban 2004 constitution in favour of devolved decision-making
functions can inform more effective peace policy. to regional institutions.

Afghanistan’s
political history
Prospects for peaceful opposition
Professor Thomas Barfield
Professor Thomas Barfield is a social anthropologist who conducted development in Afghanistan, particularly on law, government
extensive ethnographic fieldwork among pastoral nomads in pre- organisation and development issues. In 2006, he was awarded
war northern Afghanistan during the mid-1970s. He later taught a Guggenheim Fellowship to complete Afghanistan: A cultural
at Wellesley, Harvard and Boston universities and is the author of and political history (Princeton University Press, 2010). He has
several books on Afghanistan, Central Asia, China and anthropology. been President of the American Institute for Afghanistan Studies
Since 2001 his research has focused on economic and political since 2005.
ABSTRACT
What does Afghanistan’s political history reveal about to avoid insurrection. Tackling conflict today requires
possible pathways to a more peaceful future, such as the both strengthening existing governance structures
creation of space for non-violent political opposition? and creating a political system that can incorporate
insurgents peacefully. Regional devolution of power
The lack of legitimate space for dissent has been a could alleviate pressure on the centre, but would still
persistent driver of violent resistance in Afghanistan. leave the core problem of how to introduce effective
A predominant political culture has evolved of power opposition politics.
concentrated centrally in a single ruler who sets policy
and distributes resources leaving no room for non- An emerging political dynamic with potential to break
violent opposition. this enduring deadlock may be found in Afghanistan’s
growing young population, who increasingly see political
Leaders have struggled to exert authority nationwide, participation as a right rather than a privilege and are
however, and in practice have had to accommodate making demands for more meaningful representation.
regional rivals through de facto provincial autonomy

Afghanistan’s history has produced a deeply entrenched forced to grant considerable autonomy to Afghanistan’s
political culture that affects its future development. Its regions, which had their own indigenous elites. Nor did any
most striking feature is a longstanding court heritage of government at that time have direct control over the many
power focused on a single ruler who sets policy and subsistence farmers who lived in the mountains or the
distributes resources, and whose approval is sought by all migratory pastoralists who moved seasonally both across
those in government. Those outside government are Afghanistan and beyond its borders. While such rural
deemed rebels intent not on changing the ruler’s mind, but people accepted the suzerainty of a state based in Kabul,
on replacing him with a choice of their own. Max Weber’s they had little interaction with its officials and paid taxes
view of such systems as patrimonial and unstable – liable only under duress.
to palace revolts, coups and rebellions as the only
practical means of voicing dissent – accords with the The monarchal form of government reached its high point
experience of Afghanistan, which since 1747 has seen only during the late 19th century under Abdur Rahman Khan
two peaceful transfers of power: in 1901 when Amir (r. 1880–1901). In a series of bloody wars, he created a
Habibullah Khan inherited the throne; and in 2014 when highly centralised national state that did away with local
Ashraf Ghani succeeded Hamid Karzai. autonomy. Decisions were made exclusively by a small elite
centred around the Amir’s court. Although Abdur Rahman’s
“
While many younger Afghans successors took his highly centralised government as their
model, they proved less successful in maintaining its level
who have experienced decades of control. In 1929 King Amanullah was overthrown after
of war now romanticise Zahir attempting to collect higher taxes and impose progressive
social reforms. He was replaced by a more conservative
Shah’s reign as a ‘Golden Age’, it rival, Nadir Shah, who himself was assassinated in 1933.
was not seen as such at the time.” For the next forty years, Afghanistan was under the rule of
his son, Zahir Shah, but for three decades his uncles and
Despite a democratic constitution approved in 2004, the cousin Daud Khan held the real levers of power.
idea of a loyal opposition or a division of power within
the government has yet to emerge. Titles may change – In 1964 Zahir Shah attempted break their grip by
Shah, Amir, President, Commissar, Commander of the approving a more democratic constitution that explicitly
Faithful. But once in power no ruler in Afghanistan has excluded members of the royal family (except himself)
failed to act like an autocrat and since 1919 almost all from participating in government. Daud Khan eventually
have been assassinated or driven into exile. This zero- responded by overthrowing the monarchy in 1973 and
sum political game, however, has often been leavened declaring himself president of a republic. What all these
by de facto autonomy in many of the country’s regions. regimes had in common was their continuing dependence
Although rulers might proclaim their absolute authority, on the descendants of the elite created during Abdur
in practice they have had to reach compromises with Rahman’s reign to staff the highest positions. While 20th
potential opponents to avoid rebellions. The international century rulers periodically sought to widen participation in
community, by focusing on the outward structures of government, both the 1923 and 1964 constitutions preserved
government, has failed to resolve this problem because the paramount position of the monarch, and neither ceded
it has privileged process over outcomes. Afghans, real power to those who might challenge them.
by contrast, have generally been more interested in
outcomes than what brought them about. Throughout this period, particularly in rural areas,
ordinary people treated the absence of popular
Monarchal mindset participation in government as normative. Rulers had
From the foundation of the Durrani Empire in 1747, out of subjects and they were them. Rural residents never
which the modern state of Afghanistan emerged, the rulers questioned the legitimacy of the centuries-old monarchy
of the state were all members of a royal dynastic line. even when they revolted against a particular ruler and
While rival lineages often fought with one another in civil might even succeed in ousting him. Someone had to be
wars over succession, only those whose claims to power in charge and a monarchy had filled this structural role
were monarchal were considered the legitimate rulers of for 230 years by the time Daud Khan abolished it.
the state. Even after non-royal insurgent leaders drove
the British out of Afghanistan during the two Anglo-Afghan However, the legitimacy of the monarchy and its
Wars (1838–42 and 1878–80), they ceded power back to the competence to lead a modern Afghanistan was challenged
Durrani dynastic line when those wars ended. However, by the emergence of a new educated class in Kabul.
until the late 19th century such rulers in Kabul were Growing rapidly during the 1960s, but still only a tiny part

Residents of Kabul amid the destruction caused by Afghanistan's civil war, 2002. © UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe
of the total population, this group was highly critical of In less than a year, a relatively disorganised opposition
the country’s slow economic and political development. put the PDPA in such peril that the Soviet Union invaded
They also chafed at the limited prospects for their own in December 1978 to oust its leaders, roll back its most
advancement in a system that valued connections over radical policies, and put its own appointees in charge.
competence. While many younger Afghans who have This stabilised the government in Kabul but at the cost
experienced decades of war now romanticise Zahir Shah’s of Soviet occupation. Its counterinsurgency strategy was
reign as a ‘Golden Age’, it was not seen as such at the time. grounded in the belief that an ever-higher level of state
After Daud’s coup, no royalist demonstrators appeared in violence would bring non-state actors to heel. Before
the streets of Kabul or Kandahar to demand the return of the Soviet Union abandoned this policy by withdrawing
their king. Indeed, from the perspective of people in the the last of its troops in 1989, the war would kill a million
countryside, there was little difference between being ruled Afghans and induce four million people to flee as
by a king or a president since both were members of the refugees to neighbouring Iran and Pakistan.
same extended family.
External dependence: regime and rebellion
Beneath the surface, however, the abolition of the The Soviet invasion was only the latest stark reminder that
monarchy did have broader repercussions. Observing how Afghanistan’s stability, or even very existence, depended
easily Daud Khan had disposed of the king, Afghanistan’s on the policies of more powerful neighbouring states. In
communists, some of whom had assisted him, plotted their the 19th century the British had invaded Afghanistan twice
own successful coup in 1978 in which they murdered Daud but withdrew both times, leaving its territory to serve as an
and declared a socialist republic. Although the People’s autonomous buffer state under the control of a ruler that
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was quite small Britain chose. To secure Afghanistan’s borders, the British
and internally divided, it announced sweeping plans for forced Iran to abandon its claims to Herat in the west
radical social and economic reforms throughout the and got Russia to accept a border in the north that gave
country. Seeing itself as a vanguard socialist movement, Afghanistan sovereignty over the Turkistan plain and the
the PDPA assumed it could forcibly impose its will and mountainous region of Badakhshan to its east. The British
policies on the countryside just as the Soviet Union had were less generous south of the Hindu Kush where they
done in Central Asia during the 1920s. That threat and imposed the Durand Line in 1893, severing India’s north-
the secular government’s seeming rejection of Islam west frontier territories from Afghanistan, after previously
induced many communities to take up arms against the having annexed the Khyber Pass and Peshawar.
regime in Kabul. Unlike previous rebellions that rejected
only the authority of particular rulers, this insurgency Throughout this period the British controlled Afghanistan’s
viewed both the PDPA leadership and its governing foreign relations and supplied its rulers with money
ideology as illegitimate. and arms. The ability of rulers in Kabul to exert their

government’s authority countrywide was made possible and the PDPA government were eventually able to draw on
by this aid and their authority relied more on coercion than billions of dollars in aid provided by the US to counter it and
consultation. When King Amanullah declared Afghanistan’s establish safe havens in Pakistan. This flow of money and
full independence in 1919, the British ended their subsidies weapons was augmented by Saudi Arabia, which viewed
and proved less cooperative about shipping arms to his the insurgency as a jihad and was keen to support the most
government. Lack of these financial resources and weapons conservative Sunni Islamist factions in the resistance.
destabilised Amanullah’s government and helped hasten
its collapse when faced with revolts in 1929. In the 1930s Pakistan insisted on controlling the distribution of all
Afghanistan’s new monarchs restored more cooperative ties funds and arms delivered to the Afghan resistance.
with British India and began to reach out to the wider world It gave the bulk to its own Afghan clients, almost
for aid. After World War II they focused on exploiting the exclusively Islamist and predominately Pashtun parties,
Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet at the expense of other factions even when they were
Union to provide the loans and grants needed to finance doing more of the fighting inside Afghanistan or had a
Afghanistan’s development from the early 1950s until 1979. stronger popular base. Fearful that, when the conflict
ended, Afghans might prefer a return to the conservative
Playing off rival international powers for subsidies and structure of the pre-war monarchies or something similar,
military aid has a long tradition in Afghanistan, and this Pakistan worked tirelessly to marginalise the influence
continues into the present. It is fraught with risk because of Afghan nationalists and royalists. Without much
internal political factions can use similar networks to forethought, the US gave Pakistan a free hand and had little
mount coups or insurgencies when regimes exclude direct contact with the Afghan resistance. It only wanted
them from government. The PDPA knew that if it could to see the Soviet Union suffer a defeat in Afghanistan and
seize power then the Soviet Union would have to back took little interest what might come afterward. Pakistan
it up, despite Moscow’s longstanding support for the exploited this indifference to lay the groundwork for its
traditional governments in Kabul that dated back to 1919. own plan to turn Afghanistan into a client state after
Similarly, Islamist groups seeking to overthrow Daud the Soviets withdrew in 1989. This proved easier for
Khan’s government turned to Pakistan for support and Pakistan to imagine than achieve.
refuge. Governments in Kabul had been hostile to Pakistan
ever since it came into existence in 1947 when the British Civil war: regional resurgence and the rise
withdrew from greater India. Pakistan returned the and fall of the Taliban
animosity by funding Islamist factions within Afghanistan As long as the PDPA continued to receive weapons and
and giving them sanctuary when their revolts failed. supplies from the Soviet Union, it was surprisingly resilient.
Soviet-backed efforts after 1989 to create a coalition
Still, until 1979, foreign invasions of Afghanistan and its government in which the mujahidin factions would have
own internal rebellions had been of rather short duration an equal or superior role came to nothing, in large part
and affected only a few regions in the country. Peace had because of Pakistani opposition and disbelief by the
been restored after periods of turmoil by bringing back Reagan administration in Washington that such a thing
the structures of the old monarchal regimes with new was possible. When the PDPA regime finally disintegrated
leaders at the top. Because such Kabul governments had in April 1992, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union
a monopoly on foreign assistance they could successfully that ended its external support, Afghanistan fell into
suppress further internal dissent by those who lacked civil war. In the absence of a negotiated international
comparable resources. Opponents were forced either to agreement, the victorious mujahidin parties immediately
reconcile with the new order or to go into exile because began to fight among themselves for the prize of
Afghanistan’s domestic economy was too weak to finance ruling Kabul.
an insurgency without external patronage. Despite
complaints of government abuse and mismanagement, Each faction attempted to bolster its strength by recruiting
Afghanistan experienced a half-century of domestic allies among country’s regional militia commanders,
stability between 1929 and 1978. This pattern was broken mostly along regional and ethnic lines. These regional
by the Soviet invasion. The consequences of that war are commanders were independent agents who traded their
still playing out four decades later. support for subsidies and arms – a process begun during
the final years of the PDPA. Prone to switch sides for
The Soviets might have been correct in assuming they personal advantage, they all sought to preserve the de
could wipe out a domestic insurgency in Afghanistan – if, facto regional governance that had emerged during the
that is, it had remained purely domestic. But given its Cold Soviet war and then expanded during the civil war. To a
War rivalry with the US, insurgents fighting the Soviet army degree not seen since their suppression by Abdur Rahman

Khan, Afghanistan’s distinct regions and their cities once of selected notables) to give its consent. While touted as
again became political power centres. Commanders here a ‘traditional’ means to choose Afghan leaders, its use in
were not about to cede influence to a central government this way had little precedence except for it being asked to
in Kabul that lacked its own national army and had no approve the choice of Karzai unanimously without being
international patron to finance it. offered any alternatives. It was also a consultation of the
victors that excluded the defeated Taliban. Many of the
The lack of big power interest in Afghanistan after Taliban’s former leaders were keen to participate in the
the collapse of the Soviet Union opened the door to new government in 2002 but were left out of the process,
neighbouring actors seeking to achieve their own political laying the groundwork for a reborn Taliban insurgency that
ends. Pakistan supported its mostly Pashtun Islamist would grow in strength over the following years.
clients. Their mostly non-Pashtun opponents turned to
Iran, India and even Russia for support. None of these had In 2004 a new constitution was adopted that created a
the resources or will to finance a whole country but they parliament and, for the first time in Afghan history, made
could pay enough to keep their opposing factions in the the top position of president subject to election. But
fight. Cities such as Herat in the west and Mazar-i Sharif rather than design a structure of government to meet
in the north maintained relatively stable governments, Afghanistan’s 21st century needs, the drafters of the
while others such as Kandahar in the south fell victim to 2004 constitution chose to copy almost all the elements
mujahidin factions that committed abuses that local officials of Zahir Shah’s 1964 constitution, establishing a highly
were powerless to curb. Kabul, which was unscarred when centralised administration in which the president held
the PDPA fell, soon suffered so much shelling and factional almost unlimited executive power. In addition, while
fighting within the city that the capital was left a shell of Afghans might now elect the president, members of
its former self. parliament and provincial councils, the governors
and sub-provincial administrators with the greatest
Beginning in 1994, the clerically led Taliban movement impact on people’s daily lives all remained presidential
took advantage of anarchy in the south to establish itself appointees who owed no accountability to the people they
and, backed by Pakistan, expand into other parts of the governed. Given the almost kingly powers wielded by the
country. In September 1996, the Taliban swept into Kabul Afghan presidency, the ever-higher levels of fraud that
and over the next five years came to rule over most of accompanied each succeeding election to that office has
Afghanistan. However, the legitimacy of the Taliban endangered its legitimacy. While the current president,
government was never accepted internationally and its Ashraf Ghani, believes that such a centralised system as
policies were particularly unpopular in Afghanistan’s Afghanistan’s only path to stability, others see it as the
cities. The Taliban might have been capable of bringing a government’s greatest vulnerability.
draconian order to the territories they occupied but proved
incapable of much governance beyond that. The outside Conclusions
world largely ignored what happened in Afghanistan Afghanistan now sits at a critical juncture. It needs to
during this period, assuming that events there had no strengthen its existing government while creating a
wider significance. This attitude changed dramatically political structure that could accommodate the peaceful
in September 2001 when the Taliban’s Arab Islamist participation of those who have taken up arms against it.
allies, al-Qaeda, based in Afghanistan and led by Osama Both could be better accomplished by devolving power
bin Laden, masterminded terrorist attacks on New York regionally so that control of the national government
and Washington. International attention returned to becomes less of a zero-sum game.
Afghanistan with a vengeance. In alliance with anti-Taliban
factions inside the country, the US routed the Taliban However, the larger structural problem would remain
in less than ten weeks. A new chapter had opened in of how to introduce effective opposition politics as a
Afghanistan’s political history. counterweight to the historically authoritarian instincts
of whoever is the head of the Afghan government. This
Following the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, the system has deep roots and has developed in the context
international community sought to restore order to where only a small elite has had exclusive control over
Afghanistan by rebuilding its central state structure. In government institutions. But political culture is not static
one sense, they followed an old pattern: international and Afghanistan now has a young population who see
actors anointed the new Afghan leader and financed his participation in government as a right and not as a privilege
government. Keen not to be seen as colonial overlords, that can be revoked at will. The past may explain how
however, they sought to ratify the choice of Hamid Karzai Afghanistan got to where it is now, but does not determine
as leader by assembling a Loya Jirga (a national assembly what it will become in the future.

Lessons from Bonn
Victors’ peace?
Dr Astri Suhrke
Dr Astri Suhrke is a political scientist and a senior researcher and with particular reference to Afghanistan. She is the author
at the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen, Norway. She has of When more is less: The international project in Afghanistan
written widely on conflict and peacebuilding, both generally (Hurst, 2011).
ABSTRACT
What do experiences from the 2001 Bonn process Demilitarising Northern Alliance militias, justice or
reveal about priorities for peace talks today – for human rights were not priorities. Bonn’s iterative
example relating to ownership, participation, power- transitional framework included steps to broaden
sharing and the sequencing of inclusion? inclusion over time – from an interim authority, through
a constitutional assembly to popular elections. But post-
The Bonn Agreement has set the tone and Bonn opportunities to accommodate amenable Taliban
trajectory for much of Afghanistan’s political were rejected, and factions that were represented in
transition since 2001. The parameters of the Bonn Bonn have entrenched themselves in power.
talks were largely determined by the US’ overriding
post-9/11 concern of denying Afghan territory to Future peace talks with the Taliban will need to
terrorists – al-Qaeda and their Taliban hosts. The decide between narrow power-sharing like Bonn or
political logic of the Bonn process, to negotiate a stable incorporating wider rights and principles. Bonn’s
polity, was subordinate to the military, to remove the incremental approach to broadening inclusion could
terrorist threat. A key condition was the exclusion work but could also again leave the door open to
of the Taliban, assuming (wrongly) the movement’s factional elite capture. A central lesson from Bonn is
categorical battlefield defeat. that prioritising Afghan over external interests is key
to a peaceful and sustainable future.

The US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 left on the evening of 9/11, in a speech to the nation, conflated
little space for constructing a framework for the kind ‘terrorists’ and ‘the nations that harbour them’, and vowed
of war-to-peace transitions that by then had become a to pursue both with the full military might of the US.
model for UN-supported peace agreements: a political Military planning and revenge were the order of the day,
settlement between the protagonists and demobilisation not negotiating with the Taliban. The chief UN negotiator,
and reintegration of their armies. The Bonn Agreement Lakhdar Brahimi, seemed to recognise this reality when
belongs to a different category. It was not a peace asked about Afghan representation a few months later.
agreement but a statement about the structure of the As he explained in a 4 May 2002 interview with Frontline:
post-war order, shaped by the military-political logic of ‘The Taliban had gone, and were not a possible partner.’
total victory and written by the US and its allies as they
were driving the Taliban from power. The agreement was Third, and contrary to Brahimi’s claim at the time, the
a clever diplomatic improvisation. Yet it showed that even Taliban and ‘foreign fighters’ operating under the al-
a brilliant operation can leave the patient dying. Qaeda label were not in fact ‘gone’. US forces and the
anti-Taliban Northern Alliance militias launched major
9/11 offensives against the Taliban throughout October and
In November 2001, when 25 Afghan delegations, November 2001. Kabul fell on November 13, two weeks
UN advisors and a large number of foreign diplomats before the conference started, but the initial phase of the
assembled just outside Bonn, the defining feature of the US-led military campaign continued with intense, offensive
international context was the dominant role of the US. operations against Taliban and al-Qaeda targets until the
The Bush administration viewed the 9/11 attacks on New end of the year and well into 2002. Military considerations
York and Washington as part of a wider onslaught on US were thus paramount on the US side in the run-up to the
global interests and indeed the entire Western civilisation. Bonn conference as well during the meeting itself.
It is symptomatic that the first issue the administration
discussed when deliberating a strategy of response was Priorities for parley
whether to counter-attack in Afghanistan first, or target The continuing military campaign shaped the Bush
Iraq as well. Administration’s thinking about specific issues to be
addressed in the agreement. Most important from a
From the outset, then, the US government saw the war long-term perspective was the failure of the conference
in Afghanistan as one of several fronts in what it called to address the question of disarming and demobilising
a Global War on Terror. Four US military operations Northern Alliance militias. As allies of the US with
were launched in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 – in operational capacity on the ground, they were regarded by
Afghanistan, but also in the Philippines, Georgia and Washington as essential military assets and pillars of the
Djibouti. All were called Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). post-war order. In practical terms, moreover, there were
no forces on the ground to carry out demobilisation, which
Washington’s wider counter-terrorist strategy meant the Afghan armed factions themselves opposed. The final
that the Bonn conference was primarily framed as an agreement called only for all armed forces and groups
instrument in a globalised war, rather than as a path to be placed under the command of the Interim Afghan
towards peace in Afghanistan per se. This had several Authority established by the agreement. There were no
important consequences for the delegates assembled provisions for the other aspects of security sector reform.
for the talks outside Bonn.
The US military also opposed an international
First, busy preparing for a global war, the Bush peacekeeping force with a wide geographic mandate as
Administration turned the task of negotiating a political it feared this might interfere with OEF operations against
settlement over to the UN. Keeping the UN ‘out front’ al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This suited the Afghan armed
avoided a visible ‘Made in America’ stamp on the outcome, factions represented at Bonn perfectly, as they did not
as Richard Haass, then Director of Policy Planning at the want an international force presence that might curtail
US State Department later said – as reported by Frontline their power. As a result, the agreement’s provision for an
in 2002. The US still had a sufficiently large number of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) confined its
officials at the conference to ensure that US interests deployment to Kabul. The provision was later amended in
were properly taken into account. 2003 to permit ISAF to operate throughout Afghanistan.
Second, and possibly most important for Afghanistan’s Overall, the agreement bears the imprint of the Bush
future, an implicit US condition was that Taliban would Administration’s views on the nature of the post-war
not participate in the talks. President Bush had already order. Its perspective was short-term and minimalist,

defining political order as an arrangement that would Negotiating process
facilitate the final phase of US-led military operations, Brahimi had returned to work for the UN on Afghanistan
and as having a central government sufficiently stable as Special Representative of the Secretary-General
and effective to prevent ‘terrorists’ from re-establishing on 3 October, just a few days before the US started the
themselves. More specifically, that meant a ‘broad-based bombing campaign. He immediately set about canvassing
government’, understood as initially comprising the views among state parties and Afghans concerned –
factions represented in Bonn, and proper representation except the Taliban. Less than two months later, on 27
of the Pashtun, who were the largest single ethnic group November, the conference opened, and only nine days
and traditionally formed the governing elite. Hence, after that, the agreement was signed. In the annals of
Hamid Karzai was quickly endorsed as interim leader. peacemaking, it was a formidable feat of diplomacy. Even
He came from a prominent Pashtun family that had spent though this was not a conventional peace agreement
many years in exile, was considered politically ‘moderate’ between belligerents, who often take months or years to
in questions of religion and politics, and – not having a hammer out compromises, the speed was remarkable.
large armed following of his own – was not considered a Speed, it was also clear, went against Brahimi’s instincts.
formidable rival by the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara factions As he later said, ‘We were rushing in all directions … I was
that made up the Northern Alliance. Transitional justice the one who had to say “please, not too fast … go slow if
mechanisms to ensure accountability for past war you want to go fast”.’
crimes and human rights abuses were not on the agenda
as this would have implicated Afghan leaders who now Why the speed? There was a race between military and
were US allies in the transition and the construction of the political logics. As the Northern Alliance militias raced
the post-war order. towards Kabul in the second week of November, the US
Secretary of State Colin Powell was calling for ‘speed,
“
speed, speed’ to get negotiations going. The Northern
Even though this was not a Alliance, he feared, might take control of the capital
before the other Afghan factions and the international
conventional peace agreement
parties concerned had even sat down to discuss the
between belligerents, who often practicalities of establishing a central government and
take months or years to hammer possibly an international peacekeeping force to help
secure Kabul. There was also concern that Northern
out compromises, the speed Alliance militias might engage in ethnically targeted
was remarkable.” massacres in the capital.
In formal terms, only the four Afghan factions represented

US views found strong echoes among many of the Afghans at the conference were parties to the negotiations – the
and state delegates to Bonn. To be sure, there were Northern Alliance and factions organised around exiles
differences. Apportioning ministries in the post-war based in respectively Rome (with ties to the ex-King),
administration among the Afghan factions was extremely Cyprus (with ties to Iran) and Peshawar (predominantly
difficult and almost derailed the process. Representatives Pashtun based). Brahimi had insisted and the Security
from Afghan civil society, who had been excluded from Council concurred that Afghanistan was not to be a
the conference and relegated to their own ‘parallel event’ UN quasi-trusteeship as in East Timor or Kosovo. The
at a nearby venue with no formal access to the principal Afghans needed take the lead in the talks – at least
meeting, claimed their absence reinforced the illiberal formally. Official representatives of other nations were
directions of the emerging agreement, as described by only observers to the conference; they were excluded from
Florian Krampe in 2013. the formal sessions among the Afghans that only Brahimi
and his advisors attended. The final agreement thus was
The question of how to structure political representation in signed only by Afghans and witnessed by Brahimi. Matters
a post-Taliban order was of course fundamental. Brahimi dealing with the role of the UN and ISAF were addressed
played a central role in designing the solution, based in appendices and appeared as requests from the Afghan
on an iterative structure that did not lock in the initial Interim Authority established by the agreement.
power-sharing agreed to in Bonn, but had a timetable for
progressively wider elections and mechanisms to establish Brahimi scripted this structure and directed the talks.
representative institutions. In principle, this broadened the By dividing the Afghan and the foreign state delegates
competition for power beyond the narrow circle of Afghans organisationally, he created a separate space for a
assembled at the conference. relatively small number of Afghans to find common

ground. Afghans and international observers mingled Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, plus the US and Russia),
freely and frequently in the corridors, but the formal and other states concerned; and 3) prevent the political
division gave some power to Brahimi to choreograph transition from being overtaken by developments on the
the international influence and lessen the complicating ground – as discussed in my 2011 book, When more is
presence of external rivalries and patronage ties. less: the international project in Afghanistan. It was a rough
Although the regional and international context had plan in a scene with multiple actors and limited space
become relatively conducive to cooperation – Pakistan for manoeuvring, and when time was short. By his own
was ‘on board’ thanks to coercive US diplomacy, and even description, it was an improvisation. Though stressing the
the US and Iran recognised common interests – many need for preparation (‘make sure you’ve done the ground
among the Afghans and the state observers had interests work, so that when you call them in, you have a chance
to promote and favours to call. of getting somewhere’), improvisation is essential (‘it is
“navigation by sight” … just open your eyes and see where
This did not prevent Brahimi from calling in external state the wind will take you’).
support when needed, as he did at critical junctures.
Iran, the UK and Russia were extremely helpful, he Two months later, the Bonn Agreement was signed. Four
later said. The US was in this respect by far his most years later, the political transition had been implemented,
important asset by virtue of its military position in a constitution had been promulgated, and popular
Afghanistan and consequent leverage on the Afghans. elections had been held for a president (2004) and a
One episode is illustrative. When talks seemed to break parliament (2005). Yet the vulnerability that Brahimi
up disagreement regarding the division of ministries and had reflected upon during the conference had come to
a key Northern Alliance delegate threatened to leave, pass: ‘Any grain of sand can stop our machine ... this is
Washington’s advice to ambassador James Dobbins Afghanistan. There is a sandstorm.’
working the conference corridors was clear: ‘Do not let
them break up. Lock them up if you have to … [O]nce you Conclusions – whose peace?
get the frogs in a wheelbarrow, you don’t let them get Two principal consequences of the agreement are not
out’ (Frontline June 2002). When the still-titular Afghan in dispute. First, excluding Taliban set the stage for
President Burhanuddin Rabbani, sitting in Kabul, became renewed war. Not being treated as a legitimate party,
an obstacle, the US made him reassess by firing a rocket and hunted by OEF forces and their Afghan allies, the
next to his home. Taliban had few options. They could place themselves
at the mercy of local rivals empowered by the US, or
The iterative framework, with a two-year tight schedule hope for assistance in Pakistan to organise armed
of transitional steps from an interim authority to the resistance. By 2003, they were showing signs of a
convening of a constitutional assembly, pointed the way comeback, and by mid-decade the insurgency was under
towards popularly elected government. Arguably, this way. Brahimi now reassessed. Not inviting the Taliban
made it easier to forge agreement on division of power in to Bonn was ‘our original sin’ that critically undermined
phase one, as opportunities for accessing power among the post-war order, he said in 2006, as recounted in
those who lost out early in the transition beckoned in Ahmed Rashid’s 2008 book, Descent into Chaos. Second,
later phases. The agreement itself conveyed this point; the Afghan factions represented in Bonn established
it was a short, essentially skeletal outline of structures themselves securely in positions of power for years to
and an inclusive list of broad political and social norms. come. Privileging ‘warlords’ with records of serious
Constitutional design, such as a unitary versus a human rights abuses, including war crimes, in order to
decentralised state structure, was not discussed but left secure military gains in the US-defined ‘war on terror’
for the constitutional process as designated in the two- led to a securitisation of the new order that blocked the
year transitional timeline. development of stability, justice and peace.
Brahimi’s skills as negotiator and authority were both Yet both consequences were only in a superficial sense a
formal and authentically steeped in deep knowledge result of the Bonn Agreement. They flowed more directly
of the region, including previous service as UN Special from the political and military logic of the US-led ‘war on
Representative for Afghanistan in the 1990s. Returning terror’. That logic dictated the invasion of Afghanistan, a
to the job in early October 2001, he worked according to a strategy of militarily defeating the Taliban and al-Qaeda,
three-pronged strategy: 1) develop consensus among non- and – over time – produced an escalating armed conflict
Taliban Afghan factions; 2) obtain agreement principles and a political economy of war that benefited local allies
of the transition among Afghanistan’s neighbours and of the US military. The Bonn Agreement was more a
the major powers, the ‘6+2’ (China, Iran, Pakistan, reflection than a cause of this dynamic.

Future peace talks in Afghanistan will similarly reflect Skilful mediation at the Bonn conference contained two
the prevailing political realities. Hence, drawing lessons strategic elements. Organisationally, the chief negotiator
from Bonn is difficult. As Brahimi observed – negotiating created a separate space for the Afghans to find a common
is in good part navigating by sight. We do know, though, ground, although linked to external mechanisms of
that future talks probably will involve the Taliban. If these coercive diplomacy. Creating and using such a space
take place under conditions of a military stalemate, the effectively to forge an agreement rested on a fair degree of
divisions are likely to be deeper, the dilemmas sharper common interest among key external and internal actors:
and the outlines of compromises more difficult to accept first, among the major powers concerned (US, Russia and
than at Bonn. The range of views on political, social and Iran) with at least coerced cooperation from Pakistan; and
economic rights will be wider. In this situation, one key second, among the Afghans at the conference, who were
issue will be whether to aim for a narrow power-sharing at least united in their opposition to a common enemy.
agreement (like Bonn), or adopt a structure based on a Neither condition is likely to figure in negotiations between
wider set of rights and principles for the post-war order. Afghan political elites and the Taliban at the present time.
A comprehensive, rights-based peace agreement may
be more difficult to conclude, or – if on the table – take More fundamentally, the hegemonic position of the
the form of a broad, consensual statement without US in 2001 meant that US policy in effect defined the
implementing clauses. Yet a growing international chief parameters of a common strategy. This enabled
consensus, affirmed in several recent UN based Brahimi to cobble together an agreement in a matter
documents, holds that rights-based peace agreements of weeks. US policy in Afghanistan, however, was not
are more sustainable than narrow deals, even if the latter primarily designed to establish peace in Afghanistan,
bring ceasefires and an end the immediate violence. but to strengthen US national security. In a deeply ironic
sense, the result was to undermine the spirit of the Bonn
The iterative structure for a transition adopted in Bonn Agreement and the new order it promised. Perhaps
may be well suited to handle a negotiating situation with the main lesson from Bonn is that a sustainable peace
strongly conflicting interests. But the downsides must agreement must give primacy to Afghanistan rather than
also be recognised. Particular factions may capture the broader interests of outside powers. At a minimum,
power at an early stage, aborting the transitional dynamic, the key objective must be to end the armed conflict and
and difficult issues may be postponed, left to generate construct a framework that will encourage the Afghans and
renewed conflict at a later date. their foreign supporters to pursue their interests through
means other than collective political violence.

Transformative
politics in 20th century
Afghanistan
Lessons for today
Dr Amin Tarzi
Dr Amin Tarzi is the Director of Middle East Studies at the Marine the Middle East, at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is
Corps University in Quantico, Virginia, Adjunct Professor of currently working on a book on Afghanistan’s state formation
International Relations at the University of Southern California’s and borderisation.
Washington DC Program, and a Senior Fellow, Program on
ABSTRACT
What lessons for political transition in Afghanistan A number of key factors undermined prospects for
today can be learned from Mahmud Tarzi’s efforts Tarzi’s agenda: 1) imported reformist ideologies that
to reform Afghan politics in the early 20th century – were alien to most Afghans; 2) failure to engage either
such as on engaging key domestic constituencies to influential landed tribal leaders or clergy with authority
establish an-Afghan owned agenda for change? to legitimate the reform agenda; and 3) Tarzi’s royal
patron lacking either the domestic power to impose
Mahmud Tarzi looked to introduce progressive ideas changes or the foreign diplomacy to secure external
drawn from his travels in the Middle East. But progress support, and further failing to reconcile internal rifts
in realising his ambitions was hampered by a dearth of between progressive and conservative camps within
receptive constituencies in Afghanistan, such as activist his court.
civil servants, students or disgruntled military.
Notwithstanding fundamental differences
Support for Tarzi’s programme was restricted to a between Afghanistan today and a century ago, some
few returnee exiles, Kabul-based intelligentsia and core blockages to modernisation have persisted –
dissenting officials, leaving him over-reliant on his in particular the inability of the government to
proximity to the crown. Tarzi’s modernising vision promote reforms among rural populations combined
combined an exclusive, Pashtun-centred nationalism with the fact that transformational politics are
with a multinational state and a progressive approach largely seen as an external agenda. Unless these are
to science and technology – as well as to Islam, which addressed, modernisation will continue to struggle.
placed him in direct opposition with the Afghan clergy.

Political transformation in Afghanistan at the start of the 1904 the Amir set up the first public college in Afghanistan,
20th century, largely driven by the modernist ambitions Habibyah, employing local as well as Indian Muslim and
of Mahmud Tarzi, is illustrative of opportunities and Ottoman teachers. It was at this school that the ideas
challenges facing reform initiatives today. The political of political transformation and constitutionalism came
dynamics of negotiating change within the rise of about and were propagated.
statism and central decision-making provide important
comparisons for the political environment in contemporary However, the first movement to transform Afghanistan into
Afghanistan and offer insights into prospects for a more representative and inclusive political system was
negotiating change looking ahead. crushed before it became operational. Either the Amir had
informants within the group or there were opportunists
Beginnings who told the Amir that the first constitutional movement’s
The birth of the modern Afghan state under Abdur ultimate aims would lead to his own removal from
Rahman Khan (1880–1901) saw the central government power. Habib Allah ordered the execution of many of the
come to exercise a near-monopoly over the use of violence. constitutionalists and imprisoned others. A few, including
Territorial boundaries were defined and internationally Tarzi’s nephew, were released. Later, learning from the
recognised. The Amir, delegating his foreign policy to failures of this movement, Tarzi began his programme of
British India, freed himself from outside threats while transformation by forming a group known as the Young
receiving funds and expertise to engage in a hitherto Afghans, which disseminated its ideas of independence,
unprecedented programme of centralisation and nationalism, progress and women’s rights through its
unification of a state system. He transformed his country newspaper, Siraj al-akhbar, published fortnightly under
through the use of incentives, intimidation, forced mass Tarzi’s editorship from 1911–18. However, he refrained
migrations and multiple internal wars of intense brutality, from direct criticism of the monarchy.
and his surprisingly loyal military imposed his vision of
a state on his subjects. While the ideology for Tarzi’s quest to reform Afghanistan
was drawn from 19th century European experience,
By 1892, Abdur Rahman had pacified and brought his his blueprint was initially based on the Young Turks
country under the direct rule of the centralised authority era of 1908–18. However, unlike the Ottoman situation,
and organised an extensive bureaucracy on an unparalleled Afghanistan lacked viable constituencies to take his ideas
scale based on the person of the Amir. Part of his legacy forward, such as a significant core of activist civil servants
remains the lack of space or structure for political debate and students or any type of a coalition of disenchanted
and discussion. By design, ultimate authority rested in military officers. Indeed, Afghanistan had no formal
him and so he felt no need to establish a constitutional schools and the military was largely apolitical. The
basis for his governance. Through conquests and prime movers behind Tarzi’s reform movement were the
Islamification, Abdur Rahman built Afghanistan as a state returnee exiles and a very small Kabul-based group of
in which Pashtuns exercised exclusive authority and strict intellectuals as well as disenchanted and ambitious senior
interpretation of Sunni Islam became the sole law of the officials and members of the Amir’s household. A key for
land. This did not make for a cohesive state, however. To Tarzi’s successful programmatic debut was his access
echo the 19th century Italian statesman Massimo d’Azeglio, to the Amir, which was solidified through the marriage of
while Afghanistan was made as a country, the Afghans two his daughters to Habib Allah’s eldest and third sons.
were yet to be fashioned as a people. These sons convinced their father that the reforms were
a safeguard rather than a threat to the monarchy.
Abdur Rahman’s policies and programmes did lead to
a smooth and pre-planned transfer of power – a rarity Tarzi and his associates wanted to create an exclusive
in Afghanistan – to his son, Habib Allah (r. 1901–19). nationalism in Afghanistan with the Pashtuns at the centre,
The new Amir had been groomed as an heir apparent Pashtu as the national language and Persian (later Dari) as
and had a relatively good level of education. From the official language – in order to allow access to a broader
the beginning of his rule, Habib Allah sought to heal set of scientific and historical literature with cogency beyond
some of the wounds left by his father. He allowed and the borders of the country. This also afforded validity to
encouraged the return of some exiled members of his Tarzi himself who, while being a Pashtun from Kandahar,
own Muhammadzai clan, including Mahmud Tarzi who spoke primarily in Persian. In fact, the majority of the
had lived in Ottoman Damascus. Tarzi brought with him Afghan political elite going back to the foundational periods
progressive political ideas and was able to persuade the of the country in the mid-18th century used Persian as their
Amir to consider certain changes, spearheading guarded main language and had designated it as their country’s
and gradual policies of transformative nation-building. In lingua franca. By selecting Persian as Afghanistan’s official

language, Tarzi intended to allay non-Pashtuns’ fears that the disastrous end to Amanullah’s reign. Looking at
they would become second-class citizens. Afghanistan’s last attempt to write a constitution after the
collapse of the Taliban, the expediency of having a strong
The Afghanistan envisaged by Tarzi and his associates, presidency and disallowing any possibility of reviving
while Pashtun in nature and thus separate and exclusive the monarchy led to a constitution that was developed
from Iran, was to be a multinational state with a progressive with little participation by the Afghan people. Article 3
outlook on science and technology. This placed Tarzi in of the 2004 constitution further means that the majority
direct opposition with the Afghan clergy. Regarding Islam of freedoms enshrined in the document can be voided
as a religion that supports human progress, Tarzi viewed technically – as many have been in practice.
his country’s religious elite with extreme suspicion and
as a major impediment to the country’s progress and the Second, the reformists failed to include landed tribal leaders
emancipation of the masses from ignorance and misogyny. among their ranks. These men could have persuaded
His policies promoted Islamic revivalism, echoing his their peers to accept the voluntary yielding of some of
mentor Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897). Tarzi’s their immediate privileges to the state for the collective
lifelong quest was to modernise Afghanistan within the betterment of society and their own long-term prosperity.
context of progressive and inclusive Islam – a goal which he The absence of the tribal leadership also meant there was
and his associates never achieved and one that still is at the no voice for the concerns of that group, a group that had
heart of the current fight for the country’s future. immense influence on public opinion throughout the country
– including, critically, in rural Afghanistan – and strong
Blockages connections to the clergy. In his last work, written during his
King Amanullah (r.1919–29) is widely known as second exile (1929–33), Tarzi identified the landed tribal elite
Afghanistan’s reformist monarch. As a boy, he was Tarzi’s as one of three reasons for the failure of his experiment.
protégé and would in 1913 marry Tarzi’s daughter Soraya,
before becoming king in 1919 after the assassination of his Third, efforts at reform could not reconcile resistance from
father. Amanullah’s transformational initiatives ultimately the clergy, which in Afghanistan has traditionally been
failed, however, and, in retrospect, there were six main used to legitimise power, be it governmental or within
reasons for this. tribal systems. The only time that the clergy saw an active
challenge to this status quo was during Abdur Rahman’s
First, the ideologies espoused by the reformists, a reign when the Amir tried to regulate their profession,
number whom had returned from exile or were foreigners, forcing them to become state functionaries. Nevertheless,
represented a thought process alien to most Afghan as part of his statist policies, the Amir used the clergy
citizens. Afghanistan entered the 20th century with no to further reinforce the notion that Afghanistan was the
secular schools, a very small group of intellectuals domain of Pashtuns and that the Sunni Hanafi rite was the
centred mainly in the capital, and no newspapers. It had only legitimate form of state religion. Habib Allah relaxed
very limited contact with the outside world and lacked his father’s restrictions on the clergy’s position, leading
internal communication routes to connect the various to the strengthening of their political role in defining the
parts of the country resulting in extreme xenophobia. nature of the Afghan state as conservative and Sunni, and
This disconnect was never rectified despite Amanullah with Pashtun primacy.
changing his proposed constitution – the reform process’s
centerpiece of inclusivity and progressivism – twice before With Amanullah’s attempts to introduce reforms, the
it was promulgated. clergy, sensing a diminishing of their own privileges and
those of their allies within the tribal leadership, became
The final version of the constitution, which entered into the most vehement voice against both the reforms and
force in 1925, was much more restrictive than the first reformers, including the king and his father-in-law. In fact,
draft in 1921, especially in matters dealing with the role during the uprising in eastern Afghanistan, one of the rebel
of religion in society. This initial draft can be regarded as demands to end their rebellion was the ousting of Mahmud
the most progressive non-communist fundamental law Tarzi and his family from Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, Tarzi
ever envisioned for the country. Attempts to implement blamed the ignorance and regressiveness of the clergy
the 1925 constitution and other regulatory proclamations as another reason for the failure of his reforms. More
without addressing these disconnects fuelled the recently, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
rebellions that resulted in the ousting of Amanullah ensuing wars, the clergy has re-emerged as a political
in 1929. The hesitation of successive Afghan leaders force, with the main armed opponents of the current
to introduce political reforms that deal with religious Afghan political arrangement identifying as students of
and social issues has been in a large measure due to religious seminaries.

Fourth, unlike Tarzi’s hero Mustafa Kamal Atatürk, who symbiotic relationship with a regressive clergy backed
founded Turkey’s republic, the Afghan king had lost a by British anti-Amanullah polices were the principal
monopoly over the use of violent force previously held by reasons for the failure of the transformational reforms
Abdur Rahman – and with it the ability and legitimacy that he and his associates had envisaged at the beginning
needed to enforce his rules. So when he tried to introduce of the 20th century.
reforms that directly challenged privileges and
prerogatives of the tribal chiefs and the clergy, he failed. The sixth element contributing to the failure was the
Looking back, Amanullah had a relatively cohesive plan of interfamilial and interpersonal rivalries within his
action; he just lacked the enforcing mechanisms to government. As king, Amanullah was unable or unwilling
safeguard his reforms from the backlash they met. Today, to put a stop to the internal rifts among his closest advisors.
the military is arguably much stronger and more nationally There were two camps. The pro-reform camp led by Tarzi
representative than at any other time in Afghan history. The looked to the nascent Turkish Republic for inspiration and
National Defence and Security Forces are fighting internal support. Unfortunately for them, Turkey had very little
enemies whose stated goals include the reversal of social tangible assistance to offer. The more conservative camp,
and institutional progress made since 2001. The military is led by Muhammad Nadir (later Nadir Shah) found support
not the vehicle to transform Afghanistan’s politics, among the tribal leaders, the clergy and the British – Tarzi’s
however. The problem lies within the executive authority, three prime culprits in the failure of his plans. The Nadir
which is divided and weak. camp found more fertile ground on which to promote its
platform and was able to squash the reform effort. In the
“
end it was able to insert itself into power to perpetuate its
The main challenge for Mahmud conservative agenda and undermine further attempts at
Tarzi and his associates reform until the mid-1960s. In contemporary Afghanistan,
the current elite camps, while not having direct familial
stemmed from the Afghan relations, have links to various mujahidin groups, former
socio-economic system’s communist cadres or ethnic groupings. If these are not
inability to absorb the reforms harnessed and directed towards a common cause, they can
become a major source of national discord and a magnet for
and the government’s inability foreign influencers to further their interests in Afghanistan
to enforce them or withstand or to use Afghanistan as a proxy battlefield.
the backlash they caused.” Lessons for today

There is exactly a century between the start of the two
Fifth, Amanullah lacked the diplomatic nuance to transformational periods in Afghanistan’s modern history
appreciate the geopolitical situation of his country – in – Habib Allah’s ascension to amirship in 1901 and the fall of
particular the continuing presence of the British in India. the Taliban in 2001. Both transformational periods began
This author’s grandfather served as Amanullah’s personal after the country had experienced draconian and divisive
secretary during the 1927–28 voyage that took the monarch political climates. There is a clear limit to comparison
to a dozen Asian and European countries. He recounted between the two eras. In 1901, the country had been
how dismissive the king was towards any suggestions pacified by the central government, the transition of power
from Britain. For example, in response to a British request was orderly and there was no direct foreign meddling.
to relax his country’s entente with the Soviet Union, the In 2001, the country was in the midst of a civil war and
infuriated king went out of his way to antagonise the its transition came about by force, executed through
British further. direct and full foreign involvement. Despite temporal and
circumstantial differences, however, the transformational
Modern Afghan historiography generally tends to place period in early 20th century can provide valuable lessons
the main blame for the failure of Afghanistan’s reforms for the current one.
and political transformation squarely on British polices.
However, Amanullah would have given his plans a much The early 20th century reformers in Afghanistan achieved
better chance of success had he not opposed the British a number of their goals and failed in others. But in
so vehemently. In retrospect, his military could also retrospect, they managed to set up the rudimentary
have benefited from British support. Mahmud Tarzi, who elements of transformative politics for future generations.
was not a supporter of Amanullah’s trip, did, however, They succeeded in achieving Afghanistan’s full
share his father-in-law’s distaste of the British. For independence in 1919. They were able to introduce a
Tarzi, the combination of conservative tribal elite in national historical narrative – albeit not fully inclusive of all

segments of the country’s population. They began debating limited. This challenge is compounded by an array
issues dealing with ethnic, religious and linguistic identities of factors that did not exist a century ago – foremost
of their country’s diverse population. They helped introduce among them the notion that foreigners are the drivers
basic semi-secular education and tried to introduce of transformational politics. The early reformers were
rudimentary rights for women and religious minorities creating Afghanistan’s historical narrative. Today, there
under the law. The list of specific transformative reforms are several disconnected trends to deconstruct the very
was long and ranged from defining who was an Afghan concept of the country. The fact that these trends, ranging
citizen to regulating marriage age. from the status of Pashtuns in Pakistan to the universality
of the label ‘Afghan’, are debated within a political climate
The main challenge for Mahmud Tarzi and his associates conditioned by an ethnically based governance structure
stemmed from the Afghan socio-economic system’s imposed by foreigners only exacerbates the situation.
inability to absorb the reforms and the government’s Deconstruction is needed but incorporating the lessons
inability to enforce them or withstand the backlash they from past experiences.
caused. Unlike its neighbours, India and Iran, Afghanistan
did not have a civil society or intellectual base beyond the Before attempts are made to take down the existing
small elite mainly centred in Kabul. For the majority of narratives, brave undertakings should be made to chart
the masses who were either illiterate or semi-literate, a vision for Afghanistan’s future without discarding the
the transformative message was either absent or realities of the past or those of today, as uncomfortable as
incomprehensible, or was delivered via the two classes they may be. Mahmud Tarzi’s dream was to help build an
that stood to lose most from it — the tribal leaders and independent, progressive and self-reliant Afghanistan that
the clergy. could be an engine in moving the Islamic world forward
into the 20th century. The Afghanistan of 21st century,
The post-2001 experience has revived some of the while endowed with selfless defenders and dynamic youth,
same social fissures that haunted the country a century is sadly nowhere close to the dream of its son, who now is
ago. Despite improvements in literacy and means of resting on a hill in Istanbul yearning for the winds of change
information dissemination, the capacity of the rural to come from his homeland.
population to absorb the transformational goals remains

President Najibullah
and the National
Reconciliation Policy
Objectives, operations and obstacles
Heela Najibullah
Heela Najibullah is a peace and conflict researcher whose book also published articles and booklets on conflict management
Reconciliation and Social Healing in Afghanistan was published by and reconciliation in South Asia. Her current position is Community
Springer in January 2017. She has worked with the International Engagement and Accountability Delegate in the IFRC Regional
Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) for eleven years on issues of Office of Europe.
migration in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Europe. She has
ABSTRACT
What lessons can be learned from the Afghan The NRP had a multilayered approach to negotiating
National Reconciliation Policy (NRP) in the 1980s with opposition groups. Dialogue looked to establish
and 90s – about how to negotiate with armed groups, local non-aggression or peace protocol pacts. These
and how to balance local, national and international would be discussed at district level, and then village
interests to sustain focus on building an inclusive and tribal elders would be brought in to facilitate
political settlement? implementation. Talks took place directly and
through the United Nations.
President Najibullah’s government launched the
NRP in the mid-1980s as the Soviet Union was looking The biggest obstacle faced by the NPC was time.
to draw down its presence in Afghanistan. The As the Cold War wound down, Afghanistan’s reliance
NRP sought to negotiate an end to conflict with the on external assistance meant that the collapse of
mujahidin and to establish terms for a comprehensive geopolitical strategic interest to support the Afghan
political settlement. It combined traditional government’s NRP programme fatally undermined
Afghan socio-political practices for consultation its chances of success. Today Kabul has international
and decision-making with a pragmatic political support – although this is dwindling. But it lacks
strategy designed to build both domestic support the internal political will to take a reconciliation
and international legitimacy. process forward.

The National Reconciliation Policy (NRP) of the People’s power in 1978 it had refused participation of other
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government political parties
sought, among other things, to negotiate an end to the civil »» developing a renewed constitutional basis for
war with mujahidin armed groups. It was developed at a the government, to gain domestic support and
pivotal moment of the Cold War in the mid-1980s when the international legitimacy.
demise of the Soviet Union was already looming. As the
mujahidin threatened the stability of the Soviet-backed In 1986, the PDPA leadership changed and Najibullah
government in Kabul, President Mikhail Gorbachev’s was appointed head of the party. The party initiated a
glasnost reforms meant that the presence of Soviet troops consultative process to define the NRP and the terms of
in Afghanistan was increasingly being questioned in its implementation before it was endorsed in a Loya Jirga
Moscow. And this in turn encouraged pro-independence in 1987. The Loya Jirga introduced a number of changes.
PDPA members to become more vocal. These included constitutional reform, whereby the
country reverted back to its pre-1978 name (Republic of
The socio-political circumstances in Afghanistan around the Afghanistan) prior to the PDPA takeover; Islam being cited
end of the Cold War and today are very different. By 1986, as the national religion, although the country also sought
Afghanistan had endured seven years of violence, framed to maintain its secular values; the PDPA changing its name
by proxy war between the two superpowers. Contemporary to the Watan Party to try to open up membership to ‘non-
Afghanistan has been traumatised by four decades of fighting hizbis’ (non-PDPA members); and efforts being made to
and the number of stakeholders has multiplied. The country’s try to separate the party from the government – which was
socio-economic and political structures have been ravaged, driven by the administration’s desire to stop being referred
gender-based violence and discrimination has worsened and to as a ‘regime’ by the international community.
levels of education and healthcare have declined drastically.
Party politics have been superseded by tribal or ethnic Ahead of the 1987 Loya Jirga, the government launched a
politics, and since 2002 the Afghan government has had to consultation process both within the party and with selected
rebuild its military institutions from scratch. representatives of the Afghan people, which was intended
to develop a shared definition of reconciliation and to flesh
Some parallels between the period around the end of the out some of the detail of NRP implementation. Deliberations
Cold War and today can be drawn, however. As then, the went on for more than a year. PDPA cadres engaged in
Afghan government today is standing on shaky ground, internal debate on priorities for reform, while village elders,
challenged every day by armed opposition groups, many tribal leaders and communities in government-controlled
of which still operate as proxies. The country is still not areas were consulted on their demands and preferences.
economically self-sufficient and remains reliant on external
assistance, with insecurity the main driver of economic The party leadership made the NRP its core strategy,
regression. Notwithstanding the differences between the two bringing influential Afghans from outside the party into
eras, the experiences of the NRP can shed light on some of government positions and creating a National Reconciliation
the modalities of pursuing reconciliation today. Commission (NRC). The NRC was a serious effort by
the government to demonstrate its intent to implement
National Reconciliation Policy: the NRP. Its independence was key to its legitimacy.
objectives and methods NRC Chair Abdul Rahim Hatif had been a non-PDPA
The NRP had its roots in traditional Afghan socio-cultural member of the Ulusi Jirga (House of Representatives) for
practices such as tiga (putting down a stone to mark the Kandahar City during the reign of King Zahir Shah (1933–73).
end of the conflict and a deposit to guarantee the next NRC district-level leaders were selected locally and were
steps are negotiated), nanawati (seeking shelter – even non-PDPA. Nor were they affiliated with the mujahidin but
if your enemy comes to your home, you host them), and were intended to be neutral. The government sought out
Loya Jirga (a council with a participatory structure where influential individuals with broad local approval – although
people get together to resolve contentious issues and as the NRP progressed and deals were made with local
reach decisions of importance). But its policy framework mujahidin commanders, so the process became increasingly
was a well-thought-out, modern political strategy with permeated by official security personnel.
clear objectives. These included:
The main tasks of the Commission included the following:
»» the withdrawal of soviet troops
»» an end to conflict with the mujahidin, who could then »» to build trust and demonstrate that the government was
take part in political processes in order to facilitate inclusive and committed to the national reconciliation
multi-party democracy – when the PDPA came to process, and that the NRC was independent

»» offering specific posts in government to the opposition Objectives for the negotiations leading to the Geneva Accords
as well as allowing opposition groups to exercise their were determined by the superpowers, which were
political rights within the country guarantors of the agreement. They were focused exclusively
»» discussing possibilities for a coalition government with on facilitating the withdrawal of Soviet troops with
the opposition international legal approval and political endorsement.
»» announcing a unilateral ceasefire. The Geneva Accords did not put in place an internationally
binding framework for a long-term political solution in
NRP efforts to end the conflict also engaged with UN Afghanistan. Once the Soviet Union withdrew, both
initiatives. These included UN-led diplomacy mandated by Afghanistan and Pakistan reported breach of the agreement
the Security Council to mediate between different external to the UN but the guarantors were no longer focused on
stakeholders – regional countries, the Soviet Union and the Af-Pak issues. This led the Secretary-General to propose the
United States. These occurred within the framework of the UN 5PPP, to engage regional states that had not been
objectives of the 1988 Geneva Accords to oversee Soviet involved in the Geneva process and to expand the terms of
withdrawal from Afghanistan. The NRP also connected the dialogue to include modalities for a political settlement.
with efforts of UN agencies to facilitate the voluntary return
“
of refugees, and with the UN Secretary-General’s 1991
Five-Point Peace Plan (UN 5PPP), which was intended to Within Afghanistan,
serve as the basis for a comprehensive political settlement the effectiveness of the
in Afghanistan. The UN 5PPP evolved after the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan and amid informal discussions
government apparatus was
with the UN over the viability of an interim government key in negotiating with local
followed by free elections. President Najibullah had also
explored whether the UN could deploy peacekeeping
commanders and fighters.”
forces to avoid a power vacuum and related violence, but
it was felt that that the Security Council would not back By 1991, however, the world had witnessed fall of the
this. Finally, the NRP included President Najibullah’s offer Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. As a result,
to resign – as demanded by the opposition and suggested for the US as the only remaining superpower and its allies
by the UN in order to implement the UN 5PPP and to clear on the Security Council the success of the UN 5PPP was
a path for a democratic electoral process. no longer relevant. Rather, the priority was to change
the communist regime in Kabul. At the time, the Afghan
Negotiations government was making progress with negotiations
The NRP had a multilayered approach to negotiating with domestically through the NRP. But it was unable to gain
the opposition. Within Afghanistan, the effectiveness of international support for the domestic momentum it had
the government apparatus was key in negotiating with built up, and the internal process remained vulnerable to
local commanders and fighters. Talks were aimed at the conflicting interests of the external players that were
establishing non-aggression or peace protocol pacts with active in the Afghan conflict.
the government. The conditions of the pacts would then
be discussed with the NRC at district level. At this point, There were two parallel processes at the onset of the
village and tribal elders would be involved to support UN 5PPP: one overt, comprising the UN’s efforts to
local fighters’ integration back into the community, giving find a political solution in Afghanistan; and one covert,
consent to local commanders to take charge of the security comprising national intelligence agencies involved in
of their communities where requested and supporting pursuing their interests and making deals behind the
ex-fighters to find alternative livelihoods. scenes. These clandestine negotiations effectively provided
a back channel for the conflicting interests of different
The government approached opposition leaders both stakeholders to undermine the Afghan peace process.
directly and through the UN. Political negotiations with This reflects Barnett Rubin’s observation in his book
opposition leaders based in Pakistan or Iran took place The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, that the inability to find
clandestinely in third countries. These were undertaken a durable solution in Afghanistan is as much a failure of
by the government independently through its own the international system as of the Afghan state. The former
network and not through the UN. By contrast, the Afghan Head of National Directorate of Security in Afghanistan
government pursued regional and international dialogue (2004–10), Amrullah Saleh, confirmed in an interview with
with countries involved in the Afghan conflict rigorously the author that understanding how to build regional and
through the UN. Such negotiations had led to the global consensus is the missing piece that Afghans have
Geneva Accords and the UN 5PPP. been searching for to achieve sustainable peace.

President Najibullah stressed in a letter to his family in
1995 the importance of reaching a common denominator
among all stakeholders to the Afghan conflict in order
to end violence:
Afghanistan has multiple governments now, each

created by different regional powers. Even Kabul is Logo of the Afghan
National Reconciliation
divided into little kingdoms ... unless and until all the
Policy. © Heela Najibullah
actors [regional and global powers] agree to sit at one
table, leave their differences aside to reach a genuine
consensus on non-interference in Afghanistan and government then, as now, was constantly firefighting
abide to their agreement, the conflict will go on. crises at the expense of realising its long-term vision for
reconciliation and social change. Particularly vulnerable
Obstacles to the compressed timeframe were the government’s
Some of the main obstacles to the realisation of the NRP ambitions to engage communities in the NRP.
stemmed from mistrust of the intentions of Najibullah
and his government by both the public and key regional A key lesson of NRP is that the local and national process
and global ‘spoilers’. For example, his previous position must be linked to each other, and both levels need to
as head of the Afghan intelligence agency (KHAD) and be connected to external partners. For example, few
his membership of PDPA more broadly was constantly representatives of communities or civil society from inside
manipulated in Cold War propaganda. The withdrawal Afghanistan had opportunities to advocate their interests to
of Soviet troops was the focus of superpower bargaining external stakeholders. Instead, externally backed political
over Afghanistan, rather than a political solution to the opposition groups were able to consistently assert their
Afghan crisis. Neighbouring countries questioned the demands through their foreign patrons – such as Germany
legitimacy of the Afghan government or its potential to promoting Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and his faction, Pakistan
survive the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. There was also promoting Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Saudi Arabia Abdul
direct hostility after the Soviet withdrawal, for example Rasul Sayyaf.
in 1989 when mujahidin factions based in Peshawar
backed by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Conclusion: prospects for reconciliation
attacked Jalalabad in a bid to see faction leader Gulbuddin and social healing
Hekmatyar installed as leader of Afghanistan. Najibullah’s Reconciliation is a highly political term in Afghanistan. It is
refusal to grant amnesty to Soviets accused of war crimes viewed as top-down, initiated by the Afghan government,
turned a page in Kabul’s relations with Moscow (the as was the case both in 1986, and in 2010 when President
‘Afghan-Soviet Friendship’). Karzai called a ‘National Consultative Peace Jirga’,
reaching out to ‘upset brothers’ within the Taliban, who
Negotiations were more difficult with opposition leaders who in fact declined the invitation to attend. A ‘middle-out’
were resident in foreign countries such as Pakistan, Iran approach to reconciliation can be more effective and can be
and Italy. For example, King Zahir Shah was dissuaded from achieved when government leaders are prepared to engage
coming to Afghanistan despite very constructive negotiations sincerely and strategically in a peace and reconciliation
under the Rome process – perhaps the most prominent of process that acknowledges socio-cultural, socio-economic
a number of independent peace efforts that were initiated and political factors.
by Afghans in exile, funded by the Italian government with
indirect support from the US. Moderate, pro-reconciliation Remembering again my father’s quote that Kabul is divided
mujahidin factions in Pakistan were threatened by Islamabad into little kingdoms, the question arises whether political
with expulsion. The Afghan government sought to respond class in Afghanistan is sufficiently mature to place national
through transparency, communicating to the Afghan people interest above access to power and money. Lessons from
its position in terms of implementing the NRP and what kind the 1980s and 1990s suggest that a key constituent of the
of obstacles it was facing. political class at that time was genuine in its intention to
find a political solution to the challenges Afghans faced
But the biggest hurdle was time. The Najibullah and were not mere proxies of others. This is why today
government did not have luxury of the years that peace political figures such as Najibullah are remembered more
and reconciliation processes necessarily take, as it respectfully because he and other members of his party
faced advancing isolation by its international partners were true to the stated ambitions of the NRP. They tried
combined with increasing economic difficulties. The Afghan against the odds to find a political solution for Afghanistan

within an agreed international framework and supported What worked in the NRP of 1980s was the fact that the
by the UN, and there was a serious effort to make the NRP process was transparent and sincere, with clear vision,
inclusive, consultative and focused on people. objectives and mechanisms. Political will existed internally
that allowed the Watan Party leadership to pursue peace
A peace process in Afghanistan today needs to balance in the aftermath of the Cold War and amid international
efforts to build internal and external consensus. This isolation. However, the collapse of geopolitical strategic
requires international partners to support internal interest in Afghanistan also fatally undermined the NRP’s
processes that can look beyond elites to engage chances of success. Today, the situation is almost reversed.
communities in dialogue, transitional justice and truth The current Afghan government has the international
seeking. In the 1980s, the Afghan government’s economic political and financial interest and investment to be able to
dependence on the Soviet Union compromised the peace pursue peace, at least in principle. But it lacks the internal
process. In the 1990s, neither post-Soviet Russia nor the political will, strategy and understanding of reconciliation
US were interested in helping to find a political solution to take a process forward. The primary void compromising
in Afghanistan – despite proclamations to the contrary, progress towards a viable reconciliation process lies in
as well as Moscow installing the Rabbani government the lack of commitment of the national leadership and its
and providing support to some political parties. This was lack of understanding of what reconciliation might entail,
exemplified by Russia pushing to replace Najibullah ahead despite the fact that the current Afghan circumstances
of the UN 5-PPP implementation. Afghanistan’s fledgling indicate the urgent need for change.
democracy is still heavily reliant on aid, and so Kabul’s
capacity to sustain peace and reconciliation is similarly
reliant on external support.

Taliban history
of war and peace
in Afghanistan
Felix Kuehn
Felix Kuehn is the co-editor of My Life with the Taliban, the poetry written by Taliban members; and co-editor of The Taliban
autobiography of the former Taliban envoy to Pakistan, Mullah Reader (Hurst, forthcoming). Kuehn holds a degree from the School
Abdul Salam Zaeef (Hurst, 2010); co-author of An enemy we created: of Oriental and African Studies in London and will defend his PhD
The myth of the Taliban/Al-Qaeda merger, 1970–2010 (Hurst, 2012); thesis submitted to King’s College London Department of War
co-editor of Poetry of the Taliban (Hurst 2012), a volume of Studies later in 2018.
ABSTRACT
What does conflict in Afghanistan look like to the The movement sees itself as inclusive – not aligned
Taliban and how can greater knowledge of how the with any group nor based on ethnicity or a political
movement functions inform better peace policy? programme but following Islam alone. The Taliban’s
resurgence in the 2000s mirrored their initial rise to
Misconceptions of the Taliban have complicated power, facilitated by widespread public discontent
efforts to end the war in Afghanistan. A key example with the new government. They see themselves and
is the extent to which the movement represents the the US as the real stakeholders in the conflict and so
grievances of a significant section of Afghan society. likewise in any reconciliation process.
The Taliban are not unified. From inception the movement The Taliban are perhaps less exceptional in Afghanistan
has included distinct groups with different views on national than many people would prefer to believe, as they
and international policy. But the core message of the express a much broader discontent that is anchored in
central leadership has resonated widely: Afghanistan needs local conflict. The Taliban’s narrative of the conflict in
to return to law and order, and the Taliban are here to Afghanistan is not an alternative history, but rather a
dispense security and justice based on Islam. The Taliban’s missing piece of the larger puzzle of how to administer
military conquest of Afghanistan has reflected their core the country peacefully.
belief that holding a monopoly of power is a precondition for
the formation of a viable Afghan state.

Former Taliban fighters line up to hand over their rifles to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan during a reintegration ceremony
at the provincial governor’s compound May 28, 2012 in Ghor, Afghanistan. © DOD Photo / Alamy Stock Photo
The history of the Taliban remains a phenomenon. many others – believed that ‘control was in the hands of
Not because it is impossible to explain who they are, the corrupt and wicked ones’. For much of the Taliban
why they started or why they were so successful. leadership, the men who would follow Mullah Omar, it
But because politically motivated alternative narratives was clear that the civil war had been fuelled by outside
have proven even more durable than the group itself. interference, and that the victory of the jihad had been
There are fundamental misconceptions about what the spoiled by the selfishness of the mujahidin commanders
Taliban were and are, and what they were not and are not, who were fighting each other in a struggle for power.
which complicate efforts to end the war. While the Taliban
leadership is made up of distinct groups and individuals, But the crisis was more than just a few mujahidin
the movement from in the 1990s through to today remains commanders and their foreign supporters; the Taliban
an expression of the sentiment of a significant section of saw that the Afghan people had lost their way. They had
Afghan society. There are many Taliban versions of the been hiding their religion, which had allowed the chaos
past. For all the distortion and propaganda these contain, and anarchy to take hold as the loosely affiliated networks
much is to be learnt from the Taliban’s understanding of local mujahidin disintegrated and the commanders
of the Afghan crisis. turned on communities. A Taliban op-ed from mid-1995,
some seven months after the movement had started, is
Beginnings illustrative: ‘We all witnessed what happened when there
was no shari’a law in the country. The last few years are
The Religion of Allah is being stepped on, the people a good example of the disaster a society faces without a
are openly displaying evil, the People of [Islam] are strict code or law.’
hiding their Religion, and the evil ones have taken
control of the whole area; they steal the people’s There are differing views on matters of national and
money, they attack their honour on the main street, international policy within the Taliban, and to think of
they kill people and put them against the rocks on the movement as one group is misleading. Even in their
the side of the road, and the cars pass by and see the earliest incarnation there were distinct Taliban groups.
dead body on the side of the road, and no one dares Nevertheless, the core Taliban message resonated widely
to bury him […]. – that Afghanistan needed to return to law and order and
that they had come to provide security and justice on the
Mullah Omar was addressing the first group of religious basis of Islam.
students in Panjwayi, describing the situation all
around Kandahar in 1994. After the Afghan mujahidin For the Taliban, their early success was not built on their
had successfully driven out the Soviet forces and the superior military might but was an expression of the
government it had left behind in Kabul, Afghanistan widespread discontent and desperation about the steadily
descended into war with itself. Mullah Omar – and deteriorating situation. As Mullah Omar explained in

1995: ‘We asked the religious scholars for their advice Islam would provide the framework on which others should
and received a shari’a-based decree from them. In be operating. From this perspective, the central goal of an
the light of this decree from our religious scholars, we Islamic government based on shari’a could not seriously
started our armed resistance to the corrupt regime in be disputed since this had been what all Afghan mujahidin
Kabul. We started this movement for the protection of the had fought and died for in the jihad against Soviet forces.
faith and the implementation of the shari’a law and the As Mullah Omar stated in the summer of 1995, which must
safeguarding of our sovereignty.’ have been confusing to the outside world at the time: ‘the
Islamic movement of the Taliban was trying its best and
After their momentous success in taking Kandahar making all sorts of possible efforts to prevent any potential
province, the Taliban’s growing momentum soon convinced conflict in the country.’ Much of what the Taliban actually
them to turn their sights nationwide. While they only did, however, was reactive. They were making things up
established an official government after the fall of Kabul as they went. The overall goals they propagated – peace,
in 1996, by spring 1995 they had already transformed justice, security and Islam – resonated widely. But they
themselves from a loosely structured network of separate were also loosely defined and the details were often
groups. They organised as the mujahidin groups of the discussed as issues arose.
1980s had, developing their capabilities to raise finance,
fight and negotiate. Within four months of starting they In September 1996, the Taliban took Kabul. Mullah Omar
had not only managed to expand their reach to within a few announced that ‘After this, a pure Islamic government
kilometres of Kabul, but had also established committees will rule over Afghanistan.’ The Taliban would go on to
and departments that, however poorly they performed form a government – which meant for the most part
in practice, were meant to fulfil government functions reopening previous ministries and encouraging people
of international diplomacy, healthcare and economic to return to their workplace. But at the time of Mullah
development – alongside the movement’s core goals of Omar’s statement, the Taliban did not rule Afghanistan.
providing security and justice. The ministers that were appointed then were ‘acting’:
theirs was a transitional government, and Afghanistan’s
National conquest: ‘peace, justice, future was to be decided once the war had ended.
security and Islam’ Meanwhile, the Taliban would focus on their main mission
The Taliban’s primary objectives were informed by what of preventing a return to chaos and harvesting the fruits
they considered to be the precondition for the formation of the hard-won jihad.
of a viable Afghan state, ie holding the monopoly of power.
While they expanded their territory and ranks mostly Kabul, long the motor of innovation and modernity in
through incorporation and negotiation, the Taliban’s Afghanistan, seemed for much of the Taliban to be the
understanding was that as long as the option to fight epicentre of what had gone wrong. After all, it had been in
existed then there would be fighting, or Afghanistan as the capital that unhealthy ideologies such as Communism
a whole would fracture. As Mullah Ghaus, the Taliban’s and Muslim-Brotherhood-inspired Islamism had seeped
first acting minister of foreign affairs, would explain, ‘the into society. To this end the Amr bil Ma’rouf, better known
Taliban are facing opponents […] who want to increase as the Ministry for Vice and Virtue, was created soon
their military advantage through war. There are too many after Kabul fell – having previously been established only
arms in Afghanistan; the war would not end until they were as a department. In line with some of the core tenets of
disarmed. [The] Taliban would continue to fight until all the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, much of the Taliban
Afghans were disarmed and the country secure.’ leadership believed that shari’a was meant to create a
society that allowed people to be good. The mixture of
To much of the outside world, this seemed to be little more rural village culture and religious education that formed
than the Taliban requiring all other Afghan factions to lay the socio-educational background of many senior Taliban
down arms and surrender. The Taliban’s point of view, leaders had created a highly ritualistic and outward-
however, was markedly different. In contrast to how they oriented religious understanding: if something could
were perceived externally as well as by some other Afghan corrupt people, it should not be allowed.
factions, the Taliban did not consider themselves to be
party to the civil war of the early 1990s. They had come to Between 1996 and the end of their Emirate in early 2002,
end the civil war and so were a group apart. This mission, the Taliban continued to try and redress the core issues
according to the Taliban, was not about excluding people. they considered to be the reason for the Afghan crisis. While
Quite the opposite. As they often claimed, they were not they did engage in various negotiation tracks to try to end
aligned with any group, were not based on ethnicity or a the war with the opposition, none yielded any results. The
political programme, but were following Islam alone. Taliban saw the opposition as untrustworthy and so the war

continued, as opposition forces either consolidated around September 11 attacks three years later. Still, many among
Ahmed Shah Massoud or fled the country. The problems the Taliban leadership feared that Afghanistan would pay
the Taliban faced while trying to institute a functioning the price for the attack, and searched for a peaceful
government and state were the same that many aspiring solution. Many wanted bin Laden gone. However, even after
administrations had encountered before: establishing an Ulema conference in Kabul had advised that bin Laden
both authority over a fiercely independent population and a should be asked to leave, Mullah Omar made it clear he
monopoly of violence within the country’s sovereign borders. would not expel him.
“
It was arguably their understanding of the underlying The former warlords and
causes of the Afghan crisis and the solutions to these
that separated them from previous rulers. Rather than parties to the civil war of the
orientating themselves towards Western countries 1990s won positions in the
promoting modernisation or following foreign ideologies,
the Taliban brought with them a mixture of rural Pashtun
new administration, using
customs and religious education that informed what they their recently acquired power
thought needed to be changed, mostly in urban centres.
to enrich themselves and
A closer look at how they ruled in much of Afghanistan
showed that in practical matters of governance, in their supporters.”
particular the rural hinterlands, more often than not they
relied on similar arrangements to those that had allowed The US, meanwhile, was mobilising rapidly in response
other governments before them to rule – at least nominally. to 9/11. The Bush doctrine held that the US ‘will make no
distinction between those who planned these acts and
Fall from power and insurgency those who harbour them’. Operation Enduring Freedom
The Taliban’s international relations soon came to be launched in October 2001 saw the US use small teams of
dominated by links with Osama bin Laden and other foreign special forces alongside Afghan opposition groups – who
nationals accused of involvement in terrorism. The list of were familiar faces to the Taliban. In north Afghanistan the
concerns of the international community, and particularly US built up the loosely affiliated groups of the Northern
of the US, had been growing since the Taliban emerged Alliance, almost all of whom had been part of the civil war
in Kandahar: from opium production, to the treatment of of the early 1990s. These included General Mohammed
the population and especially women and girls, and then Fahim, who had been the intelligence officer of Ahmed Shah
to bin Laden and terrorists. The US and Saudi Arabia had Massoud; Ismail Khan, who had carved out his own fiefdom
been first to protest about bin Laden, but his presence in western Afghanistan; and the Uzbek commander Abdul
in Afghanistan soon started to dominate much of the Rashid Dostum, who was notorious for switching allegiance.
Taliban’s interaction with the world. In the south, Gul Agha Shirzai, the same man the Taliban had
expelled from Kandahar in 1994, mobilised men in Pakistan
From the Taliban’s perspective there seemed little and marched towards Kandahar supported by US air power.
difference between meeting a US diplomat or a
representative of the UN. The US was, in their words, The Taliban’s defeat by the US and the return to power of
‘finding […] excuses against the Emirate and the top one is their old foes came as a shock. Overwhelming US airpower
the presence of Arab mujahid, Osama bin Laden. […] even if had been decisive. But the social contract of the Islamic
Osama got out of Afghanistan, they would still not formally Emirate had begun to dissolve well before then, as the
recognise the Islamic Emirate and neither would Osama’s popular support the Taliban had once garnered had long
departure put an end to their pretexts.’ Diplomatic efforts started to dwindle in the light of new laws and policies
bore little fruit. Bin Laden continued to threaten the US enforced by their government. In power, the Taliban’s
and other nations and was held responsible for the 1998 relationship with the rural communities rehashed the
bombings of two US embassies in East Africa. same struggle faced by all central authorities before them
– to develop a working relationship with the peripheries.
The US retaliated with cruise missile strikes and later In particular, rural tribal communities were opposed to
imposed sanctions on the Taliban aimed at forcing them to growing interference in their local affairs by the Taliban
hand over Bin Laden. UN sanctions soon followed, which, government in Kabul. The opium ban that the Taliban
to the Taliban, only confirmed the UN as little more than enforced especially soured the relationship with many
another US tool. To this day, much of the Taliban leadership rural farming communities by eroding their livelihoods.
not only maintains strong doubts as to bin Laden’s Following the swift demise of the Emirate, the shell-
involvement in the 1998 bombings but also about the shocked Taliban retreated, many returning to their home

villages and mosques and madrasas, others fleeing across talks between the government in Kabul and the Taliban,
the border to Pakistan. President Obama announced a troop surge. Post-surge
efforts at reconciliation seemed to the Taliban little more
In the first couple of years after the end of the Emirate it than an offer of amnesty in response to their capitulation.
seemed that the Taliban were indeed a spent force. Many As a Taliban statement at the time reveals,
members of the senior leadership contemplated joining
the new political paradigm in Kabul or returning to their contrarily, the Pentagon is at present making
previous lives before the movement. But it seemed that preparation for new military operations in Helmand
there was no safe space for them for them to demobilise. province, south Afghanistan. Similarly, they put
The US continued to pursue its war on terror, while forward conditions, which are tantamount to escalating
Washington’s Afghan allies used their newfound support the war rather than ending it. For example, they
to settle old scores. The former warlords and parties want the mujahedeen to lay down arms, accept the
to the civil war of the 1990s won positions in the new constitution and renounce violence. Nobody can call
administration, using their recently acquired power to this reconciliation.
enrich themselves and their supporters. People who had
previously been close to the Taliban, or who were branded Around the time of the surge, President Karzai was calling
as having been close, found themselves targeted. for the Taliban to lay down their arms and join him. His
government established the High Peace Council (HPC) in
The return of the Taliban as a potent insurgent movement 2010, tasked with bringing about a reconciliation process,
would take a few years. Much like their first rise to facilitating talks or in any other way supporting an end to
power in the 1990s, their resurgence was facilitated by the conflict. The Taliban saw the HPC as little more than
widespread public discontent with the new government another organ that worked under the command of the
– the interim council headed by Hamid Karzai, and then his foreign forces. Mawlawi Kabir, a member of the Taliban’s
administration. As before, the new mobilisation comprised central council, explained a few months after the HPC
a conglomeration of local conflicts brought together under was founded that ‘[the] peace council is a one-sided
one umbrella by former Taliban leaders. Much time and entity, having been established to protect their unilateral
effort was invested in creating a coherent organisation goals and interests. The council consists of people who
that would work within the Taliban’s framework. The practically support the Americans, though they claim being
leadership circulated several rulebooks outlining rules and jihadic figures and leaders. But by siding with the American
responsibilities to be followed, the so-called Layeha. The invaders, they had forfeited their credibility.’
Taliban established a shadow government that looked to
feed off the failings of the corrupt government in Kabul and Negotiation has only made sense to the Taliban with people
the cultural ignorance of the foreign forces. they see as holding real power – ie the US. In June 2012
the Taliban announced that they were ‘ready to open a
Reconciliation? political office abroad to reach a peaceful solution of the
The Taliban questioned the Kabul government’s credibility Afghan issue and understanding with the US’. Over the next
and legitimacy, seeing it as both installed and controlled year, the Taliban would repeat that it was the ‘US which is
by a foreign power. This is why the Taliban saw themselves the true independent counterpart to the Taliban. […] The
and the US as the real stakeholders in the growing conflict Americans have been utilising the Karzai administration
in Afghanistan – and hence in any reconciliation process as a tool for prolonging their occupation.’ A year later the
towards a political settlement. Their statement regarding Taliban opened a political office in Qatar, intended as a
the 2009 election is illustrative: major milestone in advancing a political process.
Our people surely remember that the Islamic Emirate The opening of the Qatar office turned into a diplomatic
always maintained that the real decision about the disaster, however, with Taliban representatives speaking
results of elections is made in Washington. The in front of the official flag of the Islamic Emirate. President
elections are held to throw dust in the eyes of people Karzai, who had been negotiating a bilateral security
and hide their colonialist agenda under the cloud agreement with the US, called off the negotiations and
of elections. announced that the HPC would not join talks in Qatar as
long as the peace process was not Afghan-led. This came
The at times seemingly contradictory position of the US as a surprise to the Taliban who in a statement claimed
towards the insurgency further complicated things. For not only that designating the office as an official agency of
example, under the Barrack Obama administration, while the Islamic Emirate had been agreed upon beforehand, but
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton endorsed the idea of that they would maintain their commitment to using the

office as a vehicle to talk with representatives of dozens of group of Taliban leaders had pretended he was still alive
countries and members of the HPC. Karzai’s outrage over and had ruled in his stead. The news of his death saw
the flag seemed another excuse to end the talks before they Mullah Mansour become leader, but the accompanying
had started in earnest. leadership struggle meant that the enduring differences
between the various Taliban networks now began to
Despite the breakdown of official contact, the US and the develop cracks and then the first signs of actual ruptures.
Taliban in 2014 agreed on a prisoner swap. Five Taliban A year later, Mullah Rasool announced the first splinter
prisoners were released from Guantanamo prison in group. Mansour managed to consolidate his hold over the
exchange for Bowe Bergdahl, a US army soldier who had wider movement and introduced significant innovations,
been taken captive by the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2009. even suggesting that he was not ruling out a political
But while some hoped that the exchange would result solution to the Afghan conflict. But the US assassinated
in more talks, little has materialised since. Looking at him in May 2016. Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada became
the official communications of the Taliban, little seems the next Amir of the Taliban. Meanwhile, the Islamic State,
to have changed over the past eight years. In their eyes: having achieved international notoriety Iraq and Syria, had
Afghanistan continues to be occupied by foreign forces; started to branch out. The formation of the Islamic State in
the US determined the outcome of the disputed 2014 the Khorasan (ISK) in eastern Afghanistan was announced
election by negotiating the formation of the Nation Unity in 2015. Arguably an outcome of increased internal strife
Government; new President Ashraf Ghani signed the among different jihadi and other militant groups, ISK grew
bilateral security agreement with the US that allowed into a formidable foe of the Taliban, which soon found itself
American troops to stay in the country; and Abdullah in open conflict with the newly formed group.
Abdullah became Afghanistan’s first chief executive.
The Taliban saw these changes as more of the same – The Taliban today draw parallels with the situation in the
an illegitimate and corrupt government propped up early 1990s when Afghanistan descended into civil war. They
by the US and others. see many of the same people in powerful positions around
the country, as well as a comparable local security situation
In a statement commemorating the 15-year anniversary and similarly unacceptable behaviour by security forces.
of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban questioned The Taliban’s narrative of Afghanistan’s history casts them
the foreigners’ achievement in relation to their stated in the role of righteous victims. In many ways the Taliban
goals: to make Afghanistan self-sufficient; to end narcotic are less exceptional in Afghanistan than many would like
production and trade; to form a government according them to be. Many of their messages echo the grievances of
to the will of the Afghan nation; and to establish peace, a significant section of Afghan society, and they remain the
stability and security in the country. The Taliban stressed expression of a much broader discontent that is anchored in
that, in fact, in the 15 years of US occupation much had got local conflict. No group can survive in Afghanistan without
worse: Afghanistan remained one of the poorest countries local support, support which can never be won by fear alone.
in the world; drug production was at a record high; the This reality is abundantly clear from the failure of every
government in Kabul seemed one of the most corrupt in Afghan government to extend its reach into the hinterlands.
the world, ‘run by thieves and gangs of evil’; and security And it shows that the Taliban’s narrative of the conflict in
and justice were non-existent. Afghanistan is not an alternative version of Afghanistan’s
history, but rather a missing piece of the larger puzzle of
Conclusion how to administer the country peacefully – a piece that
In 2015 it was revealed that Mullah Omar, the founder and remains ignored by much of the West.
leader of the Taliban, had died two years earlier. A small

Conflict and peace
in Afghanistan
A northern, non-Pashtun perspective
Professor M. Nazif Shahrani
Professor Nazif Shahrani researches Islamic movements, identity East. His most recent books include Revolutions and rebellions in
politics in failed/failing nation states, Muslim family and gender Afghanistan: Anthropological approaches (co-editor with Robert
dynamics, and the political ecology of state-society relations in Canfield, Indiana University Press, 2018) and Modern Afghanistan: The
Soviet and post-Soviet Central Asia, Southwest Asia and the Middle impact of 40 years of war (editor, Indiana University Press, 2018).
ABSTRACT
Many non-Pashtun communities in northern entrenched perceptions of a prolonged, Pashtun-led

Afghanistan see the continuing conflict in the country project of ‘Afghanisation’ to centralise power in Kabul.
as between ‘included’ Pashtuns and ‘excluded’ non- Western efforts to support the government in Kabul
Pashtuns. How can a better appreciation of this are understood within the same worldview.
perspective inform more effective peace policies?
If strategies to address violence in Afghanistan are
This article discusses non-Pashtun views of on to gain sustainable traction, they need to acknowledge
conflict and peace in northern Afghanistan. Many and account for northern resistance to Pashtun
non-Pashtun communities in the north perceive the influence and its association with both Kabul and
current war not as between the Afghan government external intervention. A priority from this perspective
and an armed opposition, but between Pashtuns and is to revise commitments to centralised authority
non-Pashtuns. Such an outlook reflects broader ethnic enshrined in the 2004 constitution in favour of devolved
divisions and centre–periphery splits derived from decision-making to regional institutions.

In November 2017, Hezb-i Islami leader Gulbuddin and Samangan provinces. Thousands of Abdur Rahman’s
Hekmatyar declared to his party convention in Kabul that Durrani Pashtun maldar (mobile herder) supporters were
the current war was not ‘between the armed opposition relocated from Kandahar to Turkistan, Qataghan and
and the government’, but between Pashtun and non- Badakhshan, where they were awarded prime pasture and
Pashtun qawmuna (ethno-linguistic groups). A month later farmland. He also forcibly moved many Ghilzai Pashtun
Atta Muhammad Nur, Governor of the northern Balkh Kuchi nomadic herders and farmers from the Eastern
Province and Executive Director of the Tajik Jamiat-e province of Mashreqi who had rebelled against him.
Islami party, defiantly refused his attempted dismissal
by Ashraf Ghani, accusing the President of an attempted King Amanullah (r. 1919–1929), the grandson of Amir Abdur
power grab. Rahman, reclaimed the country’s independence from the
British Raj in 1919. But he paid a great cost in terms of
“
lost subsidies, which hamstrung his ability to implement
Non-Pashtun grievances among his reformist projects. A civil war ultimately forced the
northern Afghans have fuelled king’s abdication in 1929. Amanullah and his father-in-
law, Mahmood Tarzi, were the architects of Pashtun-
rising violence in the region.” centred Afghan nationalism. They initiated demographic
and cultural hegemony in Turkistan, Qataghan
These events are symptomatic of deeper divisions between and Badakhshan.
Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, and between Kabul and
the north. Such splits derive from what many northern, The peoples of these regions were systematically disarmed
non-Pashtun Afghans perceive as a centralised, Pashtun- in 1921, while in 1923 Amanullah’s government issued
led national project of ‘Afghanisation’ – a legacy of much its Nizamnamayee Naqileen ba Samti Qataghan edict. This
older processes of state-building by Pashtun rulers provided for Pashtuns from across the country to resettle
with support from foreign colonial powers dating back in Qataghan province, offering eight jeribs (half an acre)
to the 1880s. The US-NATO intervention from 2001 and or four acres of irrigated land for every male and female
support for central government in Kabul has fed into these member of the family above seven years of age for a
dynamics. Non-Pashtun grievances among northern nominal fee along with preferential tax benefits. This
Afghans have fuelled rising violence in the region. They process continued through the 1930s to the 1950s, under
need to be acknowledged and accommodated in efforts the direction of Wazir Gul Mohammad Khan Momand as
to promote peace and political reform in Afghanistan. Minister of Interior and roving special envoy of the state
This article discusses northern, non-Pashtun perspectives in the north. He is credited with the destruction of non-
on conflict and peace in Afghanistan. Pashtun historic monuments and historical manuscripts,
and with changing local vernacular names.
Afghanisation
The roots of Pashtun-led Afghanisation can be traced to The most significant ‘administrative violence’ against the
the Durrani Pashtun Empire (1747–1880), which pursued peoples of northern Afghanistan was perpetrated by the
predatory policies of waging war against weakened 1964 liberal constitution, which, ironically, was modified to
Turkic empires in northern Afghanistan. British weapons, become the new post-Taliban Constitution of Afghanistan
political support and annual cash subsidies underwrote in 2004. In the eyes of many non-Pashtuns in northern
the reign of the ‘Iron Amir’ Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880– Afghanistan, the drafters of the 1964 constitution deployed
1901), during which the official boundaries of Afghanistan something akin to Joseph Stalin’s infamous ‘Nationalities
were established. Abdur Rahman’s association with Policies’. The Afghan provinces of Turkistan, Qataghan
the British undermined his anti-colonial credentials, and Badakhshan were divided into nine new administrative
which encouraged northern communities to reject units, Faryab, Jawzjan, Saripul, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz,
his rule. Many rebellions broke out in the north in the Baghlan, Takhar and Badakhshan, effectively destroying
early 1880s, which Abdur Rahman suppressed through common Turkistani and Qataghani identities. Up to the 1978
direct force and through administrative, linguistic and Communist coup, programmes of Afghanisation continued
cultural violence. with large numbers of southern Pashtuns being resettled
across northern provinces (Naqileen). In the 1990s, these
Abdur Rahman’s mistrust of northern, non-Pashtun resettled Pashtun ‘pockets’ in the north became the
communities drove his policy of Pashtun-centred backbone of Taliban support in re-conquering the region.
Afghanisation. Communities of Pashtuns were moved from
the south, especially to the north-western regions of the old The decline of central government control in peripheral
Turkistan province – today’s Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Saripul parts of the country during the 1980s left Pashtun

CHINA
CHINA
SOVIET UNION UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
Feyzabad
QATAGHAN AND TURKMENISTAN 13 4 19 31

Mazar-e Sharif
BADAKHSHAN 1
Meymaneh TURKISTAN
IRAN
MAIMAN A 8 29 3
30
EASTERN
2 27 24 Jammu
ISLAMIC
PROVINCE
5 28 16 18
PAKISTAN and
Herat KABUL
11 14 20 Kashmir
Kabul Jalalabad
10 33 22
HERAT
6 21 Islamabad
REPUBLIC
Ghazni Gardiz
9 26 17 13 Jawzjan
14 Kabul
15 Kandahar
KANDAHAR 7 32 16 Kapisa 27 Panjshir
Farah
34 25 17 Khost 28 Parwan
29 Samangan
OF
INDIA 18 Kunar
Kandahar 19 Kunduz 30 Saripul
23 31 Takhar
IRAN
6 Daikundi 20 Laghman
FARAH 15 32 Uruzgan
12 7 Farah
1 Badakhshan 8 Faryab
21 Logar
22 Nangarhar 33 Wardak
INDIA
2 Badghis 9 Ghazni 23 Nimroz 34 Kunar
3 Baghlan 10 Ghor 24 Nuristan
4 Balkh 11 Herat 25 Paktika
5 Bamyan 12 Helmand 26 Paktya
Afghanistan, major and minor provinces before 1964. Afghanistan – provinces in 2016.
communities in the north vulnerable to revenge by local leaders were assassinated, including former President
Uzbek, Turkmen, Aimaq and Tajik communities when they Burhanuddin Rabbani.
became armed and organised as jihadi groups to resist
Soviet occupation. Many Naqileen left for the safety of Subsequently, most of the US reconstruction funds have
Pakistan. The larger Pashtun enclaves in Kunduz, Baghlan been invested in eastern, southern and south-western
and Balkh provinces, however, organised and armed provinces where the Taliban are prevalent, with little
themselves with help from Pakistan-based jihadi parties, in the relatively peaceful north. There has also been
both to resist the Communists and to protect their own comparatively less provision of security in the north by the
communities against threats from non-Pashtuns. Land in government and its NATO and non-NATO allies. Their belief
parts of Takhar and Badakhshan provinces that had been that the Taliban threat could not grow to include the non-
left behind by Pashtuns who resettled was appropriated by Pashtuns has proved wrong, however. Neglect of the north,
their Tajik and Uzbek neighbours. combined with rampant corruption, graft and ethnic
infighting within the state administration, has resulted
Following the re-conquest of the north by the Taliban after in reduced opportunities, breeding distrust and anger
1997, Pashtun refugees returned from Pakistan, along with especially among non-Pashtun youths.
new Taliban soldiers from the south and from Pakistan.
The non-Pashtuns who fiercely resisted the Taliban re- This challenging environment left young men in
conquest of their territories, which they had liberated from northern provinces with limited choices. Many from
the Soviets and Kabul regimes, were also subjected to impoverished rural villages went to Pakistan to study in
violent reprisals. The Taliban, however, had collaborators Deobandi madrasas. Others left for Iran as (unwanted)
and sympathisers among local mullahs trained in Pakistani migrant labour, or joined the Afghan army or police in
madrasas. This ultimately created tensions within the non- proportionately large numbers compared with other
Pashtun communities. The Taliban’s initial routing from parts of the country. Based on the author’s long-term
Mazar-i Sharif and subsequent triumphant recapture of observations in Badakhshan, most recently in July 2017,
the city also resulted in mutual acts of revenge, especially such conditions have created ideal grounds for Taliban
among the Hazaras, further aggravating tension in and also Daesh (Islamic State in Khorasan – ISK) to recruit
northern and central Afghanistan. disgruntled non-Pashtuns by appealing to their sense of
Islamic justice.
US-NATO intervention
After 9/11, key commanders of the anti-Taliban Northern Often, for northern non-Pashtun populations, the past has
Alliance were invited to partner with US and NATO forces seemed to repeat itself. Similar to the 1921 disarmament
to dislodge the Taliban. They were handsomely rewarded initiatives in Qataghan and Badakhshan, non-Pashtuns
in cash and were also well represented at the 2001 Bonn in the north have been asked to surrender their heavy
Conference, in Hamid Karzai’s Interim and Transitional weapons as part of disarmament, demobilisation and
Administrations and in his first term as President (2002– reintegration programmes. Also reflecting Amanullah’s
09). The majority were Panjshiris, with a small number Naqileen programme of 1923, the Taliban and post-
from northern Afghanistan in more marginal and symbolic Taliban governments facilitated the return of larger
positions. But Uzbeks and Tajiks were systematically numbers of Pashtuns to the north, among them many
sidelined during Karzai’s first term, while some key Taliban fighters.

the Taliban have used them for administering justice to
their own political advantage.
These same local communities of trust in the north

also played crucial roles during the successful anti-
Communist jihad of the 1980s, and then in the anti-Taliban
resistance of the 1990s. The political economy of Pakistan-
based jihadi political organisations sponsored by the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), however, intentionally created
ethnic fissures among resistance groups. Pakistan did
not support the formation of Uzbek or Turkmen-led
Pashtun maldar camping near Lake Shiwa, Badakhshan, summer 2009.
© Nazif Shahrani jihadi resistance movements, permitting only one Tajik-
led organisation – the Jamiat-e Islami of Burhanuddin
Rabbani, a native of Badakhshan.
Pashtun refugee resettlement programmes since 2002,
combined with poverty and increased tensions between Pakistan’s policy has had very negative consequences in the
Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, are viewed by many locals north. ISI funding enabled Pashtun-led jihadi organisations
in the north as the visible consequences of outside such as Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami and Abdur Rabb Rasul
interventions by the US and its allies. A detailed 2010 Sayyaf’s Itihad-i Islami to sponsor disgruntled Tajik and
study by the Afghan Analysts Network, The insurgents of Uzbek fronts, in order to rival Jamiat-e Islami throughout
the Afghan north, stressed that terrorist violence in the greater northern Afghanistan. Turf wars between Hezb-i
north was confined to Taliban attacks launched from Islami and Jamiat-e Islami commanders have led to violent
the safety of ‘Pashtun pockets’, primarily in Kunduz conflict with tragic consequences and to lasting tensions.
and Baghlan provinces. Also, in the absence of external Muslim patrons supporting
Uzbek-led Islamic jihadi fronts, some Uzbek leaders such
Rising violence in the north as Rashid Dostum had previously joined the Communist
The Taliban have exploited evolving circumstances in militia to protect their own communities, adding to new
northern Afghanistan to their advantage. President Karzai, conflicts within the Uzbek and Turkmen communities.
like the Iron Amir and Wazir Gul Mohammad Momand, Today, the Taliban and the Kabul regime alike exploit such
saw resettled Pashtuns in the north as local allies for his these societal fissures in the north.
government and was reluctant to confront them. Local
non-Pashtuns came to believe that governors in Kunduz During the Taliban’s triumphant re-conquest of much of
and Baghlan provinces appointed by Karzai and later Ghani the north (1997–2001), in addition to their natural partners
were protecting the Taliban and their supporters. Such in the Pashtun pockets, they also found allies among
policies have increased tensions within the government mullahs and madrasa students. The Afghan Analysts
between Pashtun and non-Pashtun officials, such as Network 2010 report stated that an estimated 70 per cent
Governor Atta and other northern leaders who now accuse of mullahs and over 90 per cent of madrasa teachers in
Kabul of complacency about instability in the north. Events the north had been trained in Pakistan. A number served
like Atta’s dismissal or the defamation and exile of General in or collaborated with the Taliban administration. After
Abdul Rashid Dostum have helped to widen the trust gap the US and NATO intervention of 2001 and especially since
between Kabul and the greater north. 2009, the Taliban have been successful in mobilising young
Uzbek, Turkmen, Aimaq and some Tajik mullahs to join
The persistent undermining of the social contract between their ranks in a number of provinces, especially in Takhar
Afghan governments and their ru’aya (subjects) has a long and Badakhshan in the north-east and Faryab and Jawzjan
history. To avoid contact with alien, oppressive and corrupt in the north-west. The credibility of Kabul’s international
officials, people in the north have relied on their mosque- patrons among the peoples of northern Afghanistan has
based communities of trust to resolve their conflicts, also been dwindling, while the diminished circumstances of
instead of taking them to the government. These parallel especially youths in rural mountainous and less accessible
power structures have shielded communities from districts has made them attractive targets for both Taliban
predatory government agents and have served them well and ISK recruitment.
after repeated failures of the state since the 1980s. Such
kin- and shari’a-based social units are the most valuable, The Taliban have changed their earlier tactics, now
often democratic local institutions for maintaining order looking beyond reliance on ethnic Pashtuns and instead
and stability – not only in the north but nationally. Indeed, pitching an Islamic message to question the legitimacy

of ‘corrupt’, puppet regimes in Kabul and their Western Islam by powerful, foreign-backed elites. These ideals and
‘infidel’ patrons. They have succeeded in garnering support practices have been inscribed and justified in all national
among disenfranchised and marginalised young Pakistani- constitutions since 1923, and affirmed most recently by the
trained mullahs and madrasa students, and since 2009 2004 post-Taliban constitution. Addressing them requires
in organising non-Pashtuns to form local Taliban fronts appropriate constitutional amendments. These are unlikely
in remote parts of Badakhshan, Takhar, Faryab and to be volunteered by Pashtun powerholders without active
Jawzjan provinces. The Taliban have integrated Uzbek, external encouragement, however.
Turkmen, Aimaq and Tajiks within their ranks, appointing
them to command local units and also to serve in their The 2004 constitution, like all previous constitutions, denies
shadow government. local Afghans the ability to elect their own governors,
mayors and district officers, or to recruit their own
Today, foreign fighters have relocated from Pakistan to professional administrators. The principles of community
Badakhshan and Faryab provinces, including members self-governance that could transform the peoples of
of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tajik, Chechen Afghanistan from being subjects (ru’aya) to empowered
and other jihadis. The Taliban has been recruiting non- citizens (shahrwand) has not been prioritised. Recruiting
Pashtuns, substantiating government claims that the civil servants with local accountability, for example vetted
violence in Afghanistan is not an exclusively Pashtun by local shuras (elected councils) or committees of peers,
phenomenon. At the same time, Pashtun Taliban fighters can reduce pervasive nepotism and corruption, dilute
from Pakistan and southern Afghanistan have also identity politics and bridge the trust gap between state and
moved to Turkistan, Qataghan and Badakhshan – thereby society. Indeed, having elected governors could ameliorate
appearing to continue the long-term project of Pashtun- the current crisis in Balkh province with Governor Nur.
centred Afghanisation in the north. For some non-Pasthuns
in northern Afghanistan, this process has, intentionally The existing constitutional provision giving Afghan
or not, progressed in conjunction with coalition forces. presidents seemingly royal powers to appoint and remove
So what are the options to address such challenges? all government officials, especially at the municipal,
district and provincial levels, should not be condoned. If
Conclusion: constitutional conflict resolution? the international community’s desire is to enhance long-
The project of Pashtun-centred Afghanisation is the term security and stability in Afghanistan, it must overtly
product of Afghanistan’s problematic political culture, advocate appropriate amendments to the constitution. In
based on prevailing ideals of highly centralised authority, its current form, it is part of the problem – exacerbating
reliance on kinship and tribe, and instrumental abuses of conflict and ethnic division.

Section 2
Looking forward
Peace initiatives
Section 2 of this publication looks at priorities for peace initiatives in
Afghanistan, which can represent critical junctures to move away from
violence and towards a different political future.
Peace initiatives need to be carefully planned and managed the dual system of governance in Afghanistan – with the
to seize opportunities appropriately and engage different government running the main population centres and the
constituencies – armed and unarmed – with an interest in Taliban much of the countryside. A single, comprehensive
their evolution and outcomes. The global political climate peace agreement to agree a new social contract is unlikely.
and the regional landscape have both shifted recently A more viable alternative would involve an incremental,
for Afghanistan. The economy is growing and the broad phased approach that builds confidence over time. Early
consensus on the military stalemate between the Taliban agreement on a pause in the fighting is the best way to
and the government places emphasis on talks towards a facilitate a sustained process of dialogue and reform.
new political settlement.
Leaders of five Taliban caucuses provide their
Discussions of peace initiatives for Afghanistan have tended perspectives on possibilities for a peaceful political future
to lack practical detail, however. Themes covered in Section for Afghanistan, in conversation for Accord with Anna
2 look to flesh some of this out. These include: elements Larson. Groups are roughly differentiated by region but are
of a political settlement – priorities for peaceful progress; otherwise anonymous. All groups currently self-identify
women’s participation; perspectives on peace options as Taliban and belong to the central Taliban movement,
presented by different Taliban caucuses and by its Political although some have expressed the desire to become
Office in Qatar; integrating military and political strategies; autonomous from it. Conversations occurred in person in
brokering local political settlements; lessons of local early 2018 at an undisclosed location outside of Afghanistan
peacebuilding; and options for international support for as part of wider talks with a group of high-level actors
a political process.. representing several countries, including Afghanistan and
the United States, about the de-escalation of violence and
Agreeing a new social contract is key to peace in potential for reconciliation with the Afghan government.
Afghanistan. Michael Semple examines the fundamental Taliban representatives were senior commanders or
issues that need to be addressed and the prospects for influential local leaders. Topics include what the Taliban
these being renegotiated successfully as part of a peace are struggling for, caucuses’ relationship with the ‘main
settlement. Fundamental issues include, among others: Taliban’, political vision for Afghanistan, possibilities for
security, respect and basic needs for combatants and agreement with the government, and democracy and Islam.
victims; property, economic rights and the illicit economy; Views between the caucuses differ, but an attempt has been
the structure of government and consolidation of electoral made to summarise common positions in the statements.
democracy; and ethnicity, social inclusion and equality of
opportunity. Impediments to progress include a severe Debate around women’s role in peace processes is
lack of trust in formal processes and agreements, and especially intense in Afghanistan. Sippi Azarbaijani-

Moghaddam asks how Afghan women can achieve positive in the midst of very violent conflict, peace is possible in
results from peace talks with the Taliban. Women were Afghanistan. The peace deals in Musa Qala and Sangin
largely excluded from the Bonn process, but have since districts ultimately collapsed. But some common factors
made significant gains in rights and political participation. that facilitated their short-lived success offer practical
But opportunities for women remain limited and women’s lessons for the future, in particular: identifying legitimate
rights defenders are wary that negotiations with the brokers; empowering local communities; honouring
Taliban will lead to further losses. Women already make commitments; coordinating military and political
key contributions to local peace initiatives, however, and strategies; and acknowledging the limits of central
the possibility now exists for women to engage in and government support. These local examples offer further
affect the course of a national peace process. Afghan insights for national-level settlements – that there are
women encompass a spectrum of interests. Many from opportunities to shift perceptions of the conflict sufficiently
rural communities see ending violence rather than gender to widen political commitment for reconciliation, and to
equality as the priority. Reaching out to different female build popular appetite to negotiate a revised and more
and male constituencies is key to building broad support inclusive social contract.
for women’s issues. Constructive progress will require
Kabul-based women’s activists acknowledging signs Jawed Nader and Fleur Roberts provide further insights
of change among the Taliban and engaging in dialogue into the potential of local peacebuilding to contribute to
with them to explore potential areas of mutual interest inclusive peace in Afghanistan. Local peace councils have
and accommodation. played essential roles in resolving disputes and supporting
justice, working with traditional jirgas and shuras to fill
Ambassador Douglas Lute reflects on how US political gaps in the formal justice architecture. Religious actors’
and military strategies could be integrated to support a influence also has a key function to mediate local conflicts.
peaceful political settlement in Afghanistan. Contrasting Neither of these institutions should be idealised. But
interpretations of stabilisation led to a flawed US strategy linking up with NGOs in joint peace initiatives has brought
to degrade Taliban and build Afghan capacity to use force. mutual benefits, for example in enhancing women’s
The efficacy of the 2009 military surge was undermined involvement, and has helped to multiply gains in preventing
by deploying troops to the wrong areas for the wrong local violence. Community-based peace initiatives can
reasons, and by a lack of complementary political action. help connect local agency to formal peace structures and
Decision-making at key moments of political-military processes – for example local peace councils sharing
tension was often driven by US domestic political priorities. conflict analysis and mitigation planning with provincial
Inconsistency was exemplified by the killing of Taliban and high peace councils. This would also help to ground
leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor in 2016, rather national peace architecture, which at present is widely
than seeing him as a potential interlocutor in dialogue. perceived as remote and ineffective.
Ultimately, the US leadership struggled to make an
explicit statement that the primary means to be used A political solution to the armed conflict between the
in Afghanistan were political, not military, and that the Afghan government and the Taliban must be Afghan-led.
military was required to support political action. But international support is essential to build momentum
and resilience. Ed Hadley and Chris Kolenda explore how
The Taliban’s Political Office in Qatar has a potentially international partners can provide effective support for
significant role to play in any peace process in Afghanistan. a political process in Afghanistan. There is a compelling
Spokesman for the Taliban Political Office, M. Suhail moral and practical case to convince Western allies to
Shaheen, provides a statement for Accord on the Office’s use their collective leverage to persuade conflict parties
perspective on pathways towards a political solution to engage in talks. A viable approach must acknowledge
to violent conflict in Afghanistan – for a negotiated end the multi-tiered realities of the war, operating nationally,
to the violence and inclusive governance. The statement bilaterally and regionally, and also the incremental political
discusses prospects for negotiation as the best means to logic of conflict resolution, working through a step-by-step
end the war in Afghanistan and resolve issues peacefully, process from informal dialogue and confidence-building,
and addresses key challenges such as foreign occupation to military de-escalation and formal negotiations. Lessons
and different frameworks for dialogue with both from past peacemaking efforts stress the need for: 1) a
Washington and Kabul. peace process necessitating a long-term commitment;
2) strategic prioritisation, to coordinate activities
Julius Cavendish draws lessons for future peacemaking towards a common political goal; and 3) third-party
in Afghanistan from local settlements negotiated in facilitation, excluding external states currently operating
Helmand Province in 2006 and 2010. These show that even in Afghanistan.

Elusive settlement
in Afghanistan
Ten priorities for peaceful progress
Professor Michael Semple
Michael Semple is a Professor at the Senator George J Mitchell conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He researches the culture of
Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice, Queen’s University militant Islamist groups, with a focus on the culture of the Afghan
Belfast. He advises at a senior level on peacemaking and the Taliban Movement.
ABSTRACT
Agreeing a new social contract is key to peace in perception that national institutions are corrupt
Afghanistan. What are the priority issues that need and partisan, and the dual system of governance
to be addressed and what are the prospects for in Afghanistan – with the government running the
renegotiating these as part of a peace settlement? main population centres and the Taliban much of
the countryside. A single, comprehensive peace
Ten priority issues include: the preservation of national agreement to agree a new social contract is unlikely
unity and Afghan identity; international military forces; to be achievable in Afghanistan. A more viable
security, respect and basic needs for combatants and alternative model would involve an incremental,
people affected by conflict; state-citizen relations and phased approach that builds confidence over time.
the role and privileges of elites; inclusive security
reform; property, economic rights and the illicit A dialogue-driven programme of implemented
economy; structure of government and consolidation reforms and carefully nurtured cooperative relations
of electoral democracy; promoting Islam and religious has potential to address the root causes of the conflict.
freedom; judiciary and legal system; and ethnicity, social The best way to shape the conditions conducive to
inclusion and equality of opportunity. such a sustained process of dialogue and reform would
be to agree a pause in the fighting early on. Conflict
Fundamental challenges to renegotiating a renewed parties wishing to participate in such a sustained peace
social contract in practice include a severe lack of process would need first to sign up to the suspension
trust in formal processes and agreements, a prevalent of violence.

Introduction are the main armed opposition. But most of the grievances
One powerful way of explaining the persistence of violent they articulate against the Kabul government are owned by
conflict in Afghanistan is the break down in the social others. A settlement of the big social and economic issues
contract, which was precipitated by the two coups of could not meaningfully be attempted among the fighting
the 1970s – led by Daud Khan in 1973 and the 1978 Saur groups. Rather, it would require broader participation of
Revolution. Ostensibly the forty years of war since 1978 political stakeholders, alongside the representatives of
have been driven by contested ideological transformations the combatants.
of the state, by Communists and Taliban, and by the
resistance to foreign intervention. Thought about a settlement in Afghanistan has been
shaped by exercises such as the Bonn Agreement, in which
But with the disappearance of the ancien regime, Afghans negotiating parties held time-limited talks and produced
have also contested their place in society. Ethno-linguistic a compact written agreement. However, alternative
groups, rural and urban communities, and clerical models may be better suited to pursuit of agreement on
networks have all aligned themselves in the conflict as a the underlying conflict issues. An incremental approach in
way of staking a claim to elevated status in the eventual which agreement was phased would allow for confidence-
new Afghanistan. Therefore, achieving a lasting peace may building measures over time to increase the parties’
depend upon Afghans agreeing a renewed social contract willingness to consider ambitious measures or embrace
which locates every citizen relative to the state and the compromise. Such an approach would recognise the
rest of society. Such a renegotiated social contract would importance of rebuilding relationships between the parties
require addressing fundamental issues which have been in expanding the possibility of agreement.
ignored in previous attempted settlements.
Ideally, the ending or reduction of violence, through some
There are formidable challenges inherent in attempting to version of an interim ceasefire, would be agreed at an
resolve the core contested issues. First, there is a major early stage. The pausing of violence would represent
trust challenge. Successive peace and power-sharing the single most important confidence-building measure
agreements in Afghanistan have been ‘honoured in the to help launch dialogue on the core issues. Rather than
breach’. The tradition of unwritten rules and informal involving a single text, such as the Bonn Agreement, an
agreements poses a challenge to the transparency of incremental peace in Afghanistan might consist of a series
any settlement process. Parties to the agreement could of agreements, sequenced from easy to hard, with agreed
reasonably ask whether there is some informal agreement reforms and confidence-building running in parallel, over
which contradicts the terms they have just agreed. a period of years.
National institutions are routinely criticised as partial, We can identify some of the substantive issues which
corrupt or ineffective and the prestige of the international would have to be addressed by any broad settlement
community has been damaged by persistence of conflict which attempted a lasting end to the conflict. Some of
and instability despite an intervention. This means that these could be addressed early as confidence building-
any proposal to establish new institutions as part of measures, while others would be more appropriately
a settlement risks lacking credibility. Existing state addressed in a final settlement. Significantly, the vast
institutions have been under permanent reform for a period majority of issues which can be expected to be addressed
of nearly twenty years, which means that further promises in a settlement process are issues among Afghans.
to reform deserve a degree of scepticism. International interest is confined to a small subset of
issues, such as counter-terrorism, and to the general
A dual system of governance is in effect operating in the concern that there should be a lasting agreement.
country, with the Afghan government running the main
population centres, while the Taliban operate their Islamic The observations below represent the issues which we
Emirate in much of the rural hinterland. Thinking about can anticipate Afghans will bring to the peace agenda.
a settlement usually starts from the assumption that the Reaching a lasting settlement on a broad agenda would
Taliban will accept and be absorbed into the Kabul-based be challenging. However, a well-handled settlement
state. However, the Taliban have yet to be persuaded to go process should generate benefits from the outset. The fact
along with this. The parties take their positions informed by that the Taliban and other Afghan parties were engaged
an idealised self-image and a vilified image of the other side. in a dialogue aimed at reaching a settlement should
undermine the case for political violence long before that
Even the question of which parties should get a seat at the settlement is finalised. Significant to achieving progress
table for negotiating the settlement is complex. The Taliban towards peace is to identify potential areas for positive-

sum outcomes on respective issues as bases for dialogue future of such intervention. Basically, the international
and accommodation. troop presence is a temporary phenomenon irrelevant to
the eventual Afghan social contract.
1. Preservation of national unity
and Afghan identity Insofar as there are real differences about the
Reaffirmation of commitment to the Afghan national state international forces, these concern the timing and
and its territorial integrity could be an important part of sequencing of eventual withdrawal. As long as the
a new social contract. Afghans often express concern Taliban are determined to sustain the conflict, they can
that the conflict undermines sovereignty. Therefore, be expected to demand, but never obtain, a withdrawal
agreement to preserve Afghanistan as a single political timetable for international troops. But if the Taliban were
entity, with Kabul as its capital, in which all citizens of to prioritise participation in a national dialogue process,
the country’s multiple ethnic groups have a stake and backed up by a ceasefire, they could reasonably expect
accept state authority, would be an appropriate way of some form of statement of principles around conditions-
symbolising the conclusion of the conflict and a starting based withdrawal.
point for building a broader settlement. Agreement on
principles of national unity should be attainable because, The winding down of international combat operations
in the Afghan political tradition, major players have to andeventual withdrawal of combat forces would shift
protect themselves from being anti-national. from being a precondition of talks (the original Taliban
position) to being an outcome of the stability generated by
Key practical measures which could give expression peacemaking. International military forces have long posed
to an agreement on national unity concern the national a dilemma for the Afghan parties associated with the Kabul
army and police. These are the institutions, visible to all government. The international and specifically United States
citizens, which most readily symbolise the state. From the presence has been a sine qua non for survival. But within
perspective of preserving national unity, rather than the Afghan political culture, any association with such
more narrowly-focused security sector reform it would forces invites the accusation of compromising on
be important to win the confidence of all parts of Afghan Afghan sovereignty.
society in the army and police, to allow members of their
communities to enlist. Another sovereignty-related issue Therefore, Taliban and Kabul actors alike could be expected
which could be tackled incrementally is that of facilitation to appeal to their constituencies by agreeing symbolic
of the accelerated return of refugees, in particular clauses asserting that the presence of international forces
from Pakistan. was subject to sovereign Afghan decisions and calling for
an early withdrawal of combat forces. But shared interest
More ambitious measures could be put on the agenda, in self-preservation among all Afghan parties to a deal may
such as reverting to the historic Afghan institution of a make them flexible on timetable and even the possibility of
non-executive head of state, whose office is designed to residual presence and military assistance. The irony is that
symbolise and actively nurture national unity – a revered the US could end up being more eager to end its military
figure, above the fray of divisive power politics. Perhaps presence than some of its erstwhile adversaries who have
the most ambitious national unity issue is that of the long demanded a pull-out.
Durand Line. The informal consensus has long been that it
would be politically impossible for any Afghan government 3. Security, respect and basic needs for
to confirm that Afghanistan recognises the Durand Line as combatants and people affected by conflict
the frontier with Pakistan. However, it is not inconceivable The Taliban leadership has generally taken the position
that Afghans could eventually build a consensus in favour that their combatants are selfless and that the issue of
of ending this irritant with Pakistan as part of the price for their welfare is not a central war objective. However, away
a lasting end to conflict. from the rhetoric Taliban representatives have repeatedly
explained the importance of ensuring that their cadres
2. International military forces win credible guarantees of security and non-persecution,
Ostensibly the Taliban’s principal cause de guerre a respectable status and some hope of a livelihood if they
throughout their post-2001 insurgency has been are to be expected to back any settlement. Their ambitions
withdrawal of international military forces and they go well beyond a simple reintegration package, with its
have previously criticised peace offers from the Afghan focus on individual material well-being. Taliban basically
government for the lack of reference to the fate of these hope that their living fighters will be honoured as having
forces. However, this Taliban claim to be fighting against defended Islam and their fallen should be considered
foreign forces obscures the extent of consensus on the martyrs. Given the way that both sides have demonised

each other, a settlement would require a formula of mutual urban elite culture. Under US protection, since 2002,
respect for the ex-combatants and fallen. Afghanistan’s political and economic elite has massively
enriched itself. It has taken ostentatious consumption to
There is ample scope for incremental measures to assure unprecedented levels and competed over the trappings of
ex-combatant status and rights in advance of a general power, such as aggressive security escorts.
settlement. The Kabul authorities have experience of
materially-oriented reintegration schemes. Domestically, If the elites were to get an opportunity to negotiate a
these have not been particularly controversial because settlement, it would be prudent for them to include on
they do not seem to threaten any vital interest. But the agenda provisions to curtail some elite privileges,
they have typically been poorly targeted and subject to rebalance state-citizen relations and counter the inevitable
misappropriation. For reintegration measures to help keep criticisms that the settlement is just another elite deal.
the Taliban ranks in line during progress towards a general Drafters would be challenged to find measures to create an
settlement, reintegration would have to managed to benefit impression of an ‘Afghanistan fit for heroes’ – one offering
bona-fide ex-combatants, rather than those administering a stake to the socially marginalised who have joined the
the programme. Who controls the patronage power inherent successive armed groups. Relatively uncomplicated
in a resource-intensive reintegration scheme should be measures could include the development of codes of
addressed explicitly rather than left to default. Taliban can conduct for public representatives and, in parallel, a
be expected to focus on the issue of prisoners. A phased and decentralised ombudsman system, holding public officials
possibly conditional programme of releases would be an and representatives to account for their dealings with
entirely appropriate early measure in a settlement process, citizens. The latter could potentially capture and redirect
with the advantage that the parties could agree to limit the some of the spirit of the old Taliban idea of moral police.
facility to those militants whose groups were practically This time they would encourage correct behaviour in the
cooperating in the reduction of violence. elites rather than the populace.
Reconciling the different parties’ narrative around the 5. Inclusive security reform
conflict and protecting the ex-combatants from being Security sector reform (SSR) has been pursued in one
dishonoured or harassed by security agencies would form or another in Afghanistan since 2002. However, a new
require more delicate compromise than material political settlement would require another round and would
reintegration. The eventual compromise narrative might involve a significantly different political calculus from the
acknowledge the sacrifices of all Afghans who fought for SSR undertaken after the Bonn Agreement. In the first
an idea of the religion and the nation. Any such agreement, place, few parts of the Taliban military could be merged
in addition to reconciling the adversarial portrayals of the with the regular state forces. Despite the effective guerrilla
combatants, would have to address the issues of victim and terrorist campaign which they have waged, most of the
rights. The Taliban’s involvement in mass-casualty attacks Taliban forces will be uninterested in integrating into regular
renders it all the more challenging for any negotiating units and would prefer either to operate as militia, if they
party to concede the kind of respectability which they crave. can, or to disband. However, as security forces are perceived
This underlines the importance of sequencing. A decisive as both a source of patronage and a guarantor of political
Taliban role in ending political violence would be the most position, Taliban could be expected to seek ways of inserting
effective way in which the movement could strengthen its some of their supporters into security forces’ hierarchies.
fighters’ case for moral rehabilitation.
Meanwhile, as the conflict winds down a radical downsizing
4. State-citizen relations and the role and of security forces is likely to accompany the settlement.
privileges of elites Kabul-aligned parties would most likely try to resist this as
Although rarely acknowledged explicitly, Afghanistan a curtailment of their access to patronage. This impending
has experienced its own version of the global anti-elite loss of patronage would ensure that any mediator trying to
insurgent sentiment. One explanation of the willingness broker an agreement on SSR would find the challenge of
of the latest generation of fighters to sacrifice themselves getting the Kabul-aligned parties on board as daunting as
is as a protest against the sense of powerlessness that of agreeing the Taliban’s path to disbandment.
and alienation from the elites of Kabul and the armed
opposition alike. In their origins, the Taliban tapped into The Taliban could be expected to delay disbandment as
this sentiment as their movement’s base of support in long as possible as a way of hedging, but only as long as
the madrasas was socially marginalised. The Taliban they are able to access resources to hold their forces
consciously cultivated an austere, Spartan image, together. Meanwhile, the most serious discussion would
juxtaposed to the luxury and ostentation of Afghan be over control of the security apparatus as Taliban would

start from the assumption that hostile, anti-Taliban limited opportunities to realise it. The challenge in
elements were well-ensconced in the intelligence service building a settlement would be to accelerate projects
and apt to use their institutions to target then, even after in response to reduction in violence and thus create a
a settlement. The interests of a durable settlement would sense of momentum.
require some effective safeguard against such action.
Looted wealth could reasonably be put on the agenda
6. Property, economic rights and the because of the widely-held perception that since 2001 the
illicit economy Kabul elites have abused their power to grab contracts
All parties to the conflict have pursued economic objectives and accumulate assets. The elites of Kabul and Quetta
but have rarely declared them candidly. The conflict alike can be expected to try and protect their gains as they
economy, especially the narcotics trade and illicit mining, have repeatedly done in the face of public scandals such
has been fundamental to sustaining the fighting. The as the failure of Kabul Bank. However, an astute mediator
restricted access to the benefits of post-2002 economic or even a Taliban delegation could push for some form of
growth has also contributed to popular grievances and commitment to recover illegally acquired assets, perhaps
sense of exclusion, and popular support for the insurgency. complemented by a conditional amnesty.
For the settlement to contribute to a lasting peace it should
contain strong economic clauses which facilitate the The opium economy and trafficking present a classic
transition from the conflict economy and create a sense of dilemma, given that both the Taliban leadership and
a popular peace dividend. elements of the Kabul government are deeply involved.
The Afghan parties could be expected to make some
However, securing agreement on progressive economic declarations of intent to wind down the narcotics economy
causes will be complicated by the fact that key figures while avoiding binding commitments. However, here too an
on both Taliban and pro-government sides, whose ambitious mediator could canvass innovative options such as
participation is important to the viability of any agreement, temporary amnesties for the proceeds of organised crime,
have a stake in the conflict economy. For easily attainable or pledging to devote the proceeds from any clampdown on
measures, there is ample scope for declarations of intent organised crime to fund popular welfare activities.
and principles around the transition from the war economy.
For example, plans to keep roads open and free of illegal 7. Structure of government and consolidation
taxation and to re-centralise the revenue would be popular. of electoral democracy
The nature of the political system is a fundamental issue
Land in both rural and urban areas has become a key on which the Taliban and representatives of the Kabul
factor in the conflict economy. Power-brokers exploit their government have adopted opposite public positions. The
position to conduct major land-grabs and cash in on the Taliban leadership have called for replacing electoral
chaos in ownership rights resulting from four decades democracy with a ‘shura system’. The Afghan President’s
of conflict. The Islamic Emirate authorities are deeply offer to the Taliban has been to let them become a
involved in land ownership issues. In southern Afghanistan political actor and participate in the existing Kabul-based
they have been embroiled in what amounts to a land reform system, implying acceptance of electoral democracy.
to privatise state land, and have seemed heedless of the Any compromise would require some major reverses
historical irony that the 1978 Communist land reform of positions.
helped trigger the conflict.
The implication of the Taliban position is that they would
A settlement could obtain some popular appeal by re-impose their old Islamic Emirate idea, perhaps granting
pledging to restore merit in land tenure. This could be other parties some right to participate in a consultative
operationalised by halting land grabs, restoring stolen council as implied by their adoption of the term ‘shura
land and ensuring that any new land grants went to the system’. However, few in the Taliban movement seriously
deserving. A settlement could usefully include another believe that they have any prospect of imposing such a
overhaul of the cadastre, updated property registration and settlement because no other political grouping would
a transparent way of adjudicating disputes. accept the authority of a Taliban Amir. On the other hand,
Afghan democracy since the Bonn Agreement has been
The peace dividend would be most attainable from deeply flawed. Nevertheless, no viable alternative to
expanded public infrastructure investment and electoral democracy is available to address Afghanistan’s
employment growth in fields such as minerals requirements for peaceful political succession, the
development. The Afghan government already has a allocation of shares of representation and power and
vision for economic development but the violence has conferring a popular mandate.

Interim measures which the parties could adopt could The place of Islam in the state is one of those areas where
provide for non-elected presence for the Taliban in political the sides have asserted their differences. However, as in
structures, a move designed to give them a visible stake in the case of national sovereignty, progress to a settlement
the system. There are multiple options, including co-option can be achieved by refocusing on the areas of possible
into the Senate, establishment of purpose-built bodies, consensus. The parties could seek additional symbolic
such as a jihadi ulema advisory council and incorporation ways of signifying the Islamic character of the state, similar
into the higher judiciary and judicial administration. This to the way in which the 2002 Loya Jirga adopted the name
co-option route for the Taliban is important because, Islamic Republic.
with conditions normalising and violence falling, they are
“
unlikely to have much success in electoral politics.
There is a credible case that
Confidence in the electoral system is important for all Afghan pluralism would be
Afghan parties, probably more so for the Kabul-linked
best served by an empowered
parties than for the Taliban. Implementing credible reforms
has proved a lot more difficult than agreeing to do so. executive requiring a majority
However, a reduction in the level of violence would remove from the parliament. However,
one of the key barriers to implementing integrity measures
and broadening participation in the elections. Thus, the first
agreement on rebalancing power
bargain around the political system would entail sufficient between the President and
symbolic affirmation of the system’s Islamic credentials
to allow the Taliban to endorse the role of elections and
parliament has been elusive.”
unlock progress towards full implementation of electoral
reforms. Parties with a popular base would be free to Not only the Taliban, but much of the population which
contest elections while the Taliban’s stake in the state identifies as religious has been alienated from the post-
would be secure independent of the electoral contest. Bonn state by aggressively disrespectful security personnel
and officials, and prejudice against cultural symbols such
On the basic structure of government, it remains unclear as the beards and turbans favoured by Pashtun men in the
whether agreement will be attainable. The challenge is Taliban’s heartland. At the most basic level the grievance is
exemplified by the failure of the National Unity Government that if you are dressed like a rural Pashtun you are apt to be
to introduce the constitutional reforms which it had pledged hassled at check posts and more likely to be singled out for
in order to formalise the position of Chief Executive. There arbitrary detention. The Taliban have successfully conflated
is a credible case that Afghan pluralism would be best such prejudice with un-Islamic behaviour and mobilised
served by an empowered executive requiring a majority to defend Islam. Dialogue among the parties could seek
from the parliament. However, agreement on rebalancing concrete measures to combat prejudice and promote
power between the President and parliament has been ‘parity of esteem’.
elusive. This is because there is a strong political tradition
(to which the Taliban probably subscribe also) of asserting A further way for the Taliban to maintain their commitment
the indivisibility of power and the need to concentrate to Islamisation and contribute to a progressive settlement
power in the presidency. would be to redirect their critique of the current state of
affairs from the constitutional order to actual practices
8. Promoting Islam and religious freedom in governance and judiciary. In this way, the Taliban could
The Taliban say that they are committed to imposing an position themselves as reformers and update the narrative
Islamic system of governance. However, it is far from clear for their supporters – the supremacy of Islam requires the
what substantive changes they envisage. The other Afghan implementation of the constitution, which is already rooted
parties point to the Movement’s 1996 to 2001 track record in the Shariat, not the overhaul of that constitution. The
to warn of authoritarianism under the guise of Islamisation. Taliban could guide their cadre to focus on the pursuit of
However, the Taliban commitment to Islamisation is security, justice and prosperity as the essence of Islamic
organic rather than merely rhetorical. Fighters still wellbeing. Likewise, drafters of a settlement could focus on
believe that their role is to Islamise a system which is measures to promote the ‘Islamic good-life’ where public
tainted by corruption and westernisation. The Afghan positions already overlap, such as commitment to universal
government’s position, apparently shared by most Kabul- education access.
linked groupings, is that the political system is already
appropriately Islamic and that any political agreement must 9. Judiciary and legal system
safeguard the fundamental freedoms in the constitution. The judiciary is highly contested in Afghanistan and

exemplifies the problem of dualism. De facto, Afghanistan and reluctance to acknowledge ethnicity as an issue) nor
now hosts two judicial systems, one answerable to a Supreme helpful (because fragmented politics in the ethnic groups
Court in Kabul and the other answerable to a group of clerics means there is rarely agreement on who is qualified
based in a madrasa in Quetta. Both sides project idealised to represent them). Despite these limitations, some of
versions of their judiciary. The state judiciary is meant to be the informal rules governing post-2001 Afghan political
law-based, accountable and adapted to the modern economy, practice, such as the practice of presidential candidates
while the Taliban portray their judiciary as Shariat-based, choosing running mates of different ethnicities, have been
incorruptible and capable of delivering ‘speedy justice’. The reminiscent of the Lebanese confessional pattern.
reality of both systems departs from these ideals. Corruption
has become endemic in both judiciaries and the Taliban stand A maximalist approach on promoting ethnic inclusion
accused of arbitrary judgments and lack of independence would include structural reforms to guarantee broad ethnic
from their armed forces. participation in national government, decentralisation
measures to shift power and resources to the provinces
The Taliban approach to the judiciary in a settlement is (because the national ethnic minorities are concentrated
likely to focus as much on the question of who controls the in particular provinces) and equal opportunities measures
judicial and legal system as on the guiding principles used to restrict the scope for ethnically based patronage.
by the judges. To have popular legitimacy, the settlement A more minimalist approach could include affirmation
would have to reunify the national judiciary and address measures, such as establishment of councils to document
chronic problems of integrity and timeliness. One approach and promote the social and economic inclusion of their
to integrating the lower judiciary and coping with Taliban respective ethnic group. A possible radical option would be
demands to accommodate their cadre would be to establish to revert to a non-executive head of state to symbolise and
a Shariat-based small claims court which could adjudicate maintain national unity, with an executive prime minister
many of the cases that people already voluntarily take to elected from the national parliament.
the Taliban. However, some of the politically contentious
issues around the judiciary in the settlement would be It is difficult to envisage any simple political or institutional
control over judicial appointments, the jurisdiction over formula which would be likely both to command enough
land and property and overcoming barriers to entry for support to be included in an agreement and to be
qualified Taliban jurists seeking to join the state judiciary. efficacious enough to create a sense of progress towards
inclusion. However, the national leadership in their
10. Ethnicity, social inclusion and equality handling of practical politics and key appointments have an
of opportunity opportunity to pursue an inclusive or exclusive approach,
Provisions to reinforce a sense of inclusion for all social thus contributing the sense of whether or not all groups
groups will be a critical part of any enduring settlement. feel included in the state.
But they can also be anticipated to be one of the areas
presenting formidable challenges in agreeing the Conclusion
settlement. There is a gulf between rhetoric and practice The dilemma at the heart of peacemaking in Afghanistan is
with regard to the role of ethnicity in public life. And that there is a formidable agenda of potential core issues to
contemporary Afghan political discourse consists of a range be addressed but the lack confidence between the parties
of contradictory narratives of exclusion and entitlement. renders it difficult to reach agreement on even the most
straightforward of issues. However, an Afghan settlement
Pashtuns as a whole, western Pashtuns, eastern need not consist of a single comprehensive document,
Pashtuns, Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks and many others have signed off by all parties. Rather, a settlement could consist
portrayed themselves as suffering from exclusion from of a series of interim and incremental agreements, reforms
state power and subject to multiple forms of discrimination. and joint actions, cumulatively contributing to confidence
Notably, there is a similarity in narratives of grievances and improvement of conditions on the ground, probably
against both the Kabul-based system of government over a period of years.
and the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate. This suggests that
Afghans’ sense that their group is excluded is rooted in No single signed document of aspirations and
well-established social practices rather than just some commitments will suffice to end the Afghan conflict.
remediable flaw in the constitution. However, a dialogue-driven programme of implemented
reforms and carefully nurtured cooperative relations has
A Lebanese-style explicit sectarian carve-up of key state potential to address the issues which have long driven
positions between the ethnic groups would probably be the conflict. A progressive approach to settlement thus
neither agreeable (because of disputed ethnic percentages builds upon reforms rather than compromising on them,

as sometimes warned of in Afghan political discourse.
But the optimal way to shape the conditions conducive to
such a sustained process of dialogue and reform would
be to agree a pause in the fighting in the early stage of
the process. The entrance ticket for conflicting parties
to participate in such a sustained peace process would
require them to sign up to the suspension of violence.

Possibilities for a peaceful political future:
perspectives of leaders of five Taliban caucuses
ABSTRACT
The following are transcribed responses from concerned had travelled in order to begin talks with
the representatives of five Taliban caucuses, a group of high-level actors representing several
in conversation with Anna Larson. Groups are countries, including Afghanistan and the United States,
roughly differentiated from one another here by the about the de-escalation of violence and potential for
geographical region in which they operate but names reconciliation with the Afghan government.
and other identifying statements have been removed
in order to preserve anonymity. All groups currently Representatives of the caucuses are senior
self-identify as Taliban and belong to the central Taliban commanders or leaders influential in their
movement, but some have expressed the desire to respective locations. Views expressed reflect those
become autonomous from it. of the individuals concerned and are not necessarily
representative of their respective caucuses. While
These conversations occurred in person over the course views between caucuses differ, an attempt has
of several days in spring 2018 at an undisclosed location been made to summarise common positions in the
outside of Afghanistan, to which the five caucuses statements that follow the transcripts.
Group 1 –North movement. But now only a small group of Zadranis and
All three representatives in this group are high- Kandaharis control the movement. If a war continues
level military commanders with field experience for more than 10 years then either side’s chances of
and religious training. winning diminish and it becomes something other than
a war. We will not be able to provide services for people.
Origins and objectives Because of this and the marginalisation from power we
Representative A: I am a madrasa graduate at Mufti are not able to solve people’s problems.
level. I was a member of the first Taliban and I am a
member of the current Taliban movement. For two The Quetta and Peshawar Shuras only appoint Kandaharis
years I was in charge of the Taliban’s foreign affairs, and Zadranis as leaders, even in our area, and not us,
so in charge of the foreign fighters. I was also in charge so we don’t have the power in our area to serve people.
of the charity collections commission. I had good These other leaders control us. There are a couple of senior
relationships with businessmen in other countries ranking [members of our ethnic group] in the Peshawar
who donated to this cause. Shura but even they don’t have authority there. We do not
even have a shadow governor [from our ethnic group].
We were taking care of the needy families of the [Taliban]
mujahidin. My influence in the community grew this way. Main blockages to ending violence in Afghanistan
But as the northern Taliban started to be excluded from and how these might be overcome
the current Taliban councils [the Quetta and Peshawar Representative A: The main blockage is foreign occupation
Shuras] I have been fighting for the rights of the northern which violates the rights of Afghans. Unlawful killings,
Taliban. These channels for influence have been getting imprisonments, murders of people under the name of
smaller and smaller and so that is why I have been Taliban. Defamation of the Holy Qur'an. Not observing
considering involvement in peace initiatives. Grassroots the religious values of our people. Widespread corruption
influence exists. If the government stands by its word, within the government, the mafia, the patronage system.
I am confident we can achieve our goals. The government does not meet the actual demands of
the people.
Relationship with the ‘main Taliban’
Representatives A, B and C: We have been marginalised We feel the responsibility on our shoulders to remove these
by the main Taliban. We were a part of the founding of obstacles. Foreigners come and go. The actual victims
the original movement and we have suffered a lot for this are the Afghans. That is why we have started a process of

helping our own people and separating ourselves from the Relationships between leaders and people in my area are
Taliban movement, to work responsibly to end this killing. close but we want to make them closer. There have been
We are ready to do our part. some issues between leaders and their people, and this is
the case with Taliban and non-Taliban leaders. Through our
Political vision for Afghanistan involvement with the peace process we will invite people to
Representative A: At the moment I see the situation as participate, and we will try to solidify some of the fractures
very critical. Not only war between the government and in the community. We want to make relations closer.
the Taliban but war within the government itself. We wish We also want the participation of our community in the
for honest foreign support for a clean, just and inclusive political process, in elections, government and parliament,
future government which can open its heart and can go inclusion in structures such as ministries, in military and
to the Taliban with an open heart. Foreigners must stop political decision-making.
their interference.
The process is not over. We are not sure of the outcome yet.
We believe in a just and transparent election where The result will become clear at some point, and then there
every vote counts – all members’ votes count. And such is the question of whether it is implemented.
a democratic government could get elders speaking to
the Taliban. We support an election if the government is Recently there has been a de-escalation of violence in the
representative of all the people. Taliban movement and this has led to high expectations
about peace from my people. We are hoping to emerge on
Representative B: The main problem is the lack of the political scene as an organised group. These meetings
culture – lack of religious culture and secular culture. have helped us to develop in this way.
If someone is well-cultured they do not kill people.
Westerners could have invested in improving our culture Group 2 – West/north-west
but they did not. If someone has religious or secular culture Representative D in this group does not self-identify as
they can solve their problems through logic. Before I did part of the Taliban but as an influential local figure has
my studies I was a hardliner. But as I started to learn about been working with Taliban commanders and other armed
different perspectives and points of view I understood the groups local to the west/north-west of Afghanistan and
real meaning of religion. We need religion and culture. at this meeting acted as a representative on their behalf.
Religion alone may not be able to solve our problems. Representative E is a Taliban field commander from the
A terrorist is a hardliner who does not use logic or north-west.
thinking to solve differences.
Motivation
Before, our people were not represented, we didn’t have Representative D: Our collective area of influence is largely
a ‘listening ear’. But then we connected with [this initiative [in north-western provinces]. The main problem for us
towards talks] and we were able to express our lack of is Pashtuns’ lack of civil rights. Not even one per cent is
representation. This was a way that we could start to respected. There are certain case by case examples where
represent our community. Provincial Reconstruction Teams may have helped the area
but nothing from the government. In Badghis and Faryab
Implications of early talks and a possible agreement we have 70 per cent Pashtuns. In Faryab even the Uzbeks
between the government and the Taliban caucuses accept that Pashtuns are 35 per cent of the population.
Representative B: Assuming that an agreement happens, Historically we have been victimised under different names
we would reduce the threat level towards the Afghan – in [Uzbek commander Ahmed Rashid] Dostum’s time, for
government – eg towards police and the National example. If this political marginalisation continues it will
Directorate of Security, etc – in [the six north and north- not help the peace process. In the parliament there are four
eastern provinces in which we have influence]. This is a representatives from Badghis, and all of them are Sunni
real process. We will be able to deliver real results, we are Hazaras, who are Jamiat-affiliated [Jamiat-e Islami] and
not faking them. We wouldn’t have bothered to come here who all come from Qala-e Naw.
if we couldn’t deliver.
Ten years ago a survey was conducted and it confirmed
Representative C: My political vision is that the conflict that Qala-e Naw has 10,000 people, but that [another] district
stops, that slowly, slowly the fighting comes to an end. with a 100 per cent Pashtun population has 120,000 people.
That a government is created that is Islamic with a popular In the Provincial Council it is the same story: there is just
base, that it is inclusive and participatory, including all not enough representation. One solution might be to add
ethnic groups. administrative units, ie more districts. One reason why the

government is not able to bring peace in these areas is the Ideal relationship with central government
imbalance of ethnic tensions. Armed groups (Taliban and Representative D: The relationship that is natural between
others) then use the opportunity to mobilise in the spaces a government and its nation or population is ideal. We are
where the government, whose representatives are from a not a group that wants to create trouble for the
different ethnic group, have no authority. For example the government. We don’t want to blow up roads or bridges (or
distance between Bala-e Muqab and Qala-e Naw is about only as a last resort). But the government should be able to
100 kilometres. But there is no administrative district there. listen to us and find out the problems in the area and come
to us with an open mind.
What the Taliban are struggling for
“
Representative D: My friend here [Representative E] When I was in Guantanamo
is a commander in [X] province. We want to end the war,
to bring peace, and we want to maintain that peace. We
an American showed me a
have already spoken with our people on the ground. picture of his family, and said
There are three groups of Taliban. The first group want
to continue fighting, the second group weigh up the
– this is my daughter, my son –
advantages and disadvantages of fighting, and the third do you understand what family
group want peace. We are working with the second and
is? They had this idea of us as
third groups. The first group are afraid for their own safety.
We want our civil rights, we want jobs to be created so that if we were not human.”
people don’t have to go to Iran for work, we want more
schools, education. And we can have mullahs teaching For example, regarding the political rights of being
in our schools. [Talibs in all three groups] often say that represented. The current voting system is flawed – those
they want a shari’a government but I believe that this is who get the most votes win, whether the votes are genuine
more about maintaining a consistent image than their or not. In Ghazni for example, there could be several ways
knowledge of the actual substance of shari’a. of conducting elections in insecure areas, where seats
are saved and then voting can take place later. I believe
The current laws, if implemented correctly, can reflect that one way to cut the influence of Pakistan is to find the
shari’a already. I strongly believe is it possible to keep Taliban and speak with them, to influence them and bring
the current constitution. The Taliban are motivated from them to our side. We should also have a plan to collect
outside to fight, but we can give them a new motivation weapons without going through the local police, who just
to re-orient themselves. The puzzle is that, Taliban, sell them back again. The Taliban in our area are held
government, international actors all want peace, so why is captive by the Kandaharis.
it not happening? Investment in the peace process is not
even one per cent of the investment in war. If we have a Group 3 – Quetta
clear vision then it is possible. Representative F is an influential figure within the
Quetta Shura.
Political system that can best sustain peace
Representative D: Civil and political rights and rights Origins of the Taliban
of representation are crucial. Any system that helps to Representative F: The Taliban was created in 1994
maintain this is important. Jobs and lack of discrimination and its purpose was to prevent the old mujahidin from
in my province are the most important things. We need taking advantage of the people. Mullah Omar and some
strong international support. The two groups of Taliban friends sat together in Maiwand district and decided to
that are amenable to talks – we have to find out their start a movement against these people. At first, they sent
problems and solve them. some messages to commanders in Kandahar to ask them
to join them. Some agreed, some didn’t, and we defeated
Representative D: The Taliban are influenced by Pakistan those who didn’t in a short battle. There were two big
and Iran. Pakistan does not want peace in Afghanistan. It commanders, Mullah Naqib (Jamiat) and Haji Qateb.
is two-faced. The Taliban in our area need independence Naqib joined but Haji Qateb didn’t. We defeated him
from outside actors and others; 90 per cent of the Taliban and took over all of Kandahar.
in Badghis is not happy with the control of the Kandarhari
Taliban over the whole movement. 10–15 commanders in Then the movement split, one half going to Zabul and the
our area were picked by the Quetta Shura but they have no other to Helmand. Mullah Omar was selected as leader
social base. If this process is successful they could easily and from this time on the Taliban officially became a
be removed or asked to surrender. movement. When the Taliban went to Zabul, most of the

commanders from the three surrounding provinces came We didn’t have any connection with al-Qaeda. Osama was
to our side. In Helmand all except Mullah Rafa came to invited by the mujahidin, not by the Taliban. In the Taliban
our side. We sent him messages three times but still he period, [Saudi Prince] Turki al-Faisal came to Afghanistan
refused and then we defeated him. Eventually the whole to ask for Osama and Mullah Omar said that he would give
province came to our side. Then Farah and Nimroz. The him to him if he came with a delegation of ulema, but not
problem was that Ismail Khan was hard to defeat. We tried unless he did. Turki al-Faisal said he would go ahead and
hard to convince him without conflict. When we were near just take him anyway, and Mullah Omar told him to go away
to Kabul, [Jamiat commander Ahmed Shah] Massoud came and never come back, because it was his responsibility as
to meet us and we agreed to defeat [Hezb-i Islami leader a Muslim not to undermine his hospitality to Osama as a
Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar together, but when we did this guest of the country.
Massoud reneged on his promise of supporting us. Then
we set up a government in Kabul with ministers and an Vision for an ideal Afghanistan
administration, etc. Representative F: Afghan people must decide about
their own future. The government must be moderate.
Taliban objectives today People support the Taliban, we have captured 70 per cent
Representative F: We are responding to cruelty. America of the land. People want us to capture their areas. The
brought down our government. Some organisations portray international community must help us to do something to
us as abnormal people who don’t know about human rights, make the situation become normal, because they were the
women’s rights etc. There was a lot of pressure on us in ones who removed our government in the first place.
2001 from the US side and they removed our government.
Just before this we had a meeting with US government We will have a government – not by elections, because
representatives when we said we would give them Osama elections are not according to shari’a laws, but by
bin Laden and work on women’s rights, etc, whatever they selecting members from councils. Elections and shari’a
wanted, but they didn’t listen to us. Now they are aware of are two different things. In Islamic law we can have one
us as humans. representative per province, for example, but not every
individual voting. We know the people want elections but
When I was in Guantanamo an American showed me a if I say that we are OK with elections then this could cause
picture of his family, and said – this is my daughter, my son a problem. If the government has elections, it will probably
– do you understand what family is? They had this idea of us be only in big cities because in 70 per cent of the provincial
as if we were not human. At that time, the media was a big areas it is impossible to conduct them. Anyway, this
problem for us, it was portraying us very badly. But we did [forthcoming] election will be corrupt. If the international
understand human and civil rights then. It is our right to be community had sent clever people to us when we were in
in Afghanistan, this is our country. power to explain these things and to explain our situation to
the world then we probably wouldn’t be in this situation now.
The Taliban were very good people. When Mullah Omar
gave the instruction to ban poppy, it was stopped. It is very difficult to talk at this point about what the
The crime rate was very low. I believe about 80 per cent structure of the government might look like. There are lots
of people were on our side. When we were in Kabul some of parties in Afghanistan. Many times it has been suggested
politicians and ordinary people visited me in my office that we are given a few ministries, but how would we work
and I asked them about the Taliban. They said we had two alongside these other criminals? We need a very strong
faces, one was good, in stopping crime etc, and the other president with no one else, not shared out by tribe, etc.
was bad, with the treatment of women and stopping music, I know that this is impossible now, but maybe it would
etc. It wasn’t the time then to focus on women’s rights happen if the Taliban took over again. The old mujahidin
– it was a very difficult time in Afghanistan. If women have sold our country. We need justice – why did these
dressed as you are dressed we didn’t have any problem people kill so many people? Why are they so corrupt?
with that at all. We just told them to dress according to We would like to be friends with the foreigners but it has
shari’a. If we had stayed in power we would have moved to be according to some rules, respecting our national
to an Iranian style of government with girls at school, at sovereignty, and recognising us as Muslims.
university, working. When the international community
came to Afghanistan they put criminals in power and we I have known [High Peace Council Chair] Ustad Khalili for
must stand against them. If we compare [senior Taliban a long time. Right now I can see that Khalili has very good
commander] Mullah Dadullah and Dostum, both killed ideas about peace with the Taliban. In all the speeches he
lots of people but Dostum is now the Vice President and has made, he has sent very good messages and he has
Mullah Dadullah is dead. helped to bring many Taliban to the side of peace (although

not to the government). In a short time he has had lots of But they are not all equal in the Peshawar Shura/Quetta
achievements in peace. Lots of Taliban leaders would like Shura either, there are some problems. The Haqqanis,
to talk to him about peace. Mansour group, others – they are all separate. These
groups have connections with foreign powers.
Group 4 – South-east
Representative G is a senior member of an armed The situation in Afghanistan is like a triangle: there are
opposition group that has links to the Taliban in south- foreign fighters, Afghan fighters, and then the Afghan
eastern Afghanistan. government and people. We need to work with all three
to achieve peace. We also would welcome talks on Islamic
Origins, objectives and operations law. Tackling the foreign fights is difficult because these
Representative G: Our district is bigger than other other countries don’t want to stop them. The international
districts. At the moment it is one district but in Daud’s community should find a way to stop them. It is not about
[Khan] time it was three districts. Our leaders are active shooting the leaders of the Taliban, but stopping the
in these areas. We are [xx group] and our leader died in the foreign fighters. Only [US President] Trump can do this.
mujahidin time. His sons are now in the group’s leadership. The other two sides of the triangle belong to Afghans
The US says we are connected with al-Qaeda but this is to sort out.
not true. In the mujahidin times the mujahidin said we were
connected to the US and Europe but this is also not true. Political system that can best support peace
Our activities are normal and we don’t understand why and inclusive representation
we are labelled in this way. Representative G: This question belongs to the
government. We have our own vision, we just want a long
We started to fight after the US invasion but this was just period of peace through Islam. We have human rights and
in defence – we were not attacking them. We tried very women’s rights. We are not like other extreme countries.
hard and met with [the organisers of this initiative] back We want a moderate way forward, with women’s rights and
in 2002 but we didn’t find any good solution. We are not the respect for women. We want a government that respects
followers of fighting. We want to continue towards peace – these and respects all Afghans, not just one group.
we are not against democracy, it is not against Islam. We
have three clinics and we have female doctors too. No one The central government can’t solve its own problems
can control local security as well as we can. There is a dam within itself so how can it solve those in our district? The
being built in one of our districts and we have 60 people government is corrupt. In this present government, the only
providing security for that project. No engineer has died good achievement has been education. If the government
or been kidnapped. We are supporting them. Police are doesn’t respect people’s rights, then it will fail like in Syria,
in their jobs, we are supporting them also. Libya or Iraq. If there was no Taliban then in this case the
young boys would rise up against the government to make a
In this area in the last 15 months there have only new movement.
been nine attacks on the checkpoints and only four of
them were caused by us – the others were Haqqanis The international community doesn’t want to change
and other foreign fighters. No one will find anything in the present government. If there is a democracy then
our history that connects us to suicide bombers. In our they should listen to the people. We are not against
mountain areas there are foreign fighters – Chechen, independent elections. The main problem is corruption.
Punjabi, etc – and we try to stop them as far as possible We are electing people who don’t understand the law.
but we cannot do this all the time. We do not allow them to No elections would be better than a corrupt election.
come to the villages or the mosques. Foreign fighters have Foreigners wanted this kind of election. 70 per cent of the
a lot of money and weapons but still we try to stop them. country belongs to the Taliban and so we can only have
We have no funds from opium. The Peshawar Shura is elections in government areas anyway. Most of Afghanistan
supporting the Haqqanis but it is not supporting us. belongs to the Taliban. The international community
This is our story. didn’t tell the truth to people. Not all the Taliban are good
people – they have thieves and killers as well.
Relationship with Peshawar and Quetta Shuras
Representative G: Peshawar and Quetta Shuras do not If the government does not apply the constitution
support us because we don’t want them in our area, we themselves then how can they apply it to others? In
don’t want the Pakistani influence. There is a road that goes Afghanistan there are three kinds of people – religious
through north and south Waziristan and the Taliban come contractors, political contractors and nation contractors.
through there. The Kandaharis do not want us in power. They are all making money. It would be better to shoot

all of these people than keep losing 150 young men Relationship between leaders and people in the south,
every day. and nationally
Representative H: We don’t have any democracy in
At the time of the Bonn Conference there was no [my province] because the relationship between officials
corruption, no insecurity – the international community and people is very bad. For example, people must wait
have made all these things. Ghani was in America at this months to see officials and when they finally get there
time. Why didn’t the international community think harder they say, oh, no, he is too busy. The government is doing
about these things at the time? The US has promised peace, very bad things, for example going backwards in a one-way
security, construction – but where are they? Why did they street just because they are a governor or something. When
say they were leaving in 2014? Pakistan cannot do anything businessmen come across the border corrupt officials take
without information from the US and UK. It can’t keep customs money from them at checkpoints. In this regard
fighting if it is not supported from outside. there is a very big difference between government and
Taliban areas. In government areas every car is stopped for
Implications [of these initial talks] and a possible money, but not in our areas.
agreement with the government
Representative G: I do not think these talks will be The Taliban governor in [my province] works very hard,
successful, but [Chair of the High Peace Council] Ustad people can see him, anyone can see him after waiting only
Khalili continues to say good things. We should keep the one hour. He makes decisions for the people very quickly.
leaders where they are, government ones in government It is not the same in the government areas. In the 2014
areas and Talib ones in Talib areas, but we should not label elections the government said ‘look, we had a free and
them like this. Only a ceasefire will help but even this will be fair election, and everyone voted’ but ballots were stuffed
very difficult to maintain, because they will keep bombing and and very few people went. No one gave people the right to
they will say it is to target Daesh [Islamic State in Khorasan], vote. When [the former head of the Provincial Council] was
but the Taliban will say they have broken the ceasefire. We alive, he made the decisions about who won the elections.
would need a third party to protect the ceasefire, maybe Even the support of tribal leaders didn’t help to change
ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross]. these decisions.
Group 5 – South I am not a Mufti [an expert on Islamic law] but in my

Representative H is a high-level member of the Peshawar experience there are two ways that electing leaders can
Shura and was a former minister during the Taliban work. When a country is peaceful, and people believe in the
government in the 1990s. Representative I is a Taliban leadership, then it is possible for them to help choose. But
field commander in the south of Afghanistan. when the country is experiencing difficult times and conflict
then it is better for a small group to choose the leadership.
Main objectives
Representative H: We want to stop the war, this is our In [former president] Najib’s time I wasn’t in [my province].
main aim. Secondly, we want to have democratic rules but In the Taliban time my province and Kabul were very
not forgetting Islam. Maybe you have heard that the Taliban close because Kandahar was the centre of the country.
is against women’s rights but you should come to my home In Karzai’s time there were close relations with Kabul.
in [x province] and see my family. You should see how we Right now there are bad relations between my province
are at home. and Kabul because the government does not get on with
the chief of police.
Democracy and Islam
Representative H: The US came to Afghanistan and It is better if the central government divide resources
have provided a bad explanation and demonstration of between the provinces, according to their size, and
democracy. Some people think democracy is to own your make decisions about how that money is spent.
own life, to have your own culture and your own religion. Then every Afghan has the same rights. During the
But Islam and democracy are two words with one meaning. mujahidin time commanders just collected money
We have rules for people that are Islamic and with these and spent it on themselves.
comes democracy. On Facebook, when the US does
something bad, the Taliban write ‘This is Democracy’. If we Decision-making within the Taliban movement
used Islamic rules instead of democracy this would be Representative H: There are two types of decisions.
useful in Afghanistan. There is something wrong between Some are taken in the Quetta Shura and are passed down
the West and Islamic countries: their TV shows bad things to commanders. Others are made inside Afghanistan,
about each other. eg about attacks and money. 70 per cent of Taliban

commanders are living in Afghanistan now. Most of the checkpoint – there were eight people there. We finished
Taliban would like to be far away from Pakistani decisions, the attack in 10 minutes, but just down the road there
but they have their own problems, they can’t come to were loads of government forces who didn’t come to help
Afghanistan. If the international community helps to them. They have no morals. Recently on the battlefield
pressurise Pakistan then they can solve all their problems a Talib soldier died and his friends came and took his
with the Afghan Taliban. It was the Pakistanis who killed body away and gave him a proper burial. A government
[former Taliban leader] Mansour. They gave the information solider also died and his colleagues came, one took his
on where he was to the Americans. gun, the other took his mobile phone, and they just left
his body there.
Afghanistan’s relationship with its neighbours
Representative H: If in the future the Afghan people want The following statements summarise common positions
good relations with their neighbours then we must first that were held by all groups
remove the foreign troops, and then Afghanistan can sort
out these relationships on its own, with an independent 1. Above all, it is critical to end the needless killing of
government. At the moment we [the Taliban] must take Afghans. We want to work towards the establishment
help from both sides (Pakistan and Iran) and this is the main of peace in our country.
source of the problem. Afghans in their nature do not like
foreigners to intervene, and not just the West – they don’t 2. We want to see Afghan sovereignty restored, and the
like neighbours or Islamic countries intervening either. political and military interference of foreign powers
removed or significantly reduced. Nevertheless
Political arrangements that might help prevent fighting we welcome interactions with foreign countries that
between different groups within Afghanistan are conducted between equal sovereign nations.
Representative H: If the foreigners withdraw their forces, Within this, foreign aid and reconstruction is also
this would help towards preventing war. If the Taliban welcomed, provided that it conforms to Afghan
were completely in power then there is no way that a civil priorities and needs.
war would happen. For a long time we have all followed
the orders of the leadership. All the Taliban think that they 3. We envision a moderate Islamic government for
would keep Afghanistan’s strong army and police, unlike the Afghanistan, and one in which corruption and the abuse
mujahidin who took the tanks and weapons for themselves of power at all levels are eliminated.
individually. At the beginning it was very bad because the
internationals made friends with the wrong Afghans. 4. We want to see justice applied to all people, no matter
their rank, and no matter their background.
The Taliban is ready to accept changes, although on
women’s rights they need to be within Islamic rules. We are 5. We want to see a government that is representative of
not against women’s education, we want this and we want all Afghans and we are interested to explore different
to allow them to do other things also. When we were in ideas about how this representation might be achieved.
power we ran two courses for women, one was in nursing.
I have travelled to a lot of other countries. When I was a 6. We agree that all citizens, men and women, deserve
minister I visited many countries and told them that we the opportunity to access services and education.
want to be friends with them, but they did not accept this.
7. We place paramount importance on the relationships
Representative I: Sometimes we attack checkpoints and between local communities and their leaders, and
the government forces are just selling weapons there. wish to see this relationship strengthened, while also
The government chief of district for our area never comes recognising the importance of connections between
to the district, he just sits in [the provincial centre] and these leaders and central government. We believe that
gets a government salary. Government forces have no local leaders should be enabled to provide assistance,
morals. A few weeks ago we attacked a government protection, services and time to their communities.

Escaping the ghosts
of the past
Women’s participation in peace talks in Afghanistan
Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam
Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam is a social scientist and consultant for International Development, the United Nations, the International
currently working on Somalia. She is a part-time PhD candidate at Committee of the Red Cross and the NATO International Security
the University of St Andrews researching Taliban identity. She has Assistance Force. She holds a BA in Persian and Old Iranian from the
worked and travelled extensively in Afghanistan since 1995 and has University of Oxford, a Masters in Rural Development Sociology from
worked with a range of international and national organisations the University of Birmingham and a diploma in anthropology from the
including the European Union, the World Bank, the UK Department University of Aberdeen.
ABSTRACT
How can Afghan women achieve positive results But women already make key contributions to local
from peace talks with the Taliban? peace initiatives, and the possibility now exists to
engage proactively to affect the course of a national
Women were largely excluded from the Bonn process. peace process. Afghan women encompass a spectrum
Since then, they have made significant gains in rights of interests. Many from rural communities see ending
and political participation. But despite Afghanistan violence as the priority over the sorts of rights that are
adopting in 2015 a National Action Plan on United their urban counterparts’ prime concern.
Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, opportunities
for women remain limited. And women’s rights Reaching out to different female and male
defenders are wary that negotiations with the Taliban constituencies is key to building broad support for
will lead to further losses, given the movement’s women’s issues. Constructive progress will require
record and reputation. acknowledging signs of change among the Taliban
and engaging in dialogue with them to explore
potential areas of mutual interest and accommodation.

Sima Wali (l) und Rona Mansuri (r) attend a meeting with women's rights representatives during the Afghanistan summit in Koenigswinter near Bonn,
November 2001. Members of four different ethnic groups with the exclusion of the Taliban took part in the talks. © dpa picture alliance / Alamy Stock Photo.
The level of violence in Afghanistan appears to grow to women. But talks can present positive opportunities for
year by year with more egregious and heinous terrorist women to engage in negotiations proactively, to reinforce
attacks claimed by the Taliban, Islamic State and on and even extend the gains achieved since 2001. Meanwhile
occasion other armed opposition groups. Donor interest for many rural Afghan women, ending violence caused by
in Afghanistan has been waning, including in providing the conflict is the priority.
support to sectors focusing on women and girls. This
contrasts starkly with the autumn of 2001, when the issue Bonn process
of Afghan women was high on international military, When the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-
political and humanitarian agendas, and advocacy General for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, was deep in
groups spearheaded by the Feminist Majority Foundation informal and formal deliberations preparing for talks in
were highlighting that women were victims of ‘gender Bonn, one of the key questions under debate was whether
apartheid’ in Afghanistan. to include women. Fresh from Afghanistan in October 2001,
I attended several meetings at the offices of various UN
But not long after the 2001 Bonn conference, many agencies in New York, where opinions were frequently aired
international women’s rights activists discovered to that Afghan women were clueless about politics and would
their dismay what many Afghan women already feared: take up seats around the negotiating table unnecessarily.
discrimination faced by Afghan women did not simply This at a time when women’s rights activists were hailing
evaporate with the removal of the Taliban. The Taliban the success of the UN Security Council unanimously
were just one more manifestation of the structural adopting Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.
discrimination, exclusion and inequality that had evolved
in Afghanistan over hundreds of years. As I explained one evening at the offices of then
UNIFEM to a group of aggressive male journalists, not
The post-Taliban trajectory of women’s rights in all Afghan women were the benighted victims of the
Afghanistan highlights potential pitfalls for women’s Taliban that the press had been portraying for many years;
presence and power in peace talks with the insurgency there were professional Afghan women who had served
today, and the need for careful consideration and in government as well as committed women’s civil society
preparation by those involved with the women, peace and groups. But my words were met with astonishment and
security agenda. Afghan women activists’ perceptions of incredulity. It was clear that ‘gender apartheid’ was not
peace talks are largely negative, clouded by experiences of confined to Afghanistan.
the past and now dominated by fears of exclusion, tokenism
and loss of rights. High on the list of questions is whether But a historic moment had arrived for Afghan women
a predominantly male-run process will result in leaders and, witnessed by international bodies, their inclusion in
seeing fit to capitulate to Taliban demands for political, national processes would soon be enshrined in a number
legislative and social changes which will be detrimental of key national documents, for example the signing of

the Convention Eliminating All Forms of Discrimination advocate of women’s rights, Afghan women still very much
Against Women (CEDAW), the new Constitution of 2004, feel at the mercy of the funding vagaries and political
and later, the National Action Plan for the Women of whims of both the international community and Afghan
Afghanistan (NAPWA). Other determined individuals and political elites. Moreover, there is confusion about the role
pressure groups continued working behind the scenes. of women in peace and reconciliation processes – from
The result was three female delegates attending the local to national level. Women’s actions and achievements
UN-sponsored meeting in Germany which led to the Bonn in the High Peace Council and other bodies tend to be less
Agreement, the fundamental document for the formation public, leading to perceptions that women’s roles can be
of a new Afghan government after the fall of the Taliban. dismissed as symbolic or limited. As a woman member of
The female delegates were Sima Wali and Rona Mansuri, the HPC told me in February 2018, women’s contributions
members of the self-styled ‘Rome process for peace’ led are often belittled and their very presence can be
by former king Zahir Shah, and Amena Safi Afzali, who challenged if they ‘push too hard’.
attended as a full delegate for the Northern Alliance.
“
Fatima Gailani was advising the predominantly Pashtun Women leaders and groups
Peshawar Group, representing a previous peace process.
There were some positive signs from the process. Sima need to initiate a process
Wali called for the creation of a Ministry of Women’s to conduct nationwide
Affairs. An Independent Human Rights Commission
was also set up, to be headed by women’s rights activist
consultations with enough
Dr Sima Samar. women to construct a valid,
coherent and representative
Since then there has been more progress on women’s
equality and Afghan women have been catapulted into message on peace.”
public and political life. Women now have a significant
presence in both houses of parliament, ministries, local While peace talks with the Taliban present challenges
government, the diplomatic service and the High Peace for women’s rights defenders, they may also provide
Council. In June 2015 a National Action Plan on UNSCR opportunities. The assumption that women’s involvement in
1325 was approved. The text of this document is rather a peace process presents some form of panacea to violent
telling of the effective cap on women’s advancement, conflict requires scrutiny. But there is no valid argument
however. It indicates that, 14 years after the fall of against women’s presence, as women’s participation and
the Taliban and after millions of dollars of targeted voice are important factors for gender equality in political
programming, women are still in need of various types of representation and are national goals in most countries.
support in order to participate in political and public life; Demands from women’s rights defenders and strong
it also recognises women’s status as a social and economic statements from President Ghani reinforce the need for
minority and the importance of developing a robust women’s participation in talks. After so much work on
implementation framework to support women’s active women’s issues in Afghanistan, women still do not see
participation in society. many national allies and remain suspicious of external
advocates who claim to support their cause in absentia.
Ensuring women’s participation in peace
talks today There is a perception among women in Afghanistan
Women’s rights defenders in Afghanistan are justifiably that the gains they have made are not important for the
distrustful of peace and reconciliation processes focused men who will engage in talks – but this assumption may
on the Taliban, which translates into a combative not serve Afghan women well. There is almost a sense
and suspicious attitude accompanied by hostile that if a small group of women is not present, nobody
pronouncements. While such friction is understandable, else will lobby for their rights and they will be forgotten.
shifting to a more proactive stance would facilitate more If this is the case then women have to focus on alliance-
interesting and productive outcomes. building with men, to be confident that women’s issues
are represented and supported by both male and
In a violent society, where security forces are stretched to female actors in any peace process.
keep the population safe and political assassinations are
frequent, women are rightly still wary of conservative Representation – which women?
elements in formal and informal political spheres who Women’s participation intersects with debates around
oppose their presence and participation in politics and representation and identity. Which women would be the most
public life. Even with a president who is a self-proclaimed appropriate or acceptable candidates to represent Afghan

women and which demographics need to be represented to consistently used this perspective to highlight the grave
ensure an adequate sense of ownership? Women leaders dangers they face.
and groups need to initiate a process to conduct nationwide
consultations with enough women to construct a valid, By convincing themselves that the Taliban are at war with
coherent and representative message on peace. them, women’s rights defenders are potentially missing an
opportunity to place themselves in a unique position in the
Issues of Muslim identity and levels of conservatism vanguard of a peace process and even to begin discussions
may also come into play. There has been an untested ahead of any formal negotiations. This could even afford
assumption that all Afghan women would unquestioningly them room to manoeuvre in terms of tackling the Taliban
rally around a rights-based agenda. Since the rise of the on their stance on issues of importance to both sides. The
Taliban there has been a perception, again unproven, that Afghan Public Policy Research Organisation stated in 2015
Afghan men are for the most part conservative while the that during informal talks between representatives of the
majority of women espouse modernity and a polity based Taliban and the Afghan government in Oslo earlier that year,
on international human rights. Like Afghan men, however, diplomatic and political cadres of the Taliban had reportedly
women’s Muslim identities also reflect a broad spectrum, been showing a more positive attitude towards female
from religious extremism to modern or more secular interlocutors, and also that some senior Taliban were now
leanings. The prospect of the presence of the Taliban in the at least talking openly about women’s political rights.
Afghan government is worrying for some people precisely
because of their ideologies around women. This is why Negotiating women’s rights with the Taliban
representation needs to be balanced, and not skewed A key question is what demands and priorities would
towards either end of the spectrum of Muslim identity. women actually take to the peace table? There is currently
Such issues should be considered and addressed now in no clear narrative from Afghan women on a peace process
order to create a united front. The alternative might be with the Taliban. Discussions have consistently centred
that women’s ability to represent effectively is challenged, around: fear of betrayal by male politicians; fear of loss of
leading to their presence and voice being stymied at a what has been achieved on behalf of women, particularly
critical moment. provisions for the basic rights of women in the constitution;
and fear of a reversal of some rights which were returned
It is not just Muslim identity which fragments attempts to women after the fall of the Taliban.
by women to create a coherent movement. Taking a more
pragmatic view, most Afghan women live in provinces There is also often an assertion that gains from a peace
and rural locations. They feel the war acutely and may be process absent of women would not be sustainable. But it
more threatened by violence on their doorsteps than by the is not clear how women’s participation would guaran-
potential rollback of rights that many do not currently enjoy tee sustainability if women participants are in any case
or even know about. Rural women in Afghanistan today disempowered and must be granted space and permission
bear the brunt of war, experiencing forced displacement, to engage in the first place. This comes across as fearful
insecurity, food shortages and decreased access to and anxious rather than a proactive approach to enter-
healthcare and basic education for their children. They ing the peace marketplace and seeing what is on offer. On
may also have lost menfolk and access to livelihoods. Such the other hand, proactive approaches to peacebuilding on
women may have different priorities to the minority who a small scale and at a local level have been fruitful, as a
currently defend women’s rights in very different milieus. woman activist working with local shuras to reduce civilian
The composition of representative groups of women should casualties recently told me.
take such differences in priorities into consideration.
Many would argue that women’s rights defenders and
Furthermore, some women currently self-identify as the Taliban have nothing to discuss. But attitudes among
potential victims or pawns in the post-Bonn political some Taliban leaders have been changing in relation to
process. Their narrative is one of grievance about lack of some issues affecting women, although as the Afghanistan
power, access, voice and control. For the past 16 years, Public Policy Research Organisation reported in 2015,
women’s rights defenders have assumed that all parts of such shifts in opinion among some Taliban leaders are
the Taliban movement see them as enemies, even though not highly publicised:
these women have never been combatants and have for the
most part have never identified themselves as members ‘The Taliban leadership and the Ulema associated with it
either of the Northern Alliance factions or of the Afghan believe that they have gone as far as possible in nuancing
National Army. They have not taken any action to test their positions on women’s rights and education without
their hypothesis of being the Taliban’s enemy, but have completely alienating their ranks and file, whose views

about women and education are typically much more Conclusion: pathways to meaningful
restrictive than the more progressive elements in the participation
leadership. However, the Taliban have not been very Afghan women’s groups currently lack a clear narrative
effective or proactive in communicating their more and a representative movement with sufficient influence
moderate positions and are probably waiting for talks to to sustain itself. Without addressing this deficit, women’s
begin before going more public with them.’ presence in any peace process may not lead to concrete
gains or be able to resist the reversal of achievements
Despite the lack of publicity, this does show movement in from the past decade. Women’s rights defenders may need
the right direction. Women’s rights defenders, however, to update their agenda and keep up to speed with Taliban
remain rooted in grievances of the past. They neither invite policies and shifts in their stated identities and narratives.
the Taliban to engage on the issues that the movement Coming largely from an urban, educated background,
seems to be willing to give ground on, nor challenge the women’s rights defenders may find that continuing to
Taliban to a dialogue on more contentious subjects. hold fast to a possibly outdated view of the Taliban as yet
another group standing between them and their rights
Safeguarding education, employment and health offer is not constructive, and will not help them to achieve
potentially productive entry points for women advocates their objectives.
and activists to talk to the Taliban. Provision of basic
services has always been a practical and constructive point Discussions on a range of issues with certain
for engaging the Taliban on women’s issues. During Taliban elements within the Taliban may well be possible.
rule, women working in the health sector were often But they need to be mediated with sensitivity. The Taliban
exempted from bans on employment and in spite of myriad will be wary of anything which affects their identity.
accounts of the ban on education, the Taliban turned a blind Mishandled engagement with them may lead to a negative
eye to home schools and even the construction of girls’ change in the internal dynamics of the movement as
schools in certain provinces. well as relations with external actors, including jihadist
sympathisers and funders.
Interactions with Taliban pre-2001 revealed in some areas
they gave limited access to education and health services The issue of representation also needs to be tackled, with
for women, although escalations in fighting resulted in any peace process on the horizon providing an opportunity
marked downturns in access to such services. The Taliban for women’s rights defenders to consult with the parts of
have also held shuras on access to education for women, the population they claim to represent, and to build the
with discussions centring around the hijab, segregation constituency to provide the popular support they currently
of the sexes, the role of Islamic education and topics lack. President Ghani’s support for women’s participation
suitable for women. There are also potential points of in peacebuilding efforts and negotiations should give
engagement on legal issues. The Taliban have been known women activists the impetus they need to engage, and to
to forcibly return inheritance shares to women when ramp up their efforts in formal and informal processes.
these were wrongfully allocated to male relatives as a Extreme diplomacy will be required in approaching the
result of pressure from traditional elders. There are other Taliban. But assuming that the movement has not changed
legal issues where the Taliban’s approach has more in its stance on women since Bonn is a pathway to an
common with the aspirations of activists than supporters of opportunity lost.
Pashtunwali (Pashtun traditional ethical code).

Integrating a military and peace strategy for Afghanistan:
Making ends, ways and means meet
Reflections by Ambassador Douglas Lute
Ambassador Douglas Lute is the former United States Permanent Deputy National Security Advisor to coordinate the wars in Iraq
Representative to the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s standing and Afghanistan, serving a total of six years in the White House.
political body. In 2010 he retired from active duty in the Army as General Lute holds degrees from the United States Military Academy
a Lieutenant General after 35 years of service. In 2007 President at West Point and from the Kennedy School of Government at
George W. Bush named him as Assistant to the President and Harvard University.
ABSTRACT
How can political and military strategies be integrated to – the Taliban and the ANSF. The efficacy of the 2009
support a peaceful political settlement in Afghanistan? US military surge was undermined by deploying troops
to the wrong areas for the wrong reasons, and by a lack
This article considers the challenges of managing of complementary political action. Decision-making
the contribution of the United States military to at key moments of political-military tension was often
an integrated strategy. It is primarily informed by driven by US domestic political priorities.
Lieutenant General Lute’s experience of the Obama
administrations (2009–17), drawn from a conversation Inconsistency was exemplified by the killing of Taliban
with Michael Semple in early 2018. leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansour in 2016, rather
than seeing him as a potential interlocutor in dialogue.
Contrasting interpretations of stabilisation led to President Obama made some specific commitments to
a flawed strategy: degrading the Taliban’s military advance a political solution, for example facilitating the
capability while building the capacity of the Afghan opening of the Taliban Political Commission in Qatar. But
National Security Forces (ANSF). This strategic equation following the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011, it was
was based on inaccurate analysis of both variables increasingly hard for him to prioritise political action.
Ends, ways and means means they intended to employ – an intensified military
The early years of the Barrack Obama presidency provide an campaign. So, we ended up with the military going one
example of the challenge of delivering an integrated strategy. direction, while the diplomats pursued regional diplomacy
Everyone agreed that there was no purely military solution to and the aid workers did their own thing.
the problems in Afghanistan. But the US military continued to
act as if there were. The administration said the right things, in If I had a chance to do it over again, I would spend more
terms of talking up the need for political action. But it proved time on ensuring that we really had pinned down what it
difficult to match that rhetoric with the action on the ground. was that we were trying to achieve. We could have then
worked through the ways and means of the military and
Fundamentally, the administration failed to align the political actors, ensuring that they were in fact aligned
essential elements of strategy – ends, ways and means. and mutually supportive. That would have allowed us to
We were locked into a debate about the contribution of the counter the classic bureaucratic tendency for every actor
competing ‘ways’ – diplomatic and political versus military. to prioritise their own effort.
The problem was that the debate about the end state was
not adequately resolved. In retrospect, the problem with The objective as formulated by the first Obama
the early Obama era strategy in Afghanistan was that the administration boiled down to the achievement of an
different US actors were inadequately aligned with regard Afghanistan sufficiently stable that it could no longer be a
to the ends we were trying to achieve. This left the military base for international terrorism. The US internal
free to interpret the ends so as to justify the ways and statements of the objectives we were pursuing in the years

after 2009 were deliberately and increasingly narrowly joined forces to support an approach that gave primacy
focused. This formula was a reaction to the way that in the to military action.
preceding years the US had signed up to overly ambitious
ends. By 2007, President George W. Bush had been talking Then there was the personality factor. Special
in terms of achieving a flourishing market economy and Representative Richard Holbrooke was the person most
equality for all citizens. clearly charged with championing a holistic political-led
approach. But for some reason his personality generated
“
If I had a chance to do it over ‘antibodies’ and he was unable to assemble enough support
within the administration to give him a chance of bringing
again, I would spend more time the military into line. And in Kabul, the larger-than-life
on ensuring that we really had generals, McChrystal and Petraeus, simply overwhelmed
our ambassadors. Finally, there was the issue of the most
pinned down what it was that we basic ways and means – resources. The military had at
were trying to achieve.” its disposal resources that just dwarfed anything the
diplomats had access to.
But even when you shift to a more limited formula
of achieving a stable Afghanistan with no room for What the military read into the commitment
international terrorism, you still have to unpick it and say to stabilise Afghanistan
what you mean, because the formula is open to different The military identified the Taliban as the main factor
interpretations. And in a sense, to achieve clarity on the destabilising Afghanistan. They therefore read the
ends you have to specify which ways and means are to commitment to stabilise Afghanistan as carte blanche
be prioritised. It would have made sense for us to state for pursuing defeat of the Taliban. In the strategy debate,
explicitly that the primary means we were going to use we pushed back against the notion of defeat. Instead
were political, not military, and that the military was we all settled on the strategic idea that the Taliban had
required to support political action. to be degraded while we built up the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF). The idea was that you would
There are many ways in which the military can support reach a moment where the threat posed by the Taliban
political action. For example, it could have been directed to was reduced to a level which was within the capability of
reduce levels of violence in specified areas, to contribute the ANSF. This strategic equation was based on a flawed
to confidence-building and diplomacy. The military analysis of both variables, the ANSF and the Taliban.
could support the work of establishing contact between
Taliban leaders and the US or the Afghan government. Taliban
Alternatively, in its work to develop the Afghan National The military seemed never to appreciate that the Taliban
Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), the military were embedded in the social fabric of rural Afghanistan.
could have been tasked to promote forces that were They were inherently not a force which was external to
representative of the population in the areas in which they the areas where it fought and indeed, in some places in
operated. This would have addressed the problem of an the south and east, they barely even had a defined force
army that recruited personnel from northern and eastern structure distinct from the civilian population. In such
Afghanistan and sent them to fight in the south. Similarly, parts of the country, by taking on a commitment to fight
the military effort could have supported diplomacy by the Taliban, you were essentially lumbered with fighting
prioritising efforts to reduce corruption in contracts. In against the Pashtun population.
reality, we prioritised none of these things and left the
military to do what it does best: delivering violence. It was The military’s troubled effort to downgrade the Taliban
as if we read the foreword to Clausewitz but did not bother became entangled with the debate over the insurgents’
to finish the book. ‘safe haven’ in Pakistan. In effect, the more difficult we
found it to degrade the Taliban, the more we felt that we
To understand why US strategy in Afghanistan played needed to blame the Pakistan safe haven, far more than
out in the way that it did, you have to refer to our was ever justified by the evidence. The majority of Taliban
domestic politics. In the first place, the incoming Obama fighters fought within walking distance of their own homes.
Administration was primarily focused on salvaging the This meant that, although the Taliban seniors tended to
US economy. The free hand that was given to the military base themselves in Pakistan, the men who did the fighting
also reflected the bureaucratic alignment of the Defense were mainly based in Afghanistan. A sort of mythology
and State Departments. Admiral Mike Mullen, General grew up around the Taliban hordes crossing over the
David Petraeus and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton border from Pakistan seasonally. But we never saw

of our equation for the military component of strategy,
the degrade side and the enabling of the ANSF, were
seriously flawed.
There was an analytical element to the flaws in the military

component of the strategy. We never developed adequate
understanding of either the enemy or our Afghan allies.
This ignorance hampered our ability to adapt over time.
The one-year tours of duty were a compounding factor.
The whole US army took one-year courses on Afghanistan.
Even personnel with multiple tours of duty never went back
to the same area or role, where they might have acquired
some experience. So, everyone was perpetually locked into
Portrait of Ambassador Douglas Lute. © U.S. State Department lesson 1-0-1.
Extent to which the efficacy of the military

them. Because there was no such mass migration – the surge was undermined by the lack of
relationship between the safe haven and the battlefield was complementary political action
more nuanced. To understand how the Taliban exploited The nature of the mistakes in the execution of the military
Pakistan, you really have to understand who they are and surge in 2009 is professionally embarrassing. For starters,
why they fight. You have to go beyond the myths of the the US army should never have gone to Helmand. This
Taliban as a force external to Afghanistan. was a basic mistake. Firstly, we had limited resources
and the president had laid it out that we were not going to
Afghan National Security Forces stay forever. The prevailing doctrine was clear: hold, build,
On the other side of the equation was the ANSF. We transfer. It made no sense to go somewhere of secondary
were to aim for that tipping point where ANSF capability importance first. We launched our military effort in a
exceeded that of the Taliban. But we unintentionally province which was of secondary importance and which
created hurdles in the process. We were late in joining was home to only three per cent of the country’s population.
the effort to build the security forces. Then we followed a It was difficult for the US to claim to be acting to protect the
dead end on the police. We made the classic mistake of population when it devoted maximum military resources to
imagining that the police would develop as a force in our somewhere which accounted for so few people. We talked
image. More generally, we seriously over-estimated the a good game but acted as if we were really there to fight
human resources which would be available to the security the Taliban rather than protect civilians. There would have
forces. We allowed ourselves to be rushed and therefore been a case for prioritising Kandahar, on the basis of the
accepted major flaws in the ANSF that we were building. province’s political importance and its greater population
Under-performing ANA leadership were tolerated rather size. Exotic places like Musa Qala and Marja were more
than being replaced. We failed to take a stand on corruption appropriate as subjects for National Geographic features
in the Afghan military. rather than as the focus of US army operations.
Then we allowed ourselves to get trapped in a production- The most plausible explanations as to why US military
line version of building a military. Everything was measured deployment went counter to the imperatives of the broader
in terms of numbers of inputs and outputs, rather than strategy were partly historic and partly tactical. In the
quality. The training mission reported on how many guns earliest days of the intervention in Afghanistan, US Marines
had been delivered and how many battalions formed. You had operated in Camp Rhino and other bases around the
pay a price when you focus on quantity and discount quality. South. That was because initially they operated from the
The most telling statistic regarding the ANA was their north Arabian Gulf and their operating range did not stretch
attrition rate, which hovered around 30 per cent, including any further than southern Afghanistan. When it was time
both outright desertion and people marked down as Absent for the Marines to return to Afghanistan as the leading part
Without Leave. It is impossible to bring an army up to its of the surge, they went to the places they were familiar
full planned strength if you are having to replace nearly with. More importantly, as the Marines planned their share
a third of the personnel annually before you progress. of the surge, they needed a part of the theatre where they
The constant leakage weakens leadership, renders it could carve out the bureaucratic isolation to run their war
impossible to build unit cohesion and obliges you to focus on their own. The Marines operate with their own resources
on the most elementary unit capabilities. Thus, both sides and brought their own chain of command, reporting to

a two-star general in Central Command, not to Stanley Taliban leaders killed. Therefore, authorising the strike
McChrystal, the Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan. against Mansour was going to play out much better in the
Helmand was the least crowded part of the theatre, where media and Congress than passing on the shot in the name
they could run their own show. of hope for future political cooperation.
If we want positive examples of the military contributing When the President backs the ends,
to an integrated approach, we probably have to look at ways and means
the best Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). There When you look at the outcome from the years that the US
were examples of PRTs which operated as planned, as under President Obama remained engaged in Afghanistan,
fundamentally integrated civil-military teams. In the you can clearly see the price that you pay when you fail to
best PRTs, there was a real synergy. They worked best align fully ends, ways and means. Obama originally got
where the PRT did not have to compete with a heavy elected on the basis that Afghanistan was the good war, in
military presence. The other example of a significant contrast to Iraq, the bad war. But, more generally, everyone
military contribution to the overall strategy was in force knew that Obama was committed to winding down US
development, in particular the work to develop Afghan overseas military adventures. He stated that his objective in
commando units. In this initiative, we succeeded in the region was to disrupt Osama bin Laden. But that meant
addressing the human capital problem by skimming off that, come 2011, and the killing of Osama, it became even
the best people from the regular military units. We also harder for Obama to explain that he wanted to prioritise
deployed the best-suited US unit for the job, the Green political action.
Berets [Special Forces], and kept them assigned to the
mission over the years, long enough to achieve a result. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge some of
the specific ways in which direct interventions by the
Interplay with US domestic politics president helped strengthen the political elements of the
You again have to consider domestic political compunctions US approach to the war. In his dealing with both Afghan
if you want to understand the decision-making at key president Hamid Karzai and Pakistan, he was consistently
moments of tension between the political and military clear that he was in favour of a politically led approach.
elements of the strategy. The killing of the Taliban leader Even in his 2009 West Point speech, in which he outlined
Akhtar Mohammad Mansour in a drone strike provides a his strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, he deliberately
classic example. [Note, at the time of the killing of Mansour included a line which communicated that there was an
in 2016, General Lute was assigned to NATO headquarters and opening for the Taliban to become part of a political
therefore he was not directly a privy to the decision-making]. process. The president intervened directly to help bring
There was a potential dilemma – do you treat Mansour as about the first meeting between the US and then Taliban
the head of a militant organisation against which you are political representative Tayyab Agha. He then helped
fighting and thus kill him when you get a chance, or do you make it possible for Qatar to host the Taliban Political
treat him as a potential interlocutor in dialogue and thus Commission. He clinched the agreement in a meeting
keep him alive? with the Qatari Amir and he persuaded Hamid Karzai to
go along with it.
From the outside, it looked as if the US finally got an
opportunity to kill him with minimal physical or diplomatic Once the five Guantanamo prisoners were transferred
collateral damage, and so they authorised the shot. to Qatar, things became messier, because there was a
Probably there was no one even there to champion the concerted effort to portray Bergdahl as a traitor. Despite
diplomatic path. The problem was that the narrative, as it that controversy, it is possible that the parking of the five
had been developed up to that moment, had not adequately Taliban leaders in Qatar may turn out to have been one of
played up the possibility of leading through political action. the important political investments made by the US towards
The US had never adequately prioritised the political effort achieving a peaceful outcome in Afghanistan. After all,
of engaging with the Taliban. This made it impossible for these influential Taliban have lived peacefully since their
the President just to ‘pass’ on the shot. The President was release, with perhaps a better quality of life than has
already labelled as the man who traded ‘five for one’ with been available to any other Taliban leaders. If they do end
regard to the Guantanamo prisoners released in exchange up playing a role in promoting a political settlement in
for Private Bowe Bergdahl. He could not afford to add to Afghanistan, it will have been made possible because, in
that reputation by getting labelled as the man who passed this case, the US military and civilian institutions prioritised
up the shot at the Taliban leader. The existing narrative a political approach and cooperated on ways and means,
described American success in terms of numbers of as directed by the national leadership.

Peaceful solution
to the Afghan issue
Statement by the Taliban Political Office in Qatar
M. Suhail Shaheen
Suhail Shaheen was educated at Kabul University and is a fluent Afghanistan, before being appointed Deputy Ambassador at the
English speaker and prolific writer. He edited the English- Afghan Embassy in Pakistan. He now serves as spokesman for the
language, state-owned Kabul Times during the Islamic Emirate of Taliban Political Office in Qatar.
ABSTRACT However, the main obstacle in this regard is the existence

of the occupation. If the occupation ends, then the Islamic
What pathways does the Taliban’s Political Office Emirate believes in the political resolution of issues.
in Qatar see towards a political solution to violent This is to put an end to the fighting once and for all and
conflict in Afghanistan? bring about an inclusive Islamic system representing all
Afghans, in which none will feel marginalised or deprived.
M. Suhail Shaheen, Spokesman for the Political To achieve this, there is need for a period of restoration
Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, puts of security so that the Afghan nation may take a breath of
forward a Taliban perspective on prospects for a relief, and Afghans can consider the pattern of an Islamic
negotiated end to the violence and inclusive governance. Shura system – a comprehensive framework that is the
outcome of the sacrifices of the past four decades and
that reflects their aspirations. Furthermore, all factors
that have led to the current war situation and sufferings
For the last 16 years, a relentless war has been going on in should be stopped.
Afghanistan instigated by America, under a pretext in which
the Afghans were not involved. Even so, no accepted and Occupation is the cause and the war is the effect. When the
impartial entity has conducted an investigation regarding cause ends, or there is a guarantee to end it, the effect of
the war as yet. But consequently, it is the Afghans who have the military operations will itself come to an end.
been the victims in terms of human lives and resources.
We want termination of the occupation as soon as possible.
This meaningless war should come to an end. However, But this depends to a great extent on the USA: how soon
the plausible question arises, how? In our view, as the war it can stop the war and let peace and stability return to
is currently in full swing in Afghanistan and the country is Afghanistan. Similarly, it is pity that the current regime
practically occupied, there is a need for measures which has been established at the behest of foreigners and
will catapult the country out of the prevailing war and based on racial cliques and factions. It doesn’t represent
pave the way for the establishment of a future system of all of the people; merit has not been taken into account
government reflecting the Islamic and national aspirations as a criterion for inclusion in the government, but rather
of the people of Afghanistan. vested interests have played a crucial role. That is why

the Afghans do not feel a sense of being independent or confidence, ie removal of the blacklist, opening of the
that the regime is their own. So, the occupation needs to office and exchange of prisoners. All these provide
be replaced by independence – an independent Afghan scaffolding for negotiation and help both sides to gain trust
inclusive government should come into being in place of in the tangibility of negotiation.
the current regime, or at least guarantees that such a
“
system will be established. Then Afghans will both feel
independent and view the regime as their own.
Once this preliminary phase is
surpassed, it will open a new
In a nutshell, we believe negotiation is the best way to
vista for a peaceful solution and
resolve the Afghan issue because it is through this process
that we can resolve the issues without bloodshed. This has turn the long-cherished dream
periodically been emphasised and elucidated in the official of peace into a reality.”
statements and annual Eid messages of our leadership.
It is also a reality that in the circumstances of occupation, Regional countries too can play a role in this regard,
the USA is the main party to the conflict. The key to the including international organisations like the United
solution of the issue lies in the hand of the main party. Nations and the Organisation of Islamic Conference.
But, this doesn’t mean the Kabul Administration is not a However, it is a fact that currently the American policy is
party to the conflict. It is a party. However, we want to talk a main obstacle, decoupling us from the peace process.
with the American side on some main issues and talk with The US raises the slogan of a peaceful solution on the
Kabul about government formation. No question, they one hand but has in practice embarked on a military
are Afghans and a party to the imbroglio. Furthermore, approach on the other, bringing new units of troops and
the Kabul Administration has not announced openly tranches of weapons to Afghanistan from Iraq and other
that they have the power to decide about or implement countries. Their President still openly says ‘we do not want
withdrawal of foreign troops or can give a guarantee as to have peace talks with the Taliban’. Such a contradictory
to their withdrawal. That is why not to discuss with them approach intentionally plays havoc with the lofty aim of
some main issues like the occupation which is not in the peace. Still more, the US regularly bombs and carries
ambit of their authority and could not lead to any result, out night raids and claims that they want to bring Taliban
because we think they are not able to independently take a to the negotiation table through pressure. In practice, all
decision about the foreign forces’ withdrawal. Of course, these actions provoke reactions, leading to intensification
as Afghans, it is their right to be heard and their views and prolongation of the war. This is a repeated, empty
taken into account and have participation in the service of ‘panacea’ tested over the past one-and-a-half decades,
the country as well as in the government. which has utterly failed.
So any ice-thawing initiative in Afghanistan depends on It will be appropriate for America to spend the money
the USA to a great extent. If America changes its current on peace and rehabilitation which it is now spending on
posture of warfare, the war situation on the ground will war. As a pragmatic gesture, it should announce an end
change simultaneously. Afghans will find an opportunity to to occupation or give a date of withdrawal, then bring all
sit around a table and resolve their problems and start a their security concerns and other matters of interests to
peaceful life. The withdrawal of foreign troops is a ‘spinal the table for discussion. The Islamic Emirate is ready to
cord’ for solving the problem. Conversely, the longer the listen to their concerns and demands and discuss with
occupation continues, the longer the war will prolong. That them all. However, the Americans should also admit the
is why we can say both the intensification of the war and its legitimate rights of the Afghan Muslim people. Once this
de-escalation are linked with the occupation. preliminary phase is surpassed, it will open a new vista for
a peaceful solution and turn the long-cherished dream of
To resolve the Afghan issue through peaceful means, it is peace into a reality. We hope this to happen at the earliest,
also necessary to create a conducive atmosphere of for a peaceful and prosperous tomorrow for Afghanistan.

Brokering local
settlements
in Helmand
Practical insights for inclusion
Julius Cavendish
Julius Cavendish lived in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2011, He interviewed many of the protagonists of the Sangin peace accords
reporting for a range of titles including Time, the Independent, and wrote a detailed account of the saga for the Afghanistan Analysts
Christian Science Monitor, the Times, and The National. Network. He now lives in London.
ABSTRACT
What lessons can be drawn from local settlements But some common factors underpinned their short-
negotiated in Helmand Province for future lived success, which offer valuable, practical lessons for
peacemaking in Afghanistan – locally and nationally? local peacemaking, in particular: identifying legitimate
brokers; empowering local communities; honouring
Experiences of sub-state settlements agreed in commitments; coordinating military and political
Helmand province in 2006 and 2010 have shown that strategies; and acknowledging the limits of central
even in the midst of very violent conflict, peace is government support.
possible in Afghanistan – and that local populations are
prepared to take calculated risks to make it happen. The case studies offer further insights for national-
level settlements – that there are opportunities to shift
Examples of peacemaking from Musa Qala and Sangin perceptions of the conflict sufficiently to widen political
districts offer practical insights into the mechanisms, commitment for reconciliation, and to build popular
brokers and strategic imperatives required to reach appetite to negotiate a revised and more inclusive
accommodations that can reduce violence and facilitate social contract.
inclusion. All three case studies featured in this article
ultimately collapsed.

Local settlements struck in Helmand province – in
Musa Qala district in 2006 and twice in neighbouring
Musa Qala
Sangin district in 2010 – provide concrete examples of Baghran
the specific, practical mechanisms through which peace
Naw Zad
initiatives can be pursued in Afghanistan. While each
Kajaki
of these accords ultimately collapsed, their temporary
success provides valuable insights into the mechanisms Washer
Sangin
and brokers, and the strategic imperatives necessary
Nahrisarraj
to forge future settlements.
Nad All Lashkar Gah
Naway-I-Barakzayl
They highlight the readiness of different populations
to take calculated risks in support of a revised, more
inclusive social contract when government good faith Reg
and capacity are felt to exist. And while each of the

three accords hinged on the successful identification
and exploitation of local particularities, they also serve Garmser
as useful case studies of some of the dynamics that
Dishu
any national-level settlement will inevitably have to
grapple with.
Musa Qala accord

In 2006, Musa Qala was the site of increasingly violent Helmand Province.
confrontation between the Taliban and the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – a conflict that overlaid
a separate, albeit connected, struggle between the two »» supervise the collection of local revenue, propose
predominant sub-groups in the area: the Hassanzai and spending plans to the provincial government,
Pirzai branches of the Alizai tribe. Predatory behaviour and help keep district schools open.
through the early 2000s by Musa Qala’s Hassanzai
district governor and associated commanders, who As Semple notes: ‘The unwritten clause of the accord was
commandeered heroin-trafficking routes and extorted that its provisions would apply within a five-kilometre
taxes from the local population, helped to tip victimised, radius of the district centre’. Although the public narrative
frequently Pirzai, tribesmen into common purpose with of the events that led to this agreement is sparse, it is
the Taliban insurgency. understood that local elders held talks with local Taliban
commanders, who saw benefits to alleviating the threat
That September, however, a representative jirga of tribal of serious conflict and agreed to call off attacks within the
elders in Musa Qala struck a 14-point written agreement five-kilometre zone.
with Helmand’s provincial government, as described by
Michael Semple, the European Union diplomat who helped Although initially successful, by early 2007 the accord
broker the accord, in his 2010 report, Reconciliation in had begun to disintegrate, stymied by criticism from
Afghanistan. Among other things, the deal provided that spoilers in Kabul, the appointment of a less sympathetic
the Jirga would: provincial governor, and the failure by the government to
deliver development and security support. In February,
»» support the district administration, which would fly an ISAF air strike killed a local Taliban commander
the Afghan flag outside the five-kilometre zone. While this strike did
»» nominate 50 men to be recruited into the Afghanistan not breach the letter of the accord, by killing one of the
National Auxiliary Police to maintain security in the commanders involved in maintaining it, ISAF destroyed a
district centre, and that only these police would be major incentive to uphold the agreement. Taliban fighters
allowed to bear arms in the district centre subsequently re-entered and occupied the district
»» along with the district administration, protect NGOs centre, and were only expelled by a major coalition (ie
and civilian departments working in the district and ISAF-Afghan) operation in December. Nonetheless, the
assure the safe transit of national and international Musa Qala accord had, for a brief moment, shown that
military forces engagement between the provincial administration and
»» guarantee that the district centre would not be used local tribes could extricate a population centre from the
for military operations against other areas surrounding conflict.

View over Sangin district centre
and the Helmand River, 2011.
© Julius Cavendish
Sangin accords Lashkar Gah evinced little interest in it. According to

In neighbouring Sangin district, tribes of the Upper Sangin British civilians supporting the Sangin district governor,
Valley (USV) twice struck deals with the local government, the coalition’s focus on central Helmand that summer, a
pledging loyalty in return for a revised social contract. First, decision to hand over responsibility for Sangin to US forces,
in May 2010, leaders of armed groups nominally aligned and previous US criticisms over the Musa Qala accord, led
with the Taliban-led insurgency offered to reconcile with PRT officials to deliberately drag their feet. And without
the government, pledging their full cooperation. In a letter PRT backing there was little prospect of delivering the
addressed to local government officials, eight prominent development support the USV leaders had requested. The
commanders invited ISAF and Afghan forces to move freely opportunity lapsed, therefore, with USV leaders and local
in the USV and to build patrol bases in their lands. They government officials losing credibility in the process. In
asked that the government provide small-scale development August, a drone strike targeting a local commander helped
assistance to help local communities, and promised both seal the accord’s demise.
their acceptance of government authority and an end of
hostilities between local fighters and the coalition. In the autumn of 2010, however, the Sangin district
governor and his British advisors began cultivating a local
The same USV leaders also agreed to help remove all Sufi leader called Agha Badar, who was highly regarded
improvised explosive devices and to encourage local men by the USV communities, and who subsequently agreed
to join the local police, while requesting protection from to support efforts to revive a reconciliation agreement.
reprisals by the Taliban leadership. An integral part of the A number of factors helped breathe new life into the
dynamic was the accord’s anticipation of a revised, more political outreach, including Badar’s involvement, the
inclusive social contract – one that addressed local needs in good reputation of the recently appointed district governor
return for political reconciliation. This was in contrast to a and continued local antipathy towards the Taliban
prevailing situation through the early and middle parts of the supreme leadership. A new accord was finally reached
decade when a narrow, predatory elite monopolised economic between USV commanders and the Afghan provincial
rents and engaged in abusive behaviour, spurring resentment. government in December 2010, and witnessed by
US Marine Corps and PRT representatives.
In the weeks after USV leaders offered this deal, insurgent
attacks on British and Afghan forces fell by 80 per cent. The deal stipulated that:
Nonetheless, despite the clear potential that the accord
provided as a strategic victory, the British Provincial »» local commanders and coalition forces in the
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the provincial capital of USV would cease hostilities

»» USV commanders and their communities would lessons that have relevance far beyond the narrow context
acknowledge government authority in their lands of northern Helmand.
»» USV communities would, with coalition support,
resist any intrusions by external Taliban fighters Recognise that good brokers can play essential roles
»» Afghan and international forces could establish in peace mediation but have ambiguous identities.
joint patrol bases along the route of the main road By definition, the best intermediaries have sets of contacts
through the USV, on which coalition forces would have and a pattern of movement that can make them appear
complete freedom of movement suspicious from a counterterrorism perspective. Their
»» Afghan government officials helping to deliver public value as brokers is linked directly to their access to and
works would have access throughout the USV influence over significant figures on opposing sides
»» USV leaders would send representatives to sit on of a conflict. In the Musa Qala instance, elders on the
a district shura, or council. tribal jirga were able to parlay their influence over local
Taliban fighters into a settlement. In Sangin, the district
Side negotiations also saw Afghan officials promise to start governor, district elders, and later Agha Badar, played
project delivery immediately, while local commanders a key role in negotiations, with Badar ferrying letters
pledged to direct fighters under their command to between parties. In August 2011, however, Agha Badar was
volunteer for the local police. The deal was less inclusive, arrested by US forces and detained for almost two years
in terms of the USV communities committed to it, than the on account of his association with insurgent leaders – the
earlier accord, with Norzai tribesmen as well as Popalzai very quality that made him such an effective go-between.
and Ishaqzai groups around Jushalay, Mian Rud and Mazak Depth of local knowledge and suppleness of thought are
peeling away. Nonetheless, it provided a framework for crucial attributes for any international actor seeking to
reconciliation and continued engagement between local decide whether or not to back a potential broker. Equally
tribes and the Afghan government. important is the calibre of that actor’s Afghan advisors.
Following the pattern established earlier in the The Sangin examples showcase how the outcome of
year, however, failure to deliver on the project by negotiations can hinge on the personal characteristics
the government and its international partners soon of key brokers. It was the appointment of a new district
undermined the agreement. USV leaders struggled to governor to Sangin in March 2010 that made both Sangin
retain credibility with their communities as none of the accords feasible. Unlike his predecessors, Muhammed
small, low-cost infrastructure projects that had been Sharif became a trusted figurehead able to bridge
planned in negotiations actually materialised, such as tribal divides on the strength of his personal integrity.
repairs to irrigation canals. At the same time, the US Following his appointment, USV leaders sought to meet
forces now responsible for security in Sangin repeatedly with him, and the subsequent small-scale delivery of
destabilised the deal, confronting USV communities projects (pre-2011) were agreed in face-to-face meetings
in a clear violation of the spirit and at times the letter between community leaders and the district governor.
of the accord. Indeed, hostility among some senior US The role of Sharif’s British advisors, Phil Weatherill and
commanders towards any accommodation with local John McCarthy, as well as that of another British civilian,
fighters led one British official to suggest that the US Andy Corcoran, were also critical, with their deep well
Marine Corps leadership in Helmand ‘could not identify of detailed knowledge and diplomatic savvy helping to
a peaceful solution, developed by civilians, as a victory’. side-line spoilers who might otherwise have been able
Meanwhile, government and coalition support for a local to undercut the second accord.
police force, formed from reconciled fighters, never
happened. Before long, external fighters sent by the Empower local communities. The foundation of the
Taliban leadership found that they could intimidate USV three accords outlined above was the establishment of a
leaders with impunity. Agha Badar was shot and wounded revised social contract between local tribes and provincial
by the Taliban, and later imprisoned by US forces. By late government. It is a testament to the absence of the
summer 2011 the deal had collapsed. government in any meaningful form that these revised
contracts amounted to little more than a basic form of
Lessons from the accords engagement, in which the provincial government provided
Despite the ultimate failures of all three accords, each a modicum of basic services and security support in return
was briefly successful, dramatically reducing violence for political allegiance. The contracts were notable as much
and showing that even in remote corners of rural for what they prevented as for what they provided, namely
southern Afghanistan, Taliban supremacy is no foregone freedom from the predatory behaviour of discredited
conclusion. They also point to several simple yet critical local elites.

Honour commitments punctually. The Afghan government project delivery entirely. Until 2010, a degree of flexible,
and its international partners should recognise that easily accessible funding had been available to the Sangin
streamlined delivery mechanisms that bypass the capacity district governor through the UK Stabilisation Aid Fund.
issues faced by the Afghan government as well as the This relatively agile mechanism had allowed the British
bureaucracy of the international development apparatus advisors supporting the district government to respond
should be established before the conclusion of any to emerging opportunities for political stabilisation without
future deal. Arguably the biggest failure by the Afghan delay. From 2011, however, a change in the resourcing
government and its coalition partners in both Musa Qala model and a series of sweeping cuts, with no compensatory
and Sangin was their inability to deliver tangible benefits mechanism put in place, starved the local government
to the local communities engaged in the accords. of funding at an acutely sensitive political moment.
Semple has observed of the Musa Qala deal: ‘The Afghan Coordinate military and political activities. Throughout
government and international support structures are too late 2010, military operations in Sangin frequently
chronically cumbersome to deliver quick impact projects or damaged reconciliation attempts, sometimes at critical
capacity-building assistance to a challenging environment junctures, despite the supposed primacy of political
like Musa Qala … Projects remained bogged down in objectives. These included:
bureaucratic delays and support to the auxiliary police was
inflexible ... Whereas there was a need to enhance the »» an August 2010 drone strike against a reconcilable
prestige of the tribesmen working with the accord, the USV commander – who survived, and subsequently
handling of the follow-up by the government and informed district officials that the attempt against him
international community seemed calculated to marked the end of the first Sangin accord
undermine them.’ »» constant operations by US military forces in late
2010 despite a central government edict banning
“
Projects remained bogged such activity
»» a November 2010 drone strike that killed Sangin’s
down in bureaucratic delays and shadow governor – who was widely viewed as
support to the auxiliary police reconcilable, who was aiding negotiations towards
the second accord, and whose death had the effect of
was inflexible.” driving several constituencies away from the accord,
when previously they had been prepared to back it.
Much the same could be said of the two Sangin accords.
While uncoordinated military action – a drone strike This fundamental disconnect between Afghan and British
first, and later the arrest of a key intermediary – may officials pursuing a political deal on the one hand, and
have signalled the end of both the Sangin accords, it was US warfighters on the other, was also evident in the
the failure of the PRT and the provincial government to contrasting narratives with which each described the
uphold the government’s side of the deals that ultimately second Sangin accord. Senior US commanders framed
undermined them. Although the small, quick, cheap rural the deal as a surrender by Taliban-aligned fighters to
infrastructure projects promised to local communities the coalition rather than a compromise with honour – a
under the terms of the accords wore the veneer of depiction that many USV fighters found both insulting and
development work, their primary function was actually inaccurate. At the same time, US commanders insisted
to consolidate the grassroots political outreach that had on ‘testing the deal’, sometimes by contravening its
led to the accords in the first place. Delivered through the terms: on one occasion by driving the length of the USV,
district government, they were intended to demonstrate and then shooting dead an irate but unarmed villager;
government credibility, force USV leaders to engage by establishing patrol bases in territory well away from
with the district governor, burnish the prestige of the the main road; and by entering local compounds without
USV commanders who had switched allegiance to the Afghan forces in tandem.
government, and highlight the inability of the Taliban to
deliver anything similar. Quick delivery was essential. Where political and military action was coordinated,
Other considerations, such as quality of workmanship, however, as it had been in the build-up to the first Sangin
or strict observance of administrative process, were not. accord, the results were effective. Most notably, the
exercise of ‘heroic restraint’ by British forces through
Yet, as had been the case in Musa Qala, cumbersome the first half of 2010 was viewed positively by local
bureaucracy and a lack of strategic purpose across a communities, and contrasted sharply with abusive
multitude of Afghan and international agencies stalled behaviour by out-of-area Taliban personnel, whose actions

bred resentment and eventually led them to be perceived sought to project government authority through local
as occupiers – precisely as the district governor and his security forces, such as the Afghan National Army, rather
advisors intended. Meanwhile, military strikes against than the revised social contract envisioned in the accords.
irreconcilable USV fighters strengthened the position of What political support existed was largely ineffectual: for
more amenable elements of the local insurgency. example, President Hamid Karzai’s edict against military
operations in the USV in late 2010 was routinely flouted
Be realistic about central government support. Even by US forces.
when it is politically willing, the Afghan government’s
capacity to deliver is constrained. In Musa Qala, a lack of Recognise that local deals can nonetheless pave
will was compounded by concerted efforts to undermine the way for a national settlement. For all their local
the accord by elements of central government. During particularities, district- and even sub-district-level
the winter of 2006–07, the accord was the subject of an settlements have the potential to create space for political
inaccurate, hostile briefing by the National Directorate of settlements elsewhere. This is most evident in the way
Security (NDS), which portrayed it as an affront to Afghan that over time different communities in Sangin expressed
sovereignty that had turned Musa Qala into an insurgent their support for the accords, showing a widespread and
haven. Divorced though this portrayal was from reality, the popular appetite for the revised social contract on offer.
effect of the negative briefing was to undermine political This was provided that the Afghan government and its
support among senior Afghans and internationals, international partners could demonstrate credibility
helping to doom any efforts to deliver the development and good faith through the delivery of development
programming or police training mandated in the accord. and security support. Furthermore, successful local
deals have the potential to alter not just local realities
While the Sangin accords never faced the same level but broader perceptions of the conflict, opening up
of NDS hostility, they still lacked the benefit of genuine more political space for deals elsewhere. And finally,
central government support. Line ministries failed to with the long-term success of local deals ultimately
view the region as a strategic priority, maintaining few requiring national backing, obtaining this degree of
officials and police in the districts and neglecting to political commitment in and of itself sets the stage for
pay salaries – and so communicating a tone of general reconciliation on a grander scale.
indifference. Meanwhile, the Afghan security apparatus

Inclusive local
peacebuilding
in Afghanistan
Lessons from practice
Jawed Nader and Fleur Roberts
Jawed Nader has been the Director of British & Irish Agencies Fleur Roberts is a British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group
Afghanistan Group since 2012. He has extensive experience in trustee and has worked with civil society in Afghanistan since 2011.
promoting civil society and good governance in Afghanistan. He She has had a particular focus on working with local civil society
worked as the Director of the Afghanistan Land Authority (2009- to test and deliver locally led approaches to support sustainable
2011), and as Advocacy Manager with the Afghan Civil Society development. She holds an MA in International Development from
Forum (2002-2006). He is from Ghazni, Afghanistan and holds a the University of Auckland.
postgraduate degree in Public Policy from the University of Bristol.
ABSTRACT
How have local peacebuilding initiatives contributed A question remains over the implications for peace
to inclusive peace in Afghanistan? beyond the local level. Community-based mechanisms
used effectively can help link local agency to formal
Local peace councils have played essential roles in peace structures and processes – for example local
resolving disputes and supporting justice, working with peace councils sharing conflict analysis and mitigation
traditional jirgas and shuras to fill gaps in the formal planning with provincial and high peace councils. As
justice architecture. Religious actors’ influence also well as providing a significant practical resource, such
has a key function to mediate local conflicts. Neither initiatives would also help to ground the national peace
of these institutions should be idealised and both bring architecture, which at present is widely perceived as
challenges, such as relating to representation, gender, remote and ineffective.
conservatism and clientalism. But linking up with NGOs
in joint peace initiatives has brought mutual benefits, for
example in enhancing women’s involvement, and has
helped to multiply gains in preventing local violence.

Graffiti in Kabul by Afghan activist group Art Lords, saying: Tan-e maihan ba marham ehtiaj ast – The country’s wounds need a cure. © Najeebullah Azad
Many Afghan and international non-governmental system and socio-economic structures – can also drive
organisations (NGOs) have been engaging in peacebuilding support for the insurgency.
initiatives in Afghanistan since the mid-1990s. A number
of different approaches have been supported by NGOs Mechanisms to facilitate peacebuilding at the grassroots
and by civil society more widely to promote peace in range from broader development initiatives to more
response to multi-faceted and persistent drivers of conflict. specific peace interventions such as peace education
This article draws on research by the British and Irish and awareness raising, supporting UN Security Council
Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) in 2017, which aimed Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, engaging
to document examples of community and civil society-led with religious scholars (ulema) and other leaders, and
peacebuilding initiatives. The research involved a desk strengthening local dispute resolution mechanisms.
study and 15 semi-structured interviews with employees of Local initiatives occur across the country but are much
a number of international NGOs (INGOs) and Afghan NGOs less prevalent in areas that are too insecure. This article
(ANGOs) operating in Afghanistan. focuses primarily on efforts to enhance dispute resolution
at the local level, in particular at two specific examples and
Why look at the local level given the dominance and how such initiatives relate to the broader armed conflict.
persistence of political conflict between armed opposition
groups, namely the Taliban and Islamic State in Khorasan Local peace councils
(ISK), and the Government of Afghanistan and its allies? Participants in the research noted that trust in formal
The NGOs interviewed stressed that a conventional political justice mechanisms is poor. The majority of people,
settlement will not on its own secure long-term peace in particularly in rural areas, more frequently refer to
Afghanistan. The country’s deteriorating situation shows traditional and informal mechanisms such as shuras
that existing top-down approaches are insufficient. Some and jirgas, which consequently resolve a greater number
feel there has been a disproportionate focus on macro- of disputes than formal mechanisms – from local land
level measures, compared with limited support for Afghan disputes to small-scale armed conflicts.
grassroots to address local drivers of instability.
But despite their prevalence and impact, respondents noted
The causes and effects of insecurity in Afghanistan vary that community-based mechanisms are not without their
greatly and measures to address it need to be multi- challenges. They can be unrepresentative and influenced
faceted to respond to drivers of conflict at all levels. Local by ingrained and partisan power dynamics, resulting in
tensions and disputes break down social cohesion and can decisions that sustain power imbalances disproportionately
compound the authority of criminal and armed opposition in favour of elites, and that disadvantage the most
groups. Equally, disenfranchisement and perceptions of vulnerable and reinforce harmful practices such as baad
unfairness in society – relating to governance, the justice – the custom of settlement or compensation whereby a

female from the guilty party’s family is given to the victim’s resolving a number of community-based conflicts.
family as a servant or a bride. Also, shuras and jirgas often As a result of the project, decreases in reported
focus on community harmony, which is generally achieved disputes were recorded as follows:
by arriving at a settlement, and not necessarily on providing
justice to the affected individuals. This can limit meaningful »» water disputes – 29 per cent
transformation of conflicts, allowing discontent to fester. »» legal disputes – 19 per cent
»» poverty and unemployment-related disputes –
The NGOs interviewed indicated that while some 27 per cent
organisations have worked to strengthen existing »» conflicts stemming from disputants’ different
shuras and jirgas, many have focused on supporting the religious beliefs and practices – 5 per cent
establishment of new, more inclusive community-based »» conflicts over customs or traditional practices in
mechanisms. The most common approach has been to target communities – 15 per cent.
set up village- and district-level peace committees and
councils (henceforth peace councils), and a number have The long-term sustainability of the peace councils is yet
been initiated across multiple provinces. to be fully established. Moreover, attributing impact is
complicated as their success in a given area depends on
The inclusivity of the councils – ensuring representation of several factors including security, social cohesion within
all facets of society – is prioritised to ensure more equitable the particular community, the nature, size and history of
outcomes. A multi-step consultation and selection process disputes, and the community’s attitudes towards traditional
is usually undertaken with various groups within the dispute resolution mechanisms. Equally, while the verdicts
community to scrutinise and cross-check information of the councils are non-binding, if the affected parties
about prospective members. Extensive meetings are are limited in their capacity to access the formal justice
held between the NGO and the local community to agree sector – whether because of money, gender or geography
on the best approach and composition. In some cases, – then there may be little recourse for appeal, as is the
involving ulema in the peace councils has helped to improve case with traditional shuras and jirgas.
inclusivity, especially in terms of women’s participation.
For example, one Afghan NGO’s work with ulema in nine Efforts have been made to give more weight to the
communities in north-eastern Afghanistan has resulted traditional dispute resolution mechanisms by formalising
in the ulema championing women’s social participation. them or improving their linkages with state institutions.
This has helped to convince other community leaders such For example, the Afghan government is considering
as maliks, khans, landlords and other powerful figures to the viability of bringing these mechanisms under the
accept a greater role for women in local committees, which Community Development Councils (CDCs). However,
in turn has had a positive impact in ensuring greater gender the CDCs already have a range of responsibilities beyond
justice in the councils’ decisions. their role of implementing rural development projects.
Adding a dispute resolution function could potentially
Peace councils have been supported to analyse the drivers create tensions between CDCs’ various roles, while
of conflicts that are impacting their community, and to such integration could also impact on the inclusive
work to address these underlying drivers and to play a composition of the peace councils.
mediation role. Examples of common disputes addressed
include conflicts over resources or domestic disputes. The NGOs interviewed stressed the value of considering
Some of the peace councils have also attempted to help the relative strength of the peace councils as informal
alleviate conflicts involving political parties, militias and independent bodies, and what might be lost if they are
major ethnic groups. Their existence has helped to improve formalised. Nonetheless, viable options for linking the
community resilience in the wake of political tension councils with the formal sector should be explored further
resulting from elections or political processes elsewhere in as a way of providing them with on-going support and
the country or seasonal tensions between nomadic groups facilitating their role as key agents in the process of conflict
and settlers. transformation, providing they respect existing institutions’
strengths and customs.
An external assessment was conducted by Thousand
Plateaus Consultancy Services of one peace council Working with religious actors
project led by an INGO jointly with six ANGOs in Religious leaders and scholars hold considerable influence
eight districts across four regions of Afghanistan. over public opinion. Estimated at around about 170,000
The evaluation confirmed that the peace councils individuals, religious leaders comprise graduates of
in question have been successful in preventing and religious schools and universities from both Sunni and

Shia jurisprudences – primarily men but also a few women. to resolve disputes sustainably. In a few cases, the religious
Unlike politicians, they are not elected and derive their leaders successfully engaged in dialogue with local
authority from the study of Islam, operating as religio- opposition groups.
political actors. Most hold conservative views and exert
“
influence over social and political processes.
Successes were achieved by
Nevertheless, peacebuilding projects that have using an educational approach
acknowledged their role and have engaged them in projects that was both experiential and
from the outset have had some success in building support
for more inclusive conflict resolution. For example, some participatory, which changed the
cases have demonstrated that obtaining the support of way religious scholars interacted
religious leaders can create more space for women’s social
participation, but only if the leaders in question are open to
with people to resolve disputes.”
this outcome and are approached in a way that raises their
own awareness about the importance of women’s rights The initiative has empowered participants to be active
and women’s empowerment. peace agents. Successes were achieved by using an
educational approach that was both experiential and
An example of an initiative that has achieved positive participatory, which changed the way religious scholars
results for peacebuilding is one in which two INGOs and an interacted with people to resolve disputes. The evaluation
ANGO work with religious leaders in all 34 provinces to help found that while these methods were different from the
them contribute more effectively to sustainable peace. The religious actors’ usual practice of taking authoritative
initiative recognised that religious actors play a critical role decisions and making judgements on people’s behalf,
in mediating local conflicts, and are often preferred over they helped to promote active learning, critical thinking,
official judicial systems. However, as their work is mostly participation and ownership among participants.
focused on preaching, teaching and advising on religious
obligations, their conflict resolution potential is largely The religious scholars reported that they changed their
under-used and abilities underdeveloped. approach towards more inclusive processes in which they
listened to people and sought their perspectives in the
The initiative set out to develop the skills of 414 religious suggested solutions, which made their mediation more
actors, including 98 women, who were members of the acceptable. The initiative also fostered a network among
nationwide Religious Actors for Peace network. The the different scholars, which according to the evaluation
aim was to strengthen their reach and effectiveness was critical in enabling them to access support and share
in resolving family, community and provincial-level ideas, challenges and learning. Meeting in person and
conflicts by providing training and mentoring in dispute regularly exchanging views, through phone and social
resolution approaches. The initiative also linked these media, created more harmony and openness among
actors to national peace structures in order to capitalise network members and helped to counter stereotypes
on their potential to mediate and foster peace across about scholars of other jurisprudences.
the country, and to include their voice in national-level
peace processes. These findings provide important lessons for other
initiatives aiming to promote more inclusive conflict
An external evaluation of the project found that a key resolution approaches with religious actors. But there
strength was the support it gave to help religious actors are associated risks. First, the risks to ulema need to be
work together to explore different interpretations of the carefully assessed. While ulema enjoy high degrees of trust
Qur'an in relation to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. and respect among the Taliban and other armed actors,
According to the evaluation, the methods used resulted in evidence has shown that armed opposition groups keep a
increased knowledge, capacity and motivation to mediate close eye on ulema who speak against their political views
conflicts. They also positively changed the way in which the and have, in some cases, threatened or assassinated them.
religious actors work in their communities by fostering Clearly, protection and Do No Harm principles need to be
participation and non-violent approaches that help to carefully factored into programme planning.
mediate, rather than perpetuate, root causes of local
conflicts. Religious scholars were taught practical and A key challenge for the initiative described above was that
conflict-sensitive ways of analysing disputes. These have it was able to achieve the aim of linking the network of
made them more conscious of their own limitations as religious actors to official peace structures. The role of
peace actors but have also given them more effective tools ulema in national and regional-level peace structures is

still ambiguous and there are varying views on what role, that have made community peace mechanisms effective,
if any, they should have in peace processes. much more consideration needs to be given to whether
strengthening linkages between informal and formal peace
Conclusion: implications for inclusivity and justice structures could help make the peace process
While assessments of local peace initiatives show positive more inclusive.
results for conflict mediation and resolution at the local
level, what, if any, are the implications for conflict and An inclusive peace process for Afghanistan must find
peace more broadly in Afghanistan? In many cases, there ways to involve all affected groups, including the most
has not been a direct link between local initiatives and marginalised. For example, Afghanistan’s population
formal processes – although there are some examples of involves a complex ethnic composition at the national
councils and religious actors engaging in dialogue with level and a complex tribal composition at the local level.
armed groups. So, what relevance do they have? It is the An inclusive peace process needs to accommodate both
view of the authors, and many of those interviewed, that the ethnic and tribal dimensions of conflict. At the local
such initiatives are important in facilitating peace. Formal level, NGOs have had success with adopting a conflict-
peace processes need to enable genuine participation from sensitive approach, which tries to ensure that all relevant
civil society, including religious actors and peace councils, stakeholders in a community are consulted and involved,
which our research suggests is fundamental in supporting including in relation to tribal affiliation. Particularly in
broader inclusivity. the case of peace councils, this approach has helped to
minimise potential errors or omissions that might result
There are multiple drivers of insecurity in Afghanistan, in ostracising particular groups, especially the most
so the response needs to be a multi-faceted. Mechanisms vulnerable and least influential.
that help to prevent violence – of any type – are important
in creating stability. Strengthening community-based Inclusive peace efforts will also need to take into account
conflict mitigation and resolution mechanisms is an the changing role of Afghan women in various sectors.
important approach in addressing localised drivers of At the local level, gender perceptions can be very varied
conflict and is particularly important where formal rule of and certain male leaders might find the way some NGOs
law and governance structures are weak or inaccessible. approach gender intimidating or incompatible. The
research found good examples of NGOs that have had
Complementing this should be a range of approaches that success moving away from narrow interpretations of a
help to build wider stability at the community level and gender approach. These have taken into account the needs
beyond. For example, unemployment and lack of economic of men and boys, and have worked with male leaders more
opportunities were cited in the research as key drivers to subtly and implicitly on gender justice matters. Dialogue on
conflict at meso- and micro-levels. Peacebuilding projects inclusive peace at the macro level could draw lessons from
that reduce poverty and improve livelihood prospects, local practice. While national and local peace processes
and even bring warring communities together over joint operate on vastly different scales, local-level approaches
economic endeavours, can be effective as they tackle this have the potential to provide useful insights on inclusivity.
driver in a visible way.
The importance of multi-track processes to building
If used effectively, community-based mechanisms can sustainable peace is widely recognised. But this recognition
also provide pathways for community voices to feed into is not matched by concrete support. Political peace
formal peace structures and processes. For example, processes need to be broadened and much more attention
community peace councils throughout the country have needs to be paid to the contribution of communities. The
engaged in conflict analysis and mitigation planning with powerful examples of peace practice presented here show
their communities. This adds up to a wealth of information how civil society initiatives have helped to strengthen
that could inform analysis and planning of provincial conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level in
and high peace councils. The research suggested that Afghanistan. Tapping into this resource can enhance and
government peace structures are perceived as remote and harness local capacity to promote a more inclusive and
ineffective, which undermines their legitimacy and capacity sustainable peace process.
to deliver. While being careful to not undermine the factors

Political process
in Afghanistan
What role for international partners?
Ed Hadley and Christopher D. Kolenda
Ed Hadley has worked for the UK government on foreign policy Dr Christopher D. Kolenda, Founder of the Strategic Leaders
and conflict issues for nearly 15 years. After posts at the Academy in Washington DC, recently served as the Senior Advisor
Assessments Staff of the Cabinet Office and National Security on Afghanistan and Pakistan to US Under Secretary of Defense
Secretariat, he worked for the Foreign Office for five years as a Michèle A. Flournoy and three four-star Generals in Afghanistan.
Senior Research Analyst on Afghanistan, with a particular focus He was decorated with the Department of Defense’s highest civilian
on the Taliban insurgency. In 2015 he moved to the Stabilisation award for his work on strategy. A veteran of four combat tours in
Unit, where he continues to focus on Afghanistan and South Asia Afghanistan, Chris holds a PhD in War Studies from King’s College,
as well as on wider research projects on peace processes and London; his dissertation is a critical analysis of American strategic
elite bargains and the analysis of the impact of UK stabilisation leadership in post-9/11 wars. He supports emerging growth
interventions abroad. The views expressed in this article do not businesses and nonprofits on leadership, organisational culture
necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies. and strategy.
ABSTRACT
How can international partners provide effective war, operating nationally, bilaterally and regionally,
support for a political process in Afghanistan? and also the incremental political logic of conflict
resolution, working through a step-by-step process
A political solution to the armed conflict between from informal dialogue and confidence-building,
the Afghan government and the Taliban must be to military de-escalation and formal negotiations.
Afghan-led. But international support is essential
to build momentum and resilience. Lessons from past peacemaking efforts stress the
need for: 1) a peace process necessitating a long-term
There is a compelling moral and practical case to commitment; 2) strategic prioritisation, to coordinate
convince Western allies to work collaboratively and activities towards a common political goal; and 3) third-
strategically, using their collective leverage to persuade party facilitation, excluding external states currently
conflict parties to engage in talks. A viable approach operating in Afghanistan.
must acknowledge the multi-tiered realities of the

US soldiers investigate an insurgent fighting position overlooking routes used by locals as well as the US and Afghan Security Forces through the inhabited
valleys of Paktya Province, 2008. © ZUMA Press, Inc. / Alamy Stock Photo
Afghanistan’s war, past and present, is multi-tiered. and its erstwhile al-Qaeda allies, which are linked but
Myriad local and sub-national conflicts sit within and distinct, making the argument for political engagement
shape a national confrontation, which itself sits within and dialogue harder to win.
and is shaped by a complex interplay of cross-border,
regional and international tensions, conflicts, relationships This conceptual challenge has also fed into the wider
and interests. While it is of course primarily an Afghan tension between the counter-terrorist policy of Western
war, regional and international actors are central to its states and their concurrent interest in starting a political
continuation and, therefore, its eventual resolution. process, resulting in conflicting priorities. The perceived
emphasis on military force and operations, for instance,
Officials and non-governmental actors in Washington, has created the impression that peace is not a priority.
London and other capitals have attempted various The abortive June 2013 opening of a Taliban ‘political
initiatives to bring the belligerents into a political office’ in Doha, on the other hand, generated cynicism
process, including bilateral and multilateral talks, Track about political outreach, damaged US-Afghan relations,
2 conferences, combatant reintegration programmes and and undermined negotiations over the proposed Bilateral
economic inducements. But in the absence of an agreed Security Agreement to allow US and international troops
and coordinated vision and public narrative, divergent to remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014.
interests and spoiler actions have undermined such efforts.
Further complicating support for a political process with
Recent signs of movement towards political dialogue, the Taliban are legitimate questions about whether it
stimulated by President Ashraf Ghani’s February 2018 would involve compromises on some of the advances
offer of peace talks with the Taliban, are encouraging. achieved in Afghanistan since 2001 on human rights,
But history shows that even the most promising political education, elections and the constitution. Moreover,
process can be derailed, not least in its nascent stages. there are concerns about the political cohesion of the
Progress needs to be nurtured, to build momentum and Taliban and the credibility of its more moderate wing
resilience to withstand shocks. What, then, are the options – which comprises mainly former Taliban officials and
for effective international support for a peace process in diplomats, many of whom are based in Doha. Would
Afghanistan? A way forward is to develop a coherent and engaging or even reaching an agreement with the
incremental approach that responds to the multi-layered Taliban result in any tangible outcomes?
realities of the conflict.
These complexities and ambiguities continue to cause
Obstacles great uncertainty about the prospects for any political
The challenge of finding a political solution to Afghanistan’s process, including among Taliban leaders. Many of them
war has been compounded by a lack of clear analysis of the interpret calls for a process as little more than a demand
conflict problem to be addressed, and by often competing that they capitulate. This is despite the fact that the
policy imperatives. In the West, and especially in the US, Afghan and US governments have continually stressed
there has been a tendency to blur the Taliban movement since 2011 that their three ‘red lines’ – that the Taliban

cut ties with al-Qaeda, renounce violence and support the occurs when the actors perceive that the likely costs of
Afghan constitution – were end-conditions rather than pre- attempting further military gains exceed the benefits.
conditions for negotiation. Perception that an outright military victory is unlikely is not
sufficient – actors will use military operations to increase
Making the case their leverage, too. Only when this becomes too costly will
Political dialogue between the Taliban and Kabul faces they begin to seek alternatives. Third, the actors must
resistance from many quarters inside and outside believe that a viable alternative path exists to achieve their
Afghanistan. Establishing a compelling case is key to core interests. An alternative path only becomes viable
build and sustain support. US President Donald Trump’s when sufficient confidence exists that the other party (or
revised Afghan strategy announced in August 2017 does parties) can make and keep credible commitments. This
not rule out a more assertive international effort to drive step alone could take years to unfold. There is no reason to
a political process forward. But his one-line reference to wait for some magic moment of insight to strike the actors.
a possible ‘political settlement that includes elements of There is a critical requirement to act now.
the Taliban in Afghanistan’ suggests there is work to be
done to convince the President and his National Security Although many voices on the side of the Afghan government
Council to commit. and Taliban recognise – even if only privately – that there is
no military solution to the conflict, both sides still believe
Despite the complex challenges, some things are clear. they can still advance their negotiating leverage through
Decisive military victory is highly unlikely. State-building military action and battlefield gains. The ‘uplift’ of US
initiatives will prove reversible in the absence of an forces announced in August 2017 has clearly given the
eventual settlement. The human and financial cost of the Afghan government new hope of forcing the Taliban to sue
war is vast. Tens of thousands of Afghan civilians have been for peace. For their part, the Taliban are likely to exercise
killed or wounded. In the first five months of 2017 alone, patience to see how intense this latest military push will be.
Afghan security forces reportedly suffered 2,531 killed Meanwhile, they are likely to continue seeking territorial
and 4,238 wounded. Over 3,500 international troops have gains and to secure a major population centre, such as
lost their lives. The US has spent over $800 billion since Kunduz or Lashkar Gah.
2001. Without a credible political process, President Trump
could yet enter the 2020 US election having spent another Political process in practice: steps and levels
$100 billion, and likely having lost more service members, To build on positive signs of headway towards a political
with no appreciable change in the strategic situation. process, an expanded international initiative to support
dialogue should proceed along interrelated and phased
There is a clear and obvious moral argument to be made. steps. These would need to function on multiple levels
But to win over sceptics it also needs to be articulated to be effective, matching the multi-tiered nature of the
in more hard-headed terms. It should be framed so as conflict. The steps begin with dialogue and confidence-
to make clear that the best way to ensure an eventual building measures. This foundational first step is key
transition out of Afghanistan and a reduction in the to progress in current conditions and so is the focus
enormous bill for the local security forces will be a of attention here. Advancement on step one facilitates
political process that tackles the root causes of the movement on steps two and three: limitations on military
interconnected conflicts described above – and does so activities leading to a general ceasefire; and finally more
in a way that respects the service and sacrifice of Afghans formal negotiations.
as well as of international troops. A strong case can also
be made for political intervention on the basis that the The three levels correspond to the dimensions of the
Afghan war is now highly internationalised. The conflict conflict where international facilitators can make a
plays into wider tensions between India and Pakistan, Iran reasonable difference: first, regional – Afghanistan’s
and Saudi Arabia, India and China, and the US and Russia, neighbours plus India, China, Russia, and also the US;
among others. The risks of broader instability are high, second, bilateral – Afghanistan and Pakistan; and third,
and the impact that this could have on Western security national – the Afghan government and the Taliban. Given
interests are considerable. the complex and dynamic nature of the conflict, a third-
party facilitator would be well placed to ensure efforts
Looking forward, the literature tells us that a peace are coordinated and mutually reinforcing – as discussed
process is likely to gain momentum when a ‘mutually in more detail below. Critically, international actors must
hurting stalemate’ exists. This requires three conditions. avoid poorly coordinated and overly high-profile ‘rushes to
First, that the conflict is deadlocked. Second, that the failure’ – such as the attempted opening of the Taliban’s
parties to the conflict recognise this to be the case. This Doha ‘office’ in 2013 – that have undermined earlier efforts.

Step one would need international engagement at all constructively when required, and how quickly the policy
three levels to find agreeable confidence-building edifice seemingly preventing progress can be undone.
measures in order to establish the credibility of all The Hekmatyar deal is no template for negotiations with
parties to deliver tangible progress. Confidence-building the much larger and more powerful Taliban movement –
measures, if carefully crafted, can begin while the conflict but it shows what can be achieved with enough resolve.
is ongoing and accelerate both the recognition of stalemate
and a viable alternative path. Measures in step one could International actors also need to seek bottom-up
include cooperation on polio vaccines, for which there is opportunities to support progress on dialogue at the
some precedent, or on reducing civilian harm. A gradual national level. Efforts to reform local government and
intensification and constant evaluation of confidence- local High Peace Council structures have been important
building measures would reduce the risk of ceding political and need to continue. But to complement these, a
and military advantage or creating unrealistic expectations. potentially effective innovation around step one would
Starting small and building toward more significant be for international actors to dedicate more effort to
measures has the potential to create important momentum understand and collectively tailor their support for local
and credibility, and offers a practical, low-risk, high-payoff level peace initiatives. Insurgents and officials have found
way forward. accommodations locally in the past that have genuinely
reduced levels of violence [see article on Brokering local
A subsequent advance within step one would be to seek settlements, p. 74].
agreement on broad-brush principles on which further
dialogue could be built. There is arguably already a basis Given the reduced international footprint in Afghanistan
for this. International actors, the Afghan government and today, mobilising adequate and effective support for
the Taliban leadership are all under some bottom-up local initiatives would be no mean feat. One way forward
public pressure to bring greater stability to Afghanistan; would be to consider ‘trial de-escalation zones’ at a sub-
all three want to see foreign fighters withdrawn from provincial level, perhaps leading to local ceasefires.
Afghanistan, whether Arabs or Americans; and all three are Afghan government engagement could be monitored and
committed to seeing corruption reduced and governance constructively supported. Positive popular pressure for
practised in light of Afghan tradition and Islamic values. All peace generated by such initiatives could be channelled
international players can also agree, at least rhetorically, upwards to both the insurgent and government leaderships.
that it is in their interests to see a sovereign, stable and
neutral Afghanistan – even if the more difficult issues Building momentum: international leverage
of distribution of political power and any long-term The US and its allies have a number of points of leverage
international troop presence would need to be considered over the key actors. Together, they have potential to bring
later in the process. their considerable diplomatic and political authority to
bear in an effort to cajole, persuade and engage all parties,
Step one could also include a well-coordinated and clearly and help establish conditions in which a political process
supported dialogue process at Tracks 2 (unofficial) and 1.5 might grow.
(quasi-official), undertaken ‘quietly’ with minimal media
coverage. This could help generate momentum at the On the Taliban side, there is evidence that the movement’s
national level. The Track 2 event held in Chantilly in France leadership recognise that they do need to engage the
in 2012, which was attended by members of the Taliban US and wider international community politically, for
leadership, caused tensions in Kabul. But it also exposed example their agreement to establish and maintain their
some Taliban leaders to other contrasting Afghan voices Doha ‘office’. Taliban leaders recall the heavy cost of their
and gave the movement’s more pragmatic figures a status isolation when in power and there have been signs that
and platform they otherwise lacked. the more politically savvy among them know that if the
movement is to survive into the long term, it must evolve
These initiatives are not without risk. But both the Afghan into a position whereby it can benefit from the enduring
government and the Taliban will need to see something support that Afghanistan needs to recover.
positive ‘on the table’ if they are to be able to sell any form
of engagement to their sceptical constituencies. In support More generally, the movement’s leaders continue to seek
of the Afghan government’s successful negotiation of the international recognition and respect they believe their
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s return to Kabul and culmination of movement deserves, given what they see as its central
his faction’s insurgency, the international community was role in rescuing Afghanistan from the horrors of the civil
able to lift sanctions on members of the armed group. This war in the 1990s. As such, despite the understandable
showed that international partners can react quickly and frustrations, there remains continued practical and

symbolic utility in the Taliban’s ‘office’ in Doha remaining It would of course be critical to build a respected and
open, as a future channel for contact and dialogue, and a expert team to support facilitation, which would need to
platform and outlet for the movement’s more pragmatic be empowered to bring together the various key actors.
leaders. Closing the political office, as some have Such a team could build up slowly and, if appropriate,
suggested, sends a powerful statement to the Taliban draw in other international actors and allies, whether
that nothing is to be gained from pursuing peace. from other Muslim states or organisations, or from
countries that have gone through similar multi-decade
With regard to the Afghan government and the wider processes, such as Colombia or the Philippines. Any
array of powerful political players in Afghanistan third-party team would also need to be able to draw
currently, the US and its allies could do more to leverage on the diplomatic, conflict resolution and mediation
the extraordinary levels of assistance that they continue human resources and expertise required to take such
to provide to ensure that there is an unrelenting focus a complex political process forward. Some of that skill
on getting a political process under way. The US and base and experience may be best drawn from the NGO
its international partners have a reasonable right to and peacebuilding community, where they have made
insist that the Afghan government supports plausible important contributions to peace efforts such as in the
opportunities to bring the conflict to a durable peace. Philippines or Nepal.
“
Shared objectives with regard to peace are especially
important given the risk that misaligned interests and Closing the political office, as
objectives between Western states and their allies have some have suggested, sends a
damaged peace initiatives in relation to past conflicts.
There is a significant risk of this happening in Afghanistan
powerful statement to the Taliban
today with the 2019 Afghan presidential elections looming, that nothing is to be gained from
as candidates may seek advantage in undermining any
pursuing peace.”
nascent political process initiatives.
In the final reckoning, there can only be an ‘Afghan-led’ Lessons identified – and learned?
political solution to the national dimension of the Afghan The costs of continued conflict in Afghanistan are huge.
conflict, a point all international actors have recognised While vital to the overall effort, the military campaign
in recent years. Evidence from across the world suggests alone will not bring stability, and nor will state-building
that the capacity of external actors to ‘screwdriver’ a deal efforts prove sustainable for as long as their fundamental
is very limited, and would only result in further instability legitimacy is disputed by an armed element of the Afghan
in the long term. population. We have argued here that an internationally
supported peace process is the best way to ensure the
But that does not mean international actors are discounted. gains made since 2001 are sustained.
Steps one (dialogue and confidence building), two
(reductions in military activities) and three (formal talks) The challenges to taking forward an Afghan political
will all require international support in some form to get process are undoubtedly enormous. The exclusivity of
traction. There is a need to ensure that an Afghan-led Afghanistan’s current political settlement will need to be
process does not become one that excuses international carefully recalibrated and the Taliban and their national
actors from taking action, or provides an opportunity to and regional supporters, who believe themselves to have
those in Afghanistan and the region who do not see it as in been excluded since 2001, will need to be brought back into
their interests that a political process progresses. the political fold.
International third-party facilitation As noted, any progress towards a recalibrated Afghan

Any renewed international effort, especially of the kind and regional political settlement will require difficult
involving regional diplomacy, will require strong political choices and compromises, and potentially significant
leadership. The investment in human resources and trade-offs on contentious indigenous and international
the injection of political capital must be commensurate issues. At the same time, there is a need to avoid too much
with the task at hand. A third-party facilitator – UN or discussion of end states. While a set of underlying shared
independent – would, we believe, be very well placed to principles may provide a helpful basis for dialogue, it will
begin to develop the foundations across the three levels be impossible to forecast the precise outlines of a future
of engagement described above for a credible peace settlement now, and attempts to do so will only serve as
process to begin. poison pills.

If a renewed commitment to peace in Afghanistan is made, actors is diminishing and the insurgency shows signs of
international policymakers must reflect on the following becoming more fragmented and radical. But the short-
lessons identified from other conflicts, and develop their term viability and impact of each step of the peace process
strategy around them. needs to be considered carefully.
Recognise the need for a peace process. The nature of the Establish third-party facilitation infrastructure and
Afghan conflict suggests that there will probably not be processes that can devote full-time attention to the
a clear moment at which peace is ‘achieved’. The step- challenges outlined here. International states currently
by-step process outlined above holds far more realistic operating in Afghanistan need to recognise that despite
prospects of sustainable progress towards reductions in laudable efforts to broker peace, they can never act as
violence over the next several years than well-intentioned ‘honest brokers’. An expert mediation support team
efforts to broker national-level ceasefires and one-off could help bring together key actors, where appropriate
peace deals. International actors will need to make a engaging international partners from other Muslim states
long-term commitment. Following 40 years of war, it may or organisations, countries with practical past experience
take almost as long to achieve a more equitable and stable of peace processes, or civil society expertise.
political settlement.
Prioritise the political process ruthlessly. Minimise the
Avoid a rush to failure, while recognising that the longer unintended consequences of other strands of activity and
international engagement in a political process is put off, synchronise interventions towards a common political goal,
the harder it will become to get going. The Afghan war while acknowledging that policy and strategy tensions will
economy is already powerful, the leverage of international always exist.

Section 3
Looking forward
Institutional change
Potential space exists in Afghanistan to diverge from past political patterns and
choose new paths forward. For example, reformulating Afghanistan’s political
system to facilitate broader inclusion and accommodate opposition non-violently
might offer a way to support sustainable stability and insulate Afghanistan
against regional political change or interference.
Elections in 2018 and 2019 present opportunities in this opportunity for the international community to mediate
regard – elections, while deeply flawed in Afghanistan, electoral reform. Some forms of indirect voting may offer
remain popular with the general public. While reform possibilities to enhance regional balance and moderate
before the coming cycle is not likely, a large-scale extreme influences in the electorate. Peace talks with
overhaul of the political system is overdue and a the Taliban present another opening to broker change,
consultative process to initiate this could bolster the which would necessitate re-examining the fundamental
legitimacy of a newly elected president. structures of government and creating space for
bargaining over how to administer authority.
Section 3 of this publication explores options for
institutional change, and scope for renegotiating reform Interspersed through Section 3 are interviews with
in the context of a peace process. Themes explored community members across different rural districts
in this section include inclusive politics as a path to in Afghanistan between November 2017 and March 2018
peace; local perspectives on peace and democracy from – in Herat Province in the west, Nangarhar Province in
four provinces; reflections on peace and transition by the east, Balkh Province in the north and Ghazni Province
significant Afghan figures; theses on peacemaking in in the south-east. Interviewees discuss their views on
Afghanistan; human rights, security and Afghanistan’s elections, peace and reconciliation. Respondents’ ages
peace process; and institutionalising inclusive and and ethnic groups vary, as do their levels of literacy. Data
sustainable justice. were collected as part of a larger research project funded
by the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Scott Worden opens Section 3 by asking what sort of
political system can enhance inclusion in Afghanistan Dr Habiba Sarabi, Deputy Chair of the High Peace Council
– to convince the Taliban to participate and compete for in Afghanistan, discusses some of her thoughts on
power peacefully, and current power-holders to let them elections and peace in Afghanistan, from a conversation
in. Options for institutional reform present dilemmas with Anna Larson in November 2017. She describes
between a presidential or parliamentary system and how frustrations with the pace of electoral reform. Voter
to promote a more party-oriented electoral arrangement registration at polling centres will facilitate a more
that can encourage greater accountability but discourage effective ballot and strong civil society monitoring
further ethnic mobilisation and division. Supporting more could play an important role. Fresh leadership and a
democratic local governance may be one way to enhance new strategy in the High Peace Council have meant that
representation, and presidential elections in 2019 are an motivation to work for peace is high, especially among

women on it. Afghan women have two central roles to The failure of the Bonn Agreement to make significant
advance peace: observing political negotiations to ensure commitments to human rights is often cited as a major
achievements are not lost; and at grassroots level, to play factor undermining peace and stability in Afghanistan
a social role to convince male members of families and today. Patricia Gossman examines the human rights
communities not to fight. A voluntary network has been priorities for a future peace settlement for Afghanistan
established for women to contribute to peacebuilding and the prospects for negotiating these effectively. Three
in this way. All Afghan leaders are men; the majority of deeply contested issues are critical to negotiating human
candidates in elections will be men. International partners rights in a future peace settlement: 1) demilitarisation
can help by focusing on women’s participation. – agreeing terms to demilitarise armed groups, including
establishing an oversight body and securing international
In conversation with Accord, former speaker of parliament backing for sanctions against violators; 2) women’s rights
Younus Qanooni discusses institutional changes needed – addressing concerns over the potential negative impact of
to support sustainable peace in Afghanistan and how such a settlement on women’s rights; and 3) transitional justice
changes might be achieved. Mr Qanooni stresses that force – addressing the legacy of massive human rights violations
should be aimed at convincing the Taliban to negotiate. and war crimes in order to avoid the persistence of abuses.
Efforts to reintegrate Taliban fighters outside a political Negotiating progress on transitional justice will not be easy.
settlement will continue to fail as reconciliation requires Acknowledging the truth about past atrocities may offer a
serious concessions from both sides. Elections present viable entry point for meaningful progress for reconciliation.
a dilemma for peace: the government will not negotiate
before elections; but afterwards the Taliban will not engage In conversation with Accord, leader of the Hezb-i Islami
with a government that claims a mandate without their political party and former mujahidin armed group Gulbuddin
involvement. A solution is to let the Taliban play a part in Hekmatyar discusses his views on war, peace and
elections. A change to a parliamentary political system with transition in Afghanistan. Mr Hekmatyar states that the
strong parties would enable representative politics that can lack of official Taliban endorsement of peace negotiations
break down tribal or ethnic mobilisation. A step towards obscures the reality that a majority within the movement
this is to have a prime minister as head of the executive, a want to see an end to the war. Meanwhile, a ceasefire is
speaker of parliament heading the legislature and a chief not possible unless it is preceded by a peace agreement.
justice heading the judiciary. Power-sharing in Afghanistan has failed because the groups
involved accept neither each other nor the concept of power-
Professor Barnett R. Rubin explores possibilities sharing per se. Different islands of power have consequently
for negotiating a mutually acceptable end-state in emerged at district, provincial and ministerial level which
Afghanistan given the multiplicity of domestic and disregard central government. Forthcoming elections
foreign interests involved. The Afghan state relies on present an opportunity to advance government reform.
external revenue, but conflicting foreign interests mean
that assistance is variously perceived as partial and Despite significant strides forward, Afghanistan’s formal
destabilising. The withdrawal of foreign troops risks justice system still struggles to deliver an accessible
state collapse. But the possibility of permanent foreign and inclusive service nationwide, beset by widespread
military presence risks provoking regional backlash. corruption and neglect especially in rural areas. Ali
Within Afghanistan, political legitimacy is contested: Wardak asks who is best placed to provide justice
Pashtuns see themselves as a dispossessed majority; effectively and equitably to the breadth of Afghan
tribal legitimacy is dwindling; and Islamic legitimacy is society. Informal institutions are the primary justice
overlaid with identity politics linked to different solidarity provider for many communities, resolving disputes
groups. Combatants have largely rejected possibilities through jirgas, shuras and ulema where the formal sector
for peacemaking to deliver mutual gains, and so have is absent, exclusive or mistrusted. But traditional bodies
looked to military ascendancy as a way to strengthen also bring challenges, from gender exclusion to human
their bargaining positions. However, no party has been rights violations and illicit practices. Taliban justice is
able to establish sufficiently strong status to guarantee also a significant feature of the informal sphere. A hybrid
success in negotiation, so the temptation to postpone talks system that draws on formal and informal institutions
indefinitely has prevailed. can offer a way forward, linked by new institutions that
prioritise human rights and women’s rights.

Inclusive politics
as a path to peace
Scott Worden
Scott Worden is director of Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs Agency for International Development (USAID). He served as a United
at the US Institute of Peace (USIP). Prior to joining USIP, he was Nations-appointed Electoral Complaints Commissioner for the 2009
director of the Lessons Learned Program at the office of the Special Afghanistan elections, as well as advising the UN on elections in
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and 2005–06. He earned his bachelor’s degree from Colgate University
served as acting director of policy as well as a senior policy advisor and a JD from Harvard Law School.
for the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs at the United States
ABSTRACT
What sort of political system can enhance inclusion Supporting more democratic local governance may
in Afghanistan – to convince the Taliban to participate be one way to enhance representation, and presidential
and compete for power peacefully, and current power- elections in 2019 are an opportunity for the international
holders to let them in? community to mediate electoral reform. Some forms
of indirect voting, tapping into traditional Afghan
The insurgency is fuelled by persistent political governance systems, may offer possibilities to enhance
disputes over how power is distributed and the pace regional balance and moderate extreme influences
of modernisation. Achieving peace will need to tackle in the electorate.
both of these challenges.
Peace talks with the Taliban present another opening
But options for institutional reform present dilemmas, to broker change. While there is resistance to
between: 1) a presidential or parliamentary system – negotiating with the insurgency, a political settlement
which alternately risk being resolute but dictatorial, remains the only viable way to end the conflict. A core
or more pluralist but indecisive; and 2) how to promote grievance for the Taliban has been their exclusion
a more party-oriented electoral system that can from the post-Bonn transition. A peace process would
encourage greater accountability but discourage necessitate re-examining the fundamental structures
further ethnic mobilisation and division. of government and creating space for bargaining over
how to administer authority.

At its core, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is It also called for jointly negotiated election reforms that
sustained by two longstanding political disputes: how would give political parties greater influence, and for a
power is distributed, and at what pace the country should Constitutional Loya Jirga – a national conference capable
modernise. It is further strengthened by international of amending the constitution – to decide whether the
support from Pakistan and religious extremism. Even president’s powers should be shared with a newly created
before the Taliban, power-sharing and progressive reforms post of prime minister. These reform demands reflected
have been the source of violent conflict in Afghanistan the concern on the part of largely non-Pashtun political
– from the communist Saur Revolution of 1978 to the groups for a guaranteed allocation of political power, even
early 1990s civil war. Peace with the Taliban will need to if one of their affiliates is not elected president.
address political power-sharing while at the same time
grappling with divisive issues surrounding the country’s For a variety of reasons, however, none of the major
modernisation – including the rights of women, the role provisions of the unity government agreement have been
of foreigners and a constitutional rule of law. Structural enacted, apart from appointments to key ministries.
reforms to Afghanistan’s governance institutions can help Recommendations from the Special Election Reform
tackle these twin challenges of reducing the strength of the Commission created by the agreement have only been
insurgency and providing a shorter path to peace. partly decided, parliamentary and district council elections
are delayed, and no Constitutional Loya Jirga has been held.
Agreeing on an approach to political inclusion is made This stalemate leaves factions on each side of the current
more difficult by Afghanistan’s stagnant economy, NUG blaming the other for blocking implementation
growing population and increasing ethnic tensions. It is and greatly increases the difficulty of coming to new
much easier to share an expanding pie than a shrinking agreements over power-sharing and political inclusion.
one. Afghanistan’s major ethnic and political factions This has two negative outcomes: it increases political
increasingly view any peace process as a zero-sum game divisions that the Taliban has exploited to expand its
versus their rivals: a prevailing attitude of ‘I support peace, territory, and it blocks reforms that could create more
but they should give up power to accommodate the Taliban’ opportunities for Taliban factions to enter the political
is part of the current stalemate dynamic. process. Continuing on the current path is a recipe for
more divisive politics that plays into the Taliban’s hands
Members of the largely non-Pashtun former Northern and reduces the government’s territorial control.
Alliance often act as if the Taliban is a ‘Pashtun problem’
that communities in the south and east should deal with Political exclusion: the cardinal sin
by giving up some of their political and economic capital to As bad as endless debates among divergent political
the Taliban as a price for ending the war. Some Pashtuns, factions in Afghanistan are for efficient governance, the
on the other hand, seem to view their political strength as consequences of political exclusion are arguably worse.
having been unfairly diminished by an insurgency fought Ethnic and regional tensions, exacerbated by contrasting
largely in Pashtun areas, such that peace should rebalance liberal versus conservative visions of governance, ensure
Pashtun influence in the government once citizens in constant turmoil in the political arena. On the other
insurgent areas can more fully and freely participate hand, violence frequently ensues whenever groups are
in political life. Meanwhile, the Taliban have expressed excluded from the political mix.
no interest in negotiating roles within the current
constitutional system but rather want to see the whole The Taliban insurgency since the 2001 Bonn Agreement
system of government renegotiated from scratch – with began in earnest only after attempts by more moderate
them having significant influence over the outcome. former Taliban leaders to reconcile with the new
government were rebuffed and the Taliban played no
A further obstacle to political accommodation is the role in forming the constitution or participating in early
erosion of trust among different political factions elections. Later, the 2014 election crisis entered critical
who seek assurances that they will be included in key mode when President-elect Ashraf Ghani declared that all
governance decisions even if they are not in control. sitting governors would be dismissed as soon as he took
Potential losers fear the outcomes of the current office. This led Governor Atta Muhammad Nur in Balkh
‘winner take all’ system. As a result, the National Unity Province to threaten to form a ‘parallel’ government,
Government (NUG) agreement that was brokered by which carried the implicit threat of civil war. Most recently,
the US and the UN in the aftermath of the disputed 2014 the Islamic State has been able to gain a foothold in
presidential election results called for the runner- Afghanistan when disgruntled factions within the Taliban
up, Abdullah Abdullah, to have ‘parity’ in apportioning or under-funded warlord militias decide that switching
appointments to key government leadership positions. allegiances would enable greater recognition or resources.

For many, giving in to secessionist demands is equivalent elections through 2005 – was the Taliban. This was for good
to capitulating to blackmail, and those left out of a reasons at the time: the Taliban had harboured Osama bin
political process in Afghanistan are in fact often behaving Laden while he planned and conducted the 9/11 attacks
irresponsibly or illegally. But, for a variety of reasons, the and refused to turn him over to US or to international
Afghan state has yet to build up the political, military or authorities after bin Laden’s role in the attacks was clear.
legal strength to impose its will over major factions that are In addition, the Taliban had ruled much of Afghanistan
willing to fight to gain a decision-making role in the political since 1996 with extreme contempt for women’s rights
system. The way forward is to find mechanisms that can and human rights, committing massacres against rival
include everyone and still manage conflict in a way that Afghan groups and destroying cultural heritage such as the
does not produce total gridlock. Bamiyan Buddhas. The Taliban were culpable for terrorist
acts and were reviled by many Afghans as persecutors and
Rather than continuing to concentrate political power murderers. This made it politically very difficult to give
at the centre, other options should be considered to them a seat at the negotiating table for a debate over the
deconcentrate power to provinces, but in a way that still future of Afghanistan.
maintains national cohesion and adheres to the principles
of the constitution. Expanding political participation Nevertheless, the complete exclusion of the Taliban
and decision making so that fewer groups have political from the political and constitutional process, and the
grievances against the central government could create largely rural, largely Pashtun populations the Taliban
a broader landscape for political compromise. This might derive support from and claim to represent, has come
slow the ideal path of reforms but would reduce conflict to be seen as a significant flaw in the Bonn framework
and violence in the process. Increasing local political and as a source of continuing instability. As Lakhdar
autonomy could also benefit the peace process. If Taliban Brahimi, the UN special envoy who convened the Bonn
factions join local political processes, it would weaken Conference, described in a 2008 Washington Post
the movement’s overall fighting strength. But even if article, ‘I regret bitterly not having advocated even more
the Taliban choose not to participate, a deconcentration forcefully’ after Bonn ‘to reach out to those members of
of political power that better addresses the demands of the Taliban potentially willing to join the political process’.
political inclusion by non-Taliban factions will remove Steve Coll’s new history of the post-Bonn Afghan
grievances that the Taliban have exploited to gain conflict, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars
support and control territory. in Afghanistan and Pakistan, has a revealing description
of Taliban overtures to the US to surrender on favourable
Democracy without the Taliban? terms in 2002 before the Constitutional Loya Jirga was
The Bonn Agreement in 2001 was a momentous announced. And President Karzai, who has an ambivalent
political milestone for Afghanistan and its successful relationship with the Taliban, struck a surprisingly
implementation between 2002 and 2005 was a signature conciliatory note in a speech just after his re-election
achievement. The agreement established an interim in 2009, to ‘call on our Taliban brothers to come home
administration led by Hamid Karzai, an anti-Taliban and embrace their land’.
Pashtun, with an ethnically and politically diverse interim
cabinet that consisted of many Northern Alliance factional President or parliament?
leaders. It also laid out a framework for establishing a One of the most significant debates among the delegates
constitution, a democratic system of government and at the Constitutional Loya Jirga was whether a presidential
respect for international human rights norms as the or parliamentary system of government was most relevant
foundation of the state. The 2004 Constitutional Loya for Afghanistan. A presidential system was most analogous
Jirga, which was attended by delegates selected in a to the constitutional monarchy that was established
democratic process, affirmed the Bonn Agreement’s by the 1964 constitution, the starting point for the new
democratic governance framework. It also established document. A strong presidential system was also better
a highly centralised presidential system of government, suited for quick executive actions deemed necessary to
with a directly elected president having vast powers of jump-start reconstruction in a country devastated by
appointment – of one-third of the members of the upper war. It was attractive to the interim government, led by
legislature, of all provincial governors, of cabinet ministers Hamid Karzai, who, as the presumed president-to-be, had
and deputy ministers, and of district officials. strong incentives to give maximum power to the new post.
Moreover, a parliamentary system would empower political
The main missing ingredient from the Bonn process parties that tended to be ethnically divisive, led by the same
– comprising the Bonn Agreement, the Constitutional warlords who were largely responsible for tearing the
Loya Jirga and the first presidential and parliamentary country apart over the previous decades.

On the other hand, putting such vast powers of patronage and president, with explicit shared duties of governance,
into the hands of a single chief executive was a significant would be one way to protect against exclusion. The
risk in a country where the central government historically Taliban have not engaged in the discussion over systems
had few resources to exercise its writ beyond a handful of government. But a parliamentary system may hold
of urban centres. Afghanistan has also suffered from advantages for them because while they are not likely
recurrent tensions between centrist reformers and to win a national election, having a small voting bloc in
rural conservatives who neither asked for nor received parliament could provide influence over choosing a prime
significant services from the state and who have fiercely minister or in deciding national legislation.
defended their local autonomy. A president who could
choose representatives down to the local level would have Of course, there is no way to guarantee winning a majority
to constantly perform a precarious political balancing act coalition – or holding a swing vote – in parliament. The
to appoint people with both loyalty to the state and local size of the population is unclear and a cause of great
legitimacy. A parliamentary system would theoretically political tension. An effort to issue new biometric national
extend power to different regional and political groups, identity cards to prevent fraud has been delayed by a
diversifying accountability beyond the presidential controversy over the degree to which ethnicity should be
palace. A parliamentary system risks political gridlock recorded. Moreover, the current presidential electoral
but might insulate against an ill-advised or incapable system undermines political parties and incentivises
president making sweeping decisions that alienate leading candidates to run as individuals rather than
key constituencies. representing political party members. Changing the system
of governance without significant electoral reform is a
The debate between presidential and parliamentary gamble with unpredictable odds.
systems of governance re-emerged in the aftermath of the
2014 presidential elections when Ashraf Ghani, a Pashtun Promoting political parties
candidate running as an independent, won a controversial The current voting system – the Single Non-Transferrable
victory over Abdullah Abdullah, a member of the Jamiat-e Vote (SNTV) – works on the basis one single vote per
Islami party that had its main support base among Tajiks person, for one candidate within a multi-member district.
in the north. There were widespread indications of fraud The number of candidates per electoral district (a province)
across the country during the election and the core of depends on its rough population size (Nimroz has two
the Northern Alliance threatened to form a ‘parallel seats, Balkh has 11, Nangarhar has 15, Kabul has 33 and
government’ if the results were not reviewed. so on). Any number of candidates may stand for election
– and in each election hundreds have done so in most
This led to a political crisis that the US and UN mediated, provinces. What this means, however, is that a great many
forging the NUG Agreement. According to the deal, votes are cast but few of these end up being for winning
the presidency would go to whoever received the most candidates. Those who win do so with relatively few votes
votes after a complete audit of the election results. The and the margins of victory are exceedingly slim. Among the
runner-up would be a Chief Executive Officer, who would current 33 members of parliament from Kabul Province,
have a prominent role in government decision-making, for example, the most popular member received 16,500
including ‘parity’ of appointments to national positions. votes, with a majority of members receiving fewer than
The agreement also called for a Constitutional Loya Jirga 4,000 votes. Overall, the total parliamentary delegation in
within two years to ratify whether such a CEO position, or Kabul received approximately 100,000 out of 480,000 total
‘executive prime minister’, should be enshrined into the votes cast – a ‘waste’ of more than 75% of constituents’
constitution. An internationally supervised audit of the votes. Voters’ ability to hold their elected representatives
votes found 11 per cent of the ballots cast were invalid, to account is thereby greatly reduced.
but also confirmed that Ghani won a clear majority.
The SNTV system also reduces the strength of political
Four years later, the Constitutional Loya Jirga has not been parties because it is difficult to apportion votes to different
held. But the demands by prominent Northern Alliance candidates from the same party within a multi-member
members for a system of government that more resembles district. If a party fields only one popular candidate in a
parliamentary democracy remain strong. One reason constituency, it may receive a large number of votes but
appears to stem from doubt that the current electoral and win only one seat. But if a party fields several popular
constitutional system would enable a non-Pashtun to be candidates and the vote is split among them, it could win no
elected president, combined with a belief that when not in seats because popular candidates running as independents
power they will be denied what they consider to be a fair could take all the top spots. Overall, independent
share of presidential patronage. Having a prime minister candidates who get support from targeted vote blocs within

a province, including warlords who attract voters either independent candidates. The parliament ultimately failed to
through intimidation or corrupt patronage, tend to do pass new legislation to move away from SNTV. President
better. As elected officials, they are not beholden to a party. Ghani passed a decree empowering the Independent
Election Commission (IEC) to study the issue further,
Almost everyone agrees that eliminating SNTV is key to whereby the IEC recommended reducing the size of the
improving both elections and the function of parliament – constituencies. To date, the cabinet has failed to act on this.
except for sitting members already elected under SNTV. In March 2018 a coalition of 20 political parties, including
But there are strong disagreements over what to replace major parties with different ethnic compositions, sent an
SNTV with. Like with the debate over presidential versus open letter to the IEC calling for a switch before the next
parliamentary democracy, this has ethnic dimensions that elections to a hybrid representation system as
has led to political gridlock and the perpetuation of a highly recommended by the SERC. This fraught debate
undesirable status quo. The Special Electoral Reform demonstrates that even though almost everyone agrees that
Commission (SERC) in December 2015 recommended a the current electoral system is undesirable, the political
change to the electoral system under its mandate from the stakes are too high to agree on fundamental reforms.
NUG agreement. During the commission’s deliberations,
“
some members favoured a proportional representation
system that would have voters choose a political party Overall, independent candidates
on the ballot, which would include a slate of candidates who get support from targeted
running under that party’s banner. Then the number of
candidates who actually won a seat would be determined
vote blocs within a province,
in proportion to the number of votes cast for each party. including warlords who
This system would greatly enhance the influence of political
parties on the electoral system and elevate the importance
attract voters either through
of party platforms. intimidation or corrupt
patronage, tend to do better.”
Other members favoured a change from the current
multi-member districts to single-member districts, in
which the seat goes to whoever gets most votes, whether All politics is local
they choose to affiliate with a party or not in a ‘first past The 2004 constitution calls for direct elections for the lower
the post’ arrangement. This system was used to elect house of the Afghan parliament (Wolesi Jirga), provincial
members of parliament under the 1964 constitution. councils, district councils, village councils and mayors
It would have the important benefit of ameliorating a of the major municipalities. The Wolesi Jirga has 249
problem in large or ethnically divided provinces where members who are directly elected from multi-member
security and access to the ballot determines who gets provincial constituencies. The 102-member upper house
elected more than the strength of a candidate’s campaign. (Meshrano Jirga) is composed of one representative per
In the ethnically diverse Ghazni province, for example, province elected from among the provincial councils, and
in 2010 all 11 members of the province’s parliamentary one per province from the province’s district councils,
delegation were Hazara because security was greater with a third appointed directly by the president. So
in Hazara areas and turnout was low in others. If single far, however, district council elections, village council
member districts are drawn carefully, representation elections and mayoral elections have not been held.
can be more evenly distributed because even insecure The last parliamentary election was in 2010, meaning
districts would be guaranteed a seat whether one person that the current parliament has overstayed its five-year
or 100,000 people come out to vote. If district boundaries constitutional term by four years and counting.
are unfairly gerrymandered, however, a change to single
member districts could embed polarising tensions into the There is often a debate in democratic transitions about
electoral system, with destabilising results. With trust at whether it is best to have local or national elections first.
such low levels in Afghan politics, it is difficult to see how a Not much time was spent on this question in Afghanistan,
nationwide process of drawing electoral district boundaries where the international community wanted to maintain
can be conducted quickly or quietly. a light footprint and establish Afghan sovereignty as
quickly as possible. The Bonn Agreement called for
The debate over a change of electoral systems ended with presidential and parliamentary elections within two and
no result. The SERC ultimately recommended a hybrid a half years, whereby the transitional government would
system in which some seats in multi-member districts become fully sovereign. As it happened, parliamentary
would be reserved for political parties, and others for elections were delayed by a year for logistical reasons,

Afghan citizens go to the polls to exercise their constitutional right to vote in presidential and provincial council elections. © UN Photo/Tim Page
and presidential elections were prioritised and held in communities, including many urban ones. On the other
2004. Focusing on the presidency made sense in a country hand, holding large and confusing national elections has
where most infrastructure was undeveloped or destroyed, enabled wholesale fraud in several of the past ballots,
massive amounts of reconstruction assistance needed which favours corrupt and powerful actors with less
to be managed from a central location, and international accountability to constituents.
relations were a critical part of stability and development.
Tellingly, once the Taliban insurgency reached a critical
De-prioritising local elections increased the risk of alienation mass in 2008, many plans for stabilisation called for the
of rural constituencies from the government, however, establishment of community councils to address local
particularly in a system with few checks on presidential grievances as a key to reducing violence. These tended
appointments to local positions. Holding local elections to be ad hoc, however, and actually establishing the
could have increased the legitimacy of local leaders and constitutionally elected village and district councils was
introduced some local accountability if government officials never seriously considered. As discussion turns to ways
were ineffective or corrupt and would have increased that the Taliban can be fragmented and reconciled with the
understanding of the democratic and electoral process government, local elections emerge as a potential way to
among citizens who had had little experience with it over the enable local political diversity without changing the overall
past decades. A 2015 impact evaluation of the Afghanistan reform direction of the country. Creating or re-empowering
National Solidarity Programme, which facilitated local local governance bodies could be a useful first inroad for the
development projects based on locally elected Community Taliban into power, without forcing out a body of incumbents.
Development Councils (CDCs), found that where CDC
elections were held, voter participation in the 2010 Limits of direct democracy
parliamentary elections increased. In fact, local communities In mandating the Wolesi Jirga, provincial council, mayoral,
had traditions of quasi-democratic self-rule in the form of district council and village council elections, the 2004
local (usually all-male) councils (shuras) that would discuss Constitution states that the polls must be ‘free, secret,
and decide certain justice and governance issues. universal, and direct’ (emphasis added). The word ‘direct’
is standard parlance for election systems and was used for
Those who favour a strong central government with local and parliamentary elections in the 1964 Constitution
nationally focused elections note that warlords or as well. It means that individual citizens must cast their
corrupt actors would have an advantage in local elections vote for the candidate or party that is running for a
and would pervert the system. This is likely true in designated seat and not for a representative or elector
the short term, although less so in safe, pluralistic who will ultimately decide on who fills the seat.

The US system for electing the president is indirect because can be excluded. But indirect elections can be a way to
it relies on an Electoral College to cast the final votes for the mitigate the distortion of regular voting rights through
president. US voters in fact are choosing ‘electors’ at the insecurity, disenfranchisement and corruption of the voting
ballot box who have indicated their candidate preference. system itself. In the cases cited above, indirect election
The number of electors each state has is proportional to processes were employed as pragmatic shortcuts to get
national population. It is the electors who actually cast the around either logistical difficulties of full voter registration
deciding votes for the president weeks after the national vote and voter education or alternative problems of exclusive
is held. This system was designed to give states of differing elite capture that would not fairly represent the interests
sizes a proportionate say in who becomes president. Electors of a larger polity. They arguably enabled balancing of
also have the ability to vote against a candidate they believe political interests in ways that were quicker and more
represents a grave mistake for the country (depending on efficient than a more thorough process of civic education
state law). An indirect election can therefore be used to about election systems and the development of credible
ensure balance of regional influence and moderate extreme institutions to operate checks and balances within the
influences in an electorate. legal and political system.
Afghanistan has a long tradition of indirect democracy that While citizens’ understanding of elections and democratic
has facilitated both national and local governance. Shuras governance principles has increased since these indirect
and jirgas provide a form of local indirect democracy, with election systems were developed, security conditions have
leaders chosen on the basis of seniority and judgment to deteriorated dramatically and trust in electoral authorities
represent the views of a community and make decisions on has declined. It may therefore be reasonable to continue to
their behalf. Since 2001, there is anecdotal evidence that consider indirect electoral mechanisms to get avoid results
indirect elections for positions outside the constitutional that are perceived as exclusive or inequitable, particularly
requirement of direct voting have been more inclusive at local levels. If, like in the Emergency Loya Jirga, citizens
and less controversial. Most prominently, delegates to the give their proxies to genuinely respected community
Emergency Loya Jirga and the Constitutional Loya Jirga in leaders, then it may be easier to select more representative
2002 and 2003 respectively, used indirect election methods. leadership than has been the case in opaque and corrupt
In the Emergency Loya Jirga, members of designated direct election processes. In the event of an eventual
districts selected 20–30 representatives who then gathered Taliban deal, indirect elections may more easily allow for
to cast secret ballots for the specific delegates who would reconciled Taliban to join local politics.
attend Loya Jirga itself. In the Constitutional Loya Jirga
selection process, a caucus system was used whereby At the national level, use of an Electoral College system
designated constituencies gathered and chose delegates in Afghanistan would help to ensure that in presidential
based on a more traditional consensus-based process than elections each province would have a guaranteed share
strict voting procedures. of influence based on its population. This would address
the current disparities in voter access across the country,
At the local level, CDCs are elected as part of a World where voters in insecure areas cannot get to the polls and
Bank-sponsored national development programme. The in conservative areas where women face greater barriers
rules call for secret and direct elections, in which women to voting. The practical effect would be to increase the
are required to participate. A mid-term evaluation of the influence of provinces like Helmand and Zabul, which
National Solidarity Programme in 2006 found that the have historically low turnouts that leave its voters with
resulting councils were largely seen as representative, little say in the outcome of Presidential elections. It would
but that it was doubtful the direct and secret balloting also reduce pressure to stuff ballots in insecure areas to
procedure was used in many cases. Also, elections compensate for perceived disenfranchisement, thereby
for temporary district councils undertaken as part of increasing overall perceptions of electoral integrity. Such
stabilsation programmes used indirect methods. The a system depends on having an accurate and accepted
District Development Assemblies (DDAs) were chosen in census, however, which has been an impossible task since
a two-tier process by which selected community leaders the Bonn Agreement.
from around a district gathered to vote secretly for a DDA,
which helped to assign priorities and make decisions on the Pathways to inclusive politics: Afghan-owned,
distribution of development programmes within the district. Afghan-led?
Once the first Afghan Parliament was inaugurated in
There are definite downsides to indirect elections. November 2005, the UN role in sharing administrative
They dilute citizens’ voting rights and are subject to elite duties ended and the Afghan government became
capture. Without fair administration, minority groups officially fully sovereign. Since then, the international

community and the Afghan government have had a complex might include: the status quo is divisive and destabilising;
relationship whereby international donors provide essential meaningful inclusion of all non-violent political and ethnic
assistance and policy advice to pursue their own interests factions is essential; and changes to the current system
while also trying to respect Afghan sovereignty and allow must be consensual and in accordance with the law. Then
for Afghans, who know their country best, to develop international actors could play a mediating role to facilitate
effective solutions to security, political, and development a consensus view on the process by which political reform
problems. The challenges of this convoluted relationship could be achieved.
have led to the mantra that Afghan elections and the peace
process must be ‘Afghan-owned and Afghan-led’. In many ways, the NUG Agreement provides an
initial blueprint for political reform negotiations
This ambition holds true from a moral and a legal – notwithstanding the severe challenges this power-
perspective. But the frequent use of the phrase masks the sharing arrangement has experienced in practice. Finding
fact that the international community, including neighbours a way to diversify the powers of the presidency among
outside the Western donor community, has enormous different groups is a key demand. Devolving some power
influence over political arrangements in Afghanistan. to the provinces will reduce central government control
International assistance is vital to funding and maintaining but may buy political stability. The fact that negotiations
the state. And, tellingly, at times of deep political or security over the removal of Governor Atta centred around the
crisis, the international community, led by the US, NATO core demands of Chief Executive Officer Abdullah in the
and the UN, has intervened to mediate a solution to a crisis. NUG Agreement discussions, including a shift toward a
The forming of the NUG in the wake of the controversial parliamentary system of government, indicate the former
2014 elections is just the latest example. Northern Alliance’s underlying demand for more effective
power-sharing among regional and ethnic groups is not
The international community is therefore both a safety going away. Although in the end the crisis was resolved by
net to avoid political and security disasters, but also negotiating a few presidentially appointed positions, the
bears some responsibility for tipping the scales in one fundamental instability of the system remains unchanged:
direction or another to resolve crises in ways that serve without addressing the system anyone with power can stall
Western security interests but may destabilise Afghan political progress for months to get patronage concessions.
politics. At the same time, the international community’s
ability to use its leverage is constrained by the fact that Some important changes can be taken by executive action
if substantial international assistance is withdrawn from – although those are most susceptible to change and
Afghanistan, the state is likely to collapse and the core goal trust levels in the durability of executive action are low.
of the international community to prevent safe havens for One opportunity would be to support the formation of a
transnational terrorists will not be met. Afghan political commission to formulate amendments to the constitution
leaders, and the Taliban, know this and a fragile balance that was called for in the NUG Agreement. This need not
of power is somewhat maintained but with a steep cost in lead to a Loya Jirga right away but could help to define the
violence and instability. Afghanistan’s neighbours are also terms of more inclusive power-sharing arrangements.
wary of the chaos that could escape Afghanistan’s borders
in the event of state collapse, and Pakistan in particular To achieve more lasting change there would need to be
fears having a government in Kabul that would act too fundamental revisions of the law and the constitution.
favourably toward India. Therefore, countries in the region However, these are nearly impossible for the Afghan political
have also intervened significantly in Afghanistan’s internal actors to achieve in the current heightened state of tension.
politics by supporting proxies that serve foreign interests
but keep the situation unstable. The first and greatest opportunity is to facilitate political
accommodation is around the 2019 presidential elections.
Amid this complex dynamic, international leadership can The international community has been very wary of
help navigate a way out of the current stalemated political intervening directly in the electoral reform debate because
dynamic if it is applied in a coordinated and strategic of the sensitivities around international interventions to
way. If recent history is a guide, it will otherwise take a resolve crises after both the 2009 and the 2014 presidential
destabilising crisis for the international community to act. elections. The Afghan government has made it clear that
International actors should first acknowledge that there electoral reform is solely a national issue. On the other
are flaws in the current political architecture and give hand, from an international perspective the failure of
cautious support to political reform processes conducted electoral reform has led to political gridlock that affects
according to shared principles that Afghan actors agree international security interests. While different factions
upon – including ideally the Taliban. Such principles within the Afghan government have argued over their roles

in decision-making, the Taliban have gained territory and Loya Jirga. It is likely that a peace process would force a
an increasing number of international terrorist groups have re-examination of the fundamental structures of
found a foothold in Afghanistan. More active international government and create space for new deals to emerge.
mediation of the political differences that have blocked
progress on electoral reform could help to break an Any significant change to the political system or the
important logjam and enable a more credible election constitution must take the negative lessons of political
process in 2019. exclusion into account. The more major the reform,
the more important it is to attempt to include Taliban
Another – likely later – opportunity to advance reforms that representatives – as well as the major non-Taliban ethnic
would bring about more inclusive governance lies in the and political factions – in the process. Given the instability
conduct of a peace process with the Taliban. No one has of the status quo, there is a need to make progress on
wanted to re-do the Bonn process or open the constitution reforms without waiting for an uncertain peace process.
to major reforms because of fear that human rights, But even without Taliban participation, reforms should
women’s rights and democratic principles might be set aim to create more space at local level for the Taliban
back. But after a decade of deteriorating status quo, one and non-violent opposition groups to have a greater and
wonders when the slow, steady decline of stability will slip safer space in the Afghan political process. The 2019
below the worst-case scenario outcome of major reforms presidential elections, preceded by President Ghani’s
and it will seem like the risk is worth taking. Apart from peace offer to the Taliban extended during the March 2018
the presence of international forces on Afghan soil, the Kabul Conference, creates a fluid situation that can be
Taliban’s biggest grievance appears to be their exclusion unstable, but also an opportunity to make progress on
from the Bonn Agreement and the 2004 Constitutional greater political inclusion.

Local perspectives on peace and elections
Herat Province, western Afghanistan
Interviews conducted by Abdul Hadi Sadat, a researcher with Unit (AREU), the Center for Policy and Human Development
over 15 years of experience in qualitative social research with (CPHD) and Creative Associates International. He has a degree
organisations including the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation injournalism from Kabul University.
ABSTRACT
The following statements are taken from longer and reconciliation. Respondents’ ages and ethnic
interviews with community members across two groups vary, as do their levels of literacy. Data were
different rural districts in Herat in western Afghanistan collected by Abdul Hadi Sadat as part of a larger
between November 2017 and March 2018. Interviewees research project funded by the UK’s Foreign and
were asked about their views on elections, peace Commonwealth Office.
Female worker with the Ministry for Rural to fight against our enemies instead of trying to strike a
Rehabilitation and Development deal with them. Reconciliation means that the Taliban is
Reconciliation with the Taliban will impact everyone’s very powerful and the government does not have the ability
life, especially women and shiite minority communities. to fight against them.
The Taliban are the delegation [proxies] of Pakistani
intelligence services – suicide bombers and killers of our Female teacher
people. There should not be any reconciliation with them I am not very optimistic about reconciliation with
because those who kill us and destroy our infrastructure Taliban – they are the most ignorant human beings on
are not one of us. They are the slaves of the Pakistani ISI the earth. They should be destroyed rather than wasting
[Inter-Services Intelligence] with their outdated ideology money on reconciliation or peace! They don’t believe in
and their barbaric actions. peace. The government should put more resources into
military operations against insurgents. At the same time
We live in a traditional community. Our people follow the international community can talk with insurgents
the village leader and if the government needs to solve a to persuade them to allow people to participate in the
problem at the village level it asks for the elders’ support. election. But I do not think that Taliban will allow this and
Our villagers respect their elders and follow their orders will try to disturb the election.
and advice to resolve disputes. Elders inform villagers about
the election and other issues. We have very active elders The leadership of Taliban will not accept negotiation over
who could facilitate reconciliation with Taliban in regards the parliamentary election but if the government and
to the election. Both sides in any reconciliation or peace international community try to talk with local commanders
process need to have some flexibility during negotiations in of Taliban then maybe it will be possible. But I am not sure
order for the process to be successful. But as far as I know because … they do not believe in logic or reason, they just
the Taliban do not believe in negotiation and reconciliation. use their power against the government.
The International community should not forget why they Community elders can encourage ordinary people in their
are in Afghanistan. Negotiation with the Taliban shows community. But in last 40 years there has been no impartial
the weakness of ISAF [International Security Assistance elder throughout the province. Some elders support
Force] and NATO in fighting against the common enemies [former governor of Herat] Ismail Khan, so this group
of humanity like the Taliban and Daesh [Islamic State in is well-mobilised and they have money and power. Now
Khorasan – ISK]. The international community should sometimes the public does not trust them because they will
rather equip and train our national police and national army only work for you if you pay them money.

Male shopkeeper
Local influential individuals will directly try to influence
the election process in our community and use their
power for their own candidates! Elders will pave the way
for fraud because the elders who have relationships with
insurgent groups will support their desired candidates
and the candidates who do not have these relationships
will lose. And insurgent activities are a big challenge
HERAT
ahead of the election. The government should control
insurgent activities.
The Taliban and the government are both sides of one coin.
They’re financed from one source. If you still believe that
the Taliban are funded by ordinary people through such
religious rules and regulations such as Oshr (charitable
land tax) and Zakat (alms) then you are deluded. Attempting
reconciliation with the Taliban and other insurgent groups
will pave the way for wide-ranging fraud in the election. I do
not agree with reconciliation with the Taliban.
We live in a traditional community. In such a community

elders have their influence but this is a very dangerous Herat Province, Afghanistan.
game. Insurgents are not only one group: they are divided
into different groups. If the elders reconcile with one group Male doctor
this may not be acceptable for other groups. It is better I don’t think anything will change after the upcoming
for the government to continue its operations in order to elections because parliament and the elections cannot
control insurgent activities. Community elders are good solve the current problems. These are systematic and
for exchanging messages between the government and in order to find a solution we need to start to educate a
insurgents. But I do not believe that the insurgents will generation. Positive change cannot be brought about with
allow the IEC [Independent Electoral Commission] to the current education system and politicians. The current
hold elections in their areas because they are fighting system teaches our children materialism not spiritualism.
to sabotage the national process. The insurgents want
to show themselves as powerful and undermine the The elections don’t solve the problem but they help us
credibility of the government. to practice democracy for good deeds. I will go to voting
centres and I will vote for the right person, for the person
Male elder who is willing to work to bring about the required change
Without international involvement the government is not into our education system.
capable of holding elections. Peace and reconciliation
are also not possible without the technical and financial I know some areas of the country are in the control of
support of internationals. I remember a month ago insurgent groups [Taliban and ISK] but this doesn’t mean
President Ghani announced that the government would that we cannot hold the elections – although there will be
not be alive without international support. But I believe we some problems. The government should prove its presence
need to solve the issue of peace in the region because some and politics should progress. Because if the government
countries in the region support the Taliban in Afghanistan delays the election it means that the insurgents are very
for their own benefit. This issue needs to be solved with powerful and gives the impression they can hinder the
governments, not with a group of people who don’t know government’s political progress.
why they are fighting.

On elections and peace
Dr Habiba Sarabi
Dr Habiba Sarabi is Deputy Chair of the High Peace Council and She previously served as Minister of Women’s Affairs as well
Adviser to the Chief Executive Officer of Afghanistan on Women and as Minister of Culture and Education. Dr Sarabi has been
Youth affairs. She was appointed as Governor of Bamiyan Province by instrumental in promoting women’s rights and representation
President Hamid Karzai in 2005 – the first Afghan woman to become and environment issues.
a governor of any province in the country.
ABSTRACT
Dr Habiba Sarabi, Deputy Chair of the High Peace Fresh leadership and a new strategy in the High
Council in Afghanistan, discusses some of her Peace Council (HPC) have meant that motivation to
thoughts on elections and peace in Afghanistan. work for peace is high, especially among women on
These are taken from a conversation with Anna it. Afghan women have two central roles to advance
Larson in November 2017. peace: observing political negotiations to ensure
achievements are not lost; and at grassroots level,
Dr Sarabi describes frustrations with the pace to play a social role to convince male members of
of electoral reform. Voter registration at polling families and communities not to fight. A voluntary
centres will facilitate a more effective ballot network has been established for women to
and strong civil society monitoring could play an contribute to peacebuilding in this way. All Afghan
important role. leaders are men; the majority of candidates in
elections will be men. International partners can
help by focusing on women’s participation.
Preparations for elections team from civil society who should check all the lists. At
Reforms have been delayed and we are not satisfied with this point we cannot use modern technology to do this.
this. The Special Electoral Commission (SERC) took a lot But we need to lock all the doors against fraud that we
of time, and the people are not satisfied with its outcome. can. In the counting process each team should go to each
They appointed new commissioners but people were not polling centre and take photos of the initial results. While
happy, they were not capable people. Also it is not only international observers cannot go to each polling centre
about expertise, but about commitment and management. they can still help by putting pressure on the government
There has been so much doubt about the date, and the to collate photos of each results list.
time for preparation before then – this is an example
of elections not being managed in the correct way. The Bad elections will result in security deteriorating. And if
procurement process itself has been controversial. And we have bad governance, then there will be a bad election.
now, the initially specified date of 8 July is no longer We will have a problem if the result of the election is
possible. If it is delayed [to October 2018], then I think not satisfactory for everyone. Fraud will create further
that would be best – but holding parliamentary and conflict among the people.
presidential elections together would be a disaster.
Progress towards peace
Single Member Districts are the government’s way of Fortunately, with our new leadership in the High Peace
manipulating MPs and a way to have control over the Council (HPC) and new strategy we have a lot of motivation
whole process. It is better that people stand for whichever to work now, especially women on the HPC. We have
district they choose to stand for. been meeting with different mujahidin leaders across the
country. Afghan women can have two roles in peace. In
Voter registration at the polling centres will help a lot political negotiations they can play a big role, they can
technically. We should also have a strong monitoring observe to see what is going on in the negotiations and

make sure that our achievements are not lost. At the
grassroots level they can play a social role, convincing
male members of their families and communities not to
fight. We have started a voluntary network for women to
contribute to peacebuilding in this way.
The majority of the HPC are tribal elders and they don’t
believe in women’s rights. They look at me very strangely.
The total number of HPC delegates is 63 and of these
12 are women. It is very difficult and sometimes they
do not listen to us. It is difficult but it is not impossible.
The big challenge is their mentality, even from the
leadership’s perspective.
The Taliban are very conservative, but it depends.

According to my knowledge, from the MPs’ meeting with
the Taliban in Oslo, at the beginning the Taliban covered
their faces as they didn’t want to see women, but at the end
of the meeting they were talking to them. Their statements Habiba Sarabi, Deputy Chairperson of Afghanistan's High Peace Council,
briefs the Security Council meeting on the situation in her country in
have become less opposed to our government’s ideology. March 2018. © UN Photo/Loey Felipe
No matter how high the mountain, there will always be a

way up! (Dari proverb – Koh harche beland basha, sir khud, this balance. If President Trump’s strategy can push
yak ra darad) supporters of the Taliban to stop fighting then maybe we
can see a way forward.
A group of us recently made a visit to Moscow and we
disagreed with each other on the subject of a Loya Jirga as We will need consultative groups for the victims of war.
part of a peace process. I think it is not a good idea to go Although some people think it is better to ignore these
backwards. A Loya Jirga is an old method, an old system things and move forward.
and an old ideology. People who are in power will bring
their own people and the poor will be excluded. If international partners can focus on women’s
participation, this would be good. All our leaders are men,
We cannot fix a date or time for peace. There should be a most of our candidates will be men. The international
balance in our approach, and the military can help with community can help in this regard.

Nangarhar Province, eastern Afghanistan
ABSTRACT
The following statements are taken from longer asked questions about their views on elections, peace
interviews with community members across two and reconciliation. Respondents’ ages and ethnic
different districts in Nangarhar Province in eastern groups vary. Data were collected by Abdul Hadi Sadat
Afghanistan, one semi-urban and one rural, between as part of a larger research project funded by the UK’s
November 2017 and March 2018, in which they were Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Male driver International involvement is really needed in elections.

Security is very bad here. And in fact it is not only the With the help of internationals at least we have fifty per cent
Taliban who have deteriorated security. Illegal armed good elections. However this percentage will come down
persons and groups are also one of the main cause of to less than ten per cent if we don’t have the support and
insecurity in our community, involved in different illegal involvement of the international community. As long as the
activities. These are the guys who are involved in killing, war criminals and drug dealers exist in our government we
assassinations, robberies and theft. Most of the time the will need the support of the internationals.
Taliban are accused for the wrongdoings of such armed
groups, which I don’t think is fair. Male undergraduate student
Take a look of the current war in Afghanistan. Security
I am not a supporter of the Taliban: their hands are also is gradually becoming more disruptive every year.
red with the blood of innocent Afghans. Most of time It is all because of the wrong individuals in power.
we see that the Taliban claim responsibility of attacks The Taliban and some other insurgent groups are also
in which civilians lose their lives. However in my point human. They have families to support. They also want to
of view the illegal armed groups which are mostly live a peaceful life. They are tired of fighting. But looking
run by previous warlords and drug dealers are more at the corrupt government and then war criminals
dangerous than the Taliban. around it, those insurgents would rather fight than join
a corrupt government.
I wish we had only one president. The international
community really upset us by creating that two-headed Every single member of my community has experienced
government. The so-called National Unity Government is some sort of insurgent activity. I don’t think there could
so unpleasant and unproductive. Reconciliation with Taliban be anyone who has not experienced insurgent activities
in relation to the election is impossible because now the so far. Bomb blasts, assassinations, kidnapping, suicide
Taliban are in power in many districts. If the international attacks on officials and their supporters usually happen
community honestly wants to end this tragedy it is possible, here. I think elections cannot have any considerable effects
but without the international community it is impossible. on security. Improvements to the economy can have some
In the past the Taliban was not as strong as it is now. You impressive effect on security, but not elections.
know many people are taking their disputes for resolution to
the Taliban. How it is possible that they will allow people to Insurgents are not the product of Afghanistan. They are
participate in the election? trained, organised, equipped and directed from outside. It is
up to the international community whether or not they want

to suppress insurgents. If international community want
they can have insurgents stop fighting in Afghanistan by
bringing pressure on their supporters in the region.
One of the important goals of the insurgents is to sabotage

the coming election to show themselves powerful.
Currently our country’s economy is directly under the
shadow of insecurity. Security is more important than the
election. First the government should have control over the
NANGARHAR
AT province and districts.
Male elder
We have experienced a lot of insurgent activity in our area.
But you know it is not fair to blame only the Taliban and
some other insurgent groups. Most of our officials are also
not less than insurgents. On one side insurgents kill civilians
by blasting bombs and suicide attacks in the city. Then on the
other side our government kills civilians in bombardments
and night operations. If insurgents make money through
drugs and kidnapping then our officials make money by
taking bribes and other corruptions. So both the government
and insurgents have so many things in common. Map of Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan.
I never hear about reconciliation with Taliban. Normally I Most of the current leadership and members of the national
just hear about how they are continuing their fighting. Even reconciliation programme were involved in fighting with the
now the Taliban have extended their influence to the other Taliban in the past. They have a long history of hostilities.
districts as well. During the past election the Taliban were That is also one of the reasons that why the Taliban are
not as powerful as now. During the past election all people unwilling to solve their problems with the government
together participated in the election for a better future but by negotiations.
until now we have not seen its impact.
Male farmer
Male labourer The government’s night attacks and operations have alienated
There are a lot of insurgent activities taking place people from the government, and so they settle their disputes
undercover in our area. Suicide bombers, kidnapping and with the help of insurgents. If you refer your issue to the
target killings are occurring so often here. Such activities Taliban they solve it in a short period of time, while it takes
barely hurt official people. Mostly only innocent Afghans months or sometimes years to get the same issue solved in
get killed and injured. As the results of blasts mainly only government courts. The government should be careful not
civilian properties are damaged and destroyed. Recently my to destroy everything like the Taliban does because people
friend’s taxi was destroyed in a bomb blast. The insurgents expect their government to protect them, not to exacerbate
had attached a magnetic bomb to a fuel tanker. When the problem or war. If the government took more care during
it went off my friend’s taxi which he had parked on the night raids the elections would take place safely.
roadside was caught in the flames of the explosion. The taxi
was his only source of income. Many people like my friend I was disappointed by the last election but this does not
have suffered from the insurgents’ activities here. And even mean that I will not participate in the next one. But I want
now we don’t know how much longer it will take before we to vote for an honest person who has served us, and to
can live in a peaceful environment. support the peace process in order to bring peace to our
area. I will not vote for those who have no commitment to
I believe if true and transparent elections take place the people and country. Because we are villagers we do
then truly reliable and trustworthy representatives will not have another way without elections. I will encourage
come into power. The old fraudulent and criminal ones all people to vote and support the election.
will not be able to get important seats in government.
Then it is clear that elections can eventually have Male farmer
positive effects on security. Community elders have influence in our district but now
the situation has totally changed. In the past the elders had

the same influence in all villages but now it is different in were educated then they would know about the equal rights
different villages. The two insurgent groups are different of men and women and we wouldn’t have as many
from each other. Daesh (Islamic State in Khorasan) kill problems that we have now. Bomb blasts, suicide attacks
elders in areas they control and do not have any respect for and many more activities are usually carried out by
the elders. The Taliban is better than Daesh because the uneducated people. It is hard for an illiterate person to find
Taliban at least respect elders and do not kill them. But work and therefore they become the prey of insurgents.
the community leaders do not have effective roles among Insurgents use such illiterate people for terrorist activities
Taliban. So the community elders do not have the same in return for a little bit of money.
role as they had in the past.
“
Illiteracy has created real
Male former driver – unemployed
If we look at our economy we will see that the Afghan problems for us. It is hard for
government has gained some significant achievements in a woman to go outside of her
the last three years in spite of the problems. For example
the project of the Salma water dam was successfully
house for work. If our people
accomplished. The dam will not only help in irrigation but were educated then they
will also provide electricity to surrounding areas. Chabahar
would know about the equal
international port was opened in Iran, which will work as a
bridge between India and Afghanistan. rights of men and women and
we wouldn’t have as many
Despite these achievements, terrorist groups like Daesh
have unleashed merciless attacks against ordinary Afghans problems that we have now.”
and their government. Wherever that group has reached
it has started killing innocent Afghans and has destroyed If transparent elections happen and a good government
their homes. comes into being it will have good outcomes. If the
government honestly works to eliminate illiteracy from the
In the previous election some community elders walked country then I hope one day will come when we will have a
to some closed villages and they motivated other people peaceful country and good economy like other countries.
to participate. Two days before the election our village I think community leaders and some other influential
elder came to me and he asked me, ‘are you aware about individuals should work on the district level to motivate
the polling station?’ I told him no so he told me the polling insurgents to hold peace talks with the local officials. Once
station is in [X] village and that I should go there and use that link is created then it will help peace talks on the high
my vote for Ghani. I asked him why Ghani, and he told level too.
me because he is not involved in fraud, corruption and
killing of innocent people. I accepted his idea and also The deal that took place between Ashraf Ghani and
I discussed the election with my wife. She works for Abdullah Abdullah [in 2014] was a huge mistake.
one of the NGOs [non-governmental organisations] so Reconciliation with Taliban is not easy. The government
she knows better than me. She also recommended that together with the international community should keep
I vote for Ghani. regular contact with Taliban leaders to convince them to
allow people to vote in elections and to convince the Taliban
Security was not that good at the time but it was better to nominate themselves for the parliamentary election.
than now. Now the security is getting worse day-by-day Today the Taliban are controlling a large number of
and some new insurgents have emerged in our province. districts. If the Taliban does not reconcile or does not allow
Especially in some districts like Pachiragam, Ghanikhil, the people to participate in the coming election, the number
Haskamena, Shinwari, Khogyani and some others. People of voters will be very low.
hope that government will control the security situation.
Illiteracy has created real problems for us. It is hard for a

woman to go outside of her house for work. If our people

Views on conflict, peace, democracy and political
reform in Afghanistan
Younus Qanooni
Younus Qanooni joined Ahmad Shah Massoud’s mujahidin based in his President of Afghanistan and Speaker of the Afghan parliament
native Panjshir Valley following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Wolesi Jirga), and is currently leader of the Afghanistan e Naween
He was involved in establishing the Northern Alliance and served (New Afghanistan) political party.
as Interior Minister in Burhanuddin Rabbani’s government. He was
chief negotiator for the Northern Alliance delegation to the Bonn The interview was conducted for Accord by Zahid ur Rehman, who has
conference. Mr Qanooni was minister in the post-Bonn Interim Masters degrees in Political Science from Peshawar University and
Administration and Education Minister in the Afghan Transitional in Peace and Conflict Studies from the National Defence University,
Administration (established in June 2002), and was a security Islamabad, Pakistan. He is conducting post-graduate research on the
advisor to interim President Hamid Karzai. He is a former Vice wartime experience of Afghan nomad tribes.
ABSTRACT
What institutional changes are needed to establish Elections present another dilemma for peace: the
sustainable peace in Afghanistan, and how might such government will not negotiate before elections;
changes be achieved? but afterwards the Taliban will not engage with a
government that claims a mandate without their
In conversation with Accord, former speaker of involvement. A solution is to let the Taliban play a part
parliament Younus Qanooni outlines his perspectives in the elections which would create conditions for a
on the causes of violence in Afghanistan, priorities ceasefire and a nationwide process.
for dialogue to negotiate potential ways forward,
challenges of sequencing peace talks and elections, Afghanistan lacks the necessary institutions to support
and longer term options for political reform. the existing presidential system. A parliamentary system
with strong parties would enable representative politics
The dilemma of whether to prioritise a military or that can break down tribal or ethnic mobilisation. A
political solution to the conflict can be resolved by step towards this is to have a prime minister as head
pursuing both together – but with clearly defined of the executive, a speaker of parliament heading the
mutual objectives. Force should be aimed at convincing legislature branch and a chief justice heading the
the Taliban to negotiate. Efforts to reintegrate Taliban judiciary. The president can bring these three branches
fighters outside a political settlement will continue to together within a balanced system.
fail. The emphasis needs to be on reconciliation, which
demands serious concessions from both sides.
Causes of violent conflict in Afghanistan external conflict drivers. Over the past two decades of
Our strategy for achieving peace must be related to our war with the Taliban, the creation of the Taliban
our understanding of the root causes of the conflict in movement and their mission in Afghanistan have been an
Afghanistan. Experience and facts show that the roots expression of Pakistan’s Afghan strategy. Pakistan, with
are mainly external as four decades of conflict have been whom we share a long border, is the neighbour with most
imposed on Afghanistan on the basis of strategies which influence in Afghanistan.
Afghans had no hand in designing.
Pakistan has helped to prolong the conflict in
The common thread between the 19th century wars with Afghanistan because, unfortunately, one of the four
the British, the Soviet invasion and the current conflict pillars of that country’s national security doctrine is the
is that they have all been imposed on Afghans. Peace notion that there must be a pro-Islamabad government
depends on us understanding and addressing these in Kabul.

Achieving peace in Afghanistan
If we are to progress towards peace, we shall require
tough negotiations with countries of the region, including
Pakistan. We should be prepared to put on the table all
the legitimate demands that countries of the region and
Pakistan have of Afghanistan. We should face the fact that
there are legitimate demands which a country can make
of its neighbour. Pakistan has a right to demand that it
should face no threat to its security from Afghanistan. But
equally we have the right to demand the same of Pakistan.
We should address the issues affecting all states which
have had a role in the Afghan conflict in this spirit, through
fair and transparent negotiations. Our citizens would never
accept conceding any illegitimate interest. However, they
will have no objection to conceding legitimate interests and
we should seek to reach agreement on this basis.
Younus Qanooni in the Polish Senate, 2008. © Michał Koziczynski The other strand to pursuing peace in Afghanistan
concerns the establishment of a strong government.
But not the strength that comes from military force.
Experience since 1947 shows that Pakistan has Rather, a government which is strong because of its
experimented with three versions of its strategy in popular support among Afghans on one hand, and its good
Afghanistan. In one variant Pakistan has tried to construct relations with the international community on the other.
an Afghan government to its own liking. In another, it It will require far-reaching changes for a government in
has tried to infiltrate the existing government, hoping to Afghanistan to become strong in this sense. But this is
determine that government’s foreign policy. In the third, necessary to create the conditions for economic, political,
it has tried to destabilise the sitting government in Kabul. social and cultural progress. As part of the process, we
must build leadership capacity within government and
If you look back to the periods of Zahir Shah and Daud Khan its institutions. If our government has genuine popular
and at all the governments since then, during each period support, it will be able to resist every form of foreign
you will find that Pakistan applied one of the three variants interference. Unfortunately, Afghanistan has always had
of this strategy. But in the Taliban period, the Pakistan either weak or failing governments. Nowadays Afghanistan
strategy reached the pinnacle of its success. In those has a failing government. Under Karzai, the government
years, the Pakistanis were able to fashion a government was just weak. Nowadays the government is failing – it
according to their plan. Therefore, if the Pakistanis today has lost its central authority and capacity to operate.
are supporting a return to power for the Taliban, it is to
regain this position of ultimate influence and as part of In summary, there are two main strands to the
their strategy against India. This strategy has economic, strategy required to achieve peace in Afghanistan.
political and military components. Strand one involves defeating the strategy of those
external players who try to impose a war on us.
However, one key feature of the Pakistani strategy is The second strand involves the establishment of a
that they always rely on internal partners to implement genuinely popular and strong government.
it. Although the roots of the conflict in Afghanistan are
external, there is an important role for domestic actors in Experience shows that even while the US had a heavy
facilitating the execution of the strategy which sustains that military footprint in Afghanistan, it was not possible to
conflict. Pakistan has deliberately avoided deploying its achieve a military solution to the problems of Afghanistan.
own army to fight in Afghanistan. Instead it relies on Afghan Today, we can be even more certain that it is not possible
forces, which it has helped to create and through which to achieve a military solution. Therefore, irrespective of
it achieves a military, economic and political presence in whether we happen to support or oppose the Taliban, let
Afghanistan. And if any one of the Pakistani tools should us accept that they are a part of the political reality.
fail, it will rapidly produce another. If we succeeded in
persuading the Taliban to abandon the fight, I have little The solution is neither fighting nor negotiations. The
doubt that Pakistan would prepare another force to take solution is negotiations alongside the fighting. But
forward the conflict. negotiations and war-fighting must both have clearly

defined objectives. The main purpose of our war-fighting left. All the rest of his Hezb-i Islami movement was already
should be to convince the Taliban that negotiations are a part of the official system and only he and his family
the only way out. Unfortunately, up to now the government were left outside. The agreement with the government
has focused on achieving the reintegration of the Taliban provided a respectable way for him to come in from the
fighters. But this is a futile effort; under no circumstances cold. In contrast, the Taliban have their military force,
will the Taliban settle for reintegration. To get the Taliban their leadership and membership intact. Therefore, we
on board, the government has to be prepared to embrace should think of ways for those Taliban who want peace to
the idea of reconciliation. But reconciliation has to be participate in the 2019 elections. If the Taliban, rather than
carefully defined. The reconciliation which the Taliban surrendering to the government, play a role in helping to
are prepared to accept is entirely different from the establish the government, they can reconcile with their
reintegration which the government has hitherto had in Afghan pride intact.
mind. This leaves us with a challenge.
My proposal is this – first of all the government should
Winning the Taliban over to participation in a peace prepare itself to pay the price of peace. Then the
process will require them to shift a long way from their government should bless the continuation of Track 2 talks
current position. For the moment, the Taliban work on the with the Taliban. The government of Afghanistan remains
assumption that this is a weak government, only propped the official authority. But they should create the space for
up by the Americans and bound to collapse if the Americans Track 2 to proceed. In the course of Track 2 we can raise
withdraw. The reasons that we are at an impasse with the issue of the elections and seek the involvement of the
regard to negotiations include the differences of vision Taliban. Then we can establish a broad-based platform,
of what the negotiations are leading to and the fact that including the Taliban.
the Taliban seek to externalise the process. Because
they consider the government dependent on the US, The current president of Afghanistan might choose to
they demand that they should negotiate with the US. be part of that team or he might choose to stay out. He
can make a new bid for power, or he can decide not to.
I have worked on several formulas to get around this But if we go ahead with the talks we can convince the
impasse. Peace has a price, just as war has, and we Taliban that the elections are a process which they can
have experience of both. The government of Afghanistan be a part of. Then we can talk of a ceasefire. Eventually,
should be prepared to make a sacrifice for peace. when the Taliban join the government they can tell their
If the government of Afghanistan finds itself in a position supporters that they brought this process about.
where it must choose between peace and staying in
power it should choose peace. A Taliban agreement to participate in elections would
create the conditions for a ceasefire and a nationwide
Sequencing elections process. We would have to form a broad-based national
The link to the Kabul political timetable presents team. We could address the issue of reform to the
another challenge. The trouble is that negotiations constitution and structure of government. We formulate
are difficult whether before or after elections. Before a government taking into account the participation and
the elections, the government is not prepared to representation of all the peoples of Afghanistan. This is
negotiate. After the elections, the Taliban will not be how we can attain real peace and stability.
prepared to surrender to a government which claims
a mandate without the Taliban. The challenge for us is Political reforms required for peace
how to rework the relationship between elections and As Afghans we are under no obligation to implement
negotiations to create an opportunity. any one model of government. Afghanistan is a complex
country with diversity of ethnicity, language, religion and
Let the Taliban play a part in the elections. For sect. This is one of the strengths of the country. We need to
the Taliban to reach agreement with the current find a system which offers expression to this diversity. All
administration, they would have to accept the the peoples of Afghanistan should see themselves with a
legitimacy of a government they have dismissed as stake in that system. All the political parties of Afghanistan,
a puppet, which in Afghan terms would be a massive through democratic channels, should gain a stake in that
climb-down. The Taliban insist that there must be a system. Power should be obtained and exercised through
difference between them and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. legitimate mechanisms.
When Gulbuddin surrendered to the government, there The current mixed political system, a watered-down
was a strong reason for doing so. He had no military force version of the American system, has not worked. The

presidential system has worked in America because it is president. Their candidates may include people from
combined with a federal system. Authorities are allocated Kandahar or from elsewhere. When the president picks
between the federating units, there is a fully functional one of these people as wali, he can count on the support
constitution and the units have their own budgets. of the people of Kandahar who have proposed the wali.
We introduced the American presidential system without
the accompanying institutions. We need a system which In the meantime, until we reach the stage of a fully fledged
gives expression to the ethnic and social diversity of this parliamentary system, we should at least have a prime
country, which is why I have concluded that a parliamentary minister heading the executive branch. We do not need to
system is required. repeat the failed experiment of having a ‘chief executive’.
This was set up to fail. Rather, we should have a prime
We have experienced ethnic confrontation. Let there minister heading the executive branch, a speaker of the
instead be ideological contests. Let us have a system with parliament heading the legislative branch and a chief
strong political parties. Healthy politics is only possible justice heading up the judicial branch. Then the president
when national parties take hold. People need political can be the overall leader, bringing these three branches
vehicles to represent them and to help them in reaching together within a balanced system.
their objectives, gaining the kind of services they require
from their government. Those vehicles should be political We had a bitter experience of the current system
rather than tribal or ethnic. This political development will during the Karzai period, when I was the speaker
maintain our national unity. If people do not have access of the parliament. Because we did not have a prime
to political parties and civil society organisations, they minister, whenever there was a confrontation between
inevitably lean on their tribe, language group and religion. the legislature and the executive, it was the president
Instead of taking Afghanistan forward, such politics can who represented the executive and found himself in
take it backward. Afghanistan remains a country where confrontation with parliament, even being defeated
individuals count for more than institutions. by parliament on various issues.
We need to change the structure of power. The current It would have been better if we had had someone else –
structure encourages ethno-linguistic confrontation and a prime minister to represent the executive. That prime
this weakens us nationally. We need a process of transition minister would then have been answerable both to the
towards a parliamentary system. From the outset, we can parliament and to the president. If we had had that
transfer some of the presidential powers to the parliament structure I am confident that it would have resulted in a
and other organs. This will enable the government to retain government more inclined to deliver necessary services
the support of the population. I am not talking about a and security to the Afghan people.
federal system. But, at least the people of each province
should be able to choose their own wali. Therefore I believe that we should transition towards a
parliamentary system, with the parties put in place. Even
Think of Kandahar. The economic situation does not if the same position remains nominally presidential, there
permit all decisions to be taken by direct election. But should be a prime minister as the second person in power,
there are ways of allowing participation in a decision. with a defined allocation of power between the president
So the people of Kandahar can call a consultative assembly and the prime minister. This will ensure accountability and
to choose, say, five acceptable candidates to send to the will reinforce our national unity and solidarity.

Balkh Province, northern Afghanistan
ABSTRACT
The following statements are taken from longer their views on elections, peace and reconciliation.
interviews with community members across two Respondents’ ages and ethnic groups vary. Data were
different rural districts in Balkh Province in northern collected by Abdul Hadi Sadat as part of a larger
Afghanistan, between November 2017 and March research project funded by the UK’s Foreign and
2018, in which they were asked questions about Commonwealth Office.
Female teacher should first think about the security and how to put into
The current political situation is unpredictable and it is very practice a proper electoral system.
difficult to imagine that the government and the opposition
parties will compromise over power! The government The international community and donors follow their own
is blamed for its misuse of power. But I think the interests in Afghanistan. If their interests do not match ours
internationals are playing a two-faced role in the political then the situation gets even worse. Do you think that the
instability of the country – they provide financial support Taliban has the power and ability to launch suicide attacks
to both the government and the opposition bodies at the on secure locations on their own? It seems that some
same time. We in northern Afghanistan are very concerned internal and external people are involved. It would be wise
about our future. The insurgents will take advantage of the to come to an agreement with the international community
disputes between the Balkh governor and the government on mutual interests.
and will influence the communities and local government.
Community elders are the most useless class in our
The community elders have a very prominent role at society. They are the closed-minded, illiterate, corrupt
the local level, in some cases they can take relatively people. There is no chance they can make any difference.
successful steps in solving social and conflicts resolution. They have influence in the community, but reconciliation
We live in a traditional community and the elders’ role is is a national level issue. As our country has experienced
vital. I remember during the past election elders motivated 40 years of war, I do not think that there are any impartial
people to go to the polling stations. Before the 2014 election elders in the community. If the elders can do anything
the district IEC [Independent Election Commission] branch regarding the election, maybe they can inform insurgents
invited elders to the office, and the IEC motivated them to to allow voters to vote for their desired candidates.
support the election and to motivate villagers to participate
in the election. Female trainer
We have influential elders throughout the district but in fact
Female community mobiliser the elders also belong to one of the parties. Some elders
It won’t be an inclusive election at all since the government are supported by Muhammad Atta Nur, some others are
does not have control of almost 35 per cent of the country. following the government. So independent elders are very few
If the election is held on the announced date in such a bad and they do not have power. As I am among the community, I
security situation, do you think the people who are living see that the Jamiat[-e Islami] party is not willing to reconcile
under the control of Taliban will be able to vote? Those with the Taliban and other insurgents. This is really important
people also have a right to have access polling stations. not only for the parliamentary election but for the long term.
Before the election the government and political parties Our people need a durable solution and peace.

Our community is safe and there are no insurgent activities
but in the rest of the Afghanistan everyday people are dying.
I think this will be ended by casting votes and practising
democracy and choosing the best possible candidates as
representatives of our communities – to further represent
BALKH
us and fulfil our needs and fight for the problems that our
community is faced with. Physically our village is safe
but our district is located in the border of [an insecure]
province. Sometimes the insurgents are coming to the
border villages. Recently we received news that people
across district should take care because the Daesh
[Islamic State in Khorasan] group has become active in the
northern provinces.
The elections are possible! But there are some conditions.

There should be the best possible reforms brought to the
election commissions – they should be committed to the
national interest of the country. Then they can contribute
to the elections and we can practice democracy. People
who live in insecure areas I know will be deprived of the
franchise of their votes in the election. We have no choice
Map of Balkh Province, Afghanistan. but we should have the election in the coming year.
Female nurse Male teacher

Peace talks should be started with our neighbouring We need two types of reconciliation, long term and short
countries like Pakistan and Iran – not with a puppet group term. In the long term Afghans need peace and stability.
of people who don’t know anything and don’t have any clear This would benefit both sides – insurgents and government.
goals or objectives. This issue should be solved through For 40 years we have been dying, so for how long will this
regional cooperation. continue? And we can have short-term reconciliation,
where community leaders can really play a very important
Also reconciliation in relation to the election is possible role. If the government supports community leaders they
with the honest support of the international community. can contact insurgents and ask them to allow the election.
The international community has influence over the Taliban
and other insurgent groups. The public has been always People think that the election is a welfare programme, but
supportive of these kinds of processes. They have always actually it is a political process. If the insurgents allow the
played a positive role and again people will contribute to the election maybe they will ask for some privileges, and this
upcoming elections in order to practice democracy in the will not be good for the legitimacy of the government.
country. The people of our country are compelled to vote
because they do not have another way.

Theses on
peacemaking
in Afghanistan
Professor Barnett R. Rubin
This contribution draws on a commentary by Professor Rubin published by War on the Rocks in spring 2018:
https://warontherocks.com/
Professor Barnett R. Rubin is a Senior Fellow and Associate for Afghanistan, during the negotiations that produced the Bonn
Director of Center on International Cooperation, where he directs Agreement. He subsequently advised the United Nations Assistance
the Afghanistan Pakistan Regional Program. From April 2009 to Mission in Afghanistan on the drafting of the constitution of
October 2013, Professor Rubin was the Senior Adviser to the Special Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Compact, and the Afghanistan National
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan in the US Department Development Strategy. Professor Rubin received a PhD and MA from
of State. In November–December 2001 he served as special the University of Chicago.
advisor to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General
ABSTRACT
What are the possibilities for negotiating a mutually Within Afghanistan, political legitimacy is contested:
acceptable end-state in Afghanistan among the Pashtuns see themselves as a dispossessed majority;
multiplicity of domestic and foreign interests involved? tribal legitimacy is dwindling; and Islamic legitimacy
is overlaid with identity politics linked to different
Challenges to stability in Afghanistan start from solidarity groups.
disagreement over delineation of the territory’s
boundaries. The Afghan state is reliant on external Combatants have largely rejected possibilities for
revenue to survive, but conflicting foreign interests peacemaking to deliver mutual gains through a win-win
mean that the provision of assistance is not seen outcome, and so have sought to establish their military
as an objective public good but rather as partial ascendancy in order to strengthen their bargaining
and destabilising. While the withdrawal of foreign positions. However, no party has been able to establish
troops brings with it the threat of state collapse, at a sufficiently strong and sustainable status to guarantee
the same time the possibility of permanent foreign success in negotiation, so the temptation to postpone
military presence risks provoking regional backlash. talks indefinitely has prevailed.

The philosophers have only interpreted the world a surplus sufficient to finance a security establishment
in various ways; the point is to change it capable of withstanding external threats, and a government
and administration with sufficient legitimacy and capacity
Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach
to control internal threats.
Either he’s dead or my watch has stopped! External priorities: whose stability?
Under present economic and political realities, establishing
Groucho Marx, A Day at the Races
even an unstable state in Afghanistan requires the
involvement of foreign powers as aid donors and direct
Great powers currently articulate two interests that security providers.
justify the allocation of resources to the stabilisation
of Afghanistan: Changing that economic reality in a landlocked state
requires economic cooperation with Afghanistan’s
1. Preventing international terrorist groups from neighbours. Such cooperation is possible only if the
establishing secure bases there. political reality changes.
2. Promoting the economic rise of continental and South The presence of foreign donors or security providers, as
Asia driven by the growth of China and India: 1) at least, well as economic cooperation with one or more neighbours,
by preventing instability in Afghanistan from threatening has the potential to threaten other powers. While the
investments in the surrounding areas; and 2) at best, by stabilisation of Afghanistan is a partial public good for the
integrating Afghanistan into those economic networks. international community, the political and military means
to establish such stability may pose a threat by providing a
The most effective way to realise both of these objectives base for forces perceived as hostile. This is an example of
is building and sustaining an effective state in Afghanistan, the general phenomenon of rent seeking in the provision
which begs the questions of who is to do it and who is to of public goods. Both the Soviet and US governments
pay for it? believed they intended to stabilise Afghanistan, but their
rivals and adversaries perceived their efforts as more
Principles of stabilisation or less threatening, even when, as is currently the case,
The international community defines Afghanistan as the those neighbours also benefit from the limits to instability
territory within the boundaries demarcated by the British imposed by the American presence.
and Russian empires, including through the Treaty of
Gandamak of 1879 and the Durand Treaty of 1893, and as Given Afghanistan’s economic and demographic profile
ratified in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1901. But no – a population that is both poor and young – as well as
Afghan government has accepted these boundaries as its linguistic, religious, ethnic, and economic links to the
legitimate since the partition of India and the creation of populations of the neighbouring countries, virtually any
Pakistan in 1947. neighbour of Afghanistan has the capacity to destabilise the
country by offering selective benefits to client groups. Most
No ruler or government has been able to build and sustain cultivate such clients to one extent or another to hedge
a state within this territory solely on the basis of domestic against consolidation of stability by a power they perceive
resources. This territory has been ruled in one of three ways: as posing a long-term threat.
1. By empires based outside Afghanistan, which transferred Therefore, the stabilisation of Afghanistan through any
resources to a local administration that lacked sovereignty combination of a foreign military presence or assistance,
– Mughals, Safavids, Shaybanids and British India. foreign economic assistance, or economic development
requires that no neighbour of Afghanistan perceives the
2. By empires based in Afghanistan that extracted constellation of forces there as hostile. In the current case,
resources from other areas by conquest (Durranis). Russia, Iran, Pakistan and China all want the US to stay
for now but oppose an indefinite presence, which might be
3. By financial or direct military assistance from one or used against them.
several foreign powers to an internationally recognised,
juridically sovereign state in Afghanistan. Regional connectivity
The growth of China and India has led to the rapid
In principle Afghanistan could sustain a stable state funded development of connectivity projects in the regions around
primarily by domestic revenue if its economy produced Afghanistan. Linking Afghanistan to these networks is the

sole way to reduce dependence on foreign assistance in Afghan territory in 1893, they also do not accept the
favour of economic development. Connectivity, however, legitimacy of Pashtuns being outnumbered by others in
like stabilisation, produces partial public goods that can their own state; if all ‘Afghans’ were ruled by their
disproportionately benefit the producer. rightful state, Pashtuns would be a decisive majority.
“
China claims that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, aims
The state lacks any
at win-win cooperation for all. India and the United institutional way to determine
States, however see it as a predatory power grab and
the electoral outcome in a
are sponsoring separate connectivity projects while
contemplating alternative alliances to balance emerging manner credible to the bulk
China. This response threatens a new Cold War in of the population. Hence every
Asia, with China and Pakistan opposing India, the US,
Japan and Australia, as the Trump National Security election is contested.”
Strategy advocates.
Tribal legitimacy, as in the days of Saddozai or
Regional cooperation that will help stabilise Afghanistan Muhammadzai rule, has lost normative appeal domestically
would require a truce between BRI and US-India projects and internationally, though it continues to structure the
such as the quadrilateral framework with Japan and actions of groups seeking power, as it has since the time
Australia and the India-Iran-Afghanistan-Japan project of the 14th century Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun. Islamic
to develop the Iranian port of Chabahar. Afghanistan legitimacy is essential for any government, but there is
could constitute one of the links between the two little support for clerical rule, which can never be rule by
networks. Conflicts between the sponsors of the two an abstract ulema, but must always be rule by a particular
networks would threaten Afghanistan’s connection to solidarity group of ulema. Such groups, like the Taliban,
international markets. may claim religious legitimacy but like other aspiring elites
use foreign and domestic patronage and ethnic appeals
Foreign troops to operate.
Stabilisation of Afghanistan would also require either the
withdrawal of all foreign troops, as the Taliban demands, or Democracy
agreement by all relevant powers to the terms of reference The election of a president by direct universal suffrage
of a foreign military presence that poses a threat to no attempts to arbitrate that choice of a ruler through a
one. Withdrawal presents the threat of collapse, while neutral process, but, in the absence of agreed demographic
permanent bases stimulate regional backlash. data or an administration with a minimum of impartiality,
ballot box stuffing becomes an imperative. The state
Among the proposals to resolve this dilemma have been: lacks any institutional way to determine the electoral
Russia’s proposal to neutralise Afghanistan; China’s outcome in a manner credible to the bulk of the population.
suggestion to replace NATO’S Operation Resolute Support Hence every election is contested.
with a UN peacekeeping force mandated by the Security
Council; Pakistan’s proposal to limit or eliminate the Democracy based on one person, one vote has some
Indian presence and partially integrate the Afghan and normative appeal but is nearly impossible to implement
Pakistan security forces through joint training; and the in a manner acceptable for all, since how many people
US plan to implement its Bilateral Security Agreement with are eligible to vote and the accuracy of the vote count
Afghanistan in such a way as to induce all neighbouring are both contested. The 2001 Bonn Agreement, the 2004
states to bandwagon with the Americans, rather than constitution, and the National Unity Government (2014–)
balancing against it. None of these options seem all tried to resolve this dilemma of legitimacy one way or
desirable or feasible at present, but all try to solve the another, but those agreements are eroding rapidly.
security dilemma presented by the presence of foreign
military forces. Possibilities for peacemaking
The credibility of any negotiation is undermined by the
Internal legitimacy: whose peace? difficulty of defining or even imagining an end state that
Domestic legitimacy faces a difficult conundrum. Pashtuns would meet the minimal needs and demands of such a
generally consider Afghanistan to be their state, founded large number of actors – the US, Pakistan, Iran, Russia,
and ruled by Pashtun tribes under a variety of legitimation China, India, Afghan urban westernised elites, Pashtun
formulas. As they do not accept the legitimacy of the loss of nationalists, Afghan Islamists, and non-Pashtun ethnic

leaders, for starters. Each actor tends to believe that its format aims at creating a regional consensus that has
adversaries have no feasible proposal and are merely the disadvantage of being led by Russia, whose bilateral
using talks to buy time. The temptation is to imagine relations with the US make it unacceptable to the biggest
that one’s adversary is a phantom totally controlled by actor on the scene. China’s approach of simultaneously
a foreign power with which one can negotiate. trying to work out from Afghanistan-Pakistan relations and
seeking universal buy-in to the BRI, in particular by India,
Given the dependence of all Afghan actors on external clashes with the US National Security Strategy.
assistance, it is impossible for them to reach agreement
if their patrons oppose it. Therefore, the starting point must The main combatants in the conflict do not see any
be to build sufficient international consensus as a basis for possibility of joint gains from a win-win outcome. Hence
any negotiation and devise a mechanism to make a credible they insist on bargaining only from a position of strength.
commitment to sustain the state into the future. But no position can be strong and permanent enough to
guarantee success in negotiation, so the temptation to
The Afghan government approach of relying on US power postpone indefinitely nearly always wins out. Irrational
to force change on its neighbours risks a backlash from optimism is the common delusion of combatants, for
the Pakistan-Russia-Iran-China alignment. The Moscow which non-combatants pay a disproportionate price.

Ghazni Province, south-eastern Afghanistan
ABSTRACT
The following statements are taken from longer their views on elections, peace and reconciliation.
interviews with community members across two Respondents’ ages and ethnic groups vary, as do their
different rural districts in Ghazni Province in south- levels of literacy. Data were collected by Abdul Hadi
eastern Afghanistan between November 2017 and Sadat as part of a larger research project funded by the
March 2018. Interviewees were asked questions about UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Female NGO employee I think the international organisations’ involvement is very

Government officials and the IEC [Independent Election vital and they have an important role in elections, but I
Commission] are not capable of talking with the Taliban don’t think they will have an important role in reconciliation
regarding the election, but community representatives can with the Taliban because they themselves do not want
convince them not to do anything to disrupt the election and Afghanistan to be in peace. If they wanted this we would
even encourage them to participate in the election process. have better life. They have the power to force the Taliban to
reconcile with Afghanistan government.
Female youth, unemployed
I don’t know for sure whether the Taliban will allow elections Male village elder
to take place here or not, but in those villages where the For decades we have been experiencing war so all people
security is low the Taliban will not let the people go to the are very tired with fighting, killing and bombing. We all have
polling centre. In the past election there was a rumour that families and children. And our children have a future: our
the Taliban had warned the people that if they vote and get people do not want war, we all want safety and security that
ink on their fingers they will cut their fingers off, but I didn’t is why all people broadly participated in the elections in the
see anything like that in this village or district. past. As far as I know the Taliban are also residents of the
district. They have children and maybe they are also tired of
The election process is quite different in Kabul than in our war and they will allow people to participate in the election.
district. People in Kabul can freely go out and vote for their
desired candidates and I don’t think that they vote more than I can say that the district centre was very safe in 2013–14
once. But in this district people will feel worried on the way but after the election security deteriorated and the
to polling centres and if they find opportunities then they insurgents speedily extended their control to other areas.
vote more than three or four times. Most of the candidates Maybe that was the impact of internal challenges within
force the people to vote for them here, but I don’t think the government. If the government resolved their internal
that people experience such things in Kabul. problems I am sure the insurgent activities would decrease.
I don’t think that the Taliban will sit around the In our village there is a checkpoint and military forces
reconciliation or peace table, they will not reconcile with govern, but we don’t feel secure. Because every day we
government. But in this district people say that if the experience war and conflict our people do not have a chance
election candidates are educated, honest and hardworking to go about their daily activities and they do not feel safe.
enough then the neighboring districts where the Taliban
rule will reconcile with them, because they also want their During this year we experienced a lot of clashes. The
districts to be improved. Taliban attacked the checkpoints in our village and other

Old Ghazni City, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, 2010. © US Air Force
villages several times. Once about 300 Talibs attacked the to their own benefit. Elders do not have ability to
checkpoints which caused a lot of injuries and deaths for reconcile between Taliban and government. It is the job
both sides, for the Taliban and military forces. of government to resolve big [national level conflict]
problems but the elders can resolve disputes between two
Most of the villages are under the Taliban control and they families or two people. And right now, most of the people
ask for taxes from all the villagers where the Pashtuns at the local level take their disputes to the Taliban because
or Hazaras live. They ask people to pay taxes from their they are very serious.
fields, gardens and water pumps, and no one is able to
prevent them from this action, not even the government. We don’t have any expectation of the government because
The truth is we have just a symbolic government. Most of the it has lost its credibility and cannot do anything for
the provinces are under the control of the Taliban and the us. We cannot solve even a small conflict or case through
government authorities cannot go there. government. It takes years and and creates a lot of other
problems. Government officials ask for money for even
Most people take their disputes to the Taliban and they a small work. If you have money or influence with the
solve the cases very quickly without bribes or corruption. government your work is done on the spot. They turn or
The people who have cases or serious problems or even change the right to wrong and wrong to right. How should
problems to do with fields, lands or gardens take their we believe and trust the government?
cases to the Taliban and after some investigation the
Taliban solve them very soon. A few cases which need Male civil society activist
recording are issued to the governmental officials, but that The election process is different in Kabul than here, a
costs a lot and takes a lot of time. distant rural district. People in Kabul will participate in
polling centres without any worries, but most of the people
Male farmer in the remote villages here feel afraid of participating.
My brother, have a look. Foreigners occupy our country. Reconciliation with Taliban is a waste of time. The Taliban
Some elders who have job in government say ‘oh the do what they want and everyone knows that they do not have
government are really serving the people’. But it is the power to rule the country or send candidates to stand
exactly not true. Elders of both sides are just looking in the election process. Since people do not permit the

Taliban to interrupt the election process, especially those
candidates who have great popular influence, the election
HERAT
might go ahead. But there could be some challenges like
transferring ballot boxes from one place to another.
The government and the IEC [Independent Electoral

Commission] lack credibility and prestige because they do
GHAZNI
not stand by their words. And all previous candidates who
nominated themselves in presidential, parliamentary or
provincial council elections and won a seat didn’t do or act
what they had shouted or promised to people. They just
wanted to win the seat and work for their own benefits and
forgot the people who voted for them.
But I am positive about elections. I participated in the past

elections and will participate in the coming election too,
because I hope the next candidates learn from the past and
work for the people. I think that especially the provincial
council candidates do not know about their responsibilities.
Even though most people in the community do not think that

their votes directly affect the elected candidate, they still Map of Ghazni Province, Afghanistan.
hope things will change. People we have talked to on social
activities say that they are still hopeful. Most of the people
want the government and candidates to provide good living
conditions and job opportunities, especially for youths.

Human rights, security
and Afghanistan’s
peace process
The justice–stability nexus
Patricia Gossman
Patricia Gossman is senior researcher on Afghanistan for Human to document war crimes committed during the Afghan conflict, 1978–
Rights Watch. Prior to joining HRW, she was Director of the 2001. She was Senior Researcher for South Asia at HRW in the 1990s,
Afghanistan Program at the International Center for Transitional covering not only Afghanistan, but India, Pakistan and Nepal. She
Justice on Afghanistan, and was the founder and director of the received her doctorate in South Asian Studies from the University of
Afghanistan Justice Project, an Open Society Institute-funded project Chicago and is widely published on human rights issues in the region.
ABSTRACT
What are the human rights priorities for a peace women’s rights. Post-2001 gains for women’s
settlement for Afghanistan, and what are the prospects participation have been hard won and remain fragile.
for negotiating these effectively? Gender-based fears over negative consequences
of concessions made in a peace deal, such as
Three deeply contested issues are critical to negotiating through revision of the constitution and other legal
human rights in a future peace settlement. safeguards, have been exacerbated by the lack of
women in the Kabul Process.
1. Demilitarisation: agreeing terms to demilitarise
armed groups, including establishing an oversight 3. Transitional justice: addressing the legacy of massive
body and securing international backing for sanctions human rights violations and war crimes is key to
against violators. Demobilisation provisions in the 2001 avoid the persistence of abuses. Recent history does
Bonn Agreement were weak. Subsequent initiatives not augur well, such as the 2008 blanket amnesty
to integrate former fighters into formal security for war crimes. While negotiating progress on
institutions have been decidedly patchy and many transitional justice will not be easy, Afghanistan today
militias continue to play a role in violent conflict today. shows the costs of failure. Acknowledging the truth
about past atrocities may offer a viable entry point for
2. Women’s rights: addressing concerns over the meaningful progress for reconciliation.
potential negative impact of a settlement on

Most peace accords include measures that reflect basic political group at the conference with respect to past crimes,
human rights principles: to reform or restructure security there was no impetus to pursue transitional justice. In closed
institutions; to enact legislative and policy changes to sessions, former mujahidin leaders vehemently rejected
address inequities that fuel conflict; and to acknowledge a proposal to prohibit an amnesty for serious war crimes.
past abuses. But while some agreements have included Barnett Rubin noted in 2003 that during closed sessions
explicit human rights language, such as commitments negotiators had discussed such a proposal, but it caused a
in Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement to serious rift when some faction leaders suggested that the
address discrimination and provide for more equitable motive behind it was to dishonour and disarm the mujahidin.
representation, few have called for specific measures to
implement human rights reforms in their final texts. Nor did the Bonn Agreement address the question of how to
demobilise various militias, or vet them for any future role
How could human rights feature in negotiations toward in the security forces. In the end, the agreement included
a settlement among the relevant parties to the conflict in only some very basic requirements on human rights,
Afghanistan? Three contested areas are critical: disarming including establishing a national human rights monitoring
militias and reform of the security forces; women’s rights; body and pledging that the government would abide by the
and the role of truth and accountability in addressing past provisions of international human rights instruments to
war crimes and human rights abuses. which Afghanistan was a party.
Negotiating rights in Afghanistan It was not a surprise that the Bonn negotiations failed
Afghanistan has been at war for 40 years. During this to address contentious issues surrounding rights,
time every party to the conflict has been responsible for a disarmament and accountability. The Afghan factions
range of human rights abuses and violations of the laws represented there were concerned with the allocation
of war. Many Afghans, including refugees and the larger of power. They had no interest in pursuing questions that
Afghan diaspora, consider themselves victims of a conflict could undermine that power and cost them the support
that has consumed generations. While Afghanistan has of their men. There was no Afghan civil society at the talks
seen a number of efforts to negotiate peace, human rights to push for such measures and no international presence
concerns, including addressing grievances that have to enforce them.
motivated fighters to take up arms, have not played much
of a role in any of them. The US sought an agreement among the main anti-Taliban
groups that would allow it to continue the fight against al-
The talks that culminated in the 1988 Geneva Accords, Qaeda and the Taliban, and the UN and other international
the agreement under which the Soviet Union withdrew participants feared pursuing issues that could spark
from Afghanistan, did not mention human rights except to confrontation among the Afghan factions. The Taliban were
affirm the right of Afghan refugees to return. There was not present at Bonn, and were not party to the bargain on
no effort to reform security institutions and no provision to which the post-2001 Afghan state was built. Thus, many of
account for war crimes by any party to the conflict. Through the conflict dynamics that had characterised the war for
the 1990s, international efforts to bring warring Afghan years prior to Bonn have since continued to undermine
factions to the table amounted to little, while foreign efforts toward peacemaking. If serious negotiations were to
support for the belligerents by Afghanistan’s neighbours get under way, they would need to address these contested
and other powers continued. issues, including the legacy of the post-2001 transition and
the security structure it created.
The purpose of the December 2001 Bonn Conference,
organised under UN auspices, was to broker a power- Demilitarising militias
sharing arrangement among the major Afghan anti-Taliban Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of
armed factions, principally those known as the Northern former combatants is crucial for post-conflict stability and
Alliance, and determine the composition of an interim human rights protection. But representatives at the Bonn
government, a roadmap for drafting a new constitution, and Conference were reluctant to press for this, fearing that
a timetable for holding elections. pursuing disarmament could drive some Afghan factions
from the table. The Bonn Agreement’s provisions on
The Bonn Agreement said little on human rights. Despite disarmament were weak, calling only for the reintegration
widespread condemnation of the Taliban for their treatment of the mujahidin into the new Afghan security forces.
of women, the agreement said only that women should Article V.1 states that ‘all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces
be represented in government and participate in planned and armed groups in the country shall come under the
political processes. In the absence of explicit demands by any command and control of the Interim Authority, and be

Afghan women take part in a protest against violence towards women outside the Ministry of Women Affairs in Kabul in February, 2014.
© Ahmad Massoud/Xinhua/Alamy Live News
reorganized according to the requirements of the new revealed that all the group’s commanders anticipated
Afghan security and armed forces’. Annex III calls for ‘the positions in the security forces or government, as had
United Nations and the international community … to assist happened to Northern Alliance forces after 2001. But if
in the reintegration of the mujahidin’. there is a settlement with the Taliban, its leaders will
not consent to having fighters either demobilised or
While incorporating former combatants into a country’s absorbed into existing governmental security institutions.
security institutions can make DDR palatable to former Instead, as Osman and Gopal described in 2016, they want
commanders, if done selectively or without concern for a reconfiguring of the post-2001 political framework,
human rights it can also undermine efforts to establish which will prompt fierce resistance from those who have
the rule of law. The International Crisis Group in 2010 benefited most from it.
described how in Afghanistan DDR did not formally get
under way until well after the Ministry of Defence had While Afghan government officials aligned with President
already incorporated many of the militias allied with the Ashraf Ghani, along with most donors, welcomed the
Tajik Panjshiri Shura-e Nazar faction into the new Afghan Hezb-i Islami deal as a positive step toward peace,
National Army – and with them, their patronage networks. some Afghan civil society groups raised concerns that
accountability was not part of the negotiations. Protesters
There was no political will to carry out vetting of personnel denounced the deal and the past crimes of Hezb-i Islami
on human rights grounds because those in positions of leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, though mostly on social
power had strong ties to those who would need to be vetted. media as many feared street protests could have sparked
Moreover, the US-led coalition was already arming and retaliation from Hekmatyar’s supporters.
paying commanders from various militias to fight al-Qaeda
and Taliban forces; many of these militias continue to play In Afghanistan, as in other conflicts, security and human
a role in the conflict today. As the dominant anti-Taliban rights are not separate but interdependent. Any future
elites competed for power and access to the vast influx of negotiation with the Taliban will need to address the same
resources from the international reconstruction effort, problem that the negotiators at Bonn ultimately evaded:
the failure to build security institutions that were not tied what to do about the thousands of armed fighters loyal to
to faction-based patronage systems fuelled corruption powerful political figures, many of whom have known only
and fed grievances among groups who felt excluded war, and fear that they will lose out in any settlement?
from the new order. Interviews I undertook in Kunduz in 2015 support research
findings of how fighters frequently cite the sacrifices they
Since 2001, accommodation of potential spoilers has or their families have made, and abuses suffered by rival
remained the preferred approach to dealing with regional forces, as motives for continuing to fight. DDR alone, even
strongmen and other powerful figures. Years of talks if carried out impartially, cannot address this; it is possible
concluded with a 2016 peace deal between Hezb-i Islami that some kind of transitional justice process focused on
and the government. Interviews I undertook in 2017 truth and reparations could go some way toward doing so.

Given the failures of the post-Bonn attempt at DDR, it President Karzai in 2009. Some lawmakers have argued
is also clear that any agreement needs to spell out the for repeal of the law, calling for elimination of the minimum
terms for demobilisation and identify a body acceptable marriage age for girls, abolition of shelters and ending
to all parties to oversee it and prevent the capture of state criminal penalties for rape. Protecting women’s rights
security institutions by any one group. The post-2001 remains an uphill battle in Afghanistan, even without a
practice of accommodating potential spoilers imposed deal with the Taliban.
no sanctions for those who violated even the minimal
constraints envisaged at Bonn, such as the prohibition But the on-again-off-again attempts at talks with the
against maintaining illegal militias. Any future agreement Taliban have intensified fears among Afghan activists that
would require sufficient international backing to support women stand to lose even more ground if a deal were to
sanctions, both political and economic, for those who include revising the constitution or scaling back other
violate its terms. laws and programmes protecting women’s rights. Women
have been all but absent from many meetings held under
Women’s rights the government’s official peace programme, the Kabul
Armed conflict exacerbates gender inequalities. Before Process, while a long-promised plan by the Afghan
the war began in 1978, gender-based discrimination was government to implement UN Security Council Resolution
deeply entrenched in Afghanistan’s socially conservative 1325, which calls for women’s equal participation in issues
culture. While women in urban areas had made some gains surrounding peace and security, has yet to materialise,
in legal status, education and employment, rural women adding to those fears.
were largely unaffected by these changes. Subsequently,
decades of war and displacement have reversed even this Huge gaps remain. While Taliban representatives have
limited progress, while further setbacks ensued under the reportedly signalled support for education for boys and
Taliban. Since 2001, Afghan women have recouped some girls at all levels, if segregated by gender, the content
lost ground and now play an active role in government and of the curriculum remains a contested area. In practice
civil society, although gender-based discrimination and some local-level Taliban commanders have blocked girls
violence remains pervasive. from studying – as have some ostensibly pro-government
militias, as reported by Afghan Analysts Network in 2013.
As prospects for peace talks have fluctuated in recent Taliban interlocutors have also indicated an evolving
years, many activists have focused on the impact that a stance on women’s employment, but one that does not
peace agreement between the Afghan government and permit women to hold the highest political or judicial
the Taliban might have for women’s rights, particularly offices. These limitations should prove an obstacle to
given that the gains made for women since 2001 are fragile any serious negotiations.
and already at risk. Enshrining women’s rights in the new
Afghan state after 2001 was not a given even after the More worryingly, Taliban spokesmen who have
ousting of the Taliban government, however, as the process participated in unofficial talks openly acknowledge that
around the drafting of the 2004 constitution illustrated. As they may not speak for their commanders on the ground,
the International Crisis Group reported in 2013, an early and that the Taliban political leadership could abandon
draft made no mention of gender equality, the chair of the even this limited flexibility on women’s rights in order
Constitutional Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) having publicly to get buy-in from the rank and file. This could prove an
advised female members that under God, they were not insurmountable obstacle unless simultaneous efforts
equal citizens. Afghan human rights activist Masuda Sultan to address the grievances that have driven many to fight
has described how, under pressure from international complement the negotiations. But as happened during
advisers who linked continued financial support for the the 2003-04 constitutional debate, protecting women’s
government on a constitutional provision guaranteeing rights in any peace process will require a commitment
equal rights for women, the drafting committee amended by the participants not to weaken existing constitutional
Article 22 on the equal rights of citizens to include the guarantees for women’s rights, including on the part of
phrase ‘whether man or woman’. any international guarantors. In recent years international
actors in Afghanistan have not consistently defended
The same conservative forces have re-emerged during women’s rights.
parliamentary debates over legislation on women’s rights,
including the Elimination of Violence Against Women law. Transitional justice
As detailed by the Afghan Analysts Network in 2017, this Transitional justice refers to a range of responses to
law has yet to be passed by the parliament, despite having massive human rights violations and war crimes, including
previously been approved through a presidential decree by recognising suffering and loss through truth-seeking,

holding perpetrators accountable through retributive deteriorating security and economic hardship, are drawn to
and restorative justice measures, and reforming justice the ethnic politics that defined the war in the past, and
institutions. The goal is to avoid a return to conflict and defend leaders from their own group even when they are
the abuses of the past. To be successful, the impetus for accused of abuses. The Ghani government’s deal with
transitional justice must come from the victims of human Hezb-i Islami, a Pashtun faction, exacerbated ethnic
rights violations. Initiating a transitional justice process tensions that had surfaced prominently during the 2014
solely from the outside, without commitment from those presidential election, now marked by demands for greater
in the country who have suffered, is unlikely to succeed. power from regional strongmen who assert that they are
In Afghanistan, transitional justice in any form, including defending ethnic minority rights. Competing narratives are
truth-seeking as well as any other form of accountability, a common feature of civil conflicts, particularly those in
has been a casualty of both the stability-first approach which the fault-lines divide ethnic identity groups, and
taken since 2001, and of the fragmented society. further stymie attempts to seek justice.
“
The Bonn Agreement mandated the Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to
As researchers gathered
investigate human rights violations, past and present. testimony about incidents
Working in an environment in which many of those spanning nearly 25 years, some
responsible for past abuses were in power, the commission
has proceeded cautiously. In 2005 it published a report discovered for the first time
noting that most people surveyed considered themselves that their compatriots in other
‘direct victims’ of human rights violations during the war.
As a next step, in consultation with the UN, the rights
districts and provinces had
commission developed an action plan outlining a series suffered the same atrocities
of steps, from documentation through judicial reform.
President Karzai signed the plan in December 2006. In
as their own families had.”
response, the Afghan parliament passed a blanket amnesty
for ‘all political factions and hostile parties’ involved in Conclusion: acknowledgement and truth
the war before December 2001, as well as those still in There will never be a way to definitively remedy the
opposition, including the Taliban, so long as they joined profound social upheaval brought about by many years
the reconciliation process and respected the constitution. of war in Afghanistan. While a peace settlement should
The amnesty became law in December 2008, amended prohibit any amnesties for grave international crimes, it is
to permit individual claims as stipulated in Islamic also clear that after 40 years of war, the cycles of violence
law, according to which only victims and relatives can and retribution run too deep to be resolved solely through
absolve an individual. traditional justice systems. However, in various studies
carried out by Afghan and international organisations
The next blow occurred in December 2011 when President surveying Afghan views on the conflict, one common theme
Karzai dismissed three prominent AIHRC commissioners emerges as a minimum requirement for a functioning
who had spearheaded a massive documentation effort to polity: the need for acknowledgement and truth about
map the major human rights violations of the war between what has happened. In interviews I have done with victims
1978 and 2001. The contents of the Conflict Mapping Report of both insurgent bombings and coalition airstrikes, the
worried powerful former Northern Alliance figures in (predominantly poor) survivors have told me they want
Kabul. It has never been published. Political leaders, both acknowledgement by those who had caused their suffering,
Afghan and foreign, have cited the danger of instability as and they want material help, something reparations could
a reason not to publish it. Despite the threat of a possible potentially help address.
investigation by the International Criminal Court, the
Afghan government has not prosecuted serious offenders, The experience of those who worked on the unpublished
from prominent strongmen, to generals and other AIHRC Conflict Mapping Report provides further evidence
powerful figures. of the importance of acknowledgment, and a way to make
Afghans aware of a shared history beyond what their
Divisions within Afghan society have further complicated own community, tribe or ethnic group has suffered. As
progress. There is little common ground between those researchers gathered testimony about incidents spanning
who have suffered losses from insurgent attacks and those nearly 25 years, some discovered for the first time that
who have experienced abuses by government forces or their compatriots in other districts and provinces had
their allies. Moreover, many Afghans, frustrated with suffered the same atrocities as their own families had.

The research was revelatory for everyone involved, and
underscored the critical significance of getting beyond an
‘us-versus-them’ approach to understanding Afghanistan’s
post-1978 history.
Nor should rights and stabilisation be seen as

contradictory. To paraphrase the seminal work on
Argentina by Juan Mendez, the former UN special
rapporteur, a society’s effort to pursue accountability
for past crimes deserves support. While there may be
necessary limitations on the scope of prosecutions, there
should be no such limits on the search for truth. The
very process of seeking the truth can have a powerful
stabilising effect; by preserving a collective memory of
what has happened, a people can forge a new awareness
of the value of human rights.

On war, peace and transition
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is the leader of the Hezb-i Islami political party The interview was conducted by Zahid ur Rehman, who has Masters
and former mujahidin armed group. He was prime minister during degrees in Political Science from Peshawar University and in
the 1990s before the Taliban takeover of Kabul. After the Taliban’s Peace and Conflict Studies from the National Defence University,
fall in 2001 he was involved in an armed campaign against the Islamabad, Pakistan. He is conducting post-graduate research on the
Afghanistan government and the international coalition. He signed wartime experience of Afghan nomad tribes.
a peace deal with the Afghanistan government in 2016 enabling his
return to Afghanistan after almost 20 years in exile.
ABSTRACT
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar describes some of his unless it is preceded by a peace agreement. Power-
perspectives on war, peace and political transition in sharing in Afghanistan has failed because the groups
Afghanistan, drawn from a conversation with Accord involved accept neither each other nor the concept
in April 2018. of power-sharing per se. Different 'islands of power'
have consequently emerged at district, provincial and
Mr Hekmatyar states that the lack of official Taliban ministerial level which disregard central government.
endorsement of peace negotiations obscures the reality Forthcoming elections present an opportunity to
that a majority within the movement want to see an advance government reform.
end to the war. Meanwhile, a ceasefire is not possible
The factors which have driven the conflict in Afghanistan to the south and the east. But refugees have not been able
and which can bring about peace are equally clear. The to return to northern Afghanistan.
war was forced on us by the Russians. They bequeathed
it to NATO, which has propped up the same forces that Over time, there has been a shift in the balance of the
the Soviets relied on. The war will end when foreign population in the north because people have been forced
interference ceases and Afghans are given a chance to find to migrate from there to the south, to Herat, Kandahar,
an Afghan solution to their problems. No imposed solution Kabul, Nangarhar and other provinces. The war will
will work in Afghanistan and peace cannot come about continue as long as this situation prevails. Indeed, it has
through an externally driven strategy. My plan is that potential to get even worse. If all these people who have
negotiations should take place between Afghans without been driven off their land start to take revenge, they can
any international mediation. easily become a force.
We shall have to accept some facts about ourselves. These refugees should be allowed to return to their
Some groups during their period in power have entrenched home areas and establish zones of peace there. These
themselves in the districts and provinces, even in the areas should be demilitarised, with no presence for
capital and the ministries. These groups are determined government, opposition or foreign forces. The leaders of
to use government resources – tanks, cannons and the armed opposition should then be allowed to return
aeroplanes – to protect their positions against their to these areas along with their families and live with
political rivals and other ethnicities. security. These leaders do not feel secure staying in either
Iran or Pakistan. And the opposition should be allowed to
The successive stages of the war have turned Afghanistan establish an office in Kabul. This is how peace can come to
into a country of refugees. Around eight million of our Afghanistan, if the foreigners allow the Afghans to get on
people currently live in Pakistan, Iran and other countries. with solving the problem.
Some of our people have been able to return, particularly

Parties’ propensity for a ceasefire
and a peace process
The armed opposition includes two types of group.
The first type is those who have been forced to take up
arms by rivals who have abused government power to
oppress them and obliged them to defend themselves.
Dealing with this first group is relatively straightforward
as long as the government adopts an inclusive approach
and is prepared to listen to facts. It should be prepared
to treat the Taliban in the peace zone with respect and
guarantee the security of their life and property.
The second group within the armed opposition is those men

who have become professional fighters, who have been
employed from outside and who perceive their own benefit
in the continuation of the war. It is more difficult to convince
these men. However, I am confident that with a solution to
the problems of the first group it will become much easier
to deal with the professional fighters.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar speaks at an event after his return to Kabul,
4 May 2017. © Xinhua/Alamy Live News
So far we have seen no official indication from the Taliban
that they endorse the idea of negotiations or peace. There
has been nothing of the sort from their office in Qatar. The first necessity is to create appropriate conditions for
However, the reality is that a majority within the Taliban all the parties involved in the government and the armed
want to see an end to the war. If only a way can be found opposition to come together under one roof, evaluate the
to bring them into the country I am confident that they will Afghan situation with patience and start negotiations. I have
embrace the peace process. tried. I came to Kabul in the hope that I would be able to
gather all parties, including those of the right and the left,
The government has changed its position and has outlined it mujahidin and non-mujahidin, and those who had a greater
new proposals for peace both in the Kabul Process and the or lesser role in the war of the past 40 years. Regrettably
Tashkent conference. The foreigners have also started to only a few parties accepted my plan and I had no reply at
talk about these issues and have given indications that they all from those aligned with foreigners.
may be ready to accept the start of intra-Afghan negotiations.
But the Taliban want to negotiate with the Americans. I have now convinced a few of the parties that we should
have a joint sitting. I hope that even if we cannot reach
The Taliban ought to have taken the position that the agreement on the overriding national issues, we should be
foreigners should cut their interference both in politics able to agree on ensuring that the forthcoming elections
and in the war. They should have insisted that negotiations are held transparently and on time, so that we can finally
among Afghans go ahead without foreign interference. put in place an effective parliament. I hope that we shall
Instead they continue to insist that they will not negotiate also agree that such elections must be the only way to
with the government and insist on negotiating with achieve power. We must agree that from now on it is
the Americans. unacceptable to use force, whether through a coup d’etat,
rebellion, tanks and fighter planes, or foreign backers. We
It is impossible to move to a ceasefire without it being must enter into an accepted covenant with the nation and
preceded by a peace agreement. Therefore, what is needed people. This is what I am working on for now.
is a general plan for peace, which can be negotiated. When
agreement is reached on this general plan, which can Political reforms needed for permanent peace
include a ceasefire as part of the over-all package, then This government has failed because it is based on the
we can proceed to ceasefire implementation. Without such idea of sharing power, but sharing power between
agreement having been reached, it is unrealistic to expect groups which accept neither each other nor the concept
either the Taliban or the government to jump directly to of power-sharing. Therefore, different islands of power
a ceasefire. On the other hand, once we have agreement have emerged at district, provincial and ministerial level
through negotiations on a general peace deal, then it will be which do not obey the rest of the government. Instead each
possible to move to a ceasefire. belongs to its own party.

Ministers lose a vote of confidence, but there is no one to a ruler gathers his hand-picked men, labels them as a Loya
remove them from their jobs. Provincial governors defy the Jirga and gets them to make whatever decision he wants.
central government but the government cannot remove
them for fear of provoking a revolt. It is the same for the The Afghan people have never decided to hold a Loya Jirga
customs and borders. The customs are controlled by the and have never managed to use one to elect a popular
same group of people and the government is not able to leader. People referring to the Loya Jirga which elected
gain control of the border so as to centralise the revenue Ahmad Shah Durrani should look at the context. Ahmad
under government control. Shah baba was an officer in the imperial army of Nader
Shah. After Nader Shah was killed, Ahmad Shah used a
We should turn the forthcoming elections into an large force to capture Kandahar by coercion. It was only
opportunity to achieve the necessary reforms in the after he was in military in control of Kandahar that he
government. I am confident that if we can hold free and sensed the need for legitimacy and then organised a Loya
transparent elections, we shall elect a strong parliament Jirga to validate his coronation. Zahir Shah, Daud Khan,
which will be capable of bringing appropriate reform in Babrak Karmal, Najib Habibullah and Ustad Rabbani
the government and in the system itself and in bringing all filled Jirgas with supporters. The rulers were able to
about peace. manipulate these gatherings to obtain any decision they
wanted. It did not even cost much to buy the members of
Afghanistan has its own capabilities and peculiarities. the these Jirgas. A turban usually sufficed.
Afghanistan requires a strong central government. We
are different from other countries in many respects. We Not one of the four rightly guided Caliphs was chosen
lack a strong army and a stable system of government, behind closed doors. On the contrary, every one of them
in the absence of which either a federal system or was chosen in a meeting out in the open. This is why I insist
a parliamentary system would have many adverse that even mentioning a Loya Jirga or a Taliban-style shura
consequences – ultimately risking the partition of the of the righteous has no basis in the shari’a. This idea of the
country and insecurity. We require a powerful president shura of the righteous was commonly used in the time of
who is elected and who is supported by a majority of the the Abbasid Caliphate. It had no occurrence in the early
nation. We also require a powerful political party as no years of Islam, before that. The idea of the shura of the
individual can really govern a country like Afghanistan. righteous was simply invented by the powerful for their
In Afghanistan authority is very important. You saw what own ends. All the Muslims of a country should be involved
happened in the last elections. One side accepted the in electing its president.
results and the other did not. But there was no authority
powerful enough to announce and enforce those results. Addressing the war economy
We knew who had won because they had received the Regrettably it is true that a number of Afghans have
majority of votes. But instead, US Secretary of State John benefitted from the war to build luxurious palaces,
Kerry divided the government between the two sides. enjoy the good life, grab and accumulate assets in banks at
home and abroad, and exercise unimaginable power. Their
It is dangerous for the management of the country’s affairs number is not that large. Over the past few years in the
to be in the hands of a few people. But in parliament we order of two million jeribs [half acres] of government and
have 250 members. Buying them, even at a low price, is not private land have been grabbed by these power-brokers.
particularly difficult. Just imagine the prospect of them taking
important decisions, like a security cooperation treaty or even People who before the start of the war had a salary of
the selection of a president. If you have a rich enemy, you Afs. 2,000 (USD $30) now have accumulated $2 billion of
are essentially giving them control of the fate of the country assets. A whole class of conflict entrepreneurs has been
because they can buy the 250 MPs. It would be particularly imposed on Afghans as rulers. They have acquired their
dangerous to hand over something like the selection of the wealth by grabbing land, looting banks and the money
president to people who can be bought like this. market, even kidnapping businessmen for ransom.
These people want to see the war continue and are happy
Taliban governance to sabotage any effort for peace. Even today foreign forces
The Taliban have declared that they want a system based support these people, although they are well aware
on shuras [elected councils]. The problem with such shuras of what the power-brokers have gained from the war.
is that anyone can convene them anywhere and choose The American generals also profit from the war.
their Amir ul Momineen (‘leader of the faithful’). Historical
experience shows that authoritarian leaders favour such The domestic and foreign thieves cooperate closely.
shuras. This has been a recurrent theme in our history, where These people fear that an end to the war would mean

financial loss and lead to them being brought to court. them to convince the Afghan people that they are interested
The nation wants exactly that, and I agree. Illegally grabbed in peace rather than insisting on the restoration of a long-
assets should be taken back as a lesson for others. If we toppled government.
manage to end the war these people cannot stay on in the
country as they have many enemies. They only stay for the International support for a ceasefire
moment because they are protected by the foreigners’ and permanent peace
planes. If it is decided that the foreign forces are leaving you The unfortunate truth is that many countries have
will see that these people flee even faster than the foreigners. transferred their political and military rivalries to
Afghanistan. There are several national intelligence
Foreign forces agencies backing up the warring parties. My request to
The Taliban’s first demand is that they should be able those countries is that they should not bring their rivalries
to negotiate with the Americans directly. Their second to Afghanistan. This applies to India and Pakistan, to Iran
demand is that the Americans should restore the same and the Arab countries and to Russia and the Americans.
Taliban government which they previously toppled. It is far
less clear what the Taliban’s current position with regard The Americans did not have any rival for their mission
to the withdrawal of foreign troops. in Afghanistan until about 2013. Initially the Pakistanis,
Russians and Iranians all refrained from opposition and
Conducting propaganda about troop withdrawal is one even cooperated in various ways. NATO logistics passed
thing but dealings behind the scenes are entirely different. through Pakistan and Russia. Even Iran, which for years
We do not know what the real position of the Taliban is on had referred to US as Great Satan, cooperated practically
troop withdrawal. My advice to the Taliban would be to get with the Americans in Afghanistan. Initially when the
into negotiations and demand an appropriate timetable for Americans intervened, the Iranians ordered the Shia
withdrawal. This is the approach which I followed in Hizb-i parties to cooperate, ejecting them from Iran and closing
Islami’s negotiations with the government. I demanded that their offices. But now Iran, Russia, China and even Pakistan
there be a sensible and transparent withdrawal timetable. have joined the front competing with the US. This has
This is recorded in our agreement. rendered the situation in Afghanistan far more complex
than it was before. Let us see whether the opposition front
With regard to the Taliban’s demand for restoration of their manages to take their rivalry somewhere else and let
government, I advise them that it is far more important for Afghans get on with solving their problems.

Institutionalising
inclusive and
sustainable justice
in Afghanistan
Hybrid possibilities
Ali Wardak
Dr Ali Wardak is a Professor of criminology at the University From September 2006 to October 2008 he worked for the United
of Glamorgan and Vice President of the South Asian Society of Nations Development Programme in Kabul, and co-authored the
Criminology and Victimology. His main teaching and research 2007 Afghanistan Human Development Report. He is graduate in
interests focus on comparative criminology, the rule of law, and law and jurisprudence from Kabul University and obtained his PhD
the relationships between state and non-state justice systems. degree from the Faculty of Law, University of Edinburgh.
ABSTRACT
Who is best placed to provide justice effectively and bring challenges, from poor record-keeping to gender
equitably to the breadth of Afghan society? exclusion, human rights violations and illicit practices.
Taliban justice is also a significant feature of the
State and non-state justice providers are both part of informal sphere.
the problem and potentially part of the solution. Despite
significant strides being made in Afghanistan’s formal A hybrid system that draws on formal and informal
justice system, it still struggles to deliver an accessible institutions can offer a way forward, linked by new
and inclusive service. Widespread corruption and institutions that prioritise human and women’s
neglect especially in rural areas are among the most rights. A sophisticated hybrid model has previously
serious contemporary challenges. been developed but has experienced resistance from
existing justice institutions. More recently there
Informal institutions are the primary justice provider for has been renewed interest in it from the Ministry
many communities, resolving disputes through jirgas, of Justice and elsewhere.
shuras and ulema where the formal sector is absent,
exclusive or mistrusted. But traditional bodies also

Justice in Afghanistan has made significant progress Alongside the expansion of the MoJ’s General Directorate
since the 2001 Bonn Agreement. But despite advances, of Taqneen (Legislation), many existing laws have been
the state justice system continues to face major challenges amended and new laws enacted. A new, unified criminal code
to deliver accessible, transparent and sustainable justice was officially introduced in November 2017, which updates
to all Afghans. As reported by the Special Investigator for relevant legislation including those relating to the elimination
Afghanistan in 2015, in spite of US expenditure of well of violence against women, anticorruption, anti-money-
over $1 billion to 2015, Afghanistan’s justice sector still laundering, anti-human-trafficking and counter-terrorism.
struggles to deliver effective and sustainable justice. Judicial case management and administration of justice
have improved through extensive technical training as well
The Bonn Agreement set out the terms for the foundation of as internal reforms, including new procedures with regard
a Judicial Reform Commission. But when the Commission to coordination between the Supreme Court, the Attorney
was established in early 2002, it comprised mainly retired General’s Office, the MoJ and the Afghan National Police.
Afghan officials who had returned from long periods of exile
and were not familiar either with modern practice or the new Justice institutions in many regional and provincial centres
legally pluralistic environment. Existing justice institutions have been equipped with modern facilities to enhance
prior to Bonn had also been damaged by successive accessibility of substantive legal material. Institutional
wars since the Soviet invasion, while multiple regimes support has been developed through a number of channels,
had introduced new, often inconsistent laws, procedures including the Independent National Legal Training Centre
and practices. The most serious challenges to justice in (INLTC) in Kabul, Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Justice
Afghanistan today are endemic corruption and neglect of Centre (ACJC), specialist courts and prosecution offices,
rural areas, where the bulk of the population lives. the Afghanistan Independent Bar Association (AIBA), legal
aid department, and the Human Rights Support Unit (HRSU)
A potential way forward that remains under-explored at the Ministry of Justice. Many more female judges,
relates to engaging non-state justice providers. Until 2009, prosecutors and police officers have been hired. Local
international efforts largely ignored non-state justice awareness of women’s rights has been raised in many
providers, despite the fact that many were popularly areas, for example reflected in increased rejection of the
perceived as more legitimate than the state’s justice system practice of baad among Afghan ordinary people, as reported
and, in fact, were the main source of dispute resolution for by the Asia Foundation in 2017. Baad refers to the practice
most Afghans. After 2009, international aid agencies began whereby the family of a murderer offer women in marriage
to develop some interest in non-state and traditional justice in compensation to the family of the victim.
providers, despite opposition from the Afghan state and
the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission Key obstacles: corruption and rural neglect
(AIHRC). But international support has still allocated only a Corruption
small fraction of its budget to non-state justice. Widespread corruption in Afghanistan’s justice institutions
is closely connected to the post-Taliban political structure,
Any new political settlement to end the war in Afghanistan which has relied heavily on pro-government – or more
needs to acknowledge the breadth of relevant justice accurately ‘anti-Taliban’ – warlords to maintain order
institutions – state and non-state – and acknowledge at both local and regional level, as reported by Jones
their functions in supporting sustainable peace. Key to in 2010. Warlords-turned politicians have staffed
developing an equitable justice system is to engage Afghan important political, security and justice positions with
capacity in women’s and human rights. Experiences in their own factional followers, building networks of
advancing a ‘hybrid model’ for justice in Afghanistan since endemic corruption, bribery, nepotism and clientelism.
2009 point to viable ways forward. Respondents to an Integrity Watch Afghanistan study in
2016 named ‘courts, municipalities and prosecution
Achievements since Bonn offices’ as the three most corrupt Afghan institutions.
Internationally sponsored judicial reform since Bonn has
supported the development of technical capacity of justice Judicial corruption has had huge negative implications
personnel, and thousands of judges, prosecutors, police for trust in the state justice system. Most Afghans look
officers, prison wardens and officials at the Ministry of to non-state justice institutions, including in some areas
Justice (MoJ) have been trained. The quality of professional to the Taliban’s parallel judiciary. Despite recent efforts
legal education inside Afghanistan has expanded to designate some apparently more impartial senior
exponentially, with 17 state universities and 96 private appointees, Houlihan and Spencer have reported that the
institutes of higher education now providing legal training Ministry of Interior remains largely administered by former
through law or shari’a faculties. Northern Alliance affiliates. The National Directorate

of Security maintains similar links, while other justice research by the author has revealed various other non-
sector institutions are mainly divided between political state justice providers. The ‘continuum’ of justice providers
affiliates of the President and the Chief Executive. Efforts to in Afghanistan is illustrated in Figure 1 below:
coordinate different components of the justice system have
not been effective, reflecting the lack of a coherent vision Figure 1: Continuum of official, semi-official, unofficial
for fundamental structural reform of the of Afghanistan’s and anti-state justice providers in Afghanistan
justice sector as a whole.
Rural neglect
State justice institutions in rural areas have received
scant attention compared with Kabul and other urban and
State JS
provincial centres. Significant increases in the number
of female judges have been largely restricted to Kabul MoWA
(90 per cent), with the remaining 10 per cent in only four
AIHRC
additional provinces, according to Madzarevic and Rao in
2014. Newly established institutions to support the justice INGOS
sector similarly lack reach throughout Afghanistan, such
NGOs
as INLTC, AIBA and HRSU. Houlihan and Spencer in 2017
pointed out that the Juvenile Appeal Court, High Anti- Wakil-e-Gozars (cities)
Corruption Court, the Serious Crimes Court, and all eight Jirga and Shura (rural villages)
chambers of the Supreme Court are situated in Kabul.
State justice in rural Afghanistan further remains largely Ulema and religious institutions
male-dominated, inaccessible and ill-equipped. For Taliban justice and mobile courts
example, AIBA under-resourcing means it has struggled to
provide assistance to rural litigants.
Rural insecurity has hampered judicial reform – Source: Wardak (2019–forthcoming). Justice providers cited above include: State
although the inability of the state to provide effective Justice System; Ministry of Women Affairs (MoWA); Afghanistan Independent
Human Rights Commission (AIHRC); International NGOs; National NGOs; wakil-
and transparent local justice is itself a prime cause of e-gozars (local representatives) in urban areas; jirga/shura in both rural and
insecurity. Furthermore, according to Swenson in 2017, urban areas; religious educational institutions, and individual members of ulema
(Islamic religious scholars/jurists); and the Taliban’s judiciary. The various justice
the relationship between justice and insecurity in rural providers illustrated in figure 1 are ranked according their level of proximity to
areas has been further complicated by the fact that the state – from the most official, through official, semi-official and unofficial to
international investment in non-state traditional justice anti-state justice structures.
since 2009–10 has been framed as a component of US-led

counterinsurgency efforts. Also, paramilitary policing has Research indicates that non-state justice providers
been prioritised over community policing, undermining not (especially jirgas and shuras) are perceived as more
only the professionalism and transparency of Afghanistan’s accessible, more legitimate, more effective, less corrupt,
justice system, but also local perceptions that justice is for more trusted, and speedier in resolving disputes than the
ordinary people’s welfare. Afghan state courts. However, Stahlmann has also stressed
that jirga and shura exclude women, do not officially record
Filling the local vacuum: multiple their decisions, sometimes violate Afghan law and human
justice providers rights, and can be influenced by warlords. Nevertheless,
The space left behind by gaps in the state justice system notwithstanding challenges associated with non-state
at local level is filled by a multiplicity of non-state justice justice providers, until recently few concrete efforts have
providers. This includes in some parts of the country, been made to use their positive potential as complementary
according to Giustozzi, Franco and and Baczko, the elements of the state justice system.
Taliban’s parallel judiciary. Field research over the past
15 years by the author and others has shown that the most Institutionalising a hybrid model for justice
prevalent non-state institutions for local dispute resolution Customary dispute resolution in civil and commercial
are the traditional village jirga (circle) or shura (council). disputes is recognised by Afghanistan’s Civil Code (1976).
Primarily civil but also criminal local cases are addressed Article Two states that: ‘When there is no provision in
through speengiri or rishsafidan (greybeards) with a the law or in the fundamental principles of the Hanafi
reputation for wisdom, piety, honesty, and local knowledge jurisprudence of Islamic shari’a, the court shall issue a
and dispute resolution expertise. However, recent field ruling in accordance with general custom, provided that

the custom is not contradictory to the provisions of this law the state justice system. ADR Units would provide
and to the principles of justice.’ Various other Afghan laws disputants with help and advice to select an existing
include provisions on informal mediation between litigants. non-state justice institution appropriate to deal with their
But customary adjudication is not recognised as legally case. Disputants would be free to select any appropriate
binding unless cases are initially registered officially. And mechanism, excluding in current circumstances Taliban
research by the author to be published in 2019 has shown justice as ‘anti-state’ and opposed to interaction with
that despite some pragmatic interaction between formal official institutions. ADR mechanisms would handle minor
and informal justice providers, most criminal and civil criminal offenses and civil cases, offering disputants the
disputes are dealt with outside the state justice system. choice to refer to the nearest state court. Serious criminal
cases would fall exclusively under the remit of the state
How the hybrid model works justice system.
The author along with others developed a hybrid model of
the justice system in Afghanistan, which was advocated in The proposed Human Rights Unit (HRU) would be mandated
2007 in the Afghanistan Human Development Report of to monitor and approve ADR decisions in order to ensure
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This consistency with human rights principles. The HRU would
model proposed a coherent framework for complementary be further empowered to examine issues relating to
institutional links between the existing state justice system, domestic violence, past human rights abuses and war
various non-state justice providers, and women’s and crimes. ADR decisions would also need to be endorsed by
human rights institutions – as Figure 2 illustrates. the nearest primary justice institution – a court or relevant
rights (hoquq) department. This is to ensure that ADR
The hybrid model advocates alternative dispute resolution decisions do not violate Afghanistan’s law or the
(ADR) and human rights units functioning alongside fundamental principles of shari’a.
Figure 2: Hybrid model of the justice system in Afghanistan
Civil Disputes, Criminal Incidents,

and Human Rights Violations
Human Rights Serious Criminal Major Civil Minor Civil Disputes

Violation Incidents Incidents Disputes and Criminal Incidents
Ministry of Justice
Police
Hoquq Department
Attorney
General
Human Rights ADR

Oversight Jirgas, CDCs, CSOs,
(internal/external) PAs, Other
Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Satisfactory

Resolution Resolution Resolution Resolution
Court of Justice
Outcome
Appeal, Acquittal, Fine, Prison, Others
Source: Afghanistan Human Development Report (2007)

Alli Wardak interviewing elders in Eastern Afghanistan, 2014. © Ali Wardak
Interactions between state and non-state justice institutions The idea of the hybrid model also began to get some
can occur through formal correspondence, physical traction within the Afghan state, although progress has
participation or other appropriate ways. Decisions reached been slow and strenuous. Recommendations of the hybrid
would be officially registered as legally binding. However as model were strongly reflected in the 2009 National Policy
Figure 2 illustrates, ADR decisions that failed to be endorsed on the Relationship between the Formal Justice System
by either the HRU or the relevant state court, or that were and Dispute Resolution Councils, drafted by the Ministry of
rejected by at least one disputant, would need to be revised Justice in conjunction with the United States Institute for
or referred to the state justice system for processing and Peace. The policy was not officially endorsed and various
adjudication. In this way, the hybrid framework proposes international organisations resorted to programmes
both a collaborative dialogue between various state and focused on other initiatives such as training traditional local
non-state justice providers and local rights organisations, mediators, raising legal awareness, promoting women’s
and the empowerment of women through raising awareness rights and coordination between state and the state
of their rights and supporting spaces for contestation. justice systems.
“
his situation has created a
T The MoJ revisited the hybrid model’s recommendations
in 2010, producing a draft Law on Dispute Resolution
justice vacuum that is filled Shuras and Jirgas. The AIHRC, MoWA and other powerful
by multiple non-state justice officials rejected the inclusion of minor criminal offenses
providers, including the in the draft law, however, and it was withdrawn from
Afghanistan’s Council of Minister’s meeting in 2010. In
Taliban judiciary.” 2015–16, the Afghan government, with the support of
UNDP, produced a new draft Law on Conciliation Jirgas in
How the hybrid model has progressed Civil Disputes. This was forwarded by the MoJ to the Council
The UNDP Report was rejected by Afghanistan’s Supreme of Ministers in 2016, which has now approved the draft
Court in 2007. Senior judges saw it as a threat to their following minor (but unwarranted) amendments proposed
authority, and its recommendations as a potential avenue by the government’s Legislation Committee.
to divert international aid away from the state. Still, the
report’s hybrid model nevertheless stimulated debate The new law is useful. But because it focuses exclusively
and practical interest in operationalising some of its on civil matters, it only partly represents the hybrid model.
recommendations. Some international organisations Full implementation of logic of the hybrid model can link
strongly supported the Report, including the Norwegian all justice providers illustrated in Figure 1, and thereby
Refugee Council (NRC) and some other national and provide inclusive, sustainable and restorative justice to
international actors, as reported by the NRC in 2007. all citizens. In time, this may also include some of the

Taliban’s parallel justice mechanisms. It is hard to imagine In its aim to provide accessible, sustainable and inclusive
linking Taliban justice to Afghan state justice institutions justice to all Afghans, the hybrid model offers a coherent
while the war continues. However, in practice Taliban framework for institutional links between the official state
justice already has links with jirga, shura and ulema based justice system, semi-official and unofficial local justice
structures of local dispute resolution in specific ways and providers, as well as existing bodies promoting human
contexts. Capitalising on these local links may provide for and women’s rights. By interlinking composite capacities,
a potential peacemaking mechanism between the Afghan the model not only has the potential to extend justice to
State and the Taliban. More broadly, as the justice vacuum all Afghans but also promises greater transparency by
is most acutely felt at the local level, institutionalising empowering the HRU as a check and balance on rights
links between male-dominated jirgas and shuras, religious abuses by both courts and jirgas, which in turn would offer
institutions, women’s and human rights organisations, and checks and balances on one another. This is enhanced
state justice institutions could provide more accessible, by the fact that women would be in the majority in the
transparent, fairer and humane justice to all. composition of the HRU. Indeed, research reveals that
selective implantation of elements of the hybrid model by
Conclusion NGOs has resulted in the reduction of baad in Afghanistan.
International investments in Afghanistan’s post-Taliban
state justice institutions over the past 16 years, have resulted Due to initial opposition from the state and the AIHRC,
in the (re)building of a functioning modern justice system, translating the hybrid model into policy has taken over a
including reconstruction of justice infrastructure, creation of decade. However, in collaboration with UNDP and the MoJ,
new justice institutions, enactment of new laws and reform the author’s recent field research on exploring applicability
of existing ones, capacity development, equipping justice of the model to civil disputes has facilitated a new draft law
institutions with modern facilities and emphasising women’s on Conciliation Jirgas in Civil Disputes in Afghanistan. There
rights. However, overemphasis on quick fixes, prioritisation is more work to be done to realise fuller implementation
of urban centres, the use of justice institutions in counter- of the hybrid model. However, this cannot be fully achieved
insurgency efforts and the failure to understand or engage in isolation from achieving inclusive and sustainable
with the multiplicity of justice providers have undermined peace. Justice and peace are inextricably linked in war-
fundamental structural reform. All this has resulted in a torn Afghanistan and require a multifaceted response.
justice system that is less accessible and more corrupt, and As local traditional dispute resolution mechanisms place
that lacks full capacity to address the complex new justice strong emphasis on restoring community harmony, dignity
needs of the Afghan people. This situation has created a and relationships between parties, the hybrid model can
justice vacuum that is filled by multiple non-state justice support social reconciliation and inclusive peacemaking
providers, including the Taliban judiciary. among warring parties across the country.

Conclusion
Incremental peace in practice
Anna Larson and Alexander Ramsbotham – with thanks for substantive input
and ideas from Professor Michael Semple
It is not possible in 2018 to talk to any Afghan who does not are soaring and the war economy continues to serve the
have direct personal experience of loss of life or livelihood interests of many government officials.
as a result of violent conflict. Limbs blown off, children
murdered, maimed or orphaned, elders decapitated, Second, common interests are discernible between the
people raped, sons kidnapped, women abused, families two major parties to the conflict, and between them and the
separated, shops obliterated, schools reduced to rubble: Afghan people. These include the end to the needless killing
pervasive, intense and violent suffering has devastated of Afghans and the establishment of an Afghan administration
a nation. Afghanistan is not a ‘safe country’ to live in that is representative and insulated against the interference
or return to, nor is it in any kind of post-conflict phase. of outside powers. Additionally, statements by leaders of
It is embroiled in a network of wars that have become Taliban groups in this publication summarise some common
intractably interlinked. positions on key issues among the armed opposition – from
the realisation of a moderate Islamic government free of
But the contributions to this Accord publication clearly corruption and the abuse of power, to achieving justice for all
demonstrate that Afghanistan is not consigned to an citizens, no matter their rank or background.
inevitably violent future. Rather, there are two potential
routes ahead: a continuation of this violence (the ‘path of Third, offsetting common interests are tensions between
least resistance’) or steps toward an incremental peace. the parties that need to be identified, acknowledged and
Strong drivers continue to push in the direction of conflict. worked through systematically. Examples include the
But new conditions like President Ghani’s February 2018 absence of trust in formal agreements or settlements,
peace offer to the Taliban and intense conflict fatigue how to reintegrate former anti-government commanders
on both sides suggest an alternate course is possible. into crowded and contested security sector, how to address
Achieving such a shift would require a conscious choice issues of immunity from prosecution without sidelining
by the major parties to the conflict and their supporters to justice, and how to ensure that women’s position vis-à-vis
claim responsibility and take tangible action. the state is insulated and enhanced.
Rhetoric to reality The fate of Afghan women’s involvement in the country’s

Moving beyond the peace rhetoric means acknowledging transition out of war is illustrative of the challenges of
certain – sometimes uncomfortable – truths. First, the breaking out of the current violent scenario. Despite
weaknesses and strengths demonstrated by both the significant gains in rights and political participation,
Taliban and the Afghan government. The Taliban have opportunities for women are still limited and many remain
established a reputation for efficient dispute resolution wary of the consequences of a political process with the
and for their stance against corruption, but their use of Taliban. Challenges are not restricted to involvement
violent force to impose control of territory and their lack with the armed opposition, however. Dr Habiba Sarabi
of unity undermine their wider credibility. The Afghan asserts in this publication that most High Peace Council
government has recently made some gains in terms of its members are men who do not listen to its female
macro-economic development strategy and has maintained representatives nor support women’s rights. Still, new
a functioning state that has seen a peaceful, if problematic, leadership and strategy have recently reinvigorated the
transfer of power in 2014. But all state institutions are HPC, especially for women. Afghan women have two key
subject to endemic corruption, unemployment levels roles in peacemaking – at the political level to ensure

achievements are not lost, and at grassroots level to Third, an incremental approach inherently implies a
convince male family and community members not to long-term strategy planned over years and not months.
fight. Dr Harabi refers to a Dari proverb: ‘No matter how Such an approach involves committing to a peace
high the mountain, there will always be a way up’! [Koh process that will ultimately outlast the political terms of
harche beland basha, sir khud, yak ra darad] western governments’ direct interest and investment in
Afghanistan. But along the way it could also offer value for
Incentivising incrementalism money – as well as for human and reputational resources
To begin tackling some of the critical underlying issues – and accumulate peace dividends for Afghans and for
that will transform Afghanistan’s future in the longer- international partners over time. De-escalation could
term, lessons from the analysis and experiences provide both direct short-term security benefits as well as
documented in this Accord suggest that an immediate longer-term investment in confidence-building. Gradual
reduction of violence is a necessary precursor. Only after transition to a political process would enable international
the establishment of a credible ceasefire can divisive root and Afghan partners to progressively re-orient military
causes of conflict be dealt with in a systematic manner resources to more cost-effective political and diplomatic
that facilitates broad participation. This provides the engagement, thereby providing a credible pathway
rationale for an incremental approach to peace, based on to drawdown.
two sets of phased objectives: first, short-term, involving
an initial end to violent hostilities; and second, long-term, Fourth, effective progress needs to combine local- and
involving the renegotiation of a social contract inclusive national-level initiatives. The insurgency exists on many
of all Afghans. levels. Felix Kuehn in this publication describes how the
Taliban are not unified but include distinct groups with
Realising a progressive approach to peace in Afghanistan different policy perspectives. Still the main message of
requires a radical strategic shift which, to progress, the central leadership that the Taliban can deliver a return
must overcome policy inertia or resistance. This shift is to law and order based on Islam has broad resonance
radical on four counts. First, prioritising de-escalation across the movement. While local peacemaking initiatives
of violence bucks the prevalent policy orthodoxy of have enjoyed some partial success in recent years, as
maintaining military pressure as the key enabler for Julius Cavendish points out in this publication they have
change – to deliver either the disintegration of the Taliban struggled to survive without national backing. Many locally
or Track 1 talks towards a grand peace bargain with the agreed settlements in Afghanistan are also informal,
Afghan government. Such policy is based on a flawed and as Michael Semple asserts in this publication, the
analysis of key variables: the vulnerability of the Taliban tradition of ‘unwritten rules’ in Afghanistan threatens the
to fatal fragmentation; the preparedness of the Taliban transparency of any formal settlement process as parties
central leadership to enter into substantive dialogue with to any agreement could question whether some existing
the government; or the capacity of the Kabul authorities unofficial arrangement contradicts the terms they have just
and their international partners to cohere a systematic signed up to. An incremental peace in Afghanistan does not
political process. necessarily imply a single document like the Bonn Accords,
but might more feasibly comprise a series of agreements
Second, Afghan and international partners need to better sequenced from easy to hard and from local to national
align strategies (‘ends, ways and means’) towards a over a period of years, and including agreed reforms and
mutual goal of political settlement. This requires strategic confidence-building running in parallel.
coordination among but also within individual entities
– neither of which has proved easy to date. Lt-General Incremental peace in practice
Douglas Lute in this publication describes how the United How then might a progressive peace in Afghanistan be
States leadership has struggled to establish the primacy put into action? Ultimately a peace process must be
of a political process to achieve peace in Afghanistan Afghan-led. Suggestions below for practical steps forward
and the role of the military to support political action. therefore describe ways in which international actors could
Strategic inconsistency was exemplified by the killing of work with the government of Afghanistan, organised into
Taliban leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor in 2016, rather short- and long-term objectives of reducing violence and
than seeing him as a potential interlocutor in dialogue. renegotiating an inclusive social contract.
Looking ahead, Afghan and foreign peace partners can
organise policies around President Ghani’s peace offer. Short-term objectives: reducing violence
Identifiable, concrete steps towards a practicable de-
escalation process as outlined below offer milestones for Reorient strategy to prioritise the reduction of violence
detailed planning. as a necessary precursor to create the conditions in

which underlying political issues can be addressed. Progressively isolate Taliban groups’ reliance on regional
The persistence of the violence in Afghanistan, sustained economic and political support. There is significant
by the thriving war economy and both sides’ demonisation political will among Taliban groups to relinquish ties to
of each other, precludes a meaningful political process. their supporters in their respective cross-border regions.
Concrete progress towards violence reduction can build This could be capitalised upon through the development of
momentum and confidence among the various parties to a set of potential inducements for those groups committing
the conflict. A phased approach could explicitly align with, to lay down arms that include not only the provision of
build upon and affirm President Ghani’s peace offer that livelihood alternatives but also local prestige and respect
the government of Afghanistan will deal with the Taliban through the upholding of Taliban positions of influence in
movement as a political actor once it goes on ceasefire. the community.
This provides a viable platform around which to coordinate
support for an Afghan-led peace programme. International Increase support and resources for intra-Taliban dialogue
support can add credibility, accountability and resources in order to broaden cross-movement consensus to commit
to President Ghani’s proposal and help it to withstand to de-escalate violence and explore key areas for mutual
resistance and shocks. International actors in discussion accommodation. This could be facilitated at the sub-
with the President could elaborate criteria that a ceasefire national level by High Peace Council representatives in
or de-escalation of violence needs to meet before it is coordination with respected local interlocutors, bringing
considered credible. together for example neighbouring regional groups of
Taliban towards a series of bilateral agreements.
Agree a joint commitment by North Atlantic Treat
Organisation command and the leadership of the Afghan Establish a hybrid International Contact Group to support
National Defence and Security Forces to reciprocate any emerging Track 1 peace talks comprising state and non-
credible Taliban ceasefire or de-escalation steps. This state membership to bridge gaps between short- and
could help convince the Taliban of the reliability and breadth long-term peace objectives. A hybrid group could help
of commitment to de-escalation and provide a basis for to link mediation tracks, providing both international
joint planning for preparatory measures, and support and political leverage to support and advise the parties and a
coordination mechanisms. Implementation measures could channel to connect negotiations to different communities.
include conditional prisoner release, temporary de-listing of It can achieve this dual function through its composite
sanctioned Taliban and safe-conduct or security guarantees. membership. It can also provide technical support to advise
Implementation support mechanisms could include an on substantive agenda items.
international working group led by an agreed third party to
develop lists of potential prisoners for prioritised release and Overcoming impediments to implementation
conditions for negotiations on temporary de-listing. Potential De-escalation requires a number of facilitative measures
rewards and wider benefits of ending violence would then to overcome implementation challenges. These include
need to be communicated between the parties through building broader support for the violence reduction
existing channels and public diplomacy. process among actors invested in the status quo or fearful
of potentially detrimental change. Also, defining what is
Support the establishment of locally agreed peace zones. meant by ‘political actor’ in relation to President Ghani’s
These could set up temporary and territorially delimited peace offer and how this may affect attitudes – of the
cessations of hostilities while the terms of a more Taliban and other political actors – to the de-escalation
permanent ceasefire could be renegotiated and the zone process. Moreover, identifying means through which
potentially expanded, providing a 'ground up' foundation Taliban operations might be visibly separated from those
for de-escalation. Implementation measures that can of Islamic State of Khorasan or other insurgent groups that
incentivise participation could include compensating local do not intend to commit to de-escalation and that still may
groups that agree to de-escalate violence in the absence pose a credible threat to international security.
of a broader Taliban commitment – recognising the
connections between local and national peace processes. In addition, it will be necessary to develop protection
This would include providing protection for participating measures for senior members of the Taliban movement
local groups and leaders in the provinces against any who may be vulnerable to retaliation by hardliners for
retaliation from potential spoilers in the area covered, their cooperation in advancing the peace process. Further,
including from local authorities and government-affiliated in order to secure sustainable commitment to any peace
strongmen with personal agendas. Parallel progress process at the local level it will be important to develop
towards reducing violence at a national level could help alternatives to the Taliban’s regional political and economic
protect local initiatives from centralised spoiling tactics. support that are persuasive enough to incentivise total

or partial shifts away from reliance on regional funding. At this point, the consultative group would take on the role
And there remains the challenge of building Taliban trust of developing a series of recommendations to the Afghan
in the High Peace Council or other government-affiliated government for how the Strategy might be implemented.
interlocutors and being able to deliver on supporting
financially and with security provisions any agreements Establish a Peace and Security Commission comprising
that are reached between groups. senior-level national and international male and female
membership, charged with ensuring that Security
De-escalation measures also need to navigate forthcoming Sector Reform efforts reinforce the peace process. This
elections in Afghanistan. It is in the Afghan government’s commission should develop measures for enhancing the
interest to ensure that as much of the country as confidence of former combatants and the wider populace
possible is able to participate in both parliamentary in the security forces, as well as developing mechanisms
and presidential polls, but facilitating Afghan rural for selective integration of former insurgents. It should
communities’ involvement could also bolster the Taliban’s monitor the compliance of security forces with the spirit
local popularity. While Taliban groups control a significant of a peace process and any re-profiling of the forces
proportion of the country, this is not a relative measure necessary to maintain broad confidence.
of their local popular support once levels of violence
decrease. Taliban leaders need to consider other ways Commit to large-scale economic reform including the
in which they might bolster their peacetime legitimacy. enhanced monitoring of customs, prevention of land-
International donors could help, meanwhile, by making grabbing and reduction of parliamentary privileges. Rather
solid political and resource commitments to candidate than function as a symbolic or dramatic gesture based on
vetting, providing technical and political support to speed imprisoning high-profile individuals, this should involve
up the vote-counting process and a clear statement of non- innovative technical and institutional reform measures that
intervention after the presidential results are released. disrupt corrupt practices. Future punitive measures could
include public threats of international sanctions against
Long-term objectives: renegotiating the individuals who continue to orchestrate corrupt activities
social contract that extract state resources for personal gain.
Securing a ceasefire requires parallel efforts to facilitate
agreement on an inclusive social contract representative Overcoming impediments to implementation
of all Afghans. In this regard, international actors should Longer-term measures also come with interrelated
support the government of Afghanistan to prioritise the implementation challenges. First is the need to ensure
following four tasks: the independence of the consultative group and publicly
communicate its commitment to impartiality and
Develop a high-level independent consultative group on transformative change, while also establishing its influence
political reform and renewal of the social contract. There to effect reform – for example though the credibility of
is an urgent need to begin reassessing the fundamental its membership, the authority of its mandate and the
character and role of the Afghan state – not least because legitimacy of its methodology to consult widely. Second, it
its current failings and loopholes are central drivers of is imperative to offer the Afghan people the opportunity to
violent conflict. It is imperative that the government of voice and document key grievances that have resulted from
Afghanistan, with the support of its international partners, Afghanistan’s protracted conflict. Third, technical innovations
commits to an overhaul of the existing political system. need to be developed within economic reform programmes
A high-level consultative group made up of senior Afghan that are implementable with limited resources but also
women and men policymakers could provide advice, sophisticated enough to withstand efforts to undermine them.
facilitate relationships and gather inputs from across
Afghan society and external experts on priorities for Rebuilding relationships
inclusive change, including on controversial issues such While renegotiating a new social contract is key to
as decentralisation, gender equality, and a revision of the sustainable peace in Afghanistan, prospects for agreeing
electoral system and the criminalised economy. a comprehensive peace settlement are blocked for the
foreseeable future. Lack of confidence among the parties
Launch a National Peace Dialogue to address the root is the main impediment to progress on even the most
causes of the conflict, providing opportunities for transitional straightforward negotiable issues, driven in the first
justice measures and building on proposals developed instance by the persistent violence affecting many parts
in the high-level consultative group. This would see the of the country. Confidence is further compromised by
proposals discussed by communities across Afghanistan chronic lack of trust in formal processes and agreements,
and responses gathered and compiled into a Peace Strategy. by the prevalent perception that national institutions are

corrupt and partisan, and by the dual system of governance A phased programme of implemented reforms and
in Afghanistan – with the government running the main cooperative relations cultivated through dialogue has
population centres and the Taliban much of the countryside. potential to address the issues that have underpinned
violent conflict in Afghanistan for decades. A progressive
An incremental approach as recommended here that builds approach to settlement could build on reforms rather than
security, confidence and inclusion over time presents a compromising on them. An early suspension in fighting could
more viable alternative model to break out of Afghanistan’s help create an enabling environment conducive to such a
predicament. This would be likely to involve a phased set of sustained process of dialogue and reform. A sincerity test for
agreements towards a more inclusive settlement, rather armed groups looking to join a non-violent political process
than looking to land a ‘grand bargain’ from the outset. It would be their preparedness to sign up to the suspension of
would aim to gradually build the parties’ confidence and violence. Until now, any ‘peace process’ in Afghanistan has
willingness to consider ambitious measures or embrace lacked both the strategic ambition and coordinated political
compromise, recognising the importance of rebuilding will to take appropriate action. There is scope for a sustained
relationships between the parties in expanding the and resolute move towards incremental peace that could,
possibility of agreement. over a period of years, repair and renew the relationship
between Afghanistan and its people

Chronology
1747 1973
Ahmed Shah Durrani unites Pashtun tribes to found the Durrani Daud overthrows the monarchy in a bloodless coup and declares
empire, which will come to be seen as the root of the modern state of a republic.
Afghanistan. At its peak it covers modern-day Afghanistan and parts of
Pakistan, India, Iran and Turkmenistan. 1978
1838–42 Daud and his family are killed in a pro-Soviet military coup which its
supporters call the Saur (‘April’) Revolution. The People’s Democratic
Britain invades and restores the deposed Shah Shujah Durrani. He is Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) takes power. Socialist reforms provoke
assassinated in 1842 and British and Indian troops are driven from Kabul. opposition, especially from Islamic conservatives, and mujahidin
groups begin to mobilise in exile against the new regime.
1878–80
1979–80
Britain wins the Second Anglo-Afghan War. It withdraws its troops but
retains control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs. With large parts of the country in open rebellion, the Soviet Union
invades in support of the communist government in 1979 and installs
1880s–90s Babrak Karmal as ruler in 1980. In response, the US, Pakistan, Iran
and Saudi Arabia provide more support to the mujahidin.
Abdur Rahman Khan, a despotic and state-building Amir, pursues an
‘Afghanisation’ involving the persecution of non-Sunni Muslims and 1986–87
moving Pashtuns to the north. In 1893 he is forced by Britain to accept
the Durand Line, which runs through Pashtun areas of what is now Karmal is replaced as leader by head of the state security agency,
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Najibullah Ahmadzai. Najibullah attempts a National Reconciliation
with mujahidin militias that would lead to a coalition government, but
1919 the programme fails.
Amir Amanullah Khan declares independence from Britain. 1988–89
1920s Afghanistan, USSR, the US and Pakistan sign the Geneva Accords in
April 1988, based on principles of non-interference, and the Soviet
Amanullah introduces extensive social reforms but domestic unrest, Union begins pulling out troops. The last troops leave in 1989 but
coupled with a lack of British support, sees him exiled to Europe in 1929. fighting continues as the mujahidin groups try to overthrow the
Najibullah government.
1933
1992
Zahir Shah is crowned. The last king of Afghanistan, he will reign
until 1973. Najibullah resigns and the PDPA government collapses in April.
Forces led by Jamiat-e Islami’s Ahmed Shah Massoud and Uzbek
1953 commander Abdul Rashid Dostum take Kabul. The Peshawar Accord
attempts to establish an interim government, installing Sibghatullah
Mohammed Daud, a cousin of Zahir, becomes prime minister. He Mojadidi as president for three months, followed by Jamiat leader
introduces social reforms but curtails opposition to the monarchy Burhanuddin Rabbani for a further three. The Peshawar Accord
within parliament. also provides for a national shura in 1992 in which an 18-month
government would be selected, ahead of planned elections. Hezb-i
1963–64 Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar refuses to sign and his attacks
on government forces and incursion into Kabul, alongside Rabbani’s
Daud is forced to resign and a constitutional monarchy is introduced. hold on power beyond his assigned three-month period, mark the
Country-wide parliamentary elections take place for the first time. beginning of a civil war.

1993 2002
The Islamabad Accord temporarily ends the fighting in March as January: The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deploys
Hekmatyar accepts the role of prime minister, but the conflict its first troops in order to provide security in and around Kabul.
soon resumes.
March: The UN mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is established.
1994
June: The Emergency Loya Jirga elects Karzai head of state.
Hekmatyar and Dostum mount attacks on Kabul and Massoud’s
territory in the north-east in January. They are fought back. Meanwhile 2003
the Taliban emerges in the south.
August: NATO assumes command of ISAF and control of security
1995 in Kabul.
The Taliban begin shelling Kabul. They are defeated by Massoud but October: The Security Council expands ISAF’s mandate to the
begin a new offensive later in the year with Pakistani and Saudi backing. whole country.
1996 2004
The Taliban takes Kabul in September. Massoud retreats to the north January: The Constitutional Loya Jirga, having convened in Kabul since
from where he leads the Northern Alliance resistance to the Taliban. December 2003, adopts a new Constitution, a modified version of the
The Taliban establishes the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan with 1964 Constitution with a strong presidency.
Mullah Mohammed Omar as its leader. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates recognise Taliban rule. November: Karzai wins the nation’s first presidential elections with 55
per cent of the vote.
1998
2005
The US launches strikes against the suspected Afghanistan bases
of Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda leader behind bombings of US May: Karzai and US President George W. Bush declare a United
embassies in East Africa. States–Afghanistan Strategic Partnership.
1999–2000 September: In the first parliamentary elections held in three decades,

winners include former warlords, former politicians, teachers, doctors
In October 1999 the UN imposes sanctions on the Taliban intended to and civil society activists. Parliament opens in December.
force them to hand over bin Laden, strengthening its sanctions regime
again in December 2000. 2006
2001 July: Fighting intensifies, especially in the south, amid a broader picture
of Taliban insurgency against the US-backed Karzai administration.
September: Northern Alliance leader Massoud is assassinated days
before al-Qaeda kills thousands in the ‘9/11’ attacks on the US. October: The transfer to NATO of responsibility for security across the
whole of Afghanistan is completed.
October: The US invades Afghanistan. The Taliban loses all its
strongholds within approximately six weeks and its leaders flee 2007
to Pakistan.
August: A Joint Declaration is made by Pak-Afghan Joint Peace Jirga
November: Kabul falls to the US-backed Northern Alliance. The condemns terrorism and calls for further dialogue and reconciliation.
Bonn Conference gets under way to plan political transition and post-
war reconstruction.
December: Hamid Karzai is appointed to head the Afghan Interim

Authority, which is otherwise dominated by Northern Alliance figures.

2008 2011
August: 58 are killed in a suicide bomb attack on the Indian Embassy in May: Osama bin Laden is killed by US forces in Pakistan. The Taliban’s
Kabul, the first major terrorist attack on the capital. The Taliban denies spring offensive sees the most civilian casualties since 2001.
responsibility but are widely blamed.
June: Stating that US goals have largely been achieved, President
September: President Bush deploys an extra 4,500 US troops in what Obama announces substantial withdrawals of US troops before the
he calls a ‘quiet surge’. end of 2012.
December: Legislation providing amnesty to all those involved in November: At a Loya Jirga Karzai wins approval to negotiate a 10-year
crimes in previous wars passes into law. Human rights advocates later military partnership with the US.
criticise it for failing international human rights obligations.
September: Rabbani is assassinated along with four other members of
2009 the Afghan High Peace Council.
October: Presidential elections see Karzai ahead but without the December: Pakistan boycotts the Bonn II Conference after a NATO
majority needed to claim the presidency outright. Shortly after a visit airstrike kills Pakistani soldiers.
from US Senator John Kerry, second-placed Abdullah Abdullah pulls out
before the runoff and Karzai is declared president for a second term. 2012
December: US President Barack Obama expands US troop numbers to January: The Taliban agree to open a political office in Dubai as a move
over 100,000 but announces the US will begin withdrawing its forces by towards peace talks. They eventually open one in Doha, Qatar, after
July 2011. NATO forces surge to over 40,000. reportedly rejecting UAE’s conditions for hosting them.
2010 February: Around 30 people are killed in protests about alleged

destruction of copies of the Qur’an at the US airbase in Bagram.
June: The National Consultative Peace Jirga, attended by 1,600
delegates, sets out a framework for ‘talks with the disaffected’ and March: The Taliban suspends preliminary talks with the US about
recommends the creation of a High Peace Council. The Taliban and opening a political office and conducting a prisoner swap, accusing the
Gulbuddin’s Hezb-i faction reject the process and do not attend the Jirga. US of breaking promises.
September: Parliamentary elections are again marred by Taliban May: Arsala Rahmani of the HPC is shot dead in Kabul. The Taliban
attacks and accusations of fraud. Results take three months to be deny responsibility despite admitting they are targeting HPC members.
completely finalised and even then are subject to a Special Court set
up by Karzai, which will eventually order the replacement of 62 sitting NATO announces plans to withdraw by the end of 2014.
MPs on the grounds that their campaigns were fraudulent. This is
rejected by the IEC but eventually nine MPs are replaced. Disputes June: The Kyoto meeting is the first major international meeting on
between the parliament and president cause months of legislative Afghanistan attended by a high-ranking Taliban member.
deadlock and delay.
July: Pakistan and Afghanistan agree to form a joint peace commission
November: NATO agrees to hand control of security to Afghan forces involving HPC members on the Afghan side and tribal leaders on the
by the end of 2014. Pakistan side.
December: By the end of the year, coalition forces have suffered over The Tokyo donor conference pledges $16 billion in civilian aid before
700 casualties, the most of the campaign. the end of 2016.
August: The US disciplines six troops for destroying copies of the

Qur’an and three for desecrating the bodies of dead Taliban. There are
no criminal prosecutions.
December: The Foundation for Strategic Research, a French think

tank, organises a Track 2 meeting between the AHPC, members of the
Taliban, Hezb-i Islami and civil society groups in Chantilly, France.

2013 October: President Obama announces 8,900 US troops will remain
in Afghanistan until the end of 2016. Previously, all but 1,000 were due
February: Karzai and Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari agree to to leave.
reach an Afghan peace deal within six months.
November: A Taliban splinter group announces Mullah Mohammed
June: The Taliban office in Doha, Qatar, is opened. The announcement Rasool as its leader.
that the US will hold direct talks with the Taliban angers President
Karzai, who suspends security talks with the US. Disputes about the December: NATO extends its mission by a year to the end of 2016.
office’s flag and plaque lead to it being closed shortly after its opening.
2016
The Afghan army takes command from military and security
operations from NATO forces. May: Taliban leader Mansour is killed by a US drone in Pakistan.
Mullah Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada assumes the leadership.
2014
July: US President Barack Obama says 8,400 US troops will remain in
April: The presidential election sees neither frontrunner achieving the country because of the ‘precarious’ security situation.
a majority large enough to win and goes to a second round between
Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah (in June). September: A deal, years in the making, is reached between
government and Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami faction, giving him
July: Electoral officials order a recount of the runoff vote. A two-month immunity from prosecution. He returns to Kabul the following May.
audit of election results begins following a US-mediated deal to break
the impasse. 2017
September: After a long dispute over the results is not resolved by the June: The ‘Kabul Process’ begins as President Ghani attempts to take
audit, the candidates sign a power-sharing agreement: Ghani becomes back the initiative in trying to engage the Taliban in dialogue.
president and Abdullah chief executive officer.
August: US President Donald Trump announces more troops to fight
October: The US and UK end their combat operations in Afghanistan. the Taliban.
December: NATO formally ends its combat mission in Afghanistan. 2018

Violence continues across the country. UNAMA figures show the year
is the deadliest for civilians since it began counting in 2009, with over January: 103 people are killed in a bomb attack in Kabul. The Taliban
3,700 civilians killed. claims responsibility.
2015 February: At the latest Kabul Process meeting, Ghani invites the Taliban
to peace talks, offering a pact to recognise them as a legitimate party in
January: NATO begins its non-combat follow-on mission, negotiations, amnesty. The Taliban gives no formal response.
Resolute Support.
April: Amid continued atrocities, peace protests from victims’ relatives
May: Talks are held in Qatar between Taliban representatives and and peace activists in Helmand spread to 16 provinces. The Helmand
Afghan officials, organised by Pugwash, an international non- Peace March demands that all warring parties join the peace process.
governmental network. Another round of talks is held in January 2016.
July: The Taliban admits that Mullah Omar died several years ago.
Mullah Mansour is announced as leader.
Meeting between government and Taliban near Islamabad in the

Murree process.
September: The Taliban briefly captures the city of Kunduz, signalling

its recent resurgence. By the end of the year it controls more territory
than any time since 2001.

Glossary
Baad Mujahidin
A practice whereby the family of a murderer offers as compensation Arabic term meaning those engaged in jihad (‘struggle’). As a modern
to the victim’s family a female family member for marriage or phenomenon, it is associated with armed struggle in various parts of
domestic servitude. the world, where local and/or international non-state armed groups
wage war under the banner of Islam. Afghanistan is one of the most
Bonn process notable examples: in this case, various loosely aligned groups fought
the Soviet-backed government in the 1980s with US, Pakistani and
Process of post-war reconstruction started at the Bonn conference Saudi support.
of 2001.
Naqileen
Durand Line
Pashtun migrants, transported to resettle in other parts of the country
A line imposed by the British in 1893 dividing Afghan and British-Indian deemed underpopulated and to extend the reach of Pashtun rulers.
territory. It ran through the middle of Pashtun-speaking areas and has
been the cause of disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan since Pashtunwali
the latter’s creation in 1947.
Unwritten Pashtun traditional ethical code, especially strong in rural
Loya Jirga areas. It encompasses ideas around hospitality, forgiveness, justice,
revenge, honour, faith, among other things.
Meaning ‘grand assembly’ in Pashto, Loya Jirgas are gatherings of
notables to discuss issues of national importance have been used Shura
in Afghanistan since the 18th century. An Emergency Loya Jirga was
called in June–July 2002 to select the transitional government, and a Arabic for ‘consultation’, a shura is a council convened to discuss
Constitutional Loya Jirga gathered in December 2003 to consider the particular issues.
proposed new constitution. Later Loya Jirgas were called by Hamid
Karzai to discuss the Taliban insurgency and the continued presence Ulema
of US forces.
Religious scholars.
Jirga
A traditional assembly to make decisions by consensus, and primarily

to settle disputes.

Profiles
These profiles are not intended as an exhaustive list but rather reference material on a selection
of political actors and government institutions.
Key institutions Political parties and armed groups
The first government after the US-led invasion was the Afghan Many of today’s political parties were once armed groups and military
Interim Authority agreed at the Bonn Conference in December 2001. factions, notably the main mujahidin groups (the ‘Peshawar Seven’
Although led by an ethnic Pashtun, Hamid Karzai, it was largely and ‘Tehran Eight’), who built on their clearly identified leaders and
dominated by ethnic Tajiks of the Northern Alliance (or United Front), local legitimacy to become parties. As institutions, however, Afghan
a front of mainly ethnic Tajiks and Hazaras that had formed the main parties have relatively limited political traction, with many electoral
resistance to Taliban rule. The aim of the July 2002 Loya Jirga was to candidates not declaring a party allegiance at all.
correct this and balance demands. However, many in Pashtun areas
felt marginalised. Jamiat-e Islami
The oldest Muslim party in Afghanistan is Jamiat-e Islami, formed in
The Interim Authority was replaced by the Transitional Authority, of the 1960s. Many members are ethnic Tajiks from the north or west.
which Karzai was elected president by the Loya Jirga. Karzai later won It was led from 1968 to 2011 by Burhanuddin Rabbani and it became
national elections for the presidency in 2004 and 2009. one of the most significant groups in the mujahidin. After the fall of the
communist government, civil war broke out as Jamiat fought Hezb-i
After the 2014 presidential elections, a National Unity Government Islami, Hezb-i Wahdat, and Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Junbish. It retained
was formed after a US-brokered deal between the disputed winner control of Kabul despite heavy bombardment but was eventually driven
Ashraf Ghani, who was named president, and his opponent Abdullah from Kabul in 1996 by the Taliban, and subsequently fought the Taliban
Abdullah, given the new post of chief executive. as part of the Northern Alliance.
The commission responsible for administering and supervising Hezb-i Islami

elections, the Independent Election Commission has been embroiled Formed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in 1976 as a breakaway from the
in controversy as a result of Afghanistan’s consistently disputed more moderate Jamiat, Hezb-i Islami is overwhelmingly Ghilzai
elections. Since 2014 the government has increasingly looked towards Pashtun. It split in two in 1979: Mulavi Younas Khalis forming his own
the Special Electoral Reform Commission. The reform process SERC faction (Hezb-i Islami Khalis), with Gulbuddin’s faction sometimes
was meant to lead has been severely hindered, however, and few known as Hezb-i Islami-ye Gulbuddin (HIG). Both factions formed part
changes have been made go the electoral system. of the Peshawar Seven. Hezb-i became one of the mujahidin groups
most favoured by CIA in the 1980s and HIG received support from
The Afghan National Security Forces comprise the army and air force, Pakistan and for a time from the Saudis. Heavily involved in the civil
the national and local police, and the intelligence agency, the National war of the 1990s, it lost crucial Pakistani support as the Inter-Services
Directorate of Security. The Afghan National Army (ANA) was formed Intelligence (ISI) turned to the Taliban to restore order. Many Hezb-i
in 2003 from various militias that had fought the Taliban. Much of its fighters also joined the Taliban or al-Qaeda. After the US-led invasion
training has been has been provided by NATO and ISAF. It currently of 2001, Hekmatyar aligned his group with the Taliban and carried out
has around 175,000 soldiers. Since 2001 international actors have been attacks against coalition forces. In 2016 the group signed a deal with
heavily involved in training the Afghan National Police. the government that ended its insurgency in exchange for recognition
and the lifting of international sanctions on Hekmatyar.
The Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) was formed in 2010 to initiate
peace talks with the Taliban. Comprising 70 members, Burhanuddin Itihad-i Islami
Rabbani was appointed to lead it. He was assassinated by suicide Itihad-i Islami (‘Islamic Union’), was another Pashtun mujahidin group
bombers in September 2011. The current head is Abdul Karim Khalili, that formed part of the Peshawar Seven. Founded in the early 1980s
who was a Vice-President under Karzai and leader of the Hizb-i by Abdur Rabb Rasul Sayyaf, it received some support from Saudis.
Wahdat, a mainly Hazara and Shia group formed in 1989. The Taliban, It converted to a political party, the Islamic Dawah Organisation of
which seeks talks with US rather than the Afghan government, has Afghanistan, in 2005.
portrayed the HPC as an organ of foreign forces.

The Taliban Warizistan. It is known as one of the most feared insurgent groups
The Taliban, from the Pashto word for ‘students’, emerged in 1994 as and was among the first to systematically use suicide bombers.
a small band of fighters led by Mullah Mohammed Omar. The group The network has also been closely intertwined with al-Qaeda, and
attracted largely young men from Pashtun southern and eastern areas Jalaluddin was the first to bring Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan.
educated in madrasas in Pakistan. Responding to the chaos of the civil Pakistan’s ISI has long been accused of links to the network but
war era, the Taliban’s leaders wanted to re-establish shari’a law in Pakistan officially banned the group in 2015 as part of its anti-terrorist
Afghanistan. Opinions vary as to the extent of the role of Pakistan’s ISI National Action Plan. It has been on the US list of foreign terrorist
in the Taliban’s emergence, but its support helped the Taliban grow organisations since 2012.
rapidly in military strength. The Taliban effectively seized control of the
country when it took Kabul in September 1996, and for several years The group is led by the Haqqani family: until around 2014 by Jalaluddin
continued to fight the Northern Alliance with Pakistani support. Haqqani and since then by his son Sirajuddin. Both have been
members of the Taliban’s council, the Quetta Shura, and Sirajuddin is
Taliban rule reflected its hard-line interpretation of Islam and its a deputy leader of the Taliban. The Taliban have in the past denied the
government was treated as a pariah by most countries. International group is distinct.
ire focused on its record of brutal punishments, include stoning and
amputations, its hosting al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, which The US reportedly reached out to explore their willingness to negotiate
drew a range of US and UN sanctions, and its demolition of an ancient in 2011: there was a meeting between a US official and Ibrahim Haqqani,
heritage site, the Bamiyan Buddhas. Jalaluddin’s brother, brokered by the ISI, but it did not yield results.
The Taliban collapsed within weeks in the face of the US invasion in Al-Qaeda
2001, with some of its leaders fleeing to Pakistan, especially the city A Salafist jihadist network founded in the late 1980s by Osama bin
of Quetta, where they formed the Quetta Shura, a council of leaders Laden, a Saudi who fought with the mujahidin against the Soviets.
of the Afghan Taliban. There are nebulous links between the Quetta Returning to Saudi Arabia after the war, bin Laden clashed with
Shura, the various networks of Afghan Taliban, and the separate the Saudi regime over the presence of US troops in the country and
Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i Taliban). was forced into exile in Sudan, where he set up training bases and
advocated attacks on the US and its allies. Expelled from Sudan in
The Afghan Taliban began to re-emerge as an insurgent force in the 1996, he returned to Afghanistan, working closely with the Taliban
years after 2001. Taliban influence gradually spread from its base in in its campaign to control the country. Unlike the Taliban, however,
the south-east close to Pakistan’s borders to the central and eastern al-Qaeda’s focus was global jihad and it was responsible for the bomb
provinces. Northern Taliban networks grew from around 2008 as attacks on US embassies in East Africa in 1998, the bombing of a USS
the Taliban sought to expand and appointed more non-Pashtuns into Cole in 2000, and the attack on the United States of 11 September
positions of power. 2001. The Taliban’s refusal to hand over bin Laden in the wake of this
event prompted the US-led invasion of 2001. Al-Qaeda camps were
After the announcement in 2015 of the death two years previously destroyed but the organisation persisted – less as a coherent group
of Mullah Omar and the succession of Mullah Akhtar Mohammad but a vast network of insurgent groups in many parts of the world.
Mansour, longstanding differences between Taliban networks began Bin Laden was assassinated by US special forces in Pakistan in 2011,
to reveal cracks in the movement. In late 2015 Mullah Mohammed replaced as leader by Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda has
Rasool formed a splinter group, the High Council of the Afghanistan sustained a small but significant presence in Afghanistan, surviving
Islamic Emirate, and allied with some other Taliban factions against through close links to other militant networks.
Mansour’s main group. Mansour’s group consolidated its control
though some factional fighting has continued in places since. Mawlawi Islamic State
Hibatullah Akhundzada assumed leadership after Mansour was killed IS, or the more derogatory Arabic acronym Daesh, is a Salafi jihadist
by a US drone strike in May 2016. group that emerged as an al-Qaeda-aligned group in Iraq and gained
global prominence for the rapid military gains it made in Iraq and Syria
The main Taliban demand has been the departure of all foreign from around 2014. Around the same time there were the first signs
troops. It has offered to engage in talks with the US but not the Afghan its black flag in some areas of Afghanistan, though this represented
government. A ‘political office’ was opened in Doha in 2013. Though it less an expansion from Syria than appeals from jihadist splinters in
later closed, it has carried on working unofficially. Afghanistan, especially among some militants settled in Nangarhar
associated with the Tehrik-i-Taliban. In January 2015, the main IS body
Haqqani network in Raqqa acknowledged this by announcing expansion into ‘Khorasan’,
One of CIA’s favoured groups in the anti-Soviet fighting of the 1980s, an old geographical term it uses to describe an amalgamation of
the Haqqani network became closely affiliated with Taliban after the regions in modern-day Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, without
newer group took Kabul in 1996. After the Taliban’s fall, the Haqqani recognising those nation states, and the term Islamic State of
leaders fled to the Pakistan border regions and remain based in North Khorasan (ISK) emerged.

The rise of ISK is a direct challenge to the Taliban’s monopoly on jihadist Russia
insurgency. ISK profited initially from splits in the Taliban and more Afghanistan has been of strategic interest to Russia since at least
especially the TTP. Many of ISK’s early affiliates were eliminated as the the 19th century when it engaged in a rivalry with the British Empire
Taliban sought to suppress it, but it did succeed in taking control of a for influence in central Asia known as the ‘Great Game’. In the
large part of Nangarhar province. The Taliban has publicly warned IS 20th century Afghanistan became a factor in the Cold War. Under
against extremism and splitting the mujahidin. The US has attempted to Mohammed Daud’s premiership, Afghanistan wavered between
‘decapitate’ the group through drone strikes against its leaders, a number dependence on the Soviet Union and non-alignment. When the socialist
of whom have died, but ISK has established itself through significant regime that toppled Daud in 1978 came under threat, the USSR
urban terrorist attacks such as a suicide attack in July 2016 that killed 80 invaded 1979. In nine-year conflict, an estimated one million civilians
people in Kabul. Perhaps more significant than its insurgent capability were killed and the Soviet Union lost 14,500 troops. Faced with the high
is its anti-Shia sectarianism and the danger that it introduces the sort of human, economic and diplomatic cost of the occupation, the Soviets
Sunni-Shia conflict seen in parts of the Arab world and Pakistan, although began looking for an exit strategy. Moreover, under Mikhail Gorbachev,
this generally has little public traction in Afghanistan. leader from 1985, Soviet foreign policy became less confrontational
with the West and China on many fronts, Afghanistan included. Soviet
Tehrik-i-Taliban troop withdrawal was announced in 1987 and completed in 1989.
The Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) is an umbrella organisation for militant It was conducted largely peacefully following ceasefires reached with
groups in Pakistan’s north-western tribal areas on the border mujahidin commanders, with some exceptions. Moscow continued to
with Afghanistan. Though predominantly Pashtun and opposed to support the Najibullah government in Kabul until the collapse of the
international forces in Afghanistan, it is not formally connected with Soviet Union in late 1991.
the Afghan Taliban and is mainly concerned with fighting the state in
Pakistan. It has become increasingly fragmented in recent years. With the rise of the Taliban, which had links to Chechen rebels,
Russia lent support to the Northern Alliance and has been generally
International supportive of the Afghan government since the Taliban’s fall in 2001.
As Russia’s relations with the West have deteriorated in the 2010s,
Pakistan Russia has been seen to take a more assertive diplomatic role in
Pakistan has had intimate and difficult relations with Afghanistan Afghanistan. In 2016–17 Russia held talks about the conflict first with
since the former’s creation in 1947, driven partly by border disputes, Pakistan and China, then with the Afghan government, Iran and India,
which persist today, and partly by fears around Afghanistan’s close in which the US declined to participate. In January 2018 Russia offered
relationship with India. Pakistan has hosted many Afghans in its to host talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In April,
religious seminaries and madrases and has supported various US officials accused Russia of arming the Taliban. Russia denies this
insurgent groups over the decades, most notably since its Inter- but with the emergence of Islamic State, Russia may see the Taliban as
Services Intelligence (ISI) heavily became involved in Afghanistan an ally against one of Russia’s top enemies in the Syrian conflict.
since the 1970s. Along with the US, Pakistan provided support and
safe havens to the mujahidin in their conflict with the Soviet occupiers. United States
Pakistan continued to support the mujahidin after 1988’s Geneva Afghanistan first became strategically important to the US during
accords, despite the agreement’s stated aim of promoting non- the Cold War, as the US tried to sway the Afghans away from Soviet
interference. When the mujahidin factions began fighting each other influence with mixed results. US relations with Kabul collapsed after
in the early 1990s Pakistan supported Hekmatyar and Dostum against the 1978 Saur revolution and the Soviet invasion of the following year.
the Rabbani government. Later it focused its support on the Afghan The US focused its diplomatic efforts on forcing Soviet withdrawal
Taliban, which and supported it with funding, training, diplomatic while also channelling funds estimated to amount to $3 billion to
assistance, becoming one of only three countries to recognise the various mujahidin opposition groups being supported by the Pakistan
legitimacy of Taliban rule after 1996. After the ‘9/11’ attacks on the intelligence services. After the rise of the Taliban in 1996, US and
US, Pakistan claimed to have stopped support for the Taliban and put Pakistani interests diverged sharply. With the Taliban hosting Osama
its weight behind the Bonn process, but it is widely believed to have bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, the US bombed targets in Afghanistan in 1998.
continued to provide refuge and assistance to the Taliban, the Haqqani Then, following the ‘9/11’ attacks on the US and the Taliban’s refusal to
network and al-Qaeda. The Afghan government has repeatedly hand bin Laden over, President George W. Bush ordered the invasion
claimed that the major need for peace is not between Kabul and the of Afghanistan in October 2001, which the US led in coalition with the
Taliban, but Kabul and Islamabad, with President Ghani claiming UK and Canada and later more than 40 countries.
that Pakistan has effectively waged war on Afghanistan since 2001.
Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban have been strained at times The Taliban government collapsed but it would lead a renewed
and the Taliban has resisted Pakistan’s attempts in recent years to insurgency that steadily gained strength over the remainder of Bush’s
assume a mediation role. Pakistan’s goal is thought to now be less a time in office. The March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq marked a critical
Taliban government than one that eventually includes the Taliban as a shift in US priorities, which arguably paved the way for a Taliban
counterweight to Indian influence. revival. While handing over the primary security responsibility to the

NATO-led ISAF, US troop levels remained around 30,000 for much of In 2001 British troops took part in the US-led invasion before becoming
Bush administration. part of the International Security Assistance Force in 2002. British
forces moved into Helmand province in 2006 as it came increasingly
With the Taliban increasing in strength, President Barack Obama under renewed Taliban influence. Task Force Helmand was eventually
(2009–17) pursued both military victory and talks with the Taliban. wound up in 2014, ending the UK’s combat mission. Some troops
By August 2010, 100,000 US troops were on the ground. In June remain for training and advice.
2011, shortly after US special forces had killed bin Laden, Obama
announced a timetable for drawdown with security to be handed to UNAMA
Afghan authorities in 2014. The Obama administration explored the Established in March 2002, the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan
possibility of talks with the Taliban and were supportive of the group’s is ‘to support the people and government of Afghanistan in achieving
establishment of a political office in Doha. Relations with President peace and stability, in line with the rights and obligations enshrined in
Karzai’s government, however, were poor. Karzai, angered by the the Afghan constitution’. Its mandate is reviewed annually. Tadamichi
suggestion the US may talk directly to the Taliban, refused to sign a Yamamoto was appointed as the Secretary-General’s Special
long-term security deal with the US. The agreement was finally signed Representative for Afghanistan and Head of UNAMA in June 2016.
when President Ghani took power in 2014.
International Security Assistance Force
Troop numbers, down to under 10,000 at the end of the Obama The UN-mandated international security mission in Afghanistan,
administration, have increased again under President Donald Trump, 2001–14. It was established in 2001 by UN Security Council
who in 2017 scrapped deadlines for withdrawal. Resolution 1386 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, initially only
to secure area around Kabul, with leadership rotating between
India countries on a six-monthly basis. NATO assumed leadership of
India has been a close ally of Afghan governments except during the the mission in August 2003 and in October 2003 ISAF’s mandate
Taliban era. Unlike most Asian countries, India recognised the Soviet- was expanded to the whole of Afghanistan. Its presence extended
backed People’s Democratic Republic. After the Taliban’s rise, it provided gradually as it took over security responsibilities from the US-led
support to the Northern Alliance, and after the Taliban’s fall became the coalition. Its expansion to the north was completed in 2004, and to
largest regional provider of humanitarian and reconstruction support. the west, south and finally the east in 2006.
This closeness was underlined by the strategic agreement of October
2011 to increase security and development cooperation, coming amid All NATO countries contributed troops, as well as a number of other
Afghanistan’s deteriorating relations with Pakistan. countries. NATO’s Riga Summit of 2006 saw rising tensions over
NATO’s role in Afghanistan. Some countries insisted on restrictions on
China how their troops could be deployed (‘national caveats’), some of which
In comparison to other regional powers, China has long appeared they relented on, although many continued to refuse to have their
relatively uninterested in Afghanistan and has exerted little political troops deployed in the more dangerous southern provinces.
influence, despite its economic strength and interests in the country,
and the role it could potentially play in rebuilding. In recent years it Operation Resolute Support
has shown an increased willingness to be involved in political efforts to Operation Resolute Support is the follow-on non-combat mission to
transition away from war, proposing a peace and reconciliation forum in ISAF. Its purpose is to provide training and support to Afghan security
2014 and receiving a visit from the Taliban political office the same year. services and government.
Iran Operation Enduring Freedom

With deep historical ties, in modern times Iran’s relations with The US Operation Enduring Freedom encompasses US counter-
Afghanistan have been difficult. Iran provided support to the mujahidin terrorism operations in several countries, but the most notable
in the Soviet era and to the Northern Alliance during the Taliban era. operation bearing the name is the joint US, UK and Afghan combat
Since the Karzai administration, relations have been strained by the mission in Afghanistan starting October 2001. The NATO-led ISAF
Afghan government’s closeness to the US. The emergence of Islamic mission, to which the US also contributed militarily, increasingly took
State in Afghanistan with its sectarian agenda has made Iran more the lead in combat operations from 2006, although US forces continued
amenable to working with the Taliban. operations under OEF in several parts of the country. President Barack
Obama announced the end of OEF-Afghanistan in December 2014. It
United Kingdom was succeeded by Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, which continues to
Britain was closely involved in the emergence of modern Afghanistan build the capacity of the Afghan armed forces and assist the NATO-led
through a series of Anglo-Afghan wars between 1839 and 1919 as it Operation Resolute Support.
sought to consolidate its imperial interests in the subcontinent and
counter Russian influence in Central Asia.

Key texts
1988 2004
Geneva Accords, 14 April Berlin Declaration, 1 April

A set of agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan with The international community reaffirms its commitment to transition
the United States and Soviet Union as guarantors and based on started under the Bonn Agreement.
principles of non-interference.
2006
1992
Afghanistan Compact Building on Success (London Conference),
Peshawar Accord, 24 April 1 February
Agreement between the mujahidin groups on establishing a new The Afghan government and international community establish a
government and naming Burhanuddin Rabbani as interim president. framework for cooperation for the following five years.
1993 2007
Afghan Peace Accord [‘Islamabad Accord’], 7 March Rome Conference on Justice and Rule of Law in Afghanistan, 3 July
A power-sharing agreement between the mujahidin groups bringing Donors confirm the commitment to reforming justice and rule of law
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar into government, facilitated by Pakistan. sectors, making new pledges.
1999 Joint Declaration adopted by Pak-Afghan Joint Peace Jirga,

12 August
Tashkent Declaration on Fundamental Principles for a Peaceful The declaration of a gathering of over 700 politicians, tribal leaders
Settlement of the Conflict in Afghanistan, 19 July and members of civil society called by the presidents of both
Declaration by the ‘Six plus two’ group (China, Iran, Pakistan, countries. It condemns terrorism and calls for further dialogue
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, plus Russia and the US) and reconciliation.
urging Afghan parties to pursue political negotiations and its
willingness to promote direct talks. 2008
2001 Declaration of the International Conference in Support

of Afghanistan (Paris Conference), 12 June
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending Reaffirming the Afghanistan Compact and committing to work
the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions [‘Bonn for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.
Agreement’], 5 December
Establishes an Interim Authority to serve until the creation the 2009
following year of a Transitional Authority.
Declaration of the Special Conference on Afghanistan Convened
2002 under the Auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(Moscow Declaration), 27 March
Communiqué of the International Conference on Reconstruction Declaration on Afghanistan by the members of the Shanghai
Assistance to Afghanistan (Tokyo Conference), 22 January Cooperation Organization (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
The international community commits to assisting Afghanistan’s Uzbekistan and Tajikistan).
reconstruction.
Statement of the International Conference on Afghanistan
Kabul Declaration of Good Neighbourly Relations, 24 December (Hague Conference), 31 March
The Transitional Authority and the governments of the six The Afghan government and international community re-commit
neighbours reaffirm their commitment to constructive and themselves to priorities established in previous conferences.
supportive bilateral relations.

2010 2014
Communiqué of the Conference on Afghan Leadership, Regional ‘Bilateral Security Agreement’ (Security and Defense Cooperation
Cooperation, International Partnership (London Conference Agreement between The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the
Communique), 28 January United States of America), 30 September
The Afghan government and international community set out targets Agreement between the Afghan and US governments on the terms
and timetables for military and civilian transitions in Afghanistan. of security cooperation, allowing US troops to stay in Afghanistan
beyond 2014.
The Resolution Adopted at the Conclusion of the National
Consultative Peace Jirga, 6 June Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the
Sets out a framework and mechanisms for ‘talks with the disaffected’, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the status of NATO forces and
calling for the international community to remove opposition figures NATO personnel conducting mutually agreed NATO-led activities in
from the blacklist and to guarantee the safety of those engaging in Afghanistan, 30 September
peace talks. Recommends the creation of a peace council.
Agreement between the Two Campaign Teams Regarding the
Renewed Commitment by the Afghan Government to the Afghan Structure of the National Unity Government, 21 September
People and the International Community to Afghanistan (Kabul Agreement between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah on
Conference Communique), 22 July a National Unity Government to break the deadlock over the
Launches the Kabul Process, through which Afghanistan seeks to take presidential election results.
the lead in international efforts to secure the country’s future.
2016
2011
Agreement between the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure Afghanistan and and Hezb-i Islami of Afghanistan led by Gulbuddin
and Stable Afghanistan, 2 November Hekmatyar, 21 September
Launched the Istanbul Process as a grouping of countries cooperating Agreement allowing Hekmatyar to return to Afghanistan
on Afghanistan including Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, China, India, Iran and recognising his faction as a political party.
and a number of Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries.
Conclusions of the Conference on Afghanistan and the International

Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade (Bonn
Conference), 5 December
The international community affirms support for Afghanistan for
another decade.
2012
Tokyo Declaration Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan from

Transition to Transformation (Tokyo Conference), 8 July
Established the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, or
‘Tokyo Framework’ setting out a ‘new reinvigorated development
partnership between the Afghanistan Government and the
International Community’.

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Zaeef, Abdul Salam. My Life with the Taliban (London: Hurst, 2011)

The Accord series
www.c-r.org/accord
Insight Accord
INSIGHT ISSUE 3 (2016) ISSUE 26 (2017)

Accord Insight 3 examines practical approaches Two steps forward, one step back:
and challenges to reconciliation in peace The Nepal peace process
processes. Case studies from the Georgian- Accord 26 includes over 30 articles and
Abkhaz conflict, Colombia, Mindanao interviews from Nepali and international
(Philippines) and Northern Ireland offer insights experts focusing on the progress of inclusion
from initiatives to transform relationships and the function of power, and how peace
horizontally, among communities, and vertically, and political negotiations in various forms
between society and the state, in societies and forums have facilitated transition from
with different histories of violence and at very negative to positive peace.
different stages on the conflict spectrum.
ISSUE 25 (2014)
INSIGHT ISSUE 2 (2015) Legitimacy and peace processes:
Local engagement with armed groups from coercion to consent
This second Accord Insight publication looks Accord 25 focuses on the practical ways
at the interactions between armed groups and that legitimacy can contribute to building
local populations. Case studies from Colombia, more sustainable peace: national dialogue;
northern Uganda, Syria and Northern Ireland constitutional reform; local governance; and
document the experiences of communities who transforming coercive actors. It looks at 15
have organised to influence the behaviour of country case studies, including the Philippines,
armed groups – often in advance of more formal Syria, Afghanistan, the Basque Country,
negotiations and in situations of intense violence Somaliland, Yemen and Burma.
and embedded conflict.
ISSUE 24 (2012)
INSIGHT ISSUE 1 (2013) Reconciliation, reform and resilience:
Women building peace positive peace for Lebanon
Most peace agreements do not address the Accord 24 includes more than 30 articles
specific concerns of women, and women are and interviews on peacebuilding in Lebanon:
still excluded from political processes. The from diverse perspectives and from inside and
first Accord Insight presents nine articles and outside the country. Together they show that
new analysis drawn from the Accord series from the Lebanese are not passive victims of a violent
1998 to 2010, which examine the roles women fate determined beyond their country’s borders.
have played in addressing violence and building Many are actively pursuing opportunities
peace – from Bougainville and Sierra Leone to for change.
Aceh and Northern Ireland.
ISSUE 23 (2012)
Consolidating peace: Liberia and Sierra Leone
A decade after the official end of wars in Liberia
and Sierra Leone, Accord 23 draws on respective
societies’ experiences and insights to ask what
headway has been made to consolidate peace,
what challenges lie ahead and what lessons can
be learnt. It argues that policy needs to focus on
people, on repairing relationships and promoting
inclusion, and that traditional mechanisms can
play a crucial role.

ISSUE 22 (2011) ISSUE 16 (2005)
Paix sans frontières: building peace Choosing to engage: armed groups
across borders and peace processes
War does not respect political or territorial Non-state armed groups, key actors in
boundaries. This twenty-second Accord many internal armed conflicts, have participated
publication, looks at how peacebuilding in peace processes across the world. Accord
strategies and capacity can ‘think outside the 16 draws on these experiences to explore the
state’: beyond it, through regional engagement, case for engaging with armed groups, and the
and below it, through cross-border community or different options, roles and challenges for such
trade networks. engagement.
ISSUE 21 (2010) ISSUE 15 (2004)

Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali From military peace to social justice?
and international peacemaking The Angolan peace process
Accord 21 contains over 30 articles including The Luena Memorandum of 2002 brought an end
interviews with Somali elders and senior diplomats to Angola’s 27-year civil war. Accord 15 reviews
with the African Union, the UN and IGAD, and the history of peacemaking efforts in Angola, and
contributions from Somali and international analyses challenges that remain if the absence
peacemaking practitioners, academics, involved of violence is to develop into a sustainable and
parties, civil society and women’s organisations. just peace.
ISSUE 20 (2008) ISSUE 14 (2004)

Reconfiguring politics: the Indonesia-Aceh Alternatives to war: Colombia’s peace
peace process processes
In 2005, the Indonesian government and the This Accord publication provides an overview
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) agreed a settlement of more than 25 years of peace initiatives with
ending 30 years of armed conflict. Accord 20 Colombia’s guerrilla and paramilitary groups.
explores how that agreement was reached and It includes analysis of civil society efforts at local,
subsequent challenges to its implementation. regional and national levels and identifies the
necessary elements of a new model of conflict
resolution.
ISSUE 19 (2008)
Powers of persuasion: incentives, sanctions and
conditionality in peacemaking ISSUE 13 (2002)
International policymakers frequently use Owning the process: public participation
incentives, sanctions and conditionality as tools in peacemaking
to influence intra-state conflicts. Using a range This first thematic Accord publication
of case studies, Accord 19 asks whether and how documents mechanisms for public participation
these tools can constructively influence conflict in peacemaking. It features extended studies
parties’ engagement in peacemaking initiatives. looking at how people were empowered to
participate in political processes in Guatemala,
Mali and South Africa. It also contains shorter
ISSUE 18 (2006)
pieces from Colombia, Northern Ireland and
Peace by piece: addressing Sudan’s conflicts
the Philippines.
This Accord publication reviews the peace
process that led to the 2005 Comprehensive
Peace Agreement in Sudan. It also explores ISSUE 12 (2002)
questions that remain to be tackled, arguing Weaving consensus: the Papua New Guinea –
that future Sudanese initiatives must be more Bougainville peace process
inclusive and better coordinated. This Accord publication documents efforts
leading to the Bougainville Peace Agreement
of 2001. It describes an indigenous process
ISSUE 17 (2005)
that drew on the strengths of Melanesian
The limits of leadership elites and societies
traditions, as well as innovative roles played
in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process
by international third parties.
Since the 1994 ceasefire, the conflict between
Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorny Karabakh
has remained deadlocked. Accord 17 explores
the dynamics of polarisation, the obstacles to
a sustainable agreement and the challenge of
overcoming resistance to compromise.

ISSUE 11 (2002) ISSUE 6 (1999)
Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives Compromising on autonomy: Mindanao
to end the violence in northern Uganda in transition
While a meaningful peace process in northern The GRP-MNLF 1996 Peace Agreement was
Uganda remains elusive, Accord 11 documents a milestone, as all previous peacemaking
significant peacemaking initiatives undertaken attempts over 24 years had failed. Accord 6
by internal and external actors and analyses analyses elements of peacemaking in Mindanao
their impact on the dynamics of the conflict. and examines the challenges of implementation.
(2003: Supplement Issue – see online index)
ISSUE 10 (2001)
Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan ISSUE 5 (1998)
peace process Safeguarding peace: Cambodia’s
This publication describes the aspirations of the constitutional challenge
parties to the conflict in Tajikistan. It documents This publication documents issues around
the negotiation process leading to the General the signing of the 1991 Paris agreements that
Agreement of June 1997, looking at the role officially ended Cambodia’s long war, and the
of the international community, led by the UN, subsequent violent collapse of the country’s
and of local civil society. governing coalition in July 1997.
ISSUE 9 (2000) ISSUE 4 (1998)

Paying the price: the Sierra Leone Demanding sacrifice: war and negotiation in Sri
peace process Lanka
The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999 sought This publication documents the cycles of ethnic/
to bring an end to armed conflict in Sierra Leone: national conflict that have blighted Sri Lanka
one of the most brutal civil wars of recent times. since 1983. It analyses negotiations and other
Accord 9 explores the Lomé process and earlier peace initiatives, and outlines fundamental
attempts to resolve the conflict, and draws concerns that need to be confronted in future
lessons for Sierra Leone’s transition. peacemaking efforts
ISSUE 8 (1999) ISSUE 3 (1998)

Striking a balance: the Northern Ireland The Mozambican peace process in perspective
peace process This publication documents the diverse
This publication examines the factors that led initiatives that drove the parties to a negotiated
to the negotiations resulting in the 1998 Belfast settlement of the conflict in Mozambique. It
Agreement. It describes the complex underlying further illustrates the impact on the country
forces and the development of an environment of changing regional and international
for peace. (2003: Supplement Issue – see political dynamics.
online index)
ISSUE 2 (1997)
ISSUE 7 (1999) Negotiating rights: the Guatemalan peace process
A question of sovereignty: the Georgia- The signing of the peace agreement in
Abkhazia peace process 1996 brought an end to 36 years of civil war
This publication explores the background and in Guatemala. Accord 2 analyses issues
issues at the heart of the Georgia-Abkhazia of impunity, indigenous rights, political
conflict, providing a unique insight into a political participation and land reform.
stalemate and pointing towards possible
avenues out of deadlock.
ISSUE 1 (1996)
The Liberian peace process 1990–1996
This first Accord publication documents the
lengthy and fractious Liberian peace process
and provides insight into why thirteen individual
peace accords collapsed in half as many years.

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Incremental peace in Afghanistan outlines a radical new approach
to move beyond the peace rhetoric in Afghanistan through a phased
process that pursues two objectives: 1) short-term – to achieve a
reduction in violence; and 2) long-term – to achieve a more broadly
inclusive social contract representative of all Afghans.
Contributions to this Accord publication offer a unique compilation

of experiences and insights by Afghan and international men and
women from academia, the military, government, armed opposition
and civil society. More than 25 articles explore lessons and
possibilities for future peaceful transition through peace initiatives
and institutional reform.
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with people in conflict to prevent violence, resolve conflicts and promote
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Accord

June 2018 // Editors

Accord // ISSUE 27 // www.c-r.org

Section 2: Looking forward – peace initiatives 46

Section 3: Looking forward – institutional change 91

Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 3

64° 66° 68° 70° 72° 74°

NIMROZ KANDAHAR International boundary

0 50 100 150 200 250 km

Map: United Nations 0 50 100 150 mi

62° 64° 66° 68° 70° 72° 74°

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Box 1: Peace and elections

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In formal terms, only the four Afghan factions represented

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the backlash they caused.” Lessons for today

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Afghanistan has multiple governments now, each

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36 // Accord // ISSUE 27

Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 37

38 // Accord // ISSUE 27

Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 39

40 // Accord // ISSUE 27

Many non-Pashtun communities in northern entrenched perceptions of a prolonged, Pashtun-led

Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 41

42 // Accord // ISSUE 27

QATAGHAN AND TURKMENISTAN 13 4 19 31

Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 43

These same local communities of trust in the north

44 // Accord // ISSUE 27

Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 45

46 // Accord // ISSUE 27

Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 47