Notes 

on Whether “Existence” is a Predicate 

Kant’s claim that “existence” is not a predicate is based on his view about
what a predicate is. We begin therefore with some background. The concept of
a predicate comes from grammar or, more precisely, from as grammar as it was
developed long ago as part of logic.

Background Notions in Logical Grammar 

A predicate has both a grammatical and a semantic definition.

Grammatically, a simple sentence – which is called a proposition in traditional
logic – has the form NPVP, and consists of the “concatenation” of a noun phase
NP and a verb phrase VP. In modern European languages both the noun and
verb phrase may be quite long and have a complex grammar.
Normally, the noun phase either stands for a single thing, for example a
proper noun or pronoun, or it stands for “many” and consists of a combination of
a common noun phrase and a modifying quantifier expression. The quantifier
determines how many objects from the class are being talking about. In
traditional logic, the common noun phrase is usually a simple common noun, and
if so, it is called the proposition’s subject term. If the noun phrase is a proper
noun, then the proper noun is the proposition’s subject. In traditional logic
quantifiers are restricted to just every, no, and some. Thus in traditional logic
Socrates, every man, no man, and some man are all possible subject terms.
In traditional logic the proposition’s verb phrases is usually understood to
be a combination of two parts: is (called the copula) and a common noun (called
the predicate term) modified by the indefinite article. If the subject term is a
proper noun or is modified by the quantifier some, traditional logic allows that the
copula may be negated by the expression not. Thus in traditional logic possible
verb phrases are is an animal, and is not an animal.
In traditional logic, then, there are four possible simple proposition forms in
which the subject and predicate are common nouns. Let us use S for the subject
and P for the predicate:

Every S is P No S is P
Some S is P and Some S is not P

If the subject term S is a proper name, there are two possible forms:

S is P S is not P

Semantically, a proposition is understood to assert that the property that

the predicate stands for is in all of the members of the class named by the
subject if the subject is modified by every, in none of them if it is modified by no,
in some if it is modified by some and the copula is not negated, and is not in

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some if the subject is modified by some and the copula is negated. If the subject
term is a proper noun, then the proposition asserts that the property named by
the predicate is in the individual named by the subject if the copula is not
negated, and that it is not in it if it is negated.

Kant’s Claim 

Kant’s claim is that a predicate can never stand for existence. Another
way of putting the claim is that existence is not a property. 1

Before we discuss Kant’s own argument for his claim, it is helpful to sketch
how properties were understood in traditional Aristotelian logic. Aristotle believed
that all substances could be classified into genera and species. They were
classified into a genus or species according to whether they possess that genus’
or species’ characteristic property, which was called its difference (in Latin,
differentia). Humans were traditionally classified according into what was called
the Tree of Porphyry (due to Porphyry, 234 – c. 305).

Substances
| |
Material Substances=Bodies Immaterial Substances=Spirits
| |
Nutritive Bodies=Living Things Non-nutritive Bodies=Non-Living Things
| |
Animate Living Things=Animals Inanimate Living Things=Plants
| |
Rational Animals=Men Irrational Animals=Brutes

Here the defining properties of the various genera and species are indicated in
bold. The point to notice is that there is no defining property of substance, the
highest genus (the summum genus). The genus substance simply consists of
everything that exists. What constitute the various substances in existence are
combinations of matter and form, and the form is constituted from the defining
properties of the various genera and species to which a substance belongs.
Socrates, for example, is a composite of his matter and form, and his form
consists of the properties named by the adjectives: material, nutritive, animate,
and rational. Properties are theoretical entities that occupy a special explanatory
role in Aristotle’s ontology. Their role is to explain what a substance is. A
substance is a combination of matter and form, i.e. of matter and the defining
properties of genera and species. But existence plays no such role. As the Tree
of Porphyry shows, there is no property called “existence” that goes into the form
of any substance. If existence is not a property, then no predicate can stand for
it. In this sense existence is not a predicate.

1
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, Book II, Chapter III,
Section 4.

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 Kant makes a similar point. He considers the terms of a proposition to be
concepts and believes that every concept has a definition. The properties that
are part of a concept’s definition are true of that concept “analytically.” Another
way of saying this is that the proposition every S is P is analytically true or a
tautology if P is a property that is included in the concept (i.e. is true by definition)
of S. Propositions that are true but not analytic are said to be synthetically true.
Kant argues that if true, the proposition S exists is either analytic or
synthetic. If it is analytic, then existence would have to be part of the concept of
S, and the proposition S exists would be a mere tautology, repeating in the
predicate position something already contained in the subject term. It would
convey no information. The proposition god exists would be true but would beg
the question of whether God exists by building into the concept of God the
property at issue. Normally, however, a true assertion of existence is synthetic
because existence is not part of the concept. In Kant’s words, “…the assertion of
the existence of the thing adds nothing to the thought of the thing.” Normally, the
object in question has a concept that allows that it is possible but does not build
into its definition that it exists. It follows that the assertion god exists needs
evidence for its truth beyond the content of the concept of god. That is, the
ontological argument fails.
Kant summarizes the issue by characterizing a predicate in a true
synthetic proposition. A proposition is synthetically true if it is true but the
predicate is not part of the concept’s definition. Such a proposition is interesting;
it is not trivially true. It has what Kant calls a determining predicate. In his words,
“a determining predicate is a predicate which is added to the concept of the
subject and enlarges it. Consequently, it must not be already contained in the
concept.” He goes on to claim that “being” or, in other words, existence, is not
such a determining predicate because it does not “enlarge it.” In Aristotelian
terms, it does not classify the subject.

Modern Logic 

Today one commonly hears from people who have learned some modern
logic that the notation of modern logic supports Kant’s view that existence is not
a predicate. It is true that modern logical notation assumes that it a sentence is
talking about existing things. If a simple sentence contains proper nouns, the
notation assumes that the name refer to an actually existing thing. The notation
does not allow for names like Santa Claus that “fail of reference.” If the sentence
talks about sets of things, the notation begins by “quantifying.” It declares
whether it will be talking about everything that exists or just some things that
exist. It then goes on to assert or deny predicates of these existing things. The
notation supports Kant, it is said, because it separates out the two functions:
quantification and predication, using different symbols for each. For example,

∃x(Fx & Gx)

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is notation for:

We are talking about at least one actually existing thing, the predicate F is
true of it, and the predicate G is true of it.

The notation

∀x(Fx → Gx)
means

We are talking about every existing thing, and for any such thing if the
predicate F is true of it, then the predicate G is true of it.

Since modern logic is right, it is argued, and since it separates out issues of
predication by indicating existence assumptions by quantifiers rather than
predicates, it follows that existence cannot be a predicate. But there are
objections to this view.

Critique of Kant’s Argument 

There is something deeply wrong with the claim that when we learn that
something exists, we are not learning anything about it. Whether Homer, the
Loch Ness monster, or god exists are very serious questions. An affirmative
answer packs lots of information. We need not put any serious weight on
Aristotle’s understanding of fixed genera and species with necessary defining
properties nor the claim that substances are composed of matter and form. Both
views have long since been superseded by modern science.
Nor should we be misled by the notation of modern logic. In modern logic
there are alternatives notations, and among these there is a perfectly acceptable
variations of notation, called (existence assumption) free logic, that does treat
existence as a predicate. In this notation quantification is over possible objects.
You begin a sentence by indicating how may possible objects you are
discussing, all or just some. You then apply predicates to them. If you want to
that something exists, you have to use a special predicate E that stands for
existence. For example,

∃x(Fx & Gx)

means

There is a possible object that is F and G

But

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 ∃x(Ex & Fx & Gx)

means

There is possible object that exists and that is both F and G.

If what makes something a property is the fact that there is a predicate that
stands for it, then free logic clearly treats existence as a property and treats
exists as a predicate that stands for that property. 2
Kant’s failure to see existence as a predicate is perhaps best made clear
by the observation made by medieval logicians, in their doctrine called
ampliation, that the range of objects we talk about is not fixed once and for all,
but varies from context to context. Sometimes we are speaking about just the
people in the room, sometimes about our friends, sometimes about all
Americans, sometimes about all things that now exist, sometimes about all things
that existed in the past or will exist in the future, sometimes about all possible
things. Medieval logicians pointed out that language contains special
grammatical markers (including adverbs, and verb tenses and moods) that signal
that we are changing or “amplifying” (hence these uses was called “ampliation”)
the range of things we are referring to. If I say I was a very cute little boy, I am not
talking about the me who is now actually existing but about somebody who existed
long ago (if then). If I say Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street or An elephant
would fit in this room, I am not taking about an actual person or elephant. We can
and often do talk about past or further objects, and even about objects that are
possible but do not now actually exist, may not have ever existed, and may never
exist in the future. We predicate properties of such things. Among the predicate we
can apply is existence. We apply this predicate if we want to indicate that some
subset of “possible” actually exists. For example, we might distinguish between two
past persons, one of which now exists and one of which does not, as in, The man
who invented the Internet is still alive but the inventor of the telephone is dead. We
might distinguish between two possible entities indicating that one is in fact real and
the other not, as in, Rin Tin Tin was a real dog but Lassie was entirely fictitious. In
sort, there are speech contexts in which the relevant entities we are taking about has
been “amplified” so that we are talking generally about entities that do not now
actually exist. In such contexts – for example in discussions of the existence of god –
predications of existence, both positive and negative, are perfectly meaningful and
informative.
The fact that Kant may be wrong about whether existence is a predicate
means that he is mistaken about grammar, not theology. It does not follow from the
fact that existence is a predicate that the ontological argument has been rescued or
that existence is part of the “essence” of the deity. What follows from the fact that
exists is a legitimate predicate is simply that we use existence to distinguish one
class of subjects – those that exist – form another – those that do not exist. Apart
from the case of god, which is controversial, entities come into and pass out of
existence. In Aristotelian terminology existence counts as an accidental property,

2
Lambert, Karel, 1958, “Notes on E!,” Philosophical Studies, 9: 60–63. Free logic is now a large
topic.

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one that holds of some members of a group but not all, or that holds of an individual
sometimes but not always. For ordinary entities existence is not part of a
substance’s essence or, as Kant would say, it is not part of its concept. For ordinary
things, then, Kant is right that the assertion that something exists, if true and meaninful,
is not analytic. The defenders of the ontological argument hold, however, that
god is an exception to this general rule. In god’s case alone, they claim, existence is
part of his essence or “idea.” Kant tried, but if the discussion here is right, failed to
refute this claim based on his argument that existence is not a predicate .
Of course, Kant’s other refutation of the ontological argument is still
devastating, and is independent of the issue of whether existence is a predicate. If
an idea is essentially a group of defining properties {P1,…,Pi,…,Pn}, then an analytic
truth is one that asserts that one of these properties is a member of that set. That is,
the assertion that

{P1,…,Pi,…,Pn} is Pi

is analytic, and is just another way of saying that

Pi ∈ {P1,…,Pi,…,Pn}

But clearly that assertion is trivially true. It adds no new information, and makes no
substantive claim about the world. It remains trivial and uninformative regardless of
the properties or concept in question. It would be trivial even if the property Pi were
existence and the concept {P1,…,Pi,…,Pn} were god or any other concept that
included existence in its definition, like Guinilo’s perfect island. The only existence
claims that are interesting are those in which existence is not part of the subject
term’s definition.
It is relevant to remark, in addition, that even if existence were a part of an
idea’s definition it does not follow that there would actually exist something that falls
under that idea. More generally, from the fact that an idea has as its definition
{P1,…,Pi,…,Pn}, it does not follow that there is anything in the world that possesses
all the properties P1,…,Pi,…,Pn, or even that there could be. The properties could
be naturally incompatible or even logically contradictory. Putting existence into an
idea’s definition does not insure that the idea as a whole has an actual instance.
Let us conclude with the general observation that it is not at all clear how to
decide whether something is a property. Perhaps the best approach is to understand
the notion of a property as an explanatory concept introduced into the branch of
philosophy called metaphysics or ontology for the purposes of explaining whatever it
is that metaphysics and ontology are supposed to explain. Among the things that
they are suppose to explain is the classification of entities that exist into their most
fundamental kinds. It may infact be useful in philosophy to postulate the existence of
a kind of entity called “properties.” One reason for doing so is linguistic, or perhaps it
is better to call it semantic or logical. This reason is the need to explain how
expressions like adjectives, common nouns and intransitive verbs work in language.
These terms encompass what are generally thought of as “predicates.” The question
for linguistic and semantic theory is, “What is the meaning of a predicate?” or “What
does a predicate stand for?” The traditional answer, one that dates from Aristotle, is
that a predicate stands for a property. On this understanding, then, the explanatory

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role of the concept of property is to provide a referent in linguistic theory for
predicates. A predicate stands for a property. But if that is the only legitimate
explanatory role for “properties,” it follows that if logical theory treats the word exists
as a predicate, then it should have a referent like other predicates. That is, existence
is a genuine property because the predicate exists is a genuine predicate. In free
logic existence is, in fact, treated as a predicate. If there is really no other legitimate
role in philosophical theory for “properties” other than their role in semantics, which
is to provide a referent for predicates, it seems to follow that existence is a property.