Zoeteweij-Turhan - State Jurisdiction and The Scope of The ECHR's Protection (Article 1 ECHR)
Zoeteweij-Turhan - State Jurisdiction and The Scope of The ECHR's Protection (Article 1 ECHR)
Zoeteweij-Turhan - State Jurisdiction and The Scope of The ECHR's Protection (Article 1 ECHR)
1 Introduction
According to Article 1 echr, States Parties are obliged to secure for every-
one within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section i of
3.1 Obligors
The Convention is a particular instrument of international law, in that it
does not create obligations between Contracting Parties reciprocally,6 but
3 Article 5 of Protocol 1 (the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, the right to education and
the right to free elections by secret ballot), Article 6 of Protocol 4 (no deprivation of liberty
for non-fulfilment of contractual obligations, right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose one’s residence, prohibition of a State’s expulsion of a national, prohibition of col-
lective expulsion of aliens) as amended by Protocol Application no. 11, Article 6 of Protocol
6 (abolition of the death penalty), Article 7 of Protocol 7 (the right of aliens to procedural
guarantees in the event of expulsion from the territory of a State, the right of a person con-
victed of a criminal offence to have the conviction of sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal,
the right to compensation in the event of a miscarriage of justice, the right not to be tried or
punished in criminal proceedings for an offence for which one has already been acquitted or
convicted (ne bis in idem) as amended by Protocol 11, Article 3 of Protocol 12 (general prohibi-
tion of discrimination) and Article 5 of Protocol 13 (banning the death penalty in all circum-
stances), which all determine the relationship between the Protocols and the Convention.
4 Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (Oxford University
Press, 2014, p. 88); Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human Rights –Commentary (Beck
Verlag, 2014, p. 2).
5 Joseph and Mcbeth (eds), Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law (Edward
Elgar, 2011, pp. 73–74). The ECtHR first held that (Article 8 of) the echr inherently contains a
positive obligation in Marckx v Belgium, Application no. 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979), para
31. In subsequent decisions, the Court has found most Convention rights to impose positive
obligations on the State.
6 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005,
p. 193).
rather between Contracting Parties and all persons –or, in the wording of the
Convention, ‘everyone’ –within their jurisdiction.7 Furthermore, the obliga-
tions are binding on all state organs –whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions,8 and likewise also on private entities
or individuals endowed with and exercising state authority.9
At present, only the States that are Members of the Council of Europe are par-
ties to the Convention. As all Member States of the European Union (EU) are also
Member States of the Council of Europe, whereas the EU is not, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) could not hold the EU accountable for bind-
ing provisions of EU law that cause EU Member States to violate the echr. In
Matthews v the United Kingdom,10 the Court held that, though the Convention
did not exclude the transfer of competences to international organisations by
Member States to the Council of Europe, these Member States remained respon-
sible for the securement of the Convention rights. Even though the same Court
subsequently held in Bosphorus Airways v Ireland11 that it considered the EU to
protect fundamental rights in a manner which can be considered at least equiv-
alent to that for which the Convention provides, and that Member States’ imple-
mentation of binding EU law is therefore compatible with the echr, it also warned
that its finding in ‘Bosphorus’ is not final and susceptible to review. Therefore, any
divergences between EU law and the echr became liabilities for the EU Member
States.
Even though Protocol 14 to the Convention opened the way for the accession
of the European Union (EU) to the echr in 2004,12 and the EU’s own Treaty on
European Union (teu) as amended by the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon requires the
accession of the EU to the echr, the negative opinion of the Court of Justice
of the European Union of 201413 temporarily put the accession process on
7 Lambert, cit, p. 8.
8 Wille v Liechtenstein, Application no. 28396/95 (ECtHR, 28 October 1999), which is con-
sistent with the views of the International Law Commission (icl) on the responsibility of
states, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (Vol ii, Part Two, 2001, 40).
9 See, for example, for the liability of a Contracting State for state actions under private law
or by private individuals: Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v Sweden, Application no. 5614/72
(ECtHR, 6 February 1976); Costello-Roberts v the United Kingdom, Application no. 13134/87
(ECtHR, 25 March 1993).
10 Matthew v the United Kingdom, Application no. 24833/94 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999).
11 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland, Application no. 45036/
98 (ECtHR, 30 June 2005), especially under para 155.
12 Article 17 of Protocol 14 added a new para 2 to Article 59 of the Convention, which now
reads that ‘The European union may accede to this Convention’.
13 Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu), Opinion 2/13, ecli:eu:c:2014:2454. This
Opinion should not be confused with Opinion 2/94 of the cjeu, in which the negative
hold. The Draft Accession Agreement, the result of lengthy negotiations by the
Council of Europe and the EU Commission, was deemed to be incompatible
with EU law because it did not take into account specific characteristics of EU
law with regard to, among others, fixed human rights standards in areas of law
that have been fully harmonised by the EU, the application of ‘mutual trust’
in Justice and Home Affairs matters, and the monopoly of the jurisdiction of
the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) on the interpretation and
validity of EU law.
More than four years later, after the Commission and the Council of Europe
publicly announced that they have addressed all issues, it is expected that a
revised Accession Agreement will soon be put forward.14 Meanwhile, breaches of
EU law can already lead to liability under the echr.15
Other international organisations cannot accede to the echr according
to Article 59(1) of the Convention. However, case law developed with regard
to the liability of Contracting States for actions implementing a commitment
under international law is applicable in relation to the EU as well as to other
international organisations. This case law16 of the ECtHR provides that delega-
tion of state authority to an international organisation does not exempt a state
party to the echr from its obligations under the Convention; case law that
is now even codified in the International Law Commission’s draft Articles on
Responsibility of International Organisations.17 This does not, however, mean
that any action attributable to Convention States participating in operations of
opinion of the Court was based on the (then) ec lacking competence to accede to the
echr under EU law as it stood at the time of the opinion. See cjeu, Opinion 2/94,
ecli:eu:c:1996:140.
14 See, European Parliament <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-area-
of-justice-and-fundamental-rights/file-completion-of-eu-accession-to-the-echr> last vis-
ited on 18 February 2019.
15 Ehlers refers to the refusal of a domestic court of an EU Member State Contracting Party
to refer a case to the cjeu for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 tfeu, which the
ECtHR has found to infringe the right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) of the echr, see
Coëme ea v Belgium, Application no. 32492/96 (ECtHR, 22 June 2000), and Desmots v
France, Application no. 41358/98 (ECtHR, 2 July 2002); Ehlers (ed), European Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms (De Gruyter, 2007, p. 42).
16 Matthews v the United Kingdom, cit; and Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim
Şirketi v Ireland, cit.
17 Grabenwarter and Pabel, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention: ein Studienbuch (Beck,
2016); also Kälin and Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection (Oxford
University Press, 2019, p. 92), on the International Law Commission’s Article 28 of the
draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations.
3.2 Beneficiaries
As already mentioned above, Article 1 echr provides that the rights enshrined
in the Convention must be secured to ‘everyone’ within the jurisdiction of the
Contracting Parties. The text of the Article clearly does not call for the prior
existence of any link, such as nationality or legal residence,20 between the
State Parties and a person for this person to fall under its scope. This does not
only include all natural persons from the moment of birth21 to the moment of
death,22 but according to Article 34 of the Convention23 also legal persons –as
long as they are sufficiently independent from the States Parties. The Court
18 See the joint cases of Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany and
Norway, Application no. 71412/01 and Application no. 78166/01, Admissibility Decision,
(2 May 2007) 45 ehrr SE10. See also Boivin v France, Application no. 73250/01 (ECtHR 9
September 2008), in which the Court declined its competence in a civil service law dis-
pute against Eurocontrol, another international organisation.
19 For a critical review of the Court’s decision, see Sari, ‘Jurisdiction and International
Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases’ (2008)
8 Human Rights Law Review 151. Furthermore, for a critical appraisal of the liability of
international organisations, see Orakhelashvili, ‘Jurisdictional immunity of international
organizations: from abstract functionality to absolute immunity’, in Orakhelashvili (ed),
Research Handbook on Jurisdiction and Immunities in International Law (Edward Elgar,
2015, pp. 497 ff).
20 The original text of the Convention as prepared by the Assembly proposed that the
rights of the Convention would merely be extended to ‘all persons resident within the
territories of the signatory States’. Through interference of the Legal Experts the liability
of the States Parties was extended to all persons within their jurisdiction; See Travaux
Préparatoires, Vol. iv, p. 20, referred to by Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention
on Human Rights: From its Inception to the Creation of a Permanent Court of Human Rights
(Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 84). See also Den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial
Asylum (Hart, 2012, p. 24).
21 Under Article 2 echr the question of whether an embryo or a foetus are entitled to fun-
damental rights is left to the discretion of the State Party; see Vo v France, Application
no. 53924/00 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004), paras 82–84, and also A, B and C v Ireland, Application
no. 25579/05 (ECtHR, 16 December 2010), para 237. However, dissenting is Joseph, Human
Rights and the Unborn Child (Brill, 2009, pp. 193 ff).
22 Without including a right to end life, see Pretty v the United Kingdom, Application
no. 2346/02 (ECtHR, 29 April 2002).
23 Article 34 of the Convention provides that ‘the Court may receive applications from any
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the vic-
tim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the
Convention or the protocols thereto.’
has found in case of legal entities under direct government control that a State
Party cannot both be applicant and respondent party.24 (Independent) legal
persons may also file an application on behalf of its members even though in
principle Article 34 provides for the right of individual petition.25
Furthermore, the clear wording of Article 1 echr means that the rights and
freedoms recognised by the echr are universally available to all individuals,
including aliens, independently of their nationality (or lack of nationality in
case of statelessness), residence title or domicile, as long as they are within the
jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties.26
As Article 1 echr provides that ‘everyone within the jurisdiction [of the
Contracting Parties]’ falls under the protective scope of the Convention, the
decisive link between the obligors and the beneficiaries –or ‘threshold cri-
terion’ for the application of the Convention27 –is the existence of jurisdic-
tion. Jurisdiction in regular public international law conditions the exercise
of sovereign state power on the existence of a territorial or personal connec-
tion, justifying the imposition of a state’s authority.28 In this sense, jurisdic-
tion ‘cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of
a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention’.29
Thus seen, jurisdiction is a delimitation of the regulatory power of states, pri-
marily to its own territory, vetoing the encroachment upon the sovereignty of
other states. Applying this interpretation under public international law to the
echr strictly, the term ‘jurisdiction’ of Article 1 seems to have the purpose of
24 Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v Turkey, Application no. 40998/98 (ECtHR, 13
December 2007), para 81, in Ichim, Just Satisfaction under the European Convention on
Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 84–85).
25 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova, Application no. 45701/99
(ECtHR, 13 December 2001); also Gomien, Short Guide to the European Convention on
Human Rights (Council of Europe, 2005, p. 167).
26 Lambert, cit, p. 9.
27 Besson, cit, p. 859.
28 Mills, ‘Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law’ (2014) 84(1) British Yearbook of
International Law 194; also Ryngaert, ‘The concept of jurisdiction in international law’ in
Orakhelashvili, cit, pp. 50–51.
29 Permanent Court of international Justice (pcij), ‘SS Lotus’ (France v Turkey), pcij 7
September 1927, pcij Series A Application no. 10, p. 19.
restricting the individuals to whom signatory states owe their human rights
obligations.30 Such an interpretation would however disregard the particular
characteristics of international human rights law.
It is recalled here that international human rights treaties stand out from
general international law, in that they impose obligations on the state with
regard to their dealings with individuals. Whereas jurisdiction in public inter-
national law thus seeks to limit assertions of state jurisdiction to minimalise
the potential for clashes between states, instruments of international human
rights law seek to bring individuals under the protection of a state by expand-
ing the scope of the jurisdiction of the state.31 ‘Jurisdiction’ in international
human rights instruments thus merely is a word that describes, but certainly
does not limit, state responsibility.32 Not all international human rights instru-
ments use the same language to describe state responsibility.33 Whereas some,
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (udhr) have no jurisdic-
tion clause at all, the nature of the Declaration and its concept make a limi-
tation of State responsibility superfluous.34 Others, such as the International
covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr) extend protection to all indi-
viduals within the state’s territory and subject to the state’s jurisdiction, which
explicitly confirms that the jurisdiction of a state under the iccpr goes beyond
the state’s territory.
30 King, ‘The Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations of States’ (2009) 9(4) Human Rights
Law Review 523.
31 Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2015,
pp. 23–24).
32 Scheinin, ‘Just another word?: Jurisdiction in the roadmaps of state responsibility and
human rights’, in Langford, Vandenhole, Scheinin and Van Genugten (eds), Global justice,
state duties: the extraterritorial scope of economic, social, and cultural rights in interna-
tional law (Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 214).
33 See, for example, Moreno-Lax and Costello, ‘Reflections on the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights –Extraterritorial Application’ in Peers, Hervey, Kenner and Ward (eds), The EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Beck, 2014, pp. 1668 ff) for an overview of
(the lack of) a notion of jurisdiction in international human rights instruments.
34 Other international human rights instruments without jurisdiction clause are the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (cat), the scope of application of which is for this reason held to be broad
(cf. Larocque, Torture, jurisdiction and immunity: theories and practices in search of
one another, in Orakhelashvili, cit, pp. 435–436, whereas the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (icescr) does not have a jurisdiction clause either
but its scope is interpreted narrowly. It is therefore not possible to conclude that, if an
instrument of international human rights law does not have a jurisdiction clause its scope
should be interpreted to be broad or universal.
an extension of the application of the echr is not the same as exercising effec-
tive control over an area outside the national territory of the state in the classi-
cal sense of extra-territorial jurisdiction.40 Therefore, Article 56 echr confirms
the view that ‘a State’s jurisdiction’ under Article 1 echr is primarily territorial,
and the presumption that a State has jurisdiction over all its territory.41
Territorial jurisdiction remains, even in cases where a State temporarily
ceases to effectively control part of its territory. In Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova
and Russia, Moldova had lost effective control over the part of its territory in
which a separatist regime, supported by Russia, had established itself. After a
while, Moldova gave up military operations to regain control over the region,
though it maintained control over issues like customs and civil documenta-
tion. In this case, the Court held that Moldova’s jurisdiction had not ceased
to exist with regard to the separatist territory: ‘Moldova still has a positive obli-
gation under Article 1 of the Convention to … secure to the applicants the rights
guaranteed by the Convention’.42 However, in the same case the Court also held
that the scope of the obligation of the State, in cases such as these where a state
is prevented from exercising its authority, the scope of its jurisdiction may be
limited, with the limitation being offset by another State assuming extraterri-
torial jurisdiction through the effective control of part of the territory.43
Application no. 16161/90 (ECtHR, 27 July 2010), para 24; Orphanides v Turkey, Application
no. 36705/97 (ECtHR, 22 June 2010), para 23.
46 Loizidou v Turkey, cit, para 62.
47 Soering v The United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989); Vilvarajah
and others v the United Kingdom, Application Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87
and 13448/87 (ECtHR, 30 October 1991).
48 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, Application no. 12747/87 (ECtHR, 26 June 1992),
para 91.
49 X v the Federal Republic of Germany, Application no. 1611/62 (ECtHR, 25 September 1965).
50 Banković and Others v Belgium and Others (Decision as to Admissibility), Application
no. 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 December 2001), para 73.
51 Orekhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent Case
law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International
Law 568. Also, Milanović, From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State
Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 411.
Thus, these two seemingly contradictory rulings of the Court in the same
year produced uncertainty with regard to the boundaries of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.57 However, it is possible to reconcile the two by arguing that
Banković confirmed extra-territorial jurisdiction of Contracting States, listing
four examples of exceptional cases in which the particular circumstances of
the case justify extra-territorial jurisdiction under Article 1 echr,58 whereas
Öcalan adds a fifth category of circumstances in which the Court may decide
to accept extraterritorial jurisdiction: in a situation in which the authorities of
a State Party exercise temporary ‘effective control’ over persons outside their sov-
ereign territory, the obligation on the state to respect the rights and freedoms
as defined in the echr may apply.
That Öcalan was not a one-off decision became clear in the more recent
case of Al-Skeini, where the Court was asked to establish whether the appli-
cants that were killed by British troops either in custody in a United Kingdom
prison in Iraq or while on patrol in the city of Basra fell within the jurisdic-
tion of the United Kingdom. Contrary to what the House of Lords had previ-
ously decided in the same case, basing itself on the case law of the ECtHR on
jurisdiction under Article 1 echr, the Court deemed jurisdiction not to arise
from ‘control over the building, aircraft or ship in which the individual were
held … [but from] the exercise of physical power and control over the person
in question.’59 In this case, the United Kingdom had exercised public powers
on the territory of a state (Iraq) that consented to its presence, powers that
would normally be exercised by the territorial state.60 Therefore, in Al-Skeini
the Court could rely on a legal entitlement to exercise public powers on the
territory of another state.61 Thus, even though not all use of physical force by a
State Party outside its own territory could lead to a violation of its obligations
under the echr (which would completely overturn Bancović), the Court in
Al-Skeini did acknowledge once more that a Contracting State is bound by its
obligations under the echr when it is invited to exercise public powers out-
side its own territory. Even though the judgment of the Court in Al-Skeini thus
seemed to restrict the scope of the fifth category of circumstances in which
57 Lord Rodger of Earlsferry in his judgment in Al-Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence
[2007] ukhl 26, lamented that ‘the judgments and decisions of the European Court do
not speak with one voice’ and that the case law of the Court presented ‘considerable dif-
ficulties for national courts which have to try to follow the case law’.
58 Banković and Others v Belgium and Others, cit, para 61.
59 Al-Skeini ea v the United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011), para 136.
60 Idem, para 135.
61 Chetail and Bauloz, Research Handbook on International Law and Migration (Edward
Elgar, 2014, pp. 124–125).
6 Conclusion
69 Goodwin-Gill, International law and the movement of persons between states (Clarendon
Press, 1978, pp. 194 ff).
70 Hirsi Jamaa ea v Italy, Application no. 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012).
71 Coppens, ‘Interception of Alien Boats at Sea’, in Moreno-Lax and Papastavridis (eds), ‘Boat
Refugees’ and Aliens at Sea: A Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Maritime Security with
Human Rights (Brill, 2017, p. 219).