Case 1 Greater Metropolitan Mla. Solid Waste Management Committee v. Jancom Environmental Corp. G.R. No.

163663 June 30, 2006 Facts: On 1994, FVR issued a memorandum creating EXECOM that will oversee the BOT implementation of Solid Waste Management Projects in San Mateo and Carmona headed by the MMDA Chairman. On 1997, the BOT contract for the waste to energy project was signed between Jancom and the Philippine Government. On 1999, due to changes in policy and economic environment, the Greater Manila Solid Waste Management Committee adopted a resolution not to pursue the BOT contract with Jancom. Subsequently, Jancom was informed that the implementation of the BOT contract would no longer be pursued and alternative implementation arrangements for solid waste management for Metro Manila would be considered instead. Jancom appealed to then President Estrada the position taken by EXECOM not to pursue the BOT contract executed and signed between Jancom and the Philippine Government. Pending appeal, the MMDA caused a publication in a newspaper of an invitation to prequalify and submit proposals for solid waste management projects for Metro Manila. Jancom filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for certiorari to declare the resolution of the Greater Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding the BOT contract and acts of MMDA calling for bids and authorizing a new contract for Metro Manila was management as illegal. On May 29, 2009 the RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent and granted its motion and prohibited and enjoined petitioners from implementing the aforesaid resolution and disregarding petitioners BOT award Contract and from making another in its place. MMDA filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for a TRO with the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the petition for certiorari, Jancom moved for execution of the RTC decision, which was opposed by MMDA. The RTC granted the motion for execution on the ground that the decision had become final since MMDA had not appealed the same to the Court of Appeals. MMDA moved to declare respondents and the RTC judge in contempt of court, alleging that the RTCs grant of execution was abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes. On November 13, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition because the MMDA chose the wrong mode of appeal. A Motion for Reconsideration was but it was denied. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether petitioners choice of the remedy of certiorari in questioning the decision of the trial court is proper. Ruling: The SC held that petitioners remedy of certiorari is wrong. Petitioner should have filed an appeal under Rule 41 which provides that an appeal may be taken from a final order or judgment that completely disposes of the case or of a particular matter therein and only in cases that the judgment or final order is not appealable can a party file an appropriate special civil action under rule 65. It should be noted that the RTC decision is not immediately executory. Only judgments in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and support and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory shall be enforced after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal there from, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. In the case at bar, the RTC decision is not immediately executory; appeal would have stayed its execution. But since no appeal was taken within the reglementary period, the RTC decision had become final and executory. Moreover, petitioner failed to file an MR, hence the petition for certiorari will not lie. Under Rule 65, petition for certiorari will lie only where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and in this case there was no showing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, the CA did not err in declaring that the

trial courts decision has become final due tot the failure of MMDA to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period.

Case 2 Pallada v. RTC of Kalibo, Aklan G.R. No. 129442. March 10, 1999 Facts: At bar is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction assailing the validity, and seeking non-implementation of the Writ of Execution issued on May 2, 1997 in Civil Case No. 2519 before Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court in Kalibo, Aklan. On September 29, 1976, private respondents file a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of land with damages before Branch 1 of the RTC of Aklan. RTC-Aklan declared the petitioners herein as the absolute and lawful owners and possessors of subject land. Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the same. Thus petitioner filed an MR but to no avail. Undaunted, petitioners appealed before the SC via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under consideration, docketed as G.R. No. 126112. But the same was denied in the Resolution of November 18, 1996, which disposition became final and executory on January 22, 1997. On May 13, 1997, the private respondents filed an Ex Parte Motion for Execution with RTC-Aklan, which granted the said motion. The respondent court then issued the Writ of Execution dated May 2, 1997 directing the Sheriff of the Province of Aklan or any of his deputies to implement the CA. Execution was partially satisfied, as shown in the Officers Return of Service of June 20, 1997. Hence this appeal before the SC. Petitioners contented that the Writ of Execution was irregularly issued insofar as the Ex-Parte Motion for Execution of private respondents did not contain a notice of hearing to petitioners. Issue: Whether the writ of execution is invalid for private respondents ex parte motion for execution was without notice to petitioners. Ruling: The requirements that notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion are mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon. Under Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court and in Supreme Court Circular No. 24-94, a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution must contain a notice to the adverse party. Hence, there should be a notice served on petitioners. However, the SC did not invalidate the writ of Execution because the petition is a dilatory move on the part of petitioners to prevent the final disposition of the case. While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. And in Nasser v. Court of Appeals, et al.: Litigation must at some time be terminated, even at the risk of occasional errors, for public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and not appealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.

Case 3 LAO vs. KING GR. No. 160358 August 31, 2006 Facts: Petitioners and respondent Philip King are stockholders of the Philadelphia School in Quezon City. On May 23, 1998 a special stockholders meeting was held where respondent King was elected as vice-president while petitioners Lao and Lian were elected as school administrator and assistant treasurer respectively. Petitioner Lao questioned the validity of said meeting and elections on the ground that the respondent King was allowed to vote his 1,200 shares despite the fact that 700 of which remained unpaid. Petitioner Lao continued to represent herself as the corporations president and passed a resolution declaring null and void the transfer to respondent King of his fathers share in the corporation. The respondent filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a petition to enjoin the petitioners from representing themselves as officers and members of the board of directors of Philadelphia School and to nullify all acts done and resolutions passed by them. Pursuant to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8799 otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, The SEC Case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of respondent King and ordered a) the meetings and election held by petitioners and all acts performed by them as the alleged officers and Board of Directors of the corporation are declared null and void b) the shares of respondent King should be restored to 1,200 and which number he is entitled to vote. The respondent filed with the trial court a motion for execution invoking Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The trial court granted the respondents motion for execution and ordered that a writ of execution be issued in accordance with the disposition of the issues as contained in the judgment of the court. On petition for certiorari with the CA, the petitioners allege that the order of execution varied the terms of the judgment sought to be executed by the respondent. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and rejected the imputation of grave abuse of discretion against the trial court judge. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the Order of execution and respondents motion for execution are at variance with the decretal portion of the trial court judgment. Ruling: An order of execution which does not substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed or which varies or goes beyond the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce is null and void. The Supreme Court does not find any inconsistency between the trial courts judgment and its Order granting the respondents motion for execution. The Order of execution by the trial court stresses that the writ of execution to be issued pursuant thereto must be in accordance with the disposition of the issues as contained in the judgment of the court. In short, the Order of execution directs in no uncertain terms that the writ must conform to the trial court judgment as embodied in the dispositive portion of the decision. The Order of execution is in harmony with the judgment it seeks to enforce. The SC further held that there is no significant point of variance between the judgment and the respondents motion for execution. For sure, the reliefs prayed for by the respondent in his motion for execution are intertwined with the disposition of issues in the trial courts decision as contained in its dispositive portion. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the respondents motion prayed for the issuance of an order of execution so as to give immediate effect to the trial court judgment dated 25 September 2002.

This only shows that the respondent merely intended to enforce the necessary implications of what was adjudged by the trial court in its decision. Finally, it bears stressing that under section 4, rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799, the prevailing party has the right to file a motion for the immediate execution of a decision or judgment. Petition was denied, the CA decision was affirmed.

Case 4 DORMITORIO VS FERNANDEZ G.R. No. L-25897 August 21, 1976 FACTS: Municipality of Victorias is the owner of several parcels of land in Victorias, Negros Occidental. Serafin Lazalita bought from the Municipality of Victorias Lot no. 1, Block 16. A deed of sale was executed and a certificate of title was issued in favor of Lazalita That about the year 1995, the spouses Dormitorio also purchased from the Municipality of Victorias a lot known as Lot No. 2, Block 16. The spouses Dormitorio obtained a certificate of title for their property. As the spouses Dormitorio have not taken actual possession of the land, they brought an ejectment suit against Lazalita. It was found out that the Lot No. 1, sold to Lazalita was converted into a Municipal road and that the Lot presently occupied by Lazalita is supposed to be the Lot No. 2, bought by the spouses Dormitorio. The Court of First Instance Judge Fernandez rendered judgment in case No. 5111 in favor of the spouses Dormitorio and ordered Lazalita to vacate the land and pay the monthly rentals. Having failed to appeal the judgment, Lazalita instituted the present action docketed as case No.6553, against the Municipality of Victorias and the spouses Dormitorio for the value of his permanent improvements and building constructed on Lot No. 2, block 16. AnAgreed Stipulation of Facts was entered into by the parties and agreed that the Decision in Civil Case No. 5111 shall not be enforced and executed anymore. Respondent Judge Fernandez issued the challenged order setting aside the writ of execution in Civil Case no. 5111 ISSUES: 1) Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he set aside the writ of execution. 2) Whether or not the parties intended a novation of Judgment. RULING: 1) Respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he set aside the writ of execution. The decision in Civil Case no. 6553 was the result of a compromise between the parties as evidenced by the Agreed Stipulation of Facts. His act was in accordance with law. 2) The presence of the animus novandi is undeniable. The parties entered into the Agreed Stipulation of Facts and their prayer was that judgment be rendered by the trial Court on the basis of the foregoing Agreed Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court decision in Civil Case No. 6553 based on the compromise between the parties manifests that the parties intended a novation of the previous judgment.

Case 5 BACHRACH CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY G.R. No. 128349 September 25, 1998 Facts: Bachrach Corporation entered into two (2) lease contracts with Philippine government, then manage by Director of Lands, covering two areas in Manila port, for a

period of ninety nine (99) years each, for which to end on year 2017 and 2018 respectively. However, by virtue of Executive Order 321 issued by Pres. Aquino, the management of the port was transferred to Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), the respondents herein, who increase the rental rate of Bachrach to 1,500% for which the latter refuse to pay. PPA initiated an unlawful detainer case with Metc of which it obtained favorable judgment. On appeal with RTC, it affirmed lower courts decision. Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the appealed decision. While petitioner filed Motion for Reconsideration, a compromise agreement was entered into by parties but PPA failed to submit. Until decision of Court of Appeals became final and executory. Then petitioner Bachrach filed with RTC a case for specific performance against PPA based on the compromise agreement, while PPA filed with Metc writ of execution, it countered petitioners complaint on grounds of litis pendentia, forum shopping, lack of cause of action and unenforceable character of compromise agreement. Yet, RTC favored Bachrach and issued Preliminary injunction, but on appeal with Court of Appeals, PPA won and set aside RTC order. Hence this petition by Bachrach Corporation. Issue : 1. Whether or not the specific performance filed by Bachrach is barred by the unlawful detainer case on ground of Res Judicata. 2. Whether or not the issuance by the trial court of the writ of preliminary injunction was an improper interference with the judgment in the unlawful detainer suit. Held: Supreme Court granted the petition. I. Res Judicata will not apply a. There are four (4) essential conditions which must concur in order that res judicata may effectively apply,(1) The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. i. The first three elements of res judicata are present here, but it is the final condition requiring subject matter and of causes of action are lacking ii. In the unlawful detainer case, the subject matter is the contract of lease between the parties while the breach thereof, arising from petitioner's non-payment of rentals, constitutes the suit's cause of action. iii. Whereas, in the specific performance case, the subject matter is the compromise agreement allegedly perfected between the same parties while the cause of action emanates from the averred refusal of PPA to comply therewith. iv. The evidence needed to establish the cause of action in the unlawful detainer case would be the lease contract and the violation of that lease by Bachrach. In the specific performance case, what would be consequential is evidence of the alleged compromise agreement and its breach by PPA. 2. While generally, after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution. a. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief. b. Thus, the action taken by RTC in issuing injunction is proper.

Case 6 DAVID SO vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines G.R. No. 138869. August 29, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner David So was convicted for BP 22 in two (2) criminal cases filed before the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction seeking to restrain the execution of judgment but it was denied. The Supreme Court then, affirmed the decision of the CA. On September 25, 2001, petitioner So filed a Motion for New Hearing relying on the promulgation of Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-2001 which establish a rule of preference in the imposition of the penalties under B.P. Blg. 22, wherein a fine instead of imprisonment may be imposed upon the discretion of the judge. Thereafter, petitioner So filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts decision alleging basically the same arguments. Resolution were issued denying said motions filed by petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner So then, filed an Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening Event alleging that he underwent a serious triple heart bypass at the Makati Medical Center on and that to impose imprisonment upon him is a sentence of death. He seeks a retroactive application of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 in his favor and prays that, for humanitarian grounds, a fine instead of imprisonment be imposed. Petitioner invokes the ruling of the court in Vaca v. CA where the court deleted the penalty of imprisonment and instead ordered them to pay the amount of the checks double the amount, for humanitarian reason, as one of the accused in that case is of old age and that they are first time-offenders. ISSUE: Whether the court may suspend the execution of a penalty in the final judgment or to cause the modification thereof? RULING: THE COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND THE EXECUTION OF A FINAL JUDGMENT The decision in Criminal Case Nos. 8345 and 8346 has become final. Nevertheless, the rule that it is the ministerial duty of the court to order the execution of a final judgment admits of certain exceptions. The court cited the case of People vs. Gallo, where it held that the court has the authority to suspend the execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification thereof as andwhen it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. The court adopted the doctrine enunciated in the Vaca case, and reiterated in Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines, as a policy on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22, under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000. In accord with this policy, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 vests in the courts the discretion to determine, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, whether the imposition of fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice. THERE IS JUSTIFIABLE REASON TO SUSPEND THE EXECUTION OF FINAL JUDGMENT In the case at bar, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Froilan L. Navarro states that as a consequence of the coronary artery triple bypass operation of petitioner So, the patient is still weak, depressed, recuperating from the surgical procedure. He could not stand stressful situation and physical activities. He needs coronary rehabilitation for at least one year under direct supervision of a coronary care therapist.

The Court held that the present physical condition of petitioner So presents a compelling reason to modify the decision of the trial court and impose, in lieu of imprisonment, a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the checks involved.

Case 7 REBURIANO vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEPSI COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES INC. G.R. No. 102965 January 21, 1999 Facts: In the case entitled "Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines Inc. v. Urbano (Ben) Reburiano and James Reburiano," the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of P55,000.00 less whatever empties (cases and bottles) may be returned by said defendants valued at the rate of P55.00 per empty case with bottles. Private respondent Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking the modification of the portion of the decision, which stated the value of the cases with empty bottles as P55.00 per case and obtained a favorable decision. After the case had been remanded to it and the judgment had become final and executory, the trial court issued a writ of execution. It appears that prior to the promulgation of the decision of the trial court, private respondent amended its articles of incorporation to shorten its term of existence to July 8, 1983. The amended articles of incorporation was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 1984. The trial court was not notified of this fact. Petitioners moved to quash the writ of execution alleging that when the trial of this case was conducted, when the decision was rendered by this Honorable Court, when the said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, and when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the private respondent was no longer in existence and had no more juridical personality and so, as such, it no longer had the capacity to sue and be sued. Private respondent opposed petitioners' motion. It argued that the jurisdiction of the court as well as the respective parties capacity to sue had already been established during the initial stages of the case; and that when the complaint was filed in 1982, private respondent was still an existing corporation so that the mere fact that it was dissolved at the time the case was yet to be resolved did not warrant the dismissal of the case or oust the trial court of its jurisdiction. Private respondent further claimed that its dissolution was effected in order to transfer its assets to a new firm of almost the same name and was thus only for convenience. The trial court issued an order denying petitioners' motion to quash. Petitioners then filed a notice of appeal, but private respondent moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the trial court's order denying petitioners' motion to quash writ of execution was not appealable. The trial court, however, denied private respondent's motion and allowed petitioners to pursue their appeal. The appellate court dismissed petitioners' appeal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the order of the trial court denying petitioners' Motion to Quash Writ of Execution is appealable? Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA.

As a general rule, no appeal lies from such an order, otherwise litigation will become interminable. There are exceptions, but this case does not fall within any of such exceptions. In Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that execution of final and executory judgments may no longer be contested and prevented, and no appeal should lie therefrom: otherwise, cases would be interminable, and there would be negation of the overmastering need to end litigations. There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be committed in the course of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances, rare though they may be, do call for correction by a superior court, as where 1. the writ of execution varies the judgment; 2. there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; 3. execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; 4. it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court; 5. the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or, 6. it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority. In the case at bar, petitioners anchored their Motion to Quash on the claim that there was a change in the situation of the parties. However, a perusal of the cases which have recognized such a ground as an exception to the general rule shows that the change contemplated by such exception is one which occurred subsequent to the judgment of the trial court. Here, the change in the status of private respondent took place in 1983, when it was dissolved, during the pendency of its case in the trial court. The change occurred prior to the rendition of judgment by the trial court.

Case 8 Saligumba vs Palanog G.R. No. 143365 December 4, 2008 Facts: Monica Palanog and Avelino Palanog (spouses Palanogs), filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants, spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses Saligumbas). In the complaint, spouses Palanog alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land located. The spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the subject premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land. Spouses Palanogs prayed that they be declared the true and rightful owners of the land in question. At the hearing, the trial court stated that Atty. Miralles, who had not withdrawn as counsel for spouses Saligumbas despite his appointment as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge, would be held responsible for the case of spouses Saligumbas until he formally withdrew as counsel. The trial court reminded Atty. Miralles to secure the consent of spouses Saligumbas. The presentation of evidence for spouses Palanogs resumed despite the motion of Atty. Miralles for postponement on the ground that his client was sick. The exhibits were admitted and plaintiffs spouses Palanogs rested their case. Upon motion of the spouses Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas were deemed to have waived the presentation of their evidence. After a lapse of more than two years, RTC rendered a judgment declaring spouses Palanogs the lawful owners of the subject land and ordering spouses Saligumbas to vacate the premises and restore possession to spouses Palanogs. A motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed but the trial

court ruled that since more than five years had elapsed after the date of its finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion. Thus, Monica Palanog then filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the Decision which she claimed has not been barred by the statute of limitations. She impleaded petitioners Generoso Saligumba and Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs and children of the spouses Saligumbas. Petitioner Generoso Saligumba, for himself and in representation of his brother Ernesto who was out of the country working as a seaman.The trial court granted respondents motion to implead additional defendants, Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba. They were, however, declared in default for failure to file any responsive pleading. RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent ordering the revival of judgment. The trial court ruled that the non-substitution of the deceased spouses did not have any legal significance. The land subject was the exclusive property of defendant Valeria Saligumba who inherited the same from her deceased parents. Issue Whether or not the instant case is an action for revival of judgment? Ruling Supreme Court held that an action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtors case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. That an action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct from either the recovery of property case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by independent action, is already final and executory. Also, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the deceased. That there was no court order for deceased legal representative or heir to appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for the decease, nor did the heirs ever ask to be substituted. It is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the death of his client. The failure of counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his client and the non-substitution of such party will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The decision rendered shall bind the partys successor-in-interest.

Case 9 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. JOAQUIN 14 SCRA 770 FACTS: In 1949 Philippine National Bank (PNB) obtained a judgment in a 1st Civil Case from the CFI of Manila against Joaquin M. Bondoc (Bondoc) for a certain sum of money plus interest and attorney's fees. This judgment was never executed. Five years after and upon the instance of the PNB said judgment was revived in the 2nd civil case in 1957 where the CFI of Manila condemned Bondoc to pay the PNB another sum of money. Neither was this judgment enforced during the five years thereafter. PNB instituted 3rd civil case in 1962 for the enforcement of the judgment on the 2nd civil case, but on motion by the defendant it was dismissed on grounds of prescription and lack of cause of action. Plaintiff has appealed from the order of dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not a revived judgment may itself be revived. RULING: Section 6 of Rule 39 states that a judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitation, a judgment may be enforced by action. A judgment rendered on a complaint for the revival of a previous judgment is a new judgment and the rights of the plaintiff rest on the new judgment not on the previous one. The purpose of the revival of a judgment is to give a creditor a new right of enforcement from the date of revival. Section 6 aforementioned requires that the judgment sought to be revived is not bared by prescription. Under Article 1144(3) of the New Civil Code the right to enforce a judgment prescribes in ten years counted from the date said judgment becomes final. The judgment in the 2nd Civil Case which provided the cause of action in the case at bar, was rendered in1957 and became final in the same year. Pursuant to Article 1144(3) of the New Civil Code the action upon such judgment must be brought within ten years from 1957 or until 1967. The instant case instituted in the court a quo in 1962 is well within the prescriptive period. The order appealed from was hereby set aside and this case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

Case 10 ADELAIDA INFANTE VS. ARAN BUIL DERS INC. G.R. NO. 156596 August 24, 2007 FACTS: Respondent Aran Builders Inc. filed an action for specific performance and damages against Petitioner Adelaida Infante before the RTC of Makati. The RTC rendered judgment ordering petitioner to deliver to respondent the complete plans, irrevocable power of attorney, real estate tax clearance, and tax receipts, and to execute the deed of sale of a lot located in Alabang . The said judgment became final and executory on November 16, 1994. Respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa for the revival of the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action for revival of judgment on the ground that the RTC of Muntinlupa has no jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was improperly laid, but the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court ruled in favor of respondent and held that since the judgment sought to be revived was rendered in an action involving title to or possession of real property, the action for revival of judgment is then an action in rem which should be filed in the place where the property is located. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the complaint for revival of judgment is an action in rem. HELD: The petition is unmeritorious. Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the lapse of five (5) years from entry of judgment or before it is barred by statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in which court the action for revival should be filed, but emphasized that other provisions in the Rules of Procedure which fix the venue of actions in general must be considered.

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Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action. Applying Sec.1 and Sec.2 of Rule 4 on venue, if the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place where the real property is located. If such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a personal action that may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides. The previous judgment has conclusively declared respondent's right to have the title over the disputed property conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private respondent has an established interest over the lot in question, and to protect such right or interest, private respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment. Verily, the action falls under the category of a real action, for it affects private respondent's interest over real property.

Case 11 Camacho vs. Court of Appeals 287 SCRA 611 FACTS: On December 20, 1974 the Trial Court ruled for respondents. Petitioner was ordered to segregate the definite portions sold and deliver to them their corresponding titles. On January 30, 1981 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgement with modification. On June 4, 1982 the appellate court granted reconsideration by deleting the modification. On March 21, 1983 the Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari which denial became final and executory on May 23, 1981. On June 6, 1983 the records were remanded to the RTC of Balanga. On respondents' motion, the writ of execution was issued on August 26, 1983. On September 28, 1983 petitioner moved to defer the execution. On January 18, 1984 the trial court denied the motion and ordered the Provincial Sheriff to enforce the writ.Thereafter petitioner filed a notice of appeal while respondents move for its dismissal. On March 22, 1985 the trial court ruled that its order was not appealable and directed the issuance of new writ of execution. Hence petition was made. ISSUE: Whether or not a judgement may still be excuted by mr motioin after the lapse of five years? RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that under the peculiar circumstances of the present case where the delays were occasioned by petitioner's own initiatives and for her advantage as well as beyond respondents' control, the five year period allowed for enforcement of the judgement by motion was deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.

Case 12 Macapagal v. Gako G.R. No. 171994 February 4, 2008 Facts: Esteban Yau bought from the Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation (Philfinance) Promissory Note No. 3447 in the amount of P1, 600, 000.00 which the latter promised to return with earnings of P29, 866.67 on March 24, 1981. On the date of maturity, all the checks issued by Philfinance were dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. In consequence, Yau filed a complaint for recovery of the value of the promissory

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note and for damages against Philfinance and the members of its board of directors in RTC Cebu, among whom were Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Pablo C. Carlos, Jr., Arturo Macapagal, Florencio Biagan, Jr., and Miguel Angel Cano. The trial court issued an Order declaring defendants in default for failure to file their answers except for Pablo C. Carlos Jr. and allowing Yau to present his evidence ex parte. Even so, defendants filed for motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the lower court, thus, Silverio and Co filed for a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the order of default of the appellate court. But the petition was again denied. Since they did not interpose an appeal, the decision became final and executory, holding that the summonses were duly served and that defendants failure to answer the complaint justifies the trial courts Order declaring them in default. On March 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its Decision in favour of Esteban Yau and against defendants Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation ordering defendants to pay the amount plus interest and damages. On April 21, 1992, an entry of judgment was made due to the dismissal of the notice of appeal filed by Silverio. Concomitantly, the bank deposits of the defendants were garnished because of the writ of execution issued by the lower court. Considering that the judgment was not fully satisfied, the sheriff resumed the implementation of the writ. In 1999, he sent notices of garnishment to several banks in Manila against any existing account of Macapagal. Thereupon, Macapagal filed with the trial court a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that its lifetime has expired, contending that the judgment in Civil Case No. CEB- 2058 became final and executory in 1992, hence, can be enforced only within five (5) years therefrom or until 1997. After five (5) years and within ten (10) years from the entry of judgment, it may be enforced only by an independent civil action. However, the lower court denied the petition because there was an effective interruption or delay in the implementation of the writ of execution. On the other hand, the appellate court granted the Omnibus Motion of Silverio that the notice of auction sale and the certificate of sale of his properties in Makati be declared void. He contends that the writ of execution has become functus oficio since more than five (5) years have elapsed from the finality of the judgment sought to be executed. Hence, Yau filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 158848. The court consolidated the two petitions, in view of the identity of the parties and the issues in G.R. No. 158848 and G.R. No. 171994. Issue: Whether or not the Decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 may no longer be enforced against Silverio and Macapagal since more than five (5) years have already lapsed from its finality. HELD: The court grants the petition of Ernesto Yau. Based on records, it is evident that there has been a delay of sixteen (16) years in the enforcement of such judgment, reckoned from its finality on December 26, 1991 up to the present because of maneuvers of defendants. Indeed, the enforcement of the trial courts judgment by motion has been interrupted by the acts of Macapagal and Silverio the judgment debtors. Here, the judgment of the trial court sought to be executed became final and executory on December 26, 1991. The writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992. It could not be enforced for the full satisfaction of the judgment within the five-year period because Macapagal and Silverio filed with the Court of Appeals and this Court petitions challenging the trial courts judgment and the writ of execution. Such petitions suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the writ. To elucidate, Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended provides:

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Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. It is clear from the above Rule that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. However, there are instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds. The court ruled that every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory, and unappealable. For just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy finality of the resolution by execution and satisfaction of judgment.

CASE 13 BANGKOK BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED, vs. LEE G.R. No. 159806 January 20, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner Bank Public Company Limited provided Respondent Midas a credit line of about $2,000,000. When Midas refused to pay its outstanding obligation, petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati City, an Amended Complaint for Sum of Money with an Urgent Application for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against respondents. After respondents filed an Answer, petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment. The motion was denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for a partial judgment. The trial court found that a partial judgment can be rendered. The only remaining factual issues would be: (1) petitioners entitlement to the writ of preliminary attachment; and (2) the parties claim for damages against each other. However, in its Resolution dated June 19, 2000, the trial court amended its decision granting plaintiffs motion for execution pending appeal perforce ordering the immediate execution of the partial decision. Not content, respondents filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The appellate court upheld the decision of the trial court. However, it ruled that a partial decision cannot be the subject of execution until after judgment is rendered on the entire case. In a Decision promulgated on Feb 28, 2001, the portion ordering the immediate execution of the partial decision was annulled and set aside. On May 31, 2002, the trial court issued a Decision upholding the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment and dismissing defendants claim for damages for lack of evidence. On July 11, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The next day, July 12, 2002, respondents filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal of its May 31, 2002 decision. On Feb 12, 2003, the trial court issued the assailed Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal. A Writ of Execution of the partial decision as amended and of the decision on the remaining issues was promptly issued on Feb 20, 2003. However, respondents filed anew before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order impugning the Feb 12, 2003 Order of the trial court. The appellate court granted the petition hence, the instant petition for review. ISSUE: Assuming that the Partial Decision is not final and executory, whether or not there are nonetheless good reasons justifying its execution pending appeal?

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RULING: We find no merit in the petition. The Notice of Appeal filed by respondents must be deemed to include the prior partial judgment as amended. The decision on the remaining factual issues is not the final and appealable judgment that finally disposes of the case on the merits. It must, therefore, only be appealed together with the amended partial judgment. Further, we note that when the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution, judgment had already been rendered on the remaining factual issues such that the partial judgment had become a complete judgment. Thus, a writ of execution could already issue. However, since appeal had been duly perfected, though not yet finally resolved, execution was not a matter of right, but of discretion provided good reasons therefor existed. The compelling grounds for the issuance of the writ must be stated in a special order after due hearing. Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. (a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal. After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court. Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. Unfortunately, the assailed Order of the trial court failed to state good reasons for the issuance of the writ. The trial court deemed that execution should issue as a matter of right because it mistakenly held that the partial decision had become final and executory.

Case 14 Intramuros Tennis Club vs CA G.R. No. 135640 Sept. 26, 2000 FACTS: Private respondent Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) owns the Victoria Tennis Court located in Intramuros, Manila. In a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed in 1987, the PTA transferred the management, operation, administration and development of Victoria tennis court to petitioner Philippine tennis Association. Petitioner Intramuros Tennis Club is an affiliate of PHILTA and has for its members tennis players and enthusiasts who regularly used the facilities of Victoria Tennis Court. During the effectivity of MOA, PTA wrote a letter to PHILTA enumerating the alleged violations by PHILTA of the terms and conditions of the MOA and demanding the surrender of the possession of Victoria tennis court. Moreover PTA issued a letter to vacate the premises of the said tennis court. On the contrary petitioners instituted a case for preliminary injunction, damages and prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of Manila. Petitioner alleged that the demand to vacate was unilateral pretermination of the MOA. TRO was granted by the RTC based upon the findings that the PTA had unilaterally pre-terminate the MOA and petitioners were allowed to retain possession of the Victoria tennis courts. In 1997, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss, stating that in view of expiration of the MOA petitioners cause of action was rendered moot and academic. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners appealed to the respondent court. While the case was pending therewith, private respondents filed a motion for execution of judgment pending appeal invoking Sec. 4 Rule 39 of Revised Rules of Court. The

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motion alleged that there was urgent necessity on the part of private respondents to immediately take possessions of Victoria tennis courts. Petitioners in their comment stated that private respondents reliance on Sec. 4 Rule 39 of Revised Rules of Court was erroneous because that provision contemplates the instance where an action for injunction was granted, not situation as the one where the judgment was for the lifting of the injunction order earlier issued. Rather the petitioners maintain that the applicable provision is Sec. 2 Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which accords the appellate court discretionary power to order execution of judgment or final order pending an appeal, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. Petitioners claims that the respondent court should have conducted hearings whether there were good reasons to issue writ of execution pending appeal. The CA issued and order granting the execution of pending appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering execution pending appeal? HELD: No, the CA did not commit an abused of discretion in issuing an order of execution even there was pending appeal. Under Sec. 2 Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court; discretionary execution--- (a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal- On motion of the prevailing party with the notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of filing of such motion, the court in its discretion, order execution of judgment or final judgment even before the expiration of the period to appeal. After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution of pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court. Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. Respondent court may order execution pending appeal subject to the following conditions: (1) there may be a judgment of final order; (2) the trial court have lost jurisdiction over the case; (3) there must be a good reasons to allow execution; (4) such good reason must be stated in a special order after due hearing. According to the Supreme Court respondents motion to dismiss and the lifted writ of preliminary injunction is a final order within the contemplation of Sec. 2 Rule 39 of Revised Ruled of Court. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to dosuch as an adjudication on the merits, which on the basis of evidence presented at the trial. In this case the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case as petitioners appeal had already been perfected and the records of the case transmitted to the CA. On the matter of hearing respondent court did not gravely abused its discretion in granting the motion for execution for pending appeal without a full blown or trial-type hearing. Lastly the CA did not gravely abused its discretion in finding good reasons to grant private respondent motion for execution of pending appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution, lest judgment illusory, or the prevailing party after the lapse of time unable to enjoy it, considering tactics of the adverse party who may have apparently no case but to delay. Petition DISMISSED.

Case 15 Planters Products, Inc. vs. CA G.R. No. 106052 October 22, 1999 Facts: On June 3, 1985, for the purpose of rehabilitating Philippine Planters, Inc., the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1465 which imposed a charge of P10.00 per bag of fertilizer on all domestic sales of fertilizer in the Philippines. Respondent Fertiphil Corporation, a domestic entity engaged in the fertilizer

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business, questioned the constitutionality of LOI NO. 1465 and brought an action to recover its accumulated payment thereunder in the amount of P6,698,144.00, before Branch 147 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On November 20, 1991, the court of origin declared Letter of Instruction No. 1465 unconstitutional and ordered the petitioner to pay the private respondent the amount it paid pursuant thereto. On February 20, 1992, simultaneously with the filing of petitioner's notice of appeal, the private respondent presented a motion to execute the said decision pending appeal, but the motion was opposed by the petitioner on the ground that there was no good reason to warrant execution pending appeal. On April 8, 1992, the lower court granted the motion for execution pending appeal and directed the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution upon the posting by private respondent of a bond in the amount of P6,698,000.00. On April 13, 1997, upon the posting of the requisite bond, Fertiphil caused the closure of petitioner's warehouse in Sta. Ana, Metro Manila.On April 20, 1992, the properties thus levied upon were sold at public auction, with Fertiphil as the highest bidder. On April 14, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court a quo an "Urgent Omnibus Motion", asked for the approval of its supersedeas bond in the amount of P10,477,902.45, and prayed that pending approval of the said supersedeas bond. Five (5) days later, or on April 20, 1993, to be precise, petitioner brought a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on the alleged ground that the lower court unreasonably failed to act on its "Urgent Omnibus Motion" dated April 14, 1992. On May 21, 1992, petitioner asked the Court of Appeals to admit its supplemental petition for certiorari imputing abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the lower court in granting private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal. On June 19, 1992, the Court of Appeals came out with its decision to the following effect: "WHEREFORE, the petition and supplemental petition are hereby DENIED. The prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is likewise denied. Costs against petitioner." Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not granting the petition and supplemental petition of herein petitioner? Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled held that the petition is impressed with merit. The prevailing doctrine then which is the same as provided in paragraph 2, Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that discretionary execution is permissible when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the time to appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may after the lapse of time become unable to enjoy it. So also, mere issuance of a bond to answer for damages is no longer considered a good reason for execution pending appeal. To consider the mere posting of a bond as a "good reason" would precisely make immediate execution of judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the exception. The rule on execution pending appeal must be strictly construed being an exception to the general rule. Then too, it can be gleaned that there is no good reason to grant execution pending appeal, under the premises. To repeat, the ground for granting execution pending appeal must be a good reason. Thus, when the Court has already granted a stay of execution upon the adverse party's filing of a supersedeas bond, the circumstances justifying execution despite the supersedeas bond, must be paramount; they should outweigh the security offered by the supersedeas bond. In the present case, however, the Court discerns no reason paramount enough to warrant the execution pending appeal. To rule otherwise would be to make the remedy of execution pending appeal a tool of oppression and inequity instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice.

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Case 16 Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation vs. CA G.R. No. 110701 March 12, 2002 FACTS: In 1988, Isabela Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO) secured a Fire Insurance Policy from the petitioner for two million pesos. This was later change with expanded coveraged to include typhoons and floods in various towns in Isabela. During the subsistence of the insurance policy, the insured properties of ISELCO were destroyed by two typhoons. ISELCO filed successive claims with petitioner despite several demands made by ISELCO petitioner refused to pay the claims. ISELCO through its representative filed a complaint against the petitioner for a sum of money in the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela. In its answer petitioner claims that ISELCOs property is underinsured thus there are entitled for a fraction of the policys face value. After trial, the trial court rendered decision in favor of ISELCO. In 1992, ISELCO filed a motion for execution of pending appeal alleging good reasons for its allowance. Petitioner filed its opposition but was denied by the trial court. The trial court finding the motion for execution pending appeal to be meritorious as there are good and valid reasons in support thereof. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, preliminary injunction with temporary restraining order with the CA alleging grave abused of discretion on the part of the Judge Eduarte in issuing special order granting execution pending appeal. The CA decided against the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of special order granting the execution pending appeal is valid. HELD: Yes, according to the Supreme Court special order granting the execution pending appeal is valid. As a general rule, the execution of judgment should not be had until and unless the judgment has become final and executory i.e. the period of appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been taken, the appeal have been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin, in which execution shall issue as a matter of right. Execution pending appeal in accordance with Sec 2 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is the exception. The requisites are: (a) there must be a motion by a prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. Being an exception to the general rule, the requisites must be strictly construed. In the case at bar all the requisites are present and that the respondent judge exercised sound discretion on the ground that ISELCO had to borrow money in order to repair it facilities. Indebtedness is the good reason for execution of pending appeal because delay of payment to ISELCO would cause irreparable injury to the consumer members of the cooperative who expect best service from ISELCO. PETITION DISMISSED.

Case 17 SIBULO vs. SAN JOSE 474 SCRA 464 Facts: On January 4, 2001, complainant Hernando O. Sibulo filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a verified complaint against respondent Muriel S. San Jose, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Naga City, for gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and acts prejudicial to public interest.

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On October 19, 1998, Judge Julian C. Ocampo III of MTCC, Branch 1, Naga City rendered a decision in favor of complainant, who was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 10454, entitled Sibulo v. Federis and Santiago for Damages. Because the defendants in that case did not file an appeal, the decision became final and executory. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued on December 17, 1998. More than a year after the decision became final, complainant informed the judge through a letter-complaint about the delay of respondent sheriff in implementing the writ of execution. Acting on the letter-complaint, the judge required respondent to explain. Respondent claimed that he made a return on the writ a few days after February 4, 1999. Upon verification of the records, no sheriffs return was found in the records of the case. A year later, on November 16, 2000, complainants father followed-up the case. Complainant averred that respondent had not until then implemented the writ of execution and it was only after his follow-up that the respondent acted on the writ. The next day, respondent made a return dated November 17, 2000. Complainant prayed that respondent be made to explain why the decision was not executed despite payment of sheriffs fees and repeated demands for the execution of the judgment. Complainant asked that respondents irregular and anomalous delay in the execution of the writ be investigated. Respondent denied complainants allegation that he failed to implement the writ with reasonable dispatch. Respondent claimed that after he received a copy of the writ on January 19, 1999, he implemented the writ in the afternoon of that same day. He claimed that service was made in the presence of the Deputy Sheriff in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court. Respondent avers now that the writ was not implemented because the defendant had no properties that could be levied upon. He asserts that the prevailing party also had the duty to assist him and should have informed him of defendants properties that could be levied upon. However, respondent adds, complainant did not coordinate with him after November 3, 1999. When he was informed that the complainants father followed-up the case on November 16, 2000, he immediately made a return on the writ on November 17, 2000 to notify the complainant to look for and inform him of any properties belonging to defendant. Moreover, considering that the sheriffs report was filed through the Receiving or Docket Clerk, respondent contends he should not be blamed if his reports were misplaced. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a letter, dated April 17, 2002, from Judge Jose P. Nacional, recommending an investigation of respondents failure to execute the writ. Judge Nacional said that upon his assumption of duty as Acting Presiding Judge of MTCC, Branch 1, Naga City, he required respondent to explain his failure to perform his duties, and to submit a regular return until the writs are fully implemented and terminated. Respondent did not comply. Issue: Whether or not the sheriff executed a judgment and make a return of the writ of execution within the period provided in the Rules of Court. Ruling: It is mandatory for a sheriff to execute a judgment and make a return on the writ of execution within the period provided by the Rules of Court. Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules on Civil Procedure provides that the writ of execution shall be returnable to the court immediately after the judgment had been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor and shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days until judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires. Records show that the writ of execution in Sibulos case was issued on December 17, 1998 and the return on the writ was made two years after, on November 17, 2000. Although respondent claimed that he made the return a few days after February 4, 1999, no such return was attached to the records of the case. In his explanation before the Executive Judge, he claimed that he received the writ on

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January 19, 1999 and served the writ on the afternoon of that date. However, in his return dated November 17, 2000, he alleged that he received the writ on February 4, 1999. Such conflicting details cast serious doubt on his claim that he indeed implemented the writ. In addition, respondent promised to furnish the investigating judge a copy of the writ but did not do so. Clearly, respondent knew there were properties that could be levied upon, when Delia Santiago offered to just remit the money to the Clerk of Court of MTCC, Naga City, for the satisfaction of the judgment. Respondent even gave her one week grace period, and waited for her at the office and when defendant did not deliver the payment to the clerk of court, respondent should have proceeded to levy on the personal properties of the defendant in accordance with the rules.

Case 18 PABLITO T. VILLARIN and P.R. BUILDERS DEVELOPERS & MANAGERS, INC., vs. CORONADO P. MUNASQUE G.R. No. 169444 September 17, 2008 Facts: This case stemmed from a Complaint for collection of sum of money filed on 10 July 2002 by respondent Coronado P. Munasque against petitioners Pablito T. Villarin and P.R. Builders Developers and Managers, Inc., and their co-defendant Intra Strata Assurance Corp. (Intra Strata) before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58. Before the answer could be filed, a compromise agreement was entered by the parties. Petitioners acknowledged the joint and solidary obligation to respondent in the amount of P15 million, with a monthly interest of P450,000.00 from 18 October 2001 until full payment, and promised to pay the whole amount within 90days from the date of the agreement. To guarantee payment of the obligation, all the real estate mortgages executed by petitioners in favor of Intra Strata were assigned to respondent. Intra Strata was released from its obligation to respondent and the complaint against it dismissed. The parties jointly filed in the RTC a motion for the approval of the compromise agreement which the judge granted the motion. Petitioners, paid only P250k. Munasque filed a motion for execution. The motion was granted and the writ was issued 27days after. Numerous Notice of Levy was issued against the petitioners. Deputy Sheriff Mendoza issued "Notice of Deputy Sheriffs Sale on Execution" relative to the levied properties, caused its registration in the Office of the City Assessor of Tagaytay and the Register of Deeds of Tanauan City, and had it posted for twenty days in three public places each in the cities of Tanauan, Tagaytay and Makati. The notice of sale on execution was published in a newspaper of national circulation. Petitioners filed a motion to recall the notice of levy and cancel the scheduled deputy sheriffs sale, alleging the same grounds raised in the letter of 13 November 2002 with regards to procedural lapses occurred. Respondent opposed the motion, contending that the day before the levy, petitioners counsel, Atty. Salamero, informed respondents counsel that petitioners did not have the money to pay even one months interest at the time, also agreed to immediately levy the real properties. Few days before auction, the RTC issued an Order denying for lack of merit petitioners motion to recall the levy and to cancel the scheduled sale on execution. The minutes of auction sale would show that counsels for both parties, who had affixed their signatures therein, were present at the sale and that only respondents representative participated in the bidding. Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to reconsider the Order declaring nullity and void and recalling the Notice of Levy, the Notice of Deputy Sheriffs Sale on Execution and the auction sale proceedings; and to inhibit the presiding judge. The judge inhibited himself without resolving the omnibus motion. Then the case was re-raffled to a new branch and judge.

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Issue: Whether or not the failure of the Deputy Sherriff to first demand the levying of personal properties constitutes fatal procedural defect resulting to nullity of the levy and the subsequent execution sale. Ruling: We thus conclude that Deputy Sheriff Mendozas failure to demand immediate payment in cash did not nullify the levy on petitioners real properties. Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure in the enforcement of a money judgment. It reads: SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. (a) Immediate payment on demand.The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ. x x x x (b) Satisfaction by levy.If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon. When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment. xxxx Based on the foregoing, the sheriff is required to first demand of the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution before a levy can be made. The sheriff shall demand such payment either in cash, certified bank check or any other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the judgment obligor cannot pay by these methods immediately or at once, he can exercise his option to choose which of his properties can be levied upon. If he does not exercise this option immediately or when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. The present rule now requires the sheriff to first make a demand for payment, and it prescribes the procedure for and the manner of payment as well as the immediate turnover of the payment by the sheriff to the clerk of court. Levy as a mode of satisfying the judgment may be done only if the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check, or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee. Furthermore, it is not disputed that Deputy Sheriff Mendoza failed to first demand of petitioners the immediate payment in cash of the full amount stated in the writ of execution. However, it is also extant in the records that petitioners never disputed the

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admissions of their counsel, Atty. Salamero, that they had no funds to pay even a months interest and that they agreed to the levy so long as the auction sale would not be set earlier than 20 November 2002. The admissions provide reasonable basis for the deputy sheriff to forego prior demand on petitioners for payment in cash and proceed to levy on the properties right away. Atty. Salamero, as petitioners counsel and representative, is expected to know all the matters related to the case, including the last stage of execution and the state of financial affairs of her clients. Since petitioners had also already agreed to the levy on their real properties, it would be pointless to require the deputy sheriff to demand immediate payment in cash. For the same reason, it would be an empty exercise to expect the deputy sheriff to first levy on their personal properties. Moreover, while petitioners, in their 13 November 2002 letter, complained of procedural defects in the enforcement of the writ, they at the same time also actually "exercised their right to choose which properties may be levied upon in satisfaction of their aforesaid obligation." It should be noted that nowhere in the letter did they offer payment of their obligation in cash. They did not even allege any willingness and ability to do so. They also did not offer personal properties that may be subject of levy. What they offered were 8 parcels of land, the value of which, so they alleged, would satisfy the obligation. With the offer, petitioners then requested that the appropriate corrections in the notice of levy be made, presumably to limit the levy to said parcels of land and to effect cancellation of the levy on the remaining parcels. The request is evidenced by petitioners subsequent motion to recall the notice of levy, specifically seeking that the notice of levy of Deputy Sheriff Mendoza be cancelled and a new one issued effecting a levy only on the aforementioned 8 parcels of land. By such acts, petitioners may be said to have overlooked the procedural lapses, acceded to the execution by levy, and effectively exercised their right to choose which of their properties may be levied on. That the 13 November 2002 letter is an exercise of this right is shown by this explicit averment in the motion to recall the notice of levy.

Case 19 MANUEL V. MENDOZA vs. ANGEL L. DORONI, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City A.M. No. P-04-1872. January 31, 2006 FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for misconduct and gross negligence filed by complainant Manuel V. Mendoza against Angel L. Doroni Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, of Quezon City. The MeTC issued a writ of execution on 4 September 2002 ordering the defendants to vacate the property and restore complainant's peaceful possession. The MeTC Sheriff successfully enforced the writ as evidenced by the Sheriff's Return. The RTC reversed the appealed decision. Defendants filed a Motion for Execution while complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and an Opposition to the Motion for Execution. The RTC denied complainant's motion and opposition, and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The Branch Clerk of Court issued the writ directing respondent to "execute the decision rendered in this case." On 11 November 2003, respondent, accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police, served the writ. Respondent issued a Certificate of Turn-Over of the property on the same date. The complainant asserted that respondent was guilty of misconduct and gross negligence when the respondent enforced the writ of execution without serving a prior notice to vacate in violation of Section 10(c), 13 Rule 39, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant jurisprudence. And he failed to enforce the money judgment in favor of the owners of the destroyed structures in the amount P15,000 each.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the sheriff fully complied with the implementation process of the writ of execution. RULING: On Respondent's Failure to Serve a Prior Notice to Vacate Well-settled is the rule that the sheriff's duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial. The sheriff must comply with the Rules of Court in executing a writ. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down in the Rules of Court is a misconduct and warrants disciplinary action. In this case, Section 10(c) of Rule 39 prescribes the procedure in the implementation of the writ. Section 10(c) expressly provides enforcement in ejectment cases requires that the sheriff must give notice of such writ and demand from defendant to vacate the property within three days. Only after such period can the sheriff enforce the writ by the bodily removal of defendant and his personal belongings. A sheriff who enforces the writ without the required notice or before the expiry of the three-day period runs afoul with Section 10(c) of Rule 39. It is evident from the records that respondent failed to serve a prior notice to vacate. On the very same day the writ was handed to him, respondent immediately went to the property to oust complainant's employees. Respondent did not give any notice to the occupants to vacate peaceably the property. On Respondent's Failure to Enforce the Money Judgment The RTC required defendants to pay P15,000 to each owner of the four destroyed structures within the property. Respondent's excuse in not collecting the P60,000 from defendants is that he could not locate the owners of the destroyed structures. This is untenable. Rule 39 provides for a remedy in case the judgment creditor could not be located. Section 9 of Rule 39 states that if the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality. By neglecting to collect the P60,000, respondent failed to implement the writ fully, to the prejudice of the judgment creditors who were owners of the four destroyed structures. WHEREFORE, the Court find respondent Angel L. Doroni, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, of Quezon City, GUILTY of misconduct and simple neglect of duty for failing to follow the procedure laid down in Sections 9 and 10(c), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. With a FINE of P10,000, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall merit a more severe sanction.

Case 20 ROSITA M. BARRETE vs. JUDGE VENANCIO J. AMILA A.M. No. MTJ-92-733 February 23, 1994 FACTS: This is an administrative complaint, filed by Rosita M. Barrete against Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC") Judge Venancio J. Amila, for grave abuse of power and authority. The instant complaint originated from the decision rendered by respondent Judge Amila in Civil Case No. 313, in favor of plaintiff Juanita Bungabong, which ordered defendant Rosita Barrete, herein complainant, to vacate the house owned by plaintiff which was occupied by complainant.

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A writ of execution was subsequently issued by respondent Judge. However, the Sheriff gave her an extension to vacate the subject premises. Barrete had not vacated; hence, an alias writ of execution was issued. Again, complainant was given an extension of two (2) days to pack up and leave. On 8 July 1992, the Sheriff went back to the premises and although he did not find complainant there, it was clear that she had not vacated because her furniture and other belongings were still in the house. Upon inquiry, the Sheriff learned that complainant had gone to Tacloban City and was due to return anytime. The Sheriff then put a padlock on the door of the house occupied by complainant. On 22 January 1992, plaintiff Bungabong's counsel filed a motion to Declare Rosita Barrete in Contempt of Court. On 23 July 1992, respondent Judge issued an Order for the arrest of Rosita Barrete. Complainant was arrested and her three (3) children remained in detention until 28 July 1992, a Tuesday (the Judge being absent from office Monday, 27 July 1992) after she had been brought before respondent Judge and had promised that she would vacate the house and lot she had been occupying. ISSUE: Whether or not the mere refusal or unwillingness to comply voluntarily with the final judgment and the writs of execution ordering evacuation from the premises and the delivery of possession of the property to plaintiff is a ground for contempt for did not constitute contempt. RULING: The Court considers that respondent Judge Amila acted arbitrarily and with disregard for complainant's rights when he ordered her incarceration on the ground of contempt for her failure to comply voluntarily with the final judgment and the writs of execution ordering evacuation from the premises and the delivery of possession of the property to plaintiff. The records show that at the time complainant was arrested, no delivery of possession of the subject premises had been made to the plaintiff; the writ of execution had not yet been implemented. The mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of complainant to vacate said property did not constitute contempt. The contumacious act punishable under Rule 71 cannot be applied. The writ of possession was directed not to complainant, but to the Sheriff, who was to deliver the properties to plaintiff Bungabong. As the writ did not command the complainant to do anything, complainant could not be held guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court. Moreover, complainant could not be punished for contempt under paragraph (b) of Section 3, Rule 71, for disobedience of or resistance to the judgment of the trial court because said judgment was not a special judgment enforceable under Section 9, Rule 39, Rules of Court. When the judgment requires the delivery of real property, it must be executed in accordance with Section 8 (d) of Rule 9, and any contempt proceeding arising therefrom must be based on the second part of Section 3 (b) of Rule 71 (see emphasized portion of Section 3 (b), Rule 71 above) and not on "the disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge" in relation to Section 9 of Rule 39. ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE respondent Judge Venancio Amila pay a fine equivalent to Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) with a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar offense will be met with a more severe penalty.

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CASE 21 CHING VS CA G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004 FACTS: The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) in the amount of P9,000,000.00 and P13,000,000.00 respectively. By virtue of the loans, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory notes and as added security for the said loan, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of P38,000,000,00. The loans were subsequently renewed on various dates. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo Ching, Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI. ABC filed an application for a writ of preliminary attachment, which was granted by the Trial Court. Meanwhile, the PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a petition for suspension of payments with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), at the same time seeking the PBMCIs rehabilitation. SEC issued an Order placing the PBMCIs business, including its assets and liabilities, under rehabilitation receivership, and ordered that all actions be suspended in whatever stage the same may be until further orders from the Commission. Subsequently, the PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or motion to suspend the proceedings invoking the PBMCIs pending application for suspension of payments (which Ching co-signed) and over which the SEC had already assumed jurisdiction. ABC filed its Opposition thereto. Thereafter, the trial court partially granted the aforementioned motion by suspending the proceedings only with respect to the PBMCI. It denied Chings motion to dismiss the complaint/or suspend the proceedings and pointed out that P.D. No. 1758 only concerns the activities of corporations, partnerships and associations and was never intended to regulate and/or control activities of individuals. Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The ABC alleged that the motion was barred by prescription or by laches because the shares of stocks were in custodia legis. The trial court issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks and ordering the sheriff to return the said stocks to the petitioners. ABC filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order but was denied. ISSUES: (a) whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines; (b) whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders. HELD: On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners that the petitioner-wife had the right to file the said motion, although she was not a party in Civil Case No. 142729.

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In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said relief. On the second issue, after a comprehensive review of the records of the RTC and of the CA, we find and so hold that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders. In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same. The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.

Case 22 CAPA vs CA G.R. No. 160082 September 19, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners were the owners of a motor banca named M/B CLM Zoltan which they used for their fish trading business. Private Respondent United Vismin Shipping Lines, Inc. was the owner of the motorized vessel named M/V Cebu Pearl. In the evening of April 21, 1993, M/B CLM Zoltan and M/V Cebu Pearl manned by Captain Rene Yhapon collided in the waters ofDumaguete City which resulted in the sinking of petitioners' M/B CLM Zoltan. Petitioners filed with the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 8, a complaint for damages, attorneys fees against private respondent United Vismin and Captain and Mrs. Rene Yhapon (private respondent Spouses Yhapon). After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering the defendants solidarily to pay the plaintiffs. Private respondents United Vismin and Spouses Yhapon filed their notice of appeal. RTC gave due course to the appeal and ordered the records to be elevated to the CA. Earlier, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Execution Pending Appeal on the ground that private respondent United Vismin had already given notice to the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) of the cessation of its operation. The RTC granted petitioners' motion after petitioners' submission of a certification from MARINA that private respondent United Vismin had suspended operation of its five vessels. A writ of execution pending appeal was issued to Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino who thereafter issued a notice of levy addressed to the Regional Director of MARINA levying two vessels registered in the name of private respondent United Vismin, namely MV Island Pearl and MV Sea Pearl. Private respondent Raco through her attorney-in-fact, private respondent Tolosa, filed a Third-Party Claim with the RTC claiming ownership over MV Island Pearl and MV Sea Pearl. An Amended Third-Party Claim was subsequently filed. A notice of the claim was sent to petitioners by Sheriff Belarmino who required the former to file an indemnity bond in the amount of P2,700,000.

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Private respondent United Vismin and spouses Yhapon filed a Motion to Quash Levy on the ground that petitioners were not required to put up a bond in favor of private respondent United Vismin as security on the latter's part in the event that the appealed decision will be reversed. The RTC in its Order did not entertain the motion since it has lost jurisdiction over the case with the perfection of the appeal. Petitioners filed with the CA a motion to approve sheriff's indemnity bond, posted and received by the Office of the Sheriff for the levy of the vessel MV Island Pearl. An opposition thereto was filed by the third party claimant. The CA held in abeyance any action on petitioners' motion pending submission of the certified true copy of the surety bond and the certification from the Supreme Court that the surety company is not black-listed. CA denied the Petitioners motion for failure to comply with the Resolution and noted the opposition. Petitioners filed with the CA a Motion to Deny Third-Party Claim with Motion to Admit Claim for Damages praying that the third-party claim be denied for it is invalid as it was not signed by Raco but by her alleged attorney-in-fact, Tolosa. Petitioners further prayed that their claim for damages arising from the malicious filing of the third-party claim against Raco and Tolosa be admitted by the CA in the same appealed case. The CA issued its assailed Resolution stating that the Plaintiffs-appellees' "Motion to Deny Third-Party Claim with Motion to Admit Claim for Damages" is NOTED without action. The said motion should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch VIII, Cebu City, and not with this Court. Hence the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus. ISSUE: Whether or not the third party claim filed in accordance with Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court was proper (NO) HELD: The petition for certiorari lacks merit. Third party-claim filed by Raco through her attorney-in-fact Tolosa pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides: Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. - If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty days (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. xxxx The second paragraph of Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which is invoked by petitioners to support their claim provides: xxx Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim. Clearly, a third party claimant or any third person may vindicate his claim to his property wrongfully levied by filing a proper action which is distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is being enforced. Such action would have for its object the recovery of the possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages

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resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the thirdparty claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff, of course, and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with the sheriff in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself. The same paragraph also provides a remedy to a judgment obligee when a frivolous and plainly spurious claim was filed by a third-party claimant, i.e., to file his claim for damages in the same court where the third-party claimant filed his third-party claim or to file a separate action. Thus, petitioners' claim for damages must be filed in the trial court, whether in the same case where a third-party claim has been filed or in a separate action for damages which petitioners may institute. This is so in order to require the filing of proper pleadings and to hold trial so as to give the parties the chance to submit their respective evidence. We likewise find no basis for the petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the CA to act on petitioners' Motion to Admit Claim for damages as it had no jurisdiction to do so.

Case 23 FIESTAN v. COURT OF APPEALS 185 SCRA 751 FACTS: Spouses Dionisio Fiestan and Juanita Arconada obtained a loan from DBP secured by a real estate mortgage of their property situated in Ilocos Sur. The spouses failed to pay the said loan. On August 6, 1979, the lot was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder after it was extrajudicially foreclosed in acoordance to Act No. 3135. The provincial sheriff issued a certificate of sale on the same day. Upon failure of petitioners to redeem the property within the one (1) year period which expired on September 28, 1980 The property was then registered under DBP. On April 13, 1982, DBP sold the lot to Francisco Peria. The lot was then registered under Peria. The petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of sale, mortgage and cancellations of TCTs against DBP and Peria. Peria also obtained a loan from DBP secured by a real estate mortgage of the lot in question. The RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur dismissed the complaint declaring the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the motgage and its subsequent sale to Peria as well as the mortgage of Peria. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial foreclosure is null and void. RULING: The formalities of a levy, as an essential requisite of a valid execution sale under Section 15 of Rule 39 and a valid attachment lien under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, are not basic requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed property can be sold at public auction. At the outset, distinction should be made of the three different kinds of sales under the law, namely: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial foreclosure sale, and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, because a different set of law applies to each class of sale mentioned. An ordinary execution sale is governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Rule 68 of the Rules of Court applies in cases of judicial foreclosure sale. The case at bar, as the facts disclose, involves an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The public auction sale conducted on August 6, 1979 by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur refers to the "sale" mentioned in Section 1 of Act No. 3135, as amended, which was made pursuant to a special power inserted in or attached to a real estate mortgage made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation. It must be noted that in the mortgage contract, petitioners, as mortgagor, had appointed private respondent DBP, for the purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure, "as his attorney-in-

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fact to sell the property mortgaged under Act No. 3135, as amended, to sign all documents and perform any act requisite and necessary to accomplish said purpose .... In case of foreclosure, the Mortgagor hereby consents to the appointment of the mortgagee or any of its employees as receiver, without any bond, to take charge of the mortgaged property at once, and to hold possession of the same. There is no justifiable basis, therefore, to apply by analogy the provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on ordinary execution sale, particularly Section 15 thereof as well as the jurisprudence under said provision, to an extrajudicial foreclosure sale conducted under the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended. Act No. 3135, as amended, being a special law governing extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the same must govern as against the provisions on ordinary execution sale under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Case 24 PHILIPPINE SURETY and INSURANCE CORP. v. ZABAL 21 SCRA 682 FACTS: On August 28, 1961, Beatriz Zabal presented for registration of deed of sale whereby Candido Fajardo appeared to have conveyed to her the parcel of land in question. Thereupon, the registration of the lot was was issued to Zabal. However, the title is annotated with a notice of levy in favor of Philippine Surety and Insurance Corp. (PSIC). Zabal filed a complaint for the cancellation of the said annotation on the ground that they are the new owners of the property. PSIC alleged the superiority of the lien, created by the prior registration of the levy, over the sale in favor of Zabal. The Trial Court ruled in favor of PSIC and the complaint was dismissed. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. The CA ordered the dissolution of the attachment and the cancellation of the notice of levy. ISSUE: Whether or not notice to the occupant of a real property is a prerequisite to a valid levy of execution upon that property RULING: To effect a levy upon a realty, the sheriff is required to do two specific things: (1) file with the register of deeds a copy of the order, description of the attached property and notice of attachment, and (2) leave with the occupant of the property copy of the same order, description and notice. These are prerequisites to a valid levy, noncompliance with any of which is fatal. The evident purpose of the law in imposing these requirements is to make the levy public and notorious, to prevent liens from attaching secretly and by surreptitious entries and endorsements, and to enable the affected party to inquire into the date and circumstances surrounding the creation of the encumbrance, as well as to give him ample opportunity to file timely claim to the property levied upon. Since the Court of Appeals, in this case, found that no notice of the levy was given to respondent who was then in occupancy of the land a factual finding which the SC cannot now review it is obvious that there was no valid levy on the land, and, therefore, its registration in the registry of deeds and annotation in the title were also invalid and ineffective. Petitioner's case is not even helped by the allegation that Fajardo, in whose name the land was registered was duly notified of the attachment. Where notice to the occupant is required by law for the validity, of a levy, personal service of the copy of the writ, description of the property and notice to the owner, who is not the occupant, does not constitute compliance with the statute

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Case 25 SPOUSES LAYOS vs. FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE SPOUSES MARINA AND GENEROSO OTIC G.R. No. 150470 August 6, 2008 FACTS: Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (FEGDI) is the developer of the Manila Southwoods golf course and residential subdivision project which partly covers lands located in Bian, Laguna and is was trying to develop a parcel of land in Binan, Laguna. Spouses Layos claim ownership over the parcel of land being developed, prompting petitioners to file a complaint for injunction and damages with the RTC of Binan against Fil-Estate Realty Corporation (FERC). This complaint was dismissed by the RTC as the petitioner was unable to substantiate his right. Spouses Layos then filed another complaint against FEGDI in San Pedro, prompting the latter to file an opposition thereto on the ground of litis pendencia, the opposition was dismissed but FEGDI was able to secure a TRO from the Court of Appeals (CA) while pursuing an appeal to their opposition. Meanwhile, the BInan case was dismissed with prejudice. The Supreme Court also upheld the opposition of FEGDI. The spouses later on filed a case against La Paz for quieting of title regarding the ownership of the lands in Binan, Laguna. This case was dismissed by the RTC and the dismissal was upheld by the CA and the Supreme Court. The petition now is about a petition for reconstitution filed by the Spouses Layos and challenged by respondents, the RTC denied the petition, and the dismissal was upheld by the CA, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether Res Judicata applies to the case at bar. RULING: The Court said that the principle of Res Judicata does apply. It has been proven before in cases involving the same facts, same parties and same issues that the contention by the Spouses Layos are untenable and the source of their claim to the land, their title, is a forgery, hence, the previous decision is a bar to their claim in this case.

Case 26 SOORAJMULL NAGARMULL, vs. BINALBAGAN-ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, INC. G.R. No. L-22470 May 28, 1970 FACTS: Petitioner is a foreign corporation based in India and has an agreement to sell with the respondent domestic corporation Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company 1,700,000 pieces of hessian bags. While some of the bags have been delivered, there remain 154 bales that remained undelivered until the export charges of the bags have been increased. The petitioner demanded a refund in the export charges it paid beyond what they paid in their agreement while defendant refuses to do so. Soorajmull was able to acquire a judgment in their favor from a tribunal of arbitration from India and is trying to enforce the same in the Philippines. Petitioner then filed an action for enforcement of a foreign decision. Issue: Whether the judgment may be enforced here in the Philippines.

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Ruling: The court said that the judgment may be enforced here in the Philippines but the same may be repelled as in this case, by a clear mistake of the law. The Supreme Court explained that the decision cannot be given force and effect as the Arbitration was incorrect in its application since it is the plaintiff who violated the contract and not the defendant.

Case 27 PRISCILLA MIJARES et.al , vs. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA G.R. No. 139325 April 12, 2005 FACTS: The petitioners filed a complaint before the US District Court, District of Hawaii against the Estate of former President Ferdinand Marcos. The petitioners claimed that they were victims of human rights abuses such as torture, arbitrary detention, and rape during the Marcos regime. They also alleged that due to the thousands of victims of human rights abuses necessitated the institution of a class suit warranted under Rule 23 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Courts jurisdiction over the complaint. The US District Court rendered a Final Judgment awarding the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) a total of $1,964,005,859.90. The Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Thereafter, petitioners filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment.They claimed that due to the failure of the Marcos Estate to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court, the decision of the US Didtrict Court became final and executory. The Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-payment of correct filing fees because petitioners merely paid Php 410.00 as docket and filing fees notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce the amount of damages in the amount of over US$ 2.25 Billion. The petitioners contended that the action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation hence they paid the correct filing fee. Respondent Judge Ranada dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The trial court estimated that the proper amount of filing fee should be Php 472,000,000.00. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the respondent court. Hence, it filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Final Judgment sought to be enforced by petitioners capable of pecuniary estimation? 2. Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case on the ground of non-payment of correct filing fees? RULING: The Supreme Court held that that action for the enforcement of the Final Judgment would necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of money hence capable of pecuniary estimation. The providential award would be the adjudication of monetary award once the foreign judgment is enforced. However, the Court ruled that respondent judge committed a serious error when he concluded that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, wherein the amount of relief sought or the value of property in litigation should the basis of computation. The Supreme Court pointed out that Section 7(b) of Rule 141 is applicable and that the petitioners paid the correct filing fees for actions not involving property. The Court further ruled that based on the principles of comity, utility, and convenience have established a usage among civilized states for the enforcement of foreign judgment. Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides the actionable

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issues to review the jurisdiction of a foreign court as well as the distinction of foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. The foreign judgment in an action in rem is deemed conclusive upon the title of the thing while an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive. In both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, notice to the party. collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact. Although the petition of certiorari was granted, the Marcos Estaste was not precluded from challenging the enforceability of the foreign judgment. Hence, the filing fee was properly paid but no verdict has been laid on the Final Judgment in question. Other issues relative to the foreign judgment are to be litigated before the trial court within the confines of the matters of proof under Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Case 28 RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., vs. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR. respondent. G.R. No. 162894 February 26, 2006 FACTS: Brand Marine Services, Inc., (BMSI) a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the State of Connecticut, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie entered into a contract whereby the respondent was hired by BMSI as representative to negotiate the sale of services with the Philippine government. Respondent secure a service contract with the government on behalf of BMSI. In 1994, respondent filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against BMSI and Rust International In. for illegal termination, non-payment of commission, and breach of contract. The Labor Arbiter rendered a favorable decision for respondent. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondent elevated the case before the Supreme Court but it was dismissed. In 1998, respondent filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the petitioner and impleaded BMSI and RUST International reiterating the allegations made in the earlier labor case. The respondent also alleged that BMSI, Rust International, and herein petitioner combined and function as one company. The petitioner sought the dismissal of the case on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens. It also filed an Omnibus Motion which was denied by the RTC. The motion for reconsideration was also dismissed by the lower court. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was also denied. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action? 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens? RULING: Petitioner contended that their written contract with respondent included a valid choice of law clause, the laws of the State of Connecticut, hence the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens became necessary. Under this doctrine, a court in conflicts- of -law cases may refuse impositions on its jurisdictions where it is not the most convenient forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. However, the Supreme Court rejected petitioners contention stating that the presence of a valid choice of law clause did not suggest that Philippine courts are precluded from hearing the civil action. The High Court ratiocinated that jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the respondent upon the filing of the complaint. It also acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner when it appeared voluntarily in court. The Supreme also pointed out that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled the need for a full-

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blown trial to determine the alleged merging of BMSC and Rust International. Hence, the petition for review was DENIED.

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1. Arnold Apdua 2. Denver Louie Cabaluna 3. Nathan John Calunod 4. Marian Casil 5. Jerome Daylo 6. Dino Delos Santos 7. Keiron Gubatan 8. Emmanuel Ellis Guerrero 9. Karen Hernandez 10. Jonathan Javier 11. Karen Javier 12. Ameer Hussein Kansi 13. Baisah Karon 14. Christian Mojica 15. Chleriza Vinky Moraa 16. Alirakim Munder 17. Vida Nabong 18. Mario Pascual 19. John Reginald Santos 20. Dennis Santos

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