Love in Print in The Sixteenth Century-The Popularization of Romance
Love in Print in The Sixteenth Century-The Popularization of Romance
Love in Print in The Sixteenth Century-The Popularization of Romance
Acknowledgments ix
Notes 187
Bibliography 231
Index 245
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Ac k now l e dgm e n ts
Above all you must beware the power of love’s frenzy, for it is the
most vehement of all the disturbances of the spirit . . . the disorder of
the mind in love is abominable in itself.
—Cicero, Tusculan Disputations. Book 4.75 1
You will not find anyone who discusses Venus and Cupid who
writes in an orderly fashion, without confusion.
—Mario Equicola, De Natura d’amore (1525) 3
The sentiment and beliefs here are clear: Love is good in all its
forms, and indeed, as the rest of the volume argues, love is neces-
sary for mental health. As the flowery prose of this passage sug-
gests, the volume attempts to convey scientific findings related to
love and emotion in a poetic and metaphorical style. All the same,
the authors might have considered their metaphor a bit more care-
fully. Cupid’s arrow, alluded to here, is of course a weapon and, as
poets from Ovid to John Donne knew well, the heart it seeks is left
pierced and bleeding. And though sexual desire in its many forms
may well be a “biological reality,” romance is not—it is a historically
specific way of understanding and validating certain forms of sexual
attraction. Its cultural formulation and significance demonstrably
changes over time.
In the early modern period, romantic love was not necessarily felt
to be natural, good, pleasurable, or essential to a healthy life. This
book is an examination of the conflicting cultural notions about
romantic love during the first period in which “love” was a broadly
popular concept—roughly the first century after the introduction of
printing. Its thesis is simple: that the rise of a commercial market for
printed books in the sixteenth century greatly facilitated the cultural
dissemination of various conflicting ideas about romantic love and its
significance. This relative popularization of the concept of romantic
love led to profound transformations in the rhetoric, the ideology,
and the social function of love—transformations that arguably con-
tinue to shape cultural notions about love to this day.
In the sixteenth century, the traditional notion that romantic love
was an essentially aristocratic emotion, indicating nobility of spirit,
was challenged by a paradigm that saw love as a more universal emo-
tion, experienced by middling and common people as well as by the
elite. At the same time, there were debates over whether love was a
negative or positive emotion, whether it was part of healthy normal
life or a diseased state, and whether it was a spiritual state or a physi-
cal urge. Though “falling in love” is often thought to be natural and
unchanging, European notions of what romantic love should be were
learned from books, and they spread as books spread. By focusing
Introduction 3
Some Definitions
In 1929 Cole Porter memorably asked, “What is this Thing Called
Love?” Perhaps wisely, his song does not attempt a definitive answer,
though it does suggest that love is a “funny” thing that makes a
fool out of people by stealing their hearts and throwing them away.
4 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
as these: and they that pretend to effect it, are to be accounted noth-
ing but meere empty Sophisters.6
Commonplace Attitudes:
TWO G ENTLEMEN OF VERONA
A Shakespearean example will serve to demonstrate the ways in which
ideas about love permeated literary discourse by the late sixteenth
century. Two Gentlemen of Verona is one of Shakespeare’s earliest sur-
viving texts,9 and though the play introduces many themes and motifs
that Shakespeare would go on to develop in his later comedies, com-
pared to his subsequent work it remains a relatively simple play. The
largely conventional nature of Two Gentlemen makes it an ideal source
for examining the received ideas about love in the sixteenth century.
Indeed, the play touches on all four discourses of love addressed in
this study: social, philosophical, rhetorical, and medical.
Love dominates the play’s dialogue to an extraordinary extent:
The leading character Valentine could be describing Two Gentlemen
itself when he exclaims,
In fact, there is more frequent use of the word “love” and its cog-
nates in Two Gentlemen than in any other Shakespearean play. The
word “love” appears 104 times; “loves” (the plural) appears 8 times;
“love’s” (the possessive), 5 times; “loved,” 10 times; “loving,” 4 times;
“lovest,” 6 times; and various forms of “lover,” 12 times, for a grand
total of 149 occurrences in a play of 2,298 lines. That works out to one
iteration of the word “love” every 15 lines or so. (The corresponding
figure for Romeo and Juliet is 130 in a play of 3,185 lines—one itera-
tion approximately every 24 lines).10
Like most romantic comedies, Two Gentlemen of Verona creates a
world in which love is the main principle underlying all social inter-
action: almost all significant relations in the play are described in
terms of “love.” The main conflict in the play is between the loving
friendship of the two gentlemen of the title, Proteus and Valentine,
and their romantic attraction for two young women, Julia and Silvia.
Initially in love with Julia, Proteus shifts his affections to Valentine’s
beloved, Silvia, bringing his friendship with Valentine into crisis.
The play thus features a pair of loving male friends, two romantic
couples, as well as various comic characters who mirror the central
plot: Thurio, Valentine’s foolish rival, is favored by Silvia’s father but
detested by Silvia herself. Lance, the idiot servant, is famously in love
Introduction 7
with his dog. Even Speed, the clever servant, jokes that he is in love
with his bed (2.1.72).11
Neither same-gender friendship nor cross-gender romance is
straightforwardly endorsed by the play. At first glance, it might
seem that, like many texts of the period,12 Two Gentlemen privileges
male friendship: After all, the play is named after the gentlemen,
and ends with Valentine offering to give up his beloved Silvia if
that will please his friend Proteus. But in fact Proteus and Valentine
have a relatively tepid relationship, and spend more time arguing
and betraying each other than being friends. On the other hand,
the play’s genre would seem to privilege romance, for the teleology
of romantic comedy tends to endorse heterosexual marriage as the
solution to all problems. But in Two Gentlemen, as in many other
Shakespearean comedies, there is a fair amount of ambivalence
about the final pairings.
The play’s conclusion does little to clarify the situation: The last
lines of the play blur the distinctions between friendship and mar-
riage, as Valentine says to his friend Proteus:
The literal meaning here may simply be that the two couples will
celebrate their weddings together in one place, but it almost sounds
as if the friends and their wives will all live together in future, one
big happy family—an overly optimistic vision of communal harmony,
given the many betrayals of the play.
Love is ubiquitous in the social world of the play, but from a philo-
sophical standpoint it remains an utterly confused concept. To begin
with, there are the usual problems of definition: Proteus uses “love”
to refer both to his affections for Valentine (2.4.196–199) and his
supposed loyalty to the Duke of Milan (3.1.46). The Duke uses it
to refer to his fatherly relation to his daughter (3.1.73) as well as his
avuncular fondness for Valentine (3.1.166). A band of outlaws vows
to “love” Valentine as their commander (4.1.65), and he uses the
same word to describe their obedience to him (5.4.16). “Love” is
also used to describe a personal fondness for things or states of being:
“as thou lovest thy life” (3.1.169), or even “I love crusts” (3.1.329).
Perhaps the most resonant use of the word comes when Valentine
declares he will give Silvia to Proteus because of the “love” he bears
his friend (5.4.82)—rhetorically equating same-gender friendship
with cross-gender romance.13
8 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
and Silvia is threatened with rape. At the play’s conclusion, Julia has
regained the affections of Proteus, but his earlier rejection of her
does not bode well for their future happiness. And Silvia is betrothed
to Valentine, although he has made it clear he is willing to give her
to Proteus if that is what his friend wants. The ambivalence many
readers and viewers feel at the end of the play may or may not be
intentional—the deep and disquieting ironies that mark the conclu-
sions of Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure and All’s Well That Ends
Well are still in the future. But Two Gentlemen in no way constitutes
a strong endorsement of romantic love.
Indeed, love is seen above all as an irrational, disruptive force, and
one that finds ultimate recourse in violence. Love is described as a
cruel master (1.1.39); a wanton child (2.2.58); blind (2.1.63); a can-
ker in a budding rose (1.1.46); a fire (2.2.20). As Proteus puts it to
Silvia:
Though Proteus claims here that rape is “against the nature of love,”
love is frequently associated with violence in the play. Love as a sol-
dier, after all, is another very old and resonant image, going back to
Ovid, if not earlier.17 And as we have seen already, love has no fixed
“nature.” It is based instead on instability and paradox. Throughout
the play love is described primarily in terms of oxymoron and contra-
diction: It is blind, but has 20 pairs of eyes (2.4. 88–90); it is both
master (1.1.39) and child (3.1.124); and the more it is spurned, the
stronger it grows (4.2.14–15).
If in philosophical terms, love is an unstable concept, the rhetoric
of love is characterized by falsehood. Proteus’s threat suggests that
the polite language of love, “the gentle spirit of moving words,” is just
a cover for the brute force of desire. In Two Gentlemen of Verona the
rhetorical quality of love is often foregrounded. Whatever else it may
be, love is a discourse, a way of speaking and writing. John Donne
described the rhetoric of love as a “masculine persuasive force,”18 and
indeed Valentine equates successful rhetoric and masculinity in similar
fashion:
But in the very same passage he also highlights the essential empti-
ness of love’s discourse:
Women say no when they mean yes; men say black is white. Everyone
lies.19
The emptiness of the rhetoric of love is reflected in the play’s overuse
of the word “love” itself: endlessly repeated, played with, defined, rede-
fined, and exchanged throughout the play. Like many of Shakespeare’s
early plays, Two Gentlemen delights in wordplay. Samuel Johnson once
observed that “a quibble is to Shakespeare what luminous vapors are
to the traveler: he follows it at all adventures,”20 and his insight is never
truer than here. In the play’s very first scene the word “love” becomes
a motif for a series of learned witticisms. Lovesick Proteus protests he
will miss his departing friend Valentine:
And so on. . . . In this passage, as in some others in the play, the repeti-
tion of the word “love” serves to empty the term of significance. The
quibbling shifts in context destabilize any solid, precise sense of the
word’s meaning.
Shakespeare was to recycle much of this patter to greater effect in
Romeo and Juliet (1.5.90–107) and As You Like It (4.1.86–92): the
conflation of love and (false) religious devotion, the mocking of pas-
sionate obsession, the mix of mythical material and mundane detail
(Leander’s soggy shoes), all reappear. Marlowe’s contemporaneous
poem Hero and Leander uses the same myth to mock and destabilize
Introduction 11
as the rings Proteus exchanges with Julia and gives to Silvia, were
much more commonly given as love tokens at all social levels.25 Like
puns and quibbles, the letters in the play are thus primarily literary
devices—part of the overused and often empty rhetoric of romance
that suffuses Two Gentlemen.
Although Two Gentlemen is one of Shakespeare’s earliest works,
it encapsulates very well the ambivalence surrounding the notion of
romantic love in the late sixteenth century. Certainly in its wariness
about the possibilities of human happiness or fulfillment, the play
is typical of Shakespeare. Throughout his career, Shakespeare ques-
tioned received notions of affectionate happiness: friends betray each
other, brothers kill each other, parents are estranged from children,
men and women fall in and out of love. Romantic bliss, lovely as it
may be, is often associated with naiveté, and is almost always seen as
transitory. There are few happy couples in Shakespeare.
This critical vision of love is by no means unique to Shakespeare.
Like the characters of the play and the situations in which they find
themselves, the notion that love did more harm than good was utterly
conventional, and was echoed in a wide variety of contemporary texts,
from sonnets to sermons. As Stephen Guy-Bray memorably put it, “In
The Two Gentlemen of Verona . . . heterosexual love is not creation but
rather recycling.”26 But this does not mean that this view of love as
irrational and destructive is merely conventional or ironic. As we shall
see, serious medical and philosophical texts from the late sixteenth
and early seventeenth century describe romantic love as both a physi-
cal disease and a mental illness. Robert Burton’s massive Anatomy of
Melancholy (1621) devotes almost a third of its length—over three
hundred pages—to a discussion of the symptoms, causes, and cures of
love melancholy. Jacques Ferrand’s On Lovesickness (1610; 1623) even
suggests surgical remedies for extreme cases, including both clitoro-
dectomy and cauterizing the forehead with a branding iron. Milder
treatments include bloodletting, enemas, fasting, and scourging. 27
It’s unclear how often such “remedies” were applied, but they were
nonetheless seriously discussed by a reputable physician in a volume
addressed to medical students. (On what seems to modern readers
a less drastic note, Ferrand and Burton also discuss the Classical
world’s primary remedy for lovesickness—sexual intercourse: with the
beloved, if possible, with someone else if not). 28
The medicalization of love is evident at several points in Two
Gentleman of Verona. Proteus’s complaint about the way Julia has
“metamorphis’d” him ends by noting his wit is weak with “musing”
and his heart is “sick with thought”—that is, his normal thought
Introduction 13
Some Observations
The concept of romantic love that Shakespeare inherited and recycled
in Two Gentlemen of Verona was not new in the sixteenth century;
it grew out of earlier traditions—the discourse of courtly love,
Petrarchism, and others. What was new in the sixteenth century
was the market for printed books, which allowed elite ideas about
love to be widely socially disseminated. It was in printed books that
Shakespeare and his colleagues found the plots for their plays and
14 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
You will hardly ever find peasants bearing arms in the court of love;
instead they are moved to the works of Venus naturally, like horses and
donkeys, as the impulse of nature provokes them. Therefore hard work
and continual uninterrupted satisfaction with the plough [i.e., penis]36
and pickax are enough for peasants. And even if, as rarely happens,
they are excited by the prick of a love beyond their nature, they ought
not be instructed in love’s doctrine.37
Peasants can pound away all day, but they have no higher sentiments
than a donkey.
In the great French allegory of love, Le Roman de la Rose (c. 1230),
the protagonist’s submission to love takes the form of a feudal oath
of fealty, complete with the joining of hands and kiss on the mouth.
The God of love commands the protagonist, “to give me a kiss on
my mouth, which no commoner [vilain] has ever touched . . . on the
contrary, my vassals must be courteous and noble.”38 Such texts rep-
resent an elite literary discourse that prides itself on speaking only for
an aristocratic minority. The refined notions of love they promulgate
were never intended for broad application, and did not reflect actual
social practices.
The notion that love is a noble passion proved an enduring one,
still endorsed by Robert Burton in his magisterial Anatomy of
Melancholy in the early seventeenth century: Burton notes that the
“mad and beastly” passion of romantic love is sometimes called “amor
nobilis . . . because noble men and women make a common practice
of it, and are so ordinarily affected with it.” In the same passage he
claims that love “rageth with all sorts and conditions of men, yet is
most evident among such as are young and lusty, in the flower of
their years, nobly descended, high fed, such as live idly and at ease.”39
Nonetheless, as literacy spread more widely, notions of romantic love
also spread beyond their aristocratic origins. While many stories of
romantic love still had princes and princesses as their protagonists,
novelle also presented lovers who were not noble, in serious as well as
comic narratives.40
This social diffusion of love greatly accelerated with the develop-
ment of a market for printed books in the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries. A thriving book market might not, in itself, nec-
essarily create a more literate public. But it greatly accelerated and
facilitated the other social processes that expand literacy, including
Introduction 17
not necessarily suit well with the domestic order thought most fitting
to married life. In his extensive study of seventeenth-century Dutch
marriage portraits, generally commissioned by middle-class patrons,
David R. Smith notes that they display “formality and informality,
abstraction and intimacy, but very little romance.”67
Competing ideas about the nature and function of marriage were
debated throughout early modern society.68 On one side, the aris-
tocratic Michel de Montaigne argued that marriages ought to be
arranged by parents:
Late in life, he added the franker marginal note: “That, as the saying
goes, is shitting in the basket and then plonking it on your head.”69
On the other hand, popular plays from Romeo and Juliet to George
Wilkins’s The Miseries of Enforced Marriage (1607) warned of the
troubles that ensued when marriages were arranged by parents against
their children’s wishes. Tracts on domestic life routinely insisted that
marriage must be based on mutual affection and attraction. A typical
example, George Whetstone’s Heptameron of Civil Discourse (1582),
concludes “if the Maried abhorre before Marriage, they may well
desemble with their tounges, but wyll never bee delighted in their
harts: and where there is such a devision in the desires of the Married,
fayre, fained semblaunce wil soone turne to flat fowle falling out.” 70
In general, both parental approval and the free consent of the couple
were believed to be crucial to a good marriage, though in practice
there was often some tension between the two.71
Along with the practical, traditional binding of love in marriage
went an alternate philosophical discourse that saw love as a nonsexual
source of cosmic concord, potentially uniting humanity and linking it
to God. These ideas have their roots in Plato’s Symposium, which was
rediscovered, translated into Latin, and extensively commented on in
the fifteenth century. In the Symposium Socrates outlines a method,
22 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
female courtiers, and the volume ends with Pietro Bembo’s elaborate
praise of an idealized and spiritualized Platonic love, based ultimately
on Diotima’s discussion with Socrates from Plato’s Symposium. As we
have seen, Platonic love was a popular subject in sixteenth-century
intellectual discourse, especially in Italy. The actual Pietro Bembo’s
1505 dialogue Gli Asolani provided an elegant exposition of the topic.
But the inclusion of the fictional Bembo’s description of Platonic
love in the Courtier exposed the concept to a broad European audi-
ence in the way no previous text had done.
The doctrine of love put forward by Bembo in the Courtier offers
an idealized fantasy of the separation of love not only from sexuality,
but also from physicality and from emotion. That is, it offers a vision
of love as a solitary masculine pursuit of self-perfection, a dream of
autonomy and mastery that stands in stark contrast to the subordinate
position of both the courtier and the traditional lover. While Platonic
love never caught on as a practice, as an idea it offered a comforting
alternative to the most frightening aspects of love in the early modern
imagination—its capriciousness and its capacity to subordinate sup-
posedly masculine reason to female and effeminized passion.
The Courtier is beautifully written, elegiac, and subtly nuanced. But
that is not what made it popular. As it circulated ever more broadly,
it was read and presented to readers not as a thoughtful and subtle
philosophical discourse, but as a list of precepts for correct or socially
effective behavior. Editors added lists of qualities the courtier should
possess, introduced printed marginalia to highlight particular points
of the argument, and generally enabled the reading of the text as a
reference work rather than a dialogue. The case of the Courtier is
emblematic, both of aristocratic efforts at self-definition, and of the
ways in which, through the medium of print, those very definitions
were immediately appropriated by a wider public. As with the later
conduct book Galateo, polyglot and indexed editions went out of their
way to make the text accessible to the broadest possible audience.75
The burgeoning book market and increased literacy ensured that aris-
tocratic ideologies could not be restricted to a social elite.
The second of the four books is Mario Equicola’s De Natura
d’amore [On the Nature of Love], an encyclopedic and convoluted
scholarly treatise first printed in Italian in 1525 and republished fre-
quently for a hundred years afterward, as well as being translated
into French.76 If the Courtier demonstrates the role played by love in
self-fashioning and social interaction, Equicola’s book can stand as a
testament to the importance of love in the intellectual world of the
sixteenth century. The six books of the De Natura address love from
24 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
Glaucon, and then the next day to an unnamed friend (this last is the
version recorded in the text). This is fourth-hand information at best,
and indeed, it is never explicitly asserted that either Diotima or Socrates
has actually experienced the vision of ideal Beauty she describes.
Neoplatonic theory provided an attractive or interesting or eccen-
tric idea of a way that sexual desire and spiritual fulfillment could be
reconciled. It was not a technique that could followed in any practical
way by any substantial number of people. Nonetheless it was an idea
that originated among an intellectual and courtly elite that then cir-
culated to a much broader reading public. And it influenced thinking
about love and sexuality even if it was not followed as a discipline or
broadly believed to be true.
again, and again, weeping and crying out. She does not look at him.
Three gentlemen witness the interaction. One, who is in love with the
woman, looks at her, and says to his friends:
You see what I can expect from my lady, who is so cruel that she not
only gives no alms to that poor naked wretch who is dying of hunger
and is begging of her so eagerly and so repeatedly, but she doesn’t
even send him away: so much does she enjoy seeing a man languish in
misery before her and implore her favor in vain.
One of his two friends replied: “That is not cruelty; it is this lady’s
tacit way of teaching you that she is never pleased with an importunate
suitor.”
The other answered: “Nay, it is a warning to signify that even though she
does not give what is asked of her, she still likes to be begged for it.”
There you see how the fact that the lady did not send the poor man
away gave rise to words of severe censure, modest praise, and of cutting
satire. (2.47)17
defines love as a solitary pursuit, and rejects the social in favor of the
individual. His speech is also, in subtle ways, a rejection of women,
and the threat of male debasement inherent in the love of women.
Bembo’s speech turns on the relation of love to masculinity. To
understand what is at stake in this relationship, one must look not just
at Bembo’s speech, but the volume as a whole. Castiglione’s Courtier
is a book that tries to define the indefinable, to put in writing things
impossible to speak about clearly: grace, sprezzatura, honor, love. All
these qualities benefit from being discussed, but not defined. Being
a courtier, or a lover, or simply a successful, admired person, is not
a matter of precepts. The dialogue form is essential to this enter-
prise, because only the give and take of conversation can express the
subtlety of the analysis.
Italy does not have, as she used to have, a manner of dress recognized
to be Italian. . . . Our having changed our Italian dress for that of
foreigners strikes me as meaning that all those for whose dress we
have exchanged our own are going to conquer us: which has proved
all too true, for by now there is no nation that has not made us its
prey. (2.26)
Gender Dynamics
Castiglione, of course, is much more overtly concerned with gender
issues than Machiavelli, particularly with power relations between
men and women. Indeed the very conditions of discussion in the
Courtier accentuate the differing power of women and men. Since
the Duke is sick and absent, the highest ranking person present is
the Duchess, but she chooses not to participate actively in the discus-
sion, preferring the role of spectator and auditor. Although her friend
Emilia moderates the discussion, the Duchess asks all the women to
be silent, and thus the speakers are all men. These arrangements, sim-
ple on the surface, create a complex and ambiguous power dynamic
throughout the conversation. The absence of the Duke allows a fan-
tasy of courtly autonomy, in which the male courtiers can speak in
relative freedom, as if what they said mattered. The silence of the
Duchess and the ladies allows a parallel fantasy of male autonomy,
in which the men can speak in relative freedom, as if they were not
answerable to women. But both these fantasies are negated from the
start, for though the Duke is absent, his wife in present, and despite
their silence, the ladies are listening. Like the woman importuned
by the beggar in the church, the male courtiers are constantly being
observed and judged.
The presence of the ladies does not stop the men from speaking
about women, or from speaking harshly of them. Throughout the
42 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
There are many who will blame me because I have asked women
to participate in these investigations, since women should confine
themselves to womanly duties rather than searching into these things.
But they don’t convince me. For unless they deny that women have
been given souls just as men have, I don’t know why women should be
forbidden any more than we are to find out what sort of a thing they
are or what one should avoid or pursue (3.1).29
The women in the Asolani do not always like what they hear. The
speech of Gismondo, who argues for the sensual pleasures of love, is
deeply undercut by the fact that, while praising the joys of a man’s
love for a woman, he alienates and offends all his female auditors.
Here, as in the Courtier, the fact that women are in the audience
changes the nature of the conversation. By staging a conversation
with women present, both Bembo and Castiglione ensure that even
a solitary male reader of their texts will have to think of the impact
of the discussion on women. This is a long way from having women
speak on an equal footing with men, and the “women” are, after
all, female characters in a male-authored text. But given the cultural
norms of humanist discourse in early modern Italy, imagining women
present at an intellectual discussion of politics, philosophy, and social
behavior marks a modest move toward gender inclusiveness. It is more
B a l d a s s a r e C a s t i g l i o n e ’s B O O K OF THE COURTIER 43
than either Ficino or Machiavelli would have done, and is a long way
from the Symposium.
Speaking of Love
It is only fitting that women should make up a large part of the audi-
ence for the discussions of the Courtier, for the conversation is rooted
in the supposedly feminine sphere of sexuality and love as much as in
the masculine sphere of war and politics. It is seldom remarked that
the Courtier begins not as a discussion of ideal courtly behavior, but
of gender relations, specifically relations of love and sexuality. 30 At the
opening of the volume, the nobles gather to choose a game for their
evening’s entertainment.31 All of their options draw on the tradition
of “dubbi amorosi”—fashionable questions about love.32 The first to
propose a pastime is Gaspare, who suggests that everyone should tell
the group a virtue and vice they would desire in their beloved (1.7).
Unico Aretino flirtatiously proposes that everyone should guess the
significance of an “s” shaped jewel the Duchess is wearing on her
forehead (1.9). Ottaviano says that, since lovers’ quarrels are inev-
itable, everyone should say for what reason they would want their
beloved angry with them (1.10). Bembo elaborates on this, asking
each person to say whether it is worse to displease one’s beloved or
to be displeased by her (1.11). The only proposal not dealing directly
with love is Cesare Gonzaga’s suggestion that everyone should say
what sort of folly they would choose to show in public, but even in
this case one of the group pipes up and says, “I am already a fool in
love” (1.8).
Love, it seems, is all these people want to discuss. And love is
assumed to be ubiquitous (at least at court): everyone, it seems, has
a “beloved” to talk about. The group also see love as something that
occurs only between men and women, although in early modern Italy
sexual relations between men were common33 —a fact that would
have been obvious to all the actual members of the court of Urbino,
but which is almost never alluded to in the Courtier.34 In the third
book, Giuliano de Medici argues that women are the motive for all
masculine cultural activity, the cause of dancing, music, poetry—“of
all the graceful activities that delight the world” (3.52).35 He not
only claims that all vernacular poetry expresses “sentiments inspired
by women,” he also makes the astonishing claim that the same is
true of Classical poetry in Greek and Latin. These characteriza-
tions are an implicit denial of a homoerotic masculine world, both
actual and literary, which was a major fact of cultural and social life
44 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
He who begins to love must also begin to please his beloved and to
comply entirely with her wishes, and by hers govern his own; and he
must see to it that his own desires serve her, and that his soul is like an
obedient handmaid. (3.63)
For all his purported martial skill, the Courtier is like a maiden
safeguarding her virginity, or a matron defending her good name.
The notion that a Courtier’s martial skill is primarily a matter of
reputation is, to say the least, problematic. Ludovico immediately
worries that some courtiers may build their reputations for valor “in
small things rather than great.” And though he insists that the true
Courtier will show courage under all circumstances, this stress on
reputation leads logically to the infamous passage in Book 2 where
the Courtier is advised to fight primarily where he will be seen to
best advantage by his prince (2.8). Although this tactic might gain
the Courtier some favor, it is definitely not a formula for delivering
Italy from the barbarians.
46 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
Bembo’s Speech
The notion that ideal, elite masculinity is a form of temperance,
almost beyond gender, finds its fullest elaboration in Bembo’s speech
on Neoplatonic love.44 Bembo’s speech attempts to make love safe by
purifying it, removing the taint of feminine sensuality and lower-class
aggression to formulate an empowering love free of sex and violence.
This is the opposite of Machiavelli’s notion that power is ultimately
sexual, and that sexuality is fundamentally violent.
When the Duchess commands Bembo to speak, she says that “a love
so happy that it brings with it neither blame nor displeasure . . . could
well be one of the most important and useful conditions that have
yet been attributed to [the Courtier]” (4.50). How is love useful?
As previously noted, Bembo’s speech marks a shift in the dialogue
from a debate about how the Courtier can best advise the Prince to
a discussion of how he can cultivate his awareness of divine beauty.
Philosophically, Bembo’s speech reworks the familiar Neoplatonic
B a l d a s s a r e C a s t i g l i o n e ’s B O O K OF THE COURTIER 49
person he initially loved and “will feel little esteem for what at first
he so greatly prized” (4.67). This abstraction and universalizing of
beauty allows Bembo to remove the feminine from love. The sexually
attractive beauty of female bodies becomes little esteemed, as does
the individual beauty of a woman’s character or virtue. Like the ideal
masculinity formulated for the Courtier, the disembodied, spiritual
Beauty that Bembo’s lover contemplates transcends both feminine
sensuality and lower-class masculine aggression. It is refined, spir-
itual, and calm. There is some question as to whether women are
capable of perceiving it (4.72–73).
Bembo’s idealization of love, removing the taint of materiality
from it, is also a way to masculinize it. It thus offers the courtiers a
way out of the troubling contradictions of their existence as talented
and ambitious servants. Love need not mean subjection to women,
or a surrender to violent, “lower” passions. But in masculinizing love,
Bembo has to also keep it from becoming homoerotic, and he does
this by rewriting the Platonic tradition to make it heterosexual. This
is, of course, a large departure from Ficino, Castiglione’s most impor-
tant source, and from Plato himself. In Ficino’s De amore 6.14, men’s
physical love of boys is specifically acknowledged and largely equated
with men’s physical love of women:
We must take care, using our words, . . . to avoid those . . . that are too
cutting. As where several had gathered in the house of one of their
friends who was blind in one eye, and when the blind man invited the
company to stay to dinner, all took their leave except one who said,
“I will stay with you because I see you have an empty place for one”;
and so saying he pointed with his finger to the empty socket. You see
this is too bitter and rude, for it wounded the man without any reason,
nor had the speaker first been wounded himself. (2.59)
Bembo may not be blind, but “keeping his eyes toward heaven, as if
in a daze,” he is no longer looking at the world around him (4.71).
Such a man does not deserve cutting words. So he is not refuted, only
teased.
Clearly, the table is a list of topics rather than a summary of the argu-
ment. It is a list of questions that tracks the subject of the conversa-
tion, but not the conclusions. For answers, the reader must consult
the text itself; the table of contents thus serves as an enticement to
read. Although this list focuses at times on some of the less promi-
nent portions of the argument, it is nonetheless a fairly comprehensive
review of the issues discussed. Drawing, perhaps, on the discussion
of the Court Lady in Book 3, there is a marked emphasis on noting
differences between men and women.
By contrast, the 1581 Spanish edition, published in Salamanca,
opens with a table of contents in which Bembo’s praise of Platonic
love is summarized in much less detail than in Dolce’s edition:
Chapter 6: Tells how the courtier, being old, can love without
hindrance.
Chapter 7: Tells how the perfect courtier can love very differently than
the common people do.63
56 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
multivalent text like the Courtier, where many opposing views are
presented by different speakers, and there is no one character who
reliably and consistently puts forward the views of the author. In the
absence of a strong authorial voice, the interpretation of the text can
be relatively easily dictated by an authoritative editor using marginal
glosses. Passages like this make clear that from the point of view of
the Counter-reformation Church, Bembo’s attempt to purify love
from taints of effeminacy and subordination was simply untenable.
For Cicciarelli, sexual desire and physical attraction are not worth
transmuting or debating—they are just filth to be wiped clean.
The index of Cicciarelli’s volume follows Dolce’s closely, but
whereas in unexpurgated editions the printed marginal notes corre-
spond precisely to the index entries, this is not the case for many of
Cicciarelli’s lengthy annotations in Book 4—they are printed in the
margins of the text, but do not appear in the volume’s index. Thus
while “correcting” the text’s heretical Platonism in the volume’s mar-
gins, Cicciarelli takes care not to draw attention to it in his index.
The Courtier first appeared in English in a 1561 translation by Sir
Thomas Hoby.
Compared to the multitude of Italian and French editions, Hoby’s
English translation had a relatively modest print history. It was
reprinted in 1588 as part of John Wolfe’s polyglot edition, and again
in 1603.70 But the Courtier also circulated in England in a Latin edi-
tion translated by Bartholomew Clerke, first published in 1571 with
subsequent editions in 1577 (twice), 1585, 1593, 1603, and 1612.71
Hoby’s English edition has neither a table of contents, nor an index,
but it does have printed marginal notes. Bembo’s speech in Book 4
is fairly lightly annotated, and certainly the annotations do not call
attention to anything unorthodox or provocative in the passage.
Like many early modern printed marginal annotations, they point to
curiosities or passages of general knowledge in the text rather than
marking the development of an argument. The brief passage from
Bembo’s speech describing the solar system (4.58), for example, gets
the following notes in quick succession: “The worlde; The heaven;
The earth; The sonne; The moone; The planettes.” The following
passage, in which Bembo elaborates on the notion that human beings
are a microcosm reflecting the larger universal structures of the mac-
rocosm is glossed as follows: “Man; Aristot. 8 Phisic; Foules; Trees;
Shippes; Buildinges; The rouffe [roof] of houses.” These notes call
attention to things mentioned in the text, but a reader scanning the
marginal notes would have no idea of the philosophical idea being
advanced—that beauty in everything from the solar system to a house
B a l d a s s a r e C a s t i g l i o n e ’s B O O K OF THE COURTIER 59
M a r io E qu ic ol a’s D E N A T U R A
D ’A M O R E : L ov e a n d K now l e dge
adult lover has too much power over the adolescent beloved. And
despite his strong reliance on Classical authority, Equicola also makes
one of the first attempts to establish a canon of modern vernacular
love poetry.
These controversial and at times strikingly modern notions suggest
that far from being arid, Equicola’s text is extraordinarily fertile. In the
mass of opinions and information that constitute Equicola’s volume it
is easy to miss the iconoclastic views that sometimes emerge. But, as
the publishing history of the volume reveals, readers were encouraged
to approach the text discontinuously, treating it as a reference work
rather than a sequential argument building from beginning to end.
Such an approach builds on Equicola’s notion that truth is multiple
and all its disparate pieces must be collected and gathered together,
despite their contradictions and apparent incoherence.
they grow, they age, they die.”15 Equicola ascribes the obvious social
inequality between men and women not to any essential weakness in
women, but to social structures that enforce women’s subordination
to men. His attitude to this injustice is instructive. While he does
not endorse the situation, neither does he offer any solution or sug-
gest that any change is possible. As we shall see in key passages of the
De Natura, this technique of quiet, well-reasoned, practical criticism
that stops short of endorsing any alteration in the status quo is typical
of Equicola.
Refreshing as Equicola’s commonsense egalitarianism may be to
modern readers, one should not necessarily conclude that his defense
of women in De Mulieribus constitutes his own strong opinion on
the subject. Lacking aristocratic birth and influential family connec-
tions, Equicola was deeply invested in his identity as a courtier—a
highly skilled and sophisticated servant. His many surviving letters
provide a detailed record of his service first to the Cantelmos, then
to Isabella d’Este and the Gonzaga family.16 His scholarly work was
frequently devoted to the praise of his patrons: his history of Mantua,
the Chronica di Mantua (1521), is a fulsome praise of the ruling
Gonzagas. He also wrote a genealogy of Isabella’s family, the d’Este;
a historical work praising their rule in Ferrara; and a Latin account
celebrating Isabella’s pilgrimage to Provence in 1517.17 Working for
female patrons, Equicola was bound to praise femininity.
In the manuscript draft of the fifth book of De Natura d’amore
Equicola matter-of-factly endorses the need for courtiers to flatter
their superiors, especially in public:
I believe God made women not otherwise than men, and not of another
nature than men. It is written that women are docile, and have much
better memories than men, and that they are good advisors. They are
rational, they have an immortal soul, they are capable of blessedness.
Friend Mario, if you’ve brought nothing with you but that little volume
there that you wrote on the nature of love, I absolutely have to tell you
that you’ve sweated in vain. You’ve labored to show the world the very
nature of love that everyone knows already. . . . I assure you that if had
you spent your time usefully, writing on the nature of hatred instead,
you would have earned one of the principal places in my Senate. 27
sweethearts alike. While sections of the work were edited and pub-
lished in Italian in the 1980s,29 the last complete publication of the
Natura de amore was in 1626 and no modern edition of the complete
text exists. An edition by Laura Ricci of the autograph manuscript of
1509–1511 was published in 1999.30 The Natura de amore has never
been translated into English.
Equicola’s opus is divided into six books: each dealing with a dif-
ferent aspect of love:
Describing the book in this way makes it seem more coherent than it
is: The Books do not actually have titles, and these descriptive head-
ings merely represent my own best summary of the disparate materi-
als contained in each. The volume is encyclopedic in scope, but not
in organization. Authorities are referred to, but there is seldom any
context: Plato says one thing; Ovid says another; Avicenna offers a
third opinion; and Equicola makes little attempt to synthesize or even
relate ideas to each other. Consequently, the text is thoroughly contra-
dictory and repetitive. In the sixth book, for example, in a discussion
on the value of temperance, Equicola uses Alexander the Great as a
negative example: “He would not have erupted in such outrageous
murders of friends if wine had not taken his prudence from him.”31
On the very next page, listing paragons of temperance, Equicola
includes Alexander here too:
Alexander the Great has been praised for giving his beloved Campaspe
to the famous Apelles.32 Oh Alexander, such a great spirit in feats of
war, but greater still for having the wisdom to be able to command
himself.33
Therefore, friends and readers, since I have wearied myself to put forth
choice foods for you . . . know that those I have prepared were found
and diligently gathered in the fields of philosophy and theology, and
that they have been variously garnished by my tentative investigations
in the meadows of oratory and the groves of poetry. So I hope such a
garden will not be without pleasure. . . . But . . . I thought it best to put
forth first the opinions of some writers on Love who have appeared
before the public, and to let you taste the extracted juice of their
works, not as we read the oration of Lysis in Plato, in order to see all
its errors, nor as in Aristotle we encounter many opinions simply to
refute them, but so that no one will be deprived of their due praise,
and in accordance with my own nature, which has always been far
from ill-will and envy.34
divides love in three: sexual love, love of visual beauty, and love of
beautiful sounds. And so on. Equicola makes no effort to reconcile
these different systems or even to relate them to each other. At the
chapter’s conclusion, he endorses a division he ascribes to Pythagoras:
love is either heavenly or human. He gives no reason for this choice,
except to suggest it is simplest (“brevissima”). Heavenly love consists
of the love of God and the Angels for mankind and for each other. All
other love is human. Human love, is then divided into natural (love of
God, self-love, love of parents for children) and accidental. Accidental
love is honorable (love of virtue, love of good works, and love that is
proper) or dishonorable (love of sensual pleasure). These divisions are
not justified in any way or explained at any length. And they are not
followed in any systematic way throughout the rest of the volume.
Indeed, at points, Equicola praises the senses and says that all love
has pleasure as its object, directly contradicting the idea here that all
sensual love is dishonorable.
Of course, Equicola does at times have opinions. And there are
some ideas he disapproves of. But such disagreements, he says, are an
inevitable condition of the search for truth.
Then strait arose a wicked race of deceivers, who as that story goes of
the Ægyptian Typhon with his conspirators, how they dealt with the
good Osiris, took the virgin Truth, hewd her lovely form into a thou-
sand peeces, and scatter’d them to the four winds. From that time ever
since, the sad friends of Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the care-
full search that Isis made for the mangl’d body of Osiris, went up and
down gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them. We have
not yet found them all, . . . nor ever shall doe, till her Masters second
comming; he shall bring together every joynt and member, and shall
mould them into an immortall feature of lovelines and perfection.36
The list mixes lyric and narrative poets with philosophers, and
major cultural figures like Petrarch and Bembo with friends of the
author, like the little-known Battista Carmelita. But it is remarkable
on several accounts: While most early modern treatises on love begin
implicitly or explicitly with Plato, this is a list comprised entirely of
modern writers—no classical authorities. As such, it is one of the ear-
liest attempts to define a canon of postclassical authorities on love.
The list is ecumenical in regard to the type of love being writ-
ten about. Some of the authors, like Ficino and Bembo, write out
of a classical, Neoplatonic tradition; others, like Jean de Meun, are
working with medieval concepts of courtly love. Some praise love,
others attack it. In no way is the list exhaustive. It does not list all the
important poets or philosophers in any of the traditions under con-
sideration. There is no mention here of the renowned Provençal poet
Arnaut Daniel, for example, praised by Dante as “il miglior fabbro,”38
and called “gran maestro d’amor” by Petrarch in the Triumph of Love
(4.41). Nor is it a list of the authors Equicola will refer to most fre-
quently in his own study.39 Indeed, Equicola claims his own theories
are entirely supported with references to classical authorities, not
modern writers (sig. A4r). Although Equicola insists he will exclude
from his consideration authors who merely wallow in their own emo-
tions rather than exploring the nature of love (sig. A4r), he neither
provides a justification of his methodology in compiling the list nor
a summary of what the list might or might not be intended to mean.
He attacks Petrarchism but praises Petrarch.
To refer to the names as a “list” is misleading in itself, if it sug-
gests that each of these figures is dealt with similarly, in the mode of
a modern encyclopedia entry. There is no uniformity whatever to the
discussions of the various authors. The chapter on Guittone d’Arezzo,
for example, says almost nothing about Guittone himself, but instead
gives an allegorical reading of the figure of Cupid (this does not stop
Equicola from devoting an entire chapter to Cupid in Book 2 that
makes no reference to the discussion here). The chapter on Bembo
provides a lengthy account of various literary rivalries and jealousies
to preface the remark that Bembo has been criticized for writing in
Tuscan rather than his native dialect (sig. C6v–C7v). The entry on the
renowned Cavalcanti is barely a page and a half long; the entry on the
relatively obscure Battista Carmelita is twice that length.
74 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
own definitions as well. Some say love is a disease, but how can that be
since diseases are against nature and it has been established on good
authority that love is a natural phenomenon? There is difference of
opinion over which organ in the body is the seat of love: heart, brain,
liver, spleen, or genitals. Given the dizzying number of contradictory
ideas, it is not surprising that Equicola ends by comparing himself to
a lost sailor whose ship is far from the sight of land, “desiring solid
ground, weighing the dangers, cursing the first inventor of boats,”
and saying, “Thus I will voluntarily withdraw from my definition of
love, and if I have not been able to bring her into port, it is enough
to have brought her up on the beach” (sig. K3r). There are not many
moments when Equicola shows signs of ironic self-awareness, but this
seems to be one of them.
Whatever love may be or not be, Equicola asserts that it is universal:
everyone desires something. Immediately after identifying love as the
Platonic “desire for the good, which one wants to possess forever,”
Equicola turns the definition on his head by specifying that there are,
in fact, innumerable desires for innumerable “good” things: “Desire
is multiple, a body with many heads, and changes its name accord-
ing to its object. Concerning food and wine it is called gluttony and
drunkeness.”41 Equicola’s willingness to equate love with any sort of
physical desire—even the desire for intoxication—constitutes a fun-
damental rejection of the Platonic formula he has just asserted. Is this
rejection deliberate? It is hard to think otherwise, but Equicola never
admits the contradiction exists.
Toward the end of his discussion of affect, Equicola concludes that
all love can be reduced to self-love: “if we do not wish to dissimulate
and quibble, we will confess that for the most part we love others
because of the love and benevolence we have for ourselves.”42 This is
a claim that comes up again and again throughout the De Natura—
that “self-love is the father, progenitor, author and creator not only of
every desire, but of every motion and action.”43
In typical fashion, Equicola begins his treatment of this idea not
by praising self-love, but by condemning it. He sees self-love as the
root cause of idolatry: ancient societies worshipped animals and forces
of nature because they were perceived as useful to self-preservation,
“Nothing so encouraged the worship of false gods and the rejection
of true religion than blind self-love”44 But if self-love is the cause of
idolatry, it also the source of civilization. Self-love encourages com-
munity, Equicola asserts, because living in a society makes life easier
and more secure. We make friendships for the same reason—for self-
preservation. Thus paradoxically, he argues, it is our love of ourselves
76 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
that is at the root of our attachment to others. Even the love of parents
for children, Equicola suggests, is based primarily on self-interest
(sig. G1v). So is patriotism, which comes from a desire to gain honor
by advancing one’s nation—and thus oneself. Equicola’s argument
culminates with the claim (which he attributes to Saint Augustine)
that the greatest evidence of self-love is religious martyrdom, because
those who choose to die for their faith are actively seeking their own
salvation, and what greater love of self could there be than that? “He
who loves himself,” Equicola states, “is a lover of God.”45 Augustinian
or not,46 this idea once again sets Platonism on its head: for Diotima in
the Symposium the true lover loves only spiritual Truth and Beauty—
all other affection is subordinate to that spiritual joy. For Equicola, we
love primarily ourselves, and if we love God it is because we are wise
enough to desire our own salvation above transient physical pleasures.
In this view, love is fundamentally pragmatic rather than idealist.
Equicola’s chapters on Venus and Cupid are compendia of con-
flicting information—mythological stories, astrological significances,
catalogues of attributes. The style, as always, is magnificently digres-
sive: a discussion of the astrological sign Libra, for example, shifts
effortlessly into a survey of conflicting explanations for why Syrians
are said not to eat fish (sig. H4r). Even Equicola may have sensed he
went too far: after concluding the chapter on Cupid, he writes,
The object of desire is the good, and as we find diverse kinds of goods,
so too there are diverse kinds of desire. Love is a kind of desire, for that
good that we call beauty.50
Love has now become not a separate category from desire, but a sub-
set of it—and a very limited one. How love as a desire for beauty
relates to the notion that all love is love of oneself is left unclear.
Equicola ends his second book with a section defining beauty, but
this does nothing to resolve the question.
M a r i o E q u i c o l a’s D E N A T U R A D ’A M O R E 77
being could think about would be itself.55 Equicola argues that while
God loves all creation, he loves humans most of all, even above the
angels (sig. M6r). Equicola’s discussion of angelic love deals primar-
ily with the notion that God assigns a guardian angel to each human
soul to aid and protect them—a very loving thing to do.
The section on humanity’s love for God begins with a praise of
ethics, “the mother of every good action,”56 and then proceeds to yet
another discussion of the four Classical virtues: Fortitude, Prudence,
Temperance, and Justice; Equicola argues that Justice is the greatest
and most necessary of the four. But eventually, he returns again to the
idea of self-love, which he presents as fundamental to a love for God
and to faith itself:
Man loves himself first, for his own well-being. Through faith, he
then comes to love God, not because God is God, but out of his own
self-interest. Afterwards, through reading, meditation, prayer, and
contemplation, he loves God and, through God, loves himself.57
The love of humanity for God subsumes all forms of human love:
God is loved as a friend, a father, even as a wife,
We love God as a man loves his life, having our being from him: and
not only our being, but our well-being. We love him like a friend,
never having ever had a better friend because he gave his life for us,
and that is the greatest charity. We love him like a father because he is
our progenitor; we love him like a wife.58
Someone who does not love God cannot know how to love their neigh-
bor: and someone who does not love his neighbor, whom he sees, how
can he love God, whom he does not see?60
M a r i o E q u i c o l a’s D E N A T U R A D ’A M O R E 79
Jesus did not command inordinate charity. We will observe his man-
date if first we love more than all other things that which is above us,
then that which we are ourselves, that which is close to us, then that
which is beneath us.61
Some say that there are four kinds of love: the love of husband and
wife; of parents and children; of the lover and beloved; and the
fourth, greater than all others, that of the body and the soul, that
is, love of oneself. We love our parents because they are our authors;
we love our brothers because they are almost like other versions of
ourselves; our children, because they are part of us; many times we
love friends as much as brothers because we cannot do everything for
ourselves. In a particular affair one person will be more useful than
another.62
Equality, conformity of will, and honest customs are the solid basis
of friendship, although every friendship has its true origin and is sus-
tained not by similarity, but by contraries. We see the poor man friends
with the rich one, the sick man with the doctor, the ignorant man with
the wise man. Euripedes affirms that the dry earth loves the humid,
cold loves heat, sour loves sweet, and emptyness loves fullness.64
80 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
This unorthodox idea does not stand for long before Equicola con-
tradicts it yet again, pointing out that true friendship must be based
on virtue and similarity—though, following Aristotle, he also sug-
gests that such virtuous relationships are so rare as to be nonexistent
(sig. O6v). Of course, friendships based on contraries (the patient
befriends the doctor) are simply utilitarian (the patient wants to be
cured). But Equicola has already implied that all relationships are util-
itarian since they are all based on self-love. We choose the friends we
need to advance ourselves in some way. We love others because they
remind us of ourselves. We love God because we love ourselves and
He will save us. Self-interest will trump virtue every time. Machiavelli
would agree.
sex between men and women must be fundamentally good. All of this
discussion draws on the notion from Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius
of Tyana that the world is a hermaphroditic animal that sexually gen-
erates life, which Equicola previously quoted in Book 3, though in
typical fashion he does not draw attention to the connection.
In the course of this discussion, Equicola defines “natural” as “that
which pleases nature”—in other words, the natural is that which is
pleasurable (though not excessively so). This is a definition he refers
to again at various other points—for example, in Book 5 he claims
that love is natural, whereas hate is unnatural.65 If pleasure is natural,
then pain is a sign that something unnatural is occurring. Nature is
thus defined not as the processes of the material world, untouched
by human technology, but as something very close to “health.” If
we take “natural” as meaning “pleasurable,” or “healthy,” Equicola’s
next contention makes more sense. He argues that sexual attraction
should always be for someone who reciprocates the affection—for
there is no suffering worse than unrequited love. And love cannot be
compelled by force.
This observation leads Equicola, quite precipitously, into his only
extended discussion of homoeroticism. Given his concern to appear
orthodox and uncontroversial, it is not surprising that Equicola is
outspoken in his condemnation of homosexual relations. But though
Equicola duly indicts homoeroticism as aberrant and forbidden by
God, his primary criticism is that homoerotic relationships are unnat-
ural because they are not reciprocal. Equicola never imagines mutual
and pleasurable consensual sex between men or between women; he
assumes that all homoerotic relations consist of a pederastic relation
between an adult and a youth, a model that would have been familiar
to him from Classical writing as well as contemporary Italian practice.66
He then argues that homoeroticism is unacceptable because it con-
stitutes a exploitative relation in which the younger partner is bound
to resent the older one: “Let us eradicate sex with boys, where the
passive person loathes the active one” (33).67 In Equicola’s view, ped-
erastic relationships—whether involving citizen youths, slaves, or
servants—constitute what we would now call child abuse. It is telling
that in Book 6, when discussing cruel pleasures, Equicola equates
“masculine Venus” with eating one’s children.68
In Book 4, he makes an explicit analogy between pederasts and
tyrants:
We see that the masculine Venus is a selfish act, a shame which makes
a man a woman; and it is clear that this love that lovers intemperately
82 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
bear towards young men is tyrannical. For, while a king rules accord-
ing to the law, a tyrant rules against the law, for his own benefit, not
the public good.69
Equicola quotes a saying from Plutarch’s Life of Solon: The law is like
a spiderweb—it catches the weak and does not disturb the mighty.70
Just as the powerful often disregard human laws, so too may they
ignore the laws of nature. This freedom, Equicola says, leads to “the
unnatural love of boys and concubines.”
In early modern discourse it is usually the passive partner in anal
sex who is seen as more shameful, for his body has been penetrated,
and this penetration was thought to transform him from a man to
a woman. But Equicola places greater blame on the active partner,
who is acting selfishly and cruelly, taking his own pleasure and not
caring what pain he causes: He expands on the point by drawing on
Socrates’s critique of pederastic relationships from Plato’s Phaedrus,
Socrates loved only the spirit? He didn’t love the body? Why didn’t he
love Theatetus? Why not Ctesiphon? Because he looked like a mon-
key. Why didn’t he love Ctesiphonte? Because he was pale. Why did
he not love Aristodemus? Because he was deformed. Whom did he
love? Those adorned with beautiful hair whose beautiful faces and eyes
commended them. (35)
Of the senses, some consider the principal is touch. Each sense has its
own element: sight, water; hearing, air; smell, fire; taste, earth. If it were
permitted to me (if only the arrogance of those who pay more attention
to words than to anything else, did not restrain me), I would say that
touch corresponded to all those celestial parts that Plato called “aether”
and Aristotle called “the fifth element.” But because I don’t want to
give slanderers a reason to demonstrate their malicious nature, I will say
(following common opinion) that touch corresponds to the dregs of the
earth; [but] in its praise, that we believe that this [sense] alone is neces-
sarily given for life. We see that the other senses are given us by nature to
ornament our existence. This is given as a necessity for existence.79
What need is there for smell? What need is there for taste or touch?
These senses perceive odors, flavors, heat, cold, softness and hard-
ness, and similar things. None of these is human beauty since they
are simple forms, whereas the beauty of the human body requires a
harmony of different parts.”83
While in respect of all the other senses we fall below many species
of animals, in respect of touch we far excel all other species in exact-
ness of discrimination. That is why man is the most intelligent of all
animals.85
puts forward the notion that just as the other four senses correspond
to the four elements, so touch, as the primary sense, corresponds to
“the fifth element” or what Plato referred to in the Timaeus as aether.
Equicola gets the idea that there are five, not four, elements from the
Life of Apollonius of Tyana by Philostratus (3.34)—the same passage
he drew on earlier for the notion that the world is a hermaphroditic
animal that generates life by having sex with itself. In Plato the aether
is the “brightest” part of the lightest element, air,92 but in the more
developed Aristotelian cosmology, aether is the eternal, and unchang-
ing substance out of which the heavens are made.93 Aristotle defines it
as “some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior
to them all, and more divine than they.”94
How can Equicola compare touch, the most material and earthy of
the senses to the most refined and purified element? In part, because
aether is incorruptible. Equicola does not argue that touch is incor-
ruptible, but rather that when it is corrupted, life can no longer be
sustained:
If the other senses are corrupted, the entire animal does not suffer
corruption; if touch is corrupted, life fails, and without life the animal
can neither exist nor endure. Without touch the human race and other
perfected animals would cease.
Chastity and abstinence are praiseworthy, and are always in every age
laudable, holy things. But as a writer I can only say what the situation
requires. And thus, I say that abstinence and too much retention [of
sperm] generates sadness and infirmity. . . . Philosophers say that many
accidents befall women if, when their genital parts desire to con-
ceive, these women do not have their will. They say that the senses
are clouded, and entire body is corrupted. . . . We read that Diogenes,
(a very strict and contented man) used Venus many times, feeling that
retention of seed was harming him.” 99
90 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
polished, and efficient. Both thrive on the same three virtues: mod-
esty, mildness, and urbanity.104
Equicola’s brief discussion of the relation of love and hate stresses
that although they are opposites, love is fundamentally unstable and
can quickly change into hate:
Hate gains strength quickly and grows quickly, and does not eas-
ily change into love. Love is a plant that grows strong slowly, can be
uprooted quickly, and easily changes into hate.105
Given this instability, the maintenance of love and favor is all the
more crucial. A lover (or courtier) must assiduously cultivate those
around him so that he attracts as much benevolence as possible.
After this brief introduction, the first half of Book 5 is taken up
with a long chapter on “Virtue, Diligence, Ways and Arts to attract
Benevolence”—how to foster love and avoid hatred.106 Equicola
begins by asserting that everyone has free will—and thus can choose
to make themselves more loveable. Temperament is not ultimately
determined by climate or other external factors, and whatever our
temperament, we can all choose to improve our behavior through
education.
Though beauty is useful in attracting others, it is not necessary,
nor does it have any moral significance:
see, involves debasement. Only by rejecting pride can one learn its
opposite: Humanità:
A detailed history of the custom of doffing one’s hat ensues (sig. V3v).
Just as there are three worthwhile activities and three ways to
practice Humanità, so Equicola says there are three necessary virtues
for courtiers: Modesty, Mildness, and Urbanity (sig. V3v). Modesty
is not simply an absence of pride—it also consists in using polite
euphemisms to speak of shameful necessities such as sex: “Many
things that we do lawfully, like generating children, are dishonor-
able to name, and we should avoid dishonor in all our discourses,”
says Equicola primly.111 Mildness consists in maintaining a placid
and tranquil demeanor, and never being disturbed by anger in the
presence of others (sig. V5r). Urbanity is the ability to converse pleas-
antly and mildly, without giving offense or saying anything sharp or
biting (sig. V5v). Following all three, one will doubtless be as pleas-
ant as possible.
Not to put too fine a point on it, in Equicola’s view, the key to being
a successful lover or courtier is to be an obsequious flatterer. The
satirist Pietro Aretino famously adopted as his motto a Latin saying
from Terence: Veritas odium parit [The truth brings forth hatred]. By
doing so, Aretino shrewdly represented himself as a fearless speaker
of truth—and all those who disagreed with him or attacked him
were cast as impotent hateful people, enraged by Aretino’s honesty.
Equicola too quotes this motto from Terence, but he takes precisely
the opposite lesson from it:
If perhaps someone who thinks too much of himself finds these mat-
ters frivolous, and believes that in these sections I’ve filled my pages
with gossip, and because of this thinks I have erred in not having
understood what is fitting to such a volume, I say to him that if I have
erred, I have erred with Plato, Aristotle, Marcus Tullius [Cicero] and
Quintilian, whose opinions I have freely espoused here, not because
they are necessary for the naively educated, but because they are use-
ful to those who, like mushrooms that sprang up overnight are naked
of learning, and who wish to pass among elegant lovers as if they were
the most elegant of all. Thus trained, my young man will be able to
woo his beloved lady with diligent obsequiousness, and place himself
in voluntary servitude, and ensure that his service matches the desires
of the one he serves. He will anticipate her thoughts. For nothing in
love is more effective than servitude.116
There is no use at all in writing notes on twelve laurel leaves, and then
eating them with olive roots and dittany mixed with genital seed.118
Flee those who are too passionate, the cunning and suspicious, and not
less those who are too credulous and proud, and those who disdain to
serve, because they are base [villani] and have no judgement. Those who
are wise know that to serve a woman is true freedom, and courtesy, not
servitude: He who does not know how to love cannot serve.121
The way [Provençal poets] described their love was new and differed
from that of ancient Latin writers. Latin poets wrote openly of things
96 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
Let [the courtier] be practiced also in writing verse and prose, espe-
cially in our own vernacular; . . . in this way he will never want for
pleasant entertainment with the ladies, who are usually fond of such
things. (1.44)
And as a courtier of Isabella d’Este, Equicola was well aware that the
benevolence of noble women could bring rewards more material than
amorous affection.
Human life has three aspects: The first is regulated and governed by
art; let us call it “effective.” The second is “prudence,” and is domi-
nated by the moral virtues. Let us place in the third those who are
dedicated to knowledge, adorned with wisdom, aware of the excel-
lence of the intellect. Of the first, the end is utility, of the next it is
honor and reputation. The end of the third is the ultimate contempla-
tion of honorable and divine things. Of all the end is pleasure, which is
embraced by both the political and the contemplative arts.124
If anyone denies that the end of these desires and activities is pleasure,
he is without doubt the stupidest man imaginable, who understands
neither himself nor others.126
Pleasure is the reward and goal of self-love, which Equicola has repeat-
edly asserted to be the ground of all human affection. But Equicola’s
Aristotelian praise of pleasure here is not simply a celebration of the
physical. He immediately attempts to link it to the Platonic ascent to
divine love:
Thus we can conclude that man in all his effects and actions cannot
think or do other than to love himself, and of this love the ultimate
end is pleasure. This being the case, we would like for our own satis-
faction to say some things about this pleasure, . . . because we hope by
this wide path to be able to attain divine love, which is . . . the perfect
state and ultimate perfection of man.127
Indeed, whatever Equicola may have said about the virtues of touch
in Book 4, he goes on here to reject sensual pleasure all together, say-
ing categorically that “false pleasures come from the senses.”128 But
as so often in Equicola, this bold assertion is immediately undercut
by the observation that pleasures associated with sustaining life, such
as eating and sex are spiritual as well as purely physical:
Some pleasures are corporeal, but appertain equally to the body and
the spirit, such as eating or the work of generating children: these
pleasures cannot be wholly bodily, because all such pleasure comes
from sense, and sense does not operate except through the spirit.129
Love God, for that is the ultimate good, and the ultimate good is
nothing other than ultimate pleasure.130
Eat to live, do not live to eat. Anyone always devoted to their gul-
let will be incapable of great thoughts. We ought to use the sense
of touch as much as necessary to render our debt to nature and the
obligations hidden in that contract. Otherwise strong and robust men
will become effeminate and enervated. Thus, let us love ourselves and
if the end of love is pleasure let us embrace temperance and modera-
tion, the conservers of health and they will give us the pleasure we
desire. The purpose of true love and of all love and of all action and
all mortal work should be that end that leads us to consider that by
the benefit of this health we can long enjoy the integral pleasures of
the senses and in honest pleasure and translate our life into glory and
honor.131
Plato concludes that man is nothing but a rational animal who merely
uses his body. . . . So anyone who wants to know himself must know his
spirit . . . the divine part of ourselves. . . . The way of sensual pleasure is
easy and clear, but it will lead you to an abrupt fall, deep darkness and
eternal oblivion.133
If you hope to live happily at court, think of the jealous informers and
detractors who live there—slander without end. And to briefly under-
stand all the adversity and unhappiness that are at court, note that
most princes judge by what they hear, and often the one who pleases is
rewarded, not the deserving and faithful servant.134
This jaundiced view of courts and princes does not stop him from
reaffirming the volume’s dedication to Isabella d’Este in a conclud-
ing note.
Lorenzo Savino ends his 1915 summary of Equicola’s De Natura
d’amore by saying acerbically, “The sigh of relief breathed by the
reader at this point is the best comment on Equicola’s book.”135
There is no doubt the text is frustrating, confusing, verbose, and
contradictory. But it was also useful. The proof of this lies in the
many editions published in the hundred years after the text’s first
publication in 1525.
Many years ago, this present book by Mario Equicola on the nature of
love was published by its author. Since it was a work full of beautiful
M a r i o E q u i c o l a’s D E N A T U R A D ’A M O R E 101
A n t on io Tagl i e n t e’s
O P E R A A M O R O S A : L ov e a n d
L e t t e rw r i t i ng
H amlet, it seems, woos Ophelia with letters. The details are some-
what unclear. She tells her father Polonius that Hamlet has given her
“many tenders of his affection” (1.3.99–100), and has “importuned”
her “with love in honorable fashion” (1.3.110–111) but neither phrase
necessarily refers to letters. Later she attempts to return “remem-
brances” Hamlet gave her and, when he denies giving them, she
protests, “you know right well you did / And with them words of so
sweet breath composed / As made the things more rich” (3.1.96–98).
Again, she may not be referring to letters. The remembrances could
be tokens of some sort; the words, though “composed,” are made of
“sweet breath,” spoken, not written.
106 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
I warrant he hath a thousand of these letters, writ with blank space for
different names—sure, more, and these are of the second edition. He
will print them, out of doubt—for he cares not what he puts into the
press. (2.1.74–78)
A n t o n i o T a g l i e n t e ’s O P E R A A MOROSA 107
You are young, beautiful, rich, modest, virtuous, humane, filled with
good manners and all the other attributes one can think of, in hap-
piness and wealth of spirit and body. In me, truly, everything is the
opposite. I am now old, and those burning flames of false love that
used to have power over me now lie extinct. You see I am . . . unworthy
of such a man” (sig. B8v).14
On one hand the sweet pleasures and other lascivious little games of
Venus press me to accept you, not only under my roof, but also in my
breast, in my eyes, in my lap. But on the other hand I see a thousand
horrible frightening images, for I feel certain that the first time I lie
closely with you I will immediately become pregnant, something I
dread above anything. Not because I would regret carrying such a dear
weight for your love, but from my great fear of my old uncle and my
other relatives who would rather see me cast out in exile or dead and
buried. Now you know all my reasons.17
But after a few more letters, and money given by Clemente to bail her
son out of jail, Madonna Ariana is more accommodating:
letters of condolence. These do the trick. (sig. C4v). The right letter,
it seems, can be just as persuasive as money.
Most traditional love letters are letters of supplication—like
Messer Iacintho writing to Madonna Cesarina, the male lover begs
his beloved for her favor. But of course the supplication is often purely
rhetorical: The male speaker is usually in a superior social position—
certainly in terms of gender, often in terms of class, wealth or status
as well. He begs only because it is an effective rhetorical strategy to
get what he wants. In Tagliente’s volume, however, not all the letters
are written by wealthy, privileged young men. Instead, eloquent and
rhetorically effective letters become a means for socially inferior writ-
ers to gain the upper hand—to express their views and even to achieve
their goals.
The clearest indication in the Opera amorosa that love is seen as a
potentially ennobling emotion comes in a letter in which a common
man woos a noblewoman (sig. B4r). Sisto Barbiere, a 30-year-old,
handsome, articulate household servant 20 from Barletta, writes to
Madonna Vittorina, Contessa di Franchi. He begins by writing:
She replies that his tender feelings show that he has an innate nobility:
The double entendres in the Countess’ reply slyly suggest that social
mobility may be facilitated by sexual endowment as much as fine sen-
timent, but the general upward social trajectory comes through all
the same.
There are several other letters written by poor or low-status men
to women above their station. Martiano da Milano, an impover-
ished 24-year-old law student (but handsome and well mannered)
writes a love letter to Madonna Sabina, Countess of Chiari (C7v).
Messer Lissandro, a rich merchant from Lucca, tries to get the favor
114 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
social condition. We shall attempt to show that our love is very hon-
orable. As a last resort, with great show of humility we shall beg that
if she can in no way deign to give her love in return, she will at least
resign herself to being loved without prejudice to herself; we shall add
that if this request is not granted, we are resolved to cut short a cruel
life by whatever means possible. Examples of these precepts may be
found in Ovid and the other poets who concern themselves with this
subject.38
Here Erasmus sees the writing of love letters not as the outpouring
of true feelings, or even as a necessary social ritual, but rather as an
intellectual exercise—a challenge. The goal is as much to create a
character as it is to communicate a desire.
The notion that letters are above all stylistic exercises designed
to create a convincing persona is consistent with Erasmus’s general
approach to letter writing. Although his own letters may have high-
lighted his individuality as a writer and humanist scholar,41 the exer-
cises that Erasmus recommends for students tend to be far removed
from everyday sixteenth-century life. Pupils should practice letter writ-
ing frequently and model their writings after “the stories of the poets
or the historians,” writing as “Nestor urging Achilles to bear nobly
Agamemnon’s seizure of Briseis” or “Cicero encouraging Milo to bear
exile with a brave heart.”42 Though Erasmus concedes that students
could also write on “some novelty . . . provided by contemporary events,”
the assignments all require the boys to write letters from a point of
view distant from their own lives and experiences. They are to imag-
ine themselves old men like Nestor, or learned politicians like Cicero.
Letters are literary compositions first and foremost. They should be
“conversational” in tone, but that does not mean they should be like
ordinary speech. And they should center on the creation of the persona
of the writer—which is not at all the same thing as self-expression.43
A n t o n i o T a g l i e n t e ’s O P E R A A MOROSA 119
While writing letters from the point of view of a cajoling suitor might
be of some use to the boys later in life, practicality is clearly not the
issue here. Once again the boys are encouraged not to express their
own feelings, but to imagine the feelings of those far removed from
them—to write as older women facing situations schoolboys might
find hard to comprehend: Helen of Troy attempting to dissuade Paris
from carrying her off, or Penelope waiting 20 lonely years for Ulysses
to return.
It might be tempting to imagine that in recommending the
Heroides Erasmus wants the boys to contemplate what women feel,
but in general, the education of young men in early modern Europe
placed more stress on Latin eloquence than on understanding women’s
feelings. After all, the “women” here are not actual women, but char-
acters in poems by Ovid; and arguably what matters for Erasmus is
not understanding women, but understanding Ovid. All the same,
one marvels at the strangeness of a culture in which the first love
letter a person encounters (or writes!) is a poem in a dead language
written by a man pretending to be a woman. If this was the dominant
model for the love letter among the educated elite, it was an extremely
impersonal and artificial one.
120 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
Unlike the Latin manuals, vernacular letter books were not designed
as school texts. They were aimed at a more general literate public:
merchants, artisans, even servants, and as such they were designed
above all to be practical. As the author’s note to readers in Le Stile et
manière puts it,
It is not for any man, to tye the use of his penne, to the vanities of his
owne imagination, which commonly be preposterous & carelesse in
A n t o n i o T a g l i e n t e ’s O P E R A A MOROSA 123
speaking, this is the sort of love letter one finds in the model letter
books. Here is a typical exchange, found both in the Stile et manière
and Fullwood’s Enemy of Idleness (1568):
This is not so different from the opening letter in the Opera amorosa.
Consciously or not, the letter follows all the precepts laid out for
such correspondence by Erasmus. There is little here that one would
mistake for personal sentiment. The tone is stilted, and the diction
pompous, but the narrative is clear enough: a young man has seen a
beautiful young woman; he is strongly attracted to her; he would like
to meet with her. The situation is described in all the terms of worn-
out courtly love and languishing Petrarchism: The lady is a sovereign
princess. The lover is a martyr to his lady’s love. His hand trembles,
his tongue stammers, his mind is inflamed.
The letter is correct, but not very eloquent, and perhaps the model
response it receives is not surprising:
A n t o n i o T a g l i e n t e ’s O P E R A A MOROSA 125
This is a bit more dignified, as well as more distant and abstract than
Fullwood’s model. It also hints at an actual social situation where
the beloved is being courted by a number of suitors, some perhaps
more attractive personally or socially than the lover. But the general
approach is the same as the letter in The Enemy of Idleness. And the
young woman’s reply is also in a similar vein:
That men have skill, and are by sundrie commendable partes enabled
to set foorth their meaning, there needeth, as I thinke, no other tes-
timonie then your presente writing, your eloquence is farre beyonde
the reach of my poore witte, and the multiplicitie of your praises fitter
for a Poeticall Goddesse, then to the erection of anies such earthlie
Deesse. For my parte, I houlde them as the fancies and toies of men,
issuing from the weakest of their humours, and howe farre my selfe can
deserve, none then my selfe can better conceive. Beeing one of good
sorte, as you are, I coulde doe no lesse then write againe unto you, the
rather to satisfie the importunitie of your messenger, wishing such a
one to your lot as wel might paragonize those excellencies you write of,
and answere everie waie unto the substaunce of all those inestimable
prayses. So having, your love and your writing, might (as I take it) bee
best suted together,
Yours, as far as modesty will, to aunswere your curtesies, &c
(sig. V2r–V2v)
I received your letters, giving you a thousande thankes for your wise
and courteous answere: advertising you, that I meane to procure my
friendes, which shall (I doubt not) but according to my expectation,
move your father of the excellent love & singular affection which I
beare towardes you. [marginal note: Duetie in the one, wisdome in
the other] And for as much as duetie bindeth you to obey your par-
ents: so likewise wisedome warneth mee, not onely to obey, but also
to indevour my selfe to be at the will and disposition of my friendes.
For sure, your godly bringing up, and your vertuous disposition, hath
so bewitched my understanding, that will I or nil I, my heart honours
you. [marginal note: Patheticall phrases] And if all the friends I have
would hinder my desires, yet are they not able to quench the fervent
flame which tormeneth my fancie, and bereth the lively spirits of my
mind. Therefore, I shall desire you from the bottome of my hearte,
that when soever my suite shalbe heard, or that by the meanes of my
friendes, the effecte of my love shalbe opened unto your parents, you
will remaine a just and stedfast friend towards mee, who hath alreadie
yelded him selfe, his life, and all that he hath into your handes. If you
seeme to judge otherwise, unhappie wretch that I am, you thrust me
downe headlong from the topp of all hope and comfort, into the bot-
tomlesse pitt of cruell despaire, where I shall as one bereft of a heavenly
joy, torment my selfe with a hellishe care. [marginal note: To be thrust
downe from the toppe of hope, to the bottom of despaire] But when I
call to mind the sundrie vertues that God and Nature hath indued you
withall, I fully persuade my selfe, that such crueltie cannot harbour in
so gentle an heart. And thus I cease, &c. (sig. D2v–D3r)
husbands and wives are all harsh letters dealing with the wife’s sup-
posed infidelities (sig. D1v–D4r).
Despite this dark view of marriage, and a pervasive sense that
women are not to be trusted, Darell’s Short discourse of the life of
Servingmen takes for granted that servants can and should be in love.
This view, along with the enduring and widespread popularity of
more general letter books like Fullwood’s and Day’s, offers evidence
of the ways in which the new market in printed books disseminated
discourses of love to a wide and socially varied audience. Here love
was the province of actual servants, not just noblemen pretending to
serve their mistresses. And it aimed not just at courtly dalliance but
at respectable marriage.
The goblets which you sent me—and they are more like crystal in their
purity than like transparent glass—have stems and calyxes so beauti-
ful of shape, and glitter so resplendently, that even if there had never
been such a thing, they would make thirst come to rivers flowing with
abundant water.81
Claudio Guillén has rightly pointed out the similarity in tone between
Aretino’s letters and contemporary novelle and comic drama.82
Vernacular letters, fictional or not, drew on the language and narrative
A n t o n i o T a g l i e n t e ’s O P E R A A MOROSA 131
techniques of prose fiction and stage plays. Tagliente’s model love let-
ters are not as eloquent as Aretino’s personal correspondence, but they
are engaging nonetheless. So it is possible that volumes like the Opera
amorosa may have had more appeal as narrative than as pedagogical
texts.83 The notion that books of model letters are a halfway point
between novelle and epistolary novels is intriguing, and certainly the
fictional letters in Tagliente’s volume have an entertaining quality—
more so than the love letters in more conventional letter books like
Le Stile et manière. In some sense, after all, love is, at its most basic, a
fictional narrative—an idealized, hyperemotional state of high drama.
Letters exchanged between lovers play a large role in popular
early Spanish novels such as Diego de San Pedro’s Arnalte y Lucenda
(1491) and Cárcel de amor [The Prison of Love] (1492) and Juan de
Flores’s Grimalte y Gradissa (1495). These texts were internationally
popular: Cárcel de amor was translated into Catalan, Italian, French,
English, and German, and was published in over 65 editions in vari-
ous languages in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including at
least 10 Italian editions and over 26 editions of two different French
translations.84 An English translation by John Bourchier, Lord
Berners, appeared in 1548.85 Both Arnalte y Lucenda and Grimalte
y Gradissa went through multiple French editions.86 And Arnalte y
Lucenda appeared in English in 1543 in a version translated from the
French.87
The first epistolary novel in any language is Juan de Seguera’s Processo
de cartas de amores [A Series of Love Letters] (1548), which begins
with a young man sending a letter to an attractive young woman,
and follows their unconsummated affair to its tragic conclusion. At
first the young woman resists the man’s advances, but soon confesses
herself smitten (Letter 10).88 Their contact is almost entirely through
letters—though at one point he contrives to hold her hand in church
(Letter 24). Just as she agrees to marry him, one of his letters falls
into the hands of her brothers, who place her in a convent (Letter
29). He continues to write, and to send gifts, and serenade her, but
eventually these communications too are detected, and the brothers
intervene again to remove their sister to an undisclosed location. Her
last letter threatens suicide, but it is unclear whether she acts on her
impulse (Letter 40). Her lover is left to lament their cruel fate, and to
cherish a bloodstained handkerchief that is her final gift to him.
The epistolary novel eventually spread to other countries and
other languages; Luigi Pasqualigo published Lettere amorose in 1563,
though it was not until the late seventeenth and early eighteenth cen-
tury that the form attained its greatest popularity and complexity.
132 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
Actual Letters
Few actual sixteenth-century English letters survive between unmar-
ried women and men outside their families. Love tokens, like those
Ophelia suggests she has received from Hamlet, were much more
commonly exchanged than love letters in early modern England.
Rings, gloves, broken pieces of gold, knives, handkerchiefs, coins,
even food were given by men to women as a common and accepted
part of courtship at almost all social levels.94 In Diana O’Hara’s
study of courtship gifts mentioned in the 26 volumes of ecclesi-
astical court depositions in the diocese of Canterbury between
1542 and 1602, written material, including letters and notes was
exchanged in only 3.2 percent of cases, whereas money was given in
39.4 percent and clothing and leather goods in 32.0 percent.95 The
giving of letters, though statistically marginal, does increase over
time, becoming more prevalent in the later years of the century. While
it seems likely that letters were more common among the social
elite or educated classes, people not sufficiently literate to write
a letter themselves could hire the services of professional writers.
The letters mentioned in the Canterbury ecclesiastical court depo-
sitions tend to come from the diocese’s larger population centers:
Canterbury, Dover, Sandwich, and the market towns of Rye and
Faversham, suggesting that letter writing was more an urban than
rural phenomenon.96
134 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
My mistress and Friend, I and my Heart put our selves in your Hands,
begging you to recommend us to your Favour, and not to let Absence
lessen your Affection to us. For it were great pity to increase our Pain,
which Absence alone does sufficiently, and more than I could ever
have thought; bringing to my Mind a Point of Astronomy, which is,
That the farther the Mores are from us, the farther too is the Sun, and
yet his Heat is the more scorching; so it is with our Love, we are at a
distance from one another, and yet it keeps its Fervency, at least on my
Side. I hope the like on your Part, assuring you that the uneasiness of
Absence is already too severe for me, and when I think of the continu-
ance of that which I must of necessity suffer, it would seem intoler-
able to me, were it not for the firm hope I have of your unchangeable
Affection for me; and now to put you sometimes in mind of it, and
seeing I cannot be present in Person with you, I send you the nearest
thing to that possible, that is, my Picture set in Bracelets, with the
whole Device, which you know it already, wishing my self in their
Place, when it shall please you. This from the Hand of
Your Servant and Friend,
H. Rex106
Myne awne Sweetheart, this shall be to advertise you of the great ell-
ingness [loneliness] that I find here since your departing, for I ensure
136 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
you, me thinketh the Tyme longer since your departing now last then
I was wont to do a whole Fortnight; I think your Kindness and my
Fervence of Love causeth it, for otherwise I wolde not thought it pos-
sible, that for so little a while it should have grived me, but now that
I am comeing toward you, me thinketh my Pains been half released,
and also I am right well comforted, insomuch that my Book maketh
substantially for my Matter, in writing whereof I have spent above
IIII Hours this Day, which caused me now write the shorter Letter to
you at this tyme, because of some Payne in my Head, wishing my self
(specially an Evening) in my Sweet-hearts Armes whose pritty Duckys
I trust shortly to kysse. Writne with the Hand of him that was, is, and
shall be yours by his will. (E3r–E3v)
letters often involved more than one person—the wealthy often used
secretaries and amanuenses; the poor or illiterate often paid a scribe
to write on their behalf.112 In Gascoigne’s Adventures of Master F. J.
the protagonist realizes by differences in style that a letter refusing his
advances was written not by the woman he is wooing, but by a male
secretary.113
As well, as many early modern letters make clear, the bearer often
took a much more active role in communication than modern postal
employees or couriers ever would. The bearer of a letter was often a
trusted servant or colleague, someone who would in many cases know
the contents of the letters they carried, and might also give a verbal
message from the writer beyond what was written on paper.114 In a
letter to Anne Boleyn, for example, Henry VIII tells her his note is
“only to Advertise you, that this Bearer, and his Fellow, be dispatched
with as many Things to compasse our Matter, and to bring it to
passe as our Wits could imagine or devise.”115 In another he refers to
“Things as your Brother shall on my part declare unto you, to whom
I pray you give full Credence, for it were too long to write.”116
A letter of October 24, 1560, from Sir William St. Loe in London
to his wife Bess of Hardwick at her country estate of Chatsworth117
provides a typical example of surviving sixteenth-century marital cor-
respondence. It begins with his complaint that the linens Sir William
has rented in London are too rough. He asks his wife to send some
from home—in the meantime his servants “hath neyther schurtt or
eynye other thyng to schyft them.” He goes on to recommend which
men to send with the clothes, and how their horses should be fed:
“One handesfull of otes to everye one off the geldyngs att a wateryng
wylbe suffysyent”; in any case, he warns, the horsekeeper is a lazy
fellow and not to be trusted. Sir William then proceeds to the court
news—Queen Elizabeth is angry with him for never being at court,
and refuses to let him kiss her hand. After detailing some financial
business, he ends by complaining of a persistent toothache—“I have
had exstreme payne in my teeth sythens sondaye dynar”—and laments
having to remain in London. He signs himself “yowre loving husband
wyth a kend hartt untyll we mete.”
Since most surviving letters are from wealthy couples, whose estates
and property required a good deal of day-to-day management, it is
not surprising that such letters mix expressions of affection with busi-
ness concerns. In the absence of one spouse—usually the husband—it
was necessary for the couple to communicate frequently about house-
hold affairs. Some letters were more affectionate. Daybell’s study of
Elizabethan women’s correspondence demonstrates that “husbands’
138 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
With all this to cover, it is not surprising the volume is over three
hundred pages long. Letters have become a very small part of a much
larger discourse of amorous self-help.
Take John Gough’s Academy of Complements, first published in
London in 1639 and frequently reprinted over the next 40 years.124
Gough’s volume is a handbook for responding politely to one’s social
superiors. But it also provides lots of models of supposedly eloquent
phrases to be used in courtship by both men and women, thus
A n t o n i o T a g l i e n t e ’s O P E R A A MOROSA 139
Suppose not I use the Court language, when I assure you I am more
than any man living, Sir, Your most humble servant. (sig. B3r)
Sir, When I forget to confesse my selfe yours, you may justlie suppose
I suffer a perpetuall silence, since whil’st I have a tongue, I protest my
selfe to bee your affectionate servant. (sig. B3r–B3v)
Or more bluntly:
Others are meant to be used to woo women rather than to flatter men:
And so on.
Still others are to be used by women rejecting unwelcome advances:
That my desires to injoy you are more then to live, proceeds from the
effects of my affection, the efficient cause being your excessive beauty.
(sig. B5v–B6r)
Fairest, Our breasts shall be ever interchangeably transparent. (sig. C5r)
One is, at times, sorely tempted to read the entire enterprise ironi-
cally, but the generally serious tone and the long-term popularity of
the volume (and genre) suggest that to do so would be to misunder-
stand the importance of such texts in a highly class conscious society
with limited educational opportunities.
This opening collection of brief phrases is followed by a selec-
tion of longer passages: (sig. C6r–G1v) many on how to tender one’s
service to a lord (sig. D5r–D7r). Then comes a series of dialogues
on more amorous themes, including one entitled “To entertaine a
Gentlewoman at your Chamber” (sig. D9r–D10r), another on how
“To contract privately ones selfe, and tye the knot of Marriage,”
(sig. E1r–E1v) and also a “merry Discourse” between two servants,
Rowland and Susan “sitting up late together.” (sig. E11v–E12v)
Rowland begins by declaring his affections:
Row. It is time, Susan, that I should now discover my minde unto you,
we have beene long servants together, and ever since my first com-
ming, I have borne you good will, which I would desire you to accept,
and to grant me your love.
Susan. For that you must pardon me, for I doe not intend to marry, and
therefore let that serve for an excuse, since I would be loth to discourage
you, and say, I cannot love you.
To which she replied, “I wonder where you have been that you have
learned all these fine complements.” They continued to banter in the
same vein. He concludes his description of the evening by saying,
“These and many more expressions were used of us at that time,” as
if he is eager to record that he and Elizabeth were courting by the
book, using the correct phrases.126 What they actually said to each
other is impossible to tell, but it is clear that when he came to leave
a written record of their courtship, Wheatcroft wanted to show he
could complement as well as another.
Sixteenth-century letter books like Tagliente’s had obliquely sug-
gested that eloquence could lead to social mobility; in seventeenth-
century complement books, this point was made much more explicitly.
One of the first of these volumes in English, Cupid’s School (1632),127
opens with a lengthy passage outlining “The Character and Description
of a Complement” (sig. A2r–A3v). A Complement is “an effable and
courteous manner of speech, [which] is now growne so necessary, that
nothing can be done without them.” Such artificial eloquence is crucial
in all fields of life, “For men now a-dayes regard not vertuous quali-
ties, but onely a pleasingnesse of nature and condition, so that hee that
speaketh best, speeds best, and shall be sure to be preferred before the
plaine meaning man.” Complements are, apparently, needed in every
social interaction:
The notion that eloquence is a masculine key that opens all feminine
locks is reiterated more than once:
I hope younge men will imbrace and love this Booke, which teacheth
them how to obtain their love. And I hope young Mayds will lay it
under their pillow, and read it when they goe to bed, since, it will
instruct them how to give an Answer to their amorous Sutors. And
so wishing to all young men and Maydes the accomplishment of their
desires, I leave these complements to their perusall. (sig. A2r–A3v)
Alas, Sir, doe you thinke we country Maids are such harmelesse inno-
cent fooles that we are taken with fine faire words which you Courtiers
call complements? alas no, you may goe use them to Ladies; yet I know
not how methinkes your words come from you with such a fervancy
of affection that I could find in my heart to answer you in your owne
phrase, for you must know we country Maids can complement as well
as you: know therefore that if your former words doe proceed out of
a chaste desire to marry mee, and if your heart hath been so long a
servant of mine I will not detaine your waies, but will pay you love
for love againe, and that I know is the payment you expect. But I pray
boast not that you overcame me with a complement though indeed
I like your complements very well, which being set forth with a lan-
guishing behaviour did become you so well, that I am content to yeeld
my selfe to your disposing, and to make my selfe an example to shew
what great power a Complement delivered in due time and place may
have over a Maids affection, and so without further ceremony, pray let
our banes be bidden, let the Fidlers be hired to play upon our wedding
day, and let the Maids strew the way to Church with flowers, for your
Complement hath overcome me. (sig. C7r–C7v)
Jacqu es Fe r r a n d’s O N L OV E S I C K N E S S :
L ov e a n d M e dic i n e
The gold and the incense are present in Plutrarch, but Shakespeare’s
description associates them not only with opulence and splendor, but
with fire and disease. In Shakespeare the gilded barge metaphorically
burns (beautifully reflected in the “burnish’d” throne), and the winds
are sickened by the sails’ perfume. It is too much of joy. This will not
end well. There will be blood.
Lovesickness is everywhere in Shakespeare, from Venus the “love-
sick queen,” pining for Adonis (Venus and Adonis, line 195), to Romeo
146 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
sick for Rosaline, and Orsino groaning for Olivia in Twelfth Night.3
Helena in Midsummer Night’s Dream is “fancy-sick” with love for
Demetrius (3.2.96). In All’s Well that Ends Well Helen’s “eye is sick”
with love for Bertram (1.3.120). Bertram in turn is tormented with
“sick desires,” (4.2.36) but unfortunately not for Helen. . . . In The
Merchant of Venice, Portia jokes about women who died of sickness
when their love was denied (3.4.70). In Sonnet 147 the speaker’s
“love is as a fever, longing still / For that which longer nurses the dis-
ease” (lines 1–2). Polonius is sure that Hamlet is lovesick for Ophelia,
though the accuracy of the diagnosis, as always with Hamlet, is
somewhat uncertain. Most of these lovers will never attain the object
of their passion—the most pathetic may be Roderigo in Othello, a
“sick fool” whom, as Iago observes, “love hath turn’d almost the
wrong side out” (2.3.44–45). But on the other hand, in Much Ado
about Nothing the sensible Benedick falls “sick in love with Beatrice”
(3.1.21), and they end by being married.
Lovesickness is part of the literary tradition Shakespeare inher-
its, from Virgil’s “love sick Dido,” mentioned in passing in Titus
Andronicus (5.3.81), to “the lover, sick to death” in the fashionable
lyric that Dumain composes in Love’s Labor’s Lost (4.3.103). Such
tropes are so common that it is easy to dismiss them as empty literary
clichés, but to do so would be a mistake. The notion that love was an
illness was ubiquitous, echoed in a wide variety of early modern texts,
from sonnets to sermons. But this does not mean that such a view of
love was merely conventional or ironic.
Lovesickness was also part of a serious intellectual tradition dat-
ing back to classical antiquity. Medical and philosophical texts from
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century frequently describe
romantic love as both a physical disease and a mental illness. We
have already encountered Equicola’s treatment of the subject in
Book 4 of De Natura d’amore. The French moralist Pierre Boaistuau,
translator of an influential version of the Romeo and Juliet story,4
addressed lovesickness as part of his enormously popular 1558 cata-
logue of earthly miseries Le théâtre du monde. The physician François
Valleriola took a neoplatonic and philosophic approach to lovesick-
ness in Observationum medicinalium libri sex [Medical Observations
in Six Books] (Lyons, 1588). André Du Laurens, doctor to Marie de
Médicis and Henri IV, expounded a more materialistic and Galenic
model in his treatise Des Maladies Melancholiques (1594), published
in English in 1599 as On Melancholicke Diseases. Robert Burton was
primarily interested in the psychological aspects of the disease, and his
magisterial Anatomy of Melancholy (1621) devotes almost a third of its
J a c q u e s F e r r a n d ’s O N L O V E S I C K N E S S 147
The notion that love was in some sense a physical ailment appeared
as a common trope in the poetry of Sappho, Virgil, Ovid, and oth-
ers. The idea was taken up and developed in the writings of Classical
medical authorities like Galen,9 and codified and elaborated by Arab
physicians in the Middle Ages.10 It reentered European intellectual
discourse in the twelfth century through the most widely reproduced
medical handbook of the period, the Viaticum of Constantine the
African.11 Lovesickness played a fundamental role in both popular
and intellectual notions about love in early modern Europe. Though
early modern medical discourse may stray at times into what would
now be considered nonscientific realms like astrology, it nonetheless
insists on the materiality of love. It assumes that love has physical
causes and can be treated by physical means: diet, physical therapy,
medicine, and surgery. It is a powerful counter-discourse both to the
idealization of Platonic love and to the romantic mythologies inher-
ited from the courtly love tradition. Rather than spiritual rapture or
emotional devotion, love is imagined as a harmful physical imbalance—
and as with any disease, the best course is to avoid infection in the
first place.
If pressed, most medical early modern medical writers on love
would insist that they were only concerned with physical love, and
that although physical love was a disease, spiritual love was a noble
sentiment. But as we have suggested elsewhere, the theoretical dis-
tinction between physical and spiritual love is difficult to maintain
in practice. It is often impossible to distinguish between material and
spiritual affection, if only because human beings have bodies, and if
a person is beloved, their physical being plays some role in that rela-
tionship. A smile, for example, is a physical action. A mother’s arms
holding her child are physical too. Sight and hearing, the senses most
frequently seen as pure or spiritual are nonetheless physical senses
that operate in the material world, for all the idealization of Plato
and Ficino. Indeed, as we shall see, the infection of lovesickness was
often said to physically enter the body through the eye. In addition,
much of the vocabulary used to describe spiritual love draws on the
discourses of physical love. In medieval devotional and theological
texts, the passionate language of the Song of Songs is frequently used
to describe spiritual longing, with the result that the tropes and terms
used to describe secular and sacred love are often identical.12
Although traditional religious thought had long subordinated
the physical to the spiritual, for many people who lived in the physi-
cal world and desired or cherished physical things this theoretical
150 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
solution was not entirely satisfying. Was any physical beauty virtuous?
Were any physical desires?
The definition of love in Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1621)
reflects this pervasive uncertainty about the moral status of the mate-
rial world and its beauties. Like Pausanius in the Symposium, Burton
attempts to neatly separate wicked lust from virtuous love: “One
beauty arises from God,” he asserts, “another from His creatures:
there is a beauty of the body, [and] a beauty of the soul” (3.13). This
seems clear enough: spiritual beauty provokes spiritual love, physical
beauty provokes physical love. But the division soon becomes much
more complicated. Bodily beauty, Burton explains, arises from “ges-
tures, speeches, several motions and proportions of creatures, men
and women.” Thus physical beauty comes not only from objects
themselves, but from their movement, their sound, even the math-
ematical relations of proportion underlying their form. Burton goes
on to specify that the physical love provoked by these many beauties
is called different things depending on its object, “as love of money,
covetousness, love of beauty, lust, immoderate desire of any pleasure,
concupiscence, friendship, love, good will, etc.” The mixture of posi-
tive and negative categories in this list suggests a certain ambivalence
about the moral status of physical love: The generally positive “Love
of beauty” is immediately followed in Burton’s catalogue by the nega-
tive term “lust”; the pejorative term “concupiscence” is succeeded by
the positive category of “friendship.” After all the talk of beauty of
gesture and proportion, it is jarring to see that Burton’s first example
of a physical attraction is “love of money.” For although one may love
money for its beauty of form or material—and early modern gold
coins could be strikingly beautiful—love of money is more complex
than that. However remarkable the coins look, however bright their
jangling sound, people love money for more abstract reasons as well—
in particular for the purchasing power it brings.
Burton goes on to explain that physical love is morally ambivalent:
It is “either virtue or vice, honest, dishonest,” excessive or deficient,
and “may be reduced to a twofold division, according to the principal
parts which are affected, the brain and liver.”
Thus, whether physical love is virtuous or vicious ultimately
depends entirely on material, physical issues, specifically on which
organ of the body is provoking the emotion. Good feelings are
located in the brain, the seat of reason; bad ones come from the liver,
the seat of physical desire. In either case, spirit or will has nothing to
do with it. What matters is whether the emotion arises from the brain
or the liver. All earthly love, from the love of money to love of one’s
J a c q u e s F e r r a n d ’s O N L O V E S I C K N E S S 151
There are two loves . . . divine love and common or vulgar love.
Metaphysicians and theologians discourse of the essence and prop-
erties of the first, while physicians deal with ordinary physical love,
which is either honest or dishonest. They teach the means for preserv-
ing the former in marriage, and they prescribe the sovereign remedies
for healing and preserving men from that lascivious, unchaste love that
so often carries away base and corrupted souls. (225)
Spiritual love is left to philosophers; doctors deal only with the phys-
ical. But whether the physical is “honest” or “dishonest” depends
on social factors rather than physical evidence. If you lust after your
spouse, your physical desires are positive; if not, negative. But the
physical processes of desire, arousal, and obsession are the same in
either case.
In a passage copied almost verbatim by Ferrand (252), André Du
Laurens’s Of Melancholike Diseases gives a detailed and suggestive
account of how love works as a physical series of material events:
Love therefore having abused the eyes, as the proper spyes and por-
ters of the mind, maketh a way for it selfe smoothly to glaunce along
through the conducting guides, and passing without any perserver-
ance in this sort through the veines unto the liver, doth suddenly
imprint a burning desire to obtaine the thing, which is or seemeth
worthie to be beloved, setteth concupiscence on fire, and beginneth
by this desire all the strife and contention: but fearing her selfe too
weake to incounter with reason, the principal part of the minde, she
152 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
posteth in haste to the heart, to surprise and winne the same: whereof
when she is once sure, as of the strongest holde, she afterward assaileth
and setteth upon reason, and all the other principall poweres of the
minde so fiercely, as that she subdueth them, and maketh them her
vassals and slaves.13
Love here is imagined as a physical agent that enters through the eye
and systematically proceeds to conquer the three “principle mem-
bers” of the body, as understood in Galenic medicine: the liver, seat of
desires; the heart, seat of emotions, and the brain, the seat of reason.14
Love first passes along the veins to the liver,15 where, like a branding
iron on dry wood, it simultaneously “imprints” its form on that organ
and kindles a fire. This burning, which Du Laurens says is the source
of “all the strife and contention” was thought to dry up the liver’s
black bile. This “adust” bile was the physical cause of melancholy—a
Greek term literally meaning “black bile.”
Once the liver has been set afire, Du Laurens’s metaphor shifts,
and Love becomes an Amazon warrior. Too weak to immediately
attack the brain, which is the seat of reason, she races instead from
the liver to the heart, seat of emotions. Only once the fortress of the
heart has been conquered does love move to subdue the brain and
take reason captive. The gendering of love as feminine in the early
modern English translation is more pronounced than in the original
French, where “love” is a feminine noun and thus always takes a femi-
nine pronoun. In English, Du Laurens’s translator Richard Surphlet
could have said “it,” but he chooses, not once, but repeatedly, to refer
to love as “she.” Love then, is imagined here as a effeminizing invader
that begins by provoking lust; she then conquers and controls emo-
tion, and finally overwhelms the body’s rational faculties.
Once enslaved by this feminine force, man is reduced to a “silly
loving worm”—fearful, alienated, tearful, and listless.16 All the func-
tions of the body are “perverted”:
Then is all spoyled, the man is quite undone and cast away, the sences
are wandring to and fro, up and downe, reason is confounded, the
immagination corrupted, the talke fond and sencelesse; the sillie lov-
ing worme cannot look upon any thing but his idol: al the functions of
the bodie are likewise perverted, he becommeth pale, leane, souning,
without any stomacke to his meate, hollow and sunke eyed. . . . You
shall finde him weeping, sobbing, sighing, and redoubling his sighes,
and in continuall restlesnes, avoyding company, loving solitarines, the
better to feed & follow his foolish imaginations; feare buffeteth him
on the one side, & oftentimes dispayre on the other; he is (as Plautus
J a c q u e s F e r r a n d ’s O N L O V E S I C K N E S S 153
sayth) there where indeed he is not; sometime he is hot as fire, and upon
the sudden he findeth himselfe as colde as ice: his heart doth alwaies
quake, and his pulse keepeth no true course, it is little, unequall, and
beating thicke, changing it selfe upon the sudden, not only at the
sight, but even at the name of the object which he affecteth.17
But this course of cure being such, as neither ought nor can alwaies be
put into practise, as being contrary unto the lawes of God and men, we
must have recourse unto the other which dependeth on the industrie
of the good Phisition.19
The volume was thus seen as dangerous on two counts: first, in advo-
cating occult practices such as astrology and magic, and second, in
describing seduction techniques and corrupt sexual practices. In the
most recent French edition of Ferrand’s 1610 text, Gérard Jacquin
speculates in detail on which specific passages of the volume might
have provoked the censors’ condemnation: references to erotically
explicit Classical and modern texts, including the satires of Juvenal
and Aretino’s I modi; the mention of erotic relations in the Bible,
including King David’s son Amnon’s passion for his half sister Tamara;
and the detailed description—albeit in a skeptical or disapproving
tone—of magic charms, philters, and potions to attract love.29 The
Tribunal was especially upset that, because the book was published in
French rather than Latin, it might be read by the general public rather
than by elite specialists and professional men. Booksellers were for-
bidden to sell the text, and existing copies were ordered to be burnt.
The severity of the penalty was underlined by including Ferrand’s
book in a document prohibiting the sale or printing of texts by Giulio
Cesare Vanini, a freethinker and professed atheist whose works openly
advocated astrology. Vanini had been arrested by the Tribunal and
condemned to death in Toulouse in 1618. On the February, 9, 1619,
his tongue was cut out, he was garroted to death, and his body was
J a c q u e s F e r r a n d ’s O N L O V E S I C K N E S S 155
I saw before me a young man, sad without any reason. . . . I saw his pale,
lemon-yellow, and wan face, his hollow-set eyes, noting that the rest of
his body was in rather good condition. I began to suspect some passion
of the spirit vexed his soul, and in light of his age, his sanguine tem-
perament, and his occupation, I concluded . . . that he was lovesick. As I
pressed him to reveal to me the external cause of his disease, an attrac-
tive girl of the house came in with a lamp as I was taking his pulse,
which from that moment went through a series of changes. (273)
to be in love with his father’s wife, and resolves to hide his feelings and
say nothing. This leads him to fall ill, and no one can find the cause of
his malady, which threatens to be fatal. Erasistratus, his doctor, notices
that Antiochus would alternately turn pale and blush when Stratonice
entered his sickroom. He takes the young man’s pulse and determines
that his pulse rate rises when his stepmother is present—he must be in
love with her. The doctor tells the young man’s father, and Seleucus
resolves to divorce Stratonice and betroth her to Antiochus, as a mag-
nanimous reward for his son’s strength of character.
The story was widely popular and was interpreted in many ways—
as an example of filial duty and parental selflessness, but most
importantly in this context, an argument that observation of physi-
cal changes in the body could reveal physiological and psychological
truths that the subject himself would or could not. The patient may
lie; the body does not. Galen took up the story from Plutarch, and
Avicenna took it from Galen, and it became a key narrative in medical
thought, proving the value of observing pulse rates to detect agitation
or ill-health, and also making the medical professional the ultimate
arbiter of the truth of the patient’s body. Ferrand himself cites the
story of Antiochus and Stratonice in support of his contention that a
physician can accurately diagnose lovesickness without a confession of
love by the patient (266).
Symptoms of Lovesickness
In medical discourse, lovesickness was divided into two major forms:
love melancholy, a wasting disease, and love mania, characterized by
hyperactivity. Both involved fixation on one unattainable object of
desire. Excited by sexual desire for an impossible partner, patients
of both genders were understood to be suffering from an excess of
sperm (327)—since early modern medicine knew little of ovaries and
assumed women had seed like men did. Sperm (in both men and
women) was understood to be produced by heating of the blood.
Once concocted, if sperm was not evacuated from the body through
sexual activity, it could accumulate and fester, with dangerous con-
sequences. Along with the corruption of sperm, love melancholy was
also believed to be caused by excessive heat in the liver, the organ that
was thought to be the seat of natural appetites. The liver’s heat dried
out the black bile, and turned it to dust. The dust ascended to the
brain (and perhaps also to the heart) and caused the patient to have
depressive, obsessive thoughts, in this case, thoughts of inexpressible
love and frustrated sexual desire.
158 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
Related to lovesickness, and often conflated with it, was the prob-
lem of excessive sexual desire, called satyriasis in males and uterine
fury or hysteria in females. Unlike love melancholy or love mania,
uterine fury and satyriasis were not focused on any one beloved object
of desire. They were instead characterized by an indiscriminate and
insatiable desire for intercourse that would eventually drive the patient
mad. Their cause was not adust humors infecting the brain, but was
instead rooted in the genital organs themselves. A good deal of the
confusion and contradiction in the discourses around lovesickness
comes from the blurring of love melancholy, love mania, and excessive
desire in general. Ferrand’s treatise discusses and at times conflates all
three conditions. At one point he goes so far as to claim that “uterine
fury . . . [is] a true species of erotic melancholy” (353). Thus the confu-
sions over whether lovesickness is caused by an imbalance or infection
in the brain, the genitals, the heart, or the liver.
In Galenic thought, the brain was the seat of “animal virtues”—
that is, qualities relating to the soul or anima, including thought,
movement, and sensation. Thus any disease that caused insanity or
irrational thought must obviously affect the brain. The heart, on the
other hand, was believed to be the seat of the “vital virtues,” bodily
functions like heartbeat, pulse, and respiration that are fundamental
to maintaining life. It was also thought to be the seat of emotions
(which quickened the pulse), and so a disease characterized by strong
emotional distress must involve the heart. The liver was understood
to be the seat of “natural virtues”—nutrition, growth, and reproduc-
tion, so an illness affecting sexual desire must be rooted in the liver.40
And of course, the genitals were also implicated in lovesickness, since
they were the organs excited.
There were many conflicting theories about exactly which parts of
the body were affected, how they were affected, and in what order.
In the passage quoted from Du Laurens above, as we have already
noted, love enters through the eye, then infects the liver, the heart,
and finally the brain, with no mention of the genitals. But there were
other models too. In Chapter 8 of On Lovesickness, Ferrand insists
that “the liver is the hearth of this fire and the seat of love” (253).
Chapter 9, however, is devoted to the question “Whether in erotic
melancholy the heart or the brain is the seat of the disease” (256–257).
And in Chapter 30, Ferrand suggests in passing that the heart can be
infected by words heard through the ear (324). True to form, Ferrand
attempts to reconcile the issue by saying that love melancholy is a
disease of the brain, caused by an infection in the heart, and that love
itself (as distinct from love melancholy) has its causes in both the liver
J a c q u e s F e r r a n d ’s O N L O V E S I C K N E S S 159
and the genitals. Of course, fear, one of the symptoms of love melan-
choly, is also located in the stomach—especially in children, as Galen
and Nemesius (a fourth-century authority) agree. (257).
For a modern reader who is aware that the Galenic, humoral body
is a largely fictional and metaphoric construct that bears little rela-
tion to the actual workings of the body, these distinctions between
one sort of lovesickness and another can seem insignificant and eso-
teric. The significance, once again, is in their very confusion. Just
as there was no clear understanding of whether love was spiritual or
carnal, so too there was no clear diagnosis of the physical mecha-
nisms, either real (like a rapid pulse) or imagined (like adust black
bile), that caused lovesickness. In medicine, as in philosophy, ethics,
and psychology, love was primarily characterized by contradiction,
confusion, and paradox. Like Equicola (whom he read closely and
often drew on)41 Ferrand was a conciliator who sought to incorpo-
rate and reconcile as many different strands of thought in his treatise
as possible.42
What is significant, therefore, is not Ferrand’s final opinion on
where the disease is located, but the fact that, being a physician, he is
intellectually committed to locating emotions and desires in particular
physical organs, rather than seeing them as fundamentally spiritual or
intellectual. Sexual desire in this view is not a temptation to sin, but a
physical function of bodily organs. Ferrand is one of the few medical
authorities who conflates lovesickness focused on one object of desire
with hysteria and satyriasis, excessive and uncontrolled sexual desire
in general. For a moralist, it makes a great deal of difference if a person
is devoted to one person or indiscriminately desires anyone in sight.
But from a purely physical point of view, the mechanisms of desire are
the same whether the patient desires one or many. Clinically speak-
ing, Ferrand would see little difference between Petrarch longing for
Laura and Chrysanthus the old lecher from Petronius’s Satyricon who
copulates with anything in the room—men, women, boys, girls, even
the dog.43
The predominant model for understanding human physiognomy
in the early modern period remained the humoral model estab-
lished in antiquity by Galen. In this Galenic model, bodily health
was maintained by a temperate balance of four natural bodily flu-
ids, known as humors: blood, phlegm, black bile, and yellow bile.44
Each humor was associated with a particular temperament: A person
whose dominant humor was blood would have a sanguine, or cheer-
ful character. If phlegm was dominant, then the person would be
phlegmatic—slow and lethargic. A quick temper indicated a choleric
160 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
I have seen a Natomie made of some of those that have dyed of this
malady, that had their bowels shrunke, their poore heart all burned,
their Liver and Lightes [lungs] all vaded and consumed, their Braines
endomaged, and I thinke that their poore soule was burned by the
vehement and excessive heat that they did endure, when that the rage
of love had overcome them.49
Some authorities also believed that the brain itself could descend into
a melancholy state through excessive concentration and fixation on
162 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
Seeing her beloved laughing with another, the speaker’s heart trem-
bles, she cannot speak, her body feels like it is on fire, she cannot see
or hear, she is pale (“green as grass” in the original Greek) and cov-
ered in sweat. This lyric was famous in antiquity, commented on by
Longinus (who preserved it by quoting it at length),54 and translated
into Latin by Catullus.55 Medical tradition considered literary texts
like this not as hyperbole or as literary convention, but as case studies.
Ferrand quotes from the poem in his chapter on “Diagnostic Signs of
Love Melancholy,” saying,
Does it not appear that Sappho was as wise and experienced in this
art as our Greek, Latin, and Arab physicians in light of the fact thay
they mentioned no indisputable signs that this lady did not already
know? (272).
outrightly states that “women are more frequently and more griev-
ously troubled by these ills than are men” (229). And again later,
without doubt the woman is more passionate in love and more frantic
and rash in her folly than man. . . . This opinion is confirmed by daily
experience, which reveals to us a greater number of women witless,
maniacal, and frantic from love than men.
The acute inflammation drives them out of their wits, the putrefac-
tion makes them homicidal, the blackness of the condition causes
frights and starts, and the pressure around the heart brings on a
desire to strangle themselves. The most inward reason, troubled and
anguished by the corruption of the blood, in turn becomes per-
verted. (264)59
these terms not only signify green, but also pale, and the color that
appears in wheat when excessive heat and winds from the south cause
it to mature too rapidly. (274)
J a c q u e s F e r r a n d ’s O N L O V E S I C K N E S S 165
He relates this green pallor to the yellow skin tone common in liver
diseases such as jaundice, positing that in both cases “the skin denotes
the corruption of humors standing stagnant within the body” (275).
The association of greenness with liver disorders, heat, and southern
climate is typical of the logic of early modern medical thinking in that
it relates a single traditional symptom (drawn ultimately from lyric
poetry) to various factors and attributes already associated with the
disease—the liver as seat of physical desires, heat, and the south wind
from Africa or other alien territories.
Another symptom of greensickness or hysteria more broadly was
female masturbation: As Ferrand explains, pain in the genital area
caused “women so afflicted [to] touch these areas with their hands
without any sense of shame or bashfulness” (263).60 Ferrand argues
that such depraved activity must indicate an infection of the brain as
well as the genitals because no sane person would act in such a shame-
less fashion. Though this passage appears in the vernacular in both
French editions of Ferrand’s treatise, the entire discussion of female
masturbation was prudently printed in Latin in Childmead’s English
translation of the volume.61
Like lovesickness, greensickness is commonly mentioned in
Shakespeare. Polonious chides Ophelia for being a “green girl”
(Hamlet 1.3.101), and both her bawdy speech after her father’s death
and the possibility that her drowning was a suicide fit the progno-
sis. Capulet calls his daughter Juliet a “greensickness carrion” for
resisting the marriage with Paris he has arranged for her (Romeo and
Juliet 3.5.156). Greensickness is also imputed to weak or effemi-
nate men— Falstaff says that men who drink no wine suffer from
“a kind of male greensickness” (2 Henry IV 4.2.84), and the politi-
cally impotent Lepidus in Antony and Cleopatra is said to be simi-
larly afflicted (3.2.6). In The Winter’s Tale, a furious Paulina says
Leontes’s groundless jealousy is “too green and idle / For girls of
nine” (3.2.179).
In a comic verse on greensickness, preserved in early seventeenth-
century manuscript miscellanies, the oracle of Apollo offers the cure
in the form of an acrostic:
Gordon goes too far, I think, when he says the lover should be spanked
and whipped . . . until he begins to smell bad all over. (325)
Gordon was not the only one to suggest such harsh measures. Valesco
de Taranta, a fifteenth-century Portuguese physician, also active at
the venerable medical school of Montpellier, had a similar prescription:
“If [the lover] is in early youth, let him be beaten, and imprisoned,
and there fed only bread and water until he begs for mercy.”71 More
170 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
If the clitoris, by its excessive length, is the cause of this furious desire
and raging disease, as is often the case, it should be cut in the manner
taught by the Greek Moschion and the Arab Albucasis. (357)
It is therefore necessary that you hold the superfluous part of the clito-
ris in your hand, or with a small hook, and cut it short, but do not cut
too deeply, especially not to the bottom of the root, to avoid a great
flow of blood.74
172 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
There is not much evidence that such procedures were often carried
out, but the notion that the best way to deal with sexual desire is to
mutilate the sexual organs demonstrates the logical conclusion of a
purely materialist approach to the regulation of sexual desire. Cut out
the offending matter.
Given the traditional male biases of early modern medical dis-
course, it is not surprising that Ferrand gives his endorsement to
female genital mutilation but balks at cutting veins that might make
men effeminate and foolish. Beyond the passage we have already cited
recommending the purported Roman practice of discouraging desire
by inserting a ring or clasp on the foreskin (325), Ferrand has little to
say on the subject of male genital mutilation. Castration is nowhere
mentioned, though one assumes that by the logic of early modern
medicine it would have been an effective cure for some of the ail-
ments under discussion.
If genital mutilation does not do the trick, additional steps may be
taken:
If the condition grows worse in a way suggesting that the erotic mel-
ancholy could turn into lycanthropy, then the veins in the arms must
be bled until the patient faints or until there is a total failure of the
heart, and in spite of this one must continue by cauterizing the front
of the head with a searing iron, or if he refuses or cannot bear it, with
a caustic compound applied to the same place. (118–119)
Take 4 large handfuls each of marsh mallows using the entire herb,
blue mallows, wild lettuce [green endive], borage, white pond lily,
pumpkin seeds, fumatory, hops, and sharp-pointed dock. Add in
2 large handfuls each of glaswort and tendrils of the grapevine. Put
in ½ large handful each of water lily, sweet violet, borage, sweetbrier
[eglantine], and marigold. Add 2 ounces of chaste tree seeds, hemp
seeds, and the heads of two wethers [castrated rams]. Make a decoc-
tion using river water, in which the patient will sit for about one hour
a day for four days. (363)
Say what you want about early modern medical practice: Sitting in a
bath of cold river water for an hour with two ram’s heads, and handfuls
of herbs, flowers, and pumpkin seeds (not to mention sharp-pointed
dock) does seem likely to cool any sort of ardor you might be feeling
before entering the tub. Ferrand recommends that during the bath
people should come and entertain the patient with jokes, songs, and
stories. The Arlesian physician François Valleriola, Ferrand’s source
for this particular recipe, recommended that such pleasing discourse
be alternated with scolding and admonition of the patient by some
wise older person.75
For women, Ferrand recommends douches and vaginal supposito-
ries, several of which involve lentils, willow flowers, and camphor—
all substances believed to have a cooling effect. (331–332, 364). He
also relates that Cleopatra, sister of Arsinoës, “Queen of Physicians,”
told her daughter Theodota to put a root wrapped in a rag in her
vagina, and when it was removed she would find that the rag was full
of little worms (331–332). A misogynist loathing of female genitalia
permeates this passage—Ferrand even uses the euphemism “the pig-
sty of Venus” to refer to the vagina. And yet paradoxically, along with
his praise of Sappho’s skill in diagnosis it is one of the only points in
Ferrand’s text that acknowledges women’s medical knowledge and
experience. This same Cleopatra is the only female authority included
in the list of experts on lovesickness that Ferrand used as sources in
the 1623 edition of the text.76
Ferrand stresses several times that purgation should not be too
violent, for violent medicines are heating, and may thus exacerbate
the disease. He concurs with Arnold of Villanova that emetics, which
promote vomiting, are to be preferred to purgatives in warding off
the disease, in part because he believes that strong medication will
174 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
Reception
Besides the dedicatory epistle to Claude of Lorraine, and the author’s
address to his readers, the 1610 edition of Ferrand’s text was accom-
panied by a series of five commendatory verses in Latin, French, and
Greek, mostly written by relatives of the author or local authorities
from the area of Agen.89 The common theme is that as a doctor who
can cure lovesickness, Ferrand is more powerful than the gods them-
selves. Jupiter and Apollo bow to him; he has broken mankind free
from Cupid’s chains:
entries asserting in turn that the brain, the liver, and the heart are
the seat of lovesickness.106 The index entry for “love” could stand as
an epitome of the confused ideas surrounding the term in the early
modern period:
Love philters have some virtue. Poisonous for the most part. Take away
good judgement. Numbered among the poisons.114
Whoever compiled the index (and it may not have been Ferrand)
surely was not trying to placate the Tribunal of Toulouse. The phrase
“have some virtue” is ambiguous, and could mean either that love
philters are powerful or that they are effective or even that they are
good. The most Ferrand himself says is that there are indeed “medi-
cations, foods, and poisons capable of inciting sexual desire” (344).
As we have seen, he steadfastly denies that any such potion can focus
desire on a particular person, or arouse “passionate love” as opposed
to increased sexual desire in general. And, in view of the prevailing
views of the Church on this matter, he prudently concludes that “the
J a c q u e s F e r r a n d ’s O N L O V E S I C K N E S S 179
truest and most effective philters are beauty, grace, and gentle civility”
(345). But the index suggests otherwise.
The dedicatory verses prefacing Edmund Chilmead’s 1640 English
translation of On Lovesickness are much lengthier and more elaborate
than those in the French editions.115 There are eight poems instead of
five, and whereas the French verses are brief and epigrammatic, most
of the English ones are several pages long. The authors are all affiliated
with Christ Church College, Oxford. Though all nominally praise
“the author,” most focus not on Ferrand’s merits as a physician or
author, but on a satirical image of the sort of lovesick fop who would
in theory profit from the volume. Some suggest this imaginary young
man should fall in love with the book itself rather than his mistress:
Being All things, but your selfe; Now that, then this
Acting ’ore Ovids Metamorphosis.
J a c q u e s F e r r a n d ’s O N L O V E S I C K N E S S 181
West ends by praising the volume for its accessibility and the wide
audience of readers it ought to attract:
Philip Sidney’s Arcadia was the most popular and widely read English
prose romance of the period.
It is unclear whether or not any chambermaids actually read Ferrand’s
treatise. And the English version, with its untranslated passages in
Latin and occasional terminology in Greek would have been partially
inaccessible to anyone without a grammar school education or better.
But the text’s accessibility, decried as a great danger by the Tribunal of
Toulouse in 1620, was praised in England in 1640. Richard West of
Christchurch College imagines chambermaids reading On Lovesickness
and learning from it. And the potential for such wide readership is
presented not as a threat but as a great accomplishment.
C onc lusion: Rom eo + Ju l i e t
The four books that form the focus of this study all demonstrate
the extent to which culturally elite ideas about romantic love were
spreading to a broader reading public throughout the sixteenth cen-
tury. Conduct books, philosophical treatises, letter-writing manuals,
and medical texts were all appearing in the vernacular, and their
specialized knowledge was being made even more accessible through
editorial apparatus such as indices, detailed tables of contents, and
printed marginal annotations.
By the end of the sixteenth century, the notion that the noble
passion of love was available to common people had spread widely
throughout literate culture. The time was ripe for Shakespeare’s trag-
edy of urban love, Romeo and Juliet—in which a pair of children from
a non-courtly background are celebrated for defying their parents and
following their passions. Shakespeare took a story from the middle-
class genre of the novella, gave it tragic dignity, and reconfigured
passionate disobedience as an idealized emotion that can redeem the
entire city of Verona.
Over time, Romeo and Juliet have become iconic figures.1 The play
is often performed, frequently adapted for film, and widely taught in
schools. Indeed, the phrase “Romeo and Juliet” is familiar to millions
of people all over the world who have never read the play, seen a staged
production, or watched one of the many film versions or adaptations.
Romeo and Juliet are Young Lovers—rebellious and pure, driven,
idealistic, and doomed. They’re good kids, innocent teenagers who
refuse to conform to the corrupt adult world that awaits them. They
break the rules and follow their hearts. And they go out in a blaze of
glory, lit by a thousand candles, martyrs canonized for love.
Like much early modern literature, Shakespeare’s writing generally
tends to be pessimistic about the possibility that long-term happi-
ness can arise from passionate relationships between men and women.
Troilus and Cressida, Hamlet and Ophelia, Othello and Desdemona,
Antony and Cleopatra: there is much love in these relationships, but
much more misery. In the comedies Beatrice and Benedick seem
well matched, as do Viola and Orsino, but these are exceptional
184 Lov e in Pr int in the Sixteenth Century
Brooke was a pious man, whose only other work, The Agreement of
Sondry Places of Scripture (1563), is an attempt to explain and reconcile
107 pairs of contradictory Biblical passages. Although his introduction
suggests his poem will be harshly moralistic, Brooke’s treatment of the
story itself is relatively free of this kind of heavy-handed commentary
and is in fact somewhat sympathetic to the lovers. The ambivalence
one finds in Brooke about whether the lovers should be pitied or chas-
tised is a persistent feature of the Romeo and Juliet story as it develops
and is disseminated through sixteenth-century Europe.
Shakespeare’s play shows less ambivalence. Despite many indications
of their immaturity and rashness, Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet are
sympathetic characters from beginning to end. The Prologue to the
Second Act (not present in the first quarto), seems somewhat criti-
cal of Romeo’s “young affection,” but as Shakespeare tells the story,
we do not strongly question Romeo and Juliet—we sympathize with
them. This is, in part, because Shakespeare always presents their illicit
relationship in the context of the irrational feud between their fami-
lies, a connection not made as strongly in earlier versions of the tale.
Bandello’s 1554 novella, for example, is much more cynical about the
reconciliation of the feuding families. His version concludes:
Amid the marked sadness of the Montagues, the Capulets, and the
city in general their funeral was held with the utmost pomp. The Duke
commanded that the two lovers be buried in the same tomb. This
led to the establishment of peace between the Montagues and the
Capulets, although it did not last very long.4
Romeo and Juliet’s tragic end becomes a warning that parents should
put aside their petty squabbles, not that they should keep a closer eye
on their children and protect them from meddling friars and lascivi-
ous nurses. In Shakespeare, the Prince of Verona explicitly sees the
lovers’ deaths as heaven’s punishment for the feud, and Juliet’s father
agrees (5.3.295).
Despite the fact that passionate, romantic love leads Romeo and
Juliet to their deaths, the play seldom questions its ultimate value.
Even Mercutio’s biting wit is unable to cast a pall over Romeo and
Juliet’s passion. Love in Romeo and Juliet is powerful and terrible, but
beautiful, and ultimately socially useful. It prefigures in some ways
later notions of the sublime, and this is, in part, why the play was so
popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the Symposium
Socrates asked Diotima, “What good can love be to humanity?”5 In
Romeo and Juliet, Shakespeare’s answer is that romantic love can
bring peace to a warring community. It can be a source of concord
and order—not chaos and discord. The rest is history.
That’s written history, printed, bound, and sold. Even Romeo and
Juliet learn how to love by reading about it: As Juliet says to Romeo,
“You kiss by the book” (1.5.107).
No t es
until the First Folio of 1623. Its simplicity of style and structure,
as well as its fondness for wordplay reminiscent of the works of
Lyly, have led most scholars to speculate on a very early date for the
play. See Jean E. Howard’s introduction to the play in The Norton
Shakespeare (New York: Norton, 1997), 77–83.
10. The corresponding figures for Romeo and Juliet are: love (94),
loves (2), love’s (12), loved (3), loving (6), lovest (2), and lover etc.
(10). All tallies taken from the Open Source Shakespeare Concordance
(http://www.opensourceshakespeare.com/).
11. All references to the works of Shakespeare are to The Norton
Shakespeare, 2nd ed., ed. Greenblatt et al. (New York: Norton,
2008).
12. Montaigne, essay 1.28 “On Affectionate Relationships” (“De
l’amitié”); Lyly’s Euphues. All references to Montaigne’s Essays are
to Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. M. A. Screech
(New York: Penguin, 1987). See Laurie Shannon, Sovereign Amity:
Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Comedy (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2002), 17–53.
13. Similarly, in 2.4.194–196 the word “love” is used both to describe
Proteus’s feelings for Valentine and for Sylvia.
14. Shakespeare only uses this term three times, twice in Two Gentleman,
and then a direct reference to the Metamorphoses in Titus (4.1.41).
In manuscript poetry from the period the term is sometimes asso-
ciated with effeminacy and loss of manly vigor. See Ian Frederick
Moulton, Before Pornography: Erotic Writing in Early Modern
England (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 69–71. It is
also used in this context in a dedicatory verse to Jacques Ferrand’s
Erotomania, sig. b2v.
15. On the Ovidian nature of Love in the play, see William C. Carroll,
“‘And Love You ’gainst the Nature of Love’: Ovid, Rape, and The
Two Gentlemen of Verona,” in Shakespeare’s Ovid: The Metamorphoses
in the Plays and the Poems, ed. A. B. Taylor (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 49–65.
16. There are some exceptions: Hercules (9.239–272), Romulus
(14.805–828), and Julius Caesar (15.843–851) become gods; but
they are not the norm and their metamorphoses are not provoked
by sexual desire.
17. Prominent throughout the love poetry of Ovid (for example, Ars
Amatoria 1.35), and memorably reprised by Shakespeare at the
opening of Midsummer Night’s Dream 1.1.16–17.
18. John Donne, The Complete Poetry and Selected Prose of John Donne,
ed. Charles M. Coffin (New York: Modern Library, 2001), “Elegy
17,” line 4.
19. Shakespeare’s Sonnet 138 has a similar notion of the relationship
between love and lying.
Notes 189
33. For example, Bray, The Friend. See also Madhavi Menon, ed.,
Shakesqueer: A Queer Companion to the Complete Works of Shakespeare
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).
34. Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe, 1978, revised
ed. (New York: Ashgate, 1994), 157.
35. On aristocratic notions of love in the Middle Ages, see C. Stephen
Jaeger, Ennobling Love: In Search of a Lost Sensibility (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).
36. “Vomer,” Capellanus’s word for “plough,” also means “penis.” J. N.
Adams, The Latin Sexual Vocabulary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1982), 24.
37. Andreas Capellanus, De Amore in Andreas Capellanus on Love. Ed. and
trans. P. G. Walsh (London: Duckworth, 1982), 1.11. My translation.
38. Lines 1932–1937. Guillaume de Loris and Jean de Meun, Le Roman
de la Rose, ed. Armand Strubel (Paris: Librairie Général Français,
1992), 136–137.
39. Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, 56.
40. See, for example, many of the stories in Giovanni Boccaccio’s
Decameron, Ed. Johnathan Usher. Trans. Guido Waldman (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 2.10; 4.5; 5.2; 7.10; etc.
41. Carlo M. Cipolla, Literacy and Development in the West (Baltimore:
Penguin, 1969), 49–50, mentions developments in ballistics, navi-
gation, clock-making, and mapmaking in this context.
42. David Cressy, Literacy and the Social Order: Reading and Writing
in Tudor and Stuart England (New York: Cambridge, 1980), pro-
vides detailed analysis of data on the proportion of the English pop-
ulation who could sign their names in the early modern period. See
Heidi Brayman Hackel, Reading Material in Early Modern England:
Print, Gender, and Literacy (New York: Cambridge, 2005), 55–68,
on the limitations of this data for measuring literacy.
43. Burke, Popular Culture, 250–251.
44. On the effect of printed material on popular culture, given what
is known about early modern literacy, see Burke, Popular Culture,
250–259.
45. Brayman Hackel, Reading Material, 55–68.
46. Adam Fox, Oral and Literate Culture in England 1500–1700 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 19.
47. Fox, Oral and Literate Culture, 311–324.
48. Fox, Oral and Literate Culture, 128–130, on the mix of popular
and learned material in sermons.
49. Brian Richardson, Printing, Writers, and Readers in Renaissance
Italy (New York: Cambridge, 1999), 112.
50. Brayman Hackel, Reading Material, 43–52.
51. Cipolla, Literacy and Development, 50–51. Cressy, Literacy and the
Social Order, 46–50, addresses the limitations of the argument that
more books is in itself evidence for more readers.
Notes 191
52. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, 1939, trans. Edmund Jephcott
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1978), 117–131.
53. On changes in table manners, see Elias, Civilizing Process, 68–105.
54. Giovanni Della Casa, Galateo, ed. Saverio Orlando (Milan: Garzanti,
2003), 7.
55. Elias, Civilizing Process. See also Burke, Popular Culture, 23–29,
270–281.
56. Paradiso 1.38; Della Casa, Galateo, 62.
57. Galateo of Maister Iohn Della Casa, Archebishop of Beneuenta. Or
rather, A treatise of the ma[n]ners and behauiours, it behoueth a
man to vse and eschewe, trans. Robert Peterson (London, 1576).
STC 4738. Galateo was also published as an appendix to Walter
Darrell’s conduct book for servants, A Short Discourse of the Life of
Servingmen (London: Ralphe Newberrie, 1578). STC 6274.
58. Giovanni Della Casa, La Galatée. Premierement composé en Italien
par I. de la Case & depuis mis en François, Latin, Allemand &
Español (Geneva: Jean de Tournes, 1609).
59. See Moulton, Before Pornography, esp. 3–15.
60. Alvin Kernan, The Cankered Muse: Satire of the English Renaissance
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959), 54–63.
61. Pascal Pia, ed., L’École des filles ou la philosophie des dames (Paris:
L’Or du Temps, 1969). English translation: The School of Venus, ed.
and trans. Donald Thomas (New York: Panther, 1971).
62. “Sotadic” refers to Sotades, a Greek sodomite and poet mentioned
in the epigrams of Martial.
63. Nicholas Chorier, Aloisiae Sigeae Tolentanae Satyra Sotadica de
Arcanis Amoris et Veneris, ed. Bruno Lavignini (Catania: Romeo
Prampolini, 1935). No modern or complete English translation
exists. Modern French translation: Satire sotadique de Luisa Sigea
de Tolède, trans. André Barry (Paris, 1969). On early modern
English adaptations see James Grantham Turner, Schooling Sex:
Libertine Literature and Erotic Education in Italy, France, and
England, 1534–1685 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003),
335–343.
64. B. V., ed., Vénus dans le clôitre. Réimpression de l’édition de Cologne,
1719 (Paris: Coffret du Bibliophile, 1934). No modern English
translation.
65. On libertine culture see Turner, Schooling Sex.
66. Lewis’s view, expounded in The Allegory of Love (London: Oxford
University Press, 1936) is well refuted by Henry Ansgar Kelly, Love
and Marriage in the Age of Chaucer (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1975), though Kelly goes too far, in my view, in his claim that
Ovid is primarily a poet of married love.
67. David R. Smith, Maskes of Wedlock: Seventeenth-Century Dutch
Marriage Portraiture (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1978),
145.
192 Notes
which adhere to the essence of life, in all its complexities and ugli-
ness.” (Translation in Virginia Cox, “Castiglione and His Critics,”
in Baldassare Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, 409–424, ed.
Virginia Cox, trans. Thomas Hoby (London: J. M. Dent, 1994),
416. Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love, 119, claims the Courtier
is characterized by “un-Machiavellian . . . unpracticality, . . . social, if
not moral isolation, [and] unwillingness to investigate deep moral
problems.”
22. In recent years the texts have been seen as sharing some similar
concerns. Brian Richardson, “The Cinquecento,” in Cambridge
History of Italian Literature, ed. Peter Brand and Lino Pertile
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 181–232, 207,
not only acknowledges the traditional critical opposition between
the Prince and the Courtier, but also discusses their similarities.
Guido Ruggiero, Machiavelli in Love: Sex, Self, and Society in the
Italian Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2007), 191–205, gives a convincing reading of the centrality of
Machiavellian virtù in the discussions of the Courtier.
23. The passage is crossed out by hand in Aeillo’s copy of the 1528
Aldine edition, now in the Houghton Library (*IC5 C2782C
1528), sig. e4v.
24. As a rhetorical strategy, Castiglione’s reticence was arguably more
successful than Machiavelli’s plain speaking. The Prince was banned;
the Courtier was widely disseminated in a multitude of languages:
see Burke, Fortunes of the Courtier.
25. Perhaps the most extreme of the many arguments that Machiavelli
was writing in bad faith is reported by Reginald Pole who claimed
Machiavelli’s defenders argued that The Prince was meant as bad
advice that would lead to the downfall of the Medici to whom it
was dedicated: Pole Apologia, 1:151. Quoted in English in Niccolò
Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. and trans. William J. Connell (New
York: Bedford, 2005), 164–165.
26. See Chapter 15 of Francesco De Sanctis, “Storia della letterature
italiana,” in Opere, ed. Niccolò Gallo (Milan: R. Ricciardi, 1961),
501; also Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love, 119.
27. On the gender dynamics of The Prince, see John Freccero, “Medusa
and the Madonna of Forlì: Political Sexuality in Machiavelli,” in
Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature, ed. Albert Russell Ascoli
and Victoria Kahn (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993),
161–178. Unless otherwise indicated, all English quotations from
the Prince are from Connell. Because of the multiplicity of editions,
references to the text of the Prince are to chapter number.
28. Joan Kelly-Gadol, “Did Women Have a Renaissance,” in Becoming
Visible: Women in European History, ed. Renate Bridenthal and
Claudia Koonz (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 148–161,
famously called attention to the subordinate role and enforced
Notes 195
che a me pare piu si simigli al vero: oltra che ancho a niuno fin qui è
stata si benivola la fortuna, che dalle opinioni sue molti non habbian
dissentito, & che non trovi chi contra lui dica: donde vedemo philo-
sophice sette, medici, historici esser fra se contrarii, & li Theologi
istessi in alcune cose non concordi, ne da altro (come credo) questo
procede, se non da soverchio amore che alla verità si porta; & cias-
cuno spera la verità trovare” (Equicola, De Natura, sig. A3v).
36. John Milton, “Areopagitica,” in Complete Prose Works of John
Milton, Vol II, 1643–1648, ed. Ernest Sirluck (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1959), 486–575, 549.
37. Kolsky, Mario Equicola, 58.
38. Dante, Purgatorio, 26.117.
39. Ricci, La Redazione, 47.
40. “Definimo semplicemente amor esser disiderio del bene, il qual vor-
remo sempre havere” (Equicola, De Natura, sig. E7v).
41. “Essendo questo amore universale, se non se dice ogni huomo
amare avien che la cupidita è moltiplice, & corpo di molti capi, che
secondo li affetti muta nome. Circa li cibi & vino si chiama gulosita,
& ebrieta.” (Equicola, De Natura, sig. E7v).
42. “Se non volemo dissimulando cavillare, confesseremo noi pre la
maggior parte amar altri per lamor & benivolentia che havemo a noi
medesmia” (Equicola, De Natura, sig. F8r–F8v).
43. “Amore di noi stessi, è non solamente di ogni disiderio, ma di ogni
moto, et attione padre, et genitore, authore, & creatore” (Equicola,
De Natura, sig. K3v).
44. “Niuna cosa accrebbe tanto la religione de falsi dei, & che dal
vero ci facesse rebelli, se non il cieco amor dell’huomo a se stesso.”
(Equicola, De Natura, sig. F8r).
45. “Chi ama se stesso, è amatore di Dio” (Equicola, De Natura,
sig. G5r).
46. On Augustinian concepts of self-love, see Oliver O’Donovan, The
Problem of Self-love in St. Augustine (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1980). O’Donovan begins by noting the contradictory nature
of Augustine’s statements on the subject (1).
47. “Se da qui inanzi quanto è detto vorrà alcuno chiamar senza ordine,
io non repugno: percio non si trovara in Venere, & Cupido che
ordinatamente senza confusione parlasse” (Equicola, De Natura,
sig. I6v).
48. León Hebreo, The Philosophy of Love (Dialoghi d’amore), trans.
F. Friedeberg-Seeley and Jean H. Barnes (London: Soncino Press,
1937), 7.
49. “La loro differentia e questa, che disiderio è solamente nelle cose
non havute, amore nelle cose possedute” (Equicola, De Natura,
sig. K3v).
50. “Obietto dal disiderio e il bene, come si trovarno diverse specie di
beni, cosi sono diverse specie di disideri, come amore e una specie
Notes 203
61. “Il mio Giesu commando non habbiate charità inordinata. Questo
mandato osservaremo se prima amaremo, & piu che ogni altra
cosa, quel che sopra noi poi quel che semo noi medesimi, in terzo
luogo, quel che è propinquo a noi, appresso quel che è sotto a noi”
(Equicola, De Natura, sig. O2v).
62. “Dissero alcuni l’amori esser quattro, del marito, & moglie de geni-
tori a figliuoli, dell’amante all’amato, il quatro maggior di tutti del
corpo all’anima, cioè amor di se stesso. Amamo li genitori, come
secondi authori di noi, amamo li fratelli come quasi altri noi, li fig-
liuoli, come parte di noi, non men che fratelli molte volte li amici,
percio che non potemo esseguire ogni cosa per noi medesimi: l’uno
in qualche cosa è piu utile che l’altro. Si acquistano amicitie per gov-
ernare con mutui /officii in communi nostri commodi” (Equicola,
De Natura, sig. O3r).
63. See, most famously, Montaigne, Essay 1.28, De l’amitié [On
Friendship].
64. “Fermo stabilmento di amicitia è la equalità, conformita de volonta,
et d’honesti costumi, benche para ogni amicitia ha ver origine, et
augmento perservante, non da simili, ma / da contrari, vedemo il
povero amico al ricco, l’infermo al medico, l’ignorante al dotto:
Euripide afferma la terra quando è secca amare l’humido, il freddo
lo caldo, l’amaro lo dolce, il vacuo lo pieno” (Equicola, De Natura,
sig. O6r).
65. “E natural l’amore, è contra natura l’odio” (Equicola, De Natura,
sig. T8v).
66. On the ubiquity of homoerotic relations between men in early
modern Florence, See Michael Rocke, Forbidden Friendships:
Homosexuality and Male Culture in Renaissance Florence (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
67. All references to Book 4 of De Natura d’amore are to the 1989 edi-
tion: Equicola, De Natura.
68. “Volupta crudelissima immane, & effera, dice Aristotele esser quella
di quelli, che usano, & si dilettano di Venere mascula, mangiar fig-
liuoli & altre scelerita” (Equicola, De Natura, sig. BB4v).
69. “Vedemo di Venere mascula esser proprio acto, vergogna che da
omo femina se devene; et, quello amore esser tiranno, che a gioveni
li amanti per intemperanzia portano, è certo. Perche, como il re sec-
ondo le legi domina, cosi il tiranno contra legi, per propria utilita,
non per la publica” (Equicola, De Natura, 33).
70. See Plutarch, Plutarch’s Lives, Life of Solon, trans. John Dryden
(New York: Modern Library, 2001), 1.109.
71. “‘Chi ama non pate che lo amato giovene sia pare or superiore a
se,’ ma molto di sè inferiore lo disidera, li piace che sia ignorante,
timido, grosso d’ingegno. Et se tal naturalmente non è, se sforza et
fa ogni opera che sia così; chè, altramenti, se reputa privo del desi-
ato piacere. Removelo da ogni studio et consuetudine donde possa
Notes 205
fede, & tal amor non passa in alcun tempo. Loro amore era in
persone grandi degni di honore, non come quelle de poeti nostri
antichi, liquali da essi medesimi sono come avare, come ad altrui
volontà esposte, & quasi meretrici notate” (Equicola, De Natura,
sig. Z5v).
124. “La vita humana è triplice: l’una sotto l’arte si regge, & governa.
Diceseli effettiva: a la seconda la prudentia, & le virtu morali
dominano, in la terza quelli ponemo, che sono dediti alla scien-
tia, ornati de sapientia, conoscitori della eccellentia dell’intelletto.
Della prima è fine utile, & dell’altra honore, & reputatione:
dell’ultima contemplatione di cose honeste & divine. Di tutte è
fine volupta, laquale è da artefici politici, & contemplativi abbrac-
ciata” (Equicola, De Natura, sig. BB3v).
125. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1153b.
126. “& di tali disii, & operationi qualunche nega esser fine volupta,
questo senza dubbio e huomo stupidissimo, che ne se, ne altri
conosce” (BB4r).
127. “Adunque concludemo l’huomo in tutti suoi effetti, & attioni non
pensare, ne operare altro, che amor se stesso, & di questo amare
dicemo esser ultimo fine la volupta. (Ilche cosa sia in effetto)
volemo per nostra satisfatione di questa volupta far parole, non per
demostratione della / verità, per esser chiara, aperta, & manifesta,
ma perche speramo per si ampia strada poter pervenire all’amor
divino, delquale termine, & meta è beatitudine stato perfetis-
simo, & ultima perfettione dell’huomo” (Equicola, De Natura, sig.
BB4r–BB4v).
128. “. . . la volupta in due parte dividemo: dell’anima l’una, del corpo
l’altra. Aristotele tre generationi di volupta pone: la prima in con-
templatione, l’altra in attione, nelli sensi la terza. Alcune volupta
sono necessarie, et naturali, alcune naturali, & non necessarie.
Necessarie, & naturali quelle dicemo, che riprimeno il dolore per-
tinente al corpo, come in gran sete, bere. Naturali non necessarie
sono magnar cibi pretiosi, per maggior volupta. Quelle necessa-
rie, ne naturali chiamono, lequale sono circa cose di non molto
momento, come è poner statue. Volupta crudelissima immane, &
effera, dice Aristotele esser quella di quelli, che usano, & si dilet-
tano di Venere mascula, mangiar figliuoli & altre scelerita. Alcune
volupta sono pure, & integre di cose divine. Alcune medie che par-
ticipono di virtu, & letitia causata da buoni effetti. Alcune sone
vere, alcune false: le vere si istimano quelle dell’animo, delle scien-
tie, & delle discipline: le false procedono delli sensi” (Equicola,
De Natura, sig. BB4v).
129. “Alcune corporali, che’l corpo parimenti, & l’anima l’usa, come è
magniare, & dar opera a far figlioli: lequali volupta non possono
essere del corpo solo, che ogni / tal volupta è col senso, & il senso
non opera se non per l’anima” (Equicola, De Natura, sig. BB5r).
210 Notes
130. “Amesi Dio, percio che è sommo bene & sommo bene non è altro
che somma volupta” (Equicola, De Natura, sig. BB7v).
131. “Magnesi per vivere, non se viva per magnare. Alla gola sempre
dedito di gran pensieri non è capace. Il tatto in tanto devemo fre-
quentare, quanto alla natura se renda il debito della obligatione
con lei nascendo contratta. Altrimenti li forti, & robustissimi
esfemmina, & enerva. Per laqual cosa se amamo noi medesimi, &
se dell’amore è fine volupta abbracesi la temperantia, & mediocrità
conservatrici / di sanita, datrici della disiderata voluptà. Fine del
vero amore, & d’ogni amore, & d’ogni attione, & d’ogni operatione
de mortali, deve essere tal termine, che ne induca a considerare, che
per beneficio di essa sanità potemo usar longamente, la voluptà delli
sensi integramente, & in piacere honestissimo con gloria, & honore
tradurre la vita” (Equicola, De Natura, sig. CC5r).
132. “Sono alcuni nelliquali nova generatione di pazzia si ritrova.
Questi simulatori con ineptissimi modi persuadere alli sciocchi
se sforzano, che nulla curano la bellezza del corpo, ma solamente
della beltà dell’animo accesi, del solo vedere, & del solo odire si
pascono: non considerano, che disio humano non po terminare,
se non in quel ultimo che si po appetere, dove la mente oltra non
si estenda ne possa piu avanti procedere: però fermarsi disio amo-
roso in viso & odito soli è impossibile, perche amor è dell’animo /
corpo: & le operationi dell’animo dal corpo dependeno, & quelle
dle corpo dall’animo; onde l’uno a l’altro ministra voluptà, &
l’uno senza l’altro non si puo dilettare” (Equicola, De Natura,
sig. CC6r–CC6v).
133. “Non esser altro huomo, conclude Platone, che anima rationale,
laqual usa il corpo . . . per laqual cosa chi vuol conoscere se medesmo,
conosca l’anima . . . parte divina in noi (Equicola, De Natura, sig.
DD6r). La via della voluptà delli sensi primo facile & piana: poi in
prerutti precipitii, profondità oscura & eterna oblivione te conduce”
(Equicola, De Natura, sig. DD7r).
134. “Se di lieto vivere in lei in corte tua speranza reponi, pensa li invidi &
delatori & detrattori in quella vivere & calumniatori senza fine: & per
brevemente comprendere tutte le adversità & infelicità che in corte
sono, adverti che de signori la maggior parte con le orecchie, & spesso
non piu merita & serve, ma chi piu pace è rimunerato” (Equicola,
De Natura, sig. EE1r–EE1v).
135. “Il respiro di soddisfazione che ha tirato a questo punto il lettore è il
miglior commento del libro dell’Equicola.” Savino, Alcuni trattati,
X. 90.
136. 1584 edition D4v (Huntington 215382) Marginal gloss: “Natura
delle donne”; text reads: “la natura delle donne è instabile.”
137. “Essendo; gia molti anni sono, il presente libro di Mario Equicola
di natura d’Amore, stato publicato dal suo Autore, per essere opera
piena di bella è varia dottrina, benche scritta non cosi politamente,
Notes 211
68. This letter appears in 1556 Stile et manière on pp. 53v–54r; in 1568
Enemy of Idleness on sig. S3r–S3v.
69. Fullwood, Enemy of Idleness, sig. S3v–S4r.
70. Fullwood, Enemy of Idleness, (London 1568), sig. S4v–S5r.
71. Angel Day, The English Secretary (London, 1599), sig. V1r.
72. BL 1084 d 1 2 (bound in same volume with Tagliente’s letter book
and other similar texts). Andrea Zenophonte da Ugubio, Formulario
Nuovo ad dittar Lettere Amorose, Messive, & Responsive composto
per Opera Nuova, intitulatoa Flos Amoris (Venice: Marchio Sessa,
1531), 80.
73. Stewart and Wolfe, Letterwriting, 80.
74. All references are to Walter Darell, A Short discourse of the life of
Servingmen, plainly expressing the way that is best to be followed, and
the meanes wherby they may lawfully challenge a name and title in
that vocation and fellowship. With certaine letters verie necessarie for
Servingmen, and other persons to peruse. With diverse pretty inven-
tions in English verse. Hereunto is also annexed a treatise, concerning
manners and behaviours (London: Ralphe Newberrie, 1578), STC
6274. The “treatise concerning manners” is a translation of Della
Casa’s Galateo.
75. Patt, “The Early ‘Ars dictaminis,’” 135, see also148–155.
76. Fantazzi, “Introductory Note,” 2–3.
77. Potter, Life and Literary Remains, 36–37.
78. Aretino’s notion of what a letter should be may have been greatly
influenced by Erasmus’s De conscribendis epistolis. See Raymond B.
Waddington, Aretino’s Satyr: Sexuality, Satire, and Self-Projection
in Sixteenth-Century Literature and Art (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2004), 49–54.
79. Waddington, Aretino’s Satyr, xxii.
80. Waddington, Aretino’s Satyr, 51.
81. Pietro Aretino, The Letters of Pietro Aretino, ed. and trans. Thomas
Caldecott Chubb (New York: Archon, 1967), 261.
82. Guillén, “Notes,” 92.
83. See Raffaele Morabito, “Giovanni Antonio Tagliente e l’epistografia
cinquecentesca,” Studi e problemi di critica testuale 33 (1986): 37–53;
and more generally Bray, L’Art de la lettre amoureuse, 21–29.
84. Diego de San Pedro, Prison of Love, ed. and trans. Keith Whinnom
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979), vii–ix; Joyce
Boro, ed., The Castell of Love: A Critical Edition of Lord Berner’s
Romance, MRTS 336 (Tempe, AZ: Arizona Center for Medieval
and Renaissance Studies, 1997), 14–15.
85. Diego de San Pietro, The castell of loue, translated out of Spanishe
into Englyshe, by Johan Bowrchier knyght, lorde Bernis, at the instance
of lady Elizabeth Carew, late wyfe to Syr Nicholas Carew knyght. The
which boke treateth of the loue betwene Leriano and Laureola doughter
Notes 219
37. On the differences between the two editions, see Ferrand, Traité
de l’essence et guérison de l’amour, XVI–XIX, 213–217; Beecher and
Ciavolella, “Jacques Ferrand,” 21–23, 34–38.
38. All my subsequent references to Ferrand’s text are to the 1623 edi-
tion unless otherwise noted.
39. Ferrand, Traité de l’essence et guérison de l’amour, 74.
40. Siraisi, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine, 107–109.
41. See, for example, Beecher and Ciavolella, “Jacques Ferrand,” 100–101;
Ferrand, Treatise on Lovesickness, 390, n. 20.
42. Beecher and Ciavolella, “Jacques Ferrand,” 113.
43. Petronius, “Satyricon,” in Petronius, Satyricon; Seneca Apocolocyntosis,
ed. E. H. Warmington and W. H. D. Rouse (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1975), section 43: “adhuc salax erat. Non
mehercules illum puto in domo canem reliquisse.”
44. Siraisi, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine, 104–106. Gail
Kern Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of
Shame in Early Modern England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1993), 6–14.
45. Siraisi, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine, 101–104.
46. Ferrand, Erotomania, sig. D4r.
47. Dedicatory poem by Martin Lluellin of Christ Church college.
Ferrand, Erotomania, sig. b2r.
48. Nicholas Monardes, Joyfull Newes out of the New Found Worlde
(London, 1577), sig. I3r. C. T. An Advice How to Plant Tobacco
in England (London, 1615), sig. B4v–C4v, sig. C4r–C4v. Tobias
Venner, A Briefe and Accurate Treatise concerning the Taking of the
Fume of Tobacco (London, 1621), sig. B3r, C2v–C4v.
49. Pierre Boaistuau, Theatrum Mundi, The Theatre or rule of the world,
wherein may be seen the running race & course of every man’s life, as
touching miserie and felicitie, wherein be contained wonderfull exam-
ples and learned devises to the overthrow of vice and exalting of virtue.
(London, 1581), sig. O1r. This is a translation of the 1558 French
edition, a very popular text, reprinted over 20 times in France, and
published in Spanish translation in 1574.
50. Avicenna, Liber canonis, trans. Gerard of Cremona (Venice, 1555),
book III, fen 1, tr. 5, ch. 23. “Fortasse necessarium erit, ut isti
reganter regimine habentium melancholiam, et maniam, et alcutu-
but” (Arabic cuturub—i.e., lycanthropy). Haly Abbas’s medical epit-
ome, al-Kit āb al-m ālik ī (Pantegni) in Opera Omnia Ysaac, trans.
Constantius Africanus (Lyon, 1515), chapter 7, treatise 9 (c. 950 AD)
is entitled “De malinconia et canina et amore causisque eorum et
signis” [on the causes and signs of melancholy, lycanthropy and love-
sickness]. See Robert Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, Book 3 Love
Melancholy, ed. Holbrook Jackson (New York: New York Review
Books, 2001), 1.1.1.4, p. 141.
51. Beecher and Ciavolella, “Jacques Ferrand,” 62.
Notes 225
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———. Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe. 1978, revised ed. New
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———. “The Renaissance Dialogue.” Renaissance Studies 3, no. 1 (1989):
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Burton, Robert. The Anatomy of Melancholy, Book 3 Love Melancholy. Ed.
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Capellanus, Andreas. De Amore in Andreas Capellanus on Love. Ed. and
trans. P. G. Walsh. London: Duckworth, 1982.
Carroll, William C. “‘And Love You ’gainst the Nature of Love’: Ovid,
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Castiglione, Baldassare. Balthasaris Castilionis comitis de curiali siue aulico
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———. Cortegiano. Florence, 1531.
———. Cortegiano. Venice: Giolito, 1552.
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———. Cortegiano. Venice, 1584.
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Index
Abrabanel, Judah, 14, 33, 60, 76, Bible, The, 62, 154, 185
78, 103 blood, 4, 12, 89, 156, 157, 159–60,
Academy of Complements, The, 163–4, 166, 168–72
138–40 Boaistuau, Pierre, 146, 161, 184
Alcibiades, 30, 33, 83, 168 Boccaccio, Giovanni, 18, 57, 72
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 86 Boleyn, Anne, 134–7
Andreini, Isabella, 121 book market, 2–3, 13–14, 16–17,
Antiochus and Stratonice, 156–7 19, 23, 33, 120, 129
Aretino, Pietro, 92–3, 130–1, 154–5 brain, the, 75, 150–2, 157–8, 161,
Ariosto, Ludovico, 18, 25 165–6, 175, 178
Aristotle, 62, 66–7, 69, 71, 72, 74, Brooke, Arthur, 184–5
77, 80, 83, 85–9, 93, 96–7, Bruno, Giordano, 33
104, 167, 168 Burke, Peter, 18, 53–4
Arnold of Villanova, 90, 167, 173 Burton, Robert, 12, 16, 59, 103,
ars dictaminis, 114–15, 129 146, 150–1, 161, 172
Aschem, Roger, 59
astrology, 14, 76, 149, 154, 167 Cantelmo family, 63–6
Augustine, St., 74, 76, 77, 84 Capellanus, Andreas, 16–17
Avicenna (Abu Ali Husayn Abdullah Castiglione, Baldassare, 3, 18,
ibn Sina), 4, 68, 74, 90, 157, 22, 27–60, 62, 66, 74, 86,
162 90–1, 93, 96, 97, 100, 101,
167, 178
ballads, 15, 18 Book of the Courtier, 3, 18, 22–4,
Bandello, Matteo, 184–5 27–61, 86, 90, 93, 96
beauty, 4, 21–2, 28–33, 35, 38, publication history, 23, 53–60
48–52, 54–5, 57–8, 69–70, Cortegiano, Il (see Book of the
72, 74, 76, 83–4, 86, 89, 91, Courtier)
98, 100, 109, 115–18, 121, Courtier, The (see Book of the
123–6, 130, 140, 150, 153, Courtier)
156, 168, 179, 186 Catullus, 94, 95, 96, 163
Bebel, Heinrich, 115 Cavalcanti, Guido, 72–3
Bembo, Pietro, 23, 27–8, 33, 38–9, Celtis, Conrad, 115
42–4, 48–60, 62, 67, 72–3, censorship, 39, 54, 56, 154, 177
86, 91, 97, 103, 167 chastity, 37, 47, 50–1, 55, 83, 89,
Asolani, Gli, 23, 33, 42, 49, 72 112, 115, 119, 138, 143,
Bernard of Gordon, 169, 178 160, 171, 179
Betussi, Giuseppe, 33 Chilmead, Edmund, 156, 179
246 Index