Options For Project Emission Baselines
Options For Project Emission Baselines
Options For Project Emission Baselines
INFORMATION PAPER
FOREWORD
This document was prepared by the OECD and IEA Secretariats in October 1999 at the request of
the Annex I Expert Group on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The Annex I Expert Group oversees development of analytical papers for the purpose of
providing useful and timely input to the climate change negotiations. These papers may also be
useful to national policy makers and other decision-makers. In a collaborative effort, authors
work with the Annex I Expert Group to develop these papers. However, the papers do not
necessarily represent the views of the OECD or the IEA, nor are they intended to prejudge the
views of countries participating in the Annex I Expert Group. Rather, they are Secretariat
information papers intended to inform Member countries, as well as the UNFCCC audience.
The Annex I Parties or countries referred to in this document refer to those listed in Annex I to
the UNFCCC (as amended at the 3rd Conference of the Parties in December 1997): Australia,
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, the European
Community, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of
America. Where this document refers to “countries” or “governments” it is also intended to
include “regional economic organisations”, if appropriate.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper was prepared by Jane Ellis (OECD) and Martina Bosi (IEA) under the guidance of Jan
Corfee-Morlot (OECD) and Jonathan Pershing (IEA). The authors thank Mark Stevens
(Australia), Satender Singh (Canada), Mette Nedergaard (Denmark), Jean-Jacques Becker
(France), Tiit Kallaste (Estonia), Murray Ward (New Zealand), Anne Johanne Enger (Norway),
Anne Arquit-Niederburger and José Romero (Switzerland) and Maurice LeFranc and Shari
Friedman (US) for the information, comments and ideas they provided. The authors are also
grateful to Debbie Stowell and Axel Michaelowa for their suggestions. Jean Cinq-Mars,
Stéphane Willems, Gene McGlynn and Thomas Martinsen (OECD), and Kristi Varangu, Richard
Baron, John Paffenbarger, Jeffery Piper and Maria Argiri (IEA) also provided advice and
comments.
Jane Ellis
Administrator
Environment Directorate
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
2 rue André Pascal
75016 Paris, FRANCE
Tel: +33 1 4524 9697
Fax: +33 1 4524 7876
E-mail: [email protected]
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................ 9
1.1 OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH ................................................................................................. 9
1.2 CONTEXT.................................................................................................................................... 10
2. BASELINE APPROACHES DESCRIBED..................................................................................... 12
2.1 PROJECT-SPECIFIC BASELINES............................................................................................. 15
2.2 MULTI-PROJECT BASELINES ................................................................................................. 16
2.3 HYBRID PROJECT BASELINES............................................................................................... 17
3 CROSS-CUTTING THEMES .......................................................................................................... 20
3.1 DYNAMIC VS STATIC BASELINES........................................................................................ 20
3.2 EMISSIONS TIMELINE ............................................................................................................. 21
3.3 DATA SOURCES ........................................................................................................................ 22
4 QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON OF BASELINE APPROACHES.......................................... 23
4.1 SURVEY OF EXPERIENCE WITH DIFFERENT BASELINE APPROACHES ...................... 23
4.1.1 Conversion of heat plants in the Czech Republic.................................................................. 23
4.1.2 Boiler conversions in Estonia ............................................................................................... 24
4.1.3 Other projects ....................................................................................................................... 25
4.2 SURVEY OF EXPERIENCE WITH DIFFERENT BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS .................... 27
4.3 CASE STUDY SIMULATIONS WITH MULTI-PROJECT BASELINES................................. 28
4.3.1 Electricity Generation in Brazil............................................................................................ 29
4.3.2 Electricity Generation in India ............................................................................................. 31
4.3.3 Simulation Results ................................................................................................................ 33
5 QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT BASELINE APPROACHES..................... 34
5.1 DATA, MONITORING AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ............................................... 34
5.2 BASELINE DEVELOPMENT COST ......................................................................................... 35
5.3 TRANSPARENCY AND EASE OF THIRD PARTY VERIFICATION .................................... 36
5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS .................................................................................... 37
5.4.1 Project-level environmental additionality ............................................................................ 37
5.4.2 Overall environmental effectiveness of JI/CDM ................................................................... 39
6 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................ 42
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................... 54
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................................................ 57
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LIST OF TABLES
Table A1: Estimated Energy Use and Carbon Emissions in Baseline [at time of project
registration].......................................................................................................................................... 47
Table A2: Estimated Gross Changes in Energy Use and Carbon Emissions from Project [at time
of project registration].......................................................................................................................... 48
Table A3: Estimated Net Changes in Energy Use and Carbon Emissions from Project [at time of
project registration].............................................................................................................................. 49
LIST OF FIGURES
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Executive Summary
The Kyoto Protocol establishes two project-based mechanisms: the clean development
mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). Emission baselines for JI and CDM projects
aim to quantify “what would have happened” in terms of greenhouse gas emissions in the absence
of those projects. Actual emissions from JI or CDM projects are measured against baseline
emissions, and, if lower, can generate emission credits. Baselines are, by definition, hypothetical
reference cases and are subject to a number of uncertainties.
There are differing views about whether or not CDM and JI require the same framework for
setting baselines. This paper does not attempt to prejudge the outcome or potential implications
of political negotiations on this issue. The paper focuses on the technical aspects of baselines.
Once established, rules and/or guidance for JI and CDM under the Kyoto Protocol are expected to
cover many aspects of the mechanisms and not just the baseline. The linkages between the
emissions baseline and other aspects of project-based mechanisms, such as eligibility criteria and
monitoring and reporting requirements means that the rules for one may influence others.
There are different ways to set up an emissions baseline. Ideally, baselines should be credible,
transparent, simple and inexpensive to set up. In practice, drawing up baselines is likely to
involve tradeoffs among these criteria. Moreover, the level of baseline aggregation and
standardisation can vary widely. Baselines can be established so they apply to one project only
(“project-specific”), aggregated to a sub-sector or sector level (“multi-project”), or be in a grey
area somewhere between these two levels of aggregation (“hybrid”). The literature also mentions
the possibility of aggregated nationwide baselines (“top-down”), but this paper focuses on the
three other approaches.
Project-specific baselines are the least aggregate type of emission baselines, and evaluate
emission reductions generated from one particular project (rather than a group of similar
projects). These baselines are established by using project-specific assumptions, measurements,
or simulations for all key parameters: they tend to take output levels into account implicitly rather
than explicitly. Most AIJ projects to date have used project-specific baselines when calculating
the emission benefits of those projects.
Multi-project baselines seek to standardise emission levels or rates, and are designed to be
applicable to multiple projects of a similar type. Individual projects would be measured against
these baselines to see whether or not they were eligible for emissions credits, and, if so, how
many credits they would generate. Multi-project baselines may be calculated based on
assumptions about the emissions rate (e.g. g CO2/kWh) as well as on an absolute emissions level.
Multi-project baselines can be highly aggregate and be applied to many projects, or fairly
disaggregated and applied to a smaller range or number of projects.
Hybrid baselines would be designed for projects that do not quite “fit the mould” for a multi-
project baseline, or would simplify the process of collecting and monitoring data for projects
which are unique and thus require individually tailored baselines. Hybrid baselines would be
more aggregate and standardised than project-specific baselines and less aggregate and
standardised than multi-project baselines. Hybrid emission baselines would, like project-specific
baselines, be made up of various components. But the parameter values, or the methodology used
to determine one or more of the baseline’s underlying data points, would be standardised. This
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would mean that establishing a hybrid baseline would be a more streamlined process than
establishing a project-specific baseline.
Some cross-cutting issues are relevant to all baseline approaches. These include the length of time
emission credits can accrue, and whether or not the baseline is fixed at the start of the project
(static) or revised during the project operation (dynamic). Static baselines are predictable and
reduce the uncertainty surrounding the level of credits generated from a project. Dynamic
baselines may better reflect actual trends, but would need to be re-estimated and re-reported at
certain intervals. A number of analyses suggest that dynamic baselines may be more appropriate
for some project types.
The total number of credits generated by a project is very sensitive to the length of time over
which they can accrue (the emissions timeline). If a standard methodology to calculate an
emissions timeline could be agreed, it would increase the comparability between projects, and
also offers a potentially simple way of limiting the effects of free riders and gaming.
The approach used to determine an emissions baseline for a JI or CDM project has consequences
for the project’s transaction cost, transparency and administrative feasibility (including data,
monitoring and reporting requirements) as well as for its environmental additionality. This study
considers each of the main baseline approaches against these performance “criteria”.
Data, monitoring and reporting requirements are important because they affect the costs and
administrative feasibility of project preparation and review. These requirements vary across
different baseline approaches. Project-specific baselines have relatively heavy data requirements
and may require some monitoring of current activities before the actual JI/CDM project or
activity starts. Using multi-project baselines requires less or no monitoring of the pre-JI/CDM
project situation for project participants. However, data are required to establish these baselines.
Different baseline approaches also have different cost implications1. Using a baseline approach
that incorporates either standardised methodologies or assumptions will be cheaper and easier
than developing a project-specific approach. While there are costs involved in developing all
baselines, who pays for their development may differ depending on the approach. By lowering
the costs of project preparation, an agreement on standardised approaches could increase the
number of JI and CDM projects. In turn, this could help increase the effectiveness of JI and
CDM by increasing their contribution to cost-effective emission abatement.
The transparency of a baseline also varies with different baseline approaches. In general, the
more assumptions related to an individual project or to a system that are included in a baseline,
the more documentation is needed with that baseline to make it transparent. Increased
transparency may help to increase participation, and may also facilitate any verification and
certification.
The environmental additionality of a JI/CDM project can be affected by the baseline approach as
this can influence the potential level of gaming, free riders and leakage. Increased levels of
gaming, free riders and leakage would artificially inflate the number of credits resulting from a
project. For the CDM, this would mean that not all credits accruing from CDM projects would
represent actual emission reductions and may lead to higher total Annex I emissions. Artificially
1
The cost of establishing an emissions baseline is one component of the transaction costs
associated with JI and CDM projects, but should ideally be kept as low as possible to encourage
investment through these mechanisms.
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high credit levels for JI projects will not affect the overall Annex I assigned amount2, although it
could make it more difficult for some host countries to meet their individual Kyoto commitments.
The potential for gaming may be particularly high for CDM project-specific baselines. Multi-
project baselines may be more vulnerable to potential free riders in some cases, although the level
at which the baseline is set – and this is true for all baseline approaches- is crucial in this regard.
The assessments presented in this paper indicate that assumptions used to develop baselines
and baseline approaches (e.g. project-specific, multi-project) are independent variables.
Both can influence the level of credits for a particular project. In the examples examined
here, the range in different possible assumptions within one baseline approach can be as large as
the range in assumptions between different baseline approaches. However, not all approaches
may be equally appropriate in all circumstances, and different approaches may be viewed more or
less suitable for different types of projects (e.g. forestry, electricity or landfill).
Both baseline assumptions and approaches will have an impact on the overall
environmental effectiveness of the mechanisms3. The baseline approach will influence the
effectiveness of the mechanism through its impact on the complexity of setting up an emissions
baseline. All other things being equal, more complex methods are likely to limit the number of
projects initiated by adding to the transaction costs associated with developing a CDM or JI
project. Within each approach, baseline assumptions are also likely to have an impact on the
effectiveness of the project-based mechanisms through their impact on the baseline stringency,
which affects the level of credits, and through this the number of projects initiated. Regardless of
the approach used, stringent baselines could limit the number of projects initiated due to their
effect on the cost of credits while lax baselines could obviously have a negative environmental
effect.
In circumstances where different baseline approaches are plausible, the independence of baseline
stringency and approaches suggests that maximum environmental effectiveness across the
project-based mechanisms (as opposed to individual projects) is likely to be achieved by
optimising baseline stringency and reducing baseline complexity. In practice, this means: (i)
seeking to minimise baseline complexity, as long as the ability to determine "what would have
happened otherwise" is not compromised; and (ii) optimising the baseline stringency so that it
2
As long as each Annex I country meets its emissions commitment.
3
Unlike the CDM, JI is a zero-sum game in which transfers and acquisitions of emission credits
will not affect the total Annex I emissions, as allowed by the Kyoto Protocol. The implications
on environmental effectiveness are thus different.
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maximises the overall global environmental effectiveness from the project-based mechanisms.
The optimal strategy takes into account that a high volume of projects will be needed to deliver
strong environmental effectiveness from the mechanisms: a greater number of good projects will
be more beneficial for the environment (in terms of total GHG reductions) than a lower number
of individually better projects.
Progress on technical issues would be greatly facilitated if policy makers decided which baseline
approach(es) are to be used for each JI and CDM project/project type. Such an agreement would
allow analysis to focus on how such approach(es) could be applied in a comparable manner or, in
the terminology of this paper, on finding assumptions that provide the balance between the
environmental effectiveness and encouraging participation given different circumstances. An
agreement would also facilitate the resolution of other outstanding questions (e.g. reporting
formats) which could also help in the development of the mechanisms. In addition,
understanding of the issue would be improved if common definitions and a common vocabulary
for key baseline-related parameters could be reached.
A decision on baseline approach(es) would open the door for assessment and eventual agreement
on other credit-related aspects of JI and CDM projects, such as:
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1. Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) establishes two project-based mechanisms: the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) and Article 6 projects (usually referred to as Joint Implementation, JI).
Article 12.5(c) of the KP states that CDM project activities should result in “reductions in
emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project
activity”. Article 6.1(b) of the KP states that JI projects should provide “a reduction in emissions
by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks, that is additional to any that would
otherwise occur”.
Estimating business-as-usual reference scenarios (i.e. what would happen otherwise) is thus
necessary to evaluate the environmental “additionality” (in terms of emission reductions) of JI
and CDM projects. These reference scenarios are defined as “baselines”.
The international community has not yet decided how these baselines should be established,
reported and verified. However, baselines are an important issue within the ongoing negotiations
on the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC.
Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) was established in 1995 at the first Conference of the Parties
(COP1) as a pilot phase of Joint Implementation. Some experience with emission baselines has
been gained during the AIJ pilot phase. This experience is mainly with emission baselines that
have been established on a project-specific (case-by-case) basis. However, these emission
baselines have been relatively expensive and time-consuming to draw up. Lack of international
guidance on how exactly to draw up these emission baselines has also meant that they are often
neither transparent nor consistent.
There are other possible options by which to develop emission baselines, and many countries
have expressed an interest in examining in more detail how such options would function and what
would be their implications. This paper seeks to define and explain the different baseline
approaches and to examine how the various approaches can impact the assessment of project
environmental additionality and the overall environmental effectiveness of the project-based
mechanisms. A survey of experiences with baseline approaches under AIJ, as well as quantitative
case studies, are included to illustrate the potential use and implications of different baseline
approaches.
• to define and assess how different baseline approaches could function for JI and/or for CDM
projects;
• to determine whether the use of a particular baseline approach (over another approach) could
influence the evaluation of environmental additionality of a particular project; and,
• to determine whether and how the use of a particular baseline approach could influence the
incentive to participate in CDM and JI projects (i.e. the potential effect on the number of
projects).
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This assessment is then used to examine the potential effect of baseline approaches on the overall
effectiveness of the project-based mechanisms4 in helping meet the objectives of the Kyoto
Protocol, i.e. contributing to sustainable development5 and helping Parties achieve their Kyoto
commitments most cost-effectively. In addition, this paper outlines the potential data, monitoring
and reporting requirements for each baseline approach, the likely cost implications of these
requirements, and assesses the applicability of each approach to different project types.
Implications of using different baseline approaches in the verification process of emission
reductions from CDM and JI projects are also examined.
This paper assesses6 different baseline approaches under a number of criteria including:
• the environmental credibility of the baseline (which is related to the potential levels of
gaming, free riders and leakage);
• the relative costs of developing and using the baseline;
• the data, monitoring and reporting requirements of the different baseline approaches; and
• transparency.
The variation in these criteria is likely to influence the transaction costs associated with a project,
the number of projects initiated under the project-based mechanisms, each project’s
environmental additionality, and therefore, the environmental effectiveness of JI and CDM as a
whole7.
The paper also looks at the potential implications of the assumptions used to develop baselines
(using different baseline approaches) on the level and stringency of the baseline. In addition, the
paper provides an initial assessment of the relationship between the assumptions and the different
baseline approaches as well as between the stringency and the complexity of baselines.
1.2 Context
Emission baselines for project-based activities aim to quantify “what would have happened” in
the absence of those activities. Baselines are estimated reference cases for likely future emission
pathways, and are therefore hypothetical8. If actual emissions from JI or CDM projects are lower
than the baseline, they are viewed as additional9 and can be used to generate emission credits.
4
As explained later in section 1.2, there are different views on whether or not baseline-setting
framework should be the same for JI and CDM.
5
Article 12.2 of the Kyoto Protocol explicitly states that one of the purposes of the CDM is to
assist non-Annex I Parties (i.e. the developing countries) “in achieving sustainable
development”.
6
This assessment is in section 5.
7
The implications on environmental effectiveness may be different for JI and CDM.
8
Even an emission baseline based on factual data is hypothetical because it is based on the
hypothesis that future and past performance will be the same – which may or may not be the
case.
9
In this paper, “additional” is defined solely based on the impact of the project on GHG
emissions. No financial criteria are taken into account though this is another important area of
consideration.
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It is important to note that there are different views on whether or not rules and guidelines for
setting emissions baselines for JI and CDM projects should be the same. Whereas JI can be
viewed as a “zero-sum” exercise where the total assigned amount for Annex I countries does not
change as a result of the transfer and acquisition of ERUs, the CDM can be viewed as a “plus-
sum” exercise.
Global emissions remain unaffected by ERUs from JI projects (as long as the JI host country
meets its Kyoto commitments), regardless of the uncertainty surrounding estimated
environmental additionality. On the other hand, CERs generated from CDM projects are added
to the Annex I assigned amount. The inherent uncertainty associated with the estimation of CERs
resulting from CDM projects can lead to positive or negative impacts on the level of global
greenhouse gas emissions. For these reasons some Parties are of the view that CDM projects and
JI projects should be treated differently. In this view, rules about baseline-setting would be
appropriate for CDM projects, while only guidance about baseline-setting would be necessary for
JI projects. Other Parties, however, do not support such a distinction between the two project-
based mechanisms. As the Kyoto Protocol (Articles 6 and 12) states that emission reductions
resulting from a CDM or JI project must be “additional to any that would” occur in the absence of
that project, these Parties are of the view that both mechanisms should have a consistent treatment
of environmental “additionality.” Emissions baselines are important to this debate because they
are used to assess environmental additionality.
While this paper notes these differing views and their potential implications, no attempt is made
to prejudge the outcome of political negotiations on this issue. Instead, the paper focuses on
technical aspects of baselines, their relationship with environmental additionality, participation in
the mechanisms (i.e. potential number of projects), and more broadly with environmental
effectiveness. Environmental effectiveness, while recognising that implications may be different
for JI and the CDM, is defined in the paper by the environmental additionality of each individual
JI and CDM project, (compared to what would have happened without such projects), and the
likely number of projects undertaken.
Leaving aside the debate on whether or not setting CDM and JI baselines require the same
framework, an ideal emissions baseline should:
• be environmentally credible (to ensure long-term benefits greater than what would happen
otherwise);
• be transparent and verifiable by a third Party;
• be simple and inexpensive to draw up (low transaction costs); and
• provide a reasonable level of crediting certainty for investors.
In practice, any baseline approach is likely to involve tradeoffs among the criteria above.
If the baseline level is higher than the emission level that would “happen otherwise”, an
artificially high number of emission credits would be generated per project. A high baseline level
would also result in more projects being eligible for JI/CDM status and could increase the number
of free riders as well as lower the cost of emissions credits. On the other hand, if the project
baseline is very stringent and set at a level lower than the emission level that would “happen
otherwise”, the amount of emission credits per project would be artificially small. A low baseline
will by definition limit the number of eligible projects, and may even disqualify some potentially
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climate-friendly projects. A low baseline is also likely to reduce the number of profitable projects
and to increase the cost of emissions credits from those projects that do qualify10.
Uncertainties in emission baselines cannot be eliminated as it is not possible to prove what would
“happen otherwise” in these hypothetical reference cases. However, there are concerns about the
potential incentives to create greater inaccuracies in the baselines, e.g. by biasing them upward in
order to generate a greater number of credits for the CDM/JI project participants (i.e. “gaming”).
Apart from the impact of the baseline level, this paper considers the impact of different baseline
approaches and assumptions on the environmental effectiveness, as defined above, of the CDM
and JI. The analysis recognises the need to strike a balance between maximising the
environmental credibility of the baseline and minimising the costs of developing the baseline in
order to encourage participation and a high level of investment in emission-reducing projects.)
The literature also mentions baselines drawn up at the national level, referred to as “top-down”
baselines (e.g. Puhl 1998). These top-down baselines are highly aggregated, reflect national
government objectives/targets and policies and have therefore been most often referred to in the
context of JI or AIJ projects. These baselines could be used to assess emission reductions
resulting from policy initiatives (e.g. Puhl et al.1998) and not only concrete project activities, as
is the case for the other baseline approaches. Because of this fundamental difference with the
other baseline approaches considered in this paper, top-down baselines12 are not treated further in
this paper.
There are many possible variations to the three baseline groups assessed in this paper. For
example, the time over which emission credits can accrue (the “emissions timeline”) can vary.
10
Estimating whether or not a hypothetical baseline was overestimated (lax) or underestimated
(stringent) is likely to be difficult, uncertain and best carried out only several years after the start
of the project (e.g. if the assessment is to be based on data regarding comparable, but non-
JI/CDM, projects).
11
This type of baseline includes those variously referred to as “benchmarks”, “activity standards”,
“project-category”, “technology matrix” and “sectoral”.
12
In some cases, top-down baselines refer to sectoral baselines based on national data. In this
paper, such baselines would fit under the “multi-project” typology.
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These, and other cross-cutting issues, such as whether or not baselines should be static or
dynamic, are discussed in section 3 of this paper.
Standardisation/aggregation
The vocabulary surrounding emission baselines is under development. At present, there appears
to be no international consensus either on terminology, or on the definition of baseline categories.
In some cases, one term is used to describe more than one concept. For example, some use
“dynamic” baselines to refer to a baseline that is not at a constant level throughout the crediting
life of the project, e.g. because of projected changes in output from that project. Some use it to
mean a baseline that has been retroactively altered. Others use the same term to refer to a
baseline that is revised during the course of a project. This paper uses the latter definition for
dynamic.
In other cases, there are many different labels describing one concept, such as using one
aggregate factor to determine the emissions credits from a project. In this case, the aggregate
factor has been variously referred to as an activity standard, benchmark, project-category, or
intensity indicator. This paper uses “multi-project”.
In addition, the approach used to determine a baseline’s level can be distinguished in different
ways, e.g. by level of aggregation, whether underlying data were historical or projected, and to
what extent models were used. Since many different data points are needed to establish a
baseline, and since each of these data points can vary in level of aggregation etc. any
categorisation is likely to be blurred. This paper distinguishes baseline approaches by the level of
aggregation and standardisation.
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- technology level Baseline emissions are specified per technology, e.g. on Difference between measured project emissions and
a rate basis such as t CO2/GWh. inferred baseline emissions.
- (sub-)sector level Baseline is equivalent to a “performance standard” (or Projects/activities would only qualify for credits if
intensity indicator) that is aggregated at a certain level emissions (per unit activity or output) were under
(e.g. sub-sector X in country Y, or sector P in country the performance standard. Credits would be based
region Q). on the difference between project emissions and the
performance standard.
Hybrid Baseline determined in a hybrid fashion, with some key Difference between measured project emissions and
parameters project-specific, and others standardised (the estimated baseline emissions.
number and level of the standardised parameters will
vary for each different project category).
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The project-specific baseline approach was the most commonly used in AIJ pilot phase
projects, and is therefore the baseline approach for which there is most experience. These
baselines were drawn up on a case-by-case basis for a particular project. For project-specific
baselines, each key component used to establish the emissions baseline is individually
assessed to determine what would have happened in lieu of that particular project. These
different data components of a project-specific baseline may be measurements, estimations,
simulations or assumptions, and may be unique to a particular project (e.g. distance from
current electricity or gas grids) or applicable to a group of projects (e.g. the technical lifetime
of the equipment installed).
Despite the project-specific nature of this baseline approach, it may still be subject to
considerable uncertainty and thus lead to uncertain estimates of the “environmental
additionality” of JI or CDM projects. One analysis (Begg et. al. 1999) indicates that using a
project-specific baseline to estimate emission reductions from refurbishment-type energy
sector projects results in uncertainties of the order of + 80% - and these type of projects are
those usually thought of as the “easiest” projects for which to draw up emission baselines!
The same analysis indicates that the largest component of this uncertainty is the hypothetical
nature of the baseline, i.e. the choice and timing of baseline fuel and technology options.
Most project-specific baselines in AIJ projects were established using measurement and
expert judgement for key parameters, though model simulations or comparisons were also
used to a lesser extent. These baselines were often drawn up by a consultant acting on behalf
of the investor, before being reviewed by a team in the investor’s country and agreed to by the
host country. Because of the lack of rules or guidance governing what needed to be measured
and/or reported in order to set up an emissions baseline, AIJ project reports did not include a
consistent set of data in their elaboration of the emissions baseline (Ellis 1999). Moreover,
the detail of data and underlying assumptions presented in the project reports submitted to the
UNFCCC varied significantly between different AIJ projects. The costs of establishing
tailored emission baselines for some JI-type projects have been estimated at 1-8% of total
project costs (Puhl 1998).
Project-specific baselines could be made more consistent and transparent than those used to
date. This would be achieved if each project type had a uniform reporting format in which to
report specific information (such as fuel and technology characteristics) from that project
type. This could encourage an agreement on methods on how to calculate emissions
baselines. Such a baseline could then be classified as hybrid or multi-project in some cases13.
Data requirements for determining tailored emission baselines vary by project type. Initial
reporting requirements for selected project types have already been suggested by some
analysts (e.g. MacDicken 1997, Vine and Sathaye 1999, Ellis 1999) and are listed in Annex
A. These suggested reporting requirements are quite data intensive, and may in some cases
13
The current Uniform Reporting Format for AIJ projects does not request the reporting of
specific data, but “estimated emissions without the activity (project baseline)” and
“estimated emissions with the activity”. Consistent methods would result in greater
transparency irrespective of baseline type, and are discussed further in section 2.5.
15
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
necessitate monitoring and reporting fuel and/or technology use over an extended period of
time before the project is in place, as well as during the life of the project. For example, the
current Dutch approach to establishing a baseline requires information “for twelve successive
months prior to the start of the project” (JIRC 1997). The tables in the UNFCCC’s current
Uniform Reporting Format imply that annual monitoring and reporting of project emissions is
required for AIJ projects.
Multi-project baselines are an extremely broad category of baseline. They could encompass
baselines drawn up at differing levels of geographical or sectoral aggregation, and baselines
using each level of aggregation could be based on historical data, trends or projected data. At
a disaggregate level, e.g. specific to a particular technology, sub-sector and country, multi-
project baselines can approach the level of detail of a hybrid project baseline17. Alternatively,
highly aggregate project categories could be drawn up, e.g. sectoral level. The AIJ pilot
phase includes at least one project (cement manufacture in the Czech republic18) where the
emission benefit was calculated by using a sectoral baseline.
Multi-project baselines are potentially simple, transparent, predictable and low-cost. They
may also reduce “micro” gaming (gaming at the project level) compared to other baselines, if
they were developed by a (neutral) third party.
Opinions differ on whether multi-project or other baseline approaches give a more plausible
estimate of the hypothetical emission level that would occur without the JI or CDM project.
Multi-project baselines are defined and applied to a group of projects. This means that the
environmental additionality of each project credited under a multi-project baseline has not
been assessed on what would have happened in lieu of that particular project, although multi-
project baselines can nevertheless represent a plausible estimate of the overall situation that
would have happened otherwise. Ultimately, projects assessed against multi-project baselines
can generate the same number, greater or fewer emission credits than if they were assessed
14
Many different alternative labels for this type of approach have been used, including
“benchmarks”, “intensity indicators”, “activity standards”.
15
Little work has been done to date on the possibility of using benchmarks for biotic projects.
However, some initial thinking on the issue (see Trexler 1999a) indicates that a binary
(yes/no) determination of additionality may be more appropriate than a rate-based
determination, at least for some LUCF sub-sectors.
16
Using a baseline based on an emissions rate allows changes in output to be taken into
account.
17
Further disaggregation is possible, e.g. for multi-project electricity sector baselines which
could separate fossil/non-fossil sources, peak/off-peak etc.
18
See http://www.unfccc.de/program/aij under the Cze/Fra project
16
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
under project-specific baselines, depending on the assumptions used for the two baseline
approaches.
Of course, the key issue would be where to set the baseline level. Should this level reflect the
host country average; the regional average; the country or regional average for recently
installed technology; the marginal technology; or the best equivalent system already installed
in the host country? Alternatively, should the baseline level be determined by the best
economically attractive system? These different choices in assumptions underlying the
emissions baseline have a significant effect on the number of credits that could be generated
for a project, and are illustrated in section 4.3.
However, once the exact technology characteristics that will form the baseline have been
chosen, the baseline could be relatively simple to establish, for example if it was determined
relative to the emissions performance of best available technology (BAT), e.g. 10% greater
emissions than BAT.
Alternatively, aggregate multi-project baselines could also be drawn up, e.g. at a sector level.
As for more disaggregate multi-project baselines, they could be based on historical data or on
projected performance of the sector.
Whether or not a component used to calculate emission baselines can be easily standardised
depends on the component itself. These are examined in Table 2. The components that are
bolded are those likely to have the greatest impact on a baseline’s level.
19
A hybrid baseline would not necessarily result in similar projects generating identical
emission credits because of project-specific variations in certain parameters and countries’
different circumstances. Nevertheless, it could reduce the wide divergence of emission
reductions for similar projects undertaken in different circumstances that was notable for AIJ
projects.
17
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
20
Average national values for this could be calculated by using national or international
statistics on electricity productions and associated carbon emissions (see e.g. IEA 1998c and
1998d).
18
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Michaelowa (1998) makes some recommendations for methods on how to calculate hybrid
emission baselines for some project categories. These include methodological
recommendations for some energy supply project types, summarised in Table 3.
Table 3: Replacing old power plant with new plant using renewable energies -
examples of suggested baselines and timelines
The level of emission credits is highly dependent on a few key assumptions (e.g. timeline,
fuel use, technology type). Reaching agreement on adequate default value(s) for these
assumptions is crucial, and may be difficult, as there are likely to be different views that will
need to be considered.
19
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
3. Cross-cutting themes
There are certain issues of relevance to many different baseline options. These include:
• whether or not the baseline should be re-estimated over the life of the project (i.e. whether
the baseline is “static” or “dynamic”);
• the emissions timeline (the length of time over which a project can generate emissions
credits); and
• how data are used to calculate the emissions baseline are generated (i.e. whether data are
historical, observed by comparing against a control group, or simulated/projected e.g. via
models).
These cross-cutting issues are discussed in this section. Other cross-cutting issues, such as
whether or not a distinction should be made between refurbishment and “greenfield” projects,
the importance of the renewal rate of technology, implications of inclusion/exclusion of non-
CO2 greenhouse gases in emissions baselines and pre-combustion emissions, are not
discussed here.
Dynamic baselines will need to be re-estimated (and therefore re-reported, and the amount of
future expected emission credits revised) at certain intervals during the project’s life. This re-
estimation will allow the baseline to reflect more closely changing “best estimates” for the
key parameters used in drawing it up. Dynamic baselines may therefore reflect more
accurately than a static baseline what would have happened in the absence of the project.
Dynamic baselines may therefore ensure the continuing environmental additionality of a
project more consistently than static baselines, as they would enable a baseline to be adjusted
downwards if the environmental performance of the sector/process improves. Dynamic
baselines result in a greater level of investor uncertainty in the number of credits for a
particular project than static baselines. However, this uncertainty can be reduced if investors
know exactly when, after what time interval, and upon what factors the baseline is to be re-
calculated21.
Both policy and technology factors could lead to the need for baseline changes. For example,
Costa Rica has announced that they would phase out non-renewable sources of electricity
supply by 200122. If this policy is successfully implemented, average per kWh emissions will
decrease to zero (within the lifetime of any proposed AIJ/CDM electricity supply project).
An electricity project proposed before the policy announcement may have assumed a
21
For example, if investors know that a baseline is fixed for eight years, and subsequently
recalculated, this dynamic baseline may nevertheless provide sufficient certainty to
encourage investments. However, if a baseline may be recalculated at any point during the
project’s lifetime, uncertainty will be much greater, and investment likely to be less.
22
It is unclear, however, if this objective will be achieved even without CDM projects.
20
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Most experience to date with emission baselines for project-based activities is with static
baselines, which were used in the majority of AIJ projects. However, at least one AIJ project
has a dynamic baseline: the project on cement production in Cizkovice (see the France/Czech
project under http:/www.unfccc.de/program/aij) has a baseline that will be re-estimated after
the first five years of project operation. In addition, many of the Swedish AIJ projects revised
their (static) emission baselines between the first and subsequent reports to the UNFCCC.
Some AIJ projects, such as the Romania/Swiss one, used a combination of (static) baselines23.
A number of analyses have suggested that dynamic baselines may be appropriate for some
project types. Begg et. al. (1999) suggest that the best way of dealing with baseline
uncertainty is to check and revise the baseline every 8-12 years. They clarify that any
revisions should apply to the remainder of a project’s lifetime only, and should not be applied
retroactively. Ernst Basler & Partners suggest that either a dynamic baseline, with
reassessment after approximately 8 years or a short timeline is needed in projects that require
long-term assumptions about a system’s electricity production. No analysis of the cost
implications arising from the use of dynamic versus static baselines has been undertaken – but
clearly, the responsibility for reassessing credits during the life of a project will add to the
transaction costs.
Both static and dynamic baselines can be set up in such a manner as to make them
environmentally effective. The effectiveness of a baseline is not only determined by the level
at which it is set (which in turn is influenced by which baseline option is used), but the length
of time over which it allows credits to accrue to the investor. The emissions timeline is
assessed in the following sub-section.
The AIJ projects examined in a previous paper (Ellis 1999) had widely differing emission
timelines, even for projects of a similar nature. Creating a standard methodology to calculate
23
Available at http://www.admin.ch/swissaij/in_meth_baselinestep.html.
21
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
an emissions timeline would have many advantages. It would increase both the transparency
of emission baselines and the comparability between projects. A standardised methodology
would also reduce the time and costs of setting up an emissions baseline, as the method would
be one factor that the developer would not have to develop themselves. If this standardised
methodology was conservative (stringent), it could also help to ensure the environmental
integrity of the projects by aiming to err on the side of caution.
However, there are many different views on how an emissions timeline could be set. These
include:
• numerical limits, e.g. 5 years for energy-sector JI-type projects (NEFCO, quoted in Puhl
1998) and 99 years for biotic projects (the Dutch FACE foundation);
• project-category formulae, e.g. 10 years for replacing an old power plant with one based
on renewable energies, or the commercial life (depreciation period) of a new power plant
(Michelowa 1998); or
• the technical or economic lifetime of the project.
Because the effect of the timeline on total credits from a project is so important, standardising
a methodology to assess a project’s emissions timeline offers perhaps the easiest way of
limiting the negative effects of free riders and gaming. A standardised timeline methodology
would therefore offer a simple way of working to ensure environmental effectiveness when
calculating emission baselines and emission credits from a possible project. Moreover, all
emission baselines will need an emissions timeline, so a standardised methodology could be
used to affect all projects. Nevertheless, applying one standard methodology to all projects is
unlikely to be appropriate. At a minimum, the methodology would need to vary between
projects that reduce emissions and those that increase sinks.
There are advantages and disadvantages associated with using the different types and sources
of data. For example, projections may be viewed as a more plausible reflection of what
would happen under a future business-as-usual scenario than baselines based on historical
data. On the other hand, the inherent speculative nature of some of the information needed to
establish baselines based on projections means that these baselines may not be not be
transparent unless extensively documented. They may also be more open to gaming and basic
error than baselines constructed using other data sources.
The availability (or not) of the data sets needed may in turn influence the approach used to
calculate an emissions baseline24, as the baseline approaches assessed in section 2 could be
based on any of these data types.
24
For example, if data are available for a comparable project a comparison-based project-
specific baseline could be used. If sectoral data are not available, it would be difficult to use
a multi-project baseline at the sectoral level.
22
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Section 4.3 simulates case studies that examine the impact of different assumptions on the
amount and potential value of emission credits under a multi-project baseline in the electric
power generation sector in Brazil and India. By examining the implication of varying baseline
assumptions on the cost of CDM credits, it is possible to understand better the significance of
these decisions on the potential volume of CDM project activity.
Variation among countries’ industry structure, fuel mix, land-use, investment patterns,
policies, evolution of supply and demand all affect the assumptions underlying any emission
baseline. This means that the relative levels of emission baselines established by a common
approach may be different depending on the country and region. The resulting emission
credits would also vary between regions and sectors. This supports the need to establish
baselines at a level where circumstances are similar, which may be at the “sub-country”,
country or regional level, depending on the country/sector examined. Thus, while some
baseline approaches are found to result in more or less generous crediting levels in certain
cases than other baseline approaches, this does not necessarily hold for all project types in all
countries. Different baseline approaches may be appropriate in different circumstances.
The relative credit levels from the different baseline approaches are due to the different
underlying assumptions. Technology-standards (a disaggregate form of multi-project
baselines) gave relatively high levels of offsets for both project types because the reference
technologies used were coal26. However, other assumptions could have also been valid that
25
The projects analysed were not designed as AIJ projects; official acceptance, endorsement or
approval of them as AIJ projects was not sought; and the Swiss government is seeking no
emission credits for these projects as potential JI projects. Nevertheless, these projects fulfill
the AIJ criteria specified internationally (UNFCCC 1995) as well as the development criteria
specified by the Czech government, and illustrate issues relating to emission baselines as
well as an officially endorsed AIJ project.
26
Coal was chosen as the reference technology as the majority of Czech heating plants are
coal-fired.
23
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
would result in a lower baseline (and crediting levels). The most extreme example in this case
would be if the reference technology were the marginal unit. Since the Czech Republic has
recently approved construction of a nuclear power station, and since nuclear power emits no
CO2, the marginal unit would in this case give a baseline of zero emissions.
Project Types Offsets under different baselines (t CO2)* - see text for baseline descriptions
Project-specific Technology- Sectoral Top-down##
based standards# standards#
Fuel switch 175000 430000 180000 195000
Cogeneration 41000 43000 21000 22000
Source: adapted from Ernst Basler & Partners, 1999
* The figures represent calculated offsets for the entire project life.
# Both these baselines would be included under the “multi-project” category described in this paper.
## This baseline is based both on current sectoral performance and future emission targets.
The size of the difference in offsets under different the baselines in this Swiss-Czech analysis
is due to the difference in per kWh emissions between gas and coal-fired technologies (which
is in turn a factor of the differing carbon contents of gas and coal, and the relative efficiencies
of gas and coal technologies). The highest number of offsets will occur if comparing against
100% coal, and the least if comparing against 100% gas. Any baseline that mixes the two,
e.g. by comparing to the relative importance of gas and coal, will give offsets somewhere in
between the two extremes.
The top-down and sectoral baselines gave lower potential credit levels because they assumed
that the starting point was a mixture of coal and other fuels, and that per unit emissions would
gradually decrease between the start and end of the project. The project-specific baseline
gave a relatively low number for the fuel switch projects because the baseline assumed that all
units would become gas-fired within 15 years. However, the project-specific baseline gave a
relatively high level of potential credits for the cogeneration project because it assumed that
the electricity displaced by the CHP plant was generated by coal. The differences in the credit
level are thus a result of the underlying reference case more than the baseline approach per se.
24
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
The results of the four separate baseline studies for one project (e.g. Viljandi boiler
conversion) are outlined in Table 5. The projected emission benefits of the same project with
the four different baselines vary by 23% over the lifetime of the project when comparing the
benefits calculated with one timeline27. (One of the suggested baselines had a shorter timeline,
which resulted in significantly lower expected emissions reductions from the project when
compared to longer timelines).
27
Because of the different relative shapes of the different baselines, the variation in projected
annual emission benefits varied by less than this amount at the beginning of the project, and
by more at the end of the project’s emissions timeline.
25
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Table 5: Comparing four estimates of the emission benefits from Viljandi boiler conversion AIJ project
Source: http://www.unfccc.de/program/aij/
26
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
For example, the Centre for Clean Air Policy (CCAP) has undertaken a qualitative estimation
of different baselines possible for the AIJ project situated in Decin, Czech Republic, Figure 2,
(CCAP 1999). This AIJ project converted a coal-fired district heating plant to one fired on
natural gas. The project also included building a new co-generation unit that would supply
electricity locally and feed surplus into the grid.
The CCAP exercise demonstrates that, as also illustrated above, different valid assumptions
for baselines can significantly alter the level of credits generated by a project. The exercise
analysed two forms of “benchmark” (multi-project) approaches. The “historical benchmark”
baseline was based on emissions from average heat and electricity production facilities, and
continuing energy efficiency improvements. The “forward looking benchmark” assumed
further improvements in energy efficiency and a greater penetration of natural gas in heating
and electricity sectors as well as some new nuclear generation. The “forward looking
benchmark” baseline also sought to take the country’s Kyoto commitment into account, as
well as sectoral development plans, when assuming gradual improvements in emissions per
unit from heating and electricity production. (The actual emissions baseline used for the
Decin project is in fact none of those below, although it follows a similar pattern to the
historical benchmark line).
40,000
35,000
30,000
20,000 Top-Down
Frwd Bnchmk
15,000
Proj Emssns
10,000
5,000
0
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Year
Some AIJ projects presented multiple baselines in their report to the UNFCCC (e.g. a
Dutch/Russian horticultural project in Tyumen). The Dutch/Russian analysis in the Tyumen
project report includes five different baselines, all calculated using a project-specific baseline
approach but with different assumptions for fuel use, technologies and project boundaries.
The emission benefits of the project (presented on a per unit basis) vary by more than a factor
of two between the different baselines, and the lowest baseline was used to calculate the
emission benefits of the project.
27
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Other AIJ projects have had more than one baseline drawn up for them, with one chosen as
the most likely scenario by the project participants and then submitted to the UNFCCC.
Some of these alternative baselines are public (e.g. for the Norway/Slovakia project - see
Yager et. al. 1998), and others are not (e.g. for the US/Russia Rusafor project - see
Michaelowa 1998). The three project-specific baseline scenarios with different underlying
assumptions drawn up for the Norway/Slovakia project (converting a coke-fired heating
boiler at Jochy to biomass) result in emission benefits that vary by a factor of nine from the
same project28. Even discounting the baseline scenario judged unrealistic (a 100% switch to
biomass in the absence of the AIJ project), the other two baselines vary by almost a factor of
two (estimating emission benefits from the 2 * 300 kW boiler project as 20 or 35.6 kt CO2).
Various sources were used to obtain emission and cost data and estimates for these case studies although
most data were obtained from publications of the IEA and NEA (NEA/IEA 1998 and IEA 1997b).
Consequently, the data presented may not always be fully comparable.
Cost estimates, types of energy sources, technology and resulting emissions vary according to each
country’s specific national circumstances. In particular, cost estimates are highly dependent on assumptions
for discount rates and future prices of energy. In this section, the discount rate used is 10 percent. It is also
important to note that costs may be underestimated in some cases, as they were estimated based on a stable
political and socio-economic context, which may not reflect the real investment conditions. Cost estimates
for renewable energy sources are difficult to compare as some, such as wind and solar, are intermittent and
are thus not comparable to sources used for baseload generation; while others, such as hydro and biomass,
are very site-specific making cost comparisons between sites quite imperfect.
For the purpose of these case studies, CERs are calculated based on projects generating emissions lower
than a set baseline standard, i.e. using a range of multi-project approaches, as described in section 2, at the
sectoral level. No judgements are made to determine whether such CERs would meet an environmental
“additionality” test or whether they would meet the host country’s sustainable development priorities,
although both are of course critical aspects of the CDM.
28
However, the lowest baseline - corresponding to an autonomous fuel switch to biomass - was
not considered as a viable alternative because of investment constraints.
29
Electricity generation was chosen for this case study for several reasons. It is a large and
growing source of GHG emissions in many countries; it is a sector with a homogenous
output; and relevant data (e.g. on emission characteristics of current technologies and BAT,
and demand projections) were relatively easy to obtain.
30
The assessment of economic feasibility is based on the amount of emission reductions (under
a particular multi-project baseline assumption) divided by the difference in investment and
operation costs between two potential electricity generation options.
28
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
The different multi-project baseline assumptions simulated in this section include: weighted
average emissions from all sources, average emissions from each fuel, 25% improvement on
average emission performance, planned new technology emission performance and BAT
emission performance (see tables in Annex B). Alternative sectoral multi-project baselines
are possible, e.g. using the emission performance of marginal units constructed, and different
sectoral aggregations, which may be viewed as a closer representation of business-as-usual.
However, these are not examined here because of current lack of data.
These case studies are intended to provide an illustration of the potential practical
implications of different simple multi-project baseline assumptions in different countries.
They should not be taken as a model for the development of baselines for CDM projects in
India and Brazil.
The predominance of hydro in Brazil’s electricity generation mix has important implications
for the construction of an emissions baseline. For example, if a single multi-project emission
baseline for Brazil’s power sector were set at the level of the weighted average of emissions
from all sources (i.e. 43.9 t CO2/GWh), this emissions baseline would preclude all fossil fuel
sources generating CERs from CDM projects. In addition, under a weighted average
emissions baseline, the amount of CERs generated from even non-GHG emitting projects
would be quite low compared to similar projects in other countries (see below) that have a
more fossil-fuel intensive electricity sector. Under a multi-project baseline set at the weighted
average emissions level, new hydro capacity could qualify32 as a CDM project and could
therefore generate some CERs. However, hydro is not expected to be the cheapest option for
future new electricity generating systems as most economical sites are being exploited and
large up-front investment capital is required. Moreover, further development of hydropower
may be subject to other constraints such as those related to transmission infrastructure or a
reluctance to developments in particular areas.
Thus, under a weighted average emissions baseline in Brazil, even the most efficient new gas-
fired plants would not generate any CERs. However, a multi-project baseline set at this level
would mean that a new wind project could generate around 44 CERs/GWh (assuming that 1
CER = 1 t CO2).
31
Information from the Electrobras website:
www.embratel.net.br/infoserve/electrobr/evindice.html
32
Such projects would also need to meet Brazil’s sustainable development objectives.
29
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Given that scenarios for Brazil’s future electricity generation indicate a significant increase in
the use of thermoelectric sources (and not hydro), it may be deemed appropriate to design
baselines based on these technologies. Multi-project baselines set at 25% better (i.e. 25% less
CO2-intensive) than the current average for thermoelectric sources, or at the emissions level
from best available technology of various sources, could provide incentives to invest in more
GHG-friendly thermoelectric sources and technology than would otherwise be the case. The
baselines and resulting crediting levels for different multi-project baseline assumptions are
illustrated in Figure 3. The length of the arrow is proportional to the number of credits
obtained per GWh.
Figure 3 shows that, for example, a wind (or biomass, or other renewable-based) CDM
project could generate 44 CERs per GWh (represented by the length of the arrow at the left of
figure 3) if using a baseline set at the level of the weighted average emissions of all plants.
This would increase to 382 CERs/GWh if the baseline were set at the level of BAT gas plants,
755 CERs/GWh if it were set at the level of weighted average thermal generation and 882
CERs/GWh if it were set at the level of average fossil fuel emissions. (See table B1 for other
examples).
33
Investment and operational costs are provided at a national level.
34
The difference between the cost of electricity generated by wind in Brazil (4.47 US
cents/kWh) and gas-fired electricity (3.38 US cents/kWh) is 1.49 US cents/kWh or 14,900
USD/GWh. Based on this cost differential, investment in wind is economic if a CER is
worth at least 340 USD per ton of CO2 (i.e. 14,900 USD/GWh divided by 43.9tCO2/GWh).
30
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
gas plants (i.e. more efficient CCGT) may become an economic alternative to the gas plants
currently planned if CERs are worth more than 79 USD/t CO2. Under this same emission
baseline (i.e. 556 t CO2/GWh), wind generation would become an economic alternative if
CERs were worth more than 27 USD/ t CO2.
It is important to note that while these examples examine the potential implications of
alternative unique multi-project baseline assumptions for new projects in Brazil’ s electricity
sector, another possibility may be to consider developing more than one multi-project
baseline for the electricity sector. For example, one for thermoelectric sources and a separate
one for non-GHG emitting sources. However, this possibility is not examined further in this
paper.
India’s power sector has been experiencing significant peak and supply shortages. Shortfalls
in the investment and construction of new power plants, poor-quality transmission lines and
theft are the main reasons for the supply shortages. These are exacerbated by the lack of an
inter-connected grid across the nation, as states with surplus power do not transfer that surplus
to states facing power shortages. Plans to bridge the gap between increasing electricity
demand and supply include, in addition to greater use of coal, increasing India’s nuclear
power generation capacity, as well as (on a smaller scale) increasing the use of renewable
energy. India’s Ninth five-year plan (1997-2002) includes a target for non-hydro renewable
capacity of 3000 MW.
Figure 4 shows various multi-project baseline assumptions for India’s electricity sector, along
with their associated crediting levels.. For example, based on 1996 data provided in Table
B3, if a sectoral multi-project baseline was set at the weighted average of current generation
in India, it would equal 945 t CO2/GWh. In effect, this would mean that electricity generated
by all sources other than coal (using current Indian technology) would be below this emission
baseline, including coal plants using the best available technology (i.e. clean coal). Under
such a scenario, new wind (or other renewable) plants would generate 945 t CO2/GWh. This
would decrease to 786 t CO2/GWh if the sectoral multi-project baseline were based on BAT
coal emissions, and decrease further to 382 t CO2/GWh if the baseline was based on BAT gas
plants. Planned new coal plants would not be eligible for any credits at all if the multi-project
baseline assumption chosen was the weighted average emission for all generation sources,
BAT coal, or of course, BAT gas.
31
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
However, setting a sectoral multi-project baseline at the level of the weighted average for all
sources in India would mean that all planned gas plants35 would be able to generate CERs if
they were initiated as a CDM project. According to the cost estimates in Table B4, installing
a new BAT gas-fired plant 36 would cost about 5,400 USD more per GWh than the cost of
installing a “planned” coal plant in India. In terms of emission reductions, the BAT-type gas
plant would generate emissions reductions totalling about 563 CERs. In this example, the
additional investment cost of a BAT natural gas plant would be economical, compared to the
cost of a planned coal plant, as long as a CER was worth more than 9.6 USD per tonne of
CO2. A wind electricity plant would be economic compared to a new coal plant if CERs were
worth 23 USD (assuming that a unique sectoral multi-project baseline was based on the
weighted average emissions of all sources).
As mentioned previously, only scenarios involving a unique multi-project baseline for India’s
electricity sector are examined here. However, scenarios with more than one sectoral multi-
project baseline could also be envisioned.
35
Emissions associated with natural gas electricity generation may be underestimated as only
CO2 emissions are taken into account in this study.
36
BAT figures in this study are derived from data on planned plants in OECD countries
(NEA/IEA, 1998). In the case of natural gas, there is not a large difference between planned
CCGT plants in India (at 50% efficiency) and OECD planned CCGT plants (at 52.9
efficiency).
32
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
This analysis shows that a key issue in determining the emissions credits associated with a
project is the stringency of the baseline level. Multiple-project baselines can be designed to
be more or less stringent within one country. However, if different countries choose to use
the same multi-project baseline assumption, it could result in different baseline levels and
different implications for potential CDM projects.
For example, a multi-project baseline in the electricity sector set at weighted average
emissions would equal 945 t CO2/GWh in India, and 44 t CO2/GWh in Brazil. This would
mean that if a unique multi-project baseline based on weighted average emissions was chosen
for the power sector in both Brazil and India, all clean coal-fired projects would be below the
baseline in India, whereas no thermoelectric plants would be in Brazil. The implications for
CERs, in such a scenario, would consequently be different in both countries: new gas plants
could generate 542 CERs/GWh if they were installed in India, but none in Brazil. The current
diversity in conditions in the electricity sector among different countries (and sometimes,
between different regions within a country) is expected to continue. It may therefore be
useful to consider the applicability of different multi-project assumptions for different
countries, as well as perhaps more than one sectoral multi-project baseline within the same
country.
In all cases, a less stringent multi-project baseline level results in a greater amount of credits
being generated by each project, as well as potentially leading to a greater total number of
projects by increasing the range of “eligible” projects. The tradeoff for lax baselines is that
eligible projects may not be, on their own, strictly environmentally “additional.”.
With a less stringent multi-project baseline the value of each emissions credit can be
relatively low while still making the additional CDM investment feasible. With a more
stringent baseline (where the level of the emission baseline is lower) fewer credits will be
generated from a particular project, so the value of each emission credit will need to be higher
to recoup the same incremental investment costs.
33
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Using these criteria, this section compares and assesses each of the different baseline
approaches.
Project-specific baselines
Project-specific baselines are relatively data intensive. Experience from the AIJ pilot phase
shows that establishing these project-specific baselines, in the absence of any centralised
guidance on what needs to be monitored and how, is often costly and time-consuming.
Project-specific baselines may require some monitoring of current activities before the
JI/CDM project or activity starts in order to be set up. This type of information would vary
by project type, and would also depend on whether the proposed project is a refurbishment
project or at a greenfield site. For example, some of these data, such as the age of the current
installation (in the case of a refurbishment project), are likely to be readily available.
However, other data, such as a plant’s thermal efficiency, may need measuring specifically in
order to set up the emissions baseline. Examples of information that may need to be gathered
and reported for selected project types are shown in Annex A. Project-specific baselines can
in theory be applied to all JI and CDM project types.
Multi-project baselines
Using a multi-project baseline does not require monitoring if it has already been developed.
As with all approaches, of course, a certain amount of project-specific data will need to be
reported (such as project size and output) during the project operation.
37
This section does not explore the data, monitoring and reporting requirements needed to
monitor the actual performance of a project.
34
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Multi-project baselines at the technology level could also be used where there is not enough
data on a sectoral level to construct a sectoral baseline. For example, a technology-level
baseline could be set at an emissions level 10% higher than the best available technology of
that type.
The development of multi-project baselines would require some resources and agreement at a
level other than that of the participants (e.g. governments, international organisations). The
development of these baselines may require balancing competing interests, e.g. between
investors and hosts for JI projects.
Constructing multi-project baselines may not be appropriate or possible for all sectors in all
countries. For example, not all countries may have complete data coverage for particular
sectors. However, there are a number of straightforward possibilities, as demonstrated in
section 4.3.
Hybrid baselines
Hybrid baselines are between project-specific and multi-project baselines on the continuum of
possible baseline approaches (Figure 1). They are therefore likely to need more data,
monitoring and reporting than multi-project baselines, and less data, monitoring and reporting
than project-specific baselines. However, how much more or less would depend on how
many of the baseline components were standardised (which is in turn dependent on project
type).
The cost of an emissions baseline is also related to its complexity. For example, a simulation
baseline that needs a system model will be expensive and time-consuming to set up and run.
The cost of developing such a model may mean that this approach is only used in future for
either very large-scale projects, such as forestry, or where many similar projects are likely to
occur, such as in fast-growing sectors such as electricity or cement production.
Limiting the time needed to establish and approve the baseline will also help to limit the cost
of the baseline. This can be done if agreement is reached on:
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COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Many potential emission mitigation projects are small scale, e.g. increased household use of
renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies. In order to maintain small-scale
projects as an attractive JI and/or CDM opportunity, the up-front costs for these projects need
to be low relative to the cost of the project. Having a simple emissions baseline or crediting
formula for small-scale projects would be one way of keeping the costs related to construction
of the baseline low. Of course, for both large and small-scale projects, the proportion of total
project costs used to establish the baseline will also need to be kept low in order not to create
barriers to investment under JI and CDM.
The level at which baselines are aggregated (e.g. sub-sectoral or sectoral level) will influence
the number of projects for which the baseline could be used, and ultimately the cost per
project. The degree of standardisation between different baseline approaches also has cost
implications. More standardised methods and reporting formats, irrespective of the level of
aggregation, would mean that each project developer would not have to spend time and
money developing methodologies or reporting formats but would instead apply those already
developed. However, reaching agreement on standardised calculation methods, parameters,
and/or reporting requirements could have significant up-front time and cost implications.
However, setting up an emissions baseline does not represent the only costs involved in
establishing a JI or CDM project. Other costs include the costs of identifying the potential
project, administrative costs (for both the host and investor), ongoing costs related to
monitoring, reporting and verification, and, for the CDM, contributions to funding adaptation.
The transparency of a baseline will vary with the baseline approach used, and will also
depend on how baseline assumptions were arrived at (e.g. model simulations, expert
judgement) and how these assumptions and supporting information were reported to the
UNFCCC.
Many baselines used for AIJ projects were not transparent. This is partly because which data
had to be reported, how, and in what detail was not established38. Thus, many project reports
do not reference or explain key assumptions, and do also not report all relevant underlying
data and information. Transparency could be improved for future reports of project-based
activities if guidance was available on the assumptions to be reported.
Another reason behind the lack of transparency of AIJ baselines is due to the project-specific
nature of many of those baselines. Since project-specific baselines are made up of many
components, listing each of these components and explaining why they (rather than
alternatives) were chosen would be a time-consuming exercise. Given the uncertainties
surrounding the underlying components of emission baselines, and the importance of expert
judgement in drawing up project-specific baselines, a degree of subjectivity is inevitable.
38
A draft revised version of the Uniform Reporting Format has been prepared and is available
in document FCCC/SB/1999/5/Add.1
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COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Gaming can have a substantial effect on the level of baselines for individual projects, and
therefore the level of credits associated with a single project. For project-specific baselines,
gaming could take place for each of the many components that make up the emissions
baseline. This is because the assumptions used to develop a project-specific baseline might
be expected to vary significantly from project to project even for those that appear to be
similar (sometimes referred to as “micro” gaming). Gaming would have the effect of
weakening the stringency of the baseline, and therefore increasing the level of credits
associated with that project. The relatively high potential for gaming was a significant
drawback noted to the project-specific baselines used in AIJ pilot projects.
Gaming might also extend across whole project categories (sometimes referred to as “macro”
gaming), e.g. if gaming was prevalent in establishing agreement on the levels of multi-project
39
This is not necessarily the case in the AIJ pilot phase, where the different categories are so
wide that there not all projects within each category are comparable.
40
As mentioned previously, the implications for global GHG emissions may be different for
CDM and JI.
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COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
baselines. However, the potential for gaming can be expected to be lower in the case of
standard assumptions being developed by bodies not having specific economic interests in the
projects.
As the examples in sections 4.1 and 4.2, and in other sensitivity analyses (e.g. Ellis 1999),
demonstrate, baseline levels are more sensitive to some assumptions than others. For
example, for energy projects emission benefits are highly dependent on e.g. the emissions
timeline and the baseline fuel/technology. Gaming is possible when assessing and deciding
both of these assumptions.
In the case of a coal-fired power plant, emissions per kWh are approximately double those of
gas-fired electricity (due to gas’ lower carbon content and the higher combustion efficiency of
gas-fired stations). Therefore, comparing a proposed JI or CDM project against a coal-fired
baseline could double the ERUs or CERs compared to a gas-fired baseline. It may be
appropriately argued that a coal-fired baseline is a valid assumption for a new plant if coal-
fired generation makes up a substantial proportion of baseload generation in the proposed host
country. However, coal may not be the type of plant that is presently being used for new
baseload facilities in that country. Nevertheless, assuming that a plant currently fired by coal
would continue to be so could be considered a valid assumption for a baseline in a proposed
refurbishment-type JI or CDM project, even in a country where policies aim for a
decarbonisation of electricity supply.
Gaming could significantly alter the credits associated with a particular project, especially
with respect to fuel input assumptions. This in turn could limit or cancel the environmental
effectiveness of the project. Clear rules on how to choose specific baseline assumptions in
different situations could limit the amount of possible gaming.
Free riders would obtain emission credits for whole projects that would have gone ahead in
the absence of the project-based mechanisms. Without clear rules on baseline selection and
thus project eligibility, free riders could inflate the number of projects obtaining credits. Free
riders could therefore artificially inflate the estimated “environmental benefits” or credits
arising from JI and CDM projects.
“Free-riding” is essentially a matter not of the baseline approach, but of baseline stringency.
For example, if projects are deemed automatically eligible for credits by fulfilling certain
criteria (e.g. by having per unit emissions below a certain level), a lax baseline could
systematically result in free riders41. Project-specific baselines may also give rise to free
riders. This could occur as a result of the potential for gaming in developing project-specific
baselines (e.g. in the case that a project developer falsely stated that the project would not
have gone ahead in the absence of JI/CDM), or because of uncertainty in the emission
baseline (e.g. if a developer estimates a baseline in good faith but is proved wrong at a later
date).
Some have suggested that multi-project baselines could also be set in such a way to allow
crediting only for low-emitting project types or categories (Friedman 1999b). This has been
referred to as “forcing”, and could reduce the risk of free riders. However, if “forcing” led to
low baseline levels, it may inhibit some projects that may nevertheless be environmentally
beneficial (e.g. a gas-fired plant where coal is being widely used).
41
However, assessing that some technologies are a priori additional may result in lower or
higher numbers of “free rider” credits depend on which technologies were assessed as
automatically additional. For example, allowing all non-hydro renewable projects to obtain
credit is still likely to result in only a small number of “free rider” credits if only a limited
number of projects that are small-scale are initiated.
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COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Free riders and gaming may pose more of a problem for CDM projects than for JI projects:
CDM hosts potentially gain investment in CDM projects and do not lose anything if a CDM
project is demonstrated to be a free rider. However, the global atmosphere may lose from
free-riding in the CDM. Similarly, free rider projects in a JI host country could make it more
difficult for that country to meet its emission commitment.
Leakage occurs if the actual emission reduction or increase in sinks from a JI or CDM project
results in emissions increasing elsewhere. Leakage could occur because system boundaries
may be drawn in such a way as to ignore emission increases from the proposed JI or CDM
project.
Potential sources of leakage vary according to project type, and which emission sources
and/or effects are taken into account (or not) in a project’s baseline. This may be influenced
by the type of baseline used. Multi-project baselines could result in relatively low levels of
leakage if the baselines account for all emissions in a sector/country. Project-specific
baselines could result in higher or lower levels of leakage, depending on where the boundary
for assessing the emissions baseline is drawn.
Figure 5 illustrates the possible effect of baseline complexity and baseline stringency (a proxy
for the environmental additionality of a project) on the number of projects undertaken. One
of the reasons suggested for the relative paucity of AIJ projects was that setting baselines was
too complex and costly. Reducing the complexity and cost of setting baselines will therefore
reduce one of the barriers to implementing project-based mechanisms (IEA 1997), and is
therefore likely to increase the numbers of projects initiated. This is represented in Figure 5
by the left-hand side assuming a greater number of projects than those on the right hand side
at the same level.
Figure 5 also illustrates the hypothesis that project numbers are related to baseline stringency.
A stringent baseline is one using assumptions that result in a lower, rather than higher,
baseline level. A stringent baseline will therefore lead to fewer credits per project, but -
despite the uncertainties surrounding baselines - is more likely to result in a project that is
environmentally additional. If investors in project-based mechanisms are rational actors, they
would prefer having a less stringent (or a lax) baseline as this would result in more credits for
42
The implications of different levels of effectiveness may be different for JI and for CDM
because of the differences already noted between these mechanisms (see section 1.2).
39
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
the same project. This is shown in Figure 5 by the assumption that project numbers will be
larger with a lax baseline than with a stringent one.
The third hypothesis implicit in Figure 5 is that the baseline complexity is not related to the
baseline stringency. Thus, complex baselines could be either stringent or lax, and therefore
generate credits for projects that may be additional or not. Equally, simple baselines could
lead to greater or lesser stringencies – therefore leading to projects where the additionality is
more or less certain. Clearly, some degree of complexity may be warranted. For example, we
would not choose to set a random level for a baseline in the forest sector – but rather would
need to know something about expected business-as-usual lifetimes of existing trees and new
trees planted; developing such a baseline could be a data intensive, and relatively complex
operation.
stringent
Lower transaction costs Higher transaction costs
Additionality Additionality
Some projects Few projects
Additionality Additionality
Many projects Some projects
simple complex
Baseline
Lower transaction costs Higher transaction costs complexity
No additionality No additionality
Many projects Some projects
lax
If these three hypotheses are correct, the maximum environmental effectiveness of the
project-based mechanisms (as opposed to individual projects) is unlikely to be achieved either
with highly complex baselines, or with overly stringent baselines. As a general rule,
minimising the degree of complexity for emission baselines is desirable as long as we do not
compromise our ability to determine “what would have happened otherwise”. Similarly,
maximising the environmental stringency of the baseline must be traded off against the
desirability of maximising the overall global environmental benefits from the project-based
mechanisms – a greater number of good projects will be more beneficial for the environment
than a smaller number of individually better projects. However, neither the relationship
between project numbers and baseline stringency or between project numbers and baseline
complexity is known. It is therefore not yet possible to determine at which baseline level(s)
the number of projects are likely to be so low that the mechanisms would no longer be an
effective means of reducing global GHG emissions.
Table 6 summarises the different criteria for, and consequences of, different emission baseline
approaches.
40
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Baseline approach Lead time for Data needs and Transparency Applicability Possible significance of:
rulemaking1 costs for project to many Free riders Gaming Leakage
preparation and different potential*
approval sectors/
project types
Project-specific Low-
Low High Low High Medium High --
Multi-project
Medium-High Low High Medium Low Low --
- technology level
High Low Medium-High MediumHig Medium3 Low- --
h2 Medium4
subsector)
* The leakage potential is likely to vary substantially between different baseline approaches. However, since this paper does not analyse this in depth, a qualitative
assessment is not presented in this table.
1
e.g. for some aggregate baselines, either host countries, researchers, organisations or others may be involved in setting up baselines.
2
Once a baseline is established for a project, it could be applied to any project in that sector. The difficulty will be to gather enough data to form a baseline for some sectors.
3
Whether or not this baseline type could systematically lead to free riders is highly dependent on the level of the baseline.
4
Gaming could be important at the macro level if not independently verified.
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COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
6. Conclusions
There are many technical issues that still need to be resolved for both JI and the CDM43.
These include questions related to baselines as well as to additionality, eligibility, monitoring,
reporting and verification. Many of these issues are interlinked; defining one will influence
others. Determining how to set emission baselines for project-based mechanisms may need to
be advanced in parallel with these other rules, in order to take these other rules into account.
There are different approaches that could be used to establish emission baselines for project-
based mechanisms. “Project-specific” approaches evaluate emission reductions generated
from a particular project. “Multi-project” approaches can be applied to many different
projects of a similar type or types. “Hybrid” baselines could also be designed, and would aim
to maximise the benefits from the other approaches. Distinguishing between different
approaches may be difficult in some cases.
Some cross-cutting issues are relevant to all baseline approaches. These include the length of
time emission credits can accrue and whether or not the baseline is fixed at the start of the
project (static) or revised during the project operation (dynamic). Static baselines are
predictable, less of an administrative, monitoring and reporting burden, and cheaper.
Dynamic baselines may better reflect actual trends, but would result in greater uncertainty as
to how many credits a particular project would generate. A number of analyses suggest that
dynamic baselines may be more appropriate for some project types.
There are many different views on how an emissions timeline could be set, but given the
importance of the timeline on total credits from a project, applying standardised
methodologies to assess a project’s emissions timeline could offer a simple way of limiting
the effects of free riders and gaming. Any such methodologies would need to vary between
projects that reduce emissions, where short timelines help to ensure the environmental
additionality of any credits, and those that increase sinks, where longer timelines would have
the same effect. A distinction may also be needed between the timelines for JI and CDM
projects, given the potential emission leakage associated with the latter.
Baseline approaches differ in their costs, transparency, data requirements and monitoring,
reporting and verification needs. They may also, in some cases, have different environmental
additionality implications. Different baseline approaches may also be most appropriately
applied for different project types. For example, projects with homogeneous output (e.g. in
the electricity sector) may be more suitable for multi-project baselines than highly site-
specific projects.
High baseline development costs will discourage potential investment in JI and CDM
projects. The relatively high cost of establishing project-specific baselines for AIJ pilot phase
projects has stimulated interest in less costly, more standardised approaches. Moreover,
although baselines that could be applied to more than one project may be costly to develop at
the outset, they could lead to economies of scale and facilitate project preparation once initial
guidance is established.
43
There are different views on whether or not the baseline-setting framework should be the
same for JI and CDM.
42
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Gaming affects the level of a project baseline, and thus the resulting amount of emission
credits generated by a JI or CDM project. Gaming is likely to be more prevalent in project-
specific baselines where a large variation in underlying assumptions is expected. Free riders
affect the number of projects credited, allowing projects that would have happened without JI
or CDM credit to get credit anyway. The level of free riders could be significant if certain
project types are deemed a priori eligible to obtain credits (e.g. by having per unit output
emissions below a certain level). Leakage is a measure of how accurately the project
boundary reflects the overall environmental effects of a project. The importance of leakage is
likely to vary significantly by project type and may be lower in more aggregated baselines
(e.g. multi-project baselines) where project boundaries are wider.
Increased levels of gaming, free riders and leakage would artificially inflate acquisitions of
ERUs and CERs by investors. If not all CERs accruing from CDM projects were “real” the
environmental effectiveness of the CDM would be lessened because the environmental
benefits of CDM investment is not assured. Higher levels of gaming, free riders and leakage
in JI projects will not affect the environmental effectiveness per se, (because the overall
Annex I assigned amount would remain unaffected by acquisitions and transfers of JI credits).
However, it could increase the difficulties for host countries in meeting their individual Kyoto
commitments. Determining the relative importance of these different factors is difficult in the
absence of information on emission baseline levels and on the number and type of projects
likely to be undertaken under each approach.
This paper presents a preliminary survey of analyses done on the effect that different baseline
approaches and/or assumptions have on the level of credits generated by a particular project.
This paper also illustrates the influence that different national circumstances can have on the
absolute level of the baseline and the resulting emission credits. For example, if both India
and Brazil set a multi-project baseline for electricity projects at the level of current weighted
average emissions, potential gas-fired projects could generate certified emission reductions if
they were undertaken in India, but not in Brazil. Because of variable conditions in the
electricity sector among different countries it may not be appropriate to use a common multi-
project baseline assumption (e.g. average fossil fuel) across different countries
The review of empirical data presented in this paper, and the theoretical case study of
electricity in Brazil and India, indicate that the assumptions and approaches used to develop
baselines are independent variables. Both can influence the level of credits for a particular
project. In the examples examined here, the range in different possible assumptions within
one baseline approach can be as large as the range in assumptions between different baseline
approaches. However, not all approaches may be equally appropriate in all circumstances,
and different approaches may be viewed as more or less suitable for different types of projects
(e.g. forestry, electricity or landfill).
Both baseline assumptions and approaches will have an impact on the environmental
additionality of individual projects. They will also influence the overall environmental
effectiveness of the mechanisms, i.e. the contribution of JI or the CDM as a whole to
achieving the objectives of the Protocol.
The baseline approach will influence the environmental effectiveness of the mechanisms in
part through its impact on the complexity of setting up an emissions baseline. More complex
methods are likely to limit the number of projects initiated because of high transaction costs.
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COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Baseline assumptions are also likely to have an impact on the effectiveness of the mechanisms
through their impact on the baseline stringency, which affects the level of credits, and through
this the number of projects initiated. Both stringent and lax baselines are possible under the
different baseline approaches. Overly stringent baselines are likely to limit the number of
projects initiated (and thus the amount of emission reductions achieved through the
mechanisms). Overly lax baselines may encourage greater overall participation in the project-
based mechanisms by raising project eligibility and the number of emission credits, but could
have a negative environmental effect.
An optimal strategy takes into account that a high volume of projects will be needed to deliver
strong environmental effectiveness from the mechanisms: a higher number of good projects
will be more beneficial for the environment (in terms of total GHG reductions) than a lower
number of individually better projects. However, since the relationship between project
numbers/baseline stringency and between project numbers/baseline complexity are both
unknown, it is not yet possible to determine the levels at which baseline stringency or baseline
complexity will limit the number of projects initiated.
There may be differences in the most desirable baseline approach for different project types in
different sectors. This would need to be examined further, as would how to minimise
complexity within the different approaches. Any future decisions on baseline approaches and
assumptions may therefore aim to reduce the complexity of baseline-setting procedures and to
set the baseline stringency so that it properly balances environmental benefit, cost, and
participation.
A decision on baseline approach(es) would open the door for assessment and eventual
agreement on other credit-related aspects of JI and CDM projects, such as:
44
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Emission baselines may need to be reported to the UNFCCC both for CDM and for JI
projects. It may be decided that the URF for these project reports may need to be more
detailed, and/or that more specific guidance is included, such as examples of what
could/should be reported for different project types. More detailed reporting formats could
help to reduce the time and cost of developing a reporting format for individual project
developers, and could also help to reduce data-related costs by indicating which data are
needed for which project type. This is a matter which will need to be decided in the
negotiating fora. Nevertheless, possible more detailed reports for project-based baseline
reports in selected sectors could include the following outlined overleaf.
Site history since last inventory: (description of significant changes in management, pest and
disease problems, harvesting or other mortality).
44
Draft revisions to this URF are outlined in FCCC/SB/1999/5/Add.1.
45
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
General information
• name of project site;
• address, country
What is the distance of the proposed plant from:
• the nearest gas grid;
• the nearest district heating system?
Is the plant currently connected to the electricity grid?
45
Reporting the information in the table would help to determine if emissions with the project
were lower than emissions prior to implementing the project. However, it would not
determine whether, for example, an existing plant would have been retrofitted anyway, or
whether emissions would have been expected to decrease anyway because of decreasing
demand. Such information could be requested either in this part of a new URF, or in the part
of the URF indicating why the particular project fits with national economic development
and socio-economic and environment priorities and strategies. The type of information
reported for a new plant, and for a grid-connected plant may be different (because of its
interaction with other plants in the same system).
46
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Table A1: Estimated Energy Use and Carbon Emissions in Baseline [At Time of
Project Registration]
Estimate annual energy use and carbon emissions (1) for the unadjusted baseline (without free riders), (2) free
riders, and (3) for the baseline (adjusted for free riders). Indicate the level of precision for each value.
Type of fuel:
Carbon emissions -
(tC/yr.)
On-site electricity
use (MWh/yr.)
Carbon emissions
factor b
Type of fuel:
Carbon emissions
(tC/yr.)
Type of fuel:
Carbon emissions
(tC/yr.) c
Off-site
electricity
use(MWh/yr.)
Carbon emissions
factor b
Type of fuel:
Carbon emissions
(tC/yr.) c
TOTAL
Carbon emissions
(tC/yr.)
a Indicate the level of precision used for project values: use either (1) standard deviation around the mean value,
or (2) general level of precision (e.g., low, medium, high) Ñ if more information is available, additional levels of
precision can be used.
b Specify type of fuel used for calculating carbon emissions factor.
c Indicate carbon reductions from off-site electric utility plant(s).
47
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Table A2: Estimated Gross Changes in Energy Use and Carbon Emissions
from Project [At Time of Project Registration]
Estimate annual energy use and carbon emissions (1) for the unadjusted project, (2) from
positive project spillover, (3) from market transformation, and (4) for the “with-project”
scenario. Indicate the level of precision for each value.
Type of fuel:
Carbon -
emissions (tC/yr.)
On-site
electricity use
(MWh/yr.)
Carbon
emissions factor b
Type of fuel:
Carbon
emissions (tC/yr.)
Type of fuel:
Carbon
emissions
(tC/yr.) c
Off-site
electricity
use(MWh/yr.)
Carbon
emissions factor b
Type of fuel:
Carbon
emissions
(tC/yr.) c
TOTAL
Carbon
emissions (tC/yr.)
a Indicate the level of precision used for project values: use either (1) standard deviation around the mean value,
or (2) general level of precision (e.g., low, medium, high) Ñ if more information is available, additional levels of
precision can be used.
b Specify type of fuel used for calculating carbon emissions factor.
c Indicate carbon reductions from off-site electric utility plant(s).
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COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2000)8
Table A3: Estimated Net Changes in Energy Use and Carbon Emissions from
Project [At Time of Project Registration]
Calculate the net change in annual energy use and carbon emissions by subtracting “with-project” values (taken
from Table A2) from “without-project baseline” values (taken from Table A1). Indicate the level of precision for
each value.
Type of fuel:
Carbon -
emissions
(tC/yr.)
On-site
electricity use
(MWh/yr.)
Carbon
emissions
factor b
Type of fuel:
Carbon
emissions
(tC/yr.)
Off-site fuel use
(Terajoules =
1012 joules/yr.)
Carbon
emissions
factor b
Type of fuel:
Carbon
emissions
(tC/yr.) c
Off-site
electricity
use(MWh/yr.)
Carbon
emissions
factor b
Type of fuel:
Carbon
emissions
(tC/yr.) c
TOTAL
Carbon
emissions
(tC/yr.)
a Indicate the level of precision used for project values: use either (1) standard deviation around the mean value,
or (2) general level of precision (e.g., low, medium, high) Ñ if more information is available, additional levels of
precision can be used.
b Specify type of fuel used for calculating carbon emissions factor.
c Indicate carbon reductions from off-site electric utility plant(s).
49
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Annex B: Data used to assess different possible baseline assumptions in India and Brazil
1996 electricity 1996 Source 25% less CO2 diff b/w source planned new tech. diff. b/w source average average best available diff. B/w source
output (GWh) specific average intensive than average and 25% In Brazil and planned tech. technology average and BAT
(t CO2/GWh) average more efficient
(t CO2/GWh) (t CO2/GWh) (t CO2/GWh) (t CO2/GWh) (t CO2/GWh) (t CO2/GWh)
Nuclear(i) 2429 (0.8%) 0,00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coal (ii) 4764 (1.6%) 1102 827 275 1042 60.2 781 320
Oil (iii) 8929(3.1%) 776 582 194 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Gas(iv) 714 (0.2%) 742 557 186 404 338 382 361
Bio & sugar cane** 7208 (2.5%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. 0.00 n.a. 0.00
Hydro** 265773 (92%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. 0.00 n.a. 0.00
TOTAL 289817 437 328 -
Average (foss.fuel) 873 654 219
Weighted average (all sources) 43.9 32.9 10.97
Weighted average (thermal only) 755 566 189
Weighted average (fossil only) 882 662 221
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Investment cost of new Total cost (incl. O&M +fuel) total cost of average BAT approx. incremental cost of BAT (US
plant ('96Uscents/KWh) of new plant ('96US cents/KWh) cents/KWh)
(1996UScents/KWh)
Nuclear (i) 3.58* 5.15* 5.35* 0.2
Coal (ii) 2.41* 4.3 * 5.15* 0.85
Oil (iii) n.a. 5.18* n.a. n.a.
Gas (iv) 1.41* 3.38* 4.77 * 1.39
Wind n.a. 4.87* 6.4 ** 1.53
Biomass/sugarcane residues* 3.27-6.54 n.a. (site-specific) n.a.
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1996 electricity 1996 Source 25% less CO2- diff b/w source planned new diff. b/w source Average best diff.b/w source
output (GWh)* specific average intensive than average and tech. average and available average and BAT
(tC02/GWh) average 25% more In India planned new technology
efficient tech.
(t CO2/GWh) (t CO2/GWh) (t CO2/GWh) (t CO2/GWh) (t CO2/GWh)
(t CO2/GWh)
Nuclear (i) 8400 (1.9%) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coal (ii) 318357 (73%) 1222 917 306 1017 205 786 436
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Investment cost of new plant Total cost (incl. O&M +fuel) of average total cost of BAT Approx. Incremental cost
('96UScents/KWh) new plant (' 96UScents/KWh) (UScents/KWh) of BAT (US cent/KWh)
Nuclear (i) 3.73 5.19 5.35 0.16
Coal (ii) 1.59 4.23 5.15 0.92
Oil (iii) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Gas (iv) 2.18 4.50 4.77 0.27
Wind n.a. 6.44** -
Hydro (almost all cost is capital inv.) 5.51* n.a. -
- Output and (fossil fuel) CO2 data from the 1998 IEA Statistics, IEA 1998c, IEA 1998d
- Most cost estimates based on NEA/IEA (1998)
* Based on the IEA, World Energy Outlook assumptions
(i) nuclear assumptions : new plant is pressurised heavy water reactor; BAT includes reactors in several OECD countries, e.g. boiling water reactor, pressurised water reactor, advanced boiling
water reactor.
(ii)coal assumptions : planned new technology is pulverised coal combustion @ 35%efficiency; BAT is clean coal, i.e. pulverised coal comb, (supercritical) @ 44% efficiency, based on average of
several OECD countries; mix of lignite (6%), sub-bituminous(70%) & bituminous(24%), (NEA/IEA, 1998)
(iii) oil : no new oil-fired plants planned in OECD (except Turkey)
(iv) gas assumptions: As no India-specific data was available, costs estimated to be similar to those of Korea (in NEA/IEA, 1998) : planned new technology is CCGT @ 50% efficiency; BAT is
[email protected]% efficiency, based on average of several OECD countries (NEA/IEA, 1998)
Renewables (**) : zero value given to emissions, as per IPCC recommendations (however, lifecycle emissions estimates available in IEA 1998b; cost estimates from IEA 1997b
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References
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Chomitz, K. M., 1998, Baselines for Greenhouse Gas Reductions: Problems, Precedents and Solutions,
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Glossary
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Approach The general methodology used to calculate an emissions baseline (e.g. project-
specific,hybrid, or multi-project).
Assumption The underlying component(s) used to develop an emissions baseline. For a project-
specific baseline assumptions could include the technology type that would have
been used and the efficiency that would have been achieved in the absence of the
JI/CDM project. For a multi-project baseline, the potential assumption could be , for
example,. Average performance, marginal performance, best available technology
etc.
Credits Unit used for the measurement, (e.g. in tonnes of CO2-equivalent), transfer and
acquisition of emission reductions associated with JI and CDM projects.
Dynamic baseline A baseline that is revised during the lifetime of the JI/CDM project, without
specifications at the outset on how the revision(s) will be made.
Emissions timeline Time (number of years) over which emission credits resulting from a JI or CDM
project accrue.
Environmental additionality Difference between baseline emissions and actual emissions for a JI/CDM project.
Environmental additionality of JI and CDM projects is required by the Kyoto
Protocol
Environmental credibility Quality of a baseline with respect to reflecting the emission level that would occur
without the JI or CDM project(s). Given the hypothetical nature of emission
baselines, environmental credibility is difficult to assess (even on an ex post basis).
Environmental effectiveness Extent to which the JI and CDM regimes, under different baseline approaches and
assumptions, result in maximum emissions reductions and maximum participation,
thereby contributing to achieving the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol.
Free riding A situation whereby a project generates emission credits from JI or CDM projects
even if the project would have gone ahead in the absence of JI or CDM, i.e. is not
“additional”. Free riding therefore affects the numbers of projects obtaining credits.
Gaming Actions or assumptions taken by the project developer and/or project host that would
artificially inflate the baseline (and therefore the credits from the project). Gaming
generally leads to lax baselines.
Greenfield projects New projects, e.g. those taking place at a new site and increasing the host country’s
capacity for heat output, electricity generation etc. (as opposed to refurbishment
projects that build on existing projects)
Hybrid baseline A baseline made up of different components that could be applied to a number of
projects. A hybrid baseline could combine some aspects of project-specific
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baselines (e.g. incorporating some site-specific analysis) and some aspects of multi-
project baselines (e.g. to include some standardised emission values for different
technologies).
Leakage Leakage occurs if actual emission reductions (or increase in sinks) from a project
results in emissions increasing (or sinks decreasing) elsewhere. Leakage occurs if
the system boundaries do not capture all emission effects of a project.
Multi-project baselines Emission baselines (also defined as “benchmarks”, “activity standards”, “intensity
indicators” in the literature) that can be applied to a number of similar projects, for
example within the same sector of a country or region. These emission baselines
may be drawn up using an engineering approach to set standard baseline values for a
particular technology or industrial sector.
Project-specific baseline Project-specific emission baselines are those that have been drawn up for individual
projects by examining them on a case-by-case basis. Each project-specific baseline
is used only for the project for which it was developed. The project-specific
approach is based on some combination of engineering judgement and site-specific
analysis.
Standardised assumptions Assumptions, e.g. on emission performance of a technology, that are standardised
(generalised). These standardised assumptions may be used in the emission
baselines for a number of projects.
Static baseline A baseline that is fixed at the start of the JI/CDM project and
remains fixed for the duration of the project. It is possible to have a static baseline
for which the level changes over time, as long as this is specified at the outset of the
project.
Static baseline A baseline that is fixed at the start of the JI/CDM project and remains fixed for the
duration of the project. It is possible to have a static baseline for which the level
changes over time, as long as this is specified at the outset of the project.
Stringency (of a baseline) The stringency of a baseline is a measure of how difficult it is for projects to
generate emissions below the baseline level. Given the uncertainty and
measurement errors inherent in establishing a baseline, there is a range of plausible
emission levels for any particular baseline. A stringent baseline will be at the low
end of that range, and a lax baseline will be at the high end of that range. The
determination of whether a particular baseline is stringent or not depends on the
project types and national/regional circumstances.
Transaction costs The costs associated with the process of obtaining JI or CDM recognition for a
project and obtaining the resulting emissions credits. Transaction costs would
include, for example, costs of developing a baseline and assessing the
“additionality” of a project, costs of obtaining host country approval, monitoring and
reporting, etc. Transaction costs would not include the direct investment,
maintenance and operational costs of the project.
Transparency A transparent baseline is one where the construction is clearly explained, where the
parameters and methods used in the baseline are referenced and traceable, and where
the baseline can be reconstructed by a third party. Transparency is also a quality
that can reduce investors’ uncertainty associated with JI and CDM projects and the
credits that they can generate.
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Value of Credits The monetary value resulting from the supply and demand of emission credits
resulting from JI and CDM projects.
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