NAMING AND KNOWING

THEMES IN PHILONIC THEOLOGY WITH

SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
DE MUTA TIONE NOMINUM

BY

DAVID T. RUN lA (SOEST)

Philo, the loquacious yet often inscrutable Jew from Alexandria, has had the
honour of being called "the first theologian." 1 Whether one agrees or dis-
agrees with this, it is surely fitting that, during a symposium on knowledge of
God from Alexander to Constantine, at least one paper should be devoted to
Philo's theological ideas. Which other author writing in Greek could we sum-
mon, in whose works the word eeoc;-as we shall see, only one of thesupreme
Being's names-is the most commonly occurring noun?2 Yet, much though
Philo wrote on God, far more has been written by modern scholars about what
Philo wrote on God, or, we might add, about what Philo might or should have
written on God. Is there anything to add to the accumulated weight of studies
on Philo's theology? Should we join the prevailing consensus that his thoughts
are stimulating but disorganized and ultimately dissatisfying? It is with some
brief remarks on Philonic scholarship, at any rate, that I wish to begin.

There are, grosso modo, three ways of approaching Philo's theology. The first
I would call the systematic approach, for it can not unfairly be described as the
attempt to put together, on Philo's behalf, the systematic presentation of his
doctrine of God which he never managed (or dared) to publish. The climax of
this attempt is represented by the two large volumes of Wolfson. But behind

I W. Bousset/H. Gressmann, Die Religion des Judentums im späthellenistischen Zeitalter,

Tübingen 19263 , 445, cited with approval by I. Heinemann, Philons griechische und jüdische Bil-
dung, Breslau 1932, 5. For J. Danielou, Message evangelique et culture hellenistique aux lle et llIe
siecles, Tournai 1961,300, Philo is "le premier theologien de la transcendance."
2 The top-twelve of nouns in Philo is, according to Mayer's (not fully complete) lexicon: ge6c;,
Ij/UX1l, A.6yoC;, lpUOIC;, av9po>1toC;, ape't1l, yij, I1EPOC;, VOUC;, tp61toC;, K6oI10C;. Compare Plato's list,
according to Brandwood: A.6yoC;, av9po>1toC;, 1t6AIC;, aviJp, ge6c;, LWKpa.'tT]C;, Ij/UX1l, v6110C;,
o<i">l1a, lpUOlC;, tEXVl1, apX1l (note that if ge6c; was confined to usage in the singular, it would fail
to gain a place).
70 D.T. RUNIA

hirn lies a long tradition, in which the names of Goodenough, Brehier, Drum-
mond, Gförer and Von Mosheim span aperiod of nearly two centuries. 3
Wolfson notoriously overtrumped his predecessors by banning every form of
inconsistency from Philo's thought and claiming the foundation of a religious
philosophy that was to last until Spinoza. It has generally been recognized that
the clarity thus achieved was of a rather artifieial kind. Since then attempts at
systematic elueidation have been more modest, e.g. in the spar kling survey of
Philo' s theological ideas published recently by David Winston. 4
The systematic approach has made significant contributions to our under-
standing of Philo's theological ideas. It does, however, run into certain
problems. It has proved, pace Wolfson, very difficult to remove inconsisten-
eies, contradictions and obscurities from Philo's thinking.1t has not been easy,
moreover, to come to terms with the nature of Philo's writings, which have
been described as unfortunate or artifieial, or even as designed to mask his true
thought. Most importantly there has been insuffieient awareness of the dangers
involved in looking at Philo retrospectively, i.e. from the perspective of later
developments in philosophy which he may have set in motion, but could not
all foresee.
In the last thirty years or so research on Philo's theology has been under-
taken from another angle, which we might call the historical (or doxographical)
approach. Strenuous efforts, pioneered by Theiler and Boyance, have been
made to locate the sources of Philo's ideas in the philosophical developments
taking place in the three centuries between Posidonius and Plotinus. Many dis-
tinctive Philonic notions can be paralleled and illuminated by doctrines in
Middle Platonism and Neopythagoreanism. In this context Philo is a source of
evidence and a faseinating figure in his own right, but not a protagonist on
the intellectual stage. Exemplary studies using the historical approach are
Boyance's account of Aristotelianizing theological motifs in Philo and John
Dillon's balanced and sympathetic survey in his well-known book on the
Middle Platonists. 5
The historical approach too has had to pay aprice for its undoubted suc-
cesses. Time and time again researchers have had to confront the harsh reality
that it is easier to use Philonic evidence to iIIuminate his surroundings than to

3 J.L. Von Mosheim, 'De Philone' in his translation of R. Cudworth, The true intellectual
system oj the universe, Lugd. Bat. 17732, 1.828-839; A.F. Gfrörer, Philo und die jüdisch-
alexandrinische Theosophie, Stuttgart 1831, 1835 2 ,2 vols.; J. Drummond, Philo Judaeus, Lon-
don 1888, 2 vols.; E. Brehier, Les idees philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie, Paris
1908,19503; E.R. Goodenough, By Light, Light, New Haven 1935; H.A. Wolfson, Philo: Foun-
dations oj religious philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, Cambr. Mass. 1947, 2 vols.
4 D. Winston, Logos and mystical theology in Philo oj Alexandria, Cincinatti 1985.
S P. Boyance, Le dieu tres haut chez Philon, in: Mt!langes d'histoire des religions ojjerts a H.-
C. Puech, Paris 1974, 139-149; J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, London 1977, 139-183.
 NAMING AND KNOWING: THEMES IN PHILONIC THEOLOGY 71

use his surroundings to illuminate hirn. In my study on Philo's knowledge

and use of Plato's Timaeus, which also had to deal with diverse theological
themes, I coneIuded that, though it is very tempting to label Philo as a 'Middle
Platonist', we do so at the peril of misrepresenting his 10yaIties and violating
his own self-awareness. 6 It is possible, however, to give a much more radical
critique of the historical approach.
I am referring to a paper comparing the Alexandrians Philo and Clement
recently presented by the Australian theologian Eric Osborn.1 Having written
highly respected studies on early Christian thinkers, Osborn feit the need to
confront the ostensible source of many of their ideas. But how much did these
men actually learn from Philo? Osborn's argument moves in two steps. First
he denounces historians who try to explain the development of ideas by
hunting sourees, by tracing the careers of terms and concepts, by presenting
doctrines in neatly packaged parcels. This doxographic approach is compar-
able to the taxonomie efforts of a stamp-collector. Terms, concepts, and even
doctrines are fluid, their meaning dependent on the context in which they are
put forward. Proper to historical enquiry in the domain of philosophy is the
method of problematic elucidation. 8 It is necessary to ask what problems a
thinker posed and to analyse the arguments he put forward in order to resolve
those problems. We now come to the second step in Osborn's argument. When
Philo and Clement are compared, it emerges that there is much common
ground, but that what Clement takes over from Philo are not the interesting
and important things. Clement makes grateful use of the language of biblical
Hellenism developed by Philo and the many exegetical themes found in his
works. The crucial difference, however, is that Philo does not offer argument,
whereas Clement does. For Philo scripture gives immediate access to the plain
of truth; reasoning is inappropriate. Philo is not a philosopher but a theo-
sophist, eIoser to the Gnostics than to Clement. 9 This is a harsh judgment on
Philo, which we should not, I think, swallow hook, line and sinker. I shall
return to it later.
It is my intention in this paper to pursue a third approach to Philo's theo-
logical thought, wh ich for want of a better term, I label the contextual ap-
proach. There is a growing consensus among Philonic scholars that Philo saw

6 Philo 0/ Alexandria and the Timaeus 0/ Plato, Leiden 19862 , 505 ff.
7 Philo and Clement, Prudentia 19 (1987) 34-49.
80sborn here draws on the work of the Australian philosopher John Passmore; cf. his justifi-
cation in The beginnings 0/ Christian philosophy, Cambridge 1981,273-288.
90sborn, 40, gives an elegant variation of the consequentia mirabilis immortalized in Aris-
totle's Protrepticus: "No one can dispense with argument for, to show that argument is unneces-
sary, it is necessary to argue." The description of Philo as a theosophist is taken over from the
study of Gfrörer cited in n. 3.
72 D.T. RUNlA

hirnself first and foremost as an exegete of Mosaic scripture, and that asound
way to start understanding hirn is to begin at the level of his exegetical exposi-
tions, Le. in the context in which his ideas are first developed. Various scholars
have contributed in various ways to this movement, among whom I might
mention the late Samuel Sandmel, Marguerite Harl, Burton Mack, Peder
Borgen and Jacques Cazeaux. But above all it is associated with the scholarly
achievement of the late Valentin Nikiprowetzky.IO A fruitful result of this
new approach has been a growing interest in the structure and procedures of
Philo's exegetical writings. But does this new awareness of the importance of
Philo's exegetical activity mean that he is no more than an exegete? In fact the
implications for his stature as a philosopher or theologian are as yet by no
means clear. Hopefully the present paper can make a contribution to this
evaluatory task. My starting point, in accordance with the method I am ad-
vocating, will be a concrete example of Philonic exegesis, an extended passage
from the treatise De mutatione nominum in which Philo reflects on the themes
of knowing and naming God.

11
The De mutatione nominum is the final treatise still extant of the body of con-
tinuous verse-by-verse and exclusively allegorical exegesis that Philo compiled
on the book of Genesis. 11 The great Allegorica/ Commentary, as we now call
it, is the richest and most rewarding section of the Philonic corpus-also for
the study of his theological ideas-, but readers have often been deterred by
the extraordinary complexities of its structure. It is only in recent years that we
are starting to understand the rationale behind the way these treatises are com-
posed.1 2 Like in the exegetical notebooks which constitute his Quaestiones in
Genesim et Exodum, Philo asks quest ions of and makes observations on the
main biblical text. Unlike in the Quaestiones, however, he makes extensive use
of secondary biblical texts in order to give the exegesis greater depth and
enchains the sequences of exposition in a continuous whoIe, interrupted on-
Iy by periodic returns to the main text. 13 The assumption upon wh ich this

10 Cf. above all Le commentaire de I'Ecriture chez Phi/on d'Alexandrie, Leiden 1977; also R.
Radice, Filone di Alessandria nella interpretazione di V. Nikiprowezky edella sua scuola, RFNS
76 (1984) 15-41; P. Borgen, Philo of Alexandria, in: M. Stone (ed.), Jewish writingsofthe Second
Temple period, Assen 1984, 259 ff.
11 Ti1~ De somniis, at least in the books we have, does not continue the verse-by-verse exegesis,
but assembles material from the whole of Gen.
12 See!Ily articles The structure of PhiIo's allegorical treatises VC 38 (1984) 209-56, and Fur-
ther observations on the structure of PhiIo's allegorical treatises VC 41 (1987) 105-138, wh ich con-
tain surveys on the progress of research.
13 The De mutatione nominum is one of the privileged cases where we can trace the parallelism
with the Quaestiones, for the same biblical passage is given exegesis in QG 3.39-44, 53-60
 NAMING AND KNOWING: THEMES IN PHILONIC THEOLOGY 73

method is based is the total coherence of Mosaic scripture. Often the only way
to retain the thread of the procedure is to keep a good eye out for the biblical
texts that Philo summons and for the associations of words and ideas that
cause hirn to summon them. A cornucopia of themes flow in and out of the
exegesis, depending on the exigencies of the text and the whims of the inter-
preter. No attempt is made to integrate these into a rigorously unified whole.
But analysis of individual treatises reveals that Philo does locate in the biblical
text under discussion a main directive idea, which is able to give the single
treatise a loose kind of unity.
The treatise I have singled out for special attention possesses so me idiosyn-
cratic features. Because of the poor manuscript tradition the text is in very bad
shape, and the exact meaning of many passages is far from clear. 14 We are
badly in need of asound, philologically precise commentary. The section of
biblical text wh ich Philo gives exegesis is rat her long, and in a number of sec-
tions this leads to a sketchy treatment, with less invocation of secondary bibli-
cal texts than usual. Nevertheless the reader will soon observe, also in the
passage we will be looking at more closely, that Philo makes extensive use of
other Pentateuchal material to cast light on the verses that are the special object
of his exegesis.
The main biblical text commented on in the treatise is Gen. 17: 1-22, the
record of an appearance of God to Abrah'am when he is ninety-nine years old.
Philo deletes verses 6-14 from his commentary for two reasons. He has ap-
parently already discussed important aspects of their contents in the lost trea-
ti ses On the covenants (cL § 53). Moreover the omission allows hirn to pass
directly from the change of name given to Abraham in v.5 to that of Sarah in
v.15. The section of the treatise on which I propose to concentrate is what we
may call the first chapter, § 1-38. 15
Without any introductory words Philo begins by quoting the initial bibli~al
lemma: 16 "

tyevETo 'Aßpaa~ hrov tVEV1\KOVTa twea, Kai Ölq>8n KUP10<; Tc!> 'Aßpaa~ Kai d-
7tEV alJ'!c!>' tyei> Et~l 0 8E6<; aou.

Abraham was ninety-nine years oId, and the Lord appeared to Abraham and He
said to hirn, I am your God. (Gen. 17:1)

(I follow the abbreviations for Philo's works set out in Runia, ap. eit. [no 6) xi-xii).
14 At a conservative estimate 400 emendations have been incorporated into or proposed for the
text as printed in Colson's translation. There are only two manuscripts of any value. Some pas-
sages are indirect1y preserved in the Sacra Parallela of John of Damascus.
15 On the role of the 'chapter' in the structure of the allegorical treatises see Runia, Further ob-
servations, 112, 121.
16 Text as in Philo; LXX twice reads A!3PUIl.
74 D.T. RUNIA

Examination of the exegesis in our chapter shows that this lemma gives rise to
five problems or aporiae, all of them implicit rat her than explicitily formu-
lated, which the exegete proceeds to answer one by one.
Aporia 1. What is the significance of the number ninety-nine? What
does it tell us about the man to whom the Lord appears?
(§ 1-2)
Aporia 2. How, or by what means, is the Lord seen? (§ 3-6)
Aporia 3. Who is it that is actually seen? (§ 7 -17)
Aporia 4. What is meant by 'I am your God'? (§ 18-26)
Aporia 5. What is meant by 'I am your God'? (§ 27-33)
At the end of the chapter, after aseries of quick thematic shifts, Philo invokes
Enoch as an example of a sage who 'pleased God and was not found' (Gen.
5:24) (§ 34-38). The choice of the secondary text clearly anticipates the next
main biblicallemma 'be pleasing before Me' discussed in § 39 ff. Philo often
uses this technique of anticipation for the fluent enchainment of his exege-
sis.'7 Later in the treatise there are two further aporiae, drawn from Gen.
17: 17 -18, the response to which iIlustrates some themes touched on in the first
chapter. I add them to the above list.
Aporia 6. Why does Abraham briefly doubt the birth of Isaac,
although he is recorded in Gen. 15:6 as having trusted
God? (§ 175-187)
Aporia 7. If Abraham asks that Ishmael shalllive, does that mean
he despairs of Isaac's birth? (§ 218-232)
We have thus seven aporiae, a suitably Philonic number, but only a limited
selection of alI the questions and themes raised in this single treatise.
Before we move on, it is worth making abrief remark on the nature of these
aporiae that Philo raises. As already noted above, the method of asking ques-
tions of the biblical text-probably drawn from contemporary synagogal
practice l8 _plays an important structural role in Philo's allegorical commen-
taries. In Hellenistic literature too there was an important genre of CTl'n'nw'ta
Kai ).UOE1<;, practised on both literary and philosophical texts. 19 Aporiae oc-
cur, as the word itself indicates, because the road to understanding is blocked.
There are obstacles which impede the exegete's path as he tries to gain an ade-
quate grasp of the text. Why should Abraham be ninety-nine when he is told

17 This anticipatory or 'teleologieal' method of exegesis has been weil observed by J. Cazeaux.
But I cannot go along with the far-reaching concIusions he draws from it in terms of a structuralist
reading of Philo. In his huge monograph on Philo's structures he gives a detailed analysis of Mut.
1-38 which weil iIIustrates his methods; cf. La trame et la chafne, Leiden 1983,476-499.
18 Cf. Contempl. 75 and Nikiprowetzky, op. eit. (n. 10), 176 ff.
19 Cf. H. Dörrie, Erotapokriseis, RAC 6, 1966, 342 ff.
 NAMING AND KNOWING: THEMES IN PHILONIC THEOLOGY 75

of Isaac's impending !Jirth, and not some other (less improbable) age? At the
same time, however, the obstacles encountered have a positive effect, for they
indicate that the real meaning lies deeper, to be unveiled by the resources of
the allegorical method. It is perhaps not entirely inappropriate to compare the
list of aporiae drawn up by Aristotle in Metaphysics B.20 The difference be-
tween Aristotle and Philo-and of course it is a very significant difference-is
that the former meets his obstacles in what he regards as a direct theorizing on
the nature of reality, whereas the latter confronts them in an authoritative text
that interposes itself between the interpreter and that reality.

III
What, then, are the themes of importance for an understanding of Philo's
theological thought that these exegetical obstacles in our passage generate? The
first two aporiae do not cause our author much delay.
The symbolism of the number ninety-nine points to the man of progress (6
1tPOK01t'tffiV), for at a hundred years the perfect man Isaac (6 'teAElO~) is born.
Abraham falls short of perfection, but only by a little. The notion of progress
and the division of men into the categories 'worthless' (q>UÜAot), 'progressing'
and 'perfect' -both doctrines familiar from Stoic ethical theory-are fun-
damental to the thematics of the treatise. 21
If the Lord of the Universe is seen by Abraham, then He is obviously not
seen by the eyes of the body, but by means of the noetic activity of the eye of
the soul, which makes use, not of sense-perceptible light, nor of its own light,
but of that light which God hirnself shines forth. These are again familiar
themes, derived ultimately from Plato's Republic. Philo has worked them out
at greater length elsewhere, and does not dwell on them here. 22 Such cursory
treatment should not, however, blind us to the quasi-automatic way in which
our author translates the appearance of God in terms of learning and the in-
tellective quest. This is reinforced by the way in which the third aporia is
tackled.
When scripture declares that 'the Lord was seen,' it must not be thought that
'to öv, the supreme Being, was mentally grasped by any man (§ 7). The ex-
perience which Moses, paradigm of the questing mind, had on the mountain
as recorded in Ex. 33 is a sufficient guarantee. God does not reveal his Being,
but only what comes after hirn. Once again Philo does not elaborate the theme
in the way we find a number of times elsewhere. 23 The crucial distinction

20 Cf. J. Owens, The doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, Toronto 1978',211-9.
21 The standard work on this immensely important theme in Philo is still W. Völker, Fort-
schritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien, Leipzig 1938.
22 Cf. Post. 166-9, Deus 62, Spec. 1.49, Praem. 36-46, QO 4.1-2 etc.
23 Post. 13-16, 166-9, Fug. 164-5, Spec. 1.32-50.
76 D.T. RUNIA

between God's existence and essence is not pointed out. Instead Philo invokes
the traditional, and not very inspiring, argument which moves by analogy from
the unknowability of the human mi nd to the unknowability of GOd. 24 The
brevity is motivated, I suspect, by his haste to arrive at the theme which oc-
cupies the central place in the treatise as a whole.
There is, strictly speaking, no exegetical constraint on Philo to introduce the
theme of the naming of God. But the juxtaposition of the two chief Septuagin-
tal names KUP10~ and eE6~ in the single biblicallemma is a good pretext. And
Philo has prepared the way by already speaking of God as 'Being' (.0 ÖV § 7,
10). Consequent upon Being's unknowability is the fact that He has no 'proper
name' (övoJ,la KUplOV). To the reader this statement in § 11 cannot as yet be
wholly c1ear. He or she can be certain that Philo introducing some kind of
word-play on the use of the divine name KUP10~ in the main biblical lemma.
But he does not know whether the expression 'proper name' is to be understood
as (1) a legitimate name as opposed to an 'improper' or metaphorical appella-
tion, or as (2) a personal proper name (the ambiguity, we note, is preserved in
English as weIl).25 Philo does not leave the reader in suspense. First he indi-
cates the secondary biblical text which he is adducing for purposes of elucida-
tion, Ex. 3: 14. Then, by immediately introducing the not ion of 'improper use
of language' (Ka't(ixPllcn~, already implicit in the words cSicSwcn Ka.axpfjoeat
§ 12), he makes it quite c1ear that he intends the first of the two possible mean-
ings. This not ion of katachresis, taken over from rhetorical theory and given
a theological application, is, I submit, the single most interesting feature of our
passage. I will discuss it in more detail later on in my paper. For the time
being, however, we have enough interpretative problems on our hands.
Interpretation of Philo's discussion on the naming of God in § 11-15 has
been complicated by two suppositions made by diverse expositors. The first is
that Philo is intentionally mixing up the two usages of 'proper name' in the
passage and oscillates from the one meaning to the other. 26 The second is that
God's 'proper name' refers to the tetragrammaton (as intended in the original
Hebrew of the second secondary text Ex. 6:3).27 If modern scholars have been
perplexed by the passage, then it is likely that ancient and medieval scribes were
too. Hence, no doubt, the chaotic state of the text. 28

24 Cf. Abr. 74-76, A.J. Festugiere, La revelation d'Hermes Trismegiste, II, Le dieu cosmique,
Paris 1949, 83, 544, 609; on the unknowability of the soullmind see also Somn. 1.30 ff.
25 It is important to note that the ancients did not c1early distinguish between name and word
(ÖVOIl(l serving for both); so in this artic1e I will disregard the distinction as weil.
26 Cf. F.H. Colson, Philo LCL (London 1929-62) 5.149; W. Thei1er, Philo von Alexandria:
die Werke in deutsche Übersetzung (Cohn/Heinemann/Adler/Theiler), Berlin 19622 ,6.110.
27 Cf. Wolfson, op. eit. (n. 3),2.120-2, whose view is uncritically accepted by Festugiere op.
eit. IV, Le dieu inconnu et la Gnose (Paris 1954) 17 n., and followed by J .C. McLelland, God the
Anonymous: a study in Alexandrian philosophical theology, Cambridge Mass. 1976,34.
28 For §§ 11-15 the much emended text as presented by Colson is generally speaking satis-
 NAMING AND KNOWING: THEMES IN PHILONIC THEOLOGY 77

My view is that both suppositions are incorrect. Philo's thesis is straightfor-

ward: because God, as he announces to Moses in Ex. 3:14, is ö rov, he cannot
be legitimately and properly named. Implicit at this point is the Platonist
argument, derived from the theological reflection on the first and second
hypotheses of the Parmenides, that any name or attribute adds to Being. A
name entails predication, which necessarily involves a measure of plurality
and-the aspect that Philo will later stress (§ 27)-a degree of relationality.
If we say 'Being is good' or 'Being is God,' the attribute and the name can
only indicate His relation to something else, for Being in Hs (essential) na-
ture is unknowable (§ 9). All that one can do is to resort to negative attri-
butes such as 'indescribable' (<'iPPT\to<;), 'unknowable' «(t1u:PWOT\to<;), 'in-
comprehensible' (aKataAT\1tto<;) (all three found in § 15), 'unnameable'
(aKa'tOvo~aato<;) (not used here, but cf. Somn. 1.67, De Deo 4). One might
argue that even here there is an implicit comparison with beings which are
knowable (and a relation to creatures who might desire to know Hirn).
Moreover 'Being' itself might be thought to be a positive attribute. Philo has
not worked out the philosophical problematics of the question with the preci-
sion that we williater find in element and Plotinus. 29 But, to be fair to hirn,
he is primarily interested at this point in the positive divine names a&o<; and
KUPtO<; (and, let us not forget, he is committed to the biblical text in Ex. 3:14).
God cannot legitimately be named, Philo concludes from Ex. 3:14. But, as
the very next verse indicates, mankind does need the use of an appellation for
Being. 30 God therefore grants the improper use of a name, KUPlO<; Ö a&o<; (the
Lord God), as if it were a proper (i.e. legitimate) name (§ 12 öiöO)al Kata-
XPllaaat 00<; äv övo~ati t(9 Kupi(9). Philo contends that the formulation in
Ex. 3:15 supports his interpretation. God gives an aic.ovtOv övo~a, a name for
the ages of man, but not appropriate for His own ageless existence. It is a
name for 'generations' (y&v&a'i<;), Le. for those who come into the realm of
mortal genesis there is need for the 'improper use' (KataXPT\CJl<;) of a divine
name, so that if they worship Hirn they can do so with a best possible name

factory. Two phrases, both involving the term ÖVOIlU KUPlOV, require comment: § 12 mss. cO<; &V
OVOIlUTI T<!> Kupiq> , lohn Dam. cO<; liv 6 (l)v OVOIlUTI TOlOUT<!>, Wendland's conjicture 6
aKuTovolluaTo<; (l)v OVOIlUTl TOlOUTq> (!), Coison cO<; liv OVOIlUTl KUpioo T<!> (accepted by Theiler);
my own suggestion is cO<; liv OVOIlUTi Tq> Kupiq>. § 13 mss. ltEpi TOÜ Il11ÖEvi öEöTlMi>a9m OVOIlUTl
UUTOÜ Kupioo, lohn Dam. TO ÖVOIlU UUTOÜ KUPlOV (followed by Wendland), Hoeschelius, Mangey,
Coison ÖVOIl<l Tl UUTOÜ KUPIOV (whom 1 follow) (interestingly exactly the same mistake at lustin
Apol.2.6.1).
29 On Clement see below at n. 91; for Plotinus see esp. 6.3.12-17, and R. Mortley, Negative
theology and abstraction in Plotinus, AJPh 96 (1975) 363-77 (esp. 367 ff.). For Philo the problem
of relationality is more important than that of multiplicity.
30 It might seem in §§ 11-12 that Philo distinguishes between ÖVOIlU (name) and ltpoapTlCJl<;
(appellation), but it soon becomes c1ear that he does not follow this through, and prefers to speak
of an "improper name."
78 D.T. RUNIA

(§ 13). Colson badly mistranslates here: mortality does not need a 'substitute
for the divine name,' for any name applied to God is substitutionary.31 An im-
pressive confirmation of the interpretation so far is located, Philo now argues,
in the parallel text Ex. 6:3, which, because it begins with the word ffiq>eT]v ('I
was seen'), brings the problematics of Ex. 3:14-15 even eloser to the main
biblicallemma from Gen. 17: 1. But the exegete has to engage in some fast foot-
work to get the text to say what he wants. The LXX text 'to övo~a ~ou KUPlO<;
('my name Lord') is cited by Philo as 'to övo~a ~ou KUptoV. Clearly he has no
idea that the tetragrammaton is being referred to. 32 Philo argues that we have
here a case of hyperbaton (unusual word order). The words need to be rear-
ranged, so that we read övo~a ~ou 'to KUPtoV ('My proper name').33 God
says, 'My proper (i.e. legitimate) name I did not reveal to them (because, Philo
means to say, I do not have one), but instead I gave My improper name.'
Moses, as we shall see, speaks here the technicallanguage of Greek grammar
and rhetoric.
Philo complicates, but does not confuse, the matter furt her by adding an a
jortiori argument (§ 14-15). If God's logos, in this case the angel with whom
Jacob wrestIed, does not diselose his name (Gen. 32:20), then is it any wonder
that God himself also does not do so? There is, however, a basic distinction
to be made. The angel, situated at a lower level of being, does have a proper
name, but refuses to reveal it, whereas God does not have one and cannot re-
veal it properly. Philo to his credit makes the distinction pellucidly cIear in two
ways. He describes the logos as having a name that is 'personal as weIl as
proper' (iÖtoV Kai KUptoV). Secondly he distinguishes between God who is 'in-
describable' (äppT]'to<;) and the logos who is 'not described' (ou PT]'tO<;), i.e. he
is weIl aware of the difference between a negative and a privative attribute. 34
Philo coneludes (§ 15) that if the supreme Being is indescribable, He is also
unknowable and incomprehensible. If we recall § 9-11, it appears that the
reasoning is circular, for there Philo deduced unnameability from unknow-
ability. Perhaps, as Wolfson argued,35 Philo believes the two doctrines are
reciprocally reinforcing. Perhaps the conelusion is made only in order to return
the commentary back to the main biblical text. However this may be, I believe
that, provided we take KUPlOV övo~a to mean 'proper, legitimate name'

31 Colson, op. eit. (n. 26), 149.

32 On Philo and the tetragrammaton cf. L. Cohn, Zur Lehre vom Logos bei Philo, Judaica:
Festschrift zu H. Cohns 70. Geburtstage, Berlin 1912,309. Philo refers to the tetragrammaton at
Mos. 2.114-5, 132, Legat. 353, but he does not attempt to relate this to the question of God's
"proper name".
33 From § 13 (and, if my emendation is accepted, § 12) it emerges that Philo prefers the expres-
sion ÖVOIl<l Tl KUpIOV. But the biblical text constrains hirn.
34 Oh this difference cf. Mortley, art. eit. (n. 29), 374-5.
35 Wolfson, op. eit. (n. 3), 2.120 (but his reading of the citation of Ex. 6:3 in Mut. 13 is wide
of the mark!).
 NAMING AND KNOWING: THEMES IN PHILONIC THEOLOGY 79

throughout, Philo's passage on the naming of God is coherently and not unim-
pressively argued. Aprecis of the same argument, with reference to the same
biblical text Ex. 6:3, is given at Somn. 1.230. 36
The aporia raised in § 7 is now elose to solution. God does not appear to
Abraham as Being,37 but in the guise of His ruling power, as indicated by the
name KUplOC;. The learning soul is a late starter. Not long ago as a Chaldean
he was still under the delusion that the cosmos possesses autonomous efficient
causes. Now he recognizes God as king and mler. And then immediately he be-
comes the recipient of a greater act of divine beneficence, when the Lord
(KUplOC;) says to hirn 'I am your God (eSOC;).'
In the fourth aporia Philo directs his attention to the personal pronoun
joined to the divine name (I am your GOd).38 The supreme Being is not only
God of creation as a whole, but also of human souls (§ 18). The relation of God
to men was already hinted at when He gave His improper name 'Lord God of
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob' (§ 12). It is now worked out with more precision,
with reference to the three elasses of men outlined at the beginning of the trea-
tise. For the worthless man such as Pharaoh He is KUPlOC; in a relationship of
fear; for the man of progress such as Abraham He is eSOC; in a relationship of
beneficence; for the perfect man such as Moses He is both KUPlOC; and eSOC;,
and such a man is honoured with the title 'man of God.' The train of thought
is here once again rat her labyrinthine. The interpretations that Colson suggests
are ingenious but unconvincing. I cannot discuss them now. 39
But Philo is not finished with the words 'I am your God.' The fifth aporia
turns to the role of the divine name eSOC;. Philo is immediately struck by the
juxtaposition of silli ('I am') and esoC;. The statement can only be spoken 'im-
properly' (K<l't<lXPllonKroc;), not 'properly' (KupiwC;). In other words the
previous discussion on the supreme Being's unnameability is relevant here too.
Philo now focusses in on the ontological aspect (§ 27). Being ('to ov) exists qua
Being (U ov), not as belonging to what is relative (1tpOC; n). This, one might be
tempted to say, is a sentence such as only Philo could write. Platonic being,

36 But in Abr. 51, 121, where he is concerned with exegesis of Ex. 3:15 and Gen. 18:1-3
without reference to Ex. 6:3, the explanations of God's name are not strictly speaking consistent
with Mut. 11-15.
37 Philo writes oux oo~ E7tlA6.Il1tOVtO~ Kai E1tUpmVOIlEvoll tOÜ 1taVto~ aitioll, by which he
must mean tO öv but at the same time refers back to the discussion in §§ 5-6. I regret having given
the impression in VC 38 (1984) 225, that the phrase might refer to the creative power.
38 Cf. Cazeaux, ap. eit. (n. 17),486.
39 Colson, ap. eit. (n. 26), 154-7. The passage should be read in terms of an intended contrast
between Moses, who is eE6~ to Pharaoh, and God, who is eE6~ to Abraham. Beginners should
look to Moses, as is implied in his blessing in Deut. 33: I (§ 25). Hence KAijpOV autoü must (rather
surprisingly) refer to Moses and not God, and Coison is obviously wrong in wanting to emend
V61l0ll~ (cf. the illuminating parallel passage at Mas. 1.158). See now my detailed interpretation
in God and man in Philo of Alexandria, JThS 39 (1988).
80 D.T. RUNIA

Aristotelian substance, Academic categories-all are brought to bear on a per-

sonal God who says 'I am,!40 Suffice it to say that the main point is the dis-
tinction between what is absolute and what is relative,41 and it is made clearly
enough. God is absolute, unchanging and self-sufficient. Created reality is
relative, wholly dependent on divine benevolence. In between, os if relative'
(mauvei 1tpo<; n),42 stand God's powers, by means of which that benevolence
is effectuated. The name 6eo<;, as the etymology indicates, discloses God's
creative activity. Thus 'I am your God' is equivalent to 'I am your maker and
creator' (f,yro ei~l 1tOlTJ'tl}<; Kui OTJIUOUPYO<; § 29).43
So we end up with a brief exposition of the doctrine of the divine powers,
probably the best known of all Philo's theological ideas. Yet I would wish to
argue that the motivation and the consequences of the doctrine are presented
here in a particularly lucid way. Philo is claiming that every time we speak of
God by means of his names, we are not speaking of Hirn as He really is, but
invariably in terms of His relationality, via the powers, towards that which is
other than Hirn. By making amental displacement we can understand, I think,
how Philo could become enthused about the consistency of the Pentateuch.
How accurate that God presents hirnself as KUPlO<; to the recalcitrant Pha-
raoh!44 How splendid that right throughout the account of creation the divine
name 6eo<; is used!45 How appropriate that only once in the whole Pentateuch
the veil of God's relationality is cast aside, when the God-beloved Moses
receives the oracle in Ex. 3: 14!46 Philo, of course, finds it quite impossible and
quite unnecessary to achieve consistency and correctness in the use and non-use
of God's names. 47 I myself do no better when 1 speak of God's names (it goes
against the grain to talk continually of Being and Its names). Moses is not
superstitious in the use of names, Philo says elsewhere. 48 Nor, he implies,

40 I am not sure Philo intends any kind of allusion to the Aristotelian doctrine of ,0 ÖV ij öv.
As far as I know it is the only instance in his writings.
41 On the Academic categories and their use in Eudorus and Middle Platonism cf. R.E. wiK,
Albinus and Ihe hislory 01 Middle Plalonism, Cambridge 1937,66-67; Dillon, op. eil. (n. 5), 8,
37, 133,279.
42 Cf. Drummond cited by Coison op. eil. 587, or compare Albinus' description of löea in Did.
9.1 as relative to God, the thinking subject, matter and the cosmos, but in absolute terms (KaO'
aUnlv) ouaia.
43 lt is tempting to accept Wendland 's proposed conjecture Öl1ll10Upro<; <a6<; >.
44 Philo has to ignore passages such as Ex. 7:16, 9:1, where God speaks as KUP10<; 6 0&6<; to
Pharaoh.
45 Cf. Planl. 86, QG 2.16. Observations such as these may have something to do with the origin
of the doctrine of the powers (and may antedate Philo).
46 Ex. 3:14, 20:21 (rv6cpo<;), 33:13-23 are the central texts of Philo's theology of transcen-
dence. On his use of the first see the analysis of E. Starobinski-Safran, Exode 3, 14 dans I'oeuvre
de Philon d'Alexandrie, in; P. Vignaux (ed.), Dieu el/'elre: exegeses d'Exode 3,14 et de Coran
20,11-24, Paris 1978,47-55.
47 E.g. in § 46 he speaks of 0&6<; when ,0 ÖV would seem more correct, whereas in § 82 the
reverse applies.
48 Somn. 1.230; on this difficult text see V. Nikiprowetzky, Sur une lecture demonologique de
 NAMING AND KNOWING: THEMES IN PHILONIC THEOLOGY 81

need we be. What he does expect is that 'we carry along with us' the awareness
of God's essential namelessness every time we find ourselves making use of the
various names which he possesses.
Time and space forbid more than a passing glance at the last two aporiae.
1 have included them to give some idea of how themes initiated in the first
chapter are developed later in the treatise. Both aporiae reveal doubts on the
part ofthe progressing soul to whom God appears. But God has said 'I am your
God,' affirming His unceasing beneficence. The learner must dispense with all
self-assertion (§ 175), recognize his own 'nothingness' (OM&VE\U, § 155) and
God's never-ceasing grace (§ 218-9).49 There is an unbridgeable gap between
God and man, for God is uncompoundedly divine, whereas man is a mixture
of the divine and mortality (§ 184). Man can only receive the munificence of
the divine grace if it is measured out in accordance with what the soul of each
person can accept (§ 232).50 Let the soul therefore be a thankful suppliant of
GOd,51 hoping for the full measure of proffered knowledge (§ 222-3). But let
her in any case be content (UYU1tll't6v § 219) with the fruits of toil and practice,
for the highest benefits are reserved for divine natures wholly severed from the
body.52 Philo thinks here not only of angels and departed souls such as Enoch
(§ 34), but especially of Moses who entered the 'darkness' of invisible and
immaterial being (§ 7), and no doubt also of Isaac who is born 'in the other
year' (Gen. 17:21), i.e. in the incorporeal and intelligible realm (§ 267). At the
end of the treatise the Iearner has not quite yet progressed so far. Isaac is not
yet born. But God leaves hirn (Gen. 17:22) perfected as a listener53 and fiIled
with wisdom, able to stand on his own two feet (§ 270).
As 1 observed a little earlier, Philo does not attempt to make his allegorical
commentaries into thematically unified and coherent literary products, the
chief reason for this being his subservience to the main biblical text. But a trea-
tise is not just a potpourri of whatever happens to enter into his head. Our trea-
ti se has a main directive idea or theme, wh ich allows a measure of integration.
I would formulate it as folIows. There is a vast difference between God and

Phiion d' Alexandrie, De Gigantibus 6-18, in: G. Nahon et C. Touati (eds.), Hommage ii Georges
Vajda, Louvain 1981,61 f.
49 The theme of divine grace/benevolence is very prominent in Mut.: cf. §§ 30, 52 f., 142, 155,
219, 253, 260, 268.
50 On the theme of measured distribution of divine beneficence cf. Runia, op. eil. (n. 6),
137-8. It looks like the wording of § 232 is meant to remind us of the celebrated text Sapientia
Salomonis 11 :20.
51 On the 'Levitic spirituality' cf. M. Hart, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit vol. 15 Les oeuvres
de Phi/on d'A/exandrie, Paris 1966, 130 ff.
52 The theme of 'contentment' also at §§ 50, 118, 183; cf. the very similar formulation at Aet.
2, which adapts Plato's O:Y!l1täv xplj at Tim. 29c8 (cf. Runia, op. eit., 123 ff.).
53 Not the seer! Philo is unpleasantly constrained by the text of Gen. 17:22, not least because
his copy of the LXX apparently read KUPlO<; and not the 6 0&6<; in our mss. Understandably Philo
does not dweil on the choice of divine name here.
82 n.T. RUNIA

man: God is steadfast, unchanging,54 whereas man is subject to the vicissi-

tudes of change. The changes of name in scripture are not a matter for ridicule
(§ 62), but illustrate a profound truth. Properly speaking God as Being has no
name, but through his diverse unchanging improper names he mercifully re-
lates to souls at different levels. Men and women such as Abraham (§ 60) and
Sarah (§ 77) receive changes of name because they show progress, or, in the
case of Joseph (§ 91), decline. The exceptions are Moses, who is polyonymous
(having three names, § 125-9),55 and Isaac, who alone of the Patriarchs has
a single name (§ 88). These are our two great examples, the one as an unwritten
law (cf. Abr. 5), the other as the great lawgiver (cf. § 26). To say that the title
of the De mutatione nominum is inappropriate because it covers the contents
of only part of the treatise (Le. the catalogue of name-changes in § 60-129)
is clearly very wide of the mark. 56

IV

In his survey of Philo's debts to Middle Platonism lohn Dillon states that Philo
is the earliest authority for the application of the epithets fLKa'toVOJ.lao'toc;,
äpPTJ'toC;, and fLKa'tuATJ7t'tOC; to GOd. 57 Even Festugiere, despite his notorious
reluctance to credit Philo with any independence of thought whatsoever, could
not contest this. 58 But does this entail that we should grant Wolfson's claim
that Philo's scripturally based philosophy provided the vital impulse for the
development of negative theology in later Greek philosophy?59 If the line
of transmission was confined to Philo, lustin, Numenius, Celsus, Clement,
Plotinus, we might be tempted to give Wolfson the benefit of the doubt. I agree
with Dillon, however, that the presence of such themes in a broad group of
school Platonists (and Neopythagoreans) militates against the thesis, and that
exegesis of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides was a probable stimulus to
reflection in Philo's time or even earlier. 60 Another weakness of Wolfson's

54 On God's stability and immutability cf. §§ 24,28,46,54 f., 87, 176. The last two words of
the treatise are (not accidentally I suspect) J3eJ3at6tatov elooc;.
55 Another difficult passage, splendidly analysed by V. Nikiprowetzky in a posthumously
published article, Moyses pa/pans ve/liniens: on some explanations of the name of Moses in Philo
of Alexandria, in: F.E. Greenspahn/E. HiigertlB.L. Mack (eds.), Nourished with peace: Studies
in Hellenistic ludaism in memory oj Samue/ Sandme/, Chico California 1984, 117-142.
56 Cf. the complaints of L. Cohn, Die Einteilung und Chronologie der Schriften Philos,
Phi/%gus Supplbd. 7 (1899) 396, and Theiler, op. eit. (n. 26), 6.104, and the sound remarks of
R. Arnaldez, De mutatione nominum vol. 18 Les oeuvres de Phi/on d'A/exandrie, Paris 1964, 11.
57 Op. eit. (n. 5), 155.
58 La reve/ation d'Hermes Trismegiste, 4.17, 307. It is true that the paraphrase of Tim. 28c
in the Epicurean doxography at Cicero ND 1.30 approaches negative theology, but the characteris-
tic negative terms are not employed. Aristotle is reported as having called the fifth element
aKatov6~a(Jtov (De phi/. fr. 27), but this seems to me clearly a privative use of the term.
59 Op. eit. (n. 3), 2.110-138.
60 Dillon ibid.; cf. also R. Mortley, Connaissance religieuse et hermeneutique chez Clement
 NAMING AND KNOWING: THEMES IN PHIlONIC THEOlOGY 83

position is the fact that the specijically Jewish prohibitions on pronouncing the
tetragrammaton and on taking God's name in vain (third commandment) do
not appear to have had much impact on Philo. 61
The subject of negative theology has been much discussed. 62 I would like
now, in the space that remains, to focus on a related topic that has gone largely
unnoticed. Indeed, as far as I know, Philo's theological application of the no-
tion of katachresis has never received any scholarly attention at all. 63 Before
commenting on Philo's application we shall have to look at the background
and development of the term and what it represents.
KU'tUXPTJcrt<; is a technical term belonging to the theory of tropes ('tP01tOl,
Le. non-literal word usage) in Greek rhetoric and gramm ar. In general terms
one can say that katachresis has to do with the extended use or misuse of words
or phrases, but it is difficuIt to give a more precise general definition, for analy-
sis of its development and usage reveals that it is employed in twö related but
differing ways.64 These I shall call the soft and hard line respectively. The
'soft line' finds its origins in Aristotle. According to Cicero Aristotle includes
katachresis under the heading of metaphora, the former term being used
by grammarians for misuses of language, 'when we say a "minute" (Le. di-
minished) mind instead of a "smalI" mind, and when we misuse related words
on occasion because it gives pleasure or it is fitting. '65 This report is consistent
with non-technical usage of the verb KU'tUXPUOJ.l.Ul in Aristotle's extant writ-
ings. 66 The term KUPlOV ÖVOJ.l.U in Aristotle does not yet have its technical
meaning of 'proper, legitimate word or name' and indicates no more than 'nor-
mal, ordinary usage. '67 Nevertheless some notion of 'extended' or 'unusual'
word-usage must be implied in katachresis; otherwise it could not be distin-
guished from metaphoric usage in general. 68 Cicero and other Latin gram-

d'Alexandrie, Leiden 1973,6-11, and the contribution of J. Mansfeld, this volume, pp. 92 ff.
61 See above n. 32; cf. also Philo's interpretation of the third commandment at Decal. 82-95.
62 See esp. Festugiere's study (cited in n. 58) and the researches of J. Whittaker now collected
together in Studies in Platonism and Patristic thought London 1984, (notably Neopythagoreanism
and the Transcendent Absolute, SO 48 (1973) 77-86 and ·APPl11:O~ Kat uKa'tov61l(:J"to~, in
Platonismus und Christentum: Festschrift für H. Dörrie, JbAC Ergbd. 10 (1983) 303-6).
63 Apart from abrief discussion in Runia, op. eit. (n. 6), 438.
64 For what follows I am partially indebted to J. Cousin, Quintilien Institution oratoire vol. 5,
Paris 1978, 296-7; cf. also D.M. Schenkeveld, Studies in Demetrius On style, Amsterdam 1964,
97-9.
6S Orator 94: Aristoteles autem tralationi et haec ipsa [unaAAaYll et IlE1:WVUllia] subiungit et
abusionem, quam Ka1:UXPl1OlV vocant, ut cum minutum dieimus animum pro parvo et abutimur
verbis propinquis, si opus est, vel quod delectat vel quod decet. Cf. also De orat. 3.169, Rhet.ad
Her. 4.45.
66 Note esp De Caelo 1.3 270b24; also earlier Plato Symp. 205b6.
67 Cf. Rhef 3.2 1404b6, 3.10 141Ob13, A.P. 21 1457bI.
68 As Prof. Schenkeveld points out to me, a lot may depend on how one interprets the words
si opus est in Cicero. Taken in a very specific way, these might point in the direction of our 'hard
line'. But nothing in Cicero's example suggests this.
84 n.T. RUNIA

marians approve of this soft line on katachresis. It finds a modern formulation

in Smyth's Greek grammar, where it is described as 'the extension of the
meaning of a word beyond its proper sphere, especially a violent metaphor. '69
In Book VIII of the Institutio oratoria Quintilian explicitly rejects the
Aristotelian-Ciceronian approach, arguing that the term KU't<lXPll<n<; should
only be used to describe the deli berate misuse of a word in order to represent
a meaning for which no correct word is available, such as when we call the
murderer of a mother or a brother a 'parricide' (which word originally only
referred to the killing of a father [pater], if we accept Quintilian's etymolo-
gy).10 In PS.Plutarch's Vita Homeri KU't<lXPll<n<; is defined as 'the trans-
ference of a word-usage from an object which is properly (Kupiro<;) signified
to another object which has no proper name (KUpWV övoIlU).'71 We note that
the technical use of KUPWV ÖVOIlU as 'proper' or 'correct' name is an intrinsic
part of the definition. The rhetorical theorist Tryphon, who lived in Alexandria
one or two generations before Philo, in his little book I1epi 'tP01trov gives a
similar definition, and at the end of his discussion specifically addresses the
problem of the difference between metaphora and katachresis. The former, he
asserts, involves the transference of a word from one named object to another
named object, whereas the latter moves from what is named to what is un-
named (aKU'toVOIlUO'tOv).72 Here, succinctly stated, is the difference between
what I have called the soft and the hard line. What the soft line calls kata-
chresis, the hard line in many instances regards as no more than metaphora.
In his standard work on ancient rhetoric Martin folIo ws the latter tradition,
when he says that 'die KU't<lXPll0t<;, abusio. besteht darin. daß für ein feh-
lendes proprium ein naheliegendes in seiner Bedeutung dem gesuchten pro-
prium ähnliches Wort eintritt.'73
It has been argued by Barwick that the origin of the doctrine of tropes is to
be sought in the contribution of the Stoa to the study of grammar and rhetoric,

69 H.W. Smyth, Greek grammar, Cambridge Mass. 1956,677.

70 8.6.34-5: •... catachresis, quam recte dicimus abusionem, quae non habentibus nomen
suum accommodat quod in proximo est ... discernendumque est (ab> hoc lotum tra/alionis istud
genus, quod abusio est ubi nomen dejuit, Ira/atio ubi aliud juit.' (ed. Cousin).
71 2.18 346.11-13 Bernadakis: KataXPTlOt~ IlEV ö1\, ij1t&P {mo toß KUpiro~ ÖTlI..OUIlEVOU
ll&ta<pEp&l t1)v xpi'jOtV &<P' ft&pov OUK fxov övolla KUPlOV ...
72 L. Spengel, Rhetores Graeci, Leipzig 1856, 3.192.20-193.7: KataXPTloi~ &on M~l~ ll&t&V-
TlV&YIl&Vl] a1to toß 1tPWtOU KatOVOllaOe&VtO~ Kupioo~ t& Kai &tUIlOO~ &<P' ft&pov aKatov61laotov
Kata tO OtKEiOV, Olov y6vu Kal..allOU, Kai 6<peal..llo~ all1t&1..0U ... öla<p&p&l ÖE Il&ta<popa
Kai KataXP1]Ot~, ön Tt IlEV Il&ta<popa a1tO KatOVOlla~OIl&VOU &1ti KatOVOlla~61l&vou My&tal.
Tt ÖE KataXP1]Ot~ a1tO KatOVOlla~OIl&VOU &1ti aKatov6llaotov, M&v Kai KataXP1]Ot~ My&tal.
M.L. West, Tryphon De Tropis, CQ 15, 1965, 230 ff., argues that both this work and the
companion piece falsely ascribed in Spengel to Gregory of Corinth, if they are not by Tryphon
hirnself, plausibly contain material going back to hirn. The t.a.q. for the fI&pi tp61tooV literature
is given by a 2nd century A.D. Würzburg papyrus, but an earlier date, e.g. Ist century B.C., is
likely.
73 J. Martin, Antike Rhetorik, München 1974,266.
 NAMING AND KNOWING: THEMES IN PHILONIC THEOLOGY 85

and that the Stoa was responsible for introducing the new technieal usage of
KUP10V (ÖVOIlU) as meaning 'proper,.74 Whether this was the case or not,75 it
is worth pointing out that certain Stoie doctrines naturally led to reflection (and
no doubt polemies) on the subject of word-usage. Chrysippus is known to have
written a treatise on 'Zeno's correct usage of words.'76 If the Stoies claimed
that only the sage is a king or a rieh man, they are clearly not using the words
ßueHA&u<; and 1tAOU010<; in the usual manner. 77 A neglected text in Philo may
be illuminating. In De Cherubim 121 he argues that only God is in the true sense
(K\)pico<;) a citizen; men, and this even includes the wise, are actually aliens and
foreigners, and if they are called citizens, it is only by misuse of the word
(KU'tUXP1l0&1 OVOIlU'tO<;). The theological extrapolation is of course Philonie.
We may, however, entertain the possibility that the Stoies defended their
paradoxes in a similar manner, by arguing that their use of words was legiti-
mate, as opposed to ordinary usage, whieh might seem correct, but is in fact
catachrestie. 78
Let us return now to Philo's exploitation of the term katachresis. He refers
to it fourteen times, a comparatively high frequency when compared with other
writers. 79 On occasion Philo uses the term quite loosely (e.g. at Decal. 94,
swearing as misuse of God's polyonymous name); sometimes this loose usage
approximates to our 'soft line' (e.g. Congr. 161, KUKCOO1<; meaning not
'chastening' but 'toil'); twice, as we have already seen, Philo gives the term a
Stoic application (Leg. 3.86, Cher. 121). Ofparamount interest to US, however,
are the seven passages in whieh Philo specifieally applies the notion of
katachresis to man's naming and speaking ab out God. 80 There can be no
doubt that in these passages he has the 'hard-line' interpretation in mind. When
we address God by one of His names, or when we speak of Hirn generally, we
use words not legitimately but catachrestieally, for we apply names or words
to a Being who is properly speaking nameless and indescribable. Naming and

74 K. Barwick, Probleme der stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik, Abhandlungen der Säch-
sischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, philoI.-hist.KI.49.3, Berlin 1957,88-97. Not the
Old Stoa, Barwick suggests (110), but initiated by Diogenes of Babyion.
7S The speculative nature of Barwick's investigations is criticized by D. Fehling, GGA 212
(1958) 161-173, who argues that the origin of such rhetorical theories should not be sought within
the confines of one particular philosophical schooI.
76 nEpi 'tOD Kupiwe; KExpi'jaSat ZTjvwvCl 'tOte; OV6!lClalV, Diog.Laert. 7.122 (= SVF 3.617).
77 Cf. the complaint of Alexander of Aphrodisias at SVF 3.595.
78 Cf. also Leg. 3.86 (health, wealth, farne can be KCl'tClXPlla'tIKWe; called ayClSu).
79 Leg. 2.10, 3.86, Cher. 121, Sacr. 101, Post. 168, Her. 124, Congr. 161, Mut. 11-14,27-28,
266, Somn. 1.229, Abr. 120, Decal. 94, implicitly at 'De Deo 4. Cf. also the use of KUP10Ä.OY&W
at Det. 58, Post. 7, Deus 71 ('tc KUPIOÄ.OYOU!lEVOV bt' avSpci)7twv 1tuSOe; <'> SU!l6e; ". EiPll'tClI
'tP01tlKW'tEPOV &1ti tOD öv'toe;; Winston and Dillon in their commentary miss the allusion to the
theory of tropes), Somn. 2.245, Mos. 1.75, Legat. 6), In Plutarch's Moralia once (25B), in Plotinus
once (1.4.6.20), in Clement four times.
80 Sacr. 101, Post. 168, Mut. 11-14,27-28, Somn. 1.229, Abr. 120, De Deo 4.
86 D.T. RUNIA

speaking about God strains the Iimitations of language, for the task of lan-
guage is to give phonetic expression to the factuality and essence of things. 81
Since God's essence is unknown to man, language must necessarily fall short.
This can be made cIear with reference to a technical term drawn from (phiIo-
sophically influenced) rhetorical theory.
It would surprise me greatly if we have not encountered here a serendipitous
find of Philo hirnself. May we not surmise that his remarkably associative
mind82 was struck by the word clK<I'tOVOJ.l.<Io'to<; in his grammar book (we
recall Tryphon's statement above83 ) and that he observed that it was precisely
the same term that Platonists were using in their attempts at negative theology.
But it is very important not to overlook that even here scripture is pointing the
way. As we observed earIier, Philo reads, or rather one should say misreads,
Moses as saying that God does not reveal a KUPtoV ÖVOJ.l.<I. The great nomo-
thete had not, it would seem, forgotten the rhetoric and philosophy that Greek
teachers had taught hirn when he was stilI a prince of Egypt (Mos. 1.23)!
Original and apposite as PhiIo's idea may have been, it cannot be said
to have caught on. This emerges when we examine the early Christi an phi-
losophers and exegetes who were acquainted with the Philonic heritage of
thought. 84 The doctrine that God is ineffable and nameless, but has made
hirnself known under many names or appellations is already a prominent theme
in lustin and other early Apologists. 85 But is there any evidence that Philo's
specific application of the notion of katachresis was taken over? I have found
only two passages which are in any way relevant. In Stromateis V Clement in
a discussion of God's ineffable transcendence writes that 'if we sometimes
name Hirn, caIIing Hirn improperly (00 KOp{ro<;) the One or the Good or Nous
or Being or Father or God or Demiurge or Lord, we apply these not as His
name, but out of embarrassment we take recourse (1tPOoXproJ.l.Ee<I) to fine
names, so that the mind can gain support from these and not be led astray.'86

81 Cf. Leg. 2.15, Cher. 56, Somn. 1.230, QG 4.194 etc.

82 Some examples at Runia, op. eit. (n. 6), 371.
83 clKUTOVOI1UaTOC; also at SpengeI3.208.30, 217.11,19 (the second work ascribed to Trypho,
see n. 72 above), 232.7.
84 I confine myself to Christian thinkers up to the time of Origen. Prof. G.C. Stead informs
me that the subject may be of relevance to the later Arian controversy.
85 Cf. esp. JustinApol. 2.6.1, also 1.61, Athenagoras Leg. 10.1, TheophiIus ad Aut. 1.3.1, and
also the text of Aristides discussed by R. van den Broek, this volume, 202 ff.
86 Str. 5.82.1: Kliv övol1a~ool1ev UlJ'tO 1tOTe, ou KupiooC; KU1..0ÜVTec; i\TOl ev ij Tclyu60v ij voüv
ij UUTO TO ÖV ij 1tUTtpU ij 6eov ij cSl111l0UPYov 1\ KUPlOV, OUX 00C; ÖVOI1U UUTOÜ 1tpoq>epOl1eVOl
Uyol1ev, (mo cSe cl1topiuC; ÖVOI1Uat Ku1..oiC; 1tpoaXPool1e6u, iv' fXU 1'\ cSlavOlu, I1Tt 1tepi nUu
1t1..UVOOI1EVl], E1tepeicSea6m TOUTOlC; (text Le Boulluec). A. Le Boulluec (element d'Alexandrie,
Les Stromateis V, SC 278-9, Paris 1981, 2.266) adduces a statement in a speech of the rhetor/
phiIosopher Maximus of Tyre, the formulation of which is almost exactIy the same as Clement's
(Or. 2.10 28.8-29.2 Hobein): {) l1ev yap 6eoc; ... Kpeinoov cSe Xpovou Kui ui&voC; Kui 1taal1C;
peoual1C; q>uaeooc;, clVcl>WI10C; v0l106tTu, Kui nPPl1TOC; q>oovij, Kui clOPUTOC; oq>6u1..110iC;· OUK
 NAMING AND KNOWING: THEMES IN PHILONIC THEOLOGY 87

This reminds us very much of Philo, and a direct debt may be suspected (much
Philonic material is absorbed into this book 87 ). The second relevant passage is
located in the Cohortatio ad gentiles, whose anonymous author was probably
a contemporary of Origen. 88 Speaking of Plato's doctrine of being, he
deelares that the Greek philosopher had heard the words spoken to Moses in
Ex. 3: 14, and had realized that God did not tell hirn his proper name (KUpWV
övolla), for no name can properly be ascribed to God (KUPWA.oYEia9at).89
The last elause is a paraphrase of Philo's words in Mos. 1.75, wh ich is elearly
the direct source.
Both Clement and the anonymus, therefore, come very elose to Philo's idea,
but the 'technical' notion of katachresis is neglected. Origin too does not ex-
ploit it in his discussions with Celsus on God's namelessness or in the De prin-
cipiis. 90 Both he and Clement show more sophistication than Philo in their
speculations on God's transcendence. It is especially striking that Clement, in
co nt rast to Philo and anticipating Plotinus, disqualifies the epithet 'Being' for
God. But, as we saw earlier, Philo cannot accept this on account of his loyalty
to Mosaic scripture. 91 Middle Platonists also do not apply the notion of
katachresis theologically, not even Plutarch, who had a fine opportunity to do
so in his mediations on the Delphic E.92 If we wish to find a creative use of the
term katachresis which is somewhat comparable to Philo's, we must turn, sur-
prisingly perhaps, to Sextus EmWricus. Sceptics do not use the terms and
expressions of their philosophy dogmatically as if they properly reveal facts,
but indifferently or catachrestically, in a way that is relative (xp6<; n) and so
also relative to the Sceptics. 93 The connection between Philo and the Sceptics

fxovt&<; öe autoü l..aßeiv t1)v ouoiav, E1t&P&löOll&6a qxovai<;, Kai OV6IlaOlV, Kai ~c1>01<; Kai tU1tOl<;
xpuooü .... E1tl6uj.1oÜV'tE<; j.1EV au'toü 'tTi<; VOTjoEW<;, U1tO öt a06EvEia<; 'ta 7tap' llj.1Wv KaAa 'tij
EK&ivou q>UOEl E7tOVOllo.~OV't&<; ... Philo and Clement would of course both aggressively reject the
rhetor's reference to "graven images". Human weakness (a06&V&la) is also stressed by Philo at
Mos. 1.75.
87 Cf. the index /ocorum in Stählin's edition and Le Boulluec's commentary. Note especially
the extensive use of Post. 12-20 in Str. 5.71-74, where in 71.5 Clement adds Kai ov6Ila'to<; Kai
VOi!O&W<; to Philo's U1tEpo.VW Kai 't61tou Kai Xp6vou (Post. 14).
88 Cf. R.M. Grant, HThR 51 (1958) 128-134.
89 Coh. ad gent. 20-21,72.20-73.3 Otto: aKTlKocO<; [0 IlMtwvl yap EV AiyU1t't1j) 'tov 6&ov 'tlj)
Mwüo&i &iPTlK&Val 'Eyoo &illlO thv, ... äyvw Ötl ou KUP10V övolla EautOÜ 0 6&0<; 1tpo<; au'tov äq>TI.
oööev yap övolla E1ti 6wü KUPlOI..oyeio6at öuva't6v. ta yap ov61lata &i<; Ö!ll..wo!V Kai Ölo.yVeoOlV
tOOV U1tOK&IIl&veov Keitat 1tpaYllo.teov ...
90 Note esp. C. Ce/so 7.42, De princ. 1.2.1.
91 See above at n. 29.
92 Cf. Mor. 388F-389A, 393B-C. With regard to the question being/above being both
Plutarch and Numenius are closer to Philo than Clement and Plotinus; cf. J. Whittaker, CQ 19
(1%9) 189 ff.; Phoenix 32 (1978) 144-154. At Seneca Ep. 58.11 (ina 'Platonist' context) the words
nomen parum proprium 'quod est' might suggest an allusion to KataXPTlOl<;, but in fact they refer
to the Latin rendering of 'to öv.
93 Hyp. 1.207: q>allev öe Kai eh<; ou Kupieo<; ÖTlI..OÜVt&<; ta 1tpaYllata ... tie&Il&V auta<;
[<peova<;I, aU' Mla<p6peo<; Kai &i ßOUI..OVtat KataXPllotlKOO<;' out& yap 1tP&1t&1 tlj) OK&1ttlKIj)
88 D.T. RUNIA

may seem less startling if we bear in mind the contribution of sceptical theories
to what Raoul Mortley has called the gradual move 'from word to silence' in
ancient thought. 94
Why, we may finally ask, was Philo's idea not more explicitly taken over?
In the case of the author of the Cohortatio one might surmise that he did not
recognize the technicalities involved. But I would be very hesitant to say this
of Clement and Origen, who know their rhetorical tropes backwards, front-
wards and sideways, so to speak. 95 A clue may be gained if we observe that,
although quotations of Ex. 3: 14 are common in early Patristic literature, refer-
ences to the other two texts used by Philo, Ex. 3: 15 and Ex. 6:3, are exceedingly
rare. 96 When Justin quotes the last-named text to Trypho, he implies that
Christ the Logos was the eeo<; who appeared to the Patriarchs and that it was
his name that was not disclosed to them. 97 Clement, having just written the
passage on God's unnameability which we discussed, goes on to add that it is
only by divine grace and God's Logos (i.e. Christ) that the Unknown is known
and quotes the words of Paul in Acts which are the subject of Dr. Van der
Horst's paper elsewhere in this volume. 98 Philo's use of the notion of
katachresis, we may conclude, has too negative an emphasis for the Christian
thinkers. The limitations of human thought and language are a fact and a
problem-on this all are in agreement-, but why underline it so heavily when
God has sent His only begotten son, who said to his followers 'if you know me,
you know my Father and have seen Him'?99 On the other hand, in comparison
with the Platonists, the aim of whose philosophy could also be said to be 'to
see God', 100 the Jew Philo and the Christian Fathers stand side by side. Some-
what simplistically we might formulate the difference as follows: for the Jew
and the Christi ans God makes sure that he is K(l'tU 'to ÖUV(l'tov known to man
(whether via Moses or the incarnation), whereas for the Greeks God is knowa-
ble (again K(l'tU 'tO ÖUV(l'tov) and it is up to man to know hirn. It might be
argued that this contrast is too absolute. Does not Plotinus emphasize the
passivity of the intellect as it waits for the spark suddenly to jump across from

q>wvollaXEiv, IiAAW<; 'tE T!lliv ouvEpyei 'to Il11ÖS 'talha<; 'ta<; q>wva<; EiAIKPIVÖ><; ol1llaivElV
AeYEOOal, aHa np6<; n Kai npo<; 'tOU<; OKEnnKoU<;. Cf. also Hyp. 1.135,191. On the use of
the phrase np6<; n cf. above p. 80 on Mut. 27, and also Greg.Naz. Or. 30.18 (in an exegesis of
Ex. 3:14 quoted by M. Harl on p. 97 of the articIe cited below in n. 96).
94 Gnosis I, RAC 11 (1981), 526.
9S Their acquaintance with the trope is cIear from passages such as Str. 8.26.1, C. Cels. 5.4.
% Cf. Biblia patristiea, ad loee. On Patristic use of Ex. 3:14 see M. Harl, Citations et com-
mentaires d'Exode 3, 14 chez les Peres Grecs des quatre premiers siecIes, in: Vignaux, op. eil.
(n. 46), 87-108.
Dial. 126.2
97
Str. 5.82.4.
98
99 Cf. John 14:6-9, cited by Clement SIr. 5.16.1, Origen C. Cels. 7.43.
100 Justin Dial. 2.6, on which see J .C.M. Van Winden, An early Christian philosopher, Leiden
1971, 50-51.
 NAMING AND KNOWING: THEMES IN PHILONIC THEOLOGY 89

the One and illuminate the soul?IOI Very true. But by then the stage of gaining
support from the availability of God's names has long been passed. 102
In my dissertation I hinted that, though the notion of katachresis in its
specific application is limited to the problem of naming and speaking about
God, nevertheless it might aid us in developing a more general perspective on
Philo's theology.103 For it cannot but draw attention to an unavoidable ele-
ment of tension in his thinking on God. Philo's loyalty to Judaism, induding
its central tenet of monotheism, is unconditional. But in his thinking and writ-
ing about God he has decided to appropriate ideas from Greek philosophical
theology, and he finds that its chief doctrine, a split-Ievel conception of divini-
ty, is not a viable option. 104 God has to be unnameable and named at the same
time. Hypostasization, as developed in the doctrine of the powers, is a crutch.
Philo would gladly throw it away if he could, but of course he is stuck with
it. In Philo's view katachresis is a necessary evil, we might be tempted to say,
symptomatic of the human condition. 105 But it occurs not without God's con-
nivance. At Mut. 12 I am tempted to read, with the direct ms. tradition, o{owj.u
Ku·wxpiiaeat. 106 'lbestow the possibility of katachresis', says God according
to Philo. Perhaps we should better say, for Philo katachresis is not a 'necessary
evil', but an audible sign of God's grace.

v
Allow me to return, as briefly as I can, to the themes with which I began.
Our reading of a single Philonic text has shown that there are two 'patterns
of correlation' in Philo's exegetical works. The diverse themes which Philo
develops in his elucidation of the main biblical text and related secondary texts
can be analysed (l) in relation to the same themes found elsewhere in his works,
and (2) in relation to the Greek philosophical doctrines which give them a

101 Cf. esp. Enn. 5.3.17.28-35 (with clear reference to PI. Ep. 7 341c), and the remarks of J.
Rist, Plolinus: Ihe road 10 realily, Cambridge 1967, 224 f.
102 Note too the casualness with which Maximus says (above n. 86) that 'we give to God's na-
ture names that we like.'
103 Op. eil. (n. 6), 438. Particularly important are the passages Sacr. 101 and Deus 51-71, in
wh ich PhiIo, with reference to his favourite texts Num.23:9 and Deut.8:5, discusses in very general
terms our speaking about God. Note that ilA.A.T}'Yopia too is one of the tropes; cf. Trypho at
3.193.8,215.31 Spengel.
104 Cf. Runia, op. eil. 442-3; the phrase öeutepo<; (leo<; is found only once in the Philonic cor-
pus, at QG 2.62 (on this text 443 n. 196). As J. Mansfeld, in this volume pp. 107 f., shows, Greek
philosophical theologies which have a voü<; as their highest divinity confront the same problem.
But by the time of Plotinus these difficulties have been definitively straightened out.
105 Cf. Origen, Comm.Joh. 32.28.351.
106 Editors since Hoeschelius have read ÖiÖW01 with John Dam. If we retain ÖiÖWJ.ll with the
mss., then Philo is quite naturally continuing the first person employed in iaov t<!> etVat 1tEcpuKa,
ou Uyea(lat.
90 D.T. RUNIA

theoretical basis. It is these two 'patterns of correlation' which make the

systematic and the historical/doxographic approaches possible and worth-
while, though they are never without their perils. They are hazardous precisely
because Philo subordinates hirnself to the main and associated bible texts at
hand, preferring the internal conceptual coherence of a chapter or a treatise to
the achievement of a wider consistency. This practice can be highly irritating
to modern sensibilities, and we are still far from fully understanding its ra-
tionale. 107 I would nevertheless contend that, if Philo is read in smaller sec-
tions as we have attempted to do in the present paper, the results can often be
quite rewarding.
What, then, should be the response to Osborn's critique? It would be facile
to affirm that our analysis of the chapter from the De mutatione nominum,
the contents of which proved to be coherentiy thought through, is sufficient
to vindicate Philo. The fact of the matter is that Philo does not argue as much
as we would wish. His method is primarily that of correlation, i.e. he relates
Mosaic words and concepts (e.g. KUPWV övo~a) to acceptable philosöphical
ideas. The notion of katachresis, for example, is sound and apposite, but it is
left to the reader to determine the precise theological connotations. element
does represent an advance, philosophically speaking, over Philo. It is hardly
helpful, though, to describe the difference in terms of theosophy and philoso-
phy. Both men accept divine revelation; both regard it as rationally defensible,
Philo perhaps more so than element, but the Jew's defences are formulated
with less eye for apologetic rigour.
Osborn is right in saying that element takes over the language of biblicaI
Hellenism first developed by Philo, but he does not recognize how important
and determinative that first step was. 108 Philo, in his exegesis of Mosaic scrip-
ture, embarks on the decisive shift from an experience of God that is direct and
concrete to an experience of God that is mediated through theoretical reflection
on what God's nature is. 109 Hence the discussion on knowing, naming and

107 Much emphasis has recently been placed on the role of tradition in Philo's exegesis, e.g. in
the Claremont Philo research project (on which see Studia Philonica 3 (1974-75) 71-112), and
by T.H. Tobin, The creation 0/ man: Philo and the history 0/ interpretation, Washington 1983,
but for critical remarks on Tobin's study see Runia, op. eit. (n. 6), 556 ff. and D. Winston, JBL
104 (1985) 558 ff.
108 In response to the view (Nikiprowetzky) that Philo is first and foremost a commentator on
scripture and that this goes a long way to explaining his lack of consistency, Osborn replies (p.
44): "The difficulty which faces this defence is that Philo is not really subject to the text; his
allegorical method is too arbitrary to be governed by its subject matter." Yet for Philo his her-
meneutic method is essentially scientific! Here a potential weakness of the method of problematic
elucidation becomes apparent, i.e. that it projects modern assumptions onto a past body of
thought wh ich as a (Kuhnian) paradigm has its own coherence.
109 Cf. a penetrating analysis of the confluence of ludaic and Hellenic theological motifs in
Hellenistic ludaism by Y. Amir, Die Begegnung des biblischen und des philosophischen Mono-
 NAMING AND KNOWING: THEMES IN PHILONIC THEOLOGY 91

speaking ab out God that has occupied us in this paper. For this reason,
perhaps, Philo was the first theologian, even if, as we have seen, not all his
theological ideas caught on. *

theismus als Grundthema des jüdischen Hellenismus, Evangelische Theologie 38 (1978) 2-19 .
• The research for this contribution was supported by a C. & C. Huygens scholarship of the
Netherlands Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.).