VILLAREAL V.

ALIGA
G.R. No. 166995; January 13, 2014

FACTS: An Information was filed against Aliga for the crime of Qualified Theft thru Falsification of
Commercial Document after stealing and falsifying a check amounting to P5,000.00 and making it appear
that it amounts to P65,000, thereafter misappropriating and converting it to her own personal use and
benefit the amount of 60,000.00 representing the amount of check.

The RTC found Aliga guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
judgment of the RTC on the grounds that: (1) her admission or confession of guilt before the NBI
authorities, which already qualifies as a custodial investigation, is inadmissible in evidence because she
was not informed of her rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of her own choice; and (2) the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. The Supreme Court
has pointed out several errors on the part of the petitioner: first, the petition should have been filed by
the State through the OSG; and second: a judgment of acquittal may be assailed only in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether a judgment of acquittal is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon
its promulgation.

HELD: Yes. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine recognizes that the accused is entitled to repose as a
direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system
has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s
leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several
avowed purposes: (a) it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials; (b) It serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the
defendant in the hope of securing a conviction; And finally, (c) it prevents the State, following conviction,
from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.

LACSON V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 128096; January 20, 1999

FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal case that started when eleven persons,
believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) were killed by the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG)where the petitioner was one of the heads. Then, in a media expose, it
was said that what happened was a rub-out and not a shoot-out. Among other issues, petitioner argues
that Republic Act (R.A.) 8249, that was enacted during his case was pending,has a retroactive effect and
is plan from the facts and was made to suit the petitioner’s case, thus, making it an ex-post facto law that
would affect the right of the accused to procedural due process. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether the statute R.A. 8249 may be considered as an ex post facto law that may affect
the petitioner’s right to due process.

HELD: No. There is nothing ex-post facto in R.A. 8249 – an ex post facto law generally provides for
a retroactive effect on penal laws. However, the Court explains, R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. As the Court
defines, ‘Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
thereof; or those that defines crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment’. Republic
Act 8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character, thus, may not be considered
an ex post facto law. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the law in question has retroactive
effect and may affect his right to due process is wrong.
 People vs. Pacificador
G.R. No.139405, March 13, 2001

FACTS: That on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Arturo Pacificador, then
Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a government-owned corporation,
and therefore, a public officer, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine Smelters
Corporation, a private corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another and with other
individuals, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident bad faith promote,
facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and conveyance by the National Shipyard and Steel
Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and interests over parcels of land in Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte where the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant is located including all the reclaimed and
foreshore areas of about 50 hectares to the Philippine Smelters Corporation by virtue of a contract, the
terms and conditions of which are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government as the
consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair market value thereof at that time was P862,150.00
thereby giving the Philippine Smelters Corporation unwarranted benefits, advantages and profits and
causing undue injury, damage and prejudice to the government in the amount of P777,005.50.

Respondent, and his erstwhile co-accused, Marcelo were charged before the Sandiganbayan with
the crime of violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner contends that, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, the provision
of Act No. 3326 on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws are not applicable to the instant
criminal case for the reason that R.A. No. 3019 provides for its own prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof
provides that offenses committed and punishable under the said law shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years.

ISSUE: Whether the fifteen-year prescriptive period shall be applied in this case.

HELD: No. Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 195,
provides that the offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears
however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved
on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten
(10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019
as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being
favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence the crime
prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.

MCIAA v. Lozada, Sr.

G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010

FACTS: On April 16, 1952, the Republic, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation proceeding
to the CFI of Cebu on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which included Lot 941, for the expansion
and improvement of Lahug Airport. In 1953, appellee Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original
owner, the original defendant in the expropriation case. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in her name.
Then in 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic which was made
to pay Chiongbian an amount for Lot 941. Chiongbian did not appeal therefrom. Thereafter, absolute title
to Lot 941 was transferred to the Republic under a TCT. Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed
by Congress creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to which the assets of the
Lahug Airport were transferred. Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under a TCT. In 1995,
Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC of Cebu, alleging, that sometime
in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to expand the Cebu Lahug Airport. As a
consequence, it sought to acquire by expropriation or negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining
the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot 941 owned by Chiongbian. Since she and other landowners could
not agree with the NAC’s offer for the compensation of their lands, a suit for eminent domain was
instituted, before the then CFI of Cebu against 45 landowners, including Chiongbian, entitled “Republic
of the Philippine vs. Damian Ouano, et al.” It was finally decided in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
Some of the defendants-landowners appealed the decision to the CA which rendered a modified judgment
allowing them to repurchase their expropriated properties.

ISSUE: Whether the abandonment of the public use for which Lot No. 941 was expropriated
entitles CHIONGBIAN to reacquire it.

HELD: The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the
expropriator which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for example,
the land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or
abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated
or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated.
If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title,
then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a
province, or a municipality, and in that case, the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title
acquired by the expropriation proceedings.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise
of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may
be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or
title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.”

Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Villarosa

G.R. No. L-64037 August 27, 1987
FACTS: On March 28, 1974, the lower court promulgated a decision in the recovery of real
property case in favor of the plaintiffs and intervenors, the private respondents herein, and against the
defendant, the petitioner herein. Shortly afterwards, the petitioner manifested its willingness to pay to
the private respondents the value of the subject parcels of land as mandated in the court's decision. On
September 13, 1974, the Provincial Board of Sorsogon enacted Resolution No. 340 appropriating the
amount of P49,500.00 for the payment of the subject parcel of land. In turn, the writs of execution issued
by the lower court ordered the petitioner to pay P49,500.00 to the private respondents. However, the
writ of execution issued on July 27, 1975 and the alias writ of execution issued on November 24, 1975
were returned unsatisfied.
The delay in the payment was caused by the requirements prescribed by the Provincial Auditor
before payment could be effected. The private respondents questioned the requirements prompting the
Provincial Auditor to refer the matter to the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA). In an
order dated August 24, 1977, the lower court through then Presiding Judge Aquilino Bonto ordered the
private respondents to comply with the requirements set up by the COA. The lower court stated that the
requirements were made purely in consonance with auditing rules and regulations and were not a whim
or caprice designed to cause a protracted delay in the actual payment. Notwithstanding the private
respondents' compliance with the stated requirements, no payment was effected by the petitioner.
Despite all these efforts, the private respondents waited in vain for the payment of the subject parcels of
land. This was the last straw. The private respondents (plaintiffs) in the belief that the petitioner was not
serious in paying for the parcel of land it had acquired, took possession of some portions of the land, using
the decision as basis for their action.

ISSUE: Whether the decision having became final in 1974 and not having been enforced for almost
eight (8) years due to the fault of the private respondents had already become dormant.

HELD: NO. In the eight (8) years that elapsed from the time the judgment became final until the
filing of the restraining motion by the private respondents, the judgment never became dormant. Section
6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not apply. We have outlined in detail the incidents which
transpired from the issuance of the writ of execution to the filing by the private respondents of the
restraining motion with the lower court. The records indicate that the delay in the execution of the
judgment, more specifically, in the payment of the land by the petitioner to the private respondents was
due to the piecemeal requirements imposed by the COA as condition for effecting payment.

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators v. City Mayor of Manila

G.R. No. L-24693; July 31, 1967

FACTS: Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its
members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner,
filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of
Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of
such ordinances.
It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963, by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After
which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its
being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulates
motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is
made to motels. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly
authorized representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963, issued a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and
void.
HELD: No. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have
admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its
decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the accepted standards of
constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
“The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the
licensing fees was intended to discourage “establishments of the kind from operating for a purpose other
than legal” and at the same time, to increase “the income of the city government.”

TANADA VS TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915; December 29, 1986

FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish
and/or cause the publication of various Presidential Decrees (PDs), letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders, in the Official
Gazette. Petitioners invoked that a law, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
The SC, in its decision in 1985, affirmed the necessity of the publication of the presidential
issuances which are of general application. Petitioners then moved for reconsideration/clarification
asserting that the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” meant that the publication required therein
was not always imperative.

ISSUE: Whether the publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the
presidential issuances in question.
 HELD: YES. Publication of presidential issuances at bar is an indispensable requirement for their
effectivity despite the special provisions as to the date they are to take effect.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.” The phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. All
statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
The Court further held that all presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity.
On the other hand, interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Therefore, the Court declared that all laws shall be published in full in the Official Gazette to
become effective in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

CUDIA V. PMA
G.R. No. 211362; February 24, 2015
FACTS: Cadet 1CL Cudia is a student of the PMA. His 4th period class under Dr. Costales was from
1:30-3:00pm while his 5th period class was from 3:05-4:05pm. Prof. Beron of the 5th period class issued
a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cudia because he was late for two minutes in his 5th period class. In
Cudia’s defense he came directly from his 4th period class. They were dismissed a bit late by the instructor.
Major Hindang meted Cudia the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Maj. Hindag clarified with
Cudai that the basis of the punishment was the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who
responded that she never dismissed her class late and followed the protocol to dismiss the calss 10-15
minutes earlier than scheduled. Cudia sought a reconsideration of his punishment and addressed his
request for reconsideration to Ma. Benjamin L. Leander asserting that he was not in control of the
circumstances on why he was late. Maj. Leander asked Maj. Hindag to submit his reply. Maj. Hindag in his
reply that based on his investigation, the 4th period class was not dismissed late. As a result, the penalty
was sustained. Maj. Hindag reported Cudia to the HC for Violation of the Honor Code on the basis of lying
where Cudia states that his 4th period class ended at 3:00 that made him late in the succeeding class.
The PMA Honor Committee found Cudia guilty of violating the Honor Code. Cudia was placed on
indefinite leave of absence without pay and allowances pending approval of his separation by the AFP
barring him from future appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for
any entrance requirements to the PMA.
CRAB (Cadet Review and Appeals Board) reviewed the case of Cudia. Pending review, Special
order No.1 was issued directing all PMA cadets to ostracize Cudia. Cudia and his family engaged the
services of the PAO. The CRAB Chariman informed Cudia that it could not favourably consider his request
for copies of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and video footages and recordings of the HC hearings
since it was neither the appropriate no the authorized body to take action thereon.
The AFP Chief of Staff affirmed CRAB’s denial of Cudia’s appeal. AFP Headquarters resolved to
deny the appeal for lack of merit. THE CHR moved to conclude and recommend that there existed
probable cause for Human Rights Violations against the officers and members of the PMA Honor
Committee and certain PMA officials for violations of the rights of Cudia to dignity, due process, education,
privacy of communication and good life. The CHR recommended that authorities should investigate
several PMA officials.
The office of the president sustained the findings of the AFP Chief of Staff and the CRAB. And that
the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights cannot be adopted as basis that Cudia’s
due process rights were violated.

ISSUE: Whether Cudia’s right to due process was violated?

 HELD: NO. Constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence,
disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must. For that
reason, the PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, the minimal
requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied. Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe
sanctions of being expelled from a course of college instruction that he or she has pursued with a view to
becoming a career officer and of probably being forever denied that career. We have been consistent in
reminding that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice; that the proceedings
may be summary; that cross-examination is not an essential part of the investigation or hearing; and that
the required proof in a student disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is neither proof beyond
reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence or "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."