MEANING AND KINDS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 315

nder Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code.

II. Kinds of Contempt of Courts
1. Difference between Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt
Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, provides that
"Contempt of Court" means civil contempt or criminal contempt. It, thus,
classifies the contempts of Court into two categories, civil contempt and
criminal contempt. However, the categories of contempt are not closed by
this definition.!
The interference with the administration of justice may be in the
form of wilful disobedience to the order of the Court or in the form of
scandalizing the Court or lowering the authority of the Court in the eyes
of the public or interfering with the due course of any judicial proceedings ,
ete. If the order of the Court passed against a party for the benefit of
the other party is not obeyed, it is, no doubt, a serious matter but not
as serious as scandalizing or lowering the authority of the Court in the
public eyes or interfering with due course of any judicial proceeding or
obstructing with the administration of justice in any other manner. On
account of it, the wilful disobedience to the order of Court is considered
civil contempt, while the scandalizing or lowering the authority of the
Court in the public eyes, etc. is considered criminal contempt. Thus, the
interference which is considered less injurious to the administration of
Justice is taken as civil contempt while the interference which is
considered more injurious to the administration of justice is taken as
criminal contempt. Civil contempt is, in fact, a wrong of a private nature
as between subject and the King is not a party to the
proceedings to
punish it. The punishment is a form of execution for enforcing
of a suitor.? the right
Civil contempt involves only the wilful disobedience of the Court's
Order or breach of undertaking given to the Court while the criminal
contempt involves the defiance of the Court revealed in conduct which
amounts to obstruction or interference with the administration of justice."
Criminal contempt is directed against the power and dignity of the Court
ana private parties have little, if any, interest in the
proceedings
punishment. In short, we may conclude that the administration for
of justice
9the basis of classification of contempts of Court. The
'atodministration of justice' has been used in wide sense. It is expression
not confined
the judicial functions of the Judges. It includes all the functions of a
Judge, whether ofadministrative,
administration justice. adjudicatory or any other necessary for the
1,
Ahmed Ali V. Superintendent, District Jail, Tejpur, 1987 Cr LJ 1849; Delhi Judicial
Services Association, Tis Hazari Court v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 2176; In re
Vinay
2. Sir Chandra Mishra. AIR 1995 SOC 2348.
3. John C.Fox, The History of Contempt of Court, p. 1 (1981 Reprint).
Dulal
AmericanChandra
4. Dhar v. Sukumar Banerjee, AIR 1958 Cal 474.
Jurisprudence, Vol. 17, pp. 7-8 (2nd Edn.).
 316 LEGAL ETHICS ACOOUNTAB LIYOF LAWYERS &BENCH-BAR
RELATIONS
2. Kinds of Contempt of Court
TheContempts of Court has been
categories-Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt.categorised
However, asinto
has two
stated above, the categories are not closed.
A. Civil Contempt.
Meaning and Nature.-Civil Contempts are taken as acts
omissions in procedure involving a private injury by the and
the judgment, order or other process of the Court. disobedience o
According to Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 Cil
Contempt' means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction
order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of
given to a Court. For civil contempt there must be undertaking
order, ete. of the Court or breach of undertaking givendisobedience
to the
to the
the disobedience or breach must be wilful. To Jourt and
both these elements must be proved. Civil contemptconstitute civil contempt
may be taken as a
failure to obey the order of the Court issued for the benefit of the
party. The purpose of the proceeding for the civil contempt is not opposite
only to
punish the contemner but also to exercise enforcement and obedience to
the order of the Court. It provides an instant and quick
the order passed by the Court implement. It is a sanction remedy to get
to enforce
compliance with the order of Court or to compensate for losses or damages
sustained by reason of non-compliance. Civil Contempt, actually, serves
dual purpose
(i) vindication of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous
conduct; and
(1) coercion to compel the contemner to do what the Court requines
of him4
To constitute Civil Contempt' the followings are required to be
proved
1. There is disobedience of the order, decree, ete. of the Court
breach of undertaking given to the Court; and
2. The disobedience or breach is wilful.
These requirements may be discussed as follows :
1. Disobedience of the order, decree, ete. of the Court or breaceh
of undertaking given to the Court-Tb constitute civil contempt thete
must be order, decree, etc. of the Court or undertaking given to the Court
and there must be disobedience thereto or breach
thereof.
For civil contempt it is necessary that order which has b
disobeyed must have been passed by the Court having jurisdiction to pass
such order. If the order has been passed without jurisdiction, it is not
binding on the party against which it has been passed and, therefore, the

1. Vidya Sagar Third Additional District Judge, Dehradun, 1991 Cr LJ 2286 (AIL
(
2. Jain, GR.: Law of
Contempt, 1996 Cr LJ 90 at p.
3. Douglas, J.. Me Comb 91.
4. Aligarh Municipal Board
Jackson uille Puper Ca., 336 US 187.
v Ekka Thrga Mazdoor Uhian, AIR 1970 SC 1767 at P
1770.
 MEANING AND KINDS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT
317
Aisobedience of such order will not amount to Contempt of Court,! It has
boen held that there is no contempt when the undertaking violated is
given in a proceeding which was without jurisdiction." A
attaches to the order of the Court that the Court passing presumption
it has
jurisdiction to pass such order, however this
presumption may be
rebutted. The burden to prove that the Court which has passed the order
had no jurisdiction to pass it or the proceeding in which the undertaking
was given was without jurisdiction lies on the person who alleges it. This
aspect of contempt law has been dealt with under Chapter VI'
Usually the order should be served on the person against whom it
has been passed. However, where it is proved to the satisfaction of the
Court that the person against whom the order was. passed had actual
knowledge of the order, he cannot escape liability for contempt on the
ground that the copy of the Order has not been formally served on him.5
Once an order is made by the Court and a person is charged with the
allegation of non-compliance of that order, he cannot plead that he was
waiting for instruction to comply with the Court's order can possibly
contend that he is to seek instructions from his superiors before he could
carry out his obligation of complying with the Court's order.5
L (It has been made clear that when the Court's order directs a person
to do something or not to do something, it is incumbent on that person
to comply with that order forthwith without any doubt or hesitation in
his mind." The excuse that he should consult the higher authorities before
complying with the orders of the Court, can be of no avail when he is
asked to show cause why he should not be committed for Contempt of
Court. No official superior can take any action against any of his
subordínates for complying with the Court's order. The person disobeying
the order of the Court will alone be responsible for the consequence and
he cannot be heard to say that he has referred the matter to his oficial
Superiors and for that matter his official superiors cannot give him any
kind of protection. The superior officers themselves may be held liable
for contempt, if they, give instructions contrary to the order of the Court
Eve an impression to the subordinate officials that complian ce with
the order of Court, without their approval, will open them to disciplinary
action or make them blameworthy.
1, Sultan Ali Nanghiara v. Nur Hussain, AIR 1949 Lah 131; K. Kutumba Rao v. Muthi
Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 1969 AP 47.
2. Roshan Lal Pokta V. Roshan Lal Chauhan, 1992 Cr LJ 1378.
3. Sultan Ali Nanghiara V. Nur Hussain, AIR 1949 Lah 131; K. Kutumba Rao v Muthi
Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 1949 AP 47.
As to this heading "Defence in Civil Contempt"
aspect of Contempt law, please see the
5. under
AligarhChapter XI. Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union, AlIR 1970 SO 1767.
Municipal
6.
7. Courts
Taluri
on its own motion v. N.S. Kanwar, 1995 Cr LJ 1261.
V. M. Narayan Rao, 1967 Cr LJ 19.
8. Ibid.
9, Ibid.
Seshaiah
10, Ibid.
318 LEGAL ETHICS, ACCOUNTABILITY OF LAWYERS &BENCH-BAR RELATIONS

In a case' the Punjab and Haryana High Court has observed that
the order passed by a Court of contempt jurisdiction is binding on all
concerned. Every one, howsoever high he may be, is bound to carry out
the order of the Court. The Court is under a duty to see that confidence
of the public in the institution of the Court is not shaken by the executive
authorities by their disregard to the orders of the Court.
In a case the Government, in pursuant to its policy of granting land
to newspaper concerns and educational institutions, assigned land to
newspaper concerns and educational institutions. However poss ession was
not delivered to some of the assignees despite payment of price. The
assignees filed petition alleging hostile treatment. The High Court directed
the State Government to resume the concerned lands and hand over
possession of the respective land to the petitioners. The Government
preferred an appeal against the order. While appeal was pending against
the order, the Government issued a fresh G.O. M.S. No. 38 dated
16-1-2001 by which the original assignment was cancelled. The issuance
of such G.O. was held to be Contempt of Court. The Supreme Court held :
"Issuance of said Government Order directing cancellation of
assignments despite judgment of High Court and pendency of writ
appeals filed by State Government and HUDA was contumacious on
the part of State Government. High Court in contempt petition was
gracious in not inflicting punishment for contempt, but remained
content with quashing of offending Government Order dated
16-1-2001.
(The breach of undertaking given to the Court is also taken as
contèmpt, if it is wilful. Where a person is committed for contempt for
breach of undertaking, the undertaking must be given to the Court.) The
undertaking given by one party to the another is not sufficient fof this
purpose. An undertaking may be given by the party himself or by any
other person on his beh alf provided in the later case the person giving
the undertaking has authority to give such undertaking. Thus, an
undertaking may be given by an advocate on behalf of his client provided
he had authority on behalf of his client to give such undertaking.
The basis for taking the breach of undertaking as Contempt of Court
is that the contemner by making a false representation to the Cour
obtains a benefit for himself and if he fails to honour the undertaking.
he plays a serious fraud on the Court itself and thereby obstructs the
course of justice and brings into disrepute the judicial institution."
Any person appearing before the Court can give an undertaking in
two ways :
(1) that he files an application or an affidavit clearly setting out the
undertaking given by him to the Court; or
(2) by a clear and express oral undertaking given by the contemner
1. Courts on its Own Motion v. N.S. Kanwar, 1995 Cr LJ 1261 at p. 1267.
2. AIR 2003 S.C. 296.
3. B.K. Rao v. Prith wish Kor, (1989) II CHN 58 (DB),
4. Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin, AIR 1979 SC 1528 at 1532.
 MEANING AND KINDs OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 319

and incorporated by the Court in its order.

1ê any of the aforesaid conditions are satisfied, then a wilful breach
ofthe
undertaking would, doubtless, amount to an offence under the Act.
none of the above conditions is satisfied,
there will be no undertaking
for this
purpose and, therefore, the question of breach of such undertaking
does not arise.
In a case contemner did not furnish bank guarantee before arbitrator
despite undertaking given before the Supreme Court. Not only this, they
t back from the undertaking and sold away only property which was
was an
in their possession. He did not disclose that the said property gross
numbered one. The Court held that the contemners committed
committed
pontempt of the Supreme Court as they misled the Court. They
hreach of undertaking given to the Court.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the breach of undertaking
amount to
recorded or forming part of a compromise decree, would not a clear cut
Contempt of Court." The Court has observed that there is
parties- or a
distinction between a compromise arrived at between the parties and a
consent order passed by the Court at the instance of the
parties. In the
clear and categorical undertaking given by any of theorder no question
former, if there is violation of the compromise or the
right to enforce the
of Contempt of Court arises, but the party has a
or getting an
order or the compromise by their executing the order
injunction from the Court.
parties and a
Where a compromise is arrived at between the
put in
particular property having been allotted to A, he has to be A.
possession thereof by B. B does not give possession of this property tothe
Bcannot be held liable for contempt of court on the ground that
of A
Commpromise decree has not been implemented by him. The remedy
Court
Would be not to pray for drawing up proceedings for Contempt of
4gainst B but to approach the executing Court for directing a warrant of
of possession under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Ifeivery
the non-compliance of a compromise decree or consent decree is taken
Contempt of Court, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
all. The
to the execution of the decree mnay not be resorted to at
relating the breach of undertaking as Contempt of Court is
1or treatingmaking
that contemner a false representation to the Court obtains a
benefit
Berious for
and if he fails to honour the undertaking, he plays a
himself
fraud on the Court itself and thereby obstructs the course of
Justice the case of
and brings into disrepute the judicial institution. In practiced by
Conshe ent,
personorder not on thedecree
or a compromise
concerned
the fraud, if any, is
Court but on one of the parties. The

oflene , thus,committed by the person

f against the Court. The very foundation for
concerned is against the party and
proceeding for Contempt
Court,
1. Marutiis Udyog
comyopletely
Lid. v. Vabsent
Mahinderin such cases."
C. Mehta, AIR 2008 SC 309.
2. Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin, AIR 1979 SC 1528 at 1532.
3.
Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin, AIR 1979 SC 1528.
4. Ibid.
 RELATIONS
320 LEGAL ETHICS, ACCOUNTABILITY OF LAWYERS &BENCH-BAR
and
The undertaking must be unconditional, unqualified undertakine
implied
express,-It is not open to the Court to assume an
is the duty of the Cont
when there is none on the record. No doubt, itcourse
obstruct the of justice or brings
to punish a person who tries to this power has to he
into disrepute the institution of judiciary but care and circumspection
exercised not casually or lightly, but with great the contemner in
and only in such cases where it is necessary to punish
Courts. However.
order to uphold the majesty of law and dignity ofonthethe basis of certain
if the party gives the undertaking to the Court knowledge, he will be
implications or assumptions which are false to his Thus, where' a
guilty of misconduct amounting to Contempt of Court." company was
tenant company knowing fully that the Chairman of the of time
already a lawful sub-tenant of certain premises prayed for grant undertaking
written
to vacate the premises and time was granted on his third
that it would not part with the possession of the premises or createin the
faith
party interest therein and the time was granted having misled the Court
undertaking, it was held guilty of Contempt of Court. It
it
for grant of time. The undertaking was based on the assumption that
the Chairman
was able to hand over the possession of the premises while
premises and
of the company was already a lawful sub-tenant of the
therefore the assumption was false and it was false to the knowledge of
the company. Consequently the company was held guilty of
Contempt of
Court.
If an undertaking is given by a party to the Court in a pending
proceeding and on its faith the Court sanctions a particular course of
action or inaction, it has the same force as an injunction made by the
Court for restraining that party from acting in breach thereof and, the
breach of such undertaking is taken as disobedience of the Court's order
5

for injunction and therefore, it amounts to Civil Contempt of Court."

What is required to avoid the contempt proceeding is the
úbstantial compliance with the order of the Court.-No court
including the Court of contempt is entitled to take frivolitiesperson and
trivialities into account while finding fault with the conduct of the
against whom contempt proceeding is taken,® If the order is substantially
complied with, the contempt will not lie.?
2. Wilful disobedience or breach.-For civil contempt the
disobedience of the order, decree, etc. of the Court or breach o
undertaking given to the Court must be wilful.
Ip India the Supreme Court has, often, pointed out that in order to

1. Bhatnagar and Co. Ltd. v Union of India, AIR 1957 sC 478 at pp. 481-482.
2. lbid.
3. Dr (Mrs.) Roshan Sam Joyce v. S.R. Cotton Mills Ltd., AIR 1990 SC 1881.
4. lbid.
5. Nurali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Setty, AlR 1990 SC 464.
6. Sukumar Mukhopadhayay v. TD. Karamehandani, 1995 Cr LJ 1610 at p. 1612
7. See also Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Vasudevan v.
8. Jiwani Kumari Parekh v. Salyabrata Chakravorty, AIR 1991 SC 326; J.
CR. Dhananjaya, AIR 1996 SC 137.
 MEANING AND KINDS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 321

punish a person or authority for Contempt of Court, the disobedience to

any judgment, ete. or breach of undertaking to the Court must be wilful.
Thus, mere disobedience of the order of Court is not sufficient to
constitute civil contempt. The disobedience must be wilful. The
Aisobedience-must-be-deliberate and intentional. The-cotermpt power
annot be used unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that the
has deliberately and intentionally violated the order of the court.!
person
According to Concise Oxford Dictionary the word "wilful" means the
action or state for which compulsion of ignorance or accident
cannot be
pleaded as excuse, intentional, deliberate, due to perversity or self-will.
The House of Lords has also made it clear that to establish that the
disobedience is wilful, it is not necessary to show that it is contumacious
in the sense that there is a direct intention to disobey
the
suficient to show that effective administration of justice order; it is
penalty for disobedience to the order of the Court, if it requires some
is more than
casual, accidental or unintentional.?
The essence of the civil contempt is wilful
judgment, decree, direction, order or writ of a court, and disobedience to any
to give effect to it. The conduct of the not mere inaction
alleged contemner must be wilful
showing deliberate and conscious disregard of the
despising or disdainful attitude towards the verdict ofCourt's order, or a
the Court. Mere
inaction on the part of the Government or its
to reinstate a decree-holder and grant servants to take any action
him all the benefits and privileges
or services will not amount to
wilfully and deliberately refrained Contempt from
of Court. But where it has
ol contempt may arise.' On this issue thegiving effect to the decree, a case
nign Court appears to be more correct and
view of the Punjab and Haryana
hat from the dictionary meaning of the pragmatic. It has observed
he Court, it is reasonable to derive term wilful and the decisions of
that the term 'wilful
dsed in section 2(b) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 disobedience
Construed to mean that an act must in all cases be designed cannot be
deliberate to be held as Civil
te order of the Court or is Contempt.° If a party who is
and
fully in know
d implications of the Court's conscious and aware of the consequences
Court's order, order, /gnores it or acts in violation of the
18 it must be held that disobedience is wilful.
never practicable to prove the actual intention Ordinarily, it
omission.
presume
A
Court behind
can approach the question only objectively and it may
the act or
the intention from the act done as
intend
1, Anil
the probable consequence of his act." Wilful every man is presumed to
disobedience cannot be
V Ratan Sarkar . Hirak Ghose, AllR 2002 SCW 1249;
Patel Patel Rajani Kant Dhulabhai
Chandra
Arudayaraj,
2.
Kant
AIR 2009 SC Dhulabhai, 2008 AIR SCW 5076; C. Elumalai v. AGL
Heatons Transport
3. 2214. and
Parkash Chand
4.
D. Court on its
Ltd. v. Thansport
v. S.S. Grewal, 1975 Cr LJ
General Workers' Union, (1972) 3 All ER 101
679, at p. 685.
Court
6. Ibid. on Own
its owrn motion v. N.S. Kanwar, 1995 Cr LJ 1261 at p. 1268.
1. Ibid. motion v. N.S. Kanwar, 1995 Cr LJ 1261 at p. 1268.
8. Ibid.
322 LEGAL ETHICS, ACCOUNTABILITY OF LAWYERS &
BENCH-BAR RELATIONS

constryed to mean that act must be designed or deliberate. !

An Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha,' the Court hes
well explained the meaning of "wilful" According to the Court wilial
means an act or omission which is done
with the specific intent to do somethingvoluntarily
and intentionally
the law forbids or with and
SDecific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done, the
is to that
say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. It
signifies a deliberate action done with evil intent or with a bad nofve
or purpose Therefore, in order to constitute contempt the order of the
Court must be of such a nature which is capable of execution by the
person charged in normal circumstances. It should not require any
extra-ordinary efort nor should be dependent, either wholly or in part,
upon any act or omission of a third party for its compliance. This has to
be judged having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
Wbether the disobedience has been wilful, is an issue to be decided
by the Court, taking into account the facts, and cireumstances of the case"
However, in deciding this issue it is better to have in mind that every
man is presumed to intend the probable consequences of his act. f atter
considering facts and circumstances of the case the Court derives a
conclusion that the disobedience is not wilful but it is due to compelling
circumstances of impossibility of compliance with the order, the contemner
may not be liable to be punished for the Contempt of Court. If having
regard to all the circumstances the Court does not conclude beyond all
doubt that the alleged contemner had acted wilfully, the Court will gve
benefit of doubt to the contemner.5 The Court, while considering the issue
as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished or not having
complied with and carried out the direction of the Court, has to take inte
consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is Wiy
the framers of the Act while defining the civil
contempt have said t
it must be wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order
writ or other process of a Court. Before a contemner is punished
non-compliance of the direction of a Court, the Court must not ony
satisfied about the disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or W
but should also be satisfied that such
the circumstances of the case, the Courtdisobedience
is satisfied was wilful. l there
that although
has been a disobedience but such
disobedience
compelling circumstances under which
is the result of s
it was not possible for the
contemner to comply with the order, the Court should not punish the
alleged contemner." Where the person alleged to be in contempt is able
to place before the Court sufficient material to conclude that it is
impossible to obey the order, the Court will not be justified in punishing
1. Ibid.
2. A.lR. 2004 S.C. 105.
3. Niaz Mohammad v. State of
4. lbid. Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332.
5. Tapan Kumar Mukheree v. Sri
6. S.S. Roy v. State of Orissa, AIRHiramani
1960 SCMondal, AIR 1991
190, Jioani SC Purekh
Kumari 281 at P Saebres
Chakravarty, AlR 1991 SC 326.
 MEANING AND KINDS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT
123
he allegod contemner. If it in proved that the compliance with the order
waR impossible, the alleged contemner is not punished for
However, mere difliculty is not allowed as a defence, contempt,
In short, if all
possible steps have been taken by the oflicer responsible for the
implementation of the order, he ahould not be punished for the Contempt
of Court. For example, the action for implementing the
generally requires its passage through different bodies, butCourt's
the
order
officer
concerned, in emergency, has power to take action required for
implementing the order of the Court, he nust take such action, if the
meeting of the bodies is not held on account of want of quorum, ete. If
the meeting is held and the meeting takes a decision against the wish of
the officer responsible for imnplementing the order and the officer has no
power to override the decision of the body and the result is that the order
is not implemented, it is not proper to punish the
he has not disobeyed the order wilfully, although officer for contempt as
in such condition the
body which has taken decision resulting in
order may be held liable for contempt. However, non-implementation of the
if the officer has power
to override the decision of the body, he should exercise this
the order of the Court is complied with and if he does not dopower 80,
so that
he
be held liable for contempt. However, care must be may
taken so that it may
not result in a method of wilfully avoiding the order of the Court. An
example of such attempt is found in the case of Ramesh Chandra
Srivastava v. JR. Chaudhary." In this case" the order was not obeyed on
the pretext of want of necessary approval, while the approval had already
been given.
In a case' the High Court directed for completing the selection
process for the post and publish the result. The candidate could not be
appointed because no appointment to the post could be made without the
pror approval of the State Government and the Government subsequently
abolished the post. The Court held that there was no Contempt of Court.
Ihe candidate could not claim the right to the post. Besides, the direction
Was to complete the
selection process and publish the result and this was
done. There was no direction that he should be appointed.
In a case the contemner did not furnish bank guarantee before the
Lrator despite the undertaking given before the Supreme Court. In
addition, he sold away the only property in his possession. He did not
disclose that the said property was eneumbered. He was held. liable to
contempt of the Supreme Court for misleading the Court.
1. Ibid
2. Niaz v. State of Haryana, AlR 1995 8C 308.
3.
State ofMohammed
Rajasthan
v Mohan Singh, 1995 Supp (2) 8CC 163; Tunnery and Footwear
4. Corporuitoinon
Suggest
v. TRudra, 1996 Cr LJ 1601.
in Author's research work on Contempt of Court, entitled "Changing
Di
. 1996
6. lbid
m ensi
Cri o nLJ
of
Contempt
1554.
of CourtA challenge to Majesty of Law in lndia"

1, Bal
8. Kris hna AlR 2008 SC 223
Behera Satya Prakash Das, Allk
v.
Maruti Udyog Ltd, v. Muhindra C. Meh tu, 2008 8C 309
 324 LEGAL ETHICS, ACCOUNTABILITY OF LAWYERS &BENCH-BAR RELATIONS
In Jhanreswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly,' the
Court has held that the contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the Supreme
question whether there has been any deliberate disobedien ce of the order
of the Court and the conduct of the party who is alleged to have
committed such disobedience is contemptuous. The Court exercising
contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which hava
not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order and not
considered the question as to what the judgment or order should have
contained. The Court exercising the contempt jurisdiction is primarily
concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party which
is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the
directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not
contain any specifie direction regarding a matter or if there is any
ambiguity in the directions issued therein, then it will be better to irect
the parties to approach the Court which disposed of the matter for
clarification of the order instead of the Court exercising contempt
jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceeding
in a manner not dealt with by the Court passing the judgment or order.
The Supreme Court has held that the order passed by the High Court
granting substantive relief to the appellants not covered by the earlier
order passed by the Court on the plea that the question raised being a
part of their grievance in the petition is without jurisdiction.
In Ram Narang v. Ramesh Narang," the Court has held that the
Ldefinition of civil contempt given in section 2(b) creates two categories f
cases
(1) Wilful disobedien ce to a process of Court; and
2) Wilful breach of undertaking given to a Court.
As far as the first category is concerned the word "any" further
indicates the wide nature of the power. No distinction has been statutorily
drawn between an order passed after an adjudication and an order passeu
by consent. This first category is separate from the second category. The
legislative intention has been to distinguish between the two and create
distinct classes of contumacious behaviour. For application of category
second the undertaking must have been given to the Court and not to
the other party. The Court has made it clear that wilful violation of terms
of consent decree amounts to Contempt of Court, For the enforcementthe
o1
decree Or direction of the court for payment of money,
contempt-jurisdiction cannot be used. The Court has made it clear that
for the enforcemnent of such decree or direction the contempt jurisdicuo
either under the Contempt of Court Act or under order 39 Rule 2A
the CPC cannot be used.
B. Criminal Contempt
In India the definition of contempt of court is found in clause (c) of
Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It provides that "Criminal
1. AIR 2002 S.C. 2215.
2. AIR 2006 SC 1883
3. Food Corporation of India v. Sukh Deo Prasad, AIR 2009 SC 2331.
 MEANING AND KINDS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 325

Contempt" means the publication whether by words, spoken or written or

hy signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise of any matter of the
doing of any act whatsoever which
i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize or lower or tends to lower
the authority of any Court; or
(ii) prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course
of any judicial proceeding; or
(i) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to
obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.
Thus, the criminal contempt means publication or doing of any other
act which scandalizes or tends to scandalize or lower or tends to lower
the authority of any court, or prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere
with the due course of any judicial proceedings or interferes or tends to
interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of
justice in any other manner.
The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any
act of a person which would tend to interfere with the administration of
justice or which would lower the authority of the Court.! The scope of
the criminal contempt has been made very wide so as to empower the
Court to preserve the îmajesty of law which is an indispensable condition
for the rule of law. Before taking up the specific ingredients of the
criminal contempt it is better to deal with certain issues which are
relevant in respect of all the ingredients.
In Arunadhati Roy, the Supreme Court has held that the defence
that allegations contained in reply filed to contempt notice cannot be
Contempt in view of section 499 of Indian Penal Code is not tenable. The
law of defamation under the Penal Code cannot be equated with the law
of Contempt of Court.
To constitute the criminal contempt it is not necessary that the
publication or other act should have actually resulted in scandalizing or
lowering
of judicial
the authority of the Court or interference with the due cOurse
proceeding or administration of justice. The essence of the
oflor ence is that the acts complained of are likely to result in scandalizing
lowerinproceeding
judicial g the authority
or of the court or interferes with due course of
administration of justice. The law of contempt is
deterrent in nature and it is concerned, essentially, with the prevention
of
scandal
proceedi ng izati
or on or prejudice or interference with due course of judieial
administration of justice rather than merely applying
autsancthoriiotn8y toof thecomments
Court oror prejudiced
acts whichor interfered
have scandalized
with theor duelowered
coursetheof
judicial proceeding or administration of justice. Thus, the offence of
Contempt is complete by mere attempt and does not depend on actual
1,
Delhi Judicial & others, (1991) 4 SCC 406,
2. AIR
at p. 456. Services Association v. State of Gujarat
3. Hira 2002 SC 1375.
Lal Dixit v. State of UP, AIR 1954 SC 743.
 326 LEGAL ETHICS, ACCOUNTABILITY OF LAWYERS &BENCH-BAR RELATIONS
deflection of justice. !'
In a case an article in a neWspaper cormmernting upon a crioinal
case in order to prejudice the public mind against the accused before th
case was taken up for trial by the Court was taken as crirminal
Contentas
as it was intended to prejudice the proceedings and the consideratin
towhether actual damage was done to the case, was not taken as material
consideration. The contempt jurisdiction is of extra-ordinary nature and
is required to be exercised cautiously. No doubt, it is for the Court t
decide whether or not the publication or act is likely to scandalize or
lower the authority of the Court or interfere without due course of any
judicial proceeding or administration of justice, but the Court should act
in pragmatic manner and should not be byper sensitive. The real effect
of the publication or act should be taken into account in determining
whether or not it is likely to scandalize or lower the authority of the
Court or interfere with due course of judicial proceeding or administration
of justice.
The strict liability rule is applied in the case of Criminal Contempt.
The intention to interfere with the administration of justice is not
necessary to constitute the criminal contempt. The es sence of the offence
of contempt lies in the tendency to interfere with the due course of justice
and motive, good faith, etc. of the alleged contemner are immaterial. It
is enough if the action complained of is inherently likely so to interfere."
Mens rea, in the sense of intending to lower the repute of aJudge or
Court, is not an essential ingredient of the criminal contempt." What is
material is the effect of the offending act and not the act per se. In re
PC. Sen' the Supreme Court has observed that the question is not s0
much of the intention of the contemner as whether it is calculated to
interfere with the administration of justice, what is intentionally published
includes matter which tends to interfere with due administration of justice,
then contempt is made out."" Where intention is referred to in dealing
with this class of contempt, it is the intention lying behind the act
intentionally done i.e., publication. l The intention of the contemner, thnus,
not essential ingredient of the criminal contempt, but certainly knowleas
of the publication or act complained of is necessary to constitute crimin
1, In the matter of a letter concerning Suit No. 1947 of 1952, AIR 1969 Cal 174
2. Smt. Padmawati Debi Bhargava v. RK. Karanjia, AlR 1963 MP 61
3. In re PC. Sen, AIR 1970 SC 1821; Reliance Petrochemical Ltd, v
Express Newspapers Bombay Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 190. Proprielors of n
4. A.G v. Butterworth, (1963) 1 QB 696.
5. Ishar, L8., Freedom of Speech and Contempt by interfering with he
administration of justice, Journal of Bar Council of India, 1981, Vol, VIlI (2) a
330.
6. AG v. Butterworth, (1963) 1 QB 696 at p. 726.
7. In re PC. Sen, AIR 1970 8C 1821; In re D.C. Saxena and Dr. D.C. SaLxena v Hon ble,
the Chief Justice of India, AlR 1996 8C
8. In re D.C. Suxena and Dr. D.C Saxena 2481
v. Hon'ble The Chief Justice of India, 1bd,
at p. 2496
9, AlR 1970 8C 1821.
10. Supreme Court Equity Division v. McPherson, (1980) 1
11, Ibid, NSLR 688 at p. 698
 MEANING AND KINDS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 327

contempt, e,g., it is
necessary that the contemner has knowledge that his
publication contains the matter complained of.' The concept knowledge
Phe distinguished from the concept 'intention'. Knowledge' signifies a
state of mental realisation with the bare state of conscious awareness of
certain facts in which the human mind remains supine or inactive, while
Sntention' is taken to mean a conscious state in which mental faculties
are roused into action for the purpose of achieving a conceived end and,
e in the case of intention' the mental faculties are projected in a set
diection. To constitute eriminal contempt the knowledge that the act
complained of will produce a contumacious act, he may be held liable for
the criminal contempt and his intention will not be relevant for this
purpose. For determining the knowledge it is to be seen whether
objectively the effect of the publication or act would result in scandalizing
the Court or interfere with the administration of justice.?
In Rex v. Dolan, Palles C.B., has observed that actual intention to
prejudice is immaterial. However, it is taken into consideration in
cunsidering the nature of punishment to be awarded, as, for instance
whether it should be imprisonment. The observation of Palles appears to
be the present position of law on this issue not only in England but also
in India. The Supreme Court of India° has made it clear that mens rea
is not a defence but it is a mitigating circumstances in considering the
question of punishment.
The essential ingredients of criminal contempt may be discussed as
follows :
(A) Publication or other act
Publication or doing of any other act which has resulted in any or
the consequences specified in section 2(cX\i), (ii) and (iii) will amount
to eriminal Contempt of Court. Thus, the publication or act will be taken
criminal contempt if it has resulted or likely to result in any of the
following consequences :
) scandalizes or tends to scandalize or lowers or tends to lower
the authority of, any Court; or
n) prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due
cOurse of any judicial proceedings; or
) interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to
obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. Tb
constitute criminal contempt, thus, firstly, there must be
publication or doing of any other act and secondly, such
publication or doing of the act has resulted in any or all of the
osequences specified in Section 2(cXi), (ii) and (iii) Doing of
1.
2. JatMcleod v. St. Aubyn, (1899) AC 549.
3. In Prahash v. State, 1991 (2) SCC 32.
4. re
5. (1907)
Rex v. Subrananayam,
2 LR
260.
A.LR. 1943 Lah 329.

Dolan,
8. In re PC. Sen,(1907)
AIR 21970 SC 182 1; In re Dr DC. Sauena and Dr DC Sauena v
LR 260.
Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, AIR 1996 SC 2481.
328 LEGAL ETHICS, ACCOUNTABILITY OF LAWYERS &BENCH-BAR RELATIONs
any other act refers to something other than
publication.
example, hurling shoe at the judge! or throwing eggs at For
Judge would be included within the meaning of the the
'doing of any other act'. words
In a case the Court has observed that the criminal contempt has
been vivisected into two categories
(1) One is publication of any matter which scandalizes or tends t
scandalize the authority of any court, etc. etc.
(ID Second, is the doing of any act whatsoever which scandalizes or
tends to scandalize the authority of any court, etc. etc.
If an act is not a criminal act merely because there was no
publication, such act would automatically fall within the purview of the
other category because the latter consists of the doing of any other act
whatsoever. The latter category is, thus, a residuary category so wide
enough from which no act of criminal contempt can possibly escape. The
common denominator for both is that it scandalizes or tends to scandalize,
etc. etc. of any Court.
The word "publication" has been given very wide meaning. The
publication may be by words (written or spoken) by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise of any matter. If the newspaper or the
broadcasting on the radio or television or the film exhibited in the cinema
hall or theatre or on the television contains the matter which has or
tends to have any one or all the consequences specified above, it will
amount to Contempt of Court.
In the case of S.K. Sundaram the telegraphic communication sent
by the contemner contain the following -
"I call upon Shriman Dr. A.S. Anand Hon'ble Chief Justice of
India to step down from the constitutional office of the Chief Justice
of India forthwith, failing which I will be constrained to move the
criminal court for offences under sections 420, 406, 471, Indian Penal
Code for falsification of your age, without prejudice to the right to
file a writ of quo-warranto against you and for a direction to depoSit
a sum of Rs, 3 crores for usurping to the office of Chief Justice of
India even after attaining the age of superannuation."
The Court held it as gross criminal contempt of court. The contention
that sending such telegram would not amount to publication was no
accepted by the court. The Court has held that a telegraphic message can
be transmitted only after the sender gives the content of the message to
the telegraphic office which would invariably be manned by the stan.
that office. The message after transmission, reaches the destination offhe
which also is manned by the members of the staff. From these only the
message would be dispatched to the sender. At all those levels the messag
1. Courls on its own Motion v. Milkhi Ram, 1992 Cr LJ 2130 (HP).
2. Re Cosgrave, (1877) Times, 17th March quoted in Borrie & Lowe, Law of Contemp.
p. 15 (3rd Ed).
3. In re, SK Sun daram, AlR 2001 SC. 2374.
4. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Section 2lc).
5. In re SK Sundaram, AIR 2001 SC. 2374.
 MEANING AND KINDS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 329

is open to be read by, at least, those who are engaged in the process of
transmission. A telegraph message is not like a letter
handwritten
sender and enveloped in a sealed cover to be opened only by the by the
sender
for reading.
(B) Scandalizing or lowering the authority of the court or
interfering with judicial proceeding or administration of justice
m ponstitute criminal contempt the
act must have resulted in any or publication or doing of any other
all of the consequences specified in
ERction 2(cXi), () and (iii), namely
() It scandalizes or tends to scandalize or
the authority of, any Court; or
lowers or tends to lower
(G) It prejudices or interferes or tend to interfere with,
the due
course of any proceedings; or
Gi) It interferes or tends to interfere with or
obstruct, the administration of justice in any obstructs or tends to
These requirements may be discussed as follows-
other manner.
() Scandalizing the Court or
Court.The publications or doing of any lowering the authority of the
other act which scandalizes or
tends to scandalize or lowers or tend to lower the
taken as criminal contempt. For this purpose actual authority of the Court is
Court or lowering of the authority of the scandalization of the
sufficient if the publication has tendency to Court is not necessary; it is
authority of Court. scandalize or lower the
Scandalizing the Court may be taken to
writing, published calculated to bring a Court ormean a
any act done or
into contempt or to lower its or his Judge of the Court
authority.'
According to Goodhart' scandalizing the Court means any
criticism of the Judge as Judge; any personal attack hostile
With the office he holds, is dealt with upon him, unconnected
and libel. Scandalizing the Court by under the ordinary rules of slander
ean bringing the authority of the Court means of publication may be taken to
28 to the meaning of the con cept into contempt by such publication.
authority of the Court', the view of Justiee
Wilmot appears to be correct. According to him' the word "authority" is
frequently
called used to express the right of declaring the law which is properly
jurisdiction
equivalent and of enforcing obedience to it, in which
to the word "power", He has made it sense it is
the clear that it does not mean
to coercive
them and power
of the Judges but the
their acts, from an opinion deference and respect which is paid
of their justice and integrity.
'Scandalizing might manifest itself in various ways but in substance
it is an
attack on individual Judges or the Court as a whole with or
without reference to particular cases casting unwarranted and
aspersions upon the character or ability of the Judges. Such conduet is
1.
defamatory

2, Lord Russelof Killowen, C.J., R. v. Gray, (1900)

3. Goodhart ,
Wilmot, C.J.,Newspaper
4. lbid. Rex V. s
on Contempt of Court,
2 QB 36 at 40.
(1935) 48 Harv LR 885 at p. 889.
Almon, 97 ER 94.
 LEGAL ETHICS, ACCOUNTABILITY OF LAWYERS &
BENCH-BAR RELATIONS
puniahed as contempt for the reason that it tends to
the popalar mind and impair confidence of the people create distrust in
in Courts
are of prime imnportance to the litigants in the protection of which
and liberties. their rights
Criminal contempt has been defined in Section 2(c) of the
of Courts Act. In the categorisation of
contempts in the three sub-clause
6) to Giim), only category (i) refers to "judicial
Contermpt
of Court in its administrative capacity will also proceedings". Scandalizine.
be covered by sub-clauses
6) and (iii)
Where criticisms are levelled against a Judge, the Court has to be
very circumspect. No action can be held to be called for if the criticisrm
is reasonable and offered for the public good. The Court has
further to
consider whether the criticism amounts merely to a libel against the Judge
in his personal capacity or it is calculated indirectly to interfere with the
due course of justice. If it is nerely a libel, it is for the Judge to follow
such remedy as is legally open to him. The criticism can form the basis
for committal of Contermpt of Court only if it is made against the Judge
in the exercise of his judicial function,
Thus, to say that a particular Judge does not act in a fair and
indeperndent manner or that in his actions he is influenced by a particular
section of the public or the mermbers of the Bar, is tantamount to saying
that he is not honest and that certainly undermines his prestige and
authority, as also the confidence which the public should response in him.
Such an allegation tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the
people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge. The mere
fact that the aforesaid words were used about the Chief Justice while
acting in his administrative capacity can mnake no difference. It will
corstitute eriminal contempt."
In Rajesh Kumar Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Madhya
Pradesh the Supreme Court has made it clear that attributing improper
motive to a judge or scurrilous abuse of a Judge will be taken as
Beandalizing the Court.
Publication
purchased
of statement in the newspaper that justice may be
by money and so on, will amount to criminal contempt.
Similarly
particular contemners filing application
case listed before beforeshould
a Bench which Courtnotwith request
include to get a
a particular
Judge, such application cast aspersions on integrity of said Judge and his
impartiality in dealing with cases and therefore it will amount to criminal
contempt and both, party and his counsel who signed the said application
will be liable for Contempt of Court.7 The Supreme Court has made it
clear that if an impression is ereated in the minds of the public that the
1. Brahaun Prahash v. State of UP, AIR 1954
2. Ranehapuds Subba Rao v. Aduocate- Ceneral, SC
AIR
10.
. Stale v Tribhuwan Nath Verma, AIR 1959 Pat 262 1981 SC 755.
: 1959 Cr LJ 754.
4. GN Vermav. Hargouind Dayal, AlR
6. AIR 2007 5C 2725 1975 All 52 at p. 64.
6. Stale v Badri Bhatia, (1994) 1 Weste rn
Law Cases 349 (Raj).
7. Rajasthan Hgh Court v. Radha Mohan Lal, 1993 Cr LJ 3182 at p. 3191
 MEANING AND KINDS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 331

ludres in the highest Court in the land act on extraneous considerations

in deciding cases, the confidence of the whole community in the
odministration of justice is bound to be undermined and no greater
mischief than that can possibly be imagined.!
It is as much a Contempt of Court to say that the judiciary has lost
its independence by reason of something it is alleged to have done out of
Court, as to say that a result of a case it has decided, it is clear that
it has no independence or has lost what it had. Where the article
complained of stated :
"It is so unfortunate and regrettable that at the present day
the Chief Justice and the Judges find a peculiar delight in
hobnobbing with the executive with the result that the judiciary is
robbed of its indepen dence which at e time attracted the
admiration of the whole country. The old order of things has vanished
away." The Court held that it was a clear case of Contempt of Court.
In Rajendra Sail v. M.P High Court Bar Association," the prosecution
witness made statement in public that in murder trial the judge had
sposition to acquit the accused. The judge about to retire was available
lor sale and that the judgment was rubbish and deserves to be thrown
dastoin. This comment made by the witness was published in
newspaper. The Court held that it amounts to gross Contempt of Court.
he person who gives publicity to a scandalizing attack on a Judge
or Court is as much guilty of criminal contempt as the person who mnakes
the attack Thus, advertisement for a demnonstration against a Judge for
action done in Court isis a contempt."
In re Arundhati Roy, the court has made it clear that the criticism
which under
dignity of the Court cannot be permitted
undermines the
cloak of freedomn off speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1 Xa).
cannot be held as law that in view
Court has made
of the constitutional it clear that it
expression no
protection of freedom of speech and
One can be proceeded with for the Contempt of Court on the allegation
of scandalizing any court. Thus,
or intending to scandalize the authority of
prosecution of for scandalizing the Court is not prohibited by
freedom person
of speech
and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1Xa).
 3. Constitutional Validity of the Contempt of Courts Act.
The Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to
any of the matters or subjects enumerated in List I (Union List) of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 4 Parliament and the State
Legislature both have power to make laws with respect to any of the
subject enumerated in List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule
of the Constitution, but in the case of conflict between the law mnade by
Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature, the law made by
the State Legislature shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void."
However, Article 254(2) creates an exception to this general rule. It
provides that where a law made by the State Legislature with respect to
of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List
containing any
provisions repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by
Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then the law
so made by the State Legislature shall, if it has been
consideration of the President and has received his assent,reserved for the
State, however, even in such condition the Parliament can prevail in that
with respect to the same matter including a law enact any law
varying or repealing the law so made by the State adding to, amending,
residuary power has been vested in Parliament.8 Legislature.7 The
Entry 77 of List I (Union List) and Entry l4 of
List) of Seventh Schedule of the List III (Concurrent
of court. Constitution include the subiect. contempt
1. Rizwanul Hu San v. The State of U.P.,
2. Rajesh Kumar Singh v. High Court of AIR 1953 SC 185.
3. Tbid Judicature of M.P.. AIR 2007 SC 2T25.
2725.
4. The
5. Tbid., Constitution
Article
of India, 1950, Article 246(1).
6. Ibid., 246(2)
7.
Article 254(1).
lbid., Article 254(2).
8. lbid., Article 248.
358 LEGAL ETHICS, ACCOUNTABILITY OF LAWYERS &BENCH-BAR AELATIONS

On the basis of these provisions, the Sanyal Committee' has derived

a conclusion that the Legislature is fully competent to legislate with
respect to Contempt of Court subject only to the qualification that the
legislature cannot take away the power of the Supreme Court or the High
Court to punish for contempt or vest that power in some other Court.
Besides, the Sanyal Committee has observed that Article 142(2)
makes every power of the Supreme Court to make any order for the
punishment of its contempt subject to any law made in this behalf by
Parliament and therefore Parliament has full power to legislate in relation
to contempt of the Supreme Court.
However, an important limitation on the legislative power is that it
should not be so exercised as to stultify the status and dignity of the
superior Courts. Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India are
based on the assumption that there should be an effective power in the
Supreme Court and each of the High Courts for dealing with cases of
contempt. The power of Parliament to legislate in relation to the law of
contempt of these Courts would, therefore, have to be exercised in such
a way that the purpose of the Constitutional provisions is not defeated.'
The Contempt of Courts Act is considered valid. It is not considered
inconsistent within the law of contempt existing at the time of its
enactment. Section 22 of the Act makes it clear that the provision of this
Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any
other law relating to Contempt of Courts.
The contempt law is not violative of Article 14.-When a statute
is challenged on the ground of violation of guarantee of equality under
Article 14, first the policy underlying the statute and the object intended
to be achieved by the statute should be ascertained, by the Court and
thereafter it is to be ascertained whether the classification is rational and
founded on the intelligible differentia which
things that are grouped together from others thatdistinguished persons or
are left out of the group
and whether the basis of differentia has any rational nexus or
with the policy or objects sought to be achieved by the statute. relation If the
classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from
group and the differentia has a rational relation to other left out of the
the objects sought to
be achieved by the statute in
reason able." On this test the
question, the classification will be
of Article 14. The object of contempt law law is reasonable and not violative
the Judges personally but to contempt
is not to provide protection t
of administration of justice. Itsprotect the public confidence in the systen
purpose
and administration of justice which is is to uphold the majesty of la
necessary for the existence of e
1. Sanyal Committee Report, p.
2. lbid.
16.
9. Sanyal Committee Report, p. 16.
4. lbid.
E Noordeen Mohammed v. A.K. Gopalan, AlIR 196g
e Harkchand v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1453. Ker 301.
7. Sher Singh v. Kaghupali, AlR 1968 Punj 217
 ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, OBJECT AND CONS TITUTIONAL VA JDITY OF
CONTEMPT LAW 359

orderly society. On account of this object the contempt

been classified as proceedings of a class by proceedings have
of their own. The punishment for themselves with a procedure
contempt is awarded summarily by not
only for the protection of the Judges personally but for
public justice, necessary for the existence of the the protection of
orderly society.
Consequently, it cannot be said that the procedure providing
summary trial is violative of Article 14.2 for the
The contempt law is not violative of the
freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by Article 19(1Xa) of the Constitution of India. In
several cases the Supreme Court has observed that the
and expression including the press is not freedom of speech
may be imposed by the State-making law absolute and restriction thereon
on any of the ground specified
under Article 19(2). Contempt of Court is one of the
Clause (2) of Article 19 and, therefore, the restriction on grounds specified in
and expression may be imposed, if it amounts to freedom of speech
Article 19(2) allows not only the enactment of law Contempt of Court.
the freedom of speech and expression so as imposing restriction on
to
Court but also protects the existing law in prevent the Contempt of
Supreme Court has made it clear that therelation to contempt. The
Contempt of Court imposes reasonable restrictionexisting law relating to
within the meaning of
Article 19(2) and, therefore, it is not violative of the
to freedom of speech and expression Fundamental Right
guaranteed
The words "existing law" has been defined in
by Article 19(1Xa).
366. It provides that existing law means any law, Clause (10) of Article
rule or regulation passed or made before the ordinance order, bye-law,
Constitution by any legislature, authority or personcommencement of this
having power to make
such a law, ordinance, bye-law, rule or regulation. It,
statutory law and not case law. On account of it, an thus, refers only to
whether the words "existing law" includes the caseimportant issue is
law relating to
Contempt of Court. The opening words of Article 366 contain the saving
phrase, "In this Constitution unless the context
the context of Contempt of Court the ambit of the otherwise required." In
law" should not be restricted to the statutory law expression "existing
to Contempt of Court in India is mainly case only as the law relating
law based on the English
Common law as interpreted by the Court. If the definition of the
expression "existing law' as given in Clause (10) of Article 366 is applied
in construing that expression occurring in Article
19(2), the power of the
Court of Record for punishing contempt would become
Contempt law would become unworkable. The statutory law nugatory and the
of court is not exhaustive and the case law relatingrelating
to the
contempt
ofCourt plays more important role than the statutory law in the
to Contempt
interpretation and determination of issues as to the meaning ad
categories of Contempt of Court, contempt power of the superior Courts,
1, Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. M.S. M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395: In re Keshav Singh, AIR
1965 SC 745: E.M.S. Namboodripad v. TN. Nambiar, AIR. 1970 SC 20 15.
C.K. Daphtary y, O.P Gupta, Alk 1971 SC 132.
360 LEGAL ETHICS ACCOUNTABILITYOF LAWYERS&BENCH-84R FELATONS

nature of contempt proceedings and quantum of punishment for conte

ete. The makers of the Constitution were aware of this fact. Prior to the
Constitution of India the superior Courts have been enercising the
contempt power. When the makers of the Constitution inserted Articles
129 and 215 recognizing the power of the Supreme Court and High Courts
as Courts of Record to punish for contempt of courts, they do not defne
the expression "contempt of court.This indicates that the law of cntemt
as contemplated by them was not only the statutory law of contempt b
also the case law relating to contempt of court. In such condition the
opening words of Article 366 containing the saving phrase "unless the
context otherwise requires" become operative and it may be concluded thst
in the context of contempt of court the phrase "eisting law" in Article
19(2) includes not only statutory law but the entire law of contempt as
was recognized in India prior to the Constitution of India based on Enghsh
common law and decisions of the Hign Courts and Privy Councl
It is notable that the term "reasonable restriction" in Artide 192
refers not only to the future law but also to the existing la
Consequently, the law relating to Contempt of Court will be vaid only te
the extent it imposes reasonable restriction on the freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by Article 19(1Xa) Before the Constitution First
Amendment) Act, 1951 the entire law relating to defamation, contempt ef
court, etc. was excluded from the operation of Artice 19(1a) but ater
this Amendment, if the existing law or future law relating to the matters
specified in Clause (2) of Article 19 contravenes the limits of reasonable
restriction on the freedom of speech and expression, it wll be voi :
will be protected only when it imposes reasonable restriction on any e
the grounds specified in Article 19(2)* The restriction on the freedom
speech and expression on the ground of contempt of court must be
reasonable, whether such restriction is imposed by the existing law or
future law. The Court has made it clear that the law of contempt 2s
laid down by the British and Indian Courts imposes reasonable restrc
on the freedom of speech and expression. The law of contempt does D
violate Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21 provides that
person shall be deprived of his life or personal lhberty except accor
to the procedure established by law. It has been made clear by the
Cou
that the existing procedure for contempt proceedings have statutay
sanction. Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 or Section 10 of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 197l and Clause (38) of the Letters PPatent
make it clear that the procedure in contempt has statutory recogmition
Consequently, it cannot be said that the contempt law is
Article 217 violatve
1. State v Editurs and Publishers of Bastern Times and Prejapahne, AIR 2952 On 318
2. The State v Bditor
3.Legal Matribhumi, AIR 1955 Ori 36
4. lbid.
Remembrancer, Bihar
B Bhusan Des Gups, AIR 1954 Pat
2s
5. Vidya Niwas State, AIR 1953
6. State of Bombay v Mr P. AIR All 342
7. lbid.
1959 Bom 182
 ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, OBJECT AND CONS TITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF CONTEMPT LAW 361

The procedure established by law in Article 21 includes the existing

procedure recognized by the Courts and the Constitution.' The summary
procedure in contempt cases had been in vogue prior to the commnencement
of the Constitution of India. This procedure has been recognized by the
Court. Besides, Article 225 of the Constitution of India makes provision
for its continuity.
Besides, Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India also makes
provision for keeping intact the laws which were valid prior to the
enforcement of the Constitution. It provides that notwithstanding the
repeal by the Constitution or the enactments referred to in Article 395
but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the laws in
force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of
this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed
or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. The
expression law in force in Article 372(1) includes not only statutory law
but also customary law or any matter of procedure which was prevalent
in India and duly recognized by the Court, although it was not enacted
by the Legislature. The expression law in force', thus, includes summary
procedure in contempt prevalent in India before the commencement of the
Constitution of India.
Thus, the the contempt law is not violative of any of the
Constitutional provisions and it is, thus, Constitutionally valid.

I. In the matter of Basanta Chandra Gupta, AIR 1960 Pat 428.

a. In the matter of Basanta Chandra Gupta, AlR 1960 Pat 428.
3. Ibid.
4. C.K. Dapthary v. O.P Gupta, (1971) 1 sCC 626.