Week- Q : Peete Nokes Topre + —_ Me ssage authent cation ; Digitad Siqrature Key management, Key eee , Hose Funct) Messas a, autRenheahon ——_—__{4. 3 ° As preynoudly menhoned, ener Key C Private oy pullre) may be Used fv encrypthon win Aw ony used fo Subsequent Aecrypticn, Ths fads htates a A Fhevenbt form of Scheme as Aescibed Ym +he Fllowin, In twes hr B core A Prepares A Mer si ney Arg pYivate Key enerypr and can gx ale wry pr ‘tbusimey A's public Kay . Y= Exe X= Exv, yy) @weve, A Yemervates a por ef Kays KVe (a Prtlte Key) ond KRa (a private Key) © As the message wns Prepaved umney Ns privehe Key it coma erly come Nom A Mervefore Ane entre ESSA Oe serves oad Aig to Sta mote C described Aw) e W's schemeWGoes nok provide confidentiality Because everyons has access +a WA's publie Key, ° Tr vs) wot effrur enh becane PR mut VAointein oy einve Wolk tun cipher texp (ox a prof of Autnentity) aA tne decoded plaintext (for the prach'en4 MSe 0f tue Aocumment) . * A move efferent way of ache ving, the same xvssult ts to encevyph aSmall bleex of kn tat ave a -fanckon of wwe Aocum ent. eo Ths blocw, called an authen Hentor, mst) mare) tives property tra ib is w feasible bo change ane document Bi tho wt chang: na the authenticator. e Tf tue autnentcaty ic encry pled Maing tue sender priyate Key Hew ik cevves ara Sigh Wace Huo vewvfles the oxgin, contenb word, seQuancng PF tue docum mb 2 This pre ce have to verify tnwok vecoived message come’ from ne alles ech Source ank\ have not Leen oAterecd tg called message authaw Menken Authent cat ow veq wrem ents a OnE eo Tn ee context of Com menicakion aceyoss “~ MetworK, tne $e lowing,atracus can be identified: VV Disclosures Release of Wreorage enutenk, + any Pevson oy PYeCese woh Possessing, me PPC OEK KE Pt sap ble Key, @ We he analysis: Digeovery ef tee pattern of tre thie between partes. In a Connection ox'ented application , ane Fe auency on dW duration of comnectBy, cond be Acter mined STA Pitney a commechoy ovvented on” comnechonles: enwron- ment) tWe Jnumber and lencty of weeds betveoy pay es could “Bam bdetevmimed. 3+ Masquerade: Incevtron of MEWAAS imto tre nehooyve fom a fran dulen Source . Wy wwclu - des ture creation of wmerwa ye by an CPPONemt Mak ave pe or fed te come from an ortho trek enhty |A Combent modi hewion », Chanyes ts fre tconkents of & mere ge ytrelediny In sex hon, deleWou , arans poss om, oy moa f cntiom: B. Sequence ano di Ferkeow + modification te & sequence of Yesn ages pehoeom partes im nding inserts, Any Aelehomn and ve ox deri ne. b- Teaminnty amo di ficou ! Delay or veg lay of meres Os Ton Qo orm echron onented applica high Yan entre e210" or sequen Ce of Ame De Aes cold bes replay of some ) previ ows valid Seren | oy In divi duet \Ane apaqea ton Ane sequence cows ben dallayjed or ~eeplay 2d. F Repke Ain Wee* Dewel of vreceipk of menage by destmateyn or denial ef Wangs ori OoN oF menage ey Sour ce - e Message an twen Henk on mag also veri fy sequen cing, one tine li measeA atlane stqnature is an authenteuton techwique thot also Mcludes measures to counter reprdiation by either Aestnaton . source or e Ans Me rage axrthenteakon ov Aqrtah cay be viewed siqnarwre me chan 6m ea or having, Famdormen tally dee \owev \evels , tneve nel ee seme sort oF Ban chto Wy yak produces an anthenhWcatey & & valus xo be used +o authemicake % MeD4HL . © AL the © Tris lower level anction is then aged Meaprionth ve im & Wigh level autnen Wcatyon proto co) Thok enmoles a ‘receiver +o veri fy As authen baby pf aA merrate. o Ths section ts concerned ath Aw tyepes of fun ch’ons dnok may be used +o produce. Onn AU Neale. Twese chun Clos: Woy be gre wpect into turee clanres, follows:\ Messace Encry phon + The cipher text of tre entive ™MENAKE SeTVAS an ‘Ww avthen kK cator . b Message autivnticabion code (MAJ: 4 public function of the menace ana a secret Key anak produces a fixed length volun Mak Serves a Ant athofcubr. O Sh ony rammly be encermid ain the lark clon of fare ton, powever ‘Eo must be noted Gina WKarh fanchow and MACs are gery diemilar except tnt ag herb code \doer not Yequive a seevet Keyl eo With veg Getto The first elon, tn's con be $20 +0 poude awtnen Heakion by vintwe of Ame Lack nat ondy tw semaer ond wecoiver Knob the “Key, © Trerefrve the mersaye could only have come from tne sender, @ Wowever Were 's Ako the Prowlem Anok the prrnterct mMenade ould be we toa SOI ay plaintext mmesrad 2.Dig lal Siqnowre © Memace anthenKcukon protect wo parbes aho exchange Mermages Seow One Ane A parky, However, Lh does not protect -the -two parhes agamst each other. © Several forms of Au pare bettseem Yoe too ave possivle. Fer example, swppese “nak John Sends am ArtnenH cated mesrygeeyte Mary. Meing one of ted Meheaore Acscrwbed eax\\ar. © Consider that following, dispwte trak could ari@ent — Mary Wray for ae a affe rere message and claim Anat ib Came from john: Mary. world sim ply have to create A Merwnaye omd arpend an authenheahon code Msing the Key thal John and Mary share. .— Bohn can deny sending, AWS Menrage « Becanke ‘hb vo Pes ble or wary +o hr ge a me A024 (neve YS x Wary Av prove Amok John AL ty fat send tw merdace . © Be scenavios are OF lear Wwnorke concern. In siiuratoww Dhere Merve is wot complete Acmat betdeen sender Ard receiver, something move than O4tMenheiakon is weededy eo The snosk attachvenySo to this Prob\ewm fs twee Ato ror siqueture . ° Wwe Aigitnd Sqrmatur e is araloqows yo awe hand aritten Sanatare | me ANT we vent, syne author and tne date and time OF tne Sg na have — TH muck anthenterte ane contents Gt the Ame of Signokure - — TX wmwst be verifiaule by and parties , to vesolve Aiserttes,© Thus, the digital signature fin chon, includes the autheny cation finchon. On yne basis of these Proper hes, ve ean, fosmulrfe tre follows Yequire - ments for a Ags mA slanakare ‘ — The stan ature yaust be a BE pattern trok depends on tne mer ace being, sqned - — We Sqnoture mist US2 Some inforvn tion oniquay-to tne sender, +0 @revent both forgery and dent oh. — Tr miaytléz velatvely Rasy +o produce We. Mov roA stonodnre . — Th vnask be veletively easy to We cog-nice and verity tre AigiteA Sqmatuve =— It mush be Comprtationally infea site Ye for 428 digi toA Signature , meen by coms tering QA NeW Merage for an existing. digi to signotnye or by cows Arnctig,a fraudulent dignred Signature ore awe Wed ae . — TW mask be practe eh vw velnin «4 tompy of me Aaron SiqnAwre Iw sterene . Siqnoatwre Scheme e A Sanatwve scheme is a Live~brpl, CFA ¥,S,Y) where tne Pollo ing, conditions ave sotisfiedl : t Pisa finyhe sehof all possible Meraye. @ A is a XSite] set of all porble Sian vere Be Kythe Keyspace, 1S Hee a finite set °F all Keys. 4: € ts a sek of all poor ble Signateve og ors Hon be or 05 qo ate Cle poss ble ven fetion Maori then.@iGey. Suck WCho ) tneve Vee signing alg ori than sig, 6 S and « wrrer pow ai ver feotion adaoricthen Vey, Ys Each stg: Ps A ad vere 2 Px A —> drewe , fact are Moe CU Pollo ng Ramration is sats fred -for eV¥ery merase re /0 and fr every Sqnature ye Ww ; — (9) = Wt of r= S909 =Alsa yl yes'ge * For every KOK , ne fin chion No and Ver Shows be palynomiah Lime functions. very, all be o& pwelic tan cHon and S53 wil be secre. RSA Skgnatuve Seheme. * Leb n= Pq anere P Ond qy ave primes. Let f= A= Ly eddefine X=} Om raed) Loe py and abe) (med #69) 3 * The values n and b ave pwelic and the valres Pr4,Q are Se tret- * K= Cuitayarb) , ole fine Sg) = xX -modn and We Compe GONG 129 GX Yn) Elgamol Signature Sche wa e Let p be\a prime sack Ancek -ne dis crete Log problem in Zp vs iniractotle, and let gem be wa prmtve element. ’ o Let Pet, A= xd and Aefine % =PCom aby: pra Great py}* Tre values Px and B are pwe We and a is secvet: o Ke Chrta, B) for a (secret) random number 1% & Ue define mat SYg (mrg) = (HE) Where y= of * (mod P) ana Se (nH a Y)K' mod (P- * for m CDF awd & & IN, Aefine Very (%) % 3) = Fae S pve aca) —) Example oe Suppose PRACT Ko 2, 45124 and oO i A Nena x Omod PY = 2 mod 467 hence be = 132 . Suppose Bob Say}. he stn Ane menage HE CO And he chooses the random value Ke Ua (mote tho ae (21%, 46e)=1 Gud 213) mod 466 = 43) yo Thenv= DP aned ACE = 29 awd S = (100 - 12FX29)-4s\ mod 4e6 = 5\ e Amyone can verify Anis Stqrnature by eheevins, not ve) SI \32. 29 = 189 Cred 46%) and paar \9q (anod 464) e Hence, ane Sang tyfe ye vald. Key Mpagement - _ A®~ eo Were are actually two Aw ct aspects to the wre of puree ney encryption tm W's veqavd : — ne Aistei bution of pwel'c Keys, — The use of Pwelic Key en Ory pron de distribwte secvet Keys.Distribulion of Pulbl¥e Keys e Several techniques have been proposed for the Aistcibuhen of Public Keys. Viv haally all of these propesaks can be ayrouped trio ane following, gener sche eg-, AD Public announcement ®) Publicly aver \o\e directory 9 Public key ava ovndy v) Public Key Cov Geoke . Public. Ammouneement of public keys e The goint ye pwrelic Key encryption should be +thak the pwelic Key is public . © Vrs if theve is Some broadly a ccepted pwelre Key og ov thm Svon a RSA, any participant can send hig or her pmrolic Key +. ony other partieipan4 ox broad coohtne key “lo the Community ok large (Aguve 0): . Altroush nis npp reach is Convenient by han a wmajoy WeOKNLDSD « Amy ms cay forge such © pmolic announce Ment . an a Sew, : Site Ue Xi Ku. a KVa rae Flaurel Uncon holled pwolie ney. Puloly chy Aveoulalble Divectory ee ee eo A qveater desvee of security can we achiever by Wm wn, ow prolidy aver \mMole. dynamic Atreetory of police Kays.e Mainlanance and dish bwhon of the pwoltc Arvectry wowd have +o Wwe ane Yesponsibility of some trusted enhhy ov organi s akon (Krave 2). Frame? Patolic Key Pro licion « © Such a scheme wowld tnclude tre toNowing, elements + — Tre au thowity mmodn twins oF Ave ctry Brin a A name, public Key any fox each parheipant,ee Ean parkeipant veqisters a pwolic Key BUN Ane divectry avthonhy, Reais ication wed have t+ be tn person oy by some form of secure ArthankK ented Communi cakon. -— A pavtcpast ynay eplace tne existing Key wth a ned One at any time , either became of tn desive +o replace % preve Mey that hoo olveady been Wed ofr a hovcqe ann orunt ,6€ Ar, or becaws the corres pow Din, povate Key han loezew com pO ced tm Soma way, = Periodically jtke orthority Prolis\es wre entre diveclory oY updater to Wwe Aire ctory, For example, A hard copy version much Wee felephone boOK comd be pmrbelishedl, or updetes, coud be Wsted vn a widely cty culated Wes Paper . Pox hcipamts could ako «C229 tne Atrechory electro ni callyFor tnis purpose, seewve , arthentented Communication from the anthorvity to Wwe park opant is man Amory | eo Wis scheme is Clearly wore secure ran mdividuck pwelre announce - vents, but still hos vulneroalittes. © TE an oppoment ewes dt in ob iyy Oy com puking ~me pryaks wey of the Aivectory authority gf THe gerpoment cog avkhow whwelyy por? ow coumferferk pwelie Keys and swlose- auestty imperfopoke any park cipant and eavesArop ow me 20425 sent to ony paxtic’pents - 2 Another way to AOveve tye same et is for Ane OPPEnent -to Jonper ath ye ecords Kerk oy We Awmthoviby | Publre key Authority « Stronger securty for pwelre Key Aivterbviion can be achieved oysoi Ai diskter control over the dg- eR vs puoi Keys frown nw divectory : © As befove, the scenario assumes thak a cenlnt auth oxiky worn ws a Aynavnic Aivector w of Police Key of al pavk pants | e In addition, each parhcipant sre Woraly Knows a pwtelie pkey oy the authority, attryonly we avktn orci ty en rag, he COVE PONdriag privote Key _ v Howeverqelhya ts not perfect a tne pele Key Athos hy could bo some Bhak of a bottleneck tw tne system . © The veason for this v's RINE Cy Oy vaust appeal to tne aukhority Y Se ete cy) ‘for every Other wer Vnot Th Wikkts +o contact.© Also the Aivectvy of names and pwolic Keys amnain yorned by “ne Avent tae vVWAnevarole +o jam penny , is Publre Rey Cerkficate eo An alley noathve approach +o the above is whe use of cerhfcate thok cam be used by part cpants to exchange Keys without contactiy a pwolic Key AVIS HA © Each cert freakey comtaini oa pMolic Key amd doth (form ion , 1's created by & cert Geake anthonty Ona Ws ivenet® the garter pant with the smokehing, private Key, o A pax Wa pant conveys its key Infrrnaton +o and ther by trans vn tony th ocevficate . e Other pavitapants ean verify “Lnak tre cer fr cote War Created ley tine awthon ty |e Four wrements can be placed on this paxrhewlar scheme + le Any par hei post can Yead & cert ficote to determine tne Name and pwrrolic Key Of the cert ficoke's owner. a Any park cipant can ven fy Anot tne certificate or! maked from “he corti freake awthovity and ts wot colnjer feb . 3. Only the com Gcate awthority Can cr€ote ond update ceyt'- frevk dg. A Any par ei pant ean ver fly Hao. CMYTENCY of the corbfieete. e An example of Wis scheme can be seen sing, the llowing, dvramsacton ' Ca = E eam LT? ID, 2 Kus]e Where Ca vs A's ceytficrke , KRawy {s the priveake Key of the cert fieate autnorty » ID, is a's Aenkkertion and ku ts A'S prrolic Key, eco ne Poros Ca “te ang parkicipont who veads and verter Ww orn follows : = v,\ KY Prevage oI = Daly WL Da ‘)] = ( sy, Wa 1 KUp) :Public Key Distibuton of Seco} Key © Once prolic Keys have been Aiskibuted er have become accessible, Secuve communicaton thot th Wark coves Aropping, ; tom paring, or both is porsble . " However, few users will wish +o make exclusive use of public-key enesyphon for cam mayen Hons because ef tne orelohvely slow data rates thot Canf abe Yaclv eved. ° Accordingly, Public Key en exyphon is More YeasowmoNly viewed as 4 velicle or the distibwvhon of secret keys to be? used for Convenbonar encry pho ny 7 © Simply Secret Key Distribwhion: An exwemely sim ple scheme pee fox werd by Ralph Merle is Ul wo reded wn / Ef A wishes to Commumeete eae 8 following procedure Is employeraA generates a pulblic/prvote Key pay 4 KUn KRa} and tonsils a me ragQe te consi shy of KU and an identifier of A, Dy: x B generates a secrek Key Ks and Acomaart it to A, encrypted arth A's prolre key: > A computes Dee Exy lel) * vecover -ne secret wey WSince only A can decrypt tne \ymlerage, only AK and B WAL S KH the Idenhhy of Kg. A dis SWE KU, ard KRa omc % Aiscavds KYA > » Kua 4 2 Ext Figuveg : Semple use of Public ker Encryplron Ho estarelish a serien Key.A and B Can NOW securely communicate e Sed1OMN Keys K,- encryphon and the © AX tne Completion of tne axchange both A and & Avscavd Ke - ‘ « Despite tke steaplieity 5 ths ts on otra chve. protecol- © No Keys exist pefore the start of he comm uni cot on and none exist after tne completion of comm uni cation. o Ths, the is OR Compromise of tne Keys ts wBivivaok. Ar the rome dive , the Coamgneni cation is secure fcom eave are PpYms - ° Tre pretecol ie vulmevalble yO om achve attack. o Tf om opeement E. haa Lonkeo| of the Inter ve ning Communi cakons chawel, com prom se the tw me following way dAetecteaA then he can Comynu ni cath ons Without beingoA qenerote’s a pullic/private Key pay { KYA, KRY and trots o Merrage intended for ® consis tims, oF KU and idenk fier ef A, ID,- » E Mtercepls the mMerage , creakes ik eon pwrlic/puvete Key party \ KUe KREG ond Aromsets KUEN ID, + B- co qenevartes a Secret Rey Keg oma “Acomswnits pho Be i ver cephs Tha Menace and learns Ke Sy computing, Der elExul4)] 5 E Wwanewds Exu, bss) HbA e We rvesult te Anak both A and B Know Ks and aye unararve that Ke har aso been vevenrleA to E . 2° A and B Can nam exchanage merages sing, Ky: E mo \emner actively mier ferves Ath he communi catoy> chawnel but sim ely eaves avops 52 Knoang Ks, E can Aecrypt al wmemages, And both A and B ave ware of the problem. © Thus, thi's simple protecol vs owy useful tn an environment Ahere the owly threat is eaves AoP png. © Next we all discusy Secret key Distkibubrow Bith confidentality and Autnentcaton |: | provides protection xa aims a parrive aAtacKs- Hive arnumed that ex changed porolic sche meas Aescnbed ° Fiquve 4 both achve om 2 For Whis example A and Pave. Keys by owe of Ane tis Section - earWay tn 2° Tren hme following, sheps eccure ; 1 A uses BS puelie key 40 encrvypr a Mervrase +o ® corn twaini ee, a ou OE CIDp) amd a Once Cri) ®hrekis used to Uniquely iden Gy Ani's transaction. 2 BR sends a merrage to A encrypted BiH KUA ond containing A’s Wonce CN) a well as a new Nonce C2) aemevated loy Q + Stnco en\y B cowd have Aecryeted mer age (Ci) 5 Wres presence of N, in Me 0He @ adures A Awek whe correspon den ve Py. A reluws Nagi eKexspted sing b- Ws Puelse Key, He armure & thot un corres pOnAemt vs A a A select secret Key Ks and sends Me E xu, LE xe, lksd] +e B" Encryphon of His merdage ath ps pwelie key ensures not only % can yead ik, encryption ath A's prvete Key ensures Anak erty A cond have, sent ih: 5 B com putes wwe secret Key, Drug l Dxel™ | +0 recoverLs Exu, (Ni 1d,} On » Exulm mI Responde B SN a) a) D Exup Feels) } Faure: Public 1G DR Mhation of secret Keys. e This schemas Snsures both Con Eden- Wality OrAye Authenticahon in ane ex Change of a secret Key) A Hybrid Scheme e ‘Xet omotner Way +. use Pwolic key encrvyphon +o Ars tri bute secret yweys tg a hybrid approach MW Use OW IBM Main frames.e Wis scheme vetring the we of key dis ibukou centre C Ke) tok Braves a secret master Key Sith each user and Aistributes secret Sermrion Keys encry plea ath the moster Key, oe RK pwelic Key ccheme is wed + dist bre Awe wracter KEYS. em is provides. © The fallowing scofiom at app roa Sov Using ants hye. \evet — Performance Tere are maw appv cethdns ,vespectally Avon sachon Bfori enye ARP i catows Mme@amhtch? me gexrion Keys change Ffrequenrty. Dish bution of serd10™ Keys by purrolic Key encryption cond dearade overall System per for man CR of me ~elatively KYy, load of patie Key A jecryption - with became com puati On A encry phon a a twee level hierarchy prrolic key encrypon ts wed omy dotke the ©ccansi ONally +o MPmastery Key between a user And tne KDC: — Bacxward Compatiterbty. The hybad sdneme is easly overlaid on a extishnz KDE scheme, arty | Ais vuphon of seftaare chan ges. e The addition of a pwolrc Key layer provides A secure ,ye FA'cuient means of distri bahwe master Keys: Ths ts an advamiagayin a con faaretion in DhW’eh A Stmale\ KPC sevves a widely Aictiphyed set of wrers.DifGie- Wellman Key Egebies = ° Te Ft prblisn eX PRK alg oes thon appeared in tne Paper by Dithe and Wellman that defined prrot'c Key cry ph graphy honevey ib is lwnited +d Ane secure exchange of a csecvek Key amd Mot of A Menage. © The cecurity of the scheme Aepends On tne Ai few Ly of com ptinsg dig evete tog art Avs - ¢ Tne Diffie-Hellmaw Key exchanae consists Ofe do pwhlicly Koon Wurm b ey Simin Ge PP IMS aumber P and an Mreger x that vs ane prin ve wo00k of 1: o Suppose The MSers KN ond B&B BAD exchange a “*eY. e Veer A selects a Yondow integer Xa <4 and compres Ny = ao vmod 4eo Srmwiladly . ser Inclapendlently Seleckg a Yandorn rear Xp 4 and comptes Yas x™ Cod a © Eacn side keees tne X va\ues private and maxes the ¥ vous. avarlaole Ppwolicly Yo te dthar stde. eo User A computes Ane Key o% k= (yey* mod gq om&AW User an Lompwhes tne MeAY Ary Km Xn “med o These “no col@Mattons produce eral weghiz and the enw is trot rege? BAer have 2x Choma eck a secrveh Key, 2 his can be seen becanse; Ke nae mod os Kr = (axe wea) wrod 4 (Cua ae ; (ox) nage - eas smed nye” moda, Cray med gy, {! "eo Fuvther more, because Xan and Xe ase private , an opponent is toy ced yo tune a Aiscvete Les eon Hae to determine te “ey, e For Rxam ple, atin tne secret Key of user B, we OCPppenent ww} compte ‘ Xn= ima ya C Xp) e Where tod eg (Ye) ts hey dis cvete leg avi then » OF tri Bayh , of Xp for the base awed. = Tre schema ean be Samm a Ti sek Os Vhoon\ in Figures e For example, lets say we have the volne q= 353 and a prmtve oot X= . « We wm see trok Az ts a pritve veo Of 4235 3 Awe +o tue follo wing, Ve asoning .e If a tee prim tve ~coot oe eo a juen the set of wm bers \o doers it dishwel reno d io a) ond x ve oe ahe set Yate ayy sons order. 1k com be 2 Tw Wis cose Xd and at of seen Ye be A prove FP Q= bbe * > mod 363, Domed 363, , conbiws , pe mod dK an ant: rt : a tne elements of {gi p Globe Public Eee nig Prime niamber LQ OMA Kars a Primitive oreot oF 9 User A Keg Generation Secret Prive e XA Knee Calewlek prtelic Yq Yat 0% mod g Vsev B Key Generrnon Seovet private Xe Xa me © 4 @¥["™+-—o @) « LG Covnpare kK Ex(mnn wo) 9 Compare. oF Ka, KRa Frowrec: Basics wees of Hash Lamchion .° Frquve 6 And RHawre Ft shrew tre paric weg Of Osh fan ch’ on ambere oo Rawre 2 Shows “he gener’ sAcudtwye OF & hak Cee ipo? ool hk ; 6 s Ex Don wniy ¥ (as) Fiauve 7: : Tawr T: Bowie wee of hook fxn ner. (contd)© Tre haxk valve is appended to AWe me rage ok whe souvce at the time when Ke Menrse is onnumed oF Knmdn to be covve ch © The veceiver authendicetes teak merage by Yecom pring Awe hawk VOue © Because the hash fonction self is not consideved +o be secret , some mean is vreqwive A +o pystek wre Wark vue (see figure 6 Ara Ft ): © We bean bygee Kari ns Aire wequive Yents for hash -fanch’on +0 we Used for — MEP 43 & authent caken . ° We pur pose of a hawk fanckton ts be produce Bo eee er print” of a file prmerdage or other blocw of dota, * To be usefil for meronye avthan Heatkien , a hah function BH mw have the rllowing properties ;te HW can be applied +o a block of dakn ef any Ste. DW produces a fixed length oukput. 3. HOY is velakvely easy +r Compute for any given *, waning both lhavdware and Soft wave wnple men tnHton practent. 4° For any aver code Wn, Va ts computationally wnfeasuble +o Lid yw such anak »p AB sh. b: For any given \blocw nm, th vs comp what omMe@\\y feass ble cho frro\ yee WER B= HOO (some himes ve fevved to av wear co\\iston property. 6. This computationally infeasible +4 Gnd any pur Guay) Ssuon HAar Boy = HOY) (sometimes wvefervred ye a strond, col\ioton pepe) .2 Tre Fist three properties axe wequivementh rv the pra cheat apeNVeaton eof a hash funchion +y menace awhenh cwhon i © Tne fourth propexky is Ane one way” property ; Vb ve easy bo enerate aS ven & merase bwe Viv tually in Porat ble + cyenermKe a merna¢e atvern aw code, e This property ts geapeyianbk if vne awheny cotton Ferhwviqnre \nvolve> tne wee of S$@@mrel Value. © Tre secveimvalke vYself ts ~ ok sents however, Me the hosh fun chon is net One- @CaY ) An attacker Con easly Ais cover whe setvef value attacker can observe or MWawmmmirion, tne atharcner A) ved ties e Tf Wwe intercepr & obraine the Menas, hack code Ce HC Sani)© Tre attrcnery tren Inverts the book fonction +o Obtey — Samime= We) - * Because, the attacker now har both M and Saml™ ) ik ts a teiviod wnattey to wecover San. he Ltt property guarantees shok an alternakve me sage hashwyg to ne some value as a aver MEW ARE caw moh be “Lfovend: ns prevents pt qersy Bhen an encrypted hash Gode is used ( see faure Gb ad 6e) e For these\cases » the eppenent Can vead the MEDIAS & and there fore. generate ite hash code. Pwk, became dwe Opponent doves not have -ne secret Key, tne opponent shows net be owle to alter the menage witnouk detechon .e Tt Anis property were not Wwue, an attacker would be capable of he fol\o wing, sequence: Observe oY wyerceph a» merase ples Ke ewcrypted hah code. 2 Generate an unencrypted hash code from tne mesrace - cf Genewete an alkernake merase with the sawe, Rarh code. oO noon fancho ny Wek tokiser tne fist five properes tn Me pre ce dina, MEQ vs Wreferread 4O a wean hark knchon - e If the coxth proper ty ts also satistiecd, anew ie fs wefeyred te ow & strony, hash funchen - © Tre sxth propery protects against a sophisti cated clany Of alton Known an birtnday Atec + Frgure® Shows shu geneva structwre, of a secure harh code.My cM We Iw Vale eve Shainin, vaTiovole Ye= ia inpwk block { = Compression algeri tim Le Number of tnpwt blew. = lengtn of hash code he b= length of pvr bloc. eo Tm tne next Wee we are sy ONG to study a Geraci? algorithm CSWA-1) Ob¥ohy OM be “seen to have anis Ovvmat*