Anna Holian Between National Socialism and Soviet 2011

Contents
Note on Sources xi
Introduction 1
Part 1. Care and Control:

The Administration of Displaced Persons
1. The Invention of the Displaced Person 29
2. Displaced Persons and the Question of Persecution 56
Part 2. The Threat of Communism

3. The Repatriation Debate and the Anticommunist
“Political Explanation” 81
4. Between Federalists and Separatists:
The Anticommunist Movement(s) 120
Part 3. The Legacy of Nazism

5. Jewish Survivors and the Reckoning with the Nazi Past 153
6. Displaced Jews and the German Question 186
7. Political Prisoners and the Legacy of National Socialism 211
8. Recognition, Assistance, Wiedergutmachung:
The Claims of Displaced Politicals 244
Conclusion 267
Notes 273
Bibliography 327
Index 347
Note on Sources
I know English well enough to slap together a nasty letter. And I’ve
painstakingly compiled a list of the major American and English
journals.
—Tadeusz Borowski to Maria Rundo, March 10, 1946
This study draws on a diverse array of sources, including letters, memo-

randa, reports, petitions, speeches, newspaper articles, memoirs, and
‹ction. They were written in many different languages: Polish, Ukrainian,
Russian, Yiddish, German, and English. A word is in order about the Ger-
man and English used by displaced persons. Eager to communicate with
the Allied and German authorities and the larger world, displaced persons
often wrote in German and English. Yet most had only an imperfect
knowledge of German, while English was usually an entirely new language
for them. Consequently, the German- and English-language texts they pro-
duced contain numerous errors—of grammar, syntax, usage, spelling, and
so forth. These errors are integral components of the texts. They re›ect the
linguistic resources of their authors and attest to their struggle to commu-
nicate in unfamiliar languages. Often, behind the German or English, one
senses the presence of other languages. In quoting these texts, all errors
have been preserved, as is customary. When prudent, I have noted individ-
ual spelling errors with the word sic; in cases of multiple errors, I have in-
stead made a general reference to this fact in the notes. In citing these texts,
on the other hand, I have preserved the original spelling without comment,
since here the issue of meaning is secondary.
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the author. Russian
and Ukrainian sources have been transliterated according to the Library of
Congress system, Yiddish ones according to the YIVO system. I have made
exceptions for words and names that already have a different common
spelling in English. In the case of Yiddish sources written in the Latin al-
phabet—a common practice in the early postwar period, when typewriters
and printing presses with Hebrew letters were scarce—the original spelling
has been preserved.
Introduction
In a story entitled “The January Offensive,” the Polish writer and concen-
tration camp survivor Tadeusz Borowski provides a ‹ctionalized account
of life in Germany in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.
His story focuses on “displaced persons” (DPs), the multinational popula-
tion of concentration camp survivors, forced laborers, prisoners of war,
and refugees from eastern Europe who found themselves on the territory of
the former Reich at war’s end. The inhabitants of Germany, Borowski
writes, were an “incredible, almost comical, melting-pot of peoples and na-
tionalities sizzling dangerously in the very heart of Europe.”1 He and his
fellow Polish survivors longed “to break away from the carefully watched,
branded mass of ‘displaced persons,’ to move to one of the large cities, and
there—after joining a Polish political organization and becoming a mem-
ber of a black-market chain—to start a normal private life.”2 Eventually,
they managed to attain this kind of “normalcy.” “Thanks to our concen-
tration camp documents,” he writes, “three of us were able—honestly and
legally—to get a comfortable four-room apartment vacated by a Nazi who
was temporarily sent to stay with his relatives and who was told to leave
some of his furniture and religious pictures for us.”3 Although the narra-
tor’s tone is ironic, it is clear that he and his friends are deeply preoccupied
with their wartime experiences. After a day’s work at the Polish Red Cross,
“editing, printing, and mailing mile-long bulletins on missing persons,”
they would return home to work on a book about Auschwitz and to debate
the lessons of the war with visitors from Poland.4
Borowski’s story draws our attention to the fact that postwar Ger-
many, far from having achieved the state of racial purity envisioned by the
Nazis, was an “incredible” multinational site, ‹lled with both the survivors
of Nazi plans for the racial reordering of Europe and new refugees from
eastern Europe. It offers a comical yet deadly serious account of the dilem-
mas displaced persons faced in reconstructing their lives. In particular, it
2 Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism
draws our attention to the central role that political questions (along with
issues of everyday survival) played in the reconstruction of a temporary
communal life. While most displaced persons did not break away from the
supervised life of the DP camps (and in many cases did not want to), they
nonetheless struggled to make sense of their most recent experiences and
to ‹nd their bearings in a foreign country, where the local population
viewed them with hostility and the occupation authorities were not quite
sure what to do with them. Questions of national and political community
were central here. Some, like Borowski himself, eventually decided to re-
turn home. Many others, including some of Borowski’s close friends, re-
fused to do so. They remained in Germany for a number of years before
‹nding opportunities to emigrate. A small minority never left.
At the heart of this book is the question of how Europeans made
sense of displacement in the aftermath of the Second World War. Focusing
on Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews—four groups from the eastern
European core of the DP population—I examine the political and histori-
cal imaginary among displaced persons in Germany. How did the people
thrown together as “displaced persons”—a term that had little to do with
their lived experiences—sort themselves out? What categories of belonging
did they ‹nd most compelling? What stories about the war years did they
offer in support of their decisions not to return home? How were these his-
torical narratives connected to political projects? Similarly, what concerns
about the emerging postwar order in eastern Europe guided their decisions
to remain “abroad”? What alternative futures did they try to create? This
book is, then, an investigation into the cultural and political meanings that
displaced eastern Europeans in Germany assigned to their predicament.
More broadly, it is an investigation into how competing interpretations of
the Second World War ‹gured in the process of postwar reconstruction. In
particular, it examines the central role that stories about National Social-
ism and Soviet communism played in representations of the past and vi-
sions of the future. In this case, however, the context is not the familiar one
of European states but rather the still relatively unfamiliar yet important
one of European refugees, individuals who by de‹nition did not ‹t into the
emerging nation-state order.
Nonetheless, as we will see, national concerns also played an impor-
tant role here. While “settled” Europeans constructed patriotic narratives
and organized committees to represent their interests as victims or heroes
of the war, similar processes were taking place among the displaced. In-
deed, the cultural and political history of postwar reconstruction is woe-
Introduction 3
fully incomplete if we examine the processes taking place within European

states without attending to the shadow cast upon them by Europe’s
refugees. Displaced persons are an important part of this shadow history.
At a moment when eastern and western Europe were being pulled apart by
Great Power con›icts, they illuminate a piece of eastern European history
“made in Germany.” Here I focus speci‹cally on the history made in
Bavaria, one of the three Länder (states) that made up the U.S. occupation
zone. For reasons that will become clear, this region became home to the
largest number of DPs and produced the most vibrant DP politics. I focus
primarily on the period between 1945 and 1951.
The Second World War set in motion an unprecedented dislocation of
populations. Between 1939 and 1947, some 55 million Europeans were
forcibly moved.5 Displaced persons were part of this great unsettling. An
administrative ‹ction of the Allied powers, the term displaced person re-
ferred to civilians found outside their countries of origin at the end of hos-
tilities. There were approximately 11 million displaced persons in Europe
immediately after the war.6 The majority, totaling more than 8 million,
were located in Germany. They included about 6 million civilian foreign
workers, 2 million prisoners of war, and 700,000 surviving concentration
camp prisoners.7 Most displaced persons quickly and willingly returned
home. Indeed, the pace of repatriation was initially intense. During the
summer and early fall of 1945, the Allied military authorities oversaw the
departure of some 33,000 displaced persons per day.
By the end of September, the DP population in Germany had shrunk
to about 1.2 million.8 However, this still huge “remnant” proved much
more dif‹cult to move. Large numbers of eastern Europeans, it soon be-
came clear, were unwilling or unable to return home. Moreover, new
refugees from eastern Europe, including many Jews from Poland, contin-
ued to arrive. These “nonrepatriable” DPs would remain in Germany for a
number of years, concentrated in the western occupation zones, especially
in the southwestern regions of the country occupied by the United States.
In the Soviet zone, by contrast, a “DP problem” did not exist, at least not
of‹cially, as the Soviet authorities insisted on repatriating all foreigners.
In 1948, new opportunities for emigration opened up, and the DP
camps and communities began to empty out. By the ‹rst half of 1950, the
number of displaced persons in West Germany had dropped to somewhere
between 100,000 and 200,000.9 With the passage of the Homeless Foreign-
ers Law of 1951, authority over DPs was formally transferred to the new
West German state. Displaced persons still remaining in West Germany
were transformed into “homeless foreigners” (heimatlose Ausländer), non-

citizens who nonetheless enjoyed most of the same civil rights as Germans.
Although opposition to repatriation—or, at least, doubts about the
desirability of returning home—was common to all those who remained in
Germany, displaced persons hardly constituted a uni‹ed or coherent
group. They came from many different countries. Their ethnic, religious,
and class origins were diverse. Their wartime experiences also varied con-
siderably. While many had been persecuted by the Nazis or marked out for
extermination, others had collaborated. Finally, the ways in which they
represented themselves were diverse. Quickly organizing themselves into
myriad “committees,” they put forward widely diverging explanations of
who they were and what they wanted. Narratives about National Socialism
and Soviet communism—as history, legacy, and future threat—de‹ned
and differentiated these displaced communities. Pieter Lagrou has noted
that a “sharp confrontation between two general interpretations of the last
global con›ict”—between antifascism and anticommunism—de‹ned the
legacy of the Second World War in western Europe. This confrontation
was even sharper among displaced eastern Europeans, who had experi-
enced both Nazi and Soviet rule during the war.10
The diverging and converging stories told by Polish, Ukrainian, Rus-
sian, and Jewish DPs are the main focus of this book. They come through
most clearly in the demonstrations that displaced persons staged in Ger-
many, which thus receive special emphasis. Among Jewish DPs, the domi-
nant political orientation was de‹ned by a rejection of diaspora life and an
embrace of Zionism. This orientation was underwritten by a historical
narrative that identi‹ed the Nazi genocide as the culmination of a longer
history of antisemitic discrimination and persecution, especially in eastern
Europe. Experiences under Soviet communism played little role in com-
munal representations, even though many Jewish DPs had spent the war
years in the Soviet Union. Jewish DPs identi‹ed Polish, Ukrainian, and
other non-Jewish DPs primarily as persecutors. They demanded not only
physical separation from other displaced persons but also recognition as a
distinct national group. The solution to the Jewish DP problem, they ar-
gued, lay in opening the gates of Palestine and creating a Jewish state.
Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian DPs also highlighted experiences of
Nazi occupation and persecution but viewed German national chauvin-
ism, not antisemitism or racism, as the core of the National Socialist pro-
ject. In narrating the encounter with National Socialism, they employed a
“martyrological idiom” that stressed national heroism and sacri‹ce. How-
Introduction 5
ever, stories about Nazism were overshadowed by accounts of wartime So-

viet persecution and concerns about the threat posed by the Soviet Union
in postwar eastern Europe. Indeed, National Socialism was incorporated
into a larger explanatory framework that stressed the “totalitarian” nature
of both Nazi and Soviet rule. Anticommunism emerged as the dominant
political movement, and the solution to the DP problem was de‹ned as the
“liberation” of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union from communist
domination. Both antifascist and anticommunist orientations were
in›ected with antisemitism.
Where do the representations that Polish, Ukrainian, Russian, and
Jewish DPs put forward as communal images come from? What forces
were responsible for the development of displaced communities? In order
to adequately address these questions, it is essential to examine both the
postwar context in which displaced persons found themselves and their
earlier history. Thus both German and eastern European history are es-
sential components of my explanatory framework. On the one hand, the
refugee communities I examine were shaped by the social, political, and
economic context of postwar western Germany, a nonstate occupied by
four Allied states with distinct political agendas. In the western occupation
zones, these states relied on intergovernmental relief agencies to manage
the DP population. It is important to note here that I do not focus
speci‹cally on DP camps. While some scholars have argued that refugee
camps function as “technologies of power,” encouraging the development
of a distinct refugee consciousness, my argument is broader.11 Although
camps were an important aspect of DP policy, at least in the U.S. and
British zones, and although the “DP era” was central to the development
of the camp as a global model for managing displaced populations, the
identi‹cations that displaced persons developed were not camp speci‹c.12
They cut across the boundaries between camp and noncamp. More impor-
tant in my estimation was the regime of policies and practices put in place
by the occupiers and the Germans. The power of this regime was especially
pronounced in the camps, but it was not spatially bounded. Following
Frank Stern, who argues that relations among Germans, occupiers, and
Jews constituted a de‹nitive framework of social interaction and political
decision making in the postwar period—a “historic triangle”—I situate all
four groups of displaced persons examined here “between” the occupiers
and the Germans.13 In Bavaria, I argue, both the American occupation au-
thorities and the Germans made some distinctions between different
groups of displaced persons, but generally formulated policies intended to
cover all DPs. So too did the major intergovernmental relief agencies, the
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and
its successor the International Refugee Organization (IRO). In this regard,
displaced persons constituted a “refugee nation.”14 At the same time,
changing priorities in Germany—notably the shift in emphasis from elim-
inating National Socialism to combating communism and integrating Ger-
many into a new western alliance—had an uneven effect on displaced per-
sons. This book examines the changing fortunes of Polish, Ukrainian,
Russian, and Jewish DPs side by side.
On the other hand, the communities these eastern Europeans created
in postwar Germany re›ected the political and historical identi‹cations
they had developed during the earlier twentieth century. Political solidari-
ties forged in the context of wartime persecution, resistance, and collabo-
ration—all of which often also involved displacement—were central. Here
one needs to keep in mind that while many Europeans suffered terribly un-
der the Nazis, for others, as Tony Judt notes, it was “quite a ‘good’ war, at
least until the very last months.”15 The situation in eastern Europe was es-
pecially complicated, with Nazi occupation alternating with Soviet. In this
context, it was inevitable that populations would compare one occupation
regime to the other. Those who fared well—or at least not too poorly—un-
der one regime generally found life under the other more dif‹cult, not least
because both the Nazis and the Soviets were suspicious of anyone who had
collaborated with the enemy (and, in the Soviet case, also of anyone who
had not resisted). Similarly, those who had been persecuted by one regime
often viewed the arrival of the other as an improvement, if not in fact as a
liberation. This is not to suggest that Nazi and Soviet rule were the same or
that Soviet crimes were equivalent to Nazi crimes, but rather to stress that
perceptions of the two occupying powers varied dramatically depending
on one’s position in the complex constellation of forces at play in wartime
eastern Europe. However, the history of the war turns out to be an inade-
quate explanation for the forms of communal identi‹cation that took
shape in the postwar. Rather, the historical narratives that DPs employed
and the political debates they conducted typically had their roots in the
prewar era. The history of the interwar years, when nationalizing states in
eastern Europe ran up against the growing national self-consciousness of
their minorities, turns out to be especially important. Indeed, the continu-
ities between prewar and postwar are often more striking than the differ-
ences. Thus while I examine how the conditions of displacement in Ger-
Introduction 7
many shaped the political outlook and actions of displaced persons, I also
emphasize preexisting solidarities, transported ideologies, and previous
political experience in eastern Europe. I bring these two elements together
in examining how displaced persons reworked older political ideas to ‹t
what they de‹ned as their needs in the postwar.
Comparing Displaced Histories
Research on displaced persons, which is as old as the DP category itself,

has developed along a number of lines. In addition to studies that offer a
panoramic view of social, cultural, and political life among the displaced,
there are now many more specialized studies focusing on the experiences of
speci‹c groups.16 The literature on Jewish DPs is especially rich and in-
cludes both studies that focus tightly on Jewish DP camps and communi-
ties,17 and studies that situate Jewish DPs in a broader postwar German
Jewish context.18 There is also a growing literature on Poles, Ukrainians,
Russians, Latvians, and others.19 Another important subset of the litera-
ture focuses on the policies and practices of the governments and inter-
governmental agencies charged with taking care of displaced persons. In
addition to general works on this topic,20 there are a number of studies fo-
cusing on the work of speci‹c agencies21 and on policies toward speci‹c
groups of DPs.22 Finally, a number of scholars have conducted local his-
tory projects that focus on the interactions between displaced persons and
their German neighbors.23
Nationality or, more precisely, ethnonationality has been a primary
category of organization and analysis in the literature on displaced per-
sons. This can to some extent be seen as an extension of the importance
that displaced persons themselves assigned to nationality—and the lack of
importance they assigned to the category of the DP. As sociologist Edward
Shils noted in 1946, using displaced person as a synonym for forced laborer,
“there was . . . no community among the displaced persons such as ulti-
mately developed among Prisoners of War, whose rights are internation-
ally guaranteed and supervised, and protected by of‹cers who feel respon-
sible for their men.”24 Most contemporary observers found the lack of
identi‹cation with the DP label surprising, having anticipated that dis-
placed persons’ wartime and postwar experiences would lead to the devel-
opment of new solidarities. They were struck by the extent to which the
displaced continued to endow the concept of nationality with great

signi‹cance. A May 1945 U.S. report on liberated foreign workers de-
scribed the situation this way.
The interesting question has been raised as to whether the unprece-

dented conditions which have existed in Germany, with millions of
men of many nations thrown together for several years, encouraged
any breakdown of national feeling together with an emergence of a
new feeling of internationalism. Such evidence as there is suggests
that this did not occur, but rather that the old national loyalties re-
tained their power. In fact, members of each nation are apt to pride
themselves upon the superior strength of national loyalties within
their own group.
The report concluded that there was no evidence “of new political crystal-
lizations either national or international.”25 Similarly, ‹lmmaker Fred Zin-
nemann, who visited DP camps in Germany in 1947, was struck by the to-
tal lack of solidarity among what he called “the remnants of various
decimated nationalities.”
I had thought they would have been drawn together by their common
experience; it was exactly the opposite. The Estonians would keep to
themselves, the Hungarians would keep to themselves, the Czechs
would keep to themselves and there would be no middle ground—
they didn’t want to know about each other.
In his estimation, “all were victims of extreme nationalism.”26 The philoso-

pher Hannah Arendt put things even more strongly. “Not a single group of
refugees or Displaced Persons,” she wrote, “has failed to develop a ‹erce,
violent group consciousness and to clamor for rights as—and only as—
Poles or Jews or Germans, etc.”27 She lamented the fact that displaced per-
sons failed to recognize what they shared, namely, the lack of basic human
rights, because it prevented them from addressing this fact. “Neither before
nor after the second World War,” she wrote, “have the victims themselves
ever invoked these . . . rights, which were so evidently denied them, in their
many attempts to ‹nd a way out of the barbed-wire labyrinth into which
events had driven them.”28
The emphasis on nationality among displaced persons has reverber-
ated in the scholarly literature. Wolfgang Jacobmeyer has gone as far as to
Introduction 9
say that “the only great concept in the consciousness of the DPs was their
nationality.”29 Historians tend to divide displaced persons into mutually
exclusive national groups and to examine them in isolation from one an-
other. Yet the meaning and signi‹cance of nationality have not received
much attention. Taking the primacy of nationality for granted, scholars
have not always inquired into its contents. They tend to treat different na-
tionalities as real, substantial groups rather than as the outcome of
processes of group-making.30
One of my objectives in looking at narratives about National Social-
ism and Soviet communism is to inquire into the meanings assigned to na-
tional categories. I thus look at the cultural and political ideas that dis-
placed persons associated with the nation, while also keeping in mind that
many of these ideas had cross-national resonance. For if displaced Poles,
Jews, and so forth were distinguished from others of the same nationality
by the fact that they did not want to return home, national consciousness
itself does little to explain why they found certain identi‹cations com-
pelling. Rather, it is the meanings assigned to nationality that distinguish
displaced persons from those who returned, or never left. The stories DPs
told about National Socialism and Soviet communism served to differenti-
ate them from their nondisplaced fellow nationals and to identify them as
“authentic” members of the nation.
By adopting a comparative framework, I hope to bring greater clarity
to these issues. Although the emphasis on nationalities might naturally
suggest a comparative framework, there has been little in the way of sys-
tematic comparison in the scholarship on DPs.31 In a context in which dis-
placed persons often tenaciously defended their status as members of this
or that nationality, comparison highlights both the substantial differences
among national groups and the similarities. Moreover, it helps us under-
stand where both the differences and the similarities came from. In partic-
ular, it helps elucidate how German and Allied policies affected the devel-
opment of representational tropes and organizational practices,
encouraging, at different moments, an emphasis on the crimes of National
Socialism or the threat of communism.
The comparative approach also makes it possible to recognize that the
boundaries of displaced communities often crossed national lines. Al-
though Hannah Arendt’s claim that displaced persons demonstrated “a
‹erce, violent group consciousness” holds true in many respects, it can also
be argued that Arendt, along with other contemporary commentators,
missed the expressions of internationalism among DPs. Throughout Eu-
rope, wartime experiences of persecution, resistance, and collaboration not

only tore societies apart but also encouraged the development of new, ex-
plicitly international solidarities.32 After the war, there was a resurgence of
interest in internationalism and its local variant, Europeanism. This trend
was also in evidence among displaced persons. The experience of displace-
ment heightened the appeal of internationalism, creating new opportuni-
ties for cross-national solidarities and a felt need for protective alliances.33
Moreover, international agencies were deeply involved in refugee relief.
They not only promoted internationalism among displaced persons, they
also managed the DP population like an international community. The
comparative approach highlights these heretofore unexamined aspects of
DP history.
At the same time, it is important to be attuned to the pitfalls of com-
parison. The comparative method is predicated on the assumption that the
groups being compared are discrete and self-contained. Comparative
analysis thus runs the risk of reifying the categories it employs and repro-
ducing rather than revealing processes of group formation. While this risk
is inherent in all comparison, it is especially great when, as in the case of
displaced persons, the groups in question are close together both spatially
and temporally. The eastern European lands that displaced persons came
from were a mixture of ethnicities, languages, and religions. Members of
ethnic minorities commonly “moved into” the majority society by adopt-
ing the majority language and culture; among Christians, rates of inter-
marriage were high. Nationalist movements developed relatively late here,
though by the interwar period, nationalism had clearly become a key po-
litical force. Thus the language of nationality is even more problematic in
the case of displaced persons than it is in many other contexts. Many dis-
placed persons shared a common history. Most important, the vast major-
ity of self-identi‹ed Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish DPs were citizens of
Poland. They had been shaped by common cultural, political, and eco-
nomic forces, including the new Polish state’s attempt to deal with the mi-
nority treaty imposed upon it after the First World War; the economic
modernization of Poland during the interwar period; and, of course, the
wartime Nazi and Soviet occupations. After the war, even as they asserted
their separateness, they continued to live in close proximity, to speak to one
another, to read one another’s newspapers. Occasionally, they ventured
into the territory of “international cooperation.” More generally, they
were keenly aware of each other’s presence. In building their associations
and putting forward their claims, they engaged in what one might call a
Introduction 11
process of dialogical modeling, carefully examining each other’s steps and

weighing each other’s successes and failures.
Thus, although national categories are dif‹cult to avoid, my emphasis
here is on the historical horizons and political visions that brought dis-
placed persons together and pulled them apart. Focusing on interpreta-
tions of National Socialism and Soviet communism draws our attention to
competition over the boundaries of national solidarity and thus to the
construction of the national identi‹cations that contemporary commenta-
tors found so striking. Indeed, I argue, it is precisely through the stories
they told about National Socialism and Soviet communism that displaced
persons de‹ned and rede‹ned the boundaries of both national and inter-
national groups. On the one hand, rejecting an identi‹cation with existing
national political structures, they proclaimed the centrality of the nation.
In this regard, the processes of contestation among displaced persons can
be seen as a continuation of struggles between minorities and majorities in
interwar eastern Europe. They aimed to “complete” the nationalization of
eastern Europe begun decades earlier, to disentangle the strands of the
“melting-pot of peoples and nationalities” Tadeusz Borowski saw bub-
bling in Germany. On the other hand, by choosing to tell some stories
about National Socialism and Soviet communism and not others, they en-
dowed the concept of the nation with distinct political and cultural mean-
ings, creating solidarity with other displaced nationals while rejecting an
af‹nity with those who returned home—or never left. By looking at the
formation and re-formation of different groups of displaced persons side
by side, I believe we gain a better understanding of how ideas and actions
shaped rather than merely re›ected the development of discrete
identi‹cations.
Representing the Interests of the Displaced
While recent work on the legacy of the war has leaned heavily on the con-
cept of memory, this study emphasizes representation.34 Two forms of rep-
resentation are at issue here: cultural representation, or the representation
of communities as the product of shared traditions, experiences, and aspi-
rations; and political representation, or the recognition of individuals and
groups as actors within the body politic. Returning to the older framework
of representation—which much recent work on memory, focusing on col-
lective images of the past, has in any case retained—offers two main ad-
vantages. First, it draws our attention to the deliberate and creative man-
ner in which cultural narratives develop. It emphasizes the gap between
what is lived and what is told. Second, it provides a framework for think-
ing about cultural production in tandem with political organization. In-
deed, it highlights the linkages between these two processes. It draws our
attention to displaced persons as political subjects. It reminds us that a
central concern among displaced persons was gaining a seat at the political
tables where decisions about their future were being made. More generally,
it reminds us that processes of cultural narration are often intimately re-
lated to organizational practices and political action, and that cultural his-
tory thus needs to be written alongside both social and political history.35
The emphasis that displaced persons placed on representation was
re›ected in the proliferation of DP “committees.” Part of the more general
“association mania” that seized Europe after the war, these committees
were created to help displaced persons meet their basic material needs and
to represent them before the authorities.36 National committees were the
most common, but there were also committees organized around speci‹c
locales (e.g., DP camps), historical experiences (e.g., political imprison-
ment), and professions (e.g., lawyers, journalists). Even the stateless
formed their own committees. Contemporaries often referred to these or-
ganizations as “interest representations” (Interessenvertretungen) or “inter-
est associations” (Interessenverbände). Similarly, displaced persons argued
that the committees were designed to act as “representations.” They spoke
of “putting their interests in common” or “sharing an interest.” These con-
temporary references draw our attention to the representational work per-
formed by DP committees, especially their role in representing displaced
persons before the authorities. Simultaneously, they suggest the utility of
thinking about DP committees and the communities they represented as
interest groups or, more broadly, as social groups: as communities created
around a shared political interest or social position. This approach is espe-
cially helpful in examining the national committees DPs created. It helps
us see these committees as strategic associations created to address con-
temporary issues rather than as expressions of preexisting and unques-
tioned identi‹cations. It thus helps denaturalize the national categories
that displaced persons employed.
Students of interest and social groups have explored both the political
and cultural dimensions of representation.37 The issue of political represen-
tation has long been a classic topic. Here the literature engages fundamen-
tal issues of modern political philosophy. Can interests be represented? Can
Introduction 13
democratic polities accommodate representation, which presupposes that

something “else” intervenes between the people and its government? Are in-
terest groups good for democracy? Are they a legitimate expression of soci-
etal interests, perhaps even a fundamental component of democratic poli-
tics in a modern, diverse society? Or do they interfere with the channels of
communication between society and the state and threaten the indepen-
dence of society’s chosen political representatives?38 Although students of
interest groups have not generally looked at displaced groups, deliberations
about these political questions nonetheless have a direct bearing on their
status. For if the displaced are by de‹nition outsiders, what possibility do
they have of representing their interests within the state? Indeed, is there
any setting within which their interests can be represented?
Increasingly, scholars of interest and social groups have also focused
on processes of cultural representation. As Pierre Bourdieu, Luc Boltan-
ski, and Michel Offerlé argue, compelling cultural images are essential to
the process of articulating interests and de‹ning groups. Per Bourdieu, “it
may be that agents are more likely to constitute themselves as a group if
they occupy similar positions in the social space. . . . But a set of agents can
organize themselves into a group, with their own organization, spokesper-
son and so on, only by producing or appropriating a certain vision of the
social world and of themselves as an identi‹able group within this
world.”39 This emphasis on the cultural production of groups dovetails
with recent trends in cultural history and with the work of refugee scholars
who argue for the need to explore the cultural dimensions of political dis-
placement. As Marjorie Muecke notes, “the experience of the political
refugee is profoundly cultural because it compels refugees as individuals
and as collective victims/survivors of massive chaos to resolve what Max
Weber identi‹ed as the problem of meaning, the need to af‹rm the ulti-
mate explicableness of experience.”40 Yet this process of meaning-making
does not happen smoothly. It involves competition over de‹nitions and
boundaries.41 As we shall see, there was indeed competition among dis-
placed persons to de‹ne the legacy of the Second World War and their
place within it.
Linking political and cultural de‹nitions of representation, historian
Gérard Noiriel has examined how and whether refugees can constitute
themselves as an interest group and thus become true subjects of politics.
For Noiriel, the creation of social groups is the product of “a double
process of political self-organization and juridical-administrative catego-
rization.”42 On the one hand, “the mobilization of actors tends towards a
‘representation’ of the social ensemble in the context of the political arena.

The collective identity develops out of the subjective identi‹cation of the
members of the group with the spokesperson and with the symbols which
endow it with unity.”43 This process of political mobilization, oriented
around the development of compelling cultural representations, is funda-
mental. On the other hand, however, the formation of the group is depen-
dent on social categorization, which, in the modern world, is the purview
of the state. Unlike groups, social categories “come into being through the
bureaucratic process of assigning identities, which depends upon an ‘ob-
jective’ identi‹cation of individuals with abstract entities de‹ned by the
law. The members of these categories share a collective identity to the ex-
tent that they interiorize the relationship of power within which they are
held, that is to say the de‹nition of themselves articulated by those who are
charged by the sovereign authority with applying the law.”44 For a social
group to develop, it must correspond to a category as de‹ned by the state.
Thus the state plays a central role in the formation of groups.
Within this constellation of power relations, refugees and other out-
siders have a dif‹cult time establishing themselves as viable social groups,
because the collective identi‹cations they create lack the recognition of the
state. Indeed, according to Noiriel, they contradict the ethos of the mod-
ern state.
In order for refugees to be able to constitute themselves as a “group,”

it would have to be possible to represent their speci‹c interests on the
national political stage. But the democratic logic of the sovereign peo-
ple makes it impossible to represent the particular interests of a group
of individuals whose position is above all that of foreigners.45
Thus, although the state views refugees as a social category, this category is
de‹ned above all by nonbelonging to the nation-state. How can a group
de‹ned in the negative be represented? For Noiriel, this is part of the
“tyranny of the national”: the constitution of the nation-state around the
ideal of a homogeneous horizontal comradeship of “the people,” around
the goal of total identi‹cation, eliminates the possibility of representing
difference in political terms.46
Noiriel’s analysis of the predicament of refugees builds on Hannah
Arendt’s work on human rights and the nation-state. As Arendt argued in
her now classic essay “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the
Rights of Man,” over the course of the twentieth century, the enjoyment of
Introduction 15
human rights became intimately tied to membership in the nation-state. It

became a privilege of state belonging rather than an inalienable right of
human beings. Thus only individuals who belong to the nation-state have
the right to represent themselves and to be represented in the political
sphere. For Arendt, who conceived of the individual as a political animal,
this was the most devastating loss faced by those on the margins of the
state. “The fundamental deprivation of human rights,” she wrote, “is man-
ifested ‹rst and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which
makes opinions signi‹cant and actions effective.”47 She recognized, as Ian
Balfour and Eduardo Cadava write, that “human rights do not precede po-
litical ones; instead, political rights—without which there could be no con-
cept or con‹rmation of citizenship—are what determine the recognition
and de‹nition of ‘human rights.’”48 The rightlessness of refugees and oth-
ers on the margins of the nation-state system is thus a fundamentally po-
litical problem.
Arendt’s and Noiriel’s analyses draw our attention to strategies of po-
litical exclusion very much at work in postwar Germany. Displaced per-
sons were “administered human beings” (verwaltete Menschen). “Even af-
ter their liberation from what in most cases was years of slave existence,”
Wolfgang Jacobmeyer writes, “the DPs did not have access to objective
rights, but rather were shut out of the self-evident condition that every in-
dividual, even a minor, ‘has’ rights.”49 The Allied governments, the inter-
governmental agencies, and the German authorities all took it upon them-
selves to represent the interests of displaced persons, but they did not allow
DPs to represent themselves. To be sure, the occupation authorities re-
stricted the rights of everyone in Germany, but displaced persons were
considerably more disenfranchised. They lacked most basic political rights.
Unlike Germans, they could not create civic associations or political par-
ties. The authorities rarely recognized their committees and, when they
did, insisted they abstain from politics.
However, these arguments require some modi‹cation. To begin with,
they put forward a normative model of a powerful and centralized modern
state that is hardly universally applicable. Certainly, such a state did not ex-
ist in early postwar Germany. Indeed, during the ‹rst few years after the
war, there was no German state, and the two German states created in 1949
were not entirely sovereign during the time period I consider. Similarly, the
idea of the nation around which the German state had been constructed
had been thoroughly discredited, and it was unclear what new ideas could
‹ll the vacuum. The Allied occupation authorities were the main statelike
entities during the early postwar period, though their power was much
more real on the level of the occupation zone than it was on the level of the
country as a whole. Each occupation authority was also internally divided.
In the U.S. occupation zone, the military government and the army shared
power. They treated displaced persons as political outsiders but also felt an
obligation to assist them. The reconstruction of German political authority
proceeded slowly, working upward from the local level. Thus, any effort to
examine the formation of DP communities must take into account the dis-
persed, decentered, and uncertain nature of political power in postwar Ger-
many. This context created opportunities for political action that do not ex-
ist in more centralized and powerful states with a strong core identity.
Moreover, the power of the statelike entities in Germany was miti-
gated by the authority of international bodies. International laws and
codes of conduct place limits on the power of the state and compel it to ac-
knowledge that all individuals within its territory, regardless of their citi-
zenship status, enjoy certain basic or “universal” human rights. They also
serve as important resources for individuals who feel that the state has vi-
olated their rights.50 While all outsiders can appeal to these international
norms, refugees enjoy greater protection than many other groups by virtue
of the greater formalization of their status. Their relationship with states,
Seteney Shami notes, “is quite particular and structured by their appeal to
humanitarian (inter-national) regimes, to global (trans-national) responsi-
bilities, and to universal (trans-cultural) human rights.”51 These observa-
tions were formulated with the contemporary scene in mind but are di-
rectly relevant to the case of displaced persons. The postwar period was an
important moment in the formation of both the international refugee
regime and the international human rights regime. Displaced persons
stood at the center of these developments. They were a key experimental
laboratory for the formation of both international norms for the treatment
of refugees and modern techniques for the management of refugee popu-
lations.52 International organizations, notably the international relief agen-
cies UNRRA and the IRO, played an important role in representing them
and structuring their daily lives. These organizations were the direct pre-
cursors of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR),
and their experiences “on the ground” in Europe, especially in Germany,
shaped policies and practices that would come to be applied to other dis-
placed populations in other parts of the world.
It is of course debatable how much in›uence international codes and
laws have on the behavior of states. Both UNRRA and the IRO were sub-
Introduction 17
ordinate to the occupation forces, something they frequently complained

about. However, they also enjoyed a good deal of authority and were an
important mediator between displaced persons and the occupying powers.
Moreover, the relationship between the occupying powers and the interna-
tional organizations was not antagonistic. Although their interests were
not identical, they worked closely together. Indeed, the lines between the
occupation authorities and the international relief agencies were blurred,
as the former were the motor force behind the creation of the latter. Thus
DPs not only enjoyed the protection of the occupation forces, they also
had recourse to international bodies whose express duty it was to protect
their interests.53 These bodies, especially the IRO, also employed large
numbers of DPs, further blurring the lines between actors.
More generally, arguments about the power of the state to de‹ne so-
cial groups and assign rights underestimate the capacities of those outside
the state system. They offer a structuralist reading of group formation that
underestimates agency. As Jacques Rancière has suggested, Arendt’s argu-
ment about human rights places us before a quandary: those who have no
rights also have no right to claim them. They seem permanently trapped in
a void of rightlessness. Her approach, he suggests, is fundamentally ›awed
because it ‹xes the distinction between those who possess rights and those
who do not, presenting the state of rightlessness as an “historico-ontolog-
ical destiny.”54 In truth, however, the distinction between those who have
rights and those who do not depends on political action. Rights are about
making claims and demanding representation, regardless of one’s origi-
nary position. In his words, “Freedom and equality are not predicates be-
longing to de‹nite subjects. Political predicates are open predicates: they
open up a dispute about what they exactly entail and whom they concern
in which cases.”55 The politics pursued by displaced persons exemplify this
kind of disputation.56 Through their political debates and actions, dis-
placed persons sought to intervene in the processes of political decision
making and to address and redress the problem of rightlessness. Thus, al-
though displaced persons were indeed “administered human beings,” they
pushed against this status, participating in the postwar “association ma-
nia” despite the fact that they lacked permission to do so. At bottom, my
discussion of DP “political” activity refers to such contestations over rep-
resentation and voice. At the same time, I am mindful of the more speci‹c
meanings that displaced persons, Germans, and Americans assigned to
“politics”: of intense DP debates over the ideological underpinnings and
territorial organization of their homelands; of German and American
policies toward collective involvement in decision-making processes in

Germany; and of American interest in limiting criticism of its allies, espe-
cially the Soviet Union. These diverse interpretations of the political
shaped the actions of displaced persons.
Central to the process of political contestation were DP elites. As the-
ories of interest groups recognize, elites play a critical role in de‹ning and
articulating interests and organizing others around them. They are de‹ned
less by their professional credentials than by their “competences”: the abil-
ity to speak eloquently, to create compelling mental images and symbols,
to organize, to lead. Hence they are best understood as “spokespersons” or
“entrepreneurs” rather than social elites who possess speci‹c educational
and professional quali‹cations.57 However, it is important not to lose sight
of the connection between quali‹cations and competences. Social origins
and education play a fundamental role in determining the cultural and po-
litical capital that social actors have at their disposal. In particular, social
conditions determine who possesses the competences considered essential
for participation in the political arena.58
Most displaced persons did not belong to traditional social elites. In
comparison with the refugees who left Russia after the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion or those who left Germany after the Nazi seizure of power, their social
origins were modest. Most had worked in agriculture, industry, crafts, and
trades. The social origins of former foreign workers, who made up the vast
majority of DPs, were especially modest. Most were young women and
men from peasant and working-class backgrounds with little formal edu-
cation. Only among the Baltic DPs was there a high percentage of white-
collar workers and professionals.59 However, even among other groups,
there was a small stratum of DPs, mostly from the middle and upper
classes, with higher degrees and professional quali‹cations. As the mem-
bers of a committee of Polish and Ukrainian DPs noted ruefully in a 1946
memorandum to the occupation authorities,
many of us used to occupy not the last positions, not only in political
life, but also in the social hierarchy, were also active in the cultural and
economic life of our countries as intellectual workers, writers, profes-
sors, journalists, lawyers, doctors, industrial specialists, business owners
or craftsmen as well as skilled workers. Not long ago we were the avant-
garde of democracy, but now we live like the last of the homeless, stand
before the gates of military barracks, hoping to get work in the
kitchen—washing dishes or cleaning trash cans, in order to have food.60
Introduction 19
We must be cautious about taking the claims to democratic leadership put

forward here too seriously; since democratic renewal was a watchword of the
early postwar period, displaced persons had good reason to present them-
selves as democrats, even when their wartime biographies suggested other-
wise. Nonetheless, this self-description highlights the educational quali‹ca-
tions and professional experience that some displaced persons possessed.
Although they no longer enjoyed the social status they had before the war,
they nonetheless continued to view themselves as members of an elite.
These displaced persons played a central role in the historical and po-
litical debates I examine. They put their cultural and political capital to
work organizing and representing DPs. This capital included not only their
professional credentials, which in many cases were only indirectly useful,
but also their organizational and administrative skills, their ability to build
persuasive arguments, their familiarity with the protocols of bureaucratic
interaction, and their knowledge of languages, especially German.
Through their speeches and writings, they sought to harness the diverse
fears and desires of the DP population and direct them toward speci‹c po-
litical projects. Many had been involved in associational and political life
before the war. Some had experience abroad, having studied or worked in
other countries, including Germany. Many had also gained new compe-
tences during the war. Some had collaborated with the Germans, working
in the occupation administrations or representing the occupied popula-
tions on of‹cially sanctioned committees. Others were concentration camp
survivors whose wartime experiences provided them with valuable skills in
“organizing.”61
Importantly, although foreign workers made up the majority of dis-
placed persons, at least initially, they played a small role in DP debates.
This, I believe, can be traced back to two main factors. First, as already
mentioned, most foreign workers came from very modest backgrounds.
They lacked the skills and experience that make activity in the political
arena possible. Second, foreign workers lacked of‹cial encouragement to
talk about their wartime experiences and assert themselves politically. In the
early postwar period—and, indeed, until quite recently—foreign workers
were not considered victims of Nazi persecution. The Nazi foreign labor
program was viewed as a more or less acceptable aspect of the German war
effort.62 Here Gérard Noiriel’s argument about the role of the state in
de‹ning and legitimating social categories seems very relevant. Lacking
of‹cial legitimation, foreign workers, already handicapped by their social
origins, remained on the sidelines of the debates that de‹ned the DP period.
Placing Displaced Persons in German and European History
One of the most dif‹cult issues encountered by scholars working on

refugees is the issue of where to place them. By de‹nition, refugees con-
found conventional categories of belonging. They challenge the “national
order of things,” which presumes that nation, state, and territory will map
neatly onto one another.63 Where, then, does their history belong? Dis-
placed persons sit uncomfortably between German and eastern European
histories. Consequently, they are often treated as a subject apart.
During the long Cold War, historical scholarship on eastern Europe
generally neglected displaced persons, even though they represented a
signi‹cant part of the population “lost” after the war. In their countries of
origin, they were largely excised from the history books, an embarrassing
reminder of the fact that not everyone returned home to participate in the
heroic project of national reconstruction. An especially deathly silence sur-
rounded the subject of Jewish DPs, whose physical absence was as closely
connected to postwar antisemitism as it was to wartime persecution at the
hands of the Nazis. Until the 1990s, most research on displaced persons
was conducted in the countries of DP emigration, notably the United
States, Canada, and Israel. Carried out primarily by DP scholars and
members of their corresponding ethnic communities, it hewed closely to
the narratives of national tragedy and survival developed in the DP camps
and communities themselves. Since then, things have changed consider-
ably. The collapse of communism has brought renewed interest in the his-
tory of migrant communities, the consequences of wartime displacement,
postwar ethnic cleansing, and the treatment of returnees.64 Scholars have
begun to examine the émigré communities that emerged after both the
First and Second World Wars.65 While only a small part of this new work
focuses speci‹cally on displaced persons, it opens up new avenues for
thinking about DPs in the context of eastern European history. It draws
closer connections between those who left and those who remained, those
who returned and those who did not. While emphasizing the dif‹culties
that many returnees faced, it also corrects the tendency, common in the
older literature, to view nonreturn as the inevitable—indeed, ideologically
correct—outcome of wartime and postwar developments. The new interest
in the history of Jews in postwar eastern Europe, which has been especially
strong in Poland since the 1980s, ‹ts within this larger pattern. It reexam-
ines postwar antisemitism and anti-Jewish violence, while also looking at
efforts to revive Jewish life in eastern Europe.66
Introduction 21
While Cold War divides played an important role in pushing dis-

placed persons to the margins of eastern European history, different con-
siderations have placed DPs outside the mainstream of German history.
Following established tropes of national history, scholarship on postwar
Germany has tended to emphasize problems of everyday survival and the
reconstruction of the country’s physical, political, cultural, and economic
infrastructure. Displaced persons are not easily integrated into such frame-
works. They were not inclined to see themselves as subjects of German his-
tory, especially not as participants in the project of postwar reconstruc-
tion. Moreover, the majority left Germany within a few years. They did not
develop enduring ties to the country, nor did they leave many traces.67
While the new cultural history that has developed in the last ‹fteen years
has offered fresh perspectives on the topic of reconstruction, highlighting
both the silence that prevailed around topics like the Holocaust and the
noisy discussion around issues such as German suffering, it has not
signi‹cantly revised the de‹nition of who counts as a subject of German
history.68 Indeed, through its emphasis on memory and memorialization, it
has tended to reinscribe non-Germans as ‹gures of German recollection
rather than actors in Germany’s postwar history. This is especially prob-
lematic given the extent to which postwar concepts of Germanness and
foreignness were freighted with meanings handed down from the Nazi era.
At the same time, a number of scholars have sought to examine Ger-
man and DP histories side by side. One impetus has come from local his-
tory. Here historians have sought to reconstruct the “multicultural” history
of Germany’s local postwar communities. Emphasizing the continuities
between the war and the postwar, they examine how displaced persons in-
teracted with their German neighbors and how Germans perceived this
foreign yet often already familiar population.69 Another impetus has come
from German-Jewish history. Scholars like Atina Grossmann and Frank
Stern have sought to interweave postwar German and Jewish histories, jux-
taposing divergent narratives of victimhood and survival. “If the history
of postwar Germany is, as we have increasingly acknowledged, not only a
story of men,” Grossmann writes, “it is also not only a German story.”70
Both German and Jewish histories, they emphasize, need to be seen as part
of a larger postwar story, with the Allied occupation forces forming the
third corner of a crucial “historic triangle.”71
This approach can be fruitfully expanded to encompass other DPs. It
dovetails with efforts to think about migration as a formative rather than
exceptional aspect of German history and to write German history from
the margins. Work on migrants and other marginal groups in German his-
tory has increasingly highlighted the instability of who and what is de‹ned
as “German” and the role that non-Germans have played in shaping Ger-
many.72 This approach seems tailor-made for an examination of the post-
war period, characterized as it was by deep cultural, political, and eco-
nomic instability. Indeed, such a perspective has informed much recent
work on German refugees and expellees.73 To be sure, displaced persons
did not identify with Germanness. Yet this nonidenti‹cation is itself an im-
portant part of German history. It was conditioned by displaced persons’
wartime experiences of National Socialism, experiences that most could
not forgive and forget. It was also promoted by the Germans, who, al-
though they no longer publicly used the language of race, continued to see
the Jewish and Slavic DPs as undesirable Ausländer. Finally, it was encour-
aged by the occupation authorities, who discouraged contact between Ger-
mans and DPs and sought as much as possible to segregate DPs from the
rest of the population, ‹rst for the purposes of repatriation and later for
the purposes of resettlement.
Keeping these speci‹cities in mind, we can begin to think about the
history of displaced persons as an important chapter in Germany’s longer
history as a country of immigration. Situated temporally between Nazi
Germany’s “foreigner deployment” and West Germany’s “guestworker”
program, the history of displaced persons sheds new light on how foreign-
ers have made Germany and how Germany has made them. It thus pro-
vides us with a deeper context for understanding contemporary German
debates about the boundaries of membership and the nature of belonging,
especially as the expansion of the European Union and globalization in-
creasingly place the meaning of the nation in question.
Both eastern European and German histories are vital for under-
standing the culture and politics of displaced persons. Indeed, the most
useful approach is one that brings these histories together in a transna-
tional perspective. Such a perspective sees the history of displaced persons
as a study in the interpenetration of eastern European and German histo-
ries. It captures, on the one hand, the extension of eastern European de-
bates into Germany and, on the other, the role of German history in shap-
ing eastern Europeans. It takes into account displaced persons’ prewar
lives in eastern Europe, their wartime encounters with both Nazi and So-
viet power, and their postwar engagement with both eastern Europe and
Germany. It de‹nes transnationalism as a process that unfolds in time as
Introduction 23
well as space, thus making it possible to capture not only the experience of
living in more than one world but also the past that structures the present.
The concept of transnationalism highlights the circulation of people,
things, money, and information across national and other kinds of bor-
ders.74 It examines the processes of adaptation, incorporation, and rejec-
tion that emerge out of these transnational movements. In doing so, it in-
troduces new ways of thinking about belonging in the modern world.
Privileging movement over stasis, it challenges the idea that “immobility
and ‘rootedness’ are the norm, since to observe movement means to oc-
cupy a point of relative ‹xity.”75 In particular, it questions the presumed
identity between people, culture, and place so central to the modern idea of
the nation. In its initial articulations, transnationalism was oriented pri-
marily toward contemporary developments, to the idea that accelerating
circulation across various kinds of boundaries was a phenomenon associ-
ated with current processes of globalization. It was seen as a means of cap-
turing what many commentators saw as a fundamental reorganization of
borders and loyalties, especially the decline of the nation-state and exclu-
sive national solidarities.
Increasingly, however, historians are also adopting a transnational
perspective. Here the analytic purchase of a transnational approach has
been decoupled from the empirical claim that transnationalism is a con-
temporary phenomenon. Transnationalism has been identi‹ed as a more
general way of thinking about cultural identi‹cations and territorial
boundaries in global perspective. It has had an especially signi‹cant im-
pact on historical thinking about the nation-state and thus on the work of
historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It counters the ten-
dency to narrate the history of the nation-state as an intrinsic process, one
that takes place exclusively inside the state’s territory and concerns only
those de‹ned as nationals. It “involves deconstructing . . . the nation-state
as one of the fundamental categories through which Western modernity is
narrated and doing so by showing how the national intersects with or is im-
bricated in sub- and supra-national phenomena.”76 This deconstruction
can take a number of forms and, of course, need not be limited to the na-
tion-state alone. One approach is to examine movements across national
boundaries and their role in shaping the nation. Another is to look at the
role of global forces in creating nation-states. Yet another is to examine the
global horizons of the nation.77
Refugees would seem to be an obvious topic to examine from a
transnational perspective, since they by de‹nition move across national

borders and are obliged to deal with unfamiliar cultural contexts. More-
over, their existence undermines the perceived stability of national cate-
gories and the naturalness of the nation-state order, while also drawing an-
alytic attention to the role that mobility and displacement play in the
formation of communities and societies. As Liisa Malkki notes, “working
in social settings of displacement invites in a very direct way the further
questioning of the anthropological contexts of culture, society, and com-
munity as bounded, territorialized units.”78 These observations are equally
relevant to historical scholarship. The proliferation of homeless and state-
less populations was one of the hallmarks of the twentieth century, leading
many to call it the “century of refugees.” The history of these populations
calls into question the tendency to place the nation-state at the center of
the twentieth century. Indeed, as Giorgio Agamben writes, “inasmuch as
the refugee, an apparently marginal ‹gure, unhinges the old trinity of
state-nation-territory, it deserves instead to be regarded as the central
‹gure of our political history.”79 However, it is not enough simply to re-
place one ‹gure over another, privileging the refugee over the citizen.
Rather, population displacements and projects of nation-state construc-
tion need to be seen as deeply intertwined.80
The conceptual approach represented by transnationalism has in fact
had a deep impact on refugee studies and on migration studies more gen-
erally.81 In particular, it offers new ways of thinking about the relationship
between displaced groups, on the one hand, and their home and host soci-
eties, on the other. One of the main advantages of the concept of transna-
tionalism is that it draws attention to the ways in which refugees continue
to orient themselves to their home country and society. This makes it su-
perior to theories of ethnic relations, which emphasize relations with the
host society and think about social groups in terms of ethnic minorities
and majorities. Looking at Kurdish refugees in contemporary Britain and
Finland, sociologist Östen Wahlbeck notes that conditions in the home
country are often much more important and real than conditions in the
host society. Hence the concept of the minority has little meaning. Politi-
cal developments at home have a strong impact on refugee communities,
and refugee politics are often oriented toward the home country. More-
over, many refugees maintain relations with their home country in a num-
ber of ways: through their recollections of home, through ongoing con-
tacts with friends and relatives there, and through contacts with refugees
Introduction 25
elsewhere. Similarly, the mass media plays an important role in sustaining

and reproducing a sense of connection to home. At the same time, condi-
tions in the host society “have a decisive impact on the refugee commu-
nity,” leading to different outcomes among members of the same group liv-
ing in different countries.82 Thus a refugee community can be thought of as
a diaspora, de‹ned as “a transnational social organization relating both to
the country of origin and the country of exile.”83
This approach can be usefully applied to the case of displaced per-
sons, who generally thought of Germany as a temporary way station, even
if they were decisively impacted by their stay there. It is especially useful
for thinking about DP politics, which were strongly oriented toward the
home country and toward the goal of return. Of course, home and return
meant different things to different people. Hence different kinds of “home-
land politics” developed among different groups of DPs. Polish, Ukrai-
nian, and Russian DPs emphasized transforming political conditions in
their countries of origin. Jewish DPs, on the other hand, focused on emi-
gration to Palestine, rede‹ned as the original home and the site of the Jew-
ish state to come. In many DP political projects, in fact, home was often
more of an idea than an actual place. These projects aimed less at recuper-
ating a past political reality than at creating a new one, transforming both
the political system and often also territorial boundaries.
However, a transnational perspective remains incomplete if it does
not include a deeper historical dimension. Anthropologists and sociolo-
gists have produced fascinating studies of refugee transnationalism. How-
ever, their work often lacks historical perspective.84 They tend to neglect
what came before displacement and thus unwittingly reproduce the dehis-
toricization that Liisa Malkki has identi‹ed as a fundamental component
of humanitarian discourse about refugees.85 It is important to think about
transnationalism as a process taking place in time as well as space. Al-
though displaced persons did not always sustain contacts with the home
country—many, especially those from the Soviet Union, had limited op-
portunities to do so—they remained virtually connected through the ideas
and experiences they had acquired at home. These ideas and experiences
provided them with durable interpretive frameworks and informed their
outlook and actions in Germany. They were especially important in shap-
ing how they interpreted their wartime experiences and how they envi-
sioned their future. Indeed, the histories of National Socialism and Soviet
communism that displaced persons constructed in Germany were often far
less in›uenced by the context of displacement than they were by discourses

from the earlier twentieth century. Thus any account of cultural and polit-
ical representation among displaced persons is incomplete if it neglects this
prehistory. This is perhaps just another way of saying that we need to be at-
tentive to where displaced persons came from as well as where they found
themselves and where they were going. Only by doing so can we explain
how and why the displaced communities I examine developed.
Chapter 1
The Invention of the Displaced Person
The Second World War set in motion an unprecedented series of popula-

tion displacements that dramatically transformed the demographic map of
Europe. According to Eugene Kulischer, some 55 million Europeans were
displaced between 1939 and 1947, 30 million during the expansion of Nazi
power and 25 million as a result of Germany’s defeat.1 The effects of this
rise and fall were more extensive and intensive in eastern Europe, the locus
of German efforts to create a new political and economic order based on
the racial primacy of the German Volk. Millions of eastern Europeans be-
came forced laborers, concentration camp prisoners, and prisoners of war.
They formed the core of the DP population. Streams of refugees from
eastern Europe, ›eeing the consequences of German defeat and new per-
secutions, added to their numbers.
As displaced persons in Germany, these Europeans lived under an ad-
ministrative regime of “care and control.”2 Allied DP policies, formulated
while the war was still going on, were initially designed with two goals in
mind: ‹rst, helping displaced persons meet their basic material needs and,
second, ensuring that they did not interfere with military operations. As war
gave way to peace, caring for and controlling DPs remained vital goals,
though their meaning changed. Care now meant providing for a stationary
population that would hopefully soon be repatriated, while control meant
ensuring that displaced persons did not become a threat to “law and order.”
As objects of administration, displaced persons were subject to numerous
policies. These policies regulated virtually every aspect of their lives, includ-
ing where they lived and what they ate. They also determined what rights
displaced persons possessed. Taken together, they constituted an unfamiliar
administrative ‹eld that displaced persons constantly had to negotiate. Un-
folding differently in each of the western occupation zones, this ‹eld opened
up some avenues for action while restricting others. It provided displaced
persons with basic care in Germany and allowed (most of) them to remain
29
there inde‹nitely. It also allowed them to develop an autonomous cultural

and political life. However, displaced persons were severely restricted in
their ability to determine their own destinies. As Wolfgang Jacobmeyer
notes, “freedom, security, property—all this was indeed guaranteed to the
DPs according to the norms of the legal-administrative order that governed
their lives, but was at the same time subordinated to speci‹c predetermined
and frequently changing goals.”3 Thus while displaced persons enjoyed
many bene‹ts, they did not possess many rights. In particular, they did not
possess political rights. Nonetheless, the contradictions between care and
control created opportunities that displaced persons readily exploited. In
the American occupation zone, where the concept of care was linked to a
New Deal conception of “active” welfare and where concerns about DP
politics rose and fell with the alliance with the Soviet Union, displaced per-
sons managed to develop a vibrant political life.
The Expansion of the Nazi Empire and Displacement in

Eastern Europe
Displaced persons were in large part a product of the forced and voluntary
migrations that took place in eastern Europe during and immediately after
the war. These migrations followed ‹rst the expansion and then the con-
traction of the Nazi empire. They were driven primarily by the labor and
population policies of Nazi Germany, including the most radical aspect of
its population policy, the attempt to exterminate European Jewry. They
were also driven by the counterpolicies of Nazi Germany’s enemies, most
importantly the Soviet Union. In what follows, I offer a selective overview
of wartime and early postwar population movements. I focus primarily on
those that involved Polish and Soviet citizens, as they made up the bulk of
self-identi‹ed Polish, Ukrainian, Russian, and Jewish DPs.
With the invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Nazi regime set in
motion its plans for a political, economic, and racial reordering of Europe.
Among the ‹rst victims of these plans were the Polish and Jewish residents
of the territories incorporated directly into the Reich and slated to serve as
German living space (Lebensraum). Almost 920,000 people were deported
from their homes in the incorporated areas, some 460,000 to the General
Government, the new administrative entity created out of the eastern part of
Nazi-occupied Poland.4 Simultaneous with these expulsions, the Nazi
regime began exploiting the labor power of the occupied territories. The ‹rst
The Invention of the Displaced Person 31
foreign workers were Polish prisoners of war. By the end of 1939, some
300,000 Polish POWs were working for the Reich.5 However, since the POWs
could not meet the demand for labor, the Germans also sought to mobilize
the Polish civilian population, long a reserve labor force for the German
economy. “Propaganda, indirect pressure, coercion, and deportation,” Eu-
gene Kulischer writes, “were utilized in turn to maintain a steady supply of
Polish manpower.”6 At the peak of the labor program in August 1944, there
were some 1.7 million Polish foreign workers on the territory of the Reich.7
As the Nazi empire expanded in 1940 and 1941, workers from ever
more countries were drawn into the German labor force. Foreign workers
became essential to both industry and agriculture, making possible the
consolidation and further expansion of German power. These workers
came from all of Nazi-dominated eastern and western Europe, including
occupied countries, satellites, and allied countries. While many volun-
teered, seeing economic opportunities in Germany that did not exist at
home, force was used to procure the major part of the foreign labor popu-
lation. The invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 opened up a vast new
reservoir of foreign workers. As in Poland, but with greater brutality, the
Germans employed a “combined system of promises, social pressure, and
brutal terror” to obtain the requisite number of workers.8 By August 1944,
there were 2.8 million Soviet citizens working in the Reich.9 They consti-
tuted more than one-third of the foreign worker population. Re›ecting the
low place that Russians occupied in the Nazi racial hierarchy, they were
treated substantially worse than other foreign workers.
While deportation for labor moved the largest number of Europeans,
with especially momentous consequences in eastern Europe, deportations
to ghettos, concentration camps, and extermination camps constituted the
deadliest forms of displacement. The formation of ghettos was central to
Nazi plans for a racial reordering of Europe. First established in the an-
nexed territories of Poland in late 1939, the ghettos were initially designed
to segregate Jews from the rest of the population and facilitate their de-
portation to the General Government and points further east. Poland was
the centerpoint of the ghettoization process, though the ghetto model was
eventually exported to other parts of Europe. In late 1941, the ghettos be-
came departure points for the extermination camps and thus part of the
machinery of the Final Solution. Over 600,000 Jews died in the ghettos of
Nazi-occupied eastern Europe, the vast majority of them Polish Jews.10
At the same time as the Germans began concentrating Jews in ghettos,
they also began arresting individuals and groups they viewed as a threat to
the occupation. Those arrested included political opponents, resistance

‹ghters, intellectuals, clerics, Jews, and Roma. While many were immedi-
ately executed, many more were sent to concentration camps. With the inva-
sion of Poland, the population of the concentration camps, growing since
the annexation of Austria, underwent an extensive process of expansion
and internationalization. Existing camps were enlarged and new ones estab-
lished, both in the Reich and in the occupied territories. Although their ini-
tial purpose was to concentrate and punish “dangerous” individuals and
groups, the camps also evolved into an important source of labor. Polish
and Soviet citizens constituted the largest categories of foreigner prisoners.11
Death from starvation and overwork, as well as outright murder, were
common in the concentration camps. Like the ghettos, however, the camps
were not initially conceived as sites of extermination. This changed after the
invasion of the Soviet Union. The goal of eliminating Jews, pursued during
the early war years through deportation and ghettoization, was now given
pride of place and pursued through outright murder. While many Jews were
murdered by mobile killing units that followed the German army into the
Soviet Union, in the fall of 1941, deportation to camps equipped with spe-
cial killing facilities emerged as the primary means of carrying out the Final
Solution. About 2.6 million Jews died in the extermination camps, located
mostly in the General Government. Smaller numbers perished in German,
Romanian, Croatian, and other concentration camps.12 Polish Jewry suf-
fered the most devastating losses: up to 1.7 million Polish Jews died in the
concentration and extermination camps.13 Altogether, some 5.1 million Eu-
ropean Jews were murdered by the Nazis and their accomplices.14
In addition to civilian foreign workers and concentration and exter-
mination camp prisoners, the other major group of eastern Europeans dis-
placed by the Nazis were prisoners of war. While some were held continu-
ously in special camps for POWs, many were moved into labor and
concentration camps. In August 1944, there were some 1.9 million prison-
ers of war in Germany, most from the Soviet Union, France, and Italy.15
The treatment of Soviet POWs differed markedly from that of other
groups, oscillating between “the physical extermination of the ideological
enemy and the exploitation of his labor power for the expansion of arma-
ments production.”16 Of the approximately 5.7 million Red Army soldiers
taken prisoner by the Germans, 3.3 million (58 percent) died.17 As it be-
came clear that Soviet civilian workers would not meet the demands of the
war economy, Soviet POWs were increasingly conscripted for labor. Of the
2.8 million Soviet citizens working in the Reich in August 1944, some
632,000 were prisoners of war.18
While German power was directly responsible for displacing millions

of eastern Europeans, the German advance also precipitated ›ight and
evacuation. The invasion of Poland produced hundreds of thousands of
refugees. The majority, some 600,000, including 350,000 Polish Jews, ›ed to
eastern Poland, which the Soviet Union occupied in September 1939 in ac-
cord with the German-Soviet nonaggression treaty; smaller numbers ›ed
north, south, and west.19 After the German invasion of the Soviet Union
in June 1941, millions of Soviet citizens, including those from the Soviet-
annexed territories of eastern Poland, were evacuated by the government
to the eastern regions of the country, where they typically endured ex-
tremely dif‹cult conditions. In all, some 16.5 million people were evacu-
ated, including about 1.5 million from former eastern Poland, the Baltic
countries, northern Bukovina, and Bessarabia.20 Importantly, a good num-
ber of Soviet citizens evaded repatriation, believing that the arrival of the
Germans would offer liberation from Soviet rule.21 Many of them would
later ›ee westward, having made themselves suspect by refusing evacuation
or, indeed, by collaborating with the Germans.
While Soviet evacuations were designed primarily to protect the civil-
ian population and prevent valuable men and material from falling into the
hands of the enemy, the Soviet authorities also selectively deported groups
they considered a threat to national security. Among those vulnerable to
deportation were the populations of the territories annexed by the Soviet
Union after September 1939, who were not considered suf‹ciently loyal.
Between 1939 and 1941, some 1 to 1.5 million people, primarily ethnic Poles,
were deported from eastern Poland to the Soviet interior, where they were
often forced to live in special corrective settlements.22 Smaller numbers
were deported from the Baltic countries. Also vulnerable to deportation
were members of minority nationalities whose allegiance to the Soviet
Union was seen as questionable. Foremost among them were Soviet citi-
zens of German descent, who were expelled from their long-established
areas of settlement, principally in the Volga region, in 1941 and 1942.
The Collapse of the Nazi Empire and Postwar

Geopolitical Transformations
As the Nazi empire collapsed, a new series of displacements began, with

many eastern Europeans now moving westward. For some, this westward
migration was a return home, while for others, it meant a new series of tri-
als. Among those being driven westward were the prisoners of the concen-
tration and extermination camps. In the summer of 1944, after Soviet forces
launched a massive new offensive, the SS began shutting down concentra-
tion and extermination camps in eastern Europe and evacuating their re-
maining prisoners, often forcing them to endure arduous marches. By the
end of the war, the evacuations had driven most surviving prisoners into the
Reich itself. Some 700,000 camp survivors were found on the territory of
Germany at the end of the war.23 Only about 10 percent were Jews.24
The advance of the Red Army also precipitated ›ight and evacuation.
As German forces retreated westward from the Soviet Union in the fall and
winter of 1943–44, they evacuated large segments of the local population.
Most of the evacuated non-Germans were taken by force and treated as la-
bor conscripts.25 However, some went voluntarily, fearful of the Red Army.
Many in this latter group were collaborators. They included Russians,
Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. Some had
participated in running local administrations, while others had joined po-
lice forces and militias, foreign units of the SS, or the ostensibly indepen-
dent Russian Liberation Army under Andrei Andreevich Vlasov. Many
had helped round up and kill Jews. The number of collaborators in eastern
Europe “was probably not higher than in western and southeastern Eu-
rope, but their fear of retaliation was greater in view of German propa-
ganda on bolshevist atrocities and the severe and arbitrary justice dealt out
by the Soviet authorities in reconquered regions.”26
The further advance of the Red Army in 1944 brought new displace-
ments. Prominent among those now moving westward were ethnic Ger-
mans from Poland and Czechoslovakia. The German populations in these
countries had been recruited in large numbers by the Nazis to serve in lo-
cal administrations and, more generally, had pro‹ted from the racial re-
ordering of eastern Europe. To their non-German neighbors and the So-
viet forces, they were closely associated with the hated occupier. While
some local Germans were evacuated by the retreating German army, oth-
ers ›ed on their own. Their greatest fear was falling into the hands of the
Soviets, who in fact often treated them quite brutally. As we shall see mo-
mentarily, this precipitous ›ight would turn into calculated expulsion as
the war ended and new governments were established in eastern Europe.
Indeed, the end of the war did not bring an end to displacement. On
the one hand, the geopolitical and territorial changes that followed the col-
lapse of National Socialism limited the possibilities of repatriating those
who had already been displaced. On the other, changes in geopolitical
alignment and territory were often accompanied by new population dis-
placements. Many of the most permanent displacements in fact took place

after the ‹ghting had ended.
The possibilities of repatriating already displaced Europeans were un-
dercut in the ‹rst place by the Soviet Union’s new position of dominance
in eastern Europe. Most important in this context are changes in Poland.
At the Yalta conference in February 1945, where a joint policy toward
postwar Germany was also announced, the Allies proclaimed their “com-
mon desire to see established a strong, free, independent, and democratic
Poland” and called for free elections to be held as soon as possible.27 How-
ever, they also gave the Soviet Union the upper hand in determining
Poland’s future. In particular, the United States and Great Britain recog-
nized the Soviet-backed Provisional Polish Government as the core of a
new postwar provisional government. This represented a signi‹cant policy
reversal. For most of the war, the Polish government-in-exile in London
had been recognized as Poland’s legitimate representative. However, the
London government’s standing worsened after April 1943, when the graves
of Polish of‹cers executed by the Soviet Union were found by German
forces in the Katyn forest near Smolensk. Polish insistence on an interna-
tional investigation led to a break in diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union and greater tensions with the western Allies, who could ill afford to
alienate the Soviets. Thus the London government was increasingly mar-
ginalized. The decisions announced at Yalta put a stamp on this evolution.
For many Poles, Yalta came to stand for betrayal by the western Allies. For
some of those who found themselves in Germany at war’s end, it created
doubt about the wisdom of returning home.
The geopolitical changes sanctioned at Yalta were part of a larger
transformational process that also included territorial shifts and popula-
tion displacements. The Soviet Union was allowed to retain much of the
territory it had occupied after September 1939, including most of eastern
Poland. The eastern border between Poland and the Soviet Union was set
at the Curzon Line, so called because it was ‹rst proposed as a boundary
between Polish and Soviet lands by the British foreign secretary George
Curzon in 1920. As compensation, Poland was allowed to annex German
territory in the west, with the western border set at the Oder and Neisse
rivers. Both boundary changes were accompanied by massive population
displacements. These displacements were part of a larger process of ethnic
cleansing in eastern Europe, driven by the desire to create more ethnically
homogeneous states and to take revenge on ostensible ethnic enemies. The
United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union sanctioned this process,
arguing that national minorities were a key source of political instability in

eastern Europe and that the best way to eliminate this instability was to
eliminate minorities themselves.
The process of ethnic cleansing in Poland began in the east. In Sep-
tember 1944, the Soviet-sponsored Lublin Committee concluded agree-
ments with the neighboring Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian re-
publics for the “mutual evacuation of citizens.” Poles and Jews who lived
east of the new Polish-Soviet border were permitted to leave for Poland,
while Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians who lived west of the new
border were permitted to migrate to the Soviet Union. In July 1945, a fur-
ther agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union extended the right to
leave the USSR to Poles and Jews living anywhere in the country, thus per-
mitting those who had been evacuated to the Soviet interior to return to
Poland. The evacuations were supposed to be voluntary, but in practice
this was often not the case. Approximately 1.5 million former Polish citi-
zens, including 230,000 Polish Jews, were “repatriated” from the Soviet
Union.28 Around 485,000 Polish Ukrainians were moved to the USSR.29
Another 140,000 were later expelled to Poland’s new western territories.30
In addition, perhaps some 300,000 prewar residents of eastern Poland were
in Germany at war’s end.31 Regardless of what they thought about the new
Soviet-backed Provisional Polish Government, these Polish citizens now
had another reason to question the wisdom of returning home: even if
they were allowed to return to Poland, they would not in fact be able to re-
turn to their homes.
The process of ethnic cleansing continued in the west. As the war
ended, the precipitous ›ight of local Germans before the Red Army was
transformed into a calculated process of expulsion, as the new Polish po-
litical authorities sought not only to punish the local German population
for the crimes of the Nazis but also to make the multiethnic western terri-
tories more ethnically Polish. Unlike in eastern Poland, there was no pre-
tense of voluntarism. Indeed, the expulsions were often carried out in a
brutal manner. At the Potsdam conference in August 1945, the Allies put
forward a plan for regularizing the removal of ethnic Germans from
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Hoping to humanize the expul-
sions, they effectively gave them international sanction. Up to 1950, some
12 million Germans were expelled from eastern Europe.32 They constituted
a huge burden for the authorities in postwar Germany, who thus tried to
distribute them evenly among the occupation zones. By the end of 1945,
some 3.4 million German expellees had arrived in the Soviet occupation
zone.33 In the other three zones, the ‹rst postwar census of October 1946
counted almost 6 million German expellees.34
While state-sanctioned population transfers were responsible for the
removal—or nonreturn—of Poland’s German, Ukrainian, Belorussian,
and Lithuanian minorities, fear of violence was largely responsible for the
departure—or, again, nonreturn—of Poland’s surviving Jews. At war’s
end, there were between 50,000 and 120,000 Jews in Poland. The Jewish
population increased dramatically after the return of Jews who had spent
the war years in the Soviet Union, reaching 240,000 in the summer of
1946.35 However, the hopes that many Jews harbored for rebuilding their
lives in Poland were short-lived. Returning home, they discovered that
their families and communities had been decimated and that their non-
Jewish neighbors were less than happy to see them. Anti-Jewish violence
was extensive. Between 1945 and 1947, somewhere between several hundred
and 1,500 Polish Jews were killed.36 The largest attack was the Kielce mas-
sacre of July 1946, in which 41 Jews were killed and some 60 injured. The
atmosphere of fear and instability encouraged a new westward migration,
which began in the summer of 1945 and increased dramatically after the
Kielce pogrom. In all, some 120,000 Jews left Poland in the ‹rst few years
after the war.37 Smaller numbers left Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and
other eastern European countries. Facilitated by the Zionist organization
Brichah, whose goal was to lead Jews to Palestine, this new migration fun-
neled Jews into Germany and Austria, especially their respective American
zones of occupation. It thus led to a dramatic increase in the number of
Jewish DPs.
Displaced Persons in Germany: An Overview
The deportations, evacuations, and ›ights outlined above drove eastern

Europeans across the Continent. They brought millions of them into the
Reich, laying the foundations for Germany’s DP population. Postwar po-
litical settlements undercut the possibilities of repatriating the displaced.
At the end of the war, there were approximately 8 million displaced per-
sons on German territory. Together with the German expellees and the
smaller number of locally displaced Germans, they made displacement a
fundamental feature of life in early postwar Germany.
Over the course of spring and summer 1945, the DP population
quickly declined, as a wave of repatriations moved millions of displaced
persons homeward. However, it soon became clear that many DPs could
not or would not return home. In September 1945, there were still some 1.9
million displaced persons scattered across Europe. The largest share, about
1.2 million, were located in the three western occupation zones of Ger-
many: 489,000 (41 percent) in the U.S zone; 649,000 (54 percent) in the
British zone; and 65,000 (5 percent) in the French zone.38 Although the DP
population continued to decline thereafter, it remained large. Thus, in
December 1946, there were still approximately 640,000 DPs receiving
UNRRA assistance in the three western occupation zones of Germany,
with many more no doubt uncounted because they lived without assis-
tance. By this point, the U.S. zone had become the most populous and
popular of the three western zones, temporarily housing some 378,000 (60
percent) of all of‹cially registered displaced persons.39
The largest group of displaced persons during the ‹rst postwar
months were Soviet nationals. In the western occupation zones of Ger-
many and Austria, they initially made up about one-third of all DPs.40
Their numbers declined quickly, however, due to both voluntary and
forced repatriation. Unlike other displaced persons, Soviet DPs could be
compelled to return home. The Soviet exception had been negotiated at the
Yalta Conference.41 In secret agreements, American, British, and Soviet
authorities had arranged for the reciprocal exchange of liberated civilians
and POWs. Soviet of‹cials were granted unprecedented access to and con-
trol over Soviet nationals in areas occupied by the western Allies, and it
was implied that Soviet nationals could be repatriated by force. In return,
the United States and Great Britain were promised the timely return of
their own nationals. There was considerable confusion about the status of
DPs from territories annexed by the Soviet Union during the war, notably
eastern Poland and the Baltic states. From the Soviet perspective, they were
Soviet nationals. The western Allies waf›ed on this issue, alternately
af‹rming, on the one hand, that displaced persons from annexed territo-
ries had the right to opt out of repatriation and, on the other, that the
identi‹cation of Soviet citizens was the prerogative of Soviet repatriation
of‹cers.42 Through the end of 1945, 3 million Soviet citizens were repatri-
ated from Germany, about 1 million from the U.S. zone. Thereafter, the So-
viet DP population declined only moderately.43 The number of those re-
maining in Germany is dif‹cult to determine. Many Soviet DPs hid their
status, taking cover under another nationality or declaring themselves
stateless. According to UNRRA ‹gures, at the end of September 1945,
there were just over 33,000 Soviet nationals in the western occupation
zones, most in the U.S. zone.44 However, this number is much too low. The
Soviet repatriation authorities themselves estimated that in March 1946,
there were some 550,000 Soviet citizens (including those from the annexed
territories) yet to be repatriated.45 Ulrike Goeken suggests that by early
1946, there were 100,000 to 200,000 Soviet DPs in the three western zones.46
The majority—by one estimate, no less than 85 percent—were “western-
ers,” meaning Ukrainians, Belorussians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and so
forth, mainly from the annexed territories.47 According to a report from
1949, most Soviet DPs were concentrated in Bavaria.48
While Soviet nationals initially made up the largest group of displaced
persons, they were soon overtaken by Polish nationals. In May 1945, there
were approximately 1.9 million Polish nationals in Germany.49 Repatriation
proceeded slowly, partly because the trains and trucks needed to take Poles
home were being used to repatriate Soviet nationals. At the end of Sep-
tember 1945, some 816,000 Polish DPs still remained in western Germany.
By that point they had become the largest national group—68 percent of
the total DP population. The British zone had the largest share of Polish
DPs with about 510,000 (63 percent), followed by the U.S. zone with about
254,000 (31 percent).50 By December 1946, the total number of Polish DPs
in the three western zones had dropped to around 293,000, with the U.S.
zone now having the largest share, about 154,000 (53 percent).51 However,
the decline in the Polish DP population cannot be attributed solely—or
primarily—to repatriation. As we shall see momentarily, it was also due to
the fragmentation of the Polish category.
In addition to Soviet and Polish nationals, the DP population in-
cluded smaller numbers of other eastern Europeans. In September 1945,
Germany’s DP population included 134,000 Estonians, Latvians, and
Lithuanians, counted together as Balts; 96,000 Hungarians; 28,000 Yu-
goslavs; and 41,000 “others,” many of whom were no doubt nationals of
the Soviet Union.52
While the earliest statistics on displaced persons offer a snapshot of
the population from the perspective of the of‹cial, state-centered national
categories, these categories quickly began to fall apart. Many displaced
persons, wanting to avoid repatriation, falsely declared their nationality or
said they were stateless. Others insisted that they be recognized as members
of a different, nonof‹cial nationality. In this context, Poles, Ukrainians,
Russian, and Jews emerged as distinct groups de‹ned by ethnicity and cul-
ture rather than membership in the state. Although the Allies tried to ig-
nore these new national categories, since the of‹cial ones were central to
the repatriation process, they were increasingly obliged to acknowledge

them. The breakdown of the of‹cial national categories signaled the
breakdown of the repatriation program itself.
The Polish DP category fell apart most completely, as Polish Jews,
Polish Ukrainians, and members of other minorities jumped ship. The dis-
integration of the Polish category is already evident in UNRRA statistics
for September 1945, which include a separate category for Jewish DPs, the
majority of whom were citizens of Poland. After mid-1946, the Polish cat-
egory was also largely emptied of Ukrainians, as both the Polish govern-
ment and Polish Ukrainians, for their own different reasons, insisted that
Ukrainians be counted separately. Thus, of the 154,000 Polish DPs residing
in the U.S. zone in December 1946, some 103,000 were classi‹ed as Poles,
the remainder as Polish Ukrainians. After emigration opportunities
opened up, the number of Polish DPs declined dramatically. In May 1949,
there were about 38,000 Poles living in DP camps in the U.S. zone, though
many more probably lived outside the camps.53
As the Polish category declined, the Ukrainian category grew. Most
self-identi‹ed Ukrainians were Polish or Soviet nationals. A smaller num-
ber were Czechoslovak or Romanian citizens or stateless persons with
Nansen passports, émigrés from the Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War
who had spent the interwar years in countries like Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia before ›eeing or again being displaced. Statistics for 1945 and most
of 1946 are dif‹cult to come by. By one estimate, there were approximately
2 million ethnic Ukrainians in the western occupation zones of Germany
at the end of the war.54 Initially, the majority were former forced laborers
and POWs from the Soviet Union. With repatriation, however, their num-
bers declined dramatically. By November 1946, the number of Ukrainian
DPs in the western occupation zones had dropped to 178,000, with 104,000
residing in the U.S. zone.55 Of‹cially, some 70 percent were Polish Ukraini-
ans, mostly former residents of the eastern Polish regions of Galicia and
Volhynia, now part of the USSR.56 The preponderance of Polish nationals
is not surprising: on the one hand, they were not subject to forcible repa-
triation (or, at least, were not supposed to be); on the other, they were not
welcome to return to Poland. Still, many of those who declared themselves
Polish Ukrainians were probably Soviet Ukrainians in disguise. Estimates
suggest 140,000 to 150,000 Soviet Ukrainians refused to return home. They
constituted about 32 percent of all Soviet nonreturners.57 By May 1949, the
total number of Ukrainians in DP camps in the U.S. zone had dropped to
about 39,000, with many more again living outside the camps.58
The decline of the Polish category was also coupled with the growth
of the Jewish category, though the process here was rather different. Jewish
DPs were initially one of the smallest groups. According to Allied esti-
mates, about 20,000 Jews were liberated in the western occupation zones of
Germany, though “the situation at ‹rst was far too ›uid for more than a
rough estimate.”59 The actual number of Jews in Germany at that point
was probably considerably higher, especially if one factors in the practice
of classifying DPs according to their of‹cial nationality. Most were con-
centration camp survivors. After the repatriations of the spring and sum-
mer of 1945, there were about 23,000 Jewish DPs in western Germany, with
some 10,000 in the U.S. zone.60 They constituted a tiny minority—less than
2 percent of all DPs.61 Over the next two years, however, the Jewish DP
population increased dramatically. This was due to the arrival of Jewish
refugees—or, in Allied parlance, “in‹ltrees”—from Poland and other east-
ern European countries. The primary destination for these refugees was the
U.S. zone, viewed by Zionist activists as the best gateway to Palestine. By
February 1946, the Jewish DP population in the U.S. zone had grown to al-
most 46,000; in the summer of 1947, it reached 157,000.62 Although Jewish
refugees also migrated to the British zone, the position of the U.S. zone in
the hierarchy of destinations was unparalleled: in September 1947, an as-
tonishing 91 percent of all Jewish DPs in Germany lived in the U.S. zone.63
Over time, the Jewish share of the overall DP population increased
signi‹cantly. By June 1947, Jewish DPs made up 26 percent of all displaced
persons receiving assistance from UNRRA.64 The Jewish DP population
was overwhelmingly Polish: according to statistics for September 1947,
some 80 percent of Jews receiving IRO assistance in Germany were from
Poland, with signi‹cant though much smaller numbers coming from Hun-
gary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Germany itself.65
Finally, Russian DPs, somewhat like Ukrainians, were a mix of old and
new émigrés, the former refugees from the Bolshevik Revolution and Civil
War, the latter largely citizens of the Soviet Union. In addition to those who
considered themselves ethnically Russian, the Russian DP category also in-
cluded members of ethnic minorities—especially Ukrainians, Belorussians,
and Cossacks—who identi‹ed with Russian culture. Initially, the Russian
DP population was dominated by Soviet Russians; as repatriation pro-
ceeded, however, the proportion of Russian old émigrés increased. The best
estimates suggest that 30,000 to 40,000 Soviet Russians refused to return
home.66 Proportionally, Russians made up a small share of Soviet nonre-
turners, by one estimate about 7 percent.67 By contrast, they made up a high
proportion of Soviet returnees, about 48 percent.68 In March 1946, there

were approximately 150,000 Russian refugees receiving UNRRA assistance
in all of Europe and the Middle East.69 A U.S. report from July 1948 puts
the total number of Russians in the U.S. occupation zone of Germany at
around 100,000, though this number may be too high.70
The Invention of the Displaced Person
Although the Second World War and the postwar settlement drove mil-
lions of eastern Europeans from their homes, not all of the displaced were
considered “displaced persons.” In particular, Germans expellees were ex-
cluded from the DP category, even though they generally came from the
same countries as those who were included. The displaced person was an
invention of the war years, a categorical novelty intended to distinguish be-
tween those who deserved Allied assistance and those who did not. It em-
ployed nationality as the primary criterion of entitlement, though in a
manner that incorporated, and thus sanctioned, the denationalizations of
the postwar settlement.
Over the course of the war, the Allies became increasingly aware of the
need to make plans for postwar reconstruction. Indeed, promises of post-
war stability and prosperity were an important part of their ideological ar-
senal. In August 1940, two months after the fall of France, British prime
minister Winston Churchill promised that the Allied powers would not only
bring the people of Europe liberation but also provide them with “immedi-
ate food, freedom, and peace.” Concrete plans for postwar reconstruction
began to be elaborated in September 1941, with the establishment of the In-
ter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements, which included Great
Britain, the Allied governments-in-exile, and later also the United States.
Here the issue of postwar refugees was discussed in depth. In August 1942,
building on the plans of the Inter-Allied Committee, British and U.S.
of‹cials agreed to jointly establish an international relief agency, to be
known as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. As
Elizabeth Borgwardt and Daniel Cohen argue, the creation of UNRRA
marked a fundamental shift in the nature of postwar relief, from a model of
“passive” charity provided by private organizations to one of “active”
welfare promoted by states.71 Formally inaugurated in November 1943,
UNRRA was entrusted with a broad range of relief responsibilities. It was
supposed to provide liberated populations with food, shelter, fuel, clothing,
health care, and other essential goods and services. It was also entrusted with
the care, maintenance, and repatriation of refugees. Although UNRRA ini-
tially hoped to work independently with European governments, it was
obliged to work through the high command of the Allied military, the
Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). Its
operations were thus subordinated to Allied military operations.
The invention of the displaced person went hand in hand with the cre-
ation of UNRRA. The earliest de‹nition of a displaced person can be
found in the SHAEF Outline Plan of June 1944, where the Allies for the
‹rst time presented their plans for the treatment of displaced populations.
The Outline Plan distinguished between two main groups, displaced per-
sons and refugees. Displaced persons were de‹ned as “civilians outside the
national boundaries of their country by reason of the war, who are: (1) de-
sirous but are unable to return home, or ‹nd homes without assistance; (2)
to be returned to enemy or ex-enemy territory.” Refugees, on the other
hand, were de‹ned as “civilians not outside the national boundaries of
their country.”72 This terminology represented a curious reversal of stan-
dard contemporary usage, importing into the category of the displaced
person an essential characteristic of the refugee, namely, the fact of being
outside one’s country of residence. No mention was made of international
protection for either group. Rather, as Ben Shephard notes, “German pol-
icy was interpreted as much in terms of forced movement as of persecution
or genocide.”73 Both displaced persons and refugees were de‹ned as
generic and reversible problems of the war.
These conceptual innovations, Hannah Arendt suggests, were a
means of avoiding the real problem of postwar refugees. “The postwar
term ‘displaced persons,’” Arendt argues, “was invented during the war for
the express purpose of liquidating statelessness once and for all by ignor-
ing its existence. Nonrecognition of statelessness always means repatria-
tion, i.e., deportation to a country of origin, which either refuses to recog-
nize the prospective repatriate as a citizen, or, on the contrary, urgently
wants him back for punishment.”74 To be sure, the Allies recognized that
the “care and disposition [of displaced persons and refugees] present not
only technical and administrative problems of great magnitude but com-
plex political problems as well.”75 Nonetheless, they expected displaced
persons to return home. Hence they made no serious preparations for a
population of nonrepatriable DPs. Indeed, UNRRA was only entrusted
with helping displaced persons during the repatriation process. This made
its work with nonrepatriables all the more dif‹cult.
The de‹nition of the displaced person was further elaborated in the

revised SHAEF Plan of April 1945, also known as Administrative Memo-
randum No. 39. Here an important qualifying criterion was introduced,
namely, nationality, understood as state citizenship. The plan identi‹ed
three general groups of displaced persons: United Nations DPs (nationals
of Allied countries), enemy DPs (nationals of Germany, Austria, and
Japan), and ex-enemy DPs (nationals of Italy, Finland, Rumania, Bul-
garia, and Hungary). The liberation, care, and repatriation of UNDPs
were de‹ned as “a major Allied objective.”76 Allied forces were to ensure
that UNDPs received adequate food, clothing, housing, and medical at-
tention and assistance in returning home. Their needs took precedence
over those of the German population. The costs of caring for UNDPs
were to be borne by the German authorities. Nationals of enemy and ex-
enemy countries, on the other hand, were considered the responsibility of
the German authorities and their respective governments. Thus, although
the term displaced person in theory covered all displaced populations, it
only had practical signi‹cance for UNDPs, that is, those entitled to Allied
assistance. In fact, it was used almost exclusively to refer to the latter. Not
surprisingly, the privileged status of displaced persons generated resent-
ment among the German population.
The distinction between displaced persons and “other” displaced
groups shows that the Allies thought ‹rst and foremost about providing for
their own citizens. They were eager to make sure their own civilians and sol-
diers were well-treated. They distinguished chie›y between winners and
losers. Moreover, they viewed the distinction between Allied and Axis as
commensurate with the distinction between victims and perpetrators. At
least, they thought little about the incommensurability of these two sets of
categories. Thus, regardless of why individuals had been displaced, their
place in the Allied DP program was determined by their nationality. This
was the primary organizing principle. It was also central to the repatriation
process. It served to organize individuals into repatriable groups that could
be handed over to their national representatives, so-called liaison of‹cers.
Hence Allied of‹cials sought to segregate the DP population according to
nationality, for example, assigning each nationality to a different camp or
camp section. Yet the concept of nationality employed by the Allies was
hardly self-evident. Rather than recognize the prewar citizenship of the dis-
placed, the Allies selectively acknowledged the denationalizations of the
postwar settlement. Most important, they excluded German expellees from
the UNDP category even though most of them were prewar citizens of Al-
lied countries. Thus, although the Allies were unhappy to see displaced per-
sons reorganize themselves according to ethnonationality, they themselves
employed nationality categories that had been thoroughly ethnicized.
Repatriation was voluntary for all groups of displaced persons except
Soviet citizens and war criminals. As mentioned earlier, the United States
and Great Britain had agreed to the Soviet exception at Yalta. The revised
SHAEF Plan of April 1945 re›ected these agreements, noting that “Soviet
displaced persons will be repatriated regardless of their individual
wishes.”77 During the ‹rst postwar months, U.S. and British forces accom-
modated their Soviet colleagues and assisted in forcibly repatriating thou-
sands of presumed Soviet nationals. As unpleasant scenes involving resis-
tance and even suicide accumulated, however, they increasingly questioned
this policy. In July 1945, SHAEF issued a directive stating that for the pur-
poses of repatriation, Soviet citizens were de‹ned as individuals who had
lived within the boundaries of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the
war. Individuals from territories annexed by the Soviet Union were thus
excluded. More generally, U.S. and British of‹cials increasingly voiced
reservations about the policy of forcible repatriation as a whole. Although
the United States never abandoned its commitment to the Yalta agree-
ment, over the course of late 1945 and early 1946, military of‹cials pro-
gressively undermined it, for example, by limiting Soviet repatriation
of‹cers’ access to DP camps. British policy underwent a similar evolution.
These shifts exacerbated tensions between the western Allies and the Soviet
Union and hastened the demise of the wartime alliance. In a small way,
they contributed to the development of the Cold War. They also left DP
policy in a shambles. The end of cooperation on the Yalta provisions not
only discredited the idea of forced repatriation, it put the entire concept of
repatriation in question. It thus helped facilitate the rise of a nonrepatri-
able DP population.78
By the fall of 1945, it was clear that not all displaced persons could be
repatriated. Although the Soviet Union, Poland, and other eastern Euro-
pean states continued to insist on the prompt repatriation of their dis-
placed nationals, the United States, Great Britain, and France slowly be-
gan to rethink their approach to the DP question. In July 1947,
responsibility for displaced persons was transferred from UNRRA to a
new organization, the International Refugee Organization. Resettlement,
rather than repatriation, now became the key objective. Unhappy about
this development, the Soviet Union and its eastern European allies refused
to join the IRO. “Thus from the beginning,” Malcolm Proudfoot writes,
“the IRO was entirely an instrument of the West.”79 Opportunities for re-
settlement opened up slowly. In the spring of 1947, the Canadian govern-
ment introduced a labor migration program for DPs; the Canadian Immi-
gration Act of 1948 made it possible for many more DPs to immigrate. In
June 1948, the U.S. Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act, which for
the ‹rst time made large-scale immigration of DPs to the United States
possible, though it was not until 1950 that the act was liberalized to allow
more Jewish DPs to immigrate. For Jewish DPs, the formation of the state
of Israel in May 1948 was of central importance, making mass legal immi-
gration there possible. These developments led to a dramatic outmigration.
Between July 1947 and December 1951, some 300,000 DPs emigrated to the
United States, 176,000 to Australia, 136,000 to Israel, 113,000 to Canada,
and 104,000 to Great Britain.80 Smaller numbers emigrated to countries
such as New Zealand, France, Belgium, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela.
While the resettlement program allowed many displaced persons to
leave Germany, it did not de‹nitively “resolve” the DP problem. At least
100,000 displaced persons remained in Germany in mid-1950. Some were
old or in‹rm and thus stood little chance of ‹nding a country willing to
take them. These were the “hard core,” as the IRO put it. Others had begun
to establish themselves in Germany, in some cases marrying Germans, and
were loath to uproot themselves again. In June 1950, the West German gov-
ernment agreed to take responsibility for all remaining DPs. In April 1951,
the West German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) passed the Homeless
Foreigners Law. Displaced persons were transformed into “homeless for-
eigners.” Unlike German refugees and expellees, homeless foreigners did
not have the right to claim German citizenship, but the German authori-
ties were instructed to take their “special situation” into account when con-
sidering their applications for citizenship. The newly created United Na-
tions High Commission for Refugees remained nominally responsible for
them. In practice, however, they were now a West German responsibility.
Although responsibility for displaced persons passed through numer-
ous hands from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s, the care and control of
DPs were consistently organized along a military model. This is not sur-
prising, since the DP program had been formulated as part of the Allied
military campaign. Central to this model was the use of camps.81 Formally
known as “assembly centers”—though no one but the authorities them-
selves ever used this term—the camps were all-purpose institutions. They
facilitated the assembly, screening, and repatriation of displaced persons.
They were the basis for providing basic services, including housing, food,
and medical care. They also made it easier to control movement. During
the ‹rst months after the war, some camps were in fact surrounded by
barbed-wire fences, and displaced persons needed permission to leave. The
primary goal was to prevent DPs from engaging in criminal acts outside
the camps, the expectation being that they wanted to avenge themselves on
the German population. The camp model was most fully developed in the
British zone and least so in the French zone. The U.S. zone fell somewhere
in the middle. It had many large DP camps, especially in Bavaria, but also
a large noncamp population, so-called free-living DPs. In keeping with the
military model, the buildings chosen to serve as DP camps were typically
large institutional buildings such as schools, hospitals, or, indeed, military
barracks. In some cases, forced labor and concentration camps were simply
converted to DP use. Thus, even if the physical conditions were better, life
in the DP camps had many unpleasant continuities with the war years, in-
cluding isolation, supervision, and treatment as part of an anonymous
mass. External control over the camps lay in the hands of the military,
while their internal administration was the responsibility of ‹rst UNRRA
and then the IRO, together with the DPs themselves. After the dissolution
of the IRO in December 1951, the remaining camps became the responsi-
bility of the German authorities. Because of the centrality of the camp
model to the DP program, at least in the American and British zones, dis-
placed persons who lived outside the camps were often de facto excluded
from assistance.
The German public viewed displaced persons as an unwelcome pres-
ence and deeply resented having to shoulder the costs of maintaining
them, as stipulated by Allied policies. There was little sense of responsibil-
ity for the “DP problem.” Indeed, from the perspective of many Germans,
it was the Allies themselves who had created this problem by treating dis-
placed persons as a specially entitled population.82 A major point of con-
tention was access to the camps. As spaces policed from without by the
U.S. Army and controlled from within by UNRRA and the IRO, the DP
camps were largely closed off from their German surroundings. They en-
joyed a measure of extraterritorial autonomy.83 This was deeply frustrating
to the German authorities, who associated displaced persons with the
black market and other kinds of criminality.84 German police often raided
DP camps on the pretext that their residents were engaged in criminal ac-
tivities. Jewish DPs were arrested on ›imsy pretexts, and there were nu-
merous reports of beatings, robbery, and other kinds of mistreatment.85 In
March 1946, a concentration camp survivor named Shmul Danziger was
shot and killed by a German police of‹cer in the context of a raid on the
Jewish DP camp in Stuttgart. In the aftermath of this event, General
Joseph McNarney, commander in chief of U.S. occupation forces, explic-
itly forbade German police from entering the DP camps unless accompa-
nied by American MPs.86 The German authorities made repeated efforts to
regain access to the camps, citing the criminal threat posed by DPs.87 In
February 1948, the Bavarian justice minister Joseph Müller made a speech
in which he described the DP camps as “oases and asylums, where crimi-
nals can ›ee and hide their deeds, and can enjoy the extraterritoriality of
diplomats.”88 The German police again gained access to the camps when
they were transferred to German authority at the end of 1951. Outside the
camps, on the other hand, displaced persons came under the jurisdiction of
the U.S. Military Government and the German authorities, with the bal-
ance of power between the two shifting toward the latter as the goal of es-
tablishing a sovereign West Germany gained ground.
DP Policy and DP Politics
Although the policy of care and control meant that displaced persons were
thoroughly administered, from the beginning the occupation authorities in
the U.S. zone also encouraged displaced persons to organize and represent
themselves. The ‹rst step in this direction was the “stand fast” order issued
by the commanding general of U.S. forces in Germany, Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, in May 1945. “Do not leave the district you are in,” the order read.
“Wait for further orders. Form small groups based on your own national-
ity, and elect spokesmen who can negotiate on your behalf with the Allied
authorities.”89 Here, then, displaced persons were practically ordered to
create committees. The process of encouraging committees continued after
the liberation. Among the three western Allies, the Americans were the
most tolerant of DP efforts at self-organization and self-representation, in
keeping with their desire to promote a new model of active welfare derived
from New Deal policies.90 They allowed displaced persons to form com-
mittees, so long as these limited themselves to welfare, social, and cultural
activities. As the wealthiest of the three western Allies, they could also af-
ford to give the committees greater material assistance. They encouraged
the formation of camp committees, as did UNRRA and the IRO. Camp
administrators, hewing to the model of active welfare, viewed these com-
mittees as valuable from a number of perspectives: they reduced the num-
ber of military and civilian personnel needed to run the camps; they gave
displaced persons a renewed sense of purpose after years of extreme dehu-
manization and objecti‹cation; and they prepared displaced persons for
life in a democratic society.91
American support for self-administration helped transform displaced
persons from objects of care and control into subjects with distinct civil
rights.92 They encouraged the proliferation of DP committees. In marked
contrast to the British zone, where strict limits were placed on self-admin-
istration, the American zone emerged as the centerpoint of associational
life among DPs.93 However, of‹cial support for DP self-administration was
limited to the camps and to nonpolitical issues. Displaced persons were
forbidden to engage in any activities deemed political.94 They had no polit-
ical rights. They were also extremely limited in their opportunities to orga-
nize outside of camps. In practice, political activities inside the camps were
usually tolerated.95 However, the distinction between camp and noncamp
was strenuously maintained. Of‹cial anxiety about DP politics was
re›ected in restrictions on displaced persons’ freedom of association and
freedom of assembly. As Rebecca Boehling has argued, a preoccupation
with public order as well as a fear of autonomous, especially leftist politi-
cal groups inhibited the development of a vibrant grassroots democracy in
the American zone. Only slowly did the American occupation authorities
allow any kind of political activity, beginning with the local level in August
1945 and working their way up to the zonal level in February 1946.96 Polit-
ical parties were screened to ensure that they were not “militaristic, un-
democratic, hostile to Allied purposes, or prejudicial to military security
and the maintenance of order.”97 While restrictions on the freedom of as-
sociation were thus the order of the day, the restrictions faced by displaced
persons were much more total. In the U.S. zone, committees created by dis-
placed persons came under the heading of “non-German associations.” In
theory, it was possible for non-German associations to “be licensed
through the procedure applicable to political parties and political
groups.”98 In practice, however, no system for licensing non-German asso-
ciations was ever put in place, and mention of this possibility was eventu-
ally dropped from Military Government regulations. As the second con-
gress of representatives of the Ukrainian emigration noted in frustration
in 1947, after two years, “the legal foundations for the organization of the
communal life of the national emigrant groups had not yet been publicly
established.”99 This was no accident. As one American of‹cial noted, look-
ing back on the occupation era, “it was the unwritten policy to avoid rec-
ognizing or licensing non-German organizations.”100 The reason for this

was their presumed political nature. In the opinion of Military Govern-
ment, “whatever the terminology used regarding the organization will be
. . . the political factor is existent and should be considered prior to any
other factor.”101 The U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps devoted con-
siderable time and energy to investigating DP committees for suspected in-
fringements of this policy. Displaced persons were thus excluded from the
revival of political life in postwar Germany.
As a result of the unwritten policy against non-German associations,
most efforts by displaced persons to represent themselves outside the
camps failed. Numerous DP committees sought recognition from the Mil-
itary Government.102 In some cases, they were tacitly allowed to operate.
For example, the American authorities permitted the ‹rst congress of rep-
resentatives of the Ukrainian emigration to take place, but they refused to
put this permission in writing.103 More often, however, DP groups met
with disapproval—or silence. Concerned that their correspondence with
DP committees could be construed as evidence of recognition, MG
of‹cials often simply refused to respond. For example, after the main Pol-
ish DP committee in the U.S. zone, Polish Union, sent a telegram to Mili-
tary Governor Lucius Clay, MG of‹cials drafted an internal memorandum
stating that “no reply has been made by this of‹ce and telegram may be a
ruse to obtain quasi-of‹cial recognition or organization through reply.”104
Lack of recognition meant that most DP committees were by de‹nition il-
legal. The American authorities were generally inclined to let them operate
as long as they limited themselves to noncontroversial activities.105 In some
cases, however, efforts were made to shut them down.106
In November 1949, responsibility for non-German associations was
transferred to the German authorities. Although the Germans generally
took a more lenient approach, they too were not eager to support DP as-
sociational life, fearful that cultural associations would serve as a screen for
political activities and foster the development (or maintenance) of minor-
ity political consciousness.107 The Homeless Foreigners Law allowed dis-
placed persons to create and belong to associations, the only exception be-
ing, as usual, political associations.108 Although the Bavarian government
provided some support to cultural organizations, during the early and mid-
1950s, the federal government did not. As an of‹cial statement from 1951
maintained, “It cannot be in the interest of the federal government . . . to
carry out a more generous support of foreign folk cultures with federal
funds that could cause . . . a minority problem within the next two or three
generations.”109 Signi‹cantly, the original draft of this statement spoke of

“political” rather than “folk” cultures, betraying the overriding concern
with minority politics and their perceived threat to the new German na-
tion-state.
Limits on the freedom of association were coupled with limits on the
freedom of assembly. In April 1947, after a series of Jewish DP demonstra-
tions demanding emigration to Palestine, the American Military Govern-
ment forbade Jewish DPs from holding demonstrations outside the
camps.110 In August, they expanded this prohibition to include all DPs.111
As with the policy on freedom of association, the distinction between
camp and noncamp was central. Inside the camps, displaced persons were
allowed to hold almost any kind of meeting, as long as it was “orderly.”
However, they were prohibited from demonstrating in public places with-
out special permission.112 Religious meetings were often permitted, but po-
litical meetings were another matter entirely. “Under no circumstances,”
MG of‹cials stressed, “will approval of the meeting . . . be granted when it
is to be held for the purpose of carrying on political activities or protesting
against the established policies of the United States or Allied Govern-
ments.”113 Military police were directed to observe unauthorized demon-
strations and prosecute their “leaders.” There was disagreement over what
role if any the German police should play, especially if the demonstrators
were Jewish. Although the German police had the right to control dis-
placed persons outside the camps, the policing of DP demonstrations was
generally seen as the responsibility of the Americans. While some U.S.
of‹cials stressed that German police should under no circumstances be al-
lowed to control DP demonstrators, others took the position that the Ger-
mans had “full authority over UNDP’s outside of assembly centers” and
should “disperse and suppress” unauthorized demonstrations.114 As plans
to establish a sovereign West German state took shape in 1948, the weight
of opinion on this issue shifted. In keeping with the goal of transferring
authority over civil and political affairs to the Germans, the American oc-
cupation authorities increasingly adopted what they called a “hands-off ”
policy, allowing the German police to intervene, even if the demonstrators
were Jewish. Thus, while in April 1946 U.S. of‹cials had insisted that “Ger-
man police will not be employed . . . in any way” to control Jewish demon-
strators,115 one year later they had concluded that “we do want them used
when necessary.”116 By 1949, U.S. of‹cials expected German police to deal
with Jewish demonstrators on their own.
MG of‹cials were aware that they could be accused of discriminating
against displaced persons. They therefore gave careful consideration to the

wording of their directives.117 In a statement prepared for distribution to the
German press in August 1947 in the context of the general ban on DP
demonstrations, they stressed that “the freedom and right of a people to pub-
lic assembly for peaceful purposes is inherent in all democracies” and that
this right was enshrined in both Military Government policies for Germany
and the German Land constitutions. However, they also insisted that they
had a right to prohibit mass meetings and demonstrations that were “inimi-
cal to the security and interests” of the Allied occupation forces or threatened
public safety.118 While internal documents make clear that the prohibition re-
ferred to political demonstrations per se, and thus did indeed touch on the
freedom of assembly, here the issue was framed in terms of threats to secu-
rity and unspoken “interests.” Displaced persons were presented as a danger
to public order, a population in need of spatial “containment.”
In what sense were the activities of displaced persons “inimical to the
security and interests” of the Allied occupation forces? MG of‹cials were
primarily concerned about antirepatriation activities. Since repatriation
was a key Allied objective, anything that smacked of opposition was con-
sidered “inimical” to the occupation. Antirepatriation activities were thus
explicitly forbidden. Two types of opposition to repatriation generated
special anxiety.The ‹rst concerned the Soviet Union and its dominance in
eastern Europe, the second Great Britain’s Palestine policy, which sharply
restricted Jewish immigration. Opposition to Soviet or British policy was
considered an embarrassment to the Alliance and a source of friction be-
tween the Allies. Concern about these issues was re›ected in decisions at
the highest levels. Thus, in April 1947, the Council of Foreign Ministers,
the main body overseeing the postwar settlement in Europe, signed an
agreement explicitly prohibiting “all ‘Committees,’ ‘Centres,’ and other
similar organizations which may be found to be engaged in activities hos-
tile to the interests of any of the Allied Powers.”119 It was clear that the
committees in question were those created by DPs.
American of‹cials were especially concerned about DP propaganda
against the Soviet Union. Driven primarily by material concerns, namely,
the urgent need for labor power, the Soviet Union’s desire for the timely
repatriation of its nationals also had an important ideological dimension.
As Mark Elliott suggests, opposition to repatriation “posed a threat to the
credibility of propaganda that stressed the unquali‹ed wartime devotion
of all Soviet citizens.”120 Soviet of‹cials also worried about an increase in
anticommunist political émigrés in the West.121 In general, they demon-
strated “extreme touchiness” about antirepatriation sentiment.122 Concern

about this issue had already surfaced at Yalta, where the agreements signed
between the Big Three included provisions stating that “hostile propa-
ganda against the contracting parties . . . will not be permitted.”123 The un-
written policy against DP associations was largely a re›ection of these
agreements. Similarly, requests for recognition by DP committees were of-
ten denied on the grounds that the committees were engaging in anti-
Soviet propaganda.124
Given that concerns about antagonizing the Soviet Union were the
main reason for restrictions on DP politics, it should come as no surprise
that these restrictions rose and fell with the Grand Alliance. By 1948,
American of‹cials were taking a more lenient approach toward DP poli-
tics. According to a February 1949 report by a German observer, “the pre-
viously existing restrictions on DP groups’ right of association and on
their possibilities for political activity have silently or in some cases even
explicitly fallen.”125 The new attitude of tolerance can be seen in the Amer-
ican response to an anticommunist DP demonstration in the Bavarian
town of Neuburg in November 1949. In keeping with established policy,
Military Government of‹cials considered the demonstration illegal and in-
sisted on prosecuting the demonstrators. However, they assured DPs in
Neuburg that “the purpose of the demonstration” would “doubtless” be
taken into consideration when deciding on appropriate punishments.126
This new attitude of tolerance was no doubt partly responsible for the rise
in political activity among “foreign national groups” that U.S. Military
Government of‹cials noted in mid-1948.127
The collapse of restrictions on DP politics was accompanied by a
more positive attitude toward DP committees, even efforts to foster them.
Most important, the IRO fostered the development of a loose collective of
national committees, which met with IRO of‹cials each month. The col-
lective included organizations representing most of the main eastern Euro-
pean nationalities, with the noteworthy exception of Jews, who chose to in-
teract with the IRO individually. The committees advised the IRO on all
manner of issues, including restitution, the transfer of authority, and the
Homeless Foreigners Law. Through the IRO, they were also able to com-
municate with American policymakers.128 Thus, while the desire to main-
tain good relations with the Soviet Union was central to the initial formu-
lation of American policy on DP politics, the development of the Cold
War made previously subversive activities acceptable, even laudable.129 I
explore this issue more fully in chapter 4.
The restrictions on DP politicals were primarily determined by con-

siderations internal to the wartime alliance. However, the fact that dis-
placed persons were foreign nationals was also important. At the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, restrictions on the political activities of
foreigners, including political exiles, had been limited. The political
refugees of the 1830s and 1840s were treated quite leniently in their western
European host countries. “Receiving countries,” Michael Marrus writes,
“almost never assumed the refugees would abandon revolutionary poli-
tics.”130 Indeed, there was considerable sympathy for their cause. In France,
the Polish revolutionaries of 1831 were welcomed as brothers in a common
struggle for liberty and democracy. Many were supported with funds from
the public purse.131 To be sure, this era also saw the proliferation of restric-
tions on aliens and a growth in laws on nationality.132 However, refugee
politics were often tolerated. As the nation-state rose to prominence in the
last decades of the nineteenth century, and as larger and more destitute
groups of refugees sought safe haven, tolerance waned. Still, refugees con-
tinued to enjoy considerable opportunities to represent their interests. Dur-
ing the interwar era, refugee associations and individual refugee delegates
often enjoyed of‹cial standing before their host governments and the
League of Nations.133 In France, “refugee of‹ces,” run by refugees them-
selves, played an important role in mediating between refugees and the
government until outlawed during the Vichy era. After a brief revival in the
early postwar period, they were de‹nitively suppressed and replaced with
an of‹ce run by the French government itself.134 Indeed, by 1945, the idea
that refugees and other foreigners were legitimate political subjects had
fallen decisively out of favor. This had much to do with the belief that po-
litical exiles contributed to international con›ict. Thus while postwar Eu-
ropean and international law did not oblige states to restrict the political
activities of refugees, in practice many states chose to do so.135
As foreign nationals, then, displaced persons were not entitled to par-
ticipate in German political life, presumed to be the exclusive preserve of
German citizens.136 Of course, it was widely understood that displaced per-
sons were not interested in participating in German politics. However, this
was precisely the problem. As was true of German refugees and expellees,
their preoccupation with “foreign” politics interfered with the creation of a
unitary national political space. Indeed, the American occupation author-
ities pursued similar policies toward both displaced persons and German
refugees and expellees. Both groups were forbidden from forming political
associations, though for different reasons. In the case of the German
refugees and expellees, the goal was to integrate them into the new body
politic.137 In the case of displaced persons, the goal was to keep them out-
side the body politic, segregating the DP problem from the German prob-
lem. As it became clear that a remnant of displaced persons would remain
in Germany, the boundary between these two problems could no longer be
maintained. Increasingly, both Allied and German of‹cials argued that if
displaced persons planned to remain in Germany, they should integrate
into German society or at least give up their privileges.138 However, plans
for integration did not include politics. Thus, although the Homeless For-
eigners Law in most respects made displaced persons equal to German cit-
izens, the right of political association remained a right of citizenship.
All this being said, the American occupation zone was clearly the
most hospitable site for DP politics. The U.S. authorities were widely per-
ceived as sympathetic to displaced persons’ fears of both communism and
antisemitism. According to Boris Balinsky, a Russian DP from the Soviet
Union, “in the American zone there was no compulsory repatriation.”139
As we have seen, this was not in fact true. Nonetheless, Balinsky’s claim at-
tests to the widely held perception that the U.S. zone was a haven for DPs.
The U.S. authorities were much more tolerant of DP committees than
their British and French counterparts, committed as they were to export-
ing the active welfare model of the New Deal and, more generally, the
American concept of democracy. By calling on displaced persons to orga-
nize and govern themselves, at least in the camps, they encouraged those
with political experience to take on the roles of spokespersons. As the
wealthiest of the western Allies, they could also provide DP committees
with more material support. Since in practice it was dif‹cult for U.S. and
UNRRA of‹cials to distinguish welfare and social activities from political
ones, not least because they lacked the linguistic skills to do so, displaced
persons in the U.S. zone had a good deal of room to engage in politics.
This paved the way for the development of a vibrant political life.
Chapter 2
Displaced Persons and the Question

of Persecution
Allied planning for the postwar had focused on displacement rather than
persecution or genocide. Thus, by the time Germany surrendered, the con-
cept of a displaced person was well de‹ned. However, this concept took lit-
tle account of why people had been displaced. In particular, it took little
account of displacement as a prelude to or consequence of persecution.
The end of the war revealed the scope of the persecutionary and extermi-
natory universe created by the Nazis. Yet there was no agreement on how
to address this legacy. Who were the victims of persecution? What counted
as persecution? How should the victims be compensated, and who was re-
sponsible for compensating them? These questions became the center of a
contentious debate involving the Allied occupation authorities, the inter-
governmental relief agencies, nascent German institutions, other Euro-
pean states, and the persecuted themselves. In the American zone, this de-
bate led to the development of a new administrative person: the persecutee.
Together with the displaced person, the persecutee became a focal point of
American efforts to make sense of National Socialism and redress its
wrongs. The emergence of the persecutee was thus intimately connected to
the process of Wiedergutmachung (formal legal restitution).1
The development of policies on persecution and Wiedergutmachung
in Germany is often examined as a narrowly German issue, with Germans
serving as the main framers (along with of course the Allies) and main
bene‹ciaries. In the early postwar period, however, foreigners made up the
vast majority of persecutees in Germany, not to mention the larger world.
In this chapter, I examine the development of persecution and restitution
policies from a DP-centric perspective. I consider how these policies
evolved out of debates over displaced persons, especially Jewish DPs, and
how they in turn rede‹ned what it mean to be a DP. I also consider how the
56
Displaced Persons and the Question of Persecution 57
status of the persecutee evolved between 1945 and the early 1950s, as occu-
pation gave way to limited West German sovereignty, and what conse-
quences this evolution had for displaced victims of persecution.
The development of persecution and restitution policies, I argue,
heightened victims’ expectations for formal recognition of their status, im-
mediate material assistance, and legal restitution. Increasingly, however,
displaced and foreign victims found themselves disadvantaged. Laws and
regulations on restitution, initially formulated in a broad and inclusive
manner, took on more restrictive form as time went on. Signi‹cant efforts
were made to recognize and compensate Jewish victims, but the victim-
hood of non-Jewish foreigners was often questioned. More generally, all
displaced victims, by de‹nition stateless, found that no one really repre-
sented their interests. This became increasingly true as the Americans with-
drew from German civil and political affairs in the late 1940s and early
1950s. However, the expectations created by the American occupation au-
thorities and nascent German institutions were not easily squelched. As we
will see in subsequent chapters, recognition, assistance, and restitution
would remain key preoccupations for many DPs, drawing on and in turn
shaping their understanding of National Socialism.
The Question of Persecution in Wartime Allied Planning
Allied DP policy, as we have seen, was organized around the principle of

nationality. Nationals of Allied countries were eligible for assistance, while
nationals of Axis countries were not. This principle was deeply problem-
atic when applied to concentration camp survivors and other individuals
persecuted by the Nazis, since many were nationals or former nationals of
Axis countries. If classi‹ed according to nationality, they would not qual-
ify for Allied assistance. They would be left to fend for themselves or to
seek help from their own governments, which often amounted to the same
thing. Indeed, the Allies initially gave little thought to the issue of persecu-
tion. As they grappled with this issue, the category of the persecutee came
into being, a kind of appendage to the displaced person but de‹ned in
terms of wartime experience rather than nationality.
The evolution of Allied thinking about persecution can be seen in the
succession of plans formulated during 1944 and 1945. The SHAEF Outline
Plan of June 1944, the earliest iteration of Allied DP policy, identi‹ed “po-
litical prisoners” and “deportees” as speci‹c categories of displaced per-
sons but did not establish criteria for their treatment.2 It only distinguished
between Allied and non-Allied DPs. Although all displaced persons were
placed under Allied authority, detailed instructions on treatment focused
on Allied nationals. Only they could be sure of receiving food, shelter,
medical attention, and help returning home. Subsequent documents rein-
forced and elaborated the nationality principle, especially the distinction
between Allied and non-Allied DPs. As the prospect of an Allied victory
drew closer, however, the question of persecution surfaced with greater ur-
gency. Attention focused on concentration camp prisoners. The Allies gen-
erally agreed that concentration camp prisoners fell into their sphere of re-
sponsibility. This sense of responsibility, especially strong among the
Americans, grew out of their stated commitment to destroying National
Socialism. Viewing the concentration camps as a fundamental feature of
the Nazi system, they believed that any program of denazi‹cation had to
include provisions for the liberation and rehabilitation of concentration
camp prisoners.3 From mid-1944 on, this relationship was implied in nu-
merous policy statements.
In seeking to formulate a policy toward concentration camp prison-
ers, Allied planners drew primarily on their experience with the German
refugee problem of the 1930s and 1940s, distilling from this experience an
individualized de‹nition of persecution centered on race, religion, and pol-
itics. This de‹nition had been articulated at the Evian Conference of July
1938, called by U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt to address the
German refugee problem. The conference broke decisively with the estab-
lished tradition of group ascription by proposing an abstract, universal
de‹nition of the refugee centering on the “fear of persecution.”4 The man-
date of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), created at
the conference, included “all persons, wherever they may be, who, as a re-
sult of events in Europe, have to leave, or may have to leave, their countries
of residence because of the danger to their lives, or political liberties on ac-
count of their political opinions, religious beliefs, or racial origin.”5 Pri-
mary emphasis was placed on the political quality of the refugees, even
though the vast majority of refugees from Germany and Austria were Jews
persecuted because of their “race.”
In the wake of the Evian Conference, the of‹cial representation of the
German refugee problem crystallized around the trinity of politics, reli-
gion, and race. The refugee problem was represented as a consequence of
Nazi persecution of political, religious, and racial “minorities” in Ger-
many itself.6 This view was not substantially altered by the events of the
war, including reports about mass murder in the occupied territories. “It
remains . . . a striking fact,” Constantin Goschler writes, “that even during
the war, the events in prewar Germany often had a much more prominent
place in the American imagination than the actual genocide.”7 The de‹ni-
tion of persecution articulated at Evian was also imported into Allied
planning for the liberation of concentration camp prisoners, who, in keep-
ing with the emphasis on political persecution, were often referred to as
political prisoners.8 Thus the text of the unconditional surrender of Ger-
many, agreed upon in July 1944, stipulated that in addition to releasing and
providing for United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, “the
German authorities will in like manner provide for and release all other
persons who may be con‹ned, interned or otherwise under restraint for po-
litical reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law, or regulation which
discriminates on the ground of race, color, creed, or political belief.”9 Here,
then, a category of protected persons was de‹ned in terms of persecution
rather than nationality. However, the Allies still thought primarily in terms
of assuring the nationals of “other” countries the same level of treatment
they demanded for their own military and civilian internees. In this respect,
the unconditional surrender was a transitional text.
Yet the documents drafted in the wake of the July 1944 unconditional
surrender text led to the formulation of a more robust and independent
conception of the concentration camp prisoner. Allied DP policy was
amended to include detailed instructions regarding political prisoners,
now identi‹ed as a uniquely important category of displaced persons.
De‹ned as “all persons in Germany, including enemy nationals, who have
been placed under restriction, detention, or sentence . . . on account of
their dealings or sympathies with any of the United Nations or because of
their race, language, religion, political opinions, or non-conformity with
Nazi practices,” they were assured basic services such as food, clothing,
and medical care.10 Similarly, the directive on military government issued
to General Eisenhower in April 1945, known colloquially as JCS 1067,
stated that all persons “detained or placed in custody on grounds of race,
nationality, creed, or political opinions” should be released and “treat[ed]
as displaced persons.”11 Here, then, the distinction between different na-
tionalities of prisoners was all but eliminated. Instead, the prisoners’ com-
mon identity as victims of persecution was stressed.
While discussions about persecution initially focused on the concen-
tration camps and political prisoners, during the last year of the war Allied
planners also began to look outside the camps and think about persecution
more broadly. This trend is re›ected in the revised SHAEF Plan of April
1945, which introduced important exceptions to the nationality rule. En-
emy and ex-enemy nationals who had been persecuted by the Nazis be-
cause of their race, religion, or political activities, interpreted as “activities
in favour of the United Nations,” were eligible for the same assistance of-
fered to UNDPs, provided that their “loyalty to the Allies” was not in
doubt.12 These individuals, no longer simply concentration camp prison-
ers, were called “persecutees.” They were considered “assimilated in sta-
tus” to UNDPs. Similar exceptions were made for nationals of neutral
countries and for stateless persons, many of whom were Jews forcibly de-
nationalized or denaturalized by Axis countries.
By April 1945, the focus of Allied DP policy had thus moved from dis-
placement to persecution. In doing so, it had explicitly adopted the lan-
guage of persecution developed to address the German refugee crisis. It
had also begun to think about persecution outside the concentration camp
system and outside the realm of the political, with the more broadly
de‹ned “persecutee” coming to replace the “political prisoner” as the dom-
inant referent in Allied discussions. Individuals targeted on the grounds of
race and religion were thus placed on more or less the same footing as po-
litical persecutees. However, a number of issues remained unresolved.
What “counted” as persecution? Was persecution synonymous with in-
ternment in a concentration camp? How, if at all, were individuals sup-
posed to prove that they had been persecuted? Was it enough to treat per-
secutees as displaced persons, or did they require special assistance? And
what about Jews, who were not only persecuted but singled out for de-
struction? These questions would become urgent after the liberation. In the
American zone, the issue of Jewish persecution would come to the fore,
propelling the formulation of a more robust policy toward persecutees, one
that de‹ned them as an especially entitled category of displaced persons.
The Harrison Report and the Rise of the Persecutee
The invention of the persecutee closed the loophole that excluded enemy
and ex-enemy nationals from Allied assistance, thus ensuring that they re-
ceived the same treatment as displaced persons. Although there was con-
siderable sympathy for persecutees, they were not singled out for special
treatment. This was not seen as a problem. Indeed, in granting citizens of
enemy countries the same status as displaced persons, the Allies considered
themselves generous, since DPs were entitled to a higher standard of living

than the German population. Writing in August 1945, General Eisenhower
insisted that his of‹ce “makes no differentiation in treatment of displaced
persons.”13 He considered this “non-discrimination” policy laudable.
However, numerous reports submitted during the ‹rst few months af-
ter the liberation suggested that displaced persons and persecutees in the
American zone were not enjoying a higher standard of care than the Ger-
man population. Rather, their living conditions were often terrible. The
most scathing of these reports was the one submitted by Earl G. Harrison
to U.S. president Truman in August 1945.14 Under pressure from American
Jewish groups, Truman had appointed Harrison, Dean of Law at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania and a representative of the IGCR, to make a tour
of the DP camps and report on the problems facing nonrepatriable and
stateless DPs. He was instructed to focus in particular on Jewish DPs. In
his preliminary report of July 1945, Harrison described the conditions in
the DP camps as dismal. The overarching focus on mass repatriation had
led to the neglect, in some cases deliberate, of displaced persons who could
not or would not return home. The situation of Jewish DPs was especially
grim. As a consequence of their more severe victimization, Harrison wrote,
“their present condition, physical and mental, is far worse than that of
other groups.”15 Yet American DP policy, with its strict nationality cate-
gories, was not prepared to accommodate this fact. In a passage that has
been widely cited ever since, Harrison compared American practices to
those of the Nazis.
As matters now stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis

treated them except that we do not exterminate them. They are in con-
centration camps in large numbers under our military guard instead
of S.S. troops. One is led to wonder whether the German people, see-
ing this, are not supposing that we are following or at least condoning
Nazi policy.16
In order to remedy this grim situation, Harrison urged the president to

make a number of changes to the way displaced persons were treated. First
and foremost, he urged him to recognize Jews as a separate group.
While admittedly it is not normally desirable to set aside particular

racial or religious groups from their nationality categories, the plain
truth is that this was done for so long by the Nazis that a group has
been created which has special needs. Jews as Jews (not as members of
their nationality groups) have been more severely victimized than the
non-Jewish members of the same or other nationalities.17
Harrison also urged the president to consider immigration to Palestine as

a solution for those Jews who did not wish to return home. He offered this
suggestion, he said, “on a purely humanitarian basis with no reference to
ideological or political considerations.”18
Truman responded promptly to Harrison’s report. Writing to Eisen-
hower on August 31, he reiterated that American policy on persecutees was
a critical element of denazi‹cation. “I know you will agree with me,” he
stated,
that we have a particular responsibility towards these victims of per-

secution and tyranny who are in our zone. We must make clear to the
German people that we thoroughly abhor the Nazi policies of hatred
and persecution. We have no better opportunity to demonstrate this
than by the manner in which we ourselves treat the survivors remain-
ing in Germany.19
Technically, Truman argued, U.S. of‹cials merely had to be more diligent

in implementing extant policies. In truth, however, the Harrison Report
prompted important changes to how both Jewish and non-Jewish DPs in
the American zone were treated. In the months following the report, mate-
rial conditions for all DPs were improved. Jews were recognized as a dis-
tinct group of displaced persons, and separate camps were established for
Jews who did not wish to be repatriated.20 The camps were placed under
the direction of Jewish personnel and Jewish agencies, in particular the
American Joint Distribution Committee, known colloquially as the Joint.
A discussion about immigration opportunities to Palestine began, leading
to the formation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in the fall
of 1945. Special bene‹ts for persecutees were also introduced. By the end
of October 1945, these included supplementary rations;21 priority in hous-
ing, including housing outside of camps;22 and priority in employment
over (nonpersecutee) German nationals.23
At ‹rst, only Jews who found themselves in the U.S. occupation zone
in the summer of 1945 were able to bene‹t from these changes. However,
the Harrison Report also set the stage for a broader policy collectively
de‹ning Jews as victims of Nazi persecution. This became relevant as large
numbers of Jewish refugees from Poland and other eastern European

countries began arriving in the fall of 1945. Although American of‹cials
contemplated closing the borders to the “in‹ltrees,” they never took this
step. Rather, in keeping with Truman’s commitment to help European
Jews, they maintained an open-gate policy, tacitly tolerating postwar Jew-
ish migration.24 American directives issued in December 1945 stated that
Jewish in‹ltrees were to be accepted into the DP camps.25 By August 1946,
it was de facto American policy to recognize all Jews as persecutees.26 This
policy was formalized in December 1947.27
American policies toward Jewish survivors established the U.S. zone
as a hospitable place for the remnants of European Jewry. The U.S. zone
emerged as the most important way station of the Zionist underground
movement, whose objective was to funnel Jews from eastern Europe to
Palestine.28 Some Jewish DPs apparently also believed that if Palestine re-
mained unreachable, a Jewish state would be set up for them in Bavaria.29
As outlandish as such an idea might seem today, it suggests the mythical
status that the U.S. zone attained in the aftermath of the Harrison Report.
With Truman supporting Harrison’s suggestion of emigration to Palestine,
the U.S. zone seemed to offer not only a temporary haven but also a hos-
pitable staging ground for the Zionist project of creating a Jewish state.
Indeed, above and beyond the material improvements it introduced,
the Harrison Report marked an important shift in the way American
of‹cials thought about Jews. Now Jews were distinguished from other
refugees and de‹ned as a paradigmatic group of victims. As Daniel Cohen
argues, they “were not merely perceived as ‘war victims’ deserving of hu-
manitarian relief but also as unique targets of racial and political persecu-
tion, warranting historical recognition.”30 At the Evian Conference, gov-
ernments had been unwilling to recognize Jews as a distinct persecuted
group and had insisted on viewing them as nationals of their respective
states. Here this was no longer the case. Jews were decoupled from their cit-
izenship status and placed on a par with the of‹cial nationalities. The
recognition of Jews as a nation of persecutees thus had an important po-
litical component. For this reason, Dan Diner suggests that the Harrison
Report should be seen as an important moment not only in Jewish DP his-
tory but in Jewish history more generally.
Neither Truman nor any other American of‹cial went as far as to re-
fer to Jews as a distinct nationality. The concept of nationality remained
tied to membership in a recognized state, and Jews remained subordinated
to the existing nation-state order in a number of important respects. Most
important, Soviet Jews were still in theory subject to forcible repatriation.

Further, recognition of a separate Jewish group did not imply support for
the creation of a Jewish state. Truman was not a supporter of Jewish inde-
pendence; his actions were motivated by humanitarian and domestic polit-
ical considerations.31 Nonetheless, as Diner suggests, the Harrison Report
opened the door to a new perception of the Jews as a political nation. This
nationalization of the Jews on the international stage was a great boon to
Zionists. Its local effects on politics in the Jewish DP camps and commu-
nities will be discussed later on.
Although its most momentous consequences concerned the percep-
tion of Jews, the Harrison Report also represented an important shift in
American thinking about victims of persecution more generally. For the
‹rst time, persecutees were recognized as a distinct segment of the postwar
population. De‹ned by their fate under National Socialism, they were
granted special treatment in the form of material bene‹ts. These bene‹ts
marked them out as a privileged group. Extending the individualized con-
ceptions of persecution introduced by legal scholars in the 1930s, the per-
secutee policy of the Americans served as the gateway to the development
of a new, individualized, and ostensibly “universal” de‹nition of the
refugee centered on persecution. This de‹nition would be incorporated
into the 1946 IRO Constitution and, most important, into the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It thus came to
serve as the de‹nition of the refugee.32
For non-Jewish persecutees, however, the new de‹nition of persecu-
tion posed a problem, as it meant they had no a priori claims to persecutee
status and were obliged to present their cases individually. Indeed, unlike
the old nationality categories, the new de‹nition of persecution placed a
greater burden of proof on the individual. A fundamental incongruity
thus existed in U.S. policy, with group and individual de‹nitions of perse-
cution existing side by side. There was considerable disagreement about
what non-Jewish claimants had to demonstrate. Con›ict centered around
the concept of political persecution. This was the broadest and most mal-
leable term, since it was capable of serving as a covering term for many
types of persecution. Precisely for this reason, it was subject to constant
rede‹nition, with the general aim of limiting the number of people who
quali‹ed for persecutee status.
U.S. of‹cials were in fact concerned about the consequences of their
persecutee policy. They worried that “undeserving” individuals might try
to take advantage of their generosity. As a September 1946 report on dis-
placed persons stated, “the ‹nancial and economic advantages of ‘DP’s,’

particularly in the ‘persecutee category,’ are so great within the U.S. Zone,
in view of their privileges and priorities, and the terri‹c shortages of the es-
sentials of life, that neither Military Government nor the German econ-
omy can afford to tolerate spurious claimants to the status of ‘DP’s.’”33
More generally, they worried that persecutees would become a special, and
especially entitled, social group in Germany, something they did not want
to see happen.34 As a Military Government of‹cial noted in 1948, “the plan
of special assistance for persecutees was established initially as a tempo-
rary expedient only for use during the unstable post-war period, the inten-
tion being that as quickly a possible a policy would be established . . . re-
quiring that all public assistance be granted on an individual basis and
according to the applicant’s need, without reference to political, racial, or
religious af‹liations.”35 In particular, U.S. of‹cials believed the persecutee
program stimulated German hostility toward the persecuted, especially
foreign Jews. “Inevitably, so long as special groups are singled out for spe-
cial treatment by the German governments,” a Military Government
of‹cial stated in July 1948, “they will draw upon themselves anger and crit-
icism from those persons not receiving special attention. Certainly in the
case of United Nations DPs under PCIRO [Preparatory Commission for
the International Refugee Organization] the charges of blackmarketing
and lawlessness are extremely prevalent among the Germans.”36 American
Military Governor Lucius Clay shared this opinion, arguing that the best
solution was to integrate both German and DP persecutees “into the Ger-
man economy on an equal footing with other citizens of Germany.”37
In practice, the bene‹ts of persecutee status, like the bene‹ts of DP sta-
tus, often proved to be illusory. Although Jewish DPs hailed the Harrison
Report and Eisenhower’s directives as an important victory, the changes
were not as dramatic as they would have wished.38 Speaking in November
1945, Jewish DP leader Zalman Grinberg argued that Eisenhower’s direc-
tives “had no consequence.”39 Many Jews who were not concentration
camp survivors found it dif‹cult to gain persecutee status, because military
and UNRRA authorities continued to associate persecution with intern-
ment in a concentration camp.40 Writing in March 1946, the Central Com-
mittee of Liberated Jews argued that American policy decisions were not
being carried out and that “in practice, . . . the political, moral, and eco-
nomic interests of the Jews are being sacri‹ed [sic] in favour of the german
[sic] population. The result is that the situation of the Jews is deteriorating
daily.”41 The persecutee policy remained a temporary measure grafted onto
the DP program, with its emphasis on national af‹liations and a uniform

standard of care, as well as its ultimate goal of repatriation.
Administering and Representing Persecutees
Throughout the occupation period, the U.S. Military Government main-

tained ‹nal authority over persecutees in its zone.42 Unwilling to entrust
the Germans with important decisions about persecutees, U.S. of‹cials de-
termined who was eligible to be considered a persecutee and what kind of
assistance persecutees would receive. From the beginning, however, the
Military Government also delegated authority to other agencies, using na-
tionality as the key criterion. UNRRA and later the IRO assisted United
Nations and stateless persecutees, though they were generally unwilling to
help DPs who lived outside of camps. After the Harrison Report, Jewish
DPs were recognized as a special group of persecutees, and the Joint
largely replaced UNRRA as the main agency providing them with care.
German persecutees, including German Jews, were seen as the responsibil-
ity of the German authorities. The latter were supposed to ensure that
German persecutees were treated at least as well as UNDPs. Thus, al-
though the invention of the persecutee had ostensibly made persecutees of
all nationalities equal, when it came to providing assistance, nationality in
fact remained central. German and non-German persecutees emerged as
separate groups within the larger category. This distinction initially worked
against German persecutees, who could not directly draw on the resources
of the occupation authorities. Increasingly, however, it would be displaced
persons who were disadvantaged, shut out of German-directed plans for
assistance and restitution.
Although the development of persecutee policy was driven largely by
the Americans, German impulses were also important. During the war
years, many exiled and imprisoned members of the German opposition for-
mulated plans for the postwar reconstruction of Germany; the rehabilita-
tion and especially restitution of political prisoners were important compo-
nents of these plans.43 Grassroots German efforts were central in providing
assistance to persecutees in the immediate aftermath of the liberation.
Among the earliest organizations to help survivors of persecution were the
so-called care centers (KZ-Betreuungsstellen). These locally based organiza-
tions were usually run by liberated political prisoners, sometimes indepen-
dently, sometimes under the auspices of the municipal government or pri-
vate agencies like the Red Cross. They assisted survivors, for the most part
Germans, who had been persecuted on account of their race, religion, poli-
tics, and worldview, providing them with immediate assistance in the form
of food, clothing, housing, and health care, and with documentation in the
form of certi‹cates that identi‹ed them as “bona ‹de” liberated prisoners.
They also sought formal restitution for victims of Nazi persecution.44
These local initiatives of the ‹rst hour were eventually supplemented
by state agencies. In Bavaria, a State Commission for the Care of Jews was
established in October 1945. Designed to help German Jews, it also offered
assistance to Jewish DPs who lived outside of camps.45 A State Commis-
sion for Political Persecutees was established in March 1946. Its mandate
covered individuals targeted because of their politics, religion, or world-
view.46 Both of‹ces employed their own guidelines in deciding who was a
persecutee. In September 1946, the two of‹ces were merged into the State
Commission for Racial, Religious, and Political Persecutees. Philipp Auer-
bach, a concentration camp survivor from a prominent German-Jewish
family, was chosen to head the new of‹ce.47 Like its predecessors, it pro-
vided aid to both Germans and free-living DPs.48 In fact, although the
original goal was to help persecuted Germans, by January 1947 the major-
ity of the 38,000 persecutees receiving assistance from the commission
were non-Germans.49 Most were Jewish DPs who lived outside the camps.
In October 1948, after the passage of the General Claims Law, the State
Commission for Racial, Religious, and Political Persecutees was closed
and replaced with a State Of‹ce for Restitution, which in November 1949
was again transformed into the State Compensation Of‹ce.
Designed to help persecuted Germans, the succession of agencies that
Auerbach presided over were also important resources for persecuted DPs.
However, Auerbach’s attitude toward the displaced was ambivalent. On
the one hand, he worked tirelessly on behalf of persecutees, insisting that
they be formally compensated for their losses. He was also one of the
strongest contemporary voices against antisemitism. He established a close
working relationship with the Central Committee of Liberated Jews and
played an important role in mediating between Jewish DPs and the Bavar-
ian authorities.50 On the other hand, he had little sympathy for the sepa-
ratist aspirations of the displaced. He thus refused to assist persecutees
who lived in DP camps, and actively encouraged displaced persons to ei-
ther leave Germany or accept German authority.51 Although he worked
closely with Jewish DP leaders, he did not support their demands for Jew-
ish autonomy and disliked their confrontational style of politics, which he
viewed as an incentive to antisemitism and a challenge to his own author-

ity.52 His attitude toward non-Jewish DPs was decidedly hostile. In his
opinion, the non-Jewish foreigners claiming persecutee status were “pre-
cisely the [concentration camp] guards and such people.”53 He stated
openly that he considered non-Jewish DPs “far more dangerous” than
their Jewish counterparts.54 In December 1947, he instituted screenings for
all foreign persecutees, under the pretense that numerous foreigners were
falsely claiming persecutee bene‹ts.55
As a division of labor between the Military Government, UNRRA,
and German agencies was worked out, organizations created by persecu-
tees themselves found themselves increasingly marginalized. The care cen-
ters and committees created by persecutees after the liberation initially en-
joyed considerable respect and authority. The persecutee certi‹cates issued
by the care centers and committees were recognized by both the American
and German authorities. They could be used to demonstrate one’s status as
a bona ‹de former concentration camp prisoner and to access various
bene‹ts, such as priority in housing or entrance to a DP camp.56 As the au-
thorities gained greater control over the situation in Germany, persecutee
organizations came to be viewed as unnecessary and undesirable. The
certi‹cates handed out by the care centers and committees diminished in
value, no longer viewed as reliable evidence of persecutee status.57 The fact
that some organizations continued to provide their constituents with doc-
umentation was viewed as a serious problem.58
Indeed, American occupation of‹cials did not generally permit perse-
cutees to establish or maintain their own organizations. This policy was an
extension of their belief that measures to assist persecutees were tempo-
rary and that persecutees should not be encouraged to develop a distinct
group consciousness. Governor Clay felt strongly that the interests of Ger-
man persecutees should be represented by the established political par-
ties.59 Foreign persecutees, on the other hand, were subject to the same re-
strictions on political activities as other foreigners. American occupation
of‹cials eventually permitted German persecutees to form their own orga-
nizations, the most important being the Association of Persecutees of the
Nazi Regime (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes, or VVN), an
ostensibly nonpartisan organization that represented racial, religious, and
political persecutees, though it was largely dominated by politicals. They
also recognized the Central Committee of Liberated Jews on a strictly non-
political basis. However, they remained opposed to other groups. So too
did Auerbach. Like DP organizations more generally, the organizations
created by displaced persecutees could not operate legally. Thus displaced

persecutees had few legitimate means of representing their interests. Build-
ing on the underground organizations they had established during the war
years, and on their early postliberation experiences in self-administration
and self-representation, they would ‹ght an uphill battle to gain a voice in
determining their own affairs. The vagaries of this process will be explored
in later chapters.
As the process of returning political authority to the Germans gained
momentum during the late 1940s, responsibility for persecutees shifted
from the American Military Government to German agencies. The initial
hesitation to entrust important decisions to the Germans faded. By Janu-
ary 1949, Military Government of‹cials had concluded that since both
German agencies and the IRO were centrally involved in helping persecu-
tees, it could “no longer insist that determination of persecutee status be
reserved to the occupation authorities.”60 In Bavaria, this meant the State
Commission on Racial, Religious, and Political Persecutees gained more
authority over persecutees. Thus foreign persecutees were increasingly be-
holden to German of‹cials for recognition of their status and for the
bene‹ts associated with it. This shift especially affected foreigners who
lived outside the camps, since they did not generally receive Allied assis-
tance. However, persecutees who lived in DP camps were also affected by
the shift. Although the IRO continued to provide them with assistance, it
did not have the right to issue persecutee certi‹cates or otherwise legally es-
tablish their status as persecutees. As the IRO itself noted, this left open a
“strong possibility of grave injustices and undeserved discrimination for
those individuals under the International Refugee Organization man-
date.”61 This would indeed turn out to be the case. As responsibility for all
persecutees shifted to German agencies in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
DPs who did not already have the “right” documentation found it dif‹cult
to prove they were victims of persecution. This put them at a disadvantage
in terms of restitution. Thus, whereas persecutees who lived in DP camps
were initially more privileged than other persecutees, their status deterio-
rated in tandem with the growth of German sovereignty.
Wiedergutmachung and the DP Exception
Running parallel to and overlapping with efforts to establish guidelines

for the treatment of persecutees were efforts at formal legal restitution or
Wiedergutmachung. The restitution legislation that was passed in Ger-

many in the early postwar period placed various restrictions on displaced
persons and other foreign claimants. Its interpretation by the courts was
also restrictive.62 Motivated by ideological, political, and ‹nancial consid-
erations, these restrictions made it dif‹cult for foreigners to gain restitu-
tion. Displaced foreigners were doubly disadvantaged, as they not only
suffered the restrictions placed on all foreigners but also lacked a state to
represent them.
Like taking care of persecutees, restitution stood high on the Allied
agenda in 1945. Within the American camp, there were differences of opin-
ion on the matter. The State Department tended to view restitution as a
moral issue that re›ected on the international standing of the U.S. govern-
ment. Its view took in all persecutees in Germany. The American Military
Government, on the other hand, tended to view restitution within a do-
mestic German framework.63 It focused primarily on German persecutees.
It saw restitution, like the persecutee program more generally, as a thera-
peutic device: a means of making up for and canceling out the material
losses that German persecutees had suffered, thereby helping them to be-
come “normal” citizens of postwar Germany. It was not inclined to con-
cede that persecutees enjoyed a right to restitution. In particular, it was not
willing to concede that active opponents of the Nazi regime had earned the
right to a special position within postwar Germany on account of their
sacri‹ces. This attitude became more prominent as time went on and con-
cern for reestablishing a stable postwar order took the place of concern for
the victims.64
Re›ecting the division of the country into occupation zones, the ear-
liest restitution legislation was formulated on the Land and zonal levels. In
Bavaria, which took the lead in Wiedergutmachung, two laws were espe-
cially important. The ‹rst was Law No. 9 of October 1945, which ad-
dressed “physical disabilities sustained as a result of treatment under the
national-socialistic system.”65 Building on the wartime plans of Wilhelm
Hoegner, the Social Democratic justice minister (later minister-president)
of Bavaria, it sought to compensate individuals who had suffered physical
disabilities according to the existing system of workers’ compensation. The
second was Law No. 35 of August 1946, which announced the building of
a “special restitution fund.”66 The fund was designed to help individuals
“who ha[d] suffered injuries to their health, their life, their freedom, or
their property under the National Socialist tyranny on account of their
race, religion, political convictions or worldview [Weltanschauung].” Indi-
viduals who quali‹ed could receive various kinds of ‹nancial assistance,

including a short-term pension and funds to cover the costs of health care,
professional education, or the establishment of a business. While Law No.
9 was speci‹c to Bavaria, Law No. 35 applied to all of the Länder of the
U.S. zone.
Although foreigners were not explicitly excluded from either law, the
restrictions placed on eligibility sharply limited the number of foreigners
who could bene‹t. These restrictions, which focused on domicile (Wohn-
sitzprinzip), increased over time. Thus, for example, Law No. 9 initially
de‹ned the group of eligible persons in exceptionally broad terms. It ap-
plied to all individuals who had been mistreated because of their race,
creed, nationality, political opinions or af‹liation, or “activity hostile to
the National Socialist state,” as well as prisoners of war and deported for-
eign workers. Indeed, the law explicitly stated that “[deported] foreign
workers have all rights equal to those of German insured persons.” How-
ever, a clause introduced in May 1946 limited compensation to injuries suf-
fered in Bavaria. This included injuries acquired by individuals interned in
Bavarian concentration camps on political grounds, so long as they were
domiciled in Bavaria at the time they submitted their claims.67 Thus in-
juries sustained outside of Bavaria, or on nonpolitical grounds, were ex-
cluded. Even more restrictively, the bene‹ts of Law No. 35 were limited to
individuals who had been domiciled in Bavaria at the time they ‹rst suf-
fered their injuries, though the injuries themselves could have been suffered
elsewhere. A revision to Law No. 35 in August 1947 made it possible for
stateless individuals who had last been domiciled in Bavaria to qualify for
assistance and allowed the State Commissioner for Racial, Religious, and
Political Persecutees to make exceptions for individuals who had been liv-
ing elsewhere in the Reich at the time they ‹rst suffered injuries, so long as
they were now domiciled in Bavaria.68 However, these revisions, designed
to open the fund to German refugees from the East, did not substantially
alter the situation of non-German claimants, since most had never lived in
the Reich.69 In practice, moreover, current domicile was often more impor-
tant than previous domicile. Thus State Commissioner Auerbach, dis-
cussing which DPs could bene‹t from the special restitution fund, made a
critical distinction between camp and noncamp DPs: only DPs living “in
the German economy”—that is, outside the camps—quali‹ed for aid.70
Implicitly, then, living in a camp was not considered living in Bavaria itself.
These early acts of legislation, Laszlo Schirilla notes, “were not ‘com-
pensation’ in the sense of the later compensation laws. Nonetheless, they
already contained within them the kernels of the idea of compensation.”71

The ‹rst real restitution law in the U.S. zone was the General Claims Law
(Entschädigungsgesetz) of August 1949. Drafted by a special commission
of the State Council (Länderrat) under American oversight and modeled
on Law No. 35, the General Claims Law was a far-reaching act of legisla-
tion.72 For the ‹rst time, victims of Nazi persecution were recognized as
having a right to compensation. Following closely the wording of Law No.
35, the new law de‹ned as eligible anyone “who had been persecuted under
the National Socialist tyranny . . . because of his political convictions, on
the grounds of race, of belief, or of worldview.”73 It provided compensa-
tion for a wide variety of damages, grouped into three main categories:
personal damages (life, body, health, and freedom); damages to property
and assets; and professional damages, or what were referred to as damages
to the means of making a living (wirtschaftliches Fortkommen). As had
been the case with previous legislation, however, eligibility was circum-
scribed according to domicile. Only individuals who were domiciled or re-
siding in the U.S. zone on January 1, 1947, as well as emigrants who had last
lived in the U.S. zone, were eligible for compensation. A special clause ad-
dressed the situation of displaced persons who lived in camps. They were
deemed eligible only if they integrated into the “legal and economic order
of the state” within a year after the law went into effect or left the country.
Displaced persons already living outside the camps came under the normal
residency clause. However, like DPs who lived in camps, they were ex-
pected to provide additional proofs of integration. In short, the law de-
manded that displaced persons give up the bene‹ts of DP status in order to
qualify for compensation. Although camp-based DPs were not explicitly
excluded, the nature of camp life, with its distinct Allied-sponsored regime
of care and control, made it extremely dif‹cult for camp-based DPs to
demonstrate integration.
However, one should not think that the primary purpose of these pro-
visos was to encourage DPs to integrate into German society. Just the op-
posite: by making it dif‹cult for displaced persons to qualify for compen-
sation, policymakers hoped to provide displaced persons with incentives to
emigrate. They were especially eager to get rid of Jewish DPs. Tasked with
making this happen, State Commissioner Auerbach established a special
of‹ce to expedite the settlement of Jewish DP claims. Those who were will-
ing to emigrate would receive priority in the handling of their claims for
compensation for imprisonment (Haftentschädigung). A mix of ‹nancial
considerations and antipathy toward Jewish DPs motivated the expedited
process, as a statement by Richard Ringelmann, secretary of state for

‹nances in the Bavarian government, makes clear. “The reason [for priori-
tizing DP claims],” Ringelmann explained in 1954,
was that at that time every DP cost us, all told, 3 to 400 Marks a
month for food, housing, care, guards, etc. and that nonetheless the
DPs could not be prevented from constituting a lasting threat to pub-
lic security. . . . It was, of course, claimed that it’s unfair to process
DPs ‹rst. But in this way 80,000 people could be eliminated [entfernt]
from the country for 500 Marks each.74
Other German authorities, including the police, assisted in this process of

“elimination” by falsifying documents.75
Although the extra demands placed on displaced persons made it
dif‹cult for them to qualify for compensation, their inclusion in the Gen-
eral Claims Law was itself an achievement. Excluded from the version of
the law written by the Länderrat, they were brought back in only after con-
siderable pressure on the Military Government by the IRO and Jewish or-
ganizations.76 Displaced persons quickly sought to take advantage of the
law. As Constantin Goschler noted, the high number of compensation
claims ‹led in Bavaria—177,000 at the end of 1952, representing fully 64
percent of all claims in the U.S. zone—is surely due to the large number of
Jewish and other DPs there.77 However, the subsequent implementation of
the General Claims Law, as well as its interpretation by the courts, again
undermined many claims. In particular, new hurdles were placed in the way
of non-Jewish foreigners. The key hurdle was contained in a concept intro-
duced shortly after the passage of the General Claims Law: the “national
persecutee” (Nationalverfolgter). According to this legal novelty, created
primarily to thin the ranks of Polish DP claimants, non-Jewish foreigners
had been persecuted on account of their nationality or as a threat to secu-
rity, not on political grounds. Thus their persecution could not be ascribed
to speci‹cally National Socialist aims. Undergirding this distinction be-
tween political and national persecution was the idea that politics was lim-
ited to the internal affairs of a state. Thus foreigners who had resisted the
Nazis had not really resisted National Socialism as a political system;
rather, they had resisted Germany as an occupying foreign power.78
The restrictions introduced in the General Claims Law were solidi‹ed
by later legislation, notably the second Federal Compensation Law of June
1956. Like the General Claims Law, the Federal Compensation Law intro-
duced various quali‹cations for DP claimants. Only displaced persons who

left the country or placed themselves under the jurisdiction of the German
authorities quali‹ed for compensation. Similarly, convention refugees and
stateless persons quali‹ed for certain kinds of compensation, so long as
they did not receive assistance for their injuries from other states or from
intergovernmental organizations like the IRO. Here too, then, non-Ger-
man claimants ran up against the obligation to demonstrate integration
into German society.79 Indeed, going beyond the General Claims Law, the
Federal Compensation Law explicitly stated that “residence in a DP camp
[is] not regarded as domicile or permanent residence.”80 At the same time,
it made some concessions to national persecutees. Although not consid-
ered real persecutees, they were eligible for compensation if they were con-
vention refugees or stateless persons who had sustained a permanent in-
jury. The idea was to accommodate individuals who stood no chance of
bene‹ting from reparations, that is, the settlement of war damages between
states. Nonetheless, most claims put forward by non-Jewish DPs under the
Federal Compensation Law were rejected, as had been most claims in the
U.S. zone.
The introduction of restrictions on national persecutees placed all for-
eigners at a disadvantage. However, they especially disadvantaged dis-
placed persons, who, unlike nondisplaced foreigners, could not access the
political and material resources of their home state. From the perspective
of German policymakers, the most appropriate way of addressing the
claims of national persecutees was through reparations. Yet since displaced
persons were effectively stateless, they could not bene‹t from reparations
agreements. West German of‹cials were well aware of this fact and ex-
ploited it to their advantage. Excepting concessions such as the highly con-
ditional inclusion of national persecutees in the Foreign Compensation
Law, they consistently rejected demands to compensate displaced persons
on the grounds that they had no legal obligation to consider individual
claims. “That the stateless lack protection as regards the restitution of the
damages in›icted upon them by Germany,” a representative of the Federal
Ministry of Justice argued in June 1950, could not be attributed to dis-
crimination on the part of the West German government. Rather, “[it] is
due to their general lack of protection.”81 Or, as an of‹cial of the Finance
Ministry put it laconically, “The stateless have always been in a disadvan-
taged position; it is one of the unfortunate consequences of their status.”82
Many victims of Nazi persecution had hoped that the end of the war
would bring a quick and just settlement of their claims for restitution. Al-
though wartime Allied planners were slow to address the problem of per-
secution, the steps taken in Germany in the early postwar period created
high expectations. In the American zone, where the problem of persecution
received the greatest attention, persecutees were not only assimilated to the
status of DPs, they were elevated to a higher status, one coupled with spe-
cial material bene‹ts. Jews were recognized as a nation of persecutees. The
development of restitution legislation also spurred hopes for a just com-
pensation. The ‹rst steps toward restitution were in fact generous, as evi-
denced by the expansive conceptualization of persecutees in the Bavarian
compensation law of October 1945. However, restitution legislation
quickly took on a more restrictive cast. Limitations on eligibility according
to pre- and postpersecution domicile restricted the number of foreigners
who could qualify. Although these restrictions applied to all foreigners—
indeed, the place-based conceptualization of the foreigner meant that
many Germans were also excluded—they were applied to displaced per-
sons in an especially peculiar manner. Even though they lived in Bavaria—
or, as the case may be, in the U.S. zone and in Germany—displaced per-
sons were excluded by virtue of the fact that they lived under the Allied
regime of care and control.
The restrictions placed on displaced persons and other foreigners re-
veal that Germans in the emerging Federal Republic lacked any sense of
responsibility for the injuries these people had suffered during the Nazi
era.83 A sense of responsibility was especially underdeveloped when it
came to displaced persons. Since most DPs lived in isolated settlements,
Wolfgang Jacobmeyer observes, it was easy for Germans “to view the DPs
as a burdensome problem of occupation rather than a consequence of
[Nazi] German policy.”84
The fact that displaced persons represented the groups on the lowest
rungs of the Nazi racial hierarchy—Jews and Slavs—is also signi‹cant.
Antisemitic and anti-Slavic prejudices—often presented, in the postwar
era, as concerns about DP criminality—mingled with deep resentment at
the costs of supporting the DP population. German politicians, lawyers,
and judges tried to limit their responsibility for persecuted DPs in a num-
ber of ways: by encouraging Jewish DPs, whose claims to persecutee status
they could not dispute, to emigrate; by demoting non-Jewish DPs, whose
claims to persecutee status they could dispute, to the status of national per-
secutees; by exploiting the statelessness of the displaced; and by making
restitution contingent on proofs of integration.
However, the restrictions placed on displaced persons and other for-
eigners were not only the product of an underdeveloped sense of responsi-

bility on the part of postwar Germans. They also re›ected the Allied-
American division of labor in the care of displaced persons and persecu-
tees. Established at the beginning of the occupation period, this division of
labor initially worked to the advantage of displaced persecutees. As the
transfer of authority to the Germans accelerated, their position deterio-
rated. Resentful of the costs associated with maintaining the DP popula-
tion and of the limits on their authority over DPs, German politicians and
policymakers were not inclined to grant persecuted DPs the same bene‹ts
as persecuted Germans. Although many DPs, especially displaced Jews, in
fact received assistance from German agencies for persecutees, these agen-
cies were beholden to higher powers with much less sympathy for the per-
secuted, especially the foreigners among them. The American Military
Government also demonstrated little interest in addressing the claims of
persecuted DPs. It viewed displaced persons as an army problem, one dis-
tinct from the German problem. More generally, it saw persecutee policy
as an issue of care rather than rights. Thus, as long as the persecuted were
adequately cared for, the issue of rights was secondary. The limits of this
approach became clear in the late 1940s, as German agencies were given le-
gal authority to grant persecutee status while the IRO was not.
The General Claims Law, and even more so the Federal Compensa-
tion Law, marked important junctures in the process by which authority in
western Germany was transferred from the Allies to the Germans. Like
other developments of the era, these laws were viewed as important tests of
Germany’s ability to create a just social and political order. American oc-
cupation of‹cials were unwilling to involve themselves too heavily in craft-
ing legislation. After the passage of these laws, they largely withdrew from
persecutee affairs. This withdrawal had a negative effect on the status of
displaced persecutees. Yet the expectations created by early American and
German policies on persecution were not easily squelched. As we will see
in subsequent chapters, many displaced persons identi‹ed strongly as vic-
tims of National Socialism. By creating frameworks for addressing the
legacy of Nazi persecution, American and German of‹cials encouraged
these identi‹cations, inviting displaced persons, especially former concen-
tration camp prisoners, to put forward a wide range of claims for recogni-
tion, assistance, and restitution. The recognition of Jews as a nation of
persecutees had perhaps the most wide-ranging effects, spurring hopes not
only for a just compensation but also for recognition of Jewish demands
for statehood. As Wolfgang Jacobmeyer suggests, the policy changes intro-
duced in the American zone heightened Jewish expectations and encour-

aged Jewish DPs to articulate new demands.85 Thus, although displaced
persecutees, like other displaced persons, were not authorized to create
their own associations or to otherwise engage in politics, in fact American
and German policies on persecution encouraged them to organize and rep-
resent themselves. A new arena for political engagement emerged.
Chapter 3
The Repatriation Debate

and the Anticommunist
“Political Explanation”
While Allied planners were establishing the framework of care and control
for displaced persons and persecutees, DPs were themselves debating the
future. The majority took for granted that they would soon return home
and that their time as displaced persons would be short. Some, however,
were adamantly opposed to the idea of return, while many others were un-
certain. Repatriation thus became a contentious issue of debate. In and
through this debate, there developed a population of displaced persons
who, to use the language of the time, were “nonrepatriable.” This hap-
pened against the wishes of the occupation authorities, who wanted to see
displaced persons return home as soon as possible. Nonetheless, the west-
ern Allies, and especially the Americans, also unwittingly encouraged this
development. The (relatively) generous assistance and protection the
Americans offered displaced persons and persecutees provided a material
basis for existence and facilitated the formation of myriad committees. In-
side the camps, it was possible to develop not only cultural and social or-
ganizations but also overtly political ones. Similarly, the tolerant attitude
shown by the American authorities toward antirepatriation sentiment gave
displaced persons unof‹cial license to agitate. The U.S. zone thus became
a space of lively debate about repatriation and its alternatives.
This chapter examines the repatriation debate among Polish, Ukrai-
nian, and Russian DPs. The hallmark of this debate was the development
of what UNRRA of‹cials called the “political explanation”: an explana-
tion grounded in political opposition to the Soviet Union and commu-
nism. This explanation took on different forms in each group. Polish DPs
stressed their opposition to returning to a Poland occupied by “the Rus-
81
sians” and dominated by communists. Ukrainian DPs opposed both Rus-

sian and Polish “occupation” and expressed their desire for an independent
Ukrainian state. Russian DPs focused on what they saw as the un-Russian
Bolshevik leadership of the Soviet Union. These differences in emphasis
not only re›ected disparate national constructions, they also implied na-
tional con›ict. Anticommunism and nationalism were closely intertwined.
However, there was also considerable overlap, re›ecting the histories that
Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians shared as citizens of Poland and the So-
viet Union. More generally, those who opposed repatriation shared one
thing in common. They identi‹ed themselves as refugees from communism
rather than—or in addition to—victims of National Socialism. They
posed the single largest threat to the repatriation program, both numeri-
cally and politically.
In their identi‹cation as refugees from communism, Polish, Ukrai-
nian, and Russian DPs differed fundamentally from their Jewish neigh-
bors. Jewish DPs were often also anxious about returning to communist-
and Soviet-dominated countries. Many had spent the war years in the
Soviet East, where, although safe from Nazi persecution, they had en-
dured extreme hardship, including forced labor. As Michal Borwicz
notes, they “wished to put as much distance as possible between [the So-
viet Union] and themselves.”1 Jewish DP newspapers reported regularly
on the political transformations taking place in eastern Europe and were
generally unsympathetic to “Moscow.” For some Polish Jews, the main
motive for leaving postwar Poland was Sovietization rather than anti-
semitism.2 However, Jewish DPs rarely identi‹ed antipathy to the Soviet
Union or communism as a reason for opposing repatriation, and anti-
communism did not become a focal point of their self-understanding.
Certainly, they were not inclined to make common cause around this is-
sue with other DPs, who, as we shall see, were often both anticommunist
and antisemitic.
By the time UNRRA of‹cials conducted the ‹rst systematic repatria-
tion poll in mid-1946, the repatriation debate had largely concluded. Pol-
ish, Ukrainian, and Russian DPs had established the institutional frame-
works for a life “in emigration.” The political explanation had taken on
de‹nite form. Indeed, some form of the political explanation had become
each group’s of‹cial representation. However, this result was less the ex-
pression of national unity than of successful projection on the part of DP
elites. Beneath the surface, multiple con›icts and differences remained.
The Repatriation Debate and the Anticommunist “Political Explanation” 83
The Development of the “Political Explanation”
American occupation of‹cials, like their counterparts in the British and

French zones, were hesitant to admit that displaced persons did not want
to return home. Over the course of the second half of 1945, however, evi-
dence of antirepatriation sentiment mounted. As early as July 1945, a U.S.
Military Government of‹cial in Munich reported that “our program now
is getting geared for the ‘static population,’ contingent as that may be upon
political arrangements.”3 A U.S. Army intelligence report submitted that
same month noted that a surprisingly large number of Soviet DPs were re-
luctant to return home. According to a former DP camp commandant, this
reluctance “seemed generally attributable to a feeling . . . that they could
enjoy a greater degree of personal independence outside of, rather than in-
side Russia.” He surmised “that a taste of freedom had been furnished [to
the Soviet DPs] through the fact of American liberation (if not, indeed, in
the very experience of forced labor for the Germans); and that in this gen-
eral ›avor of emancipation, the remembered repressions of life in Russia
were rendered distasteful.”4 Another U.S. Army intelligence report, sub-
mitted in January 1946, focused on antirepatriation sentiment among Pol-
ish DPs in the town of Murnau, on the edge of the Bavarian Alps. “Prin-
cipal reasons for not wanting to return is [sic] fear of arrest and
deportation east.”5 This fear was due to a story about a repatriant who had
been put on a train for Siberia.
Although displaced persons offered many reasons for opposing repa-
triation, political reasons increasingly came to the fore. According to Wolf-
gang Jacobmeyer, by October 1945, “among large groups of DPs, repatria-
tion was no longer self-evident, as the occupation authorities still naively
believed. The DPs no longer made their decisions with an eye towards the
available means of transportation or their individual state of health.
Rather, political determinants had moved into the foreground.”6 The cen-
trality of the political dimension can be seen clearly in the results of the
UNRRA repatriation poll of May 1946. Conducted in the three western
occupation zones, the poll was the ‹rst (and last) systematic sounding of
the DP population. It asked DPs three questions. What was their national-
ity? Did they want to return home? And if not, why not? Answers were
submitted anonymously.7 The results revealed not only broad popular op-
position to repatriation but also the extent to which opposition had come
to be de‹ned in political terms.
According to a summary analysis of the three western occupation

zones, some 82 percent of displaced persons polled were opposed to re-
turning home. These DPs, UNRRA argued, could be further divided into
two main groups, western and eastern Europeans. Western Europeans
foregrounded personal and economic factors, “while the Eastern Euro-
peans generally fall back on political factors as their primary explanation.
The Eastern Europeans seem to show a real fear in their replies, the fear in-
creasing the further east the home of the voter.”8 The director of the Funk
Caserne DP camp in Munich offered a similar analysis of the results in his
camp. Some 75 percent of DPs in Funk Caserne opposed repatriation. “Of
those who voted ‘no,’” he wrote, “the majority come from countries now
controlled by Russia. These people voted almost unanimously against re-
turn—giving as their reasons their fear of persecution, their dislike of
communism, and Soviet terrorism. A great number of them indicated their
belief that Stalinism is no better than Nazism. Many stated that they had
fought and suffered to obtain democracy, only to ‹nd a new terrorism in
their land under the Soviets.”9 Deviating from this general East-West
breakdown were Jewish DPs, who focused on the fear of persecution, the
loss of family members, and the desire to emigrate to Palestine.
UNRRA further broke down the results of the poll by nationality,
creating separate categories for Poles, Polish Ukrainians, and Russians.
Among Polish DPs, political objections predominated. “The three basic
complaints, repeated again and again,” UNRRA noted, “were the ‘pres-
ence of Russians in Poland,’ ‘the Communistic Warsaw government,’ and
‘the lack of personal freedom in Poland.’”10 Comments quoted from the
ballots substantiate this conclusion. They included statements such as
“The Russians are dominating the Polish government”; “Uncertain situa-
tion in Poland. The presence of Soviet Army is dangerous to the freedom
of my country”; and “I don’t agree with the policy of the Government and
the persecution of the church and the lack of private property and free-
dom.” Although political objections predominated, economic concerns
were also prominent. As UNRRA noted, Polish DPs had considerable ac-
cess to information from family, friends, correspondence, and the news me-
dia. “From these sources, they receive a description of destruction in the
towns and cities, shortages of food, clothes, and housing, unemployment
and the general economic insecurity of life in present-day Poland.”11
Signi‹cantly, Polish DPs in the French zone placed greater emphasis on
economic factors. This difference, UNRRA suggested, had to do with the
fact that many Poles in the French zone worked in the German economy.
They therefore enjoyed greater economic security. Other comments sug-

gested primarily personal and familial reasons for refusing repatriation.
One person wrote, “I am ill and tired after the hard work in Germany,”
while another commented, “I can’t ‹nd my family.” Past experiences of
persecution were also mentioned. One DP commented, “I have been per-
secuted by the Communists and condemned for exile to Siberia. I don’t
want to try to live under the communists again.”
Among Polish Ukrainians, political reasons ‹gured even more promi-
nently. “Like the Poles,” UNRRA wrote, “they give mainly political rea-
sons for not wanting to return home but they are generally more violent in
their attacks on Russia, and express fear of forced labor conditions, even
‘deportations to Siberia,’ should they dare to return.” One DP wrote, “My
homeland is at present occupied by Soviet Russia, which follows the policy
of general terror against those who are opposed to the communistic sys-
tem. They persecute religion (Greek-Orthodox); bishops and priests are
sent to Siberia. . . . Because of these reasons I will not return.” Some “com-
pared ‘Bolshevik totalitarianism’ with Nazism.” Others cited previous ex-
periences of Soviet persecution. One Ukrainian wrote, “Two of my broth-
ers were killed. My parents died in jail after being there a long time. My
brother was sentenced to forced labor.” A number of DPs highlighted reli-
gious persecution. Finally, many cited the desire for an independent
Ukrainian state. Indeed, UNRRA argued, “the constant dissemination of
nationalistic propaganda has completely alienated [Ukrainian DPs] from
the idea of adherence to either Poland or Russian [sic], and thereby has
eliminated all chance for a voluntary repatriation.”12 This factor was evi-
dent in the conduct of the repatriation poll itself. Initially, UNRRA had
planned to organize DPs according to their of‹cial nationality categories.
After Ukrainian DPs protested, it agreed to create a separate category for
Polish Ukrainians. It continued to include Soviet Ukrainians in the Soviet
category, which, ironically, it labeled the “Russian” category.
Like Polish and Polish Ukrainian DPs, Russian DPs also voiced wide-
spread political opposition to repatriation. A preliminary report con-
cluded that “these are all anti-Soviet Russians and object to Communism,
dictatorship, and persecution.”13 The ‹nal report provided a more nuanced
analysis. It broke Russian DPs down into three groups. The ‹rst two
groups, old émigrés and new émigrés, were labeled political refugees. They
“express[ed] a hatred for Communishm [sic] and the ‘dictatorship’ in Rus-
sia.” The third group consisted of individuals with “personal reasons for
not going home, such as illness or marriage to Germans, Poles, or other
D.P.’s.” Criticism of communism also predominated in the quotations

from the ballots. One DP wrote, “The Soviet regime is not a Russian gov-
ernment. The main idea of the Soviet government is a world revolution.”
Another stated, “In the Soviet Union there is no free work nor any private
property. There is only forced, slave-like labor in the kolchoz . . . and in the
factories or businesses, all run by the Government.” Yet another concluded
that “Communism is even worse than Naziism [sic].”
Although the repatriation poll con‹rmed that there was widespread
opposition to repatriation, UNRRA of‹cials were not sure how to interpret
this fact. They did not doubt that eastern Europeans were afraid of return-
ing home. “Nevertheless,” they wrote, “there is reason to believe that,
among many of these people, the political explanation serves merely as a
convenient justi‹cation and cover for underlying motives which are essen-
tially personal and economic.”14 It was possible, moreover, that displaced
persons merely gave what they thought was “the most acceptable answer.”15
The Polish vote struck UNRRA as especially dubious. As a preliminary re-
port noted, “team directors differ as to the interpretation of this vote. Some
take it at its face value, some think it a blind to hide the real reasons—pres-
ent comfort and indolence,—a few lay it to propaganda.”16 Indeed, the pat-
terned nature of Polish responses led UNRRA to suspect that “the voters
have been propagandized, either in the past, or that there was a planned
campaign on the part of their leaders to furnish the D.P.s with the same an-
swers for the poll.”17 While some Polish DPs had “an ideological concep-
tion of Poland as a ‘free democracy’” and believed they could better serve
their country in emigration, many others, per UNRRA, lacked “mature po-
litical opinions” and were “subject to outside in›uences.” They also had “a
strong patriotic feeling for Poland, regardless of her political complexion.”
Thus it might be possible to convince them to return home—if they were
“removed from the political in›uences hindering their repatriation.”18
Historians are also divided in their assessments of the political expla-
nation. Many take for granted that Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians were
vehemently opposed to communism. Anna Jaroszynska-Kirchmann ar-
gues that “a uniformly hostile attitude towards Communism, the Soviet
Union, and the Warsaw regime, de‹ned the political ideology of Polish
DPs.”19 Similarly, Mark Wyman states that “behind [displaced persons’]
fears of repatriation, in the inner recesses of each DP’s memory, were ex-
periences under communism.”20 Yet as Wyman himself notes, the issue of
displaced persons was for years “immersed in East-West tensions.”21 Such
tensions have informed the perspective of historians. Viewing hostility to-
ward Soviet rule as self-explanatory, they tend to draw overly broad con-
clusions about anticommunist sentiment. A very different approach is of-
fered by Wolfgang Jacobmeyer. In his analysis of Polish DPs, Jacobmeyer
acknowledges that many Poles had legitimate reasons for not returning
home. Nonetheless, he believes that most lacked the ability to make an in-
formed and independent political decision and were motivated primarily
by concerns about material security and fear of punishment. In his assess-
ment, the political explanation was “little more than a convenient borrow-
ing from the line of argumentation put forward by the occupation author-
ities and the international relief agencies.”22
It is indeed doubtful that Polish and other DPs were motivated pri-
marily by political objections. However, it is not clear how much the dom-
inance of the political explanation had to do with the in›uence of the oc-
cupation authorities and organizations like UNRRA. At the time the poll
was conducted, the political explanation had not yet become part of
of‹cial public discourse. While many American of‹cials were sympathetic
to anticommunism, they did not openly promote it, since they did not want
to antagonize the Soviet Union. UNRRA of‹cials, for their part, were
strong advocates of repatriation. While some were sympathetic to anti-
communism, many others respected the Soviet Union and admired its con-
tribution to the war effort.23 They also tended to believe that each individ-
ual “rightfully” belonged in his or her country of origin.24
More in›uential, in my estimation, were the arguments put forward
by DP elites. As UNRRA of‹cials frequently complained, antirepatriation
activists engaged in vigorous “propaganda” campaigns. Directed at other
displaced persons and at the authorities, these campaigns included formal
speeches, informal conversations, newspaper articles, and lea›ets. They
also included subtle and not-so-subtle pressure to publicly support the
antirepatriation and anticommunist positions. To an impressive extent, the
political explanation offered during the repatriation poll reproduced key
points articulated by anticommunist activists. It re›ects their efforts to
build a consensus against repatriation by amplifying the fears and anxieties
coursing through the larger DP population and channeling them in the di-
rection of opposition to repatriation. It also re›ects their efforts to frame
the multiple concerns that DPs had in an explicitly anti-Soviet and anti-
communist manner. Of course, many DPs did not need convincing, having
experienced the brutalities of Soviet rule ‹rsthand. Nonetheless, DP elites
were essential in creating a global framework for individual concerns, one
that edited out “merely” personal or economic considerations as well as
politically problematic ones such as fear of retaliation for collaboration.

They were also essential in broadcasting this framework to the larger DP
community and the world beyond. This framework was publicly convinc-
ing because it resonated both with the contemporary emphasis on political
persecution and with latent anticommunism. Thus, although the political
explanation did not originate with the Allied authorities, it resonated pre-
cisely because it emphasized political objections rather than economic or
personal ones.
All the same, the political explanation was not the product of an a pri-
ori consensus. Behind the image of unity were debates among DPs with a
wide range of positions on repatriation and the postwar political order
more generally. These debates were most intensive among displaced Poles,
where the elites represented a broad political spectrum, less so among dis-
placed Ukrainians and Russians, where the elites represented a narrower
range of political positions and had greater leverage to push the antirepa-
triation agenda.
Anticommunism and Nationalist Ambivalence

among Polish DPs
Polish DPs were deeply divided over the repatriation question. While many
were vehemently opposed to returning home, many more were ambivalent
about remaining in Germany. During the ‹rst year after the liberation,
they tested the prospect of a life “in emigration.” The centerpoint of de-
bate was the “Polish question”: the future of the Polish state. The situation
at war’s end was unclear. Polish Communists, backed by the Soviet Union,
had a monopoly of power. There were disturbing reports about the arrest
and execution of members of the Home Army, the largest Polish resistance
organization, allied with the London government. At the same time, the
new provisional government, framed as an antifascist union, included
some London Poles, notably Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, leader of the popular,
peasant-based Polish People’s Party. The free elections called for at Yalta
had yet to take place. The uncertainty of the situation created anxiety
among Poles in Germany. Delays in repatriation gave them ample time to
contemplate the future. Many waited to see what would happen in the elec-
tions, which ‹nally took place in June 1946. As Communist control over
the country solidi‹ed, Poles who had previously thought of returning
home began to question their decision. Political lines became more sharply
drawn. Both the new Warsaw and the old London governments sent liai-
son of‹cers to the DP camps, the former to convince DPs to return home,
the latter to convince them of the opposite.25
The ‹rst Polish DP committees were created in this uncertain climate.
Formed in the immediate aftermath of liberation in locales throughout
Bavaria, the committees were dedicated to two main tasks: self-help and
self-representation.26 The Polish Committee in Munich, established in May
1945, was one of the ‹rst. With the tacit approval of the Americans, it func-
tioned as a central distribution point for food and other supplies. It main-
tained registers of Poles in Bavaria and operated a tracing bureau that sent
notices about missing persons to of‹ces throughout Europe. It worked
closely with organizations from Polish communities in England and the
United States, in particular the London-based Polish Red Cross. It also
represented Polish DPs before the American occupation authorities and
UNRRA. According to Janusz Nel Siedlecki, it “was recognized as an
unof‹cial Consulate and, trusted by both sides, formed a bridge between
the Americans and the Poles.”27
The internal history of the Munich Polish Committee suggests the
›uid situation at the end of the war and the increasing link between asso-
ciational life and opposition to repatriation. The committee had close ties
to both the prewar Polish government and the communal structures cre-
ated by Polish political prisoners in Dachau. Its ‹rst head, Mieczyslaw
Grabinski, was a former high-ranking member of the Polish foreign ser-
vice, who had served as the Polish Consul General of Munich until Sep-
tember 1939. In April 1941, Grabinski was arrested by the Gestapo and sent
to Dachau, where he was active in the Polish underground.28 Upon his re-
turn to Munich, he reclaimed the Polish consulate building and, with the
permission of the American Military Government, put it at the disposal of
the Polish Committee.29 A loyal servant of the Polish government-in-exile
and a stalwart anticommunist, he continued to view himself as the Polish
government’s of‹cial representative in Munich, even after the Allies
of‹cially recognized the Lublin Committee. In 1949, he moved to London,
where he was closely associated with the circle of Polish expatriates loyal to
the government-in-exile and where he continued his work on behalf of for-
mer political prisoners.30
Although Grabinski was clearly a partisan of the government-in-exile,
the Polish Committee initially included Poles of various political persua-
sions, some opposed to repatriation, some not. Some of its most active
participants, like the Dachau survivor Walter Hnaupek, eventually re-
turned home. Over time, however, it emerged as a clear opponent of the

new Communist-dominated Polish government. Especially after many
Poles returned home in the spring and summer of 1946, it lost its character
as an association representing the spectrum of the wartime Polish resis-
tance. By the fall of 1946, UNRRA authorities were calling its opposition
to the new Polish government a “serious deterrent to repatriation in the
Munich area.”31 A few months later, in early 1947, U.S. censors identi‹ed it
as a distribution point for materials about Poland “expressing anti-Russian
attitudes.”32 As the occupation authorities continued to press for the repa-
triation of all displaced persons and as the new Soviet-backed Polish gov-
ernment became recognized as the legitimate representative of the Polish
people, the Polish Committee found it increasingly dif‹cult to operate.
As associational life became more closely linked to opposition to
repatriation, more elaborate institutional structures developed. Building
on local initiatives, Polish DPs created regional, zonal, and national orga-
nizations, with separate departments for things such as welfare, education,
legal affairs, and so forth. In December 1945, the Association of Poles in
Germany was founded, soon to be renamed the Polish Union in the Amer-
ican Occupation Zone of Germany (Zjednoczenie Polskie w Amerykan-
skiej Stre‹e Okupacji Niemiec). It was based in Regensburg. One month
later, the Polish Union in Germany was founded. Covering the U.S and
British zones, it was headquartered in the town of Blomberg in the British
zone and initially headed by Zygmunt Rusinek, a former member of the
Polish Sejm. In 1951, as the German government gained responsibility for
displaced persons, it was renamed the Union of Polish Refugees in Ger-
many (Zjednoczenie Polskich Uchod›ców w Niemczech). Membership in
the Polish Union was based on an ethnonational concept of Polishness, en-
compassing all Polish DPs “irrespective of their national [i.e., citizenship]
status.”33 According to Anna Jaroszynska-Kirchmann, the Polish Union
“consciously supported the implementation of the ideals of the exile mis-
sion.”34 However, it held out hope that this mission would soon come to an
end. As late as 1948, the president of the Polish Union in the U.S. zone,
Stanislaw Mikiciuk, expressed the opinion that the United States would
soon recognize the London government-in-exile as the legitimate govern-
ment of Poland.35 Indeed, the Polish Union had close ties to the govern-
ment-in-exile and to Polish organizations in Great Britain. In this regard,
the associational life of Polish DPs was better integrated into a larger dias-
poric structure than the associational life of Ukrainian and Russian DPs,
who lacked a diasporic center.
Debates about repatriation were framed by awareness of the tradi-

tions of the Polish Great Emigration of the nineteenth century. According
to Michael Marrus, the Polish nationalists who ›ed the Russian empire af-
ter the failure of their insurrection in 1831 were “among the ‹rst political
outcasts to de‹ne a distinct refugee identity for themselves.”36 The tradi-
tions they developed were predicated on the idea of Poland as a nation in
exile. “By reconceptualizing the nation as a spirit or an ideal,” Brian Porter
writes, “these Poles could sustain their national identity without depending
upon the immediate reestablishment of the state.”37 The traditions of the
Great Emigration provided Polish DPs with a framework for reconciling
their commitment to Poland as a nation with rejection of the Polish state.
According to Anna Jaroszynska-Kirchmann, these traditions were “well
known and respected” among Polish DPs.38 To be sure, not all displaced
Poles were intimately familiar with the literary and artistic work produced
by earlier generations of exiles. Knowledge and respect were greatest
among the intelligentsia. Nonetheless, most displaced Poles were familiar
with some of the exile tradition, which permeated Polish popular culture.
In his autobiographical novel Felda‹ng, the Polish Jewish survivor Simon
Schochet re›ects on this fact and its consequences.
Of all of us here [in the DP camp], the Poles are probably the most
prepared to live in exile. One has only to listen to their songs and mu-
sic to be aware of this startling fact. Their national anthem was com-
posed in Italy and was the marching song of the Polish legions who
fought in the Napoleonic Wars. Their mazurkas were immortalized by
Chopin, who composed them as an exile in France, and the currently
popular song, “The Red Poppies of Monte Cassino,” is the latest tes-
timony to the Poles’ eternal struggle for freedom, not only their own,
but other nations [sic] as well.39
The traditions of the Great Emigration thus provided Polish DPs with a
narrative framework that other groups with less well-developed—or less
well-appreciated—exile traditions lacked.
A closer look at how the repatriation debate unfolded can be gained
by following Polish concentration camp survivors from Dachau to the DP
camps and communities around Munich, where they merged with Poles
liberated from other concentration camps and from forced labor. Camp
survivors were among the most active participants in the repatriation de-
bate, and among the most politically active more generally. After libera-
tion, many wondered who was supposed to represent them: London or

Warsaw? Tensions over the future surfaced in the meetings of the Dachau
International Prisoners’ Committee (IPC) and in various postliberation
festivities. While some Poles participated in the international May Day cel-
ebration, many others focused their efforts on May 3, Poland’s Constitu-
tion Day. The Polish Committee of Dachau was itself split into two camps
along this line.40 The latent con›ict between these camps is re›ected in a
speech given by Antoni Czerwinski, publisher of the Polish Committee’s
of‹cial newspaper, on the occasion of May 3. Czerwinski’s speech focused
principally on the events of the recent past, in particular the sacri‹ces and
sufferings of the Polish prisoners in Dachau and the Polish nation as a
whole. However, it also touched on Poland’s political future. Linking past
and future, Czerwinski depicted national independence as both the reason
and the reward for wartime sacri‹ce and warned about what he saw as re-
newed threats to Polish freedom.
[We] loudly and clearly af‹rm:

that Poland has a right . . . to partake of the fruits of victory, has the
right to an independent and unfettered existence.
It is not right and is an offence to eternal divine fairness, is an injury
to and a trampling of the cardinal principles of international rela-
tions, is for us Poles more horrible than the tyrannical thoughts of the
Germans, for Poland to become dust behind the doors, when all of the
countries of the world decide their own fate.41
A more direct reference to the threat of communism was contained in

Czerwinski’s statement, reproduced in capital letters in the printed version
of the speech, that “the third of May was always the Day of Indepen-
dence.” Here Czerwinski implicitly contrasted the Polish national celebra-
tion of May 3 to the May Day celebration organized by the IPC and sug-
gested that Poles who celebrated May Day were betraying the Polish
nation. From his perspective, the May Day celebration was not an expres-
sion of antifascist unity but rather an af‹rmation of Soviet communism
and its efforts to dominate Poland. The contrast was all the more pointed
because May 3 commemorated the signing of the 1791 constitution, seen
an act of Polish self-assertion against Russian autocracy.
Similar themes run through Slowo Polskie, the of‹cial Polish newspa-
per of the Munich-Freimann DP camp, a former SS barracks on the north-
ern edges of the city, where Polish survivors of Dachau were housed along
with other liberated Poles. Although the paper faithfully reproduced

UNRRA’s policy statements on repatriation, its editorials and essays pro-
vided a critical assessment of the repatriation program and suggested that
the true Polish community was the one taking shape beyond the borders of
Poland. A November 1945 article on “freedom in central Europe” af‹rmed
the duty of Poles to their country but voiced its opposition to the idea of
return. Placing the fate of Poland in a broader central European context, it
accused the Soviet Union, which it identi‹ed with “asiatic totalism,” of
wanting to colonize the entire region.42 Similarly, a January 1946 article
about a meeting of the Polish Committee with a representative of the Pol-
ish repatriation mission in Warsaw gave voice to the fears that many Poles,
especially Polish concentration camp prisoners, had about being arrested
on returning home. Playing on the knowledge that the new government’s
leadership was drawn largely from Polish Communists who had spent the
war years in the Soviet Union, the article insinuated that the Warsaw Poles
were merely Russian Bolsheviks who could not speak a word of Polish. Af-
ter sitting in the fascist concentration camps, one Polish DP stated, he had
no desire to experience “red fascism.”43
This is also the position taken retrospectively by Janusz Nel Siedlecki,
another concentration camp survivor liberated at Dachau. In his memoir,
he focuses at length on the mood of Polish concentration camp survivors
in the Munich-Freimann DP camp. He suggests that the survivors as a
group were de‹ned by opposition to the new political order in Poland.
In prisons, in camps, we all dreamt of the END, of return to the loved

ones and ‹nding all as it had been before September ’39. The end had
come but it shattered our dreams just as thoroughly as the invader had
shattered our towns. The French and the Dutch departed to their own
free lands. But our Allies, those who went to war for our freedom, . . .
they sold in Yalta, to the other invader, our birthright and our Polish
lands. So we, the ›otsam and jetsam of the war, stayed in the SS uni-
forms, in the SS barracks . . . and grumbled about the soup.44
For Siedlecki, the new political order represented something more than a
change in Polish government. It signaled the introduction, or rather persis-
tence, of foreign domination. Echoing Czerwinski’s May 3 speech,
Siedlecki emphasizes that national liberation was the central goal of the
wartime resistance. The return of which he dreamed was a return to the pe-
riod of Polish national independence rather than a speci‹c prewar political
order. There is no mention of the authoritarian governments of the 1930s.

Siedlecki’s opposition to the new order is even more evident in his descrip-
tion of the liaison of‹cers sent by the new provisional government in War-
saw. Here Polish nationalism combines with anxieties about Russian
in›uence and power.
Then came the “Polish” liaison of‹cers ›aunting the new uniforms
with the Eagles no longer bearing their crowns. Though two centuries
had passed since Poland ceased to be a monarchy, the national em-
blem always retained the crown. Now these men displayed the muti-
lated device and talked to us in atrocious Polish full of Russicisms.
With promises of generous land grants they repatriated a number of
peasants, but, despite of‹cial pressure, the attitude of the majority re-
mained such that these of‹cers did not venture into the camp without
an American escort.45
For Siedlecki, the representatives of the Warsaw government do not qual-

ify as Poles. They are Russian ambassadors, bearing the message of domi-
nation rather than national revival. The speci‹c political and economic
programs of the government they represent are entirely secondary—only
the mention of land grants suggests there might be something in it for the
Poles themselves. It is enough that they are backed by the Soviets, who,
Siedlecki consistently refers to as “the Russians,” thereby stressing conti-
nuity with the former czarist rulers of Poland.
Although Siedlecki suggests that the Poles in the DP camps were
united in their opposition to the new Polish government and thoroughly
committed to the exile mission, other sources suggest a mood of uncer-
tainty and hesitation. Among them, surprisingly, is the memoir of
Mieczyslaw Grabinski, the head of the Polish Committee in Munich.
Published in 1946, the memoir covered the war years and the early post-
war period. In the ‹nal chapter, entitled “In the Ruins of Munich, Symbol
of the National Socialist Movement,” Grabinski examined life after the
liberation. Drawing inspiration from the romantic tradition that had nur-
tured Polish nationalism during the nineteenth century, he depicted him-
self as a solitary wanderer in a nocturnal city. He described himself sitting
on a bench on the bank of the Isar River that runs through Munich, con-
templating the future. He summarized his options in a self-consciously el-
liptical fashion.
I looked at the sky, towards the northeast, at the ‹ery evening glow
there and there felt my heart and soul being torn apart—to my Coun-
try and my family.
I looked at the sky, towards the west, where the west-moving sun
was and a wave of sadness fell over my soul, doubt and unease entered
my heart.46
In Grabinski’s narrative, East and West constituted the two principal op-
tions. Both were unsatisfactory. Although the East-West opposition invites
political interpretation—one thinks in particular of the opposition be-
tween Warsaw and London—the dominant emphasis here is on a senti-
mental distinction between home and away. Despite his loyalty to the Lon-
don government-in-exile, his patriotism pulled him in the opposite
direction, leaving him uncertain about the future. At least, his uncertainty
serves as a rhetorical af‹rmation of his commitment to Poland. In the clos-
ing sentences of the book, his situation remained unresolved: “My wan-
derings in the time of that ‘historic turn,’ which began on the ‹rst of Sep-
tember 1939, had not yet led me to a point of exit. I walked on by myself
. . . with further hope and faith in a better Tomorrow for mine and myself
. . .”47 As the use of multiple ellipses suggests, Grabinski’s narrative refused
closure. Thus Munich was not a destination but rather a no-man’s-land be-
tween East and West, the site of his indecision. Being a displaced person
meant being a wanderer. In this manner, Grabinski adapted the romantic
nineteenth-century language of exile to the twentieth-century predicament
of the displaced person.
While Grabinski’s memoir suggests that even committed anticommu-
nists were unsure of how to approach the Polish question, it ultimately
af‹rms the exile tradition. A more critical meditation on the repatriation
debate is provided by Tadeusz Borowski. One of the leading lights of early
postwar Polish literature, Borowski is best known for his stories about
Auschwitz, which will be discussed in chapter 7. He also wrote a number of
stories about displaced persons in postwar Germany, which, like the
Auschwitz stories, drew on his personal experiences. After his liberation
from Dachau, he spent a year in Germany as a displaced person, living ‹rst
in the Munich-Freimann DP camp and then in Munich proper, where he
worked for the Polish Committee. He was good friends with Janusz Nel
Siedlecki. Increasingly, however, he found life as a displaced person in Ger-
many unbearable. In a manner reminiscent of Grabinski, he described Mu-
nich as a dead city and Germany a dead country. “One lives there as on a
desert island,” he wrote to his ‹ancée in April 1946, “without time, without
money.”48 In May 1946, he returned to Poland. Although he eventually be-
came a member of the Polish Workers Party—that is, the Communist
party of Poland—and to some extent a party hack, his decision to return
was more a sign of resignation than a vote for the new Poland. As he wrote
to his ‹ancée on the eve of his departure, “I don’t know how I’ll manage or
what will become of me. It’s of no interest to me!”49 In July 1951, at the age
of twenty-nine, he committed suicide. The reasons for his suicide remain
unclear.50
In one of his most elaborate DP stories, “The Battle of Grunwald,”
Borowski closely examines the con›ict over the Polish future. Set in an
abandoned SS barracks-turned-Polish DP camp near Dachau in the sum-
mer after the liberation—the model here is clearly Munich-Freimann—the
story traces the fate of a group of Polish concentration camp survivors.
They are preparing to celebrate an important national holiday, the an-
niversary of the 1410 Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg), in which Polish-
Lithuanian forces defeated the Knights of the Teutonic Order, thereby
de‹nitively halting their eastward expansion. However, the Grunwald cel-
ebration is marred by growing tensions among the Poles. In the overheated
atmosphere of the barracks, guarded from the outside by American sol-
diers with guns, the group disintegrates into opposing political factions.
The London camp is represented by the lieutenant, a staunch anticommu-
nist who passes his time reading a German book about the Katyn massacre
that he has presumably rescued from the former SS library. The strongest
partisan of Warsaw is the Communist Stefan, a simple soldier. The con›ict
between the two camps, as soon becomes apparent, is both personal and
ideological. Thus Stefan accuses the lieutenant and the other of‹cers of
stealing food and keeping German mistresses while he goes hungry. He re-
minds the lieutenant of how he fed and cared for the Polish of‹cers in the
concentration camp. Yet as the narrator tells us, Stefan himself had been
the leader of the most privileged block in the camp, where “soup by the
barrel and loaves of bread by the dozen wandered around the Lager in
search of cigarettes, fruit, and meat for the block leader. This Stefan now
bragged that he had saved the lives of a couple of Polish of‹cers from the
Uprising who, today, refuse to give him in return his ‹ll of soup.”51 Stefan’s
con›ict with the of‹cers thus hinges not only on different political alle-
giances but also on the reversal of fortune he has suffered since the libera-
tion—in part because of his communist politics.
Observing these con›icts with a certain ironic detachment is the

story’s eponymous narrator Tadeusz. For him the differences between the
London and Warsaw Poles are only super‹cially signi‹cant, as both war-
ring parties are united by a passionate, even hysterical (histeryczny) com-
mitment to the Polish cause.52 Their battle for control of the Polish nation
is itself represented as something comically, even tragically Polish. “But
our Pole, our brother,” one of the of‹cers bemoans, “is ever stupid. He
wants to drown his brother in a spoonful of water.”53 Polish nationalism is
thus portrayed as essentially self-destructive. This is perhaps nowhere bet-
ter illustrated than in Tadeusz’s description of what the Poles have done to
the SS barracks.
After the departure of the lawful residents—SS of‹cers who fell on

the ‹eld of glory in the battle by the barracks, or ran back to their
families, or occupied the places vacated by us in Dachau—there re-
mained only a double-doored cupboard by some miracle not totally
destroyed by the “Ausländer” who, scarcely liberated from the camp,
burst, at war’s end, into the abandoned barracks, smashed out all win-
dows, chandeliers, mirrors in the lavatories and bathrooms; took cam-
eras apart until nothing remained; bashed in the teeth of the hospital’s
x-ray machine; set ‹re to cars, motorcycles, and cannons in the garage;
stealing ammunition, blew up a part of the barracks’ wall; broke the
more eye-catching mahogany sitting-room furniture to pieces, and,
‹lling toilet bowls to the brim with human waste, left singing national
anthems.54
The former prisoners’ destruction of the remnants of Nazism, with which

the reader might well sympathize, thus proves to be nothing more than a
senseless orgy of destruction, dressed up as patriotism. The Grunwald cele-
bration itself is represented as the height of nationalistic kitsch: a garishly il-
luminated stage decorated in red and white, in the center of which there ap-
pears “the Republic,” a buxom blond chanteuse in folkloric dress attended
by an entourage of young boys carrying symbols of the Polish nation.
The hysterical nationalism of both warring factions is contrasted with
Tadeusz’s own desires. Tadeusz dreams of escaping to “the West,” where he
wants to live “without a camp, without an army, without patriotism, with-
out discipline, normally, not for show! Not to take soup from a barrel, not
to think about Poland.”55 He wants to be a “man” rather than a “Pole.” Yet
Tadeusz has been traumatized by his concentration camp experiences. De-
spite his ironic demeanor, he is afraid to leave the DP camp. Here at least,
he knows where his next bowl of soup is coming from. Indeed, his one at-
tempt at leaving ends in disaster when his companion, a young Polish Jew-
ish woman, is shot and killed by American soldiers. He thus resigns himself
to remain as the other Poles prepare either to return to Poland or to leave
for Italy, where the remnants of General Wladyslaw Anders’s army are sta-
tioned, waiting for an opportunity to liberate Poland.
Borowski’s story highlights the ambiguity of the distinction between
London and Warsaw. It deconstructs the oppositions employed by both
camps—on the London side, between national liberation and foreign dom-
ination; on the Warsaw side, between authoritarian capitalism and demo-
cratic socialism—and suggests that they are united by their devotion to na-
tionalism, portrayed as a form of collective hysteria. It also suggests that
they have both been compromised. Stefan’s Communist sympathies are be-
lied by the pro‹ts he made at the expense of his fellow concentration camp
prisoners. Similarly, the fact that the lieutenant relies on German sources
for information about the Katyn massacre suggests a problematic af‹nity
between Poles and Germans around the theme of anticommunism. In this
constellation, Borowski’s narrator Tadeusz represents a kind of third way.
The experience of the concentration camps has freed him of enthusiasm
for all political ideologies, especially nationalism. Nonetheless, he is inca-
pable of charting an independent course. His character embodies a mood
of resignation before the momentous political con›ict over the Polish fu-
ture. Like Grabinski, but with a sharp critique of Polish nationalism,
Borowski highlights the unsatisfying nature of the choices open to Poles
after the war and hence the limitations of the debate over the Polish future.
The repatriation debate among Polish DPs was longer and more con-
tested than it was among Ukrainian and Russian DPs, because the situa-
tion in postwar Poland was more uncertain. During the ‹rst year after the
war, the outcome of the struggle between the Communists and their oppo-
nents remained unclear. By late 1946, however, the repatriation debate was
largely over. Only a small number of Polish DPs at this point still believed
that Poland was a fully sovereign nation. These were mainly members of
leftist groups with connections to the Warsaw government.56 For the rest,
life in emigration became semipermanent. The DP committees, created
during a time of chaos to provide assistance to DPs and represent them be-
fore the authorities, without in many cases a clear intention of resisting
repatriation, became the institutional anchors of a new emigration. The
arguments put forward by the opponents of repatriation, focusing on the
Russian quality of the new Polish government and the need to preserve the
true Polish nation in exile, had come to de‹ne the Polish DP community.
Ukrainian DPs and the Concept of a “Political Emigration”
While Polish DPs carried on an anguished debate about repatriation,

Ukrainian DPs appeared more united in their opposition. They presented
the image of a committed nationalist and anticommunist “political emi-
gration.” Indeed, they stood in the vanguard of the antirepatriation move-
ment. Yet this image of unity disguised a number of con›icts.
Like Poles, Ukrainians began organizing self-help committees even be-
fore the formal end of hostilities. According to Vasyl Mudry, a prominent
interwar Polish Ukrainian politician, “already in the spring of 1945 Ukrai-
nian emigrants in Germany and Austria, under the condition of general
chaos, started to organize themselves for self-protection, and later for mu-
tual aid and common defense against forcible repatriation. Everywhere, in
the major groupings of Ukrainian emigrants, committees were estab-
lished.”57 Although the initial goal was to provide material assistance, repa-
triation quickly emerged as the key issue. In early May 1945, a Ukrainian
committee in Munich appealed to the American authorities for legal pro-
tection against repatriation.58 A similar committee was organized in Re-
gensburg in September 1945. According to a report by the Army Counter
Intelligence Corps (CIC), the Ukrainians refused repatriation out of “fear
that the Russians will see them as collaborators and will either ship them off
to Siberia or put them in prison.” They joined the committee “in order to
help each other here in every way possible.”59 In August 1945, Mudry wrote
to the American occupation forces requesting permission to organize a cen-
tral Ukrainian self-help committee.60 In October 1945, under his leadership,
a congress of regional representatives of the Ukrainian “emigration” was
held in the Bavarian town of Aschaffenburg, home to three DP camps with
large numbers of Ukrainians. Bringing together local leaders from Ger-
many and Austria, the congress established the central organization Mudry
had been hoping for. Known as the Central Representation of the Ukrai-
nian Emigration in Germany (Tsentral’ne Predstavnytstvo Ukraïns’koï
Emihratsiï v Nimechchyni, or TsPUE), it became the central body repre-
senting Ukrainian DPs. The goals of the TsPUE, as outlined in 1947, were
to represent Ukrainian DPs to the outside world, offer them assistance and
protection, maintain and promote national culture, promote their eco-
nomic integration, and cultivate their “physical and moral health.”61 Cov-
ering all three western zones, it was based in Augsburg.
While fear of the unknown was an important component of opposi-
tion to repatriation, some Ukrainian DPs also opposed repatriation on
principle. Like their Polish counterparts, they argued that the DPs consti-
tuted a political emigration. This concept was clearly articulated at the
congress of representatives of the Ukrainian emigration in October 1945.
The congress’s ‹rst resolution protested the policy of forced repatriation,
while the second stated that “the current Ukrainian emigration—is a polit-
ical emigration, and it must thus consider all of its activities not only from
the standpoint of the physical safeguarding of the people but also of the
national project.”62 The terms used by the Central Representation to de-
scribe the Ukrainian DPs—“fugitives” (utikachi), “refugees” (skytal’tsi),
and “emigrants” (emihranty)—reinforced this point, suggesting that ›ight
rather than deportation was responsible for the Ukrainian population in
Germany. Since Ukrainians were political emigrants, the Central Repre-
sentation argued, they also deserved speci‹c rights. Like the “emigration of
1918,” they should be granted political asylum and given international pro-
tection. These rights should be shared by all Ukrainians, regardless of
where they had come from or why they had been displaced.63
Indeed, the unity of the Ukrainian people was central to the concept of
the Ukrainian political emigration. As Volodymyr Kulyk notes, “all the
Ukrainian DPs . . . were from the very beginning declared political émi-
grés.”64 Con‹rmation of this point can be founded in the writings of
Zinovii Knysh, a member of the Central Representation. In his memoir of
1945, ‹rst published around 1951, Knysh suggested that Ukrainians were
united in the effort to create an organizational basis for the emigration. “All
members of the Ukrainian community,” he wrote, “worked at it, regardless
of whether they felt themselves nationalists, or democrats of the political
right or left, or belonged to this or that religious denomination.”65 More re-
vealing, Vasyl Mudry noted in 1954 that “for the Ukrainians, like for none
of the other nationalities, it was imperative to create a large internal moral
force, which would be the indisputable authority for the Ukrainians them-
selves and would project its steadfastness and ‹rmness to the outside.”66
The concept of a Ukrainian political emigration was intimately re-
lated to the quest for national independence, a quest that ostensibly pitted
Ukrainians against both Russians and Poles. Writing in April 1946, a rep-
resentative of the League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners, an organization
with deep ties to the Ukrainian radical nationalist movement, looked back
at the liberation of the concentration camps and linked opposition to repa-

triation to the lack of an independent homeland. In a manner reminiscent
of Polish politicals like Antoni Czerwinski and Janusz Nel Siedlecki, he de-
scribed the moment of liberation as bittersweet because it did not result in
national independence.
Laughing and with full liberated lungs we got drunk on freedom. We

›ew on wings of happiness, but the question was, whereto. We bid
each other farewell, looking towards our dear distant land and wished
each other a reunion in the Native Land, just as we had wished each
other behind the barbed wire in the camps on the occasion of our na-
tive holidays. The liberty of the individual had arrived but its full re-
alization in the national sense was still far ahead of us.67
Here, then, it is the Ukrainians rather than the Poles whose aspirations for
national independence remain unful‹lled. Zinovii Knysh offers a similar
recollection. A radical nationalist, Knysh spent the last part of the war in
the Austrian city of Melk, where he worked for the local German authori-
ties. By that point, he writes, one could sense the end of the war.
The end of the war was desired by the Allies, as for them this was a
de‹nite and ‹nal victory. The end of the war was openly desired by
the Germans, who had already reconciled themselves to defeat and
their lost dreams of world domination, and saw in the continuation of
the war merely unnecessary losses and sufferings. In the end of the
war everyone saw for himself some interest, connected with it some
hope—only for the Ukrainians there was no hope. It was an end
which brought them nothing, after which was supposed to stand the
beginning, which promised nothing good.68
This hopelessness, Knysh explains, was connected with the threat of falling
into “Muscovite clutches.”69 During the interwar period, the Ukrainian
nationalist movement, based largely in Poland and nourished by con›ict
between the Polish Ukrainian minority and the majority Polish popula-
tion, had viewed Poles as the main impediment to national independence.
With the Soviet Union now occupying all of the territories that national-
ists regarded as ethnically Ukrainian, and Poland itself subordinated to
the USSR, the threat posed by Russians became the primary focus. Like
their Polish counterparts, Ukrainian DP leaders made no distinction be-
tween Russians and Soviets. Rather, they presented the Soviet regime as
merely the most recent incarnation of a transhistorical Russian tendency
toward imperialism.
[This tendency was] a product and property of the whole Russian peo-
ple, of all their social strata and classes throughout their entire his-
tory. Russian imperialism and messianism are historical categories
and an immanent feature of a Russian individual, regardless of [his
or] her social position, conviction, and current pro- or anti-regime at-
titude.70
Building on this argument, DP leaders sought to convince Ukrainians that

there was no possibility of coexistence with Russians. As long as the Soviet
Union existed, it was impossible for Ukrainians to return home.
While the history of Russian imperialism stood center stage, the his-
tory of Nazi imperialism received comparatively little attention. The post-
war emigration, John-Paul Himka writes, “downplayed as much as possi-
ble the cooperation between the Ukrainian nationalist parties and the
Germans and emphasized instead how Ukrainian nationalists fought both
the Germans and the Soviets and how the Ukrainian nation suffered enor-
mously at the hands of both.”71 They presented the Ukrainian people as
opponents of both German and Russian “totalitarianism.” In their re-
quests for political asylum, Julia Lalande notes, Ukrainian representatives
“stressed a deep belief in human rights and democracy as well as strong
anti-fascist sentiments.”72 However, discussions of Nazi persecution gener-
ally lacked the sense of conviction that accompanied narratives about So-
viet barbarism, and they were peripheral to arguments about opposition to
repatriation. In fact, some Ukrainians discussed accommodation to Nazi
rule and collaboration with the Nazis quite openly and unapologetically. In
his memoir, for example, Zinovii Knysh notes both the casual racism of the
Germans and their systematic exploitation of Ukrainian forced laborers
and concentration camp prisoners. Yet he also takes for granted that col-
laboration with the Germans was the lesser of two evils, a necessary ac-
commodation in the search for national independence.
Since the political emigration was at heart a national emigration, the
struggle to establish the right to political asylum was closely connected to
the struggle for “the right to our nationality,” that is, recognition of
Ukrainians as a distinct group.73 The leaders of the political emigration
thus sought not only to protect Ukrainian DPs from repatriation but also
to have them classi‹ed as Ukrainians. Indeed, they suggested that only by

classifying Ukrainian DPs as Ukrainians would it be possible to gain pro-
tection from repatriation, since repatriation was premised on the idea that
Ukrainians had a country to return to. These efforts were partially suc-
cessful. Ukrainian DP leaders convinced the U.S. authorities to recognize
Ukrainians as a separate group. In the summer of 1945, the U.S. military
authorities and UNRRA began placing Ukrainian DPs in separate camps.
In the fall of 1946, the policy of segregating Ukrainians was made
of‹cial.74 However, Ukrainian DPs did not gain the right to represent
themselves. As the leaders of the Central Representation of the Ukrainian
Emigration noted in May 1947, they had managed to secure de facto recog-
nition, but de jure recognition eluded them.75 According to Vasyl Mudry,
this situation persisted until the summer of 1948, when the U.S. Military
Government and the IRO ‹nally recognized the TsPUE.76
Although a forceful group of Ukrainian leaders presented Ukrainian
DPs as a uni‹ed political emigration, this concept was a ‹ction.77 To begin
with, Ukrainian DPs were not united on the repatriation question. Eastern
Ukrainians—Ukrainians from the Soviet Union—generally accepted the
idea of return, while western Ukrainians—Ukrainians from Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and other countries west of the prewar Soviet border—
generally did not. According to Mykhailo Marunchak, a Polish Ukrainian
nationalist and concentration camp survivor, this divide was visible at lib-
eration. “Ukrainian friends from eastern countries,” he writes, “were inca-
pable of understanding why Ukrainian prisoners don’t return to their na-
tive homes and don’t depart for their homelands.”78 Similarly, Zynovii
Knysh notes that the Ukrainian forced laborers he met in Austria were ea-
ger to return home. “Life isn’t bad,” they told him, “but we want to go
home, we desperately want to go [back] to Ukraine!”79 He suggests that
many of the Ukrainians in the Melk concentration camp “only felt them-
selves to be ‘Soviet people,’ without de‹nite national characteristics.”80
Sharing the perspective of the western Ukrainians were eastern Ukraini-
ans who had settled in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other countries after
the Bolshevik Revolution, and some Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals, though
they were not as fervently anti-Russian.
The divide in attitudes toward repatriation was rooted in divergent
wartime and prewar histories. On the one hand, most eastern Ukrainians
were deportees, while the western Ukrainians included both deportees and
refugees. As Marta Dyczok notes, “the Ukrainians most predisposed to-
wards voluntary repatriation were laborers who had been forcibly deported
to Germany.”81 They viewed their time there as a period of forced separa-

tion from home and wanted to remedy this situation as soon as possible.
They were also more isolated than refugees, who often ›ed in family
groups. On the other hand, eastern and western Ukrainians had different
conceptions of the Ukrainian nation and its political aspirations. Soviet
Ukrainians ascribed less importance to the fact that they were Ukrainian.
They also tended to view Ukrainian national identity as part of a larger
all-Russian identity. This concept of Ukrainianness had predominated in
the Russian empire and was promoted by the Soviet Union after the na-
tionalist “interlude” of the 1920s.82
By contrast, western Ukrainians placed greater emphasis on their na-
tional identity and viewed it in more exclusive terms. This was a legacy of
the more liberal nationality policies of the Austro-Hungarian empire,
which had allowed Ukrainians to develop a nationalist movement, and of
the interwar Polish state’s efforts to suppress Ukrainian nationalism, which
had encouraged nationalist retrenchment and radicalization.83 Even
among western Ukrainians, however, national consciousness was not as
strong as nationalist leaders wished. As the Polish Ukrainian nationalist
Petro Mirchuk complained in late 1949, unless the Central Representation
provided Ukrainian DPs with better newspapers, they would be corrupted
by Russian DP newspapers like Posev, which promoted an all-Russian
identity.84 Surveying the political scene, political scientist Bohdan Ciuciura
concludes, with a touch of criticism, that “the Ukrainian exile masses were
rather socially apathetic. Some Ukrainians were even completely unaware
of the whole community framework and its problems.”85
While divergent prewar and wartime histories meant that easterners
were more likely than westerners to return home, many Soviet Ukrainians
did in fact try to evade repatriation. However, national sentiment played a
minor role here. Rather, the key issues were fear of repression and dislike of
the collective farm (kolkhoz) system.86 These concerns were shared by other
Soviet citizens. Fear of repression was encouraged by the wartime Soviet
government and the postwar Soviet repatriation missions. Through their
conduct of the repatriation campaign—for example, confronting DPs with
accusations of collaboration—the Soviet authorities suggested that repatri-
ation meant punishment.87 Suspicion of collaboration hovered over both
foreign workers and prisoners of war, especially the latter. The infamous
Order No. 270, issued by the High Command of the Red Army in August
1941 and signed by Stalin himself, identi‹ed soldiers who surrendered to the
enemy as “deserters.” Commanding of‹cers and commissars who surren-
dered were to be shot on site and their families arrested.88 Rumors about
what might happen to Soviet DPs on their return home were rampant.
Looking at the literature on Soviet forced laborers, Anne Kuhlmann-
Smirnov concludes that “apparently all DPs were also familiar with the
of‹cial Soviet attitude towards Red Army soldiers who ended up in captiv-
ity or encircled by German forces. They knew that the suspicion of collabo-
ration lay de‹nitively over all repatriants, because—so the Soviet argument
went—only collaborators could have survived in the German Reich.”89
However, fear of repression may also have served as an alibi for other
concerns. According to V. N. Zemskov, fear of repression has been exag-
gerated. In his estimation, the desire to avoid the dif‹culties of life in a war-
devastated country and shame at having worked for the enemy played a
more important role in the calculations of Soviet nonreturners.90
Zemskov’s conclusions must be treated with circumspection, as they repro-
duce contemporary Soviet criticism of nonreturners as lazy and
insuf‹ciently patriotic. Nonetheless, they usefully draw our attention to
the multiplicity of concerns that motivated nonreturn. They also draw our
attention to the political “work” that fear of repression performed in post-
war Germany. It functioned as an acceptable rationale for opposition to
repatriation because it spoke to latent anticommunism and the contempo-
rary emphasis on political persecution.
In any event, the concept of a political emigration evaded the con-
cerns of most Soviet Ukrainians. It was a partial image of the Ukrainian
DP population. It was created by nationally minded western and eastern
Ukrainians who, as Volodymyr Kulyk puts it, “projected their own volun-
tary escape in face of the returning Soviets to forcibly deported peasants
and workers.”91 Polish Ukrainians from Galicia played an especially
prominent role in creating this image. Like their Polish fellow citizens, they
“had considerable experience with formal organization and bureaucratic
procedures, since they had participated in a well-developed associational
network back home.”92 Many, it is important to note, had participated in
Ukrainian associational life during the Nazi occupation and were there-
fore well prepared to operate on German territory. They included members
of the Ukrainian Central Committee, created in Cracow under Nazi aus-
pices. Most Soviet Ukrainians lacked organizational experience. Being
compelled to hide their Soviet origins and to rely on western Ukrainians
for assistance, they were vulnerable to political pressure from Ukrainian
nationalists, who viewed them as “both insuf‹ciently nationalistic and
tainted by communism.”93
The image of Ukrainian DPs as a political emigration was also a

‹ction in another respect: not only was there a fundamental divide between
westerners and easterners, the predominantly western Ukrainian leader-
ship was itself divided into many groups.94 Although these political divi-
sions, often of long standing, did not challenge the concept of a political
emigration itself, they undermined efforts to present Ukrainians as a
united and “mature” people who deserved their own state.95 Surveying the
fractious Ukrainian political landscape, an UNRRA of‹cial concluded
that there was an “appalling confusion of political philosophy in the minds
of these people, whose sole contribution to their own destinies is the weak
attempt to both invent and spread malicious anti-soviet propaganda in the
hope that they may thereby attract Allied sympathy to their ‘cause.’”96
The main political division was between “nationalists” and “demo-
crats.” The nationalist camp was represented by the Bandera faction of the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Founded in 1929 and ac-
tive primarily in Polish Galicia, the OUN was a radical nationalist move-
ment dedicated to using force to create an independent Ukrainian state.97
In›uenced by Italian fascism and its Ukrainian interpreters, it promoted a
version of integral nationalism, according to which the nation is the high-
est ideal and the state its ultimate embodiment. Scornful of liberal and
democratic thought, it advocated strong authoritarian leadership. In con-
trast to traditional Polish Ukrainian parties, which worked through formal
political channels, the OUN opted for clandestine struggle and terrorist
methods. In the 1930s, it sought primarily to destabilize the Polish state,
though it de‹ned Russia as Ukraine’s existential enemy. The repressive na-
ture of the Polish regime enhanced its popularity, especially among Polish
Ukrainian youth. By the late 1930s, it had become the dominant political
force among Polish Ukrainians.
After its leader was assassinated in 1938, the OUN was riven by inter-
nal disputes and eventually split into two rival factions. The OUN-M,
named after its leader Andrew Melnyk, represented older and more con-
servative members, who favored a hierarchical rather than charismatic
form of leadership and sought to temper the movement’s violence and an-
ticlericalism. The OUN-B, led by Stepan Bandera, commanded the alle-
giance of the organization’s younger members, who were committed to the
use of violence and viewed the older leadership as timid and ineffectual.
The members of this younger faction were also strongly anticlerical. Dur-
ing the war years, both factions collaborated with the Germans. The pri-
mary motivation, John Armstrong argues, was that “Germany was the
only power which had either the will or the means to attack [the OUN’s]
archenemies—Poland and the Soviet Union.”98 However, ideological
af‹nities were also important. Ukrainian integral nationalists sympathized
with aspects of National Socialist ideology, notably the belief that the na-
tional body had to be cleansed of “foreign” elements like Communists and
Jews. In June 1941, the OUN-B tried to use the German invasion of the So-
viet Union as an opportunity to create an independent Ukrainian state.
However, this move soon met with German repression. For the remainder
of the war, it engaged in a three-pronged battle against Soviet, German,
and Polish forces, though it remained open to the idea of collaborating
with the Germans. It was a central participant in the brutal fratricidal
strife between Poles and Ukrainians that engulfed Galicia and Volhynia in
the last stages of the war.
The OUN-B was the dominant political group among Ukrainian
DPs. Three main factors were responsible for this. First, the group’s mes-
sage appealed to the nationally minded Polish Ukrainian majority, which
knew the OUN from the interwar era.99 As one CIC report put it, the
OUN-B seemed more closely “connected with the masses” than other po-
litical movements.100 Second, the OUN-B had a number of experienced ac-
tivists in Germany. These individuals were used to working underground
and demonstrated more energy and discipline than their opponents. Fi-
nally, it used force to gain positions of authority.101 It is widely rumored
that it threatened to expose Soviet Ukrainians if they did not support the
nationalist camp.102 Ideologically, the OUN-B changed little under the new
circumstances, though it did attempt to whitewash its history of collabora-
tion. It emphatically rejected ideological compromise and attacked what it
saw as the Russophile and Polonophile tendencies of other political
groups.
The nationalists were opposed by the democratic camp, which could
more properly be called the anti-Bandera camp, as it consisted of political
groups that had little in common other than their opposition to the
OUN-B. To a large extent, their con›ict with the Banderites was a contin-
uation of interwar and wartime con›icts over the aims and tactics of the
nationalist movement. Indeed, there was little in the way of new political
ideas here either. The democratic camp included the Melnyk faction of the
OUN and a variety of other parties, ranging from monarchists on the right
to socialists on the left. These latter groups had diverse origins. Some dated
back to the Ukrainian People’s Republic of 1918–20, while others had been
created in interwar Poland. There was also a new leftist party founded by
Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic

Party (URDP), which aimed at creating an independent social democratic
Ukrainian state.103 Together, these parties opposed both the authoritarian
ideology of the OUN-B and its practical attempts to dominate Ukrainian
politics. They attacked the Banderites as fascists and collaborators. Ac-
cording to Ivan Bahrianyi, the leader of the URDP, the Ukrainian people
rejected both communism and fascism, including the fascist politics of the
Galician nationalists. “A characteristic feature of the entire population of
Ukraine,” he wrote in 1949, “is a colossal, suppressed, but implacable ha-
tred of the Bolshevik totalitarian regime, on the one hand, and of fascism
in all its manifestation, even the memory of it, on the other.”104
Despite efforts to promote a “uni‹ed narrative” of political emigra-
tion, the con›ict between nationalists and democrats permeated virtually
every sphere of associational life, especially the workings of the Central
Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration. Although it was supposed to
be nonpartisan, “from the moment the idea of the formation of a uni‹ed
community center was born,” Volodymyr Maruniak writes, “a continual
struggle developed for domination over it in the political backstage.”105
Still, this struggle should not distract us from the larger sense of agreement
among Ukrainian DP elites. Both nationalists and democrats agreed that
Ukrainians were a distinct people and that Ukrainian DPs should not re-
turn home as long as their native land was dominated by a foreign power,
in this case the Soviets, who were at bottom “Russians.” Both saw the cre-
ation of an independent Ukrainian state as the ultimate goal. The main
con›ict was the one Ukrainian DP leaders evaded, namely, the lack of
agreement over the issue of repatriation itself and the weak national senti-
ment of Soviet Ukrainians, who identi‹ed just as strongly if not more so
with the Soviet category as with the Ukrainian one.
Debates in Two Russian Emigrations
While Polish and Ukrainian DPs condemned Soviet communism as a form

of Russian imperialism, Russian DPs argued that they could not return to
their home country so long as it remained under a regime that oppressed
and terrorized the Russian people. They too presented themselves as a po-
litical emigration. They represented a broad spectrum of political opinion,
united only around the narrow issue of opposition to Stalinism.
The repatriation divide among Russian DPs ran a jagged course be-
tween old émigrés and Soviet citizens, mirroring the Ukrainian divide be-
tween westerners and easterners. Not surprisingly, old émigrés were gener-
ally unwilling to return to the Soviet Union. Indeed, many had never lived
there. The attitude of Soviet Russians was more differentiated. As among
Soviet Ukrainians, and re›ecting a more general Soviet pattern, a majority
of willing returners contrasted with a minority of opponents. According to
Boris Balinsky, a refugee from Kiev, the dividing line among Soviet Rus-
sians fell between refugees and deportees. Those who had ›ed were by
de‹nition opposed to repatriation, while those who had been deported
were for the most part eager to return home.106 Yet also among the depor-
tees, there were many who did not want to return home. The key issue was,
again, fear of repression. In an interview with U.S. intelligence in January
1947, Metropolitan Seraphim of the Russian Orthodox Church, a staunch
anticommunist, argued that the vast majority of the Russian, Ukrainian,
Belorussian, and Baltic DPs in his ministry were “anti-Bolshevistic.” He
suggested that this attitude was motivated largely by fear of persecution, a
fear he considered perfectly justi‹ed in light of Soviet attitudes toward
those who had been abroad. “These DPs believe,” the metropolitan re-
ported, “that on their return to Russia, they would be oppressed and tor-
tured by the state authorities there. The reason for this is that the Bolshe-
viks believe that everyone who has lived for many years in the West would
have been transformed in his opinions, i.e., [no longer] Bolshevik.”107 Writ-
ing in 1949, American scholar George Fischer more neutrally but similarly
argued that “the decisive impetus was the harsh treatment meted out by
their government to Soviet PWs and forced laborers returning to Russia af-
ter German internment.”108
Fear of repatriation and its consequences also surface frequently in the
writings of displaced Soviet Russians. In her 1963 memoir A Tale of
Crooked Years, Kiev native Tat’iana Fesenko dwells at length on this theme.
Both a refugee and a deportee, Fesenko ›ed west during the war, eventually
ending up in Nazi-occupied Galicia. In early 1944, she was deported to Sile-
sia for labor. In early 1945, with the Red Army approaching, she again ›ed
west, this time to the Bavarian town of Bamberg. There, as she relates in her
memoir, she watched the repatriation process with trepidation.
People hurried home to the West and to the East. Every day, over-
loaded trucks with French, Belgian, Dutch, and the long not seen but
still familiar red Soviet ›ags sped by. With songs and music, the for-
eign workers were returning home, but many among those who were
watching them had already realized that they were fated to remain in
the West until the end.
These people know that it’s going to be them that the Soviet repa-
triation of‹cers will persistently hunt for, making their way around
the city in new cars with large red stars on them. They know that to
the Soviet Union, one resister is worth a whole truckload of repatri-
ants singing songs. Such a witness to the terrible truth about “a happy
life in the freest country” can’t be left behind in Europe, he has to be
deceived with gentle appeals, intimidated, driven into a corner, taken
dead or alive.109
According to Fesenko, the key impetus for forced repatriation is to elimi-

nate all evidence that the reality of the Soviet Union might not live up to
its image. However, the manner in which repatriation is conducted is just as
frightening as the impetus behind it. The use of force demonstrates that the
Soviet Union sees its citizens merely as objects of policy. Repatriation thus
means disenfranchisement.
The former citizens of the Soviet Union, especially those living pri-
vately, became seriously agitated. They heard that their fate had al-
ready been determined at the Yalta conference, and that sooner or
later they would fall into the clutches of the NKVD. The word “deliv-
ery” [vydacha] came to be associated not with products or coupons,
but with living, angry, reluctant people. They had already lost their
home, their families, their simple but nonetheless dearly-held belong-
ings, they did not have any rights, other than the right of asylum, now
they were facing the loss of this last remaining possession, too.110
The same fear of repatriation, with its intimations of punishment, appears

in the work of Irina Saburova, an ethnic Russian from Riga who ›ed west-
ward in 1943. In her slender 1946 book DP-logical Alphabet, organized
around words associated with DP life, she includes an entry for the word
Delivery. Echoing Fesenko, she suggests that the repatriation campaign
transformed DPs into objects with an uncertain future. “The delivered ob-
jects,” she explains, “can be inanimate and animate. The former bring joy,
the latter . . .”111 Fear of being delivered like objects into the hands of an
unsympathetic government, she suggests, had transformed the outlook of
the foreigners in Germany.
All Ausländer, without exception, wanted to return home. It would

take future historians many volumes to explain why the Ausländer
wanted to return home, but could not, while the DPs can, but don’t
want to. For now it is unclear to all, except the DPs. They understand
it all right.112
In the transition from the war to the postwar, then, a fundamental shift in
outlook had taken place. The homesick forced laborers of the war years
had become displaced persons fearful of returning home.
Clearly, however, most liberated Ostarbeiter did not feel this way.
While the fears Fesenko and Saburova evoke may have been widespread,
their decisions against repatriation put them in the minority. As Fesenko
acknowledges, her feelings were not typical of most Soviet deportees, who
returned home with “songs and music.” Fesenko was not in fact a typical
forced laborer. Unlike most deportees, who came from peasant and work-
ing-class backgrounds, she was a member of the intelligentsia. Saburova
too was atypical, as she was only a Soviet citizen by virtue of the Soviet
Union’s wartime annexation of Latvia. In claiming that “all Ausländer”
opposed repatriation, she may well have projected her own fears of falling
into Soviet hands onto the mass of deported Soviet citizens.
Although fear of repression was connected primarily to the pro-
nouncements of the wartime Soviet government and the conduct of the
repatriation campaign itself, some Soviet Russians also explained their de-
cisions with reference to past experiences of Soviet persecution. In her
memoir, Tat’iana Fesenko discusses many instances of persecution she wit-
nessed during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Most important is the arrest of
her father by the NKVD in July 1941, shortly before the German occupa-
tion of Kiev. Identi‹ed as a potential collaborator because of his German-
language skills and previous experience in Germany, he was taken in the
middle of the night, never to be seen again.113 These experiences, she im-
plies, provided her with a critical framework that most deportees lacked.
Fesenko’s fellow Kievan Boris Balinsky also highlights past experiences of
persecution in his memoir, using them to explain the fateful decisions he
made during the war. In 1937, his wife was arrested and sent to a penal
camp on account of her connections to anti-Soviet émigrés. Forced to re-
sign his position at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, he spent many
sleepless nights waiting for the NKVD to come for him. These events in-
creased his alienation from the Soviet regime. He thus viewed the Nazi oc-
cupation of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to escape Soviet rule. Al-

though Balinsky candidly describes the brutalities of the occupation, in-
cluding the persecution of Soviet Jews, he nonetheless suggests that the
Nazis were preferable to the Soviets, in large part because they were anti-
Soviet. Describing the hanging of a purported arsonist in Kharkov in Oc-
tober 1941, he does not refrain from conveying his horror but comforts
himself with the thought that the hanged man may in fact have been a So-
viet agent.114 He eventually found work at a scienti‹c institute established
by the Germans in Kiev. In late 1943, he chose to evacuate westward with
his institute. “The possibility that I would be punished by the Soviets for
my cooperation with the Germans did not play a part in my decision,” he
writes, “as I really did not even consider the possibility of remaining after
the German retreat.”115
As among Polish and Ukrainian DPs, fear of repatriation led to orga-
nizing. In Bamberg, Tat’iana Fesenko and her fellow Russians formed a
delegation and went to the American military government to ask for pro-
tection from repatriation.116 Local Russian committees sprang up in many
towns. Not surprisingly, old émigrés played a prominent role in these com-
mittees. Many were members of the upper classes and the intelligentsia.
Having already been abroad for many years, they knew how to create and
sustain émigré institutions. Moreover, they were the only Russian DPs with
the legal right to remain in western Europe.117 This made it easier for them
to assume public functions. They were often resented by Soviet Russians,
who saw them as taking advantage of their skills to occupy the most im-
portant posts in DP organizations.118 In comparison with other groups,
however, the extent of organizing among Russian DPs was modest. Al-
though Russian political parties were active from an early date, a central
committee was not created until 1948, in large part because of the lingering
fear of repatriation. Known as the Central Representation of the Russian
Emigration (Tsentral’noe Predstavitel’stvo Rossiiskoi Emigratsii or
TsEPRE), it was led by Serge Yourieff, an old émigré who had served in the
czarist government and, after emigrating to Belgrade, had been the dele-
gate of the High Commissioner for Refugees in Yugoslavia during the in-
terwar period.119
For most Russian DPs, George Fischer noted in 1949, opposition to
repatriation was initially motivated by the “fear of automatic exile . . .
rather than any ideological or materialistic considerations.”120 For Russian
DP leaders, however, the emigration was above all a political phenomenon.
Thus it was important to mobilize and unite the masses for the cause of
creating a new and different Russia. Yet here too there were deep political
divisions. Many were a legacy of the old emigration. Russian émigré poli-
tics in the interwar era was characterized by division and con›ict. The émi-
grés shared an aversion to the ruling Bolshevik regime but disagreed over
how this regime had come to power and what should replace it.121 Al-
though these con›icts quickly became sterile, many remained alive
throughout the interwar period and revived after Germany declared war
on the Soviet Union. Because the émigrés had long wished for the over-
throw of the Bolshevik regime, if not necessarily the destruction of the So-
viet Union, the war placed a number of dif‹cult questions before them, es-
pecially raising the issue of collaboration. What attitude should émigrés
take toward Nazi Germany? Did collaboration mean betrayal of their
brethren in the Soviet Union or an opportunity to “liberate” the Russian
people from Bolshevism? Many on the right chose collaboration. For these
émigrés, who often sympathized with fascism, the salient fact was that
Nazi Germany was the ‹rst major power to challenge Bolshevik rule since
the Civil War. After the war, the con›icts that had consumed émigrés in
earlier decades continued, though as among Ukrainians, the history of col-
laboration added an uncomfortable new element.
Many political groups from the old emigration were represented in the
DP camps and communities.122 They ranged from autocratic monarchists
on the right to Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries on the left. They
saw the new emigrants as an important new constituency. The most im-
portant group was the right-wing National Labor Union (Natsional’no
Trudovoi Soiuz or NTS), whose followers were known as Solidarists. Sim-
ilar to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the NTS had been cre-
ated in the 1930s by the younger generation of old émigrés. These Russians,
who had come of age in emigration, considered the ideas of the older gen-
eration outdated. They took issue with the belief that the Bolsheviks were
losing their grip on the Soviet Union and that their fall from power was im-
minent. Like young Polish Ukrainians, and young Europeans more gener-
ally, they were disenchanted with democracy and attracted to fascism.
Their program, called national labor solidarity, envisioned “a corporatist
state combining Soviet social changes with a nationalist and authoritarian
political and economic structure.”123 Unlike the Soviet Union, organized
around the interests of the proletariat, this new state would serve the inter-
ests of the Russian nation, viewed as an organic entity with a close con-
nection to Orthodox Christianity. Jews and foreigners were not considered
part of the nation. The NTS presented itself as a “third power,” opposed
to both National Socialism and Soviet communism and dedicated to cre-

ating a free Russia. Like the OUN, however, it collaborated extensively
with the Germans. Many émigrés associated with the NTS worked for Al-
fred Rosenberg’s Ostministerium or ‹lled posts in the new local adminis-
trations set up in the occupied Soviet Union.124 They used these opportu-
nities to spread their ideas and build support for their movement among
Soviet citizens. The encounter with Soviet reality also led to changes in the
NTS program, including a new emphasis on ful‹lling the goals of the Bol-
shevik Revolution. In 1944, the NTS came into con›ict with the Nazis be-
cause of its unwillingness to subordinate Russian interests to German
ones, and many of its activists were arrested and sent to concentration
camps.
After the war, leading members of the NTS chose to remain in Ger-
many. In June 1945, they established their own DP camp in the town of
Mönchehof, near Kassel.125 According to NTS member Evgenii Romanov,
it functioned as its “own small state.”126 In November 1945, the NTS
founded the ‹rst Russian DP newspaper, Posev, which enjoyed wide distri-
bution. Although their wartime efforts to create a “different Russia” had
failed, NTS leaders did not betray their discouragement. The fact that the
repressive system that had existed in the Soviet Union before the war re-
mained in place, they argued, gave them renewed hope.127 Although their
primary goal was to revolutionize the masses in the Soviet Union, they also
assigned an important role to the emigration. Writing in Posev in 1954,
NTS leader V. D. Poremskii described the emigration as a vital political
and military factor. To be sure, Poremskii acknowledged, the number of
politically engaged emigrants was quite small. Nonetheless, the
signi‹cance of this group should be measured in dedication and discipline
rather than numbers.128 At the same time, the emigration was only impor-
tant insofar as it contributed to the cause of liberating Russia. In deter-
mining the main goals of the movement, Poremskii argued in 1949, “we
have to consider ‹rst of all not the interests and claims of the foreign
world, and especially not those of the emigration, but rather the interests
and needs of the active anti-Bolshevik segment of our people.”129
While the political currents of the old emigration were well repre-
sented among Russian DPs, the most popular current was the Soviet-ori-
gin Vlasov movement, named after its wartime leader Andrei Andreevich
Vlasov.130 A prominent general in the Red Army, and apparently also a
loyal Communist, Vlasov was captured by the Germans in July 1942. Hop-
ing that Germany would support a popular Russian movement to defeat
Stalin, he collaborated with the Wehrmacht. Under German auspices, he

created ‹rst a Russian Committee—later given a more federalist-sounding
name: Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (Komitet Os-
vobozhdeniia Narodov Rossii or KONR)—and then a Russian Liberation
Army (Russkaia Osvoboditel’naia Armiia or ROA). In its Smolensk Dec-
laration of December 1942, written with considerable input from the
Wehrmacht, the committee announced its intention to overthrow “Stalin
and his clique,” to conclude “an honourable peace with Germany,” and to
create “a ‘New Russia’ without Bolsheviks and Capitalists.”131 It outlined
a thirteen-point program for creating a “New Russia” that re›ected the
Vlasov group’s national populism and its belief that the Bolsheviks had
forsaken the goals of the Russian Revolution. Included in the program
were the abolition of forced labor and collective farms; the reestablishment
of private property and a commercial economy that allowed for private ini-
tiative; “the guarantee of social justice and the protection of all working
people from exploitation”; the abolition of “the regime of terror”; and the
guarantee of fundamental civil liberties.132 It also proclaimed the forma-
tion of the Russian Liberation Army and called on Red Army soldiers to
“cross over” and join it. Members of the NTS sympathized with many as-
pects of the Vlasov movement, especially its nationalism, and played an
important role in elaborating its ideological program.133
In May 1945, Vlasov and his army surrendered to the Americans, hop-
ing thereby to save themselves from Soviet punishment. However, the
Americans promptly turned them over to the Soviets, who in August 1946
executed Vlasov and some of his senior of‹cers. Despite this blow, the
Vlasov movement survived into the postwar period. As a product of the So-
viet Union, it was much more popular among Soviet Russians than politi-
cal currents associated with the old emigration. It acknowledged the ac-
complishments of the Bolshevik Revolution while taking aim at Stalinism,
associated above all with collectivization and political repression. In his
memoir, Boris Balinsky argues that he and other new émigrés supported the
Vlasov movement. Sympathetic to the idea of “a patriotic war aimed at the
overthrow of the Soviet Regime,” he suggests that it was German folly not
to use the Russian Liberation Army.134 Many postwar groups laid claim to
Vlasov’s legacy. Although U.S. Counter Intelligence Corps found evidence
of Vlasovite groups as early as the summer of 1946, it was not until 1948
that they took on de‹nite form.135 In March 1948, the KONR was resusci-
tated in Munich under a new name, the Anti-Communist Center of the Lib-
eration Movement of the Peoples of Russia (Antikommunisticheskoi
Tsentr Osvoboditel’nogo Dvizheniia Narodov Rossii or AZODNR).136 In

May 1948, the Union of the Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of
Russia (Soiuz Bor’by za Osvobozhdenie Narodov Rossii or SBONR) was
created, representing more leftist elements within the Vlasov movement,
who identi‹ed with the Kronstadt rebellion of 1921 and its credo of “So-
viets without Bolsheviks.”137 The Union of Fighters of the Liberation
Movement (Soiuz Voinov Osvoboditel’nogo Dvizheniia, or SVOD), cre-
ated in late 1948, represented the former youth league of the KONR and
became a kind of armed wing of the SBONR. Both the SBONR and the
SVOD soon came under the umbrella of AZODNR, which aspired to
unite a broad array of Russian anticommunists. Further to the right, a
Committee of United Vlasovites (Komitet Ob’edinennykh Vlasovtsev, or
KOV) was created in 1950. It sought to wed the monarchist tradition to
the social concerns of the Prague Manifesto. However, this project found
little favor among Soviet citizens, and it soon fell apart.138 More gener-
ally, in the absence of the movement’s leading ‹gure, namely, Vlasov, it
was dif‹cult to sustain the movement. Its energies were consumed by in-
ternal con›icts.
Russian DP elites, like their Ukrainian counterparts, struggled to cre-
ate the image of a uni‹ed political emigration, committed to liberating the
Russian people from the clutches of the Bolsheviks. However, there was lit-
tle that united the broad spectrum of old and new émigrés. The common
denominator was opposition to Stalinism, with support for the achieve-
ments of the Bolshevik Revolution strong among many Soviet DPs. Like
Soviet Ukrainians, Soviet Russians grounded their opposition to repatria-
tion primarily in the fear of repression. This fear was in many cases uncon-
nected to a broader critique of the Soviet Union. However, it was the basis
upon which many political groups built their platforms, hoping to persuade
the masses of Soviet DPs not only not to return home but also to partici-
pate in an émigré political movement aimed at creating a “new Russia.”
The Promise and Limits of Cooperation around the

Common Cause
Both Polish and Ukrainian DPs de‹ned themselves against “the Rus-
sians”—and each other. National con›icts were thus a fundamental ideo-
logical feature of each group’s self-de‹nition. However, opposition to
repatriation also provided a framework for cooperation. Janusz Nel
Siedlecki notes that the forcible repatriation of Ukrainian DPs in the Mu-
nich-Freimann DP camp struck fear in the hearts of many Poles. “Now
[the Americans] culled the camp and repatriated all Ukrainians, totally dis-
regarding their protests and mass suicides. Some of the Poles shrugged
their shoulders with the all-embracing ‘serves them right,’ some were sorry
for the poor beggars. But all were frightened by the precedent which could
send us via Warsaw to Siberia.”139 Indeed, American and UNRRA
of‹cials worried that antirepatriation sentiment among Ukrainians would
have a “bad in›uence” on Polish DPs. This consideration played an im-
portant role in their decision to segregate Ukrainians in separate camps
and thus move further to recognizing them as a distinct national group.140
Fear of repatriation did in fact encourage DPs to work together. In-
formally, many Poles and Polish Ukrainians helped Soviet DPs by provid-
ing them with false papers or information they could use to construct new
“identities.” There were also efforts at more formal cooperation. At the
‹rst congress of the Ukrainian emigration in October 1945, Ukrainian
leaders af‹rmed the need to work with “the organizations of other nations
that are seeking to gain the right of asylum for their political emigrants.”141
In December 1946, Polish and Ukrainian DPs created the International
Committee of Political Refugees and Displaced Persons (INCOPORE).
Based in Munich, it was headed by Mieczyslaw Grabinski. At the second
congress of the Ukrainian emigration in May 1947, Mykola Vietuchiv, a
member of the democratic camp, reported that “the Ukrainians had estab-
lished good relations with their fraternal nations” and that “the con›ict
among these nations ha[d] been resolved.” Together they were now work-
ing on behalf of their “common matter.”142 The same message was reiter-
ated at the third congress in November 1949. According to Zenon Pelensky,
a member of the OUN-B, the Ukrainians had established “very nice rela-
tions” with the other national committees organized by the IRO and met
regularly among themselves.143
However, the nationality con›icts that had de‹ned the interwar and
war years had by no means disappeared. At the third congress of the
TsPUE, the rosy picture of international collaboration presented by Zenon
Pelensky came under criticism from another OUN-B member, Iuri Stu-
dyns’kyi. According to Studyns’kyi, it was easy to collaborate on “DP mat-
ters.” It was different with “issues of cardinal importance.” “All those gen-
tlemen, who happily sign when it has to do with the protection of some
Ukrainian camp,” he argued, “these same gentlemen spread deception on
the Ukrainian issue among the IRO and other [national] groups.” This was
especially the case with Polish DP leaders, Studyns’kyi argued, who did not
accept the loss of Poland’s eastern territories. Thus Ukrainians had to be
“very careful.” They could not afford to alienate the other nationalities,
but neither could they afford to be too friendly.144 Maintaining interna-
tional relations was thus a tricky matter. Nationalism and internationalism
coexisted in delicate tension.
Despite limited cooperation, similar processes were at work among
Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian DPs. In each case, the repatriation debate
was dominated by the issue of Soviet communism. The key participants in
this debate were the most politically and organizationally experienced seg-
ments of the DP population, broadest in the Polish case and narrower in
the Ukrainian and Russian cases, where the elites came primarily from the
“western” groups, Polish Ukrainians and old émigrés, respectively. Those
most opposed to repatriation took the lead in articulating a political ex-
planation for their opposition, arguing that their group as a whole consti-
tuted an anticommunist “political emigration.” Different issues were fore-
grounded in each case: among Poles, opposition to both Soviet
communism and Russian domination; among Ukrainians, the oppression
of the Ukrainian people by both Russians and Poles, and the desire for an
independent Ukrainian state; and among Russians, the liberation of the
Russian people themselves from Bolshevik oppression.
These themes emerged clearly during the UNRRA repatriation poll of
May 1946. Whether out of conviction or expedience, many displaced per-
sons gave answers that closely conformed to the narratives elaborated by
DP elites. In this regard, antirepatriation propaganda had been successful.
Looking at the results of the poll more closely, however, it becomes clear
that “other” concerns played an important role in structuring opposition
to repatriation. Foremost among them was fear of repression. As UNRRA
recognized, many political factors were singled out for primarily personal
reasons. It was in fact dif‹cult to classify individual objections as political
or nonpolitical. Fear of persecution, for example, led many DPs to con-
demn not only the Soviet regime but also communism as a whole.
Indeed, many displaced persons did not share the outlook of the DP
leadership. On the one hand, many were eager to return home and could
not be convinced otherwise. On the other, among those who remained,
many were uninterested in the issues that animated the elites. In particular,
they often lacked a strong sense of attachment to ethnonational categories.
This was especially true of Soviet DPs, who identi‹ed as citizens of the So-
viet Union and found Ukrainian and Russian nationalist rhetoric alienat-
ing. Although fearful of returning home, and thus both amenable to per-
suasion and susceptible to coercion, they did not subscribe to the narra-
tives of political emigration articulated by elites.
The ‹ndings of the May 1946 poll were substantiated by other sound-
ings of the DP population. For example, a November 1946 interview with a
woman who worked at the UNRRA University, an international DP uni-
versity in Munich, elicited the comment that “more or less all the people
cared for by UNRRA take a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union.”145
By mid-1947, the American authorities had accepted the conclusion that
most non-Jewish DPs were refugees from communism. As a report from
September 1947 stated, “It must now be recognized that the remaining So-
viet citizens, the Balts, stateless, and many Ukrainians, are mainly political
refugees with deeply rooted convictions who refuse to return to their former
homes.”146 This conclusion in turn helped propel the search for alternative
solutions to the “DP problem.” Thus, more than two years after it was ‹rst
elaborated by DP elites, the anticommunist political explanation had been
accepted by the occupation authorities and the intergovernmental relief
agencies and had itself become an important element of DP policy.
Chapter 4
Between Federalists and Separatists:

The Anticommunist Movement(s)
Opposition to communism was one of the main reasons displaced persons

gave for refusing to return home. In numerous polls, they expressed unwill-
ingness to return to countries under Soviet or communist domination, crit-
icized the lack of political and religious freedom, wondered how they
would survive economically, and expressed fear of being deported or oth-
erwise punished. Many referred to the harshness of the wartime Soviet oc-
cupations; some mentioned previous experiences of persecution. However,
popular opposition to repatriation did not automatically translate into an
organized anticommunist movement. While many DPs were opposed to
speci‹c aspects of communist rule, they did not necessarily have a theory
of communism with a capital C and were not inclined to take part in a
broader anticommunist struggle. For some, however, the effort to resist
repatriation was merely the ‹rst step in a larger campaign to roll back com-
munism and create a new postcommunist order in eastern Europe. These
DPs formed the leading cadres of the anticommunist movement. They cre-
ated a wide variety of anticommunist organizations in western Germany.
Their goal was to harness popular anticommunist sentiment and mobilize
displaced persons for the coming struggle against Bolshevism.
This chapter examines the anticommunist movement among DPs.
This movement built on the fears and criticisms of Polish, Ukrainian, and
Russian DPs and was sometimes successful in mobilizing large numbers.
However, the relationship between popular anticommunist sentiment and
the anticommunist movement was not direct. While the political spectrum
of DPs who opposed Soviet rule was extremely broad, the anticommunist
movement was quite narrow in orientation. It was dominated by the far
right, especially authoritarian nationalists with a history of antisemitism
and collaboration. Its leaders were seasoned political activists. Their activ-
120
Between Federalists and Separatists 121
ities as displaced persons were an extension of their interwar and wartime

activities, adapted, if only modestly, to the geopolitical realities of the
postwar period and the conditions of displacement. During the war years,
many of them had collaborated with the Nazis under the banner of “anti-
Bolshevism.” After the war, they made Germany—and within Germany,
Bavaria—the seat of their organizations. Although they aspired to create a
united international front, they were divided into two mutually hostile fac-
tions, “federalists” and “separatists.” Originally viewed with suspicion and
hostility by the American occupation forces, they later capitalized on the
growing rift between the United States and the Soviet Union. By 1949, they
were openly and con‹dently asserting their presence in Germany.
Nonetheless, concerns about the dangers that DP anticommunism posed
for Germany kept them from becoming fully legitimate political actors.
While the previous chapter looked at antirepatriation and anticom-
munist sentiment in the context of national mobilization, here the empha-
sis is reversed, and national groups are placed within a broader anticom-
munist framework. I thus stress the broader concerns that united—and
divided—Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians.
A “Federative Democratic Russia”: The Federalist Movement
Committed anticommunists were united in the view that the Soviet Union
was a dictatorial regime that relied on terror to maintain control over the
population. However, they were sharply divided on a number of issues,
such as the best means of undermining Soviet rule and the nature of the
economic system that should replace the centrally planned and managed
economy of the Soviet Union.1 The most divisive issue was the “nationali-
ties question”: the status of non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union
and the Soviet bloc. This issue divided displaced persons into two oppos-
ing camps: federalists and separatists. The federalist camp, led by Russian
DPs, wanted to see the Soviet Union transformed into a “federative demo-
cratic Russia” composed of all the nationalities of the Soviet Union. The
separatist camp, led by Ukrainian DPs, viewed the Soviet Union as a
“prison of nations” and wanted to see it replaced by a comity of indepen-
dent ethnonational states. Thus the anticommunist movement was really
two distinct movements divided by attitudes toward nationalism and na-
tional identity.
Though it de‹ned postwar anticommunism, the con›ict between fed-
eralists and separatists was not in fact a postwar creation. Rather, it was
the continuation of older debates over the future of Europe’s multinational
empires and the proper relationship between nation and state. Most rele-
vant in this context are debates about the Russian empire. Before the First
World War, the primary positions in this debate had been centralism and
federalism, with separatism a distinct minority position. For most of the
non-Russian nationalities, federalism meant ethnoterritorial autonomy.
The federalist position reached its apogee during the era of mass politics
that began in 1905. As Mark von Hagen writes, “delegations of non-Rus-
sian deputies to the ‹rst Duma [of 1906] actively considered the recon-
struction of the empire along democratic and federalist lines with ethno-
territorial criteria and measures of cultural autonomy.”2 After the March
1917 revolution and the formation of the Provisional Government, de-
mands for national autonomy intensi‹ed and new political bodies emerged
to represent the non-Russian minorities.3 Ukrainians were in the forefront
of this movement. The leadership of the Ukrainian Central Rada, formed
in Kiev in March 1917, advocated for greater national autonomy without
separation from Russia. Hoping to build a federalist front against the Pro-
visional Government, which opposed demands for autonomy, it organized
a Congress of the Peoples of Russia in September 1917. The congress was
attended by delegates from twenty nationalities, including Estonians, Lat-
vians, Lithuanians, Jews, Belorussians, Georgians, Crimean Tatars, and
Cossacks. However, the beginning of the Bolshevik Revolution put an end
to these plans. During the ensuing Civil War, demands for national auton-
omy were increasingly replaced by demands for outright independence. In
Ukraine, as in a number of other regions, nationalists found themselves en-
gaged in a two-front war: against the Bolsheviks, whose political program
they rejected, and the anti-Bolshevik Whites, who refused to contemplate
federalism.
After the formation of the Soviet Union, the debate over Russia’s fu-
ture continued among émigrés. By this point, however, the terrain of de-
bate had shifted signi‹cantly. While many émigrés continued to believe in
a single and indivisible Russia, they increasingly adopted a federalist posi-
tion in order to gain broad support. After all, the Soviet Union was itself a
federation, which recognized the national aspirations of the non-Russian
peoples even if it condemned bourgeois nationalism.4 Simultaneously,
many federalists gravitated toward a separatist position. National self-de-
termination, promoted by Woodrow Wilson during the war, now meant
independence. Finally, whatever position they adopted, émigrés now de-
bated the nationalities question in tandem with the question of commu-

nism, or at least its Bolshevik variant. Opposition to communism became
the de‹ning feature of the federalist-separatist debate, with both sides sit-
uating their positions on nationality policy within a broader critique of
Bolshevism as a dictatorial and oppressive system.
The con›ict between federalists and separatists burned at a low level
during the interwar period, moving increasingly toward the right. During
the late 1920s and 1930s, the separatist cause was represented chie›y by the
Promethean movement, which sought to unite the non-Russian nationali-
ties of the Soviet Union around the goal of creating a bloc of independent
states. Led by Ukrainian exiles, it was supported primarily, and surrepti-
tiously, by the Polish government under Józef Pilsudski, who saw it as a
means of ensuring Poland’s stability and achieving greater power in the re-
gion. As Timothy Snyder writes, “while Moscow tried to use communist
parties in European countries to protect its own interests, Prometheans
tried to use national questions within the Soviet Union to undermine com-
munism.”5 During the war years, the con›ict between federalists and sepa-
ratists intensi‹ed, encouraged by the Nazis, who used anticommunism as a
means of mobilizing eastern Europeans for the war against the Soviet
Union. While the Wehrmacht sponsored Vlasov’s nominally federalist
Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, self-proclaimed
Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg promoted the separatist idea. Building
on older German plans to establish a band of semiautonomous eastern
European states, Rosenberg argued that the Nazis should dismantle the
Soviet Union, reducing Russia to a small territory and surrounding it with
a series of buffer states such as Ukraine, Greater Finland, Baltica, and the
Caucasus. During his tenure as head of the Ostministerium, he promoted
his ideas among the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union.6 Both
federalists and separatists thus found reasons to collaborate with the
Nazis.7
After the war, the con›ict between federalists and separatists contin-
ued. While the failure of Nazi Germany to destroy the Soviet Union, and
the rise of the Soviet Union’s reputation on the international stage, damp-
ened anticommunist morale, the development of a large population of dis-
placed persons offered fertile ground for a new offensive. Yet as a close
look at the leading organizations suggests, there were strong continuities
between the positions staked out during the interwar and war years and
those pursued during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Indeed, the leaders of
the postwar anticommunist groups addressed themselves to the western
powers using “words reminiscent of appeals that the same men had ad-
dressed to Hitler in earlier days.”8 On both sides, anticommunism was
deeply intertwined with conservative and authoritarian conceptions of po-
litical order, exclusivist de‹nitions of national community, and antisemitic
beliefs about Jewish power and otherness. The leadership cadres of the an-
ticommunist movement included many who had collaborated with the
Nazis. Some had supported their genocidal policies.
Like the Russian emigration from which it sprang, the federalist camp
was socially and politically diverse. It included both old émigrés and new
émigrés, and covered virtually the entire political spectrum, from conserv-
ative monarchists to socialists, excluding in essence only the Bolsheviks.
However, the most important forces in the federalist movement were
monarchists and authoritarian nationalists. This can be seen in looking at
one of the main federalist organizations, the Anti-Communist Center of
the Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia or AZODNR. As
noted earlier, AZODNR was the postwar successor to the main wartime
political organ of the Vlasov movement, the KONR. It was led by individ-
uals who had participated in the KONR and the ROA. However, Soli-
darists, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Monarchists also participated.9 In-
deed, AZODNR styled itself as an umbrella organization for
anticommunists.10 It was based in the Schleissheim-Feldmoching DP
camp, on the northern edge of Munich, known as a camp of both old and
new Russian émigrés.11
The Vlasovites had adopted a federalist position during the war years.
Vlasov did not recognize the existence of the nationalities question. Al-
though he took national self-determination and cultural autonomy for
granted, he was also a Russian patriot who viewed the “peoples of Russia”
as an indivisible unit. He ‹rmly rejected the idea of separatism.12 Nonethe-
less, he and his associates soon realized that their ability to create a viable
anti-Bolshevik coalition depended on their willingness to make concessions
to separatism.13 In November 1944, the KONR issued the Prague Manifesto,
which gave the nationalities question top billing. The manifesto proclaimed
“the equality of all peoples of Russia and their real right to national devel-
opment, national self-determination, and state independence.”14 However,
the KONR also argued that the ‹nal decision on the nationalities question
should be postponed until after Stalin had been defeated. Importantly, Jews
were not counted among the peoples of Russia. Seen as allies of Bolshevism,
they were not granted the right of self-determination.15
Like the KONR, AZODNR adopted a federalist position. It recog-

nized the equality of all the peoples of Russia and the right of national mi-
norities to determine their own futures.16 However, there was no mistaking
its position on the nationalities question. From AZODNR’s perspective,
the peoples of the Soviet Union shared certain “organic bonds.” These
bonds predated the Soviet Union and would continue after its demise. In-
deed, once the Soviet Union collapsed, national con›icts would disappear.
The nationalities problem was thus presented as a problem speci‹c to the
Soviet order. More generally, AZODNR was at pains to distinguish be-
tween the Soviet Union and Russia. Countering separatist claims that So-
viet communism was a speci‹cally Russian phenomenon, it stressed the
fundamental divide between a political “clique” around Stalin, on the one
hand, and the Russian people, on the other. “The criminal Stalin’s clique,”
it wrote, “called out the hatred of all the freedom-loving nations against
the Soviet Union which still even often has not been distinguished from the
genuine Russia.”17 It was con‹dent that the Soviet people would take its
side in any “free struggle of minds.” Although it aspired to rebuild the
Russian Liberation Army and launch a new military campaign against the
Soviet Union, its main activity was propaganda, directed at both the Soviet
population and at displaced persons.
Despite making concessions to the separatist camp, AZODNR, like
the KONR before it, had dif‹culty ‹nding support among the national mi-
norities. It appealed largely to displaced Russians from both the old and
new emigrations. It also appealed to some non-Russians from the Soviet
Union, notably Ukrainians, Belorussians, Cossacks, and Kalmyks.18 These
Soviet citizens identi‹ed with the all-Russian nationality promoted by the
Soviet Union and found the separatist idea of a fundamental hostility be-
tween Russians and other Soviet peoples dif‹cult to accept. Its leading
non-Russian collaborators were a group of prominent Russophile Ukrai-
nian intellectuals from Kiev.19 As an American military intelligence report
concluded in December 1948, “the AZODNR, with all its importance, can-
not claim to represent a majority of the Russian nationalities.”20 More
generally, with its charismatic leader missing, the federalist camp had
dif‹culty staying together. Its leadership was extremely fragmented, with
AZODNR containing within itself multiple con›icts among Russian émi-
grés, hoping to hold them together with the idea of commitment to “Rus-
sia.”21 According to NTS leader Vladimir Poremskii, it fell apart quite
quickly.22 In October 1952, a new organization with a similar mission was
created, the Coordinating Center of the Anti-Bolshevik Struggle (Koordi-

natsionnyi Tsentr Antibol’shevistskoi Bor’by or KtsAB). Like AZODNR,
it proclaimed ‹delity to the Prague Manifesto.
Beyond the Soviet “Prison of Nations”:

The Separatist Movement
While federalists sought to convince displaced persons of the unity and in-
divisibility of Russia, separatists pursued the opposite goal. A variety of
separatist groups were active in Bavaria, most based in Munich. They in-
cluded the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), closely af‹liated with
the Bandera faction of the OUN; the International of Liberty, closely
af‹liated with the OUN’s Melnyk faction; and the Anti-Bolshevik League
of Nations (ALON), a kind of superumbrella that united different sepa-
ratist groups. Ideologically and organizationally, the separatist camp was
dominated by radical nationalists, in particular radical nationalist Polish
Ukrainians. Ironically, then, it was Ukrainians with the least personal ex-
perience of Soviet communism who led the separatist wing of the anti-
communist movement. Surprisingly, given the prominence of Poles in the
interwar Promethean movement, Polish DPs played a minor role. The
wartime con›ict between Ukrainians and Poles, it seems, had dealt a
de‹nitive blow to the idea of cooperation.
The most important separatist group was the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of
Nations. Founded in Munich in April 1946, it was part of the postwar ef-
fort to revitalize the OUN-B. It was headed by one of Bandera’s closest as-
sociates, Iaroslav Stetsko, best known as the man who proclaimed a
Ukrainian state in Lviv in June 1941. The ABN claimed to “embrace” more
than thirty-two nationalities, including Belorussians, Czechs, Slovaks,
Croats, Serbs, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians,
Cossacks, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and various small Central
Asian groups, in addition to Ukrainians.23 As was true of its Ukrainian
members, its other national representatives were drawn from the right.
They included a number of authoritarian and fascist personalities who had
collaborated with the Nazis, such as Ferdinand Durchansky, who served in
the “autonomous” Slovak government set up under German auspices in
1938 and helped orchestrate the persecution of Slovak Jews.24 Like
AZODNR, the ABN saw itself as the nucleus of an armed revolutionary
struggle, but in practice it primarily engaged in propaganda. It used every
opportunity to spread its message among DPs. On national and religious

holidays and at political meetings, ABN propagandists made speeches and
passed out lea›ets. It was the focus of vigorous counterpropaganda by
both federalists and Soviets.25
The origins of the ABN lay in the war years. In 1940, the OUN-B be-
gan cultivating relations with other national groups “subjugated by
Moscow.” At the Second Great Congress of the OUN in 1941, it identi‹ed
coordinating the struggle of these groups as one of its principal goals.26 In
November 1943, the OUN-B sponsored the First Conference of Enslaved
Nations of Eastern Europe and Asia in the forests near Zhytomyr, then
part of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Held in the context of the Ger-
man retreat from the Soviet Union, the conference was attended by thirty-
nine delegates representing thirteen nationalities of the Soviet Union, in-
cluding Ukrainians, Belorussians, Armenians, Georgians, and various
smaller groups from the Caucasus and Central Asia. The resolutions
adopted by the conference articulated the goal of ‹ghting both National
Socialism and Bolshevism, identi‹ed as different forms of a singular impe-
rialist impulse. “Both warring imperialisms,” the delegates wrote, “deny the
right of a nation to political and cultural development within a national
state, bringing political, social, and cultural slavery to the conquered peo-
ples in the form of the Nazi ‘New Europe’ or the Bolshevik ‘Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics.’”27 Non-Russian soldiers in the advancing Red
Army, as well as non-Germans in the retreating Wehrmacht, were envi-
sioned as the military wing of the anti-imperialist front. Although the em-
phasis here was on imperialism in general, Bolshevism was identi‹ed as the
primary foe. The collapse of Nazi Germany was understood to be “only a
question of time,” while the threat posed by Bolshevism was seen as longer
lasting and more serious.28 The plans laid at the 1943 conference were over-
taken by events—or, more precisely, by the Red Army. With the formation
of the ABN, they were again taken up. The struggle against imperialism ar-
ticulated during the war years was transformed into a single-minded cam-
paign against Bolshevism.
For the ABN, Bolshevism was “a criminal theory and practice of ter-
roristic monoparty dictatorship which excluded even the slightest bit of
freedom, democracy, and nationality.”29 Three major points of criticism
were contained in this statement. First, and most important, the Soviet
Union was an oppressor of nationalities, a “prison of nations,” as the
ABN often stated, borrowing a phrase from Lenin himself.30 This was evi-
denced by a long series of foreign conquests and by the oppression of na-
tionalities inside the Soviet Union—for example, the forced deportation of

the “native population from its ancestral lands into the vast expanses of
the U.S.S.R.”31 Second, the Soviet Union was a “totalitarian” regime that
sought absolute control over the political, economic, social, and cultural
life of the people. This feature of the regime was especially evidenced by its
disdain for political and civil liberties. “The U.S.S.R. and its vassals,” the
ABN’s 1946 memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference stated, “reject
most of the things which Eastern Europe considers essential: personal
freedom, government based on law, the subordination of the executive to
the legislative and judiciary powers, a government elected by the people,
freedom of conscience, speech, press, and assembly. They do not attach
any value to the human being as such, they recognize violence which is
sancti‹ed by the end, for the attainment of which it is used.”32 Finally, the
Soviet Union was a regime based on terror. The people of the Soviet
Union, the ABN stated, lived in “constant human dread and fear of re-
pressions, prisons, concentration camps, penal servitude, exile, and com-
pulsory deportations.”33
The ABN identi‹ed Bolshevism as part of a more general Russian ten-
dency toward imperialism. “Aggressive and destructive Bolshevism,” a res-
olution accompanying a 1951 ABN demonstration in Munich stated,
“merely exhibits a new, higher form of Russian imperialism, which grew
across the centuries by conquering foreign lands and subjugating foreign
peoples in Europe as well as Asia.”34 This imperialist tendency was pre-
sented as a characteristic of Russian history since Peter the Great, if not, in-
deed, a genetic disposition on the part of the Russian people.35 This
identi‹cation of Soviet imperialism with the Russian people not only served
to demonize Russia but also to redeem the non-Russian nationalities of the
Soviet Union, especially eastern Europeans. Drawing on well-established
stereotypes of Asians and Europeans, they portrayed the Russian and east-
ern European nations as fundamentally different, the former prone to
despotism, the latter promoters of liberty, equality, and individualism.
Given its belief in a Russian tendency toward imperialism, it should
come as no surprise that the ABN was wary of cooperating with Russian
anticommunists. The ABN acknowledged that there was a difference be-
tween Bolsheviks and Russians, and it held out the possibility of an al-
liance with the latter. The Russians of the Soviet Union, the ABN argued,
had little to gain from the existing regime, which ruthlessly exploited them
“in order to ‹ll its pockets and . . . ‹nance a world Bolshevik ‘revolu-
tion.’”36 However, it emphatically rejected cooperation with federalists.
“There is no place in [t]he A.B.N.,” it argued, “for anyone who ‹ghts

against the existing regime alone but upholds the principle of a one and in-
divisable [sic] Russia.”37 Russians were welcome only “if they desire a
Moscovite state within its ethnic frontiers and wish to put an end to Rus-
sia—the prison of nations.”38
The destruction of the Soviet Union and its satellite states was the
means to the ultimate end of creating a “new order” based on independent
nation-states.39 For the ABN, the nation-state represented the realization
of both individual and national aspirations for liberty. As a 1954 ABN
manifesto proclaimed, “there is no individual freedom, nor democracy,
without national freedom! And there is also no national freedom without
state sovereignty!”40 This idea was also the basis of the ABN’s slogan,
“Freedom for nations! Freedom for individuals!” ‹rst elaborated during
the war. Hewing closely to the views of the OUN-B, the ABN argued that
the new states must be based on ethnic borders. Indeed, they must be eth-
nically “pure.” Only individuals who belonged to the state’s titular nation-
ality could be sure to enjoy the full rights of membership. It foresaw a great
unmixing of populations, as each national group “returned” to its rightful
homeland. Indeed, it suggested that the creation of this new comity of na-
tion-states would resolve the problem of national minorities, as each na-
tional group would now have its own state.
Not surprisingly, the myriad territorial con›icts that the creation of a
new state system would generate were left unexplored. Yet even nominally,
the “new order” envisioned by the ABN was not designed to accommodate
everyone. In particular, it had no place for Jews. The ABN itself rarely
mentioned Jews, perhaps because, in the wake of the Holocaust, the “Jew-
ish question” appeared to have been de‹nitively “resolved.” Nonetheless, it
is worth probing into the legacy of thinking about Jews that the ABN em-
bodied. Like the NTS, the ABN’s parent organization the OUN-B was
deeply antisemitic. In a resolution passed at its 1941 Great Congress, the
same event at which the construction of an international anticommunist
front was inaugurated, the OUN-B stated that it “combats the Jews as the
prop of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime.”41 It thus saw Jews as a central
component of the order it wished to destroy. Indeed, as Karel Berkhoff
and Marco Carynnyk have shown, the OUN-B not only viewed Jews as an
avant-garde of Bolshevism, it also supported Nazi extermination plans.
Stetsko in particular shared the exterminatory antisemitism of the Nazis.
“Although I consider Moscow . . . to be the main and decisive enemy,” he
wrote in July 1941, “I nonetheless fully appreciate the undeniably harmful
and hostile role of the Jews, who are helping Moscow to enslave Ukraine.
I therefore support the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of
bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine, barring
their assimilation and the like.”42 Given such a position, it is hardly sur-
prising that the new order envisioned by the ABN did not include Jews.
Although the ABN viewed the creation of ethnonational states as an
end in itself, it was not indifferent to their internal organization. For if these
states were to serve the interests of the nation, they must conform to the
principle of “social justice.” The ABN’s vision of a just social order can best
be described as national socialist, stressing social equality for the nation
rather than the working class. Like the Vlasovites, it called for a system cen-
tered upon the interests of the “popular masses”: small independent farm-
ers, craftsmen, and intellectual workers. These groups were identi‹ed as the
“guardians of freedom and sovereignty of their nations.”43 Both capitalism
and socialism “of the Soviet brand” were deemed exploitative. In their
place, the ABN promised to implement a system that would guarantee in-
dividuals “economic independence.” This system included private owner-
ship of the fruits of one’s labor and the means of production, the right to
free enterprise, and the right to conclude work agreements and participate
in management. However, large landowners and capitalists would not be al-
lowed to reclaim their property. Certain key public services, such as trans-
portation and energy, would be nationalized. The collective arrangements
created by the Bolsheviks would be dismantled but could be replaced with
similar voluntary ones.44 The emphasis on social justice was not only an ex-
pression of the ABN’s commitment to a certain brand of national social-
ism, it was also an attempt to respond to the concerns of Soviet citizens.
The OUN-B’s wartime encounter with Soviet Ukrainians had led to
signi‹cant changes in its platform. A new emphasis on economic and social
policies that appealed to Soviet citizens—for example, collective ownership
of land and industry—was appended, rather awkwardly, to the traditional
focus on national will and authoritarian leadership. This trend continued in
the postwar ABN, which argued that far from disavowing the Bolshevik
Revolution, it would realize its unful‹lled promise.45
Mobilizing DPs
Despite their differences, both federalists and separatists sought to mobi-

lize displaced persons for the anticommunist cause. According to the sepa-
ratist International of Liberty, one of its key goals was “to induce the
many persons belonging to the political emigration to partake in the strug-
gle for the liberation of the nations subjugated by bolshevism.”46 Propa-
ganda directed at fellow displaced persons was thus an important aspect of
their activities. To some extent, anticommunist organizations sought to
win DPs over by demonstrating that they understood their everyday con-
cerns. Thus the ABN lobbied on behalf of displaced persons’ civil rights
and their right to asylum.47 For the most part, however, the eyes of anti-
communist leaders were ‹xed on a distant horizon, not the DPs in their
midst. They were preoccupied with transforming political conditions at
home. At the same time, both federalists and separatists sought to demon-
strate that their efforts to roll back communism were ultimately in the best
interests of DPs. As the ABN stated in its 1946 memorandum to the Paris
Peace Conference, the establishment of independent, democratic nation-
states in Soviet-dominated Europe and Asia “would bring about the
restoration of national, political, and individual rights for all and this
woud [sic] enable the return of millions of prisoners of war, displaced per-
sons, and refugees who have refused to go back to submit themselves to
Communist dictatorship at present in power in their homelands.”48 Simi-
larly, in an undated handout, the ABN played on displaced persons’ desire
to return home. It addressed DPs as “you who have been forced by the hor-
rors of the Bolshevik and fascist terror to leave your homes, to separate
from your relatives and friends, to give up your homeland, and to remain
in a strange and unwelcoming Germany” and “you who think about the re-
turn home to your dearly-beloved homeland, but not a return home to a
totalitarian, dictatorial regime.”49 It went on to link the ful‹llment of the
desired homecoming to participation in the struggle to realize the goals of
the ABN.
Anticommunist groups also sought to mobilize displaced persons
across nationality. Both federalists and separatists aspired to make the an-
ticommunist movement international. Their writings are ‹lled with refer-
ences to the “community of fate of the refugees” and the “solidarity of the
free nations.”50 Indeed, internationalism was a fundamental component of
the anticommunist movement, though it was motivated more by tactical
considerations than ideological commitment. Countering communism ne-
cessitated an internationalist strategy. For if the Soviet Union and the So-
viet bloc more generally were founded on the idea of a progressive interna-
tional front, the anticommunist movement had to prove this idea false. The
best way to do so was to show that the nations this front claimed to repre-
sent supported the anticommunist camp. Nazi efforts to build an interna-

tional front against Bolshevism provide one model.51 But since anticom-
munists wished to present themselves as opponents rather than supporters
of National Socialism, it was impolitic to recall organizations like the
Anti-Komintern. Instead, anticommunists stressed the precedent set by the
antifascist front of the 1930s and 1940s. According to the ABN, “all free-
dom loving nations and peoples of the world” were obliged to participate
in the struggle against Bolshevism. “Historic necessity,” it maintained,
“compells [sic] them to unite into such a uni‹ed front on such an interna-
tional scale, as that which made victory over Fascism possible.”52
Anticommunist leaders realized that nationality con›icts hampered
their efforts to build an international front. They thus repeatedly called on
their members to set aside—indeed, forget—past con›icts. The separatist
International Committee of Political Refugees and Displaced Persons
stressed “the absolute necessity of agreement and cooperation among all
the free peoples” and called on its members “to let themselves be led by the
clear demands of the present and the future, not the chaotic, unhappy
past.”53 It was especially keen to bridge the gap between Ukrainians and
Poles, the two groups at the heart of interwar separatism. Federalist and
separatist groups occasionally even sought to work together to create “a
single anti-Communist front which could wage the ‹ght more effec-
tively.”54 Thus, for example, the Augsburg-based Association of the Free
Press of the Suppressed Nations, an international organization of DP
journalists, brought together separatist-leaning Ukrainians and federalist-
leaning Russians. This was a point of pride for the association, which
claimed that it was “the only exile organization in the world which gathers
Russians and Ukrainians around the same table.”55 More typically, how-
ever, the nationality con›icts that characterized DP efforts to oppose repa-
triation also hampered efforts to create a united anticommunist move-
ment. Indeed, federalists and separatists competed to win the hearts and
minds of DPs. Since the main con›ict between the two factions centered
on the nationalities question, internationalism became an important test
of each faction’s popularity among DPs.
Despite these efforts, the anticommunist movement never garnered a
mass following among DPs. Investigations into anticommunism in Bavaria
suggested that most DPs were not involved in organized anticommunist
activities. Queried about the situation of Russian DPs in Bayreuth, a Ger-
man politician from the Christian Social Union (CSU) reported “that
among this group of Russians as well, one cannot speak of active and or-
ganized anti-Soviet activity.”56 He suggested that the lack of activity was

attributable to a fatalistic Slavic mentality, which made the Russians indif-
ferent to their future. Similarly, a report into Ukrainian political activities
concluded that despite the large number of Ukrainian political parties in
the American occupation zone, most Ukrainians were not involved in
them.57 Thus, although there was widespread opposition to communism, it
did not translate into participation in the anticommunist movement. As
the anticommunist leadership itself acknowledged, most DPs had not yet
been mobilized for the cause.58
The groups at the heart of the movement were themselves partly re-
sponsible for this situation. They tended to be insular and conspiratorial.
As the American Consul General of Munich noted in October 1947, all the
Ukrainian groups were “conspiratory and discreet in their operations, pre-
sumably because of fear of forcible repatriation and the knowledge that
political activity is forbidden.”59 The same was true of many Russian
groups. According to the metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church in
Germany, many Russian anticommunist organizations operated under-
ground.60 In some groups, like the two branches of the OUN, insularity
was a feature of longer standing. It re›ected their earlier history as illegal
organizations and their authoritarian leanings. Their structures were not
designed to accommodate a large membership, nor were their leaders nec-
essarily interested in creating mass organizations, for this would require
them to distribute power more broadly.
More generally, the groups at the heart of the movement were not rep-
resentative of the larger DP population. Popular anticommunist sentiment
covered a broad range of political positions, including the far left. Inter-
viewed about his political sentiments, for example, one Polish Ukrainian
praised Marxism but argued that “the Bolshevism that exists in Russia . . .
bears no resemblance to Communism in Karl Marx’s sense of the word.”
He described the radical nationalist Ukrainians as “bandits.”61 Organiza-
tions like AZODNR and the ABN, on the other hand, stood for a narrow
range of opinion. They represented an authoritarian and antisemitic anti-
communism with theoretical links to fascism and practical links to Na-
tional Socialism.
Nonetheless, as the metropolitan also noted, these organizations had
a wide reach. Discussing their propaganda efforts, he stated that “there is
likely not a single emigrant who has not yet held such a [propaganda] sheet
in his hands.” Through their propaganda, committed anticommunists
heightened displaced persons’ fear of return and provided them with a vo-
cabulary for talking about the dangers of communism and the Soviet
Union. Moreover, they could be quite successful at harnessing popular
sentiment. This was especially true of the separatists. Skillfully exploiting
the concerns of different national groups, they brought large numbers of
displaced persons to the streets of Germany. I return to this subject later in
the chapter.
DP Anticommunism in the Mirror of the Authorities
American occupation of‹cials in postwar Germany and their superiors in

Washington initially viewed DP anticommunism with concern. Opposition
to communism not only posed a threat to the repatriation program, it also
created tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although
many Military Government of‹cials were themselves unre›exively anti-
communist, they did not wish to antagonize their Soviet ally. As the Amer-
ican vice consul in Munich stated in February 1947, American authorities
could not look kindly on “organizations devoted to the destruction of an
allied government.”62 Nor could they ignore the fascist leanings of many
anticommunist groups, having just fought to defeat fascism in Europe. As
a Military Government of‹cer commented with reference to an organiza-
tion of anticommunist Hungarians, “the slogan ‘anti-communist’ is often
used as a cover up for neo-fascistic or reactionary movements.”63 In the im-
mediate aftermath of the war, U.S. of‹cials had little sympathy for such
groups.
However, Soviet of‹cials suspected otherwise. They accused the
United States of hindering the repatriation of Soviet nationals and of al-
lowing displaced persons to engage in anti-Soviet activities. In October
1945, for example, a representative of the Soviet repatriation administra-
tion in Germany complained that despite having been formally disbanded
by the Americans, Russian and Ukrainian DP committees continued to
function. “In no way,” the representative argued, “have [these committees]
decreased their anti-Soviet activities, especially as regards propaganda
against the return of Soviet citizens to their country, while at the same time
widely disseminating various slanderous statements about the U.S.S.R.”64
As anti-Soviet propaganda continued, of‹cials at ever higher levels were
drawn into the debate. In June 1946, Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky, comman-
der-in-chief of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany, sent a strongly
worded letter to his American counterpart, General Joseph McNarney. He
accused the American authorities of offering anti-Soviet organizations in

the U.S. zone protection and support, and demanded that McNarney
“take measures to stop the hostile work of these organizations, which is di-
rected not only against the Soviet Union, but against the relations as es-
tablished between our countries.”65 In his carefully worded reply, McNar-
ney registered “deep concern” over possible anti-Soviet activities and
acknowledged that they were “prejudicial to the friendly relations existing
between our two countries.”66 He promised to follow up on Sokolovsky’s
allegations. McNarney, who had little sympathy for the Soviet repatriation
campaign, did in fact order an investigation into the alleged activities.67
However, the investigation bore little fruit, and the ‹nal report McNarney
submitted to Sokolovsky no doubt con‹rmed Soviet suspicions about
American support of anticommunist propaganda.68 Such con›icts did
their part to worsen U.S.-Soviet relations and hasten the arrival of the
Cold War.
The politically sensitive nature of anticommunism did in fact prompt
the American authorities to place tight controls on DP political activity. It
also prompted them to investigate DP anticommunism. Over the course of
1946 and 1947, they accumulated a wealth of detailed (and largely accu-
rate) information about anticommunist DP activities. A number of agen-
cies were involved in this endeavor, including the Army, the State Depart-
ment, Military Government, and American consulates in Germany. Using
the civil censorship system, they monitored exchanges between displaced
persons.69 They also looked for evidence of anticommunism in the DP
press.70 Finally, they solicited reports on anticommunist activities from a
number of sources, including U.S. intelligence of‹cers and native infor-
mants. Thus, although Soviet of‹cials were deeply suspicious of their
American counterparts, the latter did make signi‹cant efforts to control
anticommunist activities.
However, the suspicions of Soviet of‹cials were not entirely un-
founded, as this period also saw the beginnings of covert U.S. support for
anticommunist DPs.71 Indeed, American efforts to investigate anticommu-
nist DPs were intended not only to help control their activities but also to
determine their potential usefulness. Like Nazi and German military
of‹cials who had been in the front lines of the war against the Soviet
Union, anticommunist DPs (who had often been there alongside them)
were seen as valuable sources of intelligence about the Soviet Union. They
were also seen as potential recruits for covert operations.
Even before the war was over, Jeffrey Burds writes, “leading members
of the U.S. government forces in Europe began clandestine operations to

recruit German of‹cers and their non-German counterparts throughout
Soviet-occupied Central and Eastern Europe.”72 Anticipating future
con›ict with the Soviet Union, they sought to capitalize on the wartime in-
telligence operations of the Germans and their allies.73 Anticommunist
émigrés were also drawn into these efforts. Writing in August 1946, Harry
Rositzke, head of the Soviet section at the Strategic Services Unit, a pre-
cursor to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), argued that the United
States should consider recruiting “minority organizations outside the
USSR” for covert intelligence operations. “The most important of these
groups at the moment,” Rositzke continued, “appears to be the Ukrainian
Nationalist Movement, while other active or potentially active groups em-
brace the anti-Soviet White Russians, Finns, Balts, Georgians, Armenians,
and Turks.”74
American interest in anticommunist émigrés in fact went far beyond
intelligence gathering. As a CIA memorandum from April 1948 stated, “al-
though these contacts [with émigré groups] were established primarily for
the purposes of procuring intelligence on eastern Europe and the USSR,
suf‹cient overall information on these groups has been inevitably gathered
to permit a sound evaluation of their possible value to the U.S. Govern-
ment for the purposes of propaganda, sabotage, and anticommunist polit-
ical activity.75 In June 1948, the CIA was granted formal permission to con-
duct covert operations against the Soviet Union, including “propaganda;
economic warfare, . . . subversion against hostile states, including assis-
tance to underground resistance movements, guerillas and refugee libera-
tion groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threat-
ened countries of the free world.”76 A new Of‹ce of Policy Coordination
(OPC), loosely situated within the CIA, was created to plan and conduct
these activities. Through a front organization known as the American
Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR, it provided
‹nancial assistance to many anticommunist organizations, including the
NTS and the OUN-B. Although such efforts to undermine the Soviet
Union ended in the mid-1950s, the CIA continued to engage in more con-
ventional political warfare for a long time, employing both federalists and
separatists.
As the Cold War deepened during 1947 and 1948, the web of covert re-
lations between the United States and anticommunist DPs also expanded.
Simultaneously, there were important shifts in U.S. policies toward dis-
placed persons. As discussed in chapter 1, the western Allies progressively
abandoned their commitment to repatriation and turned to resettlement as

the more likely solution to the “DP problem.” They conceded that many
eastern Europeans had legitimate political reasons for refusing to return
home. Indeed, they now viewed displaced persons more as victims of com-
munism than National Socialism. In the U.S. zone, these general policy
changes were accompanied by a shift in attitude toward DP anticommu-
nism. The new attitude, clearly visible by 1948, was characterized by disin-
terest, neutrality, and even toleration. Since the USSR was now identi‹ed
as an enemy, the anger that DP anticommunism provoked among Soviet
of‹cials was no longer so problematic. And, since resettlement was now on
the table, anticommunist politicking no longer threatened the resolution of
the DP problem.
American investigators increasingly shifted their attention from anti-
communism to communism itself. In October 1947, the U.S. Military Gov-
ernment adopted a new policy on political parties. Diverging from the pre-
vious position of strict neutrality, the new policy allowed MG of‹cials to
take action against parties viewed as “undemocratic” and to favor those
that demonstrated a commitment to anticommunism. Although this new
policy was aimed primarily at combating the Communist Party of Ger-
many, it also encouraged a more tolerant attitude toward anticommunist
DPs.77 By 1948, the Americans had lost interest in investigating anticom-
munist DP groups. These groups “were [now] considered to be of little in-
telligence interest.”78 Similarly, although the Soviet authorities continued
to complain about antirepatriation and anti-Soviet propaganda, American
of‹cials no longer gave these complaints the same consideration. Recog-
nizing that voluntary repatriation had run its course, they viewed the con-
tinued presence of repatriation of‹cers from the Soviet Union and its satel-
lites as “a constant source of provocation and agitation” and called for
their reduction.79
These changes in policy and political climate gave displaced persons
con‹dence to openly advertise their anticommunist beliefs and led to a new
spurt of organizing. Indeed, while separatists organized as early as 1946, it
was not until 1948 that the Russian-led federalist camp began to reemerge.
Many DPs, who had hoped since 1945 that the western Allies would launch
an offensive against the Soviet Union, again gathered hope for a third
world war. As a July 1948 intelligence report on Russian DPs noted,
“Within the last year the panic and depression among Russian emigration
has vanished under the in›uence of the growing West-East tension. Inter-
est in political problems and the future of Russia in the light of a possible
defeat of the Bolshevist regime have created a number of political move-

ments within the emigration.”80 Moreover, ardent anticommunist DPs
now found their position strengthened vis-à-vis moderates. According to
Stanislaus Stepien, the development of the Cold War led to a narrowing of
the DP political landscape. Surveying the DP press, he concludes that
those groups whose politics were best suited to the exigencies of anticom-
munist propaganda were able to ‹nd Allied support, while those who were
less in step with the new orientation censored their opinions in order not to
draw criticism from the Allies and thus perhaps endanger their chances of
emigrating.81 Thus, far from being a liability, an anticommunist disposition
now lent the displaced person an air of credibility.82
However, the development of the Cold War did not win displaced per-
sons the unquali‹ed support of the United States.83 Although concern
about U.S.-Soviet relations receded, it was partly replaced by concern
about the political future of Germany. On the one hand, American
of‹cials continued to insist that as non-Germans, displaced persons had
no right to participate in politics, certainly not outside the camps. Thus, in
December 1948, the American Military Government refused to approve
the Bulgarian DP–created Anti-Bolshevistic Union on the grounds that
displaced persons “have never been authorized to form political parties.”
As the director of MG’s Civilian Administration Division noted, “while
we may be sympathetic with their political beliefs it appears that they may
be carrying on unauthorized activities.”84 On the other hand, American
of‹cials worried that DP anticommunism would embarrass the U.S. gov-
ernment and undermine its efforts to promote anticommunism in Ger-
many. In order to make the campaign against communism appealing to the
German public, Military Government of‹cials sought to portray commu-
nism as a “totalitarian” movement. This meant they needed support from
anticommunists who were “anti-authoritarian, anti-bureaucratic, and
anti-nationalistic.”85 They could not tolerate political parties on the far
right while criticizing those on the far left. Thus in June 1949, the Bulgar-
ian Anti-Bolshevistic Union’s continuing efforts to gain recognition from
the Americans were rejected on the basis of its far-right politics. In view of
the organization’s “strong rightist authoritarian orientation,” the State De-
partment argued, U.S. of‹cials in Germany “should avoid creating the im-
pression that the [organization] has any US recognition or connections and
should, wherever feasible, discourage the development of its program in
areas under American control.”86 However, this mood of caution seems to
have softened over time. In early 1951, the U.S. high commissioner for Ger-
many, John J. McCloy, allowed that it was acceptable to “give appropriate

concrete evidence of our sympathy and support for non-Communist
groups in exile” by participating in events they had organized.87
U.S. of‹cials were concerned that displaced persons represented a lia-
bility for their campaign to sell anticommunism in Germany. However,
German awareness of and interest in DP anticommunism was limited. Ac-
cording to the American Consul General of Munich, the in›uence of anti-
communist DPs on their German neighbors was “practically nil.”88 Even
those Germans most devoted to the ‹ght against communism, namely,
German expellees, did not seek to make common cause with DPs. On the
contrary, they associated communism with “pan-Slavic imperialism.”89 In-
deed, although anticommunism assumed an increasingly important place
in western German political life during the late 1940s and early 1950s, it did
not bridge the gap between Germans and DPs.90 This can be seen in the
limited efforts to monitor DP political opinion. From 1949 to 1950, the
German Of‹ce for Peace Questions (Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen), a
kind of skeleton German foreign ministry created during the occupation
period, received regular reports on the DP press.91 Written by Friedrich
Buchardt, a former SS “Eastern specialist” with a very dubious wartime bi-
ography, the reports were designed to help the emerging West German gov-
ernment renegotiate the status of DPs in Germany.92 They included many
details about anticommunist activities. The goal was to convince the Allies
that the current privileged status of DPs was untenable, in part by demon-
strating that displaced persons were engaging in “foreign affairs.”93 Here,
then, DP anticommunism, far from encouraging a rapprochement with
Germans, was seen as a means of painting DPs in an unfavorable light. Ul-
timately, however, the German Of‹ce for Peace Questions lost interest in
these reports.94 Monitoring anticommunist DP activity was simply not a
priority.
The only Germans truly interested in what anticommunist DPs were
doing were those on the left of the political spectrum, especially Commu-
nists. Like their allies in the Soviet Union, German Communists actively
propagandized against anticommunist DPs. They used their knowledge of
eastern European collaboration to counter DP arguments about the Soviet
Union, as the following quote from a 1949 German Communist Party
pamphlet makes clear.
Recently these former “Hiwis” (auxiliaries) of the Nazi Wehrmacht,

these SS volunteers, Gestapo agents, and criminals have become politi-
cally active. More money is also being spent on them. . . . And so they
marched against communism in Munich, Rosenheim, Bayreuth, and
other places. Only a fraction of these champions of western democracy
is composed of displaced Jews anxious to emigrate. The majority of
these permanent pensioners is a fascist mob, which neither can nor will
return home, because there the public prosecutor is waiting for them.95
Here, then, German Communists countered the claim that displaced per-
sons were refugees from communism by presenting them as war criminals
›eeing prosecution. Like other Germans, though for somewhat different
reasons, they believed that displaced persons were an expense their country
should not shoulder.
Anticommunism in the Streets: The ABN Demonstration

of April 1949
As the above quote from the German Communist Party suggests, demon-
strations were a critical component of anticommunist activism. Although
anticommunist groups were active from 1946 on, they did not begin
demonstrating until the end of the 1940s. The development of the Cold
War thus not only encouraged anticommunists to organize and to openly
proclaim their existence, it also gave them the con‹dence to take their mes-
sage to the street. Their demonstrations forced German, American, and in-
ternational audiences to take greater notice of their concerns and garnered
them a certain amount of sympathy.
The most spectacular show of con‹dence came in the spring of 1949.
In March, April, and May of that year, DPs staged anticommunist demon-
strations throughout western Germany, including Hannover, Stuttgart,
Braunschweig, Berchtesgaden, and many small towns. The demonstrations
were organized on a cross-national basis and sometimes took place simul-
taneously in multiple cities.96 Ukrainian DPs af‹liated with the Anti-Bol-
shevik Bloc of Nations took the lead in organizing many of them. The
largest demonstration took place in Munich on April 10, 1949. Organized
by the ABN and the League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners, it drew thou-
sands of displaced persons, and some Germans, to the streets of Munich.
A close look at the demonstration gives a better picture of popular anti-
communist sentiment. It also suggests how the ABN appealed to other
DPs and how it used their grievances to advance its own cause.
The immediate impetus, or perhaps merely pretext, for the demon-

strations was the decision of the Hungarian government to sentence the
primate of the Hungarian Catholic Church, Joszef Cardinal Mindszenty,
to life in prison. An opponent of the Communist-dominated Hungarian
government, Mindszenty had resisted the government’s attempt to secular-
ize Hungary’s Roman Catholic schools and to subordinate the church to
the state. In December 1948, he was arrested on charges of espionage, plot-
ting to overthrow the Hungarian government, and black marketeering. In
February 1949 he was found guilty.97 The sentence against Mindszenty pro-
voked outrage around the world and became an anticommunist cause
célèbre. In the United States, Secretary of State Acheson issued a state-
ment condemning the sentence as a “conscienceless attack upon religious
and political freedom.” Truman denounced the trial as a “kangaroo
court.”98
In late March 1949, Ukrainian DPs approached the German police in
Munich with a request to hold a religious and political demonstration on
the Königsplatz, one of the city’s central squares. The aim of the demon-
stration, they stated, was to protest religious persecution in the Soviet
Union. The German police passed the request on to local Military Gov-
ernment of‹cials, who in turn said that a political demonstration would
not be authorized, since displaced persons were not allowed to engage in
politics; however, religious gatherings were permissible. The Ukrainians
assured Military Government that the demonstration would be a strictly
religious affair.99 As the day of the demonstration approached, however,
evidence mounted that this was not exactly the case. On April 8, Military
Government of‹cials discovered that displaced persons had placarded the
city with posters “announcing a ‘protest demonstration’ against the ‘con-
centration camps in the Soviet Union’” and had distributed lea›ets that
promised “protests against political as well as religious suppression in the
iron-curtain countries.”100 Although it was clear to Military Government
of‹cials by this point, if it had not been earlier, that the planned demon-
stration was also political, there was disagreement about what to do. Some
Military Government of‹cials argued that the demonstration should be
forbidden.101 Others believed that displaced persons should be allowed to
hold the demonstration as long as it had a religious component.102 As one
of‹cial noted in supporting the DPs’ right to demonstrate, the American
government had condemned Mindszenty’s sentence, and it was therefore
“extremely unwise to forbid anything which might be construed as reli-
gious in nature.”103 To do so would be to undermine the United States’ im-
age as a bastion of religious freedom and thus its claim to moral superior-
ity over the Soviet Union. As the day of the demonstration dawned, no
consensus emerged. The task of policing the demonstration and determin-
ing where to draw the line was left to the German authorities.104
The ‹rst event of the day was a multidenominational religious service
or, more accurately, a series of denominational services. Simultaneously,
Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant services were
held in different parts of the Königsplatz.105 The theme of religious perse-
cution was central here. For example, a representative of the Ukrainian
Catholic Church read a statement in which he enumerated the “martyrs” of
his and other Christian churches, highlighting Mindszenty and the Roman
Catholic Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac of Croatia, who had been sen-
tenced to sixteen years in prison for collaborating with the Croatian fascist
regime of Ante Pavelic.106 Afterward, representatives of different national
groups took turns giving speeches. They included Ukrainians, Belorus-
sians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Slovaks, Cossacks, and Turkesta-
nis. Noteworthy for their absence were Poles and Russians. Many of the
speeches were given in German, suggesting the demonstrators’ desire to
reach beyond a DP audience. A number of them touched on religious
themes, such as the closing of houses of worship, the persecution of reli-
gious authorities, and the “godless” nature of the Bolshevik regime. The
representatives of Turkestan and the Caucasus highlighted the persecution
of Muslims, thus giving the gathering something more than a strictly
Christian character. In general, however, religious themes were overshad-
owed by secular political ones, such as the persecution of nationalities, the
exploitation of peasants and workers, the secular martyrs of the national-
ist movements, and the desire for independent democratic nation-states.
After the speeches, a resolution was passed condemning the Bolshevik
regime for religious and political persecution. The resolution enumerated
each nationality’s principal victims, including religious leaders, statesmen,
and intellectuals. Some, like the Slovak priest and statesman Jozef Tiso,
were authoritarian nationalists who had collaborated with the Nazis. The
resolution ended with an endorsement of the ABN and its vision of a post-
communist future.
The mixture of religious and political themes articulated in the
speeches was mirrored in the banners and placards carried by demonstra-
tors. More than the speeches, these give an indication of popular senti-
ment. Most banners had a secular political focus. They addressed a broad
range of themes, including the national liberation struggles (“Give Us
Fig. 1. Anticommunist demonstrators gathered on the Königsplatz, ABN

demonstration, Munich, April 10, 1949. From Wir klagen an! (n.p.: Presse-
dienst des Antibolschewistischen Blocks der Nationen, [1949]).
Back Free Latvia”); the persecution of nationalities (“Terror and Geno-

cide rages in Lithuania”); the collectivization of agriculture; mass deporta-
tions; mass executions (“Bloodthirsty Moscow! 300,000 Ukrainians Lie
with a Shot to the Neck in the republican NKVD cemetery near Kiev.
What For?!”); Soviet penal camps; and Soviet imperialism (“Down with
the Moskow Imperialism”). According to German sources, demonstrators
also carried banners with antisemitic messages.107 Some banners focused

explicitly on religious themes, though they also identi‹ed religion with the
nation. The most striking was a memorial to the bishops of the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church who had been executed or banished in
the late 1920s. Combining portrait photographs of individual bishops, text
panels, and elaborate illustrations of Ukrainian churches, it created a vivid
image of a martyred national church.108 The choice of languages in the
banners is also noteworthy. Most were in English or German. Like the
speeches, they were directed primarily at non-DPs—at Americans, Ger-
mans, and the “free world” more generally. Similarly, the lea›ets produced
by the ABN for the demonstration were printed in English, German, and
French and addressed to the “free peoples of the world.”109
The broad range of religious and political themes expressed at the
demonstration suggests the diversity of DP views on communism. It also
suggests how the ABN sought to harness this diversity for its own agenda.
Many of the themes articulated at the demonstration, such as the suppres-
sion of national self-determination and Bolshevism as Russian imperial-
ism, were familiar ABN themes. Here, it seems, there was a good deal of
overlap between the ABN and the larger DP population. However, other
themes were less familiar. These include collectivization and the persecu-
tion of religion. The emphasis on religion was especially unusual, since the
ABN’s parent organization, the OUN-B, was both secular and anticlerical.
The ABN sometimes included freedom of religion among the fundamen-
tal democratic freedoms, but it rarely mentioned religious persecution. The
prominence of religious themes can thus be read as an expression of pop-
ular anticommunism. Yet the emphasis on religion also came from the
ABN itself. The lea›ets it produced for the demonstration focused on reli-
gious persecution, though they also made a point of identifying freedom
of religion with national self-determination. This newfound emphasis on
religion was no doubt intended to appeal to religiously minded displaced
persons. It may also have been intended to bolster the movement’s appeal
among Americans and Germans, who also objected to communism on re-
ligious grounds.
That being said, the demonstration had a clear hierarchy of themes.
Primary emphasis was placed on two themes central to the ABN: the sup-
pression of national self-determination and the use of terror against the
population. The latter theme was featured especially prominently. Here the
ABN relied on a provocative parallel between the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany. Through a series of symbolic reappropriations, the ABN linked
Soviet Communism to the Nazi concentration camps and the Holocaust.

Using an implicit totalitarian framework, it depicted the Soviet Union as a
regime premised on the same structures of domination and criminal acts as
Nazi Germany. Working from this assumption, it went on to conclude that
Soviet communism was in fact worse than National Socialism.
The central element in the comparison between National Socialism
and Soviet Communism was the Gulag system, the Soviet penal camps.
The main piece of propaganda about the penal camps, consistently re-
ferred to as “concentration camps,” was a map of the camp system. This
map appeared in numerous forms during the demonstration, including
posters, lea›ets, and a banner.110 It portrayed the Soviet Union as a coun-
try dominated by camps. Camp areas were set off from the rest of the
country through the use of a lurid red. In the west of the country, the
camps appeared as small circles on a neutral background, but in the east
they took on gigantic proportions. The names of the camps, written in a
severe graphic style, dominated the map. In the most striking version, the
poster, the map was bordered by text with information about the camps
and by reproductions of camp documents; together these visual and verbal
elements attested to the veracity of the map’s claims. The overall impres-
sion was very much that of a “Gulag archipelago”: a huge network of pe-
nal institutions spread out across the country but closed off from their sur-
roundings.111
The comparison between National Socialism and Soviet communism
was also reinforced through references to the Holocaust. The ABN de-
scribed the Soviet penal camps not only as concentration camps but also as
death mills (Todesmühlen), a well-known contemporary term that evoked
the camps’ exterminatory machinery.112 Similarly, one of the posters, prob-
ably not an ABN product, used the (then very new) term genocide to de-
scribe the situation in postwar Soviet Lithuania. The Holocaust was also
directly mentioned in a speech by Petro Mirchuk, an OUN-B activist and
concentration camp survivor. According to the Abendzeitung, Mirchuk
claimed “that the gassing in the Nazi concentration camps was a humane
deed compared with the starvation of 30 million people.”113 Here a key
participant in the demonstration sought not only to draw a parallel be-
tween National Socialism and Soviet communism, but to argue that Soviet
communism constituted the greater evil. This task was accomplished by
trivializing the Holocaust.
Military Government of‹cials had only given the organizers of the
day’s events permission for a gathering on the Königsplatz. However, after
Fig. 2. Anticommunist demonstrators carrying map of Soviet penal camps,

ABN demonstration, Munich, April 10, 1949. From Wir klagen an! (n.p.:
Pressedienst des Antibolschewistischen Blocks der Nationen, [1949]).
more than two hours of religious services and speeches, the gathering
turned into a procession. The destination was the former headquarters of
the Soviet Mission, some 5 kilometers away on Herkomerplatz.114 At this
point, the demonstrators met with resistance, ‹rst from a small contingent
of German police and then from a much larger number of U.S military po-
lice. Facing strong resistance, MPs used tear gas and bayonets to break up
the procession. Demonstrators responded by throwing bricks and rocks.
Many managed to evade the police and make their way to Herkomerplatz,
where they were again met by MPs. After more than an hour of con-
frontations, the demonstrators ‹nally dispersed. Both DPs and German
police of‹cers were injured.
Despite this violent ending, the ABN demonstration can be seen as a
major success for the DP anticommunist movement in general and the
ABN in particular. According to some accounts, as many as 10,000 dis-
placed persons attended the demonstration, though other estimates sug-
gest the number was somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000. The demonstra-
tion also garnered considerable media attention. It was covered extensively
by the German press.115 It also received considerable exposure in other Eu-
Fig. 3. Confrontation between anticommunist demonstrators and U.S. mil-

itary police, ABN demonstration, Munich, April 10, 1949. From Wir kla-
gen an! (n.p.: Pressedienst des Antibolschewistischen Blocks der Nationen,
[1949]).
ropean countries and in the United States.116 Although the demonstrators

were often described as a “mob” and the demonstration itself as a “riot,”
much of the reportage was neutral or sympathetic. Thus, even if the
demonstrators failed to reach their ‹nal destination, they were extremely
successful in communicating their messages to a German, American, and
international audience.
This is most true in the German context. German media reports
faithfully reproduced the demonstrators’ critiques of communism and
presented the actions of the MPs in a critical light. The ABN received es-
pecially prominent coverage. No doubt, this considerate treatment
re›ected both German sympathy for the demonstrators and German hos-
tility toward the occupiers. It con‹rmed both the dangers of communism
and the harshness of the occupation. Nonetheless, it signaled a subtle shift
in German attitudes toward Polish, Ukrainian, and other non-Jewish
DPs. In the context of the growing Cold War, the concerns of these east-
ern European “foreigners” became not only more visible but also more ac-
ceptable. The DP presence in Germany remained undesirable, but it was

now more intelligible.
The Munich ABN demonstration was staged as displaced persons
were leaving Germany. It was not the last anticommunist DP demonstra-
tion in Germany—the ABN staged another one in Munich in June 1951—
but as time went on, the scene of anticommunist activity shifted. In the
mid- to late 1950s, most demonstrations were staged in the centers of emi-
gration, notably the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and Aus-
tralia.117 The anticommunist movement thus followed the immigration
paths of displaced persons. This movement never became a truly popular
phenomenon. Most displaced persons, however willing they were to par-
ticipate in a demonstration, did not belong to anticommunist organiza-
tions. The anticommunist DP movement was thus a distinct phenomenon
rather than a re›ection of popular sentiment.
Anticommunist activists had ambitious goals. They aimed not only to
avoid repatriation but also to transform political conditions at home.
These activists had much in common. They shared an attraction to au-
thoritarian conceptions of political rule. They also shared an antisemitic
and pro-Nazi background. However, they differed in their attitudes toward
the future of the Soviet Union. The de‹ning issue here was the nationali-
ties question, which divided committed anticommunists into two distinct
camps. Neither camp succeeded in building a broad-based movement.
However, the separatist conception of the postcommunist order found
greater resonance among DPs, as it was capable of bundling diverse na-
tional resentments into a single overarching platform. At the ABN demon-
stration in Munich in April 1949, the separatists succeeded in mobilizing
thousands of displaced persons, whose conception of anticommunism in-
cluded many themes of only secondary interest to the separatist leadership.
The most important of these was religious persecution.
The development of the Cold War promoted the reemergence of anti-
communist groups displaced from eastern Europe. The U.S. zone of Ger-
many offered an especially hospitable environment for their activities. As
anticommunism became central to U.S. foreign policy, especially U.S. pol-
icy toward Germany, anticommunist DPs were able to gain both covert
and overt support for their aims. By 1949, they not only felt con‹dent
enough to openly proclaim their existence, they were also ready to take
their message to the streets. They shaped how the German, American, and
international public understood both displaced persons and anticommu-
nism. However, DP anticommunism continued to be seen as “a potential
source of many dif‹culties,” especially in relation to the reconstruction of

Germany.118 As non-Germans, displaced persons were not supposed to
participate in politics. Moreover, their politics did not ‹t the progressive
model of anticommunism the United States wanted to promote. The in-
creasing publicity that DP anticommunism assumed during the late 1940s
thus occurred both with and against the wishes of the Americans. Indeed,
as the U.S. consul general in Munich reported to U.S. secretary of state
Dean Acheson after the ABN demonstration in Munich, it was a good
thing MPs had put an end to the demonstration. Otherwise, communist
propagandists would have been able to say that the United States had “in-
spired and promoted” it.119
Chapter 5
Jewish Survivors and the

Reckoning with the Nazi Past
In “The Battle of Grunwald,” Tadeusz Borowski interweaves the story of

liberated Polish political prisoners with that of Polish Jewish Holocaust
survivors. While the politicals are debating the Polish future in the DP
camp, a group of Polish Jews arrives. They are on their way to Palestine.
The story’s narrator Tadek makes the acquaintance of a young Jewish
woman named Nina, who is eager to put Poland behind her. In one of the
story’s pivotal scenes, an American GI mistakenly shoots and kills Nina as
she and Tadek try to sneak back into the camp. An indictment of U.S. pol-
icy toward victims of National Socialism, this scene can also be read as a
meditation on the dif‹culties of reconstructing one’s life after the war.
Skeptical of all nationalisms, Borowski portrays the exodus of Jews from
Poland and the assertion of a Jewish identity as an unsatisfactory solution
to the problem of ‹nding a home in the postwar world. In killing his one
real Jewish character, he also critiques the Zionist solution to this problem.
Among Jewish DPs, the repatriation debate did indeed revolve around
the possibility of rebuilding one’s life at home and the meaning of home
more generally. This chapter focuses on the Jewish repatriation debate. One
of the key issues I consider here is support for Zionism. This issue has been
hotly debated in the literature on Jewish DPs. However unsatisfactory the
Zionist solution may have appeared to Borowski, many scholars believe
that it enjoyed strong support. According to Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, “the
Zionist position was the only one of the many Jewish philosophies of life
whose program still made sense after the catastrophe.”1 Similarly, Zeev
Mankowitz argues that Jewish DPs demonstrated “a potent proto-Zion-
ism.”2 Yehuda Bauer puts things even more strongly, arguing that the “ide-
ological orientation [of the DPs] was clearly, overwhelmingly, and right
from the beginning, Zionist.”3 At the other end of the spectrum, Yosef
153
Grodzinsky argues that Zionists forced their agenda onto survivors, for ex-
ample, by pressuring young Jewish DPs to join the emerging Israeli army.4
Other scholars take a middle position, arguing that Zionism among Jewish
DPs is best understood as the product of noncoercive interaction with rep-
resentatives of the yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine.5
While the political visibility of Zionism among Jewish DPs is indis-
putable, the sources and strength of Zionism remain unclear. What did
Zionism mean to Jewish DPs? How was support for Zionism related to the
Holocaust? To what extent was it a mass phenomenon? In order to ade-
quately address these questions, one needs to consider the regional back-
ground of Jewish DPs, their experiences during the Holocaust, and their
prospects for rebuilding their lives in postwar eastern Europe. The regional
history of Zionism during the earlier twentieth century is especially im-
portant. For most Jewish DPs, Zionism was a familiar political idiom. Far
from being the only philosophy that still made sense, it was the philosophy
that made most sense to survivors from countries with a strong Zionist tra-
dition. American DP policies and practices also helped the Zionist camp
by progressively recognizing Jewish DPs as a distinct national group. This
process began with permission to create separate Jewish committees in the
liberated concentration camps, continued with the Harrison Report and
the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, and culminated in the recog-
nition of the Central Committee of Liberated Jews in September 1946.
Still, it is not clear that Zionism was the mass phenomenon many scholars
suggest or that support for Zionism meant support for emigration to Pales-
tine. Although survivors were quite willing to turn their backs on Europe,
emigration plans were also directed at the United States and other coun-
tries and were linked to the more general desire for a safe and digni‹ed ex-
istence. Moreover, mass rejection of diaspora life did not come until well
after the war, in the context of renewed persecution in Poland and other
eastern European countries.
Although the Jewish repatriation debate was thus quite different from
the repatriation debate among Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians, the two
debates were nonetheless intertwined. Jewish decisions about the future
were made in the context of a common framework of American and Ger-
man policies toward displaced persons and persecutees. These policies
came to recognize Jews as a distinct group, but in many respects treated
them like other DPs. As Daniel Cohen notes, “[Holocaust] survivors
shared little with the rest of the refugee world; but like their Polish, Baltic,
or Ukrainian displaced counterparts, they stood at the receiving end of ra-
Jewish Survivors and the Reckoning with the Nazi Past 155
tionalized population management techniques.”6 Moreover, Jewish DPs

were initially categorized according to their of‹cial nationality. They were
thus directly confronted with the question of whether they had a future
among their non-Jewish neighbors. Indeed, the formation of committees
among other groups of DPs made the question of belonging urgent. Many
Jewish survivors demanded to be treated as a separate group and segre-
gated from other DPs. Such demands not only served the practical purpose
of addressing the special and especially dire needs of Jewish survivors, they
were also a means of asserting a distinct Jewish identity. For many, this
identity could no longer be reconciled with life in the diaspora.
Jewish Survivors and the International Prisoners’ Community
In the aftermath of liberation, questions of identity and belonging were

foremost in the minds of many Jews. For the ‹rst Jewish DPs, survivors of
the concentration camps, these questions emerged in the context of de-
bates over representation within the international prisoners’ community.
Who had the right to represent Jews? Should they be represented by the ex-
tant national committees, organized along the nation-state principle, or
did they constitute a separate group? If the latter, how was this separate
group to be de‹ned? In particular, did Jews constitute a separate national-
ity? In his book on Jewish survivors in postwar Germany, Michael Brenner
suggests that “recognition of the Jews as an independent group was the
‹rst demand of camp committees everywhere.”7 Yet this statement begs
further questions. Who was involved in the creation of such committees?
And what did they mean when they argued that Jews constituted an inde-
pendent group? Did the creation of Jewish camp committees imply rejec-
tion of repatriation? Did it mean commitment to Zionism? To begin ad-
dressing these questions, I return to the liberated concentration camp of
Dachau. A look at the history of Jewish committees in Dachau suggests
that while Zionist demands ‹gured prominently, the formation of commit-
tees was motivated by a complex set of considerations.
Two groups claiming to represent Jewish survivors developed in
Dachau. To different degrees, both were Zionist in orientation. The ‹rst
was composed of Lithuanian Jews from the Kovno ghetto, in particular
activists from Irgun Brith Zion, a moderate Zionist youth group created
clandestinely during the ‹rst Soviet occupation of Lithuania (1940–41),
when Zionist organizations were banned. The activities of this group were
thus an extension of a movement that began before the Nazi occupation

and continued in the ghettos and concentration camps. After the liquida-
tion of the Kovno ghetto in the summer of 1944, the Irgun Brith Zion
members were deported to Dachau, where they were concentrated in the
Kaufering satellite camp.8 There they reestablished some of their organiza-
tional structures, including their newspaper Nitzotz (The Spark), which
circulated in Kaufering and neighboring camps.9 The newspaper, an amaz-
ing accomplishment in itself, served as a forum for debating the future of
Zionism. Like other Zionists, the Kovno group feared that the Nazi’s geno-
cidal program had made Zionism obsolete. As Shlomo Frenkel, one of the
movement’s central ‹gures, put it, “There is no point in dreaming anymore
about the liquidation of European Jewry for it has been wiped out already
by the ‹re and swords of German soldiers. . . . The Jewish question has al-
ready been solved by Adolf Hitler.”10 However, Frenkel and his compatri-
ots hoped that the Zionist project could be salvaged. Hitler’s genocidal
program, they argued, had demonstrated the truth of Zionism. Leib Gar-
funkel, another member of the group, saw it this way in April 1945.
While in this Nazi hell one burning question racks our brains and
gives us no respite: What was it all for, why the murder of millions and
a sea of blood? A vain sacri‹ce from which nothing good will come?
Or will this revolutionize our lives and lead to a fundamental change
in the way the world relates to us? Perhaps both they and we will come
to the realization that the Jewish people can no longer live without a
national center of its own.11
To this end, the Kovno group sought to build a new leadership cadre. They
stressed the need to overcome factionalism, a source of weakness in the
past, and create a uni‹ed Zionist front.12 These ideas went back to the early
days of Irgun Brith Zion. The Zionist youth movements had proclaimed
the goal of unity during the Soviet occupation period, in reaction to the
factionalism of an older generation of leaders. They also began to estab-
lish themselves as a new leadership cadre, one willing to participate in un-
derground political activities.13 This process accelerated after the Nazi oc-
cupation. As the end of the war neared, the members of the Kovno group
in Dachau refocused their efforts. By creating a united front, they argued,
Zionists would be able to claim that they represented the collective inter-
ests of the survivors. They would also be able to withstand the pressures to
return home. In April 1945, shortly before the liberation, prisoners from
one of the Kaufering camps were evacuated to the main camp. There, im-
mediately after the liberation, they established a Zionist Center, which

sought the right to represent Jews as an independent national group.
The second group in Dachau was composed primarily of Polish Jews
who met in the main camp after the liberation. This group spearheaded the
creation of the Jewish Information Of‹ce. In a petition submitted to the
International Prisoners’ Committee of Dachau on May 10, the leaders of
the of‹ce stated that their goal was to “represent the special interests of the
Jews of all nations” in Dachau. They presented these interests as familial
and religious rather than national and political.
It is very well known that the extreme small quantity of the European
Jews who have been left alife, have their special commun matters as for
inst. special Jews-camp accusations, seeking the family members—
there is no Jewish family in Europe that has not been divided and the
members distributed in different Ghettos and Conc. Camps—in other
concentrating camps liberated by the Allies and the Russians, farther
religious questions and many others.14
Indeed, the Jewish Information Of‹ce was primarily a welfare and memo-
rial organization. In addition to providing for the immediate material and
spiritual needs of survivors, it sought to create a record of all the Jews who
had been interned in Dachau, especially those who had died.15 However,
the inspiration behind the creation of the of‹ce was at least partly Zionist.
In his memoir, Joel Sack, one of the of‹ce’s founders, suggests that he and
his compatriots were united by a desire not to return home. This desire was
fueled by their wartime experiences of marginalization and persecution at
the hands of their neighbors. As liberated prisoners began forming na-
tional committees, they realized the urgent need to organize one of their
own.16 This negative impulse to renounce their citizenship was paired with
a positive embrace of Zionism.
As survivors, we had decided to renounce our former nationalities,

and to declare our Jewish Nationality. We were willing to be stateless
until a Jewish homeland was created in Palestine. We began to de-
scribe our nationality as “former,” as in “former Polish.” This had be-
come widely accepted.17
Well aware of the fact that their project was controversial, they deliberately
obscured its political underpinnings.
Unlike the Jews from Kovno, the members of the Polish group did not
have a history of Zionist activism. They can thus be considered “post-cat-

astrophe Zionists.”18 Their identi‹cation with Zionism developed after the
liberation, as they re›ected on the history of European Jewry and the pos-
sibility—or impossibility—of rebuilding their lives in their native coun-
tries. For Sack and his compatriots, re›ection on the history of Polish
Jewry was especially important. In Sack’s memoir, the exchange of stories
about wartime persecution in Poland is central to the formation of new
friendships. For example, in narrating his ‹rst meeting with fellow survivor
Yosef Lindenberg, Sack focuses on the story Lindenberg tells about his
own wartime experiences. The story ends with an anecdote highlighting
Polish antisemitism: “Yosef related to me bitterly how ‘our compatriots,’
the Polish inmates, searched all barracks for Jews who were hiding to avoid
[the] death transport.”19 Re›ection on the history of the Holocaust in
Poland, and the longer history of Polish antisemitism, thus played a cen-
tral role in the turn to Zionism.
Still, the original plan for the Jewish Information Of‹ce probably rep-
resented a bundling of interests. As I have already mentioned, many of the
tasks performed by the of‹ce were nonpolitical. Similarly, while some of
the group’s leading members were Zionists, others were not. The ‹rst
chairman of the of‹ce was a Hungarian Jewish doctor named Hugo
Schreiber. There is no evidence he was a Zionist. He was a person of con-
siderable standing in Dachau, which may well be why he was chosen to
head the of‹ce.20 After Schreiber left in late May, presumably to return to
Hungary, he was replaced by Mieczyslaw Dortheimer, a Polish Jewish doc-
tor who belonged to the Zionist-inspired founding group.21 Also central to
the of‹ce’s work was Abraham Klausner, a young American Jewish army
chaplain who identi‹ed closely with both the survivors and Zionism.22
For these early Jewish representations, it was important to gain recog-
nition from the authorities. Recognition was valuable from both a practi-
cal and an ideological perspective: it facilitated the work of the Jewish
committees, and it con‹rmed that the Jews constituted a distinct group. It
was especially important to the Zionists, for whom it represented quasi-
of‹cial acceptance of the Jews as a nation among nations. However, both
the U.S. Army and the International Prisoners’ Committee responded am-
bivalently to the formation of Jewish committees. The Americans initially
refused to sanction his committee, because it ›ew in the face of the inter-
national order. Even the term committee was reserved for of‹cial national
representations.23 Sack and his compatriots thus decided to reframe their
demands in more neutral terms. They started by renaming their organiza-
tion, trading committee for information of‹ce. This time, their proposal was
approved.24
Like the American camp authorities, the International Prisoners’
Committee also responded ambivalently to their proposal. The IPC invited
the chairman of the Jewish Information Of‹ce to sit in on its meetings but
would not accept him as a voting member. The IPC was committed to the
of‹cial nationality categories, which it saw as the building blocks of the in-
ternational antifascist front. It was not prepared to have these categories
taken apart. Dominated by political prisoners, it was also rather distant
from the experiences of Jews in the camp and to some extent shared the
disdain for Jews promoted by the Nazi racial hierarchy. According to Leon
Malczewski, a prominent member of the Polish Committee and the secre-
tary of the IPC, the Jewish representative could not serve “as a delegate of
the Jews as a nationality” because “the Committee considers the Jews to be
members of those national groups of which they are citizens.”25 The IPC
also insisted that Jews remain in their of‹cial national groups. This was in-
tended to facilitate repatriation, which, for the IPC, represented the only
proper end to the camp experience.26 Over time, the Jewish Information
Of‹ce did gain a ‹rmer foothold on the IPC, and by June its chairman had
been elected IPC minister of justice.27 However, this improvement in status
was not the product of an ideological shift but rather re›ected pragmatic
considerations: as most prisoners returned home, new opportunities
emerged for those who remained behind, the remnants of the camp society.
Similar efforts to create a Jewish representation took place in other liber-
ated camps, including the Dachau satellite camp of Dachau-Allach, where
a Jewish committee also wrestled with the local International Prisoners’
Committee.28
While of‹cial recognition of their committees was the main way in
which Jewish survivors sought to af‹rm a distinct identity, symbolic forms
of recognition were also important, especially to Zionists. Thus, the Zion-
ist Center created by the Kovno group demanded the right to ›y the blue-
and-white ›ag of the Zionist movement as the Jewish national ›ag. Here
too the IPC eventually relented.29 In his recollections of the period, David
Max Eichhorn, an American rabbi who arrived in Dachau shortly after the
liberation, dwells at length on such symbolic practices. Writing about the
preparations for the ‹rst campwide Sabbath service, he stresses the in-
volvement of the international prisoners’ community. “The inmates’ Inter-
national Committee,” he writes, “promised to have the platform in the
square decorated with the ›ag of every nation represented in the camp (I
think there were 28 in all), and every nationality was to send a delegation
to the services as an indication of its brotherly sympathy for the Jewish
people.”30 However, things did not go precisely as planned. A group of Pol-
ish prisoners threatened to break up the service if it was held on the main
square, and the intervention of the American military was needed in order
to proceed. In the end, the service took place as planned. For Jewish sur-
vivors and their American Jewish colleagues, it was an important mark of
acceptance into the international prisoners’ community.31
The formation of Jewish committees in Dachau suggests the com-
plexities of identi‹cation and representation in the aftermath of the Holo-
caust. On the one hand, there were various roads to the idea of a Jewish
committee: in the case of the group from Kovno, a long history of Zionist
activism; in the case of the Polish group, a belated embrace of Zionism. On
the other hand, the idea of a Jewish representation was not inherently
Zionist. As the work of the Jewish Information Of‹ce suggests, a Jewish
committee could serve various purposes. It could facilitate the collection
and distribution of information about family members and friends, pro-
vide for proper Jewish burials, and memorialize the collective suffering of
Jews under National Socialism. Opposition to repatriation was not a pre-
requisite. Nor was commitment to Zionism. Still, Zionists were more heav-
ily invested in the idea of a Jewish representation. For them, recognition as
a separate group was an important element in the struggle for recognition
of a Jewish state: it represented a provisional entrée into the international
community. Moreover, Zionists were the only political group categorically
opposed to repatriation. This gave them a long-term advantage. As
Yehuda Bauer notes, “In general it was only natural that Polish Bundists
and Communists should return to Poland in accordance with their ideol-
ogy, leaving the ‹eld in the camps to Zionists or to people who were quite
willing that they should be represented by Zionists.”32 Yet it is also
signi‹cant that the American authorities recognized these early Jewish
committees, even if their status was amorphous. Coming months before
Earl Harrison submitted his famous report, this recognition of Jews as a
distinct group, facilitated by sympathetic U.S. Army of‹cers on the
ground, helped establish the U.S. zone as a hospitable place for Zionist pol-
iticking. As the concentration camps emptied and DP camps were estab-
lished, the work of these ‹rst committees provided the foundation for the
development of a vibrant political life in which Zionism would play a dom-
inant role.
The Formation of a Jewish DP Community
The small groups that emerged on the eve of liberation were the seeds of a
movement that continued after the liquidation of the concentration camps.
Increasingly, Jewish DPs asserted their unwillingness to return home and
demanded to be recognized as Jews. In Bavaria, the leading ‹gures in this
movement were Polish and Lithuanian Jews. An especially prominent role
was again played by survivors of the Kovno ghetto. The ‹rst signi‹cant
gathering of survivors was a liberation concert held at the Benedictine
monastery of St. Ottilien, outside Landsberg, in late May. The concert was
attended by some 800 survivors as well as representatives of the American
Military Government and UNRRA.33 In late June, a ‹rst Conference of
Zionists in Bavaria was held at the Freimann barracks. Here the idea of
creating a general association of Jewish survivors was ‹rst articulated, no-
tably by Abraham Klausner. On July 1, delegates from Jewish camp com-
mittees throughout Bavaria, representing some 12,000 Jewish DPs, met in
the Felda‹ng DP camp on the outskirts of Munich to accomplish this
task. The Association of Jewish Survivors in the American Occupation
Zone they created had an eight-member executive committee and a
twenty-one-member council. Zalman Grinberg, a physician and survivor
of the Kovno ghetto, was elected chairman of the executive. Of the coun-
cil members, eight were Lithuanian, ‹ve Polish, four Hungarian, three Ru-
manian, and one Greek. Signi‹cantly, these individuals did not serve as
representatives of their countries of origin or their DP camps; rather, they
were selected for their “previous accomplishments in the ‹eld of political-
social work.”34 This re›ected the association’s desire to move beyond local
and regional af‹liations toward the goal of national unity. It also directly
challenged the nationality policy of the occupation authorities. At the end
of the meeting, the newly formed association passed a number of distinctly
Zionist resolutions. One called on Jews everywhere to unite to build a Jew-
ish state in Palestine; another demanded that the British government recall
the White Paper, open the gates to Palestine, and facilitate the creation of
a Jewish state there; a third was directed to the Allied governments, who
were asked to lend their support to the project of building a new home for
the remaining Jews of Europe. Building on these efforts, in late July sur-
vivors organized a Conference of Liberated Jews in Germany in St. Ot-
tilien, which brought together delegates from DP camps in Germany and
Austria. A fourteen-point program passed at the conference included de-
mands for the immediate restoration of a Jewish state in Palestine, the con-
centration of Jewish DPs in separate camps, and full compensation by
Germany for physical damages and the loss of property.35
Although the St. Ottilien conference re›ected the desire to organize
on a German-wide basis, anxieties about the loss of local power, as well as
the realities of occupational division, made this effort impracticable.36 The
further development of associational life thus took place largely on the
Land and zonal levels. The association created in Felda‹ng in early July,
now calling itself the Central Committee of Liberated Jews in Bavaria
(CK), became the main representative organ of survivors in Bavaria. In
January 1946, it expanded to encompass the entire U.S. zone. In September
1946, it was recognized by the American Military Government as the
of‹cial representation of Jewish survivors. The committee’s struggle for
recognition will be detailed in the following chapter. The committee saw its
work as all-encompassing. Individual divisions dealt with issues such as
welfare, health, agricultural and industrial work, culture, ‹nance, legal af-
fairs, and public relations.
The formation of Jewish committees was spearheaded by survivors
with a long history of political and community work. In a now well-known
essay from 1947, the American Jewish historian Koppel Pinson wrote that
“the Jewish DP’s are a marvelous example of a society without an elite.
The elite of European Jewry were the ‹rst to be exterminated. . . . The pres-
ent leadership of Jewish DP’s is, but for a few exceptions, made up of peo-
ple who have little experience in social planning or social responsibili-
ties.”37 As Michael Brenner notes, “this harsh judgment by a
contemporary observer certainly applied to several local DP camps, but
not to most regional leaders of the DP’s, who had emerged by 1945.”38
These leaders saw their work among the survivors as a continuation of
their prewar and wartime activities. Marian Puczyc, a leading member of
the CK, referred to the survivors who gathered in Felda‹ng as “socially
and politically active Jews.”39 In a 1946 interview, Jakob Oleiski, the former
director of ORT in Lithuania, referred to himself and other Jewish DP
leaders as “the public workers, the responsible people who stand at the
head of the Jewish commonwealth in Germany.”40 Max Sprecher, who was
involved in establishing ORT in Felda‹ng, noted that he and other Jewish
survivors started their activities as soon as they arrived there. “Partly we
were involved in social [community] work before we got into the [concen-
tration] camp, and the ‹rst thing we considered appropriate after getting
out of the camp, to do some community work for the Jews.” For him this
meant “leading again these declassed, broken-up people toward produc-
tive, normal work.”41 Many Jewish DP leaders had university degrees and
professional credentials. Indeed, the ranks of CK leaders were ‹lled with
doctors and lawyers. Some had traveled widely or lived abroad before the
war. For example, Zalman Grinberg had studied at the University of Basel,
Jakob Oleiski at the University of Halle. Many knew German well. Pin-
son’s comments notwithstanding, many DP leaders thus had substantial
cultural capital.
As was the case among other DPs, the movement toward self-organi-
zation was oriented around two main tasks: self-help and self-representa-
tion. On the one hand, a host of pressing practical problems had to be ad-
dressed. Survivors needed to be housed, fed, and clothed. Many were in
dire need of medical attention. Another key preoccupation was the search
for family members. The often terrible conditions in the DP camps and the
limitations placed on survivors’ freedom of movement generated frustra-
tion with the occupation authorities, as did the nationality principle, which
placed Jewish survivors among their non-Jewish fellow nationals and often
led to them being treated as enemy or ex-enemy DPs. By the fall of 1945,
Jewish DPs also faced another serious problem: the in›ux of Polish Jewish
refugees. The in‹ltrees placed great strains on the resources of the Jewish
DP camps, which became increasingly overcrowded. The records of the
Central Committee suggest that they were the primary preoccupation dur-
ing the remainder of 1945 and 1946.42
On the other hand, survivors were struggling to make sense of recent
events and to determine what consequences to draw from them. While
many survivors addressed these issues privately, for others they were the fo-
cal point of public debate. The central question here was whether the
Holocaust represented an end to Jewish life in Europe. For most Jewish DP
leaders, the answer was clear. The narrative they articulated was strongly
informed by Zionist readings of the Jewish past and Zionist visions of the
Jewish future. It described the events of the war years as the culmination of
a long history of Jewish suffering, intimately connected to the loss of na-
tional independence in ancient times. In the short term, it called on Jewish
DPs to reject repatriation and identify themselves as a distinct Jewish
group of DPs. In the long term, it viewed the creation of a Jewish national
home in Palestine as the only salvation for the remnants of European
Jewry.
Rereading Jewish History
Jewish DP leaders de‹ned the survivors as “the last representatives of the

European Jews.”43 Their status as representatives was the product of their
shared fate. “Different is the road, various are the stations of torture, un-
like is the space of time,” Zalman Grinberg stated in St. Ottilien in May
1945, “but together they form one common red thread of blood, torture,
torment, humiliation—and violent death.”44 This conceptualization of
Jewish survivors as representatives of European Jewry as a whole was
re›ected in the use of the term She’erith Hapletah. Usually translated as
“surviving remnant,” the term She’erith Hapletah connotes not only sur-
vival but also salvation and redemption.45 A powerful illustration of this
idea was an arboreal motif that appeared frequently on publications by
Jewish DPs: a tree with its massive trunk cut down but a new branch
sprouting from its stump. Employed by the yishuv during the war years, the
term She’erith Hapletah surfaced in the Kovno group in Kaufering in 1944
and gained wide currency after the liberation.46 It was speci‹c to Jewish
DPs. Although all Jewish survivors in theory belonged to the surviving
remnant, “it was in Occupied Germany alone that the Jews referred to
themselves collectively as She’erith Hapleitah and thereby gave expression
to their unique identity accompanied by the potent sense that they repre-
sented the dynamic center of European Jewish life.”47 In particular, they
gave expression to the hope for redemption through the creation of a Jew-
ish homeland in Palestine. The concept of She’erith Hapletah was thus
linked to a Zionist interpretation of the Holocaust.
One of the main tasks of the surviving remnant, according to Jewish
DP leaders, was to recall and commemorate the events of the recent past.
As Zalman Grinberg stated at the St. Ottilien concert, “We act as delegates
of millions of victims to tell all mankind, to proclaim all over the world
how cruel people may become, what brutal hellishness is concealed within
a human being, and what a triumphant record of crime and murder has
been achieved by the nation of Hegel and Kant, Schiller and Goethe,
Beethoven and Schopenhauer.”48 This duty to remember and inform was
instantiated in a number of projects, the most signi‹cant of which was the
collection by the CK’s Central Historical Commission of materials about
the destruction.49
The efforts of Jewish DPs to make sense of recent events focused, in
the ‹rst place, on placing them in the context of Jewish history. This is ev-
ident in the Yiddish words most often employed to describe what is now
Fig. 4. View of the meeting hall at the Third Congress of the Central Com-
mittee of the Liberated Jews in the U.S. Zone of Germany, Bad Reichen-
hall, March 30–April 2, 1948. (Photograph by Alex Hochhauser. Courtesy
of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.)
commonly called the Holocaust: khurbn (destruction) and katastrofe (cat-

astrophe).50 The word khurbn, from the Hebrew khurban, traditionally re-
ferred to the destruction of the First and Second Temples and the disper-
sal of the Jewish people. Over time, Dalia Ofer notes, “Jews extended the
concept to include their sufferings as a result of pogroms in medieval and
modern times, as well as their loss of independence in ancient times.”51
Taken to its logical conclusion, the term khurbn suggested that the entire
2,000-year history of the Jewish diaspora had been de‹ned by suffering.
Both the narrow and the broad interpretations of the term were applied to
the events of the war years, which were sometimes identi‹ed as the third
great catastrophe, der drite khurbn, and sometimes as the most recent in a
longer series of catastrophes, as in the title of the journal put out by the
CK’s Central Historical Commission, Fun Letstn Khurbn (From the Last
Destruction).
While the events of the recent past were thus quickly integrated into
an established narrative framework, there was also a strong sense that the
most recent catastrophe was quantitatively and qualitatively different from

those that had preceded it—indeed, that it marked a radical break in Jew-
ish history. Speaking before a gathering of survivors in August 1945, Jakob
Oleiski stressed this point.
The Jewish Nation during its long and great history had to encounter
many tragedies. We stood not once before the question of to be or not
to be. But the churban—the blow against our nation, the break from
the years 1939–45 can compare neither in form nor in measure with
the most tragic moments of our opressed [sic] history. Herewith is
written with blood and tears of millions a new page of Jewish his-
tory.52
The precise nature of this break was still in the process of being articulated
during the late 1940s. As Zalman Grinberg noted in April 1946, “We lack
the temporal distance needed to make a reckoning with our sorrowful
past.”53 Nonetheless, there was a clear sense that the events of the war
years were unprecedented, that they constituted not just one catastrophe
among many but “the great catastrophe.” For many Jewish DP leaders, this
meant that it was also impossible for Jews to return to their old lives.
Not surprisingly, the crimes committed by the Germans were a key fo-
cus of narratives about the recent past. Recent events signaled the total
breakdown of German civilization. “In the middle of Europe,” Jakob
Oleiski wrote, “in the country of great civilization the nation of Goethe,
Kant, and Beethoven showed itself most unstable in its spiritual essence.”54
Like many postwar commentators, Jewish DP leaders sometimes found it
hard to believe that the so-called land of poets and thinkers was capable of
committing such crimes. Indeed, the sense of disbelief among Jewish DPs
may well have been stronger than it was among other groups of survivors,
since German culture had long exercised a strong attraction for eastern
European Jews, and many Jews from Poland harbored positive memories
of German rule during the First World War.
Yet Germans and Germany by no means dominated narratives
about the recent past. For commentators like Samuel Gringauz, German
crimes had to be seen in a broader European context of antisemitism and
persecution.
[The Jewish DPs] have seen not only Germany. Eastern Europe and
Central Europe are part of their experience. And they have seen the
countries of Western Europe. The majority of the nations of Europe

were represented among the oppressors in the concentration camps,
and the only difference was that in this confusion of nationalities one
was more strongly represented than the others.55
The history of antisemitism and persecution in eastern Europe was espe-

cially important here. Indeed, although Jewish DPs held the Germans re-
sponsible for initiating the catastrophe, they directed much of their anger
at their fellow eastern Europeans. For while the Germans were foreign in-
vaders, the peoples of eastern Europe were neighbors, whose involvement
in the Holocaust constituted a fundamental breach of trust. “We have not
only been killed by Germans,” Aryeh (Leon) Retter stated. “In the
crowded ranks of our slaughterers are Ukrainians, Poles, Roumanians,
austrians [sic], and many others.”56 He gave horri‹c accounts of how his
fellow Romanian citizens had treated the Jews during the German occupa-
tion. Such events, Gringauz stressed, were the product of a longer history
of European antisemitism, which “had especially bloomed during the time
of the so-called long armistice, 1918–1939.” Its in›uence could be seen “in
the policy of economic exclusion in eastern Europe, in the policy of dis-
crimination, which was pursued in practice by all the reactionary regimes,
in the ‹asco of so-called minority rights.”57 This kind of political anti-
semitism, he suggested, could be combated. The same was not true of psy-
chological antisemitism. The peoples of Europe, Gringauz argued, had
been irreversibly poisoned by their long encounter with National Social-
ism. Even those who had opposed the murderous campaign of the Nazis
had nonetheless adopted the “Torah of Hitlerism.”58 The violence against
Jews in postwar Poland suggested that the “grim legacy of Nazi ideology”
was alive and well.59 Reading the events of the early postwar period against
the backdrop of the Nazi era, Jewish DP leaders argued that there was no
end in sight to the sufferings of the Jewish people.
While Jewish history and the history of antisemitism provided the
most immediate context for making sense of recent events, many Jewish
DP leaders also sought to put them in the context of the history of “the
West.” In doing so, they recapitulated and extended arguments about the
Enlightenment put forward by Zionists decades earlier. For Jews, the En-
lightenment traditionally stood for legal emancipation and the promise of
formal equality. It also stood for modernization, secularization, and inte-
gration into the mainstream of European culture and society. In the
Haskalah movement, which began in Germany and had a deep impact on
many parts of eastern Europe, these emphases were combined with a re-
vival of Hebrew and the study of Jewish history. In the late nineteenth cen-
tury, Zionists had begun to question this faith in the Enlightenment, argu-
ing that emancipation could not be bought at the price of integration.
Jewish DP leaders in postwar Germany reiterated these arguments, placing
the Holocaust at the end point of an established Zionist narrative about
the promises and failures of the Enlightenment.
The Jewish catastrophe, a number of Jewish DPs argued, was not only
the latest and most tragic chapter in the history of the Jewish people, it also
represented a fundamental attack on the concept of Western civilization or
civilization tout court. “We were living in the illusion,” Oleiski wrote, “that
cultural and moral standards would be raised by education and civiliza-
tion. We hoped that as humanity neared the spiritual sources of Music,
Art, Philosophy, and Literature man would reach a higher moral and ethi-
cal standard.”60 The remnants of a lingering faith in the concept of culti-
vation or Bildung, so central to the German Enlightenment and to Jewish
hopes for integration in both Germany and eastern Europe, are unmistak-
able here. Samuel Gringauz made a similar point, juxtaposing the achieve-
ments of Western civilization against the recent destruction.
Our homes were broken up, our families scattered, deported, taken in
enslavement, our children thrown living into graves, our wifes driven
to death by cold and hunger, tortured and murdered with calculated,
scienti‹c and pitiless savagery. And all that after 2000 years of human
and christian culture, after Michel Angelo and Leonardo da Vinci, af-
ter Moliére and Voltaire, after William Shakespeare and Charles Dar-
win, after Alexander von Humboldt and Emmanuel Kant.61
During this long history, a number of Jewish DPs noted, European culture
and Jewish culture had been intimately intertwined. On the one hand, Jews
had made valuable contributions to Western civilization. On the other
hand, Western civilization had penetrated Jewish life and transformed the
Jews of Europe into European Jews. The blow to Western civilization was
thus a blow to the idea of Jewish coexistence. Conversely, the attack on
Jews was an attack on Western civilization. As Samuel Gringauz stated in
a 1945 essay, “The fate of the Jews embodied the fate of civilization.”62
Indeed, recent history had demonstrated the emptiness of the En-
lightenment promise. According to Gringauz, Jews had been wrong to
place their faith in the Enlightenment, because emancipation had not been
carried out for their sake but rather “for the sake of a general principled
abstraction of liberalism.”63 Formal emancipation was not real emancipa-
tion, as the growth of antisemitism in the post-Enlightenment era demon-
strated. Indeed, real emancipation could not be found by following the En-
lightenment path. As Gringauz stated, “neither equality of rights, nor a
constitution, nor patriotism is security against persecution. . . . One cannot
escape one’s Jewishness—either by assimilation, baptism, or mixed mar-
riage.”64 The central proof of this truth was the fact that Germany, the na-
tion eastern European Jews most closely identi‹ed with the Enlighten-
ment, had been the source of their greatest sufferings.65
Looking back at the recent past, Jewish DPs were overwhelmed by
the suffering and the loss that had befallen their people. Yet it was also im-
portant for them to stress acts of heroism. In postwar Yiddish literature,
the concepts of anguish (payn) and heroism (gvure) were often linked.
This linkage tapped into a long history of Jewish thought about martyr-
dom. The term martyr derives from the Greek word for “witness.” In the
Jewish tradition, a martyr is an individual who suffers and dies—or, more
precisely, is willing to suffer and die—in order to bear witness to God’s
spiritual sovereignty. He or she risks death “for the sancti‹cation of the
Name” (kiddush ha-Shem).66 Martyrologies ›ourish in times of crisis.
Thus it is not surprising that the theme of martyrdom gained new impor-
tance during and after the Holocaust. In their writings and speeches, Jew-
ish DP leaders frequently spoke about martyrdom. Partisans, ghetto
‹ghters, and others who had actively resisted the Nazis were viewed as
heroic martyrs and endowed with moral and political authority.67 Thus it
was common to commemorate important acts of Jewish resistance like
the Warsaw ghetto uprising.68 More generally, the experience of suffering
was itself endowed with heroism, transforming all of those who had per-
ished during the catastrophe into martyrs of European Jewry. For exam-
ple, in the Dachau memorial book put together by Joel Sack and Yosef
Lindenberg in 1947, the English word martyred and the Yiddish word mur-
dered (umgebrakht) were used as synonyms. This interpretation of mar-
tyrdom was a novelty. Traditionally, martyrdom had implied a conscious
choice of death, especially in the face of demands to renounce one’s faith.
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, such an interpretation seemed prob-
lematic, as the Jews who had been murdered had not been given a choice.
Like Jews elsewhere, Jewish DPs began to think about martyrdom less in
terms of what one had done than who one was—or, more accurately, who
one was considered to be.
The Debate over the Jewish Future
What consequences should be drawn from these conclusions about the

past? How should the past inform present actions and plans for the future?
This was the key question posed by Jewish DP leaders.
The great catastrophe that had befallen European Jewry, many ar-
gued, signaled not only the end of one era but also the beginning of an-
other arguably better one. As David Treger stated at the Second Congress
of Liberated Jews in February 1947, endowing history itself with transfor-
mative power, “It was the will of Jewish history, that in our time a great
new era in the life of the Jewish people should begin.”69 In keeping with the
idea that the She’erith Hapletah represented not only the remnants of a
once great community but also the possibility of renewal and rebirth, Jew-
ish DPs were assigned the role of a vanguard in the creation of this new
era. This vanguard role was articulated clearly at the July 1945 conference
in St. Ottilien. Addressing the conference, a Jewish survivor who had re-
turned home, only to leave again for Germany, drew far-reaching conclu-
sions about the place of DPs in the Jewish future.
I have already come back from my “fatherland.” There are hundreds,

indeed, thousands like me, who have already gotten a sense of what
awaits us in our former “homes.” Therefore I come here and say to
you: today it is not only a problem of the Jews who ‹nd themselves in
Germany, it is the burning problem of all European Jewry. You today
are the pathbreakers who must pave the way for hundreds of thou-
sands of European Jews.70
David Treger elaborated on this idea in his speech at the Second Congress.
“From a historical perspective,” he stated, “we stand al poroshes drokhis,
[that is,] at a crossroads. There must be a breakthrough in the fate of the
whole Jewish nation, and we the She’erith Hapletah have been called to
lead the way to full national salvation.”71
Central to the idea that Jewish DPs represented a vanguard was the
fact that they had recognized the essential national unity of the Jewish peo-
ple and the necessity of a Jewish state. Like their obligation toward the
past, this national awakening was identi‹ed as the product of their
wartime experiences, their status as survivors of the destruction. Accord-
ing to Samuel Gringauz, the encounter with Nazi ideology had radically
transformed how Jews understood themselves. “His Jewishness,” Gringauz
argued, “became the substance of consciousness, became fate. Just as his

enemy showed day in and day out an all-embracing, extremely intense, and
omnipresent anti-Jewish attitude, making the Jewishness of the Jew the
center of all his attention, so too the Jew, in self-defense, made of his Jew-
ishness the foundation of his consciousness.”72 For Gringauz, direct expe-
rience was the bedrock upon which ideologies were constructed. The expe-
rience of Nazi persecution had given birth to a new ideology, characterized
by Judeocentrism and Jewish universalism. For Jakob Oleiski as well, the
recent past had revealed the essentially Jewish nature of the survivors.
Thus it was an error to think that Jews could ever be members of their na-
tive countries, however deep their attachments to those countries might be.
Like Gringauz, Oleiski described this realization as the product of a pro-
gressively more intense personal encounter with the persecutors.
“I want to see my home again,” we sang with a feeling of homesick-

ness in the ‹rst years of the “Ghetos” [sic] looking through the fences
over the Vilija to Kowno and other Lithuanian towns. Today, after all
that, after the concentration camps in Germany, after we stated de‹ni-
tively that our former home was changed into a mass grave, we can
only grope and clasp with our ‹nger tips the shadows of our dearest,
and painfully cry: I can never more see my home. . . . The victorious
nations that in the 20th century removed the black plague from Eu-
rope must understand once and for all the speci‹c Jewish problem.
No, no we are not Polish when we are born in Poland, we are not
Lithuanians even though we once passed through Lithuania and we
are neither Roumanians though we have seen the ‹rst time in our life
the sunshine in Roumania. We are Jews!!!73
Jewish survivors thus had to reject their old national af‹liations and adopt
a new exclusively Jewish identity. Invoking a popular song from the ghetto,
“I Long for Home,” Jakob Oleiski acknowledged the pain involved in sep-
arating from one’s native land. However, he concluded with a call to open
the gates of Palestine and allow Jews to build a state there.
The call to reject old national af‹liations translated into the practical
demand for recognition of Jews as Jews. Like Ukrainian DPs, many Jewish
DPs argued that they constituted a community that transcended and over-
rode citizenship categories. As Marian Puczyc noted in late 1946, looking
back at the ‹rst postwar months, “We began with a struggle to be recog-
nized as Jews and not seen as Poles, Lithuanians, Romanians, Hungarians,
etc. In addition we put an end to the following nonsense: the Jews from
Poland . . . [and] Lithuania were recognized as members of the United Na-
tions, while the Romanian, Hungarian, and also German Jews were viewed
as former citizens of the conquered nations and treated as enemies. They
must ‹rst be repatriated.”74 After the arrival of Polish Jewish refugees, DP
leaders insisted that they too be incorporated into the category of Jewish
DPs. It was nonsense, Zalman Grinberg argued, to distinguish between
DPs and refugees, because both were victims of the Nazi regime.75
The call to reject old national identities also translated into the de-
mand for separation from Germans and non-Jewish DPs, viewed collec-
tively as perpetrators of the genocide.76 In particular, Jewish DPs de-
manded their own DP camps. According to Jakob Oleiski, the DP camps
were “a sediment basin of Ukranians [sic], Whites, Poles, and Lithuanians
and Letts—those criminals which are afraid to return home for the day of
Judgment which is expecting them.”77 Jewish DP leaders also demanded
separation outside the camps. For example, the Central Committee for-
bade Jewish DP sports teams to play against non-Jewish groups.78 It also
criticized Jewish students who participated in the UNRRA University, an
international DP university in Munich that also drew many Poles, Ukraini-
ans, Russians, Lithuanians, and Latvians. At a meeting with the Jewish
Students Union in November 1948, a representative of the CK argued that
“no discussions should be carried on with other DPs, for example with
Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, etc., then all of them have in fact been the
persecutors of Jewry.”79 As these examples themselves make clear, rela-
tions between Jews and non-Jews were more complicated than leadership
circles may have wished. Although Jewish DPs of‹cially refused to hire or
work for Germans, it was common to employ German women as nannies
in the DP camps. Jewish DP men sometimes had sex with German
women.80 There were also painful efforts at dialogue between Jewish and
non-Jewish DPs. In Munich, for example, a group of Lithuanian DPs met
with Lithuanian Jewish survivor and DP leader Yosef Leibowitz to discuss
the possibility of working together for the liberation of Lithuania. The
meeting ended badly: the Lithuanian delegation was unwilling to provide
an unquali‹ed acknowledgment of Lithuanian complicity in the Holo-
caust, and Leibowitz determined it was impossible to work with them.81
Such encounters no doubt reinforced support for separation. The policy
changes introduced after the Harrison Report facilitated this goal, recog-
nizing Jewish DPs as a distinct group and granting them their own DP
camps.
For most Jewish DP leaders, the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine

was the only logical consequence to be drawn from the recent destruction.
The Central Committee of Liberated Jews saw it as its number one objec-
tive to lead survivors out of Germany and into Palestine.82 According to
Samuel Gringauz, the events of the recent past had de‹nitively demon-
strated that Jews could not rely on the rest of the world. No one had lifted
a ‹nger to help them in their moment of greatest need, and the revival of
antisemitism in the postwar world, as well as the poor treatment of Jewish
DPs, suggested that little had changed since then. “Our ‹rst conclusion,”
he wrote, “is that we can expect no recognition of our sufferings from the
world, that there is no point in getting angry and shouting and adopting a
pose of righteous indignation.”83 The only shelter from the old and new
antisemitism was a Jewish state. The Central Committee articulated a sim-
ilar message in a letter to the United Nations Special Committee on Pales-
tine, written with Jewish DP committees from other occupation zones. “We
have learned by personal experience,” the committees wrote, “that no
country in the world was able, or willing, to protect us, and we were thus
helplessly exposed to Hitler’s fury of destruction.” Indeed, they continued,
“the fact that the disaster which befell European Jewry reached such di-
mensions can only be ascribed to the homelessness of our people. . . . We,
therefore, ‹rmly believe that for our and our children’s safety and peace the
establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine is an absolute necessity.”84 The
recent destruction, then, had not only con‹rmed the Jewishness of the
Jews but also the impossibility of ‹nding protection in the world at large.
While the search for a Jewish state was de‹ned as a response to the
Holocaust, it was also placed in a broader historical context. As we have
seen, many Jewish DP leaders looked back on the entire Jewish encounter
with Western civilization as a “great disappointment.” In this reading, the
dream of the lost national home had accompanied the Jewish diaspora
throughout its long history in Europe. The Zionist effort to create a Jewish
state in Palestine thus promised to close a larger circle.85 While Jakob
Oleiski looked back at the old hometowns of eastern Europe with fondness
and suggested that the turn toward Zionism meant abandoning the dream
of return, other DP leaders did not dwell on this. For them, the dream of
return was attached to Palestine.
While most Jewish DP leaders subscribed to some version of the
Zionist narrative, it did not meet with unanimous approval. The Jewish DP
camps and communities were ‹lled with political parties, many modeled
after the dominant parties of the prewar Jewish communities of eastern
Fig. 5. Jewish DPs protest British immigration policy to Palestine in the

Neu Freimann displaced persons camp, date unknown. (Photograph by
Jack Sutin. Courtesy of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.)
Europe. These parties “re›ected the diversity, or, to be more precise, the
fragmentation of the Jewish community.”86 In addition to a host of Zion-
ist groups, they included the socialist Bund and the orthodox-religious
Agudath Israel. Especially during the ‹rst months after the liberation, a
variety of ideas about the Jewish future competed for attention. This
comes through clearly in the debate among the delegates who met in
Felda‹ng in July 1945 to create a general committee. Yosef Leibowitz, a
Lithuanian Jewish survivor who had worked with the Zionist youth move-
ment in Kovno, openly acknowledged that survivors still needed to be con-
vinced of the Zionist narrative. “We have to ‹ght for the new idea of Pales-
tine,” he noted. “One needs to explain to the Jews what’s going on in their
old homelands.”87 Another delegate took issue with the attempt to inject
Zionist politics into the workings of the committee. “80% of the Jews,” Dr.
Rosental argued, “want to return to their old homes. There should not be
any politicking, rather, [the executive committee] should concern itself
with feeding the people in the camps.”88 According to Rosental, the com-
mittee was supposed to be a practical entity, whose primary task was to

minister to the material needs of survivors. He insisted that he would not
work with a politically oriented committee. This declaration met with a
hostile response from yet another delegate, V. Friedheim of Poland. “The
question of Palestine,” Friedheim retorted, “is not a purely Zionist matter,
but rather a general Jewish one. Under no circumstances may boundaries
be imposed on the Executive, on the contrary, it should operate with the
broadest possible mandate.” From his perspective, the executive committee
was in fact working “for the good and in the interest of all the Jews in
Bavaria.”89 He noted that Rosental and the 800 Jews he represented were
free to leave the association. Such less than subtle pressure helped alienate
non-Zionists from the Central Committee. Indeed, the Zionist majority
was intolerant of Bundists, Communists, and other non-Zionists and suc-
ceeded in marginalizing them in most camps and communities, Felda‹ng
being an important exception.90 Consequently, many Jewish DPs did not
view the CK as their representative.
Of course, Zionists were also internally divided. Zionist unity proved
dif‹cult to maintain in the heated political atmosphere of the late 1940s.
Zionist parties proliferated, reproducing many lines of division that had
existed before the war. They included socialist Zionist groups of various
stripes, General Zionists, Zionist Revisionists, and Mizrachi or religious
Zionists.91 All of these tendencies were represented on the Central Com-
mittee.92 Indeed, the different Zionist groups competed with one another
for representation on the CK and for funds from the CK’s coffers.93 They
disagreed over key issues such as the nature and extent of a Jewish state in
Palestine, the range of tactics acceptable in the struggle for Palestine, the
role of religion, and the possibilities for a revival of Jewish life in Europe.
Control over the Central Committee oscillated between the parties of the
Zionist left, who favored a Jewish state along socialist lines, and the Revi-
sionists, who were fervently antisocialist and demanded the establishment
of a Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan River.94 As among Ukrai-
nian DPs, these con›icts undermined the effort to project an image of na-
tional unity.
The Zionist movement was also self-consciously generational. It was
a movement of the young, of those who had been born at or after the turn
of the century and had come of age during the 1930s and early 1940s. In
this regard, there are interesting parallels between Jewish leaders and their
Ukrainian and Russian counterparts: all three represent the nationally
minded younger generation. Their politics point to the broader nationalist
mobilization of youth in interwar eastern Europe. A considerable gap in

political orientation divided younger Jewish survivors from their elders.
Speaking before a gathering of American Jews in December 1946, Aryeh
Retter, himself only twenty-four at the time, alluded to this gap. The “bit-
ter experiences” survivors had suffered in their home countries, he argued,
“have taught us that we must assure the life of our children, and not repeat
the mistakes of our parents.” In the ghetto, Retter noted, only the youth
had had the courage to organize a resistance.95 He thus implicitly faulted
the older generation for its unwillingness to make a break with Europe and
its inability to resist the persecutions. Similar sentiments were expressed at
the St. Ottilien Conference. “One does not notice a Jewish life pulsating in
the camp,” a delegate from Bergen-Belsen in the British zone noted, “and
this can be explained by the fact that the politics pursued by the camp lead-
ership are not in accord with the wishes of the youth, which is nationally-
minded.”96 The struggle to de‹ne a new politics can therefore be seen in
generational terms.
Jewish DPs in Regional Perspective
In de‹ning survivors as the She’erith Hapletah, Jewish DP leaders argued

that they represented the remnants of European Jewry. Yet this was clearly
an in›ated claim. The community of Jewish DPs was not synonymous
with the community of survivors. It consisted largely of Jews from Poland,
with smaller numbers from other eastern European countries, notably Ro-
mania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Lithuania.97 Similarly, the leader-
ship cadre was drawn primarily from Polish and Lithuanian Jews who
shared a commitment to Zionism. In order to better understand how Jew-
ish DPs understood themselves, one needs to examine antirepatriation,
proemigration, and pro-Zionist sentiments in regional perspective. Lack-
ing such an analysis, it is dif‹cult to understand why some survivors re-
turned home while others did not. Regional differences in Zionist senti-
ment have not received much attention in the scholarship on Jewish DPs.
Instead, borrowing arguments put forward by Jewish DP leaders them-
selves, many scholars have argued that the strength of Zionism among DP
survivors can be attributed to the Holocaust. The Holocaust did indeed
have a profound effect on how many survivors understood themselves. By
itself, however, it does not explain their attitudes toward the future. Also
important to understanding their outlook is an examination of nationalist
political mobilization in prewar eastern Europe coupled with an analysis

of Jewish life in eastern Europe after the war.
Questions of identity and belonging preoccupied Jewish survivors
throughout Europe. However, their answers to these questions differed
widely. Attitudes toward repatriation provide a rough index here. Survivors
from western European countries such as Germany, France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Italy were generally willing to accept the authority of
their national committees and return home. Survivors from Czechoslova-
kia, Hungary, and Romania were ambivalent, while survivors from Poland
and Lithuania demonstrated signi‹cant resistance.98 Finally, the attitudes
of survivors from the Soviet Union are dif‹cult to gauge, since like other
Soviet citizens, they were subject to forcible repatriation. Among the ‹rst
DPs, then, antirepatriation sentiment was strongest among Polish and
Lithuanian Jews. As we have seen, moreover, these two groups played a key
role in the organization of the ‹rst Jewish committees. Importantly, both
Poland and Lithuania stand out as countries with a strong Zionist tradi-
tion. Previous experiences with Zionism and other forms of Jewish nation-
alism thus seem to have played an important role in shaping outlooks to-
ward the future.
Throughout eastern Europe, Zionism experienced a considerable
growth in popularity after the First World War. Yet the degrees of success
varied markedly from country to country. In Czechoslovakia and Roma-
nia, Zionism made relatively modest inroads, whereas in Hungary modern
Jewish politics as a whole did not emerge, despite the fact that Theodor
Herzl had been born there.99 In Poland and Lithuania, on the other hand,
Zionism constituted the most dynamic Jewish political movement of the
interwar era. Poland, with its large Jewish population, was numerically the
strongest center of Zionism, while Lithuania, a country with a much
smaller Jewish population, had the proportionally highest number of
Zionist activists.100 According to Ezra Mendelsohn, the appeal of Zionism
and other forms of Jewish nationalism is best understood in relation to the
strength of Orthodox traditions coupled with opportunities for accultura-
tion. In countries like Lithuania, “the combination of little acculturation
and a deeply rooted Orthodox Jewry undergoing a process of seculariza-
tion encouraged by both the government and the Haskalah produced an
environment in which modern Jewish nationalism ›ourished and com-
peted with Orthodoxy for the allegiance of the youth.”101 In Poland, the
situation was somewhat different. Here the Jewish population was becom-
ing progressively more integrated into the majority society. Young Jews in-
creasingly attended Polish schools, learned the Polish language, and par-
ticipated in Polish cultural life. By the early 1930s, Polish was replacing
Yiddish as the dominant language among the younger generations.102
However, the upsurge in antisemitism during the interwar period, re›ected
in of‹cial government policies that discriminated against Jews and pushed
them to the margins of the economy, suggested to many young Polish Jews
that like their Lithuanian counterparts, they had only a limited future in
their home countries. They thus increasingly viewed the creation of a Jew-
ish state as the best solution to their problems. Zionism ›ourished, though
as Mendelsohn cautions, “it by no means ‘conquered’ Polish Jewry,” in
large part because of the progress of Polonization.103
For survivors from Poland and Lithuania, especially the younger gen-
eration, Zionism thus constituted a well-established idiom for thinking
about Jewish belonging, a recognized alternative to the idea of rebuilding
their lives in their native countries. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, this
alternative was more appealing than ever before. During the Nazi occupa-
tion of Poland, non-Jewish Poles often looked on with indifference and
even satisfaction as their Jewish neighbors were persecuted and murdered.
In some cases, they took the initiative in perpetrating violence. In Lithua-
nia, the situation was even worse, as here, unlike in Poland, the Nazis ac-
tively solicited the assistance of the non-Jewish population. Motivated by
antisemitism, opportunism, and greed, many Lithuanians in fact partici-
pated in the Holocaust.104 The violence was often intimate. Lithuanian
Jews who survived the Holocaust thus had bitter memories of their non-
Jewish neighbors.
The connections between prewar experience and postwar outlook can
be seen in the history of the Polish Jewish survivors who founded the Jew-
ish Information Of‹ce in Dachau, discussed earlier in this chapter. These
survivors had grown up in an environment permeated with Zionist ideas.
They also belonged to that segment of the population—young, accultur-
ated, and secular Jews—among whom Zionism had the greatest success
during the interwar period. Most of them were young professionals. Joel
Sack’s background is particularly striking. He was an engineer from the
town of Boryslaw in eastern Galicia, a region with an especially strong his-
tory of Zionist success. He spoke ›uent Polish and German as well as Yid-
dish. He had been one of the few Jewish students accepted into the techni-
cal institute where he received his training. There he had been exposed to
the intensely antisemitic atmosphere typical of Polish universities in the
1930s. Yet he had also enjoyed the respect and friendship of Christian
Poles. He considered himself a loyal citizen of Poland. His circle of close

friends in Dachau included a number of non-Jewish Poles. The postcatas-
trophe Zionism of the Jewish Information Of‹ce may thus be interpreted
as a belated embrace of the political course that many Polish Jews of sim-
ilar background had chosen before the war. As Michal Borwicz notes with
reference to the Polish context, “the events of the preceding years [i.e., the
Holocaust] may have served to strengthen the movement, but they had cer-
tainly not created it.”105
While the popularity of Zionism in interwar Poland and Lithuania is
essential to explaining its appeal after the Holocaust, a mass exodus of
Jews from Poland would probably never have taken place had it not been
for postwar antisemitism and anti-Jewish violence. Few survivors any-
where returned home to ‹nd their families and communities intact. More-
over, throughout Europe, societies failed to recognize the speci‹city of
Nazi Jewish persecution. In western and eastern European countries alike,
Jewish experiences were alternately marginalized and folded into national
narratives of victimization. However, in few places did survivors face the
kind of hostility they did in Poland. Returning Jews were greeted by their
Polish neighbors with hostility. They found their homes occupied and their
possessions claimed by Poles who were unwilling to return them. Having
suffered the most under the Nazi occupation, they were also the least well-
equipped to cope with the prevailing conditions of economic distress.
Moreover, hostility toward Jews often took on violent form. As noted ear-
lier, up to 1,500 Polish Jews were killed in the ‹rst two years after the war.106
Although the new Communist-dominated government of‹cially supported
the Jewish population, the government was also eager to win over Christ-
ian Poles, who often harbored antisemitic sentiments and were anxious
about losing what they had gained at the expense of their Jewish neighbors.
Worried about being seen as “pro-Jewish,” it responded timidly to anti-
Jewish violence. Moreover, although Jews were now equal citizens, anti-
semitism had hardly been eliminated from the ranks of government ser-
vants. During the Kielce pogrom, police and security of‹cials stood by as
the population attacked Jews, and even participated in creating an anti-
semitic atmosphere.107
Despite the growing atmosphere of hostility and violence, many Pol-
ish Jews nonetheless initially hoped to rebuild their lives at home. As recent
research has shown, Jewish life in postwar Poland swung between recon-
struction and emigration. Synagogues, schools, and cultural institutions
reopened, and political life was intense. Since many Jews feared remaining
in villages and small towns, they gravitated to the big cities, contributing to
the revival of Jewish life there. Lodz, which had survived the war relatively
unscathed, became the center of Jewish life in postwar Poland.108 However,
the experience of the Holocaust and the continuing threat of violence lent
this revival an atmosphere of instability. The desperate economic situation
and the growing Sovietization of Poland also generated anxiety. As Shi-
mon Redlich notes, “a basic feature of Jewish existence and activity in
Lodz, as well as throughout Poland, was a temporary and transitory way
of life.”109 This sense of insecurity heightened the appeal of Zionism. The
social bases of Zionism in Poland expanded markedly after the war. In
their identity as survivors of the catastrophe, Jews discovered a common
bond. “Persons of vastly different backgrounds,” Irena Hurwic-
Nowakowska writes, “felt in their common Jewishness the impact of their
shared national fate.”110 Part of the movement’s appeal was the sense of
family and community it offered. The possibility of emigration to Pales-
tine—or elsewhere—was also attractive.111
The escalation of antisemitic violence in 1946 had a dramatic effect on
the outlook of Polish Jews. Emigration, which had been rising since the
early spring of 1946, increased markedly after the Kielce pogrom. Whereas
3,500 Jews had left during the month of May, in July the ‹gure rose to
19,000 and in August reached the incredible number of 35,000.112 All in all,
some 120,000 Jews left Poland in the ‹rst few years after the war, leaving
behind a community of approximately 100,000.113 Smaller numbers ›ed
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and other eastern European countries,
where antisemitism also experienced a revival. The Zionist-led Brichah
network played a pivotal role in facilitating emigration, pursuing the goal
of leading Jews to Palestine through the temporary way station of the DP
camps.
Popular Opinion and the Zionist Option
While a regional perspective is essential to understanding the appeal of

Zionism, it remains unclear how popular the Zionist vision really was.
Many scholars have concluded that Jewish DPs demonstrated overwhelm-
ing support for Zionism. According to Koppel Pinson, one of the ‹rst to
address this subject, “the deep in›uence of their suffering and the actual
annihilation of the great compact centers of active Jewish life have led
most [Jewish DPs] to a complete rejection of the diaspora and to a clear
and unmistakable Palestinocentrism.”114 Yet the documentary record of

popular opinion is thin and dif‹cult to interpret. How strong was the de-
sire to emigrate to Palestine? Moreover, what did Palestinocentrism mean?
To what extent did it mean support for the idea of building a Jewish state
in Palestine?
The most substantial sounding of the Jewish DP population was the
UNRRA repatriation poll examined earlier in the context of Polish,
Ukrainian, and Russian DPs. The poll registered both widespread resis-
tance to repatriation and widespread support for emigration to Palestine.
Opposition to repatriation was connected to the feeling that their old
homes had become mass graveyards, to the fear of persecution, and to an
overwhelming sense of loneliness. As one DP wrote, “Poland is covered
with Jewish blood; even now the Poles are persecuting Jews. We can visit
the cemeteries, but we cannot live there.”115 Another wrote, “All of my rel-
atives were killed in Auschwitz. I can’t live among the murderers of my
parents.”116 Fear of the Soviets was also a factor. Explaining why he did
not want to return home, one Hungarian Jew wrote, “because of anti-
semitism and because of Russia.”117 Regarding support for Palestine, on
their ballots, some Jewish DPs wrote comments like, “Palestine is my Fa-
therland.”118 Hundreds simply wrote “Palestine.”
The desire to emigrate to Palestine, UNRRA argued, grew out of a
con›uence of factors.
The Jews in UNRRA centers in Germany expressed a unanimous de-

sire to immigrate, the majority of them either to Palestine or to the
U.S. By far the largest number of Polish and Ukrainian Jews express
a desire to go to Palestine. This desire can easily be understood in the
light of the strong nationalistic feelings among the eastern Jewry al-
ready prevailing before the war, coupled with the racial persecution at
the hands of the Nazis, not to mention some of their own countrymen
during the war. . . . It is now impossible for the Jews from eastern Eu-
rope to return to their large Jewish communities for so many of them
have been wiped out, and tales of continued anti-semitism drift in
daily with new refugees coming out of Poland.119
These comments expertly summarize the main forces encouraging support

for Palestine among Jewish DPs. A few other situational factors should
also be considered. First, the outcome of the repatriation poll probably
re›ected the optimism about emigration that prevailed in the spring of
1946. The poll was conducted just weeks after the Anglo-American Com-
mittee of Inquiry submitted its ‹nal report, calling on the British govern-
ment to immediately authorize 100,000 emigration certi‹cates for Jewish
survivors. According to Leo Schwarz, “a mass exodus from the camps of
Germany and Austria was envisioned. In all buildings and on all bulletin
boards there appeared a colorful, patriotic poster, depicting Palestine as a
happy haven in contrast to the bleak situation elsewhere.”120 Such posters
were part of a concerted propaganda campaign on the part of the Zionist
leadership. Consequently, some element of subtle pressure no doubt also
contributed to the result of the repatriation poll.121 This is the second situ-
ational factor to consider.
While the repatriation poll demonstrated widespread support for em-
igration to Palestine, it also revealed interest in other destinations, espe-
cially the United States. On their ballots, many Jewish DPs noted their de-
sire to emigrate to the United States. This desire was occasionally
connected to the idea of the United States as a democratic country, as
when one DP called it “the best democracy in the world.”122 More impor-
tant, however, was the presence of relatives. One DP wrote, “We were a big
family and all are murdered. I have relatives in the USA. I shall go
there.”123 Another stated, “I remain alone of family of 8.—Have no rela-
tives in Europe. Have two brothers and a sister in the USA. I am miserable
and therefore I wish to reach them. Have af‹davit.”124 Many DPs hoped
that living in the American zone would heighten their chances of gaining
entry into the United States. And, of course, the United States had long
been a magnet for eastern European Jews, as the presence of relatives itself
attested. In the spring of 1946, however, Palestine appeared a more realis-
tic option than the United States. This, UNRRA analysts thought, went
some ways to explaining the popularity of the Palestine option. “Although
many would perhaps prefer to go to some western country,” they wrote,
“the emigration quotas to these lands will be so low as to allow only a
trick[le] of immigrants to enter. Palestine appears to be the only solution to
their problem.”125
Yet the prospects of emigration to Palestine were also far from bright.
While Jewish DP leaders demanded free and immediate access to Palestine,
they realized that emigration opportunities might not materialize, either in
the short or long term. This was a source of great concern, and became
more so as time wore on. By the summer of 1946, as Jewish refugees from
Poland streamed into the U.S. zone in ever larger numbers, and of‹cial de-
liberations over Palestine dragged on, it was clear that there would be no
quick exodus. Jewish DPs were increasingly demoralized, and Zionist lead-
ers worried that they would not be willing to wait.126 As Leo Schwarz
notes, the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of In-
quiry drew attention to problems in Palestine. News reports and letters
“describing the imprisonment of illegal immigrants and the growing
con›ict between the Yishub and the British and Arabs, added fuel to the
‹res of spring.”127 As a result, more and more Jewish DPs were submitting
applications for immigration to other places, notably the United States. In
a speech to Jewish leaders in the United States in December 1946, Aryeh
Retter referred to the failure to lead the Jewish DPs out of Germany as
“the second chapter of our Great Tragedy.” He sought to convince his au-
dience that survivors remained committed to the Zionist project. “If today
you ‹nd Jews who declare they will go wherever you send them,” he ar-
gued, “it isn’t because they have forgotten their tragedy and don’t want to
go to Palestine, but merely because they are desperate—and must ‹nd
some place to rest their weary bones. There is no Jew in Europe who does
not feel the vital necessity of possessing his own country.”128 Clearly, how-
ever, Retter worried that this might not be true. The desperation that led
Jewish DPs to consider other options suggested that their desire for a
peaceful new home was as strong, if not stronger, than their desire for a
Jewish state.
These conclusions are supported by David Engel’s research into the
idea of Palestine among Jews in postwar Poland. In an important essay,
Engel examines the protests against British policy in Palestine that took
place in Lodz during the visit of the Anglo-American Committee of In-
quiry in February 1946. Noting that only the combined efforts of Zionist,
non-Zionist, and anti-Zionist parties drew large numbers to the streets, he
concludes that the protests had more to do with the desire for emigration
opportunities than with support for the idea of a Jewish national home.
The Anglo-American Committee delegation visited at a time when the
prospects for emigration seemed especially dim. The economic situation
among Jews was desperate, anti-Jewish violence was rising, and illegal im-
migration had become risky. “The constellation of circumstances in post-
war Poland,” Engel concludes, “thus inexorably drove a major portion of
Polish Jews towards the Zionist leadership, if not at ‹rst toward ideologi-
cal Zionism.”129 It is possible to imagine that things might have turned out
differently: “had Polish Jews heard, for example that an of‹cial American
investigative commission had come to Poland to investigate whether immi-
gration quotas to the United States should be expanded—they probably
would have reacted in much the same way.”130 Moreover, as Natalia Alek-
siun notes, some part of the Jews who eventually left Poland with the help
of Brichah “not only did not belong to any of the Zionist organizations,
but also were not planning to settle in Palestine.”131
Nonetheless, many Jewish DPs felt a strong attachment to Palestine.
As Pinson suggests, the issue of Palestine was existential rather than polit-
ical. “Without Palestine there seemed to be no future for them. Anti-Zion-
ism or even a neutral attitude towards Zionism came to mean for them a
threat to the most fundamental stakes in their future.”132 More than a con-
crete emigration destination, Palestine represented Jewish survival and re-
vival in the aftermath of catastrophe and the recognition of Jewish dignity.
Hurwic-Nowakowska’s research on Jews in postwar Poland supports these
conclusions. As she observes, even assimilated Jews with no intention of
emigrating supported the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine, believing that
it was the only thing that would ensure their security in the postwar world.
The creation of Israel strengthened their national consciousness. “The ex-
istence of the Jewish state endows them with a sense of moral satisfaction
and creates a belief that the fact of the state will result in the recognition of
the dignity of Jews on the part of both Jews and non-Jews.”133 This may be
what the votes for Palestine in the repatriation poll ultimately tell us.
The Jewish committees that developed in the concentration camps af-
ter the liberation represented the beginnings of a movement toward self-
organization among eastern European Jews in Germany. Although this
movement had various goals, including nonpolitical ones, it was strongly
shaped by Zionist readings of the Jewish past and Zionist visions of the
Jewish future. Zionist DP leaders presented the Holocaust as the culmina-
tion of a long history of suffering in the diaspora. The creation of a Jewish
state in Palestine, they argued, was the only logical consequence to be drawn
from this history. The UNRRA repatriation poll of May 1946 suggests that
the outlook of Zionist leaders found considerable support among Jewish
DPs. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, many Jewish DPs were convinced
that life in the diaspora was no longer possible and that only a Jewish state
could protect them from future persecution. As the repatriation poll also
suggests, however, many Jewish DPs saw their future elsewhere, especially in
the United States. And support for a Jewish state did not necessarily mean
plans to emigrate to Palestine. Even among Polish Jews who remained in
Poland, there was considerable support for the creation of a Jewish state,
which represented the restoration of Jewish dignity.
Finally, support for Zionism needs to be seen in a broader historical
context, one that takes into account where survivors came from and what
circumstances they faced in their home countries after the war. The vast
majority of Jewish DPs in Germany were Polish Jews. Lithuanian Jews
represented a small cohort of Jewish DPs but played a large role in politi-
cal and communal life. For these survivors, Zionism was a familiar politi-
cal idiom, because it had played a central role in Polish and Lithuanian
Jewish politics before the war. For Polish Jews, moreover, the situation they
faced in postwar Poland was also critical. Most important here was antise-
mitic violence, which created a pervasive sense of fear. Indeed, in the ab-
sence of antisemitic violence, it is unlikely that a mass exodus from Poland
would have taken place. Thus, although the Holocaust had a transforma-
tive effect on the outlook of many survivors, in order to understand why
this was the case, it is essential to know both what came before it and what
came after.
Chapter 6
Displaced Jews and the

German Question
Most Jewish DPs had no desire to remain in Germany. As German agen-

cies gained more control over civil and political affairs, however, the ques-
tion of how to live among Germans assumed greater prominence, espe-
cially for those no longer certain when and if they would leave. This
chapter looks at the relationship between Jewish DPs and their German
environment, charting the shifts that accompanied the withdrawal of di-
rect American oversight and the corresponding increase in German au-
thority. I focus in particular on how displaced Jews interacted with Ger-
many’s nascent civil and political institutions and with the small
community of German Jewish survivors—both of which, albeit in quite
different ways, represented a troubling reassertion of German authority
and a German national future. I explore the tensions engendered by the
transfer of authority through a close examination of the Möhlstrasse
demonstration of August 1949, a pivotal event in the early postwar history
of the Jewish community, in which hundreds of Jewish DPs took to the
streets of Munich to protest antisemitism.
Looking at the shifting position of Jewish DPs vis-à-vis German soci-
ety offers an opportunity to reexamine the relationship between the for-
mation of the Federal Republic and the reconstruction of Jewish life in
Germany. The success of the democratizing project in West Germany has
long been evaluated according to how the German government and the
German public addressed—or did not address—the crimes of the Nazi
era, especially the Holocaust. Scholars generally agree that the shift in em-
phasis, over the course of the late 1940s, from denazi‹cation to western in-
tegration disadvantaged Jews. Yet they disagree over the extent to which
West Germans confronted the Nazi past and how these efforts should be
interpreted. Frank Stern argues that continuities in antisemitism were ac-
186
Displaced Jews and the German Question 187
companied by the emergence of a new “philosemitism,” which reversed

many stereotypes but evaded a genuine confrontation with the Nazi past,
serving primarily to legitimate the new West German government in the
eyes of the international community.1 By contrast, Jeffrey Herf suggests
that while silence did indeed predominate, political leaders like Konrad
Adenauer, Theodor Heuss, and especially Kurt Schumacher “believed that
it was the responsibility of postwar Germans to accept the moral obliga-
tions and burdens left by the genocide of European Jewry.”2 Scholars also
note that a new Jewish community successfully established roots in post-
war Germany and “even acquired in›uence in political life out of propor-
tion to [its] numbers.”3
Looking more closely at these issues from a DP-centered perspective
puts a somewhat different light on them. Unlike German Jews, Jewish DPs
were viewed as more “foreign” than German Jews and were more vulnera-
ble to discrimination, especially by the German police, who associated
Jewish DPs with black marketeering and other forms of illegal economic
activity. Moreover, Jewish DPs harbored greater demands for autonomy
and separation than German Jews. They were unwilling to acknowledge
the authority of most German civil and political institutions. Rather, they
demanded extraterritorial autonomy, a distinct status with no clear expira-
tion date. Their rejection of a Jewish future in Germany also made their re-
lations with German Jews uncomfortable. The transition to German au-
thority was thus more painful and less successful for Jewish DPs, especially
for the small number who remained in Germany after mass emigration.
Jewish DPs and the Future of German Jewry
From the beginning, Jewish DPs and German Jews coexisted uneasily.4
The DP committees and the reestablished Jewish communities (Gemein-
den) saw each other more as competitors than as partners. The Central
Committee of Liberated Jews initially excluded German Jews.5 Conversely,
many communities sought to exclude Jewish DPs or limit their participa-
tion. Far outnumbered by Jewish DPs, German Jews tenaciously held onto
the remnants of their destroyed communities. In Munich, for example, the
Jewish community at one point sought to deny non-German citizens the
right to vote in Gemeinde elections.6 There was also ‹erce competition be-
tween Jewish committees and Jewish communities over the material assis-
tance provided by the Joint. Writing to the Joint in 1947, one German Jew-
ish survivor questioned the division between German and foreign Jews in
the distribution of resources. Echoing the language of postcatastrophe
unity put forward by Jewish DP leaders, he wrote: “Am I a different kind
of Jew than my Pol., Hung., Lith., and Russ. co-religionists? The answer
can only be ‘No,’ as we have all lived through the same horror, we all with-
out distinction have managed to survive the same destruction.”7
The tensions between German Jews and Jewish DPs were in part the
product of inherited prejudices. Many intra-Jewish con›icts of the post-
war era can primarily be traced back to “the continuity of images and anx-
ieties” among both eastern and western Jews.8 Jewish DPs tended to view
German Jews as yekkes, assimilated Jews who had lost their connections to
traditional religious and cultural beliefs, while German Jews looked down
on Jewish DPs as uncouth and old-fashioned Ostjuden.9 Such prejudices
had colored Jewish life in Germany since the late nineteenth century, when
Jews escaping antisemitism and economic hardship in eastern Europe had
begun arriving in large numbers. However, the con›ict between Jewish DPs
and German Jews also had to do with fundamentally different attitudes to-
ward the future. Setting their sights on emigration to Palestine, Jewish DP
leaders saw no need to rebuild Jewish life in Germany. Unlike German
Zionists of the earlier twentieth century, who encouraged emigration to
Palestine but were positively disposed toward integration, they found it im-
possible to reconcile commitment to a Jewish state with life in the dias-
pora. Blithely disregarding the Jewish communities, the Central Commit-
tee presented itself as the “organizing and representative body of all the
Jewish people living in the American Zone.”10 It viewed German Jews as
merely one of the many “regional” Jewish groups now gathered on Ger-
man soil, and sought to bring them under its umbrella.11 It also presented
itself as the legal successor to the prewar Jewish communities and argued
that the unclaimed property of German Jews should be entrusted not to
the new Jewish communities but to the Jewish Agency in Palestine, which
in its view represented the Jewish people as a whole.12
German Jews saw things differently. While many wanted to emigrate,
many others placed a priority on reconstructing Jewish life in Germany.
The Jewish communities insisted that they, and not the Central Commit-
tee, were the historical and legal successors to the communities destroyed
by National Socialism. They ›atly refused to participate in the Central
Committee and protested its claims to Jewish property.13 Eventually, the
CK was obliged to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Jewish communities
and to modify its claims to succession. Through the mediation of Philipp
Auerbach, the Bavarian State Commissioner for Racial, Religious, and Po-
litical Persecutees, it established a decent working relationship with the
communities.14 More generally, many Jewish DPs participated in rebuild-
ing the communities. Thus the communities became hybrid institutions—
as they already had been before the war—re›ecting the varied religious,
cultural, and political outlooks of German and eastern European Jews.15
Although the Central Committee viewed the creation of a Jewish state
as the most important task confronting Jewish DPs, of necessity survivors
directed much of their day-to-day energy toward improving their lives in
Germany. As the prospect of a speedy departure from Germany receded,
Jewish DP leaders began to devote more attention to the here and now. In
an essay written in February 1947, on the eve of the Second Congress of
Liberated Jews, Samuel Gringauz argued that Jewish DPs no longer con-
stituted the vanguard of the Zionist movement. Thus, whereas the ‹rst
congress had been addressed to the outside world, now the task was to turn
inward and tackle the concrete problems facing survivors themselves.16 For
Zionists, however, the development of Jewish life in Germany always car-
ried the risk of distracting from the ultimate goal. “We must always keep in
mind,” Marian Puczyc wrote in late 1946, “that our presence on German
soil is temporary and that our ‹nal goal is ‘Eretz Israel.’”17 It was thus es-
sential to ‹nd a modus vivendi that did not undermine this goal.
The solution favored by Jewish DP leaders, and by many “average”
Jewish DPs, centered on the concept of extraterritorial autonomy. As we
have seen, the call to reject old national af‹liations and assert a Jewish na-
tional identity translated into the demand for separation from Germans
and other DPs. Extraterritorial autonomy was the means of realizing this
separation. It meant freedom from the German authorities both inside and
outside the camps. The demand for extraterritorial autonomy was articu-
lated early on, especially by Zionists, for whom it represented the opportu-
nity to develop, in miniature, a Jewish nation-state. However, it became
more urgent as control over political and legal affairs in Germany shifted
from the Americans to the Germans. Jewish DP leaders viewed the trans-
fer of authority as a clear “danger.”18 This led them to articulate some
rather contradictory positions. Thus, at the Second Congress of Liberated
Jews in February 1947, David Treger argued for the need to strike down an-
tisemitic laws in Germany and to introduce laws “which make racial and
religious slander criminal acts.” However, he also insisted that Jewish DPs
remain outside the German legal system. Any future peace treaty, he ar-
gued, should include a provision stating that “Jewish DPs, including those
who will remain on German soil, . . . should not come under German ju-
risdiction but rather should enjoy special international protection.”19
While autonomy and separation were central goals, Jewish DPs also
wanted to make sure that their demands and aspirations reached a broad
public. Borrowing a phrase from Hersh Glick’s famous partisan song, they
wanted to show that “we are here” (mir zeynen do). This entailed leaving
the safe con‹nes of the camps and committee headquarters and occupying
German public space, since, as everyone recognized, the camps and com-
mittee headquarters were not truly public. The desire for extraterritorial
autonomy in Germany thus competed and con›icted with the desire to en-
gage a broader audience. The means by which Jewish DPs sought to draw
attention to their presence in Germany were diverse and ranged from the
mundane to the spectacular. A wide range of everyday practices can be in-
terpreted as conscious acts of political self-assertion. For example, by
pushing their baby carriages down the streets of German towns or de-
manding that German merchants ‹ll special orders, Jewish women as-
serted their presence on German soil and took symbolic revenge on their
former persecutors.20 Jewish DPs also asserted their presence in more dra-
matic ways. Jewish committees set up shop in spaces requisitioned from the
Germans and employed prominent locations for their memorial cere-
monies and conferences. Similarly, they used central streets and squares for
commemorations, demonstrations, and protests.
Such actions were an important aspect of Jewish DP politics. In gen-
eral, Jewish DPs favored the direct and confrontational style of politics
typical of prewar Jewish nationalists—the “politics of noise,” as its oppo-
nents had labeled it.21 As Atina Grossmann notes, “there was a kind of ‘in
your face’ quality” to the public actions of Jewish DPs.22 This included ac-
tions organized by the Central Committee. The CK viewed public demon-
strations as an essential part of its work. “The abnormal conditions and
the speci‹c situation of the She’erith Hapletah, which have no equal in the
history of mankind,” a 1947 report from the CK’s Public Relations De-
partment stated, “demand immense and unprecedented efforts on the part
of the C.K., above all with regard to politics. The C.K. has decided that
not a single opportunity may be missed, where the She’erith Hapletah
should not let hear its cry of pain.”23 To this end, it organized various
“manifestations,” including public protests, hunger strikes, and letters to
foreign dignitaries.
Like associational life, these public actions were a source of con›ict
between Jewish DPs and German Jews. Most German Jews disliked the
politics of noise, which they viewed as an example of the uncultured be-

havior of their eastern European brethren and as a threat to their security.
Writing in April 1946, Hermann Aumer, the Bavarian Commissioner for
the Care of Jews, objected to DP plans to hold demonstrations protesting
German police actions. Such demonstrations, said Aumer, “would cause
disorder and violence that would re›ect on the Bavarian Jews and cause
them hardships.”24 Aumer’s successor Philipp Auerbach took a similar
tack, calling on his fellow Jews not to engage in “provocative” behavior.25
In general, German Jews sought to address their grievances in a more for-
mal and “polite” manner. Rather than organizing a protest, for example,
they would send representatives to meet privately with government
of‹cials. In the prewar era, Jewish nationalists had scoffed at such tactics,
which they considered cowardly and undigni‹ed. This attitude also pre-
vailed among Jewish DPs.
The Central Committee and the Search for Recognition
One of the Central Committee of Liberated Jews’ primary goals was gain-
ing of‹cial recognition from the American authorities.26 Like Polish, Rus-
sian, and especially Ukrainian DPs, Jewish DPs viewed recognition of
their committees as an important index of their standing on the interna-
tional stage. It meant acceptance into the international comity of nations.
A closer look at the Central Committee’s struggle for recognition sheds
new light on its political aspirations and how these aspirations were both
encouraged and tempered by American DP policies.
The promise of recognition was an important spur to the formation of
the Central Committee itself. At the CK’s founding meeting in Felda‹ng in
July 1945, Abraham Klausner justi‹ed his call for the creation of a general
association of survivors by stating that the American Military Govern-
ment encouraged such a move.27 A few days later, he reported that he had
already received verbal permission for the committee to begin its work and
that written permission would be forthcoming.28 On the strength of Klaus-
ner’s word, UNRRA gave the committee of‹ce space at the Deutsches Mu-
seum, thus allowing the committee to begin its work in earnest.29 However,
the promised permission did not materialize. This is not surprising, since,
as we have seen, the American authorities opposed the formation of com-
mittees with political ambitions. Thus the committee was obliged “to scut-
tle the nicely lettered signboard bearing the of‹cial title of the organiza-
tion” and replace it with a sign bearing the words Information Bureau, the
default title, it seems, for committees without a mandate to engage in poli-
tics.30 Internally, the committee continued to develop the structures of a
formal and rather elaborate institution, with individual departments for
agriculture, industry, ‹nance, welfare, health, culture, public relations, and
so forth. Externally, however, it led a “shadowy half-illegal, half-legal exis-
tence.”31 The committee’s association with Klausner lent its work an air of
legitimacy, and his name and status as a member of the U.S. Army were
prominently listed on the committee’s correspondence.32
For the Central Committee, like other DP committees, recognition
meant the right to represent DPs before the American authorities. Unin-
terested in engaging the German authorities, with the exception of the
State Commission for Racial, Religious, and Political Persecutees, they
viewed the Americans as their primary interlocutors. American recogni-
tion was in turn seen as a stepping-stone toward solving various practical
problems, greatly exacerbated by the in›ux of Polish refugees. By gaining
of‹cial status, committee members hoped they would be able to address
their problems more ef‹ciently. In particular, they hoped to gain indepen-
dence from the voluntary agencies: UNRRA, whose efforts on behalf of
Jewish DPs they considered mediocre; and the Joint, which they viewed as
too unwilling to acknowledge the political nature of welfare work. Ac-
complishing the basic tasks of feeding, clothing, and housing survivors
and refugees, CK members wrote in a critique of the Joint, often “implied
an infringement upon some political directive. Either the directive had to
be changed or circumvented. The Joint was always subservient to the pe-
riod in the directive.”33 Finally, recognition was seen as essential to the
committee’s political work. Indeed, the issue of recognition gets to the
heart of how the committee understood itself. In its statutes, the commit-
tee claimed for itself the right to represent Jews before the Americans, the
Germans, the voluntary associations, and the larger international commu-
nity.34 It saw itself as a quasi-state entity with the right to negotiate with
other such entities. Indeed, it saw itself as the nucleus of a future Jewish
state. It did not clearly distinguish between members of the committee and
the larger Jewish population. In keeping with the idea of the modern terri-
torial nation-state, it considered all Jews in the American zone part of its
membership. Recognition meant validation of this self-understanding.
In the summer of 1946, after an intervention by Philip S. Bernstein,
the Special Adviser on Jewish Affairs, the army agreed to reconsider the
committee’s request for recognition. The committee hoped it would soon
be granted sweeping powers. According to Leo Schwarz, the committee’s

chairman Zalman Grinberg believed that “the committeemen would be
able to choose . . . between the legalization of the Committee as a volun-
tary association with the same status as UNRRA or JOINT or as a politi-
cal organ.”35 American of‹cials, however, were anxious to limit the scope
of the committee’s authority. They rejected the idea that the committee
would speak for all Jews in the American zone and suggested that failure to
distinguish between the committee’s members and the larger Jewish com-
munity would give the committee too much power and allow “terrorism
and ‘Nazi’ political methods” to ›ourish.36 They also ›atly rejected the
committee’s sweeping claims to political authority and insisted that it re-
strict itself to welfare activities.37 Finally, they wanted to restrict the CK’s
representative powers to the military authorities and the voluntary associ-
ations. They saw its pretensions to greater political authority as a serious li-
ability for the United States and its closest ally, Great Britain. If the com-
mittee’s representative powers were not closely circumscribed, the army’s
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, Stanley Mickelsen, argued,
recognition “would permit the expansion of [its] representations to any
person, agency, or government in the world. This would place the United
States in the position of supporting with public funds a world-wide politi-
cal movement which operates outside the jurisdiction of the United States
Forces, European Theater, and which is possibly opposed to the interests of
our principal ally.”38
While most U.S. of‹cials were primarily concerned about the scope of
recognition, some questioned the wisdom of granting the committee any
representative powers. Working from within the logic of administrative care
and control, they argued that the needs of Jewish DPs were already ade-
quately met by the extant welfare organizations.39 Moreover, as both mili-
tary and Military Government of‹cials pointed out, recognition by the
army would place the Central committee in a “unique legal position.”40
While most voluntary associations were recognized on the Land level, in
keeping with the proposed reorganization of western Germany into a fed-
eration of states, the committee would be recognized on the zonal level, in
keeping with the structure of the occupation. “This would appear to imply,”
as one group of MG of‹cials put it, “that the Jewish people are to continue
inde‹nitely to be dealt with as displaced persons having no part in the com-
munity life of Germany and, therefore, to be dealt with only by the U.S.
Army and foreign relief agencies such as UNRRA.”41 Should the army rec-
ognize the committee, it would thus be condoning the formation of com-
mittees “serving nationalistic or factional political groups.” Given the un-

certain prospects for emigration, the of‹cials argued, Jewish DPs should be
encouraged to integrate into German society. Indeed, they suggested,
“some part of the dif‹culties which the Jewish people have experienced in
the past few years” were due precisely to their unwillingness to integrate.42
The critiques articulated by U.S. of‹cials were motivated primarily
by concern about the committee’s desire to be a semipermanent political
representation of Jews in Germany. This was seen as a threat both to the
U.S.-British alliance and to the political authority of a future German
state. However, the critiques of the Central Committee also re›ected anti-
semitic anxieties, made more potent by admixture with anticommunism.
This comes through clearly in the critique articulated by a high-ranking
army of‹cial named Edwin Clarke. In Clarke’s opinion, the Central Com-
mittee was nothing but a group of “rabble-rousers.” “Their record,” he ar-
gued, “has been a series of incidents, demonstrations, inspired riots, im-
promptu holidays, etc.” Raising the specter of Judeo-Bolshevism, he
accused the committee members of “us[ing] methods reminiscent of
Communist Russia in their voting, political action, and press agitation.”
He was especially critical of Zalman Grinberg. He described Grinberg as
“a Lithuanian Jew of great ambition and exceptional craft,” who made up
stories about antisemitism in order to embarrass the occupation authori-
ties.43 Grinberg’s craftiness was apparently also evidenced by his use of
what Clarke referred to as “aliases,” though a brief look at these makes
clear that Clarke had confused Grinberg with his colleague Samuel
Gringauz. He concluded that not only should the CK be refused recogni-
tion, it should be disbanded.
Clarke’s critique of recognition was shaped by antisemitic fantasies
about Jewish power and cunning. However, it also contained an important
observation: recognition of the Central Committee could spell the begin-
ning of the end of the American policy against DP committees. “We cannot
recognize Central Committee,” Clarke argued, “without placing ourselves
in the position of recognizing DP committees in general.” He thus made ex-
plicit what most critiques only implied, namely, that recognition implied a
fundamental change in policy toward political activity among displaced
persons. Even on a limited basis, recognition of the Central Committee
sanctioned the development of DP political life. In Clarke’s opinion, there
were other committees more worthy of recognition. He drew special atten-
tion to the Central International Union of Former Political Prisoners
(CIUPP), a committee of Polish, Ukrainian, and other displaced political
prisoners, which Clarke described as “a representative body in Munich

composed of at least nine nationalities and consisting of persons who fared
as badly as the Jews.” In his estimation, the International Union had a more
desirable political pro‹le: “CIUPP is anti-Russian, anti-Jewish, and anti-
Nazi. They are pro-US and pro-British.”44 Clearly, Clarke did not ‹nd the
International Union’s antisemitism a problem.
Despite Clarke’s objections, the army decided to recognize the com-
mittee. According to Leo Schwarz, it had eminently practical reasons for
doing so: as was the case more generally, self-government would allow mil-
itary and civilian agencies to reduce their obligations to DPs.45 However,
great pains were taken to limit the scope of recognition and prevent the
committee from “abusing” its new privilege. The committee was permitted
to engage in welfare activities, advise the army on the needs of Jewish DPs,
and represent its members before the military authorities. A liaison of‹cer
was appointed to facilitate communication between the committee and the
army.46 However, the committee was “expressly forbidden to indulge [!] in
political activity.”47 It was obliged to revise its statutes to conform to the
army’s more limited de‹nition of its mandate and especially to eliminate
all references to political representation. On September 7, 1946, the com-
mittee received a letter of recognition from Joseph McNarney, the com-
manding general of the U.S. Army. The manner of presentation—a letter
as opposed to a formal charter—was itself intended to make recognition as
informal as possible.48
Not surprisingly, the committee was disappointed about the limita-
tions placed on its activities. At a meeting called to discuss the issue in July
1946, Samuel Gringauz sought to present the proposed agreement in the
best possible light. He suggested that the army merely demanded “a few
(insigni‹cant) changes to the statutes.”49 Anxious for recognition, the com-
mittee unanimously approved a revised statute re›ecting a more narrow
conception of its authority and formally assented to the army’s list of lim-
itations.50 However, it did not change its mandate or its practices. Rather,
from the perspective of the committee members, recognition “simply put
the of‹cial stamp on the existence of the Central Committee, thus remov-
ing the ignominy of illegality.”51 It con‹rmed rather than refuted its status
as a Jewish protogovernment in Germany. Indeed, the committee viewed
recognition as a major milestone in its history. The CK’s work, Aryeh Ret-
ter reported in early 1947, “has now taken on a completely different char-
acter.”52 David Treger made a similar point. By establishing “direct and
permanent contact with the Army and the Military Government,” he as-
Fig. 6. General Joseph McNarney hands Samuel Gringauz, chairman of

the Central Committee of Liberated Jews in the U.S. Zone of Germany,
the signed charter of recognition, September 7, 1946. (Courtesy of the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.)
serted at the Second Congress of Liberated Jews in February 1947, recog-

nition had inaugurated a “new era” in the committee’s work.53
The recognition of the Central Committee of Liberated Jews was in
fact a signi‹cant event, a further step down the path of nationalization in-
augurated by the Harrison Report. In recognizing the committee, the
Americans deviated signi‹cantly from their own occupation policies and
perhaps occupation law more generally.54 They recognized an organization
that transcended the bounds of the camps and gave this organization the
right to represent displaced persons before the occupation authorities.
They thus recognized the possibility of self-government outside the para-
meters of the emerging German body politic. This event was all the more
signi‹cant because the organization did not represent an of‹cial national
group. Thus, although the army refused to recognize the committee as a
Jewish national representation, it effectively recognized the premise upon

which the committee was based. According to Leo Schwarz, “a major vic-
tory in the long battle for self-rule had been won. What the world still re-
fused to grant in Palestine, [the committee members] felt they had gained
on the incarnadined soil of Germany.”55 Throughout the occupation pe-
riod, the Central Committee remained the only DP committee of‹cially
recognized by the Americans.
In practice, however, recognition was more important symbolically
than practically. As committee members quickly realized, it had only a lim-
ited impact on their status. Although the direct line of communication
with the army made it easier to present requests and proposals, and the
American stamp of approval gave committee members access to high-
ranking U.S. of‹cials, fundamentally the practices of the American au-
thorities remained the same. Many of the committee’s requests and pro-
posals went unanswered. According to Retter, one reason for the limited
success was the army’s lack of experience working directly with DP com-
mittees.56 This was true, but it was not the crux of the matter. In point of
fact, the army had little interest in working directly with DP committees.
Thus, although the recognition of the Central Committee was an impor-
tant symbolic step in the nationalization of Jews on the world stage, it did
not lead to a stronger emphasis on Jewish national rights in Germany.57
Nor did it lead to greater political rights for other DPs. DP policy re-
mained de‹ned by the goals of care and control.
Indeed, while the recognition of the Central Committee pointed
symbolically toward growing international acknowledgment of a Jewish
national identity, practically Jews in Germany faced a growing willing-
ness on the part of the Allies to acknowledge German national interests.
These two trends can be seen as different aspects of a single process of
postwar (re-)nationalization. If U.S. authorities increasingly recognized
the legitimacy of Jewish claims to a distinct national identity, they also
increasingly believed that Germans should regain authority over “their”
affairs. This meant limiting the authority of groups that wished to re-
main outside the German body politic and granting Germans the right to
de‹ne the parameters of political life. Thus, although Jewish DPs con-
tinued to look to the American occupation authorities for protection and
validation, during the late 1940s they were increasingly subject to Ger-
man authority. As we shall see in the following section, this would be a
source of intense con›ict.
German Antisemitism and the Möhlstrasse Demonstration of

August 1949
One of the areas in which the transfer of authority from Americans to

Germans and its effects on Jewish DPs were most evident was demonstra-
tions. Demonstrations, mass meetings, and other public events were a fun-
damental part of the “politics of noise” favored by Jewish DPs. Staged
both inside and outside DP camps, they showcased a host of concerns:
frustration with life in the camps, the desire for emigration opportunities,
the demand for a Jewish state, and antisemitism in Germany. In August
1949, the last major Jewish DP demonstration of the early postwar period
took place in the Möhlstrasse, in the Munich neighborhood of Bogen-
hausen. It focused on German antisemitism. Although concern about an-
tisemitism in Germany was hardly new, it had for a long time been over-
shadowed by the Palestine question. Once Israel became a reality and mass
emigration got under way, however, concern over conditions in Germany
began to claim more attention. The persistence of antisemitism, coupled
with the movement toward creating a west German state, created anxiety
among eastern European Jews still in Germany, unreconciled to the
prospect of a future in Germany but increasingly uncertain whether they
would be able to leave. On the part of the authorities, there was also a
change over time, one that heightened Jewish anxiety. The American Mili-
tary Government increasingly gave the German police control over Jewish
DPs, and the German police, emboldened by this new power, were increas-
ingly willing to use force against Jews. Indeed, as a comparison between the
ABN demonstration of April 1949 and the Möhlstrasse demonstration of
August 1949 suggests, U.S. of‹cials granted the German police more con-
trol over Jewish demonstrators than over non-Jewish ones, and the Ger-
man police responded more aggressively to Jews than to Ukrainians and
other non-Jews.
The immediate impetus for the Möhlstrasse demonstration was the
publication of an antisemitic letter in the Munich-based German daily,
Süddeutsche Zeitung. Published on August 9, the letter was written in re-
sponse to an August 2 editorial by Wilhelm E. Süskind, which was itself a
response to a speech delivered a few days earlier by John J. McCloy, the
new U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. Speaking at a conference in
Heidelberg called “The Future of Jews in Germany,” McCloy had
identi‹ed German attitudes toward Jews as a “touchstone” of West Ger-
many’s progress toward a new democratic order and noted that the United
States would be watching closely how it treated its small Jewish popula-
tion.58 In his editorial, “The Jewish Question as a Touchstone,” Süskind
seconded McCloy’s statements, calling on his fellow Germans to break the
shroud of silence surrounding the “Jewish question” and begin an open di-
alogue. Echoing McCloy, he suggested that real democracy was composed
of relations between individuals rather than of institutions. Moving into
the realm of philosemitism, he suggested that Germans should not only
treat Jews as equals but also show them special deference, even when, as he
saw it, they did not entirely “deserve” it. In his opinion, the Jews as a peo-
ple possessed certain characteristics that made them an asset to any coun-
try that accepted them, including a “feel for quality, in both a material and
an intellectual sense.”59 The editorial provoked a ›ood of letters to the ed-
itor. On August 9, the newspaper published four of them, which it de-
scribed as “characteristic” of the spectrum of responses. Two were sympa-
thetic to Süskind’s position and one was politely critical. The fourth was an
antisemitic tirade signed “Adolf Bleibtreu” (Stay True to Adolf).
Go ahead and go to America, though the people there cannot use you
either. They have enough of these bloodsuckers. I work for the Amer-
icans, and several of them have already said that they forgive us every-
thing except one thing and that is: that we did not gas all of them, for
now they (the Jews) are gracing America with their presence.60
According to Marguerite Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune, the let-
ter “was unquestionably the most vitriolic assemblage of anti-Semitic feel-
ing that any western-licensed newspaper has dared to print since the war
ended.”61
The Bleibtreu letter—or, more precisely, its publication by the Süd-
deutsche Zeitung—provoked an immediate and angry reaction from Jewish
DPs.62 The same day, they began discussing how to respond. According to
Harry Greenstein, the Special Adviser on Jewish Affairs, members of the
Central Committee contacted him to say “that there was trouble brewing
in Munich, that indignation was running high, and that it seemed that a
demonstration was being planned.”63 The following morning, a mass meet-
ing took place at the headquarters of the Munich Jewish Committee on
Möhlstrasse. Here counsels were divided. Many of the gathered DPs de-
manded a protest demonstration. However, Philipp Auerbach and Peisach
Piekatsch, the chairman of the Central Committee, argued for restraint. At
the end of the meeting, a resolution was passed denouncing the Süd-
deutsche Zeitung for publishing the letter. Written “in the name of the Jew-
ish population of Munich,” it expressed the views of Jewish DPs more than
it did those of German Jews. It denounced the “repeated anti-Jewish
provocations of the German neo-fascists” and sharply rebuked the U.S.
authorities for “permitting something so in›ammatory.” It concluded this
way.
None of us contemplate remaining in this country any longer. We do

not want to remain on this ground, which is covered with Jewish
blood. We now have our own homeland. Yet as long as we are com-
pelled to stay here we will ‹ght every attempt at antisemitic action
with all our power. We demand that the instigators be punished.64
Although Auerbach and Piekatsch apparently hoped the resolution would

channel anger in a moderate direction, this was not to be. After the meet-
ing, a group of DPs set out for the headquarters of the Süddeutsche
Zeitung, where they intended to present the editor with an of‹cial protest.
Interestingly, the call for moderation by both German and eastern Euro-
pean Jewish leaders suggests that by the summer of 1949, the Jewish DP
leadership had backed away from the politics of noise. According to Leo
Schwarz, the organizers of the demonstration “maligned the leaders of the
Central Committee for their spinelessness.”65 The demonstration was thus
more an expression of popular than elite sentiment.
As the demonstration proceeded, the crowd grew. Reports on the
number of demonstrators diverge widely. Some suggest that as few as 300
to 400 people participated, while others place the number at between 1,500
and 2,000. The demonstrators carried a number of banners symbolically
identifying the Süddeutsche Zeitung with the Nazi regime. Most were in
English rather than German, making clear that the demonstrators saw the
American authorities and the international community as their primary
interlocutors.66 One declared, “Down with the Storm Troopers of 1949, the
‘Süddeutsche Zeitung’!” while another, playing on the title of Süskind’s ed-
itorial, read “The Proof of the German ‘Democracy,’ The ‘Süddeutsche
Zeitung.’ The Nest of Nationalsocialism. We Request the Withdrawal of
their License.”
By most accounts, the demonstration proceeded peacefully until Ger-
man police intervened. Charging into the demonstration, in some cases on
horseback, they tore down the banners and attempted to force the demon-
strators to disperse. The demonstration disintegrated into a tangle of
Fig. 7. German police car burning during the Möhlstrasse demonstration,

August 10, 1949. (Photograph by Hermann Grönert. From the Archives of
the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York.)
smaller groups, which fought the police with sticks, bricks, and paving
stones torn from the streets and sidewalks underfoot. Many policemen
were beaten bloody, and one lost consciousness. Demonstrators also at-
tacked German police vehicles, slashing tires, smashing windows, and
painting police cars with swastikas. One car was set on ‹re. The police re-
taliated by hitting demonstrators with their billy clubs. Some also used
their guns—without authorization to do so—shooting and wounding
three Jewish DPs.
Both American occupation of‹cials and members of the Joint sug-
gested that MPs be called in to restore order. However, the military police
said they were “considering [the demonstration] strictly as a German mat-
ter and a responsibility of the German police unless advised otherwise.”67
The German police, for their part, insisted they could handle the demon-
stration by themselves. Finally, however, the Munich police president con-
ceded that this was not in fact the case and requested American assistance.
MPs ordered the German police to withdraw, while a Jewish army chap-
lain, assisted by CK chairman Piekatsch and other DPs, persuaded the
demonstrators to go home. Some two and a half hours after it had begun,
the Möhlstrasse demonstration came to an end. In all, 7 DPs and 26 Ger-
man policemen were injured, some seriously.
On an immediate level, the Möhlstrasse demonstration was a visceral
response ‹rst to the publication of the Bleibtreu letter and then to the in-
tervention of the German police. However, the actions of the Süddeutsche
Zeitung and the German police do not in themselves adequately explain
the demonstration, certainly not the violence with which Jewish DPs re-
sponded. Numerous reports described the actions of the demonstrators as
a “riot,” and the demonstrators themselves as a “mob.” Such descriptions
must of course be treated with circumspection, as they re›ect stereotypes
of Jewish DPs as unruly. At the same time, they capture the emotions of
the demonstrators. According to Theodore Feder, a Joint of‹cial who wit-
nessed the events, “the reaction of the Jew to these incidents was quite ter-
rible to behold. There was suddenly a breakout of all the pent-up emotion
and indignation that had been stored up for years. People became irra-
tional, suddenly turned into raving maniacs, looking for a stone, a piece of
metal, or a stick to throw at the Germans. The cry of the crowd, a low roar-
ing sound, as if the anguish of a people were being made vocal.”68 Less
melodramatically, the Polish Jewish survivor Abrascha Arluk relates that
the aggressive intervention of the German police put him and his fellow
demonstrators in a ‹ghting mood, and they consciously sought out oppor-
tunities to “rendezvous” with policemen. After the police opened ‹re, their
mood became even more heated. Looking for an outlet for their anger, Ar-
luk and a friend stole the above-mentioned police car and set it on ‹re.69 To
a certain extent, the violence seems to have been cathartic. According to
Feder, the demonstrators, like the police, went after their targets “with a
great deal of relish.”70 A photograph taken after the demonstration
con‹rms this observation, showing a group of satis‹ed-looking demon-
strators standing in front of the burned-out police car, which has been dec-
orated with a swastika.
On a deeper level, the events of August 10 were an expression of grow-
ing insecurity and anger among Jewish DPs in Germany. Three factors
were responsible for this mood. The ‹rst was the increasingly aggressive at-
titude of the German authorities toward Jewish DPs, especially in the
Möhlstrasse itself. The Möhlstrasse was the site of many Jewish businesses
and institutions, including the Central Committee of Liberated Jews and
the Munich Jewish Committee. Jewish DPs viewed it as “their” space. And,
indeed, with the tacit permission of the Americans, Jews in the
Fig. 8. Jewish demonstrators in front of burning German police car during

the Möhlstrasse demonstration, August 10, 1949. (Photograph by Her-
mann Grönert. From the Archives of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Re-
search, New York.)
Möhlstrasse enjoyed a certain freedom from German law. The street thus
had something of the status of a DP camp. For German of‹cials, on the
other hand, the Möhlstrasse was synonymous with the black market and
shady business practices. As a U.S. intelligence report pointed out, the
street “had been roiling and rankling in the German of‹cial and unof‹cial
mind for a considerable time.”71 The popular postwar associations between
DPs and criminality played an important role here, as did more speci‹c as-
sociations between Jews and illegal economic activity. German reports on
the Möhlstrasse repeatedly drew attention to the fact that the makeshift
shops in the area were run by Jews.72 As local German of‹cials gained
more control over political and legal matters, they felt more empowered to
act. During the spring and summer of 1949, they carried out a multi-
pronged offensive against illegal activities in the area. German police be-
gan patrolling the Möhlstrasse in larger numbers and carrying out raids.73
American Military Government and military of‹cials, also concerned
about the black market, assented to these actions. Indeed, the raids were an
Fig. 9. German police contain a group of Jewish DPs who are standing in
front of a row of shuttered businesses during a raid to suppress Jewish
black market activity on the Möhlstrasse in Munich, May 1949. (Photo-
graph by Alex Hochhauser. Courtesy of the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum.)
important aspect of the local transfer of authority, a test of German abil-

ity to police Jewish DPs.74 In the ‹rst large raid, conducted on July 1, 550
German policemen, some on horseback, descended on Bogenhausen. The
American authorities were present but did not interfere. Thirty-four Jews
and non-Jews were arrested, and truckloads of goods were seized. Some
people resisted the police, leading to what were described as “street‹ghts”
and “riots.”75 A number of Jewish DPs were beaten up.76 Similar clashes
took place during subsequent raids.77 The Munich authorities also cracked
down on shopkeepers who ›outed the laws on opening hours by doing
business on Sunday.78 Since Sunday was typically the busiest day of the
week, this represented a serious blow.
Although both American and German of‹cials considered the raids a
success, Jewish DPs did not agree. As the American consul general of Mu-
nich later noted, the raids increased Jewish resentment toward the German
police.79 Jewish DPs rightly interpreted the actions of the police as antise-
mitic. They drew a straight line between wartime and postwar German be-
havior. As one Jewish DP said to an American Military Government

of‹cial after the July 1 raid, “They liquidated my entire family in concen-
tration camps, why do they now have to do that to me?”80 Indeed, during
the ‹rst German police raid, a Jewish survivor identi‹ed a Munich police-
man as a former Auschwitz Kapo, leading a group of Jews to throw stones
at the police. Whether or not the policeman really was a former Kapo, the
event makes clear that Jewish DPs saw the German police as merely Nazis
in new uniforms. More generally, Jewish DPs interpreted the German police
response on August 10 as continuous with the earlier raids. Describing the
police intervention on August 10 and his own response, demonstrator
Abrascha Arluk notes that they charged in on horseback “just like be-
fore.”81 In resorting to violence during the Möhlstrasse demonstration, Jew-
ish DPs were thus not only following an established pattern of response but
also responding to a deep sense of psychic insecurity. On August 10, some
demonstrators apparently carried sticks studded with nails, suggesting that
they anticipated a confrontation along the lines of July 1 and, importantly,
no longer took for granted that the Americans would protect them.
The second factor behind the Möhlstrasse demonstration was the in-
crease in antisemitism. Although antisemitism was a constant in Germany
during the late 1940s and early 1950s, there is some evidence to suggest that
it rose between 1949 and 1952.82 This upswing correlates with an increase in
nationalism. Since 1948, nationalist sentiment in western Germany had
been buoyed by a series of dramatic events, including the Berlin airlift, the
drafting of the Basic Law, and the ‹rst national election campaign. Indeed,
the Möhlstrasse demonstration came in the midst of the election cam-
paign, which was dominated by strident nationalist rhetoric. On the
ground, there were tangible signs of growing antisemitism or, more accu-
rately, of greater willingness to express antisemitism in public. Beginning
in early 1948 and continuing on through 1949 and 1950, there were numer-
ous attacks on Jewish cemeteries in Germany. In Munich, Jewish busi-
nesses and institutions in the Möhlstrasse area were attacked.83 These de-
velopments could only be perceived as deeply disturbing by the Jewish
population. In a statement put out the day after the demonstration, the
Central Committee placed the actions of the German police squarely in
the context of a rise in antisemitic violence. The events of August 10, it
wrote, were “the proof and the result of an ever more public and active
Nazism in today’s Germany, which already found expression in earlier an-
tisemitic occurrences.”84
Finally, there was the issue of the future. By the summer of 1949, mass
emigration had dramatically reduced the size of the Jewish DP population.

In May 1949, there were just under 35,000 Jewish DPs living in DP camps
in the U.S. zone, down from 157,000 in the summer of 1947.85 The exodus
included many prominent members of the Central Committee such as
David Treger and Aryeh Retter.86 The departure of so many DPs left the
institutions created in Germany in tatters; in some cases, they simply shut
down.87 Those who remained behind thus lost a vital support network. In-
deed, they were often subject to ‹erce criticism. Now that the doors to
Palestine were open, what more reason could there be for Jews to remain in
Germany? CK leaders such as Peisach Piekatsch opposed the reconstruc-
tion of the Jewish Gemeinden. “We feel no responsibility towards those
DPs who choose to remain,” he stated in March 1949. “By helping the
Gemeinden to achieve permanence we encourage DPs to remain too.”88
Yet many Jewish DPs were no longer planning to leave. Not surpris-
ingly, then, they were increasingly concerned about conditions in Germany
and increasingly intolerant of antisemitism. Although the resolution is-
sued on the day of the demonstration suggested that Jewish DPs remained
committed to leaving for their “own homeland,” statistics circulated in the
summer of 1949 suggested that the majority would remain in Germany. Al-
though statistics for Bavaria are not available, ‹gures for other locales give
a good idea of the general situation. In Frankfurt, 25 percent of Jews had
“de‹nitely decided” to emigrate to the United States before the end of the
IRO program, and 15 percent still thought of going to Israel, but concern
about unfavorable economic and political conditions there was likely to
keep the pace of emigration very slow. About 40 percent would probably
remain in Germany.89 In Hamburg, the vast majority of people registered
for emigration intended to go to the United States, with a much smaller
number choosing Israel. About 50 percent of the Jewish population was
“likely to remain inde‹nitely.”90 The reasons for remaining in Germany
varied: some people were too old or sick to emigrate, while others re-
mained for familial or economic reasons. However, many Jewish DPs faced
a future in Germany with great ambivalence. In staying, they did not nec-
essarily intend to integrate into the majority society. Separation, however,
was increasingly seen as untenable by both German and U.S. of‹cials. In-
deed, in his speech at the conference on “The Future of Jews in Germany,”
McCloy not only identi‹ed German attitudes toward Jews as a touchstone
of democracy, he also called on Jews to integrate into German society. The
era of sanctioned Jewish separatism was coming to an end. Traumatized by
their wartime experiences at the hands of the Nazis and by their postwar
experiences with Polish antisemitism, Jewish DPs were distressed at being

thrust back upon the Germans.
Like the ABN demonstration, the events of August 10 were widely
and prominently reported in the press. The German media coverage gener-
ally refrained from assigning blame, while the American and especially
Jewish press were often critical of the German police.91 The demonstration
also precipitated a host of reports and analyses. Here there were deep di-
vides of opinion. Not surprisingly, the harshest criticism came from Jewish
DPs. The Central Committee accused the German police of transforming
a peaceful demonstration into a violent encounter. Indirectly, it also
blamed the American authorities. The resurgence of antisemitism, it ar-
gued, was due to “insuf‹cient action against these phenomena on the part
of the foremost responsible parties.”92 It demanded freedom from German
police authority and a total withdrawal of German police from the
Möhlstrasse area.93 Philipp Auerbach also initially blamed the police. Af-
ter meeting with city of‹cials, however, he changed his position, agreeing
with of‹cials that the actions of the police had been justi‹ed.94 Both Jew-
ish DPs and German Jews held the Süddeutsche Zeitung responsible. The
Central Committee refused to accept that the newspaper was innocent of
malicious intent, calling the publication of the letter a “deliberately in›am-
matory, antisemitic, and punishable offence.”95 The Land Association of
Jewish Communities in Bavaria (Landesverband der israelitischen Kultus-
gemeinden in Bayern) took the SZ to court, accusing it of violating the law
against racial hatred. The court did not agree, however, concluding that the
newspaper had been interested in revealing the extent of contemporary an-
tisemitism rather than encouraging it.96
The events of August 10 reopened the whole question of German re-
sponsibility for civil affairs, especially policing. Like the Central Commit-
tee, a number of American Jewish commentators called on the occupation
authorities to reconsider their policy on policing. As Theodore Feder
noted, “there is no question but that many points could be made concern-
ing the persons responsible for all these incidents, but one thing is certain
and that is the orders given to the [German] police indicated a lack of un-
derstanding and knowledge of working with potential problem groups.”97
Harry Greenstein, the Special Adviser for Jewish Affairs, concurred: “The
wisdom of the present practice of resorting to the use of German police is,
in my opinion, very doubtful and the riot on Mohlstrasse has brought this
problem into sharper focus.”98 In the end, however, American of‹cials con-
cluded that neither the police nor the press had been motivated by anti-
semitism and that their policies did not need to be revised. As the Ameri-
can consul general of Munich, Sam Woods, reported to his superior, Sec-
retary of State Dean Acheson:
The entire affair seems to have been the result of several regrettable
decisions. In the ‹rst place the Süddeutsche Zeitung showed poor
judgment in printing the letter mentioned above. The Jews, them-
selves, apparently did not use good judgment in deciding to march
against the Süddeutsche Zeitung, although their passage of a resolu-
tion against that newspaper seems in order. It also appears that when
the German police were unable to handle the situation they should
have called for American assistance and retired from the scene.99
Woods’s conclusions were not unreasonable. Yet it was also politically ex-
pedient to play down what had happened. The transfer of authority from
American to German hands was now far advanced. The Basic Law had
been promulgated, and the ‹rst government of the Federal Republic was in
the process of being elected. At such a moment, Frank Stern notes, “over-
zealousness in political interference by the occupying authorities in public
did not appear to be particularly opportune.”100
The outcome of the Möhlstrasse demonstration bears out Frank
Stern’s conclusion that the shift from “reeducation for humanism and
against antisemitism” to “reeducation for integration into the West and an-
ticommunism” had a detrimental effect on the position of Jews in western
Germany.101 In particular, it had a detrimental effect on the position of
Jewish DPs. On the one hand, Jewish DPs harbored greater demands for
autonomy than German Jews and were psychologically less well-prepared
to face integration into the West German state. Indeed, they wanted to see
Allied protection extended into the inde‹nite future. On the other, they
were seen as considerably more foreign than German Jews, who were now
often portrayed as “good” Jews.102 Although American of‹cials identi‹ed
German attitudes toward Jews as a touchstone of democracy, Jewish con-
cerns about antisemitism now took second place to the goal of reestablish-
ing an independent West Germany, with all the rights of self-government
this entailed.
To be sure, the return to German self-government dealt a blow to the
interests of all DPs. However, a comparison between the Möhlstrasse
demonstration and the ABN demonstration that preceded it by just four
months suggests that the consequences were more serious for Jewish DPs.
At the ABN demonstration, German police demonstrated greater re-
straint, calling in the U.S. authorities at the earliest sign of trouble. Indeed,
although the ABN demonstration was considerably larger than the
Möhlstrasse demonstration, the German police contingent assigned to
control it was much smaller. For the German police, it seems, the demon-
stration of August 10 was merely another instance of Jewish illegal activity
in the Möhlstrasse. Thus their response to the demonstration mirrored
their response to the black market: a large show of force. Similarly, the U.S.
authorities demonstrated greater willingness to intervene in the case of the
ABN demonstration. Although their intervention was hardly soft—on the
contrary, the show of American force was much greater at the ABN
demonstration—it suggests a stronger desire to control the course of
events when the issue at hand was anticommunism rather than anti-
semitism. Thus, although the turn toward anticommunism does not seem
to have brought Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian DPs in Germany many
bene‹ts, it does seem that they enjoyed greater sympathy than their Jewish
counterparts and were treated more gingerly, especially by the Germans.
The Möhlstrasse demonstration can be seen as a turning point in the
history of Jewish DPs in Bavaria. Jewish DPs were increasingly faced with
the realization that the German authorities had regained control over civil
affairs. In the Möhlstrasse itself, the German police continued conducting
raids, their position strengthened by the American decision not to change
course. The Federal Republic of Germany was a fait accompli. For those
who remained in Germany, the DP era was ending. Committed to its own
“liquidation,” the Central Committee closed its doors in December 1950.
By this point, many local committees had already disappeared. The last of
the Bavarian Jewish DP camps, Föhrenwald, was placed under German ju-
risdiction in December 1951. It remained open until February 1956. The
balance of power between Jewish DP and German Jewish institutions also
shifted. Initially disadvantaged vis-à-vis the DP-run Jewish committees,
the Jewish communities gained more authority as the pace of political re-
construction intensi‹ed in 1947 and 1948. Recognized by the German au-
thorities as quasi-governmental institutions, they were able to establish
themselves as the of‹cial representatives of the Jewish population on im-
portant issues like restitution.103 The advent of mass emigration also
shifted the numerical balance of power between Jewish DPs and German
Jews. Jewish DPs remained a numerical majority. As the Jewish committees
began to disappear, however, they increasingly gravitated toward the com-

munities. The differences between the committees and the communities
thus diminished. Many Jewish DPs played an important role in the recon-
struction of the communities, contributing to their rejuvenation by provid-
ing younger members.104 The communities thus became an amalgam of
German and eastern European Jewish traditions and outlooks—continu-
ing a process that had begun in the early twentieth century—though the
tensions between the two groups would be slow to dissipate.
Chapter 7
Political Prisoners and the

Legacy of National Socialism
For displaced Jews, the legacy of National Socialism was central. This was
not, as we have seen, the case among displaced Poles, Ukrainians, and Rus-
sians. Although most of them had also been displaced by National Social-
ist policies, their collective identi‹cations centered on experiences of Soviet
oppression and the Soviet threat in postwar eastern Europe. However, ex-
periences under National Socialism did not disappear from the narrative
framework. They were especially important to one subset of the Polish,
Ukrainian, and Russian DP populations: former concentration camp pris-
oners. Like other Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians, liberated prisoners
justi‹ed their unwillingness to return home with reference to the new
geopolitical order in eastern Europe. In fact, they were often central expo-
nents of the anticommunist “political explanation.” Some played impor-
tant roles in the anticommunist movement. Simultaneously, however, they
were engaged in a different project: the reckoning with the Nazi past. They
de‹ned themselves as “political prisoners” of the Nazi regime. Their image
of the political prisoner was grounded in a nationalist reading of the strug-
gle against National Socialism. That is, they saw themselves primarily as
members of national resistance movements, as individuals who had fought
and suffered for the nation. However, they also saw themselves as part of
an international community of political prisoners. In general, they were
deeply preoccupied with their wartime experiences and sought to have
these experiences recognized and validated in the public sphere. Indeed,
sharing a widespread prejudice among “politicals” in the postwar era, they
presented themselves as a superior category of persecutees de‹ned by ac-
tive resistance to National Socialism. They made few efforts to work with
Jewish survivors, who by de‹nition belonged to the “inferior” victim
groups.
211
In laying claim to the title of political prisoners, displaced persons en-

tered a contentious debate about resistance and persecution. Members of
the anti-Nazi resistance had imbued the ‹gure of the political prisoner
with special signi‹cance. The political prisoner was de‹ned as a superior
kind of victim on account of his—and this was indeed a male icon—active
opposition to National Socialism. This sense of superiority, nurtured by
the resistance movements, was validated by the Allied powers, who placed
special emphasis on political prisoners in their planning for the postwar
period. In the public imagination of wartime and early postwar Europe,
the concentration camps were seen primarily as places of internment for
political prisoners rather than Jews. Indeed, the term political prisoner was
often used as a synonym for concentration camp survivor. Hence Jewish sur-
vivors sometimes also used the term. Conversely, internment in a concen-
tration camp was seen as the central marker of persecution. These two
themes—political opposition and internment—were fused in the key sym-
bol of the political prisoner, the red triangle, the insignia politicals wore on
their camp uniforms.
However, the category of the political was open to debate. The central
issue was whether all concentration camp prisoners who had worn the red
triangle should be considered politicals. As Eugen Kogon noted in his 1946
study of the camp system, “All sorts of prisoners in the concentration
camps were labeled ‘political’!”1 The SS used the political label quite liber-
ally, especially after 1939. Those classi‹ed as politicals ranged from indi-
viduals who resisted German occupation to those rounded up more or less
at random in the context of mass raids. Indeed, with the exception of Jews,
most foreigners sent to the concentration camps were classi‹ed as politi-
cals.2 Classi‹cation as a political, far from con‹rming one’s status as a
member of the antifascist resistance, thus opened one up to scrutiny.
Throughout postwar Europe, former prisoners, government of‹cials, and
the general public fought over the de‹nition of the political prisoner and
sought to eliminate potential “interlopers.” They were especially anxious
to ensure that “common” criminals, who had been sent to the concentra-
tion camps in large numbers, did not receive any of the bene‹ts or recogni-
tion of politicals. DP politicals, as I call them, were both subjects and ob-
jects of these con›icts. They participated in determining what it meant to
be a political prisoner, and their claims to political status were evaluated by
others. As we shall see, some of them in fact had only tenuous claims to the
status of résistant, having collaborated as often as they resisted.
The actions of displaced politicals must therefore be viewed in a
Political Prisoners and the Legacy of National Socialism 213
broader European frame. Many of their organizational practices and rep-

resentational strategies were typical of political prisoners more generally.
This was especially true of their emphasis on national resistance and supe-
rior victimhood. Yet their self-understanding was also different. Displaced
politicals were distinguished by their hostility toward communism and
their emphasis on the problem of homelessness. Their image of the politi-
cal prisoner fused antifascism and anticommunism. Opposition to com-
munism was presented as a logical counterpart to the struggle against fas-
cism. In western European countries such as France, such comparisons
emerged later and played a more marginal and contentious role. The activ-
ities of displaced politicals thus shed light on the larger issue of political
opposition and its interpretation in postwar Europe. They bring into sharp
relief postwar con›icts over the meaning of the term political prisoner and
the deep ideological divides among those who identi‹ed with it.
Rede‹ning the Prisoners’ Committees
As the liberated concentration camps emptied, the committees established

by the prisoners were divested of their original purpose. Thus, for example,
the International Prisoners’ Committee in Dachau held its last of‹cial
meeting on June 6, 1945.3 However, the committees did not altogether
cease to exist. Rather, they served as reference points and springboards for
new organizations. Political prisoners who returned home—this was the
majority—often refashioned the committees into institutions dedicated to
commemorating the camps and maintaining the national and interna-
tional antifascist fronts of the war years. They were also active in lobbying
for assistance and restitution. Political prisoners who did not return home
used the committees as a starting point for building institutions designed
to represent their interests “abroad.” Here, too, the commemoration of the
camps and the maintenance of the spirit of the resistance were central
themes, as was the search for assistance and restitution, but re›ected sur-
vivors’ status as displaced persons in Germany and their reservations
about returning home. Like the formation of Jewish committees, the for-
mation of committees of displaced politicals revealed deep divisions and
con›icts in the camp society.
Committees representing displaced politicals quickly developed and
remained active, sometimes intermittently, sometimes continuously, into
the 1950s and in some cases longer. Of the three groups I examine, Polish
politicals were the most prominent, not surprising given the extent to
which the Germans had targeted the Polish intelligentsia and sought to
eliminate all signs of Polish resistance. According to a count conducted in
March 1947, there were approximately 4,500 Polish politicals in the U.S.
zone and 12,500 in Germany as a whole.4 Polish politicals were central in
creating two organizations, both based in Munich. The ‹rst was the Polish
Committee, discussed in chapter 3. It aimed to provide liberated prisoners
with assistance and representation. It was closely associated with two other
prisoners’ committees, the Polish Information Of‹ce in Dachau and its in-
ternational counterpart, the International Information Of‹ce of Dachau.
It was thus both a Polish national entity and the Polish unit of a larger in-
ternational one. Although it served the larger Polish DP community, it had
a special interest in the welfare of the politicals. Like committees of politi-
cal prisoners throughout postwar Europe, it also policed the internal bor-
ders of the prisoners’ community, examining the credentials of liberated
prisoners to ensure that they were not common criminals and had not oth-
erwise sullied the good name of the politicals, for example, through collab-
oration.5 The second organization was the Polish Association of Former
Political Prisoners of German Concentration Camps. Beginning as a local
Munich initiative in June 1945, it was of‹cially established in January 1946
and covered the entire U.S. zone. It too was oriented toward self-help and
self-representation. It was involved in publicizing the camp experience,
putting out its own publications as well as authorizing works on the
camps.6 It also investigated accusations of collaboration on the part of for-
mer politicals.7 Mieczyslaw Grabinski, whose work with the Polish Com-
mittee has already been discussed, served as its ‹rst president. Like the
Committee, it belonged to a larger international committee of former po-
litical prisoners. Also like the Committee, it came under suspicion for its
opposition to repatriation. In July 1946, it was banned by the U.S. Military
Government for operating without permission and for participating in
“questionable or subversive activities.”8 Despite the ban, the association
continued to function, though its resources were severely limited.
While Polish politicals were the most active, Ukrainians were not far be-
hind. The category of the Ukrainian political was itself a political novelty.
Like Ukrainian forced laborers, political prisoners of Ukrainian back-
ground had been categorized according to their country of origin. Only in
exceptional circumstances had they been categorized as Ukrainians. In
adopting this label, politicals of Ukrainian background thus made an im-
portant statement about their wartime internment, recasting it as internment
on account of their ethnicity or their efforts on behalf of the Ukrainian na-

tional cause. Indeed, the struggle for recognition as Ukrainians was itself
represented as a fundamental component of the internment experience, pit-
ting Ukrainians against both their SS overlords and other prisoners. The to-
tal number of Ukrainian DP politicals in postwar Germany is dif‹cult to pin
down. According to one contemporary source, approximately 25,000
Ukrainian politicals had survived the concentration camps. Of these, some
6,000 had chosen to remain in Germany, though by mid-1946 their number
had dropped to around 4,900.9 Most were Polish nationals.
Two organizations competed to represent Ukrainian politicals. The
most important was the League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners (Liha
Ukraïns’kykh Politychnykh V’iazniv, or LUPV). Based in Munich, it had
branches throughout the three western occupation zones of Germany and
in other European countries. Like its Polish counterparts, it was a multi-
functional organization providing both assistance and representation. Its
primary goals included registering former political prisoners; providing
them with documentation attesting to their status; representing them in
front of governments and intergovernmental organizations; providing
them with legal aid; and helping them procure food, housing, clothing, and
medical care. It also placed a high priority on documenting, publicizing,
and commemorating the experiences of Ukrainian politicals.10 Between
1945 and 1947, approximately 1,300 Ukrainian political prisoners registered
with the league.11 In 1947, the American Counter Intelligence Corps inves-
tigated the league for operating without of‹cial authorization and recom-
mended that its president be turned over to the Military Government for
trial.12 It continued to operate until 1950, when it reduced its operations to
a single representative for restitution affairs.13
Although the league de‹ned itself as a nonpartisan organization,
uniting Ukrainian political prisoners across the political spectrum, in ac-
tuality it was closely associated with the Banderite wing of the Organiza-
tion of Ukrainian Nationalists. It re›ected the political ethos of the Ban-
derite group, with its commitment to a revolutionary struggle for the
liberation of Ukraine, its goal of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, and
its uncompromising attitude toward political dissent. Its membership was
composed largely of Banderites arrested and sent to concentration camps
in the wake of the OUN-B’s declaration of Ukrainian statehood in June
1941.14 Potential members were carefully screened to ensure not only that
they were bona ‹de politicals but also that they demonstrated the correct
“communal attitude,” that is, commitment to the OUN-B’s vision of a
Ukrainian nation-state.15 As noted earlier, the OUN-B had collaborated

with the Nazis during the ‹rst years of the Second World War, especially in
the campaign against the Soviet Union. Viewing Jews as the handmaidens
of Russian Bolshevism, it supported Nazi anti-Jewish actions. Thus, al-
though many OUN-B members eventually became victims of Nazi perse-
cution, this development needs to be seen in the context of the OUN-B’s
longer and more complicated relationship with the Nazi regime.
The second Ukrainian organization was the Association of Ukrainian
Political Prisoners (Tovarystvo Ukraïns’kykh Politychnykh V’iazniv, or
TUPV). Created in April 1946, it was intended as an alternative to the
league, whose expectation of political conformity led to disgruntlement
among some politicals.16 However, it was not especially successful. Al-
though it was ‹ercely nationalistic, it lacked the inner coherence of the
league. It was also continuously undermined by its competitor. Unhappy
about the emergence of another persecutee organization, the league ac-
cused the association of sowing discord among Ukrainians and repeatedly
tried to bring about a merger.17 Although it did not manage to destroy the
association, it did win the upper hand. It gained the right to represent
Ukrainian politicals within various larger organizations and received more
material assistance. As the association complained in 1948, while other
groups of politicals received CARE packages from the Central Represen-
tation of the Ukrainian Emigration, it received nothing.18 It continued to
operate until at least 1952.19
While Polish and Ukrainian politicals in Bavaria formed well-orga-
nized groups, in some cases united by a distinct ideology, the situation
among Russian politicals was rather different. Almost all self-identi‹ed
Russian politicals were Soviet citizens, and they for the most part chose to
return home. Those who did not enjoyed few opportunities for organizing
due to their semiclandestine status. Thus there are few traces of organized
activity among Russian politicals. At most one ‹nds small groups of Rus-
sian refugees from the First World War who had been interned in concen-
tration camps. Some of these were members of the NTS, who, like mem-
bers of the OUN-B, were sent to concentration camps after their fallout
with the Nazis.
Representing the Political
DP politicals placed great importance on documenting, publicizing, and

commemorating their wartime experiences. Like Jewish survivors, they felt
an urgent need to recount their experiences of internment and especially to

inform the rest of the world about the reality of National Socialism. How
then did DP politicals represent themselves? What were the de‹ning char-
acteristics of the political prisoner? How did the concentration camps
‹gure in the de‹nition of the political? How was the concentration camp
experience itself represented?
To begin with, like other political prisoners, DP politicals de‹ned
themselves as members of an elite. Their elite status was intimately related
to their sacri‹ces and sufferings for the national cause. The political pris-
oner was thus ‹rst and foremost a hero of the national resistance. This is
most obvious in the Polish case. Polish DP society was internally hierar-
chical. The top of the social hierarchy, Janusz Nel Siedlecki writes, was oc-
cupied by “the proud and disdainful heroes of the Armed Forces—those
who won the war. The ex-prisoners of war argued about the battles of ’39
but were unanimous in their contempt for the rabble of the DPs. The latter
split into the pariahs of the labour camps and the aristocracy of the polit-
ical prisoners. . . . The survivors carried forth their banners of ‘martyrdom’
and sowed the seeds of future legends.”20 Ukrainian politicals also asserted
their superiority. They presented themselves as the leaders of the Ukrai-
nian national independence struggle, stressing not only their past deeds but
also their present obligations. As the League of Ukrainian Political Pris-
oners asserted, they could not be content to rest on their laurels. “Ukrai-
nian political prisoners are not pensioners, rather, duty dictates work. . . .
The Ukrainian political prisoner must stand for the dignity of the Ukrai-
nian representation, of the Ukrainian world.”21
The concentration camp experience formed the core of the political
prisoners’ identity. It was the event that symbolically established them as
bona ‹de politicals. The extraordinary nature of the camp environment en-
dowed it with a special status in their biographies under National Social-
ism. As political prisoners stressed in their accounts, the concentration
camps were not like “other” places of imprisonment: they tested the imag-
ination and de‹ed representation. Writing in the introduction to an album
of camp drawings, the Ukrainian political Paladii Osynka noted his in-
ability to adequately depict his own experiences. “The life of prisoners in
the German concentration camps,” he wrote, “was so horrible that it could
not be captured in its entirety in the unpretentious drawings of the author
. . . and too unbelievable for those who did not themselves pass through
this hell to comprehend the truth in its entirety. For this truth was so un-
believable that it approached fantasy.”22
The centrality of the concentration camp in the image of the political
is underscored by the emphasis that displaced politicals, like politicals

more generally, placed on the symbolic markers of imprisonment: the con-
centration camp uniform and its associated insignia. The most important
marker of imprisonment was the red triangle.23 Writing about the Polish
survivors of Dachau she met in Munich after the war, former UNRRA so-
cial worker Susan Pettiss notes that they viewed the red triangle as “a kind
of badge of honor, courage, and survival, in which they took great
pride.”24 It appeared prominently on newsletters and journals and in artis-
tic representations. It was often paired with the national letter, con‹rming
that the political sacri‹ce was simultaneously a national one. Political pris-
oners also placed great emphasis on the striped “pyjama” they had worn in
the camps. It surfaced not only in artistic representations but also in real
life. In the Munich-Freimann DP camp, for example, liberated Polish po-
liticals occasionally paraded in their old concentration camp uniforms,
even after they had acquired new clothes.25 This practice continued for
many years.26
While internment in a concentration camp was the ultimate sign of
one’s status as a political prisoner, representations of the camp rarely fo-
cused on heroic deeds. Rather, primary emphasis was placed on suffering.
This is most evident in artistic representations, which document both
everyday and extraordinary forms of suffering in the camps.27 In his album
of concentration camp drawings, for example, Paladii Osynka catalogs the
varieties of punishment in›icted upon the prisoners by the SS. For exam-
ple, one image shows the infamous practice of Baumhängen, in which a
prisoner was suspended from a post with his hands tied behind his back.
Interspersed among these images of suffering are less dramatic scenes of
life in the camps, including rare moments of happiness. The self-con-
sciously naive, cartoonlike style of the drawings highlights expressions of
pain on the faces and bodies of the prisoners, producing a grotesque effect.
The album also documents the selection for the gas chambers and the
painful deaths suffered by the selected. Strangely, however, the victims of
the selection are not identi‹ed as Jews. The distinction between politicals
and Jews is blurred, creating the impression that the victims of the gassings
are actually politicals. In effect, the fate of Jews in the camps is appropri-
ated for the history of the politicals, making the suffering of the latter ap-
pear even more intense than it already was.
The concentration camp drawings of the Polish concentration camp
survivor Jerzy Zielezinski similarly highlight suffering. Zielezinski pub-
lished two albums of drawings in Munich after the war.28 His drawings
were also exhibited at the Munich headquarters of the Polish Committee.29

Each album presents life in the concentration camp as a cycle that begins
with deportation. This event plunges the prisoners into a dark world from
which there is no exit. “One’s entire life withdraws into the shadows,” as the
text accompanying one album explains.30 To an even greater extent than
Osynka, Zielezinski focuses on the modalities of pain experienced by the
prisoners. Strongly reminiscent both stylistically and substantively of
Goya’s The Disasters of War, the drawings provide a literal catalog of suf-
fering: work, hunger, cold, disease, and punishment. The varieties of death
are also documented: suicide, shooting, hanging, and garroting. Here there
is no respite. Indeed, although the albums have a thin chronological
thread, they do not end with liberation. One ends with the evacuation of
the camp, which represents the beginning of a new trial. The other ends
with a drawing entitled “Strange Incident,” which shows a prisoner in a
long column of evacuees receiving bread from a German woman. Here
there is a note of hope. The expressionistic style employed by the artist,
with its stark contrasts of light and shadow, deepens the sense of diffuse
but penetrating horror. Where Osynka represents each prisoner as a dis-
tinct individual with unique features, Zielezinski reduces them to anony-
mous shades. Their resemblance to skeletons is not accidental.
The emphasis on suffering on account of one’s political convictions
produced an image of the political prisoners as martyrs. The “martyrolog-
ical idiom” was widespread in postwar Europe.31 As we have seen, martyr-
dom was a signi‹cant theme among Jewish survivors. It also ‹gured
prominently in the larger non-Jewish world, in representations of resis-
tance ‹ghters, political prisoners, and the general population. In many Eu-
ropean countries, martyrdom provided a national myth that covered both
the minority who had resisted National Socialism and the majority who
had sought to get by. In this manner, it sought to resolve the tensions that
ran through postoccupation societies. Even in Germany, however, martyr-
dom was an important theme, reworked to highlight the suffering of the
German people at the hands of the Allies, as evidenced, for example, by the
treatment of German POWs and expellees.32 The martyrological idiom of
the postwar period was strongly imbued with Christian religious meanings.
However, the primary emphasis was on secular martyrdom, especially
martyrdom for the nation. In its secularized form, martyrdom refers to in-
dividuals who suffer and die for a higher cause. “The noble cause,” Pieter
Lagrou writes, “gives meaning to their suffering in two ways . . . : on the
one hand, they are victimized because of their own adherence to this noble
Fig. 10. Cover page of The Chronicle of the Ukrainian Political Prisoner
(Litopys Ukraïns’koho Politv’iaznia) showing a prisoner writing under
barbed wire and the motif of a felled tree with new shoots. (Courtesy of the
Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota.)
cause—an adherence that is a matter of personal choice and, in circum-

stances of persecution, of heroism—and on the other hand, through their
suffering, they deliver the proof of their dauntless personi‹cation of this
cause.”33 Thus the suffering of the politicals was not “merely” personal;
through its association with a higher cause, notably national resistance, it
implied moral superiority.
Religiously infused national martyrologies were an important compo-
nent of the commemorative vocabulary of both Polish and Ukrainian po-
liticals. The martyrological idiom was well established in Polish culture. It
originated in the romantic nationalism of the early nineteenth century,
which identi‹ed Poland as the “Christ of nations.” Like the suffering
Christ, Polish nationalists argued, the suffering Polish nation would even-
tually be redeemed. Risen from the grave, Poland would not only regain its
national independence but also bring freedom to humanity as a whole.34
Although Polish nationalism underwent important transformations in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, becoming more exclusive,
this messianic vision remained. It provided an important framework for in-
terpreting the events of the Second World War. It was central to commem-
orative practices in early postwar Poland. Representations of the
Auschwitz concentration camp stressed its identity “as a place of Polish
national suffering and sacri‹ce” and made only muted reference to Jewish
and non-Polish prisoners.35 A similar understanding of the camp experi-
ence predominated among displaced Polish politicals, who not only gave
thanks to God for their liberation and suggested that God’s hand had
played an important role in their salvation, but also folded their personal
sufferings into a broader national narrative focusing on sacri‹ce “for
Poland.”36
The martyrological idiom was also central to Ukrainian politicals.
Here too the association of martyrdom with nationalism can be traced
back to the ‹rst half of the nineteenth century. In›uenced partly by their
Polish neighbors, Ukrainian nationalists of the 1840s and 1850s developed a
similar romantic and messianic nationalism. The most important expo-
nents of this idea were the young writers known as the Brotherhood of
Saints Cyril and Methodius, who identi‹ed Ukraine as a Christ-like nation
that would eventually rise again, liberating both the Ukrainian people and
their Slavic neighbors.37 The martyrological tradition was continued by dis-
placed Ukrainian politicals. The League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners
created the Educational and Research Institute of Ukrainian Martyrology,
whose goal was to gather material on the experiences of Ukrainian politi-
Fig. 11. “The Capo,” from George Zielezinski, 24 Drawings from the Con-
centration Camps in Germany (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1946).
cals in the concentration camps. These materials, as league president

Mykhailo Marunchak stated, invoking Christ’s journey along the Via
Dolorosa, were a re›ection “of the dif‹cult [literally: thorny (ternystoho)]
road which the Ukrainian nation was obliged to take in its efforts at state-
hood, which in its entirety forms, along with the martyrology of the days
behind bars and barbed wire and mass executions, the heroic sacri‹ces
made by the ‹nest sons of the Ukrainian land.”38 One of the league’s jour-
nals, Chronicle of the Ukrainian Political Prisoner (Litopys Ukraïns’koho
Politv’iaznia), devoted itself to preserving these sacri‹ces, ‹lling its pages
with stories about the concentration camps and other episodes of persecu-
tion. The journal’s cover also evokes the theme of martyrdom. It shows a
prisoner in striped uniform bent over a large scroll, strands of thorns hov-
ering over his shaved head. Strikingly, the motif of a felled tree with new
shoots, central to the concept of the She’erith Hapletah, also appears here.
As among Jewish survivors, it suggests not only survival but also rebirth.
In postwar Europe, the ‹gure of the political prisoner was intimately
linked to the persecutory and concentrationary universe created by the
Nazis. In the hands of Ukrainian politicals, however, it was transformed
into a more general image of the national freedom ‹ghter, a ‹gure whose
pursuit of national liberation stretched back decades and even centuries.
As the League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners stated, its goal was “to
unite all Ukrainians who on account of their political activity for the fa-
therland, or their political convictions, were imprisoned by foreign regimes
in concentration camps and prisons.”39 It made no distinction between the
experiences of Ukrainians in different countries at different times. The As-
sociation of Ukrainian Political Prisoners took a similar view. In its words,
“the elderly and children, women and men, village and city dwellers, rich
and poor over many years formed one large, million-strong army of
Ukrainian political prisoners.”40
The de‹nition of the Ukrainian political prisoner as a general na-
tional freedom ‹ghter was closely connected to a reading of Ukrainian his-
tory as a series of struggles against foreign oppressors. In the words of the
league,
the history of the Ukrainian political prisoner of the past, present,

and future is merely a part of the history of Ukraine. But it will for-
ever prove before the whole world that Ukraine existed, exists, and
will exist, whether or not anyone wants this; that the battle for her des-
tiny and independence existed, exists, and will exist, whether or not
Ukrainian ‹ghters, revolutionaries, and patriots are punished with

prisons, concentration camps, or death; that the Ukrainian state ex-
isted and will exist, whether or not anyone desires this, or endeavors to
keep her from existing.41
The league journal Chronicle of the Ukrainian Political Prisoner elaborated

on this theme, featuring articles on topics as diverse as the Russian victory
over the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the late eighteenth century and the pros-
ecution of Ukrainian nationalists in Romania in the 1930s. The Association
of Ukrainian Political Prisoners took a similar position. All of Ukraine’s
enemies, it wrote, “were and are all the same. Among them there was not
and is not the slightest difference.”42 Thus, although the Ukrainian perse-
cutee committees had been created by and for survivors of the Nazi con-
centration camps, they presented the Nazi era as just one chapter in a longer
history of Ukrainian martyrdom. National Socialism was drained of its
speci‹city. At the same time, of course, it was precisely because of its asso-
ciations with National Socialism that the ‹gure of the political prisoner was
so useful to Ukrainian nationalists. In crafting the image of a transhistori-
cal freedom ‹ghter, they drew on the postwar authority of the Nazi politi-
cal prisoner in order to validate other experiences of persecution.
Ukrainian politicals were especially interested in extending the discus-
sion of political persecution to include the struggle against communism.
At the end of the 1940s, the anti-Nazi resistance was refashioned as a strug-
gle against “totalitarianism.” “In this way,” to quote Pieter Lagrou, “the
memory of Nazi persecution became the battle horse of anti-commu-
nism.”43 Camp survivors became embroiled in these debates. In France,
Buchenwald survivor David Rousset’s appeal to fellow deportees to partic-
ipate in a commission to investigate Soviet “concentration camps” led to
sharp protests on the part of Communist survivors. Similar con›icts took
place in Belgium and the Netherlands, leading in some cases to permanent
schisms in survivor associations.44 Among displaced Ukrainian politicals,
the equation between National Socialism and Soviet communism was cen-
tral from the beginning. The League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners pub-
lished numerous articles about Russian and Soviet persecution, and its
membership in theory encompassed survivors of the Gulag. Leading mem-
bers of the league participated in the anticommunist movement, and the
league itself was a chief sponsor of the Munich ABN demonstration dis-
cussed in chapter 4. The results of this conjunction were sometimes
grotesque, as when league member Petro Mirchuk described the industrial
murder in the concentration camps as a “humane deed” in comparison

with the atrocities perpetrated by the Soviets.
On a smaller scale, Russian politicals also put the memory of Nazi
persecution at the service of the anticommunist cause. Like Ukrainians as-
sociated with the OUN, Russians associated with the NTS folded their suf-
ferings under National Socialism into a larger catalog of sufferings en-
dured by their members. They presented the NTS as a “third power” that
had valiantly and steadfastly opposed both National Socialism and Soviet
communism. In a 1947 article entitled “The Memory of the Heroes,” for
example, camp survivor and NTS activist Vladimir Poremskii identi‹ed
the loss of friends and comrades in the Nazi concentration camps as the
continuation of a larger struggle.
After this victim followed many others: Dachau, Buchenwald, Sach-

senhausen, Auschwitz,—in the registers of all these camps one can
‹nd dozens of names with a note next to them: “involvement in
NTS,” and a mark signifying death.
Thus grew the terrible list of the Russian “resistance” victims—a
list of the best, the most bold and pure, who were not afraid to con-
duct the struggle on two fronts, a struggle against all the forces of
evil.45
Other NTS members also highlighted the struggle against National Social-
ism. Poremskii’s colleague Aleksandr Neimirok, for example, published a
memoir of the Nazi concentration camps in 1947.46 In general, however,
experiences of National Socialism remained a minor theme among Rus-
sian DPs. As Poremskii himself later noted, the literature on the Nazi con-
centration camps could not compare to that on the Soviet Gulag.47
In many parts of postwar Europe, the experiences of Nazi political
prisoners became the basis of broader national narratives, coming to rep-
resent the suffering of the nation as a whole. The same cannot be said
about displaced persons. Although DP politicals viewed themselves as an
elite, they did not ‹nd much con‹rmation of this status among their fellow
DPs. Thus, for example, at the second congress of the Ukrainian emigra-
tion in 1947, the League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners complained that
the Ukrainian community had all but forgotten about them.48 To other
Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian DPs, the reckoning with the Nazi past was
less important than the ‹ght for an independent, noncommunist home-
land. Thus, although many politicals were active in DP associational life,
their experiences under National Socialism played only a small role in

shaping broader group identi‹cations. The martyrological idiom, far from
underpinning broader national narratives, remained limited to the com-
munity of politicals.
The Remnants of Antifascist Internationalism
While most DP politicals viewed their respective national committees as

the anchors of their communities, they also understood themselves as part
of an international community of political prisoners. They were deeply in-
vested in having their sacri‹ces and sufferings recognized by fellow camp
survivors. Their self-understanding as members of an international com-
munity expressed itself in two ways. First, DP politicals sought to partici-
pate in the activities of German prisoner organizations and of the larger
international prisoners’ community. Second, they formed new interna-
tional groups to represent their interests as displaced persons.
The internationalist orientation of DP politicals needs to be seen in
the context of what historians have called the “moment of anti-fascist
unity.”49 Spanning the Second World War and the early postwar period,
this moment was distinguished by the formation of broadly based antifas-
cist political fronts. It was characterized, as Eric Hobsbawm writes, by a
“unique alliance of national fronts ranging from patriotic conservatives to
social revolutionaries, for the defeat of the national enemy, and simultane-
ously for social regeneration.”50 It had both national and international di-
mensions. On the one hand, nationalist sentiment in Europe increased dur-
ing the war years and provided a major impetus for resistance.51 On the
other, the national resistance movements were participants in a larger “in-
ternational ideological civil war.”52 As Eric Hobsbawm argues, “the rise of
antifascist patriotism was . . . part of what could legitimately be seen as the
triumph of a kind of internationalism.”53
The extent to which antifascist unity actually existed during the war
years is a matter of considerable dispute.54 It may well be that, as Dan
Diner suggests, antifascism only “receives its true vocation as a term de-
scribing the period after 1945,” when it became the foundation myth for
states like the German Democratic Republic.55 Nonetheless, the lan-
guage of antifascist unity was a central component of wartime and post-
war politics. It was central to the international committees created in the
concentration camps and their postwar successors. Led by political pris-
oners, the committees presented themselves as standard-bearers of the

antifascist idea. In particular, they argued that the prisoners of the
camps constituted a single nationally and internationally uni‹ed com-
munity. An example of this position can be found in a statement issued
by the International Prisoners’ Committee of Dachau shortly after the
liberation.
We lived for the sake of the friendship and the brotherhood that ex-
isted in the camp. We divided between us all the sorrows and the suf-
ferings of the dif‹cult times, but we never hated and spied [on] one an-
other. No Germans, no Russians, no Polish, no Jugoslavs were in this
hell of the nacis [sic]: here lived a community of friends and brothers,
a family that was menaced to death from all sides, a society of the
same principles and ideals. The aim of all was one: death to the hit-
lerists and their satellites. This was the war that we fought in the high
mountains and in the low steps [sic] of our countries. This was the
motto of the skeletons of Dachau.56
This description of wartime solidarity presented the different nationals of

Dachau as a uni‹ed movement against National Socialism and fascism: an
antifascist resistance. It suggested that the common struggle against the
enemy—especially the common experience of suffering—had pushed na-
tional differences into the background. However, this did not mean that
national identi‹cations had become irrelevant. Rather, it meant that all na-
tionalities were equal partners in a larger endeavor. As the numerous petty
con›icts documented in the records of the Dachau IPC make clear, politi-
cal prisoners were obsessed with the issue of national recognition.57 Im-
portantly, as we saw in chapter 5, their concept of international solidarity
excluded Jews (and other nonpoliticals), who did not ‹t into the frame-
work of heroic antifascist resistance.
The language of antifascist unity was common among displaced po-
liticals. In their accounts of the concentration camps, they often drew at-
tention to moments when prisoners of other nationalities had offered ad-
vice, support, and even friendship. Some represented the camps as sites in
which the national hostilities of old had been suspended in the face of the
threat from the common enemy. Others went further and, like the Dachau
IPC, suggested that the camp experience had revealed the emptiness of na-
tional categories. This was the position taken by the Polish political Jerzy
Szwede.
History has given us a terrible lesson. It has proved to us who we are,

showing us clearly the degree of evolution attained by humanity. It
has reunited in the camps, all possible nations and their social vari-
eties. It has stripped them totally of their inner contents.
Man alone remained from the German, Pole or Jew, Frenchman or
Dutchman. The man who had the possibility to attain, inside the
camp, the place and the degree he deserved: from the informer and ex-
ecutioner of his own companions up to the voluntary nurse of conta-
gious disease. The man who killed in order to be allowed to live and
was killed if he refused to be the executioner of the other ones. The
man who stole from others and stole from himself for the others.58
Here, then, was a classic statement of antifascist internationalism.

Displaced politicals not only employed the language of antifascist
unity, they also sought to participate in the activities of the international
prisoners’ community. In the ‹rst instance, this meant participation in
more broad-based international prisoners’ organizations, especially ones
based in Germany. The most important example of such participation is
the International Information Of‹ce of Dachau (IIO). In many respects,
the International Information Of‹ce was similar to other care centers es-
tablished after the liberation. However, while most care centers saw them-
selves as agencies for German politicals, the IIO was explicitly interna-
tional. Created largely on the initiative of Polish survivors, it brought
together two projects, one Polish and one German. The ‹rst was the
Dachau camp of‹ce, which housed most of the camp’s records. Headed by
Jan Domagala, the last camp secretary and the Polish representative of the
IPC, it was staffed primarily by Poles. The second project was an Informa-
tion Center (Auskunftsstelle) established in the city of Dachau by German
politicals. Led by Oskar Müller, the last camp elder and the president of
the IPC, its immediate mission was to care for the remaining “Reich Ger-
mans” in the camp and to maintain the records pertaining to them, though
its organizers also envisioned it as an eventual general repository of camp
records.59 In October 1945, the two projects merged to create the IIO. Do-
magala served as its ‹rst head; after he returned to Poland, the position
went to Paul Hussarek, a Sudeten German survivor. In practice, however,
the IIO was run by Domagala’s deputy Walter Cieslik, also a Polish politi-
cal.60 In keeping with its origins, the IIO’s organizational structure was in-
ternational, with separate national sections for Poles and Germans. The
Polish section, which also functioned as the Polish Information Of‹ce
mentioned earlier, was headed by Cieslik. It was closely af‹liated with the
Polish Committee in Munich. The German section was headed by Richard
Titze, a member of the German Communist resistance. Expanding on the
work of its German predecessor, the IIO’s main task was to provide sur-
vivors with immediate assistance, including food, clothing, and money.61 It
also performed a number of other roles. It maintained the camp’s records,
and it played an important role in early commemorations of Dachau.62
More broadly, it was committed to helping former prisoners of all nation-
alities, including Jews.63 Much of this international work was performed by
the Polish of‹ce. Indeed, the IIO saw itself as an organization dedicated to
promoting international cooperation in the postwar world. According to
Cieslik, the IIO demonstrated that “the spirit of international cooperation
has found acceptance in the world.”64 The international structure of the
organization, and the good relations among the organization’s multina-
tional staff, were themselves the proof of this claim. “Seldom,” Cieslik
wrote, “do people of various nationalities work together with such civility
and trust, despite all the dif‹culties.”65
Ultimately, however, the IIO’s internationalism proved to be its undo-
ing. The experiment foundered on tensions between German and non-
German politicals over the right to shape postwar institutions in Germany.
In the spring of 1946, the IIO came into con›ict with the German care cen-
ters over a circular drafted by its head Paul Hussarek. The circular argued
that political persecutees in Bavaria should create their own association in
order to strengthen their position in the debate over restitution. In a vehe-
ment letter sent to all the care centers in Bavaria, Ernst Lörcher of the
Bavarian Red Cross’s Department of Political Persecutees condemned
Hussarek’s proposal as ill-advised, drawing attention to the fact that the
extant political parties and the State Commission for Political Persecutees
could be expected to adequately represent the interests of the former pris-
oners. He also took aim at Hussarek himself, identifying him as a politi-
cally suspect foreigner with no right to speak for political persecutees in
Bavaria. “Hussarek,” he stated, “is a Czech emigrant and avoids his home-
land for reasons which, though admittedly unknown to us, are nonetheless
transparent.”66
Although the accusations of the Munich section were rejected by
other German political prisoners, the scandal created by Hussarek’s pro-
posal placed the IIO in an uncomfortable position.67 The Poles at the IIO
felt exposed by the accusation that foreigners were meddling in German af-
fairs. From their perspective, Hussarek was not a foreigner but rather a
German—a “former Czech DP and now a German”—who was using their

organization to pursue German interests. “For some time,” they stated in a
letter to local UNRRA of‹cials, “the of‹ces of the IIO have been misused
for political purposes, which is not in keeping with our program, and as a
springboard for the German Association of Former Political Prisoners of
Concentration Camps, in order to create under German initiative an inter-
national organization, to which the Germans have no right.”68 They feared
that the Hussarek scandal would create political and ‹nancial problems. In
their letter to UNRRA, they suggested that it could “call forth various
diplomatic interventions,” a reference, it seems, to the possibility of con›ict
among Polish, American, and German of‹cials. They therefore requested
that the IIO be placed under the protection of UNRRA. They also forced
Hussarek to resign.69
As a result of this con›ict, the IIO fell apart. Although UNRRA took
responsibility for the of‹ce in May 1946, it did not provide suf‹cient mate-
rial support.70 In August 1946, the IIO ceased to exist as an independent in-
stitution.71 Frustrated by this experience, Cieslik returned to Poland. Other
Poles associated with the IIO also returned home.72 The IIO’s German and
Polish of‹ces continued to function, but only as separate national commit-
tees with no particular commitment to internationalism. Indeed, there
would be few other efforts at cooperation between German and Polish po-
liticals, and between German and DP politicals more generally. Rather, as
we shall see, German distrust of Polish and Ukrainian camp survivors
would lead to their marginalization.
Committee work was one means by which displaced political prison-
ers sought to participate in the larger international prisoners’ community.
Commemorations were another. The most signi‹cant example of DP par-
ticipation in commemorations concerns the Flossenbürg concentration
camp, located in the Upper Palatinate. Displaced politicals played an im-
portant role in shaping Flossenbürg’s early commemorative environment.
In June 1946, Polish survivors living in the camp—now functioning as a DP
camp—created the Executive Committee for Erecting the Monument and
Chappel [sic] in Concentration Camp Flossenbürg. Also participating in
this effort were Ukrainian and German politicals and local notables. The
design of the memorial site, composed of three main elements—a monu-
ment, a chapel, and a “Valley of Death” on the former camp execution
site—emphasizes the idea of international community. The monument,
constructed in the city center, consists of a large granite block surrounded
by tablets commemorating each of the twenty-two nations interned in
Flossenbürg. The chapel, constructed out of stones from the camp’s

watchtowers, similarly includes elements representing individual nations,
including national ›ags and distinct stained-glass windows. Finally, the
Valley of Death includes a “Square of the Nations” lined with memorial
tablets representing individual nations. The emphasis on international
community is coupled with an understanding of the camp experience as a
form of martyrdom. This can be seen most clearly in the design of the
chapel. As Peter Fibich notes, “in the designs of the church windows . . . as
well as the cruci‹xion scene over the altar, the events in the concentration
camp are symbolically associated with the suffering and sacri‹cial death of
Christ.”73 The martyrological theme surfaces not only in the Polish- and
Ukrainian-designed elements of the chapel but also in the French- and
Belgian-designed ones, suggesting that the concept of national martyrdom
found broad resonance among former political prisoners.
For DP politicals, participation in the development of the Flossen-
bürg memorial site was an important sign of belonging to the international
prisoners’ community. The involvement of Ukrainian politicals can be re-
constructed in some detail. In 1947, the League of Ukrainian Political Pris-
oners became the of‹cial Ukrainian representative on the planning com-
mittee for the site. Soliciting funds among Ukrainians in North America, it
succeeded in raising enough money for both a memorial tablet in the Val-
ley of Death and a stained-glass window in the chapel.74 The design of the
window re›ects the Ukrainian version of the martyrological idiom. Dedi-
cated to the sons of Ukraine, “who gave their lives for freedom,” it com-
bines religious and secular imagery in a manner intended to highlight the
transhistorical struggle for national independence. The two main panels
are dominated by religious ‹gures: at the top, the Madonna, at the bottom,
Saint George slaying the dragon. Smaller panels refer to Ukrainian his-
tory: two Ukrainian churches; the coats of arms of Ukraine’s two main
cities, Kiev and Lviv; and two iconic Ukrainian warriors, the Cossack and
the Sich Ri›eman.75 The central panel contains the inscription and the tri-
dent, the symbol of Ukrainian statehood. The inclusion of Saint George,
also featured in the Belgian window, places the struggles of Ukrainian po-
litical prisoners in a clear martyrological context. It suggests that like the
soldier-saint, the prisoners had sacri‹ced themselves for their beliefs. In-
terestingly, there is no reference to concentration camp survivors per se.76
Smaller examples of DP participation in international commemora-
tions can also be found. The April 1946 ceremony commemorating the lib-
eration of Dachau, for example, included a speech by a Ukrainian sur-
vivor, who, anticipating David Rousset by a few years, drew a parallel be-
tween the Nazi and Soviet systems and called on his fellow survivors to
support the Ukrainian independence movement.77 Reporting on the cere-
mony in its newsletter, the League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners high-
lighted what it saw as a strong Ukrainian showing and proudly noted that
the gift they had presented to the U.S. Army had made a favorable impres-
sion on the audience.78
As these examples of committee work and commemoration suggest,
DP politicals were eager to participate in the activities of the larger pris-
oners’ community and sometimes managed to play important roles. The
fact that they remained in Germany, close to the camp sites themselves, fa-
cilitated their involvement. Taking a broader view, however, it is clear that
DP politicals were marginal actors on both the German and the interna-
tional scenes. For example, they had little contact with the VVN, the main
German persecutee organization, whose members included many promi-
nent German politicians, including Philipp Auerbach.
There were three main reasons for their marginalization. First, the in-
ternational prisoners’ committees were organized according to the nation-
state principle and were thus by de‹nition unwilling to accommodate com-
mittees representing stateless persons, especially when these committees
challenged the legitimacy of similar associations in their home countries. It
was simply not possible to have two Polish committees, and it was hard to
know what to do with even one Ukrainian or Russian committee, since
“Ukraine” and “Russia” were not states.
Second, politicals who refused to return home were seen as traitors to
the antifascist cause. For antifascism meant commitment not only to de-
feating the fascists but also to creating a new postfascist Europe.79 In chal-
lenging repatriation, DP politicals thus challenged the proper denouement
of the antifascist struggle. Indeed, they made themselves suspicious. For if
they refused to return home, it could only be because they were really crim-
inals: politicals who had collaborated with the Nazis or, even more omi-
nously, “common” criminals masquerading as politicals. Speaking at a
meeting of political and racial persecutees in Starnberg, about 25 kilome-
ters southwest of Munich, in November 1946, for example, former political
prisoner and local SPD politician Walter Lachmann argued that survivors
who refused to return home could not be considered real victims of fas-
cism, let alone real antifascists. “I take the position,” he stated, “that every
deportee may claim the rights of a political prisoner, but only so long as it
is impossible for him to return to his homeland.” He made exceptions for a
few groups, including Spaniards, Russians, and Polish Jews. “Every other
deportee,” he stated, “does not have the right to recognition if he does not
return to his homeland. For if he wishes to remain a deportee, he declares
himself in agreement with his deportation and has to accept contemporary
living conditions in Germany.”80 Lachmann also noted the high rate of
criminality among foreigners in Germany, which, he argued, “naturally
damages the reputation of the foreigners living here, the deportees, and
therefore also the political and racial persecutees.”81 Interpreting black-
market activities as attempts to sabotage Germany’s postwar reconstruc-
tion, he demanded that foreigners caught engaging in criminal acts be de-
ported after serving their sentences.
Third, and ‹nally, displaced politicals were suspect on account of
their nationality. National labels played an important role in the concen-
tration camps. The “divide and conquer” strategies employed by the SS
produced and reinforced national antagonisms.82 Both Poles and Ukraini-
ans were widely disliked by other prisoners. They were viewed as national
chauvinists, antisemites, poor comrades, and collaborators. Thus even a
sympathetic commentator like Joseph Rovan, whose postwar memoir of
Dachau avoided broad generalizations, criticized “the Poles,” focusing in
particular on their antisemitism. “Many of my Polish comrades,” he wrote,
“did not take many precautions in con‹ding to us how much they regret-
ted the folly of Hitler, who had gotten it into his head to exterminate the
Polish people instead of forging an invincible Germano-Polish alliance
against Bolshevism, Russian, Jewish, and atheistic.”83 In Germany, this in-
heritance of the concentration camps was ampli‹ed by the long history of
anti-Slavic and especially anti-Polish sentiment.
The effects of national stereotypes from the camps on the evaluation
of Polish DPs can be seen in the debate surrounding Nico Rost’s portrayal
of Polish prisoners in his diary, Goethe in Dachau. Rost was a Dutch so-
cialist and journalist who spent two years in the concentration camps. In
his diary, published in the original Dutch in 1947 and in German transla-
tion one year later, he was unsparingly critical of “the Poles.” He portrayed
them as ruthless exploiters of their fellow prisoners and willing collabora-
tors of the SS.84 In October 1949, a debate over this portrayal erupted in the
pages of the nascent East German press. In an open letter to Rost, the pub-
licist Susanne Kerckhoff accused him of “animosity towards the Polish
people.”85 “Little by little, page by page,” she wrote, “you create a Polish
‘national character.’”86 This, she said, was tantamount to racism. She
sought to defend the reputation of the Poles by referencing her experience
working in a DP camp, where even the reactionary Polish DPs exhibited

“agreeable characteristics, and indeed the kind that correspond to a Polish
‘national character.’”87 Rising to Rost’s defense, writer Stefan Hermlin ac-
cused Kerckhoff of ignorance and naïveté. He described the “criminal and
corrupt elements” that “the real anti-fascists” had faced in the camps. “It is
precisely these elements,” he argued, “which today ‹ll the West German
DP camps and serve the American imperialists as a reserve army.”88 He
thus drew a straight line between Polish concentration camp prisoners and
Polish DPs. Although the drama over Rost’s diary played out in East Ger-
many, similar judgments were common in the west. Here too, the poor
quality of Polish DPs was traced back to the poor quality of Polish con-
centration camp prisoners or, more broadly, to the shortcomings of the
Polish nation.
The rejection that DP politicals encountered among other political
prisoners encouraged them to band together to create their own interna-
tional community. In this community, the internationalism of the camps
was reproduced on a miniature scale, uniting those former political prison-
ers who had refused the antifascist denouement and remained “abroad.”
Here international solidarity was based not only on wartime history but
also on a sense of collective postwar victimization. A victim consciousness
was fed by rejection on the part of other politicals and by fear about the po-
litical future of eastern Europe. Indeed, inasmuch as the postwar context of
displacement reproduced the wartime context of imprisonment, with its
sense of a collective threat, it formed the basis of a new group experience,
which encouraged DP politicals to develop international alliances.
The formation of this miniature international community can be seen
in the development of international committees composed speci‹cally of
displaced politicals. Some of these committees were ad hoc and temporary,
while others proved to be longer lasting. The most important was the In-
ternational Union of Former Political Prisoners. Founded in Munich in
October 1945, it brought Poles and Ukrainians together with other eastern
Europeans, including Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Slovenes,
Croats, and Serbs.89 Unlike the “of‹cial” international prisoners’ commit-
tees, it was organized around an ethnonational rather than a nation-state
principle. The committee’s main goals were to provide for the immediate
material needs of survivors, ‹ght for restitution, and encourage “spiritual-
cultural rapprochement” among its member nationalities. Its erstwhile
president, Wasyl Pasiczniak, was a journalist and self-described “Ukrai-
nian freedom ‹ghter,” who, like his colleague Mirchuk, was also involved
in the anticommunist movement.90 Like its Polish and Ukrainian member

organizations, the International Union was eventually deemed a subversive
organization.
The immediate rationale for creating these international organizations
was the threat of repatriation. In one of his two memoirs, Petro Mirchuk
notes that opposition to returning home united many of the eastern Euro-
peans in the Ebensee concentration camp in Austria. After the liberation,
they created an international committee to represent them.91 The same logic
was operative in the case of the International Union of Former Political
Prisoners. In the early stages of its history, it was preoccupied with the repa-
triation question. In December 1945, for example, it wrote to John H. Whit-
ing, the director of UNRRA for the U.S. zone, to protest UNRRA screen-
ing methods, which, it said, threatened hundreds of thousands of displaced
persons with “fraudulent and compulsory repatriation.”92
Behind the concern over repatriation stood a broader anticommunist
orientation. The International Union presented its members as representa-
tives of the “democratic idea,” whose conscience led them to oppose not
only National Socialism but also Soviet communism. “Thus it is not sur-
prising that the membership of the national organizations that belong to
the [International Union] is ‹lled in the ‹rst place with the political pris-
oners of nations that ended up under the direct or indirect tutelage of the
USSR. Having endured the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps and
underground Gestapo prisons, they did not wish to return to that same
world, that same truth, and those same methods.”93 They called on the
leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and France to help them ‹nd a
way out of Germany, where they lived under the constant threat of repa-
triation and had to confront the hatred of the Germans.
Membership in an international community of displaced politicals was
clearly not as important to former prisoners as membership in a national
community. Indeed, as will be discussed in the following chapter, “interna-
tional cooperation” around the legacy of National Socialism was fraught
with dif‹culties. However, it did perform an important symbolic function.
In the context of rejection on the part of other politicals, it testi‹ed to the
fact that DP politicals still enjoyed acceptance within a larger international
circle—that they were “bona ‹de.” Thus the League of Ukrainian Political
Prisoners placed considerable emphasis on the fact that representatives of
other national committees had attended its ‹rst congress and even repro-
duced their speeches in its monthly newsletter.94 Yet the signi‹cance of this
international community was not merely symbolic. As we will see in the fol-
lowing chapter, it also served practical material ends: it functioned as a

lobby on behalf of displaced politicals in their claims against the German
authorities, especially their demands for restitution.
The Fragility of the Political
Few former political prisoners openly challenged the heroic image of the
political cultivated by the committees. To do so was to challenge the value
of one’s own experiences, to empty them of their positive and redeeming
content at a time when they were already under siege from without. One
exception was a small group of prisoners who worked for the Polish Com-
mittee in Munich in its early days: Tadeusz Borowski, Janusz Nel Siedlecki,
and Krystyn Olszewski. Like Siedlecki and Borowski, who have already
been discussed at some length, Olszewski had been arrested for resistance
activities and deported to Auschwitz. Together the three men were later
evacuated westward, ending up in Dachau-Allach. After the liberation,
they lived in Munich-Freimann before conspiring to move to Munich
proper. There, after hours, they wrote a book about their Auschwitz expe-
riences, which they entitled simply We Were in Auschwitz (Bylismy w Os-
wiecimiu). The idea for the book came from Anatol Girs, a well-known
Polish publisher and graphic artist. One of the founders of the prewar pub-
lishing house O‹cyna Warszawska, he had been arrested more or less at
random during the Warsaw Uprising.95 Like the three authors, he had been
interned in Auschwitz and Dachau. Published in 1946 by O‹cyna Wars-
zawska Abroad—according to Siedlecki, “cigarettes opened the gates of
Bruckmann, the famous printers of Munich”—the book was dedicated to
the Seventh U.S. Army, the liberators of Dachau-Allach.96 One of the ‹rst
concentration camp memoirs published after the war, it contained stories
by each of the three authors, though in the spirit of collaboration, who
wrote what was not indicated. Altogether, it offered a devastating critique
of the politicals.
According to Borowski, the book was a bit of “everything: encyclope-
dia, sonata pathetique, response, and anecdote.”97 The issue of response
was central. In their introductory statements, the authors and the publisher
presented the book as a response to what they called “the legend of the con-
centration camp”: myths of heroism that other camp survivors were creat-
ing. They conceived of the book as a counterhistory, a documentary project
intended to explode these myths and reveal the truth of the camps.98 More
generally, they saw it as an exposé of fascism, with relevance beyond the era
of the camps.99 The authors appealed primarily to the evidence of their own
experience, especially their visual experience.100 In other words, they pre-
sented themselves as witnesses. In order to underline this point, the stories
were narrated almost exclusively in the ‹rst person. In the book’s opening
pages, they made clear just what they had witnessed.
We saw people killed for stealing a couple of raw potatoes, and we saw
cars ‹lled with food stolen for the families of the SS men. We saw
women who gave themselves for a piece of bread, and we saw people
who bought themselves lovers with gold belonging to people who had
been gassed.
We saw, and we think that we have the right to talk about this with-
out subterfuge, openly, as we remember it. Con‹nement in the camp,
destitution, torture, and death in the gas chamber are not heroism, are
not even anything positive.101
The individual stories elaborated on this basic theme. They brought to-
gether a macrohistorical analysis of the camp system with a microhistori-
cal focus on relations among individual prisoners. This doubled perspec-
tive was employed in examining different aspects of the camp, including
work in different kinds of commandos (for example, the notorious Son-
derkommando) and the extermination of the Jews. Indeed, while much of
the ‹ction and memoir literature written by political prisoners focuses nar-
rowly on the politicals themselves, the authors of We Were in Auschwitz
took a broader view, focusing on the plight of Jewish and Gypsy prisoners
and on relations between different groups.
Although the book touched on virtually every group of prisoners, the
central objects of analysis were the politicals: those prisoners who under-
stood themselves as ‹ghters for a “cause.” Undermining the distinction be-
tween the politicals and the criminals, a distinction most politicals went to
great lengths to maintain, the authors highlighted the debasement of the
politicals and, ultimately, the interchangeability with the criminals. The
politicals, they argued, had been reduced to the state of criminals by a
criminal system. Nor did they spare themselves from this indictment.
Rather, their own debasement served as the principal evidence for their
theory of moral life in the camp.
It was defeat, the almost immediate abandonment of ideological prin-

ciples. A primeval battle remained, waged by the solitary, debased
prisoner for his existence against the equally debased SS and against
the terrible force of the camp. We stress this strongly because myths
and legends will arise on both sides. We did not ‹ght for the concept
of nation in the camp, nor for the inner restructuring of man; we
fought for a bowl of soup, for a place to sleep, for women, for gold
and watches from the transports.102
To differing degrees, the individual authors took pleasure in exposing the

debasement of the politicals, exempli‹ed by their cruelty and indifference
toward other prisoners, especially Jews. This masochistic tendency comes
through most forcefully in the stories written by Borowski, in which a
rather unscrupulous ‹rst-person narrator, sometimes self-referentially
named “Tadek,” lords it over the other prisoners and only rarely suffers de-
feats of his own. Although the narrator documents with chilling clarity
and precision the crimes being committed around him, and thus demon-
strates a keen sensitivity to the sufferings of others, he does not step in to
prevent them. His energies are devoted to surviving, which means pro‹ting
from the system as it exists. He is the very opposite of a heroic ‹gure. Such
unsparing portrayals of self-referential characters can be read as evidence
of the authors’ own deep-seated feelings of guilt. They serve, in effect, as a
form of literary self-punishment for the crimes that they themselves com-
mitted. It thus seems that one of the authors’ goals in writing the book, un-
stated but nonetheless present, was to confront their own complicity.
The authors’ reckoning with the past is all the more ruthless because
of the hopes they had invested in the political prisoners, including them-
selves. Their stories express a profound disenchantment with the ideals of
antifascism. This is especially true of Borowski, whom Czeslaw Milosz has
called a “disappointed lover.”103 He takes direct aim at antifascist solidar-
ity in one of his contributions to the book, “A Day at Harmenz.” In the fol-
lowing scene, the narrator Tadek, whose watch has just been broken by the
German commando leader, has an encounter with his Kapo, who is also a
political prisoner.
Without a word I picked up my broken watch and began to whistle.

First a foxtrot, then an old tango, then the “Song of Warsaw” and all
the Polish cavalry tunes, and ‹nally the entire repertoire of the politi-
cal left.
But just when I got to the middle of the “International,” I suddenly

felt a tall shadow move over me. A heavy hand struck across my back.
I turned my head and froze in terror. The Kapo’s huge, bloated red
face hovered over me, his spade swaying dangerously in mid-air. The
stripes of his prison suit stood out sharply against the green of the dis-
tant trees. A small red triangle with the numbers 3277 dangled before
my eyes, growing more and more enormous.
“What’s that you’re whistling?” he asked, looking straight into my
eyes,
“It’s a sort of international song, sir.”
“Do you know the words?”
“Well . . . some . . . I’ve heard them a few times,” I said cautiously.
“And have you heard this one?”
And in a hoarse voice he began singing the “Red Flag.” He let his
spade drop, his eyes glistened excitedly. Then he broke off suddenly,
picked up the spade and shook his head, half with contempt, half
with pity.
“If a real SS man’d heard you, you wouldn’t be alive right now. But
that one over there . . .”
The sickly German resting against the brick wall laughed good-na-
turedly.104
The scene presented here suggests how the ethos of international solidar-
ity has been perverted in the camp. Tadek’s performance, which moves
from popular music to Polish nationalist tunes and ‹nally to leftist classics,
reproduces, in musical form, an idealized progression of political solidari-
ties. The whistling of the “International,” the telos of this progression, is
clearly identi‹ed as a subversive activity—indeed, an overt provocation,
punishable by death. Directed at the German who broke Tadek’s watch, it
hints at the existence of an antifascist movement in the camp. However,
this subversion is rudely interrupted by the Kapo. Despite his status as a
fellow political, he is Tadek’s superior within the camp hierarchy. His
grotesque and truncated rendition of a classic radical song suggests how
his political beliefs have been compromised in the camp.
While the critique of the political prisoners aimed primarily at
demonstrating their debasement, on a more fundamental level, the authors
questioned whether the politicals could in any sense be considered mem-
bers of the resistance. This critique of the political category per se is sug-
gested by Girs’s introductory note. “We,” he wrote, “are those who were
sent to the camps because we did something, because we didn’t do any-

thing, because we were—in the thinking of this [fascist] ethic—guilty, or
because we were innocent.”105 Resistance, Girs noted, was only one of
many reasons why people were deported. Indeed, to speak of reason in this
context, of deportation as the logical consequence of an act on the part of
the deported, was to miss the larger point. In the context of the criminal
system created by the Nazis, the individual’s fate had little if anything to do
with his or her actions. Deportation and imprisonment thus could not be
seen as con‹rmation of one’s political credentials. Rather, the prisoner’s
status was de‹ned by subjection to the simultaneously systematic and ar-
bitrary practices of the Nazi regime. Those who ended up in the camp were
victims rather than heroes.
While the concentration camp experience provided the book with its
explicit focus, the interpretation of this experience took shape in the post-
war context. The problem, as the authors put it, was not merely that the
politicals had “abandoned” their principles as soon as they reached the
camp, it was also that these principles showed few signs of reviving now
that the camp system had been destroyed. In the camps, they had all
dreamed of “a better, more just world.” “What hurts us,” they wrote, “is
that in the world which was supposed to be our redemption, the same rules
of life that we came to hate so much in the camp still exist—looting, rob-
bery, swindling.”106 This verdict can no doubt be read on a number of dif-
ferent levels. It suggests not only literal swindling and robbery but also the
more metaphorical forms represented by mythmaking and falsi‹cation. It
perhaps alludes to the situation of postwar Poland, “robbed” of an inde-
pendent (though hardly democratic) government by Great Power politics.
It most certainly references the authors’ immediate surroundings. As both
Siedlecki and Borowski suggest elsewhere, their disillusionment with the
postwar world took shape in the context of the DP camps and communi-
ties, where they saw their liberated comrades become absorbed in petty
con›icts. The origins of the book, especially its harsh judgment of the po-
litical prisoners, thus lay as much in the present as in the past.107
Despite their trenchant critique of the political prisoner, the authors
did not entirely succeed in avoiding the representational tropes favored by
other politicals, tropes that identi‹ed the politicals as heroic actors and au-
thoritative witnesses. This can be seen clearly in the design of the book.
The authors’ prisoner numbers were prominently displayed next to their
names on the book’s title page. The book’s front and back covers were
wrapped in paper that reproduced the striped fabric of the concentration
camp uniform, and the front cover bore the markings of a Polish political
prisoner: a red triangle, a P, and a prisoner number (Siedlecki’s). Most as-
tonishing, some copies were bound in fabric taken from original camp uni-
forms, onto which was sewn a cloth reproduction of the prisoner mark-
ings.108 These design elements identify the authors as bona ‹de Polish
political prisoners. Even more, they establish the legitimacy of their claims:
their authority to speak about Auschwitz and the authenticity of their
words. This is especially true of the covers bound in fabric from original
uniforms, which present the reader with direct physical evidence of the
camps. The message, it seems, is that one can read a book by its cover.109
The status of the authors as bona ‹de Polish politicals is also under-
lined by another design element, the colophon or emblem for the book’s
publisher. Reproduced on the title page, it features a muscular left arm
holding a sword. It closely resembles the emblem on a Polish naval war
›ag, familiar to Girs from his prewar work.110 It also brings to mind the
syrena, the sword-bearing mermaid known in Polish mythology as the
founder and guardian of Warsaw, which, during the Nazi occupation, took
on new signi‹cance as a symbol of the city’s resistance.111 Girs himself
later said that he added this motif after learning that he had lost his entire
family, which had been deported with him to Auschwitz. He deliberately
chose to picture the sword held in the left hand, as he used his left hand to
draw.112 Explicitly associating the pen with the sword, the emblem for the
publisher can thus be seen as a tribute to the ‹ghting spirit of Warsaw and
a symbol of Girs’s personal intention to continue the ‹ght against fascism
through his artistic and literary work. Thus, although Girs was at pains to
suggest that internment in the camp was not the result of heroic action, his
design for the colophon offers a more heroic vision.
Taken together, these design elements create a powerful visual and
tactile association with the camp experiences depicted in the book. They
suggest how dif‹cult it was to avoid viewing the politicals as authoritative
and heroic witnesses. Paradoxically, in seeking to debunk the myth of the
camp, the authors made use of it. A distinction between the politicals and
the criminals had to be maintained in order to authorize the text. Like
many survivors, the four men behind We Were in Auschwitz had an urgent
desire to bear witness to the camps. In order to do so, they employed the
authority conferred on them by their status as politicals, even as they
sought to undermine this authority in the book itself.
Despite its literary and historical signi‹cance, We Were in Auschwitz
never found a large audience, neither in Poland nor abroad. “As we ex-
Fig. 12. Title page of Janusz Nel Siedlecki, Krystyn Olszewski, and
Tadeusz Borowski, We Were in Auschwitz (Bylśimy w Oświec7 imiu) (Mu-
nich: O‹cyna Warszawska na Obczyźnie, 1946).
pected,” writes Siedlecki, “it had a mixed reception: praises from the Polish
Western Press, but, for debunking the ‘heroes,’ vicious threats from many
ex-prisoners.”113 In Poland, where some of Borowski’s contributions were
published separately, the author was praised for his literary accomplish-
ments, but his presentation of the camps was seen as evidence of a debased
morality.114 The book itself was barely known there.115 Such a negative re-
ception, both critical and silent, is not surprising. With their antiheroic
‹rst-person account of Polish politicals, the authors of We Were in
Auschwitz critiqued from the inside, as it were, the political identity already
assaulted from the outside by the German and American authorities and
by other politicals. After emigrating to the United States in 1947, Girs, the
book’s publisher, was forced to destroy most of the remaining copies.116
Chapter 8
Recognition, Assistance,
Wiedergutmachung:
The Claims of Displaced Politicals
Displaced politicals were deeply preoccupied with their experiences under

National Socialism. This preoccupation not only generated a wealth of or-
ganizations, commemorations, and testimonies: it also served as the basis
for material claims. Three claims took center stage. First, DP politicals
sought of‹cial recognition of their status as persecuted persons. Second,
they sought immediate assistance in the form of food, shelter, medical care,
and monetary subsidies. Third, they demanded formal legal restitution
(Wiedergutmachung) for the crimes committed against them. They viewed
these claims as existential issues, in both senses of the word: as the basis of
their material existence and as con‹rmation of their sacri‹ces, suffering,
and contribution to defeating National Socialism.
The claims put forward by displaced politicals derived from the nar-
ratives of heroism and sacri‹ce explored in the previous chapter. However,
they were also encouraged by Allied and German policies, especially the
emphasis the Allies initially placed on exposing the crimes of National So-
cialism and assisting victims of persecution. Postwar policies thus played
an important role in channeling the energies of DP politicals and shaping
how they viewed themselves. The dominant representation of the political
prisoner as a national martyr developed against the backdrop of persecu-
tee policies: at the same time as DP politicals were writing about their
camp experiences, they were pursuing their claims with the authorities. It is
thus impossible to separate the two. Indeed, the dif‹culties DP politicals
encountered with their claims arguably strengthened their identi‹cation as
victims of National Socialism.
The search for recognition, assistance, and restitution also stimulated
competition with other victims, especially Jewish and German survivors,
244
Recognition, Assistance, Wiedergutmachung 245
who were seen as enjoying privileged positions in the German hierarchy of

compensation. Finding their claims rebuffed, DP politicals turned their
anger and frustration against these other groups. They claimed that they
were just as worthy, if not more, of recognition. Their resentment found
expression in antisemitic and anticommunist statements. DP politicals in-
terpreted policies designed to assist Jewish persecutees as conspiratorial ef-
forts to privilege Jews over politicals. Similarly, they read the discrimina-
tory attitude of the German care centers and German state authorities as
part of a German Communist plot. Occasionally, they asserted both things
simultaneously, evoking the specter of “Judeo-Bolshevism.”
Claims that Jewish suffering “takes up too much space” are generally
seen as a more recent development, a backlash against the growing recog-
nition of the Holocaust during the 1980s and 1990s.1 In most parts of Eu-
rope, where the vision of National Socialist persecution was for decades
shaped primarily by political prisoners, and the speci‹c experiences of
Jews were marginalized, this is in fact true. In the DP context, however, the
picture looks somewhat different. Here the outlines of a competitive dis-
course emerged in the mid-1940s. To understand this development, it is
necessary to recall the recognition accorded to Jewish survivors by Allied
and especially American persecutee policy. After the Harrison Report,
Jews were recognized as a distinct and, indeed, “paradigmatic” group of
victims entitled to special assistance.2 Improvements in their status also
drove forward improvements in the status of persecutees more generally. In
practice, the advantages that Jews in Germany enjoyed were modest. Jew-
ish DP leaders often complained about the failure to translate policy into
practice. However, these advantages loomed large in the imagination of
displaced politicals. They fed a competitive discourse underwritten by pre-
war antisemitism and by a sense of superiority as members of the anti-
Nazi resistance.
The Search for Recognition and Assistance
Displaced politicals placed great signi‹cance on gaining of‹cial recogni-

tion as victims of persecution. They sought recognition from numerous
sources, including persecutee committees, the Allied authorities, the inter-
national relief agencies, and the German government. Like the interna-
tional prisoners’ committees discussed in the previous chapter, the author-
ities served as a mirror in which former political prisoners searched for
con‹rmation of their political identity. They were an especially powerful

mirror, as they controlled vast material, political, and, in the case of the
Allies, moral resources.
For DP politicals in Bavaria, recognition from the American military
government was especially important. As we have seen, however, the
American authorities had little enthusiasm for DP committees, which they
viewed as a deterrent to repatriation, a source of inter-Allied con›ict, and
an unwarranted interference in German politics. Hence the committees es-
tablished by displaced politicals had dif‹culty establishing relations with
the Americans. The case of the Gablingen section of the Polish Associa-
tion of Ex-Prisoners Persecuted by Nazis provides a good illustration. In
October 1948, the Poles in Gablingen, a small town near Augsburg, wrote
to Military Government of‹cials about compensation for former political
prisoners. They complained that Bavarian compensation laws discrimi-
nated against former political prisoners who lived in IRO camps and that
no one was protecting their interests. They begged the Military Govern-
ment to intervene on their behalf.3 While local MG of‹cials suggested a re-
view of existing programs of assistance to persecutees, higher authorities
refused to consider the Polish Association’s requests.4 Writing to the Of‹ce
of Military Government for Bavaria, the director of Civil Administration
for the Of‹ce of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) stated that
“the Polish Association . . . has not been licensed by Military Government
nor are its activities looked upon with favour by this Headquarters.”5 The
substantive questions posed by the Polish Association were left unex-
plored. Indeed, the Polish Association never received a response.
The search for recognition was closely tied to the search for material
assistance. Persecutee status, as we saw in chapter 2, was coupled with ma-
terial bene‹ts. It meant priority in access to food, housing, medical atten-
tion, and cash subsidies. Although DP politicals were unwilling to be seen
as welfare recipients, they were nonetheless highly dependent on outside as-
sistance, without which they could not meet their basic material needs, let
alone rebuild their lives. Hence the search for assistance was charged with
urgency. In order to secure the bene‹ts of persecutee status, former political
prisoners had to convince the authorities that they were “bona ‹de.” This
meant demonstrating that they met the Allied, American and, later, Ger-
man criteria for political persecution. DP politicals were intimately familiar
with of‹cial policies and made frequent mention of them in their corre-
spondence. They were especially familiar with the Harrison Report and
Eisenhower’s directives, which were widely covered in the DP press.6 Al-
though the report and the directives had been formulated to address the sit-
uation of Jewish survivors, they also had implications for the treatment of
displaced persons and non-Jewish persecutees. DP politicals seized on these
implications, using Harrison’s and Eisenhower’s statements as further evi-
dence that the Americans had committed to assisting them.7 Cognizant of
special efforts to assist Jewish persecutees, they were eager to make sure they
were not left behind. This set the stage for a competitive discourse.
The nexus of demands and complaints about assistance can be seen
in the correspondence that DP politicals maintained with American and
UNRRA of‹cials. Faced with dire material shortages and poor living con-
ditions, DP politicals continually drew attention to the relationship between
political status and material bene‹ts. For example, the Polish Information
Of‹ce in Munich (i.e., the Polish Committee) was especially concerned
about the welfare of former Polish prisoners living privately in the city, who,
like other free-living DPs, did not ‹t into the division of labor worked out
between the Allied and German authorities. It maintained lists of prisoners,
which it provided to the American Military Government and UNRRA on
its own initiative. In a petition to UNRRA, the Of‹ce asked that the free-
living former prisoners be provided with “the help due to them on account
of their long con‹nement.”8 Among the things it requested were food,
clothing, and a monetary allowance. It hoped that UNRRA would grant
the former prisoners “special pri[o]rity” in recognition of the fact that they
“had to suffer all the awefulness of the nazi-regime.” The Of‹ce clearly
hoped that the Military Government and UNRRA would accept its lists as
authoritative documents. To bolster its position it referred to a political
screening. “All these persons,” it af‹rmed, “are strictly registered in our
of‹ce and the former political prisoners, being members of our Associa-
tion, are thoroughly segregated in order to eliminate the criminal element
from the political.”9 The assertion of a political identity, de‹ned primarily
against a criminal one, was central to the Polish Information Of‹ce’s claims
that its members were entitled to a certain level of Allied care.
The relationship between political status and material bene‹ts was
also asserted by the Murnau section of the Polish Association. Most of the
Poles in Murnau were not in fact concentration camp survivors but rather
former of‹cers of the Polish Army, who had been interned in the Murnau
POW camp. Nonetheless, they identi‹ed themselves as political prisoners.
They had a strong communal identity centered on commitment to military
traditions and allegiance to the old Polish state.10 In a June 1946 letter to
the local UNRRA team and the American authorities written “in the
name of more than 200 members of our Section of Former Political Pris-
oners,” the Murnau Poles protested the transfer of part of their group to
another town, where they said “conditions . . . are similar to those of the
concentration camps.” They were acutely aware of the position that perse-
cutees were supposed to occupy within the postwar political hierarchy:
“We kindly draw your attention [to the fact] that all regulations of the
Supreme American authorities and International Commissions for the
cave [sic, care] of DPs intend to provide the former political prisoners with
a better and special treatment.” They sought to strengthen their argument
by comparing their situation to that of other persecutees. “We unde[r]line
here,” they wrote, “that in all Germany foreign political prisoners have
much better conditions than ours till now. In several Teams they pro‹t
from nice private dwellings, frequently consisting of a few rooms for exam-
ple: Munich, Weiden, . . . etc.” They drew special attention to the situation
of Jews. In their locale, they noted, “the former political prisoners [of] Jew-
ish nationality live in a luxurious hotel in Weilheim and in a new hotel over
Starenberg [sic] lake, on the other hand the members of our section, as we
learned, have to be transferred to the lower barracs [sic].”11
Like Jewish survivors, displaced politicals viewed the American occu-
pation authorities and the international relief agencies as their benefactors
and protectors and thus also their primary interlocutors. However, they
also addressed themselves to the Germans. In the ‹rst months after the lib-
eration, DP politicals sought assistance from the German care centers. In
some cases, they found a warm welcome; more often, they were rebuffed.
As these informal structures were supplemented and supplanted by state
agencies, and as state agencies were given greater authority over persecutee
affairs in tandem with the transfer of authority, contact between DP polit-
icals and the German authorities increased. In Bavaria, the most impor-
tant German interlocutor for DP politicals was the State Commission for
Racial, Religious, and Political Persecutees headed by Philipp Auerbach.
Relations between DP politicals and Auerbach’s of‹ce were tense. Their
exchanges highlight the bitter con›ict that displaced politicals waged with
the German authorities during the late 1940s and early 1950s. They suggest
how the popular image of displaced politicals as criminals and pretenders
hampered their efforts to gain recognition and assistance from German
sources. They also suggest how antisemitism and anticommunism in-
formed the views of displaced politicals, transforming the struggle for
recognition and assistance into a competition with Jews and German
Communists.
The nature of contact and con›ict with the State Commission for
Racial, Religious, and Political Persecutees can be seen in the State Com-
mission’s correspondence with the Polish Association of Former Political
Prisoners of German Concentration Camps. In July 1946, the American
Military Government declared the Polish Association a subversive organi-
zation. In late 1947, the leaders of the Polish Association turned to Auer-
bach for authorization, having gained the impression that the matter really
lay in his hands. They stressed the importance of authorization “for legal
carrying on of the job of self-assistance.”12 They also petitioned him for
‹nancial support of persecutees who lived in camps. The requests of the
Polish Association were seconded by the International Union of Former
Political Prisoners, here calling itself the International Committee of Po-
litical Emigrants and DPs. Auerbach, however, was skeptical of both the
Polish Association and his authority to decide the issue. He questioned
whether the members of the Polish Association were “real victims of
nazism” and insisted that they submit to a screening by the State Commis-
sion.13 He also doubted whether he was responsible for assisting the Polish
Association ‹nancially, since some of its members lived in camps. He de-
cided to refer the matter back to Military Government.
The Polish Association and the International Committee responded
vehemently to Auerbach’s position. In a series of letters, they criticized him
for failing to support them and accused him of discriminating against for-
eigners in general and Poles in particular. They threatened “to undertake
steps with various authorities” in order to compel him to accept their de-
mands. They were especially galled by Auerbach’s insistence on a screening
run by the State Commission. “We are herewith asking you,” the Polish As-
sociation wrote, “whether you found irregularities of any kind in the activ-
ity of our checking commission? Did you ‹nd in our group any nazis, SS-
men, Mitläufer, collaborators, fascists, etc.?” They refused to submit to a
screening unless allowed to appoint their own delegates. A screening that
lacked this “democratic” element, they wrote, “would mean violation of
our national prestige and offence to the political aims, because of which
hundreds and thousands of Poles were brought in[to] German concentra-
tion camps, where they suffered worst damages after the Jews.”14
The Poles, then, viewed Auerbach’s position as an affront to their
honor as members of the Polish national resistance, the basis upon which
they built their claims to persecutee status. By questioning the validity of
their claims, Auerbach challenged this self-understanding. Indeed, he sug-
gested that, far from having been interned in concentration camps for par-
ticipating in the resistance, the Poles were criminals. This impression was
strengthened by Auerbach’s insistence that the members of the Polish As-
sociation submit to a commission-run screening, which traditionally
served to weed out criminals. By refusing to accept the conclusions of the
association’s own screening committee, Auerbach challenged the tradi-
tional authority of persecutee committees to vet their members and thus
control the process of moral and material evaluation.
The Polish Association and the International Committee hoped to
sway Auerbach in their favor by appealing to him as a fellow persecutee.
However, they found it dif‹cult to do so without revealing the limits of their
own concept of solidarity. “We are of the opinion, Sir,” the directors of the
Polish Association wrote, “that you have, in your quality as appointed State
Commissioner for racial, religious, and political persecutees, not only to
grant your help and assistance to the former concentration camp inmates of
Jewish or German nationality, but also to the various foreign groups with
whom you suffered in the concentration camps.”15 The International Com-
mittee went even further. “The of‹cials of the State Commission and vari-
ous Relief Centers,” it asserted, “are but Jews and German Comminists
[sic], who are carrying out arbitrary distribution policy. The DPs, in view of
the sacri‹ces of the Jewish people, grant the Jews privileges as to allocations
and compensation, but want to get just treatment.”16
Like the Poles in Murnau, then, the two committees discussed here in-
voked competition rather than solidarity with other survivors, especially
Jews. Indeed, despite expressions of sympathy for Jewish suffering—and
given that Auerbach was Jewish, one can surmise that they were largely
strategic—the committees read their situation through the lens of anti-
semitism. Combining antisemitism with anticommunism, they invoked the
specter of “Judeo-Bolshevism,” implying that the State Commission was
part of a Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy designed to prevent them from real-
izing their rights. Similar sentiments color the writings of Petro Mirchuk,
who claims to have known Auerbach from Auschwitz. While appealing to
Auerbach as a fellow victim, Mirchuk also accused him of reversing the
concentration camp hierarchy, from “Germans on the top and Jews on the
bottom to Jews on the top and Ukrainians on the bottom.”17 Here too it
was intimated that Jews were conspiring against displaced politicals.18
Needless to say, Auerbach did not take kindly to such accusations.
Taking the standpoint that antisemitism and antifascism were mutually ex-
clusive, he questioned the Polish Association’s claims to represent real per-
secutees. In a letter to the Of‹ce of Military Government for Bavaria, he
pointed to “the political and antisemitic turn” of the International Com-

mittee’s statement and referred to its authors as “partly fascist elements.”19
He did not, however, reject the Polish Association’s request for authoriza-
tion and, indeed, promised to consider it “objectively.”20 Military Govern-
ment of‹cials, for their part, viewed the petition of the Polish Association
in an entirely different light. Setting aside the substantive issues, they ar-
gued that the Polish Association had no legal basis for its activities since it
was a non-German organization.21 Although the leaders of the Polish As-
sociation continued to press their case with the Americans, they had little
success. Some months after its exchange with Auerbach, the Polish Associ-
ation was again declared a subversive organization, this time by the Army
Counter Intelligence Corps.22
From Assistance to Wiedergutmachung
While the efforts of displaced politicals were at ‹rst oriented toward secur-
ing recognition as persecutees and gaining immediate material assistance,
they viewed formal restitution or Wiedergutmachung as their ultimate goal.
This goal had been formulated even before the liberation. Indeed, it was
one of the key reasons why political prisoners organized after the war, and
was implicit in some of their earliest postliberation statements. For exam-
ple, many early petitions referred to assistance as something political pris-
oners “deserved” or were “due.” This perspective was typical of political
prisoners more generally. It was closely connected to their self-understand-
ing as active participants in the struggle against National Socialism. As
Otto Aster, the ‹rst Bavarian State Commissioner for Political Persecutees,
stated in 1946 with regard to German politicals, “The political victims of
persecution do not want gifts and welfare aid. They have speci‹c rights,
which they derive from their resistance against the Nazi regime and from
the sacri‹ces they made.”23 The progressive development of restitution leg-
islation, underwritten by the argument that the rehabilitation of the vic-
tims was an essential counterpart to denazi‹cation, helped sustain and
drive forward such demands. Displaced politicals issued critiques of exist-
ing legislative proposals and drafted alternative ones. They also pursued
their claims individually, through the courts. They were especially con-
cerned with gaining compensation, that is, restitution for personal dam-
ages (i.e., damages to body, health, and freedom). Property restitution was
a secondary concern.
As we have seen, numerous barriers were placed in the way of DP

claimants, ‹rst by the restitution laws themselves and then by the practices
of implementation and interpretation. Most foreign claimants were ex-
cluded from compensation by the argument that they were national perse-
cutees. These barriers surprised and angered DP politicals but did not dis-
suade them from pursuing their claims. Rather, they transformed the
search for restitution into a cause. They encouraged DP politicals to main-
tain and develop the committees they had established after the liberation.
They also encouraged them to focus on their experiences of internment
and persecution. They thus strengthened their identi‹cation as victims of
persecution. Indeed, by suggesting that their suffering at the hands of the
Germans had not yet ended, the experience of seeking compensation en-
couraged displaced politicals to view national martyrdom in a broader
temporal frame, as an event encompassing both the war years and the
postwar period.
The rhetorical framework that displaced politicals employed in mak-
ing their claims to restitution was, above all, moral. Restitution was pre-
sented as a moral obligation. In particular, it was presented as the moral
responsibility of “the German nation and government.”24 The emphasis
on German national responsibility was closely tied to an interpretation of
National Socialism as a chauvinist and imperialist form of German na-
tionalism. The German people, DP politicals argued, had been both the
means and ends of National Socialism. They were the means, because they
had consented to the National Socialist regime. According to Petro
Mirchuk, the German nation “summoned Hitler and his clique to power
by means of legal parliamentary elections, always gave him full support,
and up to the last moment praised every action of its Hitlerist government
without reservation.”25 (The fact that Hitler himself was not elected into
of‹ce was sidestepped.) They were the ends, because National Socialism
had acted in the name of the German people. As the Association of For-
eign Political Persecutees put it, “Under the leadership of the criminal Na-
tional Socialism, tremendous sufferings and damages and losses which can
never be compensated were in›icted, in the name of the German people,
upon the other European peoples.”26 A 1947 memorandum written by Ot-
mar Pirkmajer in the name of a multinational group of “homeless former
concentration camp prisoners residing in Germany” made a similar point.
“After all,” Pirkmajer argued, “National Socialism was at its base a move-
ment directed against all nations and intent upon the domination of the
world, which could only be conquered through the combined efforts of the
democratic peoples of the entire civilized world.”27 Unlike Mirchuk and

the Association of Foreign Political Persecutees, Pirkmajer thought it was
important to distinguish between war criminals and the rest of the Ger-
man population. But he also saw a practical reason for holding the entire
German nation accountable. In his words, “the national community
[Volksgemeinschaft] represented in the state may constitute a ‹nancially
stronger or indeed more easily accessible source [of restitution funds] than
the individual.”28
While nationalism was central to displaced politicals’ interpretation
of National Socialism, racism was marginal to it. To the extent that DP po-
liticals addressed the issue of racism, they focused on Nazi racial theory as
a whole. They said little about antisemitism or the persecution of Jews. For
example, Pirkmajer stated that restitution funds could be used to establish
associations for the bene‹t of an “injured race.”29 In this context, Jews
were but one of numerous races, though an especially injured one.
Not surprisingly, claims for restitution emphasized suffering rather
than heroism. This was the approach taken by Tadeusz Zgainski, a lawyer
and former of‹cer in the Polish Army who was also a leading activist in the
right-wing National Democratic Movement.30 Polish political prisoners,
Zgainski argued, had endured “unprecedented material, spiritual, and
physical sufferings,” “an ocean of cruelties.” He refrained from describing
these experiences in detail and suggested that they were in fact “unutter-
able.”31 Those who survived the camps, the Association of Foreign Politi-
cal Persecutees noted, had lost everything, “all of their worldly possession,
all of their health and vitality.”32 Although such descriptions suggest that
displaced politicals had a very broad conception of restitution, in practice,
they focused primarily on two issues, in their minds closely connected: per-
sonal damages and slave labor. Labor was an especially important theme.
As Tadeusz Zgainski noted in a memorandum on restitution legislation,
“concentration camp inmates were obliged to perform the hardest work,
without any payment, and had to endure terrible humiliations and suffer-
ings.”33 The issue of labor was also highlighted by the Gablingen section of
the Polish Association. In a letter about the discriminatory treatment of
displaced persons in Bavarian compensation legislation, the association
implored the American Military Government to ensure “that all ex-pris-
oners of German Concentration camps living in DP camps and are under
IRO protection, were paid the damages for their hard forced and bloody
work for all sufferings and undergone losses.”34 As Otmar Pirkmajer
stressed, the labor that political prisoners had been forced to perform was
not just a form of physical abuse: it represented mistreatment of the polit-

icals qua politicals.
The leadership of the German Reich and the dictatorial party clearly
endeavored to exploit to the limit the labor power of the prisoners in
order primarily to strengthen the German war potential. In this it was
not hindered by the fact that it was dealing with political prisoners,
who, according to international legal standards or prevailing stan-
dards of common decency, should not have been used for any kind of
forced labor and indeed had the right to an honorable detention (cus-
todia honesta).35
The emphasis on slave labor was thus closely related to an understanding

of the politicals as a special class of prisoners for whom labor was pro-
scribed. It highlighted the superior position that the political prisoners
were supposed to occupy in the Nazi concentrationary system.
Indeed, although claims for restitution necessarily privileged experi-
ences of suffering, displaced politicals were also at pains to demonstrate
that they were not merely victims, that as political prisoners they had made
an active contribution to the cause of defeating National Socialism. In
particular, they sought to portray themselves as participants in the Allied
military campaign. The emphasis on a military contribution can be read as
a response to the Allied discourse on persecution, which identi‹ed political
persecutees as individuals who had acted “in favour of ” the Allied cause.36
It can also be seen as a response to other postwar hierarchies of heroism.
In much of postwar Europe, military combatants were viewed as superior
to resistance ‹ghters, political prisoners, and other deportees.37 This hier-
archy ‹gured prominently in the DP context as well. As Janusz Nel
Siedlecki stressed in his memoir, “the proud and disdainful heroes of the
Armed Forces” stood head and shoulders above DPs, including the politi-
cals. The privileged position afforded to military combatants created a
kind of status anxiety among the politicals and inspired a compensatory
discourse that identi‹ed experiences in the concentration camps as equal
to experiences on the battle‹eld.
The central element in this compensatory discourse was the theme of
“spiritual” combat. Writing to the Of‹ce of Military Government for
Bavaria regarding restitution in 1946, for example, a group of Russian
refugees who had been interned in concentration camps identi‹ed them-
selves as “spiritual collaborators in favor of Allied Forces.”38 They were at
pains to suggest that their wartime activities, which they described, rather
vaguely, as propaganda, were aligned with Allied goals. The theme of spir-
itual collaboration was reiterated more forcefully by Otmar Pirkmajer. Na-
tional Socialism, Pirkmajer argued, was an ideological as well as military-
imperial project, one aimed at destroying civilization itself. This project
could not be conquered solely by military means. On the contrary, “an ar-
senal of spiritual weapons and an army of spiritual ‹ghters” were re-
quired. These ‹ghters were the privileged subjects of Pirkmajer’s proposal
for restitution.
The spiritual ‹ghters of National Socialism should at the least be seen

as fellow soldiers of the Second World War, who have furnished
countless proofs of their heroism and, through their horrendous
sacri‹ces, contributed in solidarity to the success of the war. It is more
than right that this solidarity ‹nd appropriate expression in liquidat-
ing the consequences of the war as well.39
Like the Russian refugees, Pirkmajer asserted the continuity between the
goals of the political prisoners and those of the Allies. As he put it, “The
political persecutees were principally ‹ghters in the service of the Allies,
for whose goals they fought in a self-sacri‹cing manner. They acted in the
spirit, often indeed on behalf of and on the issued instruction of the Allies,
who spurred them on to self-sacri‹ce and promised them full amends.”40
On the basis of this active contribution to the Allied cause, they were more
deserving of restitution than other victims. Although his plan covered var-
ious groups of persecutees, he insisted that political prisoners and their
surviving dependents be granted “special privileges.”41
If the responsibility for compensating the victims of National Social-
ism rested with the German people, then the failure to compensate these
victims suggested that postwar Germans had not freed themselves from
Nazi ideology. This being the case, DP politicals sought to make the reha-
bilitation and reconstruction of Germany dependent on restitution. Here,
too, the language of morality, with its implicit references to Allied state-
ments and agreements, was an important factor. Mirroring the tenets of
early Allied and American policy, displaced politicals identi‹ed rehabilita-
tion of the victims as an essential counterpart to denazi‹cation. “Atone-
ment and prompt restitution of the crimes committed by the National So-
cialism of the Third Reich,” Pirkmajer argued, “are the basis for the
moral-spiritual recovery and political-economic reordering of Germany
and as such form the preconditions for a secure and dependable peace
among nations.”42 Only restitution would demonstrate that Germany had
acquired a sense of justice and thus deserved to reenter the community of
civilized nations. To quote Pirkmajer again:
When we consider the issue from the moral perspective, we come to

the conclusion that the spiritual reconstruction of Germany can only
take place on the basis of a recognition of responsibility for the war
and if the sense of duty for compensating war damages becomes sec-
ond nature to the German people.43
The Association of Foreign Political Persecutees made a similar argument:

if Germany wished to regain its place among the civilized nations of the
world, the so-called Kulturvölker, it would have to demonstrate its commit-
ment to civilized laws.44
The failure to compensate foreign victims was especially objection-
able, for it demonstrated that the Germans had not overcome what DP po-
liticals considered the central element of National Socialist ideology,
namely, national chauvinism. They thus sought to make the rehabilitation
of Germany dependent on the restitution of foreigners, especially foreign
political prisoners. Writing to the Military Government of Bavaria “in the
name of the foreign ex-prisoners of concentration camps” in 1947, Tadeusz
Zgainski argued that the “pure national attitude” exhibited by Bavaria law-
makers in the sphere of restitution was “incompatible with the aim to build
a democratic and peace-loving Germany.”45 In a proposal submitted to
German and American authorities, he elaborated on this point.
The real and sincere will to reinsert new and peaceloving Germany
into the r[o]w of the nations of the world can best be realised before
the world and own conscience by returning to principles of justice.
One of the ‹rst and most fundamental demands of this justice is at
present to compensate as much as possible the unprecedented mater-
ial, spiritual, and physical sufferings which the persecutees endured
for political, racial, and religious reasons by [the] Nazi-system. These
indemnities for an ocean of cruelties and unjustices [sic] are not only
a demand of highest justice, but the question of honor of the German
people. . . . These principles would not be implemented if the justi‹ed
restitution were granted only to the own citizens and the victims of
the foreign nationalities were excluded.46
The Association of Foreign Political Persecutees echoed these sentiments.
[The foreign politicals] hope that the West German federal govern-
ment, by quickly enacting a just restitution law, which will not admit
any discrimination against the foreign victims of National Socialism,
will place in their hands the proof and the argument that the Nazi
spirit of intolerance and discrimination against foreigners is no longer
possible . . . in the new Germany.
“The issue of restitution of foreign victims of National Socialism,” the as-

sociation continued, “is a matter of German honor and of German stand-
ing before all the other peoples of the world.”47
Indeed, some DP politicals suggested that compensating foreigners
should take priority over compensating Germans. This was the position
taken by the Russian refugees referred to earlier, who argued that “we as
former political prisoners and foreigners are rather more entitled for com-
pensation of our losses than even the Germans themselves.”48 The Na-
tional Committees took a similar view, as did the Polish lawyer Tadeusz
Zgainski.49 Writing to the Military Government of Bavaria to protest the
national bias of Bavarian compensation legislation, he argued that such a
bias was not only “contrary to the principles of justice,” it also offended
displaced persons in their status as members of the Allied nations. “It is
not admissible,” he wrote, “that by this way the citizens of victorious pow-
ers would be discriminated [against] on behalf of German subjects.”50
In stressing Germany’s responsibility to compensate foreigners, DP
politicals were not thinking about all foreign victims or even all foreign po-
litical prisoners. They wanted to emphasize the predicament of displaced
foreigners like themselves. As discussed in chapter 2, the various restitution
plans put forward on the Land and zone level were oriented toward com-
pensating German persecutees, even though German nationality was not
an explicit criterion of eligibility. The restitution of non-German persecu-
tees was seen as an issue for states to resolve among themselves. Although
this interpretation of restitution discriminated against all foreign
claimants, displaced persons were doubly disadvantaged, since they lacked
state protection and thus could not bene‹t from reparations agreements.
As a result, DP politicals were especially anxious to establish a legal basis
for the claims of stateless persons. In some cases, they suggested that Ger-
many was directly responsible for their statelessness. In the words of the
Association of Foreign Political Persecutees, “The Second World War un-
leashed by National Socialism created in its wake a new political situation

in the world, which today makes it impossible for the foreign former polit-
ical victims of persecution to return to their homes.”51 However, regardless
of whether they believed that Germany was directly responsible for mak-
ing them stateless, displaced politicals agreed that Germany should take
special steps to compensate them because their statelessness made them es-
pecially vulnerable. As Zgainski noted, “on account of the fact that they
were pulled out from their home and deprived of their habitual earning of
living, they are in comparison with the German persecutees in [an] extra-
ordinary dif‹cult situation which requires an immediate and considerable
aid.”52 Restitution, the Association of Foreign Political Persecutees stated
plainly, “is and remains the only means by which [the foreign political per-
secutees] can reestablish themselves.”53
National and International Frameworks of Restitution
How, then, could or should the claims of foreign political prisoners, espe-
cially displaced politicals, be addressed? Were the existing and anticipated
German laws adequate to the task? Or was a new framework for restitution
required? Most displaced persons accepted a German national framework
for restitution because they believed in the concepts of collective guilt and
responsibility. Many of them also believed that German laws already pro-
vided a suitable framework for addressing their claims. The Association of
Foreign Political Persecutees put it this way, referring to their expectations
for a “full moral restitution.”
We expected this restitution all the more because German laws, just as
much as those of other civilized peoples, provide for compensation for
work performed, for stolen possessions, as well as for the wrongful de-
privation of liberty, and because restitution of foreign victims of Na-
tional Socialism constitutes an international obligation of the new
German state and the entire German people. It was especially to be
expected on the basis of humanitarian sentiments.54
Similarly, Otmar Pirkmajer believed that German law provided an ade-

quate basis for addressing at least some claims, in particular those relating
to work. In his opinion, former political prisoners should not have to
launch special criminal proceedings to gain compensation for their labor,

as such compensation represented “the simple execution of a civic duty.”55
Where German laws had fallen short, many displaced persons be-
lieved they could be amended to eliminate discriminatory clauses or
clari‹ed to ensure that non-Germans were treated equally. For example,
the Association of Foreign Political Persecutees focused its efforts on hav-
ing the General Claims Law revised in order to eliminate discriminatory
provisions. In response, German of‹cials suggested that displaced persons
were simply not satis‹ed with the rights already guaranteed to them under
the law and wanted “still more rights to restitution in the form of [mone-
tary] compensation,” which West Germany’s current ‹nancial situation did
not permit.56 The association’s members took offense at such accusations.
“Our demand,” the League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners wrote to
‹nance minister Fritz Schäffer, “does not concern a further claim that ex-
tends beyond the scope of the Law, but rather the original restitution
claims, which must be settled on the federal level through the passage of a
new law.”57
While most DP politicals focused on gaining restitution directly from
the German government, some concluded that a national framework was
inadequate from both a legal and a political standpoint. Rather, an inter-
national framework was needed. One individual who came to this conclu-
sion was Otmar Pirkmajer. In a 1947 memorandum written on behalf of
Polish, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and other eastern European “homeless
former concentration camp prisoners residing in Germany,” he sought to
formulate an alternative path to restitution. He viewed his proposal as a
starting point for a broader project of internationalization, one that
re›ected his belief that state-centered norms and institutions were inade-
quate to the problems of the twentieth century, especially the problem of
statelessness.
Pirkmajer’s main reference point was the history of restitution after
the First World War. In the ‹rst postwar period, he noted, responsibility
for compensating private persons had been assigned to individual states.
However, since the laws passed by these states tended to mirror the “polit-
ical tendencies” of the governments in power, “individuals who were un-
doubtedly entitled [to compensation] could be robbed of their right. (Thus
for example in Italy emigrants were excluded from compensation for war
damages after the First World War.)”58 Such historical precedents, Pirk-
majer argued, not only suggested the general susceptibility of law to poli-
tics, they also drew attention to the particular vulnerability of individuals

who could not base their claims to restitution on membership in a given
state. They thus demonstrated the need for an international framework for
restitution.
The war compensation of the former political prisoners should be set-

tled, not through national laws, but rather only through international
norms uniformly applied to all states coming under consideration, so
that all claims can be decided according to the same criteria and so
that all entitled persons will have their rights satis‹ed to the full ex-
tent. One has to keep in mind that after the conclusion of the peace
treaties, extensive changes will occur as regards citizenship. In the fu-
ture there will be numerous apoliticals (people without any citizen-
ship). Hence in many cases the legitimately entitled former political
prisoners would in practice be deprived of their rights if they were de-
pendent on national laws.59
For Pirkmajer, then, an international system for restitution represented a

solution to the problem of national politics. It would transcend both the
“political tendencies” of individual governments and the tendency of indi-
vidual states to privilege their own members. Unlike national governments,
it would therefore be capable of rendering true justice.
In thinking about a new framework for restitution, Pirkmajer was in-
spired by the postwar resurgence of internationalism. He took particular
inspiration from the International Military Tribunal (IMT), which was be-
ginning its work in Nuremberg when he ‹rst drafted his proposal. In both
its formal organization and its legal pronouncements, the IMT represented
a new way of thinking about war crimes. Formally, it suggested that the re-
sponsibility for trying war criminals rested with the international commu-
nity rather than individual states. Substantively, it rearticulated the con-
ventional legal relationship between state sovereignty and individual
rights, placing signi‹cant limits on the former while extending the latter,
both within an international framework. It drew special attention to Nazi
occupation policies and to the concentration camps.
In his proposal, Pirkmajer sought to make the tribunal relevant to the
debate over restitution. Most important, he believed that the work of the
IMT provided the basis for a new set of norms for restitution. He focused
in particular on the London Charter, the IMT’s founding document. Is-
sued in August 1945, it set forth the main charges against the accused:
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.60 For Pirk-
majer, it represented a clear recognition of the injustices perpetrated by the
Nazi regime. He suggested that the claims of former political prisoners
could be adjudicated according to its de‹nitions of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. For example, since the tribunal identi‹ed extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against the
civilian population as crimes against humanity, individuals who had been
subjected to such treatment had a right to restitution. Pirkmajer conceded
that the criteria might need to be narrowed.61 Still, the general value of
such an approach was that it emphasized the actions of the perpetrators
rather than the victims.62 Hence the qualities of the victims, including their
citizenship status, would not play a de‹nitive role in deciding eligibility.
To complement the new set of international norms for restitution,
Pirkmajer envisioned the creation of a new international institution, an
“international of‹ce,” modeled on the IMT, that would evaluate restitution
claims and oversee a special international reparations fund. This of‹ce
would recognize stateless political persecutees as a legitimate interest
group. “The resolution of the restitution question,” as Pirkmajer stated,
“should take place in consultation with an appropriately-constituted inter-
est group of foreign former political persecutees, in which the persecutees
rendered state- and homeless by the war will also be represented.”63 The
representational problem posed by statelessness was thus to be resolved by
making statelessness itself a representative category, a presence rather than
an absence. This development would be underwritten by the international
community.64
Pirkmajer was not the only one to propose an international solution.
In a 1949 memorandum drafted in response to the General Claims Law
and addressed to the Of‹ce of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany,
the Representatives of National Committees of DP’s and Refugees in Ger-
many, an umbrella group formed under IRO auspices, echoed many of
Pirkmajer’s points, though their proposal was overall more modest. Pirk-
majer himself was the coordinator of the representatives and thus may well
have been involved in drafting the memorandum. The representatives ar-
gued that the restitution claims of displaced foreigners should be consid-
ered an international issue. They cited numerous international decisions in
support of their position: the International Military Tribunal had estab-
lished the criminality of the acts committed against deported foreigners;
the United Nations had identi‹ed the DP problem as an international one;
and Allied DP policy placed displaced persons outside the jurisdiction of
German authorities. Moreover, they noted, the General Claims Law con-
tradicted the basic legal principle of nemo judex in causa sua (no one may
be a judge in his own cause), because it gave German authorities the exclu-
sive right to decide cases in which the German government itself stood ac-
cused of committing crimes. They called on the High Commissioner to use
his “statutory power of control” to ensure that the German authorities ac-
knowledged the persecutee status of displaced persons and their claims
under the new law. They also called on him to create international norms
and institutions to supplement the German ones and to set up an interna-
tional fund to cover claims not acknowledged by the General Claims
Law.65
Disillusioned with how German politicians, lawmakers, and judges
handled the restitution claims of foreigners, the Ukrainian political pris-
oner Petro Mirchuk also came to see an international solution as the only
viable one. Mirchuk, a lawyer by training, represented Ukrainian politicals
before the German courts. The decisions of the International Military Tri-
bunal, he says, were an important part of his legal argument, for in these
decisions, “the persecutions [represented by] the ‘eastern European’ depor-
tations to the concentration camps are clearly classi‹ed as Nazi crimes.”66
He notes that DP politicals demanded that their claims be turned over to
an international organization, citing the principle of nemo judex in causa
sua.67 Unlike Pirkmajer, however, Mirchuk did not put forward a full-
›edged proposal for internationalizing restitution. A committed national-
ist, he viewed the case of political prisoners–turned–displaced persons as
an exception to the still valid rule of interstate relations rather than a start-
ing point for rethinking these relations themselves.
The Failure of Postwar Claims
DP politicals went to great lengths to gain recognition, assistance, and

restitution. Their efforts, carried out over a span of many years, reinforced
their identity as political prisoners and heightened their sense of victimiza-
tion. Ultimately, however, they had little success with their claims. In par-
ticular, few were able to gain restitution.
A number of scholars have noted this failure. While stressing the for-
midable resistance of the German authorities to including displaced persons
in restitution schemes, they have also suggested that displaced persons failed
to organize an adequate counteroffensive. Laszlo Schirilla, a Hungarian

émigré lawyer who worked on behalf of DP claimants, states that although
the persecutee committees were preoccupied with the question of restitution
from the very beginning, they mounted only “occasional, in themselves in-
suf‹ciently intense actions,” which were not successful in “pushing through”
German resistance.68 Echoing Schirilla, Ulrich Herbert notes that displaced
persons had “no effective interest group.”69 More neutrally, Constantin
Goschler notes that associations of non-Jewish foreigners played “a rather
marginal role” in representing the interests of persecutees.70
Such comments suggest that the failure to create an effective interest
group was an internal one. This is certainly true. In order to lobby the au-
thorities effectively, it was essential for displaced politicals to organize
across political and national lines, as no group individually constituted a
signi‹cant force, and even taken together their numbers were limited—in
1947, the DP persecutee committees in Germany probably had no more
than 18,000 members, compared to about 250,000 in the German persecu-
tee organization VVN.71 Despite a shared history of internment, despite
broad agreement on substantive issues such as the nature of Nazi crimes
and collective German responsibility, and ‹nally, despite the sense of a
common postwar fate, displaced politicals failed to create a strong united
front. Although they frequently invoked international solidarity, their ef-
forts to organize internationally were fragmentary and inconsistent. The
same con›icts that marked other DP efforts at internationalism were evi-
dent here. The con›ict between Polish and Ukrainian DPs was again espe-
cially signi‹cant. During the interwar period, Poles and Ukrainians had
been locked in a “vicious circle of resistance and repression,” which esca-
lated into a full-›edged violent con›ict during the war years and continued
into the postwar period.72 Polish and Ukrainian politicals were witnesses
to and often participants in these events. The concentration camp experi-
ence did not necessarily bring them closer together, as the hierarchical
structure of the prisoners’ community tended to exacerbate national
con›icts. In his memoirs, Petro Mirchuk repeatedly draws attention to
what he sees as the per‹dious behavior of the Polish prisoners in
Auschwitz, who occupied the top of the prisoner hierarchy. Leaning on the
arguments put forward by other groups of prisoners, he notes that “im-
partial foreigners, like the French, Belgians, etc., con‹rmed that Polish
prisoners produced the largest percentage of sadists.”73 For their part, Pol-
ish prisoners viewed Ukrainians in the camps with suspicion and disdain;
they also lacked incentives to collaborate with Ukrainians, since the latter
were further down the camp hierarchy.74
The international committees created after the war were only fragile
containers for such antagonisms. This comes through clearly in the history
of the Central International Union of Political Prisoners, created under
the auspices of the League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners. As the league
reported in 1946, the earliest efforts to create an international prisoners’
committee had failed due to what it called the “intransigent attitude of one
Polish fraction towards Ukrainians and Belorussians.”75 At issue was a dif-
ference of opinion about how to de‹ne the nation. While the Poles sup-
ported a state-national de‹nition, the Ukrainians insisted on an ethnona-
tional one. This con›ict was probably more about strategy than ‹rst
principles: for each group, the goal was to claim as much territory for the
nation as possible. Thus while the Poles were well served by a state-national
de‹nition, for Ukrainians the Polish position was utterly unacceptable, as
it implied that territories it viewed as Ukrainian were part of the Polish
state. With such con›icts in the background, it took months to organize an
international committee that included both Ukrainians and Poles.
However, the failure of DP politicals cannot be ascribed solely to their
weak internal solidarity, important as this was. For the effectiveness of any
DP effort also depended on external support. In particular, it depended on
support from the main political actors in postwar Germany, the Allied
powers and the nascent German authorities. Such support was limited.
Certainly, in the American zone, the Military Government saw it as its re-
sponsibility to represent the interests of persecuted displaced persons, and
its efforts were essential in getting displaced persons included in restitution
laws, notably the General Claims Law. However, the American occupation
authorities did not allow displaced persons to represent themselves. In-
deed, as we have seen, many organizations were banned by the occupation
authorities. The nascent German authorities, on the other hand, did not
feel responsible for displaced persons, whom they viewed as an unwelcome
and unjusti‹ed burden. Of course, DP politicals did not help their cause by
invoking competition with Jewish, German, and Communist persecutees.
This signi‹cantly harmed the only government agency in Bavaria that rep-
resented the interests of persecutees, namely, the State Commission for
Racial, Religious, and Political Persecutees. The antisemitic, anti-German,
and anticommunist statements of displaced politicals con‹rmed the belief
that Polish and Ukrainian politicals were collaborators and fascists. Thus
when it came to crafting restitution legislation, DP politicals did not enjoy
the kind of support from German sources that the German persecutee-
based VVN did.76
Only the IRO, and to some extent the UNHCR, attempted to include
displaced persons in the process of formulating and evaluating restitution
legislation. The legal staff of the IRO, which included DP lawyers, tracked
the development of restitution laws and sought to ensure that they were
not discriminatory.77 The IRO hosted conferences on restitution, which
brought together voluntary agencies and DP committees, including groups
representing Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Jews.78 It supported the
memorandum on restitution prepared by the Representatives of National
Committees of DP’s and Refugees in Germany. Indeed, it submitted the
memorandum to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. Through such
initiatives, the views of DP politicals gained greater currency. The memo-
randum of the national committees, an IRO of‹cial reported in early 1950,
had generated “a certain new interest” among HICOG of‹cials as to
whether the General Claims Law was discriminatory.79 However, this did
not lead to any serious reappraisal of the law.
These failures led to a more desperate attitude on the part of some DP
politicals. Thus in late 1950, after failing to convince the West German gov-
ernment that the laws on restitution were discriminatory, the League of
Ukrainian Political Prisoners turned to threats. In a letter to justice minis-
ter Thomas Dehler, the league accused the government of wanting “to de-
lay granting restitution until all the foreign political prisoners have died.”
It claimed that it was “preparing actions that will seriously complicate the
international diplomatic-political position of the West German govern-
ment.”80 These actions included an “honor guard” (Ehrenwache) in con-
centration camp uniforms in front of newly opened West German con-
sulates in the West and direct appeals to western governments and the
United Nations.
As far as can be determined, these actions were never carried out.
However, their formulation is suggestive. Despite the development of a
West German state, former political prisoners continued to address them-
selves primarily to the western countries that had participated in the
wartime alliance, especially the United States. These countries were seen as
the guarantors of their right to restitution, especially through the pressure
they could bring to bear on the new West German state. West Germany it-
self was viewed as an unwelcome creation whose fragility could be ex-
ploited—or so they hoped. Displaced politicals continued to believe that
their status as survivors, symbolized by the concentration camp uniform,
endowed them with moral authority. Yet the threat to wear the uniform
also reveals their sense of helplessness in the restitution debate and the
continuing resonance of a victim identity. Bridging wartime and postwar
eras, it suggests they viewed their recent encounters with the western Ger-
man authorities as the continuation of their wartime encounters with the
Nazis, the latest chapter in a longer history of martyrdom at the hands of
the Germans.
Conclusion
Most displaced persons viewed their time in Germany as a waiting period.

They viewed Germany itself as a temporary abode, a way station between
past and future. Those who could leave were only too happy to do so. The
majority had in any case lived in relative isolation from the rest of the pop-
ulation, in the extraterritorial setting of the DP camps. However, even those
who had lived among Germans were usually not attached to their sur-
roundings. At most, perhaps, they had fond memories of Bavaria’s alpine
landscape. Ironically, however, Germany was an important site for the de-
velopment of durable identi‹cations. It was in the context of the DP camps
and communities that displaced eastern Europeans ‹rst sought to make
sense of the war years and to re›ect upon how the war had transformed
their place in the world. It was there that they developed political commu-
nities that re›ected their distinct understandings of the “DP problem.”
In deciding whether or not to return home, displaced persons weighed
many factors—what had happened to their family and friends, what the
economic situation at home looked like, whether they were healthy enough
to live on their own. However, the “political explanation” emerged as the
dominant explanation for opposition to repatriation. This explanation
took on different forms among different groups. Or rather, the forms this
explanation took on determined the parameters of group belonging. Most
groups were de‹ned in the ‹rst instance by national identi‹cations, but
they also had distinct political-ideological markers. Among Jewish DPs,
the dominant political orientation was de‹ned by a rejection of diaspora
life and an embrace of Zionism. The Holocaust was identi‹ed as the cul-
mination of a longer history of antisemitic persecution and murder in Eu-
rope. Although many Jewish DPs had experienced Soviet rule during the
war—indeed, the majority were repatriates from the Soviet Union—the
history and future of Soviet communism in eastern Europe played little
role in their self-understanding. Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian DP com-
267
munities, on the other hand, took shape around past experiences of “Bol-
shevik” rule and fears of returning to Soviet- or communist-dominated
countries. Anticommunism emerged as the dominant political orientation.
The history of National Socialism did not of course disappear. A small
group of Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians identi‹ed strongly as political
victims of Nazi persecution. In general, however, the threat of Soviet com-
munism loomed larger than the legacy of National Socialism.
Anticommunism and antifascism not only de‹ned the boundaries of
national communities, they also served as the basis for cross-national
identi‹cations. Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian DPs created tense but
nonetheless important “international” alliances around both the legacy of
Nazism and the threat of communism. Signi‹cantly, however, Jewish DPs
were not a party to these alliances. The common experience of displace-
ment in postwar Germany, with its uniform regimen of “care and control,”
did not bring Jewish and non-Jewish eastern Europeans closer together.
For Jewish DPs, who had experienced the indifference and brutality of
their eastern European neighbors ‹rsthand, Polish, Ukrainian, and Russ-
ian DPs were not fellow victims of persecution but rather persecutors. For
Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian DPs, on the other hand, Jews were fellow
victims of persecution but also competitors for scarce resources. Of course,
not all interactions were framed by these constructions. In particular, Pol-
ish Jews and Polish politicals sometimes worked together. Overall, how-
ever, persecution per se was not a source of solidarity.1
Despite these con›icts, similar forces shaped how displaced persons
came to see themselves. In the ‹rst place, their identi‹cations were power-
fully shaped by the conditions of displacement, which were in turn shaped
by Germany’s status as a defeated and occupied nation. In Bavaria, the
policies and practices of the American occupation forces, the intergovern-
mental relief agencies, and the nascent German authorities interacted to
shape the lives of displaced persons, with the German factor becoming in-
creasingly more important as time went on. Although U.S. of‹cials pro-
hibited displaced persons from engaging in politics, they also provided
them with greater moral and material support than their British or French
counterparts. Together with UNRRA and later the IRO, they also pro-
moted a model of active welfare. This made it possible for displaced per-
sons to develop a lively associational life. During the ‹rst few years of the
postwar period, American of‹cials granted displaced persons and persecu-
tees special privileges vis-à-vis the general German population; they also
pressured the German authorities to initiate restitution. This encouraged
Conclusion 269
displaced persons to organize around the issue of Nazi persecution. After

1947, U.S. commitment to victims of National Socialism weakened.
“Reeducation for humanism and against antisemitism” was increasingly
replaced by “reeducation for integration into the West and anticommu-
nism.”2 Victims of National Socialism were increasingly obliged to address
themselves to the German authorities. While there were some strong Ger-
man voices for restitution, most German of‹cials, and the German public
more generally, viewed displaced persons as an unwelcome and unwar-
ranted drain on public funds, and even those who pushed for restitution
were often of two minds about DPs. Simultaneously, the change in politi-
cal climate opened up opportunities for anticommunist activism. Previ-
ously discouraged, anticommunist DPs now felt empowered to express
their views openly and even to demonstrate. Although German cold-war-
riors and the broader German public demonstrated little interest in what
anticommunist DPs were doing, Germany’s status as a key site of the Cold
War encouraged anticommunist politics.
While the postwar context played an important role in shaping dis-
placed communities, these communities were also the product of older his-
tories. They re›ected the political self-consciousness that many Poles,
Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews had developed during the interwar and
war years, in the context of discrimination, persecution, resistance, and
collaboration. The meanings that displaced persons assigned to their
wartime experiences and the hopes they harbored for the future often fol-
lowed the outlines of preexisting political ideologies. The nationalist mo-
bilizations of the youth of eastern Europe during the 1930s and early 1940s
turn out to be especially important. In some cases, inherited political ide-
ologies were signi‹cantly reinterpreted in light of wartime events, as was
the case with DP Zionism. In others, they were only modestly adapted to
new historical realities, as was especially the case with Ukrainian and Russ-
ian anticommunism.
The DP era of‹cially ended in 1951, when those displaced persons who
remained in Germany were of‹cially transformed into “homeless foreign-
ers.” The administrative regime of “care and control” constructed by the
Allies was slowly dismantled. The network of DP camps administered by
‹rst UNRRA and then the IRO passed into German hands. The process of
camp consolidation and closure initiated by the IRO continued during the
1950s, with some DP camps slowly becoming more generic “foreigner”
camps designed to accommodate new groups of refugees.
The political identi‹cations that displaced persons developed in Ger-
many between 1945 and 1951 continued to inform how they understood
themselves well beyond that point, moving with them to sites of emigra-
tion such as the United States, Canada, and Israel or, indeed, remaining
with them in Germany. However, the extent to which these identi‹cations
continued to de‹ne larger communities differed quite markedly. Research
on this subject is just beginning, thus I can only offer tentative conclusions.
In some cases, displaced persons quickly revived their activities and
signi‹cantly transformed the cultural and political character of the ethnic
communities they joined in their new homes. This was true of Polish and
Ukrainian DPs who emigrated to the United States and Canada.3 Anti-
communist organizations like the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations also
maintained their activities, establishing a strong presence in the United
States and Canada in the 1950s. The situation was different for Jewish DPs
and for the small number of non-Jews who de‹ned themselves against Na-
tional Socialism. The leading Jewish DP associations in Germany, com-
mitted to their own liquidation, folded at the end of the 1940s.4 Both in Is-
rael and in the United States, Jewish survivors were discouraged from
talking about their wartime experiences, which did not ‹t into the domi-
nant national narratives.5 Polish and Ukrainian politicals maintained their
organizations for many decades, but their activities decreased dramatically
over the course of the 1950s. Their distinctive vision of the war years re-
mained marginal to the self-understanding of their respective national
communities.
Displaced persons did not see themselves as subjects of German his-
tory, nor did most Germans see them that way. Nonetheless, they shaped
postwar Germany in subtle but signi‹cant ways. Their efforts to highlight
both the crimes of National Socialism and the dangers of Soviet commu-
nism helped de‹ne the shifting cultural and political landscape of the early
postwar period. To be sure, displaced eastern Europeans did not occupy
the foreground of either antifascist or anticommunist politics in Germany.
Nonetheless, they shaped how the public understood both Nazism and
communism. Displaced Jewish and non-Jewish survivors persistently drew
attention to German wartime criminality, demanding both restitution and
a sweeping political reorientation. Their presence—most strongly asserted
by Jewish DPs—uncomfortably reminded Germans of the imperial and
genocidal intentions of the Nazi regime. The activities of anticommunist
DPs also made an impact. The center of the anticommunist political stage
was clearly occupied by German refugees and expellees. However, the pol-
itics of displaced eastern Europeans ampli‹ed the perceived dangers of
Conclusion 271
communism. Their activism on German soil—the product both of a re-

fusal to return home and, more signi‹cantly, of ›ight—shaped the growing
perception that Germany stood on the front lines of the Cold War. This
was of course a dangerous place to be. The demonstrative politics of anti-
communist DPs thus met with an ambivalent response. Sympathy for the
perspective of displaced eastern Europeans was countered by concern
about foreigners “meddling” in German politics. This concern in turn fed
the long-standing desire to see the DP problem “resolved.”
The history of displaced persons in Germany thus offers an impor-
tant perspective on the postwar period, illuminating how German and
eastern European histories crossed paths in the ruins of the Reich. This
history was itself the product of earlier encounters between Germans and
eastern Europeans. Nazi labor and population policies were responsible
for displacing millions of eastern Europeans into Germany, while the
geopolitical transformations that followed the collapse of the Nazi empire
in Europe displaced millions more. Displaced persons—like Germans ex-
pelled from eastern Europe—represented the human remnants of these
momentous upheavals. The history they made in Germany was powerfully
shaped by what they found there—a defeated nation whose future as a
state was up for grabs.
Notes
NOTE ON SOURCES
Epigraph is from Postal Indiscretions: The Correspondence of Tadeusz Borowski,

ed. Tadeusz Drewnowski, trans. Alicia Nitecki (Evanston: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 2007), 107.
INTRODUCTION
1. Tadeusz Borowski, “The January Offensive,” in This Way for the Gas, Ladies
and Gentlemen, and Other Stories, trans. Barbara Vedder (London: Jonathan Cape,
1967), 164.
2. Ibid., 165.
3. Ibid., 166.
4. Ibid., 167.
5. Eugene Kulischer, Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes,
1917–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), 305.
6. Ibid., 189–90.
7. Ulrich Herbert, “Nicht entschädigungsfähig?” in Arbeit, Volkstum, Weltan-
schauung. Über Fremde und Deutsche im 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Fi-
scher, 1995), 157–58.
8. Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter zum Heimatlosen Ausländer.
Die Displaced Persons in Westdeutschland 1945–1951 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und
Ruprecht, 1985), 82–84.
9. Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 224.
10. Pieter Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and Na-
tional Recovery in Western Europe, 1945–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), 268.
11. This argument has been formulated most eloquently by Liisa Malkki, who
argues in her study of Hutu refugees that those who lived in a camp developed a
“mythico-historical” concept of Hutuness that did not exist among city refugees.
See Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology
among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
For critiques of Malkki that question this sharp distinction, see Marc Sommers,
273
274 Notes to Pages 5–7
Fear in Bongoland: Burundi Refugees in Urban Tanzania (New York: Berghahn

Books, 2001), 42–49; Gaim Kibreab, “Revisiting the Debate on People, Place, Iden-
tity, and Displacement,” Journal of Refugee Studies 12, no. 4 (1999). Also interest-
ing in this context is Randa Farah, “Palestinian Refugee Camps: Reinscribing and
Contesting Memory and Space,” in Isolation: Places and Practices of Exclusion, ed.
Carolyn Strange and Alison Bashford (London: Routledge, 2003).
12. On the place of the DP camps in the history of the refugee camp, see Liisa
Malkki, “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the National Order of
Things,” Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995).
13. Frank Stern, “The Historic Triangle: Occupiers, Germans, and Jews in Post-
war Germany,” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 19 (1990).
14. Gerard Daniel Cohen, “Naissance d’une nation: les personnes déplacées de
l’après-guerre, 1945–1951,” Genèses 38 (March 2000); Cohen, “The Politics of
Recognition: Jewish Refugees in Relief Policies and Human Rights Debates,
1945–1950,” Immigrants and Minorities 24, no. 2 (July 2006).
15. Tony Judt, “The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar
Europe,” in The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath,
ed. István Deák, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000), 294.
16. General studies include Mark Wyman, DP: Europe’s Displaced Persons,
1945–1951 (Philadelphia and London: Balch Institute Press and Associated Univer-
sity Press, 1989); Stanislaus Stepien, Der alteingesessene Fremde. Ehemalige
Zwangsarbeiter in Westdeutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1989).
17. Key early studies are Koppel Pinson, “Jewish Life in Liberated Germany,”
Jewish Social Studies 9, no. 2 (April 1947), and Leo W. Schwarz, The Redeemers: A
Saga of the Years 1945–1952 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953); Yehuda
Bauer, “The Initial Organization of the Holocaust Survivors in Bavaria,” Yad
Vashem Studies 8 (1970). More recent works in English and German include Juliane
Wetzel, Jüdisches Leben in München 1945–1951. Durchgangsstation oder Wiederauf-
bau? (Munich: Kommissionsverlag UNI-Druck, 1987); Wetzel, “‘Mir szeinen doh.’
München und Umgebung als Zu›ucht von Überlebenden des Holocaust
1945–1948, in Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Um-
bruchs in Deutschland, ed. Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, and Hans
Woller (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1988); Yisrael Gutman and Avital Saf, eds.,
She’erit Hapletah, 1944–1948: Rehabilitation and Political Struggle. Proceedings of
the Sixth Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, Jerusalem, October 1985
(Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990); Angelika Königseder and Juliane Wetzel, Lebens-
mut im Wartesaal: Die jüdischen DPs (Displaced Persons) im Nachkriegsdeutsch-
land (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1994); Fritz Bauer Institut, ed., Überlebt und un-
terwegs: jüdische Displaced Persons im Nachkriegsdeutschland (Frankfurt am Main:
Campus, 1997); Angelika Königseder, Flucht nach Berlin: jüdische Displaced Per-
sons 1945–1948 (Berlin: Metropol, 1998); Angelika Eder, Flüchtige Heimat: Jüdische
displaced Persons in Landsberg am Lech 1945 bis 1950 (Munich: Kommissionsverlag
UNI-Druck, 1998); Menachem Z. Rosenhaft, ed., Life Reborn: Jewish Displaced
Persons, 1945–1951, Conference Proceedings, Washington, DC, 14–17 January 2000
(Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2001); Zeev W.
Notes to Page 7 275
Mankowitz, Life between Memory and Hope: The Survivors of the Holocaust in Oc-
cupied Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Hagit Lavsky,
New Beginnings: Holocaust Survivors in Bergen-Belsen and the British Zone in Ger-
many, 1945–1950 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2002); Avinoam J. Patt,
“Finding Home and Homeland: Jewish DP Youth and Zionism in the Aftermath
of the Holocaust” (PhD diss., New York University, 2005); Tamar Lewinsky, Dis-
placed Poets. Jiddische Schriftsteller im Nachkriegsdeutschland, 1945–1951 (Göttin-
gen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2008).
18. Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge: Antisemitism and
Philosemitism in Postwar Germany, trans. William Templer (Oxford: Pergamon
Press, 1992); Michael Brenner, After the Holocaust: Rebuilding Jewish Lives in Post-
war Germany, trans. Barbara Harshav (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1997); Anthony Kauders, Democratization and the Jews: Munich, 1945–1965 (Lin-
coln: University of Nebraska Press/Vidal Sassoon International Center for the
Study of Antisemitism, 2004); Eva Kolinsky, After the Holocaust: Jewish Survivors
in Germany after 1945 (London: Pimlico, 2004); Jay Howard Geller, Jews in Post-
Holocaust Germany, 1945–1953 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005);
Susanne Schönborn, ed., Zwischen Erinnerung und Neubeginn. Zur deutsch-jüdis-
chen Geschichte nach 1945 (Munich: Martin Meidenbauer, 2006); Atina Gross-
mann, Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
19. On Polish DPs, see Czeslaw Luczak, Polacy w okupowanych Niemczech
1945–1949 (Poznan: Pracownia Serwisu Oprogramowania, 1993); Anna Dorota
Kirchmann, “‘They Are Coming for Freedom, Not Dollars’: Political Refugees
and Transformations of Ethnic Identity within Polish American Community after
World War II” (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 1997); Anna D. Jaroszynska-
Kirchmann, The Exile Mission: The Polish Political Diaspora and Polish Americans,
1939–1956 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004). On Ukrainian DPs, see Wsevolod
W. Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus, eds., The Refugee Experience: Ukrai-
nian Displaced Persons after World War II (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of
Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1992); Ekkehard Völkl, “Ukrainische
Emigration in Bayern 1945–1949,” in Bayern und Osteuropa: Aus der Geschichte der
Beziehungen Bayerns, Frankens und Schwabens mit Rußland, der Ukraine und
Weißrußland, ed. Hermann Beyer-Thoma (Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 2000);
Volodymyr Kulyk, “The Role of Discourse in the Construction of an Emigré Com-
munity: Ukrainian Displaced Persons in Germany and Austria after the Second
World War,” in European Encounters: Migrants, Migration, and European Societies
since 1945, ed. Rainer Ohliger, Karen Schönwälder, and Triada‹los Triada‹lopou-
los. Research in Migration and Ethnic Relations Series (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003);
Julia Lalande, “‘Building a Home Abroad’: A Comparative Study of Ukrainian
Migration, Immigration Policy, and Diaspora Formation in Canada and Germany
after the Second World War” (PhD diss., University of Hamburg, 2006). On Rus-
sian DPs, see V. N. Zemskov, “Rozhdenie ‘vtoroi emigratsii’ 1944–1952,” Sotsio-
logicheskie issledovaniia 4 (1991); Zemskov, “Repatriatsiia sovetskikh grazhdan i
ikh dal’neishaia sud’ba (1944–1956 rr.),” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia 6 (1995);
Anne Kuhlmann-Smirnov, “‘Stiller als Wasser, tiefer als Gras,’ Zur Migrations-
276 Notes to Page 7
geschichte der russischen Displaced Persons in Deutschland nach dem Zweiten

Weltkrieg” (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa Bremen, Arbeitspapiere und Materialien
Nr. 68, July 2005). On Latvian DPs, see Juris Rozitis, “Displaced Literature: Images
of Time and Space in Latvian Novels Depicting the First Years of the Latvian
Postwar Exile” (PhD diss., Stockholm University, 2005).
20. General works include John George Stoessinger, The Refugee and the World
Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956); Malcolm Proud-
foot, European Refugees, 1939–52: A Study in Forced Population Movement
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1956); Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsar-
beiter. There are also a number of studies that situate displaced persons within the
broader context of European population movements and refugee problems since
the First World War. See Eugene Kulischer, Europe on the Move: War and Popula-
tion Changes, 1917–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); Paul Frings,
Das internationale Flüchtlingsproblem, 1919–1950 (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der
Frankfurter Hefte, 1951); Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953); Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: Eu-
ropean Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press,
1985).
21. Kim Salomon, Refugees in the Cold War: Toward a New International
Refugee Regime in the Early Postwar Era (Lund: Lund University Press, 1991);
Tommie Sjöberg, The Powers and the Persecuted: The Refugee Problem and the In-
tergovernmental Committee on Refugees (Lund: Lund University Press, 1991); Susan
Armstrong-Reid and David Murray, Armies of Peace: Canada and the UNRRA
Years (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008). The main intergovernmental
agencies charged with assisting displaced persons have also produced of‹cial histo-
ries. See George Woodbridge, UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950);
Louise W. Holborn, The International Refugee Organization, A Specialized Agency
of the United Nations: Its History and Work, 1946–1952 (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1956); Rene Ristelhueber, “The International Refugee Organization,” In-
ternational Conciliation 470 (April 1951).
22. On Jewish DPs, see Leonard Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the
Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Arieh J. Kochavi, Post-
Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States, and Jewish Refugees, 1945–1948
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). On Russian and Ukrai-
nian DPs, see Nicholas Tolstoy, The Secret Betrayal (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1977); Mark R. Elliott, Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and American’s Role
in Their Repatriation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982); Wsevolod W.
Isajiw and Yury Boshyk, eds., The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Per-
sons after World War II (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Uni-
versity of Alberta, 1992); Marta Dyczok, The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian
Refugees (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000); Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, Searching for Place:
Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory (Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, 2000).
23. Ulrich Müller, Fremde in der Nachkriegszeit: Displaced Persons—
Zwangsverschleppte Personen—in Stuttgart und Wurttemberg-Baden 1945–1951
Notes to Pages 7–11 277
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1990); Andreas Lembeck, Befreit aber nicht in Freiheit. Dis-
placed Persons im Emsland 1945–1950 (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1997); Patrick
Wagner, Displaced persons in Hamburg: Stationen einer halbherzigen Integration
1945–1958 (Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz, 1997); Königseder, Flucht nach Berlin;
Stefan Schröder, Displaced Persons im Landkreis und in der Stadt Münster,
1945–1951 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2005). The studies by Wetzel and Eder on
Jewish DPs can also be included in this category.
24. Edward A. Shils, “Social and Psychological Aspects of Displacement and
Repatriation,” Journal of Social Issues 2, no. 3 (August 1946): 6. See also Wyman,
DP, 207–8.
25. “What the Foreign Workers Are Thinking,” [May 1945], NACP, RG 331,
SHAEF, G-5, Information Branch, Historical Section, Box 110, UNRRA. A simi-
lar report is cited in Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 89–90.
26. Fred Zinnemann, Fred Zinnemann: An Autobiography (London: Blooms-
bury, 1992), 59–61. See also Genêt [Janet Flanner], “Letter from Aschaffenburg,”
New Yorker, 30 October 1948, and “Letter from Würzburg,” New Yorker, 6 Novem-
ber 1948.
27. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1973), 292.
28. Ibid.
30. On this issue, see Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and
the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996).
31. An important exception is Laura Hilton, “Prisoners of Peace: Rebuilding
Community, Identity, and Nationality in Displaced Persons Camps in Germany,
1945–1952” (PhD diss, Ohio State University, 2001). An important comparative
work on the legacy of National Socialism in western Europe is Lagrou, The Legacy
of Nazi Occupation.
32. On internationalism, see Jonathan Rée, “Internationality,” Radical Philoso-
phy 60 (Spring 1992).
33. On refugee camps as sites for the formation of new cross-category
identi‹cations, see Michel Agier, “Between War and City: Towards an Urban An-
thropology of Refugee Camps,” Ethnography 3, no. 3 (2002). On internationalism
as a means of protecting fragile national sovereignties, see Liisa Malkki, “Citizens
of Humanity: Internationalism and the Imagined Community of Nations,” Dias-
pora 3, no. 1 (Spring 1994); Akhil Gupta, “The Song of the Nonaligned World:
Transnational Identities and the Reinscription of Space in Late Capitalism,” in
Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology, ed. Akhil Gupta and
James Ferguson (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).
34. On the study of memory in history, see Kerwin Lee Klein, “On the Emer-
gence of Memory in Historical Discourse,” Representations 69 (Winter 2000); Alon
Con‹no, Germany as a Culture of Remembrance: Promises and Limits of Writing
History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Patrick H. Hut-
ton, “Memory,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd ed. (De-
troit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008).
35. On this issue, see Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation, 3–16; Con‹no,
Germany as a Culture of Remembrance, 199–204.
36. I borrow this phrase from Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation, 302.
37. A good introduction to the older literature on interest groups, focusing es-
pecially on U.S. scholarship, is G. David Garson, Group Theories of Politics (Bev-
erly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1978). For a discussion of interest groups that is
clearly attuned to the issue as it appeared in postwar Germany, see Otto Stammer,
“Interessenverbände und Parteien,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsy-
chologie 9 (1957).
38. Key treatments of these issues include Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the So-
cial Contract or Principles of Political Right, in “The Social Contract” and Other
Later Political Writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), book 3; Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Munich: Duncker
und Humblot, 1928), 204–20; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of
the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas
Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 204.
39. Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, ed. John B. Thompson,
trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1991), 3. See also Luc Boltanski, The Making of a Class: Cadres in French So-
ciety (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 34–35; Michel Offerlé, Soci-
ologie des groupes d’intérêt (Paris: Montchrestien, 1998), 65–81.
40. Cited in E. Valentine Daniel and John Chr. Knudsen, introduction to Mis-
trusting Refugees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 2.
41. Here Rogers Brubaker’s description of national minorities is helpful in
thinking about the formation of DP communities. Following Bourdieu, Brubaker
writes, “we can think of a national minority not as a ‹xed entity or a unitary group
but rather in terms of the ‹eld of differentiated and competitive positions or
stances adopted by different organizations, parties, movements, or individual polit-
ical entrepreneurs, each seeking to ‘represent’ the minority to its own putative
members, to the host state, or to the outside world, each seeking to monopolize the
legitimate representation of the group” (Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, 61).
42. Gérard Noiriel, “Représentation nationale et catégories sociales. L’exemple
des réfugiés politiques,” Genèses 26 (April 1997): 31–32.
43. Ibid., 31.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., 53.
46. Gérard Noiriel, La tyrannie du national. Le droit d’asile en Europe
(1793–1993) (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1991).
47. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 296.
48. Ian Balfour and Eduardo Cadava, “The Claims of Human Rights: An In-
troduction,” South Atlantic Quarterly 103, no. 2–3 (Spring–Summer 2004): 281.
50. Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational
Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 145–56.
51. Seteney Shami, “Transnationalism and Refugee Studies: Rethinking Forced
Migration and Identity in the Middle East,” Journal of Refugee Studies 9, no. 1
(1996): 8.
52. Salomon, Refugees in the Cold War; Nevzat Soguk, States and Strangers:
Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1999); Liisa Malkki, “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the Na-
tional Order of Things,” Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995).
53. The role of international organizations as interlocutors for postwar exiles
from eastern Europe is also explored in Idesbald Goddeeris, “Exiles’ Strategies for
Lobbying in International Organisations: Eastern European Participation in the
Nouvelles Équipes Internationales,” European Review of History 11, no. 3 (2004).
54. Jacques Rancière, “Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’ in South At-
lantic Quarterly 103, no. 2–3 (Spring–Summer 2004): 302. See also Rancière, Dis-
agreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1999).
55. Ibid., 303. Bonnie Honig takes a similar approach, focusing speci‹cally on
“the foreigner” in democratic theory and practice. See Honig, Democracy and the
Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 99.
56. Work on contemporary immigrant and refugee associations has also em-
phasized their role in negotiating the boundaries of membership. See Adriana
Kemp et al., “Contesting the Limits of Political Participation: Latinos and Black
African Workers in Israel,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, no. 1 (January 2000);
Gökçe Yurdakul, “State, Political Parties, and Immigrant Elites: Turkish Immi-
grant Associations in Berlin,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32, no. 3
(April 2006). For a critical assessment of the role refugee organizations play, see
Steven Corliss, “Asylum State Responsibility for the Hostile Acts of Foreign Ex-
iles,” International Journal of Refugee Law 2, no. 2 (1990).
57. Boltanski, The Making of a Class; Offerlé, Sociologie des groupes d’intérêt,
53–57.
58. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste,
trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 397–465; Bour-
dieu, “Political Representation,” in Language and Symbolic Power.
59. Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 178–80.
60. “Memorandum Tsentral’noï Mizhnarodn’oï Uniï Politychnykh V’iazniv do
kerivnykh orhaniv anhliis’koï, amerykans’koï ta frantsus’koï zon v Nimechchyni,”
Politv’iazen’ 4 (June 1946): 12.
61. In the concentration camps, “organizing” meant procuring what one needed
to survive without actually stealing. The concept continued to have currency after
the war. No longer tied to physical survival, it meant using unof‹cial channels and
exploiting opportunities in order to improve one’s situation both materially and
morally.
62. Ulrich Herbert, “Zweierlei Bewältigung,” in Ulrich Herbert and Olaf
Groehler, Zweierlei Bewältigung. Vier Beiträge über den Umgang mit der NS-Ver-
gangenheit in den beiden deutschen Staaten (Hamburg: Ergebnisse, 1992), 26.
63. Malkki, Purity and Exile; Malkki, “National Geographic: The Rooting of
Peoples and the Territorialization of Identity among Scholars and Refugees,” Cul-
tural Anthropology 7, no. 1 (1992).
64. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak, eds., Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in
East-Central Europe, 1944–1948 (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Little‹eld, 2001);
Benjamin Frommer, National Cleansing: Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in
Postwar Czechoslovakia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Pavel Po-

lian, Deportiert nach Hause. Sowjetische Kriegsgefangene im “Dritten Reich” und
ihre Repatriierung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001).
65. Catherine Andreyev and Ivan Savicky, Russia Abroad: Prague and the Rus-
sian Diaspora, 1918–1938 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Elena
Chinyaeva, Russians Outside Russia: The Émigré Community in Czechoslovakia,
1918–1938 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001); Iurii Aleksandrovich Poliakov, G. I. Tarle,
and V. N. Shamshurov, eds., Istoriia rossiiskogo zarubezh’ia: problemy adaptatsii mi-
grantov v XIX–XX vekakh: sbornik statei (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN,
1996); Iurii Aleksandrovich Poliakov and G. I. Tarle, eds., Istoriia rossiiskogo
zarubezh’ia: problemy istoriogra‹i (konets XIX–XX v.): sbornik statei (Moscow:
Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 2004); Iurii Aleksandrovich Poliakov, G. I. Tarle,
and O. V. Budnitskii, eds., Istoriia rossiiskogo zarubezh’ia: emigratsiia iz SSSR-
Rossii, 1941–2001 gg.: sbornik statei (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN,
2007); Sergei Karpenko, Mezhdu Rossiei i Stalinym: rossiiskaia emigratsiia i
Vtoraia Mirovaia voina (Moscow: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi gumanitarnyi univer-
sitet, 2004).
66. On Jewish life in postwar Poland, see Irena Hurwic-Nowakowska, A Social
Analysis of Postwar Polish Jewry (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish His-
tory, 1986); Lucjan Dobroszycki, Survivors of the Holocaust in Poland: A Portrait
Based on Jewish Community Records, 1944–1947 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe,
1994); Natalia Aleksiun, Dokad dalej? Ruch syjonistycny w Polsce (1944–1950)
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo TRIO, 2002); David Engel, “Palestine in the Mind of the
Remnants of Polish Jewry,” Journal of Israeli History 16, no. 3 (1995); Ewa Kozmin-
ska-Frejlak, “Polen als Heimat von Juden. Strategien des Heimischwerdens von Ju-
den im Nachkriegspolen 1944–1949,” in Überlebt und unterwegs; Marci Shore,
“Children of the Revolution: Communism, Zionism, and the Berman Brothers,”
Jewish Social Studies 10, no. 3 (Spring–Summer 2004). On anti-Jewish violence, see
Krystyna Kersten, Polacy, Zydzi, komunizm: Anatomia pólprawd, 1939–1968 (War-
saw: Niezalezna O‹cyna Wydawnicza, 1992); Bozena Szaynok, Pogrom Zydów w
Kielcach 4 lipca 1946 (Warsaw: Bellona, 1992); Jan T. Gross, Fear: Anti-Semitism in
Poland after Auschwitz (New York: Random House, 2007). On both themes, see
also the essays collected in Joshua D. Zimmerman, ed., Contested Memories: Poles
and Jews during the Holocaust and Its Aftermath (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univer-
sity Press, 2003). On eastern Europe more generally, see the essays in David
Bankier, ed., The Jews Are Coming Back: The Return of the Jews to Their Countries
of Origin after World War II (New York: Berghahn/Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2005).
67. On this issue, see Wagner, Displaced persons in Hamburg, 12. Perceived tran-
sience is one reason why refugees more generally have not received much attention,
though this has certainly changed in recent years. On this point, see Shami,
“Transnationalism and Refugee Studies,” 6.
68. On the new cultural history, see Robert G. Moeller, ed., West Germany un-
der Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1997); Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search
for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 2001); Hanna Schissler, ed., The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of
West Germany, 1949–1968 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). One of the
earliest explorations of many issues taken up by the new cultural history is Hannah
Arendt, “The Aftermath of Nazi Rule: Report from Germany,” Commentary 10
(October 1950).
69. On these studies, see n. 23.
70. Atina Grossmann, “Trauma, Memory, and Motherhood: Germans and
Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-Nazi Germany, 1945–1949,” Archiv für
Sozialgeschichte 38 (1998), 217. See also Grossmann, “Victims, Villains, and Sur-
vivors: Gendered Perceptions and Self-Perceptions of Jewish Displaced Persons in
Occupied Postwar Germany,” in Sexuality and German Fascism, ed. Dagmar Her-
zog (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 395.
71. Stern, “The Historic Triangle.”
72. The literature on migration in German history is now very large. See in par-
ticular Klaus J. Bade, Ausländer—Aussiedler—Asyl: eine Bestandaufnahme (Mu-
nich: Beck, 1994); Bade, introduction to Fremde im Land: Zuwanderung und
Eingliederung in Raum Niedersachsen seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Osnabruck:
Rasch, 1997); Bade, ed., Deutsche im Ausland—Fremde in Deutschland: Migration
in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Munich: Beck, 1992). Also very useful is Konrad H.
Jarausch and Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), chap. 7. On German history from the
margins, see Neil Gregor, Nils Roemer, and Mark Roseman, eds., German History
from the Margins (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
73. This has been a topic of great interest in recent years. See Wolfgang Benz,
ed., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten. Ursache, Ereignisse, Folgen (Mu-
nich: Fischer, 1995); David Rock and Stefan Wolff, eds., Coming Home to Germany?
The Integration of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the Federal
Republic (New York: Berghahn, 2002); Pertti Ahonen, After the Expulsion: West
Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945–1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
74. Some of the pioneering studies include James Clifford, “Traveling Cul-
tures,” in Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula A.
Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992); Angelika Bammer, ed., Displacements: Cul-
tural Identities in Question (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Smadar
Lavie and Ted Swedenburg, eds., Displacement, Diaspora, and Geographies of Iden-
tity (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996); Patricia Yaeger, ed., The Geography of
Identity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Gupta and Ferguson,
eds., Culture, Power, Place; Cheah and Robbins, Cosmopolitics.
75. Nick Baron and Peter Gatrell, “Population Displacement, State-Building,
and Social Identity in the Lands of the Former Russian Empire, 1917–23,” Kritika:
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 41, no. 1 (Winter 2003).
76. Young-Sun Hong, “The Challenge of Transnational History,” in “Transna-
tionalism” forum, H-German, January 2006, http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/log
browse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-german&month=0601&week=c&msg=Ug5gaQJIb0m
I99%2b4nOj7Ww&user=&pw= (accessed 29 August 2008).
77. On transnational history, see Thomas Bender, ed., Rethinking American
History in a Global Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Gunilla
Budde, Sebastian Contrad, and Oliver Janz, eds., Transnationale Geschichte. The-
men, Tendenzen und Theorien (Göttingen: Vandehoeck und Ruprecht, 2006);

Michael Geyer, “Where Germans Dwell: Transnationalism in Theory and Prac-
tice,” luncheon talk presented at the German Studies Association conference, Pitts-
burgh, 28 September–1 October 2006, http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse
pl?trx=vx&list=h-german&month=0610&week=b&msg=6Ipa/qqNnOPa4EWRx
1UksA&user=&pw= (accessed 12 October 2006); “Transnationalism” forum, H-
German, January 2006, http://www.h-net.org/~german/discuss/Trans/forum
_trans_index.htm (accessed 29 August 2008). For an earlier iteration of these argu-
ments, elaborated before the concept of transnationalism became popular, see
Michael Geyer, “Historical Fictions of Autonomy and the Europeanization of Na-
tional History,” Central European History 22, no. 3–4 (September–December 1989).
78. Malkki, Purity and Exile, 2.
79. Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo
Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000),
Section 21. See also Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans.
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), part 3, chap. 2.
80. Aristide R. Zolberg, “The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generat-
ing Process,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 467
(May 1983); Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during
World War I (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); Baron and Gatrell,
“Population Displacement.”
81. Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, “From Im-
migrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration,” Anthropological
Quarterly 68, no. 1 (January 1995); Gisèle L. Bosquet, Behind the Bamboo Hedge:
The Impact of Homeland Politics in the Parisian Vietnamese Community (Ann Ar-
bor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); Oivind Fuglerud, Life on the Outside: The
Tamil Diaspora and Long Distance Nationalism (London: Pluto Press, 1999);
George E. Bisharat, “Exile to Compatriot: Transformations in the Social Identity
of Palestinian Refugees in the West Bank,” in Culture, Power, Place. For a debate
about transnationalism and refugees, see Kibreab, “Revisiting the Debate,” and the
responses by Daniel Warner, Finn Stepputat, and David Turton.
82. Östen Wahlbeck, “The Concept of Diaspora as an Analytical Tool in the
Study of Refugee Communities,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28, no. 2
(April 2002): 233. See also Wahlbeck, “Community Work and Exile Politics: Kurd-
ish Refugee Associations in London,” Journal of Refugee Studies 11, no. 3 (1998).
83. Wahlbeck, “The Concept of Diaspora,” 222.
84. One important exception is Pamela Ballinger, History in Exile: Memory and
Identity at the Borders of the Balkans (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
85. Liisa Malkki, “Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and
Dehistoricization,” Cultural Anthropology 11, no. 3 (1996).
CHAPTER 1
1. Kulischer, Europe on the Move, 305.

2. The phrase “care and control” was widely used by the Allied authorities to
describe the objectives of their DP policy. Liisa Malkki has adopted it as a more
general term describing the disempowerment of refugees. See Malkki, Purity and
Exile, 232–38; Malkki, “Refugees and Exile,” 497–503.
4. Krystyna Kersten, “Forced Migration and the Transformation of Polish
Society in the Postwar Period,” in Redrawing Nations, 76–77.
5. Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 62.
8. Ibid., 170.
9. Ibid., 298.
10. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 3rd ed. (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2003), 1312, 1320.
11. Falk Pingel, Häftlinge unter SS-Herrschaft. Widerstand, Selbstbehauptung
und Vernichtung in Konzentrationslager (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1978),
129.
12. Hilberg, Destruction, 1320.
13. Ibid., 1312.
14. Ibid., 1320–21.
16. Pingel, Häftlinge, 118.
17. “Nazi Persecution of Soviet Prisoners of War,” in Holocaust Encyclopedia,
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article
.php ?lang =en&ModuleId=10007178 (accessed 28 November 2009).
19. Norman Davies and Antony Polonsky, introduction to Jews in Eastern
Poland and the USSR, 1939–46 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991), 25; Kulischer, Eu-
rope on the Move, 255.
20. Rebecca Manley, “The Evacuation and Survival of Soviet Civilians,
1941–1946” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2004), 2; Kulischer, Europe on the
Move, 260, 303.
21. Manley, “Evacuation and Survival,” 122.
22. Marrus, Unwanted, 196–97; Orest Subtelny, “Expulsion, Resettlement, Civil
Strife: The Fate of Poland’s Ukrainians, 1944–1947,” in Redrawing Nations, 156.
23. Herbert, “Nicht entschädigungsfähig?” 157–58.
24. Proudfoot, European Refugees, 306.
25. Kulischer, Europe on the Move, 270–71; Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers,
278–80.
27. “Report of the Crimea Conference (Yalta),” in From Stalinism to Pluralism:
A Documentary History of Eastern Europe since 1945, ed. Gale Stokes (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1996).
28. Philipp Ther, “A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Conse-
quences of ‘Ethnic Cleansing,’” in Redrawing Nations, 54; Jerzy Kochanowski,
“Gathering Poles into Poland: Forced Migration from Poland’s Former Eastern
Territories,” in Redrawing Nations, 138; Yosef Litvak, “Polish-Jewish Refugees
Repatriated from the Soviet Union at the End of the Second World War,” in Jews
in Eastern Poland, 235.
29. Subtelny, “Expulsion, Resettlement, Civil Strife,” 156.
30. Ibid., 167.
31. Ther, “Century of Forced Migration,” 54.
32. Gerhard Reichling, Die Heimatvertriebenen im Spiegel der Statistik (Berlin:
Duncker und Humblot, 1958), 15.
33. Manfred Wille, “Compelling the Assimilation of Expellees in the Soviet
Zone of Occupation and the GDR,” in Redrawing Nations, 265.
34. Rainer Schulze, “The German Refugees and Expellees from the East and
the Creation of a West German Identity after World War II,” in Redrawing Nations,
307.
35. Natalia Aleksiun, “Jewish Responses to Antisemitism in Poland,
1944–1947,” in Contested Memories, 248–49.
36. Ibid., 248.
38. Ibid., 237–39.
39. Ibid., 257.
40. Ibid., 207.
41. On the repatriation of Soviet nationals, see Mark R. Elliott, Pawns of Yalta:
Soviet Refugees and American’s Role in Their Repatriation (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1982); Nicholas Tolstoy, The Secret Betrayal (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1977); Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, chap. 5.
42. Proudfoot, European Refugees, 214–15.
43. Zemskov, “Repatriatsiia,” 7.
45. Zemskov, “Rozhdenie,” 9. A similar number is given by Kulischer, as cited
in Elliott, Pawns of Yalta, 174.
46. Ulrike Goeken, “Von der Kooperation zur Konfrontation. Die sowjetischen
Repatriierungsof‹ziere in den westlichen Besatzungszonen,” in Die Tragödie der
Gefangenschaft in Deutschland und der Sowjetunion 1941–1956, ed. Klaus-Dieter
Müller, Konstantin Nikischkin, and Günther Wagenlehner (Cologne: Böhlau,
1998), 329.
47. Zemskov, “Rozhdenie,” 4; Elliott, Pawns of Yalta, 174.
48. George Fischer, “The New Soviet Emigration,” Russian Review 8, no. 1
(January 1949): 7.
49. Jaroszynska-Kirchmann, The Exile Mission, 60.
53. “Summary of D.P. Camp Population by Citizenship and by Mil. Posts and
Areas,” 22 June 1949, NACP, RG 260, Of‹ce of Military Government for Bavaria
(OMGB), Land Director (LD), Box 172, DP Letters Jan–Sept 1949 383.7.
54. Vernant, The Refugee, 86.
55. Ibid., 87.
56. Holborn, The International Refugee Organization, 179.

57. V. N. Zemskov, “K voprosi o repatriatsii sovetskikh grazhdan 1944–1951
gody,” Istoriia SSSR 4 (July–August 1990): 39. See also Elliott, Pawns of Yalta, 174.
Areas,” 22 June 1949.
60. Ibid., 238–39.
61. Ibid., 238–39.
62. Ibid., 339, 341, respectively.
63. Ibid., 340.
64. Ibid., 259. This ‹gure includes Jewish DPs in Germany, Austria, Italy,
China, and the Middle East. Somewhere around 68 percent of these resided in the
American zone of Germany.
65. Ibid., 340.
66. Elliott, Pawns of Yalta, 174; Kuhlmann-Smirnov, “‘Stiller als Wasser, tiefer
als Gras,’” 6.
67. Zemskov, “K voprosi o repatriatsii,” 39.
68. Zemskov, “Repatriatsiia,” 4–5.
69. Holborn, The International Refugee Organization, 198. This number only in-
cludes those who had remained stateless.
70. “Political Tendencies within Russian Emigration,” 15 July 1948, NACP, RG
260, OMGB, Intelligence Division (ID), Box 120, Reports “T” Unit.
71. Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Hu-
man Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); G. Daniel Cohen, “Be-
tween Relief and Politics: Refugee Humanitarianism in Postwar Germany,
1945–1946,” Journal of Contemporary History 43, no. 3 (2008): 438.
72. “Outline Plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons,” 3 June 1944, IfZ, Fi
01.84.
73. Ben Shephard, “‘Becoming Planning Minded’: The Theory and Practice of
Relief, 1940–1945,” Journal of Contemporary History 43, no. 3 (2008): 408.
74. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 279.
75. “Outline Plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons.”
76. “Administrative Memorandum Number 39 (Revised—16 April 1945),” re-
produced in Proudfoot, European Refugees, 445.
77. “Administrative Memorandum Number 39,” 461.
80. Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors, 285, table A.10. Wolfgang Jacob-
meyer gives considerably lower totals for the same period. See Jacobmeyer, Vom
Zwangsarbeiter, 175.
81. For a brief but excellent discussion of the camp as a spatial form of care and
control, see Malkki, “Refugees and Exile.”
82. See, for example, Institut für Besatzungsfragen, Das DP-Problem: Eine
Studie über die ausländischen Flüchtlinge in Deutschland (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr
[Paul Siebeck], 1950).
83. Memorandum from H. P. Mettger to Chief of Staff, 1 March 1948; George

P. Hays to Juozas Brazinskas, 9 March 1948, NACP, RG 260, Of‹ce of Military
Government for Germany (OMGUS), AG File 1948, 383.7, Box 470.
84. On the association of DPs with the black market and crime in postwar
Germany more generally, see Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 46–50; Jose Ray-
mund Canoy, The Discreet Charm of the Police State: The Landpolizei and the
Transformation of Bavaria, 1945–1965 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), chap. 3.
85. Oscar Mintzer, “The Legal Situation of Jewish DP’s in the American
Zone, Germany,” 23 September 1946, YIVO, 294.1, folder 449. See also Schwarz,
The Redeemers, 104–10; Brenner, After the Holocaust, 53; Dinnerstein, American
and the Survivors, 49; Wetzel, Jüdisches Leben, 217–18; Mankowitz, Life between
Memory and Hope, 257–58.
86. Stern, Whitewashing, 109.
87. Hans H. Wacker, “Münchner Kommunalpolitik nach 1945—Nachlaßver-
waltung oder demokratische Erneuerung?” in Trümmerzeit in München, 55. See
also Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 204–8; Kauders, Democratization and the
Jews, 71.
88. Cited in Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 212. See also “DPs and Black
Market in Bavaria,” 26 February 1948; “DP’s and Black Market in Bavaria,”
27 February 1948; “Dr. Mueller on DPs,” 27 February 1948, NACP, RG 260,
OMGUS, AG File 1948, 383.7, Box 470.
89. Cited in Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 377. See also Jacobmeyer, Vom
Zwangsarbeiter, 24.
90. Stepien, Der alteingesessene Fremde, 124–25; Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsar-
beiter, 196–200.
91. “Team Directors’ Conference,” 12 July 1946, UNA, UNRRA, S-0424-0023-
07.
93. Ibid., 200–201; Stepien, Der alteingesessene Fremde, 124–25.
94. Headquarters, Eastern Military District, memorandum re: “Yugoslavian
Nationalist Committee,” 26 October 1945, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, LD, Central
Of‹ce Records, Box 35, Displaced Persons, Refugees (Directives) 383.7 27 July
45–10 Dec 46; “Team Directors’ Conference 12th July 1946,” UNA, UNRRA,
3.0.11.3.1, District 5 Files of District Operation and Administration, District 5-
Minutes of Meetings etc.
95. James E. King to A. Werchowskij, 26 May 1947, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS,
Civil Affairs Division (CAD), Box 148, 080 DP Organizations or Committees.
96. Rebecca L. Boehling, A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and
Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany: Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart under
U.S. Occupation, 1945–1949 (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1996), chap. 5.
97. J. F. J. Gillen, State and Local Government in West Germany, 1945–1953
(n.p.: Historical Division, Of‹ce of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany,
1953), 7.
98. Military Government Regulations 3-600 (April 1947).
99. “Vstupni postanovy,” 9 August 1947, UVU, Fond TsPUE.
100. Clark to Hooper, 3 February 1950. Numerous other documents con‹rm
the existence of this policy. See, for example, memorandum from William R.
Gosser to Political Activities Branch, 12 June 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, CAD,
Political Affairs Branch, Box 117, Correspondence Political Affairs; Ezekiel L.
Glazier to M. A. Braude, 26 August 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box
148, 080-DP Organizations or Committees; Edward W. Lawrence to Slovak Central
Committee in Germany-Munich, 30 March 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD,
Box 139, 001. DP and Refugee Committees in the Zone (2-48); Albert C. Schweizer
to Chief, Political Activities Branch, 20 September 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGB,
LD, Box 144, Elections and Politics Jan–Sep 1949 000.1.
101. Memorandum from Gosser to Political Activities Branch, 12 June 1948. See
also memorandum from W. M. Chase to ODI, 12 February 1947, NACP, RG 260,
OMGB, ID, Director’s Intelligence Records, Box 164, Expellee Organizations.
102. Pierre M. Purves to Chief, Intelligence Branch, 22 June 1948, NACP, RG
260, OMGB, CAD, Political Affairs Branch, Box 117, Correspondence Political Af-
fairs.
103. “Protokol Pershoho Z’ïzdu Oblasnykh Predstavnykiv Tsentral’noho Pred-
stavnytstva Ukraïns’koï Emihratsiï Nimechchyny i Avstriï,” n.d., UVU, Fond
TsPUE.
104. Memorandum from OMGUS to Director, Civil Affairs Division, 15 De-
cember 1947, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, AG File 1947, AG 383.7 UNDP (Decem-
ber).
105. Kelly to Djalalian, 28 January 1949.
106. “Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 3,” 2 May 1947, NACP, RG 260,
OMGB, ID, Director’s Intelligence Records, Box 172, Munich Military Post
Weekly Intelligence Summary. See also Dyczok, The Grand Alliance, 79–80.
107. Leonard J. Ganse to Minister President of Bavaria, 10 October 1950,
NACP, RG 466, OLCB, Central Files, Box 10, 350-G T Political Affairs, General
10/1–11/15/50.
108. Der Ratgeber für heimatlose Ausländer: Rechte und P›ichten nach dem
Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung heimatloser Ausländer im Bundesgebiet vom 25. April
1951 (Bonn: Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 1952), 86.
109. Cited in Lalande, “‘Building a Home Abroad,’” 318.
110. Walter J. Muller to Minister President of Bavaria, 8 April 1947, NACP, RG
260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 322, 3508 Jewish Demonstrations.
111. Memorandum from Theo E. Hall to Land Directors, [21 August 1947],
NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, AG File 1947, AG 383.7 (vol. 5), NACP, RG 260,
OMGUS, AG File 1947, AG 383.7 (vol. 5); memorandum from OMGUS, Prisoners
of War and Displaced Persons Division to Chief of Staff, 22 August 1947, NACP, RG
260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 138, 001—Displaced Persons Meetings and Conferences.
112. Memorandum from J. W. Brown to Chairman, Students Committee, 28
November 1949, NACP, RG 466, OLCB, Central Files, Box 9, 350-G T Political Af-
fairs General 49-Dec 49.
113. Memorandum from Hall to Land Directors, [21 August 1947].
114. Memorandum from Walter J. Mueller to Minister President of Bavaria, 8
April 1947, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 322, 3508 Jewish Demonstra-
tions; memorandum from PW & DP Division to Chief of Staff, 22 August 1947,
NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 138, 001—Displaced Persons Meetings and
Conferences; Theo E. Hall to Commander-in-Chief, 27 September 1947, NACP,
RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 461, 3500 DPs—Maintenance of Law & Order (Gen-
eral File); William Haber to Commander in Chief, 31 August 1948, NACP, RG 260,
OMGUS, AG File 1948, AG 383.7 (vol. 4).
115. Charles R. Hayes to Chief, CIC, 4 April 1946, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID,
Box 9, DP Incidents.
116. Muller to Minister President of Bavaria, 8 April 1947.
117. Memorandum from PW & DP Division to Chief of Staff, 22 August 1947.
118. Memorandum from Harry S. Messec to PI, 22 August 1947, NACP, RG
260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 138, 001—Displaced Persons Meetings and Conferences.
119. “Four Power Agreement,” [April 1947], NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, AG File
1947, AG 383.7 (vol. 5).
120. Mark Elliott, “The Soviet Repatriation Campaign,” in The Refugee Expe-
rience, 343.
121. Ibid.
122. Cited in Elliott, “The Soviet Repatriation Campaign,” 343.
123. Cited in Proudfoot, European Refugees, 155.
124. See, for example, the documents on the Latvian Resistance Movements in
NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 265, 14. Organizations & Movements.
125. Report on DP press for 16–28 February 1949, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz
(BAK), Z 35, Band 168.
126. Memorandum from J. W. Brown to Chairman, Students Committee, 28
November 1949, NACP, RG 466, OLCB, Central Files, Box 9, 350-G T Political Af-
fairs General 49-Dec 49.
127. Memorandum from Paul E. Moeller to Chief, Anal. Br., 8 May 1948,
NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 29, Miscellaneous Correspondence.
128. Records on the IRO’s relations with the national committees are scattered
throughout the IRO records in the Archives nationales in Paris.
129. Kulyk, “The Role of Discourse,” 220.
130. Marrus, The Unwanted, 19.
131. Ibid., 15–16, 20; Noiriel, La tyrannie, 41, 47–48, 63–65.
132. Noiriel, La tyrannie, 36–80; Nevzat Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees
and Displacements of Statecraft (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1999), 83–100.
133. Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe: The Emergence of a
Regime (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 78–84.
134. Noiriel, La tyrannie, 209–14.
135. On the political rights of refugees since 1945, see Atle Grahl-Madsen, “Po-
litical Rights and Freedoms of Refugees,” in African Refugees and the Law, ed.
Göran Melander and Peter Nobel (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African
Studies, 1978).
136. Memorandum from Pierre M. Purves to Director, Intelligence Division, 11
April 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, CAD, Political Affairs, Box 118, Correspon-
dence Political Affairs.
137. Ahonen, After the Expulsion, 24–26.
138. Of‹ce of Military Government for Stadtkreis Munich, “Monthly Histori-

cal Report,” 7 February 1946, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Director’s Intelligence
Records, Box 230, Munich E-213; Philipp Auerbach, “The Position of the Jewish
DPs,” 23 June 1947, NACP, RG 84, Miscellaneous Records of the Munich Con-
sulate, Box 4, 840.1A Displaced Persons.
139. Boris I. Balinsky memoir, University of Illinois Archives, 286.
CHAPTER 2
1. The term Wiedergutmachung (literally: making good) is dif‹cult to trans-

late. In the context of Nazi crimes, it refers to the process of making material, prin-
cipally monetary amends for losses related to person or property. It will be trans-
lated here as restitution. Scholars further distinguish between two main kinds of
personal material amends, Rückerstattung (property restitution) and Entschädi-
gung (compensation for injuries to health, body, etc.). Both subareas are relevant
here and will be referred to accordingly. For an excellent overview, see Constantin
Goschler, Wiedergutmachung. Westdeutschland und die Verfolgten des National-
sozialismus (1945–1954) (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1992).
2. “Outline Plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons.”
3. Goschler, Wiedergutmachung, 69–70.
4. Noiriel, La tyrannie, 112. See also Vernant, The Refugee, 7–9.
5. Cited in Vernant, The Refugee, 9 fn 1. Although the Evian Conference in-
troduced an important shift in the de‹nition of a refugee, it is generally viewed as
a failure, because it did not address the Jewish dimension of the refugee crisis. On
this issue, see Skran, Refugees, 246–47; Sjöberg, The Powers and the Persecuted,
48–52, 69–71; Marrus, The Unwanted, 141–45, 171–72.
6. Skran, Refugees, 230.
7. Goschler, Wiedergutmachung, 51.
8. Ibid., 70.
9. Foreign Relations of the United States 1944, vol. 1: General (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Of‹ce, 1966), 259.
10. “Disposition of Political Prisoners,” 12 October 1944, NACP, RG 260,
OMGUS, CAD, Displaced Persons Branch Policy Book. Emphasis added.
11. “Directive to Commander-in-Chief of the United States Forces of Occu-
pation Regarding the Military Government of Germany [JCS 1067],” April 1945,
U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany.
12. “Administrative Memorandum Number 39,” 465. See also Eisenhower to
AFHQ, [May 1945], NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 139, Displaced Persons
Branch Policy Book.
13. Cited in Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors, 28.
14. On the Harrison Report, see Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics, chap. 4;
Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors, chap. 2; Mankowitz, Life between Memory
and Hope, 52–64; Dan Diner, “Jewish DPs in Historical Context,” paper presented
at the workshop “Birth of a Refugee Nation: Displaced Persons in Postwar Eu-
rope, 1945–1951,” New York University, 20–21 April 2001.
15. Report of Earl G. Harrison, 24 August 1945, United States Holocaust

Memorial Museum, http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/online/dp/resourc1
.htm (accessed 8 May 2002).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Truman to Eisenhower, 31 August 1945, United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum, https://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/online/dp/resourc2.htm (ac-
cessed 8 May 2002).
20. Memorandum from Newman to Commanding Generals, 22 August 1945,
NACP, RG 260, OMGUS CAD, Box 181, 322 USFET Directives.
21. Eisenhower to Truman, 8 October 1945, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, AG File
1945–46, AG 383.7.
22. Eisenhower to Truman, 8 October 1945; Of‹ce of Military Government for
Landkreis München, untitled announcement, 29 October 1945, NACP, RG 260,
OMGB, Field Operations Division (FOD), Box 430, Correspondence 1946; Allied
Control Authority, Control Council, “Law No. 18: Housing Law,” 8 March 1946.
23. “Section XX, United Nations Nationals, Stateless Persons, and Refugees,”
29 June 1945, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 3, 008 Policy. See also Goschler,
Wiedergutmachung, 75.
24. Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics, 134–43.
25. Proudfoot, European Refugees, 336; Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors,
112; Mankowitz, Life between Memory and Hope, 110.
26. Regensburg Detachment to Chief of Intelligence, 9 August 1946, NACP,
RG 260, OMGUS ID, Of‹ce of the Director, Box 75, Org. Aiding Victims of Fas-
cism BB 26. See also Jacobmeyer, “Jüdische Überlebende,” 422.
27. Military Government Regulations 20-101.3 (December 1947).
29. Stern, “The Historic Triangle,” 66; Jacobmeyer, “Jüdische Überlebende,”
438.
30. Gerard Daniel Cohen, “The Politics of Recognition: Jewish Refugees in Re-
lief Policies and Human Rights Debates, 1945–1950,” Immigrants and Minorities 24,
no. 2 (July 2006): 128.
31. Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics, 97; Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holo-
caust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 245, 249–51.
32. On the transition from a collective to an individual approach in the de‹ni-
tion of the refugee, see Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, Es-
cape from Violence: Con›ict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 18–27.
33. Memorandum from PW & DP Division, 5 September 1946, NACP, RG 260,
OMGUS, CAD, Box 123, Staff Studies.
35. Willcox to Director, CAD, 29 July 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD,
Box 182, 333.5 Investigations (PW & DP Div.).
36. Memorandum from Edward H. Litch‹eld to MG, 30 July 1948, NACP, RG
260, OMGUS CAD, Box 182, 333.5 Investigations (PW & DP Div.).
37. Clay to Van Wagoner, [July 1948], NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box
182, 333.5 Investigations (PW & DP Div.).
38. Puczyc, “Notwendigkeit und Herkunft.”
39. Protocol of meeting of 15 November 1945, YIVO, 294.1, folder 135.
40. A. Retter, “Baricht fun general-skeretariat [sic] wegn bacijungen mit der
amerikaner regirung, armej, militer-regirung, UNRRA, dajtszer regirung,” [early
1947], YIVO, 294.1, folder 131.
41. Central Committee of Liberated Jews, untitled statement, [31 March 1946],
YIVO, 294.2, folder 33.
42. Memorandum from Edward H. Litch‹eld to C/S, 26 January 1949, NACP,
RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 178, 322.2 Persecutees.
43. Goschler, Wiedergutmachung, chap. 1.
44. On the care centers, see Marcuse, Nazi Crimes, 274; Marcuse, Legacies of
Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933–2001 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 65–66. See also Aster to Harnden, 3 August
1946; Aster, “Bericht des Staatskommissars für die politisch Verfolgten in Bayern,”
3 August 1946, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 12, 15 Political Victims; Walter to
Political Affairs, 6 August 1946, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 12, 15B Society
for Aiding Victims of Fascism.
45. Wetzel, Jüdisches Leben, 49.
46. “Entwurf. Gesetz über die Bestellung und die Aufgaben eines Staatskom-
missars für die politische Verfolgten in Bayern,” [circa August 1946], NACP, RG
260, OMGB, ID, Box 12, 15B Society for Aiding Victims of Fascism.
47. Auerbach is an important ‹gure in the postwar history of Germany Jews.
His forceful personality and willingness to bypass customary bureaucratic proce-
dures made it possible for him to transform the State Commission into a powerful
agency with a broad array of funds and programs, but also brought him into
con›ict with other government of‹cials and with many persecutees. In 1951, he was
charged with wrongdoing in connection with his work at the State Commission and
its successors. Although the most serious charges against him were eventually
dropped, in August 1952 he was found guilty on lesser counts and sentenced to two
and a half years in jail. He committed suicide shortly thereafter, explaining in a
“political testament” that he felt grievously wronged. See Constantin Goschler,
“Der Fall Philipp Auerbach. Wiedergutmachung in Bayern,” in Wiedergutmachung
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Ludolf Herbst and Constantin Goschler
(Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1989); Wetzel, Jüdisches Leben, 53–62.
48. “Report on Area Legal Of‹cers’ Meeting held on 20th September 1949 at
Zone Headquarters,” n.d., Archives nationales (AN), AJ 43, 879/44/8, vol. 4.
49. Miniclier to Harnden, 22 January 1947, NACP, RG 260, OMGB ID, Of‹ce
of the Director, 7Q Refugee Problems & Conferences.
50. “Agreement between the Central Committee of Liberated Jews and the
State Commission for Racial, Religious, and Political Persecutees,” n.d., YIVO,
294.2, folder 58. See also the protocols of various meetings between the Central
Committee and Auerbach, YIVO, 294.1, folders 136, 143.
51. Goschler, “Der Fall Philipp Auerbach,” 81; “Überprüfung der Ver-
schleppten,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 March 1948.
52. Auerbach, “The Position of the Jewish DPs.”

53. “Protokoll über die Sitzung des Koordinierungsausschusses der 11 Länder,”
17 March 1950, YIVO, 294.2, folder 71.
54. “Überprüfung der Verschleppten.”
55. Mitteilungsblatt des Landesausschusses der politisch Verfolgten in Bayern 14
(January 1948).
56. Memorandum from PW & DP Division, 5 September 1946. See also Bauer,
“The Initial Organization,” 135.
57. “Protokoll über die Sitzung des Koordinierungsausschusses der 11 Länder.”
58. Association of the Lithuanian Anti-Nazi Resistants to the Chairman of the
Sonderhilfsausschuss Gandersheim, 10 September 1948; Auerbach to Schweizer, 12
October 1948; Auerbach to Association of the Lithuanian Anti-Nazi Resistants, 13
October 1948; Schweizer to Auerbach, 3 November 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGB,
CAD, Political Affairs, Box 118, Correspondence Political Affairs.
59. Memorandum from James P. Abbott to C/S, 22 January 1947, NACP, RG
260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 182, 337 Conferences (UNDPs). See also Goschler, “Der
Fall Philipp Auerbach,” 87–88.
60. Litch‹eld to Chief of Staff, 26 January 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS
CAD, Box 128, 322.2 Persecutees.
61. “Monthly Narrative Report for June, 1949, (xi) Relationship with Govern-
ment and Military Authorities,” cited in “Narrative Report for June, 1949, (ix) Le-
gal and Political Protection.”
62. On early restitution legislation, especially as it relates to foreigners, see
Goschler, Wiedergutmachung, chaps. 3, 4; Regula Ludi, “The Vectors of Postwar
Victim Reparations: Relief, Redress, and Memory Politics,” Journal of Contempo-
rary History 41, no. 3 (July 2006); Ludi, “Who Is a Nazi Victim? Constructing Vic-
timhood through Post-War Reparations in France, Germany, and Switzerland,”
UCLA Center for European and Eurasian Studies, Occasional Lecture Series, 3
(2005); Susanna Schrafstetter, “The Diplomacy of Wiedergutmachung: Memory,
the Cold War, and the Western European Victims of Nazism, 1956–1964,” Holo-
caust and Genocide Studies 17, no. 3 (Winter 2003); Schrafstetter, “‘What About
Paying BRITISH Victims of Nazi Hell Camps?’ Die Entschädigungsfrage in den
deutsch-britischen Beziehungen,” in Grenzen der Wiedergutmachung. Die
Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Osteuropa 1945–2000, ed. Hans Gün-
ter Hockerts, Claudia Moisel, and Tobias Winstel (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006).
64. Boehling, A Question of Priorities, especially chaps. 5, 6; Stern, Whitewash-
ing, especially chaps. 3, 7.
65. “Gesetz Nr. 9 betreffend sozialrechtliche Wiedergutmachung von Schäden,
die durch das nationalsozialistische System verschuldet worden sind,” 15 October
1945, in Bayerisches Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt 3 (1946).
66. “Gesetz Nr. 35 über Bildung eines Sonderfonds zum Zwecke der
Wiedergutmachung,” 1 August 1946, in Bayerisches Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt 17
(1946).
67. “Verordnung Nr. 61 zur Durchführung der Verordnung betreffend sozial-
rechtliche Wiedergutmachung von Schäden, die durch das nationalsozialistische

System verschuldet worden sind, vom 15. Oktober 1945,” 17 May 1946, in Bay-
erisches Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt 12 (1946).
68. “Gesetz Nr. 75 über die Bildung eines Sonderfonds zum Zwecke der
Wiedergutmachung,” 1 August 1947, in Bayerisches Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt 13
(1947).
70. “Überprüfung der Verschleppten.”
71. László Schirilla, Wiedergutmachung für Nationalgeschädigte. Ein Bericht
über die Benachteiligung von Opfern der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltherrschaft
(Munich: Kaiser/Mainz: Grünewald, 1982), 16.
72. The Länderrat was an institution peculiar to the U.S. zone. It brought to-
gether the Minister-Presidents of the zone’s three Länder—Bavaria, Wurttemberg-
Baden, and Greater Hesse—for regular meetings to coordinate legislation and eco-
nomic activities. It was the most important German governmental institution in
the U.S. zone during the occupation.
73. “Gesetz zur Wiedergutmachung nationalsozialistischen Unrechts
(Entschädigungsgesetz),” section 1, in Hans Wilden and Martin Klückmann,
Wiedergutmachungsgesetz. Gesetztext und systematische Darstellung (Stuttgart: W.
Kohlhammer, 1950).
74. Cited in Goschler, “Der Fall Philipp Auerbach,” 92.
75. Goschler, “Der Fall Philipp Auerbach,” 91–92; Goschler, Wiedergut-
machung, 161–62.
76. Goschler, Wiedergutmachung, 135–36, 145; Paul Winter, “Legal Protection
for United Nations Refugees Residing in the U.S. Area of Control in Germany,” 30
September 1947, YIVO, 294.1, folder 451.
78. Herbert, “Nicht entschädigungsfähig?” 179–91; Goschler, Wiedergut-
machung, 154–55; Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 238–40. See also the reports of
the IRO legal staff: “Report on Area Legal Of‹cers’ Meeting held on 20th Septem-
ber 1949”; Paul Kinnare, “Narrative Report for September, 1949, (ix) Legal and Po-
litical Protection,” n.d., AN, AJ 43, 879/44/8, vol. 4; Hugh Hinchchliffe, “Narrative
Report for November 1949, (ix) Legal and Political Protection,” n.d., AN, AJ 43,
766, Monthly Narrative Report. Germany. U.S. Zone, June 1949–December 1949;
memorandum by O. Bayer, 6 December 1950, AN, AJ 43, 883/44/9, vol. 1.
79. “Bundesgesetz zur Entschädigung für Opfer der nationalsozialistischen
Verfolgung [BEG],” section 160, in Blessin, Ehrig, and Wilden, Bundesentschädi-
gungsgesetze. Kommentar (Munich: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1957).
80. BEG, section 4.
81. “Niederschrift über die Ressortbesprechung,” 2 June 1950, BAK, B 126,
Band 12358. See also Dehler to Arbeitsgemeinschaft der ausländischen Politisch
Verfolgten, 6 October 1950, BAK, B 126, Band 12358.
82. Ulrich Scheuner, “Schadensansprüche gegen Deutschland aus der Verlet-
zung von Ausländern während der Kriegszeit,” 30 May 1950, BAK, B 126, Band
12358.
83. Herbert, “Nicht entschädigungsfähig?” 181.

84. Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, “Ortlos am Ende des Grauens: ‘Displaced Persons’
in der Nachkriegszeit,” in Deutsche im Ausland, 373.
85. Jacobmeyer, “Jüdische Überlebende,” 431.
CHAPTER 3
1. Michal Borwicz, “Polish-Jewish Relations, 1944–1947,” in The Jews in

Poland, ed. Chimen Abramsky, Maciej Jachimczyk, and Antony Polonsky (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1986), 190.
2. For a story along these lines, see Justine Pas, “Finding Home in Babel:
Transnationalism, Translation, and Languages of Identity” (PhD diss., University
of Michigan, 2008), 69.
3. “Disposition of Displaced Persons in the city of Munich.”
4. Intelligence report on “Russian and Polish Displaced Persons,” 19 July 1945,
NACP, RG 319, Army Intelligence ID File 187057.
5. Military Attache Report, “War-Displaced Poles.”
7. Vasyl’ Sofroniv Levytskyi, Respublika za drotamy (Zapysky skytal’tsia)
(Toronto: Novyi Shliakh, 1983), 79.
8. “Report of the Repatriation Poll of Displaced Persons in UNRRA Assem-
bly Centers in Germany Period 1–14 May 1946,” n.d., UNA, UNRRA, S-401, Box
8, Repatriation 5/1946–15/8/1946, This and other repatriation polls are also dis-
cussed in Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 87–90; Salomon, Refugees in the Cold
War, 144–62.
9. “Analysis of Poll Questionnaires at Funk Caserne,” 18 May 1946, UNA,
UNRRA, S-0436-0047-09.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. “Repatriation Poll: Preliminary Analysis of Negative Replies,” 25 May 1946,
UNA, UNRRA, 3.0.11.3.0, Administrative, Box 4.
14. “Report of the Repatriation Poll.”
15. “Repatriation Poll: Preliminary Analysis of Negative Replies.”
16. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Kirchmann, “‘They Are Coming for Freedom,’” 174.
20. Wyman, DPs, 78.
21. Ibid., 1.
23. UNRRA of‹cials were in fact often collectively portrayed as leftists and
communists. One former UNRRA employee even wrote a scurrilous report in
which he criticized UNRRA for its purported communist sympathies. See Marvin
Klemmé, The Inside Story of UNRRA: An Experience in Internationalism; A First
Hand Report on the Displaced People of Europe (New York: Lifetime Editions,
1949).
24. Tara Zahra, “Lost Children: Displacement, Family, and Nation in Postwar
Europe,” Journal of Modern History 81, no. 1 (March 2009).
25. Military Attache Report, “War-Displaced Poles,” 29 January 1946, NACP,
RG 319, Army Intelligence ID File 238415.
26. For an overview, see Luczak, Polacy w okupowanych Niemczech, 99–105.
27. Janusz Nel Siedlecki, Beyond Lost Dreams (Edinburgh: Pentland, 1994),
229.
28. Teodor Musiol, Dachau 1933–1945, 2nd ed. (Katowice: Wydawnictwo
“lask,” 1971), 253.
29. M[ieczyslaw] Grabinski, Dyplomacja w Dachau . . . (Dachau: Wydawnictwo
“Slowa Polskiego,” 1946), 14–15.
30. Hanna Grabinska to Barbara Distel, 4 September 1991, AKZD A2017.
31. Ratcliff to Taylor, 18 October 1946, UNA, UNRRA, S-0435, Box 14, Dis-
trict 5—District No. 5—Correspondence.
32. U.S. Civil Censorship Submission A-47-4613, 6 February 1947, NACP, RG
84, General Records of the Munich Consulate, Box 14, 800 General 1947.
33. “Statute of Association known as ‘Polish Union in the American Zone of
Germany,’” [June 1948], NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 138, 001 DP and
Refugee Welfare and Defense Committees in US Zone.
34. Jaroszynska-Kirchmann, The Exile Mission, 82.
35. “Private Conversation with Mikiciuk, Stanislaw, President of the Polish
Union for the US Zone,” 27 July 1948, NACP, RG 319, Army Intelligence ID File
493559.
37. Brian Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics
in Nineteenth-Century Poland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 16.
39. Schochet, Felda‹ng, 130.
40. Musiol, Dachau, 263.
41. “Budowac bedziemy polski dom!” in Glos Polski 2 (n.d.), AKZD, camp
newspaper collection. See also “Polska a koniec wojny,” Glos Polski 3 (9 May 1945),
AKZD, camp newspaper collection. Emphasis in original.
42. P. Dunin, “O wolnosc Europy Srodkowej,” Slowo Polskie, 17 November
1945.
43. Zegota, “‘Historia osadzi.’ Wiec w sprawie repatriacji,” Slowo Polskie, 26
January 1946.
44. Siedlecki, Beyond Lost Dreams, 225.
45. Ibid., 226.
46. M[ieczyslaw] Grabinski, Dyplomacja w Dachau . . . (Dachau: Wydawnictwo
“Slowa Polskiego,” 1946), 224. All translations by the author and Lynn Tesser.
47. Ibid., 225.
48. Borowski to Rundo, 23 April 1946, in Postal Indiscretions, 109.
49. Borowski to Rundo, 30 May 1946, in Postal Indiscretions, 112.
50. On Borowski’s biography, see Jan Kott, introduction to Tadeusz Borowski,
This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen, and Other Stories, trans. Barbara Ved-
der (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967); Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind, trans. Jane
Zielonko (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), chap. 5.
51. Borowski, “Bitwa pod Grunwaldem,” in Utwory zebrane, ed. Jerzy Andrze-
jewski, vol. 2: Proza 1945–1947 (Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczny, 1954),
178. Translation by Alicia Nitecki, with minor modi‹cations by the author.
52. Ibid., 197.
53. Ibid., 175. The Polish expression “to drown someone in a spoonful of wa-
ter” (utopic kogos w lyzce wody) evokes both extreme malice and pettiness.
54. Ibid., 191–92.
55. Ibid., 198.
56. Luczak, Polacy w okupowanych Niemczech, 133.
57. Vasyl Mudry, “Nova ukraïns’ka emigratsiia,” in Ukraïntsi u vil’nomu sviti:
iuvileina knyha Ukraïns’koho Narodnoho Soiuzu, 1894–1954, ed. Luka Myshuha
and A. Drahan (Jersey City: Vydannia Ukraïns’koho Narodnoho Soiuzu, 1954),
116. I borrow the translation in Ciuciura, “Common Organizational Efforts,
1945–52: Structure and People,” in The Refugee Experience, 105 fn 16.
58. Dyczok, The Grand Alliance, 66.
59. Cited in Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 76.
61. “Statut Predstavnytsva Ukraïnskoï Emihratsiï Ukraïns’koho Dopomo-
hovoho Komitetu v Nimechchyni,” [November 1947], UVU, Fond TsPUE.
62. “Rezoliutsiï Zïzdu Vidporuchnykiv Oblasnykh Predstavnykiv Ukraïns’koï
Emihratsiï Nimechchyny v dniakh 30 i 31 zhovtnia 1945 r.,” UVU, Fond TsPUE.
63. Protocol of the second congress of the Central Representation of the
Ukrainian Emigration, 8–10 May 1947, UVU, Fond TsPUE.
65. Zinovii Knysh, Na porozi nevidomoho (spohady z 1945 roku) (Toronto:
Sribna Surma, 1963), 4.
66. Mudry, “Nova ukraïns’ka emigratsiia,” 129.
67. “V pershu richnytsiu,” Politv’iazen’ 2 (April 1946): 2.
68. Knysh, Na porozi nevidomoho, 7.
69. Ibid., 8.
70. Cited in Kulyk, “The Role of Discourse,” 221.
71. John-Paul Himka, “First Escape: Dealing with the Totalitarian Legacy in
the Early Postwar Emigration,” paper presented at the conference “Soviet Totali-
tarianism in Ukraine: History and Legacy,” Kiev, 2–6 September 2005. See also
Kulyk, “The Role of Discourse,” 220.
72. Lalande, “‘Building a Home Abroad,’” 50.
73. Protocol of the second congress of the Central Representation. For a closer
examination of the legal status of Ukrainian DPs, see Bernadetta Wojtowicz, “Die
rechtliche Lage der ukrainischen Flüchtlinge nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in Bay-
ern,” in Bayern und Osteuropa: Aus der Geschichte der Beziehungen Bayerns,
Frankens und Schwabens mit Rußland, der Ukraine und Weißrußland, ed. Hermann
Beyer-Thoma (Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 2000).

75. Protocol of the second congress of the Central Representation. See also
Dyczok, The Grand Alliance, 95.
76. Mudry, “Nova ukraïns’ka emigratsiia,” 121.
77. My argument here generally follows that of Volodymyr Kulyk, who, as far
as I know, is the ‹rst person to go beyond examining internal political differences
to probe the larger issue of the creation of a “political emigration.” However,
whereas Kulyk argues that the attempt to create this emigration failed due to inter-
nal con›icts, I see no reason to think that it would have succeeded had there been
more political unity. See Kulyk, “The Role of Discourse.”
78. Marunchak, Ukraïns’ki politychni v’iazni, 243.
79. Knysh, Na porozi nevidomoho, 9.
80. Ibid., 27.
81. Dyczok, The Grand Alliance, 44.
82. On the Bolsheviks and their nationality policies, see Jeremy Smith, The Bol-
sheviks and the National Question, 1917–23 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999); Terry
Martin, The Af‹rmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet
Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Francine Hirsch, Empire
of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2005).
83. On this issue, see Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on
Austrian Galicia, ed. Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press / Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982); John-Paul
Himka, Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement in the Nine-
teenth Century (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies/University of
Alberta, 1988).
84. Protocol of the third congress of the Central Representation. See also Ku-
lyk, “The Role of Discourse,” 221–22.
85. Ciuciura, “Common Organizational Efforts,” 100. See also Dyczok, The
Grand Alliance, 144.
86. Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a To-
talitarian Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 352.
87. Ulrike Goeken, “Von der Kooperation zur Konfrontation. Die sowjetischen
Repatriierungsof‹ziere in den westlichen Besatzungszonen,” in Die Tragödie der
Gefangenschaft in Deutschland und in der Sowjetunion 1941–1956, ed. Klaus-Dieter
Müller, Konstantin Nikischkin, and Günther Wagenlehner (Cologne: Böhlau,
1998), 322; Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 148–49.
88. “Prikaz No. 270 Stavki Verkhovnogo Glavnoho Komandovaniia Krasnoi
Armii,” 16 August 1941, in Wikipedia, http://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/%D0%9F%
D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B7_%D0%A1%D0%92%D0
%93%D0%9A_%D0%A1%D0%A1%D0%A1%D0%A0_%E2%84%96_270_%D0
%BE%D1%82_16.08.41 (accessed 21 July 2008).
89. Kuhlmann-Smirnov, “‘Stiller als Wasser, tiefer als Gras,’” 26.
90. Zemskov, “Rozhdenie,” 12–13.
92. Ihor V. Zielyk, “The DP Camp as a Social System,” 462.

93. Boshyk, “Repatriation: Ukrainian DPs and Political Refugees in Germany
and Austria, 1945–48,” in The Refugee Experience, 366.
94. The phrase “uni‹ed narrative” comes from Kulyk, “The Role of Dis-
course,” 223. For an overview of Ukrainian DP politics, see Vasyl Markus, “Politi-
cal Parties in the DP Camps,” in The Refugee Experience.
95. On competition between the OUN-B and its rivals, see Myroslav Yurke-
vich, “Ukrainian Nationalists and DP Politics, 1945–50,” in The Refugee Experi-
ence, 135–36.
96. “Report on Background of ‘Ukrainian’ Groups,” [February 1947], IfZ, Fi
01.82.
97. On the origins of radical nationalism among Ukrainians, see Alexander J.
Motyl, The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrai-
nian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1980). On
the history of the OUN until 1945, see Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism; Orest
Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994),
chap. 23. On the OUN in postwar Germany, see Myroslav Yurkevich, “Ukrainian
Nationalists and DP Politics, 1945–50,” in The Refugee Experience. Yurkevich
downplays collaboration with the Germans.
98. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 28. See also John Armstrong, “Col-
laborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Eu-
rope,” Journal of Modern History 40 (September 1968).
99. Wsevolod W. Isajiw, “Community, Class, and Social Mobility as Dynamic
Factors in the DP Experience,” in The Refugee Experience, 472.
100. “Exhibit A, Ukrainian Political Parties,” [September 1947], NACP, RG 84,
Classi‹ed General Records of the Munich Consulate, Box 5, 820.02 Military Ac-
tivities 1947.
101. Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 78; Kulyk, “The Role of Discourse,”
225.
102. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 228.
103. Markus, “Political Parties”; Yurkevich, “Ukrainian Nationalists,” 129–30.
For contemporary reports on these parties, see “Exhibit A, Ukrainian Political
Parties.”
104. Cited in Himka, “First Escape.” I have slightly modi‹ed Himka’s transla-
tion.
105. Cited in Ciuciura, “Common Organizational Efforts,” 94. For a ‹rsthand
account of the con›icts at the ‹rst congress of the Central Representation, written
from an OUN-M perspective, see Knysh, Na porozi nevidomoho, chap. 24.
106. Balinsky memoir, 281, 289.
107. Memorandum to Chief, Public Opinion Section, Intelligence Branch, 31
January 1947, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 10, 7Q Refugee Problems and Con-
ferences. See also memorandum to Chief, Political Affairs, Information Control
Division (ICD), 25 November 1946, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 117, 65A Pro-
paganda—Anti-Russian.
108. Fischer, “The New Soviet Emigration,” 9.
109. Tat’iana Fesenko, Povest’ krivykh let (New York: Novoe Russkoe Slovo,
1963), 150.
110. Fesenko, Povest’ krivykh let, 151–52.
111. Irina Saburova, Dipilogicheskaia azbuka (Munich: n.p., 1946), 7. Transla-
tion by the author and Nina Wieda.
112. Ibid., 5.
113. Ibid., 64–66. See also Kuhlmann-Smirnov, “‘Stiller als Wasser, tiefer als
Gras,’” 25–26.
114. Ibid., 207–8.
115. Ibid., 243.
116. Fesenko, Povest’ krivykh let, 154–55.
117. Kuhlmann-Smirnov, “‘Stiller als Wasser, tiefer als Gras,’” 14.
118. Memorandum to Chief, Public Opinion Section, Intelligence Branch, 31
January 1947.
119. Memorandum from R. C. Martindale to Land Director, 30 June 1948,
NACP, RG 260, OMGB, LD, Box 172, 383.7 1947-48-49; CIC Agent Report,
“Committee of Russian Emigrants,” 3 August 1948, NACP, RG 319, CIC Collec-
tion, IRR Impersonal Files, Box 22, XE135034.
120. Fischer, “The New Soviet Emigration,” 10.
121. Marc Raeff, Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration,
1919–1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 44.
122. A good overview can be found in “Political Tendencies within Russian Em-
igration.” See also Stepien, Der alteingesessene Fremde, 121–22.
123. Raeff, Russia Abroad, 9. See also Andreyev, Vlasov, 183–93.
124. Andreyev, Vlasov, 189; Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 526.
125. On the history of the camp, see K. V. Boldyrev, “Menkhegof—lager’
peremeshchennykh lits (Zapadnaia Germaniia),” Voprosy istorii 7 (July 1998).
126. Cited in Kuhlmann-Smirnov, “‘Stiller als Wasser, tiefer als Gras,’” 48.
127. “Dolgii put’,” in V. D. Poremskii, Strategiia antibol’shevitskoi emigratsii
(Moscow: Posev, 1998), 30.
128. V. D. Poremskii, “Politicheskaia missiia rossiiskoi emigratsii,” in Strategiia
antibol’shevitskoi emigratsii.
129. Poremskii, “Ierarkhiia nashikh zadach,” in Strategiia antibol’shevitskoi
emigratsii, 86.
130. On the Vlasov movement, see Andreyev, Vlasov; Dallin, German Rule in
Russia, chaps. 26–29.
131. “The Smolensk Declaration,” in Andreyev, Vlasov, 207.
132. Ibid., 208.
133. Boris L. Dvinov, Politics of the Russian Emigration, RAND Paper P-768
(October 1955), 153–57. Andreyev, Vlasov, 191–92.
134. Balinsky memoir, 261.
135. Memorandum from Richard A. Nelson to Chief, CIC, 13 July 1946, NACP,
RG 319, CIC Collection, IRR Impersonal Files, Box 63, ZF015110.
136. A very good overview of AZODNR and the other Russian émigré politi-
cal groups discussed here is provided by Dvinov, Politics of the Russian Emigration.
137. V. A. Iontsev et al., Emigratsiia i repatriatsiia v Rosii (Moscow: Popi-

chitel’stvo o nuzhdakh Rossiiskikh repatriantov, 2001), 463.
138. Iontsev, Emigratsiia i repatriatsiia, 464.
139. Siedlecki, Beyond Lost Dreams, 226. For a similar account, see Wyman,
DPs, 66.
140. Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 78; Lalande, “‘Building a Home
Abroad,’” 51.
141. “Rezoliutsiï Zïzdu.”
142. Protocol of the second congress of the Central Representation.
143. Protocol of the third congress of the Central Representation.
144. Ibid.
145. Memorandum to Chief, Political Affairs, ICD, 16 November 1946, NACP,
RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 117, 65A Propaganda—Anti-Russian.
146. Memorandum from Huebner, EUCOM to AGWAR, 18 September 1947.
CHAPTER 4
1. On anticommunist unity and division, see also Stanislaus Stepien, Der al-
teingesessene Fremde. Ehemalige Zwangsarbeiter in Westdeutschland (Frankfurt,
1989), 117.
2. Mark von Hagen, “Federalisms and Pan-movements: Re-Imagining Em-
pire,” in Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930, ed. Jane Burbank, Mark
von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007),
495.
3. I give dates in the New Style (Gregorian calendar), which differs by thir-
teen days from the Old Style (Julian calendar).
4. On this issue, see Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National Question; Mar-
tin, The Af‹rmative Action Empire; Hirsch, Empire of Nations.
5. Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to
Liberate Soviet Ukraine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 40.
6. Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupa-
tion Policies, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), passim; Catherine An-
dreyev, Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement: Soviet Reality and Émigré
Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 45–46. On earlier Nazi
efforts to build an anticommunist front, see Lorna L. Waddington, “The Anti-
Komintern and Nazi Anti-Bolshevik Propaganda in the 1930s,” Journal of Contem-
porary History 42, no. 4 (October 2007).
7. On federalists during the Second World War, see Johannes Baur, Die rus-
sische Kolonie in München 1900–1945. Deutsch-russische Beziehungen im 20.
Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998), chap. 7.
8. Dvinov, Politics of the Russian Emigration.
9. CIC Agent Report, “Democratic Russian League Re: David Dalin,” 1 Oc-
tober 1948, NACP, RG 319, CIC Collection, IRR Impersonal Files, Box 23, 182853.
10. “Political Tendencies within Russian Emigration,” 15 July 1948; memoran-
dum re: “Russian emigration—Addition I,” 25 July 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGB,
ID, Box 120, Reports “T” Unit.
11. CIC Agent Report, “Subject: Summary of Dissident Groups,” 2 May 1950,
NACP, RG 319, CIC Collection, IRR Impersonal Files, Box 23, 182853.
12. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 559.
13. Andreyev, Vlasov, 126–27.
14. “The Prague Manifesto,” in Andreyev, Vlasov, 219.
15. Dvinov, Politics of the Russian Emigration, 74, 91–95.
16. “Deklaratsiia Antikommunisticheskogo Tsentra Osvoboditel’nogo
Dvizheniia Narodov Rossii (AZODNR),” 22 August 1948, NACP, RG 319, CIC
Collection, IRR Impersonal Files, Box 23, 182853.
17. “Resolution,” 9 July 1948, NACP, RG 319, CIC Collection, IRR Impersonal
Files, Box 23, 182853.
18. “Anti-Communist Center of the Liberation Movement of the Nations of
Russia (ACODNR),” 5 August 1948, NACP, RG 319, CIC Collection, IRR Imper-
sonal Files, Box 23, 182853.
19. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 139–40, 157, 168; biographical note on
Bohatirchuk, n.d.; CIC Agent Report, “AZODNR,” 13 October 1948, NACP, RG
319, CIC Collection, IRR Impersonal Files, Box 23, 182853.
20. Annex to Munich Military Post Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 87, 14
December 1948, NACP, RG 319, CIC Collection, IRR Impersonal Files, Box 23,
182853.
21. CIC Agent Report, “Ukrainian Activities Re: AZODNR,” 21 October 1948;
CIC Agent Report, “Russian Émigré Associations Re: Penetration by Soviet
Agents,” 27 October 1948; CIC “Organization Summary Report” on the SAF, 5 De-
cember 1948, NACP, RG 319, CIC Collection, IRR Impersonal Files, Box 23,
182853.
22. Poremskii, “Politicheskaia missiia rossiiskoi emigratsii,” 164.
23. “Declaration of the Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations,” in Memorandum of
the Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations ([Munich?]: Committee of the Anti-Bolshevik
Block of Nations, [1946?]), 16. The original Ukrainian-language version can be
found in Antybol’shevytskyi Bl’ok Narodiv: Zbirka dokumentiv 1941–1956 rr. (n.p.:
Vyd. Zakordonnykh Chastyn Orhanizatsiï Ukraïnskykh Natsionalistiv, 1956),
hereafter cited as Zbirka.
24. On Durchansky, see Hilberg, Destruction, 766–67.
25. For an example of Soviet anti-ABN propaganda, see V. Styrkul, ABN:
Backstage Exposé (Lviv: Kamenyar, 1983). For examples of federalist anti-ABN
propaganda, see What Is ABN: Its History, Structure, Propaganda, and Brief Char-
acteristics of Its Leading Members (Munich, 1958) and What Is ABN? Freedom for
Nations? Freedom for Individuals? (n.p.: R. Yagotinsky, President of Executive
Committee Ukrainian Liberation Movement, 1958). An example of the ABN re-
sponse is Niko Nakashidze, The Truth about A.B.N.: An Answer to the Provocations
of Moscow’s Fifth Column in the West (Munich: A.B.N. Press and Information Bu-
reau, 1960).
26. “Z politychnykh postanov II. Velykoho Zboru OUN v spravi spil’noho
protybol’shevyts’koho frontu,” in Zbirka, 3; Ihor Bilyi, ABN v borot’bi za svobodu
narodiv (Munich: ABN, 1947), 3–4.
27. “Resolutions Adopted by the First Conference of the Enslaved Nations of
Eastern Europe and Asia,” in Memorandum, 44. For the original Ukrainian-lan-
guage version of the resolutions, see Zbirka, 17–19. The development of an inter-
nationalist agenda on the part of the OUN-B is also evident in some of the docu-
ments collected in Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, eds., Political Thought
of the Ukrainian Underground, 1943–1951 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of
Ukrainian Studies/University of Alberta, 1986).
28. “The First Conference of Enslaved Nations of Eastern Europe and Asia,
Which Took Place in Ukraine on November 21st and 22nd, 1943,” in Memorandum,
41.
29. “Declaration of the Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations,” 15.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 10.
32. Ibid., 8. The 1946 Paris Peace Conference, convened by the Allies, deter-
mined the ‹nal terms of the peace treaties with a number of former Axis states.
34. “Manifestatsiia ABN shcho vidbulasia dnia 3 chervnia 1951 r. v Miunkheni:
Rezoliutsiï,” in Zbirka, 199.
35. “The Soviet Union—An Undemocratic Power,” 23–24; “Memoriial ABN
do ministra zakordonnykh sprav SSHA Achesona i henerala Eisenhowera,” in
Zbirka, 159.
36. Z. Karbovich, “For the Partition of the U.S.S.R.,” in Memorandum, 26.
37. Ibid., 25.
38. Ibid. This position had already been staked out during the war.
39. S.O., “Nashi zavdannia,”in Zbirka, 8.
40. “Manifest svobody,” in Zbirka, 276.
41. Cited in Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nation-
alists,” 153. See also “Moskovs’ki Protybol’shevyts’ki Natsionalisty i Nasha
Sprava,” in Zbirka, 14.
42. Iaroslav Stetsko, “My Biography,” in Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Orga-
nization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” 171. Emphasis in original.
44. “Manifest II. Kongresu ABN,” in Zbirka, 115–16.
45. “The Soviet Union—An Undemocratic Power,” 23.
46. “Constitutional Charter of the International Association of Liberty,” 24
April 1948, NACP, RG 84, Classi‹ed General Records of the Munich Consulate,
Box 6, 800 Anti-Bolshevist Organizations 1948.
47. Bilyi, ABN v borot’bi, 28–29.
48. “Memorandum of the A.B.N. to the Paris Peace Conference,” 13.
49. German translation of a Russian ABN handout, n.d., NACP, RG 260,
OMGB, ID, Box 16, 27 Subversive Activities.
50. Invitation to INCOPORE presentation re: “Freies Europa vom Standpunkt
der Flüchtlinge,” [January] 1950, BayHStA, Ministerium für Arbeit und Sozialord-
nung, Familie, Frauen und Gesundheit (Marb) 1023.
51. On this issue, see Waddington, “The Anti-Komintern.”
53. “Resolution!” [September 1950], BayHStA, Marb 947.
54. U.S. Civil Censorship Submission A-47-S-405, 26 August 1947, NACP, RG

260, OMGUS, ID, Box 157, Withdrawn Items Envelope.
55. “Summary on the Association of the Free Press,” n.d., AN, AJ 43, 899/49/3,
vol. 6.
57. Sam E. Woods to Warren M. Chase, 6 October 1947, NACP, RG 84,
Classi‹ed General Records of the Munich Consulate, Box 4, 800 Anti-Bolshevist
Organizations 1947.
58. Bilyi, ABN v borot’bi, 22–24.
59. Woods to Chase, 6 October 1947.
61. Alfred Kiss, “Bericht eines DP-Ukrainers,” 17 November 1947, NACP, RG
260, OMGB, ID, Box 38, Correspondence.
62. Delmar R. Carlson to O. Drake, 3 February 1947, NACP, RG 260, OMGB,
ID, Box 164, (4) Refugees—Expellees.
63. Memorandum from Andre Kormendi to Harold E. Stearns, 15 August 1947,
NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 163, d. DPs—Hungarian.
64. Evseev, “Memorandum concerning the repatriation of Soviet citizens from
the American zone of occupation in Germany,” [October 1945], NACP, RG 260,
OMGUS, AG File 1945–46, AG 014.33, Box 21. On Soviet complaints, see also
Dyczok, The Grand Alliance, 55, 79–80, 98; Goeken, “Von der Kooperation zur
Konfrontation,” 325–26.
65. V. D. Sokolovsky to General McNarney, 5 June 1946, NACP, RG 260,
OMGUS, AG File 1945–46, AG 080, Box 26.
66. Joseph T. McNarney to V. D. Sokolovsky, 9 July 1946, NACP, RG 260,
OMGUS, AG File 1945–46, AG 080, Box 26.
67. H. R. Bull to Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, 9 July 1946, NACP,
RG 260, OMGUS, AG File 1945–46, AG 080, Box 26.
68. Joseph T. McNarney to V. D. Sokolovsky, 12 October 1946, NACP, RG 260,
OMGUS, Records of the Civil Administration Division (CAD), Box 153, 091.412—
DP Propaganda.
69. U.S. Civil Censorship Submission A-47-S-193, 11 August 1947; U.S. Civil
Censorship Submission A-47-S-405, 26 August 1947.
70. Memorandum from Ernest Langendorf to G-5, USFET, 18 December 1946,
NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, AG File 1947, AG 000.7, Box 119; note by William H.
Kinnard, 28 February 1947, in memorandum re: “Anti-Soviet Activities of
Refugees in Bavaria,” NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, AG File 1947, AG 383.7 (vol. 3),
Box 282.
71. On this issue, see Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America’s Recruitment
of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War (New York, 1988), 269–71; Mark Aarons
and John Loftus, Ratlines: How the Vatican’s Nazi Networks Betrayed Western In-
telligence to the Soviets (London, 1991); Peter Grose, Operation Rollback: America’s
Secret War behind the Iron Curtain (Boston, 2000); Major, The Death of the KPD,
chaps. 7, 8. The scholarship on this topic is of uneven quality, especially in its treat-
ment of émigrés.
72. Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 11.
73. Most notably, U.S. of‹cials sought to capitalize on the work of Reinhard
Gehlen and the Fremde Heere Ost, the military intelligence wing of the Germany
army on the eastern front. After the war, the United States employed Gehlen and
many of his former associates in a new organization for gathering intelligence on
the Soviet Union. On Gehlen, see Mary Ellen Reese, General Reinhard Gehlen: The
CIA Connection (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1990); Simpson,
Blowback, 40–65.
74. Harry A. Rositzke, “Preliminary Analysis and Evaluation of the Methods
of Procurement of Secret Intelligence on the USSR Proper,” 23 August 1946,
NACP, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 368, No. WN 13,597. I am grateful to Jeffrey Burds
for providing me with an advance copy of this document, which appears in Burds,
Rannie gody kholodnoi voiny: shpionazh i natsionalizm na Zapadnoi Ukraine
(1944–1948) (Moscow: Sovremennaia Istoriia, 2008).
75. Cited in Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 15.
76. NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948, in Containment: Documents on American Policy and
Strategy, 1945–1950, ed. Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1978), 127.
77. Boehling, A Question of Priorities, 218–20; Major, The Death of the KPD,
chap. 7
78. Memorandum from Intelligence Division, Headquarters, European Com-
mand to Of‹ce of Intelligence, Of‹ce of the High Commissioner for Germany, 23
November 1949, NACP, RG 319, CIC Collection, IRR Impersonal Files, Box 23,
182853.
79. Memorandum from Huebner, EUCOM to AGWAR, 18 September 1947.
80. “Political Tendencies within Russian Emigration,” 15 July 1948. See also Ja-
cobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, 152.
81. Stepien, Der alteingesessene Fremde, 108.
82. On DP efforts to use anticommunism as a credential for immigration, see
Laura Hilton, “How Anti-Communist Are You? An Examination of the Treatment
of Polish and Latvian DPs in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany,” paper pre-
sented at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Confer-
ence, Washington, DC, 16–19 November 2006.
83. Similarly, it did not win them unquali‹ed access to U.S. territory. While
eastern European refugees provided the United States with valuable anticommu-
nist ideological capital, they were less desirable as actual immigrants. As Susan
Carruthers notes, they were suspect not only because they came from communist
countries, “but also because they were Russians—or members of other ethnic
groups subject to malign construction.” The passage of the Displaced Persons Act
was fraught with dif‹culties. Many U.S. cold-warriors preferred to make use of
displaced persons selectively and at arm’s length—to accept only those most di-
rectly useful to the propaganda war and to build, in Europe itself, a corps of “free-
dom volunteers” ready to roll back communism when war again broke out. See Su-
san L. Carruthers, Cold War Captives: Imprisonment, Escape, and Brainwashing

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 68. Emphasis in original.
84. Memorandum from Edward H. Litch‹eld to Political Activities Branch,
CAD, 22 December 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 1, 000.1 Political
Activities.
85. H. Simons, “OMGUS Policy Regarding Communism,” 28 October 1947,
NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 72, Communism 1947. On the issue of re-
cruiting the right kind of anticommunists, see also Grose, Operation Rollback,
135–43.
86. Memorandum from USPOLAD to American Consulate General, Munich,
24 June 1949, RG 84, Classi‹ed General Records of the Munich Consulate, Box 9,
350.21 Communism-Bolshevism 1949.
87. John J. McCloy to George N. Shuster, 24 January 1951, NACP, RG 466,
OLCB, Central Files, Box 10, 350-G T Political Affairs, General Jan–May 1951.
88. Sam E. Woods, “Dispatch No. 555, Communist and Anti-Communist Pro-
paganda,” 8 June 1951, NACP, RG 84, Classi‹ed General Records of the Munich
Consulate, Box 11, 350.21 Communism (Propaganda) 1953.
89. Cited in Ahonen, After the Expulsion, 40.
90. On anticommunism in West Germany, see Eric D. Weitz, “The Ever-Present
Other: Communism in the Making of West Germany,” in The Miracle Years: A
Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001); Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD: Commu-
nism and Anti-Communism in West Germany, 1945–1956 (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1997).
91. The reports can be found in BAK, Z 35, Band 168.
92. Buchardt was involved in the creation of the Russian Liberation Army and
was implicated in anti-Jewish atrocities. On his wartime activities, see Matthias
Schröder, Deutschbaltische SS-Führer und Andrej Vlasov 1942–1945. “Rußland kann
nur von Russen besiegt werden”: Erhard Kroeger, Friedrich Buchardt und die “Rus-
sische Befreiungsarmee” (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003).
93. Aktenvermerk of 13 January 1949, BAK, Z 35, Band 168.
94. “Bemerkungen zum Schreiben, Abs. 2.), Dr. Forster vom 6. Mai 1950,” 17
May 1950, BAK, Z 35, Band 167.
95. 5.000.000.000 (Frankfurt am Main: KPD-Hauptvorstand, June 1949), n.p.
96. Newspaper reports on these demonstrations are reproduced in Wir klagen
an! (n.p.: Pressedienst des Antibolschewistischen Blocks der Nationen, [1949]),
45–50. See also report on DP press for 1–30 April 1949, BAK, Z 35, Band 168.
97. Six other defendants, religious and laypeople associated with the Catholic
Church and monarchist circles, received lesser sentences.
98. “Acheson Condemns Mindszenty Trial; U.S. Studies Action,” New York
Times, 10 February 1949; “Truman Denounces Mindszenty’s Trial as ‘Infamous’
Case,” New York Times, 11 February 1949.
99. Sam E. Woods to Secretary of State, 13 April 1949, NACP, RG 84, Classi‹ed
General Records of the Munich Consulate, Box 8, 350 Political Affairs General
1949. American authorities in Berchtesgaden received similar assurances from
Ukrainian DPs there, suggesting that the presentation of the demonstrations as a

religious event was part of a coordinated effort to evade Military Government reg-
ulations. See memorandum from Gerald F. McMahon to Director, OMGB, 9 April
1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 23, 71A Anti-Russian Propaganda & Ac-
tivities.
100. Woods to Secretary of State, 13 April 1949; memorandum from Pierre M.
Purves to Director, Intelligence Division, 11 April 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGB,
CAD, Political Activities Branch, Box 118, Correspondence Political Affairs. The
text of a lea›et that ‹ts this description is reproduced in Wir klagen an! 4.
101. Woods to Secretary of State, 13 April 1949; memorandum from Purves to
Director, Intelligence Division, 11 April 1949.
102. Memorandum from Murray D. Van Wagoner to Major General Hays, 11
April 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, AG File 1949, AG 383.7, Box 592; memo-
randum from Donald T. Shea re: “Ukrainian DP Meeting and Demonstration in
Munich,” 11 April 1949, NACP, RG 84, Classi‹ed General Records of the Munich
Consulate, Box 9, 350.21 Communism—Bolshevism 1949; memorandum from
James M. Eagan to Intelligence Division, 11 April 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGB,
ID, Director’s Intelligence Records, Box 9, 7 DP’s, Refugees (General).
103. Memorandum from Eagan to Intelligence Division, 11 April 1949.
104. Memorandum from Shea, 11 April 1949.
105. According to a German report, Muslim and Jewish services were also sup-
posed to take place. Memorandum from Chief of Schutzmannschaft to Public
Safety Of‹ce, 8 April 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Director’s Intelligence
Records, Box 9, 7 DP’s, Refugees (General).
106. Wir klagan an! 8.
107. Memorandum from Everett V. Cunningham to Mr. Shea, 14 April 1949,
NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Director’s Intelligence Records, Box 9, 7 DP’s,
Refugees (General). I have not been able to verify this.
108. Wir klagen an! 11. The relationship between religious and national persecu-
tion was addressed more explicitly in a protest resolution drafted by Ukrainian
DPs in Berchtesgaden. “We assure you,” the resolution stated, “that destroying the
Churches and religion in all conquered countries, Moscov [sic] intends to weaken
the moral powers of those nations in order to make them an obedient instrument
for its imperialist plans.” Resolution of Ukrainian committee, Camp “Orlyk” [3
April 1949], NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 23, 71A Anti-Russian Propaganda &
Activities.
109. Wir klagen an! 5–7.
110. Memorandum from Kenneth E. Van Buskirk to Kennedy, Land Director,
11 April 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, Records of the Field Operations Division,
Headquarters Records-General, Box 316, Displaced Persons—Refugees; memo-
randum from Cunningham to Shea, 14 April 1949.
111. On the use of camps as a point of comparison between Nazi Germany and
the Soviet Union, see also Carruthers, Cold War Captives, 98–100, 113–15, 123–28.
112. The Death Mills (Die Todesmühlen) was the name of a 1945 documentary
‹lm about the Nazi concentration camps. Produced by the U.S. Military Govern-
ment for Germany, it was part of the American reeducation campaign.
113. “Tränengas gegen Demonstranten,” Abendzeitung, 11 April 1949.
114. Unbeknownst to the demonstrators, Soviet of‹cials no longer occupied the

building.
115. “Militär sprengt Protestmarsch in München,” Münchener Merkur, 11 April
1949; “Tränengas gegen Demonstranten,” “Wer hat die MP gerufen?” “Augenzeu-
gen-Bericht über die Münchener Demonstrationen,” “Das amtliche Commu-
nique,” “Was die Kommunisten sagen,” and “Die gestrigen Zusammenstöße,”
Abendzeitung, 11 April 1949; “Dementi der Militärregierung: Kommunistische Un-
wahrheit,” Abendzeitung, 12 April 1949; “Panzer und Tränengas gegen DP-Demon-
stranten,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 April 1949; “Mit Tränen in den Augen,” Spiegel,
15 April 1949. See also memorandum from OMGB, Information Services Division,
Press Branch re: “Newspaper Reports on the Ukrainian Demonstration,” n.d.
116. “2,500 Ukrainian DP’s March on Soviet Mission in Munich,” New York
Times, 11 April 1949. A sampling of other U.S. and European newspaper reports
can be found in Wir klagen an! 43–45.
117. On later ABN events, see Zbirka.
118. Memorandum from Albert C. Schweizer to Director, Political Affairs Di-
vision, HICOG, 4 October 1949, NACP, RG 466, OLCB, Central Files, Box 9, 350-
G T Political Affairs General 49-Dec 49.
119. Woods to Secretary of State, 13 April 1949.
CHAPTER 5
1. Jacobmeyer, “Jüdische Überlebende,” 423. Here Jacobmeyer seems to be

echoing Pinson, “Jewish Life in Liberated Germany,” 117.
2. Zeev Mankowitz, “Zionism and She’erit Hapletah,” in She’erit Hapletah,
1944–1948, 211.
3. Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, 247. See also Bauer, “The Initial Organi-
zation,” 144.
4. Yosef Grodzinsky, In the Shadow of the Holocaust: The Struggle between
Jews and Zionists in the Aftermath of World War II (Monroe, ME: Common
Courage Press, 2004).
5. Yoav Gelber, “The Meeting between the Jewish Soldiers from Palestine
Serving in the British Army and She’erit Hapletah,” in She’erit Hapletah,
1944–1948; Y. Michal Bodemann, Gedächtnistheater. Die jüdische Gemeinschaft und
ihre deutsche Er‹ndung (Hamburg: Rotbuch 1996), 27–28.
6. Cohen, “The Politics of Recognition,” 127.
7. Brenner, After the Holocaust, 30–31.
8. On Kaufering, see Edith Raim, “‘Unternehmen Ringeltaube.’ Dachaus
Außenlagerkomplex Kaufering,” Dachauer Hefte 5 (1989); Raim, Die Dachauer
KZ-Außenkommandos Kaufering und Mühldorf. Rüstungsbauten und Zwangsarbeit
im letzten Kriegsjahr 1944/45 (Landsberg am Lech: Martin Neumeyer, 1992).
9. Mankowitz, “The Formation of She’erit Hapleita: November 1944–July
1945,” Yad Vashem Studies 20 (1990): 346; Dov Levin, Fighting Back: Lithuanian
Jewry’s Armed Resistance to the Nazis, 1941–1945, trans. Moshe Kohn and Dina
Cohen (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), 116–25, 127–30, 269 fn 27; Yehuda
Bauer, Flight and Rescue: Brichah (New York: Random House, 1970), 60.
10. Cited in Mankowitz, “The Formation,” 348.

11. Cited in Mankowitz, “The Formation,” 351.
12. As Yehuda Bauer notes, the goal of Zionist unity was articulated indepen-
dently by survivors elsewhere and “was characteristic of the atmosphere then pre-
vailing among the survivors generally.” See Bauer, Flight and Rescue, 61; Anita
Shapira, “The Yishuv’s Encounter with the Survivors of the Holocaust,” in She’erit
Hapletah, 1944–1948; Gelber, “The Meeting between the Jewish Soldiers,” 76–77.
13. Levin, Fighting Back, 25.
14. Jewish Information Of‹ce to IPC, 10 May 1945, BISO, Zespól Dachau
A700, teczka 15. Original as is.
15. Lists of the dead were later published in the United States. See Joel Zak and
Josef Lindenberger, Memorial Dates Yorzait of the Martyred Jews of Dachau, vol.
1, Jews Born in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and White Russia (New York: Jewish La-
bor Committee, 1947); Joel Zak, Jacob Silberstein, and Josef Lindenberger, Memo-
rial Dates Yorzait of the Martyred Jews of Dachau, vol. 2, Jews Born in Poland (New
York: Jewish Labor Committee, 1947).
16. Sack, Dawn after Dachau, 47.
17. Ibid., 121.
18. Dina Porat, “The Role of European Jewry in the Plans of the Zionist Move-
ment during World War II and in its Aftermath,” in She’erit Hapletah, 1944–1948,
296.
20. Musiol, Dachau, 109.
21. Jewish Information Of‹ce to IPC, 21 May 1945, BISO, Zespól Dachau
A700, teczka 15.
22. Mankowitz, “The Formation,” 354–55; Sack, Dawn after Dachau, 56.
24. Ibid., 49.
25. “Bericht über die 15. Sitzung des I.P.C., die am 17.5.45 um 17 Uhr statt-
fand,” n.d., BISO, Zespól Dachau A700, folder 11. On a similar con›ict in Buchen-
wald, see Mankowitz, “The Formation,” 339. Leonard Dinnerstein claims that
Dachau “lacked Jewish representatives on the newly formed internal camp com-
mittee because the authorities did not recognize religious divisions” (America and
the Survivors, 33). I have not found any evidence to support this claim.
26. Lager-Älteste to national committees and block elders, 11 May 1945; Lager-
Älteste to block leaders and block secretaries, 14 May 1945, BISO, Zespól Dachau
A700, Tecka nr 17.
27. “Communique No. 31,” 5 June 1945, in AKZD, ‹le on IPC.
28. Files on Dachau-Allach can be found in AKZD, 16.063 and 16.059/2.
29. Mankowitz, “The Formation,” 353.
30. Eichhorn, “Dachau,” 68.
31. “Bericht über die 5. Sitzung des I.P.C. vom 5. Mai 1945 um 17.00 Uhr,” n.d.,
BISO, Zespól Dachau A700, Tecka nr 11; Eichhorn, “Dachau,” 69–70.
32. Bauer, Flight and Rescue, 61.
33. Mankowitz, Life between Memory and Hope, 30–31, Wetzel, Jüdisches
Leben, 146–48; Bauer, “The Initial Organization,” 144; Brenner, After the Holo-
caust, 33.
34. Protocol of Felda‹ng meeting of 1 July 1945, YIVO, 294.1, folder 135.
35. Schwarz, The Redeemers, 30–31; Mankowitz, Life between Memory and
Hope, 50.
36. Wetzel, Jüdisches Leben, 151–52; Brenner, After the Holocaust, 32; Bauer,
“The Initial Organization,” 155.
37. Pinson, “Jewish Life in Liberated Germany,” 126.
38. Brenner, After the Holocaust, 32.
40. Jacob Oleiski, interview by David Boder, 20 August 1946, http://voices.iit
.edu/interview?doc=oleiskiJ&display=oleiskiJ_en (accessed 13 February 2011).
Created in Russia in 1880, the ORT movement promoted vocational and agricul-
tural training for Jews.
41. Max Sprecher, interview by David Boder, 12 September 1946, http://voices
.iit.edu/interview?doc-sprecherM&display=sprecherM_en (accessed 13 February
2011).
42. On this issue, see the protocols of the CK’s meetings in YIVO, 294.1, folder
135.
43. “Speech given by Z. Grinberg, M.D., Head Doctor of the Hospital for Po-
litical Ex-prisoners in Germany at the Liberation Concert in St. Ottilian on May
27, 1945,” YIVO, 294.2, folder 64.
44. Ibid.
45. Mankowitz, Life between Memory and Hope, 2–3.
46. Dalia Ofer, “From Survivors to New Immigrants: She’erit Hapletah and
Aliyah,” in She’erit Hapletah, 1944–1948, 304–10; Mankowitz, Life between Mem-
ory and Hope, 1.
47. Mankowitz, Life between Memory and Hope, 286.
48. “Speech given by Z. Grinberg.”
49. On historical commissions, see Mankowitz, Life between Memory and
Hope, 214–25.
50. Mankowitz, Life between Memory and Hope, 287–88; Gerd Korman, “The
Holocaust in American Historical Writing,” Societas 2, no. 3 (Summer 1972).
51. Dalia Ofer, “Linguistic Conceptualization of the Holocaust in Palestine
and Israel, 1942–1953,” Journal of Contemporary History 31, no. 3 (July 1996): 568.
52. Oleiski, “The Great Disappointment,” 24 August 1945, YIVO, 294.2, folder
1553.
53. “Referat fun Dr. Grinberg zu der trojer-akademije fun Warschawer Getto,
gehaltn dem 18 April 1946 in Prinz-Regentn Theater München,” YIVO, 294.1,
folder 129.
54. Oleiski, “The Great Disappointment.”
55. Gringauz, “Jewish Destiny,” 503–4.
56. Speech of Leon Retter, [December 1946], YIVO, 294.2, folder 33.
57. Gringauz, untitled essay, [February 1947], YIVO, 294.1, folder 131.
58. Ibid.
59. “Kurcer baricht iber di tejtigkajt fun Cnetral [sic] Komitet fun di befrajte
Jidn in der amerikaner zone in Dajczland,” [November 1946], YIVO, 294.1, folder
480.
61. Gringauz, “Allied Victory.” Errors were in original.
62. Cited in Mankowitz, Life between Memory and Hope, 177.
63. Gringauz, untitled essay.
64. Gringauz, “Jewish Destiny,” 504.
65. Gringauz, “Jewish Destiny,” 506; Mankowitz, Life between Memory and
Hope, 177.
66. On Jewish conceptions of martyrdom, especially after the Holocaust, see
Stanley Brodwin, “History and Martyrological Tragedy: The Jewish Experience in
Sholem Asch and Andre Schwarz-Bart,” Twentieth Century Literature 40, no. 1
(Spring 1994); Emil L. Fackenheim, “On the Life, Death, and Trans‹guration of
Martyrdom: The Jewish Testimony to the Divine Image in Our Time,” in Facken-
heim, The Jewish Return into History: Re›ections in the Age of Auschwitz and a New
Jerusalem (New York: Schocken, 1978); Shaul Esh, “The Dignity of the Destroyed:
Towards a De‹nition of the Period of the Holocaust,” in The Catastrophe of Euro-
pean Jewry: Antecedents, History, Re›ections: Selected Papers, ed. Yisrael Gutman
and Livia Rothkirchen (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1976).
67. Shalom Cholawski, “Partisan and Ghetto Fighters—An Active Element
among She’erit Hapletah,” in She’erit Hapletah, 1944–1948, 249; Mankowitz, Life
between Memory and Hope, 209–13, 293.
68. “Referat fun Dr. Grinberg.”
69. Speech of David Treger, in “2-ter Kongres fun der sheyres-hapleyte in der
amerikaner zone fun daytschland, bad-reykhnhal, februar 1947,” 10. A copy can be
found in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives (USHMM),
RG-68.066M, G1/6B1.
70. Protocol of St. Ottilien conference of 25 July 1945.
71. Speech of David Treger, 8.
72. Gringauz, “Jewish Destiny,” 502.
75. Protocol of CK meeting of 23 December 1945, YIVO, 294.1, folder 135.
76. Protocol of St. Ottilien conference of 25 July 1945; A. Retter, “Baricht fun
general-skeretariat.” See also Mankowitz, Life between Memory and Hope, 45.
77. Transcript of speech given by Jakob Oleiski at the World Conference of the
ORT, 18 August 1946, http://voices.iit.edu/interview?doc=oleiskiJ&display=olei
skiJ_en (accessed 13 February 2011).
78. Memorandum from E. Wouthuysen to Honeybal, 3 April 1947.
79. Protocol of Jewish Students Union meeting of 28 Nov. 1948, YIVO 294.2,
folder 1195.
80. Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies, 208–17, 227–30; Margarete Myers
Feinstein, “Domestic Life in Transit: Jewish DPs,” paper presented at the workshop
“Birth of a Refugee Nation: Displaced Persons in Postwar Europe 1945–1951,” New
York University, 20–21 April 2001.
81. Cited in Alfonsas Eidintas, Jews, Lithuanians, and the Holocaust (Vilnius:
Versus Aureus, 2003), 341.
82. Smuel Slomovits, “Frage: Wos sejnen di ojfgabn fun Central Comoitet in
lojfndn kadencjohr? Wos darf er adurch‹rn?” n.d., YIVO, 294.2, folder 38.
83. Gringauz, untitled essay.
84. Jewish committees to Chairman, United Nations Special Committee on
Palestine, 22 July 1947, AN, AJ 43, 570/31/5.
85. Gringauz, “Allied Victory.”
86. Verstandig, I Rest My Case, 240.
87. Protocol of Felda‹ng meeting of 1 July 1945.
88. Ibid. On Rosental’s remarks, see also Mankowitz, Life between Memory
and Hope, 47; Bauer, “The Initial Organization,” 149.
90. Pinson, “Jewish Life in Liberated Germany,” 116. On Bundists and Com-
munists in Felda‹ng, see also “General Impressions of Jewish D.P. Centers in Ger-
many,” 2 February 1946, UNA, UNRRA, S-0425-0062-02.
91. “List of Jewish parties and organizations,” n.d., YIVO 294.1, folder 123.
92. “List of the members of the Central Committee and their functions,” 26
August 1947, YIVO, 294.1, folder 123; report of CK personnel department, 26 De-
cember 1946, YIVO, 294.1, folder 480.
93. M. Bukantz, “Declaration in Name of the New Zionist Organization,”
[February 1946], YIVO, 294.1, folder 129.
94. B. Sapir, “Third Congress of the Liberated Jews in the American Zone of
Germany, March 30–April 2, 1948,” YIVO 294.1, folder 133.
95. Speech of Leon Retter, [December 1946].
96. Protocol of St. Ottilien conference of 25 July 1945.
97. Postwar commentators were strongly cognizant of this fact—indeed, they
often used the terms Jewish DPs and Polish Jews interchangeably. The turn to more
generic descriptors has been accompanied by a loss of speci‹city in argumentation,
which simultaneously in›ates the claims being made.
98. Report of Earl G. Harrison, 24 August 1945; Mankowitz, Life between
Memory and Hope, 293; Bauer, “The Initial Organization,” 133–34.
99. On interwar Jewish politics in all three countries, see Mendelsohn, The
Jews of East Central Europe.
100. Michael Brenner, Geschichte des Zionismus (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002),
97–98.
101. Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe, 215. See also Mendelsohn,
Zionism in Poland: The Formative Years, 1915–1926 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1981).
102. On this issue, see the interesting quotation in Mendelsohn, The Jews of
East Central Europe, 67. On language use more generally, see Chone Shmeruk,
“Hebrew-Yiddish-Polish: A Trilingual Jewish Culture,” in Gutman et al., The Jews
of Poland between Two World Wars (Hanover, NH: University Press of New En-
gland, 1989).
103. Ezra Mendelsohn, introduction to Gutman et al., The Jews of Poland be-
tween Two World Wars (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1989), 5.
104. Michael MacQueen, “Lithuanian Collaboration in the ‘Final Solution’:

Motivations and Case Studies,” in Lithuania and the Jews: The Holocaust Chapter;
Symposium Presentations (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum, 2005), 1.
105. Borwicz, “Polish-Jewish Relations,” 190.
106. Aleksiun, “Jewish Responses,” 248.
107. Gross, Fear, 94–99.
108. Shimon Redlich, “Between History and Biography: Memories from Post-
war Lodz,” in Fenomen getta lódzkiego, ed. Pawel Samus and Wieslaw Pus (Lódź:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lódzkiego, 2006); Redlich, “Jews and Jewish Life in
Post-War Lodz,” paper presented at the conference “Beyond Camps and Forced
Labour: Current International Research on Survivors of Nazi Persecution—60
Years On,” London, 11–13 January 2006.
109. Redlich, “Between History and Biography,” 422.
110. Hurwic-Nowakowska, A Social Analysis, 47.
111. Aleksiun, Dokad dalej? 267–69.
112. Bauer, Flight and Rescue, 211–12.
116. Ibid.
117. “Analysis of Poll Questionnaires at Funk Caserne.” Emphasis in original.
119. Ibid.
120. Schwarz, The Redeemers, 119.
121. Pinson, “Jewish Life in Liberated Germany,” 116–17.
123. “Analysis of Poll Questionnaires at Funk Caserne.”
124. Ibid.
126. “District Director’s Monthly Report for July 1946,” 31 July 1946, UNA,
UNRRA, S-0424.
128. Speech of Leon Retter, [December 1946].
129. Engel, “Palestine in the Mind of the Remnants of Polish Jewry,” 234.
130. Ibid.
131. Aleksiun, Dokad dalej? 270.
133. Hurwic-Nowakowska, A Social Analysis, 55.
CHAPTER 6
1. Stern, Whitewashing.
2. Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 386.
3. Geller, Jews in Post-Holocaust Germany, 289.
4. On relations between Jewish DPs and German Jews, see also Brenner, After
the Holocaust, 41–51; Geller, Jews in Post-Holocaust Germany, 17–89; Kolinsky, Af-
ter the Holocaust, 168–82; Kauders, Democratization and the Jews, chap. 1.
5. “Satzungen des Verbandes der befreiten Juden in der amerikanischen Be-
satzungszone in Deutschland,” n.d., YIVO, 294.2, folder 58.
6. Brenner, After the Holocaust, 45–47. See also Kolinsky, After the Holocaust,
168–69.
7. Fritz Jacoby to Joint Distribution Committee, 1 October 1947, YIVO, 294.1,
folder 121.
8. Kauders, Democratization and the Jews, 52.
9. Brenner, After the Holocaust, 41–51.
10. Speech of Leon Retter, in “2nd Congress of the ‘Sheirit-Hapleita’ in the
American Zone of Germany, Bad Reichenhall, February 1947,” 9. A copy can be
found in USHMM, RG-68.066M, G1/6B1.9. On the similar goals of the Central
Committee in the British zone, see Lavsky, New Beginnings, 110–23.
11. A similar attitude prevailed toward other independent groups. For example,
the CK objected to the existence of the Federation of Hungarian Jews, which, like
the German Jewish communities, stood on the margins of Polish- and Lithuanian-
dominated communal life. It considered the federation’s efforts to distribute food
and plan emigration evidence of “criminal activity.” See Piekacz to Auerbach, 26
May 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, CAD, General Records PW & DP Branch, Box
19, Public Welfare: (d3) Refugees, Expellees, D.P.s.
12. “Laws of the Association of the Liberated Jews in the US Occupied Zone in
Germany,” [January 1946], YIVO, 294.1, folder 124; protocol of meeting with Auer-
bach of 29 December 1946, YIVO, 294.1, folder 143; memorandum from K. A.
Oravetz to DP Branch, 20 July 1946, YIVO, 294.1, folder 124.
13. Israelitische Kultusgemeinden of Munich, Nuremberg, Fürth, and
Würzburg, Oberrat der Israeliten Badens, and Reichsvereinigung der Juden in
Deutschland to Central Committee, 26 January 1946, YIVO, 294.1, folder 112. See
also Brenner, After the Holocaust, 64.
14. Protocol of CK plenum meeting of 9 March 1947, YIVO, 294.1, folder 138.
15. Brenner, After the Holocaust, 41–51; Goschler, “The Attitude towards Jews,”
446–47.
16. Gringauz, untitled essay. See also Joseph J. Schwartz to Moses A. Leavitt, 9
November 1946, YIVO, 294.1, Folder 128.
18. “Protokol Nr. 4. fun der Plenum-zicung funn CK, dem 21.4.48,” YIVO,
291.1, folder 140.
20. Grossmann, “Victims, Villains, and Survivors,” 310.
21. Ezra Mendelsohn, On Modern Jewish Politics (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1993), 22.
22. Grossmann, “Victims, Villains, and Survivors,” 310. See also Kolinsky, Af-
ter the Holocaust, 175–76.
23. CK activity report for April 1947, n.d., YIVO, 294.1, folder 480.
24. Memorandum from Ulrich C. Urton, 6 April 1946, NACP, RG 260,
OMGB, ID, Box 9, DP Incidents.
25. Goschler, “The Attitude towards Jews in Bavaria,” 451.

26. On the recognition of the Central Committee, see also Königseder and Wet-
zel, Lebensmut im Wartesaal, 89–92.
28. Protocol of executive committee meeting of 5 July 1945; protocol of coun-
cil meeting of 8 August 1945, YIVO, 294.1, folder 135.
31. Ibid., 149–50.
32. Central Committee to Münchener Verkehrsbüro Wilhelm Hö›ing, 10 Au-
gust 1945, YIVO, 294.2, folder 64.
33. Memorandum from Boris Pliskin, Leon Retter, and Samuel Schlomowitz,
28 January 1947, YIVO, 294.1, folder 128.
34. “Satzung des Verbandes der überlebenden Juden in der amerikanischen Be-
satzungszone,” [July 1945?], YIVO, 294.1, folder 135; “Satzungen des Verbandes der
befreiten Juden in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone in Deutschland,” n.d.,
YIVO, 294.2, folder 58; “Satzung des Verbandes der befreiten Juden in der
amerikanischen Besatzungszone in Deutschland,” [January 1946], YIVO, 294.1,
folder 12; “Laws of the Association of the Liberated Jews in the US Occupied Zone
in Germany,” [January 1946], YIVO, 294.1, folder 124; Robert W. Beghtol to Burn-
ham, 14 May 1946, NACP, RG 84, General Records of the Munich Consulate, Box
6, 800 General 1946.
36. Memorandum from Oravetz to Sage, 20 July 1946; C. R. Huebner to Cen-
tral Committee of Liberated Jews, 5 September 1946, YIVO, 294.1, folder 124.
37. Huebner to Central Committee, 5 September 1946.
38. S. R. Mickelsen to Chief of Staff, 12 July 1946, YIVO, 294.1, folder 124;
memorandum from Oravetz to Sage, 20 July 1946.
39. Sumner Sewall to PW&DP Division, 9 August 1946, NACP, RG 260,
OMGUS AG File 1945–46, Box 25, AG 080.
40. Memorandum from Oravetz to Sage, 20 July 1946.
41. Sewall to PW&DP Division, 9 August 1946.
42. Ibid.
43. Memorandum from Edwin L. Clarke, n.d., YIVO, 294.1, folder 124.
44. Ibid.
46. Josef T. McNarney to Central Committee of Liberated Jews, 7 September
1946, YIVO, 294.2, folder 29.
47. G. H. Garde to Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater, 26
August 1946, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 165, 383.7 Jewish Affairs.
48. Mickelsen to Chief of Staff, 12 July 1946.
49. Protocol of council meeting of 30 July [1946], YIVO, 294.2, folder 29. See
also Schwarz, The Redeemers, 151–54.
50. Central Committee to Of‹ce of the Chief of Staff, USFET, 30 July 1946;
Central Committee of Liberated Jews to Joseph T. McNarney, 6 September 1946,
51. Schwarz, The Redeemers, 170. See also A. Blumowitsch, “Baricht fun der
tetikajt fun Central komitet farn kadenc-jor 1946,” YIVO, 294.2, folder 3.
52. A. Retter, “Baricht fun general-skeretariat.” See also Schwarz, The Re-
deemers, 149–50.
54. Schwarz, Refugees in Germany Today, 139 fn 20.
56. Retter, “Baricht fun general-skeretariat.”
57. On this issue, see also Mankowitz, Life between Memory and Hope, 265–67.
58. Conference on “The Future of Jews in Germany” (Heidelberg: Of‹ce of Ad-
viser on Jewish Affairs, [1949]), 27. See also “Feuerprobe der Demokratie,” Neue
Zeitung, 1 August 1949.
59. “Judenfrage als Prüfstein,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 August 1949. On postwar
philosemitism, see Stern, Whitewashing.
60. “Brief an die SZ,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 August 1949.
61. “Munich Police Battle a Rally of 1,000 Jews,” New York Herald Tribune, 11
August 1949.
62. The following synopsis of events is compiled from numerous reports, most
of which can be found in NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 24, Jewish Demonstra-
tion (Möhlstrasse etc.); NACP, RG 84, Classi‹ed General Records of Munich
Consulate, Box 8, 350 Political Affairs General 1949; YIVO, 294.1, folder 459. For
an analysis of the demonstration and the events leading up to it from the perspec-
tive of media analysis, see Werner Bergmann, Antisemitismus in öffentlichen
Kon›ikten. Kollektives Lernen in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik
1949–1989 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1997), 71–86.
63. Memorandum from Harry Greenstein to American Jewish Committee,
American Joint Distribution Committee, Jewish Agency for Palestine, and World
Jewish Congress, 15 August 1949, YIVO, 294.1, folder 459.
64. Cited in “Jüdische Demonstration gegen die SZ,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11
August 1949.
65. Schwarz, The Redeemers, 303. See also memorandum from Greenstein to
American Jewish Committee, 15 August 1949.
66. Bergmann, Antisemitismus in öffentlichen Kon›ikten, 76 fn 27.
67. Memorandum from Levan Roberts to Field Operations Division, 10 August
1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, LD, Box 169, Reports 319.1.
68. Theodore D. Feder, “Report on Möhlstrasse Incident, August 19, 1949,”
n.d., YIVO, 294.1, folder 459.
69. Abrascha Arluk interview in Roman Haller, . . . und bleiben wollte keiner.
Jüdische Lebensgeschichten im Nachkriegsbayern (Munich: Dölling und Galitz,
2004), 123.
70. Feder, “Report on Möhlstrasse Incident.”
71. “The Status of Munich’s Moehlstrasse,” [Information Control Intelligence
Summary?], 11.
72. Thomas Wimmer to James H. Kelly, 8 June 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGB,
LD, Box 161, Morals and Conduct Jan–Sep 1949 250.1. See also Kauders, Democ-
ratization and the Jews, 71–72.
73. Memorandum from Pitzer to Public Safety Of‹ce, 11 March 1948; memo-
randum from Herrmann to Public Safety Of‹ce, 15 March 1948; memorandum
from Herrmann to Public Safety Of‹ce, 23 March 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS,
AG File 1948, AG 383.7, Box 471; memorandum from William R. Rohan to Direc-
tor, CAD, 7 April 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, AG File 1948, AG 383.7, Box
470.
74. Thomas Wimmer to James H. Kelly, 8 June 1949; memorandum from Mu-
nicipal Trade Of‹ce to v.Miller, 11 June 1949; memorandum from Work and Fiscal
Department, 17 June 1949; Thomas Wimmer to James H. Kelly, 20 June 1949;
Thomas Wimmer to James H. Kelly, 28 June 1949; James H. Kelly to OMGB,
FOD, 5 July 1949; Murray D. Van Wagoner to Clarence R. Huebner, 11 July 1949,
NACP, RG 260, OMGB, LD, Box 161, Morals and Conduct Jan–Sep 1949 250.1.
75. James H. Kelly to OMGB, FOD, 5 July 1949; Murray D. Van Wagoner to
Clarence R. Huebner, 11 July 1949; “Aktion in der Möhlstraße,” Neue Zeitung, 2
July 1949; “Groß-Razzia gegen die Möhlstraße,” Münchner Merkur, 4 July 1949.
76. Memorandum from James A. Clark to Mr. Kennedy, [July 1949], NACP,
RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 24, Jewish Demonstration (Möhlstrasse etc.).
77. Memorandum from Criminal Investigation Department to Police Vice
President, 2 September 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 24, Jewish Demon-
stration (Möhlstrasse etc.).
78. Wetzel, Jüdisches Leben, 339–40.
79. Sam E. Woods to Secretary of State, 15 August 1949, NACP, RG 84,
Classi‹ed General Records of Munich Consulate, Box 8, 350 Political Affairs Gen-
eral 1949.
80. Memorandum from Clark to Kennedy, [July 1949].
81. Arluk interview, 123.
82. Goschler, “The Attitude towards Jews in Bavaria,” 444.
83. Ibid., 451; Wetzel, Jüdisches Leben, 347.
84. Central Committee of Liberated Jews, untitled statement, 11 August 1949,
Areas,” 22 June 1949.
86. Wetzel, “‘Mir szeinen doh,’” 362.
87. Schwarz, The Redeemers, 282–83.
88. Cited in Geller, Jews in Post-Holocaust Germany, 73. See also Conference on
“The Future of Jews in Germany,” 36.
89. Conference on “The Future of Jews in Germany,” 17. See also Brenner, After
the Holocaust, 48.
90. Conference on “The Future of Jews in Germany,” 19.
91. “Jüdische Demonstration gegen die SZ,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 August
1949; “Schwere Tumulte in München,” Neue Zeitung, 11 August 1949; “Der Tumult
in der Möhlstraße,” Münchner Merkur, 12 August 1949; “Jews and Police Clash in
Munich,” New York Times, 11 August 1949; “Munich Police Battle a Rally of 1,000
Jews,” New York Herald Tribune, 11 August 1949; “DPs, Police Injured in Munich
Clash,” Stars and Stripes, 12 August 1949; “Foreign News” column, Time, 22 Au-
gust 1949.
92. Central Committee of Liberated Jews, untitled statement, 11 August 1949.

93. Memorandum from LJG to Land Director, 30 August 1949, NACP, RG
260, OMGB, ID, Box 24, Jewish Demonstration (Möhlstrasse etc.).
94. Bergmann, Antisemitismus in öffentlichen Kon›ikten, 81 fn 39.
95. Central Committee of Liberated Jews, untitled statement, 11 August 1949.
96. Bergmann, Antisemitismus in öffentlichen Kon›ikten, 80, 85. See also Wolf-
gang Kraushaar, “Das Kesseltreiben,” Die Zeit 34 (1992).
97. Feder, “Report on Möhlstrasse Incident.”
98. Memorandum from LJG to Land Director, 30 August 1949.
99. Woods to Secretary of State, 15 August 1949. “The most unfortunate result,”
Woods added, “may well be that newspaper reports emanating from Munich will de-
scribe the affair in such a manner as to make it appear to have been an unwarranted
attack against defenseless Jews which, as described above, is not the case.”
100. Stern, Whitewashing, 339.
101. Stern, “The Historic Triangle,” 69.
102. Kauders, Democratization and the Jews, 70–71, 80–81, 93.
103. Kolinsky, After the Holocaust, 180–82.
104. Ibid., 185–86.
CHAPTER 7
1. Eugen Kogon, Der SS-Staat. Das System der deutschen Konzentra-

tionslager (Munich: Kindler, 1974), 48.
2. On the political category, see Sofsky, The Order of Terror, chap. 10.
3. Report of 20th I.P.C. meeting, 6 June 1945, BISO Zespól Dachau A700,
teczka 11.
4. Luczak, Polacy w okupowanych Niemczech, 105. This number only ac-
counts for those who belonged to organizations of Polish politicals.
5. Polish Information Of‹ce to UNRRA Director, 7 February 1946; Polish
Information Of‹ce to UNRRA Headquarters, 20 February 1946, UNA, UNRRA,
3.0.11.3.3, Box 19, Polish Information Of‹ce.
6. Kirchmann, “‘They Are Coming for Freedom,’” 163–64, 190 fn 157.
7. Polish Information Of‹ce to UNRRA Headquarters, 20 February 1946,
UNA, UNRRA, 3.0.11.3.3, Box 19, Polish Information Of‹ce.
8. Memorandum from Paul E. Moeller to Acting Director, Intelligence Divi-
sion, 20 April 1948, NACP, OMGB ID, Box 163, c. DPs—Polish.
9. “Do henezy i rostu Lihy U.P.V.,” Litopys Ukraïns’koho Politv’iaznia 1, no. 1
(April 1946): 39–40.
10. “Statut Lihy Ukraïns’kykh Politychnykh V’iazniv,” [August 1947], UVU,
Fond LUPV.
11. Mirchuk, U nimets’kykh mlynakh, 223–36; Marunchak, Ukraïns’ki polity-
chni v’iazni, 261.
12. U.S. Civil Censorship Submission A-47-16218, 14 July 1947; memorandum
from Donald R. Duffy to the Of‹cer in Charge, 4 August 1947, NACP, RG 260,
OMGB, LD, Box 171, Political Parties (Misc.).
13. Volodymyr Maruniak, Ukraïns’ka emigratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstriï po

Druhii svitovii viini, vol. 2: Roky 1952–1975 (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo imeni Oleny Telihy,
1998), 86.
14. “Do henezy i rostu Lihy U.P.V.”
15. “Chlenstvo Lihy UPV i ioho partiini perekonannia,” Politv’iazen’ 2 (April
1946): 3. See also “Prohram zapysiv martyrolohiv,” Politv’iazen’ 2 (April 1946).
16. Yurkevich, “Ukrainian Nationalists and DP Politics,” 136.
17. “Stanovyshche chlenstva i upravy Lihy UPV do Tovarystva Ukraïns’kykh
Politychnykh V’iazniv (TUPV),” Politv’iazen’ 2 (April 1946).
18. Association of Ukrainian Political Prisoners to Central Representation of
the Ukrainian Emigration, 8 March 1948, UVU, Fond LUPV.
19. Maruniak, Ukraïns’ka emigratsiia, 86.
21. “Persha konferentsiia predstavnykiv politv’iazniv obiednanykh v LUPV,”
Politv’iazen’ 3 (May 1946). See also “A bil’shoï liubovy nemaie, khto dushu svoiu
viddaie za druziv svoïkh . . . (Pershyi den’ kongresu Lihy UPV),” Politv’iazen’ 1
(March 1946): 27.
22. Paladii Osynka, Al’bum politv’iaznia (n.p., 1946), 4.
23. On the red triangle as symbol of authenticity, see also Hoffmann,
“Auschwitz im visuellen Gedächtnis,” 235.
24. Pettiss, After the Shooting Stopped, 109 fn 24.
25. See the fascinating photographs in Musiol, Dachau. On a similar situation
among French survivors, see Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation, 215.
26. See Franciszek J. Proch, Poland’s Way of the Cross, 1939–1945 (New York:
Polish Association of Former Political Prisoners of Nazi and Soviet Concentration
Camps, 1987), 63–64.
27. On art about the concentration camps, which also frequently comes under
the heading of Holocaust art, see Janet Blatter and Sybil Milton, Art of the Holo-
caust (New York: Rutledge, 1981); Ziva Amishai-Maisels, “The Complexities of
Witnessing,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 2, no. 1 (1987); Detlef Hoffmann,
“Auschwitz im visuellen Gedächtnis. Das Chaos des Verbrechens und die symbol-
ische Ordnung der Bilder,” in Auschwitz: Geschichte, Rezeption und Wirkung, ed.
Fritz Bauer Institut (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1996).
28. Jerzy Zielezinski, K.Z. Album (Munich: Wydawn. “Slowo Polskie,” 1946);
George Zielezinski, 24 Drawings from the Concentration Camps in Germany (Mu-
nich: F. Bruckmann, 1946). Some drawings appear in both albums.
29. Pettiss, After the Shooting Stopped, 169.
30. Zielezinski, K.Z. Album.
31. I borrow the phrase “martyrological idiom” from Jonathan Huener. On the
uses of martyrdom in different postwar European countries, see Huener,
Auschwitz, 29, 47–58; Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation, chap. 12; Sarah
Farmer, Martyred Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-
Glane (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 87–88; Judt, “The Past Is
Another Country,” 298–300.
32. Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal
Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 69.
33. Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation, 211–12.

34. On messianism in nineteenth-century Polish nationalism, see Porter, When
Nationalism Began to Hate, 27–29.
35. Huener, Auschwitz, 47.
36. “Cud wyzwolenia,” in Glos Polski 2 (n.d.), AKZD, camp newspaper collec-
tion.
37. George S. N. Luckyj, Young Ukraine: The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and
Methodius in Kiev, 1845–1847 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991);
Volodymyr Miiakovsky, “Shevchenko in the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and
Methodius,” in Shevchenko and the Critics, 1861–1980, ed. George S. N. Luckyj
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).
38. “Z nahody stvorennia Naukovo-Doslidnoho Instytutu Ukraïns’koï Mar-
tyrolohiï,” Politv’iazen’ 2 (April 1946).
39. “Statut Lihy Ukraïns’kykh Politychnykh V’iazniv.”
40. Tovarystvo Ukraïns’kykh Politychnykh V’iazniv, V pam’iat’ poliahlykh
ukrans’kykh politychnykh v’iazniv (n.p., 1947), 10.
41. “A bil’shoï liubovy nemaie,” 13.
42. Tovarystvo Ukraïns’kykh Politychnykh V’iazniv, V pam’iat’, 9.
43. Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation, 269.
44. Ibid., 270–71.
45. V. D. Poremskii, “Pamiati geroev,” in Strategiia antibol’shevitskoi emigratsii,
69.
46. A. Neimirok, Dorogi i vstrechi (Frankfurt am Main: Posev, 1984).
47. V. D. Poremskii, “Posleslovie,” in Neimirok, Dorogi i vstrechi, 128.
48. Protocol of the second congress of the Central Representation.
49. Geoff Eley, “Legacies of Antifascism: Constructing Democracy in Postwar
Europe,” New German Critique 67 (Winter 1996). On the concentration camps
speci‹cally, see Eugen Kogon, “Der politische Untergang des europäischen Wider-
standes,” Frankfurter Hefte 4, no. 5 (May 1949): 405.
50. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991
(New York: Vintage, 1994), 161.
51. Mazower, Dark Continent, 202.
52. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, 144.
53. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme, Myth,
Reality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 146.
54. Marcuse, Nazi Crimes, 273.
55. Dan Diner, “On the Ideology of Antifascism,” New German Critique 67
(Winter 1996): 125.
56. “Two Duties and One Principle: Friendship, Brotherhood, and No Poli-
tics,” AKZD, 7449.
57. On this issue, see the IPC ‹les in AKZD, A527. These con›icts are also am-
ply documented in Benz, “Zwischen Befreiung und Heimkehr.”
58. George [Jerzy] Szwede, preface to Zielezinski, K.Z. Album. Emphasis in
original.
59. Oskar Müller to Mayor of Dachau, 30 May 1945, AKZD, ‹le on IPC; Cies-
lik to KZ-Betreuungsstelle Dachau, n.d., AKZD, Nachlaß (NL) Cieslik.
60. “Geschichte des Internationalen Informations-Büros,” DP Express, 22 June

1946; “Krótka historia Miedzynarodowego Biura Informacyjnego,” n.d.; AKZD,
NL Cieslik.
61. Marcuse, Nazi Crimes, 274; Marcuse, Legacies of Dachau, 65–66.
62. The IIO installed the ‹rst exhibit about the concentration camp. See Mar-
cuse, Nazi Crimes, 275–79; Marcuse, Legacies of Dachau, 170–71. On the commem-
orations, see the untitled report on memorial ceremonies, n.d., AKZD, NL Cieslik.
64. Walter Cieslik to KZ-Betreuungsstelle Dachau, [1946], AKZD, NL Cieslik.
65. Ibid.
66. Lörcher to Betreuungstellen in Bayern, 24 May 1946, AKZD, NL Cieslik.
67. KZ-Betreuungsstelle Dachau to Bayerisches Rotes Kreuz, Abteilung für
politisch Verfolgte, 2 June 1946, AKZD, NL Cieslik.
68. International Information Of‹ce to UNRRA [German version], [7 May
1946]; International Information Of‹ce to UNRRA [English version], [7 May
1946], AKZD, NL Cieslik.
69. International Information Of‹ce to Hussarek, 20 May 1946; Hussarek to
Cieslik, 23 May 1946, AKZD, NL Cieslik.
70. “Die Zusammenarbeit mit der UNRRA,” 20 August 1946; “Finanzielle
Lage des Büros,” 20 August 1946, AKZD, NL Cieslik.
71. D. Arruda to District Accountant, 27 August 1946, AKZD, NL Cieslik;
“Krótka historia.”
72. [Untitled list of Polish employees], n.d., AKZD, NL Cieslik.
73. Peter Fibich, “Gedenkstätten, Mahnmale und Ehrenfriedhöfe für die Ver-
folgten des Nationalsozialismus. Ihre landschaftsarchitektonische Gestaltung in
Deutschland 1945 bis 1960” (PhD diss., TU Dresden, 1998), 61.
74. Marunchak, Ukraïns’ki politychni v’iazni, 96, 229–31. The window is repro-
duced on page 230.
75. The Sich Ri›emen were a military unit of the Ukrainian People’s Republic,
the short-lived independent Ukrainian state created in 1917.
76. On the Belgian window, see Hildegard Vieregg, “Die Sühnekapelle ‘Jesus im
Kerker,’” in Begegnungen mit Flossenbürg. Beiträge, Dokumente, Interviews, Zeug-
nisse Überlebender, ed. Hildegard Vieregg, Willi Eisele, and Theo Emmer (Weiden:
Spintler, 1998), 164.
77. Memorandum from Regensburg Detachment, OMGB, Information Con-
trol Division, 2 May 1946, NACP RG 260, OMGB ID, Box 104, 4 Concentration
Camps.
78. “Politychni v’iazni Dachau sviatkuiut’ pershu richnytsiu ïkhn’oho zvil’nen-
nia,” Politv’iazen’ 3 (May 1946): 4.
79. A typical expression of this sentiment was the announcement made by the
International Prisoners’ Committee of Dachau on the departure of one of its lead-
ing members: “He has ‹nished his days in Dachau. Now he reenters in his country
to work and to participate in its great effort of reconstruction” (“Communique No.
31,” 5 June 1945, AKZD, ‹le on IPC).
80. Walter Lachmann, speech at meeting of political and racial persecutees, 14
November 1946, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 12, 15 Political Victims.
81. Ibid.
82. Sofsky, Order of Terror, 123.
83. Rovan, Contes de Dachau, 73.
84. Nico Rost, Goethe in Dachau. Ein Tagebuch (Munich: List, 2001). Com-
ments about the Poles can be found on pages 43, 171, 174, 176, 277, 301, and 304.
85. Susanne Kerckhoff, “Ein offener Brief an Nico Rost. Über polen-
feindliche Tendenzen in dem Erlebnisbuch Goethe im Dachau,” in Rost, Goethe im
Dachau, 332.
86. Ibid., 334
87. Ibid., 335.
88. Stephan Hermlin, “Ein offener Brief an die falsche Adresse,” in Rost,
Goethe im Dachau, 339. See also Rost, “Für das Verständnis der Völker. Antwort
auf einen offenen Brief,” in Rost, Goethe im Dachau, 345.
89. “Do henezy i rostu Lihy U.P.V.”
90. Pasiczniak personal ‹le, BayHStA, Bestand UNRRA-Universität 160;
Memorandum re: “Notes on Anti-Bolshevistic organizations,” 5 November 1946,
NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Box 117, 65A Propaganda—Anti-Russian.
91. Mirchuk, In the German Mills, 194–95.
92. International Union of Former Political Prisoners to John H. Whiting, 18
December 1945, UNA, UNRRA, 3.0.11.3.0, Displaced Persons—General.
93. “Memorandum Tsentral’noï Mizhnarodn’oï Uniï Politychnykh V’iazniv,”
11.
94. See the articles on the congress in Politv’iazen’ 1.
95. Andrzej Klossowski, Anatol Girs: Artysta ksiazki: Warszawa, Monachium,
Detroit, West Chester‹eld, 2nd ed. (Warsaw: Biblioteka Narodowa, 1989), 36; Ali-
cia Nitecki, telephone conversation with author, 9 June 2003.
97. Borowski to Rundo, 21 January 1946, in Postal Indiscretions, 94.
98. This point has also been stressed in retrospect by both Siedlecki and Ol-
szewski. See Siedlecki, Beyond Lost Dreams, 232; Grant McCool, “New Transla-
tion Tells of Nazi Depravation,” Internet Anti-Fascist, 11 July 2000.
99. In a June 1947 letter to Borowski, Girs suggested that this was the book’s
larger historical signi‹cance. “The interest in this book as a book about the camps
is one thing,” he wrote, “but it also has other qualities and these need to be stressed.
It battles fascist ideology. From this perspective, the book continues to be rele-
vant.” Cited in the labels accompanying the exhibition Anatol Girs.
100. On the centrality of the visual in Borowski’s Auschwitz stories, see Ernst
van Alphen, “Caught by Images: On the Role of Visual Imprints in Holocaust Tes-
timonies,” Journal of Visual Culture 1, no. 2 (August 2002).
101. Siedlecki et al., We Were in Auschwitz, 3–4.
102. Ibid., 4.
103. Milosz, The Captive Mind, chap. 5.
104. Siedlecki et al., We Were in Auschwitz, 65.
105. Ibid., 1–2.
106. Ibid., 4.
107. This point has also been made by Alicia Nitecki. See her comments in
C. L. Sebrell, “Art of the Book: The Work of Anatol Girs,” Journal of Antiques and
Collectibles (September 2002).
108. I am grateful to Barbara Girs for showing me copies bound in this manner.
109. Jacek Czarnik, “Books and Senses,” trans. Jolanta Wróbel, EBIB Bulletin
10 (2002), http://ebib.oss.wroc.pl/english/grant/czarnik.php (accessed 6 June 2003).
110. See J. I. Targ, ed., Polska Na Morzu (Warsaw: Glowna Ksiegarnia Woj-
skowa, 1935).
111. I am grateful to Ziggy Nitecki for suggesting this association.
112. Girs, cited in Klossowski, Anatol Girs, 45.
113. Siedlecki, Beyond Lost Dreams, 235. See also Borowski to Rundo, 21 Janu-
ary 1946, in Postal Indiscretions, 94.
114. Milosz, The Captive Mind, 125–26; Kott, introduction to Borowski, This
Way for the Gas, 18–19; Nitecki, telephone conversation, 9 June 2003.
115. Nitecki, telephone conversation, 9 June 2003.
116. Sebrell, “Art of the Book.”
CHAPTER 8
1. Carolyn J. Dean, “Recent French Discourses on Stalinism, Nazism, and

‘Exorbitant’ Jewish Memory,” History and Memory 18, no. 1 (2006).
2. Cohen, “The Politics of Recognition,” 126.
3. Polish Association of Ex-Prisoners Persecuted by Nazis Section Gablin-
gen to Van Wagoner, n.d.; Polish Association of Ex-Prisoners Persecuted by Nazis
Section Gablingen to Lucius D. Clay, 21 October 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS
AG File 1949, 383.7 (vol. 1), Box 591.
4. Combined Routing-Information-Filing Form, Subject “Ltr. fr. Myst-
kowski Miecyzlaw to Gen Clay,” 31 January 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS AG
File 1949, 383.7 (vol. 1), Box 591.
5. Ezekiel L. Glazier to Public Welfare and DP Branch, CAD, OMGB, 16
November 1948; Albert C. Schweizer to Chief, Displaced Persons Branch, CAD,
OMGUS, 17 January 1949, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, LD, Box 169, Clubs Jan–July
49 331.2. The quote is from Schweizer.
6. See, for example, “Intensive Hilfe für jene Personen, die nicht heimbe-
fördert werden können, ist geplant,” DP Express, 11 August 1945; Biuletyn Ra-
diowy/Radio Bulletin 17, 10 October 1945, BISO ZespólZ Dachau A700, teczka 22.
7. Groups representing Polish DPs also seized on these implications. See
Kirchmann, “‘They Are Coming for Freedom,’” 81.
8. Polish Information Of‹ce to UNRRA Team 108, 3 December 1945, UNA,
UNRRA, S-0424-0027-05.
9. Polish Information Of‹ce to Military Government Munich, 20 December
1945, UNA, UNRRA, S-0424-0027-05. Original as-is.
11. Polish Union of the Former Political Prisoners, Section Murnau to
Wielezynski, 22 June 1946, UNA, UNRRA, 3.0.11.3.3, Box 12, District 5—District
5 Headquarters—Director’s Of‹ce—Munich-Pasing—Correspondence 1/10/45-
31/3/47. The hotel on Lake Starnberg is a reference to the Jewish DP camp of

Felda‹ng.
12. Union of Polish Former Political Convicts Victims of Nazi-Regime to
Auerbach, 27 January 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, CAD, Political Affairs, Box
118, Correspondence Political Affairs.
13. Auerbach to Kneuer, 22 January 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, CAD, Po-
litical Affairs, Box 118, Correspondence Political Affairs.
14. Union of Polish Former Political Convicts Victims of Nazi-Regime to
Auerbach, 27 January 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, CAD, Political Affairs, Box
118, Correspondence Political Affairs.
15. Ibid.
16. International Committee of Political Emigrants and DPs, “Relations of Dr.
Auerbach and the State Commission for racial, religious, and political persecutees
with DPs,” [January 1948], NACP, RG 260, OMGB, CAD, Political Affairs, Box
118, Correspondence Political Affairs. This statement echoes a memorandum com-
posed by the International Committee two years earlier, which suggested that the
poor reception DP politicals received at German care centers was due to the fact
that the centers were run by German Communists. See “Memorandum Tsen-
tral’noï Mizhnarodn’oï Uniï Politychnykh V’iazniv.”
17. Mirchuk, In the German Mills, 200.
18. Interestingly, what Mirchuk neglects to address is the previous position of
the Ukrainians. If they were now below the Jews, where had they been during the
war? Mirchuk’s elision unwittingly opens the question of Ukrainian participation
in the persecution and extermination of European Jewry.
19. Auerbach to Miniclier, 26 January 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, CAD, Po-
litical Affairs, Box 118, Correspondence Political Affairs.
20. Auerbach to Union of Former Political Con›icts [Polish Association], 28
January 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, CAD, Political Affairs, Box 118, Corre-
spondence Political Affairs.
21. File memo, Public Welfare Branch, 18 November 1947; Public Welfare
Branch to Civil Administration Division, 12 December 1947; Public Welfare
Branch to Legal Advice Branch, 12 December 1947; Legal Advice Branch to Public
Welfare Branch, 19 December 1947; Political Activities Branch to Legal Division, 1
March 1948, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, CAD, Political Affairs, Box 118, Correspon-
dence Political Affairs.
22. Moeller to Acting Director, Intelligence Division, 20 April 1948.
23. Aster to Harnden, 3 August 1946, NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Of‹ce of the
Director, Box 12, 15 Political Victims. See also Goschler, Wiedergutmachung, 88–89,
134–35; “Victims of Fascism in Germany Today.”
24. Polish Association of Ex-Prisoners of German Concentration Camps Per-
secuted by Nazi Regime, Section Gablingen, to Van Wagoner, [October?] 1948,
NACP, RG 260, OMGUS AG File 1949, 383.7 (vol. 1), Box 591.
25. Mirchuk, U nimets’kykh mlynakh, 195.
26. Arbeitsgemeinschaft to Adenauer, 20 September 1950.
27. [Otmar Pirkmajer], “Zur Frage der Wiedergutmachung für ehemalige poli-
tische Häftlinge, Verfolgte vom Nazi-Regime” (Munich: n.p., 1947), 12. A copy can
be found in AN, AJ 43, 1164. Pirkmajer was a Slovene jurist and survivor of
Dachau. He may have written the memorandum individually or with other mem-
bers of the group, who are identi‹ed as “Poles, Ukrainians, Yugoslavs, Balts, Belo-
russians, etc.”
28. Ibid., 10.
29. Ibid., 17.
30. Luczak, Polacy w okupowanych Niemczech, 112.
31. [Tadeusz] Zgainski, “Proposals Concerning the Restitution Legislative,”
[June 1947], NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box 165, 383.7 Jewish UNDP.
33. Zgainski, “Proposals Concerning the Restitution Legislative.”
34. Polish Assn to Van Wagoner, [circa October 1948], NACP, RG 260,
OMGUS, AG File 1949, 383.7 (vol. 1), Box 591.
35. [Pirkmajer], “Zur Frage der Wiedergutmachung,” 11.
36. On this issue, see chap. 2.
37. On the comparable situation in postwar France and Belgium, see Lagrou,
The Legacy of Nazi Occupation.
38. Konstantin Streletzky and Leon Korotty to [OMGB], 9 October 1946,
NACP, RG 260, OMGB, ID, Director’s Intelligence Records, Box 8, 4 Concentra-
tion Camps.
40. Ibid., 12.
41. Ibid., 17.
42. Ibid., 5.
43. Ibid., 7.
45. Zgainski to Miniclier, 2 June 1947, NACP, RG 260, OMGUS, CAD, Box
165, 383.7 Jewish UNDP.
48. Streletzky and Korotty to [OMGB], 9 October 1946.
49. Representatives of National Committees of DP’s and Refugees in Ger-
many, “Memorandum concerning the indemni‹cation claims of politically perse-
cuted DP’s and Refugees,” November 1949, AN, AJ 43, 883/44/9, vol. 4.
50. Zgainski to Miniclier, 2 June 1947.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
56. Wolff to Arbeitsgemeinschaft der ausländischen Politisch Verfolgten, 26
October 1950, BAK, B 126, Band 12358. See also Dehler to Arbeitsgemeinschaft, 6
October 1950.
57. League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners to Schäffer, 15 November 1950,
BAK, B 126, Band 12358.

59. Ibid.
60. For an overview of the criminal charges at Nuremberg, see Michael R.
Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945–46: A Documentary History
(Boston: Bedford, 1997).
62. Ibid., 15.
63. Ibid., 6.
64. In this respect, Pirkmajer’s proposal reminds one of the Nansen passport,
which provided stateless individuals with a document akin to a “real,” i.e., state-
sanctioned, passport and thus institutionalized statelessness.
65. Representatives of National Committees, “Memorandum concerning the
indemni‹cation claims.” The memorandum was signed by the following national
committees: Czechoslovakian Alliance of Political Refugees (Ludwigsburg), Es-
tonian Central Committee (Geislingen/Steige), Hungarian National Committee
(Munich), Latvian Central Committee (Augsburg), Lithuanian Central Committee
(Munich), Polish Union (Ludwigsburg), Central Representation of the Russian
Emigration (Munich), Whiteruthenian (Byelorussian) National Committee
(Rosenheim), Ukrainian Central Relief Committee (Augsburg).
67. Mirchuk, In the German Mills, 209–10.
68. Schirilla, Wiedergutmachung für Nationalgeschädigte, 19–20. See also
Luczak, Polacy w okupowanych Niemczech, 105; Maruniak, Ukraïns’ka emigratsiia,
86.
69. Herbert, “Nicht entschädigungsfähig?” 181.
71. Paul Grünewald, “Von Häftlingskomitees und antifaschistischen Aus-
schüssen zur VVN,” in Von Buchenwald bis Hasselbach. Organisierter Antifaschis-
mus 1945 bis heute, ed. Präsidium der VVN-Bund der Antifaschisten (Cologne:
Röderberg, 1987), 19.
72. Raymond Pearson, National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848–1945 (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 162.
74. Sofsky, Order of Terror, 123.
75. “Rivniaiem pravdi puti (Druhyi den’ kongresu Lihy UPV),” Politv’iazen’ 1
(March 1946): 22.
77. Paul Kinnare, “Narrative Report for September, 1949,” n.d., AN, AJ 43,
766, Monthly Narrative Report. Germany. U.S. Zone, June 1949–December 1949;
Alex de Lipthay, “Memo, Conference of DP lawyers in Munich on 10 May 1949,”
n.d.; “Report on Area Legal Of‹cers’ Meeting held on 20th September 1949 at
Zone Headquarters,” n.d., AN, AJ 43, 879/44/8.
78. Hugh Hinchchliffe, “Narrative Report for November 1949, (ix) Legal and
Political Protection,” n.d., AN, AJ 43, 766, Monthly Narrative Report. Germany.
U.S. Zone, June 1949–December 1949.
79. Hugh Hinchchliffe, “Narrative Report for January 1950, (ix) Legal and Po-
litical Protection,” n.d., and Hinchchliffe, “Narrative Report for February 1950,
(ix) Legal and Political Protection,” n.d., AN, AJ 43, 766, Monthly Narrative Re-
port. Germany. U.S. Zone, June 1949–December 1949.
80. League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners to Dehler, 15 November 1950,
BAK, B 126, Band 12358.
CONCLUSION
1. On this issue, see also Goschler, Wiedergutmachung, 136.

2. Stern, “The Historic Triangle,” 69.
3. On Polish DPs, see Kirchmann, “‘They Are Coming for Freedom’”;
Jaroszynska-Kirchmann, The Exile Mission. On Ukrainian DPs, see Mudry,
“Nova ukraïns’ka emigratsiia”; Lalande, “‘Building a Home Abroad.’” The per-
sistence of Polish, Ukrainian, and other non-Jewish DP organizations is also dis-
cussed in passing in Stepien, Der alteingesessene Fremde, 117–26.
4. Schwarz, The Redeemers, 305–7.
5. Lewinsky, Displaced Poets, 234; Beth B. Cohen, Case Closed: Holocaust
Survivors in Postwar America (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2007).
Bibliography
ARCHIVAL COLLECTIONS
National Archives and Records Service, College Park, Maryland (NACP)

RG 84: Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State
RG 260: Records of U.S. Occupation Headquarters, World War II
RG 319: Records of the Army Staff
RG 331: Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World
War II
RG 338: Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organiza-
tions
RG 466: Records of the Of‹ce of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington (USHMM)
RG-68.066M: Selected Records from the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee Archives, Jerusalem
United Nations Archives, New York (UNA)
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Papers
YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York (YIVO)
RG 294.1: Leo Schwarz Papers
RG 294.2: Records of Displaced Persons Camps and Centers in Germany
University of Illinois Archives, Urbana, Illinois
Boris I. Balinsky Memoir
Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (BAK)
B 126: Bundesministerium der Finanzen
Z 35: Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen
Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich (BayHStA)
Bestand Bayerische Staatskanzlei
Bestand Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht, Kultus, Wissenschaft
und Kunst
Bestand Landes›üchtlingsverwaltung
Bestand Ministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Familie, Frauen und
Gesundheit
Bestand UNRRA-Universität
Stadtarchiv München, Munich
Bestand Bürgermeister und Rat
327
328 Bibliography
Archiv des Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich (IfZ)

Fi 01: Sammlung Wolfgang Jacobmeyer
Archives of the Ukrainian Free University, Munich (UVU)
Fond Liha Ukraïns’kykh Politychnykh V’iazniv
Fond Tsentral’ne Predstavnytstvo Ukraïns’koï Emihratsiï v Nimechchyni
Archiv der KZ-Gedenkstätte Dachau, Dachau (AKZD)
Files of the International Prisoners’ Committee Dachau
Files of the International Prisoners’ Committee Dachau-Allach
Nachlaß Walter Cieslik
Archives nationales, Paris (AN)
AJ 43: Organisation internationale pour les réfugiés
Biblioteka Instytutu Slaskiego, Opole (BISO)
Zespól Dachau A 700
PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES
Blessin, Georg, Hans-Georg Ehrig, and Hans Wilden. Bundesentschädigungsge-

setze. Kommentar. 2nd ed. Munich: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1957.
Borowski, Tadeusz. Le monde de pierre. Trans. Erik Veaux. Paris: Calmann-Lévy,
1964.
Borowski, Tadeusz. Postal Indiscretions: The Correspondence of Tadeusz Borowski.
Ed. Tadeusz Drewnowski. Trans. Alicia Nitecki. Evanston: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 2007.
Borowski, Tadeusz. Die steinerne Welt. Erzählungen. Trans. Vera Cerny. Munich:
R. Piper, 1963.
Borowski, Tadeusz. This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen, and Other Stories.
Trans. Barbara Vedder. London: Jonathan Cape, 1967.
Borowski, Tadeusz. Utwory zebrane. Ed. Jerzy Andrzejewski. Vol. 2, Proza
1945–1947. Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczny, 1954.
Brownlie, Ian. Basic Documents on Human Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
Der Ratgeber für heimatlose Ausländer. Rechte und P›ichten nach dem Gesetz über
die Rechtsstellung heimatloser Ausländer im Bundesgebiet vom 25. April 1951.
Bonn: Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 1952.
Fesenko, Tat’iana. Povest’ krivykh let. New York: Novoe Russkoe Slovo, 1963.
Gillen, J. F. J. State and Local Government in West Germany, 1945–1953. N.p.: His-
torical Division, Of‹ce of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1953.
Grabinski, Mieczyslaw. Dyplomacja w Dachau . . . Dachau: Wydawnictwo “Slowa
Polskiego,” 1946.
Gringauz, Samuel. “Jewish Destiny as the DP’s See It.” Commentary 4, no. 6 (De-
cember 1947).
Haller, Roman. “Davidstern und Lederhose.” Eine Kindheit in der Nachkriegszeit.
Zurich: Pendo, 2001.
Haulot, Arthur. J’ai voulu vivre. Dachau 1943–45/Journal de camp. Brussels: Vie
Ouvrière, 1987.
Bibliography 329
Holborn, Louise W. The International Refugee Organization, A Specialized Agency

of the United Nations: Its History and Work, 1946–1952. London: Oxford Uni-
Ilnytzkyj, Roman. The Free Press of the Suppressed Nations. Augsburg: Associa-
tion of the Free Press of Central and Eastern Europe, Baltic and Balkan States
in Germany, 1950.
Institut für Besatzungsfragen. Das DP-Problem: Eine Studie über die ausländischen
Flüchtlinge in Deutschland. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1950.
Klemmé, Marvin. The Inside Story of UNRRA: An Experience in Internationalism;
A First Hand Report on the Displaced People of Europe. New York: Lifetime
Editions, 1949.
Knysh, Zinovii. Na porozi nevidomoho (spohady z 1945 roku). Toronto: Sribna
Surma, 1963.
Marunchak, Mykhailo H. Ukraïns’ki politychni v’iazni u natsysts’kykh kontsentrat-
siinykh taborakh. Winnipeg: Svitova liga ukraïns’kykh politychnykh v’iazniv,
1996.
McNeill, Margaret. By the Rivers of Babylon: A Story of Relief Work Among the
Displaced Persons of Europe. London: Bannisdale Press, 1950.
Mirchuk, Petro. In the German Mills of Death, 1941–1945. 2nd ed. Washington,
DC: Survivors of the Holocaust, 1985.
Mirchuk, Petro. U nimets’kykh mlynakh smerty. Spomyny z pobutu v nimets’kykh
tiurmakh i kontslaherakh 1941–1945. New York: Ukraïns’kyi Soiuz Politychnykh
V’iazniv, 1957.
Mudry, Vasyl. “Nova ukraïns’ka emigratsiia.” In Ukraïntsi u vil’nomu sviti:
iuvileina knyha Ukraïns’koho Narodnoho Soiuzu, 1894–1954, ed. Luka Myshuha
and A. Drahan. Jersey City: Vydannia Ukraïns’koho Narodnoho Soiuzu, 1954.
Osynka, Paladii. Al’bum politv’iaznia. N.p., 1946.
Pettiss, Susan T. After the Shooting Stopped: The Story of an UNRRA Welfare
Worker in Germany, 1945–1947. With Lynne Taylor. Victoria, BC: Trafford,
2004.
Pinson, Koppel. “Jewish Life in Liberated Germany.” Jewish Social Studies 9, no. 2
(April 1947).
Poremskii, V. D. Strategiia antibol’shevitskoi emigratsii: izbrannye stat’i 1934–1997.
Moscow: Posev, 1998.
Proch, Franciszek J. Poland’s Way of the Cross, 1939–1945. New York: Polish Asso-
ciation of Former Political Prisoners of Nazi and Soviet Concentration Camps,
1987.
Rost, Nico. Goethe in Dachau. Ein Tagebuch. Munich: List, 2001.
Rovan, Joseph. Contes de Dachau. Paris: Julliard, 1987.
Saburova, Irina. Dipilogicheskaia azbuka. Munich: n.p., 1946.
Sack, Joel. Dawn after Dachau. New York: Shengold, 1990.
Schochet, Simon. Felda‹ng. Vancouver, BC: November House, 1983.
Siedlecki, Janusz Nel. Beyond Lost Dreams. Edinburgh: Pentland, 1994.
Siedlecki, Janusz Nel, Krystyn Olszewski, and Tadeusz Borowski. We Were in
Auschwitz. Trans. Alicia Nitecki. New York: Welcome Rain Publishers, 2000.
330 Bibliography
Sofroniv Levytskyi, Vasyl’. Respublika za drotamy (Zapysky skytal’tsia). Toronto:

Novyi Shliakh, 1983.
Verstandig, Mark. I Rest My Case. Trans. Felicity Verstandig. Evanston: North-
western University Press, 2002.
Wilden, Hans, and Martin Klückmann. Wiedergutmachungsgesetz. Gesetztext und
systematische Darstellung. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1950.
Zielezinski, Jerzy [George]. K.Z. Album. Munich: Wydawn. “Slowo Polskie,” 1946.
Zielezinski, Jerzy [George]. 24 Drawings from the Concentration Camps in Germany.
Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1946.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Abramsky, Chimen, Maciej Jachimczyk, and Antony Polonsky, eds. The Jews in
Poland. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel
Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
Agamben, Giorgio. Means without End: Notes on Politics. Trans. Vincenzo Binetti
and Cesare Casarino. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
Ahonen, Pertti. After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945–1990.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Aleksiun, Natalia. Dokad dalej? Ruch syjonistycny w Polsce (1944–1950). Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo TRIO, 2002.
Altmann, Peter, ed. Hauptsache Frieden. Kriegsende, Befreiung, Neubeginn
1945–1949: Vom antifaschistischen Konsens zum Grundgesetz. Frankfurt am
Main: Röderberg, 1985.
Altshuler, Mordechai. “Escape and Evacuation of Soviet Jews at the Time of the
Nazi Invasion.” In The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the
Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941–1945,
ed. Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe,
1993.
Amishai-Maisels, Ziva. “The Complexities of Witnessing.” Holocaust and Geno-
cide Studies 2, no. 1 (1987).
Andreyev, Catherine. Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement: Soviet Reality
and Émigré Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Andreyev, Catherine, and Ivan Savicky. Russia Abroad: Prague and the Russian Di-
aspora, 1918–1938. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1973.
Armstrong, John. “Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist
Variant in Eastern Europe.” Journal of Modern History 40 (September 1968).
Armstrong, John. Ukrainian Nationalism. 3rd ed. Englewood, CO: Ukrainian Aca-
demic Press, 1990.
Bade, Klaus J. Ausländer—Aussiedler—Asyl: eine Bestandaufnahme. Munich:
Beck, 1994.
Bade, Klaus J., ed. Deutsche im Ausland—Fremde in Deutschland: Migration in
Geschichte und Gegenwart. Munich: Beck, 1992.
Bibliography 331
Bade, Klaus J. “Einführung: Zuwanderung und Eingliederung in Deutschland seit

dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.” In Fremde im Land: Zuwanderung und Eingliederung in
Raum Niedersachsen seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Klaus J. Bade. Osnabruck:
Rasch, 1997.
Ballinger, Pamela. History in Exile: Memory and Identity at the Borders of the
Balkans. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Bammer, Angelika, ed. Displacements: Cultural Identities in Question. Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press, 1994.
Bankier, David, ed. The Jews Are Coming Back: The Return of the Jews to Their Coun-
tries of Origin after WWII. New York: Berghahn/Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2005.
Barish, Louis, ed. Rabbis in Uniform: The Story of the American Jewish Military
Chaplain. New York: Jonathan David, 1962.
Baron, Lawrence. “The Holocaust and American Public Memory, 1945–1960.”
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 17, no. 1 (Spring 2003).
Baron, Nick, and Peter Gatrell. “Population Displacement, State-Building, and
Social Identity in the Lands of the Former Russian Empire, 1917–23.” Kritika:
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 41, no. 1 (Winter 2003).
Bartov, Omer. Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000.
Bauer, Yehuda. Flight and Rescue: Brichah. New York: Random House, 1970.
Bauer, Yehuda. “The Initial Organization of the Holocaust Survivors in Bavaria.”
Yad Vashem Studies 8 (1970).
Baur, Johannes. Die russische Kolonie in München 1900–1945. Deutsch-russische
Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998.
Benz, Wolfgang. “Zwischen Befreiung und Heimkehr. Das Dachauer Interna-
tionale Häftlings-Komitee und die Verwaltung des Lagers im Mai und Juni
1945.” Dachauer Hefte 1 (1985).
Bergmann, Werner. Antisemitismus in öffentlichen Kon›iketen. Kollektives Lernen
in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik 1949–1989. Frankfurt am Main:
Campus, 1997.
Berkhoff, Karel C., and Marco Carynnyk. “The Organization of Ukrainian Na-
tionalists and Its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets’ko’s 1941
Zhyttiepys.” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 23, no. 3–4 (1999).
Bisharat, George E. “Exile to Compatriot: Transformations in the Social Identity
of Palestinian Refugees in the West Bank.” In Culture, Power, Place: Explo-
rations in Critical Anthropology, ed. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson.
Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.
Bodemann, Y. Michal. Gedächtnistheater. Die jüdische Gemeinschaft und ihre
deutsche Er‹ndung. Hamburg: Rotbuch, 1996.
Boehling, Rebecca L. A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and Economic
Recovery in Postwar Germany: Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart under U.S. Oc-
cupation, 1945–1949. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1996.
Boltanski, Luc. The Making of a Class: Cadres in French Society. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Borgwardt, Elizabeth. A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human
Rights. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
332 Bibliography
Boshyk, Yury, ed. Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath. Ed-
monton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1986.
Bosquet, Gisèle L. Behind the Bamboo Hedge: The Impact of Homeland Politics in
the Parisian Vietnamese Community. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1991.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Trans.
Richard Nice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power. Ed. John B. Thompson. Trans.
Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1991.
Bourdieu, Pierre. The Logic of Practice. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990.
Brenner, Michael. After the Holocaust: Rebuilding Jewish Lives in Postwar Ger-
many. Trans. Barbara Harshav. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Brenner, Michael. Geschichte des Zionismus. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002.
Brodwin, Stanley. “History and Martyrological Tragedy: The Jewish Experience in
Sholem Asch and Andre Schwarz-Bart.” Twentieth Century Literature 40, no. 1
(Spring 1994).
Brubaker, Rogers. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in
the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Burds, Jeffrey. “The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948.” The Carl
Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies 1501, Center for Russian and
East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 2001.
Burianek, Otto. “From Liberator to Guardian: The U.S. Army and the Displaced
Persons in Munich, 1945.” PhD diss., Emory University, 1992.
Caglar, Ayse S. “Constraining Metaphors and the Transnationalisation of Spaces
in Berlin.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 27, no. 4 (October 2001).
Canoy, Jose Raymund. The Discreet Charm of the Police State: The Landpolizei and
the Transformation of Bavaria, 1945–1965. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
Carruthers, Susan L. Cold War Captives: Imprisonment, Escape, and Brainwashing.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.
Chinyaeva, Elena. Russians Outside Russia: The Émigré Community in Czechoslo-
vakia, 1918–1938. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001.
Clifford, James. “Traveling Cultures.” In Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg,
Cary Nelson, and Paula A. Treichler. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Cohen, Beth B. Case Closed: Holocaust Survivors in Postwar America. New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2007.
Cohen, G. Daniel. “Between Relief and Politics: Refugee Humanitarianism in Oc-
cupied Germany, 1945–1946.” Journal of Contemporary History 43, no. 3 (2008).
Cohen, G. Daniel. “Naissance d’une nation: les personnes déplacées de l’après-
guerre, 1945–1951.” Genèses 38 (March 2000).
Cohen, G. Daniel. “The Politics of Recognition: Jewish Refugees in Relief Policies
and Human Rights Debates, 1945–1950.” Immigrants and Minorities 24, no. 2
(July 2006).
Corliss, Steven. “Asylum State Responsibility for the Hostile Acts of Foreign Ex-
iles.” International Journal of Refugee Law 2, no. 2 (1990).
Bibliography 333
Dallin, Alexander. German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Poli-

cies. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.
Daniel, E. Valentine, and John Chr. Knudsen, eds. Mistrusting Refugees. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995.
Davies, Norman. God’s Playground: A History of Poland. Vol. 2, 1795 to the Pres-
ent. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
Davies, Norman, and Antony Polonsky, eds. Jews in Eastern Poland and the USSR,
1939–46. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991.
Diner, Dan. “Jewish DPs in Historical Context.” Paper presented at the workshop
“Birth of a Refugee Nation: Displaced Persons in Postwar Europe, 1945–1951,”
New York University, 20–21 April 2001.
Diner, Dan. “On the Ideology of Antifascism.” New German Critique 67 (Winter
1996).
Dinnerstein, Leonard. America and the Survivors of the Holocaust. New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1982.
Distel, Barbara, and Wolfgang Benz. Das Konzentrationslager Dachau 1933–1945.
Geschichte und Bedeutung. Munich: Bayerische Landeszentrale für Politische
Bildungsarbeit, 1994.
Dobroszycki, Lucjan. Survivors of the Holocaust in Poland: A Portrait Based on
Jewish Community Records, 1944–1947. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994.
Dvinov, Boris L. Politics of the Russian Emigration. RAND Paper P-768 (October
1955).
Dybciak, Krzysztof, ed. Polen im Exil. Eine Anthologie. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1988.
Dyczok, Marta. The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees. New York: St. Mar-
tin’s, 2000.
Eder, Angelika. Flüchtige Heimat: Jüdische displaced Persons in Landsberg am Lech
1945 bis 1950. Munich: Kommissionsverlag UNI-Druck, 1998.
Eidintas, Alfonsas. Jews, Lithuanians, and the Holocaust. Vilnius: Versus Aureus,
2003.
Eley, Geoff. “Legacies of Antifascism: Constructing Democracy in Postwar Eu-
rope.” New German Critique 67 (Winter 1996).
Elliott, Mark R. Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and American’s Role in Their
Repatriation. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982.
Elliott, Mark R. “The Soviet Repatriation Campaign.” In The Refugee Experience:
Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II, ed. Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Yury
Boshyk, and Roman Senkus. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian
Studies, University of Alberta, 1992.
Engel, David. “Palestine in the Mind of the Remnants of Polish Jewry.” Journal of
Israeli History 16, no. 3 (1995).
Engel, David. “The Reconstruction of Jewish Communal Institutions in Postwar
Poland: The Origins of the Central Committee of Polish Jews, 1944–1945.” East
European Politics and Societies 10, no. 1 (Winter 1996).
Esh, Shaul. “The Dignity of the Destroyed: Towards a De‹nition of the Period of
the Holocaust.” In The Catastrophe of European Jewry: Antecedents, History,
334 Bibliography
Re›ections: Selected Papers, ed. Yisrael Gutman and Livia Rothkirchen.

Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1976.
Fackenheim, Emil L. The Jewish Return into History: Re›ections in the Age of
Auschwitz and a New Jerusalem. New York: Schocken, 1978.
Farah, Randa. “Palestinian Refugee Camps: Reinscribing and Contesting Memory
and Space.” In Isolation: Places and Practices of Exclusion, ed. Carolyn Strange
and Alison Bashford. London: Routledge, 2003.
Féaux de la Croix, Ernst, and Helmut Rumpf. Der Werdegang des Entschädi-
gungsrechts unter national- und völkerrechtlichem und politologischem Aspekt.
Die Wiedergutmachung nationalsozialistichen Unrechts durch die Bundesre-
publik Deutschland, Band III. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1985.
Fibich, Peter. “Gedenkstätten, Mahnmale und Ehrenfriedhöfe für die Verfolgten
des Nationalsozialismus. Ihre landschaftsarchitektonische Gestaltung in
Deutschland 1945 bis 1960.” PhD diss., TU Dresden, 1998.
Fischer, George. “The New Soviet Emigration.” Russian Review 8, no. 1 (January
1949).
Fischer, George. Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War II. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.
Friedlander, Saul, ed. Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final
Solution.” Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Friedman, Philip. Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust. New York: Jewish
Publication Society of America/Conference on Jewish Social Studies, 1980.
Frings, Paul. Das internationale Flüchtlingsproblem, 1919–1950. Frankfurt am
Main: Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, 1951.
Fritz Bauer Institut, ed. Überlebt und unterwegs: jüdische Displaced Persons im
Nachkriegsdeutschland. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1997.
Fuglerud, Oivind. Life on the Outside: The Tamil Diaspora and Long Distance Na-
tionalism. London: Pluto Press, 1999.
Garson, G. David. Group Theories of Politics. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications,
1978.
Gatrell, Peter. A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.
Geller, Jay Howard. Jews in Post-Holocaust Germany, 1945–1953. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005.
Geyer, Michael. “Historical Fictions of Autonomy and the Europeanization of
National History.” Central European History 22, no. 3–4 (September–December
1989) .
Geyer, Michael. “Where Germans Dwell: Transnationalism in Theory and Prac-
tice.” Talk presented at the German Studies Association conference, Pittsburgh,
28 September–1 October 2006. http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=
vx&list=h-german&month=0610&week=b&msg=6Ipa/qqNnOPa4EWRx1
UksA&user=&pw= (accessed 12 February 2011).
Goddeeris, Idesbald. “Exiles’ Strategies for Lobbying in International Organisa-
tions: Eastern European Participation in the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales.”
European Review of History 11, no. 3 (2004).
Goeken, Ulrike. “Von der Kooperation zur Konfrontation. Die sowjetischen Repa-
Bibliography 335
triierungsof‹ziere in den westlichen Besatzungszonen.” In Die Tragödie der

Gefangenschaft in Deutschland und der Sowjetunion 1941–1956, ed. Klaus-Dieter
Müller, Konstantin Nikischkin, and Günther Wagenlehner. Cologne: Böhlau,
1998.
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. The Refugee in International Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Claren-
don, 1996.
Goschler, Constantin. “The Attitude towards Jews in Bavaria after the Second
World War.” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 36 (1991).
Goschler, Constantin. “Der Fall Philipp Auerbach. Wiedergutmachung in Bay-
ern.” In Wiedergutmachung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Ludolf
Herbst and Constantin Goschler. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1989.
Goschler, Constantin. Wiedergutmachung. Westdeutschland und die Verfolgten des
Nationalsozialismus (1945–1954). Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1992.
Grahl-Madsen, Atle. “Political Rights and Freedoms of Refugees.” In African
Refugees and the Law, ed. Göran Melander and Peter Nobel. Uppsala: Scandi-
navian Institute of African Studies, 1978.
Gregor, Neil, Nils Roemer, and Mark Roseman, eds. German History from the
Margins. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.
Grose, Peter. Operation Rollback: America’s Secret War behind the Iron Curtain.
Boston: Houghton Mif›in, 2000.
Gross, Jan Tomasz. Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz. New York: Ran-
dom House, 2007.
Gross, Jan Tomasz. Polish Society under German Occupation: The Generalgou-
vernement, 1939–1944. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Grossmann, Atina. Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Ger-
many. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
Grossmann, Atina. “Trauma, Memory, and Motherhood: Germans and Jewish
Displaced Persons in Post-Nazi Germany, 1945–1949.” Archiv für
Sozialgeschichte 38 (1998).
Grossmann, Atina. “Victims, Villains, and Survivors: Gendered Perceptions and
Self-Perceptions of Jewish Displaced Persons in Occupied Postwar Germany.”
In Sexuality and German Fascism, ed. Dagmar Herzog. New York: Berghahn
Books, 2005.
Grünewald, Paul. “Von Häftlingskomitees und antifaschistischen Ausschüssen zur
VVN.” In Von Buchenwald bis Hasselbach. Organisierter Antifaschismus 1945 bis
heute, ed. Präsidium der VVN-Bund der Antifaschisten. Cologne: Röderberg,
1987.
Gupta, Akhil. “The Song of the Nonaligned World: Transnational Identities and
the Reinscription of Space in Late Capitalism.” In Culture, Power, Place: Ex-
plorations in Critical Anthropology, ed. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson.
Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.
Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson. “Beyond ‘Culture’: Space, Identity, and the
Politics of Difference.” Cultural Anthropology 7, no. 1 (1992).
Gutman, Yisrael, and Shmuel Krakowski. Unequal Victims: Poles and Jews during
World War II. New York: Holocaust Library, 1986.
Gutman, Yisrael, Ezra Mendelsohn, Jehuda Reinharz, and Chone Shmeruk, eds.
336 Bibliography
The Jews of Poland between Two World Wars. Hanover, NH: University Press of
New England, 1989.
Gutman, Yisrael, and Avital Saf, eds. She’erit Hapletah, 1944–1948: Rehabilitation
and Political Struggle. Proceedings of the Sixth Yad Vashem International His-
torical Conference, Jerusalem, October 1985. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990.
Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry
into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick
Lawrence. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.
Hathaway, James C. The Rights of Refugees under International Law. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Haustein, Petra, Rolf Schmolling, and Jörg Skriebeleit, eds. Konzentrationslager:
Geschichte und Erinnerung: neue Studien zum KZ-System und zur Gedenkkultur.
Workshop zur Geschichte der Konzentrationslager, 12. bis 15. Oktober 2000 in der
KZ-Gedenkstätte Flossenbürg. Ulm: Klemm und Oelschläger, 2001.
Heigl, Peter. Konzentrationslager Flossenbürg in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Regens-
burg: Mittelbayerische Druckerei- und Verlags-Gesellschaft, 1989.
Herbert, Ulrich. Arbeit, Volkstum, Weltanschauung. Über Fremde und Deutsche im
20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1995.
Herbert, Ulrich. Hitler’s Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany un-
der the Third Reich. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Herbert, Ulrich, and Olaf Groehler. Zweierlei Bewältigung. Vier Beiträge über den
Umgang mit der NS- Vergangenheit in den beiden deutschen Staaten. Hamburg:
Ergebnisse, 1992.
Herf, Jeffrey. Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1997.
Hilberg, Raul. The Destruction of the European Jews. 3rd ed. New Haven: Yale Uni-
Himka, John-Paul. “Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews
during World War II.” In The Fate of the European Jews, 1939–1945: Continuity
or Contingency, ed. Jonathan Frankel. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Himka, John-Paul. “First Escape: Dealing with the Totalitarian Legacy in the
Early Postwar Emigration.” Paper presented at the conference “Soviet Totali-
tarianism in Ukraine: History and Legacy,” Kiev, 2–6 September 2005.
Hobsbawm, Eric. The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991. New
York: Vintage, 1994.
Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.
2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Hoffmann, Detlef. “Auschwitz im visuellen Gedächtnis. Das Chaos des Ver-
brechens und die symbolische Ordnung der Bilder.” In Auschwitz: Geschichte,
Rezeption und Wirkung, ed. Fritz Bauer Institut. Frankfurt am Main: Campus,
1996.
Honig, Bonnie. Democracy and the Foreigner. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001.
Huener, Jonathan. Auschwitz, Poland, and the Politics of Commemoration,
1945–1979. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003.
Bibliography 337
Hurwic-Nowakowska, Irena. A Social Analysis of Postwar Polish Jewry. Jerusalem:

Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 1986.
Iontsev, V. A. Emigratsiia i repatriatsiia v Rosii. Moscow: Popichitel’stvo o nuzh-
dakh Rossiiskikh repatriantov, 2001.
Isajiw, Wsevolod W., Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus. The Refugee Experience:
Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II. Edmonton: Canadian Institute
of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1992.
Jacobmeyer, Wolfgang. “Jüdische Überlebende als ‘Displaced Persons.’ Unter-
suchungen zur Besatzungspolitik in den deutschen Westzonen und zur Zuwan-
derung osteouropäischer Juden 1945–1947.” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 3, no. 9
(1983).
Jacobmeyer, Wolfgang. Vom Zwangsarbeiter zum Heimatlosen Ausländer: Die Dis-
placed Persons in Westdeutschland 1945–1951. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und
Ruprecht, 1985.
Jarausch, Konrad H., and Michael Geyer. Shattered Past: Reconstructing German
Histories. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Jaroszynska-Kirchmann, Anna D. The Exile Mission: The Polish Political Diaspora
and Polish Americans, 1939–1956. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004.
Jaroszynska-Kirchmann, Anna D. See also Kirchmann, Anna Dorota.
Judt, Tony. “The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Eu-
rope.” In The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath,
ed. István Deák, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000.
Kaiser, Joseph H. Die Repräsentation organisierter Interessen. Berlin: Duncker und
Humblot, 1978.
Kauders, Anthony. Democratization and the Jews: Munich, 1945–1965. Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press/Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study
of Antisemitism, 2004.
Kemp, Adriana, Rebeca Raijman, Julia Resnik, and Silvina Schammah Gesser.
“Contesting the Limits of Political Participation: Latinos and Black African
Workers in Israel.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, no. 1 (January 2000).
Kersten, Krystyna. “Forced Migration and the Transformation of Polish Society in
the Postwar Period.” In Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central
Europe, 1944–1948, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak. Lanham, MD: Rowman
and Little‹eld, 2001.
Kibreab, Gaim. “Revisiting the Debate on People, Place, Identity, and Displace-
ment.” Journal of Refugee Studies 12, no. 4 (1999).
Kirchmann, Anna Dorota. “‘They Are Coming for Freedom, Not Dollars’: Politi-
cal Refugees and Transformations of Ethnic Identity within Polish American
Community after World War II.” PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 1997.
Kirchmann, Anna Dorota. See also Jaroszynska-Kirchmann, Anna D.
Kleßmann, Christoph. Die doppelte Staatsgründung. Deutsche Geschichte
1945–1955. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1982.
Klossowski, Andrzej. Anatol Girs: Artysta ksiazki: Warszawa, Monachium, De-
troit, West Chester‹eld. 2nd ed. Warsaw: Biblioteka Narodowa, 1989.
338 Bibliography
Klossowski, Andrzej, and Teresa Odrowaz-Pieniazek. Anatol Girs, Boleslaw Barcz:

Artysci ksiazki. Warsaw: Biblioteka Narodowa, 1989.
Kochanowski, Jerzy. “Gathering Poles into Poland: Forced Migration from
Poland’s Former Eastern Territories.” In Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing
in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak. Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Little‹eld, 2001.
Kochavi, Arieh J. Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States, and Jewish
Refugees, 1945–1948. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
Kogon, Eugen. “Der politische Untergang des europäischen Widerstandes.”
Frankfurter Hefte 4, no. 5 (May 1949).
Kogon, Eugen. Der SS-Staat. Das System der deutschen Konzentrationslager. Mu-
nich: Kindler, 1974.
Kolinsky, Eva. After the Holocaust: Jewish Survivors in Germany after 1945. Lon-
don: Pimlico, 2004.
Königseder, Angelika. Flucht nach Berlin: jüdische Displaced Persons 1945–1948.
Berlin: Metropol, 1998.
Königseder, Angelika, and Juliane Wetzel. Lebensmut im Wartesaal: Die jüdischen
DPs (Displaced Persons) im Nachkriegsdeutschland. Frankfurt am Main: Fi-
scher, 1994.
Korbonski, Stefan. The Polish Underground State: A Guide to the Underground,
1939–1945. Trans. Marta Erdman. East European Monograph Series, No. 39.
Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1978.
Korman, Gerd. “The Holocaust in American Historical Writing.” Societas 2, no. 3
(Summer 1972).
Kozminska-Frejlak, Ewa. “Polen als Heimat von Juden. Strategien des Heim-
ischwerdens von Juden im Nachkriegspolen 1944–1949.” In Überlebt und unter-
wegs: jüdische Displaced Persons im Nachkriegsdeutschland, ed. Fritz Bauer In-
stitut. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1997.
Kreikamp, Hans-Dieter. “Zur Entstehung des Entschädigungsgesetzes der
amerikanischen Besatzungszone.” In Wiedergutmachung in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, ed. Ludolf Herbst and Constantin Goschler. Munich: R. Olden-
bourg, 1989.
Kuhlmann-Smirnov, Anne. “‘Stiller als Wasser, tiefer als Gras.’ Zur Migrations-
geschichte der russischen Displaced Persons in Deutschland nach dem Zweiten
Weltkrieg.” Forschungsstelle Osteuropa Bremen, Arbeitspapiere und Materi-
alien, July 2005.
Kulischer, Eugene. Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917–1947.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1948.
Kulyk, Volodymyr. “The Role of Discourse in the Construction of an Emigré
Community: Ukrainian Displaced Persons in Germany and Austria after the
Second World War.” In European Encounters: Migrants, Migration, and Euro-
pean Societies since 1945, ed. Rainer Ohliger, Karen Schönwälder, and
Triada‹los Triada‹lopoulos. Research in Migration and Ethnic Relations Se-
ries. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.
Kunz, E. F. “The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement.”
International Migration Review 7, no. 2 (Summer 1973).
Bibliography 339
Lagrou, Pieter. The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Re-
covery in Western Europe, 1945–1965. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000.
Lalande, Julia. “‘Building a Home Abroad’: A Comparative Study of Ukrainian
Migration, Immigration Policy, and Diaspora Formation in Canada and Ger-
many after the Second World War.” PhD diss., University of Hamburg, 2006.
Lavie, Smadar, and Ted Swedenburg, eds. Displacement, Diaspora, and Geographies
of Identity. Durham: Duke University Press, 1996.
Lavsky, Hagit. New Beginnings: Holocaust Survivors in Bergen-Belsen and the
British Zone in Germany, 1945–1950. Detroit: Wayne State University Press,
2002.
Lembeck, Andreas. Befreit aber nicht in Freiheit. Displaced Persons im Emsland
1945–1950. Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1997.
Levin, Dov. Fighting Back: Lithuanian Jewry’s Armed Resistance to the Nazis,
1941–1945. Trans. Moshe Kohn and Dina Cohen. New York: Holmes and Meier,
1985.
Lewinsky, Tamar. Displaced Poets. Jiddische Schriftsteller im Nachkriegsdeutsch-
land, 1945–1951. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2008.
Lower, Wendy. Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2005.
Luciuk, Lubomyr Y. Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada,
and the Migration of Memory. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.
Luckyj, George S. N. Young Ukraine: The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Method-
ius in Kiev, 1845–1847. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991.
Luczak, Czeslaw. Polacy w okupowanych Niemczech 1945–1949. Poznan: Pracownia
Serwisu Oprogramowania, 1993.
Ludi, Regula. “The Vectors of Postwar Victim Reparations: Relief, Redress, and
Memory Politics.” Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 3 (July 2006).
Ludi, Regula. “Who Is a Nazi Victim? Constructing Victimhood through Post-War
Reparations in France, Germany, and Switzerland.” UCLA Center for Euro-
pean and Eurasian Studies, Occasional Lecture Series, 3 (2005).
MacQueen, Michael. “Lithuanian Collaboration in the ‘Final Solution’: Motiva-
tions and Case Studies.” In Lithuania and the Jews: The Holocaust Chapter:
Symposium Presentations. Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memor-
ial Museum, 2005.
Magris, Claudio. Inferences from a Sabre. Trans. Mark Thompson. New York:
George Braziller, 1991.
Major, Patrick. The Death of the KPD: Communism and Anti-Communism in West
Germany, 1945–1956. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Malkki, Liisa. “Citizens of Humanity: Internationalism and the Imagined Com-
munity of Nations.” Diaspora 3, no. 1 (Spring 1994).
Malkki, Liisa. “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorial-
ization of Identity among Scholars and Refugees.” Cultural Anthropology 7, no.
1 (1992).
Malkki, Liisa. Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among
Hutu Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
340 Bibliography
Malkki, Liisa. “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the National Order
of Things.” Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995).
Malkki, Liisa. “Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehis-
toricization.” Cultural Anthropology 11, no. 3 (1996).
Mankowitz, Zeev W. “The Af‹rmation of Life in She’erith Hapleita.” Holocaust
and Genocide Studies 5, no. 1 (1990).
Mankowitz, Zeev W. “The Formation of She’erit Hapleita: November 1944–July
1945.” Yad Vashem Studies 20 (1990).
Mankowitz, Zeev W. Life between Memory and Hope: The Survivors of the Holo-
caust in Occupied Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Manley, Rebecca. “The Evacuation and Survival of Soviet Civilians, 1941–1946.”
PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2004.
Marcus, Joseph. Social and Political History of the Jews in Poland, 1919–1939.
Berlin: Mouton, 1983.
Marcuse, Harold. Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration
Camp, 1933–2001. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Marcuse, Harold. “Nazi Crimes and Identity in West Germany: Collective Memo-
ries of the Dachau Concentration Camp, 1945–1990.” PhD diss., University of
Michigan, 1992.
Marrus, Michael R. The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Mazower, Mark. Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1998.
Mendelsohn, Ezra. The Jews of East Central Europe between the World Wars.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983.
Mendelsohn, Ezra. On Modern Jewish Politics. New York: Oxford University Press,
1993.
Mendelsohn, Ezra. Zionism in Poland: The Formative Years, 1915–1926. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.
Milosz, Czeslaw. The Captive Mind. Trans. Jane Zielonko. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1953.
Mitrovich, Gregory. Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the
Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000.
Moeller, Robert G. “Germans as Victims? Thoughts on a Post–Cold War History
of World War II’s Legacies.” History and Memory 17, no. 1–2 (2005).
Moeller, Robert G. War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
Motyl, Alexander J. The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Develop-
ment of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929. Boulder: East European Mono-
graphs, 1980.
Müller, Ulrich. Fremde in der Nachkriegszeit: Displaced Persons—Zwangsver-
schleppte Personen—in Stuttgart und Wurttemberg-Baden 1945–1951. Stuttgart:
Klett-Cotta, 1990.
Musiol, Teodor. Dachau 1933–1945. 2nd ed. Katowice: Wydawnictwo “Slask,” 1971.
Noiriel, Gérard. “Représentation nationale et catégories sociales. L’exemple des
réfugiés politiques.” Genèses 26 (April 1997).
Bibliography 341
Noiriel, Gérard. La tyrannie du national. Le droit d’asile en Europe (1793–1993).

Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1991.
Novick, Peter. The Holocaust in American Life. New York: Houghton Mif›in,
1999.
Ofer, Dalia. “Linguistic Conceptualization of the Holocaust in Palestine and Is-
rael, 1942–1953.” Journal of Contemporary History 31, no. 3 (July 1996).
Offerlé, Michel. Sociologie des groupes d’intérêt. Paris: Montchrestien, 1998.
Paczkowski, Andrzej. “Nazism and Communism in Polish Experience and Mem-
ory.” In Stalinism and Nazism: History and Memory Compared, ed. Henry
Rousso. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004.
Pas, Justine. “Finding Home in Babel: Transnationalism, Translation, and Lan-
guages of Identity.” PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2008.
Patt, Avinoam J. “Finding Home and Homeland: Jewish DP Youth and Zionism in
the Aftermath of the Holocaust.” PhD diss., New York University, 2005.
Pearson, Raymond. National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848–1945. New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1983.
Peck, Abraham J. “‘Our Eyes Have Seen Eternity’: Memory and Self-Identity
among the She’erith Hapletah.” Modern Judaism 17, no. 1 (1997).
Peck, Jeffrey M. “Refugees as Foreigners: The Problem of Becoming German and
Finding Home.” In Mistrusting Refugees, ed. E. Valentine Daniel and John Chr.
Knudsen. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
Peterson, Edward N. The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory.
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978.
Pingel, Falk. Häftlinge unter SS-Herrschaft. Widerstand, Selbstbehauptung und
Vernichtung in Konzentrationslager. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1978.
Porter, Brian. When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in
Nineteenth-Century Poland. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Proudfoot, Malcolm. European Refugees, 1939–52: A Study in Forced Population
Movement. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1956.
Rabinbach, Anson. “Introduction: Legacies of Antifascism.” New German Cri-
tique 67 (Winter 1996).
Raeff, Marc. Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration,
1919–1939. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Raim, Edith. Die Dachauer KZ-Außenkommandos Kaufering und Mühldorf. Rüs-
tungsbauten und Zwangsarbeit im letzten Kriegsjahr 1944/45. Landsberg am
Lech: Martin Neumeyer, 1992.
Raim, Edith. “‘Unternehmen Ringeltaube.’ Dachaus Außenlagerkomplex Kaufer-
ing.” Dachauer Hefte 5 (1989).
Rancière, Jacques. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Trans. Julie Rose. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
Rancière, Jacques. “Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?” South Atlantic
Quarterly 103, no. 2–3 (Spring–Summer 2004).
Redlich, Shimon. “Between History and Biography: Memories from Postwar
Lodz.” In Fenomen getta lódzkiego, ed. Pawel Samus and Wieslaw Pus. Lódź:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lódzkiego, 2006.
Rée, Jonathan. “Internationality.” Radical Philosophy 60 (Spring 1992).
342 Bibliography
Reichling, Gerhard. Die Heimatvertriebenen im Spiegel der Statistik. Berlin:

Duncker und Humblot, 1958.
Riedl, Hermann, Hans-Uwe Rump, and Hildegard Vieregg. Erinnern statt
Vergessen. Rundgang durch die KZ-Grab- und Gedenkstätte Flossenbürg. Mu-
nich: Museums-Pädagogisches Zentrum, 1996.
Ristelhuenber, René. “The International Refugee Organization.” International
Conciliation 470 (April 1951).
Rosenhaft, Menachem Z., ed. Life Reborn: Jewish Displaced Persons 1945–1951.
Conference Proceedings, Washington, D.C., January 14–17, 2000. Washington,
DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2001.
Rothschild, Joseph. Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe
Since World War II. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Rousso, Henry, ed. Stalinism and Nazism: History and Memory Compared. Lin-
coln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004.
Salomon, Kim. Refugees in the Cold War: Toward a New International Refugee
Regime in the Early Postwar Era. Lund: Lund University Press, 1991.
Schirilla, László. Wiedergutmachung für Nationalgeschädigte. Ein Bericht über die
Benachteiligung von Opfern der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltherrschaft. Mu-
nich: Kaiser/Mainz: Grünewald, 1982.
Schmitt, Carl. The Idea of Representation. Trans. E. M. Codd. Washington, DC:
Plutarch Press, 1988.
Schmitt, Carl. Verfassungslehre. Munich: Duncker und Humblot, 1928.
Schrafstetter, Susanna. “The Diplomacy of Wiedergutmachung: Memory, the Cold
War, and the Western European Victims of Nazism, 1956–1964.” Holocaust and
Genocide Studies 17, no. 3 (Winter 2003).
Schrafstetter, Susanna. “‘What about paying BRITISH victims of Nazi hell
camps?’ Die Entschädigung in den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen.” In Gren-
zen der Wiedergutmachung. Die Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und
Osteuropa 1945–2000, ed. Hans Günter Hockerts, Claudia Moisel, and Tobias
Winstel. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006.
Schröder, Matthias. Deutschbaltische SS-Führer und Andrej Vlasov 1942–1945.
“Rußland kann nur von Russen besiegt werden”: Erhard Kroeger, Friedrich
Buchardt und die “Russische Befreiungsarmee.” Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003.
Schröder, Stefan. Displaced Persons im Landkreis und in der Stadt Münster,
1945–1951. Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2005.
Schulze, Rainer. “The German Refugees and Expellees from the East and the Cre-
ation of a West German Identity after World War II.” In Redrawing Nations:
Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana
Siljak. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Little‹eld, 2001.
Schwarz, Leo W. The Redeemers: A Saga of the Years 1945–1952. New York: Far-
rar, Straus and Young, 1953.
Schwarz, Leo W. Refugees in Germany Today. New York: Twayne, 1957.
Schwarz, Walter. “Die Wiedergutmachung nationalsozialistischen Unrechts durch
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ein Überblick.” In Wiedergutmachung in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Ludolf Herbst and Constantin Goschler. Mu-
nich: R. Oldenbourg, 1989.
Bibliography 343
Sebrell, C. L. “Art of the Book: The Work of Anatol Girs.” Journal of Antiques and
Collectibles (September 2002).
Shami, Seteney. “Transnationalism and Refugee Studies: Rethinking Forced Mi-
gration and Identity in the Middle East.” Journal of Refugee Studies 9, no. 1
(1996).
Shephard, Ben. “‘Becoming Planning Minded’: The Theory and Practice of Relief,
1940–1945.” Journal of Contemporary History 43, no. 3 (2008).
Simpson, Christopher. Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on
the Cold War. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988.
Simpson, John Hope. The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey. London: Oxford
University Press, 1939.
Sjöberg, Tommie. The Powers and the Persecuted: The Refugee Problem and the In-
tergovernmental Committee on Refugees. Lund: Lund University Press, 1991.
Skran, Claudena M. Refugees in Inter-war Europe: The Emergence of a Regime.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
Snyder, Timothy. The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Be-
larus, 1569–1999. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.
Snyder, Timothy. Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate
Soviet Ukraine. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
Snyder, Timothy. “‘To Resolve the Ukrainian Question Once and For All’: The
Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947.” Rosemarie Rogers
Working Paper No. 9, Inter-University Committee on International Migration,
November 2001.
Sofsky, Wolfgang. The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp. Trans. William
Templer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Soguk, Nevzat. States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
Sommers, Marc. Fear in Bongoland: Burundi Refugees in Urban Tanzania. New
York: Berghahn Books, 2001.
Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Mem-
bership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Stammer, Otto. “Interessenverbände und Parteien.” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziolo-
gie und Sozialpsychologie 9 (1957).
Stepien, Stanislaus. Der alteingesessene Fremde. Ehemalige Zwangsarbeiter in West-
deutschland. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1989.
Stern, Frank. “The Historic Triangle: Occupiers, Germans, and Jews in Postwar
Germany.” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 19 (1990).
Stern, Frank. The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge: Antisemitism and
Philosemitism in Postwar Germany. Trans. William Templer. Oxford: Pergamon
Press, 1992.
Stoessinger, John George. The Refugee and the World Community. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1956.
Subtelny, Orest. “Expulsion, Resettlement, Civil Strife: The Fate of Poland’s
Ukrainians, 1944–1947.” In Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Cen-
tral Europe, 1944–1948, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak. Lanham, MD: Row-
man and Little‹eld, 2001.
344 Bibliography
Szaynok, Bozena. “The Role of Antisemitism in Postwar Polish-Jewish Relations.”

In Antisemitism and Its Opponents in Modern Poland, ed. Robert Blobaum.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.
Ther, Philipp. “A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Consequences of
‘Ethnic Cleansing.’” In Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central
Europe, 1944–1948, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak. Lanham, MD: Rowman
and Little‹eld, 2001.
Ther, Philipp, and Ana Siljak, eds. Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-
Central Europe, 1944–1948. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Little‹eld, 2001.
Tolstoy, Nicholas. The Secret Betrayal. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1977.
Van Alphen, Ernst. “Caught by Images: On the Role of Visual Imprints in Holo-
caust Testimonies.” Journal of Visual Culture 1, no. 2 (August 2002).
Vernant, Jacques. The Refugee in the Post-War World. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1953.
Vieregg, Hildegard, Willi Eisele, and Theo Emmer, eds. Begegnungen mit Flossen-
bürg. Beiträge, Dokumente, Interviews, Zeugnisse Überlebender. Weiden:
Spintler, 1998.
Völkl, Ekkehard. “Ukrainische Emigration in Bayern 1945–1949.” In Bayern und
Osteuropa: Aus der Geschichte der Beziehungen Bayerns, Frankens und
Schwabens mit Rußland, der Ukraine und Weißrußland, ed. Hermann Beyer-
Thoma. Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 2000.
Von Hagen, Mark. “Federalisms and Pan-movements: Re-Imagining Empire.” In
Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930, ed. Jane Burbank, Mark von
Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.
Waddington, Lorna L. “The Anti-Komintern and Nazi Anti-Bolshevik Propa-
ganda in the 1930s.” Journal of Contemporary History 42, no. 4 (October 2007).
Wagner, Patrick. Displaced Persons in Hamburg: Stationen einer halbherzigen Inte-
gration 1945–1958. Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz, 1997.
Wahlbeck, Östen. “Community Work and Exile Politics: Kurdish Refugee Associ-
ations in London.” Journal of Refugee Studies 11, no. 3 (1998).
Wahlbeck, Östen. “The Concept of Diaspora as an Analytical Tool in the Study of
Refugee Communities.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28, no. 2 (April
2002).
Weiner, Amir. Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the
Bolshevik Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Weitz, Eric D. “The Ever-Present Other: Communism in the Making of West Ger-
many.” In The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968,
ed. Hanna Schissler. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Wetzel, Juliane. Jüdisches Leben in München 1945–1951. Durchgangsstation oder
Wiederaufbau? Munich: Kommissionsverlag UNI-Druck, 1987.
Wetzel, Juliane. “‘Mir szeinen doh.’ München und Umgebung als Zu›ucht von
Überlebenden des Holocaust 1945–1948. In Von Stalingrad zur Währungsre-
form: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland, ed. Martin Broszat,
Klaus-Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1988.
Wille, Manfred. “Compelling the Assimilation of Expellees in the Soviet Zone of
Occupation and the GDR.” In Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-
Bibliography 345
Central Europe, 1944–1948, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak. Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Little‹eld, 2001.
Wojtowicz, Bernadetta. “Die rechtliche Lage der ukrainischen Flüchtlinge nach
dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in Bayern.” In Bayern und Osteuropa: Aus der
Geschichte der Beziehungen Bayerns, Frankens und Schwabens mit Rußland, der
Ukraine und Weißrußland, ed. Hermann Beyer-Thoma. Wiesbaden: Haras-
sowitz, 2000.
Woodbridge, George. UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Re-
habilitation Administration. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950.
Wyman, Mark. DP: Europe’s Displaced Persons, 1945–1951. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
Yaeger, Patricia, ed. The Geography of Identity. Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan Press, 1996.
Yurdakul, Gökçe. “State, Political Parties, and Immigrant Elites: Turkish Immi-
grant Associations in Berlin.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32, no. 3
(April 2006).
Zahra, Tara. “Lost Children: Displacement, Family, and Nation in Postwar Eu-
rope.” Journal of Modern History 81, no. 1 (March 2009).
Zemskov, V. N. “K voprosi o repatriatsii sovetskikh grazhdan 1944–1951 gody.” Is-
toriia SSSR 4 (July–August 1990).
Zemskov, V. N. “Repatriatsiia sovetskikh grazhdan i ikh dal’neishaia sud’ba
(1944–1956 rr.).” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia 6 (1995).
Zemskov, V. N. “Rozhdenie ‘vtoroi emigratsii’ 1944–1952.” Sotsiologicheskie issle-
dovaniia 4 (1991).
Zertal, Idith. From Catastrophe to Power: Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of
Israel. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
Zinnemann, Fred. Fred Zinnemann: An Autobiography. London: Bloomsbury,
1992.
Zimmerman, Joshua D., ed. Contested Memories: Poles and Jews during the Holo-
caust and Its Aftermath. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003.
Zolberg, Aristide R. “The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating
Process.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 467
(May 1983).
Zolberg, Aristide R., Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo. Escape from Violence:
Con›ict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. New York: Oxford Uni-
Index
Abendzeitung (Munich), 145 among Jewish DPs, 4, 82, 140, 267;

Acheson, Dean, 141, 149, 208 among Polish DPs, 5, 81–82, 86–87,
Adenauer, Konrad, 187 88, 90, 92–95, 98, 118, 209, 268;
“Adolf Bleibtreu,” 199 among political prisoners, 213,
Agamben, Giorgio, 24 224–25, 235, 264; among Russian
Agudath Israel, 174 DPs, 55, 82, 85–86, 109, 113, 115–16,
Aleksiun, Natalia, 184 118, 123–26, 132–34, 137–38, 209,
ALON. See Anti-Bolshevik League of 225, 268; among Ukrainian DPs, 5,
Nations 82, 107, 108, 126–30, 132–34, 140–47,
American Committee for the Libera- 209, 224–25, 268; demonstrations
tion of the Peoples of the USSR, advocating, 53, 140–49, 208–9; di-
136 versity of among DPs, 133; histori-
American Joint Distribution Commit- ography on, 86–87; insularity of
tee (“The Joint”), 202; creation of, groups promoting, 133; internation-
62; relationship to CK, 192, 193; alist rhetoric of, 131–32; as interpre-
role in care of Jewish DPs, 66, tive framework among DPs, 4, 9, 10,
187–88, 192; role in Möhlstrasse 25, 86–87, 118–19, 213, 268; Nazi,
demonstration, 201 112–13, 123, 132; postwar organiza-
Anders, Wladyslaw, 98 tions advocating, 115–16, 120,
Anglo-American Committee of In- 123–49, 269; propaganda, 125,
quiry, 62, 154, 182–83 126–27, 131, 133–34, 136, 138,
Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations 142–45; ties to fascism, 120–21, 124,
(ABN): 1949 demonstrations by, 126–27, 134, 148; West German, 6,
140–49, 198, 207, 208–9, 224; anti- 209, 269. See also American Com-
communism of, 127–29, 131, 142–48; mittee for the Liberation of the
antisemitism of, 129–30, 133, 144; Peoples of the USSR; Anti-Bolshe-
criticism of Soviet Union, 127–29, vik Bloc of Nations; Anti-Bolshevik
141–45; establishment, 126; national- League of Nations; Anti-Bolshevis-
socialist goals of, 129, 130, 133; tic Union; Anti-Communist Center
OUN origins, 127; propaganda by, of the Liberation Movement of the
126–27, 131, 142–45. See also Orga- Peoples of Russia; Coordinating
nization of Ukrainian Nationalists Center of the Anti-Bolshevik Strug-
Anti-Bolshevik League of Nations gle; International of Liberty
(ALON), 126 Anti-Communist Center of the Liber-
Anti-Bolshevistic Union, 138 ation Movement of the Peoples of
Anticommunism, 52–53; American, Russia (Antikommunistischeskoi
135–42, 148–49, 194, 269, 304n83; Tsentr Osvoboditel’nogo Dvizheniia
347
348 Index
Anti-Communist Center of the Liber- Verfolgten des Naziregimes), 68,

ation Movement of the Peoples of 232, 263, 265
Russia (continued ) Association of Poles in Germany. See
Narodov Rossii, or AZODNR), Polish Union in the American Oc-
115–16, 124–26, 133. See also Coor- cupation Zone of Germany
dinating Center of the Anti-Bolshe- Association of Ukrainian Political
vik Struggle Prisoners (Tovarystvo Ukraïns’kykh
Antifascism, 195; among Polish DPs, Politychnykh V’iazniv, or TUPV),
5, 88; among political prisoners, 216, 223
213, 225–26; among Russian DPs, Aster, Otto, 251
225; among Ukrainian DPs, 5, 102, Auerbach, Philipp: condemnation of
108; internationalist character of, antisemitism, 67, 200, 251; media-
226–36; as interpretive framework tion between Jewish groups, 188–89;
among DPs, 4, 9, 25, 212, 226–36; as membership in VVN, 232; opposi-
OUN policy, 127 tion to DP demonstrations, 191, 199;
Antikommunistischeskoi Tsentr Osvo- prosecution of, 291n47; relationship
boditel’nogo Dvizheniia Narodov with political prisoner committees,
Rossii (AZODNR). See Anti-Com- 248–51; response to Möhlstrasse
munist Center of the Liberation demonstration, 207; role in restitu-
Movement of the Peoples of Russia tion debates, 67–68, 71–72; wartime
Antisemitism: American, 194; among imprisonment of, 232, 250
DPs, 5, 82, 120, 126, 144, 148, 158, Augsburg, 100, 132
211, 227, 245, 250, 268; Auerbach’s Aumer, Hermann, 191
campaign against, 67; DP fears of, Auschwitz, 1, 95, 181, 205, 221, 225,
55, 181, 268; as Eastern European 236–42
phenomenon, 167; Holocaust as re- Australia, 46, 148
sult of, 4, 166–67; Lithuanian, 178; Austria, 37, 99, 103, 182
and postwar historiography, 20; Austro-Hungarian Empire, 104
postwar German, 20, 75, 173, 189, AZODNR. See Anti-Communist
198–208; Polish, 5, 37, 158, 167, 178, Center of the Liberation Movement
179–80, 181, 185, 233–34; protests of the Peoples of Russia
against, 198–210; Russian, 113, 124;
Slovak, 126; Ukrainian, 5, 107, Bahrianyi, Ivan, 108
129–30, 144, 148, 216, 250. See also Balfour, Ian, 15
Germany, Nazi, racial policies of Balinsky, Boris, 55, 109, 111–12, 115
Arendt, Hannah, 8, 9, 14–15, 17, 43 Baltic countries, 33, 109, 122. See also
Argentina, 46 Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania
Arluk, Abrascha, 202, 205 Bamberg, 109, 112
Armstrong, John, 106 Bandera, Stepan, 106, 126
Aschaffenburg, 99 Basic Law (Grundgesetz) (1949), 205,
Assimilation, 10 207
Association of Foreign Political Perse- “The Battle of Grunwald,” 96–98,
cutees, 252, 256–58, 259 153
Association of the Free Press of the Bauer, Yehuda, 153, 160, 308n12
Suppressed Nations, 132 Bavaria, 3, 5, 209; anticommunist ac-
Association of Jewish Survivors in the tivism in, 121, 132–33; DP demon-
American Occupation Zone. See strations in, 53, 140–49, 198–210; DP
Central Committee of Liberated population in, 73; of‹cial aid to per-
Jews in Bavaria secutees in, 67, 246–47; restitution
Association of Persecutees of the policies in, 70–71, 73, 75, 229, 256;
Nazi Regime (VVN, Vereinigung der as rumored site for postwar Jewish
Index 349
state, 63; support for DP cultural 175, 188–90, 191, 206; Auerbach’s re-
activities in, 50; Zionism in, 161 lationship with, 67, 188–89; com-
Bayreuth, 140 memorative activities of, 164, 165,
Belgium, 46, 224, 231 169; con›ict with German Jews,
Belgrade, 112 187–88, 190–91; disbanding of, 209;
Belorussia, 34, 36, 37, 41, 122, 125 establishment of, 161–62, 174–75;
Berchtesgaden, 140, 305n99, 306n108 leadership of, 163; political tactics
Bergen-Belsen DP camp, 176 of, 190–91; relationship to other
Berkhoff, Karel, 129 Jewish organizations, 175, 187–88,
Berlin airlift, 205 192, 313n11; response to Möhlstrasse
Bernstein, Philip S., 192 demonstration, 201–2, 207; welfare
Bessarabia, 33 activities of, 163, 192, 195; Zionist
Blomberg, 90 character of, 163, 170–73, 175, 192
Boehling, Rebecca, 49 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Bogenhausen, 198, 204 (U.S.), 136
Bolshevik Revolution, 40, 41, 114, 115 Central International Union of For-
Boltanski, Luc, 13 mer Political Prisoners (CIUPP),
Borgwardt, Elizabeth, 42 194–95, 234–35, 249–50
Borowski, Tadeusz, xi, 1–2, 11, 95–98, Central Representation of the Russian
236–40, 242–43 Emigration (Tsentral’noe Pred-
Borwicz, Michal, 82, 179 stavitel’stvo Rossiiskoi Emigratsii, or
Bourdieu, Pierre, 13 TsEPRE), 112
Braunschweig, 140 Central Representation of the Ukrai-
Brazil, 46 nian Emigration in Germany (Tsen-
Brenner, Michael, 154, 162 tral’ne Predstavnytstvo Ukraïns’koï
Brichah (Zionist organization), 37, 184 Emihratsiï v Nimechchyni, or
Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and TsPUE), 99–100, 103, 104, 108, 117,
Methodius (Ukraine), 221 216, 225
Brubaker, Rogers, 278n41 Chopin, Frédéric, 91
Buchardt, Friedrich, 139 Christian Social Union (CSU), 132
Buchenwald, 224, 225, 308n25 Chronicle of the Ukrainian Political
Bukovina, 33 Prisoner (Litopys Ukraïns’koho
Bulgaria, 37. See also DPs, Bulgarian Politv’iaznia), 222–23, 224
Burds, Jeffrey, 135 Churchill, Winston, 42
Bylismy w Oswiecimiu. See We Were in CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency
Auschwitz CIC. See Counter-Intelligence Corps,
U.S. Army
Cadava, Eduardo, 15 Cieslik, Walter, 228–30
Canada, 20, 46, 148, 270 Ciuciura, Bohdan, 104
“Care and control” regime, 43, 155, Civil War, Russian, 40, 41, 113, 116, 122
197; de‹nition of, 29, 30, 282n2; mil- CK. See Central Committee of Liber-
itary model for, 46–47 ated Jews in Bavaria
Care Centers (KZ-Betreuungsstellen), Clarke, Edwin, 194–95
66–67, 68, 229, 245, 250 Clay, Lucius, 50, 65, 68
Carruthers, Susan, 304n83 Cohen, Daniel, 42, 63, 154
Carynnyk, Marco, 129 Cold War, 20, 21, 45, 53, 121, 136–37,
Central Committee of Liberated Jews 138, 140, 147, 269
in Bavaria (CK), 65, 154, 199, 202; Collaboration, Nazi: by non-Russian
American criticisms of, 194–95; Soviets, 123; by political prisoners,
American recognition of, 68, 162, 212, 214; by wartime refugees, 33,
191–97; anti-assimilationism of, 172, 34; Croatian, 142; DP attitudes to-
350 Index
Collaboration, Nazi (continued ) Congress of Liberated Jews in Ger-

ward, 4, 233; Polish, 233; and post- many (1947), 170, 189
war anticommunism, 120–21, 124, Congress of the Peoples of Russia
139–40, 142; Russian, 111–12, 113, (1917), 122
114, 115; Slovak, 126, 142; Soviet Conference of Zionists in Bavaria
punishment for, 6, 34, 99, 104–5, 111, (1945), 161
112, 115; Ukrainian, 34, 99, 102, 104, Coordinating Center of the Anti-Bol-
105, 106–7, 108, 126, 216, 323n18 shevik Struggle (Koordinatsionnyi
Collective farms (kolkhoz), 104, 143 Tsentr Antibol’shevistskoi Bor’by, or
Commemoration: by political prison- KtsAB), 126
ers, 213, 215, 216–26, 229, 230–32; Cossacks, 41, 122, 125, 142, 224, 231
Jewish, 157, 160, 164, 169, 190; in Council of Foreign Ministers (Allied),
West Germany, 21 52
Committee for the Liberation of the Counter-Intelligence Corps, U.S.
Peoples of Russia (Komitet Os- Army (CIC), 50, 99, 115, 215, 251
vobozhdeniia Narodov Rossii, or Cracow, 105
KONR), 115, 123, 124, 125. See also Croatia, 32, 142
Anti-Communist Center of the Lib- Curzon, George, 35
eration Movement of the Peoples of Czechoslovakia: antisemitism in, 126;
Russia collaboration in, 126; DPs from, 8,
Committee of United Vlasovites 40; ethnic Germans in, 34, 36; eth-
(Komitet Ob’edinennykh Vlasovtsev, nic Ukrainians from, 40, 103; Jewish
or KOV), 116 migration from, 41
Concentration camps, 3, 19, 31; Allied Czerwinski, Antoni, 92, 93, 101
policies for survivors of, 58–60,
308n25; antifascism in, 238–40; cat- Dachau concentration camp, 225, 227;
egorization of survivors as “politi- Allach satellite camp, 159, 236; Jew-
cal prisoners,” 59, 212–13; collabora- ish prisoners in, 156–57, 159;
tion in, 212; compared to DP Kaufering satellite camp, 156; liber-
camps, 61, 93, 96–98; as de‹ning ex- ation of, 97, 157, 159, 236; memoirs
perience for former political prison- of life in, 233; Polish prisoners in,
ers, 217–19; DPs from, 41, 58, 91–93, 89, 96–97, 218, 233; prisoner organi-
95–98, 103, 155–60, 171, 211–43, zation in, 156–57, 213. See also In-
263–64; deportation to, 219; evacua- ternational Prisoners’ Committee of
tion of, 34, 219; forced labor in, Dachau
253–54; genocide in, 31–32, 145, 237; Dachau DP camp, 213; commemora-
liberation of, 96, 101, 154, 156–57, tion at, 231–32; Dachau-Allach
161, 213, 219, 236; literary accounts satellite camp, 159; Jewish DPs in,
of, 217, 225, 236–42; memorials at, 155–60; Kaufering satellite camp,
230–32; organizing within, 213, 156; Polish DPs in, 91–93, 95, 96–98.
279n61; population of, 32; as site of See also International Information
suffering, 59–60, 65, 102, 164, 171, Of‹ce of Dachau; International
218–19, 231, 237; Soviet use of, 128, Prisoners’ Committee of Dachau;
224; symbols of, 212, 218, 239, Jewish Information Of‹ce; Polish
241–43, 318n23; visual representa- Information Of‹ce in Dachau
tions of, 218–19, 222. See also Danziger, Shmul, 47–48
Auschwitz; Buchenwald; Dachau Dehler, Thomas, 265
concentration camp; Flossenbürg; Denazi‹cation, 6, 58, 62, 255–56
Political prisoners; Sachsenhausen Deportation, 30–32, 103–4, 105, 109
Conference of Liberated Jews in Ger- Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen. See
many (1945), 161–62, 170, 191 German Of‹ce for Peace Questions
Index 351
Diaspora. See Refugees 18, 46, 69, 264–65; linguistic facility

Diner, Dan, 63, 64, 226 among, xi, 19, 144, 178; literary rep-
Dinnerstein, Leonard, 308n25 resentations of, 1, 91, 93, 94–95,
Displaced persons (DPs): accusations 96–98, 110–11, 153, 236–42; material
of criminality against, 47, 48, 65, conditions of, 61–62, 246–47; mem-
75, 187, 203, 209, 233, 249–50; as oirs by, 1, 91, 93, 94, 95–96, 109–10,
“administered persons,” 15, 17, 29; 111–12, 115, 217, 225, 233–34, 235,
Allied policies toward, 5–6, 9, 15, 16, 254; national classi‹cation of, 2–3,
17–18, 29–30, 42–55, 57–58, 60, 4, 8–11, 25, 39, 57–58, 59, 60, 63–64,
64–66, 137, 244–66; anticommunism 90–91, 102–3, 117–18, 155, 159,
among, 52–53, 82, 84–90, 92–93, 95, 196–97, 214, 232–33, 269; Nazi col-
104, 107–8, 109–10, 112–16, 118–19, laboration by, 4, 19, 99, 102, 104,
120–49, 224–25, 250; antifascism 105, 107–8, 111–12, 113, 114, 121, 124,
among, 4, 5, 9, 25, 88, 102, 108, 225, 139–40, 212, 214, 233; non-
226–36; antisemitism among, 5, 82, identi‹cation as “German,” 21, 22,
124, 144, 159, 211, 227, 233–34, 46, 54, 270; notion of “homeland”
237–38, 250, 268; art by, 218–19, among, 25, 101; number of, 3,
222; camps for (see DP camps); 37–38; opposition to repatriation
“care and control” of, 29–30, 46–47, among, 3, 4, 9, 38, 39, 40, 41, 45, 52,
59, 197, 268, 282n2; commemora- 81–119, 156–57, 160, 161, 170, 174–75,
tion by, 157, 160, 164, 169, 190, 213, 214, 232–33, 235; perceived danger
215, 216–26, 229, 230–32; commit- from, 52–53, 54, 65, 68, 75, 194; as
tees (see DP committees); compara- “persecutees,” 60, 62; political activ-
tive analysis of, 9–11; concentration ities of, 12, 17–18, 49–50, 51, 53–55,
camp survivors as, 41, 58–59, 155, 69, 91–92, 107, 123–26, 135–49,
211–43; con›icts between, 117–18, 173–75, 190, 191–92, 198–208,
240, 263–64; cooperation among, 269–70; political prisoners as cate-
9–10, 17; cost of care for, 73; cre- gory of, 59, 159, 194–95, 211–43;
ation of category of, 42–44; de‹ni- professional backgrounds of, 18–19;
tion of, 3, 7, 20, 42–44; demo- rede‹nition as “homeless foreign-
graphic composition of, 29; ers,” 3, 46; as “refugee nation,” 6;
demonstrations by (see DP demon- repatriation of, 3, 9, 25, 38, 39,
strations); distinguished by Allies 44–46, 52, 81–119, 120, 233, 258; re-
from “refugees,” 43, 172; diversity settlement of, 1, 45–46, 137; restitu-
of, 4; elites, 18–19, 87, 108, 118; emi- tion for, 56–57, 69–76, 229, 251–66,
gration by, 3, 148, 182–84, 270; em- 268; rights of, 8, 15, 29–30, 49,
ployment by international organiza- 51–52, 141–42, 246–47; role of inter-
tions, 17; forced labor by, 3, 19, 102, governmental relief agencies
103, 253–54; German attitudes to- among, 5, 10, 42–43; segregation of,
ward, 22, 47–48, 65, 72–73, 75, 139, 22, 47, 67, 172; self-identi‹cation as,
147–48, 172, 186–210, 229, 232–33, 7–8, 269–70; self-identi‹cation of, 2,
265, 270; group consciousness of, 8, 4, 21, 22; SHAEF categorization of,
9, 14, 270; historical sense among, 6, 44, 57–58, 60–61; statelessness of,
20, 25–26; historiography about, 74, 261; terminology for, 3, 42–44,
7–11, 20–22; incompatibility with 46, 57; U.S. recruitment of, 135–37;
notions of sovereignty, 14; interna- West German policies toward, 5–6,
tionalism among, 9–10, 131–32, 9, 18, 21, 46, 50–51, 72–77, 265–66.
226–36, 268; international norms See also Persecutees; Refugees;
for, 16, 17, 259–62; journalism, 82, speci‹c ethnicity, e.g., DPs Austrian
90, 92–93, 104, 114, 132, 135, 138, Displaced Persons Act (U.S.), 46,
139, 165, 246; legal status of, 3, 15, 304n83
352 Index
Domagala, Jan, 228 Peoples of Russia; Association of

Dortheimer, Mieczyslaw, 158 Foreign Political Persecutees; Asso-
DP camps, 1, 5, 8, 20, 39, 40; access to, ciation of Persecutees of the Nazi
45; administration of, 47–48, 61–62; Regime; Association of Ukrainian
exclusion from restitution regime, Political Prisoners; Central Com-
71–72, 74; functions of, 46–47, mittee of Liberated Jews in Bavaria;
162–63; Jewish, 7, 62, 162, 163, 209, Central International Union of
323n11; as legally non-permanent Former Political Prisoners; Central
residence, 71, 74; literary accounts Representation of the Russian Emi-
of, 96–98, 153; location of, 47; mate- gration; Central Representation of
rial conditions in, 61–62, 93, 163; the Ukrainian Emigration in Ger-
military origins of, 46–47; Polish, many; Committee of United Vlaso-
91–93, 96–98; Russian, 114; segrega- vites; Coordinating Center of the
tion by national origin, 44, 99, 162; Anti-Bolshevik Struggle; Federa-
social work in, 161–62; status of per- tion of Hungarian Jews; Interna-
secutees in, 69; transfer to German tional Committee of Political
control, 48, 269; Ukrainian, 99, 117. Refugees and Displaced Persons;
See also Bergen-Belsen DP camp; International Information Of‹ce of
Felda‹ng DP camp; Flossenbürg; Dachau; International of Liberty;
Föhrenwald DP camp; Freimann Jewish Information Of‹ce; Land
DP camp; Funk Caserne DP camp; Association of Jewish Committees
Mönchehof DP camp; Schleis- in Bavaria; League of Ukrainian
sheim-Feldmoching DP camp; Political Prisoners; Munich Jewish
Stuttgart DP camp Committee; Persecutees, organiza-
DP committees, 4; advocacy by, 12, 17, tions of; Polish Association of For-
50–55, 89, 103, 191–97, 214–15; as mer Political Prisoners of German
agents of self-representation, 12, Concentration Camps; Polish Com-
103, 163; Bulgarian, 138; coopera- mittee in Munich; Polish Commit-
tion among, 117; international, 117, tee of Dachau; Polish Information
132, 194–95, 214, 226–30, 234–35; Of‹ce in Dachau; Polish Union in
Jewish, 7, 65, 67, 68, 73, 154, 155–63, the American Occupation Zone of
172, 173–75, 190–97, 206, 270; man- Germany; Polish Union in Ger-
date of, 48–49, 163, 192, 195; na- many; Representatives of National
tional character of, 10–11, 53, 91–92, Committees of DPs and Refugees
196–97; of‹cial recognition of, in Germany; Ukrainian Revolution-
48–49, 53, 158, 162, 191–97, 246–51; ary Democratic Party; Union of
Polish, 50, 89–90, 91–93, 98–99, 117, Fighters of the Liberation Move-
214, 246–51, 270; political prison- ment; Union of the Struggle for the
ers’, 213–16, 246–51, 252; political Liberation of the Peoples of Russia;
activities of, 17, 50–55, 98–99, Zionist Center (Dachau)
120–49, 190; restrictions upon, 15, DP demonstrations: ABN Munich
49–52, 158, 246, 249; Russian, 112, (1949), 140–49, 198, 207, 208–9, 224,
113–16, 124–26, 133; terminology for, 271; Allied policies towards, 52–53,
12; Ukrainian, 49, 50, 99–100, 103, 141–42, 149; Jewish, 51, 190, 191,
108, 117, 126, 127–34, 214–16, 221–23, 198–210; Möhlstrasse (1949),
270. See also American Joint Distri- 198–210; Munich (1951), 148; Neu-
bution Committee; Anti-Bolshevik berg, 53; press coverage of, 146–47;
Bloc of Nations; Anti-Bolshevik Ukrainian, 140–49
League of Nations; Anti-Bolshevis- DP-logical Alphabet, 110
tic Union; Anti-Communist Center DPs, Austrian, 44
of the Liberation Movement of the DPs, Belorussian, 109, 125, 142
Index 353
DPs, Bulgarian, 44, 138 72–73, 76, 162; in Soviet East, 82;
DPs, Cossack, 125, 142 special status of, 67, 245, 246–47,
DPs, Czechoslovakian, 8, 142, 229 250; Zionism among, 4, 25, 37, 51,
DPs, Dutch, 233–34 52, 63, 76, 84, 153–55, 156–58,
DPs, Estonian, 8, 39, 142 159–61, 163–64, 167–71, 173–85, 267.
DPs, Finnish, 44 See also Agaduth Israel; American
DPs, German, 44, 66–67 Joint Distribution Committee; Cen-
DPs, Hungarian, 8, 39, 44, 134. See tral Committee of Liberated Jews in
also Federation of Hungarian Jews Bavaria; Conference of Liberated
DPs, Italian, 44 Jews in Germany; Conference of
DPs, Japanese, 44 Zionists in Bavaria; Congress of
DPs, Jewish, 4; anticommunism Liberated Jews in Germany; Feder-
among, 82, 140, 267; assemblies of, ation of Hungarian Jews; Felda‹ng
161–62, 170, 174–75; attitudes to- DP camp; Föhrenwald DP camp;
ward non-Jewish DPs, 4, 172, 178, Freimann DP camp; Harrison Re-
268; commemoration by, 157, 160, port; Jewish Information Of‹ce;
164–70, 190; committees, 7, 65, 67, Land Association of Jewish Com-
68, 73, 154, 155–63, 173–75, 190–97, mittees in Bavaria; Munich Jewish
270; demands for autonomy, 4, 53, Committee; Zionist Center
67, 155, 162, 163, 170–72, 189–90, (Dachau)
192–93; demonstrations by, 51, 140, DPs, Latvian, 39, 142, 172
190, 191, 198–210; emigration by, DPs, Lithuanian, 39, 142, 172
153–54, 179–80, 182–84, 199, 205–6, DPs, Polish, 4, 30; absence from ABN
209–10, 243, 267, 270; ethnic com- demonstration, 142; anticommu-
position of, 176; historiography nism among, 5, 25, 81–82, 84, 86,
about, 7, 20, 153–54; Hungarian, 88, 90, 92–95, 118, 233; antifascism
181, 313n11; leadership of, 162–63, among, 5; antisemitism among, 5,
176, 199–200; Lithuanian, 161, 162, 159, 233; camps for, 91–93, 96–98;
171, 172, 174, 176, 185; number of, committees, 50, 89–90, 91–93,
41, 206; opposition to repatriation 98–99, 117, 214, 228, 270; con›ict
among, 9, 82, 84, 156–57, 160, 161, with Ukrainian DPs, 107, 118, 126,
163, 170, 174–75; as “persecutees,” 132, 263–64; cooperation with other
56–57, 58, 60, 62, 65, 75, 76; police DPs, 117; DP hostility towards, 4,
treatment of, 47–48, 187, 191, 172, 233–34; emigration, 270; ethnic
200–205, 207, 209; Polish, 10, 30, 40, diversity of, 40; ethnic identity
41, 153, 163, 172, 176, 178–80, 182, among, 10, 39; exclusion from resti-
185, 192, 311n97; political activism tution, 73; forced labor by, 253–54;
of, 67–68, 77, 140, 173–75, 190, hierarchy among, 217; journalism
191–92, 198–210; political prisoner by, 92–93; literature by, 1, 91, 93–98,
hostility toward, 211, 227, 245; pref- 153, 236–42, 254; nationalism
erence for American zone of occu- among, 86, 90–91, 92–95, 96–98;
pation, 37, 41, 63, 73, 160, 182; number of, 39; opposition to repa-
recognition as separate group, triation among, 9, 39, 81–82, 83, 84,
61–62, 63, 154–55; rejection as “for- 86–87, 89–90, 93–94, 98–99, 117, 214;
eigners” by postwar Germans, 22, perception of Nazis as imperialists,
72–73, 187–88; relationships with 4–5; political prisoners among, 89,
Germans, 172, 187–210; repatriation 153, 213–14, 217, 228, 230, 236–43,
debates among, 174–75, 177; reset- 246–51, 253; professional back-
tlement of, 46, 72, 75, 206–7, grounds of, 18–19; repatriation of,
209–10; resettlement in Germany, 39, 45, 89, 94, 117, 160. See also
206–7, 209–10; restitution for, Freimann DP camp; International
354 Index
DPs, Polish (continued ) Struggle for the Liberation of the

Committee of Political Refugees Peoples of Russia
and Displaced Persons; Polish As- DPs, Turkestani, 142
sociation of Ex-Prisoners Perse- DPs, Ukrainian, 4, 49; anticommu-
cuted by Nazis; Polish Association nism among, 5, 25, 82, 85, 99, 101,
of Former Political Prisoners of 105, 126–30, 132–34, 136, 140–48,
German Concentration Camps; 224–25; antifascism among, 5; anti-
Polish Committee in Munich; Pol- semitism among, 5, 144, 148,
ish Committee of Dachau; Polish 323n18; anti-Polish sentiments
Information Of‹ce in Dachau; Pol- among, 107, 118, 126, 132, 263; anti-
ish Union in the American Occupa- Soviet activism by, 101–2, 106–7, 118,
tion Zone of Germany; Polish 121, 126–34, 232; assemblies of, 99,
Union in Germany 100, 117, 225; camps for, 99, 117;
DPs, political. See Political prisoners, claims for asylum by, 100, 102–3;
DP collaboration by, 99, 102, 104, 105,
DPs, Rumanian, 44 107, 108, 323n18; committees,
DPs, Russian, 4, 30, 254–55; absence 99–100, 103, 108, 117, 126, 127–34,
from ABN demonstration, 142; anti- 214–16, 221–23, 270; cooperation
semitism among, 5, 113, 124; anti- with other DPs, 117; deportation of,
communism among, 5, 25, 82, 103–4, 105; demonstrations by,
85–86, 109, 113, 115–16, 118, 121–34, 140–49; DP hostility towards, 4, 172,
137–38; camps for, 114, 124; claims 233; differences over repatriation
for asylum by, 110, 112; committees, among, 103–8; elites, 108, 125, 217;
112, 113–16, 124–26, 133; cooperation emigration by, 270; ethnic identity
with other DPs, 117; differences over among, 39, 40; journalism by, 104,
repatriation among, 109, 111; ethnic 222–23, 224; literature by, 217; na-
identity among, 39, 41, 104, 109, 125; tionalism among, 82, 85, 100–108,
federalism among, 123–26, 128–29, 126–30, 136, 148, 214–16, 217,
132; Jewish hostility towards, 4, 172; 221–26, 231–32, 234–35; opposition
journalism by, 104, 114; literature by, to repatriation among, 39–40, 82,
109–10, 110–11, 111–12, 225; national- 85, 99–108, 133; perception of Nazis
ism among, 113–16, 121–26; Nazi col- as imperialists, 4–5; Polish, 10, 30,
laboration by, 112, 113–14, 123–24; 40, 85, 105, 117, 126, 215, 235; politi-
number of, 38, 39, 42; opposition to cal divisions among, 106–8; as “po-
repatriation among, 41, 45, 82, 83, litical emigration,” 100–108, 118; po-
85–86, 108–16; perception of Nazis litical prisoners among, 214–16, 217,
as imperialists, 4–5; political divi- 221–26, 230–31; professional back-
sions among, 113–16, 121–34, 138; as grounds of, 18–19; repatriation of,
“political emigration,” 108–9, 112–13, 40, 103, 117; segregation of, 103,117;
116, 118; repatriation of, 3, 36, 38, 40, Soviet, 40, 85, 103–5, 108, 125. See
41, 45, 52–53, 64, 83, 85–86, 104, also Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Na-
109–11, 112, 134–35, 137, 177, 216. See tions; Association of Ukrainian Po-
also Anti-Communist Center of the litical Prisoners; Central Represen-
Liberation Movement of the Peo- tation of the Ukrainian Emigration
ples of Russia; Central Representa- in Germany; Chronicle of the
tion of the Russian Emigration; Ukrainian Political Prisoner; Educa-
Committee of United Vlasovites; tional and Research Institute of
Coordinating Center of the Anti- Ukrainian Martyrology; Interna-
Bolshevik Struggle; National Labor tional Committee of Political
Union; Union of Fighters of the Refugees and Displaced Persons;
Liberation Movement; Union of the International of Liberty; League of
Index 355
Ukrainian Political Prisoners; Orga- Federation of Hungarian Jews, 313n11

nization of Ukrainian Nationalists; Felda‹ng DP camp, 161, 162, 174–75,
Ukrainian Revolutionary Demo- 191, 323n11
cratic Party Fesenko, Tat’iana, 109–10, 111, 112
DPs, United Nations (UNDPs), 44, Fibisch, Peter, 231
51, 60, 66, 172 First Conference of Enslaved Nations
DPs, Yugoslav, 39 of Eastern Europe and Asia, 127
Durchansky, Ferdinand, 126 Fischer, George, 109, 112
Dyczok, Marta, 103 Flossenbürg: concentration camp,
230–31; DP camp, 230
Eastern Europe: antisemitism in, 167; Föhrenwald DP camp, 209
as context for DP history, 20; expul- Forced laborers: as DPs, 3, 19, 91, 103,
sion of ethnic Germans from, 214, 253–54; minor role of within
36–37; forced labor in, 31; formative DP debates, 19; POWs as, 31; Nazi
role of postwar Germany in, 22–23; use of, 3, 19, 30–31, 32, 34, 83, 102,
historiography about, 20; Jewish mi- 103–4, 144, 253–54; repatriation of,
gration from, 37, 41, 63; minorities 102, 109, 111; restitition for, 253–54;
within, 11; nationalism in, 6, 10; Soviet use of, 82, 86, 104, 128, 143,
Nazi collaboration in, 34; Nazi oc- 144, 224
cupation of, 6, 30; population France, 45–46, 54, 93, 231. See also
movements in, 29, 30, 31–37, 39, 42; Zone of occupation, French
prisoners of war from, 32, 34; So- Freimann DP camp (Munich), 92–93,
viet occupation of, 6, 10, 22, 30, 95, 96, 117, 161, 174, 218, 236
35–36, 84. See also Czechoslovakia; Frenkel, Shlomo, 156
Hungary; Poland; Ukraine Friedheim, V., 175
Educational and Research Institute of Funk Caserne DP camp (Munich), 84
Ukrainian Martyrology, 221–22 Fun Letstn Khurbn (From the Last
Eichhorn, Max, 159 Destruction), 165
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 48, 59, 61, 62,
65, 246–47 Gablingen, 246, 253
Elliott, Mark, 52 Galicia (Eastern Poland), 40, 105,
Emigration: communities formed by, 106–7, 109, 178
20, 270; political rationale for, Garfunkel, Leib, 156
100–109, 112–13, 114, 116, 270 Gehlen, Reinhard, 304n73
Engel, David, 183 General Claims Law (Entschädigungs-
Estonia, 8, 34 gesetz, 1948), 67, 72, 73, 76, 261, 264,
Ethnic cleansing, 20, 35–37 265
Exile, 91, 95–96 General Government (administration
Europeanism, 10, 22 of Nazi-Occupied Poland), 30, 31
European Union, 22 Genocide, 4, 30, 32, 59, 129–30, 145,
Evian Conference (1938), 58, 59, 63 156. See also Ethnic cleansing;
Holocaust
Fascism: Croatian, 142; Italian, 106. Georgia (Soviet), 122
See also National Socialism German Association of Former Politi-
Feder, Theodore, 202, 207 cal Prisoners of Concentration
Federal Compensation Law (1956), Camps, 230
73–74, 76 German Democratic Republic. See
Federalism (Russo-Soviet), 121–26, Germany, East
132, 148 German Of‹ce for Peace Questions
Federal Republic of Germany. See (Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen),
Germany, West 139
356 Index
Germany, East, 15, 226, 233–34 203–5, 207–8; relationships between

Germany, Nazi; alliance with Soviet DPs and Germans in, 21, 44, 47–48,
Union, 33; anticommunism of, 65, 67, 139–49, 172, 186–210, 229,
112–13, 123, 132, 229; collaboration 232, 248–51; repatriation to, 36;
with, 4, 19, 99, 102, 104, 105, 107–8, repatriation of Soviets from, 3, 36,
111–12, 113, 114, 115, 121, 123, 126, 38, 40, 45, 52–53, 64, 83, 85–86, 104,
129–30, 142, 178, 212, 216, 233; con- 109–11, 112, 134–35, 137, 177, 216;
centration camps in, 32, 34, 58–59, restitution policies in, 56, 73–74, 75,
61, 144, 212, 217–18, 223, 238–40; 76, 229, 251–66; reversion of au-
criminal culpability of, 252–53, 261, thority in, 16, 187, 189–90, 197,
270; defeat of, 33, 59; evacuations 198–210, 269; Zionism in, 156–60,
within, 34; forced labor under, 3, 19, 161, 164–76, 180–83, 187–89. See also
22, 30–31, 32, 34, 83, 102, 103–4, 144, Military Government of Occupa-
253–54; genocide by, 4, 30, 32, 59, tion; Zone of occupation, Ameri-
129–30, 145, 156, 164–67, 169–71, can; Zone of occupation, British;
178, 218, 323n18; as imperialist Zone of occupation, French; Zone
power, 4–5, 21, 127, 252, 270–71; in- of occupation, Soviet
vasion of Soviet Union, 4–5, 31, 32, Germany, West: anticommunist policy
33, 107, 123; occupation of Eastern of, 6, 269; antisemitism in, 20, 75;
Europe, 6, 22, 30–33, 178; occupa- attitudes toward DPs in, 7, 21,
tion of Poland, 4–5, 10, 30–32, 214; 54–55, 72–74, 75; bureaucracy of,
occupation of Soviet Union, 32–33, 74; creation of, 15, 205, 207; de‹ni-
102, 103, 106–7, 112–13, 114, 115; oc- tion of “German-ness” within, 20,
cupation of Ukraine, 4–5, 102, 103, 22, 54, 208; DP committees in,
106–7, 126–27, 216, 323n18; political 50–51, 54, 270; DP demonstrations
persecution in, 228; postwar parti- in, 148; DP policies of, 3, 5–6, 9, 18,
tion of, 35; POWs in, 32; racial poli- 21, 46, 50–51, 54–55, 72–77, 265–66;
cies of, 1, 4, 29, 30, 31, 34, 58, 59, 62, DP population in, 3; denazi‹cation
71, 102, 112, 129, 253; religious perse- in, 6, 270; historiography about,
cution in, 58, 59, 71; wartime resis- 21–22; immigration to, 22; Jewish
tance against, 169, 176, 211–13, 214, community in, 21, 22, 66, 187, 208,
226–30, 236, 241, 254–55 209–10; memorialization within, 21;
Germany, occupied: absence of state restitution policies in, 56, 73–74, 75,
within, 15; acknowledgment of Nazi 76, 265; role of Eastern European
past in, 21, 186–87, 198–99, 270; Al- history for, 22–23; theme of
lied policies within, 5; anticommu- wartime suffering in, 21, 219; trans-
nism in, 138–39, 269; anti-Polish at- fer of authority over DPs to, 66, 69,
titudes in, 233, 249–50; antisemitism 76, 189–90, 197
in, 75, 173, 189, 198–208; attitudes Gestapo, 89, 139
toward occupation in, 147; commu- Ghettos, 31, 155–56, 161, 169, 171, 176
nism in, 139–40; denazi‹cation in, 6, Girs, Anatol, 236, 239–40, 241, 243
255–56; DP control by authorities Girs, Barbara, 322n108
in, 66–67, 69, 197, 198, 200–205, Glick, Hersh, 190
207–10, 269; DP demonstrations in, Globalization, 23
4, 51–52, 53, 140–49, 198–210; DP re- Goethe in Dachau, 233
settlement in, 46, 54–55; historiog- Goschler, Constantin, 59, 73, 263
raphy about, 20–22; Jewish migra- Goya, Francisco, 219
tion to, 37, 206–7; journalism in, Grabinski, Mieczyslaw, 89, 94–95, 98,
145, 146–47, 198–200, 207–8; nation- 117, 214
alism in, 205; Poles in, 88; police in, Great Britain, 42; minority policies,
47–48, 51, 141, 146, 187, 200–202, 35–36; Palestine policy, 52, 161, 174,
Index 357
182; Polish policy of, 35–36, 89; identity, 158, 164, 170–71, 184, 188;
repatriation to, 38; resettlement of terms for, 165, 169. See also Ger-
DPs in, 46, 148; Soviet policy of, 35, many, Nazi, genocide by; She’erith
45. See also Zone of occupation, Hapletah
British Home Army (Polish), 88
Greenstein, Harry, 199, 207 Homeless Foreigners Law (West Ger-
Grinberg, Zalman, 65, 161, 163, 164, many), 3, 46, 50, 53, 55
166, 172, 193, 194 Honig, Bonnie, 279n55
Gringauz, Samuel, 166–67, 168–69, Human rights, 14–15, 16, 17
170–71, 173, 189, 195, 196 Hungary, 36, 37, 41, 141, 158, 181. See
Grodzinsky, Yosef, 154 also DPs, Hungarian
Grossmann, Atina, 21, 190 Hurwic-Nowakowska, Irena, 180, 184
Group identity, 13–14 Hussarek, Paul, 228, 229–30
Grunwald, Battle of (1410), 96
Gulag system, 144, 224. See also Soviet IGCR. See Intergovernmental Com-
Union, forced labor in mittee on Refugees
IIO. See International Information
Hannover, 140 Of‹ce of Dachau
Harrison, Earl G., 61–62, 160, 247 Immigration, 21–22, 24–25
Harrison Report (1945), 61–64, 65, 66, IMT. See International Military Tri-
154, 160, 172, 196, 245–46 bunal
Haskalah movement, 167–68, 177 INCOPORE. See International Com-
Herbert, Ulrich, 263 mittee of Political Refugees and
Herf, Jeffrey, 187 Displaced Persons
Hermlin, Stefan, 234 Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War
Herzl, Theodor, 177 Requirements, 42
Heuner, Jonathan, 318n31 Intergovernmental Committee on
Heuss, Theodor, 187 Refugees (IGCR), 58, 61
Higgins, Marguerite, 199 International Committee of Political
High Commissioner of Refugees, Emigrants and DPs. See Central In-
Of‹ce of the (League of Nations), ternational Union of Former Politi-
112 cal Prisoners
Himka, John-Paul, 102 International Committee of Political
Hitler, Adolf, 124, 156, 252 Refugees and Displaced Persons
Hnaupek, Walter, 89 (INCOPORE), 117, 132
Hobsbawm, Eric, 226 International Information Of‹ce of
Hoegner, Wilhelm (Bavarian justice Dachau (IIO), 214, 228–30
minister), 70 Internationalism: among DPs, 9–10,
Holocaust, 31–32, 145; as catalyst for 211, 226–32, 234–36, 239; among
Zionism, 158, 164, 170–71, 176, former political prisoners, 211,
178–79; as challenge to Zionism, 226–32, 234–36, 239; anticommunist
156; commemoration of, 164–65, rhetoric and, 131–32; antifascism
169; Eastern European complicity and, 226–36; and restitution regime,
in, 167, 178; Jewish interpretations 259–62; and war crimes prosecu-
of, 163–70; as martyrdom, 169; post- tion, 260–62
war German treatment of, 21, International Military Tribunal
186–87, 245; as reason for Jewish (IMT), 260–62
state, 173, 184; as renunciation of International of Liberty, 126, 131
Enlightenment promise, 167–69; International Prisoners’ Committee of
role in Zionist rhetoric, 154, 156, Dachau (IPC), 92, 157, 159, 227,
164, 173, 184; as source of Jewish 228, 320n79
358 Index
International Refugee Organization ish; Haskalah movement; Jewish

(IRO), 6, 16, 46, 103; administration Agency in Palestine; She’erith Hap-
of DP camps, 47, 246; advocacy for letah; Zionism
DP restitution, 73, 261, 265; auton- Joint, The. See American Joint Distri-
omy of, 17; creation of, 45, 64; over- bution Committee
sight of DP committees, 48, 53, 117, Judt, Tony, 6
261; planning for, 65; role in care of
persecutees, 66, 76, 253, 268; Soviet Kassel, 114
rejection of, 45–46; subordination Katyn massacre, 35, 96, 97
to Western occupation authorities, Kaufering. See Dachau concentration
16–17, 46 camp
IPC. See International Prisoners’ Kerckhoff, Susanne, 233–34
Committee of Dachau Kharkov, 112
Irgun Brith Zion, 155–56 Kielce pogrom, 37, 179
IRO. See International Refugee Orga- Kiev, 109, 111–12, 125, 231
nization Klausner, Abraham, 158, 161, 191–92
Isar River, 94 Knysh, Zinovii, 100, 101, 102, 103
Israel, 20, 46, 154, 198, 270. See also Kogon, Eugen, 212
Palestine Kolkhoz. See Collective farms
Italy, 98, 259 Komitet Ob’edinennykh Vlasovtsev
(KOV). See Committee of United
Jacobmeyer, Wolfgang, 8–9, 30, 76, 83, Vlasovites
87, 153 Komitet Osvobozhdeniia Narodov
Jaroszynska-Kirchmann, Anna, 86, Rossii (KONR). See Committee for
90, 91 the Liberation of the Peoples of
Jewish Agency in Palestine, 188 Russia
Jewish Information Of‹ce (Dachau), KONR. See Committee for the Liber-
157–60, 178–79 ation of the Peoples of Russia
Jews: appeal of German culture to, Koordinatsionnyi Tsentr Antibol’she-
166, 167–68; concentration camp ex- vistskoi Bor’by (KtsAB). See Coor-
periences of, 153, 156–57, 171, 237; dinating Center of the Anti-Bolshe-
de‹ned as victims of Nazi persecu- vik Struggle
tion, 61–63, 165, 237, 245; emigra- KOV. See Committee of United
tion to Palestine, 25, 41, 62, 153–54, Vlasovites
180, 182–83, 188, 206, 270; extermi- Kovno ghetto, 155–56, 161, 174
nation of (see Holocaust); historical Kronstadt rebellion (1921), 116
narratives of, 164–70; historiogra- KtsAB. See Coordinating Center of
phy about, 21; in Czechoslovakia, the Anti-Bolshevik Struggle
126; in Hungary, 158; in Lithuania, Kuhlmann-Smirnov, Anne, 105
155–56, 161, 162, 171, 177–78; in Kulischer, Eugene, 29, 31
Poland, 3, 10, 20, 31–32, 36, 37, 154, Kulyk, Volodymyr, 100, 105, 297n77
158, 166, 176–80; in postwar Ger- KZ-Betreuungsstellen. See Care Cen-
many, 21, 22, 66, 187, 208, 209–10, ters
245; in Soviet Union, 33, 64; as na-
tional group, 63–64, 155, 160; post- Lachmann, Walter, 232–33
war divisions among, 187–89, Lagrou, Pieter, 4, 219, 224
190–91; as postwar refugees, 37, 41, Lalande, Julia, 102
63, 154; repatriation of, 36, 37; as Land Association of Jewish Commit-
wartime refugees, 33; wartime resis- tees in Bavaria (Landesverband der
tance by, 169, 176, 236, 241. See also israelitischen Kultusgemeinden in
Antisemitism; Brichah; DPs, Jew- Bayern), 207
Index 359
Länderrat. See State Council 219–23, 231. See also Educational

Landesverband der israelitischen Kul- and Research Institute of Ukrai-
tusgemeinden in Bayern. See Land nian Martyrology
Association of Jewish Committees Marunchak, Mykhailo, 103, 223
in Bavaria Maruniak, Volodymyr, 108
Latvia, 34, 110, 111 Marx, Karl, 133
League of Nations, 54, 112 McCloy, John J., 139, 198–99, 206
League of Ukrainian Political Prison- McNarney, General Joseph, 48,
ers (Liha Ukraïns’kykh Politychnykh 134–35, 195, 196
V’iazniv, or LUPV): commemora- Melk, 101, 103
tive activities, 221–23, 231–32; con- Melnyk, Andrew, 106
gresses, 235; demonstrations, 140, Memorialization. See Commemora-
265; formation, 215; opposition to tion
repatriation, 100–101; OUN origins, Memory, 11
216; publications, 222, 223, 224; Mendelsohn, Ezra, 177–78
restitution claims by, 259, 265; role Mickelsen, Stanley, 193
in Flossenbürg memorial, 231. See Migration, 23–25, 30, 33–34, 36–37
also Educational and Research In- Mikiciuk, Stanislaw, 90
stitute of Ukrainian Martyrology Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw, 88
Lebensraum, 30 Military Government of Occupation
Leibowitz, Yosef, 172, 174 (U.S.), 161, 205; authority over DPs,
Lenin, V. I., 127 47–48, 76, 103, 246, 254; Civil Ad-
Liha Ukraïns’kykh Politychnykh ministration division, 138, 246; co-
V’iazniv (LUPV). See League of operation with international organi-
Ukrainian Political Prisoners zations, 17, 265; discouragement of
Lindenberg, Yosef, 158, 169 anticommunist activism by, 134–35,
Lithuania, 37, 145; genocide in, 171, 138; DP policies of, 5–6, 9, 15, 16,
172, 178; Jews in, 155–56, 161, 162, 17–18, 29–30, 42–55, 64–66, 69,
171, 177–78; Nazi collaboration in, 76–77, 103, 137–40, 154–55, 161,
34, 178; postwar ethnic cleansing in, 191–97, 214, 245–66; ethnic policies
36; Zionism in, 155–56, 177–78 of, 39–40; investigation of DP com-
Litopys Ukraïns’koho Politv’iaznia. See mittees by, 125, 135, 137, 194–95,
Chronicle of the Ukrainian Political 215, 249, 251; preference for Allied
Prisoner DPs, 44; reconstruction plans of,
Lodz, 180, 183 42–43; regulation of DP organiza-
London Charter (1945), 260–61 tions by, 48–49, 53, 89, 137–38, 162,
Lörcher, Ernst, 229 191–97, 214, 245–46, 249, 251, 264;
Lublin Committee, 36, 89 repatriation policies of, 43, 45, 83,
LUPV. See League of Ukrainian Po- 117, 134; restitution policies of,
litical Prisoners 56–57, 72–73, 76, 229, 258–66, 268;
Lviv, 126, 231 role in ABN demonstration, 141,
145–46; role in postwar German
Malczewski, Leon, 159 and Jewish histories, 21; segregation
Malkki, Liisa, 24, 25, 273n11, 282n2 of DPs by, 22, 44, 103; support for
Mankowitz, Zeev, 153 anticommunist organizations,
Marrus, Michael, 54, 91 137–38; statelike powers of, 15–16;
Martyrdom: as idiom of DP self-rep- transfer of authority to German
resentation, 4–5, 169, 219–23, 224, agencies, 16, 66, 69, 76, 189–90, 197,
231, 252; Holocaust as, 169; Jewish 198–210, 269
notions of, 169, 223, 310n66; and Milosz, Czeslaw, 238
nationalism, 220–23; symbols of, Mindszenty, Joszef Cardinal, 141
360 Index
Mirchuk, Petro, 104, 145, 224, 234, meanings assigned to, 9; and minor-
235, 250, 252–53, 262, 263 ity groups, 6, 278n41; Zionist rejec-
Möhlstrasse demonstration (1949), tion of prewar, 170–72
198–210 National Labor Union (Natsional’no
Mönchehof DP camp, 114 Trudovoi Soiuz, or NTS), 113–14,
Mudry, Vasyl, 99, 100, 103 115, 125, 136, 216, 225
Muecke, Marjorie, 13 National’no Trudovoi Soiuz (NTS).
Müller, Joseph, 48 See National Labor Union
Müller, Oskar, 228 National Socialism, 56, 64, 73, 107,
Munich, 218; DP camps in, 84, 91, 124; 252; as catalyst for Eastern Euro-
DP committees in, 89–91, 95–96, pean antisemitism, 167; as cause for
124, 126, 194–95, 214, 215, 219, 236; existence of DPs, 252–58; compared
DP demonstrations in, 128, 140–47, to communism, 5, 84, 85, 86, 93,
198–210, 224; Jewish community in, 127, 144–45, 213, 224–25, 232; con-
187–88, 202–3; Polish DPs in, 89–91, centration camps as feature of, 58,
94–96; press in, 145, 198–200, 207; 93, 171; DP experiences of, 22,
Russian DPs in, 124; Ukrainian 252–53; DP narratives about, 4–5, 9,
DPs in, 99, 126; U.S. diplomats in, 11, 25; imperialist aims of, 252–53,
133, 139, 149, 208 256; as nihilist ideology, 255. See
Munich Jewish Committee, 199, 202 also Antifascism; Fascism; Ger-
Murnau POW camp, 83, 247–48 many, Nazi
Nazi Germany. See Germany, Nazi
Nansen passports, 40, 325n64 Neimirok, Aleksandr, 225
Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del Netherlands, 93, 224
(NKVD). See Soviet People’s Min- Neuberg (Bavaria), 53
istry of Internal Affairs New Deal, 48, 55
National Democratic Movement New York Herald Tribune, 199
(Poland), 253 Nitecki, Alicia, 321n107, 322n111
Nationalism: anticommunist dis- Nitzotz (The Spark), 156
avowal of, 132; Baltic, 143; DP criti- NKVD. See Soviet People’s Ministry
cism of, 97–98, 118–19; Jewish (see of Internal Affairs
Zionism); and martyrdom, 220–23, Noiriel, Gérard, 13–14, 15, 19
231; Polish, 90–95, 96–98, 221; post- NTS. See National Labor Union
war German, 21, 22, 205; pre-World Nuremberg, 260
War II, 6, 122–23; Russian, 113–16,
118–19; as source of DP Ofer, Dalia, 165
identi‹cation, 8, 90–91, 97–98, Offerlé, Michel, 13
117–18, 142–43; Ukrainian, 99–108, Of‹ce of Policy Coordination (OPC).
118–19, 122, 126–34, 214–16, 221–26, See Central Intelligence Agency
231–32. See also Transnationalism O‹cyna Warszawska, 236
Nationality: as basis of DP persecu- Oleiski, Jakob, 162, 163, 166, 171, 172,
tion, 73, 233–34; as condition for 173
human rights, 15; contrasted with Olszewski, Krystyn, 236–37, 242
“refugee” status, 14, 20, 54; as crite- Organization of Ukrainian National-
rion for DP designation, 42, 44, 66, ists (OUN), 113; American aid to,
103, 117, 159, 161, 163, 171, 196–97, 136; antisemitism of, 129–30; Ban-
214, 232, 233–34; and DP self-per- dera faction of (OUN-B), 106–8,
ception, 2–3, 4, 11, 39–40; global 117, 136, 215–16; economic policies
context of, 23; historiographical em- of, 130; Melnyk faction of (OUN-
phasis upon, 7–11, 23–24; impor- M), 106, 107; nationalist agenda of,
tance in concentration camps, 233; 127, 129, 215–16; Nazi collaboration
Index 361
by, 106–7, 129–30, 216; origins, 106; 118, 128, 141–44, 211. See also Anti-
secularism of, 144; transformation semitism; Genocide; Holocaust;
into ABN, 126. See also Anti-Bol- Pogroms
shevik Bloc of Nations Peter the Great, Czar, 128
ORT (Society for Trades and Agricul- Piekatsch, Peisach, 199–200, 201, 206
tural Labor) Movement, 162 Pilsudski, Jósef, 123
Orthodox Church, Russian, 109, 133 Pinson, Koppel, 162–63, 180, 184
Ostministerium, 114, 123 Pirkmajer, Otmar, 252–54, 255–56,
Osynka, Paladii, 217, 218 258–61, 324n27
OUN. See Organization of Ukrainian Pogroms, 165. See also Kielce pogrom
Nationalists Poland: annexation of German terri-
tory by, 35; antifascism in, 88; anti-
Palestine: British policies on, 52, 161, semitism in, 5, 37, 158, 167, 178,
174, 182, 183; Jewish community in, 179–80, 181, 185; communist govern-
154, 164, 183, 188; Jewish emigration ment of, 81–82, 84, 86, 88–89, 90,
to, 153, 180, 181–83, 188, 206, 270; as 92, 93–94, 96; concentration camps
Jewish homeland, 4, 25, 41, 51, 63, in, 32; deportation from, 30–31,
157, 161–62, 163, 171, 173, 181–85, 36–37, 219, 240; diasporic culture of,
188–89, 197; symbolic value of, 184; 90–91, 93; ethnic cleansing in,
United Nations Committee on, 173. 36–37; ethnic Germans in, 34, 36;
See also Israel; United Nations Spe- ethnic Ukrainians in, 10, 30, 40, 101,
cial Committee on Palestine 103, 104, 105, 107; forced laborers
Paris Peace Conference (1946), 128, 131 from, 31, 91; government in exile of,
Pasiczniak, Wasyl, 234 35, 88–89, 90, 92, 95; “Great Emi-
Pavelic, Ante, 142 gration” from, 91; Holocaust in,
Pelensky, Zenon, 117 153, 158; interwar development of,
Persecutees: classi‹cation by national- 10, 104; Jewish emigration from, 37,
ity, 6, 73; creation of category of, 41, 63, 82, 153, 163, 179–80, 182; Jews
57–58, 60; de‹nition of, 60; loss of in, 3, 10, 20, 30–31, 36, 153, 158, 166,
status under German control, 69; 176–80, 183; liberation of, 88; mi-
“national” (Nationalverfolgter), 73, nority policies in, 10, 37, 104, 106;
74; organizations of, 68–69; as privi- nationalism in, 90–95, 96–98, 221,
leged legal category, 64; right to 253; Nazi occupation of, 4–5, 10,
compensation of, 72; role of policies 30–32, 178; notion of martyrdom in,
for in denazi‹cation, 62, 255–56; 221; political prisoners from, 89,
special bene‹ts for, 62, 64; trans- 153, 213–14, 236–43; postwar econ-
ferred to German control, 69, 76; omy in, 84–85; postwar plans for,
treatment of like DPs, 60–61. See 35–36, 88–89; repatriation to, 36, 39,
also DPs 89, 93–94, 96, 98–99, 117, 160; Revo-
Persecution: as Allied administrative lution of 1831, 54, 91; Soviet hege-
rubric, 56–58, 60, 246; Allied de‹ni- mony in, 84, 92–94, 101, 118, 180; So-
tion of, 58; as common experience viet occupation of, 10, 33, 35–36, 38,
of concentration camp survivors, 84; stereotypes about, 233–34; sup-
59, 164, 169, 211, 218–19, 223, 268; as port for Promethean Movement,
de‹ning quality of postwar 123, 126; Ukrainian resistance to,
refugees, 64, 268–69; de‹nition of 104, 106–7; Zionism in, 177–78, 180,
political, 64–65, 212–13, 246; as fo- 183, 185. See also DPs, Polish;
cus of Allied DP policy, 56–57, 60, Home Army; Lublin Committee;
62, 64–65, 246, 268–69; religious, 58, Polish Association of Ex-Prisoners
59, 71, 85, 109, 128, 141–44, 306n108; Persecuted by Nazis; Polish Associ-
Soviet, 83, 84–86, 104–5, 109, 111–12, ation of Former Political Prisoners
362 Index
Poland (continued ) 212–13; disputes among, 228–30,

of German Concentration Camps; 263–64; elitism of, 217–25, 245, 248,
Polish Committee in Munich; Pol- 254, 264; French, 231, 263; German,
ish Committee of Dachau; Polish 68, 228–30, 263, 265; importance of
Information Of‹ce in Dachau; Pol- replaced by “persecutees,” 60; inter-
ish People’s Party; Polish Union in nationalism among, 211, 226–32,
the American Occupation Zone of 234–36, 239, 263; leadership of IPC
Germany; Polish Union in Ger- by, 159; marginalization of among
many DPs, 232–34; as martyrs, 219–23,
Polish Association of Ex-Prisoners 224, 231, 252; nationalism among,
Persecuted by Nazis, 246 217, 221–25, 249; of‹cial recognition
Polish Association of Former Political of, 212, 245–51; opposition to repa-
Prisoners of German Concentra- triation among, 214, 232–33, 235;
tion Camps, 214, 249–51, 253 Polish, 89, 153, 213–14, 218, 230,
Polish Committee in Munich: advo- 236–43, 263–64; postwar German
cacy for former political prisoners, relationship with, 66, 248–51; as re-
214, 247; anticommunism, 90; sistance ‹ghters, 254–55; restitution
Borowski’s work for, 95, 236; ex- claims by, 244, 251–59, 262–66;
hibits at, 218–19; information gath- Russian, 216, 225; suffering of,
ering by, 247; leadership, 89, 94; ori- 218–19, 223, 225, 244–45; symbols
gins, 89; role in IIO, 228–29 of, 212, 218, 240–43, 265, 318n23;
Polish Committee of Dachau, 92, 93 Ukrainian, 214–16, 221–26, 230–31,
Polish Information Of‹ce in Dachau, 231–32, 262–63. See also Associa-
214, 228–29 tion of Foreign Political Persecu-
Polish People’s Party, 88 tees; Association of Persecutees of
Polish Union in the American Occu- the Nazi Regime; Association of
pation Zone of Germany (Zjed- Ukrainian Political Prisoners; Cen-
noczenie Polskie w Amerykaskiej tral International Union of Former
Stre‹e Okupacji Niemiec), 90 Political Prisoners; Chronicle of the
Polish Union in Germany, 50, 90 Ukrainian Political Prisoner; Ger-
Polish Workers Party, 96 man Association of Former Politi-
“Political explanation.” See Anticom- cal Prisoners of Concentration
munism Camps; International Information
Political prisoners, DP: Allied empha- Of‹ce of Dachau; International
sis upon, 212, 251; anticommunism Prisoners’ Committee of Dachau;
among, 213, 224–25, 235, 250, 264; League of Ukrainian Political Pris-
antifascism among, 212, 225, oners; Polish Association of Ex-
226–36, 238–40; antisemitism Prisoners Persecuted by Nazis; Pol-
among, 211, 227, 245, 250, 264; ap- ish Association of Former Political
peals to Allied authorities by, Prisoners of German Concentra-
245–48, 251–59, 262–66; art by, tion Camps; Polish Committee in
218–19; Belgian, 224, 231, 263; as Munich; Polish Information Of‹ce
category of DPs, 59, 159, 194–95, in Dachau
211–43, 245–46, 253–54; collabora- Poremskii, Vladimir, 114, 125, 225
tion by, 212, 214; commemorative Porter, Brian, 91
activities by, 213, 215, 216–26, 229, Posev, 104, 114
230–32; committees of, 213–16, Potsdam conference, 36
228–30, 246–51; concentration camp Prague Manifesto (1944), 124, 126
survivors described as, 59, 211–12; Prisoners of war (POWs): accusations
criticism of, 237–42; debased condi- of collaboration against, 104–5, 109;
tion of, 237–38; de‹nition of, 59, as category of DPs, 3, 32, 247–48;
Index 363
communal identi‹cation among, 7, Zionist opposition to, 156–57, 160,

217; elitism of, 217, 248, 254; as 163, 170, 175. See also Ethnic
forced laborers, 31, 32; in concentra- cleansing
tion camps, 32, 217; postwar migra- Representation, 12–14
tion of, 33–34; repatriation of, 38, Representatives of National Commit-
93, 109; rights of, 7 tees of DPs and Refugees in Ger-
Promethean movement, 123, 126 many, 261, 265
Propaganda: ABN use of, 126–27, 131, Resettlement, DP, 1, 45, 46
142–45; anticommunist, 125, 131, Restitution (Wiedergutmachung),
133–34, 136, 138, 142–45; anti-Nazi, 56–57; Auerbach’s advocacy for, 67;
255; communist, 139–40; U.S., 136, de‹nition of, 289n1; DP committee
138; Zionist, 182, 190 advice on, 53; as focus of German
Proudfoot, Malcolm, 45 Care Centers, 67, 229, 245; for
Puczyc, Marian, 162, 171–72, 189 forced labor, 253–54; historical
precedents for, 259–60; historiogra-
Rancière, Jacques, 17 phy on, 262–63; international sys-
Red Cross, 1, 67, 89, 229 tem for, 259–62; Jewish demands
Redlich, Shimon, 180 for, 162; legal framework for, 70–76,
Refugees, 13, 14, 16, 33; Allied de‹ni- 258–62; limitations of, 70, 71,
tion of, 43, 58; connection to home 73–74, 75–76, 252, 262–66; as moral
country, 24–25; as diasporic com- obligation, 252–53; occupation
munities, 25, 154–55, 277n33; distin- policies on, 70, 229, 258–66; politi-
guished by Allies from DPs, 43, 172; cal prisoner claims for, 244, 251–59,
nineteenth-century, 54; as objects of 262–66
persecution, 58, 64; political activi- Retter, Aryeh (Leon), 167, 176, 183,
ties of, 54; proliferation of in twen- 195, 197, 206
tieth century, 24; transnational Riga, 110
character of, 23–24, 25. See also Ringelmann, Richard, 73
Displaced persons (DPs) ROA. See Russian Liberation Army
Regensburg, 90, 99 Romanov, Evgenii, 114
Relief agencies, 5–7, 10, 15, 16. See Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 58
also International Refugee Organi- Rosenberg, Alfred, 114, 123
zation; Red Cross; United Nations Rosenheim, 140
High Commission for Refugees Rositzke, Harry, 136
Reparations. See Restitution Rost, Nico, 233–34
Repatriation, 3, 22, 36; as Allied ob- Rousset, David, 224, 232
jective, 43–44, 52, 81–83, 90, 233, Rovan, Joseph, 233
235; DP opposition to, 3, 4, 9, 38, Rumania, 32, 37, 40. See also DPs,
39, 40, 41, 45, 52, 81–119, 156–57, Rumanian
160, 161, 163, 170, 175, 214, 232–33, Rusinek, Zygmunt, 90
235, 258; historiographical treat- Russia, Czarist, 122
ment of, 20; and notion of “home- Russian Civil War. See Civil War,
land,” 25, 40, 43, 174; obstacles to, Russian
34–35, 37, 39–40, 45, 258; to Ger- Russian Liberation Army (Russkaia
many, 36, 177; to Poland, 36, 39, Osvoboditel’naia Armiia, or ROA),
89, 93, 96, 98–99; to Soviet Union, 34, 115, 124, 125
3, 36, 38–39, 40, 41, 45, 52–53, 64, Russkaia Osvoboditel’naia Armiia
83, 109–10, 134–35, 177; to U.S., 38; (ROA). See Russian Liberation Army
to Western Europe, 177; UNRRA
poll on, 82, 83–86, 87, 118–19, Saburova, Irina, 110–11
181–82; voluntary nature of, 45; Sachsenhausen, 225
364 Index
Sack, Joel, 157–58, 169, 178–79 155; collapse of, 20; compared to
SBONR. See Union of the Struggle Nazi Germany, 93, 127, 144–45; de-
for the Liberation of the Peoples of portations by, 33; deportation from,
Russia 109; ethnic policies of, 33, 35–36,
Schäffer, Fritz, 259 122; evacuations within, 33; exile
Schirilla, Laszlo, 71, 263 campaigns against, 121–49; forced
Schleissheim-Feldmoching DP camp, laborers from, 31, 32, 109, 111; forced
124 labor in, 82, 86, 104, 128, 143, 144,
Schochet, Simon, 91 224; genocide by, 145; as imperialist
Schreiber, Hugo, 158 power, 102, 127–29, 139, 143–44; in-
Schumacher, Kurt, 187 ternationalism of, 131; invasion of
Schwarz, Leo, 182, 183, 193, 195, 197, Nazi Germany, 34; Jews in, 33, 36,
200 37, 64, 82; kolkhoz (collective farm)
Separatism (Russo-Soviet), 121–22, system in, 104, 143; Nazi invasion
124, 126–30, 148. See also Interna- of, 4–5, 31, 32, 33, 107, 123; Nazi oc-
tional Committee of Political cupation of, 32–33, 102, 103, 106–7,
Refugees and Displaced Persons; 112–13, 114, 115; occupation of east-
International of Liberty ern Europe, 6, 10, 22, 30, 35–36, 38,
Seraphim, Metropolitan (Russian Or- 84, 101–2, 134; occupation of Ger-
thodox), 109 many, 134; occupation of Poland,
SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters of 33, 35, 38, 40; persecution by, 5, 83,
the Allied Expeditionary Force), 39, 84–86, 104–5, 108–12, 118, 128,
43, 44, 45, 57–58 141–48, 306n108; political prisoners
Shami, Seteney, 16 from, 216; postwar role in Poland,
She’erith Hapletah, 164, 170, 176, 190, 84, 92–94, 101, 118, 180; prewar ex-
223. See also Holocaust iles from, 109, 112, 113, 122–23;
Shephard, Ben, 43 POWs from, 32, 40, 104–5; propa-
Shils, Edward, 7 ganda by, 139; punishment for col-
Siberia, 83, 85 laboration in, 6, 34, 99, 104–5, 111,
Sich Ri›emen, 231, 320n75 112, 115; refugees from, 33, 109; re-
Siedlecki, Janusz Nel, 89, 93–94, 95, jection of IRO by, 45–46; relations
101, 116–17, 236–37, 240–43, 254 with United States, 18, 30, 35, 45,
Slowo Polskie, 92–93 52–53, 87, 121, 134–37; religious per-
Smolensk, 35, 115 secution in, 85, 109, 128, 141–44,
Smolensk Declaration (1942), 115 306n108; repatriation of DPs to, 3,
Snyder, Timothy, 123 36, 38, 40, 45, 52–53, 64, 83, 85–86,
Soiuz Bor’by za Osvobozhdenie Naro- 104, 109–11, 112, 134–35, 137, 177,
dov Rossii (SBONR). See Union of 216; Ukrainian resistance to, 40, 85,
the Struggle for the Liberation of 98–108, 118, 121, 126–34, 142–48, 216,
the Peoples of Russia 224, 232. See also Anticommunism;
Soiuz Voinov Osvoboditel’nogo DPs, Russian; Zone of occupation,
Dvizheniia (SVOD). See Union of Soviet
Fighters of the Liberation Movement Sprecher, Max, 162
Sokolovsky, Vasily, 134–35 SS (Schutzstaffeln): evacuation of con-
Solidarists. See National Labor Union centration camps, 34; former mem-
Soviet People’s Ministry of Internal bers in postwar Germany, 139; man-
Affairs (Narodnyi komissariat vnu- agement of concentration camps,
trennikh del, or NKVD), 110, 111, 93, 233, 238; re-use of quarters for
143 DPs, 92, 93, 96–97; torture by, 218
Soviet Union: alliance with Nazi Ger- St. Ottilien (Landsberg), 161–62, 164,
many, 33; Baltic annexations by, 111, 170, 176
Index 365
Stalin, Joseph, 104, 115, 124, 125 Truman, Harry S., 62, 63, 64, 141
Starnberg, 232 Tsentral’ne Predstavnytstvo Ukraïn-
State Commission for Political Perse- s’koï Emihratsiï v Nimechchyni
cutees, 67, 251. See also State Com- (TsPUE). See Central Representa-
mission for Racial, Religious, and tion of the Ukrainian Emigration in
Political Persecutees Germany
State Commission for Racial, Reli- Tsentral’noe Predstavitel’stvo Rossi-
gious, and Political Persecutees iskoi Emigratsii (TsEPRE). See
(Bavaria): authority, 69, 71, 229, Central Representation of the Rus-
264; creation, 67; mediation be- sian Emigration
tween Jewish groups, 189; relation- TsPRE. See Central Representation of
ship with CK, 67, 189, 192; relation- the Russian Emigration
ship with political prisoners, 248–51, TsPUE. See Central Representation of
264. See also Auerbach, Philipp the Ukrainian Emigration in Ger-
State Commission for the Care of many
Jews, 67. See also State Commission TUPV. See Association of Ukrainian
for Racial, Religious, and Political Political Prisoners
Persecutees
State Compensation Of‹ce (Bavaria), Ukraine, 37; antisemitism in, 107, 216;
67 Catholic Church in, 142; demands
State Council (Länderrat, U.S. occu- for autonomy by, 122; diaspora
pation zone), 72, 73, 293n72 from, 99–108; ethnic cleansing in,
State Department (U.S.), 70, 135, 137 36; forced labor in, 40; nationalism
State Of‹ce for Restitution (Bavaria), in, 105–8, 122, 126–30, 215–16,
67 221–23; Nazi collaboration in, 34,
Stepien, Stanislaus, 138 99, 102, 104, 105, 106–7, 126, 216,
Stepinac, Archbishop Alojzije, 142 323n18; Nazi occupation of, 4–5,
Stern, Frank, 5, 21, 186, 208 102, 103, 106–7, 126–27; Orthodox
Stetsko, Iaroslav, 126, 129–30 Church in, 144; resistance to Polish
Strategic Services Unit (U.S.), 136 government in, 104, 106–7, 126; re-
Studyns’kyi, Iuri, 117–18 sistance to Soviet Union in, 40, 85,
Stuttgart, 48, 140 106–7, 216; symbols of, 231. See also
Stuttgart DP camp, 48 Association of Ukrainian Political
Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), Prisoners; Brotherhood of Saints
198–200, 202, 207, 208 Cyril and Methodius; Central Rep-
Süskind, Wilhelm E., 198–99 resentation of the Ukrainian Emi-
SVOD. See Union of Fighters of the gration in Germany; DPs, Ukrai-
Liberation Movement nian; Organization of Ukrainian
Szwede, Jerzy, 227–28 Nationalists; Ukrainian Central
Committee; Ukrainian People’s Re-
Tale of Crooked Years, A, 109–10 public; Ukrainian Revolutionary
Tannenberg, 96 Democratic Party
Tatars, 122 Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, 111
Teutonic Order, 96 Ukrainian People’s Republic
Tiso, Jozef, 142 (1918–1920), 107, 320n75
Totalitarianism, 5, 84, 85, 138, 144 Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic
Tovarystvo Ukraïns’kykh Politychnykh Party (URDP), 108
V’iazniv (TUPV). See Association Union of Fighters of the Liberation
of Ukrainian Political Prisoners Movement (Soiuz Voinov Osvobod-
Transnationalism, 21–24, 25 itel’nogo Dvizheniia, or SVOD),
Treger, David, 170, 189, 195, 206 116
366 Index
Union of Polish Refugees in Germany URDP. See Ukrainian Revolutionary

(Zjednoczenie Polskich Uchodców w Democratic Party
Niemczech). See Polish Union in
Germany Venezuela, 46
Union of the Struggle for the Libera- Vereinigung der Verfolgten des
tion of the Peoples of Russia (Soiuz Naziregimes (VVN). See Associa-
Bor’by za Osvobozhdenie Narodov tion of Persecutees of the Nazi
Rossii, or SBONR), 116 Regime
United Nations Convention Relating Vietuchiv, Mykola, 117
to the Status of Refugees (1951), 64 Vlasov, Andrei Andreevich, 34, 114–15,
United Nations High Commission for 124
Refugees (UNHCR), 16, 46 Vlasov movement, 114, 115–16, 124
United Nations Relief and Rehabilita- Volhynia (Eastern Poland), 40, 107
tion Administration (UNRRA), 6, von Hagen, Mark, 122
16, 38, 40, 41, 55, 81, 89, 106, 161,
193; administration of DP camps, Wahlbeck, Östen, 24
47, 103, 117; autonomy of, 17; cre- War crimes, 253, 260–61
ation of, 42–43; criticized as leftist, Warsaw ghetto, 169, 236, 241
294n23; de‹nition of persecution, Weber, Max, 13
65; mandate, 42–43; oversight of We Were in Auschwitz (Bylismy w
camp committees, 48, 191, 218, 230, Oswiecimiu), 236–43
247; repatriation poll by, 82, 83–86, Whiting, John H., 235
87, 118–19, 181–82; role in care of Wiedergutmachung. See Restitution
persecutees, 66, 68, 247, 261, 268; Wilson, Woodrow, 122
role in DP repatriation, 43, 82, Woods, Sam E., 133, 208
83–86, 87, 90, 93, 117, 235; subordi- World War I, 10, 20
nation to occupation authorities, World War II, 101; dislocation of pop-
16–17; transfer of DP responsibility ulation during, 3, 29–34, 42; DP in-
to IRO, 45; University, 119, 172 terpretations of, 2, 13, 101, 221
United Nations Special Committee on Wyman, Mark, 86
Palestine, 173
United States, 42; anticommunist poli- Yalta conference (1945), 35, 38, 45, 53,
cies of, 135–42, 148–49, 194–95, 269, 88, 93, 110
304n83; discouragement of anti- Yishuv. See Palestine, Jewish commu-
communist activism by, 134–35; DP nity in
emigration to, 46, 148, 154, 182–84, Yourieff, Serge, 112
199, 206, 243, 270, 304n83; encour- Yugoslavia, 112
agement of camp committees,
48–49; minority policies within Zemskov, V. N., 105
postwar Europe, 35–36; Polish pol- Zgainski, Tadeusz, 253, 256, 257–58
icy of, 35–36, 89; recruitment of Zhytomyr, 127
DPs by, 135–37; recruitment of for- Zielezinski, Jerzy, 218–19, 220
mer Nazis by, 135–36, 304n73; rela- Zinnemann, Fred, 8
tions with Soviet Union, 18, 30, 35, Zionism: anti-assimilationism of,
45, 52–53, 87, 121, 134–37; repatria- 168–69, 171, 173, 188–90, 206; as
tion policy of, 42, 44–46, 81–83, 117, bene‹ciary of separate recognition
119, 134, 137; repatriation to, 38; war of Jews, 64, 161–62; divisions within,
crimes prosecution by, 259–60; 175–76, 178; generational divide
Zionism in, 158. See also Military within, 176, 178; historiography on,
Government of Occupation; Zone 153–54, 180–81; Holocaust as cata-
of occupation, American lyst for, 158, 176, 178–79; Jewish DP
Index 367
support for, 4, 25, 153–54, 159–60, 126–49, 154, 155–63, 173–75, 191–97,
161, 175, 180–85, 188, 267; and Jew- 214, 235; DP political life in, 30,
ish migration from Eastern Europe, 49–50, 52–53, 55, 134–49, 191–97;
37, 41, 63, 153, 180, 182; Lithuanian, DP population in, 38; establishment
177–78; opposition to, 153, 173–75; of DP camps in, 5, 47, 48–49; ethnic
opposition to repatriation, 156–57, German emigrants in, 37; gover-
160, 161, 163, 170, 188; organizations, nance in, 16, 72, 73, 189–90, 293n72;
37, 155–56, 161, 184; Polish, 177–78, Jewish DPs in, 37, 41, 63, 73, 76–77,
180; postwar congresses of, 161, 164, 153–85, 187–210; “persecutees”
170, 189; prewar growth of, 177–78; within, 56, 66, 75; Polish DPs in, 39,
propaganda, 182, 190; publications, 40, 81–82, 83, 84, 86–87, 89–90,
156; reaction to Holocaust, 156, 91–95; role of Länderrat in, 72, 73,
163–71, 173, 178, 184; symbols of, 293n72; repatriation of Russians
159, 164. See also Brichah; Irgun from, 38, 83; restitution policies in,
Brith Zion; Jewish Agency in Pales- 70–72, 75–76; Russian DPs in, 39,
tine; She’erith Hapletah; Zionist 42, 82, 83, 85–86, 114; Ukrainian
Center (Dachau) DPs in, 40, 82, 85, 99–100, 103, 106,
Zionist Center (Dachau), 157, 159 306n108. See also Military Govern-
Zjednoczenie Polskich Uchod›ców w ment of Occupation
Niemczech. See Polish Union in Zone of occupation, British, 5; DP
Germany committees in, 49, 55, 90; DP popu-
Zjednoczenie Polskie w Amerykanskiej lation in, 38; ethnic German ex-
Stre‹e Okupacji Niemiec. See Polish pellees in, 37; Jewish DPs in, 41, 176,
Union in the American Occupation 193; Polish DPs in, 39, 90; Ukrainian
Zone of Germany DPs in, 40; use of DP camps in, 47
Zone of occupation, American, 3, as Zone of occupation, French, 37, 38,
center for anticommunist activism, 47, 55, 84
121, 132–33, 148–49; DP committees Zone of occupation, Soviet, 3, 36–37,
in, 49–50, 68–69, 89–90, 92, 124–26, 134–35

Anna Holian Between National Socialism and Soviet 2011

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Anna Holian Between National Socialism and Soviet 2011

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Anna Holian Between National Socialism and Soviet 2011

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Contents

Part 1. Care and Control:

Part 2. The Threat of Communism

Part 3. The Legacy of Nazism

This study draws on a diverse array of sources, including letters, memo-

fully incomplete if we examine the processes taking place within European

were transformed into “homeless foreigners” (heimatlose Ausländer), non-

ever, stories about Nazism were overshadowed by accounts of wartime So-

Comparing Displaced Histories

Research on displaced persons, which is as old as the DP category itself,

displaced continued to endow the concept of nationality with great

The interesting question has been raised as to whether the unprece-

In his estimation, “all were victims of extreme nationalism.”26 The philoso-

rope, wartime experiences of persecution, resistance, and collaboration not

process of dialogical modeling, carefully examining each other’s steps and

Representing the Interests of the Displaced

democratic polities accommodate representation, which presupposes that

‘representation’ of the social ensemble in the context of the political arena.

In order for refugees to be able to constitute themselves as a “group,”

human rights became intimately tied to membership in the nation-state. It

ordinate to the occupation forces, something they frequently complained

policies toward collective involvement in decision-making processes in

We must be cautious about taking the claims to democratic leadership put

Placing Displaced Persons in German and European History

One of the most dif‹cult issues encountered by scholars working on

While Cold War divides played an important role in pushing dis-

transnational perspective, since they by de‹nition move across national

elsewhere. Similarly, the mass media plays an important role in sustaining

less in›uenced by the context of displacement than they were by discourses

The Invention of the Displaced Person

The Second World War set in motion an unprecedented series of popula-

there inde‹nitely. It also allowed them to develop an autonomous cultural

The Expansion of the Nazi Empire and Displacement in

the occupation. Those arrested included political opponents, resistance

While German power was directly responsible for displacing millions

The Collapse of the Nazi Empire and Postwar

As the Nazi empire collapsed, a new series of displacements began, with

placements. Many of the most permanent displacements in fact took place

arguing that national minorities were a key source of political instability in

Displaced Persons in Germany: An Overview

The deportations, evacuations, and ›ights outlined above drove eastern

the repatriation process, they were increasingly obliged to acknowledge

proportion of Soviet returnees, about 48 percent.68 In March 1946, there

The Invention of the Displaced Person

The de‹nition of the displaced person was further elaborated in the

DP Policy and DP Politics

ognizing or licensing non-German organizations.”100 The reason for this

generations.”109 Signi‹cantly, the original draft of this statement spoke of

against displaced persons. They therefore gave careful consideration to the

strated “extreme touchiness” about antirepatriation sentiment.122 Concern

The restrictions on DP politicals were primarily determined by con-

Displaced Persons and the Question

The Question of Persecution in Wartime Allied Planning

Allied DP policy, as we have seen, was organized around the principle of

The Harrison Report and the Rise of the Persecutee

themselves generous, since DPs were entitled to a higher standard of living

As matters now stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis

In order to remedy this grim situation, Harrison urged the president to

While admittedly it is not normally desirable to set aside particular