Summary Notes On Condoravdi 2002
Summary Notes On Condoravdi 2002
1.0 Introduction
• non-uniformity follows from their interaction with the elements they combine with
(ML: Even though these are morphologically perfect, they semantically seem past)
Adverbial Modification
• modals for the present: shift the EvalT forwards, sometimes, from UttT
◦ only compatible with present/future adverbials
• modals for the past: shift the EvalT backwards from UttT
◦ only compatible with past adverbials
• Condoravdi: Directly
1
• What if modals are temporal as well as modal operators?
• (6a) is
◦ present-perspective, future-oriented (unambiguous)
◦ epistemic or metaphysical1
• (6b) is
◦ epistemic: present-perspective, past-oriented
◦ counterfactual: past-perspective, future-oriented
So “might have” is not, as one might expect, the perfect of “might”, but rather a future in the past
1 metaphysical is wrt. how the worlds may/might have turned out to be, re: live options
2
• Why do modals of the past have this ambiguity?
• Condoravdi: Modals
◦ A2: combine with untensed sentences
◦ A1: occur in the scope of tense
• Observation:
◦ modal auxillaries in unembedded clauses have only present-perspective
• Assumptions:
◦ there are zero tenses (cf. von Stechow 1995)
◦ Modals are in the scope of
▪ present tense (in extensional contexs)
▪ zero tense (in intensional contexts)
eg.
(Condoravdi will refer to this as “outer tense” - i.e., tense above a modal)
[Question: How do these two perspective options yield different modal bases? See section 4]
3
• But what about semantically?
(Condoravdi will refer to this as “inner tense”, i.e., tense below a modal)
--> Condoravdi will argue that there is no tense in the scope of the modal
Condoravdi's Representation:
• Standard analyses of the perfect give it the back-shifting interpretation seen in (11b)
4
• already and yet are incompatible with eventive predicates
◦ yet they are compatible with “modals for the past”
▪ event with eventive VPs, but only with perfect morphology
ii) if tense is in the scope of modals, we'd predict a different interpretation from what we
actually get in certain cases
• And so these shifting effects must come from something other than tense
• Condoravdi argues:
◦ forward-shifting comes from the modal
◦ backward-shifting comes from the perfect
5
b) PRES (PERF (MIGHT (FUT (he win))))
• A representation like (18b) predicts (18a) to be a future at UttT
◦ since non-zero tense operators are deictic),
◦ whereas it is actually a future in the past.
• Condoravdi concludes that the temporal localization of the sentence must be attributed to the modal
itself, and not an inner ten
Generalisation:
• Modals for the present:
◦ stative/progressive predicates:
• optional future orientation
◦ eventive predicates:
• obligatory future orientation
• Assumed Ontology:
• Eventualities:
◦ events (eventive predicates)
◦ states (stative predicates)
• Temporal Intervals
◦ Tense operators
• map properties of eventualities to propositions
6
Temporal Operators rely on the AT relation:
Where AT(t,w,P) means that property P is instantiated in world w at time t
(19) AT (t,w,P)=
a) if P is eventive: ∃e[P(w)(e) & τ(e,w) ⊆ t
b) if P is stative: ∃e[P(w)(e) & τ(e,w) ∘ t
c) if P is temporal: P(w)(t)
(22) MAY/MIGHTMB: λP. λw. λt. ∃w' [w' ∈ MB(w,t) & AT ([t,_), w', P)]
(23) WOLLMB: λP. λw. λt. ∀w' [w' ∈ MB(w,t) ⟶ AT ([t,_), w', P)]
• As modals don't shift EvalT into the future, but rather expand the local EvalT into the future
i) default interpretation includes UttT
ii) PAST scoping over MODAL over PERF still yields present-perspective
(eg. givven what I will know)
7
• Condoravdi treats already/yet/still as truth-conditionally trivial
◦ mapping properties of states or times onto themselves
◦ (being undefined if P is not remporal or stative)
(ML: I don't know how I feel about this. Then again, I have completely different judgements from what
she's provided regarding their acceptability)
(recall that PERF shifts the evalT to a time prior to the RT)
8
◦ Temporal inclusion of the event with an interval that precedes [now,_)
• yields past orientation
• Modals in intensional contexts have their temporal perspective determined by the time associated
with the intensional context (eg. Hacquard's attitude time)
9
he win: eventive, so inclusion of event in t' (in a possible world)
◦ Epistemic: related to what the speaker takes the actual world to be now
◦ Metaphysical: related to how the world may turn out to be, given that at present, there
are a number of live options
These are difficult to disentangle, as if an issue, p, is taken to be not settled, then the metaphysical
live options are also the epistemic alternatives.
• Settledness/Historical Necessity
• “A sentence is historically necessary at a time t, if it is true at t, regardless of what the
future is like.”
▪ TxW frames
10
(ML: So basically, if w1 and w2 are equivalent at t, and t' precedes t, then w1 and w2 were equivalent at
the previous time, t'. So possible worlds can only branch off in the future. You can't have convergence of
different possible worlds)
• Generalisation:
◦ A non-root possibility modal has an exclusively epistemic reading when the instantiation of the
property it applies to is presupposed to be historically necessary if true.
For any world w' ∈ CG, and any w'' such that w' ≃t0 w'':
AT([t0,_), w', P) iff AT ([t0,_), w'', P)
(ML: So as long as P holds for the interval [t0. _) for each world. Does this mean that it can have taken
place at different subintervals in [t0,_)
• A non-root possibility modal can have a metaphysical modal base only if the common ground
of the context does not satisfy settledness for P
• (i.e., it must satisfy Diversity (see paper for definition, it's basically non-settledness)
past-perspective, future-orientation
i) The past-perspective says that P was a live option at t', w here t' ≺ now
ii) There are more live options at t' than there are worlds in the CG at now,
(because we are assuming worlds branch off, but don't converge)
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