Politikon

South African Journal of Political Studies

ISSN: 0258-9346 (Print) 1470-1014 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cpsa20

The Fourth Industrial Revolution – The Case of

South Africa

Ewan Sutherland

To cite this article: Ewan Sutherland (2020) The Fourth Industrial Revolution – The Case of South
Africa, Politikon, 47:2, 233-252, DOI: 10.1080/02589346.2019.1696003

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2019.1696003

Published online: 28 Nov 2019.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 3061

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 7 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cpsa20
POLITIKON
2020, VOL. 47, NO. 2, 233–252
https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2019.1696003

The Fourth Industrial Revolution – The Case of South Africa

Ewan Sutherland
LINK Centre, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

ABSTRACT
On becoming President of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa put the Fourth Industrial Revolution
(4IR) into his national economic strategy, generating criticism for its neoliberal rhetoric
echoing the World Economic Forum (WEF) and concern it would not create jobs. 4IR is an
umbrella term for 3D-printing, artificial intelligence (AI), big data, industrial Internet of
things (IIoT) and robotics. For corporations it means rethinking strategies and auto-
cannibalisation of business models. For policy-makers in manufacturing nations it is
supposed to raise national competitiveness and bring manufacturing home, potentially
blocking developing nations from creating jobs through attracting labour-intensive
manufacturing. Its effects on work and employment are forecast to be complex, potentially
heightening inequality by reducing demand for low levels of skills. South Africa has a
significant skills shortage, due to failings in its education system, limiting the supply of
managers, researchers and workers needed for 4IR. There are also problems of poor quality
infrastructure, reflecting weak governance and state capture. It has a poor record in policy
formulation and implementation, especially across departments, with notable delays in
cybersecurity and data protection. There is only a small domestic market and, despite
aspirations, it is not an easy gateway to the rest of Africa, which has strong demographic
growth but limited spending power and poor physical distribution systems. Moreover,
South African firms have to compete with a strong Chinese presence.

Introduction
In his first State of the Nation Address (SONA) the newly elected President of South Africa,
Cyril Ramaphosa (2018),1 incorporated the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) into his econ-
omic policy.2 He echoed the World Economic Forum (WEF) he had attended the previous
month, which had trumpeted the coming of 4IR (Schwab 2017). Yet, South Africa has had a
complex and often troubled engagement with industrial policies, as much under the
National Party (NP) as under the African National Congress (ANC). This paper seeks to
explore what 4IR might mean and what it might deliver for South Africa.
4IR is not the result of careful historical analysis, rather it is a flag to rally and a rhetorical
device for those trying to create particular economic and commercial futures, hoping to ride
waves of Schumpeterian economic disruption caused by ‘extreme automation and extreme
connectivity’ (Baweja et al. 2016). This has been combined with strong lobbying by manufac-
turers and the WEF, seeking to persuade governments to change their policies to support the
deployment of 4IR technologies and to mitigate their adverse socio-economic effects. The
consequences of these neoliberal efforts potentially destroy jobs, depress wages and increase
inequality (Benioff 2017). It is an indisputably elite initiative, with WEF meetings in Davos
amongst the most select on the planet, in contrast to the rise of populism in many

CONTACT Ewan Sutherland [email protected]

© 2019 South African Association of Political Studies
234 E. SUTHERLAND

nations (Bang and Marsh 2018; Kaul 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2018). Schwab (2017) has
sought to enhance the profile of the WEF by using this futuristic bandwagon.
South Africa is not an obvious location for 4IR, given its economy is still rooted in
farming, mining and the informal sector, and burdened with high levels of unemploy-
ment, while the vast majority of its citizens lack advanced and, often, basic skills.
Although South Africa likes to present itself as one of the BRICS, comparisons with
Brasil, Russia, India and China can seem unconvincing. Moreover, its government
has a poor track record of implementing complex policies, those spanning multiple
departments and requiring engagement with business, notably struggling to hold a
consistent position on the roles and limits of the private sector. Poor interdepartmen-
tal coordination has been aggravated by repeated ministerial reshuffles. The adoption
of the elitist 4IR terminology, just fifteen months before an election, was in contrast to
the challenge of rising populism, represented by the Economic Freedom Fighters
(EFF).
Ramaphosa announced a Digital Industrial Revolution Commission to help his govern-
ment take advantage of rapid technological changes (DST 2018; Lourie 2018). Discussion
of 4IR and the workplan of the Commission signalled governmental awareness and will-
ingness to engage with multinational corporations (MNCs), and understanding of the con-
ditions needed for foreign direct investment (FDI). The government quickly obtained
pledges of investments of ZAR 134 billion, suggesting some successful engagement
with MNCs (Kekana 2018). The Department for Telecommunications and Postal Services
(DTPS) was designated the ‘convening department’ within government, working with
the Departments of Science & Technology and of Trade & Industry. It is not the most influ-
ential ministry, only recently separated from and then merged back into the Department
of Communications and Digital Technologies, making it difficult to coordinate the drive for
domestic reforms. Moreover, the 4IR Commission quickly attracted large volumes of inputs
from lobbyists and special interests.
One of the repeated claims has been that South Africa could act as a business gateway
to the continent, though there few firms that have achieved that goal (e.g. MTN).3 Oppor-
tunities should improve with the creation by the African Union (AU 2018) of a Continental
Free Trade Area (CFTA), echoing the single market of the European Union (EU), but facing
uncertain willingness to eliminate the innumerable tariff and non-tariff barriers. The ser-
vices sector is subject to considerable, mostly non-tariff, barriers, though it is seen as
offering promising opportunities for new types of exports that are key inputs in the pro-
duction of many exportable goods and services (Dihel and Goswami 2016). While Africa
has seen good economic growth, 4.7 per cent per annum between 2000 and 2017, it is
less than required for its strong demographic growth, with a scarcity of good jobs and pro-
blems of inequalities and migration (AUC & OECD 2018). The AU Agenda 2063 presents
daunting challenges (AU 2014a):

(1) Growth remains volatile, despite accumulating much capital and acquiring new trade
partners. Some governments may no longer be able to sustain current levels of public
investment.
(2) Recent growth has not translated into higher well-being. In Africa, gross domestic
product per capita is less correlated with well-being indicators than is the world
average.
 POLITIKON 235

(3) Quality jobs remain scarce. If current trends persist, the share of vulnerable employ-
ment in Africa will remain at 66% until 2022 – far from the Agenda 2063 target of
41% by 2023. Today, 282 million workers are vulnerably employed.
(4) Reducing inequalities is essential for lowering poverty. Were Africa’s Gini coefficient
equal to that of developing Asia, its 1990–2016 level of growth would have lifted an
additional 130 million people out of poverty.
(5) Structural transformation may be hard to sustain without improving productivity
growth. African firms lag behind the global productivity frontier in many
labour absorbing sectors. Firms need to boost their productivity to sustain long-
term growth

4IR requires government action in many areas, including cybersecurity, data protection,
education, infrastructure and skills. In South Africa the legal and policy frameworks for
infrastructure have been problematic, with changes being made slowly, with poor
quality drafting and inadequate parliamentary scrutiny of legislation, weak regulation,
and excessive reliance on poorly controlled and financed state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) (OECD 2017). In telecommunications the government failed to make Telkom SA
comply with its pro-competitive policies, despite it being both state-owned and regulated
(Competition Commission & Telkom SA 2012, 2013). Corruption badly affected the mon-
opoly electricity generator and railway company (Bracking 2018; Commission of Inquiry
into State Capture 2019; Peter et al. 2018), while SAA and SABC were made all but bank-
rupt. Data protection legislation has only recently and partially become operational, after
two decades of preparation, leaving it far behind developments in Europe, though still
ahead of much of Africa (Makulilo 2016). Cybersecurity has received some attention, but
with government adopting overly complex policies and mechanisms for inter-departmen-
tal and inter-governmental cooperation, while legislation has made only slow progress
(PMG 2018; Sutherland 2017). The education system cannot produce sufficient graduates
in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) to meet demand, largely
because there are too few appropriately qualified school leavers. Nor are there adequate
systems to train and re-train individuals in information and communication technology
(ICT) skills (Schofield 2016, 2017, 2018). While there has been progress in the creation of
technology hubs and financing for start-ups, these have yet to have a significant economic
effect (Giuliani 2018; Kelly 2014).
The automation of work and the potential loss of jobs are central concerns about 4IR.
McKinsey Global Institute (2018) broke work down into 25 types of activity to identify likely
changes, with a rise expected in the demand for basic and, especially, advanced techno-
logical skills. Forecasts show a decline in demand for workers with basic cognitive skills,
including basic data input and processing, expected to fall by 15 percent, dropping
from 18 to 14 per cent of hours worked. Demand for physical and manual skills, including
general equipment operation, will also drop, by 14 percent, but will remain the largest cat-
egory of workforce skills in 2030 in many countries, accounting for 25 percent of the total
hours worked.
The next section reviews the supposed three previous industrial revolutions and the
roles of Africa. This is followed by a discussion of industry policy in South Africa. The
next section evaluates industrial automation as a driver of change. Finally, conclusions
are drawn, and issues identified for further research.
236 E. SUTHERLAND

Industrial revolutions and Africa

With the growth of industry in Great Britain and then continental Europe in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, the role of Africa was limited to providing agricultural products
and raw materials, such as cocoa and coffee beans, cotton, rubber, sugar cane, and
tobacco, plus gold and diamonds from South Africa and copper from then Northern Rho-
desia (Amin 1972). The division of the continent by the colonial powers resulted in each
overseeing extraction of resources in different areas, but creating only tiny markets for
luxury goods for colonial officers and their families, plus infrastructure for resource extrac-
tion (e.g. railways). In terms of economic growth and industrialisation, path dependencies
proved almost inescapable and while they varied, the different historical legacies per-
sisted, so that even half a century after independence economic growth and industrialis-
ation remained difficult to achieve (Nunn 2007). Part of the explanation lies in the limited
institutions left by the colonial powers (North 1991), the subsequent arbitrary interven-
tions in economic activity made by presidents unaccountable before electorates, judici-
aries and parliaments, combined with the failure to create institutions that would have
enabled more rapid economic growth.
Economic history includes accounts of three industrial revolutions (see Table 1), though
all are contentious. Understanding of the first or British industrial revolution has evolved
over the centuries, but remains contested and debated, its significance variously raised
and lowered (Allen 2009; Berg and Hudson 1992; De Vries 1994; Mokyr 2018; Temin
1997; Toynbee 1884).4 Cannadine (1984) showed that the differing conclusions reflected
contemporary concerns. The ‘second’ industrial revolution continues to be subject to dis-
putes over the relative significance of electricity, the internal combustion engine and
Fordism (Chandler 2005), while the ‘third’ is more difficult still, with a yet more complex
bag of evolving technologies and organisational practices (Chandler 2001).
The initial proliferation of computers and electronic data processing triggered discus-
sions of and forecasts about post-industrial and information societies (Bell 1973;
Machlup 1962; Masuda 1981; Porat 1977; Stonier 1983). Efforts were made to analyse
the effects of these new technologies on industry and society, and to envisage the
future, emphasising ideas and knowledge as drivers of economic growth and social
change. Although Marx had died at a time when ICTs were known only through the

Table 1. Industrial revolutions.

Period Major features
First industrial 1760–1850 Originating in the United Kingdom, economies shifted from rural-agrarian to urban-
revolution mechanised production. Key advances arose from the applications of water and
steam power to cotton spinning, steamships and railways. Construction shifted
from wood to metal.
Second industrial 1870–1970 The United States led a shift to mass production, distribution and communication.
revolution Electricity was applied to communications, lighting and motors. Urban water and
sewage systems were built. Internal combustion engines were used for ground
and air transport. Other advances included highways, dyes and plastics, air
conditioning, high-rise buildings (n.b. lifts), and antibiotics.
Third industrial Began in Again led by the United States, there were significant advances in computing and
revolution 1960s networks, with steep price reductions and rapid quality improvements. Key
innovations in semiconductors, personalisation of devices, email, faxes,
photocopying, electronic documents, the Internet, e-commerce, barcodes,
automatic teller machines (ATMs), and mobile telecommunications.
 POLITIKON 237

telegraph, his work provided an alternative framework for the analysis of technological
change (Fuchs 2015). Current Marxist analyses have highlighted the unpaid labour of
user-generated content (UGC) for social networks and the unpaid labour of watching cus-
tomised advertisements, for which profits accrue to a handful of unaccountable plutocrats
(e.g. Zuckerberg).
A useful framework from economics is that of general purpose technologies (GPTs),
new means of production that have significant and long-term economic effects (Bresna-
han and Trajtenberg 1995; Helpman and Trajtenberg 1996; Lipsey, Carlaw, and Bekhar
2005; Rousseau 2010). Examples include the wheel, bronze, steam engine, electricity,
the computer, and telecommunications. Efficiency gains from GPTs are not immediate,
because of the time taken for knowledge to disseminate and for the technologies to be
included in machinery, consumer devices and military equipment, and for the necessary
changes to be made to organisations and in consumer behaviour. They often require
the creation of special infrastructure, such as railways, roads and electricity distribution
networks.
4IR comes not from these historical analyses, but from of a recent tradition of auto-can-
nibalism of business models − firms re-imagining their businesses before rivals do it for
them, in order to capture their revenues. This unremitting pursuit of strategic re-invention
is considered essential in high-technology and other areas of rapid change (D’Aveni,
Dagnino, and Smith 2010). As business environments have become less certain and less
predictable, the elucidation of strategies has become more difficult. Today, many
businesses have a visceral fear of the entry of platform operators such as Amazon or
Google, or of start-ups that are not tied to legacy practices (e.g. banking apps without
bank branches). A central concept is the dynamic capability or the means by which an
organisation adapts its resources, used as a framework to understand how corporations
respond to disruptions, for example, when formerly valuable assets are quickly stripped
of their value (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Teece 2007, 2011). Underlying this is the
idea of Schumpeter (1947), who described a process of creative destruction, which has
initially slow economic growth, but leading to significant changes. The principal thrust
of 4IR is about changing business models, to help create and thus better understand
the future, through the adoption of a poorly defined set of technologies (Schwab 2017),
including 3D printing; artificial intelligence (AI); autonomous vehicles; biotechnology;
cyber-physical systems (CPS); fifth-generation wireless (5G); internet of Things (IoT); indus-
trial Internet of Things (IIoT); nanotechnology; quantum computing; and robotics.
Discussion of the strategic and transformational use of ICTs dates back decades, as
businesses sought to justify and to manage substantial expenditures on technologies
that often proved to be strategic necessities, required by all firms in a sector, or were
ephemeral, being overtaken by some further innovation. The currently preferred term is
digital strategy, something that is emergent and iterative, influenced by the dynamic capa-
bilities of the firm (Davenport and Westerman 2018; Gupta 2018; Yeow, Soh, and Hansen
2018). While once the aim was alignment between ICTs and business strategies, these are
now fused, and are a process rather than an end state. Digital transformation continues,
changing the ways firms do business, requiring investments in infrastructure and skills,
mixing changes in business processes, machines and people. Organisations must maintain
a realistic view of digital business models, avoiding an all-consuming focus on novel tech-
nologies at the expense of their existing business.
238 E. SUTHERLAND

To date, there is little about 4IR that can be said to be African, though early engagement
with the concept by businesses and governments may see this develop. There is great
diversity of industry across the continent, with very different commercial and institutional
capacities, likely to generate quite different responses to the technologies encompassed in
4IR, exclusively originated on other continents. Significant problems lie in the lack of
engagement of most governments with advanced technology, and their lack of experi-
ence and capacity to manage investments, compounded by the slowness of the adminis-
trative and political processes needed to address the challenges of providing the
necessary legal, institutional and policy frameworks. Africa has almost exclusively been
a taker of advanced technologies and of related policies, often with limited adaption to
national requirements. The adoption of 4IR technologies relies on infrastructure, intellec-
tual property rights and skills, areas where governments have not been very effective.
Aside from South Africa, there has been some interest in 4IR from Ethiopia and Rwanda,
both with unconstrained top-down direction, being elective dictatorships under very
little pressure to deliver benefits for the bulk of their citizens (Ayentimi and Burgess 2018).
It is too early to assess the effects of 4IR technologies on long-run economic growth and
productivity (D’Souza and Williams 2017). Indeed, many countries suffer productivity
puzzles with sluggish rather than revolutionary rates of change. Experience of GPTs is
that efficiency gains are delayed, because of the need to learn about them and to
adapt production and consumption; processes that businesses and governments can
try to accelerate. Deployment of 4IR technologies has only begun and, viewed as GPTs,
it will be necessary to wait for them to be absorbed into firms and into their relationships
with customers and suppliers.

Industry policy in South Africa

The Trump trade war, to Make America Great Again (MAGA), potentially saw collateral
damage, since some ‘German’ automobiles are shipped from South Africa. This was the
result of many years of work to create jobs through attracting foreign direct investment
(FDI) into the automobile sector (see Table 2). With only a small local market, South
Africa had to look to integration into global production networks (GPNs) and to ensure
manufacturers could sell their products on foreign markets.
Economic development in South Africa has been characterised as a minerals-energy
complex (MEC), with cheap energy and cheap labour for mining and related minerals

Table 2. Automobile manufacturing facilities in South Africa.

Year MNC Activity Location
1998 BMW (Germany) ZAR1 billion upgrade Rosslyn (Pretoria)
1984 Daimler-Benza Invested ZAR900 million for a new body shop East London
1994 Ford (USA) Re-acquired a stake then whole ownership of SAMCOR Silverton (Pretoria)
1996 General Motors (USA)b Operated an assembly plant closed in 2017 Port Elizabeth
1983 Honda (Japan) Closed in 2001 East London
1973 Nissan (Japan) Assembled Datsun and later Nissan models Rosslyn (Pretoria)
2011 Tata Group (India) Invested ZAR 110 million for an assembly plant Rosslyn (Pretoria)
1962 Toyota (Japan) Invested R1.2 billion in a new paint and body shop Prospecton (Durban)
a
Car Distributors Assembly Ltd. began producing Mercedes-Benz vehicles in 1958 under contract. Then in 1984 Daimler-
Benz AG acquired a 50.1% of United Cars and Diesel Distributors (UCDD).
b
Originally owned by GM, then sold as an MBO in 1986, to be reacquired in 1997 (49%) and 2004 (51%).
 POLITIKON 239

beneficiation. This was followed by a financialised MEC, with unusually concentrated cor-
porate and financial sectors, the result of colonial and apartheid economic and financial
development (Ashman and Fine 2013). From the 1950s these were ideologically driven,
with the NP seeking to use Black or Bantu labour, rather than capital, at artificially low
wages and within strict geographical confines, but at locations that were economically dis-
advantageous (Geyer 1989). The substantial capital required for deep mining drove the
financialised MEC and because firms were constrained by exchange controls and sanctions
they used their profits to expand domestically to become conglomerates, rather than
make more conventional investments into foreign mining. The NP operated statist pol-
icies, especially under international sanctions against apartheid, which had driven many
MNCs to sell their subsidiaries to local investors. Only towards the end of its period in
office did the NP begin to adopt neoliberal policies, introducing competition, corporatising
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and discussing, if not implementing, privatisation (Fine
1996; RSA 1987). In 1993, the NP government adopted a model for ‘growth with redistri-
bution’ (Central Economic Advisory Service 1993; RSA 1993).
After the ban on its activities was lifted, the ANC faced significant challenges in its dia-
logue with the then National Party over economic and industrial policies. It had made little
preparation, despite understanding the immense challenges of bringing the greater part
of the population out of poverty and of unwinding the ethnically and geographically
skewed development achieved by the NP. There has been considerable criticism of ANC
leaders for adopting a neoliberal approach, despite the lack of alternatives (Habib and
Padayachee 2000; Lazar 1996). Having decided not to dispossess the white population
it could not redistribute its wealth, so that the ANC needed strong economic growth
and consequently FDI. The collapse of the Soviet/COMECON system in 1989 removed
Marxist-Leninist state planning as a plausible option, reinforced by the considerable suc-
cesses of economic reforms in China, and compounded by many ANC exiles having experi-
enced life in African states that had badly mismanaged their economies. There was
lobbying from business, especially the conglomerates, arguing for neoliberal reforms,
while foreign governments that had historically supported the ANC argued for
globalisation.
There had been limited analyses of alternative policies that ANC leaders might have
drawn upon, and as infrastructure and the automobile industry showed, both design
and implementation could easily go wrong. Canada, through the IDRC, funded work on
a future industrial policy:
It would be more accurate to argue that the ANC leadership, under pressure on many
fronts, had by this time all but abandoned the idea of developing an alternative progressive
macroeconomic framework to the late-apartheid neo-liberalism of the previous government’s
Normative Economic Model. (Padayachee 1998, 439)

The failure of the ANC to achieve a developmental state was only partly due to deficiencies
in the inherited state institutions. The interests of and lobbying by business were signifi-
cant factors, seeking low production costs and access to foreign markets through trade
agreements, rather than boosting local demand. Today, the ANC continues to struggle
to lift people out of poverty, with attention focused on the expropriation of land for puta-
tive but possibly unskilled farmers, and the enduring and massive spatial problems that it
has largely ignored (Todes and Turok 2018).
240 E. SUTHERLAND

Table 3. South African economic policies.

1994 RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme (ANC 1994; Presidency 1994)
1996 GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Department of Finance 1996)
2005 ASGISA Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (SA 2006)
2010 NGP New Growth Path (Economic Development Department 2010)
2013 NDP-2030 National Development Plan 2030 (National Planning Commission 2013)
Source: https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-africa%E2%80%99s-key-economic-policies-changes-1994-2013.

During its time in office, the ANC has promulgated a number of economic policies (see
Table 3). There have been significant inconsistencies concerning the roles assigned to the
private sector over time and between general and sectoral policies, with the ANC having
struggled to agree how far business was to be trusted or must be directed to perform
specific tasks. Masondo (2018) described the attitude of ANC governments to business
as that of a ‘nanny state’, rather than a developmental state.
Figure 1 shows the current distribution of the gross domestic product, while Figure 2
shows the distribution in terms of employment, with only a modest share for manufactur-
ing that is to be the heart of the 4IR. Mining, another 4IR target, is an area where auto-
mation might sustain its economic output, but do so by replacing people with smart
machines.
In 1992 the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) sought to
avert an impending crisis in the automobile industry, arguing at the National Econ-
omic Forum (NEF) that the government must act, leading to the Motor Industry Devel-
opment Programme (MIDP), subsequently considered an ANC success. South Africa
was due to join the Word Trade Organisation (WTO), requiring removal of the tariff
and non-tariff (i.e. local content) barriers that had protected domestic production.
The government agreed to seek FDI to produce high-quality cars, trucks and com-
ponents, for both domestic and, principally, global markets. Local political demands
resulted in factories being so dispersed that there were limited economies of scale
for component manufacturers and few technology spill-overs. It is a sector promoted

Figure 1. Gross domestic product of South Africa (StatsSA 2018).

 POLITIKON 241

Figure 2. Employment by sector (StatsSA 2019).

by many developing countries, with success depending on attracting some of the

leading MNCs, aiming for high-volume assembly, with low plant costs and deep
supply chains, with co-located suppliers cutting total production costs (Barnes, Black,
and Techakanont 2017).
Automobile manufacturing started in Europe and the United States in the late nine-
teenth century and expanded by exporting, licensing and creating local assembly plants
(Chandler 1964). In the 1970s and 1980s the dominance of US manufacturers was chal-
lenged by Japanese (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990), and subsequently by Chinese and
Indian firms. Manufacturers that had opened plants in South Africa sold them because
of sanctions against the apartheid state, only returning in the 1990s to find an inefficient
industry focused on domestic sales. The ANC strategy was to achieve low production costs
to attract foreign manufacturers that would export most of their output. MNCs were
encouraged to buy into the existing manufacturers, considered incapable of making the
necessary investments themselves or of achieving economies of scale. While the target
was exports, the automobile industry accounts for around 40 per cent of the trade
deficit. Yet 4IR promises turmoil in the industry as further automation changes production,
while autonomous vehicles and the rise of transportation as a service could devastate
vehicle demand.
Developing countries have shown considerable interest in replicating the successes of
the Asian tiger economies, but with limited success because of the blocking effect of China
and other Asian economies, and their very different institutional and economic systems.
Today, there is limited global demand for manufactures and many countries aggressively
competing for any opportunities for factories, offering very low wages that consequently
limit domestic demand and reinforce their reliance on exports to global markets. There is
shrinking space for export-led industrialisation, increasing reliance on domestic develop-
mental policy to mobilise and support the growth of consumer and inter-sectoral demand
(Ovadia and Wolf 2018).
242 E. SUTHERLAND

The aims of South African industrial policy have been to maintain and create jobs, and
to support economic growth, in part through the attraction of FDI. However, 4IR risks jobs
being destroyed by automation, mass customisation and robotisation, potentially moving
manufacturing closer to customers, with increased use of recycled materials. Its adoption
requires an understanding of and engagement with the underlying technologies and of
the strategies of the businesses seeking to use them to disrupt global markets. Given
the uncertainties about 4IR it is necessary to seek critical engagement and understanding
of the processes at work. Nonetheless, some responses are straightforward, such as
increasing spending on research and development, boosting the number of students
studying STEM subjects, requiring improvements to the school system, and overcoming
the bitter debates about the level of student fees (Booysen 2016).
The challenges are formidable, requiring the formulation of new policies for the
economy, education, industry, and science and technology, which must be more sophis-
ticated and require faster action than anything previously attempted in South Africa. They
require a detailed understanding of the failures of the past and coordination of implemen-
tation across government and with industry. At the same time the government is mopping
up the enormous mess left by state capture, tackling massive unemployment and coping
with a technical recession.

Industrial automation
The automation of manufacturing processes dates back the first industrial revolution,
through the application of water and then steam power. Today, advanced manufacturing
involves the use of computers, robots and software, enabling the production of vastly
more complex goods, increasingly customised for individual consumers and manufac-
tured closer to them from recycled materials.
The European Commission has proposed policies for advanced manufacturing with a
view to increasing its contribution to employment and GDP in the EU, trying to recover
some of its historic losses to East Asia and the USA (EC 2010b, 2012, 2014a, 2014b). Indus-
trial strategy is part of its Europe 2020 strategy (EC 2010a), to bolster economic recovery
and competitiveness, following the global financial crisis. Innovation and technological
advances are seen as the main sources of competitiveness; a digital transition including
cloud computing, big data and data value chain developments, industrial applications
of the Internet, robotics, smart factories, and 3-D printing. It is also linked to other policies,
such as increasing the use of renewable energy, improving energy efficiency, and reducing
waste. The EC has increased funding for research and development, innovations and start-
ups, and sought to address skills mismatches and training for manufacturers, especially
addressing the significant variations between member states in the availability of skills
and the effectiveness of vocational training systems.
While 4IR, ICTs, and Industry 4.0 are potentially useful policy tools to improve the com-
petitiveness of industry, differences in the ability to adopt them are thought likely to
increase the gaps between the most successful companies and EU member states, com-
pared to those less able to adapt, leading to an increase in social and territorial inequalities,
requiring mitigation measures by the EU and member states (Veugelers 2017).
Robots are central to automation, their numbers growing at about 12 per cent per
annum, though this is forecast to accelerate (see Figure 3). They are already being used
 POLITIKON 243

Figure 3. Estimated worldwide stock of robots (IFR 2018).

extensively in the automobile industry and are being introduced enthusiastically in the elec-
tronics industry. Their distribution is very uneven (see Figure 4), which may change but there
are first-mover advantages favouring those already making and deploying robots.
The supply of robots is increasing (see Figure 5). It is dominated by Asia, with China
expected to supply 40 per cent of the global market by 2020, followed by South Korea
and Japan.
There are declining prices for the components used to make robots, while there are
improvements in their gripping, mobility and vision, making them more affordable and
more widely useful, with their manufacturers offering Robots as a Service (RaaS) to encou-
rage adoption. The addition of artificial intelligence is creating a market for robots able to
work alongside humans, rather than being kept in protective cages. Some workers
already use exoskeletons to improve their performance and to reduce the chances and
costs of injuries, notably in lifting heavy objects (Borisoff et al. 2017; Dunietz 2017; Zhang
and Huang 2018). Cloud robotics is used to improve performance, processing and sharing
information from robots, other machines, smart objects and humans, allowing the robots
to be lighter, cheaper and ‘smarter’. The technology is also being used to improve logistics,
with the development of autonomous delivery vehicles (Olson 2018; Scroxton 2018) and
drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (Marsh 2015; McKinsey 2017).
Robots are assigned some tasks formerly performed by workers, which in aggregate is
expected to destroy jobs, though it also creates jobs in robot-using firms through

Figure 4. Robots per 10,000 workers in leading user nations (Dalton 2018).
244 E. SUTHERLAND

Figure 5. Estimated and forecast worldwide supply of industrial robots (IFR 2017).

increased sales, due to improved productivity, and in vendors designing, constructing and
leasing robots. The OECD suggests that automation is unlikely to destroy large numbers of
jobs, finding only 9 per cent of jobs to be automatable, though this ranged from 6 per cent
in South Korea to 12 per cent in Austria, with less well qualified workers bearing the brunt
of the losses (Arntz, Gregory, and Zierahn 2016). In the USA, between 1990 and 2007 one
additional industrial robot per thousand workers in a local area reduced the ratio of
employment to population by 0.18–0.34 percentage points and wages by 0.25–0.50 per
cent (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017). A similar analysis for leading European countries
found a smaller effect, probably due to the greater difficulty in dismissing workers and
more active labour market policies, reducing the likelihood that those displaced would
fall into long-term unemployment (Chicchio, Petropoulos, and Pichler 2018). The
adverse effects were greatest for the youngest workers, with firms creating fewer
vacancies by redeploying existing workers to different tasks, with greatest job losses
amongst those without college or university education. Skills levels in developing
countries are typically much lower, suggesting a greater need to invest in training.
Domestic robots are emerging less in the humaniform of science fiction (Asimov 1952),
but as vacuum cleaners (e.g. iRobot Roomba), lawnmowers (e.g. Honda Miimo),5 and pets
(e.g. the re-launched Sony Aibo). In addition to their use in medical surgery, there are robot
carers and exoskeletons for patients requiring physical rehabilitation – all subject to regu-
latory procedures for medical device approval (Ackerman 2018; Goher, Mansouri, and
Fadlallah 2017; Ziefle and Valdez 2017). Concierges or personal assistants have software
that provides a voice-activated gateway to the Internet and online devices (e.g. Apple
Siri and Tencent Xiaowei), with evidence of rapid adoption (see Figure 6). However,
voice-activated systems have proved susceptible to attacks using inaudible commands
and have created severe privacy problems, apparently recording conversations
(Moorthy and Vu 2015). A highly controversial application lies in sexual robotics and broth-
els (Owsianik 2017; Sharkey et al. 2017).
Mining has always been a dangerous occupation, despite efforts to reduce the risks in
more democratic societies, with automation now reducing the number of workers
required in dangerous environments, while increasing efficiency and productivity (Herma-
nus 2017; Simonite 2016). Firms such as BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto are removing human
operators from bulldozers; diggers; trains; and trucks.
 POLITIKON 245

Figure 6. Smart speakers in Wi-Fi enabled homes (Engleson 2018).

Robots allow mining firms to reduce their operating costs, to increase their efficiency,
and to access ores in deeper rocks and on the seabed.6 The effect is to reduce demand for
unskilled labour and to increase demand for better educated workers (e.g. with advanced
degrees). Countries that have relied on mining for employment now need policies that
address the full value chain, from the design and supply of mining equipment through
to finished products, including automation of most processes. In many African countries
there is only artisanal and small scale mining (ASM) (IIED 2018), for which it will be very
difficult to introduce advanced technologies, because of the lack of capital, security and
technical skills. In South Africa it would be difficult to envisage any increase in mining
employment levels, even if output increases and the industry is transformed (Harvey
2019).
It has become more difficult for economies to sustain high levels of manufacturing
output and employment, while simultaneously increasing wages and living standards.
The internationalisation of supply chains and increased competition among nations and
cities have made the location of manufacturing more sensitive to the availabilities of
skills and the levels of wages. Technological changes have put sustained downward
pressure on demand for low-skilled workers. Consequently, it seems unlikely that the
rapid, manufacturing-driven growth experienced by the Asian tiger economies − Hong
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan − can be replicated. Yet no country has
reached middle- or high-income status by jumping directly to services, all first achieved
substantial manufacturing employment. Manufacturing has been seen as a way to
boost economic growth for developing countries, to help them move towards middle-
income and ultimately high-income status, though for citizens the primary interest has
been the prospect of well-paid jobs (Felipe, Mehta, and Rhee 2014). Developing countries
have traditionally seen their abundance of low-skilled labour as an advantage, but that
could now be or could become a liability, not least since developed countries want to
bring manufacturing closer to their customers, with mass customisation and advanced
manufacturing.

Conclusion
The fourth industrial revolution (4IR) is neither a revolution nor the fourth of a series,
lacking any evidence of its economic effect, while historians continuing to debate even
246 E. SUTHERLAND

the first industrial revolution. The changes that followed from innovations such as steam
and electric power do not fit into a sequence of revolutions, they both overlap and inter-
fere. Nonetheless, 4IR is an attractive flag around which to spin an elitist and neoliberal
vision of the future of manufacturing in a confusing and disrupted economy. It can be
used to challenge executives and politicians to create strategies for a Schumpeterian
world, in the belief that existing business models and policy frameworks are rapidly des-
tined for the wastebasket of history.
Thus, 4IR is a rhetorical rather than an analytical device, boosting Davos rather than
economic history. Instead of viewing the changes as a single industrial revolution, the fra-
mework of general purpose technologies (GPTs) is more useful for policymakers, allowing
them to focus on particular technologies (e.g. 3D printing) and skills training (e.g. data ana-
lytics), selectively boosting spending on R&D, together with bolstering underpinning
policy frameworks for cybersecurity and data protection to protect citizens and boosting
Internet access to enable them. Viewed in this light, the challenges for the South African
government are formidable but addressable.
4IR will not run to the plan set out by Schwab (2017), predictions of that sort never do,
though it provides a useful ‘straw man’. As corporations adopt yet more advanced man-
ufacturing, governments need to address a range of policies to secure their positions;
their national competitiveness and the contribution of manufacturing to their economies.
They must ensure a sufficient supply of skills, through basic and higher education,
reinforced by continuing professional development (CPD), while retraining workers and
managers displaced by automation, plus supporting some relocation. Attracting foreign
direct investment (FDI) requires a workforce with enhanced skills and flexibility, while
the resulting exports must have access to markets without trade barriers. The Schwabian
vision is for governments to meet these needs of business and to mitigate all the adverse
effects of its extreme automation, but ignores the need for governments to tax firms equi-
tably and to contain and reverse growing inequality.
Industrial technologies originated in Europe and North America. The most notable
changes of the last half century have been the extent of the shift of manufacturing
locations to East Asia and the vertiginous rise in Chinese spending on research and
development, in support of its Made in China 2025 strategy. The role of Africa has been
as a supplier of natural resources, of gas, oil and metallic ores, extracted with little local
processing, together with similar patterns in agriculture (e.g. citrus fruits, flowers
and palm oil). Today, there is a modest level of demand for manufactures in Africa, in prac-
tice this means mostly Chinese imports, the result of market opening policies instigated by
the IMF and World Bank, combined with limited domestic manufacturing capacity. The
various industrial changes in the Northern hemisphere have had little effect on African
economies, even if demand has shifted to extracting Cobalt and Coltan rather than coal
and rubber.
The introduction of 4IR into political debates in South Africa was strangely timed, an
obviously elite term in the face of a growing challenge from the EFF, a populist faction
split from the ANC, shortly before an election. While the EFF is not economically sophisti-
cated, its populist demagoguery is often effective, notably concerning land reform. Given
the need to boost the economy, awareness and discussion of 4IR signals to MNCs that the
South African government is aware of current issues in manufacturing and is engaging
with the challenges they present in order to retain and enhance its place in global
 POLITIKON 247

production networks. By comparison, South Africa must develop its approach to 4IR in a
democratic way, with accountability and transparency.
Complex policies have proved difficult for South African governments, both their devel-
opment and implementation. Telecommunications infrastructure has been the subject of
badly drafted legislation and unexpected government interventions in support of poorly
performing state-owned enterprises. Efforts to widen access to broadband have been
overly complicated and insufficiently effective. The legislation for data protection took
two decades to develop and is only slowly coming into effect. The policy for cybersecurity
was developed more quickly, but awaits critical legislation. Consequently, it is very difficult
to see that the development of a 4IR strategy is likely to be easy or that it will be effectively
implemented, even if might serve as a useful justification to examine specific policies. This
is especially so when based in the Department of Communications, which lacks the
resources, skills and influence.
4IR is expected to reduce further the demand for low-skilled workers, while an increas-
ing range of jobs with mid-level skills are expected to be vulnerable to, at least, partial
automation. Consequently, there are risks of increasing income inequality. Managed
poorly, further automation risks a ‘paradox of plenty’, with a richer society but heightened
inequalities between individuals and between communities. Proponents of 4IR argue that
gains will be recirculated at the national level, with jobs reallocated rather than eliminated,
with economic output increased, and the creation of new sources of wealth. However, this
would require considerable work by governments. At the international level, the capacity
for mass customisation close to customers seems likely to deprive developing countries of
opportunities to develop their manufacturing industries, essential to lift them to middle
income status.
Further research is necessary to understand the limitations of the South African govern-
ment to formulate and implement policy necessary to boost its economy. Work on the use
of 4IR in other emerging economies (e.g. India and Turkey) would make useful compari-
sons. A deeper understanding of the lobbying by consultants and industry on 4IR
would help explain the real nature of its demands on government.

Notes
1. His predecessor, Jacob Zuma, had been recalled by the ANC, i.e. told to resign, over allegations
of corruption and state capture, causing Ramaphosa to be promoted from Deputy President.
2. His then junior minister at the Department for Telecommunications and Postal Service (DTPS),
later promoted to be Minister of Communications and Digital Technologies, risked accusations
of trivialisation by having jumpsuits prepared for herself and her civil servants emblazoned
with a 4IR logo (SAfm radio 2018). Confusingly, these resembled the uniforms worn by her pol-
itical opponents in the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who advocate Marxist-mercantilist
policies in order to boost domestic manufacturing.
3. Even MTN uses Mauritius as the base for its holding company for African assets and tax
reduction.
4. This was supported by Temin (1997) with an economic analysis of trade patterns, showing
widespread technical changes in British manufacturing industries.
5. There is an early stage robot for weeding gardens. https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/
rorymackean/tertill-the-solar-powered-weeding-robot-for-home-g.
6. NASA (2018) sponsors an annual robotic mining competition to find technologies suitable for
missions to Mars.
248 E. SUTHERLAND

Acknowledgements
This paper was developed from ideas in a wider-ranging paper delivered in July 2018 at the 4th
Annual Competition and Economic Regulation (ACER) Conference in Johannesburg, organised by
Simon Roberts. My thanks to Charley Lewis and Petrus Potgeiter for comments on earlier versions.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCID
Ewan Sutherland http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5220-9605

References
Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual Restrepo. 2017. Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ackerman, Evan. 2018. Cyberdyne’s Medical Exoskeleton Strides to FDA Approval. https://spectrum.ieee.
org/the-human-os/biomedical/devices/cyberdynes-medical-exoskeleton-strides-to-fda-approval.
Allen, R. C. 2009. The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Amin, Samir. 1972. “Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa – Origins and Contemporary
Forms.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 10 (4): 503–524.
ANC. 1994. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Marshalltown: African National
Congress.
Arntz, Melanie, Terry Gregory, and Ulrich Zierahn. 2016. The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD
Countries: A Comparative Analysis. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
Ashman, Sam, and Ben Fine. 2013. “Neo-liberalism, Varieties of Capitalism, and the Shifting Contours
of South Africa’s Financial System.” Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 81/82:
144–178.
Asimov, Isaac. 1952. I, Robot. London: Grayson & Grayson.
AU. 2014a. Agenda 2063. https://au.int/en/agenda2063.
AU. 2018. Continental Free Trade Area. https://au.int/en/ti/cfta/about.
AUC & OECD. 2018. Africa’s Development Dynamics 2018: Growth, Jobs and Inequalities. Paris & Addis
Ababa: African Union Commission & Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Ayentimi, Desmond Tutu, and John Burgess. 2018. “Is the Fourth Industrial Revolution Relevant to
Sub-sahara Africa?” Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 31 (6): 641–652.
Bang, Henrik, and David Marsh. 2018. “Populism: A Major Threat to Democracy?” Policy Studies 39 (3):
352–363.
Barnes, Justin, Anthony Black, and Kriengkrai Techakanont. 2017. “Industrial Policy, Multinational
Strategy and Domestic Capability: A Comparative Analysis of the Development of South Africa’s
and Thailand’s Automotive Industries.” The European Journal of Development Research 29 (1):
37–53.
Baweja, Bhanu, Paul Donovan, Mark Haefele, Lutfey Siddiqi, and Simon Smiles. 2016. Extreme
Automation and Connectivity: The Global, Regional, and Investment Implications of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution. Geneva: UBS.
Bell, Daniel. 1973. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. New York:
Basic Books.
Benioff, Marc R. 2017. 4 Ways to Close the Inequality Gap in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, January 18.
Accessed September 13, 2018. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/4-ways-to-close-the-
inequality-gap-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/.
 POLITIKON 249

Berg, Maxine, and Pat Hudson. 1992. “Rehabilitating the Industrial Revolution.” The Economic History
Review 45 (1): 24–50.
Booysen, Susan. 2016. Fees Must Fall: Student Revolt, Decolonisation and Governance in South Africa.
Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
Borisoff, Jaimie, Mahsa Khalili, W. Ben Mortenson, H. F, and Machiel van der Loos. 2017. “Exoskeletons
as an Assistive Technology for Mobility and Manipulation.” In Robotic Assistive Technologies:
Principles and Practice, edited by Pedro Encarnação, and Albert Cook, 179–218. Boca Raton: CRC
Press.
Bracking, Sarah. 2018. “Corruption & State Capture: What Can Citizens Do?” Daedalus 47 (3): 169–183.
Bresnahan, Timothy F., and M. Trajtenberg. 1995. “General Purpose Technologies ‘Engines of
Growth’?”Journal of Econometrics 65 (1): 83–108.
Cannadine, David. 1984. “The Present and the Past in the English Industrial Revolution 1880-1980.”
Past and Present 103 (1): 131–172.
Central Economic Advisory Service. 1993. The Restructuring of the South African Economy: A Normative
Model Approach. Pretoria: Government Printer.
Chandler, Alfred Dupont. 1964. Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry;
Sources and Readings. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Chandler, Alfred Dupont. 2001. Inventing the Electronic Century: The Epic Story of the Consumer
Electronics and Computer Industries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Chandler, Alfred Dupont. 2005. Shaping the Industrial Century: The Remarkable Story of the Evolution of
the Modern Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Chicchio, Francesco, Georgios Petropoulos, and David Pichler. 2018. The Impact of Industrial Robots
on EU Employment and Wages: A Local Labour Market Approach. Brussels: Bruegel.
Commission of Inquiry into State Capture. 2019. Commission of Inquiry into State Capture. Accessed
August 5, 2019. https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/.
Competition Commission & Telkom SA. 2012. 11/CR/Feb04 (South Africa Competition Tribunal, 7
August 2012).
Competition Commission v. Telkom SA. 2013. 016865 (South Africa Competition Tribunal, 18 July
2013).
Dalton, Alyssa. 2018. Increasing Robot Density Illustrates Automation Growth Potential. https://www.
automationmag.com/opinion/thought-leaders/8163-increasing-robot-density-illustrates-
automation-growth-potential.
D’Aveni, Richard A., Giovanni Battista Dagnino, and Ken G. Smith. 2010. “The Age of Temporary
Advantage.” Strategic Management Journal 31 (13): 1371–1385.
Davenport, Thomas H., and George Westerman. 2018. “Why so Many High-profile Digital
Transformations Fail.” Harvard Business Review, 1–6. https://hbr.org/2018/03/why-so-many-high-
profile-digital-transformations-fail
Department of Finance. 1996. Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic Strategy for
South Africa (GEAR). Pretoria: Government of South Africa.
De Vries, Jan. 1994. “The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution.” The Journal of
Economic History 54 (2): 249–270.
Dihel, Nora, and Arti Grover Goswami. 2016. The Unexplored Potential of Trade in Services
in Africa: From Hair Stylists and Teachers to Accountants and Doctors. Washington, DC: World Bank.
D’Souza, Chris, and David Williams. 2017. “The Digital Economy.” Bank of Canada Review, 5–18.
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/boc-review-spring17.pdf
DST. 2018. Fourth Industrial Revolution and the Digital Economy: Brief by Department of Science and
Technology. https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26554/.
Dunietz, Jesse. 2017. “Robotic Exoskeleton Adapts While it’s Worn.” Scientific American, July.
EC. 2010a. Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth. COM(2010) 2020.
Brussels: European Commission.
EC. 2010b. An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era: Putting Competitiveness and
Sustainability at Centre Stage. COM(2010) 614. Brussels: European Commission .
EC. 2012. A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery. COM(2012) 582. Brussels:
European Commission.
250 E. SUTHERLAND

EC. 2014a. European Competitiveness Report 2013: Towards Knowledge Driven Re-industrialisation.
Brussels: European Commission.
EC. 2014b. For a European Industrial Renaissance. COM(2014) 14. Brussels: European Commission.
Economic Development Department. 2010. The New Growth Path Framework. Pretoria: Government
of South Africa.
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M., and Jeffrey A. Martin. 2000. “Dynamic Capabilities: What are They?” Strategic
Management Journal 21 (10/11): 1105–1121.
Engleson, Susan. 2018. Smart Speaker Penetration Hits 20% of U.S. Wi-Fi Households. https://www.
comscore.com/Insights/Blog/Smart-Speaker-Penetration-Hits-20-Percent-of-US-Wi-Fi-
Households.
Felipe, Jesus, Aashish Mehta, and Changyong Rhee. 2014. Manufacturing Matters … But It’s the Jobs
That Count. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
Fine, Ben. 1996. The Political Economy of South Africa: From Minerals-Energy Complex to
Industrialisation. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press.
Fuchs, Christian. 2015. Reading Marx in the Information Age: A Media and Communication Studies
Perspective on Capital. Vol. 1. Basingstoke: Routledge.
Geyer, Hermanus S. 1989. “Industrial Development Policy in South Africa – the Past, Present and
Future.” World Development 17 (3): 379–396.
Giuliani, Dario. 2018. Africa: A Look at the 442 Active Tech Hubs of the Continent. Accessed September
13, 2018. https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programme/ecosystem-accelerator/
africa-a-look-at-the-442-active-tech-hubs-of-the-continent/.
Goher, K. M., N. Mansouri, and S. O. Fadlallah. 2017. “Assessment of Personal Care and Medical Robots
from Older Adults’ Perspective.” Robotics and Biomimetics 4 (5): 1–7.
Gupta, Sunil. 2018. Driving Digital Strategy: A Guide to Reimagining Your Business. Cambridge, MA: HBS
Press.
Habib, Adam, and Vishnu Padayachee. 2000. “Economic Policy and Power Relations in South Africa’s
Transition to Democracy.” World Development 28 (2): 245–263.
Harvey, Ross. 2019. Mining for a Circular Economy in the Age of the Fourth Industrial Revolution: The
Case of South Africa. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.
Helpman, Elhanan, and Manuel Trajtenberg. 1996. Diffusion of General Purpose Technologies.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hermanus, M. 2017. “Mining Redesigned – Innovation and Technology Needs for the Future – A
South African Perspective.” Journal of the Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy
117: 811–818.
IFR. 2017. How Robots Conquer Industry Worldwide. https://ifr.org/downloads/press/Presentation_PC_
27_Sept_2017.pdf.
IFR. 2018. Robots Double Worldwide by 2020. https://ifr.org/ifr-press-releases/news/robots-double-
worldwide-by-2020.
IIED. 2018. Global Trends in Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM): A Review of Key Numbers and
Issues. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development.
Kaul, Volker. 2018. “Populism and the Crisis of Liberalism.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 44 (4):
346–352.
Kekana, Mashadi. 2018. Pledges Worth R134bn Committed at Investment Conference. Accessed
October 28, 2018. https://mg.co.za/article/2018-10-26-pledges-worth-r134bn-committed-at-
investment-conference.
Kelly, Tim. 2014. Tech Hubs Across Africa: Which Will Be the Legacy-Makers? Accessed September 13,
2018. http://blogs.worldbank.org/ic4d/tech-hubs-across-africa-which-will-be-legacy-makers.
Lazar, David. 1996. “Competing Economic Ideologies in South Africa’s Economic Debate.” The British
Journal of Sociology 47: 599–626.
Lipsey, Richard, Kenneth I. Carlaw, and Clifford T. Bekhar. 2005. Economic Transformations: General
Purpose Technologies and Long Term Economic Growth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lourie, Gugu. 2018. President Ramaphosa to Create Digital Industrial Revolution Commission. https://
techfinancials.co.za/2018/02/16/president-ramaphosa-to-create-digital-industrial-revolution-
commission/.
 POLITIKON 251

Machlup, Fritz. 1962. The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Makulilo, Alexander. 2016. African Data Privacy Laws. Cham: Springer.
Marsh. 2015. Drones – A View Into the Future for the Logistics Sector? London: Marsh.
Masondo, David. 2018. “South African Business Nanny State: The Case of the Automotive Industrial
Policy Post-Apartheid, 1995–2010.” Review of African Political Economy 45 (156): 203–222.
Masuda, Yoneji. 1981. The Information Society as Post-Industrial Society. Washington, DC: Institute for
the Information Society.
McKinsey. 2017. Commercial Drones are Here: The Future of Unmanned Aerial Systems. Washington,
DC: McKinsey & Company.
McKinsey Global Institute. 2018. Skill Shift: Automation and the Future of the Workforce. Boston:
McKinsey & Co.
Mokyr, Joel. 2018. “Bottom-up or Top-down? The Origins of the Industrial Revolution.” Journal of
Institutional Economics 14 (6): 1003–1024.
Moorthy, Aarthi Easwara, and Kim-Phuong L. Vu. 2015. “Privacy Concerns for Use of Voice Activated
Personal Assistant in the Public Space.” International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction 31 (4):
307–335.
NASA. 2018. Robotic Mining Competition (RMC). https://www.nasa.gov/offices/education/centers/
kennedy/technology/nasarmc.html.
National Planning Commission. 2013. National Development Plan 2030: Our Future – Make it Work.
Pretoria: Government of South Africa.
Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2018. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass Cecil. 1991. “Institutions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 97–112.
Nunn, Nathan. 2007. “Historical Legacies: A Model Linking Africa’s Past to its Current
Underdevelopment.” Journal of Development Economics 83 (1): 157–175.
OECD. 2017. Economic Survey of South Africa 2017. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
Olson, Parmy. 2018. Amazon Just Sparked a Race to Bring Robots to Our Doors. https://www.forbes.
com/sites/parmyolson/2018/01/31/amazon-just-sparked-a-race-to-bring-robots-to-our-doors/.
Ovadia, Jesse Salah, and Christina Wolf. 2018. “Studying the Developmental State: Theory and
Method in Research on Industrial Policy and State-led Development in Africa.” Third World
Quarterly 39 (6): 1056–1076.
Owsianik, Jenna. 2017. The Future of Sex: How Intimacy is Transforming. https://futurism.com/the-
future-of-sex-how-intimacy-is-transforming/.
Padayachee, Vishnu. 1998. “Progressive Academic Economists & the Challenge of Development in
South Africa’s Decade of Liberation.” Review of African Political Economy 25 (77): 431–450.
Peter, Camaren, Hannah Friedenstein, Haroon Bhorat, Ivor Chipkin, Lumkile Mondi, Mark Swilling,
Mbongiseni Buthelezi, Mzukisi Qobo, Nicky Prins, and Sikhulekile Duma. 2018. Shadow State:
The Politics of State Capture. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
PMG. 2018. Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill (B6-2017). Accessed November 5, 2018. https://pmg.org.
za/bill/684/.
Porat, Marc Uri. 1977. The Information Economy: Definition and Measurement. Washington, DC: Office
of Telecommunications.
Presidency. 1994. “White Paper on Reconstruction and Development.” Government Gazette 353
(16085): 1–81.
Ramaphosa, Cyril. 2018. SONA2018: Read the Full Text of Cyril Ramaphosa’s Address Here. Accessed
October 28, 2018. https://www.thesouthafrican.com/sona2018-read-the-full-text-of-cyril-
ramaphosas-address-here/.
Rousseau, Peter L. 2010. “General Purpose Technologies.” In Economic Growth, edited by Steven N.
Durlauf, and L. E. Blum, 74–79. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
RSA. 1987. White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation. Pretoria: Republic of South Africa.
RSA. 1993. The Key Issues in the Normative Economic Model. Pretoria: Ministry of Finance.
252 E. SUTHERLAND

SA. 2006. Accelerated and Shared Growth in South Africa (ASGISA). Pretoria: Government of South
Africa.
SAfm radio. 2018. Deputy Minister of DTPS @stellarated Arriving at DTPS Budget Vote with Her Wingsuit
Saying 4IR Fourth Industrial Rolution. https://twitter.com/SAfmRadio/status/998076992842059776.
Schofield, Adrian. 2016. 2016 JCSE ICT Skills Survey. Johannesburg: Joburg Centre for Software
Engineering.
Schofield, Adrian. 2017. 2017 JCSE ICT Skills Survey. Johannesburg: Joburg Centre for Software
Engineering.
Schofield, Adrian. 2018. 2018 JCSE ICT Skills Survey. Johannesburg: Joburg Centre for Software
Engineering.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1947. “The Creative Response in Economic History.” The Journal of Economic
History 7 (2): 149–159.
Schwab, Klaus. 2017. The Fourth Industrial Revolution. London: Penguin.
Scroxton, Alex. 2018. Starship’s Autonomous Delivery Robots Get Commercial Roll-out. https://www.
computerweekly.com/news/252439993/Starships-autonomous-delivery-robots-get-commercial-
roll-out.
Sharkey, Noel, Amy van Wynsberghe, Scott Robbins, and Eleanor Hancock. 2017. Our Sexual Future
with Robots. Den Haag: Responsible Robotics.
Simonite, Tom. 2016. Mining 24 Hours a Day with Robots. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
603170/mining-24-hours-a-day-with-robots/.
StatsSA. 2018. Gross Domestic Product – First Quarter 2018. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.
StatsSA. 2019. Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). Accessed August 12, 2019. http://www.statssa.
gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0211.
Stonier, Tom. 1983. The Wealth of Information: A Profile of the Post-Industrial Economy. London:
Methuen.
Sutherland, Ewan. 2017. “Governance of Cybersecurity – the Case of South Africa.” The African Journal
of Information and Communication 20: 83–112.
Teece, David John. 2007. “Explicating Dynamic Capabilities: The Nature and Microfoundations of
(Sustainable) Enterprise Performance.” Strategic Management Journal 28 (13): 1319–1350.
Teece, David John. 2011. Dynamic Capabilities & Strategic Management: Organizing for Innovation and
Growth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Temin, Peter. 1997. “Two Views of the British Industrial Revolution.” The Journal of Economic History
57 (1): 63–82.
Todes, Alison, and Ivan Turok. 2018. “Spatial Inequalities and Policies in South Africa: Place-Based or
People-Centred?” Progress in Planning 123 (1): 1–31.
Toynbee, Arnold. 1884. Lectures on the Industrial Revolution in England. London: Rivingtons.
Veugelers, Reinhilde. 2017. Remaking Europe: The New Manufacturing as an Engine for Growth.
Brussels: Bruegel.
Womack, James P., Daniel T. Jones, and Daniel Roos. 1990. The Machine That Changed the World.
Oxford: Maxwell Macmillan.
Yeow, Adrian, Christina Soh, and Rina Hansen. 2018. “Aligning with New Digital Strategy: A Dynamic
Capabilities Approach.” The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 27: 43–58.
Zhang, Ting, and He Helen Huang. 2018. “A Lower-Back Robotic Exoskeleton: Industrial Handling
Augmentation Used to Provide Spinal Support.” IEEE Robotics & Automation Magazine 25 (2):
95–106.
Ziefle, Martina, and André Calero Valdez. 2017. “Domestic Robots for Homecare: A Technology
Acceptance Perspective.” In Human Aspects of IT for the Aged Population. Aging, Design and User
Experience ITAP 2017, edited by Jia Zhou, and Gavriel Salvendy, 57–74. Cham: Springer.