英语南亚和东南亚的基督教

EDINBURGH COMPANIONS TO GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY
Edinburgh Companions to Global Christianity

Series Editors: Kenneth R. Ross and Todd M. Johnson
This series of reference volumes comprehensively maps worldwide Christianity, describing it in its entirety.
CHRISTIANITY IN
It covers every continent and offers country-specific studies as well as examining regional and continental
trends. Through a combination of maps, tables, charts and graphs a full demographic analysis is provided,
while original essays explore key topics and trends.
EAST AND
Todd M. Johnson
Francis D. Alvarez SJ and
Edited by Kenneth R. Ross,
‘This volume represents public recognition of the unprecedented explosion of World
Christianity during the past half century. Ambitious and wide-ranging essays by forty
SOUTHEAST ASIA
authors from varied backgrounds and disciplines explore the highly complex and
multiple forms of local and regional Christianities that now exist within fourteen
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countries in South and Central Asia. This truly remarkable collection should appeal to a
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broad readership concerned with contemporary affairs in our world.’
Robert Eric Frykenberg, University of Wisconsin–Madison
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Combines empirical data and original analysis in a uniquely
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detailed account of Christianity in South and Central Asia
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This comprehensive reference volume covers every country in South and Central Asia, offering
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reliable demographic information and original interpretative essays by indigenous scholars and
SOUTHEAST ASIA
CHRISTIANITY IN
practitioners. It maps patterns of growth and decline, assesses major traditions and movements,
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analyses key themes and examines current trends.
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Key Features
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EAST AND
• Profiles of Christianity in every country in South and Central Asia including clearly presented
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statistical and demographic information
• Analyses of leading features and current trends written by indigenous scholars
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• Essays examining each of the major Christian traditions (Independents, Orthodox, United
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Churches, Protestants/Anglicans, Catholics, Evangelicals, Pentecostals/Charismatics) as they
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are finding expression in South and Central Asia
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• Essays explore key themes such as faith and culture, worship and spirituality, theology, social
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and political engagement, mission and evangelism, religious freedom, gender, inter-faith
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relations, South Asian diaspora, caste and Christianity in India, and tribal identity
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Kenneth R. Ross is Parish Minister, Netherlorn Churches, Argyll, and an Honorary Fellow in
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the University of Edinburgh’s School of Divinity.
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Daniel Jeyaraj is Professor of World Christianity and Director of the Andrew F. Walls Centre for
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the Study of African and Asian Christianity at Liverpool Hope University.
Todd M. Johnson is Associate Professor of Global Christianity at Gordon-Conwell Theological
Seminary, South Hamilton, MA.
Cover image: photograph supplied, with kind permission, by Mrs Jayashree Jayapaul, Madurai, India. It shows her painting,
‘Jesus rescues sinking Peter and restores his hope and trust in God’, which is on display at the JC Residency Hotel, Madurai,
Tamil Nadu, India. Edited by
Cover design: Stuart Dalziel and Paul Smith
Kenneth R. Ross, Francis D. Alvarez SJ
and Todd M. Johnson
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Christianity in East and Southeast Asia
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Editorial Team
Editors
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Kenneth R. Ross
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Francis D. Alvarez sj
Todd M. Johnson
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Associate Editor
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Albert W. Hickman
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Managing Editor
Julia Kim
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Editorial Advisory Board
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Alexander Chow
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José Mario C. Francisco sj

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Septemmy Lakawa
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Julie Ma
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Peter C. Phan
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Kang-San Tan
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Demographic Profile
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Editor: Gina A. Zurlo

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Data Analyst: Peter F. Crossing

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Layout and Design: Justin Long

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Cartography: Bryan Nicholson

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EDINBU RGH COMPANIONS TO GLOBAL CHR ISTI ANIT Y
Christianity in East and

Southeast Asia
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Edited by
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Kenneth R. Ross, Francis D. Alvarez sj and
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Todd M. Johnson
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Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish
academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social
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sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to
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produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website:
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edinburghuniversitypress.com
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© editorial matter and organisation Kenneth R. Ross, Francis D. Alvarez sj and
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Todd M. Johnson, 2020
© the chapters their several authors, 2020
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Edinburgh University Press Ltd
The Tun – Holyrood Road
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12 (2f) Jackson’s Entry
Edinburgh EH8 8PJ
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Typeset in Palatino and Myriad
by R. J. Footring Ltd, Derby, UK, and
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printed and bound in Poland by Hussar Books

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A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
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ISBN 978 1 4744 5160 4 (hardback)

ISBN 978 1 4744 5162 8 (webready PDF)
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ISBN 978 1 4744 5163 5 (epub)

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The right of the contributors to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and the Copyright and
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Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).

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Contents
Series Preface viii

Volume Preface x
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Contributorsxiii
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Introduction
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A Demographic Profile of Christianity in East and Southeast Asia 3
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Gina A. Zurlo
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Christianity in East and Southeast Asia 15
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Countries rp
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Mainland China (Protestant) 39
Manhong Melissa Lin
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Mainland China (Catholic) 51

Edmond Tang
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Mainland China (House Churches) 63

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David Ro
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Hong Kong 74
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Fuk-tsang Ying
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Macau87
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Louis Ha
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Mongolia92
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Bayarjargal Garamtseren
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Taiwan99
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Yang-En Cheng
North Korea 112
Philo Kim
South Korea 119
Meehyun Chung
Japan132
Akemi Kugimiya
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Myanmar145
Hrang Hlei
Thailand155
Seree Lorgunpai and Sanurak Fongvarin
Laos167
David Andrianoff
Cambodia175
Barnabas Mam
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Vietnam187
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Peter Phan
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Indonesia200
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Sulistyowati Irianto
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Malaysia212
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Hwa Yung
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Singapore 225
Violet James rp
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Brunei238
Francis D. Alvarez sj and Kenneth R. Ross
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The Philippines 242

Jayeel Cornelio
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Timor-Leste254
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Filomeno Jacob sj
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Major Christian Traditions

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Anglicans269
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Ken Christoph Miyamoto

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Independents281
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Orthodox283
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Nikolay Samoylov and Ambrose-Aristotle Zographos

Protestants295
Timothy Lim
Catholics310
Daniel Franklin E. Pilario cm
Evangelicals 323
Kang-San Tan
Contents vii
Pentecostals and Charismatics 335

Julie Ma
Key Themes
Faith and Culture 351
Worship and Spirituality 364
Wonsuk Ma
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Theology375
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Alexander Chow
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Social and Political Context 387
Sebastian C. H. Kim
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Mission and Evangelism 400
Septemmy E. Lakawa
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Gender413
Sharon A. Bong
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Religious Freedom 425
Paul Marshall
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Inter-religious Relations 438

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Sivin Kit
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Migration451
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Maruja M. B. Asis
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Colonial and Postcolonial Context 463

Wai Ching Angela Wong
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Conclusion
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The Future of Christianity in East and Southeast Asia 479

Mary Ho
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Appendices
Christianity by Country 495
Methodology and Sources of Christian and Religious Affiliation 501
Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo
Index518
Series Preface
While a number of compendia have recently been produced on the study

of worldwide Christianity, the distinctive quality of this series arises from
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its examination of global Christianity through a combination of reliable
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demographic information and original interpretative essays by indigenous
scholars and practitioners. This approach was successfully pioneered
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by the Atlas of Global Christianity 1910–2010, published by Edinburgh
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University Press on the occasion of the centenary of the epoch-making
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Edinburgh 1910 World Missionary Conference.
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Using the same methodology, the Edinburgh Companions to Global
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Christianity take the analysis to a deeper level of detail and explore the
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context of the twenty-first century. The series considers the presence of
Christianity on a continent-by-continent basis worldwide. Covering every
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country in the world, it maps patterns of growth and/or decline and
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examines current trends. The aim of the series is to comprehensively map

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worldwide Christianity and to describe it in its entirety. Country-specific

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studies are offered, all the major Christian traditions are analysed and
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current regional and continental trends are examined.

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Each volume is devoted to a continent or sub-continent, following

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the United Nations classifications. Through a combination of maps,

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tables, charts and graphs, each of the successive volumes presents a com-
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prehensive demographic analysis of Christianity in the relevant area.

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Commentary and interpretation are provided by essays on key topics,

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each written by an expert in the field, normally an indigenous scholar. By

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the use of these various tools each volume provides an accurate, objective
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and incisive analysis of the presence of Christian faith in the relevant area.
The projected volumes in the series are:
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1. Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa

2. Christianity in North Africa and West Asia
3. Christianity in South and Central Asia
4. Christianity in East and Southeast Asia
5. Christianity in Oceania
6. Christianity in Latin America
7. Christianity in North America
8. Christianity in Western and Northern Europe
Series Preface ix
9. Christianity in Eastern and Southern Europe

10. Compact Atlas of Global Christianity
As series editors, we rely heavily on the regional expertise of the

dedicated third editor who joins us for each volume. Furthermore, each
volume has its own editorial advisory board, made up of senior scholars
with authoritative knowledge of the field in question. We work together
to define the essay topics for the volume, arrange for compilation of the
required demographic data, recruit the authors of the essays and edit their
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work. Statistical and demographic information is drawn from the highly
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regarded World Christian Database maintained by the Center for the Study
of Global Christianity at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary (South
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Hamilton, MA, USA) and published by Brill. For each volume, 35–40
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authors are recruited to write the essays, and it is ultimately upon their
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scholarship and commitment that we depend in order to create an original
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and authoritative work of reference.
Each volume in the series will be, we hope, a significant book in its
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own right and a contribution to the study of Christianity in the region in
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question. At the same time, each is a constituent part of a greater whole –
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the 10-volume series, which aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of
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global Christianity that will be groundbreaking in its demographic quality

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and analytical range. Our hope is that the Companions will be of service
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to anyone seeking a fuller understanding of the worldwide presence of the

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Christian faith.
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Kenneth R. Ross and Todd M. Johnson

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Series Editors
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Volume Preface
This volume combines two United Nations regions, Eastern and South
eastern Asia. Together these span more than 16 million square kilometres.
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This is only 11% of the total land area of the planet, yet it is home to more
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than 2.3 billion people, almost one-third of the world’s population. Within
this terrain are found breath-taking contrasts in such matters as wealth and
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poverty or war and peace. In East Asia, we have the economic juggernaut
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that is China. Japan has been a member of the Group of 7, the countries
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with the most advanced economies, since it was known as the Group
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of 5 in 1973. Yet right beside South Korea, the world’s eleventh largest
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economy by nominal gross domestic product (GDP) (as of 2018), is North
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Korea, where, according to a 2017 United Nations study, more than half
of children under two years old and half of pregnant and breastfeeding
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women are malnourished. In Southeast Asia, the Credit Suisse Research
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Institute reports that in 2018 Singapore was home to more than 180,000
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millionaires. According to US News and World Report, as of 2018, Hong

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Kong had 93 billionaires, ranking it seventh in the world. By contrast, in

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2017, the entire GPD of Timor-Leste was less than US$3 billion.
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In the 2018 Global Peace Index, this part of the world had two countries
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in the top 10 (Singapore at number 8 and Japan at number 9). By contrast,

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the Philippines ranked 137th out of 163. Security analysts predict that in
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this and nearby countries, fundamentalist violence will increase before

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the situation gets better. Yet the Philippines also ranks in the upper half
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of all countries in the UN’s 2018 World Happiness Report. More than
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1,800 languages are spoken in these regions, by adherents of Buddhism,

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Chinese folk religion, Islam and the fastest-growing belief system in the
region, Christianity. The Christian faith itself is far from monolithic in East
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and Southeast Asia. Rather, it comes to expression in many different ways.

How does one present the many facets of Christianity in a diverse expanse
of ethnicities, histories, cultures and sensitivities?
He Qi’s Adoration of the Magi has two versions: one in crayon and
gouache, as reproduced on the cover of this volume; and the other in silk,
the painstaking work of Chinese artisans who dyed individual silk strands
and then wove them following He Qi’s design. Depending on where the
viewer stands, the different hues in the tapestry take on a myriad of tones,
tints and shades. Each viewpoint reveals a subtly different art piece. This
Volume Preface xi
volume presents Christianity in East and Southeast Asia from many points
of view, from the diverse perspectives of our authors, and from a great
variety of disciplinary, cultural and confessional standpoints. It is the fruit
of a collaborative effort that has spanned every country in the two regions.
In pursuit of understanding, the volume offers four angles of analysis.
The first is demographic, using the methodology of the highly successful
Atlas of Global Christianity (Edinburgh University Press, 2009) to present
reliable statistical information in an attractive, user-friendly format. Maps
and charts depict the status of Christianity regionally and in terms of the
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principal church traditions. This ranges from countries where Christians
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form a majority of the population to others where the Christian presence
is marginal. It also varies from Christian communities that have been
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established for many generations to those formed by new movements of
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faith in the twenty-first century.
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The second angle of analysis is at the country level. Account is taken of
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the presence and influence of Christianity in each of the 19 countries and
regions in East and Southeast Asia. Scholars who are either indigenous or
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have long experience of the region have contributed interpretative essays
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that offer a ‘critical insider’ perspective on the way in which Christi
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anity is finding expression in their context. Most countries are the subject
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of a dedicated essay, while China, in view of its size and population, is

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considered in three essays that examine each of its three main forms of
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Christianity, with a further two essays devoted to the Special Administra-

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tive Regions of Hong Kong and Macau.

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Thirdly, Christianity in East and Southeast Asia is considered in terms

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of its principal ecclesial forms or traditions. Four types of church are

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considered: Anglican, Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic. It is a distinctive

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feature of this volume that it does not include an essay on Independent

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churches. This respects the problematic nature of this category in the

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two regions, while an editorial note points to essays elsewhere in the

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volume that include consideration of this ecclesial type. In addition, the

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Evangelical and Pentecostal/Charismatic movements, which cut across

ecclesial affiliation, are examined.
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Fourthly, selected themes are considered. Eight of these run right

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through the entire Edinburgh Companions series: faith and culture;

worship and spirituality; theology; social and political context; mission
and evangelism; gender; religious freedom; and inter-religious relations.
A further two have been selected by the editorial board specifically for this
volume on account of their salience in the context of East and Southeast
Asia: migration; and colonial and post-colonial context. Each of these
themes is examined on a region-wide basis, deepening our understanding
of features that are definitive for Christianity in this part of the world.
xii Volume Preface
As is evident from the short bibliography offered at the end of each

essay, this book rests on the body of scholarship that has illumined
our understanding of East and Southeast Asian Christianity, particu-
larly the burgeoning literature of the early twenty-first century. Besides
many detailed local studies, much insight has been derived from The
Oxford Handbook of Christianity in Asia, edited by Felix Wilfred (Oxford
University Press, 2014), which has become the standard reference work
on Asian Christianity. An earlier valuable but now dated work is A
Dictionary of Asian Christianity, edited by Scott Sunquist and David Wu
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Chu Sing (Eerdmans, 2001). A magisterial historical study is Samuel Hugh
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Moffett’s two-volume History of Christianity in Asia (Orbis, 1998, 2005).
Robbie B. H. Goh’s Christianity in Southeast Asia (Institute of Southeast Asia
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Studies, 2005) offers a concise and helpful introduction. The three-volume
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Asian Christian Theologies: A Research Guide to Authors, Movements, Sources
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by John C. England, Jose Kuttianimattathil, John M. Prior, Lily A. Quintos,
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David Suh Kwang-sun and Janice Wickeri (Orbis, 2002, 2003, 2004) is com-
prehensive in its coverage and well geared to be a resource for theological
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research.
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While resting on the preceding scholarship, this volume breaks new
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ground through its reliable demographic analysis, its contemporary focus,
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the indigenous authorship of its essays and the originality of the analyses.
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The essay authors employ a variety of disciplinary approaches – historical,

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theological, sociological, missiological, anthropological – as appropriate

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to their topics. Taken together, the volume offers a deeply textured and
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highly nuanced account of Christianity in East and Southeast Asia, one

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that will reward the attention of any who wish to deepen their knowledge
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of this subject.
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Kenneth R. Ross
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May 2019
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Contributors
Francis D. Alvarez sj, a Filipino Jesuit priest, is Assistant Professor of Biblical

Theology and Religious Education at Loyola School of Theology in Quezon
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City, the Philippines. He also teaches theology at the Ateneo de Manila
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Christianity in East and Southeast Asia; Brunei
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David Andrianoff was raised in Laos by missionary parents and served there
himself with World Concern from 1983 to 1992. He continues to visit Laos and
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church leaders there at least once each year.
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Laos
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Maruja M. B. Asis is Director of Research and Publications of the Scalabrini
Migration Center, based in Manila, the Philippines. She is a sociologist who
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has been researching migration and social change in Asia.
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Migration
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Sharon A. Bong is Associate Professor in Gender and Religious Studies at

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Monash University, Malaysia. She is author of The Tension Between Women’s

Rights and Religions (Edwin Mellen Press, 2006) and co-editor (with Pushpa
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Joseph) of Re-imagining Marriage and Family in Asia: Asian Christian Women’s

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Perspectives (Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2008).

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Gender
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Yang-en Cheng is Professor of Church History at the Taiwan Graduate School

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of Theology. A long-term participant in the ecumenical movement, he is

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currently a Central Committee member of the World Council of Churches,

representing the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan.
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Taiwan
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Alexander Chow is Senior Lecturer in Theology and World Christianity at the

School of Divinity, University of Edinburgh. He has written two books, most
recently Chinese Public Theology: Generational Shifts and Confucian Imagination
in Chinese Christianity (Oxford University Press, 2018), and is an editor of the
academic journal Studies in World Christianity (Edinburgh University Press).
Theology
Meehyun Chung is an ordained minister of the Presbyterian Church in the

Republic of Korea (PROK), Professor of Systematic Theology at the United
xiv Contributors
Graduate School of Theology of Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea,

and Chaplain to Yonsei University. She has served as Vice-President of the
Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians (EATWOT) and as head
of the Women and Gender Desk at Mission 21, Switzerland (2005–13).
South Korea
Jayeel Cornelio is Associate Professor of Developmental Studies and Director

of the Development Studies Program at the Ateneo de Manila University, the
Philippines. A sociologist of religion, he is the author of Being Catholic in the
Contemporary Philippines: Young People Reinterpreting Religion (Routledge, 2016)
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and the associate editor of the journal Social Sciences and Missions (Brill).
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The Philippines
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Sanurak Fongvarin is Director of the Research Institute for Thai Church
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Development and full-time Lecturer in Research Methods for Ministries at
Bangkok Institute of Theology, Christian University of Thailand.
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Thailand
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José Mario C. Francisco sj, a Filipino Jesuit professor at the Ateneo de
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Manila University and Pontifical Gregorian University, explores the interface
between cultural studies and theology in Asian and Philippine contexts. He is
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a member of the editorial boards of the International Journal of Asian Christian-
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ity and Asia Pacific Mission Studies.

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Faith and Culture

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Bayarjargal Garamtseren is Mongolian Standard Version project manager

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in the Mongolian Union Bible Society and a board member and Academic
Committee Chair of the Mongolian Research Institute for Christianity. He
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pastors the Life Community Church in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, and is married

with four children.
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Mongolia
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Louis Ha is Director of the Centre for Catholic Studies, Chinese University

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of Hong Kong. A Catholic diocesan priest, he is author of Foundation of the

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Catholic Mission in Hong Kong, 1841–1894 (Open Dissertation Press, 1998) and
editor of the Hong Kong Journal of Catholic Studies (published by the Centre for
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Catholic Studies).
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Macau
Hrang Hlei is Director of Christian Education and a pastor at Indiana Chin

Baptist Church, Indianapolis, Indiana, USA. An ordained American Baptist
minister, he is the author of The Formation of Chin Immigrant Congregations in
the United States: Discovering Their Ecclesiological Identities (Luther Seminary,
2015) and a former faculty member of the Myanmar Institute of Theology,
Yangon, Myanmar.
Myanmar
Contributors xv
Mary Ho is International Executive Leader of All Nations Family, a global

missions organisation focused on igniting church-planting movements
in more than 40 countries. She received her Doctor of Strategic Leadership
degree from Regent University in 2016.
The Future of Christianity in East and Southeast Asia
Sulistyowati Irianto is Professor of Legal Anthropology at the Faculty of

Law, University of Indonesia. She publishes books and articles focused on
law, society and gender justice.
Indonesia
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Filomeno Jacob sj is Associate Professor of Sociology and Cultural Anthro
pology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Pontifical Gregorian University.
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He was a cabinet member for the United Nations Transitional Administration
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in East Timor (UNTAET) in 2001.
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Timor-Leste
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Violet James is chaplain at the Singapore Bible College, where she formerly
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served as Professor of Church History for more than 35 years, teaching Asian
church history and Asian religions.
Singapore
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Todd M. Johnson is Paul E. and Eva B. Toms Distinguished Professor of

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Mission and Global Christianity and co-Director of the Center for the Study
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of Global Christianity at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary in South

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Hamilton, Massachusetts, USA. His most recent book is the World Christian
Encyclopedia, 3rd edition (Edinburgh University Press, 2019). He also serves
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as a Series Editor for the Edinburgh Companions to Global Christianity

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(Edinburgh University Press).

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Methodology and Sources of Christian and Religious Affiliation

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Philo Kim is Associate Professor at the Institute for Peace and Unification
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Studies (IPUS), Seoul National University, South Korea.

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North Korea
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Sebastian C. H. Kim is Director of the Korean Studies Center and Professor

of Theology and Public Life at Fuller Theological Seminary, California, USA.
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Previously, he held the Chair in Theology and Public Life in the Faculty of
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Education and Theology at York St John University, UK. He is the co-author

(with Kirsteen Kim) of Christianity as a World Religion: An Introduction
(Bloomsbury Academic, 2nd revised edition 2016).
Social and Political Context
Sivin Kit is Lecturer in Christian Theology and Religious Studies at the

Malaysia Theological Seminary. He also serves as Director of the Centre for
Religion and Society and is an ordained Lutheran pastor.
Inter-Religious Relations
xvi Contributors
Akemi Kugimiya is Professor at the Center for Catholic Education of

Shirayuri University in Japan. She is the co-author of The Aspects of Christianity
in Modern Japan (Oriens Institute for Religious Research, 2008), co-editor (with
Masayuki Shimizu, Yoshio Tsuruoka and Naoki Kuwabara) of The Meaning
of Life (Oriens Institute for Religious Research, 2017) and the editor of The
Collected Works of Klaus Riesenhuber (Chisenshyokan, 2015).
Japan
Septemmy E. Lakawa is President of the Jakarta Theological Seminary,

Indonesia (2019–23). Her research interests are in the areas of mission
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theology, trauma and theology, and feminist theology.
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Mission and Evangelism
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Timothy T. N. Lim is a Visiting Lecturer with the London School of Theology.
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Formerly, he was the Director of Chinese Research and Training at the Carey
Baptist College (Auckland, New Zealand). He has published on ecclesiol-
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ogy, ecumenism and theological trajectories in Asia in addition to Ecclesial
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Recognition with Hegelian Philosophy, Social Psychology, and Continental Political
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Theory (Brill, 2017).
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Manhong Melissa Lin is Associate General Secretary of the China Christian
Council and Academic Dean and Associate Professor of Christian Ethics at
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Nanjing Union Theological Seminary. She is ordained and the first woman
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PhD holder in the Protestant Church in Mainland China.

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Mainland China (Protestant)

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Seree Lorgunpai is General Secretary of the Thailand Bible Society and a

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member of the Committee on Translation Policy of the United Bible Societies.

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Thailand
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Julie Ma is Associate Professor of Intercultural Studies at Oral Roberts

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University, Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA. She is the author of When the Spirit Meets
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the Spirits: Pentecostal Ministry Among the Kankana-ey Tribe in the Philippines
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(Peter Lang, 2000).

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Pentecostals/Charismatics
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Wonsuk Ma, a Korean Pentecostal, serves as Dean and Distinguished

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Professor of Global Christianity at Oral Roberts University, Tulsa, Oklahoma,

USA. He is the author of many publications and is series editor and publisher
of the 35-volume Regnum Edinburgh Centenary Series (2009–17).
Worship and Spirituality
Barnabas Mam is Asia Ministry Advisor of Ambassadors for Christ Inter

national. He is a gospel songwriter and the author of Church Behind the Wire: A
Story of Faith in the Killing Fields (Moody, 2012).
Cambodia
Contributors xvii
Paul Marshall is Wilson Professor of Religious Freedom and Research

Professor of Political Science at Baylor University, Senior Fellow at the Hudson
Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom, and Senior Fellow of the Religious
Freedom Institute and member of its South and Southeast Asia Action Team.
Religious Freedom
Ken Christoph Miyamoto is Professor of Christian Studies at Kobe Shoin

Women’s University in Kobe, Japan. He received his PhD in Mission and
Ecumenics from Princeton Theological Seminary, USA, and is the author of
God’s Mission in Asia (Pickwick, 2007).
.
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Anglicans
on
Peter C. Phan is the inaugural holder of the Ignacio Ellacuria Chair of Catholic
se
Social Thought at Georgetown University, Washington, DC. A native of
lu
Vietnam, he has obtained three doctorates and authored and edited some 30
na
books and 300 essays on theology and the history of missions.
so
Vietnam
er
Daniel Franklin E. Pilario cm is Professor at St Vincent School of Theology –
rp
Adamson University, Quezon City, the Philippines. He is the author of Back
Fo
to the Rough Grounds of Praxis: Exploring Theological Method with Pierre Bourdieu
(Peeters, 2005). He belongs to the editorial board of Concilium and other philo-
e.
sophical and theological journals. As a member of the Congregation of the

l
sa
Mission, he ministers in a garbage dump parish in Manila.

Catholics
re
or
David Ro is Director of the J. Christy Wilson Center for World Missions at

Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, Massachusetts,
n
tio
USA, and serves as Regional Director for the Lausanne Movement in East
Asia.
bu
Mainland China (House Churches)

tri
is
Kenneth R. Ross is Professor of Theology at Zomba Theological College,

rd
Malawi. His most recent book is Mission as God’s Spiral of Renewal (Mzuni
fo
Press, 2019) and he serves as a Series Editor for the Edinburgh Companions to
Global Christianity (Edinburgh University Press).
ot
N
Brunei
Nikolay Samoylov is Professor and Head of the Department of Theory of

Asian and African Social Development at Saint Petersburg State University,
Russia, where he also serves as Director of the Center for Chinese Studies. He
has published extensively on Russian interactions with China and Japan.
Orthodox
Kang-San Tan serves as General Director of BMS World Mission – the

Baptist Missionary Society. Previously he was Director for Mission Research
xviii Contributors
at Overseas Missionary Fellowship, Head of Mission Studies at Redcliffe

College, UK, and Executive Director of AsiaCMS, a network for Asian mission
movements based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Evangelicals
Edmond Tang was Director of East Asian Christian Studies at the University
of Birmingham, UK, before his retirement. He researched extensively on
Asian theology and Chinese Christianity and was editor of the China Study
Journal from 1990 to 2011.
Mainland China (Catholic)
.
ly
on
Wai Ching Angela Wong is Vice President for Programs at the United Board
for Christian Higher Education in Asia, having earlier served as Professor in
se
the Department of Cultural and Religious Studies, the Chinese University
lu
of Hong Kong. Her latest works include Gender and Family in East Asia
na
(Routledge, 2014), Sex/Gender Politics and the Local Movements (Commercial,
2015) and Christian Women in Chinese Society: The Anglican Story (HKU Press,
so
2018).
er
Colonial and Post-Colonial Context
rp
Fo
Ambrose-Aristotle Zographos (Song-Am Cho) is Metropolitan of the
Orthodox Metropolis of Korea and Professor in Hankuk University of Foreign
e.
Studies, Seoul, South Korea. His publications include Gabriel of Thessalonica

l
sa
and the Unpublished Homiliarion Attributed to Him (in Greek; Kéntro Byzantinon
Ereunon, 2007).
re
Orthodox
or
Gina A. Zurlo is co-Director of the Center for the Study of Global Christianity
n
tio
at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, Massachusetts,

USA. She is co-editor of the World Christian Database and Associate Editor of
bu
the World Religion Database.

tri
A Demographic Profile of Christianity in East and Southeast Asia; Methodology and

is
rd
Sources of Christian and Religious Affiliation

fo
ot
N
N
ot
fo
rd
is
tri
bu
tio
Introduction
n
or
re
sa
l e.
Fo
rp
er
so
na
lu
se
on
ly
.
N
ot
fo
rd
is
tri
bu
tio
n
or
re
sa
l e.
Fo
rp
er
so
na
lu
se
on
ly
.
A Demographic Profile of Christianity
in East and Southeast Asia
Gina A. Zurlo
Majority Religion by Province, 2020
.
ly
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
MAJORITY RELIGION
e.
Agnostics Buddhists Chinese folk Christians

10% - 49% 10% - 49% 10% - 49% 10% - 49%
l
sa
50% - 74% 50% - 74% 50% - 74% 50% - 74%

75% - 100% 75% - 100% 75% - 100% 75% - 100%
re
Ethnic religionists Hindus Muslims

10% - 49% 10% - 49% 10% - 49%
50% - 74% 50% - 74% 50% - 74%
or
75% - 100% 75% - 100% 75% - 100%

n
tio
East and Southeast Asia are two of the most religiously diverse regions in the
world. In 2020, they were home to significant percentages of Buddhists (22%),
bu
agnostics (22%), Chinese folk-religionists (20%), Christians (12%) and Muslims

tri
(12%). Of these large religions, Christianity experienced the fastest growth

is
between 1970 and 2020 (3.1% per year).

rd
Religions in East and Southeast Asia, 1970 and 2020

fo
ot
1970 2020
Religion Adherents % Adherents %
N
Buddhists 219,502,000 17.2 505,021,000 21.7

Agnostics 423,480,000 33.2 503,423,000 21.6
Chinese folk-religionists 237,681,000 18.6 465,951,000 20.0
Christians 62,196,000 4.9 281,889,000 12.1
Muslims 108,894,000 8.5 275,008,000 11.8
Atheists 100,445,000 7.9 111,072,000 4.8
Other 124,834,480 9.8 190,271,600 8.2
Total 1,277,032,000 100.0 2,332,635,000 100.0
Source: Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo (eds), World Christian Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill), accessed July 2019. Figures do not add to 100%
due to rounding.
4 Gina A. Zurlo
Christianity in East and Southeast Asia, 1970–2020
Christians by Country, 2020

282 Million Christians, 12.1% of Population
% Christian
3%
10% MONGOLIA
.
50% 2%
ly
NORTH KOREA
75%
on
<1%
CHINA JAPAN
se
7% 2%
lu
LAOS HONG KONG SOUTH KOREA 34%
na
3% 15%
so
TAIWAN 6%
MYANMAR 8%
er
MACAO 7%
THAILAND 1% rp
VIETNAM PHILIPPINES
Fo
CAMBODIA 3% 9% 91%
e.
MALAYSIA
l
sa
9% BRUNEI 12%
SINGAPORE 20%
re
or
INDONESIA 12%
n
tio
TIMOR-LESTE
bu
89%
tri
is
rd
fo
Christianity (282 million, 12% of region) in East and Southeast Asia has a long
history that has reflected the religious, cultural, political and socio-economic
ot
diversity of the region. Churches in the region have experienced the political
N
challenges of colonialism, conflict, communism and religious fundamentalism.

Despite this, Christianity has grown in the region in recent decades, although
in many countries still remains a small proportion of the population, most
under 10%. Much of the growth has been in Pentecostal/Charismatic churches,
and often among poor and marginalised people. China is, by far, home to the
largest number of Christians (106 million), who are found in both government-
sanctioned and ‘underground’ churches. The region is also home to Asia’s only
two Christian-majority countries: the Philippines and Timor-Leste, both with
long Catholic histories.
1970
12m Major Christian traditions, 1970 and 2020
East and Southeast Asia is home to
12m
62 23m historic Catholic populations, such as
40m Anglican in the Philippines and Vietnam, both
Catholic with Christian populations that are
Independent more than 80% Catholic. The region
Orthodox
2020 Protestant
is also home to newer Protestant and
Independent churches. Independents
.
All Christians
grew the fastest between 1970 and
ly
103m Population (millions)
on
2020, from 12 million to 103 million.
282 119m
e
us
79m
al
20%
on
le% of regional population
rs
15%
Christians, 1970–2020 % Christian
pe
10%
has been on a gradual increase since
or
1970, from 5% of the population then
.F
to 12% in 2020. Countries with the 5%

most significant growth include Brunei
sa
(6% to 12%), China (<1% to 7%) and 0%

Singapore (8% to 20%).
re
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
Year
or
n
tio
bu
17.2% 21.7% Buddhists

tri
Religious affiliation, 1970 and 2020

is
Asia is the most religiously diverse

rd
33.2% 21.6% Agnostics continent as the historic home to many

fo
of the world’s religions, including

18.6% 20.0% Chinese folk-religionists Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism
ot
4.9% and Jainism. The region experienced

N
12.1% Christians
significant change in the twentieth
8.5% 11.8% Muslims century due to the rise of communism
4.8%
7.9% Atheists and state-imposed atheism in China.
5.5% 4.3%
Ethnic religionists
1970 2020
% of regional population
Note: Throughout this profile, traditions will not add up to total Christians in each region
because of double-affiliation and the unaffiliated. Only the religions over 1% are identified.
6 Gina A. Zurlo
Major Christian Traditions, 1970 and 2020
Christians
1970 2020
.
ly
on
62 million 282 million
se
lu
na
so
% of country population Overall, Christianity has grown in the region, although
some countries experienced decline in their Christian
er
3%
10% populations from 1970 to 2020, such as Macao (13% to
50% rp
7%) and North Korea (1% to 0.4%). The largest Christian
Fo
75% populations are found in China (106 million), the
Philippines (100 million) and Indonesia (33 million), the
e.
last of which is also the country with the most Muslims.

l
sa
Anglicans
re
1970 2020
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
286,000 784,000
rd
fo
ot
N
% of Christian population Anglicans in East and Southeast Asia represent a

minority tradition, with less than 1 million adherents
3%
10% in 2020. Most countries in the region were not impacted
50% by British colonisation, which decreased the tradition’s
75% influence. The highest percentages of Anglicans (among
all Christians) are found in Malaysia (9%), Brunei (7%)
and Hong Kong (3%).
Catholics
1970 2020
.
ly
on
se
lu
% of Christian population The number of Catholics has grown slightly in propor-
na
tional terms (3% in 1970 to 5% in 2020) but substantially
3%
in absolute terms, from 40 million to 119 million. Between
so
10%
50% 1970 and 2020 the proportion of Catholics among
er
75% Christians grew substantially in some countries, such
rp
as Brunei (1% to 39%) and South Korea (15% to 32%).
In other countries, it dropped substantially, such as
Fo
Cambodia (60% to 5%) and Laos (67% to 24%).
l e.
sa
Independents
re
1970 2020
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is

rd
fo
ot
N
% of Christian population Independent Christianity grew the second fastest (after

Pentecostals/Charismatics, although there is overlap
3%
10% between the two) regionally between 1970 and 2020,
50% averaging over 4.3% per year. Thirty-seven per cent of all
75% Christians in the region are Independents, due mainly to
the large numbers of house churches in China, both rural
and urban. The region is also home to large Independent
churches such as the Philippine Independent Church.
8 Gina A. Zurlo
Major Christian Traditions, 1970 and 2020
Orthodox
1970 2020
.
ly
on
42,600 62,200
se
lu
na
so
% of Christian population Orthodox Christianity is a minority tradition in East and
Southeast Asia, with fewer than 100,000 members in the
er
3%
region. Mongolia is the only country with any indication
10%
50% rp
of a robust Orthodox community (4% of all Christians),
Fo
75% due to historical Russian influence. Japan also has a
historical Orthodox population, at 1% of all Christians.
le.
sa
re
Protestants
or
1970 2020
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
% of Christian population Protestantism grew to 79 million adherents by 2020, up

from 12 million in 1970. East Asia is home to a greater
3%
10% proportion of Protestants than Southeast Asia (36% of
50% all Christians versus 21%). This is due mostly to large
75% Protestant denominations in China (where 32% of all
Christians are Protestants) and South Korea (where 60%
of all Christians are Protestants).
Movements Within Christianity, 1970 and 2020
Evangelicals
1970 2020
.
ly
on
se
lu
na
so
% of Christian population Evangelicalism – historically a white, Western
er
3% tradition – is a minority movement in East and Southeast
10%
50% rp
Asia but grew from 0.5% of the region’s population in
1970 to nearly 4% in 2020. South Korea has the highest
Fo
75% Evangelical percentage (74% of all Christians), followed
by Laos (73%) and Thailand (45%).
l e.
sa
re
Pentecostals/Charismatics
or
1970 2020
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
% of Christian population Pentecostal/Charismatic Christianity was the fastest-

3% growing tradition in East and Southeast Asia from 1970
10% to 2020 and now represents more than 32% of the region’s
50% Christian population. In many countries, Christians are
75% more than 30% Pentecostal/Charismatic: Cambodia
(78%), South Korea (53%), the Philippines (38%) and
Indonesia (33%).
10 Gina A. Zurlo
Christianity in East Asia, 1970–2020

.
ly
on
se
MONGOLIA
2%
lu
NORTH KOREA
na
<1%
so
CHINA SOUTH KOREA JAPAN
34% 2%
er
7%
rp
Fo
TAIWAN 6%
e.
HONG KONG 15%

l
sa
MACAO 7%
re
or
% Christian
n
3%
tio
10%
bu
50%
tri
75%
is
rd
fo
East Asian Christianity exhibits a significant amount of diversity. In China,

ot
Christianity is split into both ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ churches and thus difficult
N
to enumerate. Japanese Christianity was driven underground in the seventeenth

century and has remained a minority tradition. South Korea is, in many ways, the
‘success story’ of twentieth-century world Christianity, growing from less than
1% in 1900 to 34% in 2020, and now sends the third-largest number of foreign
missionaries worldwide (after the USA and Brazil). The hermit kingdom of North
Korea is notorious for persecution of Christians under successive dictatorships,
despite the impact of a prominent Pentecostal revival in Pyongyang in 1907.
Mongolia is home to one of the world’s newest Christian communities, since
only 1991, and is in the process of discerning how to create authentic, indigenous
expressions of the faith.
1970
3m 2m Major Christian traditions, 1970 and 2020

In 2020, Christianity in East Asia
11 was largely Independent (58% of all
Anglican Christians) and Protestant (36% of
3m Catholic
Independent
all Christians). Independents had the
Orthodox fastest growth rate between 1970 and
2020 Protestant 2020, averaging nearly 7% per year,
though Protestants and Catholics also
.
17m All Christians
ly
75m experienced high growth rates, at 5%
on
Population (millions)
and 4%, respectively.
129
se
46m
lu
na
20%
o
rs
% loferegional population
pe
15%
Christians, 1970–2020
Christianity in East Asia increased or % Christian
from 1% of the population in 1970 to 10%
.F
8% in 2020, an average of 5% growth

per year. Some of the most significant
5%
growth in the region was in China (10%
sa
growth per year) and Mongolia (6%

re
per year). 0%
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
or
Year
n
tio
bu
tri
41.9% 29.1% Agnostics

is
rd

Chinese folk-religionists
fo
23.2% 27.2% Atheists’ and agnostics’ share of the

region’s population dropped dramatic
ot
13.0% 19.9% Buddhists ally, from a combined 52% in 1970 to

N
1.2% 7.7% Christians 35% in 2020, largely due to relaxed re-

6.3% strictions in China. Gains were made by
9.9% Atheists
5.7% 4.3% Chinese folk-religionists (453 million in
Ethnic religionists 2020) and Buddhists (331 million).
2.7% 2.7% New religionists
1970 2020
12 Gina A. Zurlo
Christianity in Southeast Asia, 1970–2020

.
ly
LAOS
on
MYANMAR 3%
8%
se
PHILIPPINES
THAILAND 1% VIETNAM 91%
lu
9%
CAMBODIA 3%
na
BRUNEI
so
12%
er
MALAYSIA
SINGAPORE
9% rp
Fo
20%
e.
INDONESIA 12%
l
sa
% Christian
re
3% TIMOR-LESTE
or
10% 89%
n
tio
50%
75%
bu
tri
is
Southeast Asia has been heavily influenced by outside powers, from Muslim
rd
Arabs in the thirteenth century (Indonesia, the Philippines) to Portuguese,

fo
Spanish, Dutch, French and British imperialists beginning in the sixteenth century.
As a result, Christianity took root in the region as a minority tradition. Today’s
ot
exceptions are the Philippines and Timor-Leste, the only Christian-majority

N
countries in Asia. While Western missionaries contributed to positive transfor-

mation of societies in this region, many simply transplanted Western Christian
expressions. Many Southeast Asians rejected Christianity from deeply held anti-
colonial sentiments.
In 2020, Southeast Asia was 23% Christian (153 million) and home to
both historic Catholic populations as well as newer Pentecostal/Charismatic
expressions of the faith. Many young churches throughout the region are active in
developing indigenous theologies and expressions of the faith. At the same time,
persecution is on the rise and proselytisation is prohibited in Brunei, Cambodia,
Laos and Vietnam.
1970
10m
9m
51 23m Major Christian traditions, 1970 and 2020
Most Christians in Southeast Asia are
37m Anglican
Catholic Catholic (67% of all Christians), largely
Independent due to the weight of the Philippines.
Orthodox All Christian traditions experienced
2020 Protestant growth between 1970 and 2020, with
.
All Christians the largest denominations found in
ly
32m Indonesia: Batak Christian Protestant
on
Population (millions)
Church and Bethel Church Indonesia.
28m
153
se
102m
lu
na
30%
so
% Christian
er
Christians, 1970–2020 25%
Christianity’s share of the population
in Southeast Asia remained mostly rp
Fo
20%
steady between 1970 and 2020, rising
four percentage points (to 23% in 2020).
e.
15%
Every country in the region (except the
l
sa
Philippines) experienced an increase

in its Christian proportion, including
re
10%
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
Timor-Leste (35% to 89%) and Brunei
or
(6% to 12%). Year

n
tio
bu
tri
34.5% 37.2% Muslims

is
rd

Islam in Southeast Asia is the largest
fo

religion, with only a slight propor-
ot
18.1% 22.9% Christians tional increase from 1970 to 2020 (35%

N
5.0% 4.4%
Ethnic religionists
to 37%). The region is home to some
2.0% 2.8%
large Muslim populations, including
Agnostics
Indonesia (217 million) and Malaysia
3.8% 2.2% New religionists (18 million). Christianity grew the
2.4% 1.9% Chinese folk-religionists fastest of any major religion over the
50-year period, at an average of 2.2%
1970 2020
% of regional population per year.
14 Gina A. Zurlo
Future of Christianity in East and Southeast Asia, 2020–2050
2020
103m Major Christian traditions, 2020 and 2050

282 119m Looking forwards, Independents
are likely to outpace Protestants and
Anglican
Catholic
Catholics in Southeast Asia by 2050
79m
as Christianity becomes far more
.
Independent
ly
Orthodox indigenised in the region. Many of
on
2050 Protestant these Independent churches are also
Pentecostal/Charismatic in nature.
se
All Christians
119m
160m Population (millions)
lu
430
na
so
167m
er
20%
rp
Fo
15%
Christians, 2020–2050
% Christian
e.
By 2050, Christians will likely number

l
431 million in the region, 18% of the

sa
10%
population. Future growth of Christi-
re
anity in the region is uncertain given

or
social and governmental restrictions in 5%

many countries, in particular China.
n
tio
0%
2020
2030
2040
2050
bu
Year
tri
21.6% 16.5% Agnostics

is
rd

fo
Christians are projected to grow faster

20.0% 17.3% Chinese folk-religionists
than any other religious group (1.4%
ot
per year); in fact, the percentages

N
12.1% 18.0% Christians

of non-religious and Chinese folk-
11.8% 13.7% Muslims religionists are expected to decline
4.8% 4.0% Atheists slightly by 2050, and Buddhists and
4.3% 3.8% Muslims are projected to keep pace
Ethnic religionists
with general population growth.
3.0% 2.6% New religionists
2020 2050
Chuang Tzu’s (莊子) parable of the first look between a disfigured parent
.
ly
and child plays out in a number of slightly different versions. In Burton
on
Watson’s translation, the drama unfolds moments after the mother’s
labour. The joy of her delivery is marred by the fear of discovery: ‘When
se
the leper woman gives birth to a child in the dead of the night, she
lu
rushes to fetch a torch and examine it, trembling with terror lest it look
na
like herself.’ Angus Charles Graham recasts the mother into a man, still
so
leprous and still anxious to see what his son looks like. These variations
er
can already serve as a metaphor for the multiplicity of Christianities in
rp
East and Southeast Asia. They can further make one wonder, ‘If the pro-
tagonist changes in gender, is it still the same story?’ In the same vein,
Fo
we risk drawing blood with the question ‘How much can you change in
e.
Christianity and still call it Christianity?’

l
Thomas Merton, a Trappist monk and student of Zen Buddhism and

sa
Taoism, expands and pushes Chuang Tzu’s tale further:

re
or
When a hideous man becomes a father

And a son is born to him
n
tio
In the middle of the night

He trembles and lights a lamp
bu
And runs to look in anguish

tri
On that child’s face

is
To see whom he resembles.

rd
fo
We can debate whether or not Merton’s extension is already overreach-

ing, but I do not think we can deny that as Chuang Tzu’s parable wades
ot
into poetic lines and then goes further into ambiguities, one is drawn to
N
dive deeper into complexity. The hideous man could have been made ugly
because of leprosy, or, heartbreakingly, he could have just been born that
way. Leprosy, as we now know, cannot be transmitted from a pregnant
mother to her unborn child, and definitely not from a father to the child
in his wife’s womb. But hideousness can. Changing the sex of the parent
adds a twist of uncertainty. A mother can be sure that the child to whom
she has just given birth is hers. Her husband cannot rest assured of the
same. The father is afraid that his son will be ugly like him. If the boy is,
16 Francis D. Alvarez
the father blames himself. But if the boy is handsome, then pounces the
doubt – is this really his son? The parable unfolds in the dark of the night.
But was the boy born in the middle of the night? Or did the man wait until
the middle of the night to look at the boy? Is the man so ugly that it is
only during the night that he can venture to see the child? This adds to the
darkness, too.
As a Filipino Christian, I tremble as I open this volume on Christianity
in East and Southeast Asia. What Christianity will I see lying before me?
If it is depicted unflatteringly, will I have only myself to blame? If the
.
ly
portrayal is too complimentary, can I still call it my own?
on
‘To See Whom He Resembles’
se
Since the late 1990s, church weddings have challenged and even outnum-
lu
bered traditional Shinto nuptial rites as the ceremony of choice for young
na
couples in Japan. These church weddings are patterned after Protestant
so
rites even if the couples are not Christian. The entourage marches down
the aisle, the men in suits and the women in dresses like those worn in
er
the fairy-tale wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana; Joseph Scriven’s
rp
‘What a Friend We Have in Jesus’ (the most widely known Christian hymn
Fo
in Japan) is sung in Nihongo using Charles Crozat Converse’s melody; the
e.
great ode to love in 1 Corinthians 13 is read; and a Caucasian man offici-

l
ates the service in a mix of English and Japanese. Having a white minister
sa
is important because it is easier to believe he is Christian, and to have a

re
Christian officiant is the finishing touch on the bride and groom’s dream
or
of a Western wedding.
n
This reveals how Christianity has been and still is seen in many parts of
tio
Asia – it is the religion of the West. In the Vietnam of 1615, an Italian mission
bu
ary tried to correct the translation of the key question in the baptismal rite
tri
to ‘Do you want to enter the Christian religion?’ Before his intervention, it
is
was ‘Do you want to become a Portuguese?’ But as late as the eighteenth
rd
century, Vietnamese court documents still referred to Catholic Christianity

fo
as Đạo Hoa Lang, ‘the way of the Portuguese’. In Malaysia, Christianity is

still sometimes referred to as agama orang putih, ‘the white man’s religion’.
ot
In Myanmar, some Buddhist monks still call Christianity a ‘guest religion’

N
without affording it even perfunctory hospitality.

Geographically, the case can be made that Christianity is Asian in its
origins. Jesus did walk the roads of Palestine in Western Asia, and it was
in Antioch, whose ruins lie near present-day Antakya in south-central
Turkey, where followers of the Way were first known as Christians.
Culturally, we can point out that life as pictured in the Bible is closer
to Asian ways than Western ways today. The scene in Mark 3: 31–5, when
Jesus’s mother and brothers call for him and seemingly are rejected, would
be particularly striking and puzzling for many Asians. It can be argued

that this is exactly Mark’s intention, and this is also what fuels the Thai
and Cambodian apprehension that Christianity separates its converts from
family and community. Earlier in the same chapter in Mark, the detail of
Jesus not having the opportunity to eat would not escape the eye of many
Asians, especially Filipinos, who greet each other not only with a ‘How
are you?’ or ‘Kumusta?’ but with a ‘Have you eaten?’ or ‘Kumain ka na ba?’
For us, Jesus’s relatives would be justified in seizing him and asking if he
was still in his right mind.
.
ly
Historically, we can cite the coming of the Syriac monk Alopen to
on
China in the seventh century. Many scholars still refer to him and his
followers as ‘Nestorian’ Christians, though this term has been challenged
se
and ‘Church of the East’, this group’s self-description, has been proffered
lu
instead. Whatever designation is used, the eighth-century ‘Nestorian’
na
stele, inscribed with Chinese and Syriac text memorialising the propaga-
so
tion of the ‘luminous’ religion in the Middle Kingdom, is proof that our
first encounter with Christianity in East and Southeast Asia was Eastern.
er
However, this mission lasted only 150 years. Today, we cannot deny that
rp
the Christianity thriving in Asia is from the West.
Fo
While Christianity in East and Southeast Asia definitely manifests
e.
Western influence, this does not mean that Christianity remains foreign
l
to East and Southeast Asians today. Many church buildings have taken
sa
on the aesthetics of local architecture. Phát Diệm Cathedral in Vietnam,

re
built by Father Tran Luc in 1892, features upturned pagoda roofs

or
crowning Gothic towers. In Thailand, some Catholic churches follow the

n
style of Buddhist temples. Like Buddhist temples, they are called wats,
tio
and have murals telling the story of Jesus just as the walls of Buddhist
bu
wats depict scenes from the life of the Buddha. But this does not mean
tri
that Baroque churches in the Philippines are less Asian. Looking more
is
closely at these churches, one will notice that they are squat rather than
rd
towering, a necessary modification because of the earthquakes that shake

fo
the Pacific Ring of Fire. They are also constructed of local materials like
adobe and coral stone. The Church of Saints Peter and Paul in Singapore
ot
(characterised not only as neo-Gothic but tropical Gothic) is adorned with

N
lotus motifs. Similarly, many Philippine colonial churches are decorated

with bananas and papayas, mirroring the flora around – the local artisans
stamping their signature on their work.
Local touches, though, are not always welcomed by Asians. While
some Thai Catholics feel at home in church-wats, others cannot pray in
them. When a Protestant missionary in the 1960s first introduced the use
of the xylophone-like ranat ek into worship, Thai congregants objected
because these percussion instruments reminded them of the cult of the phii
(spirits). Nods to local culture also court controversy in Korean represen-

tations of the Holy Family. The faithful are divided on whether, in such
images, Joseph, Mary and the boy Jesus in churches should be dressed in
hanboks made of ramie and silk like royalty, or dressed instead in hemp
and cotton, as peasants were attired.
Church buildings do not have to be made of nipa (palm leaves) for
them to be Asian. Our Christianity does not have to be expressed with joss
sticks for us to call it our own. Christianity does not always need to shed
its Western-ness to become Asian. In Mongolia, original Christian music
.
ly
pieces with a distinct Mongol flavour have been composed. In the Philip-
on
pines also, religious hymns that resonate with the traditional kundimans,
courtship songs pledging devotion, are popular. But when we choose to
se
sing in the melodies and words of the St Louis Jesuits from Missouri, USA,
lu
and Hillsong worship from Sydney, Australia, we still celebrate as Asians.
na
Even when rites are most Western, they do not remain alien. Catholics in
so
rural China felt a strong connection to the Mass when it was in Latin –
strong enough that they resisted when Second Vatican Council (1962–5)
er
pushed for the use of the vernacular. There must have been something
rp
in the Latin to which they related. Perhaps it was the strangeness of the
Fo
language that allowed them to express that what they were doing and
e.
believing was something strange, something different from what they had
l
known – and the mystery was part of their faith. Or perhaps the connec-
sa
tion was simply that their great-grandparents and grandparents prayed in

re
this way, and continuing this paid them honour and made them present.
or
In Korea, it was a conscious choice by Koreans in the past not to in

n
digenise church architecture, so that Christianity would be seen as distinct

tio
from Shamanism. Today, Korean mega-churches are often compared to

bu
their American counterparts. But as Western as these might seem, the

tri
Asian-ness creeps in. Mega-churches in the USA and Korea risk becoming
is
personality cults. In Korea, this can be partly explained by the Shamanism

rd
in the background. As a shaman’s followers become increasingly

fo
dependent on the shaman’s powers, so too the members of a mega-church

can become inordinately attached to a pastor’s charisma.
ot
When something is transmitted, it is received in the mode of the receiver

N
rather than that of the transmitter. Thus, what was transmitted as Western
we have received as Asian. And our ownership of the tradition that has
been shared with us is made stronger when we in turn pass it on.
Japanese weddings in the Protestant style reflect the aspirations of the
young to be modern. They are actually cheaper as well. But most impor-
tantly, these rites, more than the traditional Shinto proceedings, allow
the couples to be more ‘romantic’ and to express themselves more. Many
couples are brought to silence and moved by the Western ceremony. They
are able to connect to it, and so these rites are no longer just Western.
Romance and self-expression might not fit the Japanese stereotype, but the
popularity of these weddings tells us that they have also become part of
what it means to be Japanese.
In a similar way, Korean pop music (or K-pop) has been criticised for
being nothing but copycat music. Songs sample American popular music
and are riddled with English words that are meaninglessly repeated. Yet
not only has K-pop connected in Korea, it also has become a very suc-
cessful export to other East and Southeast Asian countries. Why? In these
.
ly
songs, Koreans can feel han, an untranslatable combination of sorrow,
on
anger, pain and the hope to struggle through these – a concept also used
in Minjung theology. In the case of BTS (Bangtan Sonyeondan), one of
se
Korea’s most successful boy bands and the first to crack the Billboard 200
lu
at number 1, the story of the group’s struggles to reach the top of the charts
na
is also full of han. This might be another reason why K-pop has resonated
so
with the Chinese, Japanese, Taiwanese, Filipino, Indonesian, Singaporean,
Malaysian, Cambodian and Thai psyches.
er
It is important to stress how Christianity is not foreign to Asian
rp
Christians any more. This recognises the agency of the faithful in East and
Fo
Southeast Asia. We do not merely receive passively; we make Christianity
e.
our own, and this volume can be read as an account of how we are con-
l
tinuing to make Christianity Asian.

sa
If what is transmitted is received in the mode of the receiver, if what is

re
transmitted to us as Western is received by us as Asian, what happens to

or
the call for inculturation? Theologians and missionaries still need to look
n
for the best ways to translate Christianity for other cultures, but at the
tio
same time they cannot ignore the inculturation that is always and already
bu
happening from below.

tri
We return to Chuang Tzu’s parable as expanded by Thomas Merton.

is
Fatherhood is not limited to biological or genetic parentage. One can

rd
be a parent by accepting another’s child and nurturing it. Though with

fo
Western features, Asian Christianity need not be ashamed of the faith we

have fathered or mothered.
ot
To say that Asian Christianity is still foreign to us is to belittle and even

N
betray the sacrifice of the many Asian Christians who have given their lives
for their faith. The Catholic Church counts almost 500 saints and blesseds
from all over Asia, most of whom were killed for witnessing to the gospel.
The Eastern Orthodox Church recognises as saints more than 200 Chinese
Christians who were martyred during the Boxer Rebellion. More recently,
we have the examples of Lisi Meng and Xinheng Li, missionaries in their
twenties from China’s house churches, who were killed by ISIS radicals in
Pakistan in May 2017. We must recognise not only those who have died
but also those who continue to live in persecution and whose fervour also
continues to increase. How can we say that their Christianity is foreign to
them? (Here, and in the ‘Minority’ section below, I am indebted to José
Mario C. Francisco, a contributor to and a member of the editorial advisory
board of this volume, for helping me flesh out my thoughts.) Despite the
persecution, Christianity in the region has seen and is projected to have
more growth than any other religion. This is another sign that East and
Southeast Asians have truly made Christianity our own.
History can be instructive, as it also underlines the need to break
.
ly
through the barrier of the foreignness of Christianity. The Church of the
on
East, Christianity’s initial foray into this region, lasted only 150 years in
China because it fell victim to the systematic oppression of all foreign
se
religions during the latter half of the Tang dynasty. Threatened by the
lu
growing influence of Buddhism – then also considered foreign – Emperor
na
Wuzong (840–6) started demolishing Buddhist temples and monasteries.
so
Followers of Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and ‘Nestorian’ Christianity
were not spared. Again, this persecution was not anti-Christian but anti-
er
foreign. Sadly, while Buddhism was later considered one of the Three
rp
Doctrines of China, alongside the indigenous ways of Confucianism and
Fo
Taoism, Christianity continues to be seen as foreign. As it did from the late
e.
Qing dynasty to the Nationalist period, so this stigma persists today. In

l
2014, in the eastern coastal province and Christian stronghold of Zhejiang,

sa
where Wenzhou, a city dubbed China’s Jerusalem, is located, officials

re
ordered the removal of hundreds of crosses and the demolition of dozens

or
of churches. Their reason was simply expressed: ‘To stave off the penetra-
n
tion of hostile foreign forces’. In this conflict, Communist Party members

tio
used the expression yáng jiào (洋教), translated as ‘foreign teaching’ and
bu
meant to be derogatory, to designate Christianity.

tri
It is not just in China but also in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,

is
Malaysia, Indonesia and Japan that being considered foreign has created
rd
problems for Christianity. This was well expressed by one nationalist,

fo
Kanzō Uchimura (1861–1930), who proclaimed (in parallel English and

Japanese lines):
ot
N
I love two J’s and no third; one is Jesus, and the other is Japan. I do not know
which I love more, Jesus or Japan. I am hated by my countrymen for Jesus’
sake as yaso [Christian], and I am disliked by foreign missionaries for Japan’s
sake as national and narrow. Even if I lose all my friends, I cannot lose Jesus
and Japan . . . my faith is not a circle with one center; it is an ellipse with two
centers. My heart and mind revolve around the two dear names. And I know
that one strengthens the other; Jesus strengthens and purifies my love for
Japan; and Japan clarifies and objectives my love for Jesus. Were it not for the
two, I would become a mere dreamer, a fanatic, an amorphous universal man.
In a similar vein, Archbishop Albertus Soegijapranata (1896–1963), the

first native Indonesian bishop, is well known for the slogan ‘100% Catholic
and 100% Indonesian’, which Indonesian Catholics often feel the need to
repeat to this day.
How a Western religion can be seen as not foreign is complicated
enough without it being compounded by the experience of colonialism.
But we must confront the fact that the Christianity that came to our shores
after our first contact with Alopen and the Church of the East not only
rode on ships but on the coat-tails of imperialist governments wanting to
.
ly
expand their reach. Christian missionaries took advantage of their gov-
on
ernments’ resources to spread the gospel (even as they were also used
by their governments), and this compromised their message. Colonial
se
Christianity has a chequered past. With it came oppression and exploita-
lu
tion but also modernisation and education – and special mention must be
na
made of the educational opportunities given to women. Friars were used
so
to pacify the locals, but they also sometimes took the side of their charges
and protected them against the conquerors. The white man looked down
er
on the abilities of the natives, but Westerners also helped heighten our
rp
self-awareness. In the Philippines, for example, colonisers spurred on our
Fo
national awakening by sharing with us the idiom to understand ourselves
e.
in the Christ story. The experience of being colonised has already shaped
l
us, and we cannot go back to a pre-colonial identity. This is also the child
sa
to whom we must accept our role as parent.

re
If we are able to shed the perceived foreignness of Christianity and

or
unload the baggage of colonisation, will Christianity be more easily

n
welcomed? Will it encounter less resistance, at least from the state?

tio
The image of the Catholic Church leading the fight against the Marcos
bu
dictatorship in the Philippines in 1986 can be a threatening reminder or a

tri
beacon of hope, depending on which side of the conflict you find yourself.
is
In Vietnam, perceptions of Catholics as more loyal to the Vatican and of

rd
Protestants as colluding with the USA are slowly changing, but the Viet
fo
namese government is still wary that Christian conversions among the

Hmong people will trigger an independence movement.
ot
An encouraging sign is the 2016 election of Henry Van Thio, a Chin

N
Christian, as vice president of Myanmar. Also in 2016, Taiwan elected as

vice president Dr Chen Chien-Jen, a Catholic who is still very much active
in his parish. Tarō Asō, also a Catholic, rose from the ranks to serve as
prime minister of Japan from September 2008 to September 2009 and as of
2019 was deputy prime minister and minister of finance.
In Indonesia’s fight for independence from Dutch colonisation,
Christians battled alongside Muslims, and this watered the seed of what
was to become the philosophy of Pancasila. In Korea, Protestantism has
always been seen as part of the nationalist struggle. Enshrined in the

constitution of Timor-Leste is the invaluable contribution of the Catholic
Church to its independence. This, though, might not be viewed in a fa-
vourable light in Indonesia.
In 1982, with the issuance of Document 19, The Basic Viewpoint and Policy
on the Religious Question During Our Country’s Socialist Period, the Chinese
Communist Party finally came to terms with the impossibility of eradicat-
ing religion, but it still insisted that the state should be prioritised above
all. This is where the fundamental difference with Christianity lies. In the
.
ly
wake of an increasing number of worship spaces being shut down and an
on
increasing number of leading Christians being jailed, more than 400 pastors
of Chinese house churches (which consider themselves self-governing,
se
self-supporting, self-propagating and patriotic, but not members of the
lu
Three-Self Patriotic Movement) issued a strongly worded statement in
na
September 2018. Here, the fundamental difference is underscored:
so
Christian churches in China believe unconditionally that the Bible is the Word
er
and Revelation of God. It is the source and final authority of all righteousness,
rp
ethics, and salvation. If the will of any political party, the laws of any govern-
Fo
ment, or the commands of any man directly violate the teachings of the Bible,
harming men’s souls and opposing the gospel proclaimed by the church, we
e.
are obligated to obey God rather than men, and we are obligated to teach all
l
sa
members of the church to do the same. (From ‘A Joint Statement by Pastors: A

Declaration for the Sake of the Christian Faith’)
re
or
The document went on to stress that Chinese Christians ‘are willing to

n
obey authorities in China whom God has appointed and to respect the
tio
government’s authority to govern society and human conduct’ as long as

bu
the state ‘does not overstep the boundaries of secular power laid out in the
tri
Bible and does not interfere with or violate anything related to faith or the
is
soul’. Christians will fervently pray for the government and society, but
rd
they are also ‘eager and determined to walk the path of the cross of Christ
fo
and are more than willing to imitate the older generation of saints who
suffered and were martyred for their faith’. The document ended strongly:
ot
‘For the sake of the gospel, we are prepared to bear all losses – even the
N
loss of our freedom and our lives.’

The perceived foreignness of Christianity arises not only from Christi
anity’s Western connection but also from its relativisation of the loyalty due
to government and state. Catholics have been stigmatised as ‘Romanists’
and ‘papists’, but even with efforts to clarify that their connections to the
Vatican are not political, there is no going around their conviction that
ultimate loyalty belongs to God. Beyond competition, can there be another
way to approach the relationship between churches and states?
Aside from the spectre of foreignness arising from Christianity’s

Western influence and its subordination of all loyalties to the Divine, there
is another foreignness that haunts East and Southeast Asian Christianity:
ethnicity. As an example, in Japan, migrant Catholics (mostly Filipinos
and Brazilians) already outnumber native Japanese Catholics. Ethnic
(non-Japanese) Pentecostal churches are also increasing, as evidenced
by the many old warehouses being converted into worship spaces. But
as Japanese Catholic bishops themselves admit, living with people from
a different race, culture or religion can be threatening to many Japanese
.
ly
people. There is an insider–outsider dynamic in Japan that, while not yet
on
devolving into persecutions similar to those in the country’s isolationist
and even xenophobic past, has resulted in micro-aggression and dis-
se
crimination. The Catholic Church in Cambodia is blessed with Vietnamese
lu
immigrants who either have established families there already or are just
na
settling down, but many Cambodians do not consider them a blessing.
so
In Malaysia, most Christians are members of indigenous tribes, or are of
Indian or Chinese descent. These Christians endure a double marginalisa-
er
tion, stemming from their religion and their race. For politicians looking
rp
for a rallying point to garner support, it is easy to drum this up into an
Fo
insidious narrative of us versus them. Beyond ethnicity and faith, can
e.
there be other ways of conceiving nationhood?

l
sa
‘Hideous Man Becomes a Father’

re
In December 2013, after almost six years of construction and at a cost of

or
some ¥20–30 million (US$3–5 million), local Christians in Yongjia County

n
near Wenzhou, China, finally saw the fruit of their pooled resources with
tio
the completion of Sanjiang Church. Just four months later, on 28 April

bu
2014, despite thousands of Chinese Christians camping out to protect

tri
the 2,000-seat church, it was demolished by the government. It stood on

is
100,000 square feet of land, when approval had been given for only 20,000.
rd
But skirting around regulations is not uncommon in Zhejiang Province.

fo
The authorities claimed that the building was structurally unsound, but
they had also earlier cited it as a model project. Local faithful allege it
ot
was toppled because a Communist Party official objected to the number

N
of crosses going up in that area. While there are definitely political

motives behind the tearing down of Sanjiang Church, it is worth noting
that a pretext used for the demolition was a complaint by local practition-
ers of Chinese geomancy that the building disrupted the area’s feng shui
(referring to the balance of chi or energy).
Chinese Christians, including those in the Philippines, Singapore and
other Southeast Asian countries, would not find this objection too strange
to understand. After all, though some of them have MBAs, though they
are able to crunch the numbers needed to run financial projections and
though they know how to assess the stock market using advanced metrics,
they are still afraid to invest during August, the Hungry Ghost Month.
Feng shui governs on what date and at what time a deceased loved one
should be buried and when the next wedding can be auspiciously cele
brated. When many Chinese Christians choose the officiants who will
solemnise their marriages, they avoid pastors who were born in the year
of the tiger.
Quiapo Church in the Philippines attracts millions of devotees of the
.
ly
Black Nazarene. With the image, they march barefoot on hot Manila roads
on
for 6.5 kilometres every year on 9 January. But every day, right outside
the basilica, anting-anting (native amulets and talismans) are sold that
se
are supposed to grant success in business, love and other areas of life. To
lu
guarantee their effectiveness, these magical artefacts must be charged with
na
prayers on Good Friday.
so
As a priest, I have been invited to bless construction sites and newly
built houses with holy water, but I am not surprised when the owners tell
er
me that they had slaughtered chickens and sprinkled their blood before
rp
I came. As a hospital chaplain, I have also been called by doctors, nurses
Fo
and medical technicians to light candles in wards, rooms and laboratories
e.
to dispel the strange feelings these scientifically trained personnel have

l
experienced in them.
sa
The disenchanted world described by Charles Taylor in A Secular Age,

re
where the environment is evacuated of spirits, ghosts and demons, is still

or
far from being the reality in East and Southeast Asia. Here, it is not just the
n
human mind that imbues meaning. Meaning and power are inherent in
tio
the world, and things that we cannot see are at work.

bu
The still-palpable magic in the Asian world can be advantageous to

tri
Christianity. It brings Christians closer to the experience of the Bible, with

is
its legion of demonic possessions. In Laos, ethnic minorities are able to

rd
find liberation from the animistic fear of evil spirits in the power of Jesus
fo
Christ. Our belief in spirits can also open us up to the mighty workings
of the Holy Spirit and a more vibrant pneumatology. The surging growth
ot
of Pentecostalism in East and Southeast Asia may be partly attributed to

N
practices that highlight the activity of the Spirit.

But our belief in spirits might also stoke the accusation that East and
Southeast Asian Christians are nothing but syncretists. If the accuser is
kinder and wants to be more politically correct, we can be more gently
criticised for our multiple religious belonging. This can be one explanation
for how in Japan the reported membership of religious groups is larger
than the total population. Respondents must be self-identifying with more
than one religion. Syncretism and the phenomenon of multiple religious
belonging assume the definition of religion as a clearly articulated system

of dogma, ethical norms and liturgical rubrics embraced by a defined and
delineated community. But this is far from the Asian experience. As a com-
bination of historians and philosophers have pointed out, in Asia we do not
really have a pre-modern word for religion. In the Tagalog language, we
settled on the loanword relihiyon, which was how we heard the Castilians
say religión. Zōngjiào, a compound consisting of zōng, derived from a
pictogram of an ancestral altar, and jiào, meaning ‘teaching’, appeared in
the Chinese lexicon only in the late nineteenth century.
.
ly
The European experience has promoted a division between the secular
on
and the sacred, but the Asian experience has proved that boundaries
between the realm of social life – which includes worldview, ethos and
se
ethics – and the realms of politics and economics are porous. The teachings
lu
of the Buddha presupposed social and political transformation, not just
na
individual enlightenment and psychological satisfaction. Muhammad saw
so
Islam not just in the narrow definition of religion but in the larger context
of nation. Western categories have been used to try to understand Asian
er
realties, and they have been found wanting.
rp
The history of Christianity in East and Southeast Asia must always
Fo
include a discussion of the Rites Controversy, which was not only a
e.
clanging cymbal in China but also resounding gongs in Taiwan (with

l
Shinto rites during the Japanese occupation) and in rural villages in

sa
Thailand, where Christians and Muslims are expected to wai (show

re
reverence) to the Buddha. The easy solution to these controversies is to

or
make a distinction between civil rites and religious rites. But can we easily
n
separate the civil and the religious? When politicians in the Philippines
tio
visit the worship gatherings of the Iglesia ni Kristo or the Jesus Is Lord
bu
Church to ask for the leaders’ endorsement and blessing, when the flocks
tri
pray over these politicians and vote as blocs, are we in the realm of the
is
civil or the religious? It has been proclaimed many times that to be Thai is
rd
to be Buddhist. If this is so, then there can be no Thai Christians – unless

fo
we change our ways of distinguishing religion and culture, and, as we saw

in the previous section, church and state.
ot
It has been observed that Christianity has had difficulty securing a

N
foothold where world religions are already planted. But is this just about
religious beliefs, or is it also about culture, a way of seeing, hearing,
smelling, tasting and feeling things? Is this not also about having a
strong leadership that pushes for the continuation of the status quo?
Religion and culture, church and state, the spirit world and the secular,
faith and economics and politics are not easily separable spheres. After
their conversion, new Evangelicals are told to break radically from their
previous beliefs and past lives. Might this imposed hard boundary be a
contributing factor to why Evangelicalism is growing only modestly in

East and Southeast Asia?
Once, Chuang Tzu dreamt he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting and fluttering
around, happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He didn’t know he was
Chuang Tzu. Suddenly he woke up and there he was, solid and unmistakable
Chuang Tzu. But he didn’t know if he was Chuang Tzu who had dreamt he
was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was Chuang Tzu. Between Chuang
Tzu and a butterfly there must be some distinction!
.
ly
Can the key to this conundrum be in transcending distinctions? This is one
on
of the central ideas of Taoism and the key also to Chuang Tzu’s parable
of the hideous man. From the first line, we learn that the hideous man
se
has already accepted being the father of the child, whether it is his or
lu
not. The question that remains is, will he be a happy father? As long as
na
he sees himself as hideous, he will be miserable and will only make his
so
son miserable, whatever the son looks like. The father must transcend the
distinction of beauty and ugliness and relish the gift of being a father and
er
having a child. Can Asian Christianity learn from Chuang Tzu?
rp
A challenge that Christianity has faced in Timor-Leste is how to deal
Fo
with practices involving lulik. One manifestation of the lulik culture is
e.
the storing in sacred houses of objects that are charged with power.
l
These objects can be heirlooms passed down from ancestors or symbolic

sa
artefacts that link the Timorese to their origins and their past. Foreigners –
re
and anything foreign – are prohibited from entering these sacred houses
or
lest death come to the family who cares for the sacred house. Catholic
n
missionaries once engaged in the iconoclastic practice of burning these

tio
sacred houses but are now more open to this ancestral custom. But long
bu
before Catholic thought became open to lulik, Timorese people opened

tri
their sacred houses to statues of Saint Anthony and other Catholic images.
is
The Timorese faithful had transcended the distinction between foreign

rd
and local before their pastors.

fo
Taoists might disagree, but I side with philosophers who have studied
Taoism and opine that it is impossible to live totally without distinctions
ot
or categories. This is why I emphasise that the key is in transcending dis-

N
tinctions and categories, not eliminating them. I think that when Chuang
Tzu tells us to forget distinctions, he is telling us first and foremost not to
be fixated on them. After all, distinctions are never fixed. Distinctions can
be helpful for analysis, but after the unravelling and the dissection, there
must be a synthesis or a putting together again – and not always in the
same way.
There is a need to go beyond distinctions and categories, but distinc-
tions and categories need also to be made so they can make our thoughts
clearer. When we have enough light then we can, as Chuang Tzu chal-
lenges us, ‘leap into the boundless’. Distinctions of ethnicity and categories
of civil and religious, of state and church, of the realms of politics and
economics and the world of the spirit can help us think, but in everyday
life these all blend and flow as one. To transcend distinctions and catego-
ries is to imagine new ways of conceiving them and then living in them.
Kintsugi (金継ぎ; literally, gold joining technique; or more poetically,
golden joinery) is the Japanese art of piecing together broken pottery
using, as an adhesive agent, lacquer mixed with gold, silver or platinum.
.
ly
The repaired vessel is then considered more valuable than the original, as
on
it has become unique, and the seams strengthened with precious metals
create patterns that add to its aesthetic appeal. Some Japanese people even
se
break expensive bowls and dishes intentionally so that they can be beauti-
lu
fied through kintsugi. Similarly, we now break existing distinctions and
na
categories – vessels of our thoughts and understanding. We break them by
so
questioning their validity, and then we challenge the reader to put these
distinctions and categories back together again, hopefully in a way that
er
sheds more light on our reality.
rp
Fo
Minority
e.
Christians are viewed as a minority in East and Southeast Asia. While

l
percentages of the total population will bear this out for many years in the
sa
future, it might now be time to start nuancing this statement. Since 1970,
re
Christianity has been the fastest-growing religion in the region, and until
or
2050 it is expected to grow faster than any other religious group. By 2030,
n
it is projected that, in terms of absolute numbers, China might have more

tio
churchgoers than the USA. The idea of the white missionary is also being
bu
challenged by South Korea, which is now second only to the USA in the
tri
number of missionaries it sends abroad. Filipino migrant workers can also

is
be counted as informal missionaries, bringing their faith to other parts of

rd
Asia and the Middle East by their life witness and recharging the churches
fo
in Europe and the USA with their lively worship.

Can we really say that Christians are a minority if we factor in the impact
ot
Christian institutions have had in East and Southeast Asian countries?

N
In Vietnam, for example, many people have acknowledged that the best
schools are those run by the Saint Jean-Baptiste de La Salle Brothers and
other Christians. Catholic groups also run hospitals, leprosaria and other
social service centres that are open to people of all faiths. Christian NGOs
serve Christians and non-Christians, locals and migrants, in Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Cambodia, Myanmar, Japan, Korea and many other places.
Christian schools with a tradition of excellence have contributed to nation-
building by providing the basic instruction and advanced scholarship that
a number of governments have not been able to achieve. These schools

have also produced outstanding graduates who are not just competent in
their fields but also compassionate and passionate about serving others.
As young countries slowly entered modernisation, as newly established
governments groped their way towards legitimacy, Christian institutions
were there to help set solid foundations. In Mongolia, for example, where
Christian communities began only in 1991, shortly after the end of the
communist regime, Christianity has affected significant portions of the
population through ministries in the areas of health, education, family
.
ly
life, children’s welfare, care for the disabled and the dying, outreach to the
on
poor and the imprisoned, support for alcoholics and drug addicts, small
business and agriculture, mass communication and even the arts. And
se
Christians make up only around 2% of the Mongolian population! Institu-
lu
tions like these, though, have also prompted many Asians to ask whether
na
Christianity is nothing more than social service and education.
so
Inter-religious conversations with Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia
have revealed that the rise of Muslim fundamentalism among ordinary
er
people is fed by Muslims feeling threatened by Christians. But Indonesia
rp
is the most populous Muslim country in the world, with Muslims
Fo
numbering more than 200 million and Christians only around 20 million.
e.
How could a minority be perceived as threatening? What ordinary

l
Muslims pick up from media – traditional and, increasingly, social – is

sa
the cultural, political and economic domination of the West, identified

re
as mostly Christian. This not only challenges seeing Christianity as a

or
minority but also underlines how boundaries between religion, culture,

n
politics and economics are blurred.

tio
bu
Community
tri
East and Southeast Asian Christians are seen as more communal than indi-
is
vidual. The theory that this comes from our rice culture has been proposed.
rd
No one person or even family can plant, cultivate and harvest rice: it takes
fo
a village. But what happens to our community orientation as we move

from rural to urban centres and as agriculture becomes industrialised?
ot
One insight comes from the experience of helping edit this volume: our
N
contributors know much about their own traditions but are challenged
when asked about other Christian groups. If we are communal, why is
the value of community not expressed more in ecumenism? Formally,
in the state documents of countries like China, Vietnam and Indonesia,
Catholicism and Protestantism are seen as different religions. Infor-
mally, in people’s eyes, this is also the case. In South Korea, the Gidokgyo
(Protestant Christians) do not treat the Chonjugyo or the Gatolic (Catholic
Christians) as their brothers and sisters in the faith. There are some
exceptions and pockets of hope, as in Christianity in Brunei, but, overall,

there seems to be more competition than cooperation among different
Christian groups. In some instances we might actually be doing better at
relating with Buddhists and Muslims than with other followers of Christ.
In the Philippines, two different Independent groups have set up rival
television stations. A significant portion of the programming on each is
devoted to criticising the other. Disgruntled members of one group are
often featured on the opposing channel as whistleblowers. There is
televised worship music, but there is also much airing of dirty laundry.
.
ly
Pentecostals and Charismatics have touched more than 40% of the region’s
on
population, and this has pushed other groups onto the defensive. They
put down these movements as attracting only the naïve and the gullible.
se
Some Pentecostals and Charismatics then go on the offensive by proclaim-
lu
ing how they are enlivened by the Spirit while the other groups are just
na
dry bones in the desert.
so
We can critique each other more kindly, and our differences can help
us open our eyes to more ways of encountering God. Ecumenism can lead
er
us to healthy self-reflection, but though our leaders always tout it, those
rp
on the ground have not given it much of a chance. Two areas often seen
Fo
as needing more resources are the education and formation of leaders.
e.
While we do have different traditions, we have not exerted enough effort

l
to explore ways for our seminaries, Bible schools and theological institutes
sa
to collaborate.
re
Even when we are communal, our communities do not really cross

or
national boundaries. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

n
(ASEAN) has been criticised for not doing more to correct Myanmar, one
tio
of its member countries, with regard to the 2017 Rohingya crisis that is still
bu
burning. Non-interference might be the ASEAN way, but in 1999 Aung San
tri
Suu Kyi herself decried this policy as being just an excuse for not helping.
is
When Christians in East and Southeast Asia think about building ties
rd
with others, it is most of the time from the point of view of what we can
fo
do for others. But others have also done much for us. In January 2019,
shortly after terrorists bombed Our Lady of Mount Carmel Cathedral in
ot
Muslim-populated Sulu Province in the southern Philippines, Muslim

N
professionals formed a human barricade around Santa Isabel Cathedral

in Basilan, the largest island in Sulu. They said they did this so that
their Christian brothers and sisters could worship in less fear. Similarly,
moderate Muslims from Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, the two
largest socio-religious organisations in Indonesia, guard their Christian
neighbours from attacks by militant groups. They support Christians in
their celebration of Christmas and allow them to join in the festivities of
the Great Ramadan. These are a few examples of ‘neighbourology’, which
Kosuke Koyama, the Japanese Protestant missionary in Thailand who is

also known for his ‘water buffalo theology’, explains simply as stepping
into the lives of our neighbours. In China, not only Christians but also
Xinjiang Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists are harassed. Can the common
experience of persecution also make our neighbourology stronger?
Connected with neighbourology is inter-religious dialogue. It is almost
a slogan that to be religious in Asia is to be inter-religious. Moreover, there
is not just one Christianity, not just one Islam, not just one Buddhism, but
many Christianities, many Islams, many Buddhisms, and so on. Catholi-
.
ly
cism is highly centralised, with a clear hierarchy, but the other religious
on
groups are not as clearly defined. Which Protestantism, which Islam and
which Buddhism are we talking about? And who will assign their repre-
se
sentatives? Is it, then, really a dialogue between religions or a dialogue
lu
between believers that we should be aiming for? And what will the goal
na
of this dialogue be? Some strains of East and Southeast Asian Christi
so
anity still look to convert others to accept Christ; some Christians seek, in
the ensuing dialogue, only to convert themselves to Jesus more. Is there
er
another way of building community with other religions beyond the ex-
rp
clusivist, inclusivist and pluralist paradigms we now have?
Fo
e.
Rationality
l
The West is usually characterised as being more inclined towards rational-

sa
ity than the East. This does not mean that we Asians are irrational, but
re
we do pay more attention to extra-rational sources of knowledge and

or
wisdom, sources that go beyond mathematical logic but are still full of
n
reason. Lü Xiaomin’s formal education might have gone only as far as

tio
elementary school, but her more than 1,600 religious songs about pain and
bu
suffering are theology. They touch on themes of Pentecostal Christology,

tri
pneumatology and eschatology without ignoring present Chinese political

is
reality. East and Southeast Asian theology also draws from paintings
rd
and other art forms, as this introduction will also venture to do below.
fo
Alongside the inspired words of the Bible, we have the wisdom of the
sages – and so this introduction has turned to Chuang Tzu for inspiration.
ot
East and Southeast Asian Christianity is inter-scriptural.

N
Another extra-rational source is our bodies. Pentecostal and Charis-

matic worship is quite physical, with raising of hands, speaking in tongues
and being slain in the Spirit. Catholic sacraments, too, engage the body:
visits to churches are not really complete without dipping your fingers in
holy water and touching the feet of the statues of the saints. Cambodian
Christians kneel in worship with hands above their heads. Japanese
Catholics, on the other hand, rarely genuflect but execute a profound bow.
If given a choice, they would receive Communion by the hand rather than
stick out their tongue to the priest. These are not just practices that have
been ‘socialised’ into us; our bodies are actually expressing something
deep within.
It is tempting to fall into dichotomising between the Western predilec-
tion for clear and distinct ideas and Eastern ambiguity and fluidity, but
humans are never static. Intellectual Christian humanism is on the rise
in China as the urban intelligentsia explore faith. Modernisation and
globalisation in Singapore have introduced Christians to the beauty of
logic and systematisation in faith. Now, they are attracted to how religion
.
ly
‘makes sense’. Some might argue that Singapore has become too Western,
on
but can we say that this is now also part of their way of being Asian?
se
Poverty
lu
East Asia is home to the world’s second-largest economy: China, which
na
might overtake the USA by 2030. Japan remains the third-largest economy.
so
The tiger economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore,
and the tiger cubs that are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand
er
and Vietnam, are ready to pounce. But according to a 2018 World Bank
rp
report, 9% of the 783 million people globally who are considered extremely
Fo
poor are in Asia and the Pacific region. Less than 10% might not seem
e.
many, but this still means an estimated 70 million are living below the
l
poverty line of US$1.90 a day. Justifiably, the Federation of Asian Bishops’

sa
Conferences (FABC) emphasises dialogue with the poor.

re
There has already been great progress. Again, according to the World
or
Bank, from 1990 to 2015, the world’s poverty rate fell from almost 36%
n
to 10%, with all regions except the Middle East and North Africa gaining
tio
ground in the fight against poverty. Still, great inequality exists. ASEAN
bu
reports that in 2018, Thailand’s and Indonesia’s richest 1% controlled

tri
around half of their countries’ wealth.

is
A significant number of conversions to Christianity in East and

rd
Southeast Asia have come from the sector of the marginalised, like the
fo
ethnic peoples of Myanmar. In Singapore, members of mega-churches

tend to come from less-privileged, non-English-speaking families. But
ot
growth has also come from the affluent, the urban middle class, as well
N
as the working classes who have aspirations to climb the social ladder.
The growth of Christianity in China has been accompanied by Christians
improving their economic status. But the dialogue with poverty must
include reflection on wealth and its purpose.
The message of prosperity theology has attracted many. In the Philip
pines, followers of Mike Velarde’s Catholic Charismatic group El Shaddai
are told to open their umbrellas and hold them upside down to catch
blessings from God. A similar trend has been observed in Malaysia, Laos
and the house churches in China, where there seems to be a preoccupation

with blessings and miraculous healings. While the gospel of prayers
answered and favours granted has dangers, this is where people are. And
there are signs of maturing faith. Many devotees of the Black Nazarene join
the long and physically challenging procession every 9 January because of
petitions for themselves or for family. But when they do not receive what
they ask for, they turn to the image of Jesus bearing his cross and say, ‘We
are assured we are not alone in our suffering’.
.
ly
Youth
on
Despite the ageing populations and the negative growth rates of Japan and
Korea, despite also the slowing down of the birth rate in China, United
se
Nations figures show that the majority of the world’s youth live in the
lu
Asia Pacific region. In East Asia, 30% of the population is in the 0–24-year
na
age bracket; in Southeast Asia, 44.2%.
so
Any projection of the growth of Christianity has to take into account
the youth population. The great potential of Christian youth goes hand in
er
hand with the possibility of unpredictable change. Are our young people
rp
getting sufficiently formed to have the torch of faith passed on to them?
Fo
It is still the family that is most formative for Asians, but what happens
e.
now that the traditional family setup has been challenged by migration
l
and other factors? We want to give the young the best opportunities for
sa
economic development, but greater wealth has also been shown to lead to
re
greater individualism. Where will the youth take us?

or
In China, Catholic youth attend the services of both the patriotic and
n
the underground churches. Convenience is the deciding factor for where

tio
they go to Mass. They say they are not affected by the baggage of their
bu
elders and that involvement in politics is only for a few. Is this a ray of
tri
hope for the unification of the patriotic and underground churches? Can
is
the wounds of division be healed by those who do not know the past? An
rd
enduring source of hope for unity comes from the old friendships formed
fo
before the separation of the churches. What happens when that generation
passes away?
ot
The youth value authenticity. Christianity has suffered from sex

N
scandals, association with politicians who have questionable ethics, lack

of financial transparency, and corruption. How will all of these affect the
youth, especially in South Korea, Macau and Taiwan, where it is already a
challenge to attract them?
In spite of this ominous picture, growth is still projected for Christianity.
Perhaps this is a sign that communist ideals and capitalist promises are
not really able to quench a deepening spiritual thirst. If the youth are not
as present in religious gatherings as before, maybe it is because religiosity
is really something for those who are older. Studies have shown that mil-
lennials have a different view of commitment. They sow many seeds, wait
for what bears the most fruit for them and only then invest themselves.
Maybe we just have to give them the space and time to explore.
Christianity still has much to learn with regard to women. Chinese aca
demics estimate that 72% of Christians in China are women, but this is
not reflected in the leadership positions given to them. The same is true
in other East and Southeast Asian countries. In Asia, also, more and more
women are joining the labour force, but expectations of what they are
.
ly
supposed to do at home – cook, clean, wash clothes and so on – are not
on
lessened. They are also given much of the menial work in churches. Will
young women be drawn to be active in religious activities? Will they have
se
time to form the next generation – another responsibility that more often
lu
than not we pass on to women?
na
so
These are but five examples of distinctions that can be confirmed or
challenged in this volume. We invite the reader to join in confirming or
er
challenging them. This, too, is part of nurturing the child we have chosen
rp
to parent. It is also worth noting that though we started talking about
Fo
definite categories, we always ended up going beyond them and touched
e.
on other themes – proof that categories are indeed porous and connected.
l
sa
‘The Middle of the Night’

re
What can unite East and Southeast Asia beyond the boundaries of
or
longitude and latitude? We are multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-

n
religious. Though its neighbours were colonised by either the British or

tio
the French, Thailand was never colonised. The Philippines was under
bu
Spain for 300 years and under the USA after that; Indonesia, under the
tri
Dutch; Malaysia, under the British. But it was Japan that colonised
is
Korea. Western Christianity was brought by the colonisers in the former

rd
countries, but Koreans brought Christianity to Korea. Our histories are as

fo
varied as the tonal and non-tonal languages that are spoken in the region.
Our theologies occupy the whole spectrum – from conservative pietism
ot
to fundamentalism to liberal strains that emphasise social action. We are

N
Independents, Catholics, Protestants, Pentecostals, Charismatics, Evan-

gelicals, Anglicans and Orthodox. We come to the faith because we seek
blessings and miracles, because of the personal witness of others, because
of family, because of a spiritual thirst or because of intellectual curiosity.
In terms of mission, we have groups centred on strengthening hierarchy
and internal organisation, and we have groups who are ready to branch
out, plant churches and evangelise even outside their countries. We have
churches that work with their governments and churches that have gone
underground. Religious freedom is challenged in communist China, Laos,

North Korea and Vietnam and in the authoritarian states of Cambodia
and Myanmar. In the Muslim-majority countries of Brunei, Indonesia
and Malaysia, Christianity faces difficulties. But in Japan, Mongolia, the
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Timor-Leste, a greater
degree of freedom is accorded to us. China is the most populous country
in the world, while Brunei has fewer than half a million people in an area
of 5,765 square kilometres. But Brunei has been ranked as high as fourth
in the world by gross domestic product per capita at purchasing power
.
ly
parity. Singapore hosts the highest percentage of millionaires in the world;
on
the portrayal of ‘crazy rich Asians’ in the groundbreaking Hollywood film
of that title (2018) is not really hyperbole. But in Myanmar, unemployment
se
rates hover around 30%, and in Timor-Leste half the population lives
lu
below the poverty line.
na
If the contributors to and editors of this volume were gathered in one
so
room, would we be able to agree about East and Southeast Asia? Trying
to characterise this region at times seemed like working in the dark.
er
Categories that worked for other regions in this series did not really fit us.
rp
And it is not just the famous Asian false modesty that makes me say the
Fo
portrait that we have painted here is still far from complete. After all, who
e.
can really say what is Asian and what is Christian? Cultures are always
l
fluid and changing. The Asians the colonisers met in the sixteenth century
sa
are not the Asians of today.

re
To say this has repercussions for how we see the work of inculturation.
or
If no one fully knows what is Asian and what is Christian, how can we
n
translate between the two? Perhaps all we can say is that we are trying to
tio
pass on only what we understand of Asia and Christianity today while

bu
humbly admitting that Asia and Christianity can be something more

tri
tomorrow. Perhaps, then, the work of inculturation starts with striving

is
to answer these two key questions: Who are Asians today? Who are
rd
Christians today? These are the questions we have tried to answer in the
fo
next pages – not just for us, but for other Christians and for other peoples
from other regions too. Our hope is that in our wrestling with who we
ot
are, in our trembling in the dark, in our acceptance of how we have made
N
something foreign our own, in our confirming and challenging distinc-

tions, and in our putting it all back together, lamps will be lit and readers
will have a better understanding not only of us but of themselves.
We began our introduction with Chuang Tzu’s parable of the first look
between a disfigured parent and child. We end our introduction with the
story of another first look – the first gaze strange men cast on the newborn
baby Jesus as depicted in Adoration of the Magi, He Qi’s artwork featured
on the cover of this volume. In this painting, Jesus is rightfully one of the
foci. The donkey’s and the horse’s eyes are directed towards the infant
Saviour. Mary’s eyes are closed as she holds her child. She does not need
to see Jesus’s face. Whatever he looks like, he is her son. Fast forward this
scene 33 years and pause to consider Michelangelo’s Pietà. Mary is still
cradling Jesus. Her eyes are still closed. Whatever has happened, however
he looks, he is still her son.
Returning to He Qi, two of the magi are facing Jesus, but, curiously,
the third – the one dressed in a Chinese chángshān (literally, long
shirt) – is looking straight at the viewer of the painting, as Jesus also does.
.
ly
In Chuang Tzu’s parable, the emphasis is on the look the parent gives the
on
child. Nothing is said about the child looking at the parent. In He Qi’s
art, the baby Jesus looks back at those beholding him. I interpret this as a
se
challenge for the reader of this volume. After finishing all the essays, con-
lu
template the painting on the front cover. How do you now see East and
na
Southeast Asian Christianity? Whether or not you are Asian, has anything
so
changed about how you view Asia? Whether or not you are Christian,
has anything changed about how you view Christianity? The Roman
er
dramatist Terence once wrote, ‘Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto’
rp
(‘I am human, and nothing human is alien to me’). After reading about
Fo
East and Southeast Asian Christianity, has anything been touched in your
e.
own humanity?
l
One focus of the painting is Jesus; the other is the blue and white vase
sa
He Qi places in the centre of his artwork. Judging by its colours, one can
re
say the vase was fired in a Chinese kiln. The crane on it can be a symbol
or
of nobility – the perfect gift for a child of the Divine. Taking this blue and
n
white vase in the context of this book, one can see it as a metaphor for the
tio
gift of East and Southeast Asian Christianity.

bu
To see that East and Southeast Asian Christianity is indeed a gift, four
tri
hermeneutics are crucial. First, a hermeneutic of openness: our Christi

is
anity might be Western in influence, but it is no longer foreign to us. It

rd
might still look Western in some areas, but it is already our own child.
fo
And where it looks non-Western, it still is Christian. Acceptance of our

Christianity, though, does not mean that it cannot be critiqued. There is
ot
still much we can learn, and we have plenty of room to grow. For example,
N
the 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste, which continued to rumble even in 2008,

saw violence gripping the young Catholic nation. Rampaging mobs
burned houses – but only after ‘evacuating’ statues of saints and images of
the Virgin Mary from the homes. Our popular religiosity still needs to be
wedded to our ethical practice.
This and similar critiques can lead us to the second hermeneutic, of
constant questioning and healthy doubt. Are we still who we say we are,
or have we changed? Are the categories and distinctions we and others
have used to characterise us still valid? The first hermeneutic needs to be

balanced by the second.
Reflection on the second can open us up to the third – the hermeneutic
of distance. Is there anyone who has grasped what ‘Asian’ really means
and what ‘Christian’ really means? No one person, and no one culture
even, possesses the final definition of what is Asian and what is Christian.
It is not already written somewhere and just waiting to be applied. What
is Asian and what is Christian are still being both constructed and discov-
ered. Quite a distance still must be travelled, but we are on the way.
.
ly
What is Asian and what is Christian will always be a few steps ahead of
on
us. But we are not aimlessly wandering. We are going deeper. The fourth
hermeneutic, of depth, can give us hope. Our running after what is Asian
se
and what is Christian is not a futile pursuit. Though it does not come
lu
easily, we are growing in understanding.
na
As the magi gift Jesus with the blue and white vase that can stand
so
for Asia, Jesus also has a gift, though it is not for the magi but for the
viewer of the painting: an apple. Is this apple supposed to remind us of
er
the fruit in Genesis that led to our sin, which Jesus now takes away? Or
rp
is it something else? In feng shui, a red apple symbolises peace, because
Fo
in Mandarin the word for apple (苹果, píngguǒ) sounds like the word for
e.
peace (平安, píng’ān). The apple Jesus gives to us, in my interpretation, is a

l
wish and another set of challenges for the reader: may you come to peace
sa
with the East and Southeast Asian Christianity you find. Amid many dis
re
agreements, persecution, violence stemming from fundamentalism, amid

or
great difference, there can still be peace. Find the peace in openness and
n
acceptance. Find the peace by questioning and doubting. Find the peace
tio
even if there is distance. The waters might seem turbulent on the surface,
bu
but find the peace by going deeper.

tri
is
Bibliography
rd
Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences (FABC) Papers available online at <http://www.

fabc.org/fabc%20papers>; indexes by James H. Kroeger mm (see FABC Papers 100, 125
fo
and 150).
ot
Frankopan, Peter, The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World (London: Blooms-
N
bury, 2018).
Hayes, Peter, and Chung-In Moon (eds), The Future of East Asia (London: Palgrave Mac
millan, 2017).
Phan, Peter, Asian Christianities: History, Theology and Practice (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,
2018).
Wilfred, Felix (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Christianity in Asia (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014).
N
ot
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rd
is
Countries
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tio
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re
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l e.
Fo
rp
er
so
na
lu
se
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ly
.
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.
Mainland China (Protestant)
Manhong Melissa Lin
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, Protestant missionaries of
.
ly
different denominations came to mainland China one after another. Based
on
on their efforts in areas ranging from evangelism to education, medicine
and translation work, they can be viewed as bearers of the gospel of Jesus
se
Christ and contributors to modern China’s development. Nevertheless,
lu
due to their relation to imperialist and colonial powers and their failure to
na
root Christianity in Chinese culture and society, Christianity was regarded
so
as a tool used for aggression and cultural invasion and was largely resisted
er
by common Chinese people.
rp
As a result, building a Chinese Christian church became imperative.
The idea was first officially brought to the table by Chinese church leaders
Fo
at the National Christian Conference in 1922. The method proposed was
e.
the Three-Self Movement – self-governing (rather than being governed by

l
missionary societies or personnel), self-supporting (rather than relying on

sa
foreign resources) and self-propagating (rather than being a dot on mis-

re
sionary maps). In the following decades, however, China was caught up

or
in battles among warlords, the war of resistance against Japan and the
n
war of liberation, and Chinese people, including Christians, struggled

tio
for survival in the subsequent disasters. Thus, the course of promoting a

bu
Chinese church through the Three-Self Movement did not proceed much
tri
further in that period.

is
Because of the needs of the church and the political climate, the task of
rd
building a Chinese Protestant church through the Three-Self Movement

fo
was again placed on the agenda of the Chinese Christian leadership after
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. In 1950,
ot
N
‘The Christian Manifesto’, a key document advocating for the Three-Self

Movement and signed by 1,527 church leaders, was released; by 1954 it
was actively supported by more than 400,000 Christians. The Committee
of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) was officially established in
1954 to safeguard the achievements of the churches in China, including
eliminating the control of administration, finance and personnel by
Western mission boards, uniting the majority of church leaders from all
denominations and theological backgrounds to build up an independent
church, and responding to the national mandate for anti-imperialism,
40 Manhong Melissa Lin
patriotism and the construction of a new China. From then on, the Prot-
estant church in China was no longer a branch or sub-branch of Western
churches but gained its sovereignty on an equal footing with other
churches in the world.
In 1958, almost all congregations belonging to the more than 70 Prot-
estant denominations and over 120 missionary societies present in China
started to hold joint worship and became a post-denominational church
based upon the spirit of mutual respect and seeking common ground while
preserving the differences. Unfortunately, due to political movements
.
ly
that came one after another and to the influence of ultra-leftism, religion
on
came to be considered a negative social element, even to the point of being
attacked and nearly exterminated. Therefore, the process of building a
se
post-denominational Chinese church did not go any further at that time.
lu
In the four decades since the reform and opening up of China in 1979,
na
however, the Chinese Protestant church has progressed in all areas. Not
so
only have the churches made exciting progress, but the whole nation
has also developed tremendously. Two among many significant changes
er
will be briefly highlighted here. Beginning from the early 1980s, steady
economic growth in China has enabled Chinese people to experience the rp
Fo
transformation to a better life through the alleviation of poverty. In 1978,
e.
the gross domestic product per capita of China was US$156; by 2017 it had
l
grown to US$8,583. Over the same period, the Engel’s coefficient – the pro-
sa
portion of income spent on food purchases – of rural households dropped

re
from 67.7% in 1978 to 33% in 2017, and that of city households dropped
or
from 57.8% in 1978 to 29.3% in 2017. The consistent policy of reform

n
and opening up has not only led to an improved standard of living but
tio
also granted much greater freedom for Chinese people. Such freedom is
bu
reflected in the change of attitude and the tolerance of the Chinese govern
tri
ment towards religion.

is
rd
Christianity in China, 1970 and 2020

fo
1970 2020 Average annual growth

ot
Tradition Population % Population % rate (%), 1970–2020

N
Christians 876,000 0.1% 106,030,000 7.4% 10.1%

Anglicans 100 0.0% 950 0.0% 4.6%
Independents 183,000 0.0% 62,000,000 4.4% 12.4%
Orthodox 5,000 0.0% 10,000 0.0% 1.4%
Protestants 254,000 0.0% 33,999,000 2.4% 10.3%
Catholics 400,000 0.0% 10,000,000 0.7% 6.6%
Evangelicals 59,300 0.0% 35,000,000 2.5% 13.6%
Pentecostal/Charismatics 93,400 0.0% 28,000,000 2.0% 12.1%
Total population 824,788,000 100.0% 1,424,548,000 100.0% 1.1%
Source: Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo (eds), World Christian Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill), accessed March 2018.
In 1982, the Communist Party of China issued its landmark Document

19, The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question During Our
Country’s Socialist Period, which acknowledged that it is impossible to
use political orders or coercive measures to eliminate religion and which
ensured that the freedom of religious belief would be a fundamental and
long-term policy. Document 19 expressed the desire of the Party to unite
believers and non-believers and to enable them to centre all their will and
strength on the common goal of building a modernised and strong socialist
state. Since then, religion has gradually been regarded as encompassing
.
ly
social, historical and cultural phenomena and as deserving a place in the
on
development of human society. Religious believers have come to enjoy the
same political, economic, social and cultural rights as non-believers, for
se
they have been deemed a part of the common Chinese people and must
lu
not be treated unequally due to a difference in belief. Religious believers
na
are also encouraged to play a positive role in the reform and opening up,
so
in the construction of a harmonious society and in the realisation of the
Chinese dream of national rejuvenation.
er
Major Features and Church Ministries rp
Fo
Benefiting from the friendly environment and the church’s own sense
e.
of spiritual empowerment, the Protestant church in mainland China has

l
grown rapidly. If the TSPM was established in 1954 to unite all Chinese
sa
Christians to work for the complete independence of the Chinese church

re
and to take an active part in socialist reconstruction, the China Christian

or
Council (CCC) was formed in 1980 at the Third National Christian Confer-
n
ence to run the church well by attending to the pastoral needs of Chinese
tio
Christians, including: to print the Bible, hymnals and Christian literature;

bu
to reopen the seminary; to strengthen the pastoral work of local Christian

tri
communities; and to do the work of evangelism. Following the model of

is
the CCC and national TSPM, Christian councils at the provincial and local
rd
levels were launched during provincial or local Christian conferences, and

fo
local TSPMs were either re-established or established at the same time.

They are called the Christian lianghui (two organisations) in Chinese.
ot
Nowadays, both parts of the Christian lianghui at all levels aim to run
N
the church well based upon the Three-Self principle as stated in their
constitutions, but with a division of labour. Generally speaking, the TSPM
deals more with the church’s relationship to public affairs, while the CCC
has its focus more on internal church affairs. Though each organisation
has its own constitution, leadership and standing committee, the lianghui
always work together, sharing the same office and jointly holding their
assembly every five years to elect new leadership. The leadership of the
lianghui usually serves no more than two consecutive terms.
Each local and provincial lianghui is independent in administration

and finance, while the CCC and national TSPM also serve as the umbrella
organisations for the provincial lianghui, providing guidance and various
services to them; the provincial lianghui play the same role for the local
lianghui. The CCC and national TSPM represent Protestantism in mainland
China, while the provincial and local lianghui represent Protestantism in
their respective provinces, cities or counties. The Christian lianghui can be
seen as a typical church structure in mainland China.
Different kinds of ministry are carried out by the lianghui at different
.
ly
levels. Bible publication is under the CCC and national TSPM. By 2017,
on
more than 80 million copies of the Bible in Mandarin, 11 ethnic minority
languages and Braille had been printed and distributed for churches in
se
mainland China. Ordination is conducted by the provincial lianghui;
lu
theological schools are run by the national or provincial lianghui. The rest
na
of the church ministries, including Christian publications, lay leadership
so
training, social service and ecumenical fellowship, are carried out by the
lianghui at all levels and even by local congregations.
er
Pastoral work is taken care of by the local churches. The more than
rp
60,000 churches and affiliated congregations are led by around 4,000
Fo
ordained pastors, 6,000 full-time elders, 50,000 evangelists (some of
e.
whom are theologically trained but not yet ordained) and over 190,000
l
lay leaders. Churches in urban areas usually have full-time pastors, while
sa
in rural areas many congregations are led by elders, evangelists or lay

re
leaders. Many congregations have multiple services on both Sunday and

or
Saturday to ensure that every church member has a place to worship, but
n
still the churches are usually full for each service. Church life is active and
tio
lively. Bible study, testimony sharing, prayer meetings, choir rehearsals,

bu
fellowships for various age groups and professions, and other church
tri
activities are offered throughout the week. Baptism is usually conducted

is
twice a year, at Easter and Christmas, and may take the form of sprinkling
rd
or immersion. Most churches have Holy Communion once a month, while

fo
a small number of congregations hold it once a week or once every quarter.

Different practices of baptism and forms of celebrating Holy
ot
Communion exist due to the post-denominational feature of the Chinese

N
church. The unity, holiness, catholicity and apostolicity of the post-

denominational church are understood to be derived from the authority
of the Bible, the proper preaching of the Word and the apt administra-
tion of the sacraments. This unity is more radical than that in reconciled
diversity because the church has abolished denominational organisations.
Nevertheless, it is not coercive but tolerates differences, partly owing to
the influence of the traditional Chinese cultural value of ‘Great Harmony’.
The churches still exhibit some of their previous denominational elements,
reflected in liturgy, worship style, spirituality, sacraments and architecture.

Local churches are rather independent, and the pastors, elders, evangelists
and leading lay workers join in decision-making. Some congregations
have more autonomy in church operation and personnel allocation, while
others are more under the leadership of the local lianghui.
Despite all the differences, a significant commonality in the Chinese
church is that it is a church of the Word and proclamation. Chinese Chris-
tians treasure the Bible and respect it as the true authority for their life and
faith. Almost every Christian carries the Bible– at least a digital Bible on
.
ly
their mobile phones, if not a print copy – to the Sunday worship services
on
and other weekly church activities. In interpreting the Bible and applying
biblical teachings to their actual lives, they focus more on the ‘hermeneu-
se
tics of faith’ rather than the ‘hermeneutics of doubt’.
lu
Christians are constantly reminded that conversion is a transformation
na
in all aspects of life. To follow Jesus is to demonstrate good works that
so
bear fruit so as to glorify God’s name. Such important teaching contributes
significantly to the growth of the church. This growth relies not on door-
er
to-door evangelism or popular evangelists conducting massive outdoor
rp
revival meetings, but on the personal witness of each individual Christian.
Fo
In 1949, the number of Protestant Christians was around 700,000; it had
e.
reached 3 million by the early 1980s and 38 million in 2017. In the early
l
1980s, 80% of Christians lived in rural areas, but with urbanisation that
sa
percentage has now been reduced to 50%. The average age of Christians
re
is 51, and women make up around 72%, according to a recent survey

or
conducted by Chinese academics.

n
While most rejoiced in the reopening of the churches, a small number

tio
of Chinese Christians continued worshipping in homes and, for their own

bu
reasons, did not want to associate with the lianghui. They have become a
tri
part of the private home gatherings, the so-called ‘house churches’. The
is
private home gatherings also include Christians who live too far away
rd
to go to a church building to worship, those who prefer worshipping

fo
with fewer people or in their own circles, and those who are influenced,
supported and often manipulated by overseas groups. Some home gather-
ot
ings belong to the lianghui and some do not. For the latter, as long as they
N
are faithful to biblical truth, not averse to the Three-Self principles and
law abiding, they are also considered by the lianghui to be a part of the
Chinese church.
Theological Reconstruction and Christianity That Is Zhongguohua

During the first two decades after China’s reform and opening up,
the church put its priority on the return of church properties, the re-
establishment of church institutions, the training of clergy, the printing
of the Bible and the establishment of ecumenical relations. Nevertheless,

to maintain unity, the theology taught by fundamentalist missionaries in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that shaped the Chinese
church was neither criticised in the 1950s nor challenged when the church
was reopened in the early 1980s. Such theology can be criticised as
negative and otherworldly in its thinking because it deemed that humanity
and human society were totally depraved and therefore worthless and
hopeless. In this theology, Christian hope basically lay in the other world,
and the most important earthly obligation for Christians was to convert
.
ly
people in order to gain heavenly reward and personal salvation. God was
on
portrayed as a divine punisher who was hard to please and in favour only
of the select few. It also taught that Christians and Christian nations were
se
blessed and the rest were condemned; thus, a distinct line had to be drawn
lu
between believers and non-believers. Such theological thinking aroused
na
concern that it might hinder the development of the Chinese church.
so
Bishop K. H. Ting (丁光訓), the most important Chinese Christian leader
of the twentieth century, whose role in the Chinese church is unparalleled,
er
initiated the process of Theological Reconstruction for the Chinese church
rp
in 1998. He deemed it was time to bring Chinese Christians back to the
Fo
essence of Christian teaching by challenging and decolonising the Western
e.
theological discourse taught by the fundamentalist missionaries, so that

l
the Christian message could be properly preached and understood in the

sa
Chinese context. His hope was that through Theological Reconstruction,

re
a Chinese Christianity that was faithful to biblical teachings, that high-

or
lighted God’s inclusive love and that focused on Christians’ ethical and
n
moral responsibilities could emerge. Ting made great efforts to promote

tio
Theological Reconstruction by widely discussing and sharing his theologi-

bu
cal reflections with church leaders and theological educators at all levels in
tri
China, as well as with his ecumenical friends. He reflected on a wide range

is
of theological themes, but here only his most well known and important
rd
arguments will be briefly rehearsed.

fo
Ting asserted that a negative or pessimistic worldview was not the

gospel, and an overemphasis on sin or the human fall would not be com-
ot
patible with the God whose name is love. Ting stressed that God’s grace
N
far surpasses human sin, just as the impact of Christ on humanity is infin
itely greater than that of Adam. With God’s grace and love, Christians will
have the strength and courage to carry out their social and ethical respon-
sibilities in the world as an embodiment of their Christian faith.
Ting emphasised that God’s love is God’s most important and most
fundamental attribute. God’s love is the love reflected in the cosmic nature
of Christ, who gave up his life for all and whose domain, concern and
care are universal. The love of the Cosmic Christ is God’s all-inclusive
love, which extends all over the world, to all of God’s people. To help rid
Chinese Christians of an image of God as a divine punisher, Ting pointed
to the mother image used to describe God and God’s love (such as in
Isaiah 66: 13 and 49: 15, and in Psalm 131: 2). By using the mother image,
Ting demonstrated that God’s love does not coerce but works through
education, persuasion, transformation and sanctification.
Ting criticised the overly simplistic and even distorted interpretation
of justification by faith leading to spiritual pride and antinomianism. Ting
claimed that believing in God and converting people are not the only
.
ly
dimensions of Christian faith. Justification cannot be used as an excuse for
on
Christians to escape their social responsibilities and to avoid integrating
into the whole community. Christians’ good works do not merely aim to
se
expand the church but, more importantly, to follow the Cosmic Christ’s
lu
example of serving others. Ting strongly argued for a doctrine of sancti
na
fication alongside the doctrine of justification.
so
The Theological Reconstruction advocated by Bishop Ting aroused
some debate at the beginning due to the response of the fundamentalist
er
wing in the church. After two decades, however, through thousands of
rp
conferences, essay presentations and sermons, more and more clergy and
Fo
Christians have come to appreciate the significance of Theological Recon-
e.
struction and to support the positive changes and healthy development it

l
has brought to the Chinese church.

sa
To deepen Theological Reconstruction and to make Christianity more

re
relevant to the Chinese cultural, social and political context, the Ninth
or
National Chinese Christian Conference in 2013 proposed the promotion

n
of Christianity that is Zhongguohua (Christianity in China must be Chinese

tio
in orientation – that is, further contextualised). A Five-Year Outline Plan

bu
to Promote Protestant Christianity’s Zhongguohua was released by the

tri
CCC and TSPM in March 2018. The goal of further contextualisation is

is
to develop a Chinese church that exalts Christ and that maintains unity,
rd
that is faithful to biblical truth and rooted in Chinese culture, that has a
fo
contextualised theology relevant to the Chinese social as well as political

context, and that is courageous in taking up social responsibilities. It aims
ot
to realise the transformation from ‘Christianity in China’ to ‘Chinese

N
Christianity’. Some of the major tasks of this further contextualisation

include building a solid theological foundation for it by deepening Theo-
logical Reconstruction, continuing to standardise theological education
and accelerate the pace of personnel training, using Chinese cultural forms
to express faith, engaging in social service and practising the core values
of Chinese socialism, which are prosperity, democracy, civility, harmony,
freedom, equality, justice, the rule of law, patriotism, dedication, integrity
and friendship.
Theological Education
Since 1981, 22 seminaries and Bible schools have been either reopened or
opened in China. From the perspective of enrolment, these theological in-
stitutes are divided into three levels: Nanjing Union Theological Seminary
(NJUTS), which enrols students nationwide; five regional seminaries, each
of which enrols students from its own region; and the rest of the provin-
cial seminaries and Bible schools, each of which enrols students from its
particular province. Some specialised courses, such as the sacred music
programme and the programme for the deaf run by certain seminaries,
.
ly
have started to enrol students nationwide as well.
on
According to the design, these 22 schools are divided into two cat-
egories. Nine seminaries and Bible schools run a three-year or two-year
se
programme, while the rest of the seminaries offer a full undergraduate
lu
programme, including NJUTS, which also grants master’s and doctoral
na
degrees. NJUTS is run by the CCC and TSPM, while the provincial theo-
so
logical institutes are led by the provincial lianghui, and the regional ones
er
by the lianghui in their respective regions.
rp
Nearly 3,800 students attend these theological schools. Baptised
Christians with high-school diplomas who have been church members
Fo
for at least one year and are called to serve the church full time, and who
e.
have the recommendation of the local church and the endorsement of the
l
local or provincial lianghui, are eligible to apply for the undergraduate

sa
programme or lower. To be admitted, applicants need to pass the entrance

re
examinations in four or five subjects (depending on the theological school),

or
an interview and a physical examination. With the same requirements,

n
those who apply for the master’s programme at NJUTS should also have
tio
either a four-year seminary or secular university education, and those who

bu
apply for the doctoral programme should have a master’s degree in either
tri
theology or another subject in the liberal arts. There is no age limit for
is
admission to NJUTS, while other schools generally do not enrol students

rd
over 35, making the average age of all theological students under 30.
fo
The curriculum of these schools covers biblical, theological, historical

and practical theological studies and some liberal arts courses, but the
ot
number and level of the courses offered vary from school to school. There
N
are more than 280 faculty members, most of whom have master’s degrees,
with a dozen also holding doctoral degrees.
More than 23,500 students have graduated from the 22 seminaries and
Bible schools since 1985. Most of those from the provincial and regional
theological schools, together with those who have attended the under
graduate programme in NJUTS, have returned to their home churches to
serve. Many graduates of NJUTS with a Master of Theology (MTh) degree
have become faculty members in various theological institutes.
NJUTS, with nationwide enrolment, is the model for many other

seminaries and Bible schools in China in terms of curriculum plan, faculty
development, library development and so forth. NJUTS started to run both
the four-year undergraduate and the three-year graduate programme in
1981, the Doctor of Theology (ThD) programme in 2016 and the Doctor of
Ministry programme in 2017. It began to confer bachelor’s and master’s
degrees in 1995. Due to the separation between education and religion, no
degree from a religious institute in China is accredited by the Ministry of
Education, but they are recognised in religious circles.
.
ly
NJUTS joined the Association for Theological Education in South
on
East Asia (ATESEA) in 2015 and is in the process of being accredited by
ATESEA. It has 21 full-time faculty members and a handful of visiting
se
professors teaching over 450 students. By 2020, the number of students
lu
will exceed 500, including 90 students in the MTh programme and around
na
10 doctoral students. Currently, three faculty members have either PhD
so
or ThD degrees, while another three are pursuing their doctoral studies
overseas; the rest hold master’s degrees. The doctoral programme at
er
NJUTS depends heavily on visiting professors who are well established
rp
scholars in their fields. The library has a collection of more than 60,000
Fo
volumes, not including digital resources such as ATLAS and CNKI. NJUTS
e.
also runs a three-year correspondence course to train lay leaders, with an

l
enrolment of nearly 3,000.

sa
During the second half of the 1980s, the CCC and TSPM started to send
re
seminary graduates abroad for advanced degree programmes as a supple-

or
ment to Chinese theological education. Since 2008, more than 130 people
n
have been sent to seminaries in North America, Europe, Australia and the
tio
Chinese territories of Hong Kong and Taiwan.

bu
tri
Church and Society

is
Christian personal witness contributes not only to the growth of the

rd
Chinese Protestant church but also to its good reputation in society. With
fo
the understanding that ‘a good Christian should be a good citizen’ in mind,

Christians in all walks of life endeavour to achieve professional success
ot
and good working relationships with peers. In recent years, the stories
N
of the achievement in career and in Christian witness of some renowned

painters, artists, singers, musicians, dancers, athletes, coaches, writers,
educators, entrepreneurs, philanthropists, physicians and many others,
including some model workers or advanced workers, have been shared
in almost every issue of the church monthly magazine Tian Feng, which is
publicly distributed and has more than 57,000 subscriptions. Christians in
rural areas are also active in promoting the common good of their villages.
There are Christians among the deputies to the People’s Congress (PC) and
the members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

(CPPCC) at all levels. The churches can raise any concerns on religious
freedom, social issues, social conditions and public opinions to govern-
ment at all levels through the bills and proposals forwarded by Christians
in the PC and CPPCC. The restoration of church property in many places in
the 1980s and the policy concerning social and medical insurance enacted
for religious workers in recent years are two examples among many that
are indebted to the bills and proposals from these Christians.
Another way for the church to participate in society has been to offer
.
ly
social service, especially after the release of Opinions on Encouraging
on
and Regulating Religious Circles’ Participation in Public Welfare Charitable
Activities by six government departments at the national level in 2012,
se
which has granted religious circles more space and policies favourable to
lu
engaging in charity. In 2003, the CCC and TSPM had already established
na
a Social Service Department (SSD) to foster the work of Christian social
so
service. The SSD has worked with local churches all over the country to
carry out various kinds of ministry in social service, including education
er
support and child care, medical and health care, service to the elderly,
rp
community development, social welfare, disaster relief, capacity building
Fo
and poverty alleviation. Annually, it has operated around 40 projects with
e.
local churches. The funds raised over the years have totalled around ¥119
l
million (around US$19.8 million).

sa
Every September, during Religious Charity Week, many local churches

re
together with the SSD conduct programmes to help people in need near
or
and far. The SSD also works with other religious groups, for example
n
inviting Muslim participation in training projects and visiting overseas

tio
Buddhist care homes for the elderly. Local churches also have joint social
bu
service programmes with other religious groups from time to time.

tri
Apart from social service, Protestant churches have interactions with

is
other faith groups in different ways. For instance, conferences on religious

rd
dialogue and religious harmony have often been held at the international,
fo
national and local levels among the five major religions in China, namely
Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism. Leaders of
ot
religious groups at all levels maintain good relationships, and some are PC
N
deputies or CPPCC members. Theological institutes of different religions

arrange visits to one another from time to time. A course on religious
dialogue is offered in some seminaries and Bible schools, and representa-
tives of other religions are often invited to introduce their own religion.
Relations with Churches Worldwide

Since China’s reform and opening up, the Chinese churches have either
resumed or newly established friendship with churches overseas. In the
past 20 years, apart from the provincial lianghui, the CCC and TSPM alone
have received more than 1,600 delegations of over 13,000 people repre-
senting Protestant churches on all continents. Some significant groups
and individuals included leaders from the World Council of Churches,
the World Evangelical Alliance, the World Communion of Reformed
Churches, the Baptist World Alliance, the Lutheran World Federation and
the Christian Conference of Asia, as well as the Archbishop of Canterbury
and the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. During the same
period, the CCC and TSPM organised about 500 delegations of around
.
ly
1,600 people, including church leaders, theological educators, lay people
on
and youth. Overseas exchanges included mutual sharing on the whole
range of church ministries, theological education, social service, church
se
media, inter-faith dialogue and Christian music and arts. The Protestant
lu
church in mainland China also has close contacts and cooperation with
na
churches and seminaries in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. The CCC is
so
the largest Protestant member of the World Council of Churches.
er
Challenges and Prospects
rp
What the Chinese church has achieved has gone far beyond what Chinese
Fo
Christians could ever have predicted 40 years ago. In the meantime,
e.
however, it also faces unprecedented challenges. For instance, the

l
churches have been challenged in various ways by a lack of well trained

sa
clergy. Because many rural congregations are led by lay leaders, elders or
re
evangelists without theological training, proper teaching of the Bible and

or
pastoral care are inadequately provided, so some misguided individuals

n
can take advantage and lead some Christians astray. In some rural areas,
tio
tensions between Christianity and Chinese folk religions remain, and the
bu
distinction between inculturation and syncretism is sometimes hard for

tri
some Christians to make. Due to urbanisation, members of city churches

is
often come from all walks of life, ranging from rural migrant workers
rd
to well established white-collar staff, from illiterate grannies to college

fo
students and well educated elite, from the jobless to the entrepreneur. It
is truly challenging to prepare one Sunday sermon that will speak well to
ot
the spiritual needs of thousands of Christians with different backgrounds

N
and to provide apt pastoral care to them with a limited number of clergy
serving each church. Though affected less by heretical teachings, urban
churches also face the negative influence of the theology of prosperity and
of Charismatic trends brought from overseas.
The lianghui at all levels are fully aware of these challenges. In order to
create a wide variety of personnel who can properly address the issues of
the church, a more effective mechanism of training is being established to
study and analyse training needs; to define training objectives; to design
training programmes; and to expand training channels, including continu-

ing education and overseas study. The seminary curriculum is also being
revised in response to the new challenges to the churches.
A concern to many Chinese Christians is the divisive influence of forces
from abroad. With the opening up of China, some overseas Christian
groups have either publicly or secretly flocked into China with their own
agendas. They raise funds by misinforming people outside mainland
China about the situation of the Chinese churches and society. They
claim that the ‘real churches’ that they want to establish or support in
.
ly
China should be ‘underground’ and ‘opposing the Chinese government’.
on
Their common teaching is to stay away from churches that do not fit their
standard and from society as well unless it can be used to convert people
se
to the churches they accept. In the eyes of many Chinese Christians, such
lu
groups from overseas have created confusion, division and chaos in the
na
Chinese churches, a situation that the whole church needs to resist.
so
To safeguard the post-denominational unity, the Protestant church in
China also needs to develop its own ecclesiology as a solid foundation for
er
continuing to form a uniting church. A revised set of Church Regulations
rp
is expected to be released once it receives the approval of Tenth National
Fo
Christian Conference as a step forward in building up the ecclesiology of
e.
the Chinese church.

l
The future of the Chinese church will be shaped by the extent to which
sa
it is able to renew itself in a changing society by putting the calls for Theo-
re
logical Reconstruction and further contextualisation of Christianity into

or
practice. For Protestantism in mainland China to become more relevant to

n
its Chinese context, it will be important for Chinese Christians to embrace

tio
a theology emphasising God’s all-inclusive love and its ethical implica-

bu
tions. In this way the Chinese church will be able to address the issues and
tri
common concerns of the time more effectively, and Chinese Christians

is
will be equipped to follow the example of Jesus Christ more closely.

rd
fo
Bibliography
Chinese Theological Review (1985–2018).
ot
Lin, Manhong Melissa, Ethical Reorientation for Christianity in China: Individual Community,
N
and Society (Hong Kong: Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion and Culture, 2010).
Luo, Weihong (罗伟) (ed.), Zhonguo jidujiao(xinjiao)shi [中国基督教] [The History of Christi
anity (Protestantism) in China] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe [上海人民出版社],
2014).
Tian Feng [天] [The Magazine of the Protestant Churches in China], 1981–2019.
Wickeri, Philip L., Reconstructing Christianity in China: K. H. Ting and the Chinese Church
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2007).
Mainland China (Catholic)
Edmond Tang
On 22 September 2018, the Vatican signed a provisional agreement with
.
ly
the Chinese government regarding the selection of bishops in the Chinese
on
Catholic Church. According to the agreement, the government will have
a role in the selection process but concedes the final veto to the Vatican,
se
thus ensuring that all future candidates will be acceptable to Rome. In
lu
return, the Vatican has moved to recognise the eight remaining Chinese
na
bishops who were not yet in communion with the Holy See, including
so
one posthumously. As Bishop Michael Yang Ming-cheung of Hong Kong
er
commented before his untimely death in November 2018, the present ar-
rp
rangement is far from perfect and important issues remain to be resolved,
including the release of clergy and laity who are in prison or in detention.
Fo
It is also not clear whether underground Catholics can still worship
e.
separately. Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, Bishop Emeritus of Hong Kong,

l
however, is more critical of the Vatican, believing the agreement will bring
sa
serious harm to the underground communities without any benefit to

re
the church as a whole. Nevertheless, it is a step forward towards healing

or
the division within the Catholic community. In his message to Chinese

n
Catholics, Pope Francis also reiterated that the agreement was made for
tio
pastoral reasons and wished the Catholic Church would heal and then
bu
move forwards together in the task of evangelisation, an important theme

tri
in his pontificate.
is
The last time the Catholic faith came close to being accepted into
rd
Chinese culture was during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when
fo
Jesuit missionaries were allowed into the imperial court and when officials
of the state became prominent Christians. This ‘golden age’ ended with
ot
N
the so-called Rites Controversy, which mainly concerned the practice

of ancestor worship. In reality, the Controversy covered a range of un
avoidable conflicts in the encounter between two major cultural systems,
including different understandings of human nature, morality and the
ultimate authority of the emperor. Nevertheless, the Jesuits’ approach
to mission in China, as in India at that time, has been upheld in more
recent decades as a model of mission to another culture. This defining ex
perience, called ‘inculturation’ in more recent theology, has been written
into the DNA of the Catholic Church in China. Since the 1980s, the term
52 Edmond Tang
has frequently appeared in Chinese Catholic discourse as well as in papal

pronouncements regarding China. This approach also distinguishes the
evangelism of the Catholic Church from that of Protestant groups in the
country. However, the challenges of inculturation in seventeenth-century
China are very different from those of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, and we shall return to this later in the essay.
The second defining experience in the history of the Catholic Church
in China is the colonial missions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
that marked the church out to be both foreign and imperialistic. Very
.
ly
few of the Christian missions were not guilty of association with colonial
on
powers, but this was even more true of the Catholic Church, because its
faith requires the acceptance of a foreign authority. In the eyes of the
se
government, and to the majority of the Chinese population, the Vatican is
lu
not only a foreign religious authority but a political one as well.
na
The nineteenth-century missions, both Catholic and Protestant, used
so
and abused the power of their respective governments to open mission-
ary routes beyond the trading ports and into the Chinese hinterland. Of
er
course, the missions made contributions to the development of modern
rp
China with the introduction of modern health care, education and, above
Fo
all, new social and political ideas. Modern Chinese people can appreciate
e.
the role of the West in hastening the end of the old imperial order but still
l
resent the imposition of a foreign religion. This has played well into the
sa
propaganda of the communist government since the 1950s.

re
It is worth noting that a resentment of Christianity is not exclusive to

or
the communist period in China. There is a continuum of anti-foreign and

n
anti-Christian movements from the late Qing dynasty (the Boxer Uprising
tio
of 1900), through the Nationalist period (the May Fourth Movement of

bu
1919) to the present day. The communist government has effectively chan-
tri
nelled these popular feelings into its official narrative despite numerous
is
protestations that times have changed and Christianity is no longer a

rd
political threat to Chinese society or culture. However, the idea of Christi

fo
anity as a foreign and aggressively hostile religion has entered into the
popular consciousness. These sentiments can still be detected among the
ot
general populace; even intellectuals and academics who are critical of the
N
communist government share the same point of view.

The challenges to Christianity, and to the Catholic Church in particular,
are twofold. On the one hand, the Catholic Church has to change funda-
mentally its image in Chinese society by shedding its ‘foreign character’,
but more crucially it has to discover its role in the evolving Chinese culture
through an in-depth inculturation. On both counts, it is interesting to see
how the Jesuit missions of the sixteenth century have been constructed
as an exemplary model of mission, and how their most prominent
representative, Matteo Ricci, has acquired iconic status in Catholic

discourse in both China and the Vatican. Before the Catholic Church in
China can respond effectively to the twofold challenge above, however, it
must come to terms with the third defining experience, of separation and
division, that is as intense today as when it began in the 1950s.
When the communist government in China came to power in 1949 it
began to bring all non-communist organisations under the United Front.
For the religions, it established ‘patriotic associations’ as a tool of manage-
ment and control. Through these patriotic associations, the government
.
ly
has direct control of institutions, clergy and places of worship. Because
on
of their foreign connections, the principles of self-finance, self-government
and self-propagation were imposed on Christians. The Protestant Three-
se
Self Patriotic Movement was established in 1952 with some support from
lu
more progressive leaders among their ranks, but the similar effort among
na
Catholics encountered fierce resistance. For the latter, communion with
so
the Holy See is not only a question of organisational links but part of their
belief. Foreign priests and nuns were expelled and indigenous leaders were
er
put in prison. Not until 1957 was the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association
rp
(CCPA) finally established. In the same year the CCPA proceeded to conse-
Fo
crate the first new bishops to fill the vacancies of the departed bishops. The
e.
Vatican condemned this act as schismatic. Those who followed the Vatican
l
and opposed the Patriotic Association went underground. For more than
sa
30 years the ‘underground church’ was persecuted by the government,

re
and many accused the CCPA of taking an active part in that persecution.
or
The Cultural Revolution (officially 1966–76) drove the church further into
n
the shadows. The churches under the CCPA were also closed and their
tio
clergy disbanded or forced to marry. The 1980s saw a general liberalisa-

bu
tion in China, however, and the religions were allowed to resurface.

tri
is
Churches under the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association

rd
A document released by the CCPA in 1987 stated:

fo
The Chinese Catholic Church affirms that on the basis of independence and
ot
autonomy, the self-management of the Church is a response to the will of God

N
and the interests of the country. This is our position which will not change: a
Chinese Catholic religion on Chinese soil.
It is worth pointing out the nuance in the use of the phrase ‘independence
and autonomy’. ‘Autonomy’ means running the church’s affairs according
to local circumstances, which is acceptable according to the theology of
the local church since the Second Vatican Council, but ‘independence’
amounts to rejecting allegiance to Rome or jurisdiction under the Pope
and therefore is not acceptable.
54 Edmond Tang
The 1987 document also gave an analysis of the Vatican’s Ostpolitik, suc-
cessfully applied in Eastern Europe in the 1980s, which saw the resurgence
of the Catholic Church as a formidable political force in such countries
as Poland and Yugoslavia. The fear of the CCPA is that the Vatican’s
call for dialogue is a cover for subversion and infiltration. It also accuses
the Vatican of sending secret missions into China to recruit agents (the
underground church) in order to organise a reactionary force against the
independent church and further the downfall of the government, just as it
had done in former Soviet satellites. The overall tone is one of suspicion
.
ly
and hostility.
on
Opinions in China differ regarding the CCPA. Those who oppose it
believe it is the work of the devil, an instrument of the government to
se
destroy the church. They blame the CCPA for creating division in the
lu
church and attempting to separate it from the seat of Peter. They also think
na
that politically motivated persons and priests of doubtful reputation have
so
taken control of its leadership.
On the other hand, some are sympathetic to the historical injustices of
er
colonialism that underpin its foundation. As the communist government
rp
took over in the 1950s and political purges began, many in the church
Fo
believed that to accept an independent administration was the only way
e.
to safeguard the continued existence of the church under the new regime.
l
It is possible to find evidence to support either view. At present, it is

sa
difficult to say with confidence that the CCPA is working to eliminate

re
the church. Government policy has definitely changed; it now accepts

or
that religion will be a permanent feature of Chinese society, and a more

n
effective policy is to bring the various groups into the mainstream. Since
tio
the 1980s, the CCPA has assisted in the return of 6,000 places of worship
bu
and has opened eight major seminaries for the training of priests and 10
tri
minor seminaries for younger vocations. It has printed Bibles, liturgical

is
texts and prayer books for the use of the faithful. In fact, many Catholics,
rd
like the majority of Chinese citizens, believe that politics is only for the
fo
elite. If they are resigned to government control then they can go to Mass,
confess their sins, receive the sacraments of healing and even baptise their
ot
children. Perhaps this explains why the ‘patriotic’ churches are generally
N
well attended, especially on major feast days. It is estimated that half of

the Catholic population in China come under the CCPA.
This is not to say, however, that the CCPA is loved and supported.
Most of its bishops and priests resent its presence. The organisation’s
power is strong nationally and in large cities, while in many areas the local
branches of the CCPA are often ignored until they are needed to negotiate
with the government. Sometimes the clergy can be creative in their passive
resistance. In a few churches, the local clergy took the initiative to join
the CCPA in order to become officials in the organisation while quietly

working for the pastoral benefits of the faithful. In other cases, the local
bishop, supported by his priests, has stood up against the CCPA and
wrested back a certain amount of authority in the running of the church.
In short, the picture is quite complicated. As the rapprochement with
the Vatican appeared on the horizon, many bishops consecrated under
the CCPA have reconciled with the Holy See. Before the rapprochement
between the Vatican and Chinese authorities in 2018, only eight of the 60
or so ‘patriotic bishops’ were not yet regularised, and they have since been
.
ly
accepted by the Vatican in the provisional agreement.
on
The ‘Underground Church’
se
Those who opposed the CCPA went underground in the 1950s; this
lu
underground church was sometimes called the ‘faithful church’ because
na
of its loyalty to the Pope. It was a difficult existence and there were heroic
so
stories, recounted in letters smuggled out of China, of how priests moved
about from one home to another, sometimes in the middle of the night,
er
to avoid arrest. Local Catholics lived in fear of detention, discrimination
rp
in employment and disadvantages in the educational opportunities for
Fo
their children. Sometimes underground communities could operate in a
e.
semi-open environment, tolerated by local officials as long as they did not

l
create any trouble. As the political atmosphere eased after the Cultural
sa
Revolution, some underground priests could ‘hide’ in plain sight in official

re
churches but still minister to a non-official congregation.

or
The formation of a more structured underground community began in

n
the 1980s, when China embarked on its drive for modernisation. In 1979
tio
the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples sent a document to

bu
China giving the underground community certain concessions regarding

tri
the administration of sacraments outside of the framework of the CCPA.

is
At roughly the same time, the Vatican also gave permission to set up un-
rd
official seminaries, even though they could not fulfil the requirements of
fo
canon law, and most importantly for bishops to ordain other bishops and
priests. Some in the underground church considered this a green light to
ot
organise a parallel church. The number of ‘clandestine’ bishops suddenly

N
increased at an alarming rate. Many priests were ordained secretly,

sometimes with only a few months of doctrinal instruction. They were
then sent around the country to warn Catholics away from the official
churches, and claimed they had a mandate from Rome. They warned that
the sacraments administered by CCPA priests were invalid, and those
who received sacraments from these priests were committing a sin instead
of receiving grace from God. As a result, the number of Catholics going
to official churches declined and many of the faithful were confused.
56 Edmond Tang
Some seminarians left the official church because they began to doubt the
validity of their ordinations.
The so-called underground church found its leadership among bishops
coalesced around a leader, Bishop Fan Xueyuan of Baoding in Hebei
province, who spent more than 30 years in prison. In 1988 Bishop Fan,
in between prison or detention, gave an interview that was subsequently
summarised in a circular known as the ‘Thirteen Points’. The document
repeated the attack on the ‘patriotic church’, as mentioned, and called on
Catholics to boycott the churches under the CCPA.
.
ly
Rome was alarmed, as the prospect of a permanent schism was on the
on
horizon. In a series of programmes broadcast to China from Manila, the
Vatican’s Radio Veritas toned down the claims of the Thirteen Points.
se
Radio Veritas stated firmly that only the Pope had the power of excom-
lu
munication, and some bishops, priests and even lay people overstepped
na
their authority when they excommunicated others on behalf of the Pope. It
so
recognised that CCPA membership did not necessarily mean the person in
question was anti-Vatican, and some actually were secretly loyal to Rome.
er
It stressed that according to canon law the sacraments administered by
rp
priests of the CCPA were still valid and receiving them would not be con-
Fo
sidered a sin.
e.
In September 1988 the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples

l
sent a letter to the bishops of the world giving the Vatican’s evaluation
sa
of the situation in China and its view of the CCPA, namely that within
re
the organisation there were members of an intermediate way, those who

or
‘conserve in their hearts as unrelinquishable their bonds of communion

n
with the Holy Father, as well as accepting the religious policy imposed by
tio
the [Chinese] Authorities’.

bu
The letter also referred to a confidential document circulated in China,

tri
Directives on Some of the Problems of the Church in Continental China, that had
is
been prepared at the request of Pope John Paul II and approved by him.
rd
The Directives more or less repeated the same clarifications on excommuni-

fo
cations, validity of ordinations and the ‘presumed’ validity of sacraments

administered by priests not in communion with Rome. Nevertheless,
ot
the Directives advised that the faithful should still seek out priests who
N
remained loyal to Rome.

The intervention from Rome halted the schism, but the two communi-
ties were still running parallel to each other. Many areas have overlapping
communities, each with its own bishop, group of priests and religious
sisters, including the religious orders that have resurfaced since the 1980s.
In 1989 the underground church consolidated its structures by creating its
own bishops’ conference, with Bishop Fan elected as chairman, although
he was still in prison. The government’s crackdown was fierce. Bishop Fan
died in custody in 1992, his body dumped by the authorities in front of the
rural church where he served, showing signs of torture and broken ribs.
Towards Reconciliation
After the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the atmosphere in the country
changed. In Eastern Europe, the former communist regimes collapsed
one after another. The role played by the churches in their demise, as
in Poland, East Germany, Yugoslavia and Romania, was not unnoticed.
Consequently, the Chinese government imposed tighter control on the
.
ly
religions, but at the same time set out a new policy to bring the religions
on
more tightly into the mainstream. Resources were provided to improve
local religious infrastructure and for the training of religious leaders.
se
The Vatican, alarmed by the danger of schism, took a series of
lu
measures to minimise further divisions and left open opportunities for
na
future reconciliation. Despite its support for the ‘faithful church’, it did
so
not give recognition to the underground bishops’ conference, and from
1993 onwards refused permission for the underground church to ordain
er
bishops without prior Vatican agreement. It also opened more communi-
rp
cation with the priests and bishops of the official church, allowing bishops
Fo
under the CCPA to secretly reconcile with the Holy See.
e.
Under Pope John Paul II (1978–2005) the church in China became a

l
priority. In his early statements he praised China as a great nation (1979)

sa
and sought to reassure the Chinese government that it had nothing to fear
re
from the Catholic Church, for ‘a good Catholic is also a good citizen’ who
or
would treat the authorities with filial piety (1981). The Catholic Church
n
would be a Chinese church through inculturation. In 2001 he acknowl-

tio
edged that mistakes had been made in the past by some in the church and
bu
apologised for them. He repeatedly made clear his desire for dialogue in
tri
public statements as well as through diplomatic channels, including an

is
undisclosed letter that he sent to Deng Xiaoping personally in 1982.

rd
As for the divided Catholic community, there is no doubt that his sym-
fo
pathies lay with the suffering faithful, but he also showed understanding
that many followed the CCPA against their will. Above all, he called for
ot
the church to seek unity. In January 1995, from the World Youth Day in
N
Manila, he sent an open message to China calling for the church to unite,
first of all among themselves and with the successor of Peter in Rome.
Pope Benedict XVI (2005–13) followed with a similar call for unity in
an open letter to Chinese Catholics in June 2007. He acknowledged the
suffering of Catholics under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party but
said it was time to forgive past wrongdoings and for the underground
and official communities to reconcile. To the CCPA, however, he made it
clear that it was not possible for the church to operate independently of
58 Edmond Tang
the Vatican. He also advised Catholics to worship with priests who are
faithful to Rome, although he added that sacraments performed by the
official church were still valid.
It is left to Pope Francis (2013–) to continue the negotiations with the
Chinese authorities. He elevated Cardinal Pietro Parolin, until then the
chair of the Vatican’s China committee, to secretary of state. This was
a sign that dialogue with Chinese authorities would intensify. On 22
September 2018 the dialogue led to a provisional agreement on the ap-
pointment of bishops, the main issue dividing the Catholic communities
.
ly
in China. Aware of the strong feelings inside and outside China about the
on
agreement, Pope Francis explained the reasons in a message to Chinese
Catholics on 26 September. The purpose of the accord is to provide a stable
se
relationship between the Vatican and the Chinese authorities so that they
lu
can cooperate in the selection of shepherds for the flock. The agreement is
na
provisional and needs improvement; above all, it is only ‘an instrument,
so
and not of itself capable of resolving all existing problems’. He asks for
a ‘deep commitment’ by all, especially bishops, priests and consecrated
er
persons, to leave behind past conflicts and personal interest to work for
rp
the common good of the church and to advance the task of evangelisation.
Fo
He recognises the suffering of many Catholics but deems the rise of the
e.
underground church ‘abnormal’ and asks all Chinese Catholics to work

l
towards reconciliation.
sa
The agreement will not produce the expected reconciliation if there is

re
no grassroots desire for unity. The conflict between the two communities
or
is well documented, but less so the instances of local reconciliation. At

n
present, this information is anecdotal and fragmentary, in some cases to

tio
avoid outside intervention. Nevertheless, they are not uncommon, sug-

bu
gesting a changing atmosphere since the early 1990s. We can cite with
tri
confidence two such examples.

is
In 1995 someone paid a visit to Jin Peixian, the official Bishop of

rd
Shenyang diocese in north-east China. Jin is well respected for his pastoral
fo
oversight of the diocese and had brought the local CCPA under his
control. After attending morning Mass the visitor left the cathedral and
ot
was surprised to hear another Mass being celebrated in the old refectory
N
within the cathedral compound. He asked Bishop Jin what was going on,
and the old bishop said matter-of-factly, ‘It’s the underground church
having Mass there’. When the visitor joined the bishop and his priests
for breakfast in his residence, the bishop introduced him to an old priest
sitting at the table: ‘This is Father [X], the underground priest who was
saying Mass in the refectory’.
Earlier, in 1994, another visitor was in the city of Wuhan. The Bishop
of Wuhan, Dong Guangqing, was the first bishop to be consecrated in
China without the approval of Rome. The episcopal seat had been vacant
for more than five years after the departure of the previous bishop, who
was Italian. The diocese sent a message to the Pope asking for permission
to consecrate a new bishop to fill the vacancy, but it was firmly rejected.
It was said that the bishop cried for three days and three nights before
he succumbed to government pressure to proceed with the ordination.
Late in the evening Bishop Dong brought the visitor to another wing of
his residence, where he introduced the visitor to an old friend. This turned
out to be the underground bishop of the neighbouring diocese, Bishop Liu
.
ly
Hede, who had been jailed for 22 years for his opposition to the CCPA.
on
Then the two old friends, both in their 80s, recounted how they reconciled
with each other through a common friend and now worked together, with
se
the local government’s tacit understanding, for the pastoral care of the
lu
diocese and the seminary.
na
Since the older generation knew each other personally before the split
so
in the 1950s, it was perhaps easier to re-establish communications and
understanding. This cannot be said of the younger generation of priests.
er
Some of those from the underground church did not know any form of
rp
community but their own and have become fiercely militant against the
Fo
official church. There are signs, though, that contact and communication
e.
channels are opening, and with the agreement clearly directed by the
l
Pope himself, many from the underground church are willing to explore
sa
reconciliation with the official church.

re
or
Second Vatican Council and Renewal

n
It will not do justice to the story of the Catholic Church in China if we

tio
attend only to its division and the task of reconciliation, important as

bu
they are. The four decades or more since the end of the Cultural Revo-
tri
lution have also been a time of rebuilding and renewal. In the 40 years
is
since its return to public worship, the church has grown steadily to about
rd
10 million members, from less than 3 million just before the Cultural
fo
Revolution. As of 2017 some 6,000 churches are open, divided between

96 dioceses (144 in the old boundaries of 1951). There are 101 bishops
ot
(though not all are active), with 65 in the official church and 36 belonging
N
to the underground church. The numbers of priests have gone up to 2,550

and 1,320 respectively. There are also 3,170 sisters in official convents and
1,400 underground. The number of priests is dwarfed by the much larger
number of pastors in the Protestant churches. Reasons for this include
the requirement that Catholic priests be celibate, which is an obstacle
to vocations under the one-child policy, and the fact that the training of
Catholic priests usually takes two to three times longer than that for Prot-
estant clergy.
60 Edmond Tang
Very often the growth of the Catholic Church is compared unfavour-

ably to the exponential expansion of Protestants. Indeed, many Catholic
leaders in China are worried about the slow speed of evangelisation,
although the number of annual baptisms is quite steady. Specific reasons
include greater government control, the more institutionalised approach
to mission and the curse of division. Perhaps it is also worth considering
that Catholicism is a different way of ‘being church’ – that is, the Catholic
Church takes a different trajectory, giving more emphasis to rebuilding
its hierarchy and pastoral infrastructure before branching out from the
.
ly
centre. On the other hand, compared with Protestantism there is greater
on
coherence in doctrine (aside from the ‘political’ question of allegiance to
Rome), fewer ‘heresies and cults’, more institutional identity, a greater
se
sense of belonging, an educated clergy and greater theological openness to
lu
cultural changes in society.
na
If asked to identify the most important change in the Catholic Church
so
in China, many would not hesitate to mention the Second Vatican Council.
First and foremost is the introduction of the new liturgy, particularly
er
saying Mass in the vernacular. For more than a century, Chinese Catholics
rp
were used to Mass in Latin, with the priest facing away from a passive
Fo
congregation, performing obscure rituals in an obscure language. This was
e.
considered the height of Catholic worship and identity. Even the powerful
l
CCPA dared not tamper with it. Slowly, with help from the churches in
sa
Hong Kong and Taiwan, the new liturgy was introduced in a few places,
re
then gradually to the whole country. In short, the changes, introduced

or
with patience and accompanied by a good educational programme, were

n
well received, and the whole style of worship was transformed. The Mass
tio
has become more lively and the sermons more meaningful and relevant,
bu
and the congregation is more active in its participation. The new liturgy
tri
was a test case of whether the faithful were open to adopting a new way
is
of practising their religious life. The Chinese texts, with minor changes,
rd
are now the same as the ones used in overseas Chinese communities,
fo
establishing the common bond with the universal church. If even

re-
the Eucharist can be changed, what cannot be improved in other areas
ot
of Catholic life? Social responsibility, culture and spirituality are good

N
examples.
The most prominent Catholic development agency in China is the
Beifang Jinde Social Service Centre in Shijiazhuang, an industrial city not
far from Beijing. It is special because it was not established by the church’s
central authority, but by a priest in the Shijiazhuang diocese, Father John-
Baptist Zhang. He started a local Catholic newspaper in 1991 that grew
into a regional and then national publication. The government almost
closed it at one point because of its independence. The social service side
grew out of the newspaper, from the stories about small church projects
in disaster relief and help to the poor. Now it is staffed by several priests,
sisters and lay professionals and its work has gone national. In the 2000s,
the newspaper started a publishing house with a series of books on
Catholic doctrine, spirituality and ethics.
Similarly, the Institute for the Study of Christianity and Culture was
started by a priest in the Beijing diocese. Father Peter Zhao obtained
his doctorate in canon law from the University of Leuven in Belgium in
2002. Upon his return to China he devoted his ministry to forwarding the
.
ly
dialogue between Catholicism and Chinese culture. The small initiative is
on
now an established academic platform that organises national conferences
with Chinese universities and publishes a journal in cultural dialogue as
se
well as books in academic theology. The only other comparable Catholic
lu
publishing house is the Guangqi Press in Shanghai, which was revived
na
after the Cultural Revolution.
so
Another important development since the first decade of the 2000s is
the increase in the number of centres of spirituality around the country.
er
Several spiritual traditions, including Benedictine, Franciscan and Augus-
rp
tinian, have been revived through the re-establishment of religious orders
Fo
and houses. In seminaries and churches, training workshops are organised
e.
in Catholic social teaching, pastoral counselling and eco-theology.

l
The significance of these and similar initiatives is that they were taken
sa
by a new generation of leaders who are academically competent and who

re
embraced wholeheartedly the spirit of the Second Vatican Council. These

or
are the elements of a modern Chinese church.

n
tio
The Politics of Inculturation

bu
In the introduction to this essay we outlined the three defining experiences

tri
of the Catholic Church in China that are also its main challenges: from
is
foreign to Chinese; from colonial to national; from division to unity. With

rd
the agreement reached between the Vatican and China, and the clear
fo
appeal from the Pope for unity, we can expect that reconciliation will
gradually take place, especially with the passing of the older generation.
ot
As for its colonial image, it remains for the church to demonstrate that it
N
can emerge from the past stigma, by actively serving the Chinese people
through service to society, a strong Chinese leadership and building up
national institutions with a clear cultural identity. The danger of external
intervention, except in narrow areas of doctrine, is likely to subside; the
statements of recent Popes have conceded as much.
As China’s economy develops at an unprecedented speed, Chinese
society has become more materialistic and secular, while social relations,
which broke down through 70 years of tumultuous political campaigns,
62 Edmond Tang
are still to be healed or even reinvented. There is a thirst for values and
spirituality. Christianity – in many different forms, from fundamentalism
through Pentecostalism to an intellectual Christian humanism – is finding
echoes from different sectors of Chinese society. However, will Christi
anity be just another form of the religious escapism that was so despised
in the past, or will it be a positive contributor to a new system of values
and a new cultural identity?
The greatest barrier to inculturation today comes from a new national-
ism emerging in China that appears in both cultural and political forms.
.
ly
The government version is the most political. In trying to forge a new
on
political and cultural cohesion in society, and to consolidate its control
over all spheres of social life, the government has launched a campaign
se
of ‘Sinicisation’, including the Sinicisation of Marxism and Sinicisation of
lu
religions. President Xi Jinping explained the meaning of that in a speech
na
to the United Front in 2015: follow the party, adapt to socialist society,
so
support economic progress and maintain ethnic unity.
Inculturation requires immersion and commitment in order to belong
er
and to be part of a community or culture. At the same time, there must
rp
also be discernment guided by faith and knowledge. How to be ‘in the
Fo
world and not of the world’ and to discern what role the Catholic Church
e.
can play in President Xi’s vision of the ‘Chinese dream’ will be a daunting
l
task.
sa
re
Bibliography
or
Chu, Cindy Yik-yi, The Catholic Church in China: 1978 to the Present (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012).
n
tio
Lam, Anthony Sui-ki, The Catholic Church in Present-Day China (Hong Kong: Holy Spirit
Study Centre, 1997).
bu
Madsen, Richard, China’s Catholics: Tragedy and Hope in an Emerging Civil Society (Berkeley,
tri
CA: University of California Press, 1998).

is
Tiedemann, Gary, Handbook of Christianity in China, Vol. II: 1800–Present (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
rd
Yan, Chiaretto Kin Sheung, Evangelization in China (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2014).
fo
ot
N
Mainland China (House Churches)
David Ro
The house-church movement in China comprises millions of Christians
.
ly
who worship without legal status. Around the time China opened its door
on
to the world in 1979, a house-church movement grew rapidly: first in the
countryside among semi-literate peasants, followed by another church
se
movement in the cities, among intellectuals. On the surface, the political
lu
reforms provided more freedoms and saw the release of pastors from
na
prison. More influential, however, was a movement of spiritual renewal
so
that resulted in the emergence of a house-church movement, marked by
er
many of the characteristics of the early church, as described in the Book
of Acts.
rp
This movement quickly attracted millions of people in rural China,
Fo
with little outside influence. After an intense period of suffering, a
e.
house-church movement grew explosively, without foreign seminaries,

l
denominations, mission agencies or para-church organisations. Miracu

sa
lous healings were one of the primary reasons the gospel spread like
re
wildfire in the countryside. Chinese evangelists with only elementary- or

or
middle-school education had nothing but the Bible and their conversion
n
testimonies, yet they made a profound impact. Several large networks

tio
representing millions of rural Christians spread across China in the 1980s

bu
and 1990s. Evangelists from Henan and Anhui travelled from village to
tri
village and to cities throughout China to preach the gospel and plant
is
churches. Entrepreneurs from Wenzhou started churches as they launched

rd
their businesses across China. However, millions of rural young people

fo
migrated to the cities due to China’s urbanisation, resulting in a decline of

Christianity in the countryside and the growth of the urban church in the
ot
N
cities.
In the 1990s and 2000s, a church movement emerged in the cities
among a new group of urban intellectuals. A generation of young people
came to faith after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, resulting in
the emergence of a ‘newly formed emerging urban church’ (新兴型城市
教会). This ‘new wineskin’ urban church consists of mainstream white-
collar professionals and intellectuals. It surfaced independently in cities
all across China, ‘newly formed and emerging’ as opposed to the existing
traditional urban house churches. Many of these urban churches are
64 David Ro
generally theologically Reformed and have developed new alliances and

denominational affiliations. Christianity continues to experience steady
growth in the cities through both urban intellectuals who are coming to
faith and the rural church in its migration to the cities.
Another type of house church is the ‘traditional house church’, which
persevered through an experience of suffering during the Cultural
Revolution. Christians belonging to this kind of house church endured
persecution for refusing to compromise their faith by joining the official
Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), which they consider to be under
.
ly
the control of an atheistic government. Theologically conservative and
on
deeply pietistic, these house-church Christians endured and kept the faith.
The traditional house church exists in the coastal regions of Shandong,
se
Zhejiang, Wenzhou, Fujian and Guangzhou and in the large cities of
lu
Shanghai and Beijing. Several patriarchs of this movement, including
na
Wang Mingdao, Allen Yuan, Moses Xie, Samuel Lamb and Li Tianen, who
so
suffered 20 or more years in prison, have already passed away. However,
their legacy continues to inspire today’s house-church Christians who
er
remember their persevering spirituality and sacrificial faith.
rp
Fo
House Church and Official Church
e.
China’s Protestant church was estimated in 2015 to comprise some 55

l
million members in the unregistered house churches and about 30 million

sa
in the official Three-Self Patriotic Movement church. House churches are

re
Evangelical in theology and have no formal membership in any foreign

or
organisations. The official China Christian Council has been a member

n
of the World Council of Churches since 1991 and is aligned theologically

tio
with the liberal mainline denominations. At the grassroots, however, both

bu
TSPM pastors and house-church leaders tend to align with Evangelical

tri
doctrine and practice unless prevented by the authorities. Typically, they

is
regard the Bible as central to their faith, believe in a conversion born-again

rd
experience by grace through faith in Jesus Christ to be saved, accept in

fo
literal terms the biblical accounts of the miracles and the virgin birth, and
are evangelistic within their limitations.
ot
Why doesn’t the house church submit to the authorities and join the
N
official TSPM? In general, house-church Christians are patriotic Chinese

citizens and do not hold animosity towards the Communist Party. At the
same time, house-church believers as a matter of conscience have decided
not to compromise with an atheistic government on faith- and church-
related matters. The ‘A Joint Statement by Pastors’ explains this position:
Christian churches in China are willing to obey authorities in China whom

God has appointed and to respect the government’s authority to govern
society and human conduct. We believe and are obligated to teach all believers
in the church that the authority of the government is from God and that as
long as the government does not overstep the boundaries of secular power laid
out in the Bible and does not interfere with or violate anything related to faith
or the soul, Christians are obligated to respect the authorities, to pray fervently
for their benefit, and to pray earnestly for Chinese society.
House-church leaders often look to Wang Mingdao, who suffered 26 years

in prison (1955–80) for his uncompromising stance. Wang’s famous quote,
.
‘it is because of our faith [我们是为了信仰]’, implied that his persecution
ly
was not because of politics but because of his refusal to compromise by
on
joining the TSPM. Wang viewed the TSPM as being under the control of
se
an atheistic Communist Party that became the final authority on church-
lu
related matters, especially the appointment of pastors.
na
The Chinese house-church position is the historic Evangelical Protes-
tant theology of suffering and martyrdom sometimes called ‘cooperative
so
resistance’. This involves cooperating with the authorities unless under
er
attack for faith-related matters, when believers appeal to a transcendent
rp
standard above the law. The house churches’ uncompromising coopera-
Fo
tive resistance does not preclude the desire to be a legally recognised entity
outside of the control of the TSPM. In 2005, a prominent urban house
e.
church, Beijing Shouwang Church, attempted to register with the govern-

l
sa
ment when a new regulation allowed for legal registration apart from the
re
TSPM. This Beijing house church submitted all the required documents,
or
but the government rejected the application on the basis that the TSPM
did not ordain or recognise any of the pastors.
n
tio
If a future legal registration process for house churches does not

bu
provide a satisfactory answer to the question of who the head of the

church is, we can expect a return to the same problem seen in the previous
tri
generation. The 2018 decision by the Vatican to enter into an agreement

is
rd
with the Chinese government is viewed with anxiety by some house-

church leaders, who fear that it will ‘keep China in charge of the church’,
fo
with priest appointments decided by the Chinese government and only

ot
veto power given to the Pope. The house churches might soon divide
N
over this issue of the separation of church and state. The more conserva-
tive house-church leaders would consider those who sign away part of
their autonomy as compromisers, calling them ‘a new TSPM’. More than
400 pastors and elders who have signed the non-compromising Joint
Statement represent millions of house-church Christians. They are ready
to be the new generation of torchbearers for the principle of freedom from
state control, repeating Chinese church history by suffering in prison for
this conviction like Wang Mingdao.
66 David Ro
The essential difference between the TSPM and the house church is not
necessarily legal status but overall direction. While the TSPM church is
focused on a Five-Year Plan for Sinicisation (2018–22) and works closely
with the governing Communist Party, the house church is in preparation
to impact the world through urban church planting and global missions.
The house-church movement is now expanding globally by sending cross-
cultural missionaries overseas. Rural house-church networks have already
been sending hundreds of missionaries to serve in many difficult regions
of the world through the Back to Jerusalem Movement. Urban house-
.
ly
church leaders are planting churches in the cities as well as preparing for
on
a Mission China 2030 vision to send 20,000 missionaries by the year 2030.
House-church attitudes to the official TSPM church vary, ranging from
se
compassion to indifference to strong negativity. The younger urban house
lu
churches that have not experienced persecution have less animosity to the
na
TSPM than the traditional house-church generation. Their attitude is often
so
indifference, as they worship in an unregistered house church due to prac-
ticality and expediency. Other house-church leaders feel compassion for
er
their TSPM counterparts, as they consider them to be under the ‘bondage’
rp
of an atheistic ruler. For example, urban house-church leaders travelled
Fo
to Wenzhou at considerable risk to show support for the Wenzhou TSPM
e.
when crosses were removed from some churches. Among the traditional
l
house churches, a strong negative feeling to the TSPM persists as they

sa
remember the persecution that resulted from their refusal to join.

re
Nevertheless, the existence of both the TSPM and the house churches
or
can be mutually beneficial. TSPM churches can benefit from the house
n
churches, as the authorities often give them a freer hand when the house
tio
churches are under attack. For example, a Beijing TSPM church was
bu
permitted to plant new church meeting points when a nearby house church
tri
was under attack in order to encourage house-church members to join the

is
Three-Self church. At the same time, the house churches benefit from the
rd
TSPM, as many house-church believers’ first exposures to Christianity

fo
were through TSPM churches. The TSPM’s legal status also allows for the
printing of millions of Bibles through Amity Press. On occasion, TSPM
ot
leaders have provided legal protection for house-church religious activity.

N
Worship, Spirituality and Pastoral Life

Spirituality and worship styles vary according to the different kind of
churches. The traditional house-church worship is conservative, funda-
mentalist and pietistic, usually done in smaller groups in private homes.
The rural house church closely aligns with Pentecostal/Charismatic spiritu
ality, emphasising the experiential in worship, prayer, Bible study, simple
faith and evangelistic fervour. Hundreds of indigenous worship songs
have been written by a rural middle-school-educated hymn writer called

Lü Xiaomin, drawing on experiences of hardship and suffering. The urban
house church is usually led by a full-time pastor focused on preaching of
the Word and is usually more Reformed and theologically grounded, with
an orderly congregational worship and governing structure. Urban house
churches have moved from homes to office complexes but still call them-
selves ‘house churches’ since they originally started in homes, as opposed
to the church buildings of the official TSPM. Some ‘house churches’ in
Wenzhou have cathedral-style buildings like the TSPM. In the earlier days,
.
ly
worship in homes would involve 20–60 worshippers crowded together
on
under tight security. Only the faithful believers would be invited, as gov-
ernment infiltrators were considered a real threat.
se
The overall house-church spirituality springs from the historic Evan-
lu
gelical pietism of the earlier missionaries such as Hudson Taylor and the
na
China Inland Mission. It is marked by prayer, Bible study, deep affection
so
for God, repentance, evangelism, simple living and a deep faith in God
under extreme circumstances. Chinese characteristics have included
er
courage, sacrifice, perseverance and suffering, developed from the way of
rp
the cross through persecution and the example of patriarchs like Wang
Fo
Mingdao. John Sung made a mark on the house church through his evan-
e.
gelistic revivals, which stressed repentance, being filled with the Holy
l
Spirit and personal holiness. Watchman Nee and the Brethren Movement
sa
influenced house-church ecclesiology and its emphasis on the laity. Other

re
indigenous influences include the Jesus Family, with its emphasis on

or
communal living, simple lifestyle and brokenness. More recently, Koreans

n
have influenced the urban house church with prayer, the ordination of
tio
pastors, larger church buildings, shepherding the congregation, disciple-

bu
ship, tithing and overseas cross-cultural missions.

tri
is
Theological Fault Lines

rd
The house church has split into two major camps: the Charismatic-leaning
fo
rural and the urban Reformed. The majority of the rural church networks
are shaped by Charismatic and Holiness influences from Arminian
ot
theology. The newly formed emerging urban churches and the traditional
N
house church in the coastal cities have generally adopted Reformed

theology. This summary is, however, an oversimplification, as these
divisions are also caused by historical lineage, rural and urban differences,
younger and older generations, power struggles and personalities.
The large rural networks from Henan, Wenzhou and Anhui have
Pietistic, Holiness and Pentecostal Charismatic leanings. Though Pietism,
the Holiness Movement and Pentecostalism influenced the church even
before the communist takeover, it was after the opening up of China in
68 David Ro
the 1980s that Pentecostal missionary Dennis Balcombe introduced the

baptism of the Holy Spirit. However, the term ‘Charismatic’ has negative
connotations for some. The two largest networks, Yinshang from Anhui
and the China Gospel Fellowship from Henan, would not call themselves
Charismatic. Some urban church pastors influenced by the third-wave
Charismatics are largely rejected by the Reformed urban churches.
More recently, Charismatic influences have come through the ‘Coming
Home’ conferences led by Egyptian-Canadian elder David Damien from
Vancouver. Overseas Chinese Charismatic pastors invited Damien to hold
.
ly
a Coming Home conference in Hong Kong in 2010, and 5,000 supporters
on
attended. The following year, 12,000 believers came together, two-thirds
of them from mainland China. In 2012, the number increased to 15,000,
se
and in 2016 the total attending the conference reached 30,000, probably the
lu
largest-ever gathering of mainland Chinese Christians outside of China.
na
Reformed theology has also experienced a resurgence. Overseas Chinese
so
Reverend Stephen Tong and Dr Jonathan Chao along with Korean Presby-
terians had an earlier impact with the introduction of Reformed theology.
er
More recently, a Reformed church-planting ministry called Grace to City
rp
was launched in 2012 with a vision to see churches planted in the cities of
Fo
China. Some 50–70 urban churches were planted between 2012 and 2018,
e.
and there are plans to launch more. A younger generation of house-church

l
participants has attended large conferences in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In

sa
2014 in Hong Kong, 1,500 met. In 2017, the 500th anniversary of the Refor-
re
mation was celebrated by 2,700. In August 2018, around 800 participants

or
met in Kinmen, Taiwan, for the conference Gospel-Centred Discipleship.

n
The gospel-centred church-planting city movement has fostered a re-

tio
surgence of Reformed theology and a return to denominations. However,

bu
more significant is a return of the doctrine of grace and the centrality of

tri
Christ’s work on the cross. For a younger generation, the gospel-centred

is
grace has been a breath of fresh air against the traditional legalistic house-
rd
church culture. During a period of persecution, faithful obedience in the

fo
midst of suffering became the dominant theme.

Another reason for the popularity of Reformed theology among urban
ot
intellectuals is a doctrinal foundation along with organisational structure.

N
An anti-intellectualism from fundamentalism influenced the traditional

urban churches and rural networks. These older churches viewed theolog-
ical education with scepticism. For the more-educated Christian urbanites
and even some traditional churches, the Reformed faith provided an all-
inclusive system of doctrine and practice that made sense.
Reformed denominations have returned to China. Reformed pastors
have been forming alliances and creating new associations and denomin
ations. Critics have alleged that some of these Reformed pastors with
Presbyterian denominational alliances have become ‘hyper-Calvinist’ as

they now no longer associate with non-Reformed pastors and churches.
Several younger pastors who studied in seminaries abroad have returned
to China to establish a network of ‘Returnee Seminarians’. Many of these
overseas-educated younger pastors have decided to align themselves with
the Reformed Baptists and are less exclusive than the Presbyterians.
China’s Reformed church mission is primarily a gospel-centred
church-planting movement in the cities, with a strong emphasis on the
distinction and importance of Reformed theology. Reverend Wang Yi,
.
ly
pastor of Early Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu, has been very vocal
on
and courageous in pointing out the injustices of society. He has also been
the leading voice defending the churches from recent government attacks
se
and has been attacked by the authorities for conducting memorial services
lu
for the victims of the Tiananmen Square incident and the Sichuan earth-
na
quake. Reformed churches have little interest in joining the Mission China
so
pastors who are engaged in a global endeavour to send missionaries to the
unreached areas of the world.
er
An Overall Political Tightening rp
Fo
China is undergoing an overall tightening in control of all sectors,
e.
including academia, business, entertainment, media and religion. Particu-

l
lar targets include Xinjiang Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Catholics and

sa
Protestants. President Xi’s overall government strategy is the rejuvenation

re
of the nation through a ‘Chinese dream’, with plans to Sinicise 200 million
or
religious adherents to become more loyal citizens. Chinese characteristics

n
must be incorporated into all activities, beliefs and traditions; chief among
tio
them is unwavering loyalty to the Communist Party.

bu
The official Protestant TSPM churches were the first to be targeted

tri
for attacks, which from 2014 often took the form of removing the crosses
is
from church buildings. In February 2018, with new regulations governing

rd
religious affairs, the government instituted some of the most restrictive

fo
policies since the Cultural Revolution. As a result, virtually all religious

activity outside the TSPM became illegal, including attendance at events
ot
outside China. In the summer and autumn of 2018, reports surfaced of

N
a coordinated all-out attack on the house churches. The attacks targeted

regions previously considered quite peaceful in terms of the churches’
relations with the government: Lanzhou, Liaoning, Shenyang, Jiangsu,
Hunan, Hebei, Guangdong, Guizhou, Guiyang, Taizhou and Anhui. In
autumn 2018, the Wenzhou city government issued an order instructing
both TSPM and house churches to stop youth and children’s ministry, and
further warned against church connections overseas. The largest house
church in Beijing has been under attack from the authorities after refusing
70 David Ro
to install surveillance cameras in its sanctuary. The intensity of these

attacks has far surpassed anything seen in recent years. Cross removals
and church demolitions previously experienced in Wenzhou have now
shifted to Henan, and hundreds of churches have suffered persecution.
In response to the wave of attacks in September 2018, 439 house-church
pastors and elders signed ‘A Joint Statement by Pastors: A Declaration for
the Sake of the Christian Faith’. This stressed the following principles:
the Bible is the Word of God, carrying final authority over the laws of
the government; Christians will be willing to walk the way of the cross
.
ly
of Christ, following the examples of the saints who suffered and were
on
martyred for their faith; the house churches respect and submit to govern-
ment authority; and under no circumstances will the pastors and elders
se
allow the house churches to be under the control of the government, being
lu
willing to pay any price for this principle. Particularly significant is the last
na
statement: ‘For the sake of the gospel, we are prepared to bear all losses –
so
even the loss of our freedom and our lives’.
Are we to expect a ‘winter season’ for Christians for the foreseeable
er
future under President Xi’s reign? With the removal of presidential term
rp
limits, China experts predict a harsher environment for all religions,
Fo
including Protestant Christianity, both TSPM and house church. However,
e.
some house-church leaders have been informed by officials of a new era

l
to come that will provide a path to legal recognition. It would be highly

sa
unlikely for a new path to lead to a complete break from at least some
re
government control. House-church leaders have expressed readiness for

or
either scenario, whether a season of persecution or a more open environ-

n
ment. The churches have weathered far worse in the past. A freer, more
tio
open environment would make carrying out evangelism, church planting

bu
and missions far easier. However, greater freedom could have a cost. Some
tri
have expressed the fear that the greater danger is not a harsher govern-
is
ment but a free, materialistic, liberalised world.

rd
An area of concern for the authorities has been religious activities

fo
connected to foreign entities, primarily related to the West but also more
recently South Korea. In October 2010, more than 200 invited Chinese
ot
participants primarily from the house churches were prevented from

N
attending the Third Lausanne Congress on World Evangelisation in Cape

Town, South Africa. The risk of international embarrassment was con
sidered too great. Officials imagined ‘anti-China’ foreign forces infiltrating
the Chinese church to use this occasion to embarrass the authorities while
the world was watching. Though these fears were unfounded, un
fortunately an opportunity was lost, as most were stopped from attending.
The chair of the Lausanne Movement, Doug Birdsall, openly apologised to
China at the Congress:
We are very sorry that those who received the word of Lausanne’s activity in
China did not seemingly understand the spirit and intent of our having people
here from every stream of the church, but we want them to know, not only
those who are our brothers and sisters in Christ but also the leaders of that
nation, that we want the best for the church there and we want the best for the
nation.
The government sees foreign entities, even those with no ill-will, as

a potential threat. Some officials have privately acknowledged that they
might have over-reacted, yet this incident reveals the general mistrust of
.
ly
foreign connections among China’s authorities. According to hardliners,
on
Western powers were using religion to undermine the Chinese govern-
ment. A statement from the new TSPM leader Xu Xiaohung at the Chinese
se
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in Beijing on 11
lu
March 2019 read: ‘Anti-China forces in the West are trying to continue to
na
influence China’s social stability and even subvert our country’s political
so
power through Christianity’.
er
A Global Mission Movement
rp
Urban pastors from the ‘newly formed emerging urban church’ have
Fo
embraced global missions as their primary focus. As a precursor to
e.
global missions, Reverend Tianming Jin, former senior pastor of Beijing

l
Shouwang Church, launched a ‘City on a Hill’ vision to prompt the

sa
urban house-church movement to rise to the surface, changing from an

re
underground church to a visible public witness in society. This paved the

or
way for the urban house church to have a wider operating space for local
n
outreach as well as for the mobilisation of global missions. Even though

tio
Tianming Jin has been under house arrest since 8 April 2011, other pastors
bu
have taken on the global mission mantle. Pastors from Beijing, Shanghai
tri
and Xian have been hosting annual mission conferences to mobilise an

is
indigenous mission-sending movement. Following the Lausanne World

rd
Congress at Cape Town in 2010 and a subsequent landmark gathering at

fo
the Asia Church Leaders’ Forum in Seoul in 2013, Mission China 2030 was
launched ‘to send 20,000 missionaries by the year 2030’. In 2015, the first
ot
in a series of large mission conferences started in Hong Kong, followed

N
by another Mission China 2030 conference in Jeju, South Korea, in 2016. A

third conference was held in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in 2017, at which some
200 students and young people made mission commitments. A fourth
conference, in Singapore, was held in December 2018 for marketplace
ministry and business as mission.
Criticism of Mission China 2030 has been voiced overseas as well as
within China. It is suggested that Mission China 2030 is numbers-driven,
overly optimistic, triumphalist, nationalistic and even too Korean. Rural
72 David Ro
house-church leaders have questioned the passion and faith of the urban
churches. Others have questioned the wisdom of launching a mission
movement at a time with one of the tightest political environments
in decades. Is the church in China ready for missions or is this just the
wishful thinking of a few high-profile urban pastors? The reality of the
challenges and cost of mission-sending has dampened earlier optimism.
The recent attacks on the house churches by the Chinese state, martyrdom
in the field elsewhere, and division within have slowed the momentum.
On 24 May 2017, two young Chinese missionaries – Ms Meng Lisi
.
ly
(aged 26) and Mr Li Xinheng (aged 24) – were kidnapped and later killed
on
by ISIS radicals in Pakistan. The ISIS radicals were most likely looking for
Chinese people to kill as a warning to President Xi’s Belt and Road Initia-
se
tive conference of world leaders on 14–15 May 2017. This tragic loss of two
lu
young lives is viewed by the Chinese mission movement as falling within
na
the long Christian tradition of martyrdom and thus as a significant form of
so
witness to the faith. As Meng Lisi herself stated, ‘If a life sacrificed can be
exchanged for a people’s revival, I think it would be worth it’.
er
The origins of the missionary movement from China can be traced back
rp
to the 1940s, when the first wave of Back to Jerusalem (B2J) missionaries
Fo
arrived in Xinjiang, north-west China. The B2J Chinese missionaries felt
e.
a calling from God to head back to Jerusalem with the gospel but were
l
not able to leave China due to persecution. However, their sacrificial lives
sa
served as an example for the generation to follow. Christians came into

re
contact with surviving members of the first group of B2J missionaries,

or
who were now in their 80s and 90s. One of the best-known B2J ministers,
n
Simon Zhao, served more than 30 years in prison. Seven of his colleagues
tio
died in prison.
bu
A second wave of the B2J movement began around the year 2000,
tri
when a team of 39 Chinese missionaries arrived in Thailand. Hundreds

is
of rural-church missionaries were sent out. The failure rate has been high
rd
for reasons relating to levels of education, cultural awareness and global

fo
sophistication. One of the largest sending networks estimates that it has

sent 140 missionaries overseas. Most of these Chinese missionaries in the
ot
field still struggle with language, culture and fundamental survival issues.
N
Currently, it is estimated that between 1,000 and 2,000 Chinese mission

aries are serving overseas, primarily in the Middle East and Southeast
Asia. As China’s economic influence and global reach are growing, so too
are opportunities for the Chinese Christian missionary movement.
Mission China represents a large-scale mission-sending initiative by
a church that is still not legally recognised. All Nations Church, a house
church in Shanghai, sent out a team to Thailand less than a year after being
attacked. Beijing Shouwang Church sent out missionaries to Africa during
a time when their pastor was under house arrest, and Beijing Zion Church
commissioned overseas missionaries while the authorities recently closed
it down. A sending church has to take into account security concerns both
at home and in the field. China’s political condition requires its church
mission movement to set up low-key, creative sending structures. These
challenges, while difficult, are also helpful for work in regions that are
hostile to Christianity.
Conclusion
.
ly
China’s house-church movement exploded in growth, with millions
on
becoming Christians in the countryside soon after the end of the Cultural
Revolution in 1979, followed by a newly formed emerging urban church
se
of intellectuals in the cities soon after 1989. As the official TSPM church
lu
appears to be focused inwardly on Sinicisation, the house church is on
na
an outwardly expanding trajectory, with a global mission vision to plant
so
churches in the cities and to send 20,000 missionaries to the world. The
challenges are growing with the increased political tightening, as churches
er
across China are experiencing the harshest attacks since the Cultural
rp
Revolution. The cost has been high at home but also in the mission field,
Fo
with the first two missionary martyrs in Pakistan. The threats of divisions
e.
are real between the rural and urban, the traditionalist pietist and grace
l
gospel-centred, the Charismatics and Reformed churches. There seems to

sa
be something beyond what meets the eye: a spiritual movement among a

re
persecuted people on a mission with the gospel of grace and ready to take
or
the way of the cross. The house church in China is on a global mission
n
with a desire to reach a suffering world with the hope of the good news of
tio
Jesus Christ.
bu
tri
Bibliography
is
Aikman, David, Jesus in Beijing: How Christianity Is Transforming China and Changing the
rd
Global Balance of Power (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003).

Balcome, Dennis, China’s Opening Door: Incredible Stories of the Holy Spirit at Work in One of
fo
the Greatest Revivals in Christianity (Lake Mary, FL: Charisma House, 2014).
ot
Conkling, Timothy Garner, Mobilized Merchants-Patriotic Martyrs: China’s House-Church

N
Protestants and the Politics of Cooperative Resistance (Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace In
dependent Publishing Platform, 2014).
Fulton, Brent, China’s Urban Christians: A Light That Cannot Be Hidden (Eugene, OR:
Pickwick Publications, 2015).
Hattaway, Paul, Back to Jerusalem: Three Chinese House Church Leaders Share Their Vision to
Complete the Great Commission (Carlisle: Piquant, 2003).
Hong Kong
Fuk-tsang Ying
.
ly
In 1807, the British Protestant missionary Robert Morrison (1782–1834)
on
arrived in Canton (now Guangzhou), signifying the advent of the modern
Western missionary movement in China. The Chinese Empire had been
se
unwilling to join the international community and the movement of
lu
Western powers into the East increased the tension in Sino-foreign relations.
na
The influx of opium, which was auctioned in exchange for silver to redress
so
a trade imbalance between Qing Imperial China and Britain, led to the
er
outbreak of the Anglo-Chinese War (also known as the First Opium War).
rp
In 1841, the British army occupied Hong Kong Island. The following year,
the Treaty of Nanjing was signed and Hong Kong Island was ceded to the
Fo
British in perpetuity. The boundary of the Crown Colony extended to the
e.
Kowloon peninsula in 1860, and the Qing Empire further leased the New
l
Territories to the British in 1898. Sovereignty over Hong Kong eventually

sa
reverted to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from the UK in 1997. This
re
international city of only 1,102 square kilometres was formally changed

or
from a British colony into a Special Administrative Region of the PRC.

n
Hong Kong Island lacks natural resources. When it was occupied by

tio
the British, its population was only a few thousand. Lord Palmerston
bu
(1784–1865), the British foreign secretary, mocked Hong Kong as nothing

tri
but ‘a barren island with hardly a house upon it’. The main focus of the
is
British was cementing Hong Kong’s strategic role in its policy towards
rd
China, as the island functioned as a stepping stone for the British Empire
fo
to enter China. A similar understanding was shared by most of the

Christian missionaries to China. The development of Christianity in Hong
ot
N
Kong was built upon a ‘go into China’ mindset. In the nineteenth century,
Hong Kong became a springboard to South China and logistical base for
Western missionary societies. To understand the development of Christi-
anity in Hong Kong, one must view it from the setting of South China.
The Roman Catholic Church was established there as an apostolic
prefecture in 1841; the prefecture expanded to cover part of Guangdong
Province (Xin’an and Huiyang prefectures) and became an apostolic
vicariate in 1874. In 1946, the Hong Kong Vicariate was raised to a diocese,
with Apostolic Vicar Enrico Valtorta installed as the first bishop on 31
Hong Kong 75
October 1948. The Hong Kong Diocese was under the jurisdiction of the
Archdiocese of Guangzhou.
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in October
1949, the Western missionary movement in China came to an end. To
sever all ties between Christianity (including both Roman Catholicism
and Protestantism) and imperialism, churches in China implemented the
state-regulated and state-controlled Anti-imperialist Patriotic Movement
(Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement and Catholic Patriotic
Movement), which had self-support, self-governance and self-propagation
.
ly
as its objectives. Against this background, Hong Kong Christianity could
on
not maintain ecclesiastical relations with its South China dioceses and was
forced to operate independently. Nevertheless, Hong Kong Christians still
se
felt a strong affinity with churches in their motherland under communist
lu
rule and prayed for the reopening of China. After the Cultural Revolution,
na
the CCP allowed Christian churches to reopen. Hong Kong Christianity
so
resumed contact and exchanges with churches in China and advocated
‘care for the churches in China’ as one of its missions at a Protestant
er
mission consultation held in 1980.
The establishment of Christian churches in Hong Kong depended to a rp
Fo
large extent on support from Western missionary societies for personnel
e.
and finance. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, how to realise
l
self-governance and self-support had been an important issue for the

sa
development of Protestantism in Hong Kong. While different Protestant

re
denominations developed at different paces, by the 1970s most denomina-

or
tions established by Western missionary societies had basically achieved

n
self-support and self-governance. The first local (Chinese) Anglican

tio
bishop, Peter Kwong, was installed in 1981. Protestant Christianity became

bu
rooted in Hong Kong, achieving financial and administrative independ-

tri
ence while maintaining close relationships with ecumenical partner

is
rd
Christianity in Hong Kong, 1970 and 2020

fo

ot

N
Christians 623,000 16.1% 1,146,000 15.2% 1.2%

Anglicans 23,200 0.6% 29,200 0.4% 0.5%
Independents 57,200 1.5% 170,000 2.3% 2.2%
Orthodox 50 0.0% 100 0.0% 1.4%
Protestants 193,000 5.0% 411,000 5.4% 1.5%
Catholics 256,000 6.6% 590,000 7.8% 1.7%
Evangelicals 122,000 3.1% 259,000 3.4% 1.5%
Pentecostal/Charismatics 82,300 2.1% 320,000 4.2% 2.8%
Total population 3,873,000 100.0% 7,548,000 100.0% 1.3%
76 Fuk-tsang Ying
churches. The localisation of the Catholic Church was also achieved in the
1970s, as a consequence of the ground-breaking Second Vatican Council
(1962–5). Bishop Francis Hsu was appointed as the third bishop in 1969 as
the diocese was handed over to local clergy.
After the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997,
according to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, Hong
Kong Christianity was placed under the new ‘One Country, Two Systems’
model. The Hong Kong churches have called for both ties between the
region’s religious groups and the independence and self- management
.
ly
of the Christian church in China to be based on ‘non-subordination,
on
non-interference and mutual respect’ while maintaining and developing
relations with religious organisations and Christians in other regions.
se
The Catholic Church in Hong Kong also sought to play the role of bridge
lu
between the Vatican and China, between the underground church and the
na
official church in China.
so
Protestantism: Denominational Diversity, Church Unity
er
Hong Kong has a large number of denominations. According to the Hong
rp
Kong Church Census of 2014, among the 1,287 local churches, 1,064 were
Fo
under 71 different denominations. Those denominations with the longest
e.
legacies in Hong Kong are identified with the earliest missionary societies
l
that entered the Chinese mainland, particularly South China. The more
sa
prominent societies included the American Baptist Mission (1842), the

re
London Missionary Society (1843), the (Anglican) Church Missionary

or
Society (1843), the Basel Mission (1847) and the Rhenish Mission (1847).
n
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, these five denominations,

tio
along with the Wesleyan Methodist Mission (1882) and the American Con-
bu
gregational Mission (1883), were considered to be the seven traditional

tri
mainline denominations in Hong Kong.

is
From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, the non-
rd
mainstream traditions began to send missionaries to China and began

fo
missionary work in Hong Kong. These included the Seventh-day Adventist

Church (1888), Pentecostal Church (1907), Pentecostal Holiness Church
ot
(1907) and Assemblies of God (1928). The footprints of ‘faith missionaries’

N
in Hong Kong are also visible from this time. In line with the Independent
Movement in China and the development of indigenous churches, inde-
pendent churches with more local essences were also founded in Hong
Kong, including the China Christian Church (1903), Chinese Church of
Christ (1926), True Jesus Church (1932) and Christian Assembly (1936?).
Early in the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), certain denominations, such as
the Evangelical Free Church (1937) and Bethel Church (1937), moved to
South China to escape the war and began ministry in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong 77
The rapid increase in the number of denominations in Hong Kong

occurred mainly from the 1950s. Due to the change in the political regime
in China, many Western missionaries and Chinese clergy who originally
did not have ministries in Hong Kong retreated to the British colony. Wit-
nessing the huge number of refugees flooding into the region, they decided
to launch new services there, targeting the diasporic Chinese, to extend
their visions of serving China. At the same time, some pastoral workers
and Christians also established new denominations in Hong Kong, such as
the Church of Brethren in Christ, Charismatic Mission, Lock Tao Christian
.
ly
Association and Chinese Overseas Christian Mission, resulting in a surge
on
of different denominations. By 1956, more than 300 missionaries were
working in Hong Kong, and over 50 missionary organisations had offices
se
there.
lu
Denominational diversity in Hong Kong has not resulted in
na
estrangements or sectarianism; on the contrary, it has encouraged cross-
so
denominational cooperation. In 1915, the Hong Kong China Christian
Churches Union was established (renamed the Hong Kong Chinese
er
Christian Churches Union in post-war Hong Kong) with the objective
rp
of promoting cooperation among churches in evangelistic and other
Fo
charity works. The Hong Kong Christian Council was founded in 1954,
e.
strengthening the linkage between Hong Kong and the ecumenical

l
movement. In 1975, the amalgamation of the British-affiliated Chinese

sa
Methodist Church, Hong Kong, and the American-affiliated Methodist

re
Church, Hong Kong, marked a major step towards church unity.

or
n
Catholicism: Diverse Individuals, Universal Church

tio
A variety of Catholic religious and missionary institutions arrived in

bu
Hong Kong in the nineteenth century: the Order of Friars Minor (1842),
tri
Paris Foreign Mission (1847), Sisters of St Paul de Chartres (1848), Pon-

is
tifical Foreign Missions Institute (1858), Canossian Daughters of Charity

rd
(1860) and Order of Preachers (Dominican Fathers, 1861). They started the
fo
difficult task of exploring mission in China through the colony. During the
twentieth century, Jesuits, Maryknoll sisters, Salesians, Sacred Heart and
ot
other religious orders and missionary congregations also arrived to start

N
their missions. Responding to the influx of refugees in turbulent post-war

Hong Kong, 27 new religious institutions arrived during the 1950s and
1960s.
Since the reform and opening up of China in 1979, some religious orders
have also built connections in mainland China. The Hong Kong Diocese
now hosts 47 religious orders and missionary congregations, from Italy,
France, Spain, the USA, Canada, Ireland, Mexico, India, Australia and the
Philippines. While stressing the universality of the church, the Catholic
78 Fuk-tsang Ying
Church in Hong Kong manifests great diversity. Some orders, such as the
Jesuits, specialise in education, while others, such as the Little Sisters of
the Poor, focus on service to the poor and elderly.
Church Growth
The different missionary societies and congregations in Hong Kong had
far fewer resources than their counterparts in South China because of the
effects of the Conquer China for Christ Movement and the evangelisation
of China. The overall development of Christianity during its first 100 years
.
ly
in Hong Kong was slow. Before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in
on
1937, Protestants in Hong Kong numbered about 10,000, only 0.5% of the
total population. According to the statistics of Hong Kong Dioceses, the
se
number of Catholics in 1948 was 33,848.
lu
In contrast, Christianity developed much faster in post-war Hong
na
Kong, particularly after 1949. The 1950s was a golden era for the growth of
so
Christianity there. Between 1955 and 1968, the number of Protestants rose
from 53,917 to 159,359 and the number of Catholics from 64,399 to 235,937.
er
The rapid growth was closely related to the influx of Chinese refugees
rp
after 1949. Hong Kong was a refugee society in the 1950s, which intensi-
Fo
fied local social problems. Benefiting from huge overseas missionary and
e.
relief resources, as well as colonial government policies, the Christian

l
church responded swiftly to address the physical and spiritual needs of

sa
local society. This effort greatly relieved the crisis in Hong Kong society
re
and boosted the growth of Hong Kong Christianity.

or
From the 1950s, a solid foundation for education and social services had
n
been laid by Hong Kong Protestant churches, and Hong Kong had become
tio
a hub of theological education and Christian literature for Chinese-

bu
speaking churches in the region and the diasporic Chinese communities

tri
overseas. The relocation of some theological seminaries and Christian

is
publishers from the mainland to Hong Kong aided this shift.

rd
After the 1970s, however, the increase in the number of Christians could
fo
not match the fast pace of population growth, which resulted in a slowing
of church growth rates. The regular census held by Hong Kong Protestant
ot
churches showed that the number of Christians in Hong Kong remained

N
at about 4% of the population. Protestant churches had a Sunday-service

attendance of 305,097 in 2014. In 1999, a ‘negative growth’ signal appeared
as the number of local churches increased while the number of church
attenders declined. In the twenty-first century, a depletion in the number
of younger-generation church-goers has been a critical issue. The annual
statistics of the Hong Kong Diocese, however, indicate steady Catholic
growth. The resident local Catholic population was around 581,000 in
2017.
Hong Kong 79
Social Change and Cultural Exchange

Although evangelism was China’s main concern about the influx of
Western missionaries, the impact of Christianity’s inner-worldly spirit and
the effects of Western civilisation on social transformation, as revealed by
Christianity, were also significant. During the process of evangelism, Hong
Kong churches did not neglect the needs of the marginalised and disabled,
and offered them care and services. Protestant organisations such as the
Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA, 1901), the Hong Kong Mutual
Christian Improvement Society (1903) and the Young Women’s Christian
.
ly
Association (YWCA, 1920) offered comprehensive charitable services.
on
The missionaries’ emphasis on education rights for girls and care for
the disadvantaged in society contributed to improvement and reform in
se
social customs, and missionaries became pioneers of these issues in Hong
lu
Kong society. For example, Hong Kong churches and Christians were at
na
the core of the Anti-Mui Tsai (slave girl) Campaign from the 1920s to the
so
1930s. As Hong Kong was undergoing an industrial boom in the 1960s,
er
the working conditions of factory workers and increasing labour conflicts
rp
aroused much public concern. A Catholic priest founded the Industrial
Relations Institute in 1968 to encourage labourers to claim their rights. The
Fo
Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee and the Industrial Evangelis-
e.
tic Fellowship were established in 1968 and 1975, respectively, to defend

l
labourers’ rights and advocate the industrial missions of Hong Kong

sa
Christianity. Christianity played a positive role during the rapid changes

re
in Hong Kong society.

or
Western missionaries were also the intermediaries for cultural

n
exchanges between East and West. The Western-style schools with the
tio
longest histories in Hong Kong were established by Western missionar-

bu
ies (such as the Anglo-Chinese College in 1843, St Paul’s College in 1851,

tri
St Savior’s College in 1866, St Francis’ Canossian College in 1869 and

is
St Joseph’s College in 1875). They contributed greatly to the nourishment

rd
of Chinese–English bilingual elites and shaped the bicultural face of Hong

fo
Kong Christianity. These elites with proficiency in Western culture not

only met the needs in the colonial context: quite a number of them went
ot
back to China, contributing to China’s intellectual and institutional reform

N
and modernisation by bringing in new values, knowledge and technology.

Furthermore, Protestant Christianity in Hong Kong also played a
special role in the revolutionary movement of the late Qing dynasty.
Christian civilisation had broadened the visions of many Christians and
Chinese intellectuals. The new concepts of Western democracy and lib-
eralism made them realise the deficiencies of monarchy and stimulated
revolutionary thinking. Hong Kong enlightened the revolutionary ideas
of Dr Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), with Christianity playing an indispensable
80 Fuk-tsang Ying
role. A considerable number of Protestants also participated in the revolu-

tionary movement.
Social Presence
The number of Christians has always been relatively small. However,
the role of Christianity in the public sector is considered indispensable,
particularly in the realms of education and social services. Such develop-
ment not only grew from Christianity’s inner-worldly spirit but also was
closely related to policies of the colonial government. The unique feature
.
ly
of Hong Kong was the post-war government policies on education and
on
social welfare, which benefited the Christian church (both Catholic and
Protestant) as a service provider and partner of the government. During
se
the 1950s, because the social welfare policy of the Hong Kong government
lu
was very passive and was not expected to meet the needs of the new im-
na
migrants, the relief work for refugees in Hong Kong relied on the financial
so
support of international relief organisations, including contributions
from Christian institutions. According to the handbook Working Together
er
published by the Hong Kong Council of Social Services in 1958, among
rp
more than 70 social services institutions, about 30% were affiliated with
Fo
Christian organisations, including the Canossian Sisters Foundling Home,
e.
Society of St Vincent de Paul, Ebenezer Home and School for the Blind,
l
YMCA, Kwong Yam Home for the Aged, YWCA, Little Sisters of the Poor,
sa
Salvation Army, Sisters of the Precious Blood, Church World Services,

re
Catholic Relief Services, Hong Kong Catholic Social Welfare Conference,

or
Maryknoll Sisters Catholic Welfare Centre, Lutheran World Services and

n
Hong Kong Christian Welfare and Relief Council.

tio
Overseas donations began to drop in the mid-1960s, and international

bu
relief agencies, having assessed the refugee question in Hong Kong as

tri
being no longer urgent, were preparing to retreat. The reorganisation

is
of Caritas–Hong Kong in 1966 and the establishment of the Hong Kong

rd
Christian Services in 1967 signified a new chapter of Christian involve-

fo
ment in social welfare. The Hong Kong government also reformulated its
social welfare policy. The new measures adopted by the colonial govern-
ot
ment included cooperation with voluntary/charitable organisations and

N
the adoption of Christian churches as partners.

Under these circumstances, Christian churches, as sponsoring bodies
of schools and social services organisations, could receive government
subsidies to provide education and social services. Nearly half of all
schools and social services agencies in Hong Kong are run by Protestant
and Catholic churches, offering various services to different social sectors
under the supervision of the education and social services departments of
the government. Concurrently, the government allows religious activities
Hong Kong 81
to take place within the related premises. In 2014, almost 30% of Hong
Kong Protestant churches used the premises of publicly funded schools
and subvented social services centres for religious ministry. About 25% of
Catholic congregations and parishes also made use of school halls in their
charge for their Sunday gatherings. Moreover, the churches were allowed
to provide religious education as spiritual cultivation. As a result, the
Christian churches became the government’s major partners in providing
social services, and Christianity was even described as the mainstream of
the social and cultural ideology in Hong Kong. In an epoch emphasising
.
ly
the separation of church and state, this was a unique phenomenon in the
on
history of the ecumenical church.
According to the Hong Kong Annual Report 2016, Protestant organisa-
se
tions operated 180 high schools, 199 primary schools, 260 kindergartens
lu
and 127 nursery schools. They also operated and managed seven hospitals,
na
17 clinics and many social services organisations, including over 100
so
special centres for families and teenagers, 11 children’s homes, 169 elderly
care centres and residential homes, and 59 rehabilitation centres for drug
er
addicts and handicapped persons. For the Roman Catholic community,
rp
252 Catholic schools and kindergartens impart education to about 149,600
Fo
pupils. Caritas–Hong Kong is the diocese’s official social welfare arm,
e.
offering services to Catholics and non-Catholics alike. It provides medical

l
and social services through six hospitals, 13 clinics, 43 social and family
sa
services centres, 23 hostels, 16 homes for the aged, 26 rehabilitation service

re
centres and many self-help clubs and associations.

or
n
Approaches to Mission
tio
Three main approaches have emerged in the understanding of mission

bu
among Hong Kong Protestant churches: the fundamentalist, evangelical

tri
and ecumenical approaches. Differences of opinion among these three

is
have resulted in a broad but often tense theological spectrum. The fun-
rd
damentalists believe that mission is concerned exclusively with preaching

fo
the gospel with a view to the salvation of the individual soul and negates
any form of social concern and participation. The fundamentalists shaped
ot
the theological and spiritual tradition of the Hong Kong churches with
N
evangelistic enthusiasm and revivalist spirit, emphasising the individual’s

born-again experience, living a holy life, reading the Bible diligently,
preaching the gospel enthusiastically and longing for the second coming
of Jesus Christ.
During the 1950 and 1960s, the evangelicals’ social roles were driven
by the urgent needs of the refugees rather than deriving from thorough
theological reflection on Christianity’s social responsibility. After the
Lausanne Congress of 1974, however, the evangelicals began to emphasise
82 Fuk-tsang Ying
social responsibility. This approach considers social services as merely the

means to realise the Great Commission of personal conversion. Facing the
challenges of the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, leaders
of the evangelical movement encouraged Christians to care about Hong
Kong and undertake mission responsibilities. The promulgation of The
Conviction of Hong Kong Christians in Current Social and Political Changes in
1984 was one of the models.
The ecumenicals interpret the gospel holistically and consider social
involvement as an intrinsic part of the witness and realisation of the
.
ly
gospel. Since the 1970s, ecumenicals have been working with other non-
on
governmental groups in fighting for labour rights, pushing forward
community development and even democratising the political system.
se
Having been built by overseas missionaries, Hong Kong churches also
lu
put great effort into their own overseas missions. They have set up mission
na
ary societies and send out missionaries to different parts of the world to
so
fulfil their responsibility to preach the gospel to the world. According to
statistics of 2014, 55.7% of local churches have set up permanent mission/
er
evangelisation ministries.
rp
Catholics, too, believe that Christian faith is relevant to the world.
Fo
According to the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World
e.
of 1965, a large proportion of the world’s population is still struggling in

l
hardship caused by disaster and poverty. To promote world justice and

sa
Christian concern and brotherly love for the poor and afflicted, it was
re
urged that a world organisation be set up to assist in the development of

or
the poorer nations. The Vatican officially set up the Pontifical Commission
n
for Justice and Peace in 1967. However, the implementation of these social
tio
teachings by the Catholic Church in Hong Kong was far from being fully
bu
realised for fear that the social teaching and action might embarrass the
tri
colonial government. It was not until 1977, when the Justice and Peace
is
Commission of Hong Kong Catholic Diocese was established, that the

rd
local churches became better able to fulfil the role of prophet and advocate
fo
for justice and peace in accordance with the social teachings of the Second
Vatican Council.
ot
Hong Kong churches have also launched alternative missions and

N
pastoral care initiatives. Besides traditional prison ministry and gospel-

based detoxification, churches are caring for homosexuals, sex workers,
refugees seeking asylum in Hong Kong and the homeless. They aim to
stand with those who are being ignored and marginalised, sharing their
burdens and struggles.
Internationally renowned Protestant evangelists (such as Billy Graham)
have been invited to conduct large-scale rallies in Hong Kong. One such
annual event is the Hong Kong Bible Conference, which dates from 1928.
Hong Kong 83
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this kind of large-scale evangelistic event

has often been debated within church circles. Pope Paul VI made a historic
three-hour visit to Hong Kong on 4 December 1970. He said Mass at the
Happy Valley Racecourse and preached to the Catholic community. At the
end of his sermon, he said, ‘Christ is a teacher, a shepherd and a loving
redeemer for China too’.
Indigenisation and Religious Dialogue

Hong Kong is a cultural crossroads where East meets West: more than
.
ly
150 years of British colonial rule enabled the spread of Western culture
on
and religions, while the many Chinese migrants settling there helped
sustain and develop traditional culture and customs. Ever since the British
se
settlement in Hong Kong, Eastern and Western religions have coexisted
lu
peacefully. Large-scale religious conflicts and disputes are rare. During
na
the missionary process in Hong Kong, many efforts were been made to
so
integrate Western religion into local Chinese culture.
Hong Kong is a typical immigrant society. The development of Christi-
er
anity reflects this multi-ethnic characteristic. Besides Cantonese churches,
rp
there are also churches belonging to different ethnic groups, such as
Fo
Hakka churches, Chiuchow churches, fisherman churches, Hokkien
e.
churches, and Shanghainese, Fuzhou, Hainan and Mandarin churches.

l
These churches, with local dialects as their defining characteristic, reflect

sa
the discrete situation of immigrants and how they combine religion with
re
ethnic identity, cohering strength and mutual vigilance, and establish-

or
ing identity within the South China Cantonese-speaking community. At

n
the same time, Hong Kong, as an international city where Eastern and
tio
Western cultures fuse, plays host to English, Filipino, Japanese and Korean
bu
churches that enrich the spectrum of internationalisation. Special attention

tri
should be paid to the Filipino community, which constitutes the largest

is
ethnic minority in Hong Kong. According to recent Hong Kong Diocese

rd
statistics, 171,000 Filipino Catholics live in Hong Kong.

fo
The boat people represent another special ethnic group in Hong Kong.
As an ethnic underclass, fishermen were often discriminated against by
ot
the land people. The Hong Kong Harbor Mission Church was established
N
by some Chinese Protestant leaders in 1911 for the evangelisation of the

fishing communities. Later, several Western missionaries of the China
Peniel Missionary Society and Pentecostal Holiness Church also sought to
minister to this specific ethnic group. Immediately after the founding of
the PRC, the South China Boat Mission transferred its work from Canton
to Hong Kong. The integration of the Christian faith with the fishing com-
munities, as exemplified by the distinguished ‘Fishermen Church’, is a
unique example of the practice of indigenised Protestant Christianity in
84 Fuk-tsang Ying
Hong Kong. Indigenisation is a major concern of Hong Kong Christianity.

In 1931, Norwegian missionary Karl L. Reichelt (1877–1952) dedicated a
Christian ministry centre in Tao Fong Shan; it is notable for its design in
the style of a Buddhist monastery. Reichelt was also the founder of the
Christian Mission to Buddhists, which aimed to discover a fulfilment
relationship between Mahayana Buddhism and Christianity.
In the mid-1930s, two Anglican churches (Holy Trinity Church and
St Mary’s Church) were built according to traditional Chinese architec-
tural design, reflecting indigenisation through combining with traditional
.
ly
culture. Another famous church building of Sinicising Christian architec-
on
ture in Hong Kong is the Regional Seminary for South China (renamed
Holy Spirit Seminary in 1964). The design of the building was conceived
se
by the Benedictine father Dom Adelbert Gresnigt. His original intention
lu
was that it would have four sides built around an open courtyard.
na
Owing to a shortage of funds, however, only one side of the building was
so
constructed.
The positive and inventive approach of the Catholic Church towards
er
other religions is intimately connected with other new directions resulting
rp
from the Second Vatican Council, which spoke clearly about dialogue
Fo
with other religions. Moreover, liturgy in local dialects and sacred music
e.
in Cantonese (instead of Latin) also signalled a significant renewal in the

l
expression of the faith with local forms.

sa
Hong Kong has always been an important platform for religious

re
dialogues. The Christian Study Center on Chinese Religion and Culture,

or
established in 1957 by Sino-foreign church members, is another in-

n
digenised organisation supported by ecumenical partners and local

tio
churches. In 1978, representatives of Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Confucian-

bu
ism, Protestantism and Catholicism established the Colloquium of the Six

tri
Religious Leaders of Hong Kong to exchange views on different current

is
social issues from their respective positions, seeking common ground

rd
while preserving differences between religious faith and social practices.

fo
The Colloquium is not just a pioneer in Chinese society: it also embodies

mutual respect among different religions and the spirit of inclusiveness.
ot
N
Facing up to Challenges
Since the advent of British colonisation in 1841, with the exception of a
turbulent period during the Japanese occupation (December 1941 to
August 1945), Hong Kong Christianity has developed in a relatively stable
social environment, resulting in an accumulation of abundant resources
and experiences. In the 1980s, shadowed and confronted by the 1997
question, Hong Kong churches worried about their prospects – in particu-
lar, whether the original religious freedom could be sustained and whether
Hong Kong 85
the communist Beijing government would restrain the churches from

participating in education and social services, to reduce their influence in
the public domain. In response to the signing of the Sino-British Joint Dec-
laration in September 1984, Bishop John B. Wu of the Hong Kong Diocese
made a ‘Statement on the Catholic Church and the Future of Hong Kong’,
which underlined the right to religious freedom as a basic human right
and expressed the wish that this right and its free exercise be explicitly
expressed and effectively guaranteed in the Joint Declaration and in
the Basic Law of the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
.
ly
(SAR). A similar statement, signed by the leaders of some 200 Hong
on
Kong Anglican and Protestant churches, was communicated to both the
Chinese and the British governments. Eventually, provisions in the Basic
se
Law stipulating that ‘the Government of Hong Kong Special Administra-
lu
tive Region shall not restrict the freedom of religious belief’ and ‘religious
na
organizations may, according to their previous practice, continue to run
so
seminaries and other schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions, and to
provide other social services’ (article 141) directly addressed the worries
er
felt by members of religious communities.
rp
During the years since the transfer of sovereignty, the Hong Kong
Fo
churches have faced various challenges. Some Christian leaders, both
e.
Catholic and Protestant, have taken a very clear-cut stance in fighting

l
for democracy in Hong Kong. Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-Kiun, Emeritus

sa
Bishop of Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, often voiced his concerns

re
about the critical situation of local society. The Protestant involvement

or
(including clergy, Christian professionals and young Christian students)

n
in the large-scale civil disobedience movement in 2014 was also remark-

tio
able. In the rapidly changing social and political environment, tensions

bu
among different political stances have also emerged within the Christian
tri
community, resulting in a lack of consensus on the role of the Christian

is
church in public affairs.

rd
In recent years, the Beijing government has strengthened its govern-

fo
ance and control of Hong Kong, intensifying contradictions between

Hong Kong and the mainland. It has also triggered different explorations
ot
by the Hong Kong Christian churches of their own identity and how
N
to face up to the Chinese authoritarian regime. As the Hong Kong SAR

govern ment pushes forward reforms in education and social services
as well as its relations with service providers, the question of how the
Hong Kong churches adjust their role is widely debated. Any substantial
changes in school and social services policy by an unsympathetic or un-
friendly government would present great challenges to the development
of the Hong Kong churches. In the development of the worldwide Chinese
church, the Hong Kong church, with its special historical background,
86 Fuk-tsang Ying
has enjoyed various opportunities and accumulated many resources.

Changing eras and circumstances have required the Hong Kong churches
to keep abreast of the times to confront the challenges of fulfilling their
mission.
Bibliography
Ha, Louis, ‘The Foundation of the Catholic Mission in Hong Kong, 1841–1894’, PhD dis-
sertation, University of Hong Kong, 1998.
Leung, Beatrice, and Chan, Shun-hing, Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong,
1950–2000 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003).
.
ly
Smith, Carl T., Chinese Christians: Elites, Middlemen, and the Church in Hong Kong (Hong
on
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984).
Ying, Fuk-tsang, and Pan-chiu Lai, ‘Diasporic Chinese Communities and Protestant Christi
se
anity in Hong Kong during the 1950s’, Studies in World Christianity, 10:1 (2004), 36–153.
lu
na
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Macau
Louis Ha
As of 2018, Christians in Macau constituted only around 5% of the 660,000
.
ly
population, with around 30,000 Catholics and about 8,000 Protestants, of
on
whom not more than half were actively attending church services. This
Christian presence traces its origins to the arrival of Portuguese traders and
se
Catholic priests in Macau in 1553. The former came to exploit the lucrative
lu
silk trade between China and Japan, while the latter had the Catholic
na
mission as their calling, with a papal mandate. At first, the missionaries
so
served only the Portuguese and other foreigners, but before long Macau
er
became a stepping stone for the Jesuits to enter China.
rp
The Catholic hierarchy was set up in Macau when it became a suffragan
diocese of Malacca in 1576, covering the whole of the Far East, including
Fo
Indochina, China, Mongolia, Japan and Korea. The Bishop of Macau
e.
started to provide social and medical services to the settlers. In 1594, the
l
Jesuit-run St Paul’s College was opened to offer the first university degree
sa
in Asia. However, it was closed for more than two decades during the
re
eighteenth century when the Jesuits were banned from Macau.

or
Macau was given the name ‘City of the Name of God’ by the King of
n
Portugal in 1654. Despite this high accolade, the city was trapped in the
tio
tension between Portugal, Spain and the Holy See in matters relating to
bu
the appointment of a bishop. As a result, Macau went without a bishop

tri
from 1633 to 1690.

is
Catholic missionaries expelled from China in 1746 after the Rites

rd
Controversy eventually settled in Macau. They suffered a setback in 1834

fo
when Macau, following a policy of the Portuguese monarchy, confiscated

all the properties of religious orders. A year later, the church building that
ot
N
was part of St Paul’s College was destroyed in a fire. The remaining façade
became one of Macau’s best-known landmarks. Along with eight other
baroque-style church buildings it formed an area that was declared to be a
UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2005.
In 1887, the Portuguese signed a treaty with the Qing court and thereby
formally obtained the governance of Macau. After this, the Catholic mission
started to take the Macau Chinese seriously as a missionary target. During
the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), drastic changes occurred in Macau that
transformed the pro-Taiwan enclave into a ‘patriotic’ pro-mainland one.
88 Louis Ha
This put a sudden stop to some traditional pro-Taiwan Catholic schools

and created a chilling effect on other church activities. The change was
affirmed politically by the Joint Declaration in 1987, which led to the
handover of Macau to China in 1999.
During this modern period, Domingos Lam (林家駿, 1928–2009) became
the first Chinese bishop of Macau in 1988 and began the localisation of the
church. In 2016, Auxiliary Bishop Stephen Lee (李斌生, b. 1956) of Hong
Kong was transferred to Macau to replace Bishop José Lai (黎鴻昇, b. 1946),
who retired early for health reasons. Under Bishop Lee, the church has
.
ly
undergone a series of reorganisations, with a new emphasis on formation
on
activities, particularly for the youth.
Formerly, Mass in the Catholic Church was offered only in the two
se
official languages – Cantonese and Portuguese. Over the past two decades,
lu
Masses in English, Putonghua and Vietnamese also became available in
na
some of the 10 parishes. This reflects changes in the composition of the
so
parishioners, as there are more Filipino workers and new immigrants
from mainland China, while at the same time there has been an exodus
er
of Macanese Portuguese and refugees from Timor-Leste since around the
time of the 1999 handover. rp
Fo
As is evident from this condensed history, missionary work of the
e.
Catholic Church in Macau started very late and the localisation of the
l
church began even later.

sa
re
Non-Catholic Churches
or
The first Protestant missionary to China, Robert Morrison (1782–1834)

n
of the London Missionary Society, arrived in Macau in 1807. He trans-

tio
lated the entire Bible into Chinese and published the translation in 1823.
bu
Morrison carried out most of his missionary work in Macau, making the
tri
island the birthplace of Protestant Christianity in China.

is
rd
fo
Christianity in Macao, 1970 and 2020

ot

N

Christians 32,600 13.2% 44,600 6.8% 0.6%
Anglicans 200 0.1% 150 0.0% –0.6%
Independents 50 0.0% 2,800 0.4% 8.4%
Protestants 5,400 2.2% 10,200 1.6% 1.3%
Catholics 27,000 11.0% 31,200 4.8% 0.3%
Evangelicals 3,100 1.2% 6,800 1.0% 1.6%
Total population 246,000 100.0% 652,000 100.0% 2.0%
Macau 89
Through the influence of the London Missionary Society small groups

of Protestants emerged in Macau during the nineteenth century. This led
to the foundation of the Chi Tao Church (志道堂), probably the first Chinese
Protestant church in Macau. It opened its first church building in 1906.
It has developed significant educational institutions. The early twentieth
century also witnessed the establishment of the Macau Baptist Church,
which opened its first church building in 1927. The early Anglican Church
in Macau was justifiably seen as a ‘foreign’ church; it was created by Royal
Letters Patent in 1849 as the Diocese of Victoria. Though the church has
.
ly
remained small in numbers, it has the distinction of having ordained the
on
first woman in the Anglican communion to become a priest, Florence Li
Tim-Oi (李添嬡, 1907–92). She was ordained on 25 January 1944 as part of
se
the response of the Anglican Church to the crisis brought about by the
lu
Japanese invasion. The Macau Anglican Church is presently only a mis-
na
sionary area of the Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui (as the Anglican Church
so
is now known in Hong Kong). It has had limited development, with only
four churches, seven schools and nine social services centres.
er
Although the mainline non-Catholic churches, such as the Anglican
rp
Church, the Baptists and the Church of Christ in China, started their work
Fo
in Macau more than a century ago, the fruits are few. During the last 50
e.
years, large numbers of immigrants from mainland China, educated under

l
an atheistic system, have made the development of churches in Macau

sa
unpredictable. At the same time, the churches suffer from a ‘brain drain’
re
of the younger generation from Macau because of their financial structure

or
and political arguments that are not helping the development of church
n
leadership.
tio
However, a conservative Independent church, the Evangelical Church

bu
(宣道堂, Christian Shuen Tao Church of Macau), which is supported

tri
mostly by local members, has seen great development in recent years. It

is
started in 1950 and has established 11 local congregations with a mem-

rd
bership totalling 6,550, more than half of the Protestants in Macau. The
fo
growth might be attributable to its 10-year plans, campus evangelisation,

household visits, more than 10 large-scale evangelisation assemblies since
ot
1978 and the passing of leadership from the Reverend Yam-man Lam (藍欽
N
文, b. 1936) to his son, the Reverend Chung-kong Lam (藍中港), which had
provided continuity.
A Challenging Context
Protestant denominations in Macau are mostly branches from Hong Kong
or vice versa. In either case, they maintain close relations, which find ex-
pression in formation, evangelisation and theology exchanges. Christians
in Macau maintained relations with the official Chinese Christian Church
90 Louis Ha
in mainland China based on the principles of non-subordination, non-

interference and mutual respect laid down in the Basic Law of Macau.
After their consecrations, both Bishop Lai and Bishop Lee made visits to
the official church in China in Beijing. Bishop Lam was also a member of
the Basic Law Drafting Committee. At the same time, some individuals
or groups also connect with the underground Catholic community or the
Protestant house-church movement, both of which are deemed illegal by
the Beijing government.
The national security law, which caused a major conflict in Hong Kong,
.
ly
was swiftly passed in 2009 in Macau without much dispute. Moreover, the
on
religious freedom that Christians enjoy was not disturbed by the new law.
Pastoral contacts between the Macau Diocese and the Portuguese Bishops’
se
Conference, based on their historical roots, were also unaffected.
lu
After 450 years of Catholic missionary work and 200 years of mission
na
endeavour by the Protestants, the number of Christians in Macau remains
so
small, while the dominant Chinese religion is primarily ancestor worship
and a blend of Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism. Buddhism in
er
Macau started in 1632, during the Ming dynasty. Several monasteries
rp
and pagodas were set up in the twentieth century as a sign of redevelop-
Fo
ment. Contrarily, there is a decrease in the folk worship of the Goddess of
e.
Macau, which has the oldest temple in the territory.

l
Socially, harmony constitutes one of the outstanding characteristics of

sa
Macau. It accepts a plurality of identities. Christianity, especially Catholi

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cism, is regarded as a Macanese cultural institution, as it is closely related

or
to Macau’s system of education, particularly through famous and cele

n
brated Catholic schools.

tio
The future of Christianity in Macau is hard to predict, as its membership

bu
fluctuates. It is strongly influenced by the contemporary political situation,

tri
as has always been the case throughout history. Perhaps the most pressing
is
problem of Christianity in Macau is how to attract the young, as they are

rd
immersed in an economy that depends mainly on gambling and they often

fo
prefer to work in casinos rather than pursuing other careers. The values
of the gambling industry, however, run counter to those of the Christian
ot
faith. The temptation to pursue material wealth presented an even greater

N
moral struggle for Christians after the relaxation, in the early twenty-first
century, of restrictions that prevented casino employees from gambling in
their workplace. A bright future for Christianity in Macau is hardly to be
assumed.
Bibliography
Berlie, Jean (ed.), Macao 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Chan, Chi-hou, Religion and Culture: Past Approaches, Present Globalisation, Future Challenges
(Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 2004).
Macau 91
Lam, Domingos, A Diocese de Macau (Macau: Publicação do paço Episcopal, 2000).

Latourette, K. S., A History of Christian Missions in China (New York: Macmillan, 1929).
Zheng Wei-ming, and Huang Qi-chen, Ao Men Zong Jiao [Macau Religions] (Macau:
Fundação Macau, 1994).
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Mongolia
Bayarjargal Garamtseren
Mongolia is a large country, at 1.5 million square kilometres, landlocked
.
ly
between Russia and China. The country has the lowest population density
on
in the world, and almost half of its 3.2 million population (2017) live in
the capital, Ulaanbaatar (‘Red Hero’). There are over 20 ethnic groups
se
(2010) in Mongolia, the largest of which is the Khalkh (82%). The Khalkh
lu
Mongolian dialect is the only official and written language, but 20 other
na
dialects of Mongolian are spoken in different regions. The Kazakh and
so
Tuva, who together comprise about 4% of the population, speak Turkic
er
dialects. Since the 1940s, Cyrillic script has been used in all written com-
rp
munication. The communist regime collapsed in 1990 and the country
currently has a single-chamber parliament with 76 members, elected every
Fo
four years. The president, elected every four years, is the head of state and
e.
the prime minister is the head of government. It is estimated that Mongolia

l
has the following religious composition: Buddhism (53%), atheism (39%),

sa
shamanism (3%), Islam (3%) and Christianity (2%).

re
or
Historical Background
n
Christianity arrived in the land of today’s Mongolia in the sixth and

tio
seventh centuries through missionaries and traders from the Church of

bu
the East, representing Syriac Christianity. Turkic tribes, ancestors of the

tri
Mongols, began to embrace the Christian faith, and by the twelfth and
is
thirteenth centuries Christianity was one of the well known and well estab
rd
lished faiths in Mongolia. Four Turkic tribes were Christian, and there
fo
was a specific term for a person of Christian faith, erke’ün. Markos, from
the Turkic Onguud tribe, was the Catholicos of the Church of the East in
ot
Baghdad from 1281 until 1317. The Syriac form of Christianity in Mongolia
N
had its connection with the mother church in the Middle East and had its
own ecclesiastical structure, with bishops, teachers and disciples. A few
archaeological remains – for example, the Runi inscription discovered in
Bulgan province, two Syriac rock inscriptions in western Mongolia and
Christian gravestones and inscriptions in Inner Mongolia, China – testify
to the extent and depth of the Christianity of this period. However,
Christianity declined and ceased to exist by the sixteenth century, due to
the disintegration of the Mongol Empire, assimilation and relocation of
Mongolia 93
Christians, the forceful spread of Islam in the Middle East and the instate-
ment of Buddhism as the state religion in Mongolia.
In modern times, Protestants made attempts to preach the gospel and
evangelise Mongolians, including that of the famous English missionary
James Gilmour in the late 1800s, the American mission in Kalgan among
the Mongols in North China, and the Swedish and other Scandinavian
missions from the end of the nineteenth century until 1924. Catholic
mission experienced sizeable growth in Inner Mongolia from the 1860s
until the 1930s, with the development of a few church buildings, a training
.
ly
college and a Mongolian priest. All Protestant and Catholic mission work,
on
though, was forcefully stopped in 1924 in Mongolia and in the 1930s in
Inner Mongolia.
se
lu
Contemporary Christianity
na
Contemporary Christianity in Mongolia is the result of mission work that
so
began from nothing in 1990, after the country chose democracy and the
market economy. Leadership by foreign missionaries in churches and
er
para-church organisations characterised the first 10 years, until about 2000.
During that time of economic hardship and social disorientation, foreign rp
Fo
missionaries came through NGOs to work with street children, alcoholics,
e.
and the poor and needy, as well as to teach English in educational institu-
l
tions. Teenagers and young adults were the primary regulars in churches
sa
that started in the capital and across the countryside. Evangelistic outreach
re
was common in the form of showing the Jesus film, distributing tracts,
or
door-to-door encounters, friendship, teaching English and the running of

n
various youth camps.

tio
The next 10 years saw the highest growth rate of Christianity and
bu
the advancement of national Christians into the leadership positions

tri
of various ministries. Thanks to the advantages of being a largely

is
rd
fo
Christianity in Mongolia, 1970 and 2020

ot

N

Christians 3,500 0.3% 62,400 1.9% 5.9%
Independents 100 0.0% 24,000 0.7% 11.6%
Orthodox 3,400 0.3% 2,600 0.1% –0.5%
Protestants 0 0.0% 34,000 1.1% 17.7%
Catholics 50 0.0% 1,300 0.0% 6.7%
Evangelicals 10 0.0% 9,000 0.3% 14.6%
Pentecostal/Charismatics 100 0.0% 17,000 0.5% 10.8%
94 Bayarjargal Garamtseren
monolingual society, of the adaptability of Mongolians to hard physical

and climactic conditions, and of the general openness and hospitality of
the people, Mongolian Christians endeavoured to travel to distant as well
as nearby provinces and rural settlements to start Bible study or home
groups and local churches. Foreign missionaries began to leave, and Mon-
golians started to take over their responsibilities. Various Christian social
ministries started in the areas of health, education, family, small business,
agriculture, hospice, care for the disabled, prisons, alcoholics and addicts,
street children and families, orphanages, child protection, radio and
.
ly
television, arts and sports. Church-planting efforts and movements and
on
the sending of Mongolians to overseas missions – especially to China and
Russia, but also to other countries – were most active in this period.
se
The reasons for the rapid growth of Christianity in Mongolia in
lu
this period were the need to fill the spiritual and moral gap left by the
na
communist system, the life-transforming power of the Christian message,
so
the good and sincere spirit of Christian fellowship, the attractiveness to
the youth and young adults, and practical help offered to the needy. Many
er
Mongolians became Christians because the gospel genuinely answered
rp
their fundamental questions regarding meaning and goals in life. The
Fo
Christian churches provided a place where people could experience accept-
e.
ance, concern and love for each other. While, nationally, morality seemed
l
to have been broken on the levels of the individual, family, workplace and
sa
society during the communist era, the Christian message and the Bible
re
brought clear lines between right and wrong, moral and immoral. For
or
instance, sexual relations and cohabitation before marriage had become an

n
accepted social phenomenon even for parents of young partners, but now
tio
Christians took a stand against such behaviour, demonstrating to society

bu
what a holy wedding means. Christians also showed their stance against
tri
alcoholism by holding wedding feasts with no alcoholic drinks. Christians

is
are gaining a good reputation in society for being honest, responsible and
rd
reliable people. The Bible has become the source of guidance for their
fo
personal lives, interpersonal relationships and work ethics.

Today, possibly all leadership and key roles of churches, para-church
ot
organisations, Bible schools, the Bible society, mission movements and

N
mercy and outreach ministries are occupied by Mongolian Christians,

although the declining number of foreign missionaries still play a sup-
porting role. Mongolian Christians have started churches or fellowship
groups among migrant overseas Mongolians, usually affiliated with and
supported by local churches in those countries. These small churches
and groups, about 100 of them, are located especially in South Korea, the
USA and Europe, part of the overall diaspora Mongolian church. Vision
20/10, from the early 2000s, aims to see 10% of the population of Mongolia
Mongolia 95
become disciples of Christ by the year 2020. The National Council of

the Mongolian Church, which aims to lead and provide guidelines for
Mongolian churches and meet urgent needs, has been seeking to lead
this effort. Mongolian Christians have been praying and working for
this high calling, but it asks for much more concentrated effort in evan-
gelism, church planting and leadership development. When the name of
Jesus is no longer a new phenomenon in the country and many people
have become indifferent to religions and more concerned with personal
health and financial gain, effective and contextualised methods need to be
.
ly
explored to reach and disciple today’s Mongolians.
on
Christian Denominations
se
The majority of Mongolian Christians are Protestant Evangelicals (ap-
lu
proximately 60,000), while the Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches
na
each have about 1,500 members. There are about 600 Protestant churches
so
in the country, half of which are in the capital city and the rest spread
across all 21 provinces. The churches started and led by Mongolians have
er
generally good mutual communication and cooperation. This explains
rp
the large percentage (45%) of all churches that claim to be independent
Fo
and have no strong affiliation with a particular denomination. The biggest
e.
denominational affiliation (35%) is Presbyterianism from South Korea.

l
Pentecostal (6%), Baptist (6%), Methodist (4%), Charismatic (2%) and

sa
Lutheran (2%) churches make up the rest.

re
The Catholic Church has one cathedral and six parishes, and over
or
1,000 national believers. They run the Don Bosco Technical and Industrial
n
Training Center, which has over 300 students, mostly from poor families
tio
and school dropouts. The first Mongolian Catholic priest in the modern
bu
era, Father Joseph Enkh Baatar, was ordained in 2016.

tri
is
Government–Church Relations
rd
The government requires all religious groups to register through the city or
fo
provincial council of local representatives after having met certain criteria.

Buddhism is regarded as the traditional religion and has a preferred and
ot
elevated status compared with other faiths. There are no formal relations
N
or discussions between Christianity and Buddhism or shamanism.

Registering Christian churches with the government presents difficulties,
and one province has not registered a single Christian church. About 30%
of all Protestant churches (183 churches in 2016) have registration from the
government. The registration gives the opportunity to employ staff legally
and invite foreign missionaries on a religious visa. However, because reg-
istration needs to be extended every year and the extension process is often
delayed by months, there are practical difficulties in registering churches.
Bible Translation
A Franciscan missionary, Giovanni of Montecorvino, ministered in the
capital of the Mongol Empire, in today’s Beijing, between 1294 and 1328.
In 1305, he wrote to Rome that he had translated the whole of the New
Testament and the Psalms. The next undertaking of Bible translation came
with the effort of I. J. Schmidt, a Moravian missionary working among the
Kalmucks, an ethnic Mongol people in the lower Volga area, from 1815.
Schmidt translated and published the New Testament in the Kalmuck
dialect, while his assistant Badma adapted his translation into the Buryat
.
ly
dialect in 1827. The most important translation came through the great
on
effort and sacrifice of British missionaries, particularly William Swan
and Edward Stallybrass, who were stationed in Buryatia between 1817
se
and 1840. As well as evangelising the people and running an elementary
lu
school, they translated the Old Testament (1840) and New Testament (1846)
na
from the biblical languages into the Mongolian language in the traditional
so
vertical script. This literary translation was revised a number of times, and
er
the last revised New Testament was published in 1952 in Hong Kong.
rp
The efforts to translate the Scriptures into the Cyrillic script were started
in the 1970s by John Gibbens during the communist era and resulted in
Fo
the publication in 1990 of the New Testament in contemporary language.
e.
The Mongolian Bible Translation Committee, a team of missionaries

l
and Mongolians, produced another translation, the ‘Holy Bible’ version,

sa
in the Cyrillic script in 2000. This word-for-word-style translation is the

re
most commonly used version today. In 2014, the Mongolian Union Bible
or
Society, a member of the United Bible Societies, started the Mongolian

n
Standard Version project, aiming to produce a fresh translation from the

tio
biblical languages by a team of Mongolian Christians.

bu
The issue of how to translate the name of God in the Mongolian

tri
language has provoked some debate. In most historic and contemporary

is
translations and revisions, the generic traditional term Burkhan, meaning

rd
‘God, god or deity’, was used. But the 1990 New Testament translation
fo
used a new term, Yertuntsiin Ezen, meaning ‘Lord of the universe’. Since
the Christian context clarifies the referent (namely, the God of the Bible),
ot
and the advantages of the traditional term outweigh any possible dis
N
advantages, almost all Mongolian Christians and churches now use the
term Burkhan. Today, about 250,000 print copies of the Holy Bible have
been sold and the Bible is now available in digital format. Mongolian
Christians read their Bibles and many Christian publications.
Developments in Spirituality and Liturgy

Since most of the Protestant churches were planted and led by foreign
missionaries, the style of worship and leadership structures are usually
Mongolia 97
carried over from the missionary-denomination style to current Mongolian

leaders. Thus, while churches started by Korean missionaries have a Korean
style and flavour in prayer and worship, the Western missionary-planted
churches have a Western style. Many churches use Western musical instru-
ments such as guitar, keyboard and drums to accompany the singing of
translated contemporary Christian songs from English and Korean.
Mongolians are naturally highly gifted in music, dance, art and poetry.
The worship songs composed by Mongolians have been particularly
effective in expressing natural and genuine worship from the hearts of
.
ly
Mongolians. Therefore, there need to be many more Christian worship
on
songs composed by Mongolians with beautiful poetic lines and Mongolian
melodies. Another area waiting for the development of effective and con
se
textualised methods and styles of worship is in reaching out to herders
lu
and people in remote regions.
na
so
Leadership in Churches and Ministries
While in the 1990s and 2000s many of the leadership positions in churches
er
were filled by untrained lay people, today it is becoming increasingly
rp
expected that pastors and leaders will have at least a certificate-level
Fo
Bible-school training. Union Bible Theological College (UBTC), the only
e.
inter-denominational Bible school, with its beginning in the early 1990s,

l
is accredited by the Asian Theological Association and is now largely

sa
staffed by Mongolians who have been trained at overseas Bible schools

re
to the master’s and doctoral levels. UBTC remains the main school where
or
Mongolian pastors and leaders are trained for church and other minis-
n
tries. There are other denominational and church- or ministry-affiliated

tio
Bible training and discipleship schools, such as those associated with the
bu
Assemblies of God, Presbyterians, Methodists, Theological Education by

tri
Extension, Youth With A Mission, mobile training schools to remote areas,

is
Langham preaching, and others.

rd
The fact that the majority of Mongolian Christians are women is

fo
reflected in the gender ratio of leaders. According to a 2015 survey by

Mongolian Evangelical Alliance, 44% of Christian leaders are women,
ot
serving in pastoral and ministerial capacities. Generally, women play

N
a much more active role in society and carry more responsibilities than
men. Out of all women Christian leaders, 15% are single mothers who are
responsible for both their families and their ministries.
The Christian church in Mongolia today is still young and developing;
thus, much strategic and theological work is yet to be done. The biggest
and most fundamental need is the development and maturity of pastors
and leaders. The Association of Mongolian Pastors and Elders recognises
ordained Mongolian pastors and aims to encourage fellowship and
training and to serve the spiritual and emergency needs of pastors. Now
there are more than 400 ordained Mongolian pastors serving throughout
the country and overseas. About one-third of these have bachelor-level
theological education. Mongolian pastors and leaders need systematic
and comprehensive training and coaching that gives not only biblical
knowledge but also more support and development in personal character
and maturity as well as ministerial training. The needs for such spiritual
maturity and character development and striving for unity within the
whole Mongolian church are reflected in the Jeju Proclamation of the First
.
ly
Congress of Diaspora Mongolian Pastors and Elders, which convened at
on
Jeju Island, South Korea, in June 2017.
The formation of Mongolian Christian scholars, researchers and Bible
se
teachers is a felt need for the organic growth and long-term sustainabil-
lu
ity of the church. The Mongolian Research Institute for Christianity was
na
formally established in 2017 to foster the development of the study of
so
Christianity in Mongolia, to accurately inform society about Christianity
and to be a centre for research interaction and cooperation. The Institute
er
held its first symposium in December 2017, covering a wide range of
rp
topics from the history of Christianity in Mongolia to Bible translation and
Fo
current issues for pastoral ministry.
l e.
Bibliography
sa
Baigalmaa, S. (prep.) and D. Batbayar and J. Olonbayar (eds), Khristiin mongol chuulgan,
re
baigguullagyn sudalgaanii dun (Mongol ulsiin khemjeend 2015 ony baidlaar) [Report of the
or
Survey of Christian Churches and Organizations in Mongolia as of 2015]. (Ulaanbaatar:

Моngolyn Evangeliin Evsel, 2015).
n
Garamtseren, Bayarjargal, ‘Re-establishment of the Christian Church in Mongolia: The

tio
Mongolian Standard Version Translation by National Christians’, Unio Cum Christo, 2:2
bu
(October 2016), 49–66.

tri
Garamtseren, Bayarjargal, ‘A History of Bible Translation In Mongolian’, Bible Translator,

is
60:4 (2009), 215–23.

rd
Kemp, Hugh, Steppe by Step: Mongolia’s Christians – From Ancient Roots to Vibrant Young
Church (London: Monarch Books, 2000).
fo
Kemp, Hugh, and Bayarjargal Garamtseren, ‘Mongolia’, in Hope Antone, Wati Longchar,
ot
Hyunju Bae, Huang Po Ho and Dietrich Werner (eds), Asian Handbook for Theological
N
Education and Ecumenism (Oxford: Regnum, 2013), 565–73.

Taiwan
Yang-En Cheng
The establishment of Christianity in Taiwan (known earlier as Formosa)
.
ly
came about in three separate and distinguishable waves. The first began
on
with the Dutch and Spanish colonial enterprises in the seventeenth century.
The second came with the Great Missionary Movement in the latter half of
se
the nineteenth century. The third occurred when, with the defeat of the
lu
Nationalist regime by the communists in China, nearly all of the Christian
na
denominations moved their bases to Taiwan in the mid-1950s.
so
er
Christianity with a Colonial Face
rp
For thousands of years the aborigines who lived on the island of Taiwan
were largely undisturbed by outsiders. Then, in the early sixteenth-
Fo
century, small unorganised groups of settlers and privateers from China
e.
and Japan began to occupy parts of the island. Before the arrival of Dutch
l
and Spanish colonial forces and subsequent Chinese feudalistic regimes,

sa
Taiwan was a ‘no-man’s-land’, enjoying a free and unaffiliated status. One

re
scholarly theory is that the Austronesian peoples originated in Taiwan.

or
During the early seventeenth century Taiwan appeared on the world map,
n
when several foreign powers became interested in invading the island.

tio
In August 1624, in order to safeguard their monopoly of trade in the

bu
East Indies, Dutch fleets and troops occupied southern Taiwan and became
tri
its first sovereign regime. In 1626, Spanish troops despatched from Luzon
is
in the Philippines conquered northern Taiwan, and Catholic mission

rd
aries, predominantly Dominicans, briefly established mission posts.

fo
The Spaniards were expelled by the Dutch in 1642. Under the chartered
system of the Dutch East Indian Company, headquartered in Batavia
ot
(now Jakarta), Dutch colonial rule lasted for 37 years. More than 30 Dutch
N
Reformed missionaries, in addition to catechists and schoolmasters, were

sent to Formosa during this period.
The Dutch Reformed missionaries came to Taiwan and extended
so-called ‘international Calvinism’ beyond European domains. With
military muscle they worked efficiently among the plain aborigines, chiefly
the Siraya tribes, by means of itinerant preaching, catechism, schooling
and moral enforcement. In order to increase trade for the Company, the
church–state policy of Holland was transplanted to this new context.
100 Yang-En Cheng
However, the new faith was not deeply rooted. The translation of the Bible
and the setting up of a seminary for aboriginal converts came too late, and
the method of ‘mass conversion’ proved problematic. The expulsion in
early 1662 of the Dutch regime by Koxinga, a famous general from the late
Ming dynasty, led to two centuries of ‘silence’ so far as Christian presence
is concerned; all traces of the Dutch and Spanish missions had disappeared
within half a century.
Christianity and the Modernisation of Taiwan
.
ly
A second wave of missionary activity in Taiwan began in the late 1850s
on
and 1860s, as part of the Great Missionary Movement of the West. This
was facilitated by the Tien Chin Treaty of 1858, contracted between the
se
Ching Empire of China and several Western nations. With the opening
lu
of trading seaports, Dominican priests from Manila and Amoy arrived in
na
1859 and began the so-called Restoration of Mission. The Catholic priests
so
worked mainly among the plain aborigines in the south and maintained a
‘qualitative’ approach to local converts.
er
Missionaries from the English Presbyterian Mission, many of Scottish
descent, began their work in southern Taiwan in 1865, followed by rp
Fo
Canadian Presbyterian missionaries in the north in 1872. The anti-foreign
e.
mentality of the Taiwanese people elicited several religion-related

l
incidents, resulting in persecutions of both missionaries and local converts.

sa
Under these trying circumstances, the Reformed spirit of nec tamen con-
re
sumebatur (‘and yet it was not consumed’, a reference to the burning bush
or
of Exodus 3: 2) was upheld. Early missionaries adopted a rather compre-

n
hensive approach to mission, engaging in evangelism as well as medical,

tio
educational and social services. These efforts marked the beginning of

bu
modernisation in Taiwan, which lasted until the onset of Japanese rule in

tri
1895, when the Presbyterian mission had to compete with the new colonial
is
government in the provision of social services.

rd
fo
Christianity in Taiwan, 1970 and 2020

ot

N

Christians 933,000 6.3% 1,463,000 6.1% 0.9%
Anglicans 2,100 0.0% 1,100 0.0% –1.2%
Independents 210,000 1.4% 510,000 2.1% 1.8%
Protestants 261,000 1.8% 450,000 1.9% 1.1%
Catholics 305,000 2.1% 240,000 1.0% –0.5%
Evangelicals 127,000 0.9% 225,000 0.9% 1.1%
Taiwan 101
In time, medical work became the most efficient means of mission,

facilitated by advanced Western surgical skills. Indeed, the spread of
the gospel was coupled with the introduction of modern medicine and
the scientific worldview. In contrast, non-medical missionaries were
concerned more with the enlightening of the mind, conversations on
science and religion and the development of a ‘theology of creation’ based
on arguments from design and evidence. This ‘enlightened mission’ and
its educational philosophy can be traced back to the combined impact of
the Scottish Enlightenment and subsequent evangelical revivals. However,
.
ly
with the exception of a few individuals who had strong respect for and
on
identification with the local people, most of the missionaries carried with
them a sense of superiority and paternalism, as well as a strong prejudice
se
against non-Western culture.
lu
From the 1880s, the Presbyterian missionaries felt pressured to start
na
middle schools as preparatory institutions for theological education. Inter-
so
estingly and unexpectedly, after having passed through middle schools, a
fairly large portion of graduates went into various professions and became
er
leading elites in Taiwanese society under Japanese rule. In fact, during this
rp
period, a quarter of all graduates from medical college and two-fifths of all
Fo
those who studied abroad, in Europe or North America, were children of
e.
Christian families. This is noteworthy, given that Christians formed less

l
than 1% of the population.

sa
As was generally true in all Presbyterian missions, the education of

re
women was advocated from an early stage in Taiwan, the pioneers being
or
Hugh Ritchie and his wife Eliza C. Cooke in the south and George L.
n
Mackay in the north. Women’s education under the sponsorship of the

tio
Presbyterian missions was generally free of charge, the only qualifica-

bu
tion for entrance being that ‘the pupils must not bind their feet’. The
tri
women graduates contributed greatly to the life of the church as well as

is
to community cultural life. However, under the influence of the Japanese

rd
frame of mind towards women’s education, the girls’ schools were

fo
also courted to perform the function of training capable and obedient

housewives.
ot
In 1926, the Holiness Church from Japan and the True Jesus Church
N
from China were introduced to Taiwan and began evangelising among the
Taiwanese, thus ending the dominance of the Presbyterian missions and
creating new tensions. These two new churches, nonetheless, remained
small until the end of the Second World War.
Christianity Tested: War and Militarism

In 1912 the English and Canadian Presbyterian missions merged and
formed the Taiwan Synod, the forerunner of the Presbyterian Church
102 Yang-En Cheng
in Taiwan (PCT). From 1915 onwards, when the English Presbyterian

Mission celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, some local leaders, notably
the Reverend Gou Hi-Eng, began to advance the missionary principle of
‘self-support, self-government and self-propagation’. This gradually led to
the formation of a native and autonomous church. It was on this founda-
tion that the church in Taiwan endured difficult times under the Japanese
colonial regime and its aggressive militarism.
With the outbreak of the war against China in 1937, and particularly of
the Pacific War in 1941, the Japanese government accelerated the ‘spiritual
.
ly
mobilisation’ movement, aiming to foster the national spirit and to enlist
on
all religious bodies in support of the war. This reinforced the Royal
Citizen Movement imposed earlier to Japanise the Taiwanese people and
se
their lifestyle and to enforce Shintoism, in association with tennosei (the
lu
emperor system) and military patriotism, on all families and institutions.
na
The question of shrine attendance brought about a collision between
so
the principle of freedom of religion and the national Shinto system. The
Presbyterian schools became major targets.
er
In Japan itself, as the Far Eastern crisis deepened in the 1930s, Christian
rp
views on state Shintoism gradually changed from opposition to accommo-
Fo
dation, with the National Council of Churches in Japan and the Christian
e.
Educational Association adopting the official interpretation that the shrine

l
ceremonies were ‘supra-religious’ and the act of obeisance, the bow, was
sa
simply meant to indicate patriotism and loyalty. This allowed Japanese

re
Christians to cooperate with the war effort. In Taiwan, under the colonial
or
educational system, with the issuance of private school regulations in 1905,

n
attendance at Shinto shrines was already compulsory. Private schools that

tio
refused to take their pupils to shrines were deprived of government recog-

bu
nition, thus blocking the way of their graduates to higher education. In the
tri
end, all Presbyterian schools were forced to make the ‘expedient decision’
is
to follow the ‘non-religious’ interpretation and the policy adopted by

rd
Christian schools in Japan, namely allowing the pupils to attend shrine

fo
ceremonies.
Under the extremely hostile situation and hoping to relieve Taiwanese
ot
Christians of the constant suspicion of being associated with foreigners,

N
both British and Canadian missionaries decided to leave in late 1940 and
early 1941. Around this juncture, theological colleges, church schools and
hospitals, and many churches were either closed or confiscated. In 1944
the two Presbyterian synods, along with Japanese churches, were co-opted
into the Taiwan branch of the Kyōdan (United Church of Christ in Japan)
for convenient control under the wartime system.
In comparison with their counterparts in Korea, and even in Man
chukuo, who chose to resist for their principles, Presbyterian missionaries
Taiwan 103
and Christians in Taiwan seemed timid and acquiescent. The young Pres-
byterian Church in Taiwan, barely self-sufficient and functional, was
caught unprepared. Only a handful of young pastors who were able to
study in Japan learned about Karl Barth’s ‘Theology of Crisis’. There was
no genuine theological reflection on the issue at hand, and thus no courage
was instilled nor acts of conscience followed. However, it is noteworthy
that the small Holiness Church did experience persecution and closure of
churches due to the hostile Japanese policy on its ‘mother church’ in Japan.
.
ly
Ecclesiological Scene after the Second World War
on
The third wave of mission to Taiwan began in the late 1940s. After suffering
defeat by the Communists, the Nationalist regime in China retreated to
se
Taiwan. The situation gradually stabilised under American military and
lu
economic aid after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, in particular
na
with the signing of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954.
so
This led to an influx of missionaries and mission agencies withdrawing
from China and relocating to Taiwan. After the mid-1950s, virtually all
er
denominations were represented in Taiwan. Christian churches seized the
rp
opportunity to engage in evangelistic work among the numerous refugees
Fo
whose lives had been greatly disrupted. The PCT also launched a series
e.
of evangelising movements, of which the Church Doubling Movement

l
(1955–65) and the New Century Mission Movement (1965–78) were the
sa
most significant. Within a short period of time (up to 1960), the number of
re
Christians increased from 51,000 to 220,000, that of seminaries from two to

or
10, and that of mission-related bodies from four to 33.

n
The political refugees fleeing from China, soon referred to as ‘Main-

tio
landers’, numbered around 1.5 million and slowly settled into Taiwanese
bu
society among the 6.5 million ‘Native Taiwanese’. Under unsettling

tri
political circumstances, and influenced by the fact that Chiang Kai-shek

is
and his Methodist-affiliated wife Madame Song openly propagated

rd
Christian faith among high-ranking governmental officers, a significant

fo
number of Mainlanders became Christians and found solace and hope in

their new faith, to a certain degree similar to the situation in South Korea
ot
after the Korean War.

N
Six distinct and emergent Christian groups could be identified in Taiwan

by the mid-1960s. The first included those that already existed before the
end of the Second World War, including the large and well established
Presbyterians and the tiny, late-coming Holiness and True Jesus churches.
The second was the oldest Catholic Dominican mission, soon to be over-
powered and marginalised by the Chinese Regional Bishops’ Conference,
which brought abundant human and financial resources to Taiwan. The
third was the historic mainstream churches comprising the Lutherans,
104 Yang-En Cheng
the Methodists, the Anglicans and the Baptists, all of which paid more
attention to the Chinese refugees and thus established mainly Mandarin-
speaking churches. The fourth was the minor historical churches, including
the Free Methodists, the Mennonites, the Quakers, the Alliance Church
and the Seventh-day Adventists, who established T aiwanese-speaking
as well as Mandarin-speaking congregations. The fifth was Independent
churches, including the Assembly Hall Church (founded by Watchman
Nee and later renamed Church of Christ), Evangelize China Fellowship
and Ling Liang World-Wide Evangelistic Mission Association (now Bread
.
ly
of Life Christian Church), focusing also more on the Mandarin-speaking
on
congregations. The sixth was newly established churches which called
themselves ‘Mandarin churches’ or ‘local churches’.
se
In general, the Han-Taiwanese Christian groups experienced initial
lu
success and growth in the post-war period of the late 1950s and early 1960s,
na
due primarily to the critical political atmosphere of the time. However,
so
after the stabilisation of the political and economic situation, owing
largely to American aid and the martial law imposed by the Nationalist
er
regime, and with gradual industrialisation and urbanisation after 1965,
rp
the growth of the church became stagnant. The only exceptions were the
Fo
non-historical Taiwanese-speaking churches such as the Holiness Church,
e.
True Jesus Church and Assembly Hall Church, which continued to ex
l
perience a certain degree of growth. Han-Taiwanese Christians continue

sa
to be a minority and a ‘community of strangers’ in society at large.

re
On the other hand, after the Second World War, mission work among
or
the aborigines in Taiwan flourished like ‘the blossoming of wildflow-

n
ers’. Growing from around 3,000 Christians belonging to a single tribe,

tio
the Truku, in 1945, to more than 100,000 among virtually all of the 10
bu
aboriginal tribes in the 1960s, this mission movement has been termed ‘the
tri
miracle of the twentieth century’. At the peak of the mission movement

is
in the 1970s, the percentage of Christians among the aboriginal popula-

rd
tion reached 65%, in some tribes even as high as 85%. George Vicedom,
fo
a German missiologist, has identified four factors that led aboriginals to

Christianity in large numbers: Christianity helped them in the process of
ot
assimilation into Han-Taiwanese society; it helped in their resistance to the

N
Japanese; it would improve the standard of living of the tribes; and it filled
the vacuum caused by the failure of the Japanese.
In the midst of this new social and ecclesiastical context, the PCT was
formally founded, resulting from the union of the North and South synods
in 1951. Immediately, the PCT joined the World Presbyterian Alliance and
the World Council of Churches and became an active member of the world
ecumenical community. This young indigenous church, both historic
and ecumenically minded, soon encountered tremendous challenges,
Taiwan 105
including issues of mission and contextualisation, ethnic tension and

national identity, globalisation and economic justice, spiritual renewal
and Charismatic movements.
Meanwhile, with the arrival of the Regional Bishops’ Conference in the
1960s, the Catholic Church has exhibited a strong presence in Taiwan; it
has established hospitals and social services agencies in rural and remote
areas, and founded three universities and three professional nursing
schools. It has also worked continuously among marginalised communi-
ties, in particular the aboriginal tribes, with keen ‘inculturating’ efforts.
.
ly
During the last two decades, the Catholic Church has also laboured and
on
cared for the many Filipino foreign workers in Taiwan.
In line with the spirit of Second Vatican Council and epitomising a
se
major advance in terms of indigenisation, the Rites of Ancestor Venera-
lu
tion were officially adopted in 1971, with Cardinal Yu-Ping officiating the
na
ceremonies, thus marking a break with the historical legacy of the Rites
so
Controversy. Since the 1960s, the Fu Jen Faculty of Theology of St Robert
Bellarmine had engaged compassionately with indigenous Chinese phil
er
osophy and culture, exemplified by the innovative work of Aloysius B.
rp
Chang, Mark Fang and Luis Gutheinz. In addition, Father Andrew Zhao
Fo
Yizhou worked diligently over many years on the translation of Latin
e.
liturgical texts into Chinese and published Institutio Generalis Missalis

l
Romani in 2003.
sa
In 2016, with the re-election of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)

re
government, Dr Chen Chien-Jen ksg khs, a renowned epidemiologist and

or
a Catholic, became vice president. Yet, with the signing of a provisional

n
agreement on the appointment of bishops between the Holy See and China
tio
in September 2018, there are concerns that the long-lasting diplomatic

bu
relation between Taiwan and the Vatican might be jeopardised, potentially

tri
exacerbating Taiwan’s international isolation.

is
rd
Ideological Confrontation and Ecumenical Movement

fo
From 1960s on, the emergent ecumenical movement was threatened by

ideological confrontations under the Cold War framework. The Nationalist
ot
regime (Kuomintang, KMT), embracing anti-communist ideology and insti-

N
gated by Carl McIntire of the International Council of Christian Churches,

a conservative rival to the World Council of Churches (WCC), put great
pressure on the PCT to withdraw from the WCC. With the tacit under-
standing of ecumenical leaders, the PCT was forced to leave the WCC in
1970; it rejoined in 1985. Other mainline churches, including the Anglicans,
Methodists and Lutherans, also left the WCC, but never rejoined.
This tension triggered efforts from Western missionaries for democratic
development in Taiwan. New missionaries arriving in Taiwan gradually
106 Yang-En Cheng
realised that despite Generalissimo Chiang and Madame Song’s claim

that the tiny island-state was ‘Free China’, it was in fact ‘neither free nor
China’. More than 30 missionaries, mostly from the Reformed family,
were politically involved and became ‘voices for the voice-less Taiwanese
people’; they were either deported or denied re-entry to Taiwan in the late
1960s and 1970s.
Since the 1970s, the democratic development and the political future
of Taiwan have become a paramount concern, as well as a divisive issue,
for the Taiwanese churches. In 1971 the People’s Republic of China was
.
ly
admitted to the United Nations and the membership of the Republic of
on
China was concluded. Taiwan experienced diplomatic setbacks and inter-
national isolation. In response, the PCT issued three public statements: ‘A
se
Public Statement on Our National Fate’ (1971), ‘Our Appeal’ (1975) and ‘A
lu
Declaration of Human Rights’ (1977). Through these prophetic statements
na
the PCT called for social and political reforms, proclaimed the right of the
so
Taiwanese people to self-determination, and expressed hope for a ‘new
and independent country’.
er
During this critical stage, drawing on the pioneering theological
rp
work of Shoki Coe and C. S. Song, homegrown theologies were adeptly
Fo
articulated, including Wang Hsien-Chih’s ‘Homeland Theology’, Chen
e.
Nan-Jou’s ‘Theology of Identification’ and Huang Po-Ho’s ‘Theology of

l
Self-Determination’, as well as emergent theologies on gender and eco-

sa
logical justice, aboriginal culture and ethnic identity, contextual liturgies

re
and arts.
or
On 10 December 1979, World Human Rights Day, the momentous

n
Kao-Hsiong Incident, a crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators,

tio
signalled the dawning of a new era for Taiwanese democratic movements,

bu
with the PCT implicated as a civil community. As a result, the PCT was
tri
severely persecuted and suppressed by the Nationalist regime, with the

is
Reverend C. M. Kao, its general secretary, imprisoned for more than

rd
four years. Intriguingly, the ecumenical bodies and the local Taiwanese
fo
churches reacted very differently. On the one hand, the three main ecu-
menical organisations (the WCC, World Alliance of Reformed Churches
ot
and Christian Council of Asia) and more than 30 partner churches all
N
over the world sent representatives or official letters to support the PCT,
whereas other Christian churches in Taiwan, both mainstream denomina-
tions and independent churches, did not share these same convictions and
were critical of the PCT. The grounds for their negative reactions were
not theological in nature but rather stemmed largely from ideological and
ethnic differences in the Taiwanese context. There was an intermingling of
religious faith and anti-communist ideology among the so-called ‘party-
state Christians’ in Taiwan, and this impacted local inter-church relations.
Taiwan 107
From the 1980s onwards, the longing of the Taiwanese people for chhut-
thâu-thin (‘free at last,’ Taiwanese slang signifying ‘political liberation’) and
the PCT’s advocacy of ‘self-determination’ were gradually interwoven
and profoundly contributed to the formation of a new Taiwanese identity.
The Democratic Progressive Party was formed by pro-independence op-
position factions in 1986, and martial law, in force for 38 years, was lifted
in 1987.
Since the late 1970s, these two ‘camps’ (PCT and non-PCT) have often
divided and split on pro-ecumenical/anti-ecumenical lines. Debates re
.
ly
volving around whether Christians should engage in social and political
on
actions or conflicting political ideologies and contrasting attitudes
towards the former Nationalist regime and its China-oriented policy to a
se
certain degree still alienate Christian churches from each other. From the
lu
late 1970s, the PCT continued to embrace an ecumenical ethos and joined
na
hands with the democratic movement in Taiwan. This self-understanding
so
is reflected in the section on ecclesiology in its 1985 Confession of Faith: ‘We
believe that the Church is the fellowship of God’s people . . . both ecu-
er
menical and rooted in this land, identifying with all its inhabitants, and
rp
through love and suffering becoming the sign of hope’.
Fo
Within this intricate context, the Ecumenical Consultative Committee
e.
(ECC) of Taiwan, founded in 1963, was rarely vigorous and responsive

l
in the face of emergent and contentious issues. In 1991 the ECC was
sa
succeeded by the National Council of Churches in Taiwan (NCCT), which

re
has never played a prophetic role and continues to serve only inter-church
or
fellowship functions.
n
tio
The Charismatic Movement

bu
Since the late 1960s, Taiwanese society has experienced rapid social change,
tri
resulting in the breakdown of rural and aboriginal communities. The

is
impact of globalisation has been profoundly felt. Prevailing phenomena

rd
include the disintegration of traditional ethical values, the emergence of

fo
a popular and Westernised ‘mono-culture’, the dwindling of communal

ways of life and ethos, the existence of an individualistic and privatised
ot
mentality among the bourgeois class, the unending pursuit of material-

N
ism and, most critical of all, the confusion of national identity. Inevitably,
Taiwanese Christians have also experienced the challenge and impact of
the globalising trends.
Since the 1990s, one response to the new situation has been the
emergence and growth of Charismatic groups in urban areas. Of these
there are several, variously influenced by Korean, Singaporean and North
American trends as well as developing from indigenous church groups.
From South Korea, these groups were highly influenced by the Prayer
108 Yang-En Cheng
Mountain revival modelled on the Yoido Full Gospel Church under

the leadership of the Reverend David Yonggi Cho; from Singapore, by
high-tech mega-churches, the theology of prosperity and market-oriented
strategies; from Northern America, by Charismatic leaders exercising
healing ministry, ‘Power Ministry’ and church growth movements.
According to Murray Rubinstein, Charismatic Christians account for
roughly one-third of Protestant Christians in Taiwan, with members of
mainstream churches such as the Presbyterians and the Baptists also par-
ticipating in Charismatic activities. He argues that, even as mainstream
.
ly
churches in Taiwan were faltering, this Holy Spirit-centred, experiential
on
form of Christianity continued to grow and to demonstrate dynamism.
Charismatic churches include: the Taiwan Assemblies of God, which
se
are linked closely to their Western roots and mission bodies; the Prayer
lu
Mountain revival movement, which maintained a careful relationship with
na
its Western ‘parent churches’ yet existed at the same time as aggressively
so
independent entities; and the True Jesus Church, which represents the
indigenised wing of the spectrum and is determinedly ‘non-political’,
er
thus offering an alternative form of Christianity to the Taiwanese to that of
mainstream churches such as the PCT. rp
Fo
In addition to the three types of Charismatic groups presented by Ru-
e.
binstein, what is noteworthy in the twenty-first century is the emergence

l
of several Independent church groups – such as the Bread of Life Christian

sa
Church, the Evangelical Covenant Church and the Truth Lutheran

re
Church – that attempted to combine Charismatic elements, cell-group

or
church growth strategies and the mega-church model. In general, with

n
the onset of Charismatic movements during the early twenty-first century,

tio
subjectivist spiritual experiences gradually prevailed among the urban

bu
middle-class churches, especially among young professionals.

tri
Intriguingly, aboriginal Christianity in Taiwan, compared with the tiny

is
and marginalised Han Christianity, emerged as a kind of ‘new religion’

rd
after the Second World War and was embraced by the majority of the
fo
aboriginal population. As first-generation Christians, they exhibited great

energy and dynamic strength of faith, first in Pentecostal movements and
ot
then in missionary activities. Among the various aboriginal Christian

N
communities, the most significant ones are among the Tayal, the Amis, the
Paiwan and the Bunun tribes. One episode will be sufficient to illustrate
their vitality. In 1972, a few churches of the Tayal tribe began to experience
a spiritual revival via itinerant lay preaching and visitations that included
some extraordinary manifestations, such as shaking of the body, going into
trances, falling like a stick to the floor, seeing visions, prophesying and
passing judgements on others (mostly by women). Though controversial
and conflictive, the spiritual movement left a powerful and lasting legacy
Taiwan 109
after some 30 years: not only did these ‘burnt-over’ churches experience
renewal and growth, but they are now engaged in overseas mission work
in Saipan Island, Thailand and Indonesia.
On the other hand, these spiritual movements were severely criticised
as creating and classifying two rival groups of Christians (spiritual and
non-spiritual), promoting self-righteousness and pride, causing division
and schism, being misled by political ideologies and lacking biblical
teaching.
.
ly
Current and Emergent Issues
on
Several issues have special relevance for contemporary Taiwan. The first
of these is transformative justice. The ethnic relationship in Taiwan has
se
always been sensitive and tense and often tangled with political ideologies.
lu
For a long time, the minor ethnic groups were overpowered and marginal-
na
ised by the dominant groups, especially the so-called ‘internal colonialism’
so
that was experienced by the aboriginal peoples. There is a pressing need
for transformative justice as well as healing of historical wounds.
er
In 2016, the DPP government offered a formal apology to all aboriginal
rp
peoples in Taiwan, followed by a resolution issued by the PCT to stand in
Fo
solidarity with the aborigines. The Transitional Justice Commission was
e.
formally established in 2017 to deal with major political incidents and

l
grave cases of injustice during the White-Terror Era, that is, the martial
sa
law period which began in 1947 and was marked by the suppression of
re
political dissidents. Evidently, however, the old KMT political alignment

or
and associated groups will resist and fight for their vested interests. Will
n
some of the Christian churches still be entangled in the party-state alliance

tio
and struggle against structural reform? Should the churches advocate for
bu
restorative justice instead of transformative justice?

tri
The second issue is the rise of civil society. Despite the lifting of martial
is
law and the beginning of the end of dictatorial rule in 1987, the building of
rd
civil society in Taiwan never truly got underway. In the midst of political
fo
reform and social and economic transformations, politics and economics

continued to assume command, with the government and big corpora-
ot
tions continually manipulating power and resources and the so-called

N
‘third sector’ constantly compressed and pushed to the corner. The non-
profit and non-governmental organisations, and grassroots and advocacy
groups were largely marginalised and not able to facilitate social change
or transformation.
After two peaceful yet painful transfers of political regime in 2000
(DDP) and 2008 (KMT), the majority of the Taiwanese people were
certainly awakened by the civil movements in 2013 and 2014, especially the
Sunflower Movement. This was a protest movement driven by a coalition
110 Yang-En Cheng
of students and civic groups against the passing of the Cross-Strait Service
Trade Agreement by the ruling KMT party. The Trade Agreement sym-
bolised the younger generation’s fear that trade with China would hurt
Taiwan’s economy and leave it vulnerable to political pressure from
Beijing. This movement resulted in the election of a new DPP government
and the first woman president, Dr Tsai Ing-wen, in 2016.
Thus, within the first two decades of the third millennium, the pursuit
of civil power and the establishment of a robust civil society have become
a compelling reality in Taiwan. The younger generations, born and
.
ly
educated after the martial law era, were able to receive better ideas about
on
human rights, democracy and independent thinking, and have a well
founded sense of Taiwanese identity. These new energies had triggered
se
greater civil awareness. How are the Christian churches responding to
lu
these rising powers?
na
The Cross-Straits Christian Forum is a third issue of relevance.
so
Taiwan’s national identity and the identity of the Taiwanese people
continue to occupy the minds of Christians. From the 1990s onwards,
er
after the internal process of gradual indigenisation and democratisation,
rp
Taiwan began to face the external threat and hegemonic pressure of China
Fo
as a ‘rising power’, with political, diplomatic, military, economic, cultural
e.
and even religious measures. The struggle for a ‘normalised’ national

l
identity and a ‘dignified’ identity for the Taiwanese people remains a

sa
pressing issue.
re
When the China Christian Council (CCC) joined the WCC in 1991
or
and became an active player on the ecumenical stage, the relationship

n
between the PCT and the CCC presented itself as a challenging issue for
tio
the ecumenical community. Many ecumenical partners even considered

bu
the interaction between the two churches as a situation of ‘impasse’ and

tri
urged for open dialogue. From the early 2010s onwards, the CCC created
is
a Cross-Straits Christian Forum and invited representatives of Christian

rd
churches in Taiwan to join the gathering, although bypassing the PCT

fo
as formal ecumenical partner. The Chinese factor is now a significant

influence in the ecclesiastical as well as political Taiwanese scene.
ot
Another critical issue is gender justice and same-sex marriage. The

N
promotion of equal rights and the participation of women had enjoyed

modest success among Christian communities until the 1990s. For
example, since the 1960s the PCT had adopted the policy of ordaining
women pastors and church leaders. Even though the male-dominant and
patriarchal culture of Taiwanese society still had strong repercussions
within church life, the PCT continued to promote gender justice, following
and building upon the completion of the WCC’s Ecumenical Decade of the
Churches in Solidarity with Women in 1998.
Taiwan 111
However, conservative Christian groups, nurtured by right-wing ide-

ologies, joined hands with anti-LGBT parties to form the Family Guardian
Coalition in 2013 to oppose the legalisation of same-sex marriage in
Taiwan. As a result, this critical issue created divisions among the Christian
communities and instilled negative impressions of Christian faith in the
minds of the Taiwanese public, especially among the younger generations.
Becoming Christians in Taiwanese Society

Campbell N. Moody, the Scottish missionary who worked in Taiwan
.
ly
more than a century ago, paid special attention to the ‘reception’ of the
on
Christian message and the psychological, spiritual and social aspects of
Taiwanese Christians in his famous books The Heathen Heart and The Saints
se
of Formosa. He noted that, from the dogmatic Christian’s viewpoint, the
lu
Han Taiwanese were ‘disappointedly good’ and their realistic mentality
na
(always seeking ‘what is useful’), lack of ‘sinfulness of sin’ and heartless-
so
ness towards human sufferings had rendered the gospel ‘almost without
market’. He nearly concluded that Taiwanese Christians were ‘non-ethical’
er
and ‘non-religious’ and even considered them a sort of ‘rice Christian’.
rp
Almost a century later, due to the accumulated efforts of Christian
Fo
elites working devotedly in the larger society during the Japanese era, of
e.
the PCT’s struggle during the process of democratisation in the 1970s, and
l
of the social welfare services in needed areas during the past decades, the
sa
Christian community in Taiwan, according to surveys conducted in 2012

re
and 2015, now comprises 5.8% of the population and plays a prominent
or
and collaborative role as it actively participates in the public domain.

n
tio
Bibliography
bu
Chen, Nan-Jou (ed.), A Testament to Taiwan Homeland Theology: The Essential Writings of
Wang Hsien-Chih (Taipei: Yeong Wang, 2011).
tri
Cheng, Yang-en, ‘Calvinism and Taiwan’, Theology Today, 66:2 (July 2009), 184–202.
is
Ion, A. Hamish, The Cross and the Rising Sun: The British Protestant Missionary Movement
rd
in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, 1865–1945 (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,
fo
1993).
Rubinstein, Murray A., The Protestant Community of Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and
ot
Church (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991).

N
So, Francis K. H., Beatrice K. F. Leung and Ellen Mary Mylod (eds), The Catholic Church in
Taiwan: Problems and Prospects (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
North Korea
Philo Kim
.
ly
At the time of liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, there are
on
believed to have been around 3,000 churches with 300,000 Christians in
the northern half of the Korean peninsula, while there were around 1,000
se
churches with 120,000 Christians in the southern half. According to the
lu
official North Korean Central Yearbook, as of 1950 there were around
na
200,000 Protestants and 53,000 Catholics in the country. It was recorded
so
that there were 410 pastors, 498 evangelists and 2,142 elders in the North.
er
The communists began to persecute Christians after taking power in
rp
1945, since Christians were considered to represent the most potent threat
to the regime. The government sought to suppress Christians by forcing
Fo
them either to go to work or to attend schools on Sundays, thus disrupting
e.
worship and church attendance. The regime also used physical force to
l
repress those who wished to continue their lives as believers.

sa
The tragic Korean War (1950–3) brought seismic change to the Christian
re
community in the north. During that war, the leadership of the Protestant
or
Church was largely annihilated. According to Protestant Church research,

n
260 Presbyterian and 50 Methodist ministers in the north either were

tio
martyred or fled to the south following the war. Unfortunately, however,

bu
records for only around 100 persons can be found. What happened to the
tri
remainder cannot be ascertained, although some of them were absorbed

is
into the Korean Christian Federation (KCF), the official Christian organi-
rd
sation in North Korea.

fo
Repression initially was sporadic following the war, but from 1958
surveys to set up the family-background-based system of Songbun
ot
N
coincided with far more extreme repression targeting Christians, namely

arrests and expulsions. From 1958 to 1960, central party leadership
supervised the classification of ‘the religious and their families’, which
numbered around 100,000 households, with a total of 450,000 people. Such
data were then used to implement an ongoing policy of mass repression.
It is a moderate estimate that about 100,000 Christians survived the war
and faced these severe repressions. Families were arrested, imprisoned or
expelled to the countryside and remote regions, while some managed to
escape surveillance and continue to worship on their own.
North Korea 113
Along with the expulsion policy, from the early 1960s the regime
initiated a concentrated policy of anti-religious education, making it im-
possible for religious people to practise their faith in public any longer.
Sporadic resistance and underground worship disappeared, and the last
vestiges of the community vanished from view. The ruthless punishment
and purging of Christian households set members of families against one
another, with children encouraged to denounce their parents as part of a
society-wide campaign against religion. In such circumstances, worship
had to be entirely hidden or carried out in the privacy of individual minds
.
ly
alone.
on
Emergence of Official Practices
se
In the late 1960s, the state’s ‘relaxation policy’ was applied to some
lu
families previously associated with Kim Il-sung’s revolutionary past, but
na
social and policy-based discrimination and oppression did not abate. It
so
is said that 200 household places of worship were legally created in 1968
based on the state policy, but only around 20–40 households actually were
er
functional, with the rest of the household congregations existing only on
paper. It appeared that there were 100 household congregations as North– rp
Fo
South dialogue was progressing in 1972.
e.
According to North Korean refugee testimony, the sixtieth birthday of

l
Kim Il-sung in 1972 was accompanied by a great amnesty, and as a result

sa
a number of Christians returned from exile in remote regions to their

re
original places of residence. Another large number of Christians were re-

or
portedly pardoned just before the Sixth Party Congress, in October 1980,
n
and among them were many who returned from internal exile in remote
tio
areas. Whether they became part of underground churches or were

bu
summoned to congregate in the official church, they became the centre of

tri
what could be called church attenders in North Korea.

is
In 1988, a unique event occurred in North Korean history: the Bongsu

rd
Church (for Protestants) and Changchung Cathedral (for Catholics) were

fo
ot
Christianity in North Korea, 1970 and 2020

N

Christians 142,000 1.0% 99,000 0.4% –0.7%
Independents 8,000 0.1% 90,000 0.3% 5.0%
Protestants 119,000 0.8% 6,000 0.0% –5.8%
Catholics 15,000 0.1% 3,000 0.0% –3.2%
Evangelicals 8,800 0.1% 10,000 0.0% 0.3%
114 Philo Kim
built. It has been alleged that this church construction took place for
propaganda purposes, targeting a foreign audience to demonstrate that
North Korea had religious freedoms. There are also those who argue that
as North Korea began to attempt reform and opening, it sought to gain
access to South Korean churches. However, it should not be overlooked
that there were a number of other changes that occurred from the early
1980s, both internally and externally. A decisive factor were the frequent
visits of overseas Korean Christian leaders. Yet the change also resulted
from internal demands.
.
ly
As the North Korean authorities explain, they had a problem to solve:
on
the higher population concentration that came with high-rise apartment
blocks rendered it impractical to conduct worship informally within the
se
household. A large number of people living in a concentrated area wanted
lu
to worship together and thus needed a place where such activities could
na
be practically carried out. Hence, the government claims that Bongsu
so
Church was built to provide for religious households in the Kwangbok
Street area of Pyongyang. At the same time, household-based worship
er
continued in eastern Pyongyang. While it is undeniably true that religious
rp
activities became visible again in part because the authorities wanted to
Fo
improve North Korea’s relations with other countries and also to earn
e.
foreign currency, their re-emergence also speaks to a need that the North
l
Korean regime felt in terms of integrating religious families.

sa
re
Official Churches and Household Congregations

or
Bongsu has a congregation of 300, while Chilgol Church, the second Prot-
n
estant church built, has 90 members. Many of these people are descendants
tio
of believers, mobilised to participate due to familial relations. Those with

bu
duties inside the church in particular are often first-generation believers

tri
or their families. An observer estimates that there are around eight or nine
is
elders, 6–14 exhorters and 5–16 deacons at Bongsu Church, and it is likely
rd
that they were Protestants prior to the regime’s religious repressions or are
fo
relatives of those who were. At Chilgol Church, there are three elders, one
exhorter (a woman) and three deacons (one man, two women), all thought
ot
to be from Christian families; many believers are also thought to be from

N
Christian families. Of course, believers are mobilised by the authorities,

but they also have had experience with Christian faith or have a family
background of Christian tradition.
Household congregations were the means through which Christian
families practised their faith in the 1970s. These congregations became
more active in the 1980s. In accordance with changes in North Korean
govern ment control policies, household congregations sometimes
numbered as many as 100–200 and sometimes as few as 20–40. In the
North Korea 115
1980s, their numbers appeared to rise as high as 520 house churches na-
tionwide. Contrary to the assertions of the North Korean authorities, the
household congregations located outside the capital appear to be inactive.
Visits to household congregations have been allowed only in Pyongyang.
No authorisation has yet been given for official visits outside Pyongyang,
such as to North Pyongan, a place that has witnessed a large revival of
Protestantism.
On the basis of observations from South Korean visitors to 10 household
congregations, each was composed of around 12 members, one or two
.
ly
of whom were first-generation believers. The household congregation
on
visited by the present author in Okryu in the District of Taedong River,
Pyongyang, had nine members present, with three more not in attend-
se
ance due to work commitments. Some participants told the author that
lu
they had been attending for only two or three years, while others had been
na
coming since 1989. Each had different reasons for joining, but generally
so
they were connected in one way or another to Christian families.
The North Korean authorities assert that household congregations are
er
run by lay people who serve as elders, exhorters and deacons. However,
rp
an observer who lived in North Korea for an extended period and fre-
Fo
quented the Chilgol Church for a number of years told the author that
e.
household congregations do not seem to convene regularly, but only when

l
the need arises. A KCF official stated that among the 12,300 Protestants in
sa
the country, around 6,000 are organised into the official household congre-
re
gations, with the other 6,000 being spread out in the countryside but not
or
members of KCF-organised household congregations.

n
At present, there are five religious organisations in North Korea:

tio
the Korean Christian Federation, the Korean Buddhist Federation, the

bu
Korean Catholic Association, the Korean Chondoist Association and

tri
the Korean Orthodox Church. The Korean Religionists Council consist-

is
ing of the aforementioned organisations was formed on 30 May 1989.

rd
According to an official explanation given by North Korea, there are

fo
40,000 religious believers in the country, including 12,300 Christians

(Protestants), 12,000 Buddhists, 3,000 Catholics and 15,000 Chondoists.
ot
There are two Protestant churches, 20 ministers and 520 house churches;
N
one Catholic church and two assembly sites; and about 60 Buddhist
temples with some 300 monks, including one central temple, seating 100,
at Chundokyo in Pyongyang. There are also an estimated 800 Buddhist
house prayer places (this has not been confirmed due to inaccessibility).
Each religious organisation has its own educational centres for training
religious leaders, such as the Pyongyang Theological Seminary operated
by the Central Committee of the KCF and the Buddhist School run by the
Korean Buddhist Federation.
116 Philo Kim
‘Underground Church’
The ‘underground church’ refers to religious organisations that exist
outside the control of the North Korean government, as ‘illegal’ organisa-
tions. In contrast to the loose organisation of old Christian families into
a social community, the underground church is considered to be highly
active as a set of Christian organisations. During the famine of the mid-
1990s, as many as 300,000 North Koreans escaped to China, where some
80% of them were exposed to the Christian community. Among them, as
many as 100,000 returned to North Korea, with a number having become
.
ly
Christians. Some of them created a new, vibrant religious community
on
after coming into contact with Christianity from the outside world. While
the old Christian families have sought to maintain their identities within
se
the household or groups of relatives, the typical underground church is
lu
composed of 4–10 members who connect and bond through a network in
na
an unofficial faith organisation.
so
Evidence suggests that the underground church includes several tens
er
of thousands of people newly converted by North Korean refugees. It
rp
appears that many believers have come from old Christian families, while
some who do not have become connected to these families when they
Fo
engage in faith activities. They are basically individuals who often form
e.
family-based or friend-based groups. These underground churchgoers

l
gather in household congregations in such localities as Chungjin, Musan,

sa
Hoeryong, Hyesan and Sinuiju.

re
The worship activities of the underground church are often connected

or
to old Christian families. This is because while it is likely they will come
n
under the control of North Korea’s police, religious families have tacit
tio
permission from the authorities to organise networks among family and

bu
relatives and/or are able to worship in private. There are numerous cases of
tri
converted believers who were from old Christian families. A refugee who
is
became a Protestant while in China returned to North Korea and told his
rd
mother about his faith. His mother confessed to him that she had hidden
fo
her faith from him. Another refugee remembers how they found out about
their father’s faith and time at Pyongyang Seminary only after escaping
ot
the North. There are also those who, having become Protestants in China,
N
have found out about their families’ religious past and returned to the
North to proselytise. For example, the mother-in-law of a North Korean
refugee lived in Pyongyang as a believer until the age of 23. Underground
church activities centre on old Christian families partly because many
refugees from the North come from places to which old Christian families
were expelled in the past. Such locations formerly were considered distant
backwaters, but now they are some of the easiest places from which to
escape the country.
North Korea 117
The underground church is known to South Korean society largely

through Christian missions that seek to spread Protestantism in the
North. Each missionary organisation gives different estimates regarding
the size of the underground church. This is because there is disagreement
as to whether the networks of underground churches are purely Protes-
tant faith communities, whether business activities should be included,
and/or whether former Christian families should be included. South
Korean missionary groups sometimes include former Christian families
in their numbers as well as potential Christians, and thus cite figures as
.
ly
high as 100,000–300,000. However, where the underground church is
on
treated purely as a faith organisation, some estimate such organisations
may include as few as several thousands; in other words, when former
se
Christian families and returned refugees who are not religiously active
lu
are discounted, the number of people who have actually maintained their
na
faith is small.
so
Close inspection of the activities of the underground church indicates
that reporting might have been distorted significantly. Taking the asser-
er
tions of South Korean missions at face value raises many issues. North
rp
Korean intelligence operatives have infiltrated and are using many of
Fo
these underground organisations. Furthermore, the activities of the under
e.
ground church are also used by North Korean refugees to address their
l
own personal needs. Thus, it is possible that the size and reality of the
sa
underground church have been exaggerated, and many aspects of what

re
has been reported cannot simply be accepted without independent veri-

or
fication. In this regard, underground church activities centring on North

n
Korean refugees that have begun in recent times would struggle to exist
tio
without external support. And while a network of organisations exists,

bu
their activities are not just faith-oriented but also business-related.

tri
The format of worship in underground churches is not as highly

is
developed as one might expect. Christians communicate with each other

rd
in various ways and on various occasions. They sometimes meet in one

fo
place to share biblical texts that they have memorised and to pray together.
At other times they conduct business affairs and exchange information.
ot
Except for the old Christian families who are not very active in their
N
faith, most Christians have an external connection. This is why the North
Korean intelligence agency regards them as spy organisations and tries to
catch them.
Interactions with South Korea and China have decreased in recent years,
and the crackdown by Chinese authorities on religious activities there has
intensified. This situation directly affected the Christian community in
North Korea and caused a serious contraction in their activities. Early in
2018, however, inter-Korean dialogue and talks resumed, and a series of
118 Philo Kim
summit talks have begun between North Korea and China, South Korea
and the USA. Christians inside North Korea expect to gain great help and
strength from the diplomatic dialogues. It is expected that as North Korea
becomes more open to international society, the Christian community in
North Korea might have opportunities to mature in faith.
Bibliography
Baek, Joong Hyun, Is There a Church in North Korea? (Seoul: Kookmin Ilbo, 1998).
Kim, Heung-Soo, and Dae-Young Ryu, A New Understanding of North Korean Religion (Seoul:
.
Dasan Books, 2002).
ly
Kim, Philo, Unification Concert of North and South Korean Churches (Seoul: Christian Mission
on
to North Korea, 2006).
Song, Won-Keun, Changes of Religious Topography in North Korea (Seoul: Cheong Media,
se
2013).
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
South Korea
Meehyun Chung
Korea’s warm and enthusiastic reception of Christianity can be explained in
.
ly
part by the rich multi-religious complexity of Korean culture and tradition.
on
The rich religious background of script religions like Buddhism and Con-
fucianism as well as the ancient indigenous religion of shamanism have
se
informed the development of Christianity on the peninsula. Shamanism
lu
is related to the Korean founding myth, which includes the Supreme
na
Deity. For centuries shamanism has influenced the reception of Buddhism,
so
Confucianism and the more recently arrived Christianity. Through this
er
influence Koreans have preserved faith in the heavenly Supreme Being.
rp
Koreans are proud that Christianity was introduced to their country
not by foreign missionaries but rather by indigenous Koreans returning
Fo
from abroad. Lee Seung-hun, who was baptised in Beijing, China, intro-
e.
duced Catholicism to Korea in 1784, while Protestantism was introduced

l
by Seo Sang-ryun in 1884. Seo had met the Scottish missionary John Ross
sa
in Manchuria and worked with him on the translation of the Bible into
re
the Korean Hangul language before returning to found the first Protestant
or
church at Solnae, now in North Korea.

n
During the eighteenth century, the Catholic faith spread as Koreans

tio
were eager to learn more of Western science and philosophy in order to

bu
renew conventional thinking and customs. However, the new faith, with
tri
its doctrine of the equality of all people before God, presented a challenge
is
to the strictly hierarchical order of the Chosun dynasty. As a result, the first
rd
Korean Catholics suffered severe persecution, and many were martyred

fo
for their faith. Through the work of French priests and German Benedic-
tine missionaries, the Catholic Church gradually took root. Today, around
ot
N
a tenth of the South Korean population are Catholics. The Metropolitan

Archdiocese of Seoul also covers North Korea. South Korean dioceses are
organised under three ecclesiastical provinces and include a total of 14
suffragan dioceses, the Military Ordinariate of South Korea and the pre-
diocesan Territorial Abbey of Tokwon, in North Korea.
The Orthodox Church was introduced in the eighteenth century through
contacts with Russia. Partly as a result of changes in Russia, Orthodoxy in
Korea has had a chequered history but an unbroken presence. An arch
diocese was established in 2004.
120 Meehyun Chung
Protestantism was a late arrival, first appearing in the late nineteenth

century. It proved, however, to be the fastest-growing form of Christianity
in Korea. Having begun through Korean initiative, it was significantly
influenced by missionaries from the USA such as the first medical mission-
ary, Horace Newton Allen (1858–1932). Especially influential were Horace
Grant Underwood (1859–1916), an American of British heritage, whose
work from his arrival in 1885 laid the foundation for the Presbyterian
churches, and Henry Gerhard Appenzeller (1858–1902), an American of
Swiss heritage, whose work was foundational for the Methodist Church.
.
ly
Through missionary efforts, Protestant churches contributed in a major
on
way to education and health care in Korea. Baejae Hakdang, the Methodist
high school for boys; Ewha Hakdang, the Methodist school for girls; the
se
Presbyterian Kuse Hakdang (‘Underwood’) orphanage school for boys; the
lu
Presbyterian Chung-shin school for girls; and Chosen Christian College
na
(which later became Yonsei University) are examples of educational insti-
so
tutions that exercised great influence in Korea.
However, Koreans themselves took initiatives that proved decisive for
er
the Christian faith. The translation of the Bible into the Korean Hangul
script grounded the Protestant faith in the consciousness of the ordinary rp
Fo
people. While the upper classes had historically used Chinese, the
e.
ordinary people preferred Hangul. As Minjung theologians pointed out

l
in the 1970s, opting for Hangul meant that Christianity became a faith that
sa
was from ‘below’. In contrast to the male-dominated Chinese language,

re
Hangul was considered to be a female language. Indeed, women were

or
educated through the Korean Bible to learn Korean Hangul.

n
A pivotal moment in the development of Protestantism was the Great

tio
Revival of 1907 that took place in Pyongyang (today in North Korea) in the
bu
midst of political upheaval. In the face of Japanese oppression, Protestant-

tri
ism became a rallying point for people who felt that traditional religious
is
rd
Christianity in South Korea, 1970 and 2020

fo

ot

N
Christians 5,747,000 17.8% 17,277,000 33.5% 2.2%

Anglicans 32,400 0.1% 90,000 0.2% 2.1%
Independents 1,718,000 5.3% 11,330,000 22.0% 3.8%
Orthodox 3,000 0.0% 2,300 0.0% –0.5%
Protestants 2,117,000 6.6% 10,400,000 20.2% 3.2%
Catholics 838,000 2.6% 5,500,000 10.7% 3.8%
Evangelicals 2,132,000 6.6% 12,855,000 25.0% 3.7%
South Korea 121
values had failed them and were looking for a new faith that would be
transformative. Many became Christians at this time, causing Pyongyang
to be called the Jerusalem of East Asia. From then on, Christianity, and
Protestantism in particular, became closely identified with Korean
nationalism and resistance to Japanese rule. Many Christian leaders, both
male and female, such as An Chang-ho, Kim Kyu-sik, Kim Maria and Yu
Gwan-sun, participated in the independence movements in various ways.
Another formative period for Korean Protestantism was the 1950s,
when people were learning how to live in the aftermath of both Japanese
.
ly
colonial rule and the Korean War. In these difficult times, Korean believers
on
never lost their zeal and their desire for God. Following significant
economic growth, the ecclesiastical landscape changed somewhat, but a
se
living relationship with God, even if it is sometimes associated with fear
lu
of punishment, remains a point of emphasis in Korean Christianity today.
na
The Pentecostal message found particular resonance at this time. The
so
ideology of the Cold War was incorporated into Pentecostalism’s rapidly
growing following and found fertile soil among the lower strata of society
er
and a people whose primary concern was material and economic growth.
rp
This resulted in a period of rapid numerical growth among marginalised
Fo
people during the 1960s and 1970s.
e.
Today, the number of Christians is stagnating or decreasing. According

l
to Korean government statistics published in 2015, 43.9% belonged to

sa
religious communities, and this percentage is generally decreasing.

re
Women’s participation stands at 48.4%, while men’s is at 39.4%. Among

or
people in their twenties, 64.9% do not have any religion, whereas 58.2%
n
of people in their seventies profess to belong to a religion. South Korea’s

tio
population is now about one-fifth Protestant, of whom 69% are members

bu
of Presbyterian churches. There are many Presbyterian denominations,

tri
varying in size and character. The Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK,

is
Tonghab) and the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Korea

rd
(GAPCK, Habdong) are the largest. The Presbyterian Church of the

fo
Republic of Korea (PROK, Gijang) is the most theologically and socio-

politically progressive, though numerically a minority.
ot
Based on the pivotal moment of the Great Revival at Pyongyang in

N
1907, a Pentecostal movement developed. This was shaped during the

1930s by the work of American missionaries who had been influenced by
the Azusa Street Revival in Los Angeles. However, it was from the late
1950s that a Korean version of Pentecostalism emerged through the efforts
of Choi Jashil and Cho Yonggi with a tent church, now known as the Yoido
Full Gospel Church.
South Korea currently contains some of the world’s largest Christian con-
gregations, with Yoido Full Gospel Church the outstanding example. There
122 Meehyun Chung
are some mega-churches, but many churches are suffering under stagna-
tion and even face financial debt. Rising standards of living, a growing
aversion to institutional religion and greater access to leisure pursuits have
resulted in the churches losing members. The reputation of Christianity
has also suffered from sex scandals, lack of financial transparency, corrup-
tion and association with politicians tainted by questionable ethics.
While domestic numerical growth has slowed, mission activities abroad
have increased. Experience of short-term mission awakens spiritual com
mitment. South Korea has become the second-largest country in terms of
.
ly
overseas Protestant missionaries (after the USA). They are active in many
on
countries worldwide, but focus on areas where Christianity is little rep-
resented. The deep rifts within Korea’s Protestant Church have been a
se
chronic problem, resulting from the competitive nature of US missionary
lu
societies, tension between regions, theological differences and ideological
na
conflict, including an anti-communist stance regarding North Korea.
so
Main Features of Korean Protestantism
er
Employing a theological typology, Korean Christians can be considered to
rp
fall into three types, in terms of whether they identify primarily with God
Fo
as Father (as omnipotent heavenly being), Son (as political reformer) or
e.
Holy Spirit (as spring of prosperity). The first group, which identifies with
l
God the Father, forms the majority among Protestants and is strongly in-
sa
fluenced by the Northeast Asian religious background, which is Confucian

re
and Taoist. It is patriarchal, politically conventional and concentrated

or
in the east coast area. The second group, which identifies with God the
n
Son, tends towards socio-political engagement, as they understand Jesus

tio
as a political activist and reformer in the context of Roman imperialism.

bu
It is politically progressive, oriented to social salvation and concentrated

tri
mostly in the west coast area, which is historically underdeveloped and

is
neglected. The third group, which identifies with God the Holy Spirit as
rd
healer and provider of happiness, is focused on the theology of prosperity.

fo
It is spread nationwide, is politically conservative and, like the first group,

is oriented towards personal salvation.
ot
Another frame of analysis that can be applied to Korean Protestantism

N
is drawn from the classic Christian concepts of kerygma (the message),

koinonia (fellowship), martyria (witness) and diakonia (service).
Kerygma
The most popular form of preaching employs a story-telling style of
sermon. Instead of following a lectionary, the pastor will choose a Bible
text and preach according to the subject rather than using an exegetical
method. In terms of the subject and content of the sermon, the first and
South Korea 123
third groups (‘Father’ and ‘Holy Spirit’ Christians) prefer a narrative and
emotional approach, while the second group (‘Son’ Christians) expects to
have some political comments regarding burning issues.
Giving a testimony of one’s personal experience with God is a favoured
contribution to worship services and other meetings. Most church
members prefer this kind of personal testimony to a more academic
sermon. In accordance with Protestant tradition, Word-centred (or Story-
centred) worship services are provided many times during the week, often
on a Wednesday or Friday evening. Many worship services are transmitted
.
ly
through Christian television broadcasting.
on
The Korean Presbyterian standardised form of liturgy with long
sermons is rather common, regardless of denominational differences.
se
Conventional worship features more hymns with Western melodies than
lu
those with authentically Korean words and melodies. Also popular is con-
na
temporary Christian music introduced from the USA. Young people are no
so
longer familiar with traditional hymns. Regardless of denomination, the
younger generation are interested in this genre of modern popular music
er
accompanied by electronic instruments. The lyrics tend to be concerned
rp
with personal faith rather than any social concerns. Pentecostal worship
Fo
includes more hymns with body movement.
le.
Koinonia
sa
Korean church life features some important components for building fel-
re
lowship, such as communal meals, cell groups for Bible study and prayer
or
meetings. The Korean Protestant churches do not have a parochial system.

n
They tend to be pastor-centred. People have freedom to choose their own

tio
local church community, even if this involves geographical distance.

bu
Boom towns and satellite cities have been built since the 1980s to ac-
tri
commodate people moving out from the inner cities. This has meant that
is
church members travel long distances to come to church and need to

rd
have a communal lunch after the worship service. They have also formed
fo
home cell groups and prayer meetings for revival and sharing of faith ex-
perience, based on geographical districts. The intimate setting of a home
ot
fosters the growth of strong relationships and helps to create organic unity
N
within the church community.
Martyria
The introduction of Christianity to Korea, rather than depending on
Western missionaries, was very much driven by indigenous lay people
who were active in evangelism. People at the grassroots, women in par-
ticular, have continued to be eager to participate in Christian fellowship
and to disseminate the gospel.
124 Meehyun Chung
Regardless of denominational differences, there is a common method

of congregation-building: a patriarchal structure, early-morning prayer,
common meals, and house visits as well as house groups for prayer
meetings and Bible sharing. Mission and evangelism are emphasised, with
the aim of increasing numerical growth of the churches. Usually mission
is divided into inner/domestic and outer/abroad. Evangelism is under-
stood as spreading the gospel at the local community level. The main
denominations place great importance on mission work in other countries.
In general, church members prefer to support short-term charity-style
.
ly
initiatives rather than sustainable development with long-term plans. The
on
duration of missionary service is becoming shorter. Short mission trips
are very popular. This approach attracts enthusiastic participants but can
se
also have shortcomings, such as lack of gender awareness or lack of un-
lu
derstanding of other confessions, such as Orthodox or Catholic, leading to
na
resentment and hostility over apparent proselytisation.
so
Evangelism is carried out on military bases as well as in hospitals.
Evangelisation in the military is important and is carried out on a non-
er
denominational basis. In major Christian hospitals regular worship
rp
services are offered, an initiative supported by regional congregations
Fo
in terms of resources. Religiously neutral hospitals accept Christian ac-
e.
tivities as well as those of any other religious group. Military service is

l
mandatory and healthy young men spend on average two years in the
sa
military. Spiritual care is very important because of the stresses of military

re
service. Besides Christian (Catholic and Protestant) chaplaincy there is a

or
Buddhist chaplaincy system, and the two work hand in hand. Through
n
chaplaincy supported by churches there is active evangelisation, but while

tio
many people convert to Christianity during their military service a large

bu
proportion do not continue in the faith on their return to civilian life.

tri
In the early period of Korean Christianity, evangelisation by Bible

is
women was an important method of spreading the gospel. They were able
rd
to reach other women whose realm was mainly domestic. Door-to-door

fo
evangelism or street evangelism still takes place, even when people are
reluctant to be disturbed. When South Korea was going through a period
ot
of rapid economic growth and industrialisation, progressive churches

N
focused on social outreach programmes like industrial mission and the

labour movement. While Evangelical groups were interested in numerical
growth through evangelisation, progressive groups were working for
structural justice and making political statements.
Diakonia
Korean churches have a major involvement in social welfare. Diaconal
work such as medical care, outreach programmes for marginalised people
South Korea 125
and provision of food for the hungry is undertaken by the churches, with
participation by a high proportion of their members. The work ethic
associated with Christianity is widely regarded as a driving force of the in-
dustrialisation that drove the country’s economic growth. This, however,
has led to a focus on prosperity as God’s blessing rather than considering
the structural sin that causes poverty. While progressive churches were
addressing structural issues, conservative churches focused on instant
social service, which was more attractive to recipients and givers. Increas-
ing interest in public theology and networking of stakeholders assists the
.
ly
development of diakonia.
on
Christian Influence in Society
se
Influential theologians and pastors include Han Gyung-Jik (1902–2000)
lu
of the Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK), Kim Jae-June (1901–87) and
na
Kang Won-Yong (1917–2006) of the Presbyterian Church of the Republic
so
of Korea (PROK), Park Hyung-Nong (1897–1978) of the General Assembly
of the Presbyterian Church in Korea (GAPCK) and Park Yoon-Sun
er
(1905–88) of the Korean Presbyterian Church (KPC). These all belonged to
rp
the Reformed tradition, though their theology and biblical interpretation
Fo
varied considerably.
e.
All along, women have worked hard to build up the churches at the
l
grassroots level. In the early days of Christianity in Korea, many nameless

sa
women served as evangelists and gained access to fellow women who

re
were segregated. Nonetheless, although women played important roles

or
in church and society, they could not occupy a position as minister or

n
presbyter in the decision-making body of the church. The Salvation

tio
Army and the Assemblies of God were the first to allow the ordination of
bu
women. The Methodist Church started to ordain women in 1931, though

tri
with certain conditions. The Presbyterian churches, which form the largest
is
segment of Protestant Christianity, took many years before they began to

rd
ordain women as ministers, the PROK in 1977 and the PCK in 1996. Other
fo
major Presbyterian churches still reject the ordination of women.

Even today, women form a small minority among theologians holding
ot
positions in universities and theological institutions. One influential

N
woman theologian is Park Soon-Kyung, one of the founders of the Korean

Association of Women Theologians, who has contributed significantly to
the development of a feminist theology for unification in Korea.
The National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) is a Christian ecu-
menical organisation founded in 1924 as the National Christian Council in
Korea. It is a member of the World Council of Churches and the Christian
Conference of Asia. High on the NCCK’s agenda are such social issues
as unification, justice, peace and integrity of creation. Its socially oriented
126 Meehyun Chung
approach and ecumenical way of thinking do not sit well with the more
conservative churches. The latter have formed their own association, the
Christian Council of Korea, founded in 1989 and a member of the World
Evangelical Alliance. Its main issues of concern include working together
in coalition as Korean churches, evangelism at the national and inter
national levels, preparation for unification and countermeasures against
sectarian movements.
Korean churches take a variety of stances in relation to political issues.
During the 1970s and 1980s the PROK became known as the most pro-
.
ly
gressive denomination, while the larger churches were generally silent
on
on political matters. Its espousal of Minjung theology is one factor that
gave the PROK an international reputation for political engagement.
se
Meanwhile, the vast majority of Korean Christians were not influenced by
lu
Minjung theology at all. Most expressed their faith by seeking prosperity
na
rather than pursuing social justice.
so
Due to the communism and atheism prevailing in North Korea, many
Christians fled to the South for the sake of religious freedom. As convinced
er
anti-communists, they looked to the churches to provide ideological
rp
support for democracy and capitalism. The question of reunification of the
Fo
two Koreas has divided opinion. Until recently, anti-communism has been
e.
a defining characteristic of Korean Christians regardless of where they

l
stand on the theological spectrum. Those who are influenced by this anti-
sa
communist stance tend to be conservative politically.

re
In the twenty-first century there has been a marked polarisation

or
between the conservative camp and those who espouse a theology of

n
social justice. For instance, during the corruption controversy that led to
tio
the impeachment of former president Park Kun-Hye in 2017, there was a

bu
clear division between the non-governmental organisations and socially

tri
oriented Christians who supported the anti-Park candlelight rallies and

is
the politically and theologically conservative groups who supported the

rd
pro-Park Taeggki (Korean flag) rallies.

fo
Minjung theology has been the watchword of those who prize social
justice. It arose in the 1970s as an indigenous liberation theology and
ot
contributed to the voicing of opposition to social injustice and the dictator-

N
ship of President Park Chung-Hee (1961–79). Minjung theology became a

trademark of Korean theology and attracted much international interest,
though its influence at the level of the local congregation was limited.
However, the ideas of Minjung theology influenced such popular social
justice movements as the Catholic Farmers Movement and the Protestant
Urban Industrial Mission, which fought for better working conditions
and just wages. The current generation of Minjung theologians is in
dialogue with process theology and is engaged with issues raised by the
South Korea 127
neo-liberal socio-economic system, such as gentrification, gender injustice

and unification.
Inter-faith relations
Inter-faith relations have been harmonious in South Korea, with Buddhism,
Christianity and Confucianism all represented at significant public events.
Cooperation between different religious communities has been important
at some turning points in Korean history, such as the ‘March 1’ movement
against Japanese colonialism in 1919. Inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s
.
ly
declaration of the principle of national self-determination and provoked
on
by the mysterious death, apparently by poisoning, of King Gojong, 33
different religious leaders from Christianity, Chondogyo (Donghak) and
se
Buddhism gave their backing to the nationwide movement.
lu
People began to explore the Catholic faith through Western Christian
na
literature. This led to meetings being organised for discussion in the
so
Buddhist Temple of Chonjinam, which became a kind of cradle of the
Korean Catholic Church. A combination of academic curiosity and longing
er
for new belief led people to become acquainted with Catholic faith. Due
rp
to strict control by the Chosun government, they needed to have a secret
Fo
place to study Western religious thought. It was the Buddhist monks who
e.
provided the required hospitality, a remarkable form of inter-religious co-

l
operation. It proved to be highly costly for the monks, who were accused
sa
of being collaborators and were beheaded. In an environment in which

re
the government was anxious to maintain the dynastical order and impose
or
strict classism, one of the points of attraction among those interested in

n
Christian teaching was the equality of people before God.

tio
Inter-religious dialogue is conducted at a high level but has limited

bu
influence at the grassroots. For example, there can be religious conflicts

tri
within families when members have different faiths. A frequent point of

is
tension is when there is ancestor worship on special occasions. While the

rd
Catholic Church provides an alternative integrated form of liturgy, it is

fo
only minority churches that have provided a complete replacement for

ancestor worship. This reveals a certain lack of indigenisation in Korean
ot
Christianity. Funeral practice is rather syncretic, bringing together

N
different religious traditions. Traditional practices of cleansing and

clothing are followed, after which funerals take different forms according
to religious affiliation.
When Christianity was introduced to Korea it sought to win converts
from shamanism and Buddhism. This created inter-religious tension, and
conflicts with Confucianism were evident with regard to ancestor worship
on major Korean festival and memorial days. To distinguish Christianity
from Korean traditional religions and customs, the Christian churches
128 Meehyun Chung
adopted a Western style. In order to avoid suspicion of syncretism with

shamanism, Christians wanted to be clearly distinguished. This affected
culture, art and music. Western styles of architecture and interior design
were adopted. Likewise, people preferred the Western style of hymns
to Korean traditional melody for church music. The same preference for
Western style is evident in the visual arts, a notable exception being the
attempts to depict biblical scenes with Korean costume by Kim Ki-chang
and Kim Chang-su. In general, the lack of indigenisation of the faith is
evident in art and music, where Western styles continue to prevail.
.
ly
on
Current Political Issues
The militaristic tensions between the two Koreas have led to many
se
political incidents and events. In some of these the churches have played
lu
an active part. For example, in 2005 in Daechuri, Pyeongtaek, which used
na
to be a small farming village in Gyeonggi Province, some 65 kilometres
so
south of Seoul, people were being forced off their land to allow for the
expansion of a US military base. When the villagers resisted the eviction,
er
religious communities like the Catholic Priests Association for Justice
rp
(CPAJ), Protestant groups and Buddhists joined the demonstration. In
Fo
spite of this solidarity of religious groups with the ‘Anti-US Military Base
e.
in Pyeongtaek’ campaign, which organised countless rallies and marches

l
at this rice village area, the Pyeongtaek base has been expanded as US
sa
Camp Humphreys. Similarly, when a US naval base was introduced to

re
Gangjeong village on Jeju Island in 2012, religious groups joined together

or
to demonstrate against the construction project. Jeju Island is cherished as

n
the island of peace and ecological diversity. In spite of many demonstra-

tio
tions, construction of the naval base was completed in 2018.

bu
The successive nuclear weapons tests conducted by North Korea and

tri
the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

is
weapon system in South Korea led by 2016 to a peak of militaristic and

rd
diplomatic tension and conflict in Northeast Asia. The THAAD system is

fo
deployed in Sangju, a centre of Won Buddhism. When the Won Buddhists

organised protests against the deployment, some socially oriented
ot
Christian groups joined them.

N
Tensions provoked by political uncertainty and militarism are constantly

in the minds of Korean people and have a profound effect on them psycho-
logically, culturally and socially. While more conservative Christians focus
on upholding opposition to communism in the face of the nuclear threat
posed by North Korea, more progressive Christians focus not on military
solutions but on the challenge of how to cultivate peace and promote life.
A significant development in November 2018 was the decision of
South Korea’s Supreme Court to allow conscientious objection to military
South Korea 129
service. Prior to this, Jehovah’s Witnesses and members of the Seventh-

day Adventist Church were subject to punishment when they refused to
serve in the military on grounds of Christian belief. It is yet to be clarified
what form and length of alternative service will be required. Another con-
troversial issue is the introduction of a tax system for Protestant pastors.
This might prove to be of assistance to churches in terms of transparency
in financial matters.
Contemporary Challenges
.
ly
Since the Protestant churches do not follow a parochial system, churches
on
are built up around the pastor. Church planting is often an individual
matter. Within denominations there are structures that apply, but inde-
se
pendent churches can be planted anywhere, regardless of nearby existing
lu
churches. The salary paid by congregations to pastors depends on their
na
success in developing the churches. Founder-pastors who are successful
so
and build flourishing churches gain authority and are rewarded finan-
cially. Such success, however, carries the risk of the development of a
er
personality cult and authoritarian hierarchical leadership – an issue with
rp
which Korean churches are currently grappling, particularly in relation to
Fo
father–son succession in mega-churches. Tensions and conflicts have often
e.
arisen in the latter cases, which often involve political and financial issues
l
and attract considerable public attention. This might be explained by the

sa
shamanistic background: as a shaman’s followers rely on the mediation of

re
the shaman, so church members depend on their pastors.

or
Women form a majority in most churches, regardless of denomina-

n
tion and confession. Yet there is still a clear lack of gender justice. Even
tio
in denominations where the ordination of women is allowed, women are

bu
not guaranteed acceptance as ministers at the local congregational level.

tri
Women are in the minority in decision-making bodies and are more often
is
active in diaconal work, particularly food preparation in the kitchen.

rd
By and large, Korean Christians are conservative on matters of sexuality,

fo
and there is little tolerance for sexual minorities. The movement to oppose
recognition of homosexuality is mostly supported and organised by
ot
Christian groups. In some cases this can find expression in open homo-
N
phobia, supported by a literal interpretation of certain biblical texts. More

progressive Christians offer a liberal interpretation of the Bible but are a
minority voice in a debate that seems likely to continue.
The prevailing understanding of salvation in Korean Christianity is
very much human-centred. Few are alert to the ecological implications of
Christian faith and the issue of the salvation of the natural environment.
Though there is a Christian environmental movement, it reaches only a
small minority and has little impact on the day-to-day life and worship of
130 Meehyun Chung
the Christian churches. So far, little consideration has been given to ways
in which churches can demonstrate environmental responsibility in such
matters as energy usage. Exceptions include the Hansalim Movement, a
federation of Korean organic farmers that has developed since the 1980s
as a Catholic movement based on mutual trust between producer and
consumer.
The anti-communist sympathies of the pastors and church members
who migrated from North to South Korea at the time of the Korean War
continue to influence many Christians today. Presbyterians have drawn
.
ly
on Calvinism’s doctrine of double predestination to develop a dualistic
on
way of thinking in which North Korea is viewed as evil and categorised
as a perpetual enemy. This deep ideological divide is characteristic of the
se
mainline Korean churches, including Korean Pentecostalism. It remains to
lu
be seen whether Korean Christians will review such attitudes in light of
na
current hopes for peace and unity on the Korean peninsula.
so
There is currently a backlash against the confrontational methods
employed by more conservative Christians. Repeated attacks on statues in
er
Buddhist temples and Dangun Myth statues have drawn strong criticism.
rp
Street missions with loudspeaker slogans such as ‘Believe in Jesus, go to
Fo
heaven. Don’t believe, go to hell’ are provoking a negative reaction. Cor-
e.
ruption scandals involving well known pastors or Christians prominent

l
in public life such as former president Lee Myungbak, who was a Presby
sa
terian elder and found guilty of corruption, have discredited the churches
re
in the eyes of many.

or
Another controversial issue, particularly since Yemeni refugees arrived

n
on Jeju Island in 2018, has been Christian–Muslim relations. While con-

tio
servative Christians have viewed Muslims as candidates for conversion or

bu
potential criminals, others have argued for a more humanitarian approach.

tri
is
Conclusion
rd
Pak Nak-Joon, historian and the first president of Yonsei University

fo
(1957–60), highlighted issues in Korean Christianity that call for attention:

the inherent conservatism of the churches, the lack of social application
ot
of Christianity and the low intellectual standard among the Christian

N
community. His comments remain pertinent in the twenty-first century.

Although many theologians have trained up to PhD level and there is
greater acceptance of a more academic approach to biblical interpretation
and hermeneutics, most Christians still prefer a sermon based on appeal
to emotion rather than exegesis of the biblical text.
The age profile of Korean church members is rising and the number of
young people participating in church life is decreasing. After the spectacu-
lar growth of the late twentieth century, there are serious questions today
South Korea 131
about whether the churches can win a new generation of young people.
This is also a challenge for churches in the extensive Korean diaspora. For
first-generation Korean migrants, the church was attractive as a cultural
centre where they could hear their own mother tongue and experience
familiar social customs. The next generation has had an entirely different
upbringing and is comfortable in the cultural context of their host country.
Often their commitment to their Korean church congregation is much
slacker than that of their parents.
Digital technology has made sermons and Christian teaching widely
.
ly
accessible, to the extent that growing numbers choose to satisfy their
on
spiritual needs without becoming part of a local Christian community.
Sometimes described as ‘paper Christians’, they self-identify as Christians
se
but do not participate in communal church life. In order to meet the aspira-
lu
tions of the younger generation, the churches might have to become more
na
hospitable and inclusive, foster a vision of salvation that encompasses
so
the entire creation and not only individual souls, overcome ideologi-
cal dualism so as to become a force for reconciliation and peace, raise a
er
prophetic voice to transform militaristic politics and militant Protestant
rp
ism rather than defaming each other among the confessions, and play a
Fo
dynamic role in the transformation of individuals and society instead of
e.
remaining a fortress of outdated convention. The future of Protestantism

l
might depend on how far it can overcome its negative reputation for being
sa
in symbiosis with US-oriented capitalism.

re
or
Bibliography
n
Baker, Donald (ed.), Critical Readings on Christianity in Korea, 4 vols (Boston, MA: Brill,
tio
2014).
bu
Buswell, Robert E., Jr, and Timothy S. Lee (eds), Christianity in Korea (Honolulu, HI: Uni-
versity of Hawaii, 2006).
tri
Min, Kyoung-Bae, A History of Christian Churches in Korea (Seoul: Yonsei University Press,
is
2005).
rd
Oak, Sung-Deuk, The Making of Korean Christianity: Protestant Encounters with Korean
fo
Religions, 1876–1915 (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2013).

Park, Chung-Shin, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle, WA: University of Washington
ot
Press, 2003).
N
Japan
Akemi Kugimiya
A 2015 survey by the Agency for Cultural Affairs on ‘the national
.
ly
character of the Japanese’ produced a fascinating finding regarding the
on
religious views of the Japanese population. Although 70% of respondents
identified as ‘non-religious’, more than 70% of that group also affirmed
se
that ‘the religious mind is important.’ Moreover, Japan’s 2017 Statisti-
lu
cal Survey of Religion includes the strange result that the total number
na
of believers in some kind of religion (182,266,404) is significantly higher
so
than the total population of the country (126,706,000). The breakdown
er
among the different religions is Buddhism 48.1% (87,702,069), Shinto
rp
46.5% (84,739,699), Christianity 1.1% (1,911,196) and other religions 4.3%
(7,910,440). Clearly these numbers need to be qualified and many of those
Fo
identifying with a particular religion would not be recognised by the
e.
religion itself as official believers. Nonetheless, it indicates the extent to

l
which the Japanese people are to varying degrees connected to religion in

sa
terms of culture, custom and practice, while keeping their distance from
re
formal affiliation or personal commitment. Those who advocate ‘non-

or
religion’ celebrate Christmas, visit shrines at the beginning of the year and
n
hold funeral ceremonies in the Buddhist style. Such scenes occur quite
tio
routinely in Japan.
bu
According to the latest Japan Christian Yearbook, which is more reliable

tri
regarding Christianity, the total number of Christians in 2018 was 987,070,

is
consisting of 532,183 Protestants, 434,054 Catholics, 10,197 Orthodox

rd
Christians and 10,636 clergy and missionaries. This is a mere 0.78% of

fo
the total population of Japan. The ratio, which was 0.42% in 1948 (the
oldest reliable statistical record), has been consistently within the range
ot
N
of 0.7% to 0.8% since the late 1960s. There are slightly more Protestants
than Catholics. The number of clergy and missionaries, which slightly
exceeded 20,000 in 1994, has almost halved. On the other hand, Christian
universities accounted for 9.5% of all universities in Japan in 2018. Another
survey showed that approximately 10% of the total Japanese population
are graduates of Christian educational institutions.
Despite Christians being less than 1% of the population in Japan,
Christianity has for a long time played important roles and exercised
significant influence on society, thought, culture and education. Since the
Japan 133
Meiji period (1868–1912), in particular, Japan has been unable to overlook

the Christian faith underlying Western European civilisation, as the
modernisation of Japan was promoted by introducing that civilisation.
This essay surveys the history of the reception of Christianity in Japan
before describing the role of Christianity in modern society.
Beginnings: the Kirishitans

The history of Christianity in Japan begins with the arrival of the Jesuit
missionary Francis Xavier on 15 August 1549. During the following 100
.
ly
years, as many as 300 foreign missionaries came to Japan and lived there
on
according to the Jesuit ‘accommodation’ policy, based on which they
valued the local culture and customs and ‘harmonised’ with the countries
se
to which they were sent. The missionaries started philanthropic work and
lu
introduced Western medicine, culture and objects to Japan. The lords of
na
the warring states benefited from their trade with Spain and Portugal,
so
and in return they gave permission to the missionaries to spread Christi
anity. As a result, some of the lords were baptised. Amidst the social chaos
er
caused by ongoing war and disaster, the people of Japan sought spiritual
redemption. With Buddhism failing to address the crisis, some turned to rp
Fo
Christianity. Soon, Christianity gained its highest proportion of adherents
e.
in Japanese history. The number of Christians during the 1580s was

l
350,000, in a total population of 24 million.

sa
However, after unifying the warring states, Hideyoshi Toyotomi

re
(1537–98) announced the Bateren Tsuiho Rei (Edict on the Expulsion of

or
Priests) in 1587, and in 1614 the Edo shogunate issued a ban on Chris-
n
tianity. The Japanese feudal thought system was based on the ethics of
tio
sovereign–subject/parent–child loyalty, which clashed with Christian

bu
teaching about the equality of all before one God. Christianity was con-
tri
sidered an obstacle to the unification of Japan to such an extent that one of

is
rd
Christianity in Japan, 1970 and 2020

fo

ot

N
Christians 3,100,000 3.0% 2,665,000 2.1% –0.3%

Anglicans 49,100 0.0% 47,600 0.0% –0.1%
Independents 617,000 0.6% 1,113,000 0.9% 1.2%
Orthodox 26,500 0.0% 32,000 0.0% 0.4%
Protestants 417,000 0.4% 522,000 0.4% 0.5%
Catholics 361,000 0.3% 535,000 0.4% 0.8%
Evangelicals 258,000 0.2% 310,000 0.2% 0.4%
134 Akemi Kugimiya
the Kirishitan lords, Justo Ukon Takayama (1552?–1615), was deported. In

1597, at Nagasaki, a missionary and 26 of his disciples were captured and
crucified; these martyrs were canonised in 1861–2 by Pope Pius IX. During
this time, the Edo shogunate adopted isolationism, banned Christianity
completely within Japan and heavily persecuted Christians. Christianity
was seen as an anti-establishment philosophy, and such views formed the
foundation of lasting prejudices and the concept of jashumon (evil faiths).
Christians disguised themselves as Buddhists and secretly continued
their Christian faith. They became known as the kakure Kirishitan (hidden
.
ly
Kirishitans).
on
The Modern Missionary Era
se
At the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth,
lu
Protestant missionaries from Britain and the USA, inspired by the Evan-
na
gelical movement in the two countries, began to consider Japan. Since they
so
were unable to reach mainland Japan because of the country’s isolationist
policy, Karl Gützlaff, translator and physician for the East India Company,
er
visited Ryukyu (present-day Okinawa) and distributed Robert Morrison’s
rp
Chinese translation of the Bible. Another missionary, Bernard Jean Bettel-
Fo
heim, looked after three sailors from the Owari region while in Macau.
e.
He learned Japanese from the sailors and after translating the gospel and
l
Epistles of John published them in Singapore in 1837. This became the first
sa
Japanese Bible, with God translated as gokuraku (heaven or paradise) and

re
logos as kashikoi mono (the wise being).

or
In 1858, a Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the USA and the
n
Empire of Japan was signed, and freedom of faith and worship was
tio
permitted in the US living quarters. This enabled the official arrival of

bu
foreign missionaries. The first Protestant missionary assigned to Japan,

tri
in May 1859, was John Liggins from the Protestant Episcopal Church of
is
America, soon followed by Channing Moore Williams from the same

rd
church, James Curtis Hepburn of the Presbyterian Church of America,

fo
and S. R. Brown, Duane B. Simmons and Guido H. F. Verbeck from the

Reformed Church in America. Based on their experiences of missionary
ot
work in China, these men dedicated themselves to missionary work in

N
foreign lands. However, they were not able to overcome their elitist view
that they were enlightening an undeveloped country where darkness and
unbelief were rampant.
Catholic missionary work was revived through the Société des Missions
Étrangères de Paris, under whose auspices Father Théodore-Augustin
Forcade landed in Naha, in the Ryukyu kingdom, in 1844. However, he was
placed under house arrest because Christianity was banned and he was
not able to do any missionary work. In 1846, when Japan was designated
Japan 135
a vicariate, Forcade was appointed Vicar Apostolic of Japan, but he soon

left for Hong Kong. Among his successors was Father Bernard-Thadée
Petitjean, who completed the construction of Oura Cathedral in 1865. On
17 March of that year, Christians in the Urakami region of Nagasaki, who
had heard of the cathedral, came to visit. One of the women among the
visitors placed one hand on her heart and said to Father Petitjean, ‘We
here are of the same heart as you. Where is the statue of Santa Maria?’ This
was a historic event, as Kirishitans in Urakami were discovered 250 years
after the ban on Christianity was announced. The hidden Kirishitans of
.
ly
Nagasaki’s Sotome, Goto, Amakusa and Hirado regions returned to the
on
church and secretly received instruction from Petitjean. Still today, these
areas in Nagasaki are home to many devout Catholics and have produced
se
many priests and nuns.
lu
Despite this turn of events, the Nagasaki Magistrate began to persecute
na
Christians again in 1867. This was the beginning of the so-called Urakami
so
Yoban Kuzure, the large-scale crackdown on the Christians who had
remained hidden in Nagasaki’s Urakami district. Christians were captured
er
and sent away to places such as Tsuwano, where they underwent severe
rp
torture. Following protests from diplomatic representations, the Meiji
Fo
government finally lifted the ban on Christianity in 1873, and Christianity
e.
was tolerated.
l
From the mid-nineteenth century, British and American Protestant

sa
missionaries introduced Western knowledge to Japan by teaching Eigaku

re
(provision of English studies as a means to acquire Western knowledge) in

or
private schools, which became the foundation of the ‘missionary schools’

n
in Japan. They also emphasised education of girls, to the extent that 60%
tio
of the 60 schools that were founded between 1864 and 1889 were girls’
bu
schools. The missionaries influenced their students through character-

tri
building education based on the gospel, which led some youth to become
is
Christians. Most of the new believers during this time were children of
rd
samurai families who had lost out in the Meiji Restoration, and were from
fo
feudal domains that supported the Tokugawa shogunate and opposed the
new government. Young people who experienced a crisis at this turn of
ot
history found a guideline for life and new values in Christianity.

N
Three groups of worshippers, known as bands, emerged during this

period and laid the foundations of Protestantism in Japan. The Yokohama
band consisted of worshippers instructed by missionaries such as
Hepburn, Brown and James Ballagh. Famous members included Masahisa
Uemura (1858–1925), Kajinosuke Ibuka (1854–1940), Masayoshi Oshikawa
(1850–1928) and Yōitsu Honda (1848–1912). In 1872, the band founded
Nihon Kirisuto Kokai (the Church of Christ in Japan), the largest Protestant
denomination in Japan at that time. The Kumamoto band members studied
136 Akemi Kugimiya
in Kumamoto Yogakko (Kumamoto School of Western Studies) under

Leroy Lancing Janes, a former army officer and a devout member of the
Congregational Church. With members such as Danjō Ebina (1856–1937),
Michitomo Kanamori (1857–1945) and Hiromichi Kozaki (1856–1938),
they studied at Doshisha Eigakko (Doshisha School of English Studies)
founded by Jō Niijima (1843–90) and laid the foundation of the Nihon
Kumiai Kirisuto Kyokai (the Japanese Congregational Church). Members
of the Sapporo band, such as Kanzō Uchimura (1861–1930), Inazō Nitobe
(1862–1933) and Kingo Miyabe (1860–1951), studied at the Sapporo Agri-
.
ly
cultural College (the present Hokkaido University Faculty of Agriculture)
on
and were influenced by the character-building education of William
Smith Clark. Many of its members played major roles in education, with
se
Uchimura later leaving a significant mark on Japanese Christianity and
lu
philosophy from his non-denominational standpoint.
na
The Protestant missionaries cooperated across denominations and
so
focused their efforts on translating the Bible. A Japanese version of the
New Testament was published in 1880, followed by the Old Testament in
er
1888. Translation of the Bible meant the introduction of new concepts to
rp
the Japanese language. Since the times of the Kirishitans, translation of the
Fo
word ‘God’ had been an issue for the Japanese because the Shinto concept
e.
of ‘God’ differs from that of Christianity. To avoid misunderstanding,

l
‘God’ had previously been translated as dainichi (the great sun, or the ab-
sa
breviated form of the Chinese translation for Mahāvairocana, the supreme

re
deity in esoteric Buddhism), deusu (Deus, the Latin word for God) or
or
tenshu (master of heaven). In the new translation, God was translated with
n
the word kami (absolute existence beyond human being), which has been
tio
retained until the present.

bu
Another example is the word ai (love). Whereas in Buddhism the word

tri
had negative connotations such as desire or thirst, in the new transla-

is
tion the word was associated with the Christian concept of neighbourly
rd
love or affection. In 1917, the translation was revised and published as

fo
the Bungoyaku seisho (written Japanese translation of the Bible). This was
a phenomenal translation with a refined style of writing and excellent
ot
insights that had great influence on Japanese literary works. Many current
N
Japanese idiomatic expressions – such as semaki mon (narrow gate),

mayoeru kohitsuji (lost lamb) and me kara uroko (fish scales falling from the
eyes) – are taken from the Bible. The translation of hymns also influenced
the new style of poetry during the Meiji era, and many songs authorised
by the Ministry of Education derive from the hymns.
While the Protestants performed their missionary work through
education of the middle and upper classes, the Catholics put more effort
into welfare and charity and preached Christianity mainly among the
Japan 137
lower class. After becoming bishop, Petitjean invited three organisations

from France to come to Japan: les Dames de Saint-Maur (later known as
Les Sœurs de l’Enfant-Jésus, the mother organisation of Futaba School) in
1872, la Congrégation des Sœurs de l’Enfant-Jésus de Chauffailles (mother
organisation of Osaka Shinai Girl’s School) in 1877, and les Sœurs de Saint-
Paul de Chartres (mother organisation of Shirayuri University) in 1878. The
Catholic sisterhoods played an important role in education and welfare.
The history and the development of the Orthodox Church in Japan owes
much to the efforts of the Russian Orthodox missionary Father Nikolai
.
ly
(Ivan Dmitrievich Kasatkin), who arrived in Japan in 1861 as the priest in
on
residence at the Russian consulate in Hakodate. Nikolai learned Japanese
and baptised three worshippers, including Takuma Sawabe (1835–1913), in
se
1868, when Christianity was still banned. In 1871, after baptising 11 more
lu
worshippers and spreading the faith in places such as Sendai, Nikolai
na
moved to Tokyo and set up a seminary in Surugadai, making it the base
so
for his missionary work. In 1891, he built the Holy Resurrection Cathedral
in Tokyo (known as ‘Nikolai do’) and engaged energetically in the
er
translation of various prayer books. Although the Orthodox Church had
rp
fewer clergy than the Catholic or Protestant denominations, they spread
Fo
their faith actively among the Japanese under Nikolai’s supervision and
e.
increased their influence. Among the famous members of the church is the
l
icon artist Rin Yamashita (1857–1939).

sa
re
Emergence of Nationalism
or
The Meiji government adopted Westernisation, aiming to modernise

n
Japan. As a result, elites in Japan became interested in Christianity and

tio
the number of followers grew exponentially. Christian beliefs, such as

bu
freedom, equality and benevolence, also influenced the Freedom and

tri
People’s Rights Movement in Japan.

is
After the mid-Meiji period, however, specifically in 1887, Japan adopted

rd
‘Rich Country’ and ‘Strong Army’ policies. As nationalism emerged in

fo
Japan, Christianity came to be tested. In the constitution of the Empire of

Japan, which was declared in 1889, religious freedom was limited to the
ot
extent that ‘it does not disturb the nation’s order and does not go against
N
subjects’ responsibilities’. In addition, the Imperial Rescript on Education

of 1890 explained the subject’s loyalty to the emperor. This rescript became
the basis of morality and education in Japan, which were designed to give
the emperor and Shrine Shinto a special status in the framework of the
nation. This led to the absolutisation/deification of the emperor and state
sponsorship of Shintoism. In this climate, Kanzō Uchimura’s ‘Disrespect-
ful Incident’ took place in the first high school in 1891. After he refused
to bow deeply enough before the Imperial Rescript on Education during
138 Akemi Kugimiya
a formal ceremony, Uchimura was accused of profanity. He was driven

to resign his post as a teacher. In his 1892 book Clash Between Education
and Religion, Tetsujirō Inoue (1856–1944), a philosophy professor at Tokyo
Imperial University, alleged that Christianity was a crime since it went
against the framework of the nation and its education. With attacks from
nationalists and the pressure from nationalistic ideas, mission activities
stagnated, and many people abandoned Christianity. During the same
period, Neo-Orthodoxy based on the ‘higher criticism’ of the Bible intro-
duced from Germany, brought turmoil and confusion to churches in Japan.
.
ly
Danjō Ebina, who espoused progressive theology, and Uemura Masahisa,
on
who took a hard-line orthodox position, clashed over the question of the
deity of Christ.
se
lu
Christianity in Time of War
na
As the country moved from the Meiji and Taisho (1912–26) periods to the
so
Showa (1926–89) period, it became more militaristic. With the First Sino-
Japanese War (1894) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904) as its triggers,
er
Christianity became incorporated into the framework of the nation and
rp
started to take on nationalistic qualities. Many Christians compromised
Fo
with the government by supporting the wars and cooperating in them.
e.
There were only a few pacifists, one of whom was Kanzō Uchimura.
l
During these transitions, Protestant churches were already promoting

sa
indigenisation of Christianity by ending its relationship with foreign

re
religious orders. Based on the resolutions of the 1910 World Missionary

or
Conference, in 1914 they started large-scale cross-denominational mis-

n
sionary activities. With Taisho Democracy, Protestant numbers increased

tio
from 79,000 in 1912 to 164,000 in 1917.

bu
The number of Catholics in Japan was 58,800 in 1904 and grew to

tri
67,000 in 1912. By 1891, the four apostolic vicariates had been promoted
is
to become the archdiocese of Tokyo, and the dioceses of Hakodate, Osaka

rd
and Nagasaki. Missionary activities, however, stagnated as the Missions

fo
Étrangères de Paris lacked personnel and money. The Society of Jesus

received a request to establish higher educational institutions in Japan.
ot
They despatched missionaries in 1908 and opened Sophia University in

N
1913.
Sōichi Iwashita (1889–1940) was a famous Catholic priest and theologian
who became the leader of modern Catholicism in Japan. Iwashita studied
philosophy under Raphael von Koeber at Tokyo Imperial University. After
that, while he was studying abroad in Europe at his own expense, he was
ordained a priest in 1925 in Italy. He returned to Japan as a missionary.
In 1930 he became the head of the Koyama Fukusei Hospital and worked
hard for leprosy patients. Simultaneously, in order to gain citizenship,
Japan 139
Catholics in Japan were actively publishing and translating literature on

medieval philosophy and Catholic theology. Iwashita also advocated the
authority of Catholicism based on the objectivity of the truth it professed.
During the 1930s the Japanese government became militaristic,
signalled by the Manchurian Incident of 1931, when Japan took military
action against China. Then Japan entered the Second Sino-Japanese
War (1937) and the Pacific War (1941). Under an ideology of militarism,
freedom of speech and religious freedom were suppressed. There was
increased pressure from the military and the public against Christianity
.
ly
as a Western religion, with many incidents of suppression of free speech
on
and repression of religious pacifists. The Religious Association Act of 1940
united 30 Protestant denominations and about 300 congregations to form
se
the United Church of Christ in Japan. Catholic churches became part of
lu
the Japan Imperial Public Educational Association. Both were subject to
na
government authority.
so
Kanzō Uchimura’s Non-Church Movement
er
To provide a full account of Christianity in Japan in the Meiji, Taisho
rp
and Showa periods, consideration must be given to the ‘Non-Church
Fo
Movement’ (Mukyōkai) of Kanzō Uchimura. Uchimura received a tradi-
e.
tional Confucian education before proceeding to Sapporo Agricultural

l
College on government sponsorship. While there, he was influenced by

sa
the missionary William Smith Clark and was baptised. As a bureaucrat,

re
he became involved in fishery research. After that, he studied under Julius

or
H. Seelye at Amherst College. This led him to a new understanding of

n
the atonement that resulted from Christ’s death on the cross. Uchimura
tio
lost his job as a result of the Disrespectful Incident. He moved around

bu
and started writing despite being impoverished. He published a number

tri
of influential books, including Representative Men of Japan (1894) and How

is
I Became a Christian (1895). Regarding the Russo-Japanese War, he main-

rd
tained his pacifist position. In 1900, he created a Christian magazine, Bible

fo
Study. He devoted his life to Bible study and missionary activities, with
his weekly Sunday meetings listed in the magazine.
ot
Uchimura advocated the Non-Church Movement, aiming to recover

N
true religious beliefs directly from the Bible. Having neither any official
title nor any church association, he presided over Christian gatherings
on his own responsibility. The gatherings centred on explanations of
biblical teaching instead of official teaching from the clergy. There was
no celebration of the sacraments. Uchimura engaged vigorously with
the original languages of the Bible. In 1918 these gatherings resulted in a
movement focused on Christ’s Second Coming. This prophetic belief in-
fluenced not only Christians but also Japanese literature and philosophy.
140 Akemi Kugimiya
The Non-Church Movement was passed down by Uchimura’s pupils,

including Toraji Tsukamoto (1885–1973), Takeshi Fujii (1888–1930) and
Tadao Yanaihara (1893–1961). Many of these leaders were scholars or
teachers. They promoted the study of the Bible in Japan. Today, gather-
ings associated with the Non-Church Movement are in decline and do not
attract the same level of enthusiasm. However, Uchimura’s books continue
to be widely read.
Social Movements, Welfare, Medical Activity
.
ly
Christian teachings of God’s love and love of neighbour created oppor
on
tunities to put the faith into practice by serving other people. Christian
social movements and social work became significant during the Meiji and
se
Taisho periods. Their work proved to be foundational for medical as well
lu
as welfare services in modern Japan. At that time, capitalism grew rapidly
na
and the modern proletarian class emerged. The economic depression
so
caused by the Russo-Japanese War and then the First World War made
social and labour issues more visible, for example with the Ashio Copper
er
Mine Poison Incident. In these circumstances many Christians began to
rp
express their faith by seeking to solve social problems, rather than just
Fo
spreading their message only to members of the elite class or to people
e.
already attending churches.

l
Leading proponents of Christian social witness have included: Jūji

sa
Ishii (1865–1914), who dedicated himself to the education of orphans and

re
child welfare; Kōsuke Tomeoka (1864–1934), who dedicated himself to

or
educating delinquent youngsters by establishing Home School, a facility

n
supporting children’s independence; and Gunpei Yamamuro (1872–1940),

tio
who carried out many social welfare business activities, including

bu
Christmas kettle (which involved soliciting for donations at the end of the
tri
year), the settlement house movement and the Salvation Army campaign
is
for the abolition of licensed prostitution.

rd
The roadside missionary activities of Toyohiko Kagawa (1888–1960) in

fo
poor areas by the Kobe Shinkawa became well known around the world.
He led a labour union movement and took part in labour disputes with
ot
a view to countering poverty. He also developed a farmers’ movement

N
and a cooperative movement based on the idea of helping each other out.
These activities were based on Christ’s ‘atonement love’ and also the battle
to resolve social disintegration and existential crisis, aiming to promote
human freedom at an existential level. Kagawa founded the Iesu no Tomo
Kai (Friends of Jesus) along with people who were suffering in society.
He developed the Million Souls for Christ Movement and the Kingdom
of God Movement across the different denominations, the most success-
ful such movements after the Meiji period. However, Kagawa’s elite-like
Japan 141
thinking and cooperation with the military during the Pacific War have
been criticised. His activities have attracted more admiration overseas
than they have in Japan.
The Modern Period

On 15 August 1945, through the Potsdam Declaration at the end of the
Second World War, Japan accepted defeat. State Shinto was abolished and
the Religious Corporation Ordinance replaced the Religious Organisation
Law. This enabled each denomination to be reorganised according to its
.
ly
distinctive features, and the Christian community began to recover its
on
vigour.
In 1946, the emperor issued a declaration to make it clear that he was
se
not to be regarded as divine but rather as a human. By article 20 of the
lu
1946 constitution, complete freedom of religion was guaranteed for the
na
first time. The Fundamental Law of Education enacted in 1947 became an
so
indicator of the educational policy of Japan after the war. The commission
concerned with its establishment included many who had studied under
er
Kanzō Uchimura and Inazō Nitobe.
rp
As for the shape of Christianity in Japan, Protestant influence was strong
Fo
before the Second World War, but the activities of Catholic intellectuals
e.
were remarkable after the start of the Showa period, especially after the
l
war. The pioneer Sōichi Iwashita, mentioned above, influenced Yoshihiko

sa
Yoshimitsu (1904–45), the philosopher and mystic who converted to

re
Catholicism. Another significant figure was Kōtarō Tanaka (1890–1974),

or
a legal philosopher. Meanwhile, the novelist Shūsaku Endō (1923–96)

n
pursued the question of what Christianity means for the Japanese, under
tio
Yoshimitsu’s tutelage. Likewise, Yōji Inoue (1927–2014), a Catholic priest

bu
who worked in the same spirit as Endō, preached the Christian message
tri
with sensitivity to Japanese culture and with reference to broad views

is
drawn from Japanese philosophical thought and literature.

rd
On Iwashita’s advice, Yoshimitsu studied the philosophy of Augustine

fo
and Thomas Aquinas under Jacques Maritain in France and emphasised

the universal meaning of the Catholic intellectual history of the Western
ot
Middle Ages. Pointing out the misery of the modernistic humans who had
N
lost their faith in God, he criticised the intellectual situation of modern

Japan in wartime.
Shūsaku Endō studied under Yoshimitsu and became a novelist on
his advice. Endō was baptised at the age of 12 and inherited the Catholic
faith from his devout mother. He aimed to ‘make it suitable for the body
because it is stifling to be put in baggy Western clothing’. In his novel
Silence (1966), set in the Edo period under the anti-Christian policy, his
main character is Father Rodrigo, who was driven to abandon his belief
142 Akemi Kugimiya
by the persecution and torture of Christians. In the novel, Endō developed

the motherhood image of Jesus Christ, who drew close to the suffering
and sadness of humans – in other words, God for the weak. This created a
sensation. One of the characters in the novel states, ‘This country [Japan]
is a swamp decaying all the things . . . Christianity won’t be rooted in this
country’, reflecting difficult issues of inculturation. Silence was translated
into English by a Jesuit, Father William Johnston, and was influential in-
ternationally. In 2016 it was made into a film directed by Martin Scorsese.
Endō’s later work Deep River is an ambitious attempt to reconcile Christian
.
ly
monotheism and Japanese pantheism under the image of the flow of the
on
mother Ganges, drawing on John Hick’s work on religious pluralism.
Academic research into the philosophy, theology and spirituality of
se
ancient times and medieval times gained momentum after the 1960s
lu
and has provided a base for the development of Catholic theology. A
na
steady flow of publications, including some outstanding translations, has
so
stimulated intellectual enquiry and allowed lay believers to deepen their
understanding of the faith. The publication of Corpus fontium mentis medii
er
aevi (1992–2002), edited by the Sophia University Institute of Medieval
rp
Thought under the supervision of Father Klaus Riesenhuber sj (b. 1938),
Fo
played an especially significant role. Moreover, through the efforts of
e.
Ryosuke Inagaki (b. 1928) and others, the Japanese translation of Thomas
l
Aquinas’s Summa Theologica was completed in 2012, after 52 years of work.

sa
The spread of Catholicism in Japan owes much to the role and efforts of
re
the missionaries who came to Japan from foreign countries. For example,
or
a member of the Société des Missions Étrangères de Paris, Father Sauveur

n
Antoine Candau (1897–1955), provided insight on post-war Japanese

tio
society based on his deep knowledge of the Japanese language and its
bu
classical texts. The preaching of German Jesuit missionary Father Hermann

tri
Heuvers (1890–1977) touched the hearts of many Japanese people, and

is
Spanish Jesuit Father Mendizabal (1920–2011) devoted himself to his work

rd
as a confessor at the St Ignatius Church.

fo
In Protestant theology, Karl Barth’s work was received actively and

had a significant impact. Japan by this time was also producing its own
ot
Christian theologians, with a distinctive contribution to offer. Kazoh

N
Kitamori (1916–98), author of The Theology of the Pain of God (1965),

regarded salvation by the crucifixion of Christ as the pain of God against
the background of Japanese thinking and developed an original dialectical
theology. Katsumi Takizawa (1909–84), who developed his ‘philosophy
of Immanuel’ under the influence of Barth and Kitaro Nishida, claimed
that all persons belonged to the fact that ‘God is with us (Immanuel)’.
The presence of God comes first, and a second level of being with God is
found when we, as humans, become conscious of that presence. Takizawa
Japan 143
explained that the relationship between God and humans was indivisible,
unassimilable and irreversible.
In Japan, which has a polytheistic culture, faith in God does not
necessarily take a monotheistic form. Therefore, a constant question has
been how to explain Christianity to non-believers, and there has been
a continuous search for a universal statement that proves convincing.
When explaining Japanese spirituality, the philosophy of Kitaro Nishida
cannot be disregarded. Nishida explained ‘transcendent and immanent,
immanent and transcendent God’ as the field of ‘absolute nothingness’,
.
ly
positioned and incarnated as a comprehensive and ontological reality.
on
Although Nishida is not Christian, his viewpoint can open a door to
dialogue between Christianity and other religions.
se
Rapid globalisation of modern society has brought changes to the
lu
composition of churches in Japan. Since the 1990s, immigration has
na
greatly increased, and multicultural coexistence with people of different
so
linguistic and cultural backgrounds has become a major issue. Foreign-
ers who came to Japan after 1990 and have settled are called ‘newcomers’.
er
Those from such countries as the Philippines, Brazil, Peru and Vietnam
rp
are often Catholics. As a result, the Catholic Church has rapidly become
Fo
multi-ethnic and multilingual. By 2003, the Catholic Commission of Japan
e.
for Migrants, Refugees and People on the Move estimated that, in the
l
Catholic Church nationwide, foreign believers totalled 565,712, compared

sa
with 449,925 Japanese believers. There are also contrasting demograph-

re
ics, as Japanese believers are older and declining in number, while the
or
‘newcomers’ are younger and growing in number. In large churches Mass

n
is celebrated in English, Portuguese, Spanish, Vietnamese, Bahasa and

tio
Tagalog as well as Japanese. There can be friction between Catholics from

bu
different cultural backgrounds, but they are challenged to find unity in the
tri
faith. There are also Evangelical and Pentecostal churches that are made
is
up predominantly of Brazilians and Peruvians.

rd
The essay cannot conclude without some reference to the contribution

fo
of women to Christianity in Japan. Mieko Kamiya (1914–79), who was in-

fluenced by the Non-Church Movement and by the work of Inazō Nitobe,
ot
explored the purpose of suffering in human life in her highly original

N
book On the Meaning of Life (1966), based on the experience of psychiat-

ric treatment for sufferers of Hansen’s disease. Atsuko Suga (1929–98)
was influenced by new Catholic theological thinking in France and Italy,
where she studied. Her original essays, literary works and translations,
as well as her faithful way of life, have won her an appreciative audience.
In addition, Sadako Ogata (b. 1927) and Michiko Inukai (1921–2017), both
of whom served as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
contributed significantly to refugee assistance; both are also Catholics.
144 Akemi Kugimiya
Advocacy and action on behalf of the socially vulnerable are the most sig-
nificant role Christianity has played in Japan.
Christianity remains very much a minority faith in the country, yet
Japanese Christianity displays both depth and vigour. While the number
of baptised Christians remains relatively low, the influence of Christian-
ity on Japanese thought and the role of its educational and social service
institutions are not to be underestimated.
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.
ly
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Marins, Mark R., Christianity Made in Japan: A Study of Indigenous Movements (Honolulu, HI:
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sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
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is
rd
fo
ot
N
Myanmar
Hrang Hlei
As with many other countries in Asia and Africa, Christianity came
.
ly
to Burma (now Myanmar) on the back of colonialism. It first arrived in
on
southern Burma in the early sixteenth century after Vasco da Gama, a
Portuguese who sailed around the Cape of Good Hope, discovered the
se
sea route from Europe to India. Christianity was introduced to Burma by
lu
the priests who accompanied the Portuguese merchants and soldiers as
na
chaplains.
so
Problems ensued when Philip de Brito – a Portuguese captain who was
er
appointed by the king of Portugal to be the governor of Syriam (modern
rp
Thanlyin) in 1600 – built a church in Syriam and tried to strengthen his
power by pressing the Buddhists to embrace his religion. As a result, the
Fo
Christian presence in Burma was perceived by the kings and many na-
e.
tionalist Burmans as a threat to their religious and national identity, rather

l
than as a spiritual entity. This became a real challenge when the Protestant
sa
missionaries arrived in Burma in the early nineteenth century. Since then,

re
the Christian presence in Myanmar has been a struggle on the one hand
or
and an opportunity to spread the Christian message on the other.

n
tio
Catholic, Protestant and Pentecostal Missions

bu
The early Christian presence in Burma was brought by the Portuguese,

tri
who came seeking opportunities for political expansion and economic

is
development. Catholic missionaries arrived during the rule of the

rd
Portuguese and settled in Syriam. They won some converts, including

fo
Natshinnaung, a ruler of Taungoo, who was a friend of Philip de Brito. It is

reported that de Brito imposed the Catholic faith by destroying Buddhist
ot
pagodas, melting gold from the pagodas and turning the monastery bells
N
into guns. This incident, along with other events, provoked the wrath and
distrust of the Arakan king, who in 1607 had many Portuguese killed or
imprisoned. In short, the early Catholic missionary efforts were rejected
by local Buddhists due to fear and distrust of foreigners.
The arrival of Barnabite priests in the eighteenth century brought a
more active and sustainable mission to the country. According to the
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Myanmar (2017), the Barnabites excelled
in their tasks not only as missionaries but also as educators, scientists and
146 Hrang Hlei
scholars. Despite establishing their mission, however, they did not achieve
any significant success, as they later faced restriction and even persecution
from the Burmese authorities. The arrival of Bishop Paul Bigandet in 1856,
after the Second Anglo-Burmese War, and the commitment of succeeding
missionaries did, though, help the Catholic mission in Burma to witness
remarkable success. This was partly due to a change in their mission
approach, as they turned their attention to the ethnic minority groups,
especially to the hill tribes, who were culturally more inclined towards
Christianity.
.
ly
The history of Christianity in Burma changed with the arrival of Prot-
on
estant missionaries in the early nineteenth century. The first Protestant
missionaries were Richard Mardon and James Charter, from the Baptist
se
Missionary Society in London, who arrived in 1807. They were later joined
lu
by Felix Carey, the son of William Carey, the famous Baptist missionary
na
to India. It was, however, after the arrival of an American Baptist mission-
so
ary couple, Adoniram and Ann Judson, in 1813 that the Protestant mission
was firmly established on the soil of Burma. The Baptists were, much later,
er
followed by other Protestant and Pentecostal missionaries.
The Burmese kings allowed Judson to practise his own religion, but rp
Fo
they did not allow the Burmans to be converted to the foreign religion.
e.
Consequently, native Burmans were hesitant to embrace the Christian

l
faith, for fear of retaliation and persecution. The Baptists thus switched
sa
their attention to minority ethnic groups, expanding their mission work

re
as follows: to the Sgaw Karen in 1828, Pwo Karen in 1836, Karen hill tribes
or
in 1853, Asho Chin in 1856, Shan in 1860, Kachin in 1877 and Chin people
n
in 1899. As a result, Christianity has flourished among the ethnic minority

tio
peoples while it has generally not been well received by the Burmans.
bu
The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (Church of England)

tri
started its mission work in Burma in 1854, half a century after its Baptist
is
rd
Christianity in Myanmar, 1970 and 2020

fo

ot

N
Christians 1,350,000 5.1% 4,362,000 8.0% 2.4%

Anglicans 27,000 0.1% 72,500 0.1% 2.0%
Independents 84,400 0.3% 680,000 1.2% 4.3%
Orthodox 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
Protestants 963,000 3.6% 2,628,000 4.8% 2.0%
Catholics 268,000 1.0% 660,000 1.2% 1.8%
Evangelicals 443,000 1.7% 1,600,000 2.9% 2.6%
Myanmar 147
counterparts. Their initial mission focus was among the English residents
in the southern part of Burma. Like the Anglicans, the Methodist mission
was started by the British Methodists in 1887 to minister to and educate
the Anglo-Burmese and British. Unlike the other Protestant churches, the
Presbyterian Church was started in Burma only in the 1950s, by Mizo
missionaries in the Kalay and Kabaw valleys in the north-western part
of the country. The Pentecostal mission was introduced to Burma in the
1920s by Hector and Sigrid McClean, who worked as missionaries among
the Melee people in Upper Burma. The Assemblies of God, established in
.
ly
1931, is believed to be the largest Pentecostal organisation in Myanmar
on
today. The churches in Myanmar are actively engaged in evangelism and
mission, and, amidst their struggles, there has been a steady increase in
se
the Christian population within the country.
lu
na
Christianity under Successive Military Regimes
so
The churches in Myanmar have grown under the repressive military
regimes that have been in power since the coup of 1962. In 1965 the
er
socialist regime declared the nationalisation of all businesses and schools,
rp
including the churches’ social institutions and properties. All Western mis-
Fo
sionaries were ordered to leave the country in 1966, and the local churches
e.
had to be on their own, since the country was cut off from the rest of the
l
world. Meanwhile, the churches in the West and the missionaries were
sa
understandably concerned for the survival of these churches and feared

re
that their years of mission efforts might have been in vain.

or
At the same time, the missionaries were hopeful that the indigenous
n
churches would survive and be able to continue to spread the gospel after
tio
they had left. In the epilogue of the Burma Baptist Chronicle (Rangoon Uni-
bu
versity Press, 1963), the editors – Genevieve and Erville Sowards – stated
tri
that God was the one who had helped the Baptists for the past 150 years
is
and that the indigenous leaders could look forward in faith and con-
rd
fidence to the years yet to come and say, ‘The future is as bright as the
fo
promises of God’. The churches endured enormous pressures from the

successive military regimes. Many faithful believers overcame hardship
ot
and withstood oppression and persecution, ready to make sacrifices for

N
the sake of their faith. The churches, during the military regimes, had to
go through severe difficulties and hardships. But at the same time, they
witnessed significant growth.
Christians from minority ethnic groups suffered harassment and dis-
crimination under the repressive military regimes. In many cases, being
an ethnic minority Christian was like a crime under the military regime.
Numerous villages were destroyed and burned, women were raped
and men were forced to go to the front lines of battle as military porters.
148 Hrang Hlei
Christians were suppressed by the banning of religious activities such as

open-air meetings, religious conferences and even worship on Sundays.
Ethnic minority Christians also suffered discrimination when they were
denied due promotion in various government departments. It has been
challenging for Christians, amidst such enormous pressure and so many
difficult situations, to remain true to their faith.
However, the post-independence period proved to be a time of church
growth under the national leadership as Christians tried to cope with
and respond to the political and social changes. Though scattered and
.
ly
deprived of their leaders, Christians continued as much of their work
on
as conditions permitted. The Burmese churches had years of testing and
suffered great losses after foreign missionaries left, but they came through
se
with strengthened faith and resolve. They could endure many challenges
lu
by adopting the three-self method in their approach to leadership, aiming
na
to be self-supporting, self-propagating and self-governing.
so
During the post-independence period, indigenous Christian leaders
were able to exercise and develop their leadership skills. They proved that
er
they were able to do evangelistic work and lead the church. For example,
rp
the Catholic Church, after its missionaries left the country, was able to
Fo
establish new dioceses; indeed, church membership grew steadily in all
e.
dioceses. In the same period, both the Anglican and the Methodist Church
l
were growing and active in evangelism. The Anglican Church was able
sa
to establish new dioceses during this period, such as Sittway Diocese in

re
1984, Toungngu Diocese in 1993 and Myitkyina Diocese also in 1993. The
or
Methodist churches also showed signs of progress during this period. They
n
were able to establish new districts after they became autonomous in 1964.
tio
In the 1970s, the Kachin Baptist Convention launched a historic mission

bu
project called the Three Hundred Three Years Mission, which planned to
tri
recruit 300 volunteers to serve for three years among the Kachin people.
is
It concluded with great success in 1981. A similar mission project was

rd
launched by the Chin Baptist Convention in 1983. The project, called

fo
the Chins for Christ in One Century (CCOC), was concluded with great
success in 1999 at the centennial celebration of the arrival of Christianity
ot
among the Chin people in Hakha. The Karen Baptist Convention also had
N
a two-phase mission project known as the Five Years Mission (1988–92)

and AD 2000 Mission (1991–2000). It was concluded in the year 2000 with
5,460 new converts from non-Christian families.
Christian Presence: Challenges and Prospects

The Karen, Kachin, Chin and other churches and organisations, including
non-denominational churches, continue to engage in mission projects. For
example, the Chin Baptist Convention launched a post-CCOC mission
Myanmar 149
project called Centennial Mission for Christ, running from 1999 until 2013
and focusing on the non-Christian population in various regions in the
country. It also continues to engage in a mission project that plans to send
500–1,000 missionaries annually until the year 2028. Similarly, the Karen
Baptist Convention and Kachin Baptist Convention have launched mission
projects among the Rakhines, Wa, Palaung, Mon, Kayah, Burmans and
other groups within the country. The Myanmar diaspora churches also
have been actively engaged with similar mission projects in Myanmar and
spreading the gospel among the non-Christian population. For example,
.
ly
in 2013 the Chin Baptist Churches, USA, launched an ambitious mission
on
project inside Myanmar called the International Chin Baptist Mission
and through the work of those missionaries hundreds of people have
se
become Christians. Similar mission activities have been launched by other
lu
churches abroad such as the Karen Baptist Churches, USA; Chin Baptist
na
Association of North America; and Kachin Baptist Churches, USA.
so
In 2009, Myanmar Missions International, a non-denominational mission
organisation, launched a project that aimed to spread the gospel among the
er
‘unreached people who never heard of the gospel in Myanmar’. Significant
rp
numbers of new converts have been added to the Christian population
Fo
through this initiative. Pentecostal churches are also engaged in various
e.
mission and evangelism activities, such as open-air revival meetings,

l
crusades and revival conferences. For example, in 2016 the Hebron

sa
Brethren Assembly organised the Yangon Love Joy Peace Festival, at which
re
the Reverend Franklin Graham was invited to be the guest preacher. The
or
festival was held for three days at the Myanmar Convention Centre and
n
attracted more than 170,000 people, with more than 7,000 declaring that
tio
they accepted Jesus Christ as their saviour during the festival. The Pente-
bu
costals in Myanmar have been active in organising similar revival meetings,

tri
through which thousands of people have become Christians.

is
Through the efforts of various denominations and organisations,

rd
applying different mission approaches, the Christian population of

fo
Myanmar has increased dramatically. The 2014 census showed that the
total population had reached 51 million, with Christians accounting for
ot
6.2%. It has been suggested that this is an underestimate. The number of

N
Christians in contested areas such as Kachin and Karen states appears

to be under-reported. What is beyond question is that the Christian
population in Myanmar has dramatically increased during and after the
repressive military regimes. The recent changes in the political landscape
in the country have helped to open ways for the Christian churches to
freely engage in mission. This has created a situation of opportunity for
Christian witness, and it can be expected that the Christian population
will continue to increase in number despite ongoing challenges.
150 Hrang Hlei
As indicated above, the presence of Christianity was perceived by the

Burmese kings as a threat to religious and national identity. Buddhist
nationalists tend to perpetuate this misperception, which leads them to
view Christianity not simply as a spiritual entity but as a Western colonial
tool. Hence, ethnic minority Christians are often accused of being unpatri-
otic and of destroying the values of Buddhist culture. But the 2016 election
of Henry Van Thio, a Chin Christian, as second vice president might be
an indication that Myanmar has finally overcome this misperception. It
appears that since the recent political changes there is a more informed
.
ly
understanding of the Christian faith.
on
There are, however, still instances of Christians suffering discrimina-
tion and subtle repression. For example, a township chief administrator
se
in Chin state was threatened by his superior with removal from office
lu
because he was accused of not complying with the mandate to send his
na
subordinates to participate in a Buddhist water festival. The administra-
so
tor happens to be a Christian, and had the courage to refute the charge
against him.
er
The current constitution, drafted under the strict supervision of the
rp
military regime, guarantees 25% of the seats in parliament for the military,
Fo
which entrenches the military’s continuing influence in the new political
e.
system. Buddhism is given a special status in the constitution, and it

l
continues to exert its influence not only in politics but also in the public
sa
sphere. The Christian presence in such a situation is challenging, and hence

re
the church is confronted with this existential reality. What is important, in

or
this case, is how the church responds to this reality and what role it will
n
play in wider society in such a fast-changing social and political context.

tio
Put differently, the question still remains how Christians in Myanmar live
bu
out their faith in the public sphere.

tri
Generally, Christians in Myanmar had a very limited role in the public

is
sphere from the 1960s, when General Ne Win took power, until the end of
rd
military rule in 2010. During this period, the churches tended to confine
fo
their ministry within their own ethnic groups. This was partly due to
government restrictions and partly due to the churches’ approach to the
ot
church–state separation principle. Though the Christian population grew

N
steadily during military rule, the churches’ contributions to the social and
political spheres were very limited. However, the political landscape in
Myanmar has changed significantly since the start of democratic rule in
2011, and doors of opportunity have opened for the churches to freely
express their faith in public and to extend their prophetic role by con
tributing to social transformation in the country.
A significant challenge for the churches in Myanmar today is how
they perceive their calling in the current political context and how they
Myanmar 151
view their engagement in wider society. Moreover, as the country is

gradually opening to democratic rule, the churches are challenged to be
attentive to ways to engage in social and political issues in order to dem-
onstrate that they are not simply the product of Western colonialism. In
fact, the churches have the opportunity to be witnesses to God’s love by
actively engaging in issues that are important for the development of the
community as a whole.
As indicated above, Christianity has flourished among the ethnic
minority peoples of Myanmar. This is partly because of the strong lead-
.
ly
ership of early indigenous Christian leaders who were faithful to the
on
gospel that summoned them to live out their faith in difficult situations.
It is also partly because the ethnic Christian leaders were well equipped
se
with leadership skills and able to lead their own people when all Western
lu
missionaries were forced to leave the country in 1966. Christianity has
na
been the fastest-growing religion in Myanmar since the 1970s, and it is
so
practised today primarily among the ethnic minority peoples, who have
effectively applied the soul-winning or church-planting mission approach.
er
As a result, both Protestant and Pentecostal churches in Myanmar have
rp
become vibrant missionary-sending organisations, despite economic limi-
Fo
tations and geographical isolation.
e.
Myanmar is ringed by the regions where ethnic minorities predominate.

l
The Kachin in the north, the Karen in the south, the Rakhine and Chin in
sa
the west and north-west, and the Lahu and Shan in the east surround the
re
centre of the country. The ethnic minority peoples from these regions are
or
socially undeveloped and economically poor. Interestingly, however, the

n
pioneer Christians accepted the gospel when the Burman majority resisted
tio
it. They have a sense that they have been chosen by God, like the Israelite
bu
people in the Bible, to be a light to the nation. Despite their economic

tri
limitations, the ethnic minority churches are active in their mission en-
is
deavours, sharing the gospel among the Burman Buddhists. Because of

rd
their efforts, a growing number of Buddhists have accepted Christianity as

fo
their new religion.

As indicated above, many Western churches were genuinely concerned
ot
that the indigenous churches in Myanmar would disappear after the

N
missionaries had left. But because of the faithful commitment and self-
determination of the indigenous leaders, the indigenous churches were
able to carry on the mission work by themselves. Today, the ethnic minority
churches in Myanmar are vibrant in their mission efforts. The Chin, Kachin,
Karen and other ethnic churches in Myanmar actively engage in mission
among non-Christians, especially in Buddhist-majority areas. People are
responding to the gospel on a daily basis and the Christian population
has noticeably increased. Significantly, the current government recognises
152 Hrang Hlei
the presence of Christianity in Myanmar. For example, a number of ethnic

minority Christian leaders have been invited as special guests at the peace
talks between the government and militia groups. Such developments
suggest that the Christian presence in Myanmar is being recognised as an
accepted element within society.
In fact, the current political system allows Christians to be more pro
active in their social and spiritual engagements in society. There seem to
be few restrictions on Christians who wish to organise public meetings,
open-air preaching and other religious gatherings. They have freedom
.
ly
to engage in God’s mission in various respects. Put differently, as the
on
country has embarked on a new democratic era, Christians have oppor
tunities to witness to their faith and to spread the gospel among the people
se
of Myanmar. At the turn of a new democratic era and the opening of the
lu
current administration, dozens of mission organisations and missionary
na
training centres have sprouted up throughout the country. As a result,
so
the gospel has reached every part of the country, millions of people have
heard about the Bible and Christianity, and thousands have taken the
er
decision to become Christians.
rp
Myanmar has experienced a significant growth of the church during the
Fo
last decade. Because of the mission efforts of Protestants, Pentecostals, In-
e.
dependent churches and non-denominational mission groups – inside and

l
outside of the country – more and more Burmese people have embraced
sa
the Christian faith as their new religion. As a result, thousands have been
re
baptised and added to the Christian population. The Harvard Divinity

or
School’s Religious Literacy Project estimates the current Christian popula-

n
tion in Myanmar at around 8% of the whole population. If this growth

tio
continues at the current rate, the Christian presence in Myanmar is likely

bu
to have a significant impact within society at large in the near future.

tri
Hundreds of Christian orphanages have been freely organising and

is
operating in many parts of the country. Some of them are sponsored

rd
by churches and Christian organisations from abroad, while others are

fo
sponsored by local churches. Many of these orphanages have been accused

of being self-serving mission agencies that are looking for financial support
ot
from abroad. At the same time, others are genuinely interested in helping
N
the unfortunate by welcoming children and youth, including Buddhists.

Their ministry emphasises teaching about the Bible and the Christian
message. They offer both Christian education and secular education. The
Christian population in the country continues to grow significantly, partly
through the commitment of these orphanages and educational institutions.
Many of the mission organisations in Myanmar focus not only on
the soul-winning method in their mission efforts. They also recognise
the importance of basic education and its impact on the daily life of the
Myanmar 153
people. They strongly believe that education is an essential element for

sustaining a community and building the nation. For example, the Chin
Baptist Churches, USA, put an emphasis on education in their mission
projects by taking the initiative in building boarding schools and sponsor-
ing students from rural areas in the southern Chin state. Other mission
organisations have adopted a similar approach and focused on education
in their mission endeavours. As the country slowly opens and adopts a
more relaxed education system, dozens, perhaps hundreds, of new private
schools have appeared. Many of these private schools are run by churches
.
ly
and Christian organisations, which is a sign of progress and promising for
on
the future of the Christian presence in the country.
se
Conclusion
lu
As indicated in the introduction to this essay, Christianity came to
na
Myanmar on the back of Western colonialism. The early Portuguese
so
Christians appeared to be more interested in economic opportunities and
political expansion than engaging in Christian mission in the country. This
er
later resulted in the distrust on the part of the Burmese kings, and since
rp
then the Christian presence in Myanmar has been misconceived by nation-
Fo
alist Burmans as a threat to their religious and national identity. Hence,
e.
Christians, especially those from ethnic minorities, have been accused

l
of being unpatriotic, their presence in the country regarded as hostile to

sa
Burmese culture and religion.

re
There is no doubt that the presence of the Christian churches in

or
Myanmar has been a struggle both politically and socio-economically.

n
Christians have faced discrimination, oppression and even persecution

tio
simply because of their faith. However, with the recent advent of demo-
bu
cratic rule, Christianity is no longer perceived as a colonial religion and is

tri
gaining respect as a genuine spiritual entity in the country. If the current

is
political situation continues to improve, Christians in Myanmar will have

rd
greater opportunities to live out their faith and to share the gospel among
fo
their compatriots.
As Myanmar embraces a new political system, the Christian churches
ot
are encountering new opportunities to witness to their faith and embody

N
its values in the way they live their lives. This being the case, the Christian
presence in Myanmar will likely be defined by how far Christians are
missionally informed and socially involved as a force for transformation
in the country. There are grounds to expect that the Christian presence in
Myanmar in the near future will significantly contribute to the develop-
ment of the country in many respects.
154 Hrang Hlei
Bibliography
Augurlion, Saw, Christian Existence and Issues Related to Nationalism and Religious Identity in
Post-Colonial Myanmar (Yangon: Tin Tin Chit Press, 2017).
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Myanmar, National Church History of Myanmar (Yangon:
Alpha & Omega Press, 2017).
Ling, Samuel Ngun, Communicating Christ in Myanmar: Issues, Interactions and Perspectives
(Yangon: ATEM, 2005).
Moffett, Samuel H., A History of Christianity in Asia, Vol. II: 1500–1900 (Maryknoll, NY:
Orbis Books, 2005).
Wa, Maung Shwe, Burma Baptist Chronicle (Rangoon: University Press, 1963).
.
ly
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Thailand
Seree Lorgunpai and Sanurak Fongvarin
A distinctive feature of Thailand’s history is that it was never colonised by
.
ly
Western countries. Even though neighbouring countries were colonised
on
by France or the UK, Thai people maintained a distinct sense of identity as
a traditional society respecting the monarchy. This has helped the country
se
to survive the turbulent politics of modern times. Thai people were united
lu
in their respect for King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who died on 13 October
na
2016. During his long reign he was loved and revered by the people, who
so
mourned his death for an entire year, choosing to dress in black as a mark
er
of respect. He himself was Buddhist but he supported every religion,
rp
including Christianity, and every religion conducted ceremonies to mark
his passing. The monarchy remains influential in promoting inter-religious
Fo
harmony.
e.
Freedom from colonial rule allowed Thailand to grow economically, and

l
the national infrastructure has been expanded. In modern times Thailand

sa
has become a hub for world travellers. However, even though Thai people
re
have encountered many other cultures, they are able to maintain their
or
own traditions. An important factor in sustaining Thai culture is the Thai

n
language. Almost every person who is Thai by birth is expected to speak

tio
Thai. Many tribal people who were born in Thailand are ashamed to speak
bu
their own languages in public. They will use Thai even if their Thai is not
tri
up to standard. To be a Thai citizen, one has to speak Thai. This mindset

is
discourages people in Thailand from maintaining their tribal languages

rd
or learning foreign languages. Even though Thailand is an open country,

fo
many citizens cannot communicate in English, and their limited English

communication skills affect educational development. For example, most
ot
N
people are unable to access resources on the internet because they cannot
read them. Another factor that keeps people in Thailand from develop-
ing educational skills is the strength of oral tradition. They prefer to talk
rather than to read or write. Government studies conducted to explore
Thai citizens’ reading behaviour found that when people do read, it is
mostly material on social media or email (83.3%), followed by newspapers
(68.7%); reading about religion ranked lowest (30.1%). When people were
asked why they did not read books, the prevailing answer was that they
preferred watching television, while 24.6% said they did not have time.
156 Seree Lorgunpai and Sanurak Fongvarin
The impact of internet use on social networking has begun to intensify,

creating a new way of life. People tend to avoid personal relationships
with family members and focus more on people in online communities.
The result is a wider gap between family members. Care and commitment
among the family are decreasing. This not only affects relationships but
also communication and analytical skills, because those who use social
media heavily tend to read casually, without critical thinking, and to
forward information without checking the sources to ensure reliability.
Nonetheless, traditional Thai respect for seniors remains highly influ-
.
ly
ential. Thai people tend to trust those whom they regard as having more
on
status. Even if they do not agree, they would not dare to voice a different
opinion, because Thai culture honours those who are in a higher position.
se
The Thai term Kren Jai indicates the mindset of the people. This term is
lu
used in three different ways. It can mean to ‘be considerate’ when one
na
does not want to disturb another person, even when one needs help. It can
so
mean to ‘feel obliged’ to do something requested by one’s superior, even
when one does not wish to do it. It can also mean to ‘feel bad’ when one
er
does not want to hurt another person. As we shall see, this strong cultural
tradition influences the way that people interact at the religious level. rp
Fo
e.
Religion in Thailand
l
The Thai government under the leadership of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-
sa
o-cha on 22 September 2016 issued a protection plan for every religion.

re
In this document are six strategies to protect religions: promoting and

or
supporting education, supporting the correct teaching of each religion,

n
fostering all religions, protecting every religion from harm, creating an

tio
opportunity for cooperation among religions, and encouraging communi-

bu
cation among religions to understand each other’s activities. Even though

tri
there is no recognition of Protestantism in the constitution, the Protestant

is
rd
Christianity in Thailand, 1970 and 2020

fo

ot

N
Christians 240,000 0.6% 906,000 1.3% 2.7%

Anglicans 700 0.0% 20,000 0.0% 6.9%
Independents 50,600 0.1% 89,300 0.1% 1.1%
Orthodox 0 0.0% 950 0.0% 9.5%
Protestants 34,000 0.1% 449,000 0.6% 5.3%
Catholics 154,000 0.4% 385,000 0.6% 1.9%
Evangelicals 27,000 0.1% 410,000 0.6% 5.6%
Thailand 157
churches are recognised by the Thai government. Therefore, the Protestant

churches benefit from this protection plan.
Although Buddhism is the major religion in Thailand, people are free
to follow other religions. The other major religions in Thailand are Islam,
Christianity, Hinduism, Chinese ancestor worship and animism. During
important national events, Buddhist monks, Muslim imams, Catholic
priests, Protestant ministers and Hindu priests are called to conduct
religious ceremonies. In 2004 a tsunami hit the south of Thailand and
many lives were lost. Identifying some of the bodies was difficult, so that
.
ly
it was unknown to which religion each victim had belonged. In response,
on
the government called on religious leaders to conduct a multi-faith funeral
service. Following an August 2015 bombing incident at Rajaprasong
se
intersection in Bangkok that resulted in many foreigners being killed, the
lu
government called on religious leaders to pray for peace in all countries.
na
In the past, Thai people would do good in order to gain merit according
so
to Buddhist teaching, but modern Thai would use a new term, Jit-asa, to
indicate volunteering to do good for other people without thinking of
er
gaining merit. This kind of volunteer spirit is a new platform for religious
rp
unity. Anyone can join without hesitation or conflict.
Fo
The Buddhist worldview and the Christian worldview are, in some
e.
respects, opposites. Buddhism teaches that one can gain salvation by

l
one’s own effort, whereas Christianity maintains that salvation is the

sa
gift of God. Buddhism, however, is not merely a matter of religion but

re
is integral to the culture of the Thai people. Many Thais do not fully
or
understand Buddhism but nonetheless understand themselves to be

n
Buddhists. Although Christians are in a minority, it is possible for them to

tio
maintain their faith even in a Buddhist cultural milieu. Many factors, both
bu
external and internal, help Christians to remain faithful. One of the most
tri
important external factors is that Thailand gives freedom for all people to
is
choose their own religion. Pressures from the communities generally are
rd
not life threatening, except from extremist Muslims in the far south. So
fo
far as internal factors are concerned, Thais who remain in the Christian
faith tend to be those who have had personal spiritual experiences. Some
ot
of them opposed Christian teaching for many years but later encountered
N
love among believers. Through listening to sermons, testimonies and

sharing, they opened their minds to accept the teaching of the Bible. When
they prayed, they often saw unexpected results. Even when they are facing
difficulties, they feel a sense of peace through their faith.
Reception of Christianity
The Kren Jai factor has been significant when Thai people have encountered
Christian missionaries. Their Thai culture inclines them to respond very
politely to visiting foreigners, sometimes even to the extent of professing

that they accept the message being shared with them. On occasion this has
led missionaries to conclude that their Thai hosts have become Christians,
when in fact they have not undergone any change of heart and have simply
been attempting to put their visitors at ease. There is also a pluralist strain
to Thai culture, which fosters the understanding that different faiths may
be equally valid. This was evident as early as the Ayutthaya period. When
King Narai received visitors from Europe in 1684, he was invited by the
representative of France to become a Christian. He politely refused but
.
ly
did not wish to offend the other faith. King Narai said, ‘the reason I do not
on
have faith in Christianity may be that God wants each of us to believe in
different religions like he has created human beings to be different tribes
se
and races’. Even though he did not convert, he allowed the foreigners
lu
to share their faith with Thai people. It is common to hear Thai people
na
saying that every religion teaches human beings to be good. By offering
so
this affirmative assessment of other faiths, Thai people would mean, ‘Your
religion is good, and my religion is good also; therefore, I do not need to
er
change to believe in your religion.’
rp
Despite the friendly and affirmative response to the Christian message
Fo
required by Kren Jai, Thai people on the whole have considered Christi
e.
anity to be foreign and not for them. Everything about Christianity marks
l
it as foreign to Thailand. The architecture of its buildings, the structure

sa
of its institutions and the nature of its music combine to give Thai people
re
the impression that Christianity is a religion of the Western world. Its

or
emphasis on individual conversion and its drive to separate converts

n
from their original community provide confirmation that it is alien to the

tio
Thai way of life. So deeply entrenched is the Thai view of Christianity as

bu
a foreign religion that, despite the politeness of their reception, Christian

tri
missionaries have consistently met with unyielding resistance to their

is
message.
rd
Nonetheless, since the nineteenth century a small but significant

fo
minority of Thai people have chosen to become Christian. American

Presbyterian work in Siam (as Thailand was known until 1949) began
ot
in 1840. The Presbyterian mission built an extensive network of educa-

N
tional institutions and health-care services as well as churches. Its work

continues today as part of the Church of Christ in Thailand. However,
the first churches in Thailand were founded not by the Presbyterian
mission but by Baptists who started a church among the Chinese in
Bangkok. The Chinese church in Thailand began in 1833, when the first
three Chinese people professed faith and were baptised. In 1839, the first
church building was constructed and two Chinese schools were opened.
By 1850 the church had 35 members, and by 1877 six Baptist churches
Thailand 159
had been established. Based on their location, they adopted the name Wat
Koh Church in 1852, the first Protestant church in Thailand and the first
Chinese Baptist church in Asia. In 1915, American Presbyterians began
to work among the Chaozhou Chinese and the Guangdong Chinese
who lived in Thailand. In 1924 the Chinese Church Coordinating Centre
was established in Thailand. Through its influence the Maitrichit Baptist
Church was built and dedicated on 14 September 1935, after the church
moved from Wat Koh to Maitrichit Road. By 1948 its membership had
grown to 200. This number has continued to increase and the church has
.
ly
exercised great influence.
on
Christian Linguistic Diversity and Worship
se
A feature of Christianity in Thailand is linguistic diversity. Two-thirds
lu
(65.4%) of churches worship in Thai, followed by Karen (16.3%), Lahu
na
(5.6%), Akha (4.2%) and Lisu (1.4%). However, these percentages do not
so
necessarily equate to the relative numbers of believers in each group. Since
the 1990s, for example, the number of Christians among the Akha people
er
has increased significantly but many of them cannot read Akha, although
rp
they have learned to read Thai or Chinese. Some of them migrated from
Fo
Myanmar and remain unregistered in Thailand. The younger generation
e.
of Akha generally speak Thai and English very well, equipping them to go
l
to work overseas.
sa
Churches in Bangkok and other cities have adopted a broadly similar

re
pattern of worship. They begin by singing contemporary Christian songs

or
for half an hour or more, followed by a formal liturgy that uses hymns
n
or devotional songs. In rural areas, many churches do not have musical

tio
instruments, so they sing only familiar songs or do not sing at all because
bu
they lack musical accompaniment. However, some tribal Christians can

tri
sing together in harmony without any instruments. During the early

is
twenty-first century, Christian musicians have joined hands to compose

rd
more contemporary worship songs and have encouraged Christians to

fo
use these new songs in their worship. For example, a group called W501
promotes their songs through YouTube, social media, CDs and concerts.
ot
N
Evangelism, Conversion and Church Growth

Both formal and informal evangelism methods are used by individual
Christians and churches. When evangelism is formally organised, it is
often run by a committee from different churches. The evangelism event
normally takes place in a public venue for a few nights, and preachers from
outside Thailand are invited. Another formal method is Christian broad-
casting on television and the internet. Informal evangelism is normally
a matter of sharing the gospel through social media. The most popular
media in Thailand are YouTube, Facebook and Line. (Thai Christians like
to share scripture texts with pictures on Facebook and Line.)
A third method of evangelism might be termed indirect evangelism.
The Thailand Bible Society has run a Bible competition since 2002. Origin
ally, this project was intended for Christian children from churches or
Christian schools. Some Catholic schools have sent non-Christian students
to take part as well, however, and many of these students have won prizes.
Some of these children have become Christians after reading the Bible.
Several churches have run the Alpha course. This is based on a small
.
ly
group meeting each week in a home, so that people can be relaxed and
on
friendships can be developed while the Christian message is presented
in an attractive way. Those attending feel more comfortable than they
se
would at a formal church service. Three organisations focus on school and
lu
university ministry: Thai Christian Students Association, Thailand Youth
na
for Christ and Thailand Campus Crusade for Christ. Many churches also
so
work with schools or in universities by planting a church near the campus.
Church planting has recently been emphasised by many churches.
er
Local churches send teams to plant new churches in areas where there
rp
is no church. The new church that has been planted becomes a daughter
Fo
church; it usually uses the same name as the mother church, with the
e.
addition of the local place name. The mother church normally sends
l
financial, material, personal and prayer support to the daughter church.

sa
Thai people typically experience conversion to Christianity in one

re
of four ways. The first is through educational activities sponsored by

or
the churches, including opening schools, teaching English and music

n
at church, sports training, vacation Bible studies and Bible day camps.
tio
Parents accept these activities because they see the change of behaviour
bu
in their children. Most parents are very busy, and they trust the churches
tri
to look after their children; in this regard churches are almost like cheap
is
day-care centres. When a church maintains such activities over a long

rd
period, it often sees people becoming Christians through these activities.

fo
The second way by which people become Christians is through health

care offered at hospitals and clinics. In the past, missionaries started
ot
hospitals to help Thai people who were sick and showed them the love
N
of God, giving them the opportunity to share the Christian message. This
approach met with considerable success. The sick came to the hospital
for healing and received treatment; the hospital and clinics were willing
to meet all the cost. Today, however, Christian hospitals have become a
source of income for the church rather than a means for evangelism.
Thirdly, social welfare provided through Christian community service
centres has been a pathway to conversion for some people. The Baptist
mission began its church planting by opening up Christian community
Thailand 161
service centres and started some worship services on weekdays. When

they had enough believers, they worshiped on Sundays and slowly
began a new church at the centre. Many Christian organisations promote
social welfare. The Compassion ministry gives scholarships to students
via local churches. The children who receive the support are required to
attend church, and some become Christians. World Vision, a Christian
international development organisation, works mostly with local com-
munities and has many development projects. It receives funding from
non-Christians and big firms as well as from Christians and is not involved
.
ly
in direct evangelism. Several churches in the north of Thailand established
on
dormitories to host tribal students who come to study in the cities. They
have run Bible studies and devotional activities for the students, helping
se
them to grow spiritually.
lu
Fourthly, people have become Christians through direct evangelism,
na
which can involve giving leaflets, approaching people personally, estab
so
lishing friendly relationships as a means of evangelism, evangelism
meetings in local churches, cell-group meetings in educational institutes
er
and large-scale open-air crusades. Relationship evangelism is the most
effective method. rp
Fo
Both the Chinese and Thai people who live in Thailand call themselves
e.
Buddhist. It is noticeable that Thai citizens who become Christians are

l
more often Chinese or from a Chinese background than ethnically Thai.

sa
It seems that the Chinese find it easier than the ethnic Thais to accept the
re
Christian concept of God. This does not mean that ethnic Thais do not
or
believe in divine beings, however. For example, a Thai person who wants
n
to buy a second-hand car will go to a fortune-teller for advice about what

tio
to do for good luck and safety while driving the car. The fortune-teller
bu
might advise that the colour of the car needs to be changed. However,
tri
changing the colour often costs too much, so many second-hand car
is
owners put the colour name on the back of the car instead of repainting
rd
the whole car. For example, the owner of a white car will put on a sticker
fo
saying ‘This car is black’.

Western missionaries have attempted to contextualise the Christian
ot
faith as they have sought to increase the number of Christians in Thailand.

N
Catholic churches have been built in the style of Buddhist temples. Instead
of using ‘Church’ in their names, they are called ‘Wat’, like Buddhist
temples. The priests in the Catholic churches are called Pra, like Buddhist
monks, and Catholic churches use the Buddhist kathin ceremony to
raise funds for buildings and some big projects. It seems that people are
accepting this contextualisation. Contextualisation, however, also involves
challenging practices that run counter to the gospel of Christ. For example,
in the past, girls were not allowed to study in school, but when the
Protestant missionaries came, girls were given the opportunity to study.

At present, more women than men are enrolling in universities. Adoption
offers another example. Adoption is not popular in Thailand, as explained
by the saying ‘Don’t eat food that other people have chewed’. Families
commonly believe that they should not take children from other parents to
raise as their own, because when they grow up, they will not be as grateful
for the adoptive parents’ love. However, the Bible teaches care for others
who are in need. Sadly, many Christians still avoid adoption and keep
praying to get their own children. This might be a point at which they need
.
ly
to bring a challenge to the prevailing culture on the basis of their faith.
on
Christianity in Thailand is now growing at an average rate of 5–6% per
year, and one-third of that growth comes from children born into Christian
se
families. Two-thirds of the growth comes from new converts who are
lu
baptised into the church. However, the growth rate varies dramatically by
na
region. The most important factor determining how fast a church grows
so
is its age. New churches tend to grow faster than older churches. The new
churches tend to be more welcoming to newcomers, who can quickly feel
er
that they are part of the family. By contrast, the older churches, where the
rp
congregation has been together for 20 years or more, find it much more
Fo
difficult to welcome newcomers. There is a sense of excitement among the
e.
new members of a new church, and they are very active in sharing their
l
faith. Newcomers get the opportunity to be involved in ministry at an

sa
early stage. All these things lead to rapid growth.

re
The Committee of Protestant Churches in Thailand (CPCT) had set a

or
goal to increase the number of Christians to 1 million by the year 2015, but
n
this was not achieved. However, the Committee has reset the goal, now
tio
aiming to have 2 million Christians in Thailand by the year 2020, and by

bu
2030 to have at least some churches in all 80,000 sub-districts in Thailand.

tri
In 2017, the population of Thailand was 65,729,098, with 454,127 Protestant

is
Christians worshipping in 5,188 Protestant churches. In 2018, there were

rd
379,975 Catholic Christians worshipping in 517 churches.

fo
When we look at the whole country, we can say that Christian numbers
remain relatively small. However, when we look at regional variations,
ot
we can see that Christians are concentrated in the north. The biggest
N
Christian population is in Chiang Mai, with 22.73% of Protestants living

there. Though Thai people are being influenced by Western culture, most
are resistant to the Christian message, which they regard as alien to their
culture and their ancestors. The strongest resistance to Christianity derives
from family pressure. For example, one high-school boy came to church
every Sunday and wanted to become a Christian. He informed his mother
of his decision on a Saturday night; upon hearing this, his mother locked
him up so that he could not go to church on Sunday.
Thailand 163
Organisation and Leadership

Five main Christian organisations are registered with the Thai govern-
ment. The Seventh-day Adventist Church of Thailand was established in
1919. Their witness has been distinguished by the attention that they pay to
questions of health. In particular, they have promoted eating according to
biblical teachings. Their teaching on health issues has been well accepted
by other Christians.
The Church of Christ in Thailand (CCT), previously named the Church
in Siam, was established in 1939. Its administration is organised at three
.
ly
levels: the council of churches, church districts and local churches. An
on
outstanding leader of the CCT is the Reverend Dr Boonratana Boayen, a
former general secretary and former moderator of the church. Because he
se
was very popular among church leaders, he was re-elected several times.
lu
He is also the first missionary sent by the Thai church to Papua New
na
Guinea.
so
The Thailand Baptist Convention was established on 24 November
er
1960. The Reverend Thongchai Pradabchananurat, founder of Nimitmai
rp
Christian Church, is the Director of the Baptist Students Centre, Thailand,
and president of Thailand Baptist Convention. A former president of the
Fo
CPCT, he is the pastor of Church of Joy and Church of Love as well as
e.
being a writer, broadcaster and president of Alpha Thailand.

l
The Evangelical Fellowship of Thailand (EFT) was established on 19

sa
June 1969. EFT was started by missionaries who were not affiliated with the
re
CCT. The Reverend Dr Wirachai Kowae has been an outstanding president

or
of the EFT. Founder and senior pastor of the Romyen Church, he is

n
renowned as an evangelist and a church planter. His influence extends far

tio
beyond Thailand, as he is planting many Thai churches in other countries.

bu
The Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Thailand was established on 9

tri
September 1969. The Roman Catholic Church came to work in Thailand

is
more than 300 years ago. Catholicism in Thailand has been divided for
rd
administrative purposes into 10 districts (vicariates). One of its notable

fo
leaders was Bishop George Yod Phimphisan (1933–2017), who served as

the second bishop of the Diocese of Udon Thani, in the region of Isan, from
ot
1975 to 2009. He was the president of the Bishops’ Conference of Thailand

N
for three terms: 1991–4, 1997–2000 and 2006–9. In addition, he played an

important role on the board of the Thailand Bible Society.
These five organisations occasionally work together, for example on
the board of the Thailand Bible Society. In addition, the CCT, the EFT
and the Thailand Baptist Convention formed the Committee of Protestant
Churches in Thailand (established on 6 May 1988). The main ministries
of these three organisations are evangelism, church planting, building
schools, building hospitals and social work.
Major Western denominations, such as Anglicans, Methodists,

Lutherans and Pentecostals, belong to the EFT. Besides these denomina-
tions, the membership of the EFT had included the Hope of Bangkok
Church, founded by local pastor Kriengsak Chareonwongsak on 6
September 1981, but this church had expanded very quickly and created
conflict with other churches, which resulted in it losing its membership
in 1987. At that point the church became independent and planted many
churches in provinces in Thailand. In 2008, the founder decided to become
a candidate in the election for governor of Bangkok and used church
.
ly
money to run his campaign. When this was found this out, many members
on
left the church to form new churches under new names. Many joined the
EFT and a few of them joined the Thailand Baptist Convention. Some of
se
these new churches expanded very quickly.
lu
Many para-church organisations are registered under the EFT. One of
na
them is Thai Christian Students, established in 1971 and a member of the
so
International Fellowship of Evangelical Students. The students who are
involved in the ministry have been trained and become leaders in different
er
churches and Christian organisations. Thailand Campus Crusade for
rp
Christ (CCC) is another organisation that is working among students all
Fo
over Thailand. The former director, the Reverend Yuttasak (Enoch) Sirikul,
e.
not only led CCC but also led the Evangelical movement in Thailand.
l
He organised many campaigns to encourage Thai Christians to serve

sa
the wider church. Thailand Youth for Christ is another organisation that
re
works among Thai youth and students. It has run Youth Challenge every
or
four or five years, an event that brings together young people from all over
n
Thailand. Each time, at least 1,000 youths participate. Many of them have
tio
become leaders, and some of them have gone on to enroll in seminaries.

bu
Since CPCT has set the goal to reach 2,000,000 believers, 10,000 churches
tri
and 10,000 Christian leaders by the year 2020, a network of prayer for
is
blessing Thailand has been formed. It has designated 40 days of prayer

rd
and fasting every year, and has called on Christians all over Thailand
fo
to set the same dates. It has provided a manual with Bible reading and
prayer requests each day for Christians to follow. CPCT was formed
ot
because of the common interest in evangelism. It has run the Thailand

N
Congress on Evangelism many times. Normally, Christian leaders come

for Bible study, workshops, visits to exhibitions of Christian organisations,
revival meetings and evangelistic meetings. The number of participants
has increased from thousands to tens of thousands.
In recent years, many informal churches, unconnected with the estab-
lished churches, have been formed, although they have not registered. In
these churches, worship and baptisms are usually performed at home.
Numbers are difficult to estimate but they are evident on social media.
Thailand 165
Even though Thai Christians have a clear and strong vision for evan-
gelism, they are not always successful. Therefore, some Christian leaders
have sought a fixed formula for evangelism, and recently a programme
called G12 has been used by a number of churches. Though it has attracted
large numbers, many churches do not accept this programme, for theo-
logical reasons. It is perceived to promote authoritarian church leadership,
prosperity theology and the downplaying of biblical authority in favour of
spiritual inspiration. The aforementioned Alpha course has gained wider
acceptance among the traditional churches.
.
ly
World Vision is very successful in Thailand. Even Thai Buddhists are
on
willing to donate money to World Vision to support children’s projects.
In addition, the Thai government has accepted World Vision as a trusted
se
organisation that fights human trafficking. World Vision has worked at
lu
the borders and in villages all over Thailand.
na
Theological training in Thailand is still weak because of limited funds
so
and personnel, and lack of English language skills. Thai Christians do
not tend to read theological books, which are often translations of books
er
written in English. Most students who have studied at Bible institutions
rp
work in churches. They prefer to be pastors rather than scholars, since
Fo
pastors enjoy greater respect.
e.
Technology makes the Bible available in many forms, especially in ap-

l
plications promoted by the Thailand Bible Society, such as YouVersion,

sa
PocketSword and a programme called ‘The Word’ that gives Christians

re
more options to read the Bible. However, people still do not read as much
or
as accessibility allows.
n
Christian books are rarely found in secular bookstores. However, twice

tio
a year there are national book fairs in Bangkok. The Thailand Bible Society
bu
and other Christian publishers partner to set up a booth called Panyajan

tri
to promote Christian literature. These bi-annual occasions help non-

is
Christians to know about Christianity.

rd
Thailand suffers from a lack of Christian scholars. Many seminary

fo
graduates do not choose to pursue a formal academic degree but prefer

to obtain a doctoral degree without undertaking serious study, simply
ot
in order to gain prestige. This trend is harmful to Christian academic

N
institutions. However, there is a positive trend among lay leaders who

are willing to spend time studying in seminary part time, while working
in their vocation and serving in the church. This trend is more helpful
because these people have experience in both worlds.
Conclusion
Christianity in Thailand continues to grow in the midst of diverse cultures.
The Thai government is reforming the country in many ways, including
support for the activities of all religions. In addition, the religious pro-
tection of the government extends to the promotion of inter-religious
cooperation for the sake of a harmonious and peaceful society. The
effective factors in evangelism in Thai society are strong family nurture
and long-term relationships. Thai people often make their decision by
following the community in which they live. A significant opportunity for
Christian growth lies among Thai people who work overseas. They are
often more open to the Christian message than those who remain at home.
.
ly
Bibliography
on
Blanford, Carl Edwin, Chinese Churches in Thailand (Bangkok: Suriyaban Publishers, 1975).
Martin, Dwight, Diverse Perspectives on the Protestant Church in Thailand (Chiang Mai: eStat
se
Foundation, 2016).
lu
McFarland, George Bradley (ed.), Historical Sketch of Protestant Missions in Siam 1828–1928
(Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1999).
na
Poonsakvorasan, A. (ed.), 170 Years of the Maitrichit Chinese Baptist Church (Bangkok:
so
Maitrichit Chinese Baptist Church, 2017).
Rung, Ruengsan-ajin et al., The Five Pillars of the Protestant Faith [in Thai] (Bangkok:
er
Committee of Protestant Churches in Thailand, 2017).
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Laos
David Andrianoff
Catholic Christianity
.
ly
The presence of Christianity in Laos began with the arrival of Roman
on
Catholic missionaries. In 1630 Giovanni Leira, an Italian Jesuit, visited
Vientiane, the first person to share the good news of Jesus Christ in Laos.
se
Much later, in 1885, missionaries of the Paris Foreign Mission Society es-
lu
tablished a church on Ban Dom Don island in the Mekong River – the first
na
church in Laos. Initially, the Roman Catholic work in Laos came under
so
the authority of the church in Siam (as Thailand was then known). In 1899
er
Pope Leo XIII established the Apostolic Vicariate of Laos, separating the
church in Laos from Siam.
rp
The Catholic Church in Laos has four Apostolic Vicariates – Vientiane,
Fo
Luang Prabang, Savannakhet and Pakse – each with a resident bishop.
e.
Because of government regulations, the Luang Prabang bishop lives in

l
Vientiane and periodically visits Luang Prabang. On 21 May 2017, Pope

sa
Francis elevated Lao Bishop Louis-Marie Ling Mankhanekhoun, a Khmu,

re
to become a cardinal, the first for Laos.

or
The approximately 45,000 Catholics in Laos include ethnic Vietnamese

n
in the major urban centres. The church faces a severe shortage of personnel,
tio
having only 20 priests for its 218 parishes. Ordination to the priesthood
bu
proceeds very slowly. The government does not permit the church to run
tri
social institutions, so the approximately 100 sisters work within parishes

is
or in government hospitals and health facilities. The sisters have placed

rd
themselves under the authority of the Catholic Church in Thailand.

fo
Beginnings of Protestant Christianity

ot
Throughout its history, the Protestant Church in Laos has expanded at

N
the margins of Lao society. In the late nineteenth century, some Khmu
labourers came to faith in Jesus Christ after several visits to Laos by
American Presbyterian itinerant missionary Daniel McGilvary, based in
Chiang Mai in northern Thailand. The Lao referred to the Khmu as Kha
(slave). McGilvary planted the first Protestant church in Laos in Vang
Mon, a Khmu village, in 1898.
Four years after the planting of the Khmu church in northern Laos,
Gabriel Contesse and Maurice Willy, both Brethren missionaries from
168 David Andrianoff
Switzerland, moved into southern Laos. They hired Chan Pan, head abbot
of the local Buddhist temple, to teach them Lao. He also helped them to
translate some of the New Testament gospels from Thai into Lao. As a
result, Chan Pan came to faith in Jesus Christ. The first church among the
Lao in southern Laos began with an Easter Sunday baptism in 1905.
In 1908, a cholera epidemic took the life of Gabriel Contesse and his
wife Marguerite. Their deaths stimulated Fritz Audetat, a close friend of
Contesse, to hastily leave Switzerland for Laos. While the sole missionary
in Laos for more than three years, Audetat instituted annual Bible confer-
.
ly
ences for the few believers and established Sunday school programmes for
on
adults as well as children. He translated the Bible into Lao, publishing the
Lao New Testament in 1926. He then completed the entire Bible, published
se
in 1932 by the press run by the Christian and Missionary Alliance (C&MA)
lu
in Hanoi, Vietnam.
na
The Swiss missionaries in southern Laos found their strongest response
so
from those Lao accused of spirit possession. The Lao called them Phii Pop
and evicted them from their villages. The missionaries protected the Phii
er
Pop, gave them respect and shared the Christian message with them. The
Phii Pop responded to this message of Good News. Other Lao people who rp
Fo
found themselves ostracised from village society because of their leprosy
e.
also responded to the gospel. The villages for people with leprosy more
l
readily received the good news of Jesus’s love than the general Lao society.
sa
One young girl, at the very margin of the marginalised people of

re
Laos, illustrated how Christianity can grow from peripheral and unlikely
or
locations. Souphine was born in southern China. When she was five, a
n
travelling merchant purchased Souphine and took her to Savannakhet

tio
in southern Laos, to sell cigarettes and sweets. Knowing little Lao, shy
bu
Souphine sold very little. She then began to show signs of leprosy. The
tri
frustrated merchant thought of leaving her in the forest, but a neighbour

is
suggested offering her to a local Swiss missionary. Eventually Fritz

rd
fo
Christianity in Laos, 1970 and 2020

ot

N

Christians 62,400 2.3% 199,000 2.8% 2.3%
Anglicans 300 0.0% 200 0.0% –0.8%
Independents 400 0.0% 1,500 0.0% 2.7%
Protestants 20,200 0.8% 150,000 2.1% 4.1%
Catholics 41,500 1.5% 47,000 0.7% 0.3%
Evangelicals 20,300 0.8% 145,000 2.0% 4.0%
Pentecostal/Charismatics 40 0.0% 18,000 0.3% 13.0%
Laos 169
Audetat and his wife Ida took Souphine in and cared for her. With her
leprosy in remission, they sent her to school, where she did very well.
When the leprosy returned, Audetat very reluctantly put her in the local
leprosy village. In the meantime, Souphine had become a faithful follower
of Christ. As a young teenager, Souphine devotedly read her Lao Bible.
But her fellow villagers mocked her, even tearing pages out of her Bible.
Souphine did not retaliate but instead reacted with quiet love and faith-
fulness to her Saviour. Attracted by her love and faithfulness, the Lao
villagers began to follow Christ themselves, and this was the beginning
.
ly
of a church in the village. It was Souphine, a young girl with leprosy – it
on
is hard to get much lower in Lao society – who planted a church in her
village. That church still exists today. Souphine died of complications
se
from her leprosy at the age of 19 but left a legacy that continues to bear
lu
fruit today.
na
At the invitation of the American Presbyterian Mission, which felt it
so
could no longer provide missionaries to oversee its work in northern Laos,
and after consultation with the Swiss mission in southern Laos, the C&MA
er
expanded its work from Vietnam into northern Laos. Having completed
rp
his French-language studies in Paris, George Edward Roffe arrived in
Fo
Luang Prabang in 1929 to pioneer the C&MA’s work in northern Laos. The
e.
Swiss mission sent Saly Kounthapanya to help the C&MA. Saly became
l
the first ordained pastor of the Lao church and the first president of the
sa
Lao Evangelical Church (LEC). The Reverend Saly’s nephew, Khamphone

re
Kounthapanya, currently serves as the president of the LEC.

or
The C&MA’s greatest impact in Laos came from another marginalised

n
group. In the nineteenth century, in order to escape the increasing incur-

tio
sions by their southern Chinese neighbours, the Hmong ethnic group

bu
migrated into Laos and settled on the heights of the mountains, above
tri
the reaches of the lowland Lao authorities. Many Hmong lived in Xieng
is
Khouang Province, where Touby Lyfoung, often referred to as the ‘king of

rd
the Hmong’, was appointed deputy governor. In 1949, the C&MA mission
fo
sent a young missionary couple, Ted and Ruth Andrianoff (the author’s
parents), to Xieng Khouang to study the Lao language. The mission then
ot
sent Nai Kheng, a Khmu Bible school student, to assist them. Nai Kheng
N
and his wife moved into a cottage belonging to Bua Ya, Touby’s personal
shaman, which was affordable because it was haunted by evil spirits. After
Nai Kheng had successfully lived in Bua Ya’s cottage a week, Bua Ya asked
Nai Kheng to bring the young missionary to explain this great power over
the evil spirits. Andrianoff summarised the teaching of the Bible from
creation through the life, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus. Bua Ya
exclaimed, ‘I want this power!’ He had his spirit paraphernalia destroyed,
committing himself and his family to Jesus. Two days later, at the annual
mission conference in Vietnam, Ted Andrianoff excitedly informed his col-

leagues of the first Hmong in Laos to believe. When he returned to Xieng
Khouang two months later, Bua Ya and Nai Kheng greeted him with a
list of more than 1,000 names – people who had come to faith in Jesus
Christ while no foreign missionaries were present. By the time Andrianoff
returned to the USA for furlough two years later, a people movement to
Jesus Christ had occurred with more than 5,000 – mostly Hmong, but also
Khmu – professing faith in Christ in Xieng Khouang Province.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Vietnam War spilled into Laos.
.
ly
The US military recruited Hmong to conduct a clandestine sideshow
on
war in Laos. When the communists achieved victory in 1975, virtually
all the Hmong who had sided with the USA fled to Thailand. The Thai
se
government quickly set up camps to house the hundreds of thousands of
lu
refugees from Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Because a sizeable minority
na
of the Hmong were Christians, they erected churches in the camps.
so
Large numbers of Hmong who had lost their sense of identity and found
themselves in refugee camps entered these churches. Their trust in Jesus
er
gave them a new identity and a new start in life. Hence a second wave of
rp
Hmong entering Christianity occurred, outside Laos.
Fo
Gradually, Hmong refugees resettled in the West, particularly the
e.
USA. A Hmong church leader in California, Chong Lee, began broad-

l
casting the message of Christianity via shortwave to Southeast Asia. He

sa
regularly responded to letters asking questions about the Christian faith.

re
By the mid-1980s, Lee had received many letters from Hmong in northern
or
Vietnam, among whom there were no known Christians. Whole villages

n
came to faith in Christ and asked Lee how to set up churches. By the early
tio
1990s, the approximately 300,000 Hmong Christians in northern Vietnam

bu
attracted the attention of and persecution by Vietnamese government

tri
authorities.
is
The Hmong comprise just one of many marginalised ethnic minorities

rd
in Laos. These minorities make up more than 50% of the population, and
fo
it is they who continue to show the greatest response to the message of

Christianity. The ethnic minorities, who are mostly animists, find that
ot
faith in Jesus Christ frees them from the constant need to appease the ma-
N
levolent spirits around them.
Spiritual Practices in the Church

The Lao Evangelical Church (LEC), the umbrella Protestant church in
Laos, grew out of the C&MA. While the LEC clearly reflects its C&MA
roots, it is distinct from the C&MA denomination. The churches within
the LEC have a wide range of practices. The LEC churches in the south,
planted by Brethren and Overseas Missionary Fellowship (OMF)
Laos 171
missionaries, practise cooperative leadership. The northern churches have

a clear hierarchy. The churches in the south mostly serve the Eucharist
weekly, while the churches in northern Laos serve it on the first Sunday
of the month. Those who have received baptism by immersion, performed
by pastors, are entitled to partake of the Eucharist. None of the churches
within the LEC currently practise infant baptism. However, the churches
do have dedication services for babies, often part of the Sunday morning
worship service. Church services include hymns; special music and, occa-
sionally, dances; Bible reading; offering; and a sermon. The sermons often
.
ly
emphasise proper behaviour, which reflects the Lao Buddhist concept of
on
‘if you do good you will receive good’, feeding into the rising popularity
of prosperity theology.
se
The LEC encourages Christians to share their faith with friends and
lu
neighbours. Church members invite church leaders to their homes and
na
villages to lead special services of thanksgiving for such occasions as
so
weddings, births, healings and harvest. The believers invite their neigh-
bours to these gatherings, which always include the sharing of the Good
er
News of Jesus Christ.
rp
Fo
Current Trends in Expanding Christianity
e.
The churches provide training programmes for church leaders, both

l
inside and outside Laos. Pastors from Vientiane (the capital city) and Sa-
sa
vannakhet (the largest city in southern Laos) visit more remote provinces
re
and districts to train church leaders. At least once a year, church leaders
or
go to Vientiane to participate in training seminars. Groups of Christians

n
also cross the border into Thailand to receive training in Christian doctrine
tio
and in sharing the Good News. Potential church leaders enrol in formal
bu
Bible training institutes in Thailand and elsewhere. Meanwhile, in cities

tri
and larger villages the churches provide programmes to train disciples

is
and church leaders. The church in Laos continues to grow at a steady rate.
rd
Between December 2014 and December 2017 the total number of Protes-
fo
tant Christians increased by 17%.

In addition to attracting people to the Good News of Jesus Christ by
ot
their lifestyle, church leaders demonstrate the power of God over the spirit
N
world through healings and deliverances. A historic example illustrates

this. One evening in late 1950 in a Hmong village, Ted Andrianoff told
the biblical story of Christ. In the midst of his presentation one woman
shouted, ‘This is it! This is what I told you about two years ago! Listen
to him!’ The villagers informed Andrianoff that two years previously the
village chief had died. As was their custom, this shaman recounted the
story of the village chief’s ancestors. But she did not stop with his death.
She went on to say, ‘In two years a white man will come with a special
book. He will tell us about a power that is greater than the spirits we fear.’
As a result, the entire village came to faith in Jesus Christ.
Not only the animistic tribal people, but also the Buddhist Lao, with
an underlying animism, turn to Jesus Christ due to encounters with the
spirit world. Miraculous healings attract the attention of fellow villagers.
Non-believers have started to call on church leaders to pray for the healing
of people with various illnesses. Following a healing, many in their family
and village might decide to join the Christian faith.
Gospel radio and recorded Christian programmes in local languages
.
ly
reach people who live in more isolated areas. Recently, many Khmu have
on
come to faith in Jesus Christ as the result of Khmu-language broadcasts.
Christian radio broadcasts into Laos in more than half a dozen languages
se
on a weekly basis.
lu
The change in government in Laos in 1975 delayed but did not stop
na
Bible translation projects. The Bible is available in six languages spoken
so
in Laos, and a further six languages have Bible translation projects
underway. With an estimated 100 language groups in Laos, not all these
er
languages will ever have the Bible in their language. Representatives from
rp
some minority languages receive training in telling stories from the Bible
Fo
in their own languages. Oral Bible storying is much less time-consuming
e.
than translating the Bible into local languages.

l
Even though ethnic minorities comprise half the population of Laos,

sa
lowland Lao provide the basic social and administrative structure for the
re
nation. The Lao consider Buddhism part of their national identity and
or
often view Christianity as counter-cultural. The LEC has taken a strong

n
stance against two Lao practices in particular – drinking of alcohol and

tio
participating in the khwan rituals. The most commonly practised ritual for
bu
Lao people, the khwan ritual calls on personal spirits (khwan) to increase
tri
well-being and re-establish order, thereby strengthening community

is
solidarity. Births, weddings, sicknesses, promotions, visits, moving into

rd
a new house and deaths provide occasions for khwan rituals. The khwan
fo
ceremony calls wandering khwan back to the individual or community.

Strings tied to the wrist symbolise tying the khwan to the body. The centre-
ot
piece of the ceremony, most often held in homes, is a cone-like structure

N
of banana leaves resembling the Buddhist Mount Meru, with lengths of

string attached. Friends and relatives gather around the cone, leaving
space on one side for the person(s) honoured and the other side for the
master of ceremonies, usually someone of religious significance such as
a Brahmin priest or local shaman. The master of ceremonies chants some
prayers over the cone and the attendees. People closest to the cone touch it
with their right hand; those farther away touch someone touching the cone
with their right hand. At the end of a chanted blessing, each person takes
Laos 173
strings from the cone and ties them around the wrists of the attendees,
saying a blessing for them. By the end, all present have several strings tied
around their wrists and feel blessed.
With the khwan ritual so integral to Lao society, some churches have
started to incorporate khwan into the worship service. Instead of a cone
they have a basket with lengths of string. The pastor prays a blessing
over the strings. Then those gathered take the strings and say a prayer of
blessing over each person on whose wrist they tie a string.
.
ly
Inter-faith Relationships
on
Laos has two main religions: Buddhism and animism. In general, the
lowland Lao consider themselves Buddhist, while most of the ethnic
se
minority peoples are animists. However, the situation is not so clear-
lu
cut. The Lao incorporate many animistic beliefs and practices into their
na
Buddhism. For example, virtually all Buddhist temple compounds have a
so
spirit fetish to protect the temple.
Until very recently there has been limited dialogue between Christi
er
anity and Buddhism. Generally, Christian leaders have taught that
rp
Buddhism opposes Christianity. In practice, Christians more often oppose
Fo
Buddhism. With recent peace-building workshops, leaders of Christian
e.
churches have begun to talk to Buddhist leaders.

l
Roman Catholics, Protestants (LEC) and Seventh-day Adventists

sa
are registered with the government. In addition to Christianity, other

re
registered religions with a following beyond Laos include Islam and

or
Baha’i, but these are smaller minority religions. Occasionally new religions
n
have appeared in Laos. For the most part these have been short-lived and
tio
not formally recognised by the government. However, both Lao and ethnic
bu
minorities are susceptible to new religious movements.

tri
is
Conclusion
rd
The government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic proclaims

fo
freedom to believe or not believe. Both the Catholic Church and the Prot-
estant churches experience some constraints – from the government, from
ot
society and from within and among the church bodies. In the larger urban
N
centres Christian groups experience considerable freedom to practise their

faith. More remote areas still report occasional persecution of Christians,
including imprisonment, expulsion from villages and forcing individu-
als to sign documents denying their Christian faith. In spite of delays
in the ordination of priests, the elevation of Bishop Louis-Marie Ling
Mankhanekhoun to cardinal reflects a vibrant Catholic Church in Laos.
Likewise, the pace of growth of the LEC of 17% over three years continues.
Overall, Christianity in Laos remains healthy and growing.
Bibliography
Andrianoff, Jean L., Chosen for a Special Joy: The Story of Ted and Ruth Andrianoff (Chicago, IL:
Wing Spread Publishers, 2012).
Corthay, Charles, Le Laos: Décourverte d’un champ missionaire (Yverdon: Henri Cornaz, 1953).
Decorvet, Jeanne and Georges Rochat, L’Appel du Laos (Yverdon: Henri Cornaz, 1946).
Dupertuis, Silvain, The Gospel in the Land of a Million Elephants (St-Prex: Éditions de Sème,
2013).
McGilvary, Daniel, A Half Century Among the Siamese and the Lao: An Autobiography
(Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2002).
.
ly
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Cambodia
Barnabas Mam
Cambodia, formerly the Khmer Empire, is located in the south of the
.
ly
Indochina peninsula. Cambodia is currently the sixty-ninth most populous
on
country in the world, with an estimated 2018 population of 16.25 million.
The largest of the ethnic groups in Cambodia are the Khmer, who comprise
se
approximately 90% of the total population. The national language used in
lu
Cambodia is Khmer, and the name of Cambodia in Khmer is Kampuchea,
na
which derives from Sanskrit Kambujadeśa (land of Kambuja). During a
so
turbulent 40-year period (1953–93) Cambodia changed its name five times:
er
from Kingdom of Cambodia (1953–70) to Khmer Republic (1970–5), Demo
rp
cratic Kampuchea (1975–9), People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979–89),
State of Cambodia (1989–93) and finally Kingdom of Cambodia (1993 to
Fo
date). It is a predominantly Buddhist country, with Christians forming a
e.
small but fast-growing minority.

l
sa
Christianity Before the Killing Fields

re
The Roman Catholic Church has the longest history of all the Christian
or
churches in Cambodia. The first known Christian mission in Cambodia

n
was undertaken by Gaspar da Cruz, a Portuguese member of the

tio
Dominican Order, in 1555–6. According to his own account, the enterprise

bu
was a complete failure; he found the country run by a ‘Bramene’ king and
tri
‘Bramene’ officials and discovered that ‘the Bramenes are the most difficult
is
people to convert’. He felt that no one would dare to convert without the
rd
king’s permission and left the country in disappointment, having not

fo
‘baptised more than one gentile whom I left in the grave’. But according to
Bishop Emile Destombes, Apostolic Vicar of Phnom Penh and president of
ot
the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Laos and Cambodia, in his interview

N
with the Vatican news agency Agenzia Fides in 2007, the history of
Catholic missions actually began in 1554, with a visit by the Jesuit priest
Fernandez Mendez Pinto. The first communities were founded in the
seventeenth century by Jesuits, Dominicans and Franciscans. In the mid-
1700s, the Catechism was translated into Khmer by priests of the Paris
Foreign Missions Society. In 1850 the Apostolic Prefecture of Cambodia
was created. The first Cambodian-born priest was ordained in 1957.
176 Barnabas Mam
In 1972 there were probably about 20,000 Christians in Cambodia,

most of whom were Roman Catholics. Before the repatriation of the Viet
namese in 1970 and 1971, possibly as many as 62,000 Christians lived in
Cambodia. According to Vatican statistics, in 1953, members of the Roman
Catholic Church in Cambodia numbered 120,000, making it, at the time,
the second largest religion in the country. In April 1970, just before repa-
triation, estimates indicate that about 50,000 Catholics were Vietnamese.
Many of the Catholics remaining in Cambodia in 1972 were Europeans,
chiefly French.
.
ly
Protestant missions began in 1892 with the Reverend Walter James
on
of the British and Foreign Bible Society, who met Mr Vong, a secretary
serving in the royal palace, in Phnom Penh, and had him translate the
se
gospel of Luke from French into Khmer. In January 1923, the Reverend
lu
Arthur L. Hammond, with his wife Esther, of the Christian and Mission-
na
ary Alliance (C&MA), entered Cambodia. He was an American missionary
so
trained at Nyack College who first arrived in Southeast Asia in 1921 and
served for two years in Saigon, Vietnam. He began translation of the Bible
er
into Khmer in Battambang in 1925. The New Testament was completed
by 1934, but it was not until 1954 that the whole Khmer Bible was finally rp
Fo
published.
e.
In March 1923, the Reverend David W. Ellison with his wife Muriel,
l
also of the C&MA, arrived in Cambodia. He also lived and served in

sa
Battambang, focusing on evangelism and church planting. In 1932 King

re
Sisowath Monivong imposed an anti-proselytising act upon the church in

or
Cambodia. Ellison hired a small aircraft from Royal Laotian Aviation, filled
n
it with boxes of evangelistic tracts and flew across the sky of Cambodia.
tio
He asked the Holy Spirit to bring the tracts to some Khmer people whom
bu
God had chosen to follow Jesus and threw the tracts from the aircraft. As
tri
a result, five of the people who received the tracts read them, believed in
is
the gospel, made their way to the address printed on the tracts, met the
rd
fo
Christianity in Cambodia, 1970 and 2020

ot

N

Christians 33,300 0.5% 471,000 2.8% 5.4%
Anglicans 200 0.0% 700 0.0% 2.5%
Independents 2,000 0.0% 180,000 1.1% 9.4%
Protestants 10,600 0.2% 305,000 1.8% 7.0%
Catholics 20,100 0.3% 25,000 0.1% 0.4%
Evangelicals 10,600 0.2% 320,000 1.9% 7.1%
Cambodia 177
missionary and prayed to accept Jesus as their Saviour. Ellison started

a Bible school in Battambang in 1935 with these five students. Four of
them – Chao Vouch, Try Hoc, Neak Hom and Sok Chhoum – completed
the training course and graduated from the Bible school.
In 1952 the C&MA decided that the national church should take respon-
sibility for supporting its pastors and planned to phase out the missionary
subsidy at the rate of one-tenth per year over a decade, beginning in
1952. In May 1955, three years into this scaling-back programme, the
subsidy was cut entirely. This took place just after the National Executive
.
ly
Committee met at the National Conference and reassigned many pastors
on
to other congregations. The result was difficult relations between foreign
missionaries and Cambodians, as many congregations determined that
se
they could not possibly support a full-time pastor.
lu
During the 1950s, an American Unitarian mission maintained a
na
teacher-training school in Phnom Penh, and Baptist missions functioned
so
in Battambang and Siem Reap provinces. On 1 November 1958 the first
Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) church in Cambodia was chartered, with 11
er
members, who represented many different nationalities. The Cambodian
rp
government recognised the SDA mission on 21 August 1959, making
Fo
possible the construction of a 150-seat church in Phnom Penh, which
e.
opened on 3 February 1962. The Jehovah’s Witnesses also began their

l
work in Cambodia in 1958. The 1962 census reported 2,000 Protestants in

sa
Cambodia.
re
In 1965, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, head of state of Cambodia, aligned

or
more with China and cut off diplomatic relations with the USA. Most
n
Western missionaries were forced to leave Cambodia by not having

tio
their visas renewed. National Evangelical church leaders were jailed on

bu
trumped-up charges. The first – Son Sonne, future director of the Bible
tri
Society in Cambodia – was arrested while working in a bookshop and held

is
in jail for three months. Three others – San Hay Seng, Yos Aun and Uong
rd
Un – followed. Due to financial insufficiency, Westernised expression of

fo
worship and weak leadership, the Khmer Evangelical Church remained

silent and ineffective for five years without doing any outreach work.
ot
Things changed rapidly after General Lon Nol led a coup d’état to oust
N
Prince Sihanouk from power on 18 March 1970. Many refugees flooded

into Phnom Penh and lived there, while others camped outside the city.
The US embassy in Phnom Penh was reopened, and foreigners and
Western missionaries were warmly welcomed by the new government.
Cambodians, especially the youth, were eager to learn English. Large
Christian humanitarian organisations such as Catholic Relief Services and
World Vision International introduced programmes to demonstrate the
love of God to the poor, the needy and the vulnerable. All their leaders,
178 Barnabas Mam
most of their staff officers and many of their staff workers were committed
Christians whose quality of life attracted people to Christianity.
Dr Stanley Mooneyham, president of World Vision International,
conducted three gospel rallies in Chaktomuk Conference Hall in Phnom
Penh, two in 1972 and one in 1973. Each rally was so crowded that
Mooneyham had to preach to his audience both outside and inside the
hall. In spite of the resentment felt by many Cambodian patriots towards
the Roman Catholic Church for giving refuge to the Vietnamese, there was
always a good response from the audience when Mooneyham made an
.
ly
altar call. Another influential figure was Edwin Moore, an SDA mission
on
ary, who started an English-language school in Phnom Penh that had
grown to more than 500 students by 1975.
se
While the Roman Catholic Church suffered the pain of losing much of
lu
its Vietnamese membership through forced repatriation to South Vietnam
na
in 1970 and 1971, by 1975 the Khmer Evangelical Church was experiencing
so
exponential growth, with its membership increasing from around 2,000 to
around 10,000. But with the coming to power of the Khmer Rouge, or Red
er
Khmer, all foreign missionaries were expelled again.
rp
Fo
Persecution During the Killing Fields
e.
The Khmer Rouge conquered the Khmer Republic on 17 April 1975. They
l
evacuated all the people from the cities to rural areas and banned all banks,
sa
shops, restaurants, schools, theatres and religious practices. Cambodia

re
then became an isolated and deprived nation. Pol Pot, prime minister
or
of Democratic Kampuchea, ruled the nation with terror and atrocity. A

n
quarter of the Cambodian population were killed by the Khmer Rouge

tio
during the Killing Fields era simply because they were rich, educated,
bu
famous or religious; because they had been associated with foreigners

tri
or had served any other government; or because they opposed Pol Pot’s
is
policy. The Khmer Rouge regarded any religion as opium that weakened
rd
the nation. They suspected all Christians of being affiliated with the US
fo
Central Intelligence Agency and regarded Catholic priests and Christian

ministers as counter-revolutionary people or leeches who sucked the
ot
nation’s blood.
N
According to Bishop Emile Destombes, who was quoted by The Phnom

Penh Post in an article dated 25 March 2005:
Despite the murder of Cambodian Catholic priests and the expulsion of
foreign missionaries, Catholics met to worship in secret during the years of
religious repression under Pol Pot. Consecrated Eucharistic bread, which
Catholics believe is the body of Christ, was smuggled from Vietnam, often in
film canisters, and distributed among the faithful. Catholics would meet in
family groups and as a sign of unity with the Church some of them would
Cambodia 179
kiss a cross that once hung around the neck of Khmer Catholic bishop Joseph
Chmar Salas. All Cambodian Catholic priests, including Salas, the first Khmer
Catholic bishop, and many members of Catholic religious orders and lay
people were killed. Churches were razed and properties seized.
All the members of the National Executive Committee of the Khmer

Evangelical Church (KEC) except Pastor Reach Year were killed by the
Khmer Rouge, including Chau Uth, Sem Bun, Chhirc Taing, Bible Society
director Son Sonne and Minh Thien Voan, president of the Gideons. All
SDA Church members perished, except three who left the country just
.
ly
before it fell to the Khmer Rouge.
on
Christianity Before National Unification
se
Democratic Kampuchea, or the Killing Fields regime, was terminated by
lu
Vietnamese troops and their Cambodian allies on 7 January 1979. The
na
results of a local survey indicated that 1.7 million people lost their lives in
so
the Killing Fields. Only a few hundred Christians survived the genocide.
er
Most of the Christian survivors left the country, but around 200 remained.
rp
Pastor Sieng Ang and his wife Bun Sok, Cambodian missionaries who
had served the Khmer Krom people in Sóc Trăng (Khleang Province),
Fo
Vietnam, since 1972, returned to Cambodia to shepherd the church of
e.
the survivors that managed to meet secretly on Sundays in three places.

l
sa
Pastor Sieng Ang was arrested in 1984 and was jailed for several months.
After his release he continued to strengthen the underground church in
re
Phnom Penh. He planted a church in Prek Talong near Takhmau, about 10

or
kilometres south of Phnom Penh.

n
For fear of the new government and communist practice imposed and
tio
supported by the Vietnamese, many people fled to Thailand, living in

bu
refugee camps for several years before eventually taking asylum in the
tri
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and many European countries. In

is
the refugee camps in Thailand, Cambodians were open to the Christian

rd
message. Many of them believed in Jesus, were baptised, attended the

fo
church and grew in faith. Para-church organisations such as the Catholic

Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees, JRS (Jesuit Refugee Service),
ot
N
Don Bosco, Youth With A Mission, COR (Christian Outreach), CAMA

Services (Compassion and Mercy Associates), FHI (Food for the Hungry
International), OMF (Overseas Missionary Fellowship), Baptist Missions
and Campus Crusade for Christ were instrumental in strengthening the
faith of the new Christians and training them to build a better future in
Cambodia. Together with Sarin Sam, the present author wrote, compiled
and edited hundreds of Cambodian indigenous hymns and gospel songs
that have been widely used by the Cambodian church worldwide since
1985. Inspired by the Second Lausanne Congress, held in Manila in
180 Barnabas Mam
1989, Cambodian Evangelical church leaders and Western missionaries

connected with the Cambodian churches gathered in Singapore in January
1990 to pray for Cambodia and plan future work.
Christianity After National Unification

The effort for national unification was cemented by the signing of the Paris
peace accords by all four Cambodian warring factions on 23 October 1991.
After this, Cambodians living overseas, refugees and displaced people
were welcomed back to their homeland and were treated equally as
.
ly
citizens of Cambodia. The country was now officially called the Kingdom
on
of Cambodia again. Buddhism was recognised as the state religion, but
the constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the government has
se
generally respected this right in practice.
lu
In Asia, the church in Malaysia and the church in Singapore were
na
the first to send missionaries to Cambodia, followed by the churches in
so
South Korea and Thailand. Many individuals, missionaries, mission
agencies, denominations and para-church organisations from Asia, the
er
Americas, Europe and Australia came to Cambodia in 1992. Local and
rp
international non-governmental organisations offered their programmes
Fo
to serve Cambodia and its people with child protection, child sponsorship,
e.
community development, medical care, health care, caring for people with
l
HIV/AIDS, prison ministry, military ministry, English teaching, vocational

sa
training, leadership training and Christian education.

re
Bishop Emile Destombes told Agenzia Fides in 2007:

or
One urgent priority is formation, formation of priests, formation of the

n
community, to help the laity assume greater responsibility. At present we have

tio
only 5 Cambodian-born priests, formed after the period of the Red Khmers.
bu
We have 96 missionary priests of whom 8 are diocesan and the rest belong
tri
to various congregations, and we have 102 women religious. We are forming

is
special Commissions to animate each parish: a Liturgy Commission (to

rd
prepare liturgies, hymns etc.); a Catechesis and Education Commission, which

fo
is a task not only for priests and religious; a Commission for charity work and
social service, to provide assistance for the poor, the abandoned, people with
ot
AIDS. We wish every community to have these three commissions.

N
Around 300 Cambodian pastors and church leaders met together for
the first time at the National Church Leaders’ Conference in Phnom Penh
in April 1994 to promote unity and synergy. On 10 June 1994 around
3,000 Christians joined the Global March for Jesus from Wat Phnom to
the Royal Palace in Phnom Penh. Among the Protestants, several church
councils were formed. Two of them are inter-denominational with inter
national affiliation: the Evangelical Fellowship of Cambodia (EFC), a
member of the World Evangelical Alliance; and the Kampuchea Christian
Cambodia 181
Council, a member of the World Council of Churches. Three of them are

inter-denominational with national affiliation: the Cambodian Christian
Evangelical Alliance; National Christian Church Networks Cambodia;
and the Cambodian Christian Protestant Community. The rest are mono-
denominational church councils, such as the Cambodia Baptist Union,
Cambodia Methodist Church and Cambodia Foursquare Church. Of all
the church councils, the EFC – which was recognised by the government
on 14 January 1996 – is the largest local indigenous umbrella religious
organisation, with many denominations, church associations, mission
.
ly
agencies, independent churches and non-governmental organisations
on
joining its membership. The Cambodia government also recognised as
church councils the SDA Church, the New Apostolic Church, the Jehovah’s
se
Witnesses and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
lu
On 12 December 1995, the Bible Society in Cambodia received a permit
na
from the government to operate as a society. The Khmer Standard Version
so
(KHSV), a new translation of the Bible, was completed in April 1997. The
dedication of the KHSV Bible was held on 5 June 1998, and the presen-
er
tation of the KHSV Bible to King Norodom Sihanouk by the board of
rp
directors took place a week after the dedication. The board of the Society
Fo
comprises leaders from the Roman Catholic Church, the SDA Church and
e.
most of the main Evangelical denominations.

l
One hundred and fifty Christian leaders joined the staff of the Far East
sa
Broadcasting Corporation (FEBC) on 8 November 2014 to dedicate a new

re
transmitter in the presence of the secretary of the Ministry of Information.

or
Three radio ministries are recognised by the government: Family FM 99.5,

n
Trans World Radio Cambodia and Voice of New Life Radio.

tio
For the first time in the history of the church of Cambodia, on 5 April
bu
2015, the minister of religion attended a joint Easter celebration, in Phnom

tri
Penh, in the presence of 3,000 Christians, 150 government officers, 150

is
Buddhist leaders and 150 Islamic leaders. As Christian ministries con-

rd
cerning child protection are appreciated by the Cambodia government

fo
and UNICEF, 1,400 Evangelicals and 600 Catholics were invited to attend
the World Day of Prayer and Action for Children on 14 December 2015,
ot
together with 1,400 Buddhists and 600 Muslims, in the presence of the
N
prime minister of Cambodia.

On 25 December 2009, after joining a Christmas celebration in Phnom
Penh, Mrs Men Sam An, a deputy prime minister of Cambodia, told the
minister of religion as they were walking through a row of exhibition
booths with two senior Evangelical leaders, ‘I just know that Christians in
Cambodia have done more good works to rebuild our nation than what
was sent to us in their written reports. I am proud to see them wear Khmer
costumes and to hear them sing Khmer carols.’
182 Barnabas Mam
Main Christian Movements

The Khmer Evangelical Church (KEC) of the C&MA is known as the first
Protestant church in Cambodia. The KEC is united, well organised, well
connected and steadily growing. It is strong in training leaders through
Theological Education by Extension and is actively reaching out to tribal
people.
The Assemblies of God (AOG) came in with an agreement with the
Cambodian government in 1990. The AOG is known for its partnership
with primary-school teachers in implementing a full curriculum and
.
ly
teaching biblical values to the students in Takeo Province. AOG Cambodia
on
is also known for the first Christian high school in Phnom Penh. To train
Christian workers, AOG Cambodia runs the Cambodia Bible Institute
se
(CBI). All AOG local pastors are CBI graduates.
lu
The New Apostolic Church (NAC) planted more than 200 churches
na
nationwide in the 1990s. Because some of the local leaders left the NAC
so
and joined other Evangelical denominations in the late 1990s, however,
er
membership has decreased, and the NAC is no longer active in church
planting.
rp
Southern Baptist missions from the USA also planted more than 200
Fo
churches in Cambodia in the 1990s. After some of the first-generation
e.
leaders died and others left the movement, the Southern Baptist-affiliated
l
churches in Cambodia decreased in membership and are now less active

sa
in church planting. However, other Baptist churches that train and deploy
re
emerging leaders for ministry are growing rapidly.

or
The Mormons or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS)

n
began their work in Cambodia in 1994. They are known for their commit-
tio
ment to pay tithes, two-by-two house evangelism, humanitarian projects,

bu
nice church buildings and sending students to Brigham Young University

tri
in Hawaii. In 2012 the membership of LDS in Cambodia reached more

is
than 14,000, with a steady stream of members recruited to the church each
rd
year, according to David Moon, president of the Cambodia mission. In

fo
2009, there were 432 new Mormons in Cambodia, and since then the figure
has risen to more than 600 new members per year.
ot
The Methodist missions came to Cambodia from Malaysia, Singapore,

N
Korea, France, Switzerland and the USA in the early 1990s. Multiple
Methodist bodies began working together in 2004 to support and plant
local churches in Cambodia. In less than a decade, leadership of the
Methodist Mission Church has shifted from foreign missionaries to
Cambodian Methodists. The local Khmer leadership is strong and local
leaders continue to be cultivated. The 154 Methodist faith communities
and 140 pastors that make up the Cambodia Mission Initiative are focused
on planting new churches and strengthening ministry by women, ministry
Cambodia 183
with street children, Christian education, ministry with youth, economic

development and community health.
Various Presbyterian missions from South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore
and the USA came to Cambodia in the early 1990s. Korean Presbyterians
have planted more churches than the others. Even though they are not
yet united as one Presbyterian Church of Cambodia, they have effectively
reached out to high-school students and college students. They are known
for their Christian university in Kampong Som and their theological semi-
naries in Phnom Penh.
.
ly
The Foursquare Church of Cambodia (FCC) claims to be the fastest-
on
growing church in Cambodia. FCC claims to have 5,985 churches and
meeting places, and 984,389 members. Many researchers on church
se
growth and church planting in Cambodia find it hard to accept these
lu
figures, however. In spite of some tension between missionaries and
na
the local leadership, the FCC is actively planting churches and building
so
orphanage centres all over Cambodia. The FCC is known for love and care
for orphans and widows.
er
New Life Fellowship Phnom Penh was planted by Pastor Eric Dooley,
rp
an American missionary, when he came to Phnom Penh in 1993 to do
Fo
pioneer evangelism. Dooley moved his family to Vietnam in 1997, and
e.
leadership passed to Pastor Chuck McCaul. In 1999, New Life Fellowship

l
began planting and resourcing churches throughout Cambodia’s remote

sa
and rural areas. Pastor Chuck continued to serve as the senior leader in
re
Cambodia until 2004, when he began to transfer the leadership of New

or
Life Fellowship Phnom Penh to his son Jesse and local leaders so he could
n
focus on overseeing rural church plants and development work. More than
tio
60 provincial congregations have been planted. Under the leadership of

bu
Jesse McCaul and the local leadership team, New Life Fellowship Phnom
tri
Penh has grown to become one of the largest churches in Cambodia.

is
One of the indigenous church associations that pioneered church

rd
planting is Living Hope in Christ Church (LHCC). Paulerk Sar and the
fo
present author were called to plant LHCC in Phnom Penh in 1995. During
the late 1990s and early 2000s, LHCC grew into an association that today
ot
has 132 churches in its membership. The present author established the
N
Institute of Church Planting Cambodia (ICPC) in 1998, training 30 new

church planters every year. By 2018, 608 church planters had graduated
from ICPC and planted more than 500 churches.
Church Growth in Cambodia Today

‘To be Cambodian is to be Buddhist’ is a widely quoted saying. The
would-be convert’s first hurdle to overcome is the feeling that Christian-
ity is in some sense a betrayal of Khmer-ness. The second hurdle is that
184 Barnabas Mam
Christianity has a reputation for teaching disrespect for parents, although

Christians find this difficult to fathom given the biblical injunction to
honour one’s mother and father. But respect for parents is one of the
foundations of Khmer society, and young would-be converts are both
surprised and relieved to find that they are not expected to turn their backs
on their families. The rapid growth of churches in Cambodia is testimony
that these obstacles are increasingly being overcome. A number of factors
can be identified to account for this rapid growth.
An analogy used by Cambodian Evangelicals is that their compatriots
.
ly
of Buddhist background see themselves as people drowning in a river but
on
being given a swimming lesson by a good teacher to rescue themselves
from the calamity. They have tried their best to follow the teacher’s in-
se
struction, but they realise that they are too weak to swim. Just as they
lu
become desperate, Jesus jumps into the river to rescue them and takes
na
them to safe ground. Then Jesus makes friends with them and gives them
so
useful and practical swimming lessons so that they can enjoy their swims
and their travels by boat for the rest of their lives. Their point is that as the
er
drowning need a rescuer rather than a swimming teacher, so Cambodians
rp
need a Saviour rather than a religious teacher.
Fo
Many Cambodians who never experienced fatherly love or brotherly
e.
love, because they grew up in fatherless homes or broken families, through

l
the Christian faith come to feel a strong sense of the fatherly love of God,
sa
the brotherly love of Jesus and the love of fellow believers within the
re
church. This offers a strong sense of acceptance, belonging and oneness in

or
God’s family (no racial discrimination, no social status discrimination and

n
no gender discrimination). In response to the love of Christ, they worship

tio
God’s majesty with intimacy. Compelled by this divine love, they pray
bu
for one another and passionately proclaim the gospel of Christ to their
tri
neighbours. They are set free to forgive the Khmer Rouge who killed their
is
loved ones and even the Vietnamese, whom they once regarded as their
rd
bitter enemies.
fo
Cambodian Christians are excited to go to church because they have

seen miracles take place in their lives and in those of other believers,
ot
including healings, casting out of demons, family reunion, marital

N
restoration, reconciliation, job opportunities, promotions and financial

breakthroughs. They believe that they can experience abundant life in
Christ through the church.
Students like going to church or a Christian school because of the higher
ethical values, the higher training quality, the higher tuition quality, the
safer environment and the subsidised school fees or scholarships offered
by the churches. Many students from Christian high schools pass the
national exam and are accepted for college education every year. Poor
Cambodia 185
students can learn English, music and creative arts or can receive voca-
tional training at church free of charge. Illiterate people in rural areas can
learn to read and write Khmer at church. Above all else, emerging leaders
are equipped at church and released for ministry at church. They believe
that they will have a brighter future in Christ through the church.
Cambodian Christians no longer feel that they lose their national
identity. They are proud to wear Cambodian costumes and to integrate
indigenous music, hymns, carols, dances and performing arts in their
Christian worship. They grow rapidly in number because they have access
.
ly
to contextualised Christian resources in their native language that are
on
easy to read, easy to hear, easy to understand, easy to apply and easy to
share with others. They grow in good relationships with their parents by
se
honouring them while they are alive. Cambodian Christians show their
lu
love, respect and gratitude to their parents who stay with them by greeting
na
them kneeling on the floor, with closed hands reaching up to the nose and
so
with head bowing down three times. They bring them baskets of fruit, cake,
drink and dried food, and give them an envelope with a good amount of
er
money in it on special occasions such as birthdays or anniversaries or on
rp
national holidays such as Khmer New Year or Pchum Ben festival. Chris-
Fo
tians whose parents do not stay with them travel far to visit their parents,
e.
greet them with the same level of greeting, bless them with the special gifts
l
and spend a few days with them for family reunion. Christians whose
sa
fathers are Buddhist monks go to the Buddhist monasteries, greet them

re
by kneeling on the floor with closed hands reaching up to the forehead

or
and with head bowing down three times, and bless them with special gifts.
n
Cambodian Christians also worship Jesus in a kneeling position, with head

tio
up, and with closed hands or open hands above the head.
bu
In the past, the church in Cambodia was known as a community of

tri
the foolish, the incompetent and the unemployed, but now the church is
is
known as the community of the wise, the competent and the employed.
rd
The church in Cambodia has many contrasts, such as an institutional

fo
church versus an organic church, a denominational church versus an

indigenous church, an urban church versus a rural church, an ‘elephant’
ot
church versus a ‘rabbit’ church, a church that meets in a proper building

N
versus a church that meets at home and a church that meets only on
Sunday versus a church that meets every day. Urban churches have five
age groups: children, teenagers, young adults, adults and senior people.
Rural churches have only three age groups – children, teenagers and
senior people – because many young adults go to the city for college
education or work and many adults go to the city or overseas for work.
Churches vary in size, with the smallest having fewer than 25 members
and the largest more than 1,000. Most of the rural churches are house
186 Barnabas Mam
churches or ‘rabbit’ churches, with fewer than 100 members, mainly

peasants, under the leadership of a local pastor and a small team of elders.
Most of the urban churches are churches with a proper building and more
than 100 members, who may be professionals, business people, students,
police officers, military personnel or housewives, under the leadership of
a pastoral team and a team of elders. Most rural churches meet for two or
three hours on Sunday, use indigenous musical instruments and sing more
indigenous hymns and fewer translated hymns and contemporary songs
of praise and worship. They pray longer prayers by and for more people,
.
ly
allow two or three testimonies and usually listen to an hour-long sermon
on
on a Bible story that encourages the people’s faith and gives direction to
their lives. Most urban churches meet for an hour and a half or two hours
se
on Sunday; use both indigenous and modern musical instruments; sing
lu
one or two indigenous hymns, one or two translated hymns and several
na
contemporary songs of praise and worship; pray shorter prayers by and
so
for fewer people; allow only one testimony and usually have a 40–60-
minute topical sermon that is relevant to the needs of the people.
er
The recent history of Christianity in Cambodia suggests that mission
rp
aries are needed to pioneer the first church plant, to make disciples
Fo
among the first-generation believers and to produce leaders among them.
e.
Missionaries are needed to partner with the local leaders of the first
l
church planted through evangelism, in making disciples among the next

sa
generation of believers and in raising leaders among the next generation of

re
Christian disciples. Then the time comes when the church can be left in the
or
hands of local leaders. Tension between influence and resources coming

n
from the mission-sending nations and the development of local leadership

tio
arises only when missionaries are not willing to move from the pioneering
bu
stage to the parenting stage, then to the training stage and finally to the
tri
partnering stage, when appropriate.

is
rd
Bibliography
fo
Cormack, Don, Killing Fields Living Fields: Faith in Cambodia (London: Monarch Books and
OMF International, 1997).
ot
Maher, Brian with Uon Seila, Cry of the Gecko: History of the Christian Mission in Cambodia
N
(Centralia, WA: Gorham Printing, 2012).

Mam, Barnabas, with Kitti Murray, Church Behind the Wire: A Story of Faith in the Killing
Fields (Chicago, IL: Moody Publishers, 2012).
Ponchaud, François, Nancy Pignarre, Sharon Wilkinson and Nicole Butcher, The Cathedral
in the Rice Paddy: The 450 Year Long History of the Church in Cambodia (Phnom Penh:
Catholic Catechetical Centre Cambodia, 2012).
Ross, Russell R. (ed.), Cambodia: A Country Study (Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of
Congress, 1987).
Vietnam
Peter Phan
Systematic and organised missions to the Vietnamese people were not
.
ly
undertaken until the arrival of Jesuits in Quang Nam, central Vietnam
on
(then known as Cochinchina), in 1615. From 1615 to 1659, the bulk of
missionary work was carried out by the Jesuits, of whom the most cele
se
brated is Alexandre de Rhodes of France (1591–1660). De Rhodes arrived
lu
in central Vietnam in December 1624, and after a few months of language
na
study he was sent, together with Pero Marqués, to the north, then known
so
as Tonkin, arriving there on 19 March 1627. De Rhodes was expelled in
er
1630, went back to Macao, remained there for 10 years, and in 1640 came
rp
back to Cochinchina. In 1645, banished from Vietnam for good, he went
to Rome to lobby for the establishment of a hierarchy in Vietnam. As a
Fo
result of tenacious efforts by de Rhodes in the face of fierce opposition
e.
by the Portuguese crown, in 1658 Pope Alexander VII appointed François

l
Pallu Apostolic Vicar of Tonkin – bishop under the authority of the Con-
sa
gregation of the Propagation of the Faith (Propaganda Fide) rather than

re
the Portuguese Padroado Real – and Pierre Lambert de la Motte Apostolic

or
Vicar of Cochinchina.
n
tio
The Church Steeped in Blood

bu
Missionary work in the next two centuries, though highly successful, met
tri
with grave difficulties. Some of these stemmed from the political situation
is
of the country at the time. When Christianity first arrived in Vietnam, the
rd
reigning dynasty was the Le, which was founded in 1428 and ended in
fo
1788. However, in 1527 power was wrested from it by the Mac dynasty,
which ruled the northernmost part of Vietnam until 1592. In 1532, two
ot
clans, the Trinh and the Nguyen, defeated the Mac in defence of the Le.
N
Subsequent Le kings were nothing more than puppets, however, and the
real power was in the hands of the Trinh and Nguyen clans. Soon rivalries
divided the two clans, with the former dominating the north and the latter
the south. Military conflicts between the two parts of the country erupted
in 1627, the very year de Rhodes went to the north; a total of seven wars
lasted off and on for 45 years but failed to produce a victory for either side.
The rivalry between the north and the south greatly complicated the work
of missionaries as each side, especially the Trinh clan, suspected them of
188 Peter Phan
being spies for the other but, when convenient, used them as go-betweens
to obtain merchandise and military wares from their Western countrymen,
especially the Portuguese.
In addition to external political problems, missions in Vietnam faced
two internal church issues. The first was the jurisdictional conflict between
missionaries, mostly Spanish and Portuguese Jesuits and Dominicans,
operating under the Portuguese padroado system and the French ones
associated with the Société des Missions Étrangères de Paris (MEP), a
missionary society founded by Bishop Pallu, under the supervision of the
.
ly
Propaganda Fide. The second issue was the Chinese Rites Controversy,
on
which was extended to Vietnam, in which Dominicans, Franciscans and
MEP missionaries succeeded in having the Jesuits’ more liberal attitude
se
towards the practices of offering sacrifices to Confucius and the ancestors
lu
condemned as superstitions.
na
However, the most devastating challenge to the infant church was the
so
numerous persecutions of its members by various Vietnamese rulers. It is
estimated that 30,000 Catholics were killed under the rule of the Trinh clan
er
in the north and under the rule of the Nguyen clan and the Tay Son family
in the south during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In addition, rp
Fo
40,000 were reportedly killed under the reign of three Nguyen emperors:
e.
Minh Mang (1820–40), Thieu Tri (1841–7) and Tu Duc (1848–83). Finally,
l
an estimated 60,000 were killed by the nationalist Van Than (pro-king and
sa
anti-French) movement (1864–85). In 1988, Pope John Paul II canonised

re
117 of these martyrs.

or
n
On the Way to Maturity

tio
In spite of these tragedies, the church expanded rapidly. In 1933 the

bu
first Vietnamese bishop, Nguyen Ba Tong, was consecrated. In 1934 the

tri
first Indochinese council was held in Hanoi, with the participation of 20

is
bishops, five religious superiors and 21 priests; its policies had extensive
rd
fo
Christianity in Vietnam, 1970 and 2020

ot

N

Christians 3,264,000 7.5% 8,924,000 9.1% 2.0%
Anglicans 2,200 0.0% 200 0.0% –4.7%
Independents 44,700 0.1% 529,000 0.5% 5.1%
Protestants 159,000 0.4% 1,586,000 1.6% 4.7%
Catholics 2,899,000 6.7% 7,221,000 7.3% 1.8%
Evangelicals 168,000 0.4% 1,650,000 1.7% 4.7%
Vietnam 189
implications for the life of the church. Unfortunately, no sooner had the
church begun its expansion than the country was engulfed in the inde-
pendence war against colonialist France, and the subsequent Geneva
accords (1954) temporarily divided Vietnam into two parts, the north
under the communist regime and the south under a democratic and pro-
Western government.
As a result of the partition, 860,000 Vietnamese, of whom 650,000 were
Catholic, fled the north, thereby decimating the northern church and
dramatically swelling the Catholic population of the south. On 8 December
.
ly
1960 Pope John XXIII established the Vietnamese hierarchy, dividing the
on
church into three ecclesiastical provinces (Hanoi, Hue and Saigon) with 20
ordinaries and no longer merely apostolic vicars. Thus, after 300 years of
se
mission, the Vietnamese Catholic Church became a fully fledged church
lu
with its own hierarchy.
na
so
North and South: 1954–75
Cut off from the church in the south and the Church of Rome for almost 21
er
years (1954-75), persecuted by the communist government and devastated
rp
by the departure of a large number of clergy and laity in 1954, the church
Fo
in the north barely survived. With its educational and social institutions
e.
confiscated by the government and its clergy practically under house

l
arrest, the church limited its activities to sacramental celebrations and

sa
pious devotions. It could not benefit from the great reforms instituted by
re
the Second Vatican Council (1962–5).

or
Compared with the church in the north, the church in the south was in
n
a far more favourable situation. Not only did it benefit from the massive
tio
influx of Catholics in 1954, it also enjoyed 20 years of freedom (1955–75)

bu
that fortunately coincided with a period of extensive renewal in the

tri
Catholic Church initiated by the Second Vatican Council. It made rapid

is
gains: in 1959 it had 1,226,310 Catholics, 1,342 native priests, 715 brothers
rd
and 3,776 sisters. In addition, it exercised extensive influence on society at

fo
large through its numerous first-rate educational, health-care and social

services.
ot
N
Religious Freedom: 1975–2015

Like all other religious organisations in South Vietnam, the Catholic
Church was caught completely unprepared for the victory of communist
North Vietnam on 30 April 1975. Its stance towards communism had been
one of rejection and condemnation, consistent with that of the universal
church until the end of the Second Vatican Council. The new challenge
was how to exist as the church and fulfil its mission under the communist
regime.
190 Peter Phan
The most important and widely disseminated document expound-

ing the attitude of the church towards communism and outlining its
ministry under the communist regime is no doubt the first pastoral letter
of the now-reconstituted Vietnamese Episcopal Conference, composed of
33 bishops from both north and south. It was issued on 5 January 1980
and titled Living the Gospel in the Midst of the People. Beginning with an
emphatic affirmation that the Church of Jesus Christ must live in the midst
of the people, the letter asserts that Vietnam is the place where God calls
Vietnamese Catholics to live as children of God and that the Vietnamese
.
ly
people are the community which Catholics must serve as both citizens of
on
the nation and members of the church.
Meanwhile, from 1975 to 1995 the economic condition of Vietnam
se
worsened alarmingly, and the communist government attempted to
lu
respond to the economic crisis by adopting the Doi Moi (renovation)
na
programme, moving partially from the socialist economy to the market
so
economy. Along with economic innovation, some important changes in the
political system were advanced. However, unlike perestroika in the Soviet
er
Union, which was officially accompanied by political glasnost, Doi Moi was
rp
not undergirded by a new political ideology of openness. Nevertheless, no
Fo
doubt it represented the most significant reforms, not only economic but
e.
also political, in post-1975 Vietnam.

l
In spite of all these Doi Moi changes towards the free market, the Viet
sa
namese Communist Party (VCP), like the Chinese Communist Party, did
re
everything to retain its status as the only party with power to govern
or
Vietnam. Occasionally, laws and policies were enacted, and ordin

n
ances and decrees issued, to protect human rights, including religious

tio
freedom, especially if these measures could improve Vietnam’s standing

bu
in the international community and attract foreign investment. Nothing,

tri
however, would be tolerated if it could challenge or jeopardise the party’s

is
exclusive grip on power. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that in

rd
the 1990s there was some relaxation in the government’s attitude towards
fo
religious freedom and practices in general. New laws and policies on

religious matters were issued. With regard to the Catholic Church, diplo-
ot
matic relations were established between the Vietnamese government and

N
the Vatican.
The 1992 constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, emended in
2001 and again in 2013, stipulates that:
citizens have the right to freedom of belief and religion, and may practise or
not practise any religion. All religions are equal before the law. Public places of
religious worship are also protected by law. No one has the right to infringe on
the freedom of belief and freedom of religion or take advantage of the latter to
violate state laws and policies. (Article 70; author’s translation here and below)
Vietnam 191
Basic to the VCP’s stance on religious freedom is the distinction between

religion as faith or belief (tin nguong) and religion as religious organisation
and activities (ton giao). For the former, there is a guarantee of complete
freedom of believing and not believing; for the latter, there are restrictions,
especially to protect ‘national security’. Accordingly, Directive 37-CT/TW
of 2 July 1998 of the Central Committee of the VCP requires party com-
mittees and administration at all levels ‘to encourage religious followers
to promote their traditional patriotism, to take an enthusiastic part in the
renovation cause, to fulfil religious tasks and citizens’ duties, to build and
.
ly
defend the Fatherland, and to continue to implement the policy of the
on
Party and state on religion’.
A detailed and specific list of stipulations regarding what is allowed
se
and what is forbidden was given the following year, in Decree 26/1999/
lu
ND-CP of 19 April 1999, especially in articles 6–26. While this Decree
na
marks an advance over the 1998 Directive, inasmuch as it clarifies the
so
kinds of religious activities that can ‘cause social disorder and insecurity’
and are therefore unlawful, it has been heavily criticised for its attempt
er
to interfere in the normal internal affairs of religions. For example, it
rp
requires approval from appropriate government authorities for extraor-
Fo
dinary religious activities outside religious buildings (such as procession
e.
and pilgrimage), the appointment of religious officials (in particular,

l
bishops and their equivalents), the building of churches, the founding of

sa
seminaries and houses of formation, meetings and conferences of religious

re
leaders at the national and local levels, and relations with foreign religious
or
organisations.
n
On 18 June 2004, the government issued the Ordinance on Belief and

tio
Religion, composed of 41 articles. The Ordinance gives precise definitions

bu
of terms such as ‘belief-related activity’, ‘belief-related establishment’,

tri
‘religious organisation’, ‘grassroots religious organisations’, ‘religious

is
activity’, ‘religious association’ and ‘religious establishment’. A key

rd
distinction is again made between ‘belief’ (for which there is complete

fo
freedom, as there is for non-belief) and ‘religion’ (on which there are re-
strictions). This Ordinance is a further improvement on the 1998 Directive
ot
and the 1999 Decree. Of great interest is article 6, which stipulates that:
N
relations between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and other States and/or
international organisations in religion-related matters shall be based on the
principle that promotes each other’s independence and sovereignty, non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, and in
conformity with each other’s law and international law and practice.
The Ordinance was shortly followed by the Decree of the Government

Guiding the Implementation of the Ordinance on Belief and Religion
192 Peter Phan
(March 2005), which has 38 articles. As implied by its title, this Decree,
which is so far the longest and most detailed legal document on religious
institutions and practices, sets out procedures for registering ‘belief-
related festivals’ (articles 3–5), ‘religious organisations’ (articles 6–19)
and ‘religious activities’ (articles 20–35). Again, the overriding concern
of the government is control of religions and their activities, particularly
by means of ‘registration’. Without registration, no religion may legally
function. As of 2007, the state, through the Committee for Religious Affairs,
officially recognises six religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism,
.
ly
Islam, Caodaism and Hoa Hao Buddhism.
on
Government and the Vatican: 1990–2015
se
The Vietnamese Catholic Church, differently from other religious organis
lu
ations, suffered special legal restrictions, especially in the appointment of
na
bishops, because of its institutional connections with what the VCP calls
so
‘foreign elements’ – that is, the Vatican State. However, since 1989, after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a remarkable rapproche-
er
ment between the Vatican and the Vietnamese government.
rp
A turning point in the relationship between Vietnam and the Vatican
Fo
occurred on 13 January 2011, when Archbishop Leopoldo Girelli was
e.
appointed Apostolic Nuncio to Singapore, Apostolic Delegate for Malaysia

l
and for Brunei Darussalam, and non-residential papal representative for

sa
Vietnam. He was the first papal representative to be appointed for Vietnam

re
since the expulsion of the resident apostolic delegate in 1975.

or
Another highly significant event was the government’s permission

n
given to the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences (FABC) to hold its

tio
tenth Plenary Assembly on 10–16 December 2012 in Vietnam, which drew

bu
71 participants hailing from more than 20 Asian countries, Europe, Latin

tri
America and Oceania. On 15–20 September 2013, a seven-member delega-

is
tion from the Vietnam Government Committee for Religious Affairs paid a
rd
working visit to the Vatican, during which they met with Pope Francis, to
fo
whom they presented a statue of Jesus as a gift. These official events signal
a notable improvement in relations between the government of Vietnam
ot
on the one hand and the Vatican and the Vietnamese Catholic Church on
N
the other.
Protestant Churches
In most Asian countries, Protestantism (in Vietnamese Dao Tin Lanh,
‘The Good News Religion’) is officially and legally treated as a distinct
‘religion’ from Catholicism. Introduced into Vietnam in 1911 by Robert
A. Jaffray under the aegis of the Christian & Missionary Alliance
(C&MA), Protestantism was organised in 1927 into a church known as the
Vietnam 193
Evangelical Church of Indochina, later changed to the Evangelical Church

of Vietnam (ECVN). During the Vietnamese War of Independence (1945–
54), the ECVN adopted a policy of neutrality, restricting itself to spiritual
activities. After the 1954 Geneva accords, the ECVN was divided into two
bodies, ECVN North and ECVN South, and about 1,000 members moved
from the north to the south. Soon, and especially during the Vietnam War,
other Protestant denominations and groups followed the C&MA, notably
the Seventh-day Adventists (1929), the Mennonite Central Committee
(1954), the Eastern Mennonite Board of Missions and Charities (1971), the
.
ly
Southern Baptists (1959) and the Assemblies of God (1972).
on
Despite (or, rather, because of) persecutions by the government, since
1975 the number of Vietnamese Protestants has grown from 160,000 to
se
1.6 million. The ECVN’s missions were highly successful among the ethnic
lu
Vietnamese in the south, especially in My Tho and Can Tho, but less so in
na
the north. Later, the church focused its work on the ethnic minorities in the
so
Highland Mountainous Region in the north (notably among the Hmong)
and in the Central Highlands in the south (notably among the Koho, Ede,
er
Jarai, Bahnar, Stieng and Mnong). Even though the ethnic minorities make
rp
up only 13% of the Vietnamese population, they constitute more than half
Fo
of Protestants in Vietnam.
e.
A recent phenomenon deserving close attention is the emergence of

l
the house-church movement. In the late 1980s some young ECVN pastors
sa
(notably Dinh Thien Tu, Vo Van Lac, Tran Mai and Tran Dinh Ai) were
re
dissatisfied with the accommodating attitude of the church’s senior

or
leadership towards the government, and advocated instead for a con-

n
frontational approach. In addition, they favoured Pentecostal doctrines

tio
of the Holy Spirit and worship style, with emphasis on speaking in

bu
tongues and healing. They were subsequently expelled from the ECVN
tri
for insubordination. These pastors started the house-church movement,

is
which spread like wildfire. By 2009, an estimated 250,000 Christians in at

rd
least 2,500 home-based groups belonged to house-church organisations.

fo
These range from single congregations to hundreds of congregations.

Some of them have also tried to be connected to international denomina-
ot
tions such as Assemblies of God, Nazarenes, Methodists, Mennonites and

N
Presbyterians.
The spread of Protestantism among the tribal people and the rise of
the house-church movement present great difficulties for the churches
in relation to the government. For example, there was among the Central
Highland tribes in the 1960s a liberation movement called FULRO (United
Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races). Most of its members were
Protestants who were adamantly opposed to the communists. In 2001 and
2004 there were extensive demonstrations among the Central Highlands
194 Peter Phan
tribes against the confiscation of their lands and lack of religious freedom.
These protesters, who called themselves ‘Dega’ (derived from the Ede-
language phrase anak ede gar, meaning ‘children of the mountains’), were
accused by the government of working for the USA and were brutally
crushed.
Another problem concerns ‘registration’. In 2005, as mentioned above,
the government issued the Decree of the Government Guiding the Im-
plementation of the Ordinance on Belief and Religion, requiring that
religious organisations ‘register’ for ‘recognition’ with the government to
.
ly
be allowed to function legally. The following month the prime minister
on
issued Special Directive No. 1 Concerning the Protestant Religion,
directing commune- and city-level authorities to expedite the registra-
se
tion of Protestant house churches. Some of these applied for registration
lu
and recognition. Two Protestant organisations, the ECVN North and the
na
ECVN South, representing well over half of Vietnam’s Protestants, already
so
had full legal recognition, the former since 1950 and the latter since 2001.
Only 160 ethnic congregations associated with the ECVN North, out of
er
more than 1,000, received provisional recognition. In 2009, church leaders
rp
reported that not more than one-tenth of house churches’ applications
Fo
for recognition had been approved. Other house churches have refused
e.
to register, on the ground that such a process allows the government to

l
control their religious activities. Obviously, the combination of the recent

sa
mushrooming of Protestant house churches without a central authority

re
and the cumbersome process of registration conspire to make harmonious

or
relations between Vietnamese Protestantism and the Vietnamese govern-

n
ment nearly impossible.

tio
bu
Christianity’s Contributions to Vietnam

tri
Today, the Vietnamese Catholic Church has 26 dioceses that are grouped
is
in three ecclesiastical provinces: Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City

rd
(Saigon). Of the current population of nearly 100 million, some 6.8% are
fo
Catholics and somewhere between 0.5% and 2% are Protestants; there is

one Russian Orthodox parish. Despite its minority status, Christianity
ot
has made great and lasting contributions to the country. Until 1975, in
N
addition to several universities, the best high schools were Catholic, the
majority of which were run by the Saint Jean-Baptiste de La Salle Brothers
of the Christian Schools and were highly esteemed by non-Christians.
(In 2016 the communist government permitted the opening of the first
Catholic university since 1975.) The church also operated many hospitals,
leprosaria and social service centres, especially through the work of
religious sisters, notably the indigenous Congregation of the Lovers of
the Holy Cross.
Vietnam 195
One of the most important and lasting cultural contributions made by

the Catholic Church is the alphabetisation of the Vietnamese language,
which is now the national script (chu quoc ngu). This has been accompanied
by a large number of works in chu nom (southern script), especially by
Gerolamo Maiorica, and the composition of dictionaries and grammars,
notably those by Alexandre de Rhodes, Pierre Pigneaux de Béhaine and
Jean-Louis Taberd. Catholics introduced new forms of literature (especially
the poetry of Han Mac Tu), religious art, sacred music and songs, and ar-
chitecture. Besides the Gothic cathedrals of Hanoi and Saigon, the most
.
ly
famous church is Phát Diệm Cathedral, built in 1892 by the Vietnamese
on
priest Tran Luc (also called Cu Sau or Father Six), which combines Viet-
namese traditional pagoda style with Gothic architecture and is described
se
by the novelist Graham Greene as ‘more Buddhist than Christian’.
lu
The Catholic Church also played a significant role in politics, producing
na
two presidents (Ngo Dinh Diem and Nguyen Van Thieu) and many
so
political and military leaders. One religious leader deserving special
mention is Archbishop Nguyen Van Thuan, who was the nephew of
er
President Diem and was prevented by the communist government from
rp
assuming leadership of the Archdiocese of Saigon in 1975. He was put in
Fo
prison and later under house arrest for more than a decade. Eventually
e.
released and exiled abroad, he went to Rome and was made a cardinal
l
and president of the Pontifical Council of Justice and Peace. His case for
sa
sainthood has been initiated.

re
After the fall of South Vietnam, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese

or
Catholics migrated to the West, especially the USA, Canada and Australia.
n
Currently there are three Vietnamese bishops, one in each of those three
tio
countries. The Vietnamese diaspora communities, while lively and influ-

bu
ential abroad, with notable achievements in education, science, technology

tri
and commerce, continue to maintain close relations with the churches in

is
Vietnam and contribute in many and diverse ways to its well-being and
rd
expansion.
fo
As a whole, despite occasional conflicts between the communist

government and some Catholic priests (especially in matters regarding the
ot
reclamation of church lands and properties) and violations of freedom of

N
speech and religion (which involve not only Catholics and Protestants but
also the followers of other religions and which have attracted international
attention), it must be acknowledged that the churches, both Catholic and
Protestant, do enjoy a measure of freedom of religion as long as they do
not engage in public criticism of government policies. The threat to the
well-being of Vietnamese Christianity arguably lies less in the restrictions
imposed by the communist government than in the corrosion of faith by a
new form of economic development fostered by globalisation.
196 Peter Phan
As far as church worship is concerned, Masses are regularly celebrated

on weekdays and Sundays and well attended, often with the congregation
spilling into the churchyard, especially on Sundays and solemn liturgical
feast days. Other sacramental celebrations, such as baptism, confirmation,
penance (confession), marriage and ordination, are routinely carried out.
Religious education of children is now permitted. Theological education
not only of the clergy but also of religious sisters and the laity is also a
regular feature. Priests and religious sisters can easily go abroad for higher
degrees in all academic disciplines. Bishops can freely travel to Rome on
.
ly
official business with the Vatican. Even large-scale public celebrations,
on
such as religious pilgrimage to the Shrine of Our Lady of Lavang, with
hundreds of thousands of participants, are annual events. In sum, despite
se
government restrictions, the Catholic Church in Vietnam is alive and well.
lu
na
The Future of Vietnamese Christianity
so
Coexistence between Vietnamese Christianity and the communist regime
since 1975 has more than proved that Vietnamese Christian churches have
er
not been a threat to national security as the older political leaders had
rp
feared. A generation of new communist leaders have come to realise that
Fo
the Christian churches have been and certainly can be a powerful and ir-
e.
replaceable ally in the promotion of economic well-being and social justice

l
for all. It is surprising to read the following statement from the Seventh
sa
Plenum of the Ninth Party Central Committee on Religion-Oriented Work

re
(March 2003):
or
Beliefs and religions are the spiritual demand of a part of the population,
n
tio
who have been and will be present with the nation in the course of building
socialism in our country. Religious believers are a building block of national
bu
unity.
tri
is
It is also encouraging that the same Plenum recognises that religions have
rd
a positive role to play in the life of the nation. According to it, one of the
fo
tasks of religion-related activities is

ot
to start a patriotic movement to build a lifestyle of ‘good worldly and religious

N
life’ among their followers, clergy, and religious practitioners from the grass-
roots level and to build nationwide solidarity to successfully carry out the
cause of renovation, national construction, and defence.
In the meantime, as long as Vietnam maintains a one-party political

system, Christianity in Vietnam, both Catholic and Protestant, is chal-
lenged to find a peaceful modus vivendi with, and to carry out its mission
under, a communist-socialist government. The first challenge concerns
the relationship between Christianity and the state. Christianity was,
Vietnam 197
and to a certain extent still is, perceived as a Western religion that has
colluded with Western colonialism and is associated with foreign powers.
The Catholic Church is seen as identical with the Vatican State (whose
nature as a sovereign state distinct from the Holy See is recognised under
international law), whereas the Protestant churches are perceived as
being in collusion with the USA. No doubt the colonialist legacy remains
a heavy and scandalous baggage for Vietnamese Christians, which they
must honestly acknowledge, even if Christian missions historically have
made and continue to make significant contributions to their countries,
.
ly
especially in the fields of education, health care and social welfare.
on
The second challenge to being Christian under a communist regime
concerns religious freedom. Christians around the world continue to press
se
their governments for it, since it is an inalienable human right and not
lu
a special favour to be secured through under-the-table deals, or through
na
diplomatic negotiations between their governments and the Holy See
so
in the case of Roman Catholics. Furthermore, this struggle for religious
freedom is carried out on behalf of all believers and not just for Christians.
er
It can also be pursued in concert with the followers of other religions, in
rp
particular Buddhists, as well as with non-believers, since they too suffer
Fo
from lack of religious freedom.
e.
The third challenge is internal, albeit originally caused by the

l
communist government’s religious policies, and that is the reconcilia-

sa
tion of various groups and divisions in the church itself. These may take
re
the form of patriotism – for example, the so-called quoc doanh (national
or
enterprise) church – versus allegiance to a foreign power, or competition

n
among different Christian denominations (Catholics versus Protestants),

tio
or theological differences (mainline Christianity versus Pentecostals/

bu
Charismatics). That these intra-ecclesial disputes have been exploited by

tri
various communist governments in their opposition to Christianity is

is
plain and incontrovertible. Fortunately, in recent times, these divisions

rd
have been partially bridged through mutual recognition and collaboration,

fo
but much work remains to be done. Authentic and full Christian identity
depends largely on the success of this ecumenical enterprise.
ot
The fourth issue concerns the role of the Catholic, mainline Protestant
N
and Evangelical/Pentecostal churches of the Vietnamese diaspora, es-

pecially in the USA, Canada and Australia. These Vietnamese Christian
communities have greater material, academic and personnel resources
at their disposal. What is being advocated here is not old-style financial
support and control by mission boards (for Protestants) or the Congrega-
tion for the Propagation of the Faith, now known as the Congregation for
the Evangelisation of Peoples (for Catholics). The Three-Self Movement,
whatever the Communist Party’s exploitation of it, must remain the norm
198 Peter Phan
for Vietnamese Christianity. Rather, what is being suggested is that the

Christian churches that enjoy political freedom and economic prosperity
have a particular responsibility to and solidarity with their counterparts in
Vietnam, especially in matters of human rights.
The fifth challenge is the encounter with other religions. Though there
has been a remarkable change in the position of the Roman Catholic Church
towards non-Christian religions, at least since the Second Vatican Council,
inter-religious dialogue, even among Vietnamese Catholics, is still in its
infancy. Moreover, the attitude of Vietnamese Protestants towards other
.
ly
religions remains by and large condemnatory. An adequate theology of
on
religions remains to be developed that acknowledges the positive role of
non-Christian religions for the spiritual well-being of their adherents and
se
Christians themselves, beyond the so-called exclusivist, inclusivist and
lu
pluralist paradigms made popular in recent decades. In Vietnam, being
na
religious is being inter-religious, and Christian identity cannot be formed
so
apart from a sincere and humble dialogue with the believers of other faiths
and from the reality of multiple religious belonging. This dialogue is not
er
only theological but must also involve sharing of life, collaboration for the
common good and sharing of religious experiences.rp
Fo
The sixth, and perhaps the hardest, challenge to being Christian in
e.
communist countries today, Vietnam included, is, ironically, the rapid

l
encroaching of the market economy and rampant materialism and con-

sa
sumerism, especially among the young. Communism as an ideology,

re
though still spouted and propped up by the Communist Party, is fast

or
becoming an empty shell, and party leaders are quite cognisant of this
n
state of affairs and are busy preserving their interests in an eventual

tio
post-socialist state. Today, the greatest threat to Christianity in the Asian

bu
socialist countries is not (or no longer) the oppressive religious policies

tri
of the Communist Party, or the cultural ‘dictatorship of relativism’ for

is
that matter. Rather, it is complete indifference to Christianity as well as

rd
to any other religious way of life, as the result of a relentless pursuit of

fo
wealth and all the pleasures it promises. Religious oppression produces

faithful resistance, martyrdom seeds of conversion and relativism at least
ot
still takes religion into account by declaring that all religions are equally
N
effective. The threat to Christianity now comes from the newfound faith
in the unbounded and unparalleled power of capitalism, whose sole creed
is ‘greed is good’, as the panacea for all ills, the faith that swallows up all
other faiths.
Bibliography
Keith, Charles, Catholic Vietnam: A Church from Empire to Nation (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 2012).
Vietnam 199
Launay, Marcel, and Gérard Moussay (eds), Les Missions Étrangères: Trois siècles et demi
d’histore et d’aventures en Asie (Paris: Éditions Perrin, 2008).
Nguyen, Minh Quang, Religious Issues and Government Policies in Viet Nam (Hanoi: Gioi
Publishers, 2005).
Phan, Peter C., ‘Christianity in Vietnam Today (1975–2013): Contemporary Challenges and
Opportunities’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 14:1 (2014), 3–21.
Taylor, Philip (ed.), Modernity and Re-enchantment: Religion in Post-revolutionary Vietnam
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007).
.
ly
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Indonesia
Sulistyowati Irianto
This essay explores the place of Christianity within a Muslim-majority
.
ly
nation that is characterised by vast geographical, cultural and social
on
diversity. The identity of the Christians always has to be considered in
relation to multiple identities in terms of race, ethnicity, social class and
se
gender. The Christian community forms a minority within a democratic
lu
society, but their presence recognised in the constitution. Yet today
na
freedom of religion is in jeopardy in Indonesia, and at times Christians
so
find themselves being targeted by hostile forces.
er
The Indonesian archipelago consists of more than 17,000 islands. The
rp
largest are Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua. The most
highly populated island is Java, on which the capital, Jakarta, and many
Fo
other large cities are located. The country is home to around 272 million
e.
people, equivalent to 3.5% of the global population. Indonesia’s popula-

l
tion is predominantly Muslim, and it has the largest Muslim population

sa
in the world. Christianity is Indonesia’s second-largest religion. Indonesia

re
also has the second-largest Christian population in Southeast Asia, after

or
the Philippines, as well as the largest Protestant population in the region.

n
Around 33 million Christians live in the country, constituting some 10% of

tio
the population: 7% Protestant and 3% Catholic.

bu
The population is characterised by vast diversity in race, ethnicity,

tri
religion and social class. Over the course of Indonesian history, racial,
is
ethnic and especially religious conflicts have always had the potential for
rd
escalation. However, the state ideology, known as Pancasila, the 1945 con-
fo
stitution, the national motto, ‘Bhineka Tunggal Ika’ (‘Unity in Diversity’)

and a strong civil society movement have fostered national unity.
ot
N
Christianity in Indonesia is deeply rooted in history and culture. The

faith is perceived and practised mostly in a local way, as the missionaries
introduced Christianity through local language and tradition. Christians
are found within different ethnic groups in different parts of the archi-
pelago and, for the most part, Christianity has been welcomed in the
daily life of the Indonesian people. However, at times Christians have
been subject to discrimination, usually because political interests sought
to position them as ‘other’ or ‘subaltern’ within a predominantly Muslim
nation in order to exclude them from power and resources. However,
Indonesia 201
the people who save and protect the Christians are usually their Muslim
brothers and sisters.
Christians play an important role in all aspects of national life. They
were involved in the fight for Indonesian independence and remain
involved in defending the Pancasila philosophy against radicalism and
intolerance. Christians are active as professionals in higher education,
working as professors, scientists and researchers; as military generals or
police officers; as medical doctors and other medical professionals; as en-
trepreneurs, consultants, accountants and owners of business enterprises;
.
ly
as lawyers and judges; as engineers and technicians; and as government
on
ministers and leaders in the private sector. In short, Christians play
important and significant roles in all aspects of Indonesian life.
se
lu
Unity in Diversity
na
Indonesia’s population consists of more than 300 ethnic and sub-ethnic
so
groups, with 700 to 1,000 languages and dialects. Six religions are officially
recognised: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and
er
Confucianism. In addition, hundreds of local religious minority groups
and beliefs struggle to gain recognition from the state, which they need rp
Fo
in order to have access to official registration of births, marriages and
e.
property ownership and to be seen as an equal party in a court of law.

l
Before independence, the Nusantara (archipelago) was occupied by

sa
the Dutch for around 350 years and was known as the Netherlands East
re
Indies. Christians played a full part in the struggle for independence,

or
notably through the Youth Pledge and Women’s Congress, both held
n
in 1928 with the aim of uniting as one nation, one motherland and one
tio
language. In 1945 Indonesia was proclaimed a nation by Soekarno and

bu
Mohamad Hatta, who became respectively the first president and vice-
tri
president of independent Indonesia. Aware of the imperative to unite the

is
rd
Christianity in Indonesia, 1970 and 2020

fo

ot

N
Christians 11,233,000 9.8% 33,192,000 12.2% 2.2%

Anglicans 2,000 0.0% 4,200 0.0% 1.5%
Independents 2,192,000 1.9% 6,384,000 2.3% 2.2%
Orthodox 0 0.0% 3,000 0.0% 12.1%
Protestants 6,261,000 5.5% 20,200,000 7.4% 2.4%
Catholics 2,620,000 2.3% 8,100,000 3.0% 2.3%
Evangelicals 1,715,000 1.5% 9,414,000 3.5% 3.5%
Pentecostal/Charismatics 2,179,000 1.9% 11,000,000 4.0% 3.3%
202 Sulistyowati Irianto
vast and diverse country, Soekarno launched the foundational concept,

Pancasila, which was declared as the state ideology. He was inspired by
local knowledge and philosophy, which are blended from indigenous
Indonesian, Hindu, Western Christian and Islamic traditions. Pancasila
consists of five pillars: belief in the one Supreme God, humanity, the unity
of Indonesia, democracy and social justice. Pancasila was proclaimed as
the highest Indonesian legal principle and the way of life for the Indo
nesian people.
The 1945 constitution provides for democracy and the rule of law, with
.
ly
freedom for each community to develop its own culture. It also provides
on
that the country’s rich natural resources be utilised for the welfare of the
people. Concerning religious plurality, article 28 of the constitution grants
se
freedom of religion for all Indonesian citizens. Article 27, very much
lu
related to article 28, grants equality before the law for Indonesian people.
na
At independence, the state recognised five religions – Islam, Protestant-
so
ism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Abdurrahman Wahid added
Confucianism as a sixth official religion during his presidency (1999–2001).
er
No formal recognition is given to some 200 local religions or beliefs, nor to
rp
the many different streams that are found within Islam and Christianity.
Fo
Though the constitution grants freedom of religion, other legal pro
e.
visions seem to run counter to the constitution. One of these is Blasphemy

l
Law no. 1/1965, article 1 of which prohibits the ‘deviant interpretation’ of

sa
religious teachings. This law is most often used to victimise people from
re
religious minorities, although that was never the intention of its framers.
or
The civil society movement took a case for the judicial review of this law
n
to the Constitutional Court in 2010 and again in 2018 but their cases were
tio
rejected on both occasions. Some articles of the Penal Code, inherited from
bu
colonial period, also concern blasphemy. Article 156(a) makes it an offence

tri
to deliberately, in public, express feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt

is
against religions with the purpose of preventing others from adhering to

rd
any religion and targets those who disgrace a religion. The penalty for
fo
violating this article is a maximum of five years’ imprisonment.

Normatively, Indonesia has a set of legal references, a historical founda-
ot
tion and a national ideology sufficient to recognise and respect diversity and
N
freedom of religion. These ideals and values are reflected in the Pancasila
ideology, and further formulated as legal reference in the 1945 constitu-
tion. However, legal problems remain, as some legal instruments – ranked
lower than the constitution – are not in line with the constitution.
There is always a gap between the normative system and its practices.
In this regard, the use of the politics of identity to position Christians as
‘other’ or ‘subaltern’, with the aim of excluding them from fair competition
and access to power, represents a particular concern. The 2015 presidential
Indonesia 203
election and the Jakarta gubernatorial elections in 2012 and 2017 saw a
fragmentation of society as competing political factions resorted to scape-
goating tactics in order to gain an advantage.
Protestants
Indonesian Christianity is rooted in the local cultures of many ethnic
groups. Because the ethnic groups are diverse, Indonesian Christianity
is necessarily diverse. Each church has its own history and local context.
Among the most prominent Protestant churches are the Javanese Christian
.
ly
Church, the Sundanese Christian Church, the Batak Christian Church, the
on
Eastern Indonesian Protestant Christian Church and the Western Indone-
sian Protestant Christian Church – each of the latter three having many
se
branches. Smaller churches also reflect their unique local situations.
lu
To take one example, Protestant Christian churches have been growing
na
rapidly in Batak Land. The Batak are one of the ethnic groups whose
so
identity is closely bound up with Christianity; they include the sub-
groups of Toba, Karo, Pakpak, Simalungun, Angkola and Mandailing.
er
Christianity has been planted and has grown among these various groups.
rp
Originally from Batak Land, North Sumatra, the Batak have migrated
Fo
to many regions in Indonesia. Different streams of Protestant Christian-
e.
ity are found in the Batak Land, including some who applied the names
l
of their ethnic sub-groups to their churches (huria is the Batak word for
sa
church.) The churches that have emerged among the Batak include the
re
Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP; Batak Protestant Christian Church),

or
Gereja Kristen Protestan Indonesia (Indonesian Protestant Christian),

n
Huria Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Church), Huria Kristen

tio
Indonesia Protestan (Indonesian Protestant Christian Church), Gereja

bu
Mission Batak (Mission Batak Church), Gereja Kristen Luther Indonesia

tri
(Luther Christian Indonesian Church), Gereja Punguan Kristen Batak

is
(Christian Batak Clan Church), Gereja Protestan Persekutuan Batak Karo

rd
(Protestant Batak Karo Brotherhood Church), Gereja Kristen Protestan

fo
Simalungun (Protestant Christian Simalungun Church), Gereka Kristen

Protestan Angkola (Protestant Christian Angkola) and Gereka Kristen
ot
Protestan Pakpak Dairi (Protestant Christian Pakpak Dairi Church).

N
The largest Protestant church among the Batak is the HKBP. When
Batak people settle somewhere, their presence is usually marked by the
establishment of an HKBP congregation. Counting the number of Batak
people is usually done by tracing the number of HKBP members. The first
famous HKBP church, established by migrant Bataks in Jakarta in 1926,
is Kernolong Church. At that time, this HKBP congregation, located in
Kernolong Street, was the only one in Jakarta. By 1965 the number had
increased to 20 and by 1999 to 108.
The first contact of the Toba Batak with the outside world occurred in
1881, with the arrival of the German Zending, the Christian Institute of
Barmen. Pioneering missionary Ludwig Ingwer Nommensen founded a
church in Sait Ni Nuta village in Tarutung District. German missionaries
established the first school for local people in a village, and then people
from the neighbouring villages also came. A rising awareness among the
Batak people that they needed education if they were to participate in the
emerging modern economy meant the many schools established by the
German Zending attracted high enrolments.
.
ly
Around 1900, the Toba Batak began to migrate extensively to East
on
Simalungun in search of a better life. Later they began to migrate to
Medan – today the capital of North Sumatra – and to other regions in
se
Indonesia, including Batavia (now Jakarta). During their migrations, they
lu
established many more Batak churches, mainly HKBP. Educated people
na
were urgently needed by the German Zending to manage the bureaucra-
so
cies of the church, as well as by the Dutch administration to function in
the offices of the colonial government and of staff companies. In 1926 the
er
Zending established Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs (Junior High School)
rp
in the city of Tarutung, North Tapanuli, which has since been known as the
Fo
student city. Java also developed as a leading educational centre and many
e.
able students went to Batavia to continue their education. As a result, the

l
Christian churches in Java grew in strength. The Batak are only one of the
sa
ethnic groups in Indonesia to have embraced Christianity and made it

re
integral to their identity. Similar stories could be told of many others.

or
n
Catholics
tio
The emergence of Catholicism in Indonesia can be divided into two

bu
periods, the Portuguese era and the Netherlands East India period.
tri
Catholic missions were embedded within the Portuguese colonisation of

is
Asia. Their first connection was made in the Maluku (or Molucca) Islands,
rd
where the Portuguese were searching for herbs and spices. Maluku has
fo
been well known for herbs and spices, particularly nutmeg. The Catholic
presence began in 1534 when Father Simon Vaz baptised the first convert
ot
from among the Moro people, inhabitants of Mamuya village, Halmahera,

N
in Maluku. Other baptisms followed, and soon Halmahera could claim

3,000 baptised Catholics. This early development of the Catholic Church,
however, was caught up in a conflict between Muslim forces and the
Portuguese; Vaz lost his life and the Christian community was targeted.
Eleven years later, the celebrated Jesuit missionary Francis Xavier visited
Moro, after his stay in Ambon and Ternate.
In the next century, Portuguese power was weakened as it was replaced
by the Dutch, represented by the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie
Indonesia 205
(VOC; Association of Trading Companies), established in 1602. During the

VOC period (1602–1800) Catholic missions were forbidden. The Catholic
villages were destroyed and Catholics were subject to oppression. Only in
the eastern part of Nusantara did some Catholic churches survive.
With the bankruptcy and demise of the VOC in 1800, power over the
Nusantara archipelago was assumed by the Dutch government, at that
time under the influence of France. As a result, Dutch Catholics were
allowed to come to Nusantara, particularly to serve Catholics of Dutch and
Portuguese descent in Batavia. In 1808 King Louis of Holland appointed
.
ly
Herman Willem Daendels as governor-general of the Dutch East Indies
on
(1808–11) and ordered him to apply freedom of religion to all colonised
areas. Thereafter Dutch Catholic missionaries arrived in growing numbers,
se
both to minister to Catholics of European extraction and to bring missions
lu
to the indigenous people.
na
In the twentieth century, the Dutch government introduced a policy
so
called the Politics of Ethics. The aim was to develop the indigenous
people. One of its programmes was to relocate people from Java to the
er
outer islands, in order to balance the population density throughout the
rp
archipelago. The Catholic Church became a partner of the government
Fo
in this initiative and was able to greatly extend its missionary outreach
e.
throughout the country. This growth in Catholic missions was halted

l
by the Japanese occupation of 1942–5, when many Catholic priests and

sa
leaders were arrested and charged with being Dutch spies. It was a
re
difficult period for the Catholic Church, ending only with Indonesian in-
or
dependence in 1945.
n
Prior to the Second World War, Monsignor Petrus Willekens sj was

tio
appointed Apostolic Vicar of Batavia (now Jakarta), the biggest city on

bu
Java. He was concerned about the political situation in Europe and the
tri
possibility that the Netherlands could be occupied by the Germans. He

is
therefore took the initiative to separate Central Java, where the Catholics
rd
were mostly of an indigenous background, from Batavia, where the

fo
Catholics were mostly of European descent. The Catholic Church had

been growing in Central Java, with indigenous Catholics starting to
ot
outnumber their European co-religionists. It was estimated that of the

N
60,000 Catholics in the Apostolic Vicariate of Batavia, some 40,000 were in

Central Java. Growing Catholic communities could be found in Semarang,
Yogyakarta and surrounding districts, some of them served by Javanese
priests, products of the recently established seminaries. Willekens made
the case for Central Java to become a separate province.
The vitality of Javanese Catholicism was particularly evident at St
Yoseph Bintaran Church in Jakarta. The majority of its members were
Javanese. Though the language used in the Mass was Latin, the homily
was delivered in Javanese. Many spiritual songs, prayers and other texts
from the Catholic tradition were translated into Javanese. The parochial
leader, Father Albertus Soegijapranata sj, a Javanese priest, was assisted
by a Dutch priest, Father A. de Kuijper. This demonstrated that the
church hierarchy was not based on race supremacy. The guiding phil
osophy was that the indigenous Catholic people would be better led by
an indigenous priest, who could better understand the need of the folk.
In addition, Soegijapranata was appointed as the chair of the Javanese
journal Swaratama. Because Swaratama was concerned with public matters,
.
ly
Soegijapranata became heavily involved in societal issues. At the same
on
time, he was appointed as supervisor of the Sarekat Jesuits, covering not
only Central Java and Batavia but also Flores in East Nusa Tenggara.
se
On 26 June 1940 the Apostolic Vicariate of Semarang (Central Java)
lu
was separated from that of Batavia. Then, on 1 August, the Vatican sent a
na
telegram appointing Soegijapranata Apostolic Vicar. He was consecrated
so
on 6 November, the first indigenous bishop in Java and all of Indonesia.
The development of the Catholic Church in Central Java is well illu
er
strated in the story of Monsignor Soegijapranata. Born into a Muslim
rp
family, he asked for baptism at age 13 from a Dutch priest, Father
Fo
Mertens. The priest told him to get permission from his father first, but
e.
Soegijapranata refused, instead convincing the priest that his parents

l
would accept his conversion. His parents’ reaction to his baptism surprised
sa
him, as they accepted his conversion. So did his sister and brother. Both
re
parents told him that, for a Javanese, all religions are good as long as they
or
are well practised, with the aim of becoming a good person.

n
Some years later, when he told his parents that he was eager to become
tio
a Catholic priest, his mother responded by saying, ‘The Javanese knows

bu
and is familiar with spiritual exercise. The Javanese is accustomed to be

tri
humble in life, practise fasting, control himself, practise meditation to

is
understand himself, and always to be trying to be close to God.’ In this

rd
respect, Javanese spirituality closely matches Catholic values. During his

fo
service to the Catholic people, Monsignor Soegijapranata was well known

for his slogan ‘100% Catholic and 100% Indonesian’. Indonesian Catholics
ot
often repeat this slogan today. The Javanese, who form the majority of the
N
Indonesian population, have always been known as a tolerant people. It is

common to discover that in a Javanese family the members are affiliated to
different religions.
Soegijapranata’s ministry owes its origins to the work of Franciscus
Georgius Josephus Van Lith (1863–1926), a Jesuit priest from the Nether-
lands, who paved the way for the emergence of Javanese Catholicism. He
baptised the first Javanese Catholic in Sendangsono, Muntilan, Central
Java. This place has been memorialised and is today a pilgrimage site for
Indonesia 207
Indonesian Catholics. Van Lith became well known as a priest with the
capacity to harmonise Catholic teachings with Javanese tradition. Catholi-
cism has come to be accepted by Javanese society. On his visit to Indonesia
in 1989, Pope John Paul II gave a speech in Yogyakarta in which he said,
‘Today, I am in the heart of Java Island to specifically memorise the ones
who laid a foundation for Catholic people. Those are Romo (Father) Van
Lith sj, and his two students: Monsignor Soegijapranata and I. J. Kasimo.’
Contemporary Pressures
.
ly
Despite the growth of Indonesian Christianity and the diversity hailed as a
on
social virtue, Christians can be the targets of discrimination and violence.
Most often it is political elites who activate religious sentiment as a device
se
to promote their interests. Appealing to religious prejudice is perceived
lu
to be the easiest way to win a political contest, rather than promoting
na
concepts and programmes that appeal to voters. Firing up primordial
so
sentiment is preferred to educating people politically, no matter what the
risk, including the sacrifice of national cohesion. For the sake of gaining
er
power, political elites are ready to stir up the politics of identity, differen-
rp
tiating between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and denying plurality and diversity, thus
Fo
destroying tolerance, brotherhood and sisterhood within society.
e.
In Indonesian history, those who are constructed as double or triple

l
minorities, such as Christian Chinese women, are invariably the first to

sa
be victims of identity politics. Christians, women and people of Chinese

re
ethnicity have been disproportionately represented among the victims

or
whenever large-scale riots have broken out at times of high political

n
tension. Groups perceived to be deviant sects of Islam, such as Ahmadiyya,

tio
Shia and Gafatar, and believers in traditional local religions have also been
bu
victimised on such occasions. According to a survey by the Wahid Institute

tri
in 2015, violations of freedom of religion during the year 2015 reached 190
is
events, with 249 acts – 20% higher than in 2014. The Institute also found
rd
that state actors, particularly from local government, were involved in

fo
most of the violations of religious freedom.

The worst human rights violations Christians suffer are the damaging
ot
and burning of places of worship/churches, lack of permission to construct

N
church buildings and the forced closure of churches by radical Islamic

groups. In the post-Suharto era, more than 1,000 churches have been
burned. According to CNN Indonesia, when B. J. Habibie was president
of Indonesia (1998–9), the number of cases was 162; under Wahid it was
360; under Megawati it was 160 and under Susilo Bambang Yudoyono it
was 500. Churches were burned and destroyed also under Jokowi’s ad-
ministration, with the latest being bomb explosions in three churches in
Surabaya, East Java, in 2018.
Another painful situation for Indonesian Christians is when a Christian

governor becomes a victim of the Blasphemy Law. An Indonesian court
found the Christian governor of the country’s capital, Jakarta, guilty of
blasphemy against Islam and sentenced him to two years in prison. The
case is viewed by many as an unfair trial, as judges were under pressure
from a hostile mob. The appeal of this case in the Supreme Court was
also rejected by all three judges who handled the case. This case is widely
seen as a test of religious tolerance and free speech. The governor, Basuki
Tjahaja Purnama (known as Ahok), is not the only victim: there were 88
.
ly
similar cases, with many other people being victimised in blasphemy
on
cases and sent to jail. Ahok presented a threat to many political elites when
he was in power as governor, as he had done much to revitalise Jakarta,
se
mainly by promoting public services, building infrastructure, reforming
lu
governance and combating corruption. He lost an election when identity
na
politics was deployed against him. However, he enjoys the support of
so
many moderate Muslims.
An influential factor in Indonesia’s chaotic situation is the interpreta-
er
tion of the first principle of Pancasila – Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa (belief in
rp
one God). This first principle aims to guarantee religious freedom and to
Fo
accommodate the diverse religious identities of all Indonesians. However,
e.
recent interpretation has turned this into a homogeneous doctrine of One

l
God that reflects only a majoritarian (Muslim) perspective. This interpreta-

sa
tion is deeply embedded and institutionalised not only among people on

re
the street, but also among government bureaucrats at many levels. Their
or
perception is reflected in their policies and regulations.

n
Intolerance also affects women, including through the enforcement

tio
of regional regulations that place women in the domestic domain. These

bu
mainly involve a prohibition against going out at night and an obligation

tri
to wear ‘proper’ dress, which covers women’s bodies. Komnas Perempuan

is
in 2016 identified 421 regional regulations throughout the country with

rd
discriminatory implications for women. The creep of conservatism into

fo
legal institutions and practices could be also identified from some court
processes and judicial decisions.
ot
The growth of a culture of hatred and intolerance, loudly provoked

N
by conservative groups in the name of majority religion through their

massive activism, is now a well established phenomenon in Indonesia.
State officials have played an important role in this, either by omitting to
control it or by directly participating as actors in promoting it.
Daily Life of Indonesian Christians

Some observers suggest that a sectarian spirit began to grow in Indonesia
during the Suharto era. The Suharto regime maintained its power by a
Indonesia 209
strategy of ‘divide and rule’ between ‘indigenous and non-indigenous’

(‘non-indigenous’ referring primarily to Indonesian Chinese) and ‘Muslim
and non-Muslim’ (‘non-Muslim’ referring primarily to Christians). This
policy continues to have serious consequence for Christians, even though
Suharto stepped down in 1998. It has provided a licence for Christians
to be targeted, and they have occasionally been the victims of mass riots
and bomb explosions, church closures, burning of churches and prohibi-
tion against building new churches when they are required to obtain the
agreement of village members. They do not enjoy full religious freedom.
.
ly
For example, Christians often have difficulty finding houses to rent in
on
the cities, as owners do not give permission for non-Muslims to stay on
their land. Likewise, Christian students often meet with difficulty finding
se
accommodation in a university city like Yogyakarta, simply because of
lu
their Christian identity. Christians in government service also suffer dis-
na
crimination and are often denied promotions on account of their religious
so
identity. It appears that a different standard is applied in their cases, and
their performance has to be extraordinary before they can be promoted to
er
a higher rank.
rp
However, Christians remain hopeful that society can come together to
Fo
build a better future for Indonesia. Christians maintain shared cultural
e.
values together with people from other religions, and these give a sense of
l
being fellow members of a family, village and society at large. They look
sa
for brotherhood and sisterhood with people from other religions through
re
many common activities. They share a strong sense of coming from the
or
same ancestor, family or neighbourhood. They are united by shared values

n
that teach them to respect one another. When Christians suffer, it is often
tio
Muslims who act to protect them and fight on their behalf.

bu
During the twenty-first century, Catholics have developed places of

tri
pilgrimage in many locations throughout the country. Sendangsono in

is
Central Java is prominent, but it is not the only one. Usually, such centres
rd
are located in remote areas and feature large statues of Jesus or Mother
fo
Mary set in beautiful parkland. Such is their popularity that they have a
significant beneficial impact on the economy of the surrounding districts
ot
as pilgrims require food, souvenirs and other services. Both Catholics

N
and non-Catholics benefit from the economic activity, and relations are
harmonious.
The question of the interplay between Christianity and traditional
beliefs has been a major point of interest for anthropology postgraduate
students at leading universities in Indonesia, such as the University of
Indonesia and Gadjah Mada University. Their research has focussed on
the ethnic groups in Java and elsewhere in Indonesia who have become
Christian but cannot live without their ancestral tradition. Traditional
adat rituals are observed alongside church ceremonies in marking rites

of passage, such as the birth of a child, marriage and funerals, as well as
at significant points in the agricultural cycle, such as the planting of rice
or the harvest. Christian rituals can be practised in a paddy field, on a
beach or in any other public space while, at the same time, celebration of
important events in the life cycle can be observed in the church.
Another phenomenon is the practice of syncretism, as seen for example
in Kebatinan in Java, rooted in local ancestral religions with their beliefs
about the relationship between humans and their God, humanity and
.
ly
nature, and human interrelations. They have adopted principles from the
on
Christian, Muslim and Hindu religions, blending them together in a syn-
cretistic way.
se
lu
Hope for the Future
na
The emergence of Christianity in Indonesia cannot be separated from the
so
historical and cultural context of the communities or societies. In contexts
like Batak Land in North Sumatra or Central Java, the growth of Christi
er
anity is very much integrated with local culture. As a result, Christian
rp
faith emerges and grows in a highly diverse society. The principle of unity
Fo
in diversity remains important to society as a whole, as well as to the gov-
e.
ernment as mandated by the constitution. However, sometimes conflict

l
occurs, usually triggered by the political interest of a certain group. When

sa
politicians play the religion card it is often a matter of targeting Christians,

re
as they are perceived to be a minority group.

or
Though majoritarianism and intolerance are infectious and harmful to

n
democracy and the rule of law, Indonesia has powerful forces to resist such
tio
developments and strength to survive them. The civil society movement

bu
remains a powerful force. Indonesian nationhood has been supported

tri
by powerful social movements, including the feminist movement. These

is
have been evident at every stage of Indonesian history: pre-independence,

rd
the Soekarno era, the Suharto era and the recent post-Suharto era. At the
fo
beginning of the post-Suharto era, these movements played a significant

part in formulating many legal instruments to defend human rights,
ot
including freedom of religion. They remain very active in advocacy and

N
launch critiques of the government if there is any policy or action that

endangers democracy or violates the rule of law.
Besides, brotherhood and sisterhood are deeply rooted in traditional
Indonesian culture. It is common to find that a family or extended family
consists of members from different religions. Christians join in the celebra-
tion of the Great Ramadan, while Muslims support their family member
or neighbour who is celebrating Christmas. In some regions it is common
that people work hand in hand to build places of worship, regardless of
Indonesia 211
religion. They also collaborate in maintaining one another’s daily liveli-

hoods. In this context, it is not surprising that it is often Muslims, mainly
from the moderate Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, who guard
their Christian neighbours, friends or community from attack by militant
groups. Protection of Christianity comes from the Muslim community,
within the idea of Unity in Diversity.
Bibliography
Aritonang, Jan Sihar, and Karel Steenbrink, A History of Christianity in Indonesia (Leiden:
.
Brill, 2008).
ly
Darmaputra, Eka, Pergulatan Kehadiran Kristen di Indonesia [The Struggle of the Emergence of
on
Christianity in Indonesia] (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 2001).
se
Farhadian, Charles E., Christianity, Islam and Nationalism in Indonesia (Oxford: Routledge,
2005).
lu
Steenbrink, Karel, Catholics in Independent Indonesia: 1945–2015 (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
na
van Klinken, Gerry, Minorities, Modernity and the Emerging Nation: Christians in Indonesia. A
Biographical Approach (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2013).
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Malaysia
Hwa Yung
The Malaysian church exists in a nation with a complex mix of ethnici-
.
ly
ties, languages and religions, and undergoing tremendous socio-political
on
uncertainties today. Malaya, which is now West Malaysia, gained its inde-
pendence from the British in 1957. Six years later, in 1963, Malaysia came
se
into existence with the incorporation of the two East Malaysian states of
lu
Sabah and Sarawak, together with Singapore. However, in 1965 Singapore
na
became a sovereign state of its own.
so
The population of Malaysia in 2017 was 32 million, broken down into
er
the following ethnic percentages: Bumiputras (‘sons of the soil’, a term
rp
used for Malays and other indigenous peoples) 68.8%, Chinese 23.2%,
Indians 7.0% and others 1.0%. Approximately 79% reside in West Malaysia
Fo
and 21% in Sabah and Sarawak. The last full census, in 2010, recorded
e.
the religious breakdown of the country as Islam 61.3%, Buddhism

l
19.8%, Christianity 9.2%, Hinduism 6.3% and others 3.4%. However, the
sa
distribution of Christians is very uneven. In West Malaysia, Christians

re
are a small minority of 3.1%, whereas in Sabah they are a substantial

or
minority of 26.6% and in Sarawak a plurality of 42.6%. Indeed, 72.9% of

n
all Christians are found in East Malaysia, especially among the non-Malay
tio
indigenous peoples. These non-Malay Bumiputras constitute a majority of

bu
all Christians (59.2%), with Chinese, Indians and others making up only
tri
40.8%. Such a distribution makes for very different religious and social
is
dynamics between East and West Malaysia.

rd
Islam as practised in Malaysia follows the Shafi’i version of Sunni

fo
theology and jurisprudence, with all non-Sunni sects like Shiism pro-
scribed. It was accorded a privileged position as the ‘religion of the
ot
N
Federation’ at the time of independence. Nevertheless, the constitution

simultaneously also included clear safeguards for the religious freedom
and citizenship rights of all non-Muslims. But, as shall be seen, over 60
years later this delicate balance is now in danger of being destroyed.
The Coming of Christianity

The earliest traces of Christianity in the country date back to the Nestorian
presence on the Kedah coast in the seventh century. At the end of the
fifteenth century, Christian Armenians were found in Malacca. But it
Malaysia 213
was the Portuguese conquest of Malacca in 1511 that brought Roman

Catholicism, and there remains a substantial group of Catholics of mixed
Portuguese descent in the country. Protestantism came with the Dutch
takeover of Malacca in 1641. The oldest functioning Catholic and Protes-
tant churches in the country are St Peter’s Church and Christ Church, built
in Malacca in 1710 and 1753, respectively.
The real expansion of the church began only in the late eighteenth
century. French Catholic missionaries first came in 1781, to Kedah and
Penang. The Anglican presence dates from Francis Light’s establishment
.
ly
of Penang as a British colony in 1786, although the first priest arrived
on
only in 1815. Others followed in the nineteenth century in West Malaysia,
including the Presbyterians in 1815, Christian Brethren in 1860 and
se
Methodists in 1885. In East Malaysia, James Brooke, a British soldier and
lu
adventurer, was made the White Rajah of Sarawak in 1841 and the first
na
Anglican priest arrived in 1848. Catholic missions began when Don Carlos
so
Cuarteron was sent as the Prefect Apostolic to Labuan and Borneo in 1857.
But Cuarteron’s ministry was less than successful, and a fresh start was
er
made in 1881 through the British Mill Hill Fathers. From the end of the
nineteenth century, other missions also began work in the country. rp
Fo
Christianity did not come only through Western missionaries. It also
e.
came through migrations of Christians from China and India, many of

l
whom came to meet labour needs in the developing colonies. During the
sa
British colonial era, many Tamils from India and Sri Lanka were brought
re
to West Malaysia to work in the plantations, railways and various colonial

or
administrative services. Many of these were Christians. Among Chinese

n
migrants who came in organised groups, the most notable were the
tio
Hakkas, who went to Sabah under the Basel Mission beginning in 1882,
bu
and the Methodist Foochows, who went to Sarawak in 1900 under the
tri
leadership of Wong Nai Siong. Another Methodist Foochow group came

is
rd
Christianity in Malaysia, 1970 and 2020

fo

ot

N
Christians 571,000 5.3% 2,991,000 9.1% 3.4%

Anglicans 69,600 0.6% 280,000 0.9% 2.8%
Independents 24,100 0.2% 236,000 0.7% 4.7%
Orthodox 3,700 0.0% 4,500 0.0% 0.4%
Protestants 157,000 1.5% 900,000 2.7% 3.6%
Catholics 301,000 2.8% 1,500,000 4.6% 3.3%
Evangelicals 126,000 1.2% 630,000 1.9% 3.3%
214 Hwa Yung
to Sitiawan in 1903. In the past few decades, several million legal and
illegal migrants have entered the country to meet the need for workers
in plantations, factories, the building industry and the like. These have
included many Christians from Indonesia and Myanmar.
Growth since the Second World War

The church grew from 3.0% of the population in 1947 to 9.2% in 2010. The
growth was much faster in Sabah and Sarawak than in West Malaysia but
has weakened over the last two decades. In West Malaysia, the growth
.
ly
has been steady but slow, increasing from 2.1% of the population in 1947
on
to 3.1% in 2010. In the 1950s and 1960s, increased Catholic and Protestant
missionary efforts in the New Villages and elsewhere, partly through
se
Western missionaries relocated from China after 1949, spurred much
lu
growth. Mission schools certainly helped. But in the last few decades the
na
growth has been largely in urban centres, while numbers in small towns
so
and rural areas have stagnated or declined due to urban migration.
From the 1970s onwards, the Charismatic movement has impacted the
er
church significantly. On the Catholic side, it began in 1973 with Sister Cyril,
rp
then Principal of Taiping Convent, who experienced ‘being filled with the
Fo
Spirit’ while on leave in Ireland. With the bishops’ permission, a series of
e.
conferences followed that touched many in the church. Though the impact
l
has tapered off somewhat, there remain 11 Catholic Charismatic Covenant

sa
Communities throughout the country; the largest, in Kota Kinabalu, has

re
more than 400 members. On the Protestant side, the renewal was driven by
or
visiting speakers, especially from the USA, the UK and India, and through
n
the Full Gospel Business Men’s Fellowship. Pentecostal churches, like the
tio
Assemblies of God, and independent Charismatic churches, such as the

bu
Full Gospel Assembly, grew rapidly until the late 1990s. However, for
tri
Protestants the renewal has brought mixed blessings due to the prolifera-
is
tion of prosperity teaching and a lack of accountability in some churches.

rd
Churches in West Malaysia have also made serious attempts to reach

fo
the non-Malay indigenous peoples, the Orang Asli, who live mainly in the
jungle or on its fringes. Of some 850 villages, more than 250 have been
ot
reached. In East Malaysia, the rapid growth of the church was largely the
N
result of mass conversions among the non-Malay indigenous peoples,

who were originally ethno-religionists.
In Sabah, Christians were 8.7% of the population in 1951 and continued
to grow fairly rapidly in number until the late 1960s. But Mustapha
Harun, state chief minister from 1967 to 1975, soon after coming to power
initiated an Islamisation policy that put intense pressure on the church.
All foreign missionaries were expelled in 1970 or shortly thereafter. The
Anglican Church, for example, was left with four clergy for the whole
Malaysia 215
state, an area the size of Scotland. The then Catholic bishop, Peter Chung,
although a citizen, was not permitted to reside in Sabah but had to serve
his diocese using three-month visitors’ passes. Available statistics indicate
a slackening in growth in the 1970s, but Christians still reached 27.2%
of the population in Sabah in 1980 nonetheless. However, from 1980
onwards growth effectively plateaued, with the proportion of the Sabah
population recorded as Christian being 27.8% in 2000 and then declining
to 26.6% in 2010. It has been suggested that this dramatic halt to growth
was engineered by the government in response to developments in Sabah
.
ly
politics, where a Christian-majority party was in power from 1985 to 1994.
on
Migrations of Muslims from the southern Philippines and Indonesian
Borneo were apparently encouraged so as to dilute Christian numbers in
se
the state. Despite all attempts to get to the truth of the matter, no satisfac-
lu
tory answer has ever emerged.
na
Similarly, in Sarawak all churches grew rapidly after the end of the
so
Second World War. Furthermore, the Charismatic renewal from the 1970s
onwards impacted many churches, including the Catholics. This brought
er
a new vibrancy, especially among the indigenous communities. In one
rp
Catholic church in Bintulu, for example, from 1992 to 2000 the indigenous
Fo
Iban congregation grew from 500 worshippers to 4,000 using Iban and
e.
another 1,000 using Malay every Sunday. At Christmas, that church’s

l
carolling teams visited several thousand homes over two weeks. All that
sa
the priest did was to introduce ‘Life in the Spirit’ seminars, small groups
re
for all members, compulsory catechism classes for adults and children,
or
and family life teachings.

n
Probably the most exciting story belongs to the Borneo Evangelical

tio
Church, or Sidang Injil Borneo (SIB). Australian missionaries of the Borneo

bu
Evangelical Mission (BEM) began work in 1928. A breakthrough was soon

tri
achieved among the Lun Bawang people, who had been left to die out
is
by the colonial administration because of their social problems. This was

rd
followed by a series of revivals in 1952–4, again in 1971–6, and yet again

fo
in 1984–5. In every case, the Lun Bawang people were directly involved,
although other people groups, like the Kelabits, were also included in
ot
some years. Some documented reports from the last two revivals read like
N
the apostolic accounts of signs and wonders in Acts. All these contributed
to the rapid and steady expansion of the Sarawak church from 7.9% of the
population in 1947 to 42.6% in 2010.
The Churches Today

The Catholic Church in Malaysia is divided into three archdioceses and six
dioceses, with one archdiocese and two dioceses in each of West Malaysia,
Sabah and Sarawak. About a quarter of the members are in West Malaysia,
216 Hwa Yung
with the rest distributed over Sabah and Sarawak. The three archbishops
and six bishops together constitute the Catholic Bishops’ Conference.
However, each bishop functions autonomously and is answerable directly
to Rome. There are also 30 religious orders serving in the area. In 2013, the
Vatican and Malaysia officially agreed to establish diplomatic relations.
The Apostolic Nuncio, Archbishop Joseph S. Marino, was officially
appointed on 16 January 2013.
In West Malaysia, Catholics used to be primarily Indians, Chinese
and Eurasians, but, increasingly, large numbers of Bumiputras from East
.
ly
Malaysia are now included. In Sabah and Sarawak, non-Malay Bumipu-
on
tras are the majority, followed by the Chinese. The Catholics have two
major seminaries. Pride of place must go to College General, which began
se
life in 1665 in Siam (Thailand) but moved several times before settling in
lu
Penang in 1809. It was the regional Catholic seminary for Southeast Asia
na
until 1983, but now trains only Malaysians. The other is St Peter’s College
so
in Kuching. All ordinands today attend both seminaries consecutively.
After the Catholics, the three largest churches are the Methodist, the
er
Anglican and the BEM/SIB churches. The Methodists are made up of seven
rp
conferences: the four in West Malaysia are set up along linguistic lines,
Fo
Chinese, English, Tamil and Sengoi (Orang Asli); the two in Sarawak are
e.
Chinese- and Iban-speaking; and the seventh is in Sabah. Their churches

l
are largely located in the urban areas and small towns, except for the Iban
sa
and Sengoi churches, which are predominantly rural.

re
The Anglicans have three dioceses in West Malaysia, Sabah and

or
Sarawak. Together with Singapore, they form the Province of South East
n
Asia. Numerically, the Anglicans are strongest in Sarawak, followed by

tio
Sabah, and are largely rural in both. Generally speaking, Sarawak tends to
bu
be more high church, and West Malaysia and Sabah low church.
tri
There are three autonomous BEM/SIB churches that work closely

is
together in Sabah, Sarawak and West Malaysia. Their members are largely
rd
indigenous Bumiputras from Sabah and Sarawak, but there is a substan-

fo
tial Chinese presence in the urban centres. They are much stronger in East
Malaysia and largely rural, although many of their members are now
ot
urbanised. In West Malaysia, they are found mainly in cities where their
N
members have migrated for jobs.

Of the others, the Seventh-day Adventists are found largely in Sabah
and Sarawak, while the Basel Christian Church (Lutheran) is primarily
in Sabah. The Assemblies of God are much stronger in West Malaysia,
where they have some large urban churches, each with several thousand
members. Except for the Protestant Church of Sabah (Lutheran), which
is rural-based, the rest of the smaller denominations and independent
churches are largely urban. The latter include better-known groups such as
Malaysia 217
Baptists, Presbyterians and Christian Brethren, as well as others of Asian

origins, like the historic Syrian Orthodox Church and Mar Thoma Church
from India and the True Jesus Church and Assembly Hall Churches
(Watchman Nee) from China.
In general, all churches are short of workers. For example, the BEM/SIB
in Sarawak has more than 700 churches but little more than 400 pastors.
Many local theological schools have been established to meet the training
needs of the churches. About 10 of these are accredited to offer up to the
master’s degree, with three offering doctoral studies and a host of others
.
ly
offering various lower-level programmes. The two oldest seminaries are
on
the Malaysia Baptist Theological Seminary in Penang and the Methodist
Theological School in Sibu, both founded in 1954. Other more-established
se
ones include the Bible College of Malaysia in Petaling Jaya, Sabah Theo-
lu
logical College in Ranau, Malaysia Evangelical College in both Lawas
na
and Miri, Malaysia Bible Seminary near Rawang, Malaysia Theological
so
Seminary in Seremban and Sabah Theological Seminary in Kota Kinabalu,
the last three run ecumenically.
er
Most churches in the country are linked organisationally. The Catholic
rp
Church is overseen by the Catholic Bishops’ Conference (CBC). Non-
Fo
Catholics are affiliated with the Council of Churches of Malaysia (CCM) or
e.
the National Evangelical Christian Fellowship (NECF). The older denomi-

l
nations, including Anglicans, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, the

sa
Syrian Orthodox Church, the Mar Thoma Church and the Salvation Army,
re
all come under CCM. The Pentecostal Charismatic and overtly Evangelical
or
groups, including the Assemblies of God and BEM/SIB churches, mostly

n
affiliate with NECF, although some churches are with neither.

tio
Presently, the heads of the CBC, CCM and NECF are respectively the
bu
Catholic Archbishop Julian Leow of Kuala Lumpur, the Methodist Bishop

tri
Ong Hwai Teik, and independent church pastor the Reverend Eu Hong
is
Seng. In order to relate to the government with a united Christian voice,

rd
the Christian Federation of Malaysia (CFM) was formed in 1985, with all
fo
three groups as equal partners. The CFM chair is rotated among them and
is currently held by Archbishop Julian Leow. The CFM is also a member of
ot
the Malaysian Consultative Council on Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism,

N
Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST), which serves as the public voice of all
non-Muslim religious communities in the country.
Given the distinctive needs of East Malaysia, the Sabah Council of
Churches (SCC) and the Association of Churches in Sarawak (ACS) were
formed to bring together and represent the majority of the churches in the
respective states. However, recently the Sarawak Association of Evangeli-
cal Churches was formed because many churches in the state, but outside
the ACS, felt that their concerns were not represented.
218 Hwa Yung
Overall, these structures have worked well to strengthen fraternal

relations within and beyond the church. However, at the denominational
level, churches tend to run their own programmes separately. Neverthe-
less, at the ground level there is plenty of grassroots ecumenism at work.
Examples of this include inter-denominational student outreaches, joint
representation by mission school authorities to the government, Christmas
city parades in East Malaysia and inter-denominational prayer networks.
Identity, Theology and Social Engagement
.
ly
Malaysian Christianity has some distinctive characteristics. The first is
on
its multilingual and multi-ethnic complexities. To begin with, both the
Chinese and Indian congregations were originally migrant churches.
se
Sometimes these find their primary Christian identity in race and
lu
language, whether Chinese or Tamil, rather than in their denominational
na
distinctions. This is particularly true with Chinese-speaking churches that
so
have strong links with similar churches around the world. On the other
hand, many urban churches are English-speaking and rather Western-
er
oriented in ethos and practice. In some of these may be found the latest
rp
Western worship fashions and theological trends.
Fo
Furthermore, in West Malaysia there are 19 indigenous Orang Asli
e.
groups. In East Malaysia there are between 50 and 100 different tribal
l
groups and languages, depending on how these are classified. Many

sa
churches among the indigenous peoples use Malay, the national language.
re
But others prefer to worship in their mother tongue, such as the Ibans
or
in Sarawak and the Kadazans and Rungus in Sabah. In urban churches,

n
especially those in West Malaysia, Chinese, English and Tamil are also
tio
widely used. Thus, many churches regularly run separate services in two
bu
or more languages. All these combine to make the quest for a common
tri
Malaysian Christian identity rather elusive.

is
A second distinction concerns theological orientation. For Catholics,

rd
the Second Vatican Council certainly brought fresh challenges, particu-

fo
larly the call for Aggiornamento or renewal. In West Malaysia, for example,
the whole church experimented with a ‘priestless month’ in August
ot
1976, with all bishops and priests going on retreat for a whole month.
N
Aggiornamento also led to a call for the formation of Christ-centred Basic

Ecclesial Communities throughout the church, an increased role for the
laity, a greater openness to other Christians and peoples of other faiths,
as well as a strong commitment to justice issues, among other things. This
also coincided with the coming of the Charismatic renewal in the church,
and thus reinforced it. Despite more radical external influences like Latin
American liberation theology, the church has remained essentially theo-
logically mainstream.
Malaysia 219
On the Protestant side, things were less sedate. The years after the
Second World War saw the heyday of liberal theology in the West, with all
mainline denominations influenced by missionaries of that mindset. On
the other hand, there were also Christian leaders, schooled in the earlier
fundamentalism, who were both anti-intellectual in temper and dis
couraging of anything that smacked of the Social Gospel. Yet today, by and
large, the leadership in mainline denominations is firmly Evangelical in
theology. Similarly, those in the Evangelical and Pentecostal Charismatic
churches, with some exceptions, are increasingly open to Christian socio-
.
ly
political engagement. Credit for the shift away from the liberal theological
on
influence in the 1950s and 1960s must go to Evangelical mission societies
such as OMF International and the Church Missionary Society, as well as
se
to the student movements, including Scripture Union, Campus Crusade
lu
and the International Fellowship of Evangelical Students. The Lausanne
na
Movement also helped steer Evangelicals away from their earlier neglect
so
of social engagement. Moreover, over the past few decades, Christians
have had to wrestle increasingly with national issues such as poor govern
er
ance, corruption and restrictions on religious freedom, thus becoming
much more socially conscious in the process. rp
Fo
The other major theological issue was the Pentecostal Charismatic
e.
renewal. Many in the church had some prior experience with deliverance
l
and healing ministries. But when the renewal first came, in the 1970s, with
sa
its overwhelming emphasis on the baptism of the Holy Spirit and tongues,
re
it was met with resistance from large segments of the church. That phase
or
is now largely over. Although there remains a minority holding on to

n
anti-supernatural or cessationist teachings, most churches display varying

tio
degrees of openness to the renewing work of the Holy Spirit. Within

bu
the Protestant churches, the bigger problem is that many are caught up
tri
with the Prosperity Gospel on the one hand and a preoccupation with
is
the miracu lous without proper biblical and theological grounding on

rd
the other. These, coupled with strong personalities in leadership and

fo
weak accountability structures, have spawned multitudes of independ-

ent churches around the country. At the same time, few with genuinely
ot
powerful gifts of healing, prophecy and godly leadership have emerged.

N
The third distinctive characteristic of Malaysian Christianity concerns

the question of social engagement and nation-building. The churches’
record here is rather uneven. In some areas like mission schools, it
was brilliant. There are still 448 mission schools in the country. All or
most existed at the time of independence, when few good schools were
available, with students welcomed irrespective of race or religion. In some
of these, very high standards were attained. For example, from the 1950s to
the 1970s the four best mission schools in Penang regularly sent students
220 Hwa Yung
on scholarships to leading US universities like Harvard, Yale, MIT and

Wellesley College. But by the late 1960s the schools had been absorbed
into the government school system, with churches no longer allowed
control. Educational standards have since declined. Recently, the churches
have begun asking the government to return some of the schools in order
to run them privately.
The churches are also strong on social ministries. Earlier, various
mission hospitals and clinics were established, but most of these have
been closed with the introduction of a national health service. The few
.
ly
remaining hospitals, including Adventist in Penang and Assunta in
on
Petaling Jaya, are now completely commercialised. Catholics also have
various social service ministries under the diocesan human development
se
offices or commissions, Catholic Welfare Services and Society of St Vincent
lu
de Paul. They also run senior citizen homes, Montfort training centres for
na
youths, children’s hostels and the like. Other denominations also have
so
significant social outreach programmes, such as the St Nicolas Home for
the Blind, Salvation Army homes and Malaysian Care. Various churches
er
operate some 40 drug rehabilitation centres, which have high success rates.
rp
The churches’ attitude towards social advocacy and political involve-
Fo
ment has been rather more ambiguous. There have been and still are both
e.
Catholics and Protestants who have risen to high political office. But it is
l
uncertain whether they have been able to bring into their politics a clear
sa
Christian social vision. However, there are exceptions. One notable figure
re
was the late Tan Chee Khoon, who was the parliamentary opposition leader
or
from 1964 to 1978 and later was honoured by the government for that role.
n
Moreover, in recent years there have been changes, with many younger
tio
Christians with firmer Christian convictions moving into electoral politics.

bu
A good example is Baru Bian, a one-time opposition leader in Sarawak but

tri
now a minister in the federal cabinet, who has been noted for fighting land
is
rights cases for the rural poor. Christians are also increasingly involved
rd
in social advocacy. One outstanding example is the late Irene Fernandez,

fo
who founded Tenaganita, an organisation dedicated to helping and

‘protecting migrants, refugees, women and children from exploitation,
ot
discrimination, slavery and human trafficking’. In 1995, she courageously

N
wrote a piece exposing the mistreatment and abuse of migrants in govern-

ment detention centres. For that, she was charged by the authorities with
spreading false news and shamefully dragged through the courts for 13
years before being finally acquitted.
Living in an Islamic Milieu

The greatest challenge to the Malaysian church today is that of living
within a Muslim-majority society. The worldwide resurgence of Islam
Malaysia 221
in the last 50 years has led to an Islamisation agenda that increasingly

denies public space and religious freedom to both Muslims and non-
Muslims in the country. What happened in Sabah from 1967 to 1975
intensified throughout the nation from the late 1970s. First, it came by way
of inconveniences like difficulties in getting land for non-Muslim religious
buildings and burial grounds, or visa restrictions on non-Muslim religious
workers. But soon more restrictive measures followed that caused non-
Muslims to feel increasingly a deep sense of injustice and marginalisation.
These feelings were partially expressed in a strong protest note, dated 6
.
ly
August 2007, sent to the Parliamentary Select Committee on National
on
Unity by the MCCBCHST, representing all non-Muslim communities. It
drew attention to
se
lu
the personal tragedies of ordinary Malaysians suffering anguish as a result, in
na
one way or another, of the misuse of religion, e.g. persons who are treated as
so
‘Muslims’ against their will, some who are being detained for ‘rehabilitation’
merely because they want the government to recognise their choice of religion
er
and women (and men) who are faced with the loss of their children merely
rp
because of the religious conversion by their spouses . . . The rule of law appears
Fo
to be set aside in Malaysia. Our Courts seem powerless to protect non-Muslim
rights as we saw in the still unresolved cases of Everest Moorthy, Shamala and
e.
now recently Subashini. In Terengganu, the State authorities demolished the

l
sa
Sky Kingdom even though there was a Court order telling them to hold on.
re
Islamic authorities continue to convert non-Muslim students in institutions of

higher learning. Prison authorities allow prisoners to be converted to Islam
or
despite prohibitions in the Lock Up Rules against this. Under-aged children

n
still disappear, leaving their parents distraught, only to emerge days after
tio
their 18th birthday converted to Islam. Local authorities all over the country
bu
continue to act with disregard for the sensitivities of non-Muslims in dealing

tri
with their places of worship.

is
rd
The focus of concern was the increasing marginalisation in the name of

Islamisation of the rule of law and constitutional safeguards of citizenship
fo
rights.
ot
How did the country get itself into this legal mess? Article 11 of the
N
constitution states that ‘Every person has the right to profess and practice
his religion’. Further, article 8 affirms the equality of all before the law and
prohibits any legal discrimination based on religion, race or descent. These
were the constitutional safeguards enshrined at the time of independence
from Britain in 1957. Although Islam was given a privileged position as
the ‘religion of the Federation’ (article 4), all the literature of the period
clearly affirmed that the state is secular and the constitution supreme. But
in 1988 a constitutional amendment of article 121 created a fundamental
222 Hwa Yung
change by stating that civil courts ‘shall have no jurisdiction in respect of

any matter within the jurisdiction of the [sharia] courts’, without clearly
demarcating the boundary between the two. This not only elevated the
sharia courts into a parallel system of equal standing with the civil courts
but also allows the former to trump the latter by ignoring their rulings
whenever conflicting judgements arise. The agenda to subsume civil law
under the sharia was slowly but surely being advanced.
On the other hand, the government is worried by another concern,
that of Muslims leaving their faith. Despite contrary arguments, most
.
ly
conservative Muslims take the view that there should be no apostasy
on
in Islam. In Malaysia, this was the implicit view taken at the Treaty of
Pangkor, signed in 1874 between the Perak Sultan and the British colonial
se
government. It gave the British power to administer the state in all matters
lu
except those ‘touching Malay Religion and Custom’. This suited the
na
British nicely because they were primarily concerned with their political
so
and economic interests, and not religion. This became the model for all
subsequent dealings of the British with other Malay rulers. Consequently,
er
the British discouraged, though they did not forbid, all missionary efforts
rp
to the Malays. This also explains why, although the constitution provides
Fo
for freedom of religion, most states have laws that severely penalise con-
e.
version out of Islam and any such efforts directed at Muslims.

l
In recent years, other restrictions have been directed at the church, in

sa
particular through executive fiat. In 1981, the government banned the

re
production and public circulation of the Malay Bible, on the grounds that
or
it is ‘prejudicial to the national interest and security’, although a year later

n
this was relaxed, with Christians and the church specifically exempted
tio
from the ruling. In 1986, Christians were told that they are not permitted
bu
to use certain words in the Malay language, to avoid confusing Muslims

tri
about their faith. This applies especially to the word ‘Allah’, which had
is
been used for ‘God’ in Arabic centuries before the advent of Islam. Not-
rd
withstanding that this has become almost a joke among other Muslims
fo
worldwide, the government continues to enforce the ban. To outsiders

these rulings seem strange and irrational to say the least, especially
ot
when the Malay Bible can be downloaded in minutes from the internet
N
nowadays. But underlying these rulings is the great fear that the Malays,
who are Muslims by definition in the constitution, will change their
religious affiliation and thereby undermine their community’s political
power in the country.
This is the situation in which the churches find themselves today.
How are they to respond? To begin with, Christians are clearly concerned
about the restriction of religious freedom for non-Muslims in the country.
Historic ally, every church that has lived under majority Islamic rule
Malaysia 223
has wilted, and many have died – a trend repeated in the fate of many
Christian communities throughout the Middle East and North Africa
today. The only reversals were those that came through military or
colonial interventions, clearly not options for the Malaysian church today.
It should be noted that many Muslims in the country are also not happy
with the way that Islamisation is moving. They do not subscribe to the
ultra-conservative and bureaucratic versions of Islam driving the present
agenda. How this will pan out is far from clear.
Secondly, because of the fear of conversion, certain groups have in-
.
ly
creasingly attacked the church with charges of trying to ‘Christianise’ the
on
country. Moreover, over the past three decades, the governing coalition,
previously in power but now in opposition since the 2018 general election,
se
often played the religious card to garner votes in elections. It is true that
lu
some Muslims have attempted to exit Islam for other faiths. But most
na
Christians are not involved in evangelising Muslims, if only because they
so
are intimidated by the law. Yet charges of ‘Christianisation’ persist, with
one state mufti claiming in 2006 that there is a group of 100,000 Muslim
er
converts led by a woman religious teacher, though no evidence was
rp
produced. Nevertheless, these two issues have left many Christians rather
Fo
anxious about their future in Malaysia. One unfortunate consequence
e.
is that large numbers of Christians, including many in leadership, have

l
chosen to emigrate.
sa
re
The Church at a Crossroads

or
To sum up, the Malaysian church is alive and well, despite being deeply
n
troubled by the challenges it faces. There are many positives. Over the
tio
past century, it has come a long way and now even sends 500 or more
bu
long-term missionaries abroad. Despite the external pressures, there is

tri
much inner vitality and sustained growth. Despite natural fissiparous ten-
is
dencies within, serious efforts are being made to enhance Christian unity
rd
at different levels. Despite the manifest weaknesses of the church, we see

fo
new life birthed everywhere through renewed spiritual life and prayer.
But doubts persist about its future. Given the continuing pressure of Is-
ot
lamisation, what future does the church have in Malaysia? Will it weaken
N
and die a slow death like many others under Islam in history? Or will it be
revitalised and become a powerful source of blessing to the nation and all
its peoples?
Bibliography
Chew, Maureen K. C., The Journey of the Catholic Church in Malaysia, 1511–1996 (Kuala
Lumpur: Catholic Research Centre, 2000).
International Panel of Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion or Belief, ‘Country Briefing
224 Hwa Yung
on Freedom of Religion or Belief in the Universal Periodic Review Process – Malaysia’, 8

October 2017, at <http://ippforb.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/FORB-Malaysia.pdf>
(accessed 6 December 2017).
Rowan, Peter, Proclaiming the Peacemaker: The Malaysian Church as an Agent of Reconciliation
in a Multicultural Society (Oxford: Regnum, 2012).
Roxborogh, John, A History of Christianity in Malaysia (Singapore: Armour, 2014).
Tan, Jin Huat, Planting an Indigenous Church: The Case of the Borneo Evangelical Mission
(Oxford: Regnum, 2011).
.
ly
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Singapore
Violet James
Singapore is a small island at the tip of West Malaysia, surrounded by
.
ly
larger islands of Indonesia and the Philippines. It has four main ethnic
on
groups – Chinese, Malay, Indian and ‘other’ (CMIO); four official
languages – Bahasa Melayu (the national language), English (the working
se
language), Chinese and Tamil; and four main religions – Buddhism (and
lu
Chinese religions), Islam, Christianity and Hinduism. Chinese comprise
na
77% of the population, Malays 14%, Indians 7.6% and others 1.4%.
so
The coming of the Roman Catholic and Protestant missions coincided
er
with the arrival of Sir Stamford Raffles and the beginning of British
rp
colonialism. Singapore at the time was only a fishing village with a few
hundred indigenous Malay families who exercised loose control over the
Fo
island. Very soon, Chinese and Indian migrants began to enter the island
e.
to find their fortunes and then return to their homelands. Eventually,

l
many remained and became a vital part of the political, economic and
sa
social fabric of the community. Today, the Chinese provide the economic
re
backbone of the country.

or
How did this small, obscure island become a major hub of Christi-
n
anity? Why was it that the late Billy Graham, who visited Singapore in
tio
1978, referred to its church as the ‘Antioch of Asia’? He was comparing

bu
Singapore today to the first-century church in Antioch (Acts 11: 19–21).

tri
That city was strategically located and was a political and economic hub
is
for Asia. The city and the church were multiracial and multicultural, exer-
rd
cising wide international influence.

fo
It was the foresight of Raffles, who saw Singapore’s potential, and

the colonisation of the British that transformed the fishing village into
ot
N
a modern city with a free port. Unlike other colonial officials, Raffles
allowed missionaries to enter and propagate the Christian faith. His vision
was realised when, within two centuries, not only has this island become
a thriving cosmopolitan, global city but also Christianity has become the
fastest-growing religion.
The early forms of Christianity were transplanted from Britain. Western
denominations like the Anglican, Methodist, Brethren and Presbyterian
churches came in the nineteenth century. The Baptists, Lutherans, Assem-
blies of God, Church of Christ, Bible-Presbyterian Church and Salvation
226 Violet James
Army entered Singapore in the twentieth century. The traditional churches

associated with missionaries have metamorphosed into something quite
different in recent decades. While the former denominations are growing,
the phenomenal growth in the twenty-first century is seen in the rise of
independent mega-churches.
People, Events and Trends

One of the most significant persons involved in shaping Singapore and
unifying the indigenous Malay together with the Chinese and Indian
.
ly
migrants was the founding father and first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew.
on
He was a great visionary and pragmatic leader. With a team of talented
leaders, Lee united the three main ethnic groups and laid the foundation
se
for the nation’s political and economic infrastructure. Singapore was
lu
granted self-governance by the British in 1959 and joined the Federation
na
of Malaysia in 1963. But the many disagreements between Singapore and
so
the federal government, and the fear that the Chinese community might
dominate the scene if the merger were continued, led the Malaysian
er
prime minister, Tungku Abdul Rahman, to expel Singapore from the Fed-
eration in 1965. Lee was devastated. How could this tiny island survive rp
Fo
without any natural resources? However, by 1966 Lee believed Singapore
e.
would survive, and he was able to successfully build a nation of diverse

l
cultures, religions and languages. He governed Singapore for more than

sa
30 years. Even at his death in 2015 he continued to unite Singaporeans,

re
as thousands of Chinese, Malay, Indian and other nationalities grieved

or
his loss, out of love and respect for this stalwart ‘Father of Singapore’.
n
His son, Lee Hsien Loong, assumed the office of prime minister in 2004,
tio
and continues in his father’s footsteps by leading with a sense of clarity,

bu
mission and purpose.

tri
is
rd
Christianity in Singapore, 1970 and 2020

fo

ot

N
Christians 162,000 7.8% 1,205,000 20.3% 4.1%

Anglicans 10,000 0.5% 70,000 1.2% 4.0%
Independents 14,800 0.7% 200,000 3.4% 5.3%
Orthodox 800 0.0% 2,700 0.0% 2.5%
Protestants 35,200 1.7% 180,000 3.0% 3.3%
Catholics 80,000 3.9% 270,000 4.5% 2.5%
Evangelicals 31,100 1.5% 250,000 4.2% 4.3%
Singapore 227
Church life in Singapore has also featured outstanding leaders. Some

of the most influential leaders today are pastors from the mega-churches,
like Joseph Prince of New Creation, Lawrence Khong of Faith Community
Baptist Church (FCBC) and Kong Hee of City Harvest. From the tradi-
tional denominations Bishop Emeritus Robert Solomon of the Methodist
Church and the Reverend Edmund Chan from Covenant Evangelical Free
Church (CEFC) are greatly respected.
In 1983 Joseph Prince started New Creation with only a handful of
young people. This has grown to over 30,000 and is currently the largest
.
ly
church in Singapore. His famous message on the ‘non-judgemental gospel
on
of grace’ and on ‘God’s blessings poured out on all believers’ has spread
globally, through books and a television programme aired in 150 nations.
se
Lawrence Khong started FCBC in 1986, as a splinter from Grace Baptist
lu
Church. Today this church has around 10,000 members. Khong became
na
the trailblazer as he introduced entertainment into Christian ministry in
so
order to transform communities throughout Asia. He himself is an illu-
sionist. He uses magic, music, drama and dance to share the gospel with
er
non-English-speaking heart-landers, who formerly had rejected Christi
anity as a Western religion. rp
Fo
In 1989, Kong Hee started City Harvest with 20 young people. By 2007
e.
it numbered 17,000 and it reached 30,000 in 2010. Kong might have learned
l
the secret of church growth from the Reverend Cho Yonggi, the founder of
sa
the world’s biggest church (in South Korea), as the latter mentored Kong
re
at the start of his pastoral ministry.

or
Christian leaders attribute the significant growth of these churches to

n
membership transfer from other churches rather than to first-time conver-

tio
sions. However, these charismatic pastors have denied such allegations,

bu
affirming that many of the young people who have come to their churches
tri
are first-timers who were baptised in their premises.

is
Mega-churches have several similarities. Their leaders are young,

rd
with a charismatic-style of leadership, bold in venturing into initiatives

fo
such as the performing arts and entertainment industry. Their members

are young, often under 30 years. Many of them are from less privileged,
ot
non-English-speaking families who live in public housing managed by the

N
government at reduced cost. This is in marked contrast to members from

the Anglican and Methodist churches, who are English-speaking, from
the middle and upper classes, and live primarily on landed property or
in condominiums. Worship services in the mega-churches are designed
like rock concerts, with state-of-the-art acoustics and lighting, attractive
back-up singers and skilled musicians, all of which appeal to the younger
generation, especially those who are not churched. The theology of these
churches seems to orientate towards a ‘prosperity’ gospel that resonates
228 Violet James
with the working class and the lower-income groups, many of whom are
ambitious to climb the social and economic ladder.
A vital part of their mission is community service. FCBC started Touch
Community Service in 1992 and has more than 17 centres that offer a wide
spectrum of social services, encompassing children to senior adults. New
Creation raised S$2 million to build a kidney dialysis centre to demonstrate
God’s love to the less fortunate in Singapore. City Harvest distributes S$2
million every year to more than 4,000 needy people through its community
services.
.
ly
As noted above, two other significant voices from the Evangelical
on
denominations are the Edmund Chan and Robert Solomon. The name
Edmund Chan is almost synonymous with ‘disciple-making churches’.
se
As a pastor of CEFC, Chan has invested his entire life in making CEFC
lu
a model for disciple-making and also empowering other churches to do
na
the same. In 2001 he launched the Intentional Disciple-making Church
so
(IDMC) Conference and in 2008 he launched the Global Alliance of Inten-
tional Disciple-making Churches. The former is an annual event at CEFC,
er
and over the years it has drawn thousands of pastors and leaders from
rp
hundreds of churches and delegates from more than 20 countries. Chan
Fo
defines intentional disciple-making as ‘the process of bringing people
e.
into a right relationship with God and developing them to full maturity
l
in Christ through intentional growth strategies that they might multiply

sa
the process in others also’. Solomon was principal of Trinity Theological

re
College, bishop of the Methodist Church for three terms from 2000–12 and
or
president of the National Council of Churches of Singapore. Both these

n
men are popular conference speakers, emphasising the need for disciple-
tio
ship in the marketplace as well as in the church.

bu
LoveSingapore first started as a prayer meeting in 1995, through the

tri
initiative of Lawrence Khong of FCBC. The goal was to unite the Protestant
is
churches in order to serve the community and to proclaim the gospel to

rd
the unreached. At one such prayer summit, Khong publicly confessed

fo
his own sins and sought reconciliation with the pastors who were in at-
tendance. He also desired God’s peace and reconciliation for his fellow
ot
pastors and church leaders who were present. From 90 leaders in 1996,
N
the numbers grew to almost 700 leaders from more than 100 churches and
37 organisations. In 2015, Singapore celebrated its golden jubilee. Under
the leadership of LoveSingapore, a Global Day of Prayer was organised,
where 50,000 Christians from various denominations gathered to give
thanks to God for Singapore. The guest of honour was the prime minister,
Lee Hsien Loong, who thanked the Protestant Church for its contribution
to ‘nation building’ through education and ‘building trust and mutual
confidence with other religious groups’ to establish harmony and mutual
Singapore 229
respect. The audience sang the Aaronic Blessing (Numbers 6: 22–3), and
the prime minister was deeply moved.
During the same period, the Roman Catholic Church, under the leader-
ship of the Archbishop of Singapore, William Goh, together with 10,000
communicants, invited prime minister Lee to attend a thanksgiving Mass
as part of the golden jubilee celebration. Lee praised and appreciated the
Church for serving society and strengthening racial and religious harmony
by ‘living your faith through your deeds’.
.
ly
Christianity, Politics and Religious Harmony
on
Christianity grew rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s. From 10.1% of the
population in 1980 to 12.5% in 1990, the number of Christians increased as
se
a result of intentional and proactive evangelism by the churches. In 2015,
lu
as the number of Christians grew to 18.8%, the percentage of Buddhists
na
dropped from 42.5% in 2000 to 31.1% in 2015, and that of Muslims dropped
so
from 14.9% to 14.0% in the same period.
In order to keep the peace among the ethnic and religious groups,
er
the government made it clear that it will take serious measures against
rp
any one race that is subversive or intolerant of other religions and races.
Fo
Evangelism of the unreached has been challenged by laws that have been
e.
passed to keep religious harmony among the different ethnic groups.

l
Despite the many challenges, the church has grown significantly over the
sa
last 50 years. Besides this aggressive evangelisation in the 1980s, the fear of
re
resentment among other religions and the presence of some social activism
or
forced the government to take stronger measures to prevent possible racial

n
and religious conflicts. In 1987, several leaders, including the then prime
tio
minister, Lee Kuan Yew, warned the people not to use their religion as a
bu
platform for political gains. Lee ‘condemned insensitive evangelisation’ as

tri
threats to racial harmony and even threatened ‘detention without trial for
is
religious extremists’. That same year, Roman Catholic social activists were
rd
accused and detained for using the church as a cover for alleged ‘Marxist’
fo
activities. These fears and concerns resulted in a White Paper on Religious

Harmony in 1990, which birthed the Maintenance of Religious Harmony
ot
Act (MRHA) in 1992. After 25 years, the government continues to affirm

N
the MRHA as the means of maintaining religious harmony among all the
races and religions in order that no one race or religion exploit another.
The government intends to use the MRHA to keep in check any apparent
subversive tendencies. In 2017, two foreign Christian preachers were
banned from entering Singapore because of comments made about other
religions that were ‘denigrating and inflammatory’. The MRHA aims to
keep the state and church separate, based on the assumption that politics
and religion do not mix.
230 Violet James
Evangelism, Spirituality and Other Faiths

Christianity has flourished in postcolonial Singapore, with conversions
primarily among young, affluent and English-educated Singaporean
Chinese, as well as a small proportion of Indians. Between 1980 and 2000,
the Christian proportion of the population increased by 2.5 percentage
points, and in 2010 Christianity became the fastest-growing religion.
These conversions were mainly among the affluent, university graduates
and professionals. This profile changed with the emergence of the mega-
churches, generally attended by younger people from the lower to middle
.
ly
classes, who spoke English and already identified themselves as Christians.
on
Did the ‘prosperity’ message have anything to do with this increase? One
mega-church member teaches that ‘the more you give, the more you will
se
get’. Such teaching resonates with the ‘millennials’ who view investments
lu
in the marketplace in the same way as investing in God’s kingdom.
na
Many of the contemporary converts come from Chinese ancestor-
so
worship and animistic backgrounds (‘Shenists’). Their understanding
er
of spirituality is often mixed with their former worldviews. The idea of
rp
prosperity is evidenced in the Chinese religious worldview, which is
‘this-worldly’. Prosperity, longevity and good health are what Chinese
Fo
religious practitioners embrace. The right kind of food, proper breathing
e.
and exercise, the balance of the yin–yang idea, indeed everything in life
l
is somehow linked to the external force. This external force or ‘chi’ must
sa
be harnessed and brought into alignment with one’s own chi in order to
re
establish good health, prosperity and harmony. Everything one lives for
or
is found in this life, and one considers the afterlife only when death is
n
imminent. The concept of eternity is alien to their worldview, as what is

tio
truly important is the here and now. Physical exercise, diet and whatever
bu
prolongs one’s life must be embraced. A faith that promotes prosperity,

tri
long life, good health, happiness and the absence of suffering is very at-
is
tractive. As the younger generation find the ‘prosperity’ gospel appealing,

rd
another interesting phenomenon is the conversion of elderly Chinese

fo
parents and grandparents of first- or second-generation Christians during

times of crisis such as sickness and terminal illness. Such conversions
ot
have occurred on their deathbeds because of hope in miracles or greater

N
awareness of their own mortality.

A number of people from Hindu backgrounds have been baptised into
the Christian faith. Yet many of these converts merely add Christianity
to their inherited Hindu beliefs, resulting in a kind of syncretistic belief
and practice. There are many Hindus who in desperation might pray to
Jesus because they know that the name of Jesus is powerful. Yet they will
remain Hindus because they cannot denounce their deities. The Hindus
are tolerant of all religions until they are forced to give exclusive allegiance
Singapore 231
to Christ. These Hindus, while rejecting the Christian faith, are comfort-
able in attending Roman Catholic services, where they can retain elements
of their Hindu faith and still enjoy the benefits that the church promises to
its worshippers. The Church of Saint Alphonsus, better known as Novena
Church, attracts Hindus, Buddhists and others.
A more recent phenomenon is the number of people who claim to have
no religion and some who profess to be humanists. In the 2010 census,
17% declared that they had no religion. Five years later, that proportion
had increased to 18.5%. Sixty-five per cent of those with no religion are
.
ly
aged 15–44, and many of them believe that reason alone is sufficient to
on
determine right from wrong. In July 2011, the local paper, the Straits
Times, featured an article in which several Singaporeans of various ages
se
shared their humanistic approach to life. In 2008 the Humanist Society was
lu
founded with 10 members. By 2010, there were 100 registered members.
na
The Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims are becoming more intentional in
so
making their faith attractive to young people. The Buddhists have started
their own rock band. They also chant Pali scriptures in modern rap style.
er
The Muslims have interactive sessions of Islamic classes in English to boost
rp
Quranic literacy skills, build character and foster love for God. The Hindu
Fo
youth have Saturday workshops and ‘Sunday schools’ in the temples.
e.
Many Evangelical pastors are equally concerned that despite the growth
l
of the church, many of their members are not rooted in the fundamentals
sa
of the Christian faith. These pastors are making genuine efforts to disciple
re
their congregations as they impart biblical theology, teach the cost of

or
discipleship and show them how to live this earthly life with eternal per-
n
spectives. Many of these pastors and ministry leaders have attended the
tio
IDMC conducted by Edmund Chan and read his books, like Built to Last
bu
and Cultivating Your Inner Life, and also books written by Robert Solomon,
tri
such as Apprenticed to Jesus. They also seek help from the Singapore Navi-
is
gators to guide their churches into becoming disciple-making churches.

rd
The goal for every believer is to grow in faith and accomplish the Great
fo
Commission of Jesus Christ and ‘win the world for Christ’.

ot
Contemporary Church Growth

N
In 2017, of the 5.61 million people in the country, 3.41 million were
Singaporeans (this includes permanent residents) and 1.67 million were
non-residents. It is estimated that by 2030, Singaporeans will make up
55% of the population, while non-residents will constitute 45%. Many of
the migrants are packing the churches today, in both the Roman Catholic
and the Protestant denominations. The majority of the Catholics are
Chinese and Eurasians, with a minority from Filipino, Indonesian, Indian
and European backgrounds. The Archdiocese of Singapore comprises
232 Violet James
31 parishes spread throughout the country’s five districts, which come

directly under the authority of the Roman See. The current Archbishop,
Monsignor William Goh, wants the church to be more missionary and
evangelistic and to find effective ways to do social mission to help the
poor and the marginalised.
But the fastest-growing churches today are those led by charismatic
pastors from the independent mega-churches, which entered the scene
in the 1980s. Today, they have overtaken the traditional Protestant de-
nominations that were birthed by missionaries in the nineteenth and
.
ly
twentieth centuries. They are called ‘mega’ because they have more
on
than 2,000 members, their income and staff strength are large, they have
multiple programmes, and they and their leaders are known internation-
se
ally. Currently, there are 19 churches that are considered ‘mega’; the
lu
top five are New Creation, City Harvest, Lighthouse, Faith Community
na
Baptist and Victory Family Centre. Three other denominational churches –
so
Trinity Christian Centre, St Andrew’s Cathedral and Wesley Methodist
Church – also have large congregations. St Andrew’s Cathedral is the
er
seat of the Anglican Diocese of Singapore, established in 1870, which
rp
oversees 27 local parishes and six deanaries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Fo
Nepal, Thailand and South Vietnam. In the 1950s the Singapore Welfare
e.
Council was established to provide comprehensive welfare services. It was

l
renamed Singapore Anglican Community Services in 2006 and operates a

sa
wide range of centres, from mental health facilities to centres for seniors
re
and families. In 1996 the Diocese of Singapore joined with the Dioceses of
or
West Malaysia, Kuching and Sabah to form the Province of Southeast Asia,
n
a historic moment, when authority was transferred from the Archbishop

tio
of Canterbury to the Archbishop of Southeast Asia.

bu
New Creation had more than 30,000 members in 2012. In that year it
tri
collected S$75.5 million in tithes alone. In 2010 it raised S$21 million in

is
one day for the purchase of Star Performing Arts Centre. New Creation
rd
occupies levels 3–11 of the building and its full cost of $500 million was
fo
paid in 2016. It has a 5,000-seat auditorium, which is one of four venues

where their services are held.
ot
City Harvest had a membership of 20,000 in 2009. That same year it

N
collected an offering of S$38.6 million. In 2012, it bought a S$97.8 million

space at the Suntec City Singapore Exhibition Centre, with a 39.2% stake
in that building. Between 2007 and 2010 about S$23 million of church
funds was used to finance the singing career of Kong Hee’s wife, Yeow
Sun. The goal of this Crossover Project was to reach out to Chinese youth
in Asia through the use of Mandarin pop music, which was very popular
at the time. Eventually this project was aborted as it was not altogether
successful. Kong and five other leaders were charged with criminal breach
Singapore 233
of trust, falsifying accounts for the Crossover Project and using church
funds for personal gains. All six of them were given jail sentences. This has
indirectly contributed to a decline in City Harvest’s membership.
While the mega-churches are growing exponentially, the smaller
churches often feel disadvantaged. They meet in rented premises, as they
are financially unable to purchase their own buildings. Some of them
believe that the only way to grow in number is to mimic the mega-churches,
with their external paraphernalia such as state-of-the-art acoustics, singers
of the Hillsong kind and stage presence, believing that these contribute to
.
ly
the success and growth of mega-churches. (Hillsong is the largest mega-
on
church in Sydney, Australia. Its music pastors, Geoff Bullock and Darlene
Zschech, have written worship songs that have revolutionised their
se
church’s music ministry and have also been well received internationally,
lu
not least in Singapore.)
na
In order to fully equip the church through the proper teaching of
so
sound doctrine, two theological seminaries were established to train
pastors for the mainline denominations and the Brethren and other
er
inter-
denominational and independent churches. Trinity Theological
rp
College (TTC) was established in 1948 to serve the traditional historic de-
Fo
nominations such as the Anglican, Lutheran, Methodist and Presbyterian
e.
churches. The Singapore Bible College (SBC) was established in 1952 to

l
meet the challenges of the Chinese-speaking churches and confront theo-

sa
logical liberalism, which was creeping into the churches. Many Chinese
re
churches had a shortage of pastors, as their pastors who had come from
or
China were returning home due to a change of government and the uncer-
n
tainties that the future held for them. They were looking for Bible-based
tio
preachers to equip the congregations but were not comfortable with the
bu
graduates from TTC, as some of their foreign lecturers were influenced by

tri
liberal theologies and questioned the infallibility of the Bible. It was in this
is
context that SBC was established to meet the urgent needs of the Chinese
rd
churches. In October 2018, TTC will celebrate its seventieth anniversary. It

fo
has a strong faculty that is Bible-believing and mission-oriented, a far cry

from what it was in the formative years. Since 2014, TTC – in partnership
ot
with the National Council of Churches and the Bible Society of Singapore –
N
has provided theological education to the laity through the Ethos Institute
for Public Christianity, which assists the community to approach societal
issues from a theological perspective. In 2017 TTC was invited to teach
modules in a local university at the master’s level.
SBC celebrated its sixty-fifth anniversary in August 2017 and continues
to be church-oriented, Bible-based, mission-minded and context-relevant,
integrating theory and practice and theology and spirituality. It is currently
considering implementing a ‘smarter classroom’ in which classes at SBC
234 Violet James
can have simultaneous teaching connections with alumni and church

leaders in other countries in institutions that have similar facilities. This
means that on a given day, a professor can be teaching a class at SBC and
at the same time be connected with students in another country, have
professor–student interactions and also be able to see what is written on
white boards on either side of the globe. SBC continues to do theology
biblically and contextually to meet the challenges of a new post-millennial
generation. These institutions are of strategic importance as they engage
with church and society and train both Singaporeans and other Asians in
.
ly
Southeast Asia and beyond.
on
Denominations such as the Assemblies of God, the Bible Presbyterians,
the Baptists and the mega-churches have established their own colleges
se
to train their members for the ministry. Because of the many choices of
lu
seminaries today, the number of Singaporean students at TTC and SBC
na
has dropped significantly, and this has warranted administrators to look
so
beyond Singapore to recruit students. Today there are many students from
‘Creative Access Nations’ (CANs) who are studying in Singapore. The
er
term CANs refers to countries that are ‘closed’ to any form of evangelism
rp
and missionary activities and whose governments do not grant missionary
Fo
visas of any kind. The majority of these countries are either communist or
e.
Islamic. Missionaries have found creative means to enter these countries,

l
through their professional skills. Thus, the term CANs was born. It is from
sa
these countries that many students are now coming to Singapore to get an
re
education, in both the secular and the sacred realms. Both TTC and SBC
or
are focusing on master’s degree training, while some of the denomina-

n
tional colleges have diploma and bachelor’s degree programmes to cater

tio
to those without tertiary education. The challenge of the seminaries is to

bu
integrate theory and practice, impart a comprehensive understanding of

tri
God’s truth and be able to engage with a world that is rapidly changing.
is
When they succeed, they enable Christians in the pews to navigate their
rd
faith in the marketplace, to be salt and light so that they will be able to
fo
fulfil God’s mission for the church and the world.

ot
Challenges in Society
N
There are internal and external challenges that have implications for the
state and the church. The arrival of new migrants has brought more diversity
into society. Today, there are more than 150 ethnic groups in the country,
including professional foreign talent, middle-tiered skilled workers in the
service industries and technicians, blue-collar workers at construction sites
and domestic helpers. Many of these migrant workers live in communities
and ghettos that Singaporeans frown upon and sometimes even consider
as threats in their otherwise peaceful environment.
Singapore 235
The Malays who are indigenous to the island are somewhat alienated
because of their Islamic faith. At times, because of a common faith, they
are wrongly associated with the fanatical fringe that has contributed to
terrorist activities. The fact that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
has become a major threat internationally, including to member states of
the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the belief that
Malays are automatically Muslims make the latter a potential threat to
non-Muslims. In general, the other races and religious groups appear to
be paranoid about and suspicious of the Muslims. After the events of 11
.
ly
September 2001, more attempts have been made at inter-faith dialogues to
on
promote better understanding of and greater appreciation for other faiths,
including Islam. The government is more vigilant about terrorism in this
se
region. In 2001, 15 people were arrested, 13 of whom were members of
lu
a terrorist group, Jemaa Islamiyah (JI). In the following year, another 21
na
people were arrested, and 19 were members of JI. Ministers are currently
so
preparing the various religious and public institutions, and the general
public, to take necessary steps to protect themselves with the watchword
er
SGSecure. The public is repeatedly warned to be on the alert and be
rp
prepared, as these terrorist attacks will certainly happen.
Fo
There are also some exclusive identities, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual,
e.
transgender (LGBT), that are becoming more pronounced and could cause
l
schism and fragmentation in society. The Pink Dot Movement is a yearly

sa
event that attracts tens of thousands and promotes LGBT as an alternative

re
lifestyle with an intention to change the attitude of society and to repeal

or
Penal Code 377A, which forbids same-sex marriage. Lawrence Khong of

n
FCBC speaks against the LGBT agenda, as both spokesman for his own
tio
church and also for the church generally in Singapore. Khong believes that
bu
the movement has violated God’s design for marriage and family and must
tri
return to the authority of God’s Word and be realigned with God’s design.
is
In 1997, 10 gay Christians met together to pray and study the Bible.
rd
Out of this group the Free Community Church (FCC) was born. The FCC
fo
welcomes lesbians, gays, bisexuals and others, stressing that the church
is both free and inclusive. Their leaders believe that Jesus commanded
ot
members of the church to love one another; that everyone, regardless

N
of their orientation, is made in the image of God, and that homophobia

is inconsistent with the teachings of the Bible. The late bishop of the
Methodist Church, the Reverend Yap Kim Hao, served as advisory pastor
of FCC for many years, believing that God had called him to serve the
marginalised community.
Although Christianity is growing rapidly, the 2010 census shows that
many young people are neither religious nor committed to any religion.
Several Evangelical churches are struggling to sustain their youth and
236 Violet James
young adult ministries because of the many challenges faced by them.

Many young Christians are not attending Bible colleges nor are they
entering the mission fields. This lack of commitment could be because
they are first-generation believers whose parents object to their becoming
pastors or missionaries. But not many Christian parents encourage
their children to enter full-time ministries, as such ministries are neither
lucrative nor something they could boast about to their friends and
relatives. In some cases, there seems to be an erroneous belief that people
who join Christian ministries have no other option, as they do not have the
.
ly
relevant qualifications to enter the professional sectors.
on
Prospects
se
Singapore’s demography, identity and landscape have changed over
lu
the past 20 years. The four racial groups in Singapore in the past were
na
clearly demarcated as CMIO. With intermarriages between these races
so
and across other nationalities, there are greater varieties and distinctive-
ness. Singapore has metamorphosed into a new complex mix of numerous
er
national, linguistic, social and religious peoples. As a multicultural, multi-
rp
lingual and multi-religious community, this small nation is surrounded by
Fo
a crescent of countries that are pursuing an Islamic identity. This location
e.
presents both a challenge, with the risk of increasing extremism, and an

l
opportunity, in terms of Christian presence and witness.

sa
Singapore can indeed become an ‘Antioch of Asia’ because of its multi

re
cultural, multiracial character and its strategic positioning in Asia. The

or
church is also becoming more multicultural as migrants enter the country

n
at multiple levels, from the professional white-collar elite to the blue-collar

tio
construction workers. Many churches are working among these migrants

bu
as they see the mission on their doorstep. Local Christians are taking the
tri
lead in pastoral ministries and planting churches and sending missionaries

is
to other parts of Asia and the world. The ‘Lion City’ has a strategic role to
rd
play in Christian mission in Asia and beyond. Its effectiveness in doing so

fo
will depend on how far its churches can promote true discipleship among
their members, and can become authentic Christian communities where
ot
children, youth, young adults and seniors can pursue intimacy with God
N
and reach out to a world that is greatly in need of the churches’ reconcil-
ing, healing and saving message.
Bibliography
Chong, Terence, and Yew-Foong Hui, Different Under God: A Survey of Church-Going Protes-
tants in Singapore (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013).
Lim, Isaac (ed.), The Christian Church in 21st Century Singapore (Singapore: National Council
of Churches, 2000).
Singapore 237
Poon, Michael Nai-Chiu (ed.), Engaging Society: The Christian in Tomorrow’s Singapore
(Singapore: Trinity Theological College, 2013).
Sng, Bobby E. K., In His Good Time: The Story of the Church in Singapore, 1819–2000
(Singapore: Graduates Christian Fellowship, 2003).
Turnbull, C. M., A History of Singapore, 1819–1975 (Singapore: Oxford University Press,
1977).
.
ly
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Brunei
Francis D. Alvarez sj and Kenneth R. Ross
The sultanate of Brunei is located in the north of the island of Borneo and
.
ly
is divided into two separate areas by the Limbang corridor, part of the
on
Malaysian state of Sarawak. Both parts have a coastline on the South China
Sea and otherwise are completely surrounded by Sarawak. The unusual
se
geography is explained by history: in earlier centuries the authority of the
lu
Sultan of Brunei extended over a much wider area, which shrank to its
na
current proportions during the colonial era, becoming a British protector-
so
ate in 1888. When the Federation of Malaysia was formed in 1963, Brunei
er
was the only state that voted to remain under British rule. It was only in
rp
1984 that it became independent from Britain. The same family has been
in power for more than six centuries. The current ruler, Hassanal Bolkiah,
Fo
was crowned sultan in 1968 and became prime minister at the time of
e.
independence. He is an absolute monarch and no criticism of the govern-

l
ment is permitted. In 1991 he introduced the ideology of Malay Muslim

sa
Monarchy, under which the monarch is regarded as defender of the faith.

re
One of the world’s wealthiest individuals, he remains the dominant figure

or
in national life.
n
Brunei continues to have much in common with Malaysia, including

tio
the fact that the majority of the population are Malay in ethnicity and
bu
Muslim in religion. In terms of both size – 5,765 square kilometres – and

tri
population – well under half a million – it is one of the smallest countries

is
in Southeast Asia. However, in terms of per capita income it is among the

rd
most prosperous, largely thanks to rapid economic growth during the

fo
1990s and early 2000s as Brunei began to exploit its extensive oil and gas
reserves. No personal income tax is levied from its citizens, but it is able
ot
N
to provide a high level of public services, including education and health

care that are free at the point of delivery. Its prosperous economy has
attracted many migrant workers, who account for most of the Christian
presence in this strongly Islamic country.
Sunni Islam has long been the faith of the (predominantly Malay)
majority of the population, with significant minorities of (mainly Chinese)
Buddhists and Christians from a variety of backgrounds. Although there
is freedom of religion to the extent that individuals are free to practise any
faith in private, Brunei is officially an Islamic state and Islam shapes its
Brunei 239
public life. This feature was strengthened in 2014 when Brunei adopted
sharia law, despite protests from the international community and human
rights organisations. A ban on the public celebration of Christmas was a
further indication of the direction being taken.
Even before 2014, Christians were lamenting restrictions imposed on
any public display of their faith. Foreigners have been deported for taking
part in worship activities in parks and on beaches. Even gatherings and
celebrations in private residences, when attended by more than a handful
of Christians, have caused problems. A statue of Mary donated in 1999 by
.
ly
the then first lady of the Philippines, Luisa Ejercito-Estrada, and installed
on
in front of the Church of Our Lady of the Assumption, the main church
in the capital city Bandar Seri Begawan, had to be re-oriented to face the
se
building, which also serves as the unofficial chancery and cathedral of the
lu
Catholics in Brunei. A semi-circular wall also had to be erected to cover
na
the image because the parents of Muslim students attending the church-
so
operated St George’s School complained about it.
Anyone converting from Islam to another religion faces severe penalties:
er
the death sentence or a prison term of up to 30 years. Additionally, intense
social pressures discourage any Muslim in Brunei from considering a rp
Fo
change of religious identity. On the other hand, when people convert to
e.
Islam, they are featured on the front pages of the newspapers and are
l
given a cash reward.

sa
re
The Christian Presence

or
Christians in Brunei therefore face considerable restrictions. They are

n
forbidden to proselytise or to import Bibles and Christian literature.

tio
Churches are required to register with the government. The construction

bu
of new church buildings is strictly limited. Marriages between C

hristians
tri
is
rd
fo
Christianity in Brunei, 1970 and 2020

ot

N

Christians 7,300 5.6% 52,000 11.7% 4.0%
Anglicans 4,000 3.1% 3,700 0.8% –0.2%
Independents 1,900 1.5% 17,500 3.9% 4.5%
Protestants 1,200 0.9% 9,400 2.1% 4.3%
Catholics 100 0.1% 20,000 4.5% 11.2%
Evangelicals 1,900 1.5% 10,200 2.3% 3.4%
Total population 130,000 100.0% 445,000 100.0% 2.5%
240 Francis D. Alvarez and Kenneth R. Ross
and Muslims are prohibited. The centrality of Islam to mainstream society

means that Christianity remains a marginal presence, despite its signifi-
cant number of adherents. Christians are found mainly among the Chinese
population, the indigenous peoples and the migrant workers.
Most Christians in Brunei belong to the Roman Catholic Church, which
has three parishes operating under the Apostolic Vicariate of Brunei
Darussalam. Since 2005 Cornelius Sim has been Bishop and Apostolic
Vicar of Brunei. The diocese is very small, with just three priests serving
under the bishop. The clergy estimate that some 70% of the faithful are
.
ly
Filipino migrant workers, with some 20% coming from other Asian
on
countries such as India, Indonesia and Malaysia, and just 10% being indig-
enous Bruneians. At the Church of Our Lady of the Assumption, between
se
5,000 and 6,000 congregants attend Mass each Sunday. Almost every day,
lu
prayer groups comprising different ethnicities – Tamils, Malays, Chinese
na
and Filipinos – also meet at the Church of our Lady of the Assumption.
so
A holy hour designated for Eucharistic adoration is also well attended. In
2018 a localisation policy was introduced by the government, leading to
er
fewer work permits for migrant workers and a resultant reduction in the
number of participants in church life. rp
Fo
The large Filipino contingent brings vitality and a strong tradition of
e.
piety. Though restrained out of regard for the Islamic context, Filipinos
l
are still able to celebrate the Misa de Gallo, the traditional nine dawn
sa
Masses leading up to Christmas. After these Masses, Filipinos sell tradi-

re
tional Christmas food outside the church. Lately, they have been joined
or
by Malay and Chinese Catholics who bring their own delicacies and make
n
the early-morning gatherings more festive. Processions, of which Filipinos

tio
are particularly fond, are also held – but within the church compound
bu
and sometimes in the grounds of the nearby St George’s School at times

tri
when there are no classes. Restrictions imposed on the practice of their

is
faith have made the Catholics more community-oriented. In the Philip-

rd
pines, baptisms are focused on the family, with only close relatives and a
fo
few friends invited. In Brunei, they have become occasions for communal
thanksgiving and celebration.
ot
The minority Protestant presence includes the Borneo Evangeli-

N
cal Church, the Anglican Church (Diocese of Kuching), the Methodist

Church, the Seventh-day Adventist Church and the Korean churches.
St Andrew’s Anglican Church, centrally located in Bandar Seri Begawan
and the only officially registered Protestant church in the country, is a
particularly strategic centre of Protestant life and witness. There is also
a growing number of Independent churches, often registered as secular
organisations and leading a precarious existence, vulnerable to raids from
the religious police.
Brunei 241
The difficult situation in Brunei has helped bring Christians together.

In less challenging contexts, different Christian groups tend to compete
with one another. In Brunei, there is more cooperation and collaboration.
Other Christians have borrowed and been welcomed into the facilities
of the Church of Our Lady of the Assumption. They have even joined
some Catholic services during major celebrations. Despite the pressures
that result from being a Christian community in an Islamic nation, the
churches in Brunei demonstrate much vitality and look to the future with
confidence.
.
ly
on
Bibliography
De Vienne, Marie-Sybille, Brunei: From the Age of Commerce to the 21st Century (Singapore:
se
National University of Singapore Press, 2015).
lu
Rooney, John, Khabar Gembira: History of the Catholic Church in East Malaysia and Brunei,
1880–1976 (London: Burns and Oates, 1981).
na
Tan, Jin Huat, Planting an Indigenous Church: The Case of the Borneo Evangelical Mission
so
(Oxford: Regnum, 2011).
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
The Philippines
Jayeel Cornelio
This essay offers new ways of critically assessing the vibrancy of Christi
.
ly
anity in the Philippines. The premise is that it is diverse. While it is
on
important to discuss the fortunes of Catholicism, the dominant religion, it
is also crucial for new analyses to factor in the emergence of new religious
se
groups. In other words, the analytical way forward is to frame the dis
lu
cussion in terms of Christianities in the Philippines. To spell out their
na
salient attributes is the aim of this essay. In the latter part, consideration
so
will be given to how Roman Catholicism fares in relation to this diversity.
er
The first point is that Christianity in the Philippines is militant. In the
rp
literature, militant Christianity refers to fundamentalism and its trium-
phalist disposition to different spheres of society. These facets have some
Fo
local resonances. Although many new groups and denominations have
e.
emerged over the years, their general theological character is fundamental-

l
ist, which spills over into their political choices. In this sense, the religious
sa
economy, while competitive, also has a predictable and dominant trait.

re
The second characteristic is that it is global. The global expansion of

or
many groups has been made possible by the movement of Filipinos to

n
work around the world. But explaining it only in this manner is no longer
tio
adequate. I will argue that the global character of Filipino Christianity is a

bu
result too of a postcolonial assertion. Many religious leaders are convinced

tri
that Filipinos have a calling to evangelise the world.

is
Before its concluding section, the essay situates Roman Catholicism in

rd
relation to these developments. While other Christian groups are asserting

fo
themselves in militant and global ways, there are indications that Roman
Catholicism’s influence in the public sphere is waning.
ot
N
Religious Diversity
Roman Catholicism is the religion of the Filipino majority. Recent demo-
graphic data from the Philippine Statistics Authority show that Catholics
constitute 80% of the population. Only 5% are Muslims, while 10% are
Evangelicals and Protestants of different denominations. Iglesia ni Cristo
(Church of Christ) and the Philippine Independent Church are indigenous
churches that constitute around 2% and 1%, respectively. The rest of the
population belong to different religions, including Jehovah’s Witnesses,
The Philippines 243
Latter-day Saints and Buddhism. Different ethnic groups around the

country practise indigenous spirituality. In Mindanao (the Southern
Philippines), the collective term referring to ethnic groups that did not
convert to either Islam or Christianity is lumad (native).
In spite of the dominance of Catholicism, other Christian groups are
making their presence felt. Religious diversity, after all, is about recognition
and visibility. The more competitive a religious environment is, the more
assertive the demand for recognition will be. The assertion takes place in
different ways. Prominent mega-churches like Victory Christian Fellowship
.
ly
and Christ’s Commission Fellowship have the financial resources to build
on
halls to accommodate their members in their thousands. Their financial
capacity is not surprising, because their contemporary services attract
se
aspirational students, young professionals and middle-class families.
lu
To accommodate attendees in other areas, they even rent cinemas every
na
Sunday to hold worship services. The presence of these mega-churches is a
so
given in urban areas such as Manila, Cebu, Iloilo and Davao.
But Christian diversity is also discernible in rural areas. In every
er
community around the Philippines, it is not uncommon to encounter the
neo-Gothic chapels of Iglesia ni Cristo or the worship halls of Jehovah’s rp
Fo
Witnesses and Latter-day Saints. Rural communities are dotted around,
e.
too, with apartments or warehouses renovated for purposes of worship.

l
Many of these communities are independent, calling themselves born-

sa
again Christian or non-denominational. Apart from independent

re
Evangelicals, other Protestant denominations, such as Lutherans, Baptists

or
and the Union of the Church of Christ in the Philippines, are very much
n
present in rural areas. Their rural presence has to do with missiological

tio
models, which is why in some cases these churches build not just their own
bu
halls but also schools. Their religious and educational services directly
tri
compete with Catholic parishes and their affiliated parochial schools.

is
rd
Christianity in the Philippines, 1970 and 2020

fo

ot

N
Christians 33,607,000 93.9% 99,577,000 90.8% 2.2%

Anglicans 63,300 0.2% 163,000 0.1% 1.9%
Independents 7,142,000 19.9% 19,300,000 17.6% 2.0%
Orthodox 200 0.0% 4,000 0.0% 6.2%
Protestants 1,430,000 4.0% 6,237,000 5.7% 3.0%
Catholics 30,860,000 86.2% 83,000,000 75.7% 2.0%
Evangelicals 692,000 1.9% 3,863,000 3.5% 3.5%
Pentecostal/Charismatics 1,182,000 3.3% 38,000,000 34.6% 7.2%
244 Jayeel Cornelio
Furthermore, religious diversity is palpable in politics and the media.

Politicians and local celebrities do not shy away from professing their
religious affiliations in public to widen their support base. Some celeb
rities even host local television or radio programmes that are decidedly
evangelical. One example is 700 Club Asia, which is broadcast from Manila.
Big religious groups even own their own television stations. Iglesia ni
Cristo and Ang Dating Daan (Members Church of God International) are
two competing groups that have their respective stations on which they
broadcast their religious shows. Their programmes showcase the bitter
.
ly
tension between the two, accusing each other of heresy, for example. The
on
Kingdom of Jesus Christ’s Sonshine Media Network International broad-
casts from the southern city of Davao. On radio, the Far East Broadcasting
se
Corporation has a long history of doing evangelistic work in the country
lu
and in the wider region of Southeast Asia. It is the Evangelical counterpart
na
to DWXI and Radyo Veritas, which are owned respectively by the Catholic
so
Charismatic group El Shaddai and the Archdiocese of Manila.
These are just some illustrations to show that Christian diversity is
er
a social reality in the Philippines. Among observers it is imperative not
rp
to dismiss these religious groups as negligible minorities. But there is a
Fo
caveat. Although other observers might not necessarily neglect these
e.
groups, they often categorise them as sects, a term that is loaded with
l
religious and cultural derision. This is the case for many journalistic reports
sa
about Iglesia ni Cristo, even though it has become a major religious player
re
around the world. There is also a perception among non-members that

or
many of these churches are not Christian because they do not subscribe to
n
the Trinitarian doctrine found in Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.

tio
The bigger issue, then, is not whether diversity is neglected but whether
bu
it is approached – wittingly or otherwise – with the biases of dominant

tri
Catholic (or Protestant) perspectives. What are the characteristics of

is
this diverse Christianity? There are two that I discuss in the succeeding
rd
sections: it is militant, and it is global.

fo
Militant Christianity
ot
Believers who are driven to impose their fundamentalist religious

N
views on society are described in the literature as ‘militant’ Christians.

Although they are not a homogeneous group, there are some shared
facets. Many are conservative Evangelicals in the ministry, the media,
politics or education. They respond to any ideology that challenges the
fundamentalist worldview. In the USA, members of the Christian right
have their answers to evolution theory, abortion, same-sex marriage and
liberal theology, among other concerns. They also subscribe to dominion
theology, which explains their involvement in different sectors of society,
The Philippines 245
including business, legislation and the justice system. Militant Christianity

is thus not just intellectual. It also has its own modes of organising. Its
militancy has a long anthropological history, which can be traced back to
Indo-European warfare.
Some of these attributes resonate with the state of contemporary
Christianity in the Philippines. The overarching militant tone has to do
with its fundamentalism, which manifests even in its political involve-
ments. I will present my case using a historical perspective. But there is
another caveat. It is a mistake to say that Christianity in the Philippines
.
ly
replicates its American counterpart’s militancy wholesale. Not all issues
on
are comparable. The American Christian right, for example, has stakes in
the supremacy of the USA in global politics. The Philippines, by contrast,
se
plays the role of a small country in international relations. Moreover,
lu
fundamentalist Christians in the USA have set up their own colleges and
na
universities in defence of creation science and strict sexual norms. They
so
attract faculty and students who echo these ideas. While there are many
Christian tertiary institutions in the Philippines, they are not known for
er
dismissing the theory of evolution or asking students and faculty to sign
rp
statements of faith. Finally, militant Christianity is generally associated
Fo
with conservative Protestantism in the USA. As I have explained above,
e.
Christianity is diverse in the Philippines and it is crucial to factor in the

l
theological and political dispositions of groups that are traditionally

sa
neither Catholic nor Protestant.

re
Around the 1980s a fascinating development emerged in the religious

or
history of the Philippines. Various religious groups emerged in this

n
decade, including Evangelical churches, Charismatic fellowships and new

tio
religious movements. Some of these churches include Victory Christian

bu
Fellowship and Christ’s Commission Fellowship. Jesus Is Lord, arguably

tri
the biggest Evangelical community in the country, was formed a little

is
earlier (in 1978). Many independent churches that consider themselves

rd
born-again were also planted in this decade as the result of the work of
fo
foreign missionaries. Catholic Charismatic groups became fashionable

too, the most famous of which is Brother Mike Velarde’s El Shaddai. One
ot
prominent example of the new religious movements is the Kingdom of

N
Jesus Christ, whose leader, Apollo Quiboloy, is believed to be the very

embodiment of the Son of God in the present dispensation. It was also in
the 1980s that the Iglesia ni Cristo, founded by Felix Manalo in 1914, saw
its unprecedented expansion around the country.
What is special about the 1980s? The decade saw the decline of the dic-
tatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, which eventually ended with the People
Power Revolution of 1986. During the two-decade presidency of Marcos
(1965–86), which was riddled with poverty and human rights violations,
246 Jayeel Cornelio
Catholics responded by drawing from liberation theology to organise

communities around the country. Jaime Cardinal Sin, then Archbishop of
Manila, played a crucial role in galvanising the public against the dictator-
ship. The Catholic Church’s pivotal role in the People Power Revolution
would be the high-water mark of its involvement in politics and the
national narrative. (In the conclusion I will revisit this moment to reflect
on the decline of the Catholic Church’s influence in the Philippine public
sphere.)
Hence, by the 1980s the time was ripe for a renewal movement to
.
ly
emerge, but one that no longer had the dictatorship as the enemy. The rise
on
of new religious groups coincided with the high hopes about the future
of the Philippines and the restoration of its democracy. Interestingly,
se
Iglesia ni Cristo, Ang Dating Daan and the Kingdom of Jesus Christ have
lu
all adopted a Restorationist theology, which considers their respective
na
movements as the true and faithful form of Christianity. Salvation is tied
so
to membership. Evangelical churches and Charismatic groups would not
state that only their members are saved, but their growth was part of a
er
renewal movement that took place within Catholicism and Protestantism.
rp
Many of these renewal groups looked beyond the country. They also
Fo
adopted a militant imagery that found its way into spiritual visions. A
e.
classic case is Bill Perry’s book about the role of the Philippines in the
l
evangelisation of the rest of Asia – A Prophetic Vision for the Philippines

sa
(1994). This was based on his divine visions as a missionary in the country
re
in the 1980s. In the book, which was widely circulated among Evangelicals,
or
he referred to Asia as a ‘war zone’ for which Filipino Christians should

n
take up ‘swords of the Spirit’. In fact, in one of his visions the shape of the
tio
archipelagic Philippines resembled that of a warrior, with the long island

bu
of Palawan as the sword. This sword moved and emitted flames towards
tri
Southeast Asia, which set the rest of the continent on fire.

is
Fire was a powerful militant metaphor. No wonder that newly formed

rd
religious groups wanted Christians to be ‘on fire’. This meant imbibing

fo
an unwavering commitment to the faith as a result of either conversion

or religious awakening. Thus, the very narrative of their founders was
ot
about discovering their religious fervour. In their respective accounts, the

N
Lord delivered Catholic El Shaddai’s Brother Mike Velarde from financial

ruin and called the Kingdom of Jesus Christ’s Apollo Quiboloy to be the
‘Appointed Son of God’. When he was still a communist student leader,
Brother Eddie Villanueva also had an encounter with God. It inspired him
to begin a Bible study group, which eventually became Jesus Is Lord. In-
terestingly, being on fire manifested too in the drive to proselytise. Among
Catholics, Charismatic fellowships were formed around the country.
They became a religious ecology in their own right, with their song
The Philippines 247
books, concerts and regular meetings. They arguably arrested the rapid
expansion of born-again churches, many of which had the influence of the
Charismatic movement. The 1980s, in a nutshell, opened up the competi-
tive environment of Christian diversity that remains to this day.
The Catholic, Protestant and new religious groups mentioned above are
just a sample of the many that are now present around the country. While
the competition for converts is fierce, the intriguing part is that their theo-
logical and moral positions are not necessarily far from each other. They
share a literalist view of the Scriptures, which inspires their conservative
.
ly
outlook on divorce, same-sex marriage and abortion. These are just some
on
of the controversies that have generated militant reactions recently. Many
of these leaders are also open to the return of the death penalty, a curious
se
position given their hesitation over abortion. Manny Pacquiao, the world-
lu
renowned Filipino boxer who is now a senator, believes that reimposing
na
the death penalty is God’s will. Being invited to speak to ministers, he is,
so
in a way, the face of fundamentalist Christianity in the country. Even the
role of women in religious leadership remains contested for many of these
er
religious groups. So, although they argue with each other about who is
rp
genuinely saved, they are in fact on the same side when it comes to a moral
Fo
crusade. After all, they have a grasp of the sacred calling of the Philippines
e.
as a nation whose holiness must be upheld and defended.

l
It is in the same vein that the political activities of these churches are
sa
to be understood. Iglesia ni Cristo is known for voting as a religious bloc

re
according to the endorsements of its leadership. Jesus Is Lord has fielded

or
its own candidates, including no less than Brother Eddie Villanueva

n
himself for the presidency. (His son, Joel Villanueva, is now a senator.)
tio
Although many Evangelicals supported him, his base was not big enough
bu
for victory. Politicians court the backing of the Kingdom of Jesus Christ
tri
during campaigns. One may thus interpret the political activities of these
is
religious groups as a result of their expansion. But that is only one side
rd
of the story. That they play a prominent role in local and national politics
fo
is also an indication of their conscious militancy. The point is that if the

Philippines had a spiritual destiny to fulfil, these groups had to be actively
ot
involved in influencing the government so that the country itself could be a

N
‘light to Asia’ and the rest of the world. This brings us to the second point.
Global Christianity
Different Filipino religious groups, regardless of tradition or denomina-
tion, are very much active around the world. They set up their own
congregations, hold massive events and convert other people. In this
light, the competition is not confined to local communities in the country.
Bringing up this point is crucial because depictions about the move
248 Jayeel Cornelio
of Christianity to the Global South can be misconstrued as a one-way

process. The Philippines has been identified as a centre of Global South
Christianity, but that is not to say that it stays there. Migrant workers and
missionaries themselves have brought local Christianity outside of the
country in different ways. This can be observed historically.
The spread of Christianity among Filipinos outside the Philippines
coincided with the government’s labour export policy. In the 1970s the
country, under President Ferdinand Marcos, began deploying workers
when it became clear that the economy could not absorb surplus labour.
.
ly
The government then took advantage of the emerging oil and construc-
on
tion industries in the Middle East to send its mostly male skilled workers.
In the succeeding decades the country addressed global demand in
se
the service sector, including domestic work and care-giving. Women
lu
generally occupy these jobs. Now Filipinos around the world are in
na
various industries, such as information technology, food and beverages,
so
and seafaring. Since pay is higher, a typical Filipino aspires to work
abroad. The education system reinforces this aspiration, which explains
er
the proliferation of training centres and colleges that offer degrees in
rp
such fields as engineering, health care and marine transportation. Recent
Fo
estimates show that more than 10 million Filipinos live overseas, roughly
e.
10% of the Philippine population.

l
Consequently, they have formed their own Christian communities.

sa
Local Catholic parishes in Europe, the USA, Hong Kong and Singapore
re
have Filipino communities that alter the Catholic demographics there.

or
They also bring with them their own practices, such as Misa de Gallo during
n
Christmas. In other cases, Filipinos become part of the global outreach of

tio
their respective churches. Jesus Is Lord, for example, has grown tremen-
bu
dously among Filipinos in many countries; recent data show that they are
tri
present in 60. With more than 2 million members in total, Iglesia ni Cristo
is
is present in at least 100. The same can be said about other indigenous
rd
churches, like the Kingdom of Jesus Christ and Ang Dating Daan. Contem-
fo
porary theological reflections have caught up with this reality by framing

the movement of Filipinos as a divine design with missiological implica-
ot
tions. At the same time, the global presence of these local groups provides
N
social functions. They offer not just uninterrupted religious socialisation

but also support that eases the transition on the part of migrant workers.
However, to continue explaining the expansion of these groups in terms
of the global movement of Filipinos is no longer adequate. This is because
these churches are also conscious of converting other nationalities. It is a
result of a missiological realisation. This idea is quite clear in the experience
of Victory Christian Fellowship. It is part of a global movement called
Every Nation. Its Philippine unit has taken a large role in evangelising the
The Philippines 249
rest of Asia. In the Philippines alone it has around 80 congregations. Its

headquarters, in Bonifacio Global City, is a modern complex that includes
a training centre for local and international missionaries, who are expected
to plant churches in different places. The church has sent missionaries to
such countries as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Vietnam and Afghanistan. The
Iglesia ni Cristo is similarly aggressive. Its television programmes are
broadcast in different languages, including German, Spanish, Portuguese
and French. It has also carried out massive evangelistic events to target
locals in such places as South Africa, Thailand and Hong Kong. To meet
.
ly
the needs of their new converts it now buys properties and takes over old
on
worship halls in other countries.
The continuity with religious militancy is evident. In the eyes of these
se
Christians, their global success exemplifies divine calling. But it also has a
lu
postcolonial dimension in the twenty-first century: if the Philippines were
na
to be a new centre of world Christianity then it had to be engaged with
so
other cultures. Many of these churches were born in the Philippines, and in
a literal sense are now reaching the world. Thus, the postcolonial assertion
er
progresses radically from the older diaspora theology that called for the
rp
evangelisation of Filipinos wherever they might be. Instead, Filipinos
Fo
themselves, formerly colonised and proselytised, are now the bearers of
e.
truth for other nations.

l
In this light, their global outlook is very much tied to the militant
sa
character of diverse Christianity in the Philippines. Militant Christianity, it

re
will be recalled, embodies a triumphalist mindset. Whereas this took shape

or
in the form of geopolitical assertiveness on the part of the Christian right

n
in the USA, as far as Filipino Christianity is concerned, it is about massive

tio
evangelisation, even among other cultures, by Filipinos themselves. One

bu
need only to look at these religious groups’ websites, publications and

tri
television programmes to see how they celebrate their missiological

is
achievements.
rd
Finally, the global outlook has to do, too, with the growing affluence of
fo
these religious groups. A decade ago, El Shaddai opened its International

House of Prayer to accommodate attendees in its weekly fellowship. It
ot
is touted to be the largest worship hall in Asia. To celebrate its 100th an-
N
niversary, Iglesia ni Cristo inaugurated the Philippine Arena, the biggest

indoor stadium in the world. The Kingdom of Jesus Christ is now building
a bigger one, with a seating capacity of 70,000. The arena is called King
Dome. These are just some of the architectural feats of religious groups
in the Philippines that showcase their affluence. These are ultimately tied
to how they see themselves as key entities in world Christianity. They
are architectural achievements at the same time that they are centres for
training, missionary work and religious service.
250 Jayeel Cornelio
Whither the Catholic Church?

I began this essay by arguing that religious diversity is now a fact of
religious life in the Philippines. Christianity has to be discussed in a plural
sense because of the assertiveness of religious groups that emerged in the
1980s, many of which are now flourishing. But Catholicism remains the
dominant religion. This section of the essay is thus devoted to exploring
what has happened to the Catholic Church with respect to these develop-
ments. The answer depends on what one looks at.
At the level of the institution, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
.
ly
Philippines (CBCP) remains formidable. Although journalistic accounts
on
tend to reduce it to its statements on political issues, CBCP is not only
a gathering of bishops who represent the country’s more than 80 ec-
se
clesiastical territories. The CBCP affects pastoral life through its various
lu
commissions in such areas as doctrine, social action and the formation of
na
clergy and lay people. At the level of communities, the Catholic Church has
so
numerous thriving ministries, many of which are led by the laity. Basic Ec-
er
clesiastical Communities (BECs), common in rural areas, are an example.
rp
Often connected to the local parish, BECs rely on the participation of
the laity for evangelisation, liturgy and even social services. Given their
Fo
limitation in number and resources, parish priests rely on lay Catholics
e.
to organise feasts and other religious events, especially in far-flung areas.

l
Further more, the most successful BECs have initiated livelihood pro-
sa
grammes. They also have organised local people to protest against mining
re
and logging industries that have destroyed the environment. In urban

or
areas, Catholic life is flourishing as well in the form of renewal movements

n
that cater to different demographics. El Shaddai is popular among the

tio
urban poor, with an estimated membership of 9 million in the Philippines

bu
alone and 2 million more followers among overseas Filipino workers. Its
tri
leader, Brother Mike Velarde, is a lay Catholic. By contrast, attracting the

is
aspirational middle class is the Light of Jesus Family, another Catholic

rd
Charismatic group known for its weekly gatherings called The Feast. The
fo
group claims to have 35,000 members in the Philippines and around the
world. It is led by Bo Sanchez, a much sought-after lay preacher who has
ot
written books on love, happiness and wealth.

N
These illustrations are just some of the lay configurations that make
Catholicism a vibrant religion for many Filipinos. That they are led by lay
people is key to making their activities relevant to particular sectors. These
communities and their collective message of hope help their members in
navigating the changes that are taking place in Philippine society today. In
this sense, these renewal communities add to the already vibrant popular
piety that is common among many Filipino Catholics, such as the devotion
to the Black Nazarene in Manila, Santo Niño in Cebu and the various icons
The Philippines 251
of the Virgin Mary in different parts of the country. To claim, therefore,

that Catholicism is on the decline among Filipinos is a common mistake
among observers.
But that is just one side of the story. In relation to the emergence of
militant and global Christianity, there are important considerations
regarding the Catholic Church’s fortunes. One crucial area needs to be
unpacked: weekly Mass attendance among Catholic adults has declined
significantly, from 64% in 1991 to 40% in 2017, according to a survey by
the Social Weather Stations. The figure stands in stark contrast to Iglesia
.
ly
ni Cristo’s 58% weekly attendance and other Christians’ 67%. But this
on
does not mean that Catholics do not consider their religion important. In
fact, 75% of them consider religion ‘very important’. Given that the Mass
se
is central for Catholic life, a case may be made that many Catholics have
lu
become less institutionally involved over the years.
na
What could account for this trend? As mentioned above, in 1986 the
so
Catholic Church played an important role in the restoration of democracy
in the country. That was its high-water mark in terms of its national and
er
political engagements. That also sealed the church’s narrative in the years
rp
to come that the Philippines, in spite of its secular constitution, is a Catholic
Fo
nation that must uphold Catholic virtues. After all, the nation owed
e.
much to the Catholic Church. But the public no longer appreciates the
l
church’s involvement in politics. In 2008, the International Social Survey

sa
Programme revealed that 64% of Filipinos agreed that religious leaders

re
should not influence government. Unsurprisingly, the wider public felt

or
alienated when many Catholic leaders became very vocal in resisting

n
the provision for artificial contraceptives made in the 2012 Reproduc-

tio
tive Health Bill. Not only were Sunday homilies devoted to resisting the
bu
policy, some parishes even went so far as to dissuade their members from
tri
voting for politicians who supported the legislation. This call backfired,
is
with theologians like Father Ramon Echica now admitting that the church
rd
has a new social context in which it no longer has a privileged place.

fo
The adjustment has to do not only with the use of public reason in
engaging the state and the public. The bigger issue at stake for the Catholic
ot
Church is credibility. Over the years, many clergy have been accused of
N
corruption, sexual misconduct and collusion with politicians. Many of

these accusations made the headlines, thus affecting the majority popu-
lation. By contrast, the religious leaders of the other Christian groups I
discussed above, even if they are militant in the public sphere, still attract
their own loyal converts. One reason is that they are credible as far as their
followers are concerned. In other words, it is not only whether religious
leaders are morally conservative or whether they use public reason
whenever they talk about political matters that counts.
252 Jayeel Cornelio
At the same time, Catholics may feel that their leaders are not in touch
with realities on the ground, a point repeatedly brought up by Catholic
youth. In this light, it is consequential that the greater public no longer
associates the Catholic Church with the liberation and social justice that
characterised much of its political engagement in the 1970s. Its weak
credibility drowns out the many social and community involvements of
Catholic groups around the country. This makes it difficult for church
leaders to engage the state on various issues of the day, including divorce,
human rights and the rise of penal populism.
.
ly
on
Conclusion
This essay has been devoted to making sense of the state of Christianity in
se
the Philippines today. The decline of the influence of the Catholic Church
lu
in the public sphere has been matched by the rise of militant and global
na
religious groups that continue to attract many converts. From the 1980s
so
onwards, these churches called for new ways of being Christian. Their
goal is to be authentic and ‘on fire’ about the confession and practice of
er
their faith. In some cases their version is Restorationist, seeing themselves
rp
as the only church faithful to the principles of the Scriptures. Others have
Fo
inaugurated the renewal movement, calling for a spiritual awakening
e.
that draws from Charismatic gifts or an Evangelical fervour. Regardless

l
of the differences, these movements converge on a fundamentalist view

sa
of the Scriptures. To them the Bible is final, authoritative and inerrant.

re
Their fundamentalism thus informs their conservative attitudes towards

or
some of the controversial issues in the country in recent years, such as

n
divorce, same-sex marriage, abortion and even the death penalty. Their
tio
militancy has spilled over into their political choices, either by supporting
bu
candidates or by fielding their own. It also explains their global outlook,

tri
which is why they have taken the competition outside the country to reach
is
Filipinos and even other nationalities.

rd
It is in this manner that they are transforming the Philippines to

fo
become a central player in the future of global Christianity, and this is an

achievement given that Catholicism remains the dominant religion. This
ot
depiction, however, does not mean that all is lost for the Catholic Church.
N
Catholicism remains influential, especially in terms of popular piety. But

it has to confront issues with respect to its public engagements and, more
importantly, the credibility of the clergy. The reality is that many Catholics
are alienated by their own religious institutions. This uneasy situation,
coupled with the rise of militant and global Christianity in the country, is
what the Catholic Church now faces.
The Philippines 253
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ation (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
Cornelio, Jayeel, Being Catholic in the Contemporary Philippines: Young People Reinterpreting
Religion (London: Routledge, 2016).
Cornelio, Jayeel, ‘Popular Religion and the Turn to Everyday Authenticity: Reflections on
the Contemporary Study of Philippine Catholicism’, Philippine Studies: Historical and
Ethnographic Viewpoints, 62:3/4 (2014), 471–500.
Echica, Ramon, ‘Elements in the Barrel that Produce Rotten Apples’, in Stephen Bullivant,
Eric Genilo, Danilo Pilario and Agnes Brazal (eds), Theology and Power: International Per-
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spectives (New York: Paulist Press, 2016), 137–54.
ly
Francisco, José Mario C., ‘People of God, People of the Nation: Official Catholic Discourse
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62:3/4 (2014), 341–76.
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Timor-Leste
Filomeno Jacob sj
Timor-Leste lies north-west of Australia, at the eastern end of the Indo-
.
ly
nesian archipelago, and shares a border with West Timor. The country
on
became independent on 20 May 2002, after 24 years of armed resistance
against the Indonesian occupation and nearly 500 years of Portuguese
se
colonial rule. According to the 2015 national census, the total population
lu
was 1,179,654, with 99.51% identifying themselves as Christian. Of these,
na
97.57% were Catholics and 1.95% Protestants. The Catholic majority lives
so
side by side with the small Protestant minority and the tiny Muslim
er
community of Arabic descent. At that census, Muslims accounted for
rp
0.23% of the population, Buddhists 0.047% and Hindus 0.023%. Followers
of traditional religion accounted for 0.077% and 0.083% of the popula-
Fo
tion was unaffiliated. Nearly 400 years after the baptism of the Queen of
e.
Mena (1641), the Timorese state has recognised Christianity as one of the
l
national identity markers of the Timorese.

sa
The nation comprises many ethnolinguistic groups, who speak 11

re
Austronesian and four non-Austronesian languages. The constitution

or
defines Tetum and Portuguese as official languages, while English and

n
Indonesian are working languages. Mandarin and Hakka are spoken by

tio
the small Chinese-Timorese community.

bu
tri
Catholic Missions
is
The Timorese Catholic Church and the government of Timor-Leste cele

rd
brated in 2015 the five hundredth anniversary of the arrival of the first
fo
missionaries on the island of Timor, believed to be around 1515. The

occasion was marked by the signing of a concordat between the Demo-
ot
cratic Republic of Timor-Leste and the Holy See and the unveiling of a
N
monument to the Catholic missionaries in Oe-Cusse.

The first missionaries on the islands of Solor and Timor were
Dominican friars who followed Portuguese traders roving the southern
seas for sandalwood. Frei Antonio Taveira was among the first Dominican
missionaries who crossed the strait from Solor (part of modern Indonesia)
to Timor in 1556. On hearing about good news from Timor, the first Bishop
of Malacca, Frei Jorge de Santa Luzia, sent more Dominicans to Timor in
1561, under the leadership of Frei António da Cruz. The fall of Malacca
Timor-Leste 255
in 1640 triggered events on the island in unexpected ways. Muslims took

advantage of the circumstances to attack the Christian bases in Larantuka,
Solor and Timor. To ensure the safety of Christians in Timor, Frei António
de São Jacinto, Frei Crisóstomo de São Tiago and Frei Pedro Manso,
together with Captain Francisco Fernandes and 70 soldiers, sailed from
Larantuka to the Kingdom of Mena, on Timor, in 1641. The Portuguese
expedition of soldiers and missionaries offered protection and earned the
trust of the Timorese, resulting in the baptism of the queen, her son and her
people on 24 June 1641, the feast day of St John the Baptist. The Christian
.
ly
communities, the Christian way of life and the institutions were cycli-
on
cally abandoned to their own devices for shorter or longer periods, which
did not help the sustained growth of the church. A turning point in the
se
evangelisation of Portuguese Timor occurred more than 200 years later, in
lu
1877, when Father António Joaquim de Medeiros, accompanied by seven
na
missionaries, arrived in the territory. As Superior and Vicar General of the
so
Missions of Timor and later, Bishop of Macau (1884), Father Medeiros was
instrumental in establishing Catholic schools and promoting education for
er
women through the work of the Canossian nuns. He passed away on 7
January 1897, at the Central Missions’ house at Lahane. His remains are rp
Fo
kept in St Anthony’s Church at Motael, in Dili.
e.
One of the first decisions of Bishop José Manuel de Carvalho on 15

l
November 1900 was to create two independent vicariates: the Northern

sa
Vicariate covered the missions on the northern coast and the Southern
re
Vicariate those on the southern coast. The latter was entrusted to the Jesuits,
or
while the diocesan clergy retained the responsibility for the Northern
n
Vicariate. Father Sebastião Aparício da Silva and his Jesuit companions

tio
arrived in Soibada in 1899 and embarked on a missionary project that

bu
combined frequent pastoral visits to the villages and catechesis of children

tri
and adults, followed by baptisms and marriages, but, most importantly,

is
formal education. Under Father da Silva’s leadership, the Jesuits built the
rd
church and a residence and set up two colégios in Soibada, one for boys,
fo
ot
N
Christianity in Timor-Leste, 1970 and 2020

Christians 211,000 34.8% 1,224,000 88.6% 3.6%
Protestants 22,000 3.6% 59,700 4.3% 2.0%
Catholics 207,000 34.2% 1,143,000 82.8% 3.5%
Evangelicals 6,000 1.0% 29,500 2.1% 3.2%
Total population 605,000 100.0% 1,381,000 100.0% 1.7%
256 Filomeno Jacob
run by the Jesuits, and another for girls, administered by the Canossian
Sisters. Considering the needs of the country, they opened a vocational
training school with a carpentry workshop that trained many Timorese at
the beginning of the twentieth century. The mission flourished, but events
surrounding the Republican Movement in Portugal led to the expulsion
of the religious orders and the ensuing contraction of Christianity. The
Jesuits and the Canossians left the colony on 23 December 1910, and the
diocesan priests took care of the missions. Bishop José da Costa Nunes
reorganised the missions in the 1920s; he also founded a teacher-training
.
ly
school for primary-school teachers and catechists. Its graduates were
on
selected to serve in mission centres throughout the country. The Soibada
colégio became a model replicated in various parts of the country, namely
se
Manatuto, Oe-Cusse, Maliana, Ermera and Ossu. These institutions
lu
provided formation and training for the Timorese, many of whom worked
na
in the colonial public administration until 1975.
so
Father Jaime Garcia Goulart was appointed in 1940 as Vicar General
and Superior of the Missions of Timor. One of his main achievements
er
was the establishment of the Minor Seminary of Our Lady of Fatima at
rp
Soibada in 1936 to train the native clergy. Four years later, in 1940, the
Fo
Holy See created the Diocese of Dili and Father Goulart was appointed its
e.
apostolic administrator. By then, the Second World War had brought the
l
Japanese and Australian armies to fight the war on Timorese soil. Father
sa
Goulart took refuge in Australia and in 1945 was consecrated a bishop in

re
Sydney. There were many Timorese casualties during the war, including
or
four missionaries. Returning from Australia, Bishop Goulart reopened

n
the seminary in 1948, and in 1958 he requested that members of the Jesuit
tio
Order came back to Portuguese Timor to take charge of the formation of

bu
future priests.
tri
is
Indonesian Invasion
rd
Indonesia invaded Portuguese Timor on 7 December 1975, one of the most

fo
significant and darkest events in Timorese history. The United Nations

General Assembly reacted on 23 December 1975 with a resolution calling
ot
for the withdrawal of the Indonesian troops and the holding of a genuine
N
referendum on self-determination. Countering the United Nations, the In-

donesians carried out a formal annexation of Portuguese Timor on 17 May
1976. The Indonesian occupation was characterised by brutal military op-
pression, mass internal resettlements, sexual abuse, imprisonment, torture
and starvation. Journalist John Pilger wrote:
In my experience as a reporter, East Timor was the greatest crime of the late
20th century. I had much to do with Cambodia, yet not even Pol Pot put to
Timor-Leste 257
death as many people – proportionally – as Suharto killed and starved in East

Timor. (<http://johnpilger.com/articles/the-universal-lesson-of-the-courage-of-
east-timor>; accessed 8 August 2018)
Throughout this period, the Catholic Church remained a source of strength

and hope for the people. The principles behind the church’s transforma-
tion were outlined in Bishop Ribeiro’s 1975 pastoral letter Perante uma
Nova Situação:
The position of the Church will be, in any of the options, to accept the situation
.
ly
that the Timorese people choose and to continue its evangelizing mission in
on
the midst of the same people of Timor, no matter what the fate may be.
se
Bishop Ribeiro was replaced by Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, who
lu
firmly believed that the evangelising mission is the theological basis for
na
the church’s continued commitment to the people, which includes in all
so
circumstances demanding justice and being at the service of the public
good, in respectful cooperation with the legitimately constituted authority.
er
Protestants rp
Fo
The history of the Protestant denominations in Timor-Leste begins in the
late 1950s and is tied to the activities of itinerant pastors. The first prayer
le.
meetings took place in private homes, including the family home of the
sa
Seabra Gomes family at Balide. Pastor Francisco Coiás helped set up the
re
first prayer meetings at Fatumeta, on the outskirts of Dili, where the first
or
small, thatched-roof provisional chapel was built in August 1968. The

n
most prominent members of this prayer group at Fatumeta included José

tio
Gomes and his wife, Maria Gomes, Vicente de Vasconcelos and his wife,
bu
Marcelo Cireneu, Alberto Rodrigues, Joaquim Morais, Bernardo Guterres,

tri
Florindo Marçal and a few other families, all former Catholics. Soon, as
is
the community grew, a bigger place was required to accommodate them.

rd
Despite ongoing characterisations of the Portuguese colonial power as

fo
anti-Protestant, the application submitted to the municipal authorities in

Dili for land to build a church was granted at Vila Verde in Dili, and con-
ot
struction work started in 1970. The church building was completed and
N
inaugurated in 1971 in the presence of the municipal authorities. It was the

first Protestant church building in the country under the Igreja Evangélica
Assembleias de Deus (IEAD).
Small communities were by now emerging in Dili, Same, Aileu and
Baguia and on the island of Ataúro. After the Indonesian invasion, the
Igreja Evangelica Assembleias de Deus changed its designation to the
Indonesian-language name, Gereja Sidang Jemaat Allah, and associ-

ated with the Indonesian Assemblies of God churches. Around the same
258 Filomeno Jacob
period, in 1976, some members of the Fatumeta group, led by Vicente

Vasconcelos, set up another denomination with the support of Indonesian
Protestants. Initially, they met for prayers at a building in the Mandarin
area in Dili. Later they found a permanent location at Vila Verde and
built the Hosana church, where Indonesian Protestant pastors, including
military chaplains, played essential roles. Thus the Gereja Kristen Timor
Timur (Indonesian-language name) was born. Alex Surjadinata, a Protes-
tant pastor based in the USA, stated that one of the negative consequences
of the long association with the Indonesian Protestant churches was the
.
ly
perception among Timorese people that the Timorese Protestant churches
on
were ‘pro-Indonesian’. The Third General Assembly (2000) adopted
the Tetum-language name Igreja Protestante iha Timor Loros’e (IPTL)
se
in a bid to change that perception. Pastors Arlindo Marçal, Francisco de
lu
Vasconcelos and Moisés da Silva have been leaders working towards

na
Timorisation and national integration.
so
Official statistics in 1967 put the overall membership of Protestant
churches at 1,471. IPTL membership grew during the Indonesian occu-
er
pation, to 35,000 in 1996. As Indonesian members left the country after
rp
independence, IPTL Timorese membership declined to 17,000; this figure
Fo
was reduced further due to the emergence of new Christian denominations,
e.
drawing from both IPTL’s and IEAD’s congregations. The Igreja Evan-
l
gelica Presbyteriana iha Timor-Leste was set up in 2011 by former IPTL

sa
members. Many other very small Christian denominations have emerged

re
in the twenty-first century. Most of them came together in 2010 to form

or
the Forum Igreja-Igreja Kristaun Protestante iha Timor-Leste (FIKPTL), as

n
they try hard to develop common organisational and operational values

tio
in order to carry out their mission. Significantly, the two largest Protestant
bu
churches (IPTL and IEAD) are not active members of the FIKPTL.
tri
Ecumenical relations take time to build and require knowledge and

is
respect to overcome reservations about the political histories and the

rd
cultural significance of the churches. Ecumenism requires, moreover,

fo
a theological framework that supports religious cooperation at various

levels. The Catholic Church and the IPTL, among others, have developed
ot
the first steps towards future structures of recognition and possible co-
N
operation. A very strong social platform of recognition shared by leaders

and members in both is kinship that binds them in solidarity. However,
a future of meaningful formal ecumenical relations might require deeper
commitments and focus on religion and society.
Papal Visit and the Santa Cruz Massacre

Pope John Paul II visited Portuguese Timor on 13 October 1989, when it
was still under Indonesian occupation. This pastoral visit is significant
Timor-Leste 259
in the history of Christianity in Timor-Leste for a number of reasons. It

was the first time that the leader of the Catholic Church was visiting the
small, predominantly Catholic country. For the oppressed and suffering
Timorese people, the visit indicated the Pope’s solidarity. Before the
celebration of the Eucharist, the Pope knelt down and prostrated to kiss
the Holy Cross laid on the ground before the altar, blessed the land and
paid homage to the many killed in the struggle for freedom and human
dignity. For the Timorese Catholic Church and the nationalist resistance,
the Pope’s actions demonstrated recognition of Timor-Leste as a nation
.
ly
and a people. In his homily, the Pope called on the Timorese to strengthen
on
their unity in faith and reconciliation ‘while seeking a just and peaceful
solution to current difficulties’.
se
Two years after the papal visit, on 27 October 1991, Indonesian agents
lu
stormed the residential compound of Motael church looking for resist-
na
ance members suspected of underground activities. A young activist,
so
Sebastião Gomes, was then killed. It was for him that, on 12 November
1991, Father Alberto Ricardo da Silva celebrated a memorial Mass at the
er
Motael church. After Mass, the worshippers joined the procession to
rp
the Santa Cruz cemetery, praying and singing nationalist songs, openly
Fo
defying the Indonesian military. The response of the Indonesian military
e.
was not unexpected: they killed at least 271 people within the grounds
l
of the cemetery, and many more disappeared. The facts of the Santa
sa
Cruz massacre were caught on camera by Max Stahl for the world to see.
re
Historian Peter Carey summed up the pivotal role of the church in the
or
following statement:
n
tio
[I]t is significant that almost all important political manifestations in Timorese

territory, especially those organized by resistant students, took place during
bu
events related to the Church: for example, the papal mass of 12 October 1989,
tri
the celebrations of the 15th anniversary of the diocese of Dili on 4 September

is
1990, and of course the commemorative service of 12 November 1991 in the

rd
cemetery of Santa Cruz. (‘Netherlands Indies to Indonesia — From Portuguese

fo
Timor to the Republic of East Timor/Timor Loro Sa’e: Two Paths to Nation-
ot
hood and Independence’, Indonesia and the Malay World, 25:71 [1997], 15)
N
Nobel Peace Prize and Independence

Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo (later Bishop Belo) was appointed Apostolic
Administrator in 1983 in very challenging circumstances for the Catholic
Church in Timor. Military operations were under way, and many Timorese
suffered the direct consequences. While facing intimidation from the Indo-
nesian authorities, Bishop Belo chose to stand up for the people by speaking
out on their behalf and offering protection and support to the most vulner-
able. He was strengthened in his mission when he was ordained bishop on
260 Filomeno Jacob
19 June 1988. The following year, on 6 February 1989, Bishop Belo wrote
a letter to Dr Javier Perez de Cuellar, United Nations secretary-general,
calling for a referendum to resolve the Timorese conflict. Moral pressure
was applied by the international community when the Nobel committee
awarded the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to Belo and José Ramos-Horta, the
two most visible faces and voices of the Timorese plight, and called for
a diplomatic solution based on the people’s right to self-determination.
Finally, Portugal and Indonesia, mediated by the United Nations, signed
an agreement on 5 May 1999 by which Indonesia accepted a referendum
.
ly
for self-determination, under the auspices of the United Nations Mission
on
in East Timor. UN secretary-general Kofi Annan announced the results on
4 September 1999. A total of 98.6% of Timorese voted in the 30 August
se
1999 referendum, and a majority of 78.5% voted for independence. Timor-
lu
Leste was, finally, a free nation.
na
Achieving nationhood meant that the Timorese needed to write their
so
own constitution. In this process, the people of Timor-Leste insisted on
recognising the active participation of the Catholic Church in the national
er
resistance when the Constituent Assembly carried out its consultation with
rp
communities around the country. In response, the Constituent Assembly
Fo
included in the preamble of the constitution the following provision: ‘In
e.
its cultural and humane perspective, the Catholic Church in East Timor
l
has always been able to take on the suffering of all the People with dignity,
sa
placing itself on their side in defence of their most fundamental rights’.

re
In section 11, on Valorisation of the Resistance, article 2 states, ‘The State

or
acknowledges and values the participation of the Catholic Church in the

n
process of national liberation of East Timor’.

tio
The Holy See continued to follow developments in the country.

bu
Cardinal Renato Martino was appointed papal legate to the independence

tri
celebrations. He presided at the Eucharistic celebration on Independ-

is
ence Day at Tasi-tolu, the same location where Pope John Paul II had
rd
celebrated Mass in October 1989, and blessed the national flag presented
fo
by the president elect of the Republic, Xanana Gusmão. The Holy See was
present in solidarity with the jubilant people, to continue to offer hope in a
ot
better future for all.

N
The Quality of Catechesis

Membership of the Timorese Catholic Church rose from 31% of the popu-
lation of 674,550 in December 1973 to 97.57% of 1,179,654 million people in
2015. Numbers are important, but, as noted by many observers, the quality
of faith matters, too. During the Portuguese colonial period, catechumens
were required, before baptism, to learn by heart the fundamental tenets
of the Catholic faith to lead a Christian life. The rituals were learned and
Timor-Leste 261
understood through participation in community celebrations. Hence, the

road to baptism took time, to ensure the structural quality of faith and
the fundamental Christian values, to know and to understand what they
believed. This traditional approach is in contrast with the phenomenon
of mass Christianisation during the Indonesian period, when baptisms
took place in record time without proper doctrinal instruction. This course
of events caused resistance leader Xanana Gusmão to express concern
and to suggest the priority of faith education. In a letter written in 1986
to the Bishop of Dili, he stated, ‘We know the difficulties, we know the
.
ly
good intentions and the efforts, but we think that the church must avoid
on
self-satisfaction because the true essence of conversion cannot be relegated
to mere statistical data’. The need for continued catechesis was further
se
highlighted when Pope John Paul II reminded Asian bishops that ‘if the
lu
church in Asia is to fulfil its providential destiny, evangelisation as the
na
joyful, patient and progressive preaching of the saving Death and Resurrection
so
of Jesus Christ must be your absolute priority’ (italics mine). A ‘patient and
progressive preaching’ through catechism does not end with the initiation
er
sacrament of baptism, first communion or confirmation; it accompanies
people in their journey through life. rp
Fo
How does one reach the most profound spiritual experience of the
e.
Timorese? A few steps are required. First, one must walk the long road
l
to the substantive core of systematic evangelisation of the people, as

sa
proposed by Pope Paul VI’s Evangelii Nuntiandi (1975: 18): ‘For the
re
church, evangelising means bringing the Good News into all the strata
or
of humanity, and through its influence, transforming humanity from

n
within and making it new’. Secondly, one must aim at interior change as
tio
the purpose of evangelisation: the ‘Church evangelises when she seeks to

bu
convert, solely through the divine power of the message she proclaims, both the
tri
personal and collective consciences of people, their lives and their context’
is
(italics mine). Thirdly, one must reach out to the spiritual experience ac-
rd
complished in the liturgy.

fo
Liturgical Developments
ot
For the liturgy to become an act of the people, their language must come
N
to the fore to ensure their full participation and express their deepest
feelings, fears, desires and hopes. Most missionaries learned Tetum, the
lingua franca of Timor. Jesuit Father Sebastião Aparício da Silva spoke
the Soibada Tetum fluently. He wrote the Catecismo da Doutrina Christã
em Tétum (1885) to help the newly baptised Christians understand the
basics tenets of Christianity. He also wrote the Dicionário Tetum-Portuguez
(1889), which later became the basis to standardise the Tetum language.
Father Manuel Fernandes Ferreira sj wrote the Catecismo Badac no Oração
262 Filomeno Jacob
ba Loron-Loron (1907) and the Resumo da Historia Sagrada em Portugues

e Tetum para Uso das Crianças de Timor (1908). Manuel Patrício Mendes
and Manuel Mendes Laranjeira published a Tétum–Portuguese diction-
ary (1935) and a catechism. Finally, in 1980, the Liturgical Commission
of the Diocese of Dili, led by Father Alberto Ricardo da Silva, published
the official Tetum text of the Ordinary of the Mass and the Liturgical
Lectionaries. The adoption of the inculturated liturgy was made possible
by the interplay of two factors: the inculturation movement triggered by
the Second Vatican Council, including Paul VI’s Evangelii Nuntiandi, and
.
ly
the political and theological pressure for the Catholic Church to identify
on
with the people during the Indonesian military occupation. The Timorese
Christian churches are now in a similar process of inculturation: the IEAD
se
and the IPTL as well the smaller churches have liturgies translated from
lu
Indonesian sources into Tetum. However, as stated by Pastor Arlindo
na
Marçal, a former moderator of the IPTL Synod, the translation of texts into
so
Tetum is only the first step. There needs to be a deeper identification of the
Christian churches with the local cultures.
er
Evangelisation and Lulik rp
Fo
It is no secret that a sizeable number of Timorese Catholics still follow
e.
lulik practices alongside their Catholic faith. For some observers, this is
l
a symptom of superficial Catholicism. What is lulik? In its most narrow

sa
contextual meaning, lulik refers to the sacred in the Durkheimian sense. It

re
is the socially constructed system of human relations, including religion

or
as the distinctive space of human practice and belief, which cannot be

n
reduced to any other, although they may overlap or be intertwined. The

tio
social, cultural and ‘theological’ structures of the lulik – as indeed in Christi

bu
anity – are deeply intertwined with the social and cultural systems, such
tri
as kinship and alliance structures of wife-givers and wife-takers, without

is
which there is no history and no society. The lulik ontology and ‘theology’
rd
is constructed around the uma (house) and the lia (word) paradigms. Uma
fo
(uma lulik, sacred house) and lia are the root cultural paradigms framing
the pervasive and necessary complementary oppositions that are critical
ot
for the ritual and political production of history. Life flows in the con-
N
junctural exchanges between the wife-givers and the wife-takers framed

by the paradigmatic uma and lia structures. Wife-givers and wife-takers
enact ritual and politics in dyadic, diachronic, fractal and permanent re-
productive structures of partnership. Uma lulik and lia determine, frame
and shape the lives of the Timorese and thereby ensure historical con
tinuity, stability and permanency. In other words, the uma lulik and the
lia stand for a historical ideology constructed on the symbiotic platforms
of genealogy and religion. The only basis to conceptualise lulik as sacred
Timor-Leste 263
is the hamulak (prayer) addressed to the ancestors and the highest Na’i(n)
(Lord, Owner) of everything, sometimes identified as Maromak, an entity
similar to the impersonal Unknown God or the U _ru-Vatchu (the sun and
the moon) male–female complementary opposition. It is hamulak that
brings lulik closer to the basic sociological meaning of religion, defined as
an engineered response to human needs and as the making of humanity.
The controversy with lulik came to the fore when the mission-
ary colonial theology labelled Timorese social structures and cultural
practices as ‘non-Christian’. Lulik – an eclectic mix of social practices and
.
ly
religious ideas – came to be seen in opposition to Christianity, which led
on
some Catholic missionaries to actively pursue burning of lulik houses and
objects, although the Timorese would always rebuild new ones. Even
se
today, some local Protestant churches require their members to turn their
lu
back on lulik as a logical, Cartesian confirmation of total commitment to
na
Jesus Christ. The burning of lulik houses has stopped. Since the 1970s,
so
the Catholic Church has opted for more conciliatory approaches to lulik.
Based on the Second Vatican Council’s overture to cultures, the Catholic
er
Church has pursued inculturated pastoral practices, with a more lenient
rp
and gradualist approach to the social and cultural lulik, through the ap-
Fo
propriation of acceptable traditional Timorese values and symbols and the
e.
pastoral care of the lulik human and social structures. Becoming and being
l
Christian is a personal choice of total, personal commitment to Christ. It is

sa
significant that the late Mau Duan, a ritual leader at the Hohulo-Raimansu
re
lulik houses, once stated in symbolic terms that lulik is the (rai) nakukun
or
(darkness), the past (in the present) and that Christianity is the (rai)
n
naroman (dawn), the future (in the present).

tio
Most Timorese are Catholics, and they participate in the Timorese lisan
bu
(customary social and cultural practices) enacted by the uma lulik and lia
tri
structures and their corollaries. Christianity and lulik now live side by
is
side, shaping symbiotic practices and ontologies, without creating any

rd
syncretistic third form. Although some political and military movements

fo
have made attempts to create such an entity, this proved to be merely an

opportunistic and provisional bricolage of symbols and rituals – in other
ot
words, a pool of syncretic performances of limited scope. The search for

N
life – which permeates the symbiotic relationship between Catholic and

lulik ontologies and practices – finds its most striking iconographic display
in the Cruz Jovem (Youth Cross) event of public veneration of the Holy
Cross. Since 1992, the same Holy Cross is carried around the country, at-
tracting large crowds and bringing together people of all ages to pray, sing
and dance to celebrate their Catholic faith. Uma lulik elders, who might
be Catholics as well, participate actively in the celebrations. Individual
prayers mix with collective devotions in the context of collective memories.
264 Filomeno Jacob
The Cross has become a powerful ritual attractor, the centre of the crowds’
public demonstration of their Christianity, in which the devotion to the
Virgin Mary, invoked as Virgem Peregrina, has a prominent place. The
atmosphere is charged with an emotional and devotional intensity that
more often than not leads to profound, personal religious transformations.
In the process, the Cross – the Christian icon itself – became manas (hot),
lulik (sacred) in the lulik sense: powerful and dangerous.
Participation in social and cultural lisan practices does not diminish the
Christian faith. There is no reason to think that the Catholic faith of the
.
ly
Timorese is of a lesser quality because they participate in the lulik culture.
on
Peter Carey suggested that faith sustained the Timorese in their struggle
against the Indonesian military occupation. He wrote:
se
lu
At the heart of this struggle has been the East Timorese Catholic Church, a
na
Church which has undergone a remarkable transformation since the mid-1970s
from an institution closely linked to the Portuguese colonial order to one
so
which has discovered a new sense of mission as a Church of service, a people’s
er
Church able to articulate and defend the interests of the Timorese people.
rp
(‘The Catholic Church, Religious Revival, and the Nationalist Movement in
Fo
East Timor, 1975–98’, Indonesia and the Malay World, 27:78 [1999], 77)
e.
Christianity coexists with lulik in the socially constructed ontological,

l
ritual and political frameworks of the complementary opposites that

sa
define the metaphysical and cosmological aspects of Timorese social life.

re
The Timorese, as true agents of their culture, have made Christianity an

or
integral part of that culture while keeping the social and cultural struc-
n
tures that make them Timorese.

tio
bu
The Road Ahead

tri
The Catholic Church and all its institutions could do much to shape the
is
cultural and religious experience of the people. It is the deep and personal
rd
faith experience of each faithful member of the church that ensures the
fo
transformation of the structures of culture into the locus of faith. The

church can provide the best of its long tradition of spiritual life through
ot
education and formation of the whole person to strengthen the values that
N
underpin the life of the society. If the church is coherent with the values of
the gospel it preaches and avoids moral and political corruption, if it keeps
its independence and freedom to proclaim justice, the church becomes
the critical conscience of the nation. If the church upholds human rights,
standing by women, families and the forgotten poor of the rural areas; if it
does social solidarity and relies solely on the divine power of the message
it proclaims; if the church consistently seeks spiritual depth, it will always
have a place in the hearts of the Timorese.
Timor-Leste 265
However, if the church allows for mediocrity and runs muddled parish
administrations and intolerable low-quality education in its schools; if the
church runs reckless and careless pastoral services; if the church’s cateche-
sis and moral instructions are superficial; if the church ignores women,
families and the poor; if it becomes frivolous and corrupt, and does not
discern intelligently to understand the times and the people’s plight; if the
church seeks its pragmatic interests alone and does not know its place,
then the church’s human structures will have failed evangelisation and
the Christian people. Unless the church finds spiritual depth and moral
.
ly
coherence that come from intellectual wisdom and pastoral humility to
on
touch the deeper layers of the contextual realities of every person and the
whole community, the church will morph into irrelevance.
se
At this juncture, how can the church learn from its history in order
lu
to modernise and become a vibrant and relevant institution for the
na
people? The solution lies, first, in the tradition set by Bishop Medeiros
so
and Bishop Goulart to invest in the quality formation of the clergy and
the laity and to fully adopt the guiding principles of the Second Vatican
er
Council and subsequent teachings on Christian formation. The strength
rp
of the Jesuit and Canossian education in Soibada is a case in point to be
Fo
revived and amplified to promote faith, education and health of families
e.
and communities. Secondly, much will depend on how much the role of
l
lay Catholics is valued and incorporated into the service of the church to
sa
promote Christian values in broader society, within the state structures

re
and in everyday life. The clerical temptation to be at the fringes of politics

or
needs to be tempered to ensure the church remains true to its evangelising

n
mission. The issue is leadership. Bill Nicol suggested that dark scenarios
tio
in Timorese politics need not happen

bu
if the right people with the right attitude and the right skills take the political
tri
helm. Quality leadership is not just the central if for East Timor, it is also the
is
key to its future. If capable people with moral integrity and the right leader-
rd
ship qualities assume the reins of power within a constitutional framework

fo
that promotes fairness, transparency, accountability, and contestability, the

ot
country does have a chance. (Timor – A Nation Reborn [Jakarta: Equinox Pub-
N
lishing, 2002], 339)
Mutatis mutandis, that applies to the churches, too.
Bibliography
Durand, Frédéric, Catholicisme et Protestantisme dans l’Île de Timor: 1556–2003. Construction
d’une identité chrétienne et engagement politique contemporain (Toulouse: Editions Arkuiris,
2004).
Hodge, Joel, Resisting Violence and Victimisation: Christian Faith and Solidarity in East Timor
(London: Routledge, 2012).
266 Filomeno Jacob
Kohen, Arnold, From the Place of the Dead: The Epic Struggles of Bishop Belo of East Timor
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999).
Smythe, Patrick A., ‘The Heaviest Blow’: The Catholic Church and the East Timor Issue (Münster:
Lit Verlag, 2004).
Traube, Elisabeth G., Cosmology and Social Life: Ritual Exchange among the Mambai of East
Timor (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
.
ly
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
N
ot
fo
rd
is
tri
bu
tio
n
or
re
sa
l e.
Fo
rp
er
Major Christian Traditions
so
na
lu
se
on
ly
.
N
ot
fo
rd
is
tri
bu
tio
n
or
re
sa
l e.
Fo
rp
er
so
na
lu
se
on
ly
.
Anglicans
Ken Christoph Miyamoto
Anglicanism is the form of non-Roman Catholic Christianity that emerged
.
ly
from the English Reformation in the sixteenth century. As the result of the
on
movement, the Church of England separated from the Roman Catholic
Church and became the established religion of England. In contrast, a
se
non-established form of Anglicanism has its roots in the Scottish Reforma-
lu
tion. When Presbyterianism was established in Scotland after the Glorious
na
Revolution, a group of Episcopalians chose to follow their own way and
so
formed the Episcopal Church in Scotland. In the wake of the American
er
War of Independence in the late eighteenth century, Anglicans in the
rp
USA organised the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of
America, independent from the Church of England. Their first bishop was
Fo
consecrated by the Scottish Episcopalians, thereby inheriting their non-
e.
established Anglicanism.
l
The Anglican tradition is characterised by the biblical faith, liturgical

sa
worship based on the Book of Common Prayer and the historic episcopate.
re
Though it originated in the Protestant Reformation, Anglicans consider

or
their church to be continuous with the pre-Reformation Catholic Church

n
and to share many features with Roman Catholicism. They therefore

tio
describe it as both Catholic and Reformed. The Archbishop of Canterbury,

bu
the leader of the Church of England, is respected also as the spiritual

tri
leader of the worldwide Anglican Communion.

is
Anglicanism has become a significant part of today’s Christian

rd
presence in East and Southeast Asia. Its expansion to the region took place
fo
during the period of British colonialism and American imperialism there,

particularly in the nineteenth century. Three major missionary forces
ot
N
contributed to the development: two British societies affiliated with the

Church of England and the American Episcopal Church mission. One
of the British societies was the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
in Foreign Parts (SPG), incorporated in 1701 and the oldest non-Roman-
Catholic overseas missionary organisation. While the SPG was marked
by the High Church or Anglo-Catholic tradition, the other, namely the
Church Mission ary Society (CMS), had the Low Church orientation,
because it was founded by a group of Evangelical Anglicans in 1799. As for
the American Episcopal Church, it established the Domestic and Foreign
270 Ken Christoph Miyamoto
Missionary Society (DFMS) in 1821. However, with the understanding

that mission belonged to the entire church, it was legislated in 1835 that
every Episcopalian was a member of the DFMS, making the church and
the Missionary Society identical.
Introduced by these and other missionary organisations, Anglicanism
has taken root in many countries in East and Southeast Asia since the nine-
teenth century. In this process, it came to take diverse forms, influenced
by the way it was brought to a particular country in the region as well as
by the way missions interacted with local conditions. Focusing on such a
.
ly
missionary process in various parts of East and Southeast Asia, this essay
on
seeks to understand how Anglicanism arrived in this part of the world
and examines how its interactions with local contexts, both historical and
se
social, contributed to the emergence of diversity within Anglicanism in
lu
the region.
na
One note is needed about the name of the American Episcopal Church.
so
While ‘The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America’
is its original name, the church decided in 1964 to make ‘The Episcopal
er
Church’ also official. There thus exist two official names of the church. In
the rest of the essay, however, it will be referred to with the unofficial yet rp
Fo
popular third name, ‘The Episcopal Church in the USA’ (ECUSA).
l e.
Mainland China
sa
No fewer than 12 missionary bodies contributed to the emergence of

re
the Anglican Church in China. The missionary who is considered to be

or
its founder is the American Episcopalian William Jones Boone, who first
n
came to Macau in 1840. After the First Opium War, he moved to Shanghai
tio
in 1845, having been consecrated as the first Bishop of China the previous
bu
year. He worked there until his death in 1864. In 1844, the South China
tri
Mission was established in Shanghai by two English missionaries des-

is
patched by the CMS. One of them, George Smith, later became the first
rd
Bishop of Victoria (Hong Kong). While the CMS worked mainly in South
fo
China, the SPG ministered mainly in the north, namely Beijing and the
provinces of Hebei and Shandong. The inter-denominational China Inland
ot
Mission founded by Hudson Taylor also sent to China a group of young

N
Anglicans in East and Southeast Asia, 1970

Region Total Christian Anglican % of region % of Christians
population population population Anglican Anglican
East Asia 996,425,000 11,456,000 107,000 0.0% 0.9%
Southeast Asia 280,607,000 50,740,000 179,000 0.1% 0.4%
East and Southeast Asia 1,277,032,000 62,196,000 286,000 0.0% 0.5%
Globe 3,700,578,000 1,229,309,000 47,394,000 1.3% 3.9%
Anglicans 271
Anglican Evangelicals known as the Cambridge Seven, who landed in

Shanghai in 1885 and engaged in various works throughout China. In the
early twentieth century, Canadian Anglicans also began their missionary
activities in Henan province in central China.
Particularly important among the Anglican missionaries to China was
the polyglot Bishop Samuel Schereschewsky of Shanghai, an American
Episcopalian born in Russian Lithuania. His major contribution was the
translation of the entire Bible into Chinese. Together with Bishop Boone, he
founded St John’s College in Shanghai. It became a full university in 1905,
.
ly
and many future Chinese leaders, including K. H. Ting, studied there.
on
In 1912, Anglican missions operating in China merged and formed a
single national church called the Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui (CHSKH) or
se
the Holy Catholic Church in China. A theological seminary was founded
lu
in Nanjing, and the first Chinese bishop, Shen Tsai-sen, was elected to be
na
Assistant Bishop of Zhejiang and consecrated in Shanghai in 1918.
so
After the difficult years of the Sino-Japanese and the civil wars, the
Communist Party came to power and established the People’s Republic
er
of China in 1949. This development radically changed the situations sur-
rounding Christianity in China. Western missionaries were forced to leave rp
Fo
the country. Chinese Anglicans participated in the Three-Self Patriotic
e.
Movement (TSPM) under the leadership of Bishop K. H. Ting of Zhejiang.

l
His episcopal consecration in 1955 was one of the last Anglican ones in
sa
China, and the CHSKH had ceased all its activities by the end of the 1950s,
re
though it was never formally dissolved. The churches were closed during
or
the Cultural Revolution, but when they resumed worship, all Protestant
n
denominations came together and decided to create the China Christian

tio
Council in 1980 as their umbrella organisation, with Bishop Ting as its

bu
president. The age of denominationalism thus came to an end in China,

tri
and the Anglican Church also ceased to exist as an independent ecclesi

is
astical body.
rd
fo
Hong Kong
As Hong Kong was ceded to the UK under the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842,
ot
the Anglican Church there took a distinct course of historical development.

N
Anglicans in East and Southeast Asia, 2020

Region Total Christian Anglican % of region % of Christians
population population population Anglican Anglican
East Asia 1,663,619,000 128,787,000 169,000 0.0% 0.1%
Southeast Asia 669,016,000 153,102,000 615,000 0.1% 0.4%
Globe 7,795,482,000 2,518,834,000 99,586,000 1.3% 4.0%
The first missionary to Hong Kong was Vincent John Stanton, who came
to the island in 1843 when he was still an undergraduate student. He
later became the first colonial chaplain of Hong Kong and founded both
St John’s Cathedral and St Paul’s College. When the Diocese of Victoria
was created in 1848, the CMS missionary George Smith was appointed as
its first bishop. Initially they ministered to the British communities, but
missionary work among the Chinese developed gradually, and the first
Chinese church, St Stephen’s, was founded in 1865.
In the 1930s, the Sino-Japanese War made the connection between the
.
ly
mainland and Hong Kong, as well as Macau, uncertain. This development
on
led Bishop Ronald Hall to make a memorable but controversial decision: to
ordain Florence Li Tim-Oi into the priesthood to work among the refugees
se
who escaped the Japanese occupation of the mainland. Being ordained in
lu
1944, she was the first female priest in the history of the entire Anglican
na
Communion.
so
As the CHSKH joined the TSPM, Anglicans in Hong Kong and Macau
reorganised the Diocese of Victoria. They formed the Diocese of Hong
er
Kong and Macao in 1951, completely separating it from the CHSKH,
under the Archbishop of Canterbury. The diocese was abolished in rp
Fo
1998, when the Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui (the Holy Catholic Church
e.
in Hong Kong) was formed as an independent province of the Anglican

l
Communion, with three new dioceses in Hong Kong and a missionary

sa
area in Macau. Peter Kwong became the first Archbishop of Hong Kong.
re
or
Taiwan
n
The history of the Anglican Church in Taiwan took yet another course,
tio
as Taiwan was under Japanese occupation from 1895 until 1945 as a

bu
consequence of the First Sino-Japanese War. It is during this period that

tri
Anglicanism reached the island for the first time. The Nippon Sei Ko Kai,
is
or the Anglican-Episcopal Church in Japan, created the Diocese of Taiwan

rd
(Taiwan Sei Ko Kai) and engaged in pastoral and missionary work chiefly
fo
for the Japanese Anglican communities in Taiwan, establishing churches

in Taipei and Tainan. The number of Taiwanese natives who became
ot
Anglican was very limited. After the Pacific War ended in 1945, the
N
Changes in Anglicans in East and Southeast Asia, 1970–2020, growth rate, % per year
Region Total population Christian population Anglican population
East Asia 1.03% 4.96% 0.92%
Southeast Asia 1.75% 2.23% 2.49%
East and Southeast Asia 1.21% 3.07% 2.03%
Globe 1.50% 1.45% 1.50%
Anglicans 273
Japanese, including the Anglican clergy and church members, withdrew

from Taiwan and the churches in Taipei and Tainan were transferred to the
Presbyterian Church.
In 1949, the Republic of China was established in Taiwan by the
Kuomintang (KMT), who escaped from the communist takeover of

China. Among those who moved to Taiwan with the KMT were a group
of Chinese Anglicans, and this group initiated a new Anglican ecclesi
astical body in Taiwan. The ECUSA was supportive in this process, and
in 1954 it placed Taiwan under the jurisdiction of the Diocese of Hawaii
.
ly
as a missionary diocese. In 1988, John C. T. Chien was consecrated as the
on
first native Bishop of Taiwan, and the missionary diocese was upgraded to
full diocesan status. Now the Episcopal Diocese of Taiwan, also called the
se
Taiwan Sheng Kung Hui or Taiwan Episcopal Church, constitutes part of
lu
Province 8 of the ECUSA.
na
so
Japan
The first Anglican missionary who came to Japan was Bernard Bettelheim,
er
a naturalised British Anglican born in Hungary. Sent by the Loochoo
rp
Naval Mission, he arrived at Naha, Okinawa, in 1846 as a medical mission
Fo
ary. Lasting missionary work in Japan, however, began in 1859, when
e.
the country’s two centuries of national isolation came to an end. As soon

l
as the ports, such as Kanagawa and Nagasaki, opened to foreigners that

sa
year, the American Episcopal missionary John Liggins moved from China
re
to Nagasaki as the first non-Catholic missionary to Japan. While he left

or
the land soon because of illness, his seminary classmate Channing Moore
n
Williams, arriving at Nagasaki less than two months later and consecrated
tio
as the Bishop of China and Japan in 1866, made a significant contribution

bu
to the formation and development of the Anglican Church in Japan. He

tri
later moved to Tokyo and founded St Paul’s School (today’s Rikkyo Uni-
is
versity) there.
rd
British missionaries also arrived later, sent by both the CMS and the
fo
SPG. While the American Episcopal mission worked mainly in Tokyo and
Yokohama, as well as Fukuoka in Kyushu, the CMS and the SPG made
ot
Osaka and Kobe their bases, respectively. As in Williams’s case, they also
N
attached importance to educational mission and founded schools for boys

and girls in these cities, some of which later developed into universities
and colleges.
The three Anglican missions, one American and two British, cooperated
in the translation of the Book of Common Prayer. In 1883, the Japanese
Nobori Kanai and Masakazu Tai were ordained by Bishop Williams as the
first native deacons. The three missions held the first synod in 1887 under
the leadership of Bishop Williams and his British counterpart, Bishop
Edward Bickersteth. At this meeting, it was agreed to form the Anglican-

Episcopal Church in Japan, named the Nippon Sei Ko Kai (NSKK) or the
Japanese Holy Catholic Church. It was also agreed to drop the 39 Articles
and make the Chicago–Lambeth Quadrilateral the confessional basis of
the newly formed church. The establishment of the NSKK was a milestone
in the history of Anglicanism because it was the first autonomous province
of the Anglican Communion outside the lands where British settlers were
predominant.
In 1888, the Anglican Church of Canada also entered the mission-
.
ly
ary work in Japan, with a focus on Nagoya and Central Japan. The first
on
Japanese bishops, John Yasutaro Naide of Osaka and Joseph Sakunoshin
Motoda of Tokyo, were consecrated in 1923.
se
In 1941, Japan’s wartime government forced all the existing Protestant
lu
denominations in the country, including the NSKK, to merge and form
na
a single religious body in order to make it easy to control them. Thus,
so
the United Church of Christ in Japan, known also as the Kyōdan, was
established. However, the Anglican bishops, under the leadership of the
er
Primate Paul Shinji Sasaki, rejected this measure. They chose to dissolve
rp
the NSKK rather than join the Kyōdan, despite the persecutions they faced
Fo
during the war, as the government saw Anglicanism as an enemy religion.
e.
After the war, most of those who joined the church union returned to
l
the restored NSKK. Subsequently, its Anglo-Catholic orientation was re

sa
inforced because many of those ‘lapsed’ Anglicans were Evangelicals.

re
Generally speaking, the present-day NSKK takes liberal stances on

or
the issues surrounding worldwide Anglicanism. However, two dioceses,

n
namely Kobe and Yokohama, maintain more traditional stances. For

tio
instance, those two dioceses have not yet recognised women’s ordination
bu
to the clergy, while the other nine dioceses do.

tri
is
Korea
rd
The East Asian country where Christianity has taken root most remarkably
fo
is Korea. Over 30% of its population are now said to confess the Christian
faith. The dominant groups among Korean Christians are Presbyterians
ot
and Catholics, whereas Anglicans constitute a minority.

N
Anglicanism in Korea goes back to Charles Corfe, an Englishman

who was a former Royal Naval chaplain and consecrated in 1889 as Mis-
sionary Bishop of Korea. He arrived in Korea the following year and
established the Church of St Michael and All the Angels in Seoul. He also
started hospitals in Seoul and Incheon. Herbert Kelly founded the Korean
Missionary Brotherhood in London to train people for missionary work in
Korea. This brotherhood, however, soon developed into the Society of the
Sacred Mission, an Anglo-Catholic religious order for training clergy for
Anglicans 275
the church in England. A religious order called the Community of St Peter

in Kilburn sent its nuns to Korea from 1892 onwards, and made Korea
the focus of its mission. In 1925, with the help of Bishop Mark Trollope, it
founded the Society of the Holy Cross as a local religious order in Korea. It
is thus Anglo-Catholicism that took root there.
The Anglican missionaries in Korea were strongly interested in incul-
turation. This is shown by the Church of St Peter and St Paul in Ganghwa
Island, built under the oversight of Trollope and consecrated by Bishop
Corfe in 1900. The church building was a beautiful fruit of an early attempt
.
ly
to harmonise Christianity with Buddhism, Confucianism and Korean
on
religious culture.
Trollope was consecrated as the third Bishop of Korea a year after
se
Japan’s colonial rule began in 1910. He had a more cooperative policy on
lu
Japan than did the Presbyterians, who strongly identified themselves with
na
the Korean independence movement. As a result, the Anglican mission
so
work had little success during the Japanese period. Nonetheless, even
Japanese Anglicans in Korea refused to join the Kyōdan, resisting the
er
forced merger of the churches imposed by the Japanese government.
rp
After liberation from Japan’s rule in 1945, the Anglican Church
Fo
gradually started to grow and expand its work, despite the difficulties
e.
caused by the Korean War and the subsequent division of the nation. In
l
1965, the first native Korean Bishop, Lee Cheon Hwan, was consecrated.
sa
In 1992, the Anglican Church in Korea became an autonomous province

re
known as the Tae-Han Song-Kong-hwei (Korean Holy Catholic Church)

or
or the Anglican Church of Korea, with three dioceses, and Simon Songsu
n
Kim became the first Archbishop of Korea the next year.

tio
bu
The Philippines
tri
The Philippines is one of the two Christian nations in East and Southeast
is
Asia, the other being Timor-Leste. According to the 2010 census, more than
rd
80% of its population profess Roman Catholicism and around 11% Protes-
fo
tantism. This is because the islands were ruled by Spain from the sixteenth
century to the end of the nineteenth century. Only after the Philippines
ot
came under the colonial rule of the USA in 1901 did Protestantism begin to
N
penetrate the islands.

Anglicanism in the Philippines goes back to the first Episcopal worship
service held in Manila in 1898 for Americans and other English-speaking
residents by Charles Pierce, an Episcopal chaplain of the US Armed
Forces that had occupied Manila that year. Later in the same year, the first
Episcopal worship was conducted for Filipinos as well.
In 1901, the ECUSA created the Missionary District of the Philippine
Islands, and Charles Henry Brent was consecrated as the first bishop of
the district. He came to Manila in 1902 with a ‘clear-cut missionary policy’,

although he considered American expatriates and other English-speaking
peoples ‘as his first responsibility’. Thus, he built a cathedral in downtown
Manila (the Cathedral of St Mary and St John), hospitals and schools.
Being against proselytising Roman Catholics, he directed his missionary
efforts towards the three major non-Christian groups in the Philippines:
the Filipino-Chinese in Manila, the Muslims in Mindanao and the Igorot
people of north Luzon.
The mission to the Igorot was particularly successful, and they came
.
ly
to constitute 80% of the membership of the Missionary District when it
on
was given the status of diocese and renamed the Philippine Episcopal
Church (PEC) by the ECUSA in 1937. Subsequently, the town of Sagada in
se
Mountain Province, the heart of the Igorot mission, has become the only
lu
predominantly Anglican town in the Philippines. Ninety-five per cent of
na
the population of Sagada are Episcopalian, with the Episcopal Church of
so
St Mary the Virgin at the centre of town. In 1971, the ECUSA divided the
single diocese of the PEC into three, with a Filipino diocesan bishop in
er
each of them, but still kept them under its own jurisdiction. It is only in
rp
1990 that the PEC was officially separated from the ECUSA and became
Fo
an autonomous province in the Anglican Communion as the Episcopal
e.
Church in the Philippines (ECP). The ECP is in full communion with

l
the Philippine Independent Church, which is given the privilege to send

sa
delegates to the Council of Churches of East Asia (CCEA).

re
or
Southeast Asia
n
The history of Anglicanism in the rest of Southeast Asia is complicated.

tio
The Malay peninsula and the island of Singapore were under British
bu
control from the eighteenth century, while Borneo was controlled by the
tri
British and the Dutch. The first introduction of Anglicanism into these
is
areas took place at the settlement established by the British East India
rd
Company at Penang Island in 1786. The local magistrate, George Caunter,

fo
was appointed the lay chaplain there in 1800 under the jurisdiction of the
Bishop of Calcutta, and the Church of St George the Martyr in Penang, the
ot
oldest Anglican church in Southeast Asia, was consecrated in 1819. In the

N
same year, Singapore was founded as a British colony, and the Anglican
Church was established there as well to serve British expatriates.
Anglicans started missionary work in Borneo in 1848, when the SPG
responded to the appeal of James Brooke, the Rajah of Sarawak, and sent
out Francis Thomas McDougall to Kuching. In 1856, the first Diocese of
Labuan was formed, with Singapore as its centre, under the jurisdiction
of the Bishopric of Calcutta, and McDougall was consecrated as the first
Bishop of Labuan. He was also appointed the bishop for the Diocese
Anglicans 277
of Sarawak created by Brooke. As the British authorities strongly dis

approved of evangelism among the Muslim Malays, missionary work was
carried out mainly among Chinese and Indian migrants.
In 1867, the Anglican churches in Penang, Malacca and Singapore
were organised into the Church in the Straits Settlement, which later
was separated from the Bishopric of Calcutta and placed under the care
of the Bishop of Labuan as the United Diocese of Singapore, Labuan and
Sarawak. In 1909, however, the United Diocese was divided into three
dioceses: Singapore, Labuan and Sarawak. During the Second World War,
.
ly
the work of the church fell on the shoulders of local clergy and church
on
workers because the Japanese interned British clergy and missionaries.
This development eventually led to the establishment in 1951 of Trinity
se
Theological College in Singapore for training local leaders.
lu
In 1957 Malaya attained independence from British rule. In 1963, it
na
formed the Federation of Malaysia together with North Borneo (Sabah),
so
Sarawak and Singapore, though Singapore was expelled from the Federa
tion in 1965. After several reorganisations of the dioceses, the Anglican
er
churches in these regions eventually became autonomous and formed
rp
the Church of the Province of South East Asia in 1996, with four dioceses:
Fo
Kuching, Sabah, Singapore and West Malaysia. Moses Tay, the Bishop of
e.
Singapore, was installed as the first archbishop of the province.

l
During the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Singapore

sa
has been the major centre of growth in Asian Anglicanism. The number of
re
Anglicans there increased fivefold between 1970 and 2010. The Diocese of
or
Singapore has energetically engaged in church planting across Southeast

n
Asia and beyond. Thus, the Province now covers nine countries: Malaysia,
tio
Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and

bu
Nepal. Singaporean Anglicanism is conservative Evangelical in theology

tri
and Charismatic in spirituality. Archbishop Tay was one of the most

is
outspoken opponents in the Anglican Communion towards the liberalism

rd
of the ECUSA. He was involved in founding the Anglican Mission in the

fo
Americas in the late 1990s, supporting conservative Anglicans in North

America. Together with Bishop Kolini of Rwanda, he consecrated Chuck
ot
Murphy and John Rogers as missionary bishops for North America in

N
2000.
Myanmar
Anglicanism in Myanmar (Burma) goes back to army chaplains who came
there with the British army in the early nineteenth century. In 1854, the
SPG sent out its first missionary, T. A. Cockey, to begin educational work
in Mawlamyine (Moulmein), the centre of British Burma. The SPG then
sent A. Shears and J. D. Marks to join him in educational mission, which
was later extended to Yangon and Mandalay. The Diocese of Rangoon

(now Yangon) was established in 1877.
The nation became independent in 1948, and in the following year
Francis Ah Mya and John Aung Hla were consecrated in Calcutta as the
first native assistant bishops. In 1962, the military took control of Myanmar
through a coup d’etat. In 1966, all foreign missionaries had to depart from
the country. Consequently, Francis Ah Mya became the first native Bishop
of Rangoon. In 1970, a proposal to form a new Anglican province in
Myanmar was approved by the Provincial Council of the Church of India,
.
ly
Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. Thus, the Church of the Province of Burma
on
(now Myanmar) was created, and the Diocese of Rangoon became one
of its dioceses. Francis Ah Mya became the first archbishop of the newly
se
created church.
lu
na
Conclusion
so
There are thus in total seven Anglican Churches in today’s East and
Southeast Asia. Six of them are autonomous: Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, the
er
Philippines, Southeast Asia and Myanmar. The church in Taiwan belongs
rp
to Province 8 of the Episcopal Church in the USA. Although Anglicanism
Fo
was brought to East and Southeast Asia mostly in the nineteenth century,
e.
Japan’s Nippon Sei Ko Kai alone attained autonomy within the century,
l
whereas the other five became autonomous only in the late twentieth
sa
century. The indigenisation of the church leadership also required a con-

re
siderable period, and it is only in the second half of the twentieth century
or
that most Anglican Churches in the region obtained native bishops.

n
Depending on by whom and how Anglicanism was transplanted,

tio
these churches took different courses of development and, consequently,

bu
came to show diverse faces: liberal or conservative, Low Church or High

tri
Church, and national or trans-national. For instance, Anglicans in Hong

is
Kong are traditionally liberal, and one of their bishops was the first
rd
ordained female priest in the history of Anglicanism, whereas Singapo-

fo
rean Anglicans are quite conservative and have been firmly opposed to the
liberalism of American Episcopalians. While Anglicans in Korea cherish
ot
the Anglo-Catholic tradition, Japanese Anglicans present a mixture of

N
different tendencies: a few High Church dioceses do not recognise the

ordination of women, but others welcome and support them to seek ordi-
nation to Holy Orders.
No matter how different they are, however, all these churches share the
common tradition that emanates from the English Reformation. For non-
Roman-Catholic Christians in the region, the Anglican liturgical tradition
based on the Book of Common Prayer offers an important alternative to
the less structured Protestant worship normally consisting of scriptural
Anglicans 279
readings, preaching, free prayers and hymn singing. The historical episco-
pate fundamental to the Anglican tradition also provides a church with a
structural stability – the stability displayed remarkably by the experience
of the NSKK, which – resisting the pressure of the wartime regime –
refused to participate in the merger of the Protestant denominations. The
NSKK decided to dissolve itself, but Japanese Anglicans survived the
hardship under the leadership of their bishops and successfully restored
their ecclesial organisation after the war.
It is not easy to offer a general assessment regarding Anglicanism’s
.
ly
impact on society and culture in the region as a whole because of the
on
diversity both of the region and of Anglicanism there. Such an assessment
is made even more difficult by the fact that the nations and countries in
se
the region have experienced British and American influence quite differ-
lu
ently. For Japan, the Anglican impact was quite positive and productive.
na
Japan now has nine Anglican universities and colleges. Historically,
so
most of them go back to schools originally founded by the Anglican
and Episcopal missions to educate boys and girls in the spirit of Chris-
er
tianity. Some mission aries even taught at national universities. Thus,
rp
the Anglicans, with their emphasis on education, greatly contributed to
Fo
the transformation of Japanese society and culture from traditional to
e.
modern. Even though the Anglican community in Japan has never been
l
large numerically, one cannot underestimate the role it has played in the
sa
modern history of the nation.

re
As for cooperation among Anglicans in East and Southeast Asia, the

or
seven Anglican Churches form a regional ecclesial council, the Council

n
of Churches of East Asia (CCEA). It was founded in the 1930s and has
tio
gained momentum since the 1950s. The Anglican Church of Australia

bu
and the Philippine Independent Church also participate in it as associate

tri
members. The CCEA holds a full assembly every four years, and the
is
member churches send to it a bishop, clergy, lay and youth representa-

rd
tives from each diocese, while the associates send the same from their
fo
province. It is, nonetheless, fair to say that there is little missional coopera-
tion among the churches – perhaps because they had few opportunities
ot
to work together in the past, given their separate development. Thus, it

N
remains as their future task to foster closer relations and search for ways
to achieve missional cooperation at various levels of church life.
Bibliography
Cox, Jeffrey, The British Missionary Enterprise since 1700 (New York: Routledge, 2008).
Ion, A. Hamish, The Cross and the Rising Sun, Vol. 2: The British Protestant Missionary
Movement in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in 1865–1945 (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier Uni-
versity Press, 1993).
Jones, Arun W., Christian Missions in the American Empire: Episcopalians in Northern Luzon,
the Philippines, 1902–1946 (New York: Peter Lang, 2003).
Sunquist, Scott W., David Wu Chu Sing and John Chew Hiang Chea (eds), A Dictionary of
Asian Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI, Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2001).
Ward, Kevin, A History of Global Anglicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006).
.
ly
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Independents
Editorial Note
.
ly
The Edinburgh Companions to Global Christianity use ‘Independents’ as
on
an umbrella term to cover those Christians who belong to churches that
are not affiliated to the Orthodox, Catholic, Anglican or Protestant streams
se
of Christianity. While some of these are stand-alone local congregations,
lu
most belong to organised networks.
na
This category can be applied to the East and Southeast Asia region
so
but is problematic, since relatively few Christians self-identify as ‘Inde-
er
pendent’. House churches in China fall within this category and, in this
rp
region, constitute by far the largest component within it. Yet Christians
who belong to house churches are eager to advance their Protestant cre-
Fo
dentials, lest they be considered deviant or extreme. Likewise, in much of
e.
the rest of the region the minority status of Christianity means that even
l
churches that choose to operate independently of historic denominations

sa
are concerned to demonstrate that they belong within the mainstream of

re
the Christian religion.

or
Hence it is quite unusual for a church to identify as Independent. An

n
exception is found in the Philippines, where the early twentieth century

tio
saw churches breaking away from the Roman Catholic Church in order
bu
to espouse the cause of independence for their nation. Some of these

tri
churches have departed from Christian orthodoxy – for example, on the

is
doctrine of the Trinity or the divinity of Christ – but continue to under-

rd
stand themselves as part of Christianity. In this respect, they are similar

fo
to movements or churches like the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Latter-day

Saints, which have set themselves apart from historic Christian belief.
ot
N
All of the above forms of Christianity are included when assessing

the numbers of Independents in this region. However, out of sensitivity
to the particular context of East and Southeast Asia, there is no essay on
‘Independents’ in this volume. Instead, full consideration is given to the
Chinese house churches in the essay ‘Mainland China (House Churches)’
by David Ro (pp. 63–73). The essays on ‘Protestants’ by Timothy Lim
(pp. 295–309) and ‘Evangelicals’ by Kang-San Tan (pp. 323–35) sketch
characteristics of the Protestants and Evangelicals, and many of these
apply equally to Independents, given the concern evident in this region
282 Independents
for Independents to align themselves closely with Protestantism. It is

hoped that this provides a culturally and contextually appropriate way to
present the Independent stream of Christianity in this region.
Independents in East and Southeast Asia, 1970

Region Total Christian Independent % of region % of Christians
population population population Independent Independent
East Asia 996,425,000 11,456,000 2,793,000 0.3% 24.4%
.
Southeast Asia 280,607,000 50,740,000 9,557,000 3.4% 18.8%
ly
East and Southeast Asia 1,277,032,000 62,196,000 12,351,000 1.0% 19.9%
on
Globe 3,700,578,000 1,229,309,000 89,480,000 2.4% 7.3%
se
lu
Independents in East and Southeast Asia, 2020
na
Region Total Christian Independent % of region % of Christians
so
population population population Independent Independent
East Asia 1,663,619,000 128,787,000 75,240,000 4.5% 58.4%
er
Southeast Asia 669,016,000 153,102,000 27,617,000 4.1% 18.0%
East and Southeast Asia 2,332,635,000 281,889,000 rp 102,857,000 4.4% 36.5%
Fo
Globe 7,795,482,000 2,518,834,000 391,125,000 5.0% 15.5%
l e.
sa
Changes in Independents in East and Southeast Asia, 1970–2020, growth rate, % per year
re
Region Total population Christian population Independent population

or
East Asia 1.03% 4.96% 6.81%

n
tio

Globe 1.50% 1.45% 2.99%
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Orthodox
Nikolay Samoylov and Ambrose-Aristotle
Zographos
.
ly
This chapter comprises a regional survey by Professor Nikolay Samoylov
on
and a case study of Korea by its serving Metropolitan, His Eminence
Ambrose-Aristotle Zographos.
se
lu
Orthodoxy in East and Southeast Asia: A Regional Survey, by Nikolay
na
Samoylov
so
The Orthodox presence in East and Southeast Asia is numerically small
er
but has a significant history in China, Japan and Korea as well as interest-
rp
ing recent developments in Southeast Asia. In general, it has depended on
the influence of Orthodox countries, particularly Russia, but it is marked
Fo
today by growing numbers of indigenous people embracing the Orthodox
e.
faith. In recent years, Orthodoxy began to spread even in countries where

l
sa
it formerly was practically nonexistent, such as Thailand, Vietnam and

Indonesia. This development adds interest to the question of the prospects
re
for Orthodoxy in this part of the world.

or
n
China
tio
The Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church was officially established in

bu
1956, but the history of Orthodox Christianity in China goes back more
tri
than three centuries. In 1685, the Orthodox priest Maxim Leontiev came
is
to Beijing with a group of Russians captured from the fort of Albazin by

rd
Qing military troops, and as a result the first Orthodox chapel was built
fo
in the Qing capital. In 1715–16, the first Russian Ecclesiastical Mission,

ot
formed according to Peter the Great’s edict, arrived in China, headed by

N
Archimandrite Hilarion (Lezhaisky).

The Mission operated in China for about three centuries. Apart from
their religious activities, members of the Mission’s staff figured promi-
nently in promoting Sino-Russian cultural exchanges in various fields.
It is largely owing to the Ecclesiastical Mission in Beijing that Russian
Sinology began to emerge. Russian Orthodox missionaries slowly estab-
lished a small Orthodox Christian community in Beijing and its suburbs.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, some members of the
Beijing Ecclesiastical Mission became well known Sinologists and made
284 Nikolay Samoylov and Ambrose-Aristotle Zographos
noticeable contributions to Russian intellectuals’ knowledge of Chinese

culture, history and language. They acted as interpreters of Chinese
culture, and, as its original foreign chroniclers, promoted the Russian
formation of what was essentially a new communication mode for socio-
cultural interaction.
In 1863, Russia separated the Beijing Ecclesiastical Mission from diplo-
matic activities. In this new situation, the Russian missionaries who served
in the Beijing Mission could focus on guardianship and protection of the
Albazin Orthodox community and preach Christianity among the Chinese
.
ly
and Manchu. During the Yihetuan (Boxer) Rebellion of 1898–1900, the
on
Mission was destroyed, and more than 200 Chinese Orthodox Christians
were killed. In 1902, Archimandrite Innocent (Figurovsky) was consecrated
se
bishop in Russia and returned as the first Orthodox Bishop of China. He
lu
spent much effort working to restore Orthodox churches that had been
na
destroyed or burned during the Boxer Rebellion. The number of Chinese
so
priests increased. Bishop Innocent was pessimistic about the possibility of
converting people from the educated strata of Chinese society and decided
er
to focus on the common Chinese and the lower strata of society. By 1915
there were 5,587 baptised Orthodox Chinese. rp
Fo
From 1917, the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in China began to focus
e.
on the spiritual care and moral support of a large group of refugees from
l
Soviet Russia. By 1949, parishioners included not only Russians but also
sa
approximately 10,000 Chinese converts. The Mission returned to the juris

re
diction of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1945. The following year the East
or
Asian Exarchate was formed and included Beijing, Harbin, Shanghai,

n
Tianjin and Xinjiang dioceses. After the Communist Party of China came
tio
to power in mainland China in 1949, most of the Russian emigrants left

bu
China, and the Moscow Patriarchate headed the creation for the Chinese
tri
people of the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church, in which most of

is
the bishops were Chinese. By 1951, all the Chinese religious organisa-
rd
tions established official ‘patriotic unions’ that included Chinese believers

fo
only, and according to the new law they could not be controlled from
abroad. The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church decided in
ot
1954 to abolish the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in China and donated

N
Orthodox in East and Southeast Asia, 1970

Region Total Christian Orthodox % of region % of Christians
population population population Orthodox Orthodox
East Asia 996,425,000 11,456,000 37,900 0.0% 0.3%
Southeast Asia 280,607,000 50,740,000 4,700 0.0% 0.0%
Globe 3,700,578,000 1,229,309,000 141,930,000 3.8% 11.5%
Orthodox 285
its territory to the Soviet embassy in Beijing. Chinese authorities agreed

to the appointment of the head of the Chinese Orthodox Church, Archi-
mandrite Vasily (Shuang), who was a Chinese citizen. That same year, on
23 November, the Chinese Church received autonomous status from the
Moscow Patriarchate. By 1957 more than 100,000 communicants lived in
north-eastern China alone, with 200 priests in 60 parishes, several mon-
asteries and a seminary. In other parts of China, there were more than
200,000 Orthodox Christians and 150 parishes.
Unfortunately, many churches were destroyed during the Cultural
.
ly
Revolution – including the famous St Nicholas Orthodox Сathedral in the
on
centre of Harbin – and the number of believers at that time was sharply
reduced. In the late 1960s, the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church
se
practically ceased to exist, and it has not fully recovered up until now.
lu
After the start of Chinese economic and political reforms following the
na
Cultural Revolution, the official attitude towards religions changed for
so
the better. According to the official sources from the Russian Orthodox
Church, about 15,000 Orthodox believers live in China today, and their
er
number is growing, due both to the increasing number of permanent or
long-term resident aliens and to growing interest in Orthodoxy among the rp
Fo
Chinese. Orthodox believers are concentrated in Heilongjiang Province
e.
and in Xinjiang Uyghur and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regions.

l
Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, paid his first visit
sa
to China in 2013 and was well received by Xi Jinping, chairman of the

re
People’s Republic of China, as well as by Wang Zuoan, director of the

or
China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs. Since then, the activity
n
of the Orthodox Church in China has intensified. In 2016 the Church of the
tio
Intercession of the Mother of God in Harbin was reopened, and the Easter
bu
service was conducted by the recently ordained Father Alexander Yu Shi,

tri
the church’s first priest in 15 years.

is
rd
Japan
fo
The Japanese Orthodox Church is an autonomous church under the omo-

phorion of the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1970 the Russian Orthodox
ot
Church granted autonomy to the Japanese church while retaining a

N
Orthodox in East and Southeast Asia, 2020

Region Total Christian Orthodox % of region % of Christians
population population population Orthodox Orthodox
East Asia 1,663,619,000 128,787,000 47,000 0.0% 0.0%
Southeast Asia 669,016,000 153,102,000 15,200 0.0% 0.0%
Globe 7,795,482,000 2,518,834,000 292,132,000 3.7% 11.6%
measure of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over it. The election of the head of

the Japanese Orthodox Church must be confirmed by the Moscow Patri-
archate, but the Japanese Сhurch can elect and ordain its other bishops
without such confirmation.
The first Japanese to accept Orthodoxy was Masuda Kosai (Tachibana
Kosai), who was baptised in Saint Petersburg in 1858, taking the name
of Vladimir and patronymic Iosifovich, after the name of his godfather,
Russian diplomat Goshkevich. The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Japan
was founded by the Russian missionary Archimandrite (later Archbishop)
.
ly
Nicholas (baptised as Ivan Dmitrievich Kasatkin) (1836–1912), who arrived
on
in Japan in 1861. In 1864 Father Nicholas baptised the first three converts in
Japan. By 1870, the Orthodox community numbered more than 4,000. The
se
Orthodox Theological Seminary was opened in 1879 in Tokyo in premises
lu
adjacent to the cathedral. It remains active today.
na
By 1880, the Japanese Orthodox Church had 5,377 members, six
so
Japanese priests and 78 Japanese catechists. The most important event
in the life of the Japanese Orthodox community was the construction in
er
Tokyo of the Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ, consecrated on 24
February 1891. This church, erected by St Nicholas of Japan, remains one rp
Fo
of the most interesting historical and cultural monuments of the Japanese
e.
capital. The Japanese traditionally call it Nikorai-do (Nicholas Temple) in

l
memory of its creator, indicating the popularity of Archbishop Nicholas

sa
in Japan. At the time of its completion, it was the tallest building in Tokyo.
re
After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Orthodox Church in Japan

or
became virtually self-governing. Japanese parishes, deprived of financial

n
support from Russia, switched to self-financing, which led to a significant

tio
curtailment of its missionary and educational work. According to a law

bu
passed in Japan in 1939, only those who were born in Japan could lead
tri
religious communities. Metropolitan Sergius was forced to retire, trans-

is
ferring the temporary administration of the affairs of the church to the

rd
layman Arseniy Iwasawa, who enjoyed the confidence of the Japanese

fo
civil and military authorities. Archimandrite Nicholas (Ono) was conse-

crated as Bishop of Tokyo and Japan on 6 April 1941 by the bishops of the
ot
Russian Church Abroad.

N
Changes in Orthodox in East and Southeast Asia, 1970–2020, growth rate, % per year
Region Total population Christian population Orthodox population
East Asia 1.03% 4.96% 0.43%
Globe 1.50% 1.45% 1.45%
Orthodox 287
On 5–6 April 1946, the first post-war Japanese Church Council decided
to remove Bishop Nicholas (Ono) from office. In early 1947, Bishop
Benjamin (Basalyga) arrived in Japan from the USA. With the support of
the civil authorities, he became the head of most of the Japanese Orthodox,
as well as of the Korean mission, which in 1955 withdrew from the sub
ordination of the American Metropolia and passed under the omophorion
of the Patriarch of Constantinople. A smaller part of the Japanese flock,
led by Nicholas (Ono) and Archpriest Anthony Takai, refused to enter
American jurisdiction and continued to exist as the Japanese deanery of
.
ly
the Moscow Patriarchate. On 10 December 1967, Hieromonk Nicholas
on
(Sayama) was ordained Bishop of Tokyo and All Japan in Leningrad and
declared the head of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, continuing the
se
work of Nicholas of Japan and Metropolitan Sergius.
lu
In 1969, complete reconciliation was reached between the American
na
Metropolia and the Russian Orthodox Church, and the decision was taken
so
to establish an autonomous Japanese church within the jurisdiction of the
Moscow Patriarchate. In 1970, Archbishop Nicholas, the founder of the
er
Orthodox Church in Japan, was canonised by the Patriarch of Moscow
rp
and All Russia and was recognised as St Nicholas, Equal-to-the-Apostles
Fo
to Japan.
e.
Since 2000, Metropolitan Daniel (Nusiro) has been Archbishop of Tokyo

l
and Metropolitan of All Japan. The residence and cathedral church is the
sa
Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ in Tokyo. Here the church runs the
re
Tokyo Orthodox Seminary and publishes a monthly Japanese-language

or
journal, Seikyo Jiho. The Orthodox sisterhood and the society of Orthodox
n
youth are now very active. In 2018, in the town of Ajiro, construction
tio
started on the first male monastery in honour of St Nicholas of Japan.

bu
Three dioceses comprise the Japanese Orthodox Church: Tokyo Arch-

tri
diocese, Eastern Japan Diocese and Western Japan Diocese. It celebrates

is
its liturgy in Japanese though occasionally other languages such as church

rd
Slavonic or Greek are used. Many liturgical and biblical texts were first
fo
translated into Japanese in the late nineteenth century by Archbishop

Nicholas and his Japanese colleague Nakai Tsugumuri. As a result, the
ot
language of these texts is heavily influenced by Russian Orthodox usages

N
at that time and sounds archaic today. The Japanese Orthodox Church is
active in publishing and its publications include the Japanese Orthodox
translation of the New Testament and Psalms as well as liturgical texts.
Southeast Asia: an overview

Today, the number of Orthodox Christians in Southeast Asia is small, the
first Orthodox communities having appeared there only in the twentieth
century. The Eastern Orthodox Metropolitanate of Hong Kong and
Southeast Asia was set up in November 1996 by the decision of the Holy
Great Synod of Constantinople after a visit to Hong Kong by Ecumenical
Patriarch Bartholomeos I of Constantinople, the first Patriarch of Constan-
tinople to visit the territory. On 2 December 1996, Archimandrite Nikitas
(Loulias) was elected as the first Orthodox Metropolitan of Hong Kong
and enthroned the following year, with jurisdiction over Hong Kong,
Macau, China, Taiwan, Mongolia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei,
Timor-Leste, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan
.
ly
and Afghanistan.
on
In 2008, the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate took the decision
to divide the vast area of the Metropolitanate by creating a new Metro-
se
politanate of Singapore and South Asia, with jurisdiction over Singapore,
lu
Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Timor-Leste, the Maldives, Sri Lanka,
na
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The remaining
so
territory continued to be under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitanate of
Hong Kong. Archimandrite Nectarios (Tsilis) was elected and enthroned
er
as the new Metropolitan of Hong Kong. In 2011 the Holy Synod of the
rp
Ecumenical Patriarchate elected Archimandrite Konstantinos (Tsilis)
Fo
as the first Metropolitan, and he was ordained by Ecumenical Patriarch
e.
Bartholomew I of Constantinople. He resides in Singapore, where there is

l
a small Orthodox congregation made up mainly of Greeks, Russians and

sa
Ukrainians.
re
or
Thailand
n
The first Thai baptised in the Orthodox faith was Prince Chakrabongse
tio
Bhuvanath (Chakkraphong Phuwanat), a son of King Chulalongkorn.

bu
He came to Saint Petersburg in 1898 and studied in Russia for about

tri
eight years, under the personal patronage of Emperor Nicholas II. Prince
is
Chakkraphong and his associate Nai Phum received higher humanitarian

rd
and military education in Saint Petersburg. In 1906, Prince Chakkraphong

fo
married Ekaterina Desnitskaya (Catherine Na Phitsanulok), and for this

reason he accepted Orthodoxy. Subsequently, Prince Chakkraphong
ot
returned to Buddhism, but his associate, Nai Phum, also accepted Ortho
N
doxy, having married a Russian woman, and then rose to the rank of
colonel in the Russian army.
Orthodoxy has become widespread in Thailand only since the end of
the twentieth century. Beginning in the mid-1990s, a large number of im-
migrants from the former USSR began coming to Thailand. At that time,
not a single Orthodox church was found in the kingdom. Attempts to
organise an Orthodox parish in Thailand were made by the Patriarchate
of Constantinople. In 1999–2000, with the blessing of Metropolitan Nikita
Orthodox 289
(Loulias) of Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, a Greek priest was sent to
Bangkok. For lack of their own church, services were held in Catholic
churches. The congregation of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in
Thailand included mainly Greeks, as well as some Romanians.
In response to numerous appeals from Orthodox believers, mainly
citizens of the former USSR, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox
Church at its meeting on 28 December 1999 decided to open St Nicholas
Parish in Bangkok. By the same decision, Hegumen Oleg (Cherepanin)
was appointed the first rector of the newly formed parish. Soon after its
.
ly
appearance, the Russian Orthodox community in Bangkok ceased to be
on
mono-ethnic, as Orthodox Romanians joined it. In addition, the conversion
of local Thais to Orthodoxy began. The first of these was Danai Bath (who
se
received the baptismal name Daniel), who wished to become an Orthodox
lu
priest and was sent to study at Saint Petersburg Theological Seminary.
na
In 2001, after reviewing the activities of the St Nicholas Parish in
so
Bangkok, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church decided to
open a Representative Office of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow
er
Patriarchate) in the Kingdom of Thailand. Hegemon Oleg (Cherepanin)
rp
became the representative of the Russian Orthodox Church in Thailand
Fo
and also provided spiritual nourishment for Orthodox believers in
e.
Cambodia and Laos.

l
In early 2008, the Thai authorities, having considered the long-term

sa
activities of the Orthodox community in Thailand, recognised it as

re
useful, in line with the interests of the Kingdom and strengthening the
or
moral foundations of society. The Orthodox Christian Church in Thailand

n
was officially registered in July 2008. In addition to the main parish of

tio
St Nicholas Cathedral in Bangkok, there are Russian Orthodox com-

bu
munities in significant centres throughout the country. Today, around

tri
1,000 people in Thailand are Orthodox Christians (about 0.002% of the

is
population of the country), not counting Orthodox people who come to

rd
the country on holiday (about 1 million Russian tourists per year). Thai
fo
translations of the Divine Liturgy of St John Chrysostom and the Orthodox

Book of Prayer have been completed. At the beginning of 2011, construc-
ot
tion of the Assumption Monastery in Ratburi Province was completed. A

N
religious school and an Orthodox cemetery were planned for its territory.
Among those who wish to become monks are citizens of Russia, Romania,
Thailand and Laos. On 21 March 2012, the first issue of the newspaper
Thailand Orthodox was published.
Cambodia
An Orthodox church in honour of St George the Great Martyr and under
the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was built on the territory
of the Bulgarian Embassy in Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, in

1993. It was erected in commemoration of Bulgarian peacekeepers who
died in Cambodia. However, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church did not send
priests for the regular conduct of worship in this church.
In the 2000s, a cleric of the Russian Orthodox Church, Oleg (Cherepa-
nin), with the permission of the hierarchy of the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church and the leadership of the Bulgarian diplomatic mission in Phnom
Penh, began to hold services in the St George Church during his trips
to Cambodia. However, as he noted, ‘it is difficult to organise a capable
.
ly
parish at the temple, which is located on the special territory’.
on
A constituent assembly of Orthodox believers took place in Phnom
Penh in 2012 and unanimously decided to establish an Orthodox parish
se
in Phnom Penh in the name of the Holy Great Martyr George the Victo-
lu
rious under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. The same year
na
a constituent assembly of parishioners took place in Sihanoukville. The
so
Orthodox believers in Sihanoukville also decided to establish an Orthodox
parish in the name of the Great Martyr and Healer Panteleimon. With the
er
blessing of the head of the Office for Foreign Institutions of the Moscow
rp
Patriarchate, Archbishop Mark of Yegoryevsk (Golovkov), and within
Fo
the framework of the programme for the development of Orthodoxy in
e.
Southeast Asia, the website ‘Orthodoxy in Cambodia’ was launched, to

l
be run by the Representative Office of the Russian Orthodox Church in

sa
Thailand. In 2013, the Representation of the Russian Orthodox Church in

re
Thailand, to which Cambodia administratively belongs, received a decree

or
by the minister of cults and religions of Cambodia on the government’s

n
favourable decision on state registration as a religious organisation of the

tio
Russian Orthodox Church under the name Orthodox Christian Church of

bu
Cambodia (Moscow Patriarchate).

tri
At the request of Orthodox believers in Cambodia, in October 2015,

is
the Orthodox Prayer Book was published in the Khmer language. In June
rd
2016, the Liturgy of St John Chrysostom was published in Khmer. In

fo
addition to the text of the Liturgy itself, the book also contains prayers for
Holy Communion and prayers of thanksgiving after Holy Communion.
ot
In addition to the temple in the name of the Great Martyr George the Vic-
N
torious in Phnom Penh and the temple in the name of the Great Martyr
Panteleimon in Sihanoukville, a parish is being developed around the
temple of the Kazan Icon of the Mother of God in Siem Reap.
Vietnam
Orthodox Christianity is the smallest Christian community in Vietnam.
It is represented by only one parish of the Russian Orthodox Church in
the city of Vung Tau, where several hundred Russians are employees of
Orthodox 291
Vietsovpetro (the joint Russian–Vietnamese enterprise for oil and gas ex-
ploration). The parish was opened in 2002 following the visit to Vietnam of
the chairman of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Department for External
Church Relations, Metropolitan Kirill (since 2009 Patriarch of Moscow and
All Russia). Metropolitan Kirill was the first Russian Orthodox hierarch to
visit the country.
Laos
Orthodoxy is represented in Laos by employees of the Russian embassy
.
ly
and other state and commercial organisations of the Russian Federation.
on
Orthodox citizens of former Soviet republics also reside in Laos. A small
number of indigenous Lao people have converted to Orthodoxy. The
se
total number of the Orthodox community is no more than 200. There is
lu
no Orthodox church in the country, so they have to meet in temporary
na
accommodation. In 2016, the first Laotian priest, Hieromonk Micah
so
(
Phiasayawong), was ordained. In the same year, he translated the
textbook The Law of God by Serafim Slobodsky into the Laotian language.
er
Indonesia rp
Fo
Orthodoxy first appeared on the territory of modern Indonesia in the
e.
seventh century. The followers of the non-Chalcedonian Christianity of the

l
Syrian-Antiochian tradition appeared in Sumatra in the Majapahit period.

sa
Soon, however, the traces of Orthodoxy in Indonesia disappeared. The

re
revival of Eastern Christianity in Indonesia began in the twentieth century.

or
In 1934, in Batavia (Jakarta) on the island of Java, a Russian Orthodox

n
parish was founded, to which priest Vasily Bystrov was appointed. The
tio
parish was subordinate to the Harbin Diocese. Upon his arrival in Java,
bu
Father Vasily reorganised an Orthodox parish and established a church in

tri
Bandung. At the end of the 1940s, the parish in Java became subordinate to
is
Archbishop Tikhon of San Francisco. In May 1950, Father Vasily reported

rd
that many Russian parishioners had left Indonesia and, as a result, the
fo
parish had ceased to exist. Today, Eastern Orthodoxy in Indonesia is rep-

resented by the Indonesian Orthodox Church, headed by Archimandrite
ot
Daniel Bambang Dwi Byantoro. It has 2,000 members, who are spread
N
across Java, Bali, Sumatra, Celebes, Timor and Papua.
Conclusion
For the foreseeable future, Central and Eastern Europe will remain the
main centre of Orthodox Christianity, with more than three-quarters of
the total number of Orthodox believers living in the region. By contrast,
the entire Asia-Pacific region is home to a mere 4% of the global Orthodox
population. Yet, today, the number of Orthodox Christians is increasing
in East and Southeast Asia, mainly due to the migration of people from
historically Eastern European Orthodox countries (Russians, Greeks,
Romanians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians). In recent years, however, interest
in Orthodoxy among the local population has also increased, which
creates the potential to increase the number of Orthodox believers in these
countries. The example of Japan, where the Orthodox Church over many
years has occupied a prominent place among religious denominations,
demonstrates what is possible.
.
ly
Korea: A Case Study in Orthodoxy, by Ambrose-Aristotle Zographos
on
The Orthodox presence in Korea can be traced back to a decision taken
in 1897 by the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Russia to begin a
se
Russian Orthodox mission to ‘serve the religious needs of the Orthodox
lu
Russians who lived in Korea and the possible spread of the holy Orthodox
na
Faith among the indigenous pagan population’. Two years later, deacon
so
Nicholas Alexeev (1869–1952) arrived in Seoul. On 17 February 1900, at
the Russian consulate in Seoul, the first Divine Liturgy was celebrated
er
and a temporary chapel dedicated to St Nicholas was consecrated. In
rp
1911, John Kang-Tak (1877–1939), who had previously served as a teacher
Fo
at the mission school, was ordained as deacon. He was the first Korean
e.
Orthodox member of the clergy and was ordained to the priesthood the
l
following year.
sa
After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Holy Synod decided to bring
re
the Orthodox mission in Seoul under the jurisdiction of the Russian Arch-
or
bishop of Tokyo, Sergii Tikhomirov, who was the nearest Orthodox bishop
n
to Korea. In 1932, the Korean cantor Alexis Kim Yi-Han (1895–1950) was
tio
ordained as a deacon by Archbishop Sergii and in 1947 he was ordained to

bu
the priesthood. On 9 July 1950, after celebrating the Divine Liturgy, Father
tri
Alexis was arrested by North Korean soldiers and was never seen again.
is
Shortly before this, Father Polikarp Priimak, who had served as head of
rd
the Orthodox mission from 1936 to 1949, had been arrested and expelled
fo
from the country. This marked the end of the first period of the Orthodox
mission in Korea under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate.
ot
During the Korean War (1950–3) Orthodox chaplains to the Greek

N
troops provided pastoral ministry to the scattered community of Orthodox

Koreans. The political situation after the war made it no longer possible
for the Orthodox Church in Korea to come under the jurisdiction of the
Russian Orthodox Church. In 1955 it came under the jurisdiction of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Ecumenical Patriarch
ensured that pastoral care was provided to the Orthodox Church in Korea
through a succession of arrangements until, on 20 April 2004, the Ecu
menical Patriarchate established the Holy Metropolis of Korea. Bishop
Orthodox 293
Soterios of Zela was elected first Metropolitan of Korea, and his enthrone-
ment took place on 20 June 2004.
As of 2019, the Holy Korean Orthodox Church has seven parishes in
South Korea (in Seoul, Busan, Incheon, Jeonju, Palang-Li, Chuncheon
and Ulsan) and one in North Korea (Pyeongyang). In addition there are
13 chapels, a monastery, a publishing house, two bookshops, a kinder-
garten, a home for the elderly, a cemetery and a training and conference
centre. Provision is also made for Orthodox immigrants from Russia and
other Slavic lands, with the Divine Liturgy being celebrated in their own
.
ly
languages. The Orthodox Metropolis of Korea, which is under the spiritual
on
authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, serves all
Orthodox who reside in Korea, without any ethnic, national, linguistic or
se
social discrimination.
lu
Great emphasis is given to the practical application of the gospel in
na
the daily life of the faithful. In other words, the Orthodox Christians of
so
Korea are taught that the Orthodox faith is not a theoretical approach
to the doctrinal and moral teaching of the church. On the contrary, they
er
are taught that their Orthodox faith must form and shape their daily
rp
actions, so that the Orthodox faith becomes life, not abstract knowledge
Fo
alone. Catechism lessons for those preparing to join the Orthodox Church
e.
stress that the gospel is not a textbook from which one obtains intellectual
l
knowledge but a way of life or mode of being. The Orthodox approach is

sa
based on the teaching of the holy fathers of the early church: ‘deed is more
re
important than theory’ (πράξις θεωρίας επίβασις).

or
For example, the Orthodox Church’s dogma regarding salvation as

n
theosis (deification of man), namely that Christ ‘became man so that we

tio
might be god-like’, teaches that Christ is the Saviour of not only the soul
bu
but also the body, which has implications for the daily lives of the faithful.
tri
Korean Orthodox are taught to respect their own bodies and the bodies
is
of others because Christ deified the human body through his incarnation,
rd
and he raised it glorified to the throne of God with his Ascension. One
fo
consequence is that the Orthodox faithful object to burning the dead. That
is why, in Korea, burial rather than cremation is practised for those who
ot
have died. The body of the deceased is delivered to mother earth, looking
N
forward to ‘the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come’.
Following a catechumen’s baptism, great emphasis is placed on partici-
pation in the liturgical and sacramental life of the church. The Orthodox
Church’s rich liturgical prayer and hymnologic tradition is a treasure
used in the daily, weekly and annual worship cycles to assist the faithful.
However, the liturgical life of the believer is not cut off from everyday
practice. After participating in the sacrament of the Eucharist during the
Divine Liturgy, which is the centre of the spiritual life of every Orthodox
Christian, the faithful continue to ‘live the liturgy’ in their everyday lives.
The true Light and the Holy Spirit that believers receive by consuming the
Body and Blood of Christ – not symbolically but substantially – positively
shapes their contact with their fellow human beings. Participating in the
liturgy helps Orthodox Christians to see in the face of every other person
the image of Christ ‘in another other form’; it strengthens them to behave
with sacrificial love towards every ‘little’ brother of Christ, ‘for whom
Christ died’. Consistent with the example of the God of Love, applied love
is the essence of Orthodox Christian life.
.
ly
Finally, Orthodox Christianity places great emphasis on the ascetic
on
way of life. ‘Orthodox spirituality’ is by no means words only, but daily
struggle – a struggle against fallen human passions and a struggle for
se
the acquisition of the Kingdom, by the grace of God. Fasting, vigilance,
lu
philanthropy and other means of spiritual activity contribute to the cul-
na
tivation of Orthodox spirituality and help the faithful in their effort to
so
become ‘partakers of divine nature’ (2 Peter 1: 4).
er
Bibliography
rp
Heliotis, Andreas, Ἡ Ὀρθοδοξία στὴν Κορέα, Συνοπτικὸ χρονικὸ τῆς Ἱεραποστολῆς τῆς
Fo
Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας στὴν Κορέα [Orthodoxy in Korea: Concise Chronicle of Orthodox
Mission in Korea] (Athens: Πατριαρχικὸν Ἵδρυμα Ὀρθοδόξου Ἱεραποστολῆς Ἄπω
e.
Ἀνατολῆς, 2005).
l
sa
Huang, Paulos, and Nikolay Samoylov (eds), International Journal of Sino-Western Studies, 14
(2018), Special Issue on Orthodoxy and China.
re
Православие на Дальнем Востоке, Выпуски 1–4 [Orthodoxy in the Far East, Vols 1–4] (St
or
Petersburg.: СПбГУ, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2004).

Sablina, Eleonora, Саблина Э. Б. 150 лет Православия в Японии. История Японской
n
tio
Православной Церкви и ее основатель Святитель Николай [150 years of Orthodoxy in

Japan. History of the Japanese Orthodox Church and its founder, Saint Nicholas of Japan] (St
bu
Petersburg: Дмитрий Буланин, 2006).

tri
Widmer, Eric, The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking during the Eighteenth Century
is
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976).

rd
fo
ot
N
Protestants
Timothy Lim
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European Protestants
.
ly
arrived in East and Southeast Asia. Protestant Christianity took root when
on
missionary societies and churches made headway among locals during
the nineteenth century. Since the twentieth century, Western-nurtured
se
and indigenous Protestantisms have emerged, developed and matured
lu
in various socio-political and postcolonial contexts, decrying oppression,
na
exploitation and unjust treatment of women and the poor. Churches also
so
experimented with educational, entrepreneurial-missional, health-care
er
and social initiatives.
rp
Protestant churches have grown rapidly in China and South Korea.
Large and growing churches are also found in Indonesia, Singapore and
Fo
Taiwan. The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have seen
e.
the conversion of ethnic groups of Akha, Hmong, Karen and Lahu to

l
Protestantism in Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. The

sa
Vietnamese governmental Committee for Religious Affairs, for example,

re
reported a sixfold multiplication of Protestants from 1975 to 2013 despite

or
state censuses claiming a declining interest in religious matters between

n
1999 and 2009. Many smaller-sized Protestant churches also faithfully

tio
preach and witness for Christ, theologise and raise disciples in Cambodia,
bu
Timor-Leste, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Taiwan, Thailand and

tri
Vietnam. Protestants in Japan and the Philippines remain few in number.

is
The Christian conversion rate in recent decades has grown more rapidly
rd
than the population growth rate in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, North

fo
Korea, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand.

ot
Theological Characteristics
N
During the past 60 years, Asian Protestants have inherited Western

Protestant denominational taxonomy and theologies, experimented with
indigenisation, faced pushback in contextualisation and experienced theo-
logical and ecclesiastical conundrums, such as the conservative–liberal
divide among Western Protestants and the reception of Spirit-filled
movements. The broad conservative–liberal divide continues sharply
today in China, Myanmar, South Korea and Taiwan, while its impact is
less intense among churches in Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore,
296 Timothy Lim
Thailand and Vietnam. Protestants who aligned with the World Council
of Churches (WCC) and the Christian Conference of Asia (CCA) were
regarded as ‘liberals’ because of their revisionist reception of Scripture as
one among many sources (instead of the only source) for theology. These
Protestants also expanded the gospel’s salvific witness to include advocacy
for the socially, economically and politically oppressed, including women,
children and the poor. In the perception of theologically conservative
Asian Protestants, the conciliar churches had compromised the faith by
embracing theological liberalism, disavowing the authority of Scripture,
.
ly
rejecting Jesus as God’s revelation and saviour, accommodating religious
on
pluralism and supplanting the gospel with advocacy in social justice and
creation care. The conservative constituency responded by contending for
se
biblical authority. Asian conservative Protestants retrieved local cultures
lu
within an a priori theological sufficiency of a closed canonical scripture
na
and accepted the agency and finality of Christ to save humanity.
so
To a great extent, the conservatives have won the debate. Today’s
mainline Protestants in Asia receive the infallible Bible as normative for
er
belief and conduct, centre their faith in Christ, preach the Evangelical
gospel, promote a ‘born again’ conversion experience and adhere to Evan- rp
Fo
gelical piety and social activism. And although the membership of the Asia
e.
Evangelical Alliance registers only national Evangelical associations rather

l
than mainline denominational membership, the national members of the

sa
Alliance in Japan, Korea and Singapore include Lutheran, Methodist and

re
Presbyterian denominational membership. Gordon-Conwell Theological

or
Seminary President Scott Sunquist rightly notes the increasingly Evangeli-

n
cal expressions of Asian mainline Protestantism.

tio
Asian Protestants have also been influenced by the Pentecostal/

bu
Charismatic movement. While many reacted against non-cessationist

tri
theologies between the 1960s and 1990s, mainline denominations today

is
have either accepted sign gifts (and, for some, even the glossolalia) or
rd
maintained a revisionist cessationist position (repudiating teaching on

fo
tongues but keeping an open mind about God’s continuing revelation).

Still, the drive of some Korean mega-churches to promulgate an affluent,
ot
N
Protestants in East and Southeast Asia, 1970

Region Total Christian Protestant % of region % of Christians
population population population Protestant Protestant
East Asia 996,425,000 11,456,000 3,366,000 0.3% 29.4%
Southeast Asia 280,607,000 50,740,000 9,093,000 3.2% 17.9%
Globe 3,700,578,000 1,229,309,000 204,506,000 5.5% 16.6%
Protestants 297
consumeristic expression of Christianity has come in for criticism. None-

theless, the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit has gained ascendancy
among the strongly Evangelical mainline and the less expressly Evangeli-
cal Protestants.
The Christian Conference of Asia and the Association for Theological
Education in South East Asia (ATESEA) have also seen more Evangelic
ally oriented participation by Protestant denominations that previously
followed higher critical presuppositions in biblical, theological and missio
logical scholarship. Particularly, the turnaround at ATESEA is partly
.
ly
attributed to Evangelical faculty joining and leading the Trinity Theological
on
College, Singapore, and its collaborative activity in the region. Though
this Evangelical fervour promotes collegiality rather than separatism and
se
seeks wider collaborative witness, a convergence between conciliar tradi-
lu
tions and Evangelical Protestant denominations in Asia is not immediately
na
apparent. The staunchly Evangelical Asia Theological Association has
so
leaned towards a Philippine Evangelical contextuality. In recent decades,
indigenous theologians and diaspora returnees have engaged theologically
er
with local and inter-religious sources. Sino-Christian and critical cross-
religious studies – Christian readings of Asian non-Christian religious rp
Fo
canons and traditions as well as using other religious/cultural lenses to
e.
read Christian Scripture, traditions and practices – represent innovative

l
Protestant theological engagement. Payap University in Chiang Mai now

sa
seeks inter-religious, less exclusive readings in Buddhist Thailand. The

re
development actualises an insight from early-twentieth-century Chinese

or
Christian scholar Ching-yi Cheng: inculturating Christianity might not

n
require that theologians do away with local ideas and cultural customs.
tio
bu
Ecumenism and Ecclesiology

tri
Asian Protestants share a historical-spiritual connection with the

is
European Reformational churches in a threefold theological, liturgical and

rd
ecclesiastical separation from Catholicism. They uphold the five ‘solas’ of

fo
Protestant faith along with a fourfold commitment to world evangelisa-

tion, discipleship nurture, transmitting faith and containing/curtailing
ot
N
Protestants in East and Southeast Asia, 2020

Region Total Christian Protestant % of region % of Christians
population population population Protestant Protestant
East Asia 1,663,619,000 128,787,000 45,832,000 2.8% 35.6%
Southeast Asia 669,016,000 153,102,000 32,703,000 4.9% 21.4%
Globe 7,795,482,000 2,518,834,000 486,010,000 6.2% 19.3%
298 Timothy Lim
cultural seduction. However, they share limited historical, ecclesiastical

and socio-cultural/political proximity with European Protestantism’s ecu-
menical development, particularly the modern ecumenical movement’s
attempt to repair the ecclesiological divide.
Thus, at the quincentenary of the Protestant Reformation, apart from
a few exceptions – in Japan, Myanmar and Singapore – the Protestant
and Catholic Churches in Asia registered their prejudicial, ecclesiological
and theological mutual condemnation or indifference, while historic
European Christianity ushered in a more conciliatory inter-church era.
.
ly
While the quincentenary was marked in Europe with notes of reconcilia-
on
tion and convergence, it was a very different story in Asia. On 31 October
2017, the learned emeritus Asian Methodist bishop the Reverend Dr
se
Robert Solomon resounded the sixteenth-century Protestant convictions
lu
to a multi-congregational Protestant church, Covenant Evangelical Free
na
Church in Singapore, while a well attended Roman Catholic Mass at
so
the Church of Divine Mercy in the same country said nothing about the
Reformation. Accordingly, conservative Asian Protestants resist initiatives
er
towards pan-Protestant–Catholic ecclesiality and keep a distance from
conciliarism. rp
Fo
Several examples illustrate the spectrum of the Asian Protestant
e.
reception of ecumenical efforts. When the WCC held its tenth assembly in
l
Busan, South Korea, in 2013, major South Korean Presbyterian churches

sa
protested against what they perceived as the WCC’s stances on condoning

re
homosexuality, gravitating towards socialism and denying Jesus as un-

or
paralleled mediator of salvation. In contrast, the Hong Kong Christian

n
Council, the Hong Kong Chinese Christian Churches Union and the Viet-
tio
namese mainline Protestant churches welcomed the WCC’s partnership/

bu
connection.
tri
Approaches to Protestant–Catholic relations vary too. In South Korea,

is
Gidokgyo (Protestants) do not regard Chonjugyo and Gatolic (Catholic

rd
Christianity) as faith siblings. Cambodian Protestants joined Catholics

fo
to translate the Bible into the Khmer language amid their antagonism
towards Catholics. On the other hand, the Christian Conference of Asia
ot
N
Changes in Protestants in East and Southeast Asia, 1970–2020, growth rate, % per year
Region Total population Christian population Protestant population
East Asia 1.03% 4.96% 5.36%
Globe 1.50% 1.45% 1.75%
Protestants 299
and Catholics jointly stood in solidarity for ecumenical formation with

regard to social, developmental, gender and political injustices, as well
as advocacy to overcome poverty and to respond to HIV/AIDS concerns
and other crises and emergencies. At CCA’s international consultation
for ecumenism in Asia, held in July 2017, the Asia Evangelical Alliance,
the Roman Catholic Church’s Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences
(FABC) and the CCA agreed to witness a ‘more relevant and unique Asian
ecclesiology . . . with a vision of seeking to build the Kingdom of God’. The
Myanmar Council of Churches and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of
.
ly
Myanmar have started a joint commission, while the Presbyterian Church
on
in Taiwan and the Roman Catholic Church have organised reconciliatory/
unity prayers together.
se
Intra-Protestant fellowship exists for different reasons. In East Asia, the
lu
China Christian Council and the union of Three-Self Patriotic Movement
na
(TSPM) Protestant Churches pledge to construct an indigenised Chinese
so
Christian socialism. The National Christian Council of Japan seeks
solidarity with the oppressed/discriminated and to promote mutual
er
understanding and peace between people and religions. Meanwhile, the
rp
Evangelical Mongolian Church Council, a 2012-established association
Fo
of Mongolian pastors and elders, collaborates with Intercessory Prayer
e.
Network, Word Harvest, Cru, Help International, Youth With A Mission,

l
JCS International, Genesis-AOM and Scripture Union to promote a

sa
24-hour prayer movement. In South Korea, Protestants have been divided

re
between the Korean National Council of Churches (a perceived political

or
and ecumenical-liberal human rights advocacy agency) and an ecumenic

n
ally conservative Christian Council of Korea (CCK). Recent schisms saw

tio
the formation of associations serving the Tonghap, Koryo, Hapdong and

bu
Koshin Presbyterian Churches.

tri
In Southeast Asia, the Cambodian Christian Protestant Community

is
seeks to represent ‘all denominations and independent churches’ to the

rd
government of Cambodia. Otherwise, all other national councils represent

fo
the churches as needed, serve the cause of intra-Christian unity, bring

churches together for common witness and facilitate inter-religious
ot
dialogue for peaceful coexistence in their respective socio-political con

N
texts. These councils include: the Communion of Churches in Indonesia

(
Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia); the Council of Churches of
Malaysia (Majlis Gereja-Gereja Malaysia), along with the Christian
Federation of Malaysia and the National Evangelical Christian Fellowship;
the Myanmar Council of Churches; the National Council of Churches in
the Philippines (Sangguniang Pambansang Mga Simbahan sa Pilipinas);
and the National Council of Churches, Singapore. The Philippines council
includes Old Catholic traditions but not Roman Catholics.
300 Timothy Lim
Worship and Liturgy

In 1999, a Western liturgical musicologist observed that Asian churches
used more Western liturgical resources than local sources. For him, the lack
of contextually flavoured worship resources and liturgies did not match an
ethno-musicological fact: three of the world’s five major musical notation
systems originate from Asia (China, India and Indonesia) while the other
two originate in the Middle East (Persia) and the West. An appeal by the
late Sri Lankan theologian D. T. Niles for more indigenous productions,
which began with the East Asian Christian Council Hymnal (1963), gave
.
ly
impetus to I-to Loh’s pioneering collation of more than 20 Asian hymnals.
on
Today, indigenous Asian hymnal literature/production is expanding.
Christian Music from Asia for the World (2014) is revised from Sound the
se
Bamboo – CCA Hymnal 2000 and selected from hymnals from 20 Asian
lu
countries (and in 44 Asian languages) published since Asian Songs of
na
Worship (1988). In China, besides Putian Songzhan, known largely as
so
Hymnal of Universal Praise (Shanghai, 1936), the indigenously composed
er
Jianan Shige (Hymnals/Songs of Canaan), by Hui-minority born-again
rp
composer Lü Xiaomin, has been used throughout Chinese churches. In
Taiwan, conservative Lutherans and Presbyterians still rely on the older
Fo
Zhangmeizhichuan (Stream of Praise), whereas Hillsong worship songs
e.
are sung in newer independent international-styled churches such as

l
Ling Yang Tang (literally translated as Spirit-embracing Temple/Hall).

sa
The Evangelical Formosan Church General Assembly (EFCGA) in North

re
America, a Taiwanese-migrant Christian establishment with an indigen

or
ous vision, has through its Logos Evangelical Fellowship produced

n
indigenous worship, theological and ministerial literature for use in its 140
tio
congregations in Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand and Asia. The Presby

bu
terian Church of Taiwan produced Sheng-si (Sacred Hymnal, 2009) after

tri
28 years of editorial collation to provide a wider historical, ecumenical,

is
contextual, multicultural and liturgical representation. Sheng-si comprises

rd
50% Western hymns (650 hymns), 25% Taiwanese tribal-language songs

fo
and 25% majority-world resources. The production of bilingual English–

Korean hymnals also raises issues of contextualising worship.
ot
Observers have regularly noted intense and disciplined pursuit of God

N
and spiritual vibrancy among Asian Protestants, especially those who are
subject to religious persecution. Rural churches in China maintain fervent
dawn prayers. South Korean Protestants hold ardent daybreak prayers in
the mountains. Unlike the Chinese and Korean Protestants who intercede
for the world and for national affairs, a recent study of prayers among
Protestants in the Philippines reveals that Filipino Protestants see prayer as
petition-making or spontaneous appeal to God to improve one’s personal
conditions; prayer is not conceived as following a formula or reading a
Protestants 301
(monologue) litany. In Islamic countries, Protestant spirituality is tested

as disciples live out their faith. Across these and other churches, spiritual
hunger is also evident in believers’ active gatherings and participation
in Bible-study groups. On creative ministries of worship and service,
the Teatro Ekumenikal, a cultural theatre group of the National Council
of Churches in the Philippines, expresses worship as doxology through
creative arts, using the medium to educate and invite audiences to better
understand social justice issues and to provide a wider understanding of
prayer, worship and spirituality. Yadong, a Taiwanese Protestant drama
.
ly
group, exercises a similar ministry.
on
On indigenous worship and liturgy, scenarios vary too. In Vietnam,
some Hmong Protestant congregations gather to receive American
se
Hmong Protestant preachers’ sermons that are streamed live via Skype.
lu
Younger generations in Vietnamese Christian congregations draw readily
na
from Hillsong’s YouTube worship resources. Singapore’s Chinese-dialect-
so
speaking congregations rely on Mandarin and Chinese-dialect resources
from Malaysia, Taiwan and occasionally China. Otherwise, the predomin
er
antly English-speaking congregations across various denominations
rp
in Singapore use Western hymnals and worship litanies for traditional
Fo
worship services and contemporary Western worship resources for the
e.
contemporary worship services. The pervasiveness of contemporary

l
worship culture presents challenges for nurturing indigenous theologic

sa
ally deep and liturgically rich worship.

re
or
Mission and Witness

n
China, Mongolia and South Korea have all seen exponential Protestant
tio
growth as a result of conversion to Christianity. However, the upward

bu
growth rates have tapered with secularisation and commercialisation. The

tri
conversion growth rate in South Korea has stagnated because of growing

is
distrust and dissatisfaction with aggressive Protestant evangelism and

rd
frequent moral/ethical scandals among Protestant ministers.

fo
In Mongolia, criticisms arising from the circulation of suicide notes

from Christian youths who wrote ‘I gave my life to Jesus’ and videos of
ot
women in tears praying ‘Father, use me’ have led social critics to wrongly
N
accuse churches of indoctrinating youths and women to disregard filial

piety and familial responsibilities, respectively. Mongolian public miscon-
strual of Protestantism is also due to a misassociation of Korean-initiated
Moonism and Protestantism and a reaction to many disrespectful criti-
cisms of Buddhism by Thomas Terry, owner of Eagle Television, a 24-hour
news and overseas Christian broadcasting agency in Mongolia.
Despite these pushbacks on evangelistic fervour, Korean Protestant
churches, such as Chunghyeon Church and Gwangrim Methodist Church,
302 Timothy Lim
have sought a turnaround by planting churches in newer residential

complexes, which have generated new conversion growth. Mongolian
Protestants have redirected attention to social services. Churches have
been learning the correlations between stewardship and witness as they
become more discerning in evangelism and in managing public responses
to the Christian message. The turnaround will take time.
Asian Protestants continue to be a modernising force for society. In the
twentieth century, missionary activities were unwittingly perceived as pro-
grammes for Westernising and modernising Asia. This opened doors for
.
ly
Christian outreach (as in Korea) despite concerns about the compatibility
on
of Christian exclusivity with local cultures (for example, in Japan) and mis-
perception of missionary services as tools for Western political agents/spies
se
(as in Vietnam). Nonetheless, Protestant mission was favourably received
lu
until there were socio-political outcries for ‘de-Westernisation’ and ‘de-
na
Christianisation’. In Taiwan, Presbyterian outreach to natives (yuan zuming)
so
helped indigenous peoples to stay current with the urban populace. Retro-
spectively, Protestant mission indirectly facilitated a transfer of knowledge
er
and introduced Western models of economic growth, education, health
rp
care and modernisation for a developing Asia, which expedited progress
Fo
(albeit unevenly).
e.
One example of Protestantism’s modernising force is the increasing role

l
of women in Christian leadership. Today, women hold leadership roles

sa
and ordained ministries in various Protestant denominational churches

re
in Southeast Asia. The Lutheran World Federation reports that 41 of

or
its 54 Asian member churches ordain women in ministry. The World

n
Communion of Reformed Churches’ declaration on women in ministry

tio
registers that only nine Asian member churches did not ordain women in
bu
ministry. Protestant views of gender equality contribute to emancipation of

tri
women in paternalistic Asia. In many Chinese house churches and TSPM

is
churches, women hold select leadership roles. Indonesian Protestants – es-

rd
pecially in the Gereja Masehi Injili di Timor, the Christian Church of Jawa,
fo
the Batak Protestant Christian Church in Sumatra and even the staunchly
conservative Christian and Missionary Alliance-founded Gereja Kemah
ot
Injil Indonesia – now ordain women ministers. Ordained women ministers

N
serve in congregations of the Methodist Church in Singapore and represent

them on international theological commissions. In Taiwan, the Presby
terian and Lutheran churches have women ministers sharing in the pulpit,
although theologically trained and gifted women leaders still provide sup-
porting roles to male leaders, unlike their counterparts in Hong Kong. The
Church of Christ in Thailand, too, has welcomed gender equality.
Promoting gender-equal leadership will remain challenging. In China,
especially in TSPM churches, critical appointments are still held by men.
Protestants 303
A recent interpretation of Calvinist theology has swayed Chinese house

churches from their long-standing reliance on women pastors and leaders.
In Malaysia, Methodist denominational leadership positions are still filled
primarily by males. Ironically, in Mongolia, even though women leaders
are well received locally, Western missionaries have frowned upon local
women in church leadership. In Myanmar, Presbyterian and Baptist
women pastors often undertake low-profile services, while Methodist
women pastors lead more openly. In South Korea, patriarchal sociality
remains the norm despite extensive reporting of ministers abusing and
.
ly
mistreating their wives.
on
Protestant missions and churches will remain invested in education.
Innumerable institutions of higher learning in China, South Korea and
se
Singapore today can trace their origins to the efforts of early missionaries
lu
and, later, local Protestants. These Christian schools provide literacy and
na
facilitate upward social mobility for the poor, thereby transforming social,
so
economic and political life for Christians and other residents.
As urbanisation and secularisation take effect across Asia, governments
er
will exercise more leadership in policy-making and providing education.
rp
Programmes of modernisation (by-products of historic and ongoing
Fo
Protestant mission and witness) and educational endeavours started by
e.
Protestant missions have, in many cases, come under state jurisdiction or,
l
if they remain as private schools, have lost part or all of their autonomy
sa
upon compliance with state policies and the ruling governmental and
re
educational ideologies.
or
For example, Christian schools in Singapore adhere to the Educational

n
Department’s policy and curriculum and are required to employ teachers

tio
of other religions. In Malaysia, the 433 Christian mission schools serving

bu
240,000 learners are subjected to restrictions that limit their autonomy.

tri
For instance, teachers are hired by the government’s educational authori-

is
ties. In contemporary Myanmar and Vietnam, Christian schools that are

rd
independently owned, administered and financed are sought-after educa-

fo
tional institutions, although these schools are also subjected to provincial

and/or township oversight.
ot
Postcolonial Protestant churches have been facilitating social change.

N
Asian churches that align with the WCC seek to free society and the
church from colonial, neo-colonial and Western ideological values and in-
fluences. They continue to decry socio-economic exploitation and political
oppression as well as the unjust treatment of women, ethnic minorities
and the poor. They build upon medical and social missions started by
Western missionaries. On the other hand, mainline Evangelical Protestants
regularly critique those aligned with the WCC as having supplanted the
gospel with advocacy in social justice and creation care.
304 Timothy Lim
Despite mutual criticisms of each other’s efforts as either too eternally

minded or else too justice oriented (to the neglect of offering Christ’s eternal
salvation), both these streams and many others in between have conscien-
tiously provided social and medical services in an ever-changing, widely
diverse and socio-economically unevenly developing Asia. For instance,
the Christian Conference of Asia and the Asia Theological Association
have been independently supporting programmes to eradicate poverty
and prevent economic exploitation. In the last decade, both spectrums
have experimented with agricultural–missional– entrepreneurial initia-
.
ly
tives known as ‘business as mission’.
on
Fighting poverty and injustice is a response to the region’s income gap
and problems of urbanisation. Protestantism will perhaps have to rethink
se
its role as an agent of spirituality and societal development, however.
lu
In Vietnam, for instance, although Protestantism has reached a sizeable
na
ethnic minority in the lowlands and highlands, the World Bank reports
so
the highest poverty head-counts among ethnic minorities. In Mongolia,
Protestants seek social reform to counter vices such as alcoholism, abuse
er
and criminality. Protestants in China will have to come alongside the 30
rp
million rural Chinese in extreme poverty, including Protestants living
Fo
in rural areas, in their struggle for survival as urbanisation reshapes
e.
towns, cities and provinces, and to complement the state’s goal to raise
l
the annual income for the poorest by 2020. Protestants will likely expand
sa
their education, health-care and social-service provision in Cambodia,

re
Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam besides the

or
hundreds of Protestant schools, 40 or more hospitals and many social

n
services in the region.

tio
Opportunities abound for Asian churches to develop and lead

bu
boundary-crossing missions as they experience conversion growth, send

tri
staggering numbers of missionaries globally (particularly from South

is
Korea), inspire more social entrepreneurs and see indigenous Chinese

rd
gospel-heralds bringing the gospel ‘back to Jerusalem’. Churches would

fo
benefit from studying and implementing trans- and inter-Asian migrations

for ministry, such as how Filipinos witness for Christ as migrant workers.
ot
Learning from oral traditions will better aid the communication of the
N
gospel to oral cultures and to Asia’s increasingly affluent, technologically

advanced, secular (or even anti-Christian) society. Asian churches have
yet to focus on the emerging areligious, non-religious and ‘deconverted’
populations. Less denominationally driven ‘insider movements’ and
inter-denominational collaboration will increase. Cross-denominational
Protestants will likely receive Pentecostal/Charismatic spirituality as
harbingers of evangelism and church growth despite pushback by
Evangelicals and mainline Protestants. Perhaps the voluntary ecclesial
Protestants 305
association of Protestants, as well as the attraction to pragmatism, will

lead churches to chart Christianity in the Global South less dogmatically
than the theological-ecclesiological structures.
Inter-regional and inter-ethnic opportunities could inspire constructive
missions. The need for contextualisation in church life, discipleship and
evangelism will remain. For instance, Mongolia might become a base to
nurture religious exchange for Northeast Asia, especially North Korea,
given its geopolitical and economic goodwill relations with Russia, China
and North Korea. Ethnic minority Christians from the Chin, Cachin and
.
ly
Karen people could potentially reach 132 other ethnic minority groups in
on
Myanmar if they could overcome the norm of only evangelising their own
ethnic groups and seek social justice for constituencies beyond themselves.
se
In Vietnam, Protestants who have actively won over ethnic groups could
lu
broaden their reach by exploring urban ministries and addressing urban
na
poverty to the rising urban middle-class Vietnamese.
so
Religious Liberty and Inter-religious Relations
er
Today, humanity does not consistently respect basic human rights regard-
rp
less of culture, ethnicity, race, religion, language, sexual orientation, social
Fo
standing and other socio-political identity markers. Protestants continue
e.
to experience persecution. As society becomes urbanised and affluent,

l
those ‘left behind’, including the religious faithful, will face other forms of
sa
discrimination. The test of ‘lived experience’ in discipleship will get tense

re
as the societal cultures of consumerism, selfishness, incivility and godless-

or
ness increase.
n
State policy on religious liberty and inter-religious relations affects

tio
religious life in the 17 countries of the region. Christians enjoy relative

bu
freedom to practise their religion in Singapore’s secular, social-

tri
democratic and multi-religious society. Likewise, in predominantly

is
Buddhist-populated Taiwan and Thailand, Christians may practise their

rd
faith while respecting Buddhists. In socialist China as well as Confucian-

fo
dominated Vietnam, religious groups practise religion with stipulated

state sanctions.
ot
However, Christians practise their faith more reservedly in sharia-law

N
Malaysia and Pancasila-Islamic Indonesia, although the constitutions of

both countries grant religious adherents freedom to practise their faiths.
Violence against Christians occurs frequently. Though some have re
conceptualised cultural civilising (or adat) in the aftermath of past conflicts
in Sulawesi, south Kalimantan and Ambon, the bombings of churches in
Surabaya killed more than 140 in May 2018, testing inter-religious trust. In
the Catholic Philippines, religious violence caused by Islamic jihadists is a
constant concern of the churches.
306 Timothy Lim
In Buddhist-privileged Mongolia, though its constitution permits the

practising of select religions, including Christianity, Christians who evan-
gelise actively have unwittingly aggravated Buddhist–Christian tension.
Some Buddhist monks criticised Christians for receiving foreign resources
and for kowtowing to foreign cultures and religious practices. Christians,
on the other hand, attacked the Buddhist religion and the concept of
salvation in a karmic worldview. Muslim–Christian relations have been
particularly challenging in Bayan-Ulgii, a largely Muslim province in
Mongolia. In Theravada-Buddhist Myanmar, roughly 75% of the Burmese
.
ly
are exclusive Buddhists. Some Buddhists regularly antagonise Cachin,
on
Chin and Karen Christians, though in recent decades antagonism has been
redirected to the Rohingya Muslims.
se
In China, the redrawing of state laws on religious practice and monitor-
lu
ing under local township jurisdiction instead of reporting to the religious
na
affairs bureau in February 2018 meant that Chinese Protestants – whether
so
previously TSPM or registered or non-registered house churches – will ex-
perience pressures limiting religious practice. The prospect looks bleak for
er
non-registered churches even as TSPM churches in Shanghai, Wenzhou
rp
and other towns and provinces have shut down or will have to reformu-
Fo
late orthodoxy for Sinicisation. With regard to North Korea, reports of
e.
defectors and foreign workers paint a graphic picture of religious and

l
political restrictions. Whether the North Korean government will enact the
sa
constitutional guarantee of genuine freedom of religious practice remains

re
unknown. Mission agencies, however, have reported that death sentences

or
and/or imprisonment are stated penalties for practising Christianity.

n
Religious persecutions in Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam have

tio
receded as economic development has helped their governments and

bu
people to become better disposed towards Christianity. Formerly, local

tri
Christians were regarded as spies for foreign governments. As the Viet-

is
namese government embraces the market economy, its former suspicion

rd
has diminished. The recognition of minorities in upcoming years remains

fo
uncertain at present, since ethnic minorities continue to experience per

secution from dominant groups. In Malaysia and Indonesia, an underlying
ot
inter-religious animosity still stirs persecutions and hate crimes against

N
Christians. This was evident in the bombings at Surabaya in Indonesia

in May 2018 and the kidnapping of Malaysian Pastor Raymond Koh in
February 2017 (he remains missing as of May 2019).
As Asian nations regulate religious practice and inter-religious relations,
Protestants will grow in their discipleship and love amid animosity and
hatred from the religious other and/or government officials. Responding to
threats of religious fundamentalism, Asian Protestants will likely maintain
their exclusivistic understanding of faith amid limited collaborations
Protestants 307
for inter-religious community development. On the opposite end of the

spectrum, the Bangkok-based Asian Forum on Cultural Development,
which invited Buddhists, Christians and Muslims to serve in community
development in several Southeast Asian countries, has blazed an inter-
religious trail.
Social and Political Presence

Protestants’ socio-political presence contributes a vital moral compass and
provides a sanctifying role to society, albeit expressed and felt differently
.
ly
in the region. Having survived the wars, Japanese and Korean Protestants
on
still chart an alternative national consciousness. Protestant churches that
received North Korean Christian refugees during the Korean War (1950–3)
se
have grown into mega-churches, such as the Chunghyeon Presbyterian
lu
Church, Gwangrim Methodist Church, Somang Church and Youngnak
na
Church. Founding and leading members of these churches have been core
so
members of South Korea’s conservative right-wing movement. However,
Korean Presbyterians, despite their active nationalistic influence during
er
the Japanese colonial period, have been losing public confidence:
rp
many ministers have evaded taxes, been caught in sex scandals and/or
Fo
embezzled funds and pursued aggressive proselytising policies to finance
e.
high-salaried ministers and construct opulent church buildings.

l
Besides supporting the Mingjing dang (Democratic Progressive Party),

sa
Taiwanese Presbyterians’ active advocacy for human rights and minority

re
rights, including the rights of indigenous minorities (yuan zuming), is

or
widely acknowledged. In recent years, politically inactive Protestants

n
have started to engage public discourse, such as joining the Sunflower

tio
Movement to evaluate the legislative procedure in 2014 and contribut-

bu
ing to public debate about changing the constitutional definition of the

tri
spousal relationship in a civil marriage to possibly accept a ‘multi-partner-

is
type familial relationship’ (duoyuan cheng jia) in 2016.

rd
Asian Protestants continue to offer either active or implicit support

fo
to peacekeeping. The National Council of Churches in South Korea, the

Korean Christian Federation in North Korea and the World Council of
ot
Churches have fervently prayed and sought socio-political reconciliation

N
for the Korean peninsula. At the time of writing, there are hopes that these
prayers might by answered by the Panmunjom Declaration of 27 April 2018
in which North and South Korea committed to demilitarise the peninsula
and usher in a new period of peaceful and prosperous coexistence.
In many contexts, Protestants struggle to respond effectively to conten-
tious civil-religious issues. Three examples suffice. Chinese Protestants
still struggle to accept or repudiate the official position of the China
Christian Council and the TSPM churches on Sinicisation (that is, the
308 Timothy Lim
development of a Chinese Christian socialism/nationalism). In Mongolia,

Protestants have refused to join social movements demonstrating against
child abuse, opposing corruption, demanding socio-political transpar-
ency and expressing concern for ecology. The church has remained silent
while witnessing environmental degradation, deforestation and pollution
of rivers and lakes caused by urbanisation and irresponsible mining. In
Myanmar, ethnic minority Christians from the Chin, Cachin and Karen
people still seek social justice only for themselves but not for the 132 other
ethnic groups. Such Protestant exclusivity contrasts with Buddhists’ active
.
ly
social engagement for the masses.
on
Protestants can benefit from rethinking their witness, such as how they
might contribute to national development amid pressing socio-political
se
concerns and without infringing church–state regulations. Without col-
lu
lective effort, a few Christians elected to public office – in Indonesia,
na
Malaysia, Mongolia, Singapore, South Korea – will produce only sporadic
so
efforts to effect public good. Consider Mongolia again: though the land
contains abundant mineral deposits, the mining industry that has been
er
driving economic growth has often done so at the expense of people’s live-
rp
lihoods. Protestants’ refusal to seek the nation’s development and speak
Fo
against exploitation leads to a loss of credibility and a missed opportunity
e.
to witness to the faith amidst a suffering people.

l
sa
Conclusion
re
In Christian witness, postcolonial Protestant emancipatory trajectories will

or
continue to call churches to act on behalf of God and the suffering of mar-
n
ginalised people to restore peace and justice, facilitate reconciliation and

tio
care for the voiceless. As the former executive secretary of the Christian
bu
Conference of Asia, Hope S. Antone, observes, Christians witness in the

tri
midst of massive poverty, powerlessness and pluralism. Hopefully,

is
future Asian Protestant emancipatory programmes, such as Micah Asia,

rd
will overcome impasses between the theological/missional shibboleths

fo
of the earlier Asian Christian generation, which followed either radical

postcolonial, liberational praxis paradigms or the cautious conservative
ot
Evangelical aversion to social justice witness. Missional partnership in the

N
future will no longer impose Western ideals or dominate local missions.

Observers have also noted a nascent development of philanthropy, a
significant rise of ultra-wealthy Asians, as well as a predominant lower-
income cluster of churches that contribute in their different ways to social
development. If Protestants do not construct a viable Asian Protestant
social teaching to inform the churches’ social justice service and evangel
ism, others will soon take the initiative as the rich–poor disparity widens.
Protestants 309
Bibliography
Kwan, Simon Shui-Man, Postcolonial Resistance and Asian Theology (London: Routledge,
2013).
Ngo, Tam, The New Way: Protestants and the Hmong in Vietnam (Washington, DC: University
of Washington Press, 2016).
Toh, I-to, In Search for Asian Sounds and Symbols in Worship, ed. Michael Poon (Singapore:
Trinity Theological College, 2012).
Press, 2014).
Yung, Hwa, ‘South-East Asian Protestantism to the Present Day’, in Alister E. McGrath
.
and Darren C. Marks (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Protestantism (Oxford: Wiley-
ly
Blackwell, 2004), 206–9.
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Catholics
Daniel Franklin E. Pilario cm
.
ly
Catholicism is a minority religion in East and Southeast Asia, with the
on
exception of the Philippines and Timor-Leste. In this context, how does the
Catholic consciousness coexist with other ancient religions? Let me start
se
with a short narrative. I once taught a theology class for Catholic young
lu
people from different countries in Southeast Asia. To start a lesson on the
na
Resurrection, I asked them to identify what ‘resurrection’ means to them
so
and to give an example. One student from Myanmar volunteered her ex-
er
perience: ‘My brother who died years ago was resurrected in my younger
rp
brother who was born right after’. Another one from Thailand shared a
parallel experience about his cousin who acted, talked and walked like his
Fo
uncle who had long ago passed away. Their classmates from Laos narrated
e.
similar stories. They truly were convinced that their relatives had ‘resur-
l
rected’. Were these really about resurrection or perhaps reincarnation?

sa
Were they examples of incommensurable religious paradigms or syncretic

re
exchange? Did the experiences evince lack of evangelisation or, rather, in-
or
culturation? How does the Catholic consciousness endure alongside other

n
ancient religions in this milieu?

tio
bu
Catholic Christianity as Minority Religion

tri
What are the effects of Catholicism’s (and Christianity’s) minority

is
position? Like all minorities (cultural, political and economic), religious

rd
minorities suffer three problems: security, equality and identity.

fo
First, Catholic/Christian minorities experience violence and persecu-

tion. Security issues for minorities can be more difficult in authoritarian
ot
states, but the everyday lives of religious minorities anywhere can be quite
N
harsh and violent. Take the case of Myanmar. The 2016 Report of the US
Commission on International Religious Freedom identifies different forms of
harassment of Catholic/Christian congregations by the Buddhist military
and government: devastation of churches, destruction of cemeteries, land
grabbing, arbitrary arrests, forced mass interrogation of believers inside
churches, brainwashing and forced conversion, sexual violence in church
compounds, forced displacement of villages and torture of church leaders
and members. Thus, it is not only the Rohingyas who suffer in present-day
Catholics 311
Myanmar as is widely publicised; the Christians too and other cultural

minorities suffer with them.
Second, minorities are always in danger of being discriminated against.
Opportunities given to the majority are most often not afforded to others.
Laws and customs are structured to the advantage of the dominant groups.
For instance, government promotion institutionally favours Buddhists
in Myanmar. Christians are sanctioned for not supporting Buddhist ac-
tivities, and Christian employees are forced to work on Sundays without
remuneration.
.
ly
Third, minorities suffer from problems of identity. On the one hand,
on
the minority needs to assert its identity constantly vis-à-vis the hegemonic
group. On the other hand, there is also a danger of being co-opted by the
se
majority group and in the process losing one’s identity. These directions
lu
engender two understandable reactions – aggression and isolationism.
na
Thus, threatened with violence and discrimination, there is a tendency
so
for Christians (including Catholics) to aggressively assert their religious
convictions. At the same time, because of fear and anxiety, Catholics might
er
isolate themselves into their own enclaves to protect themselves.
However, in countries such as Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand rp
Fo
and Japan, Catholics are also described as a ‘creative minority’, whose
e.
leading institutions are influential in the fields of education, business and

l
social service. It is not all bad news for the Christian minorities.
sa
re
Catholicism under Communist Regimes

or
Catholicism in countries under communist rule is numerically insig-

n
nificant and has not grown substantially in recent decades. For instance,
tio
Laos has only 47,000 Catholics, distributed among four apostolic vicari-
bu
ates (small dioceses directly under Vatican supervision) with only three
tri
bishops and a few priests in charge. Similarly, Cambodia has only 25,000
is
members, divided into three apostolic vicariates. Most of these churches

rd
are dependent on foreign help, both in theological training and in their

fo
human and material resources. Seminary formation is at its barest

minimum and local creative theological production is almost nil. These
ot
N
Catholics in East and Southeast Asia, 1970

Region Total Christian Catholic % of region % of Christians
population population population Catholic Catholic
East Asia 996,425,000 11,456,000 2,202,000 0.2% 19.2%
Southeast Asia 280,607,000 50,740,000 37,451,000 13.3% 73.8%
Globe 3,700,578,000 1,229,309,000 658,556,000 17.8% 53.6%
312 Daniel Franklin E. Pilario
churches are working closely with NGOs dedicated to empowerment and

social transformation. External agents (foreign religious congregations
and lay pastoral workers) use NGOs as their entry point into the local life
of these churches.
In China and Vietnam, however, official communist atheism holds a
dominant position. The relationship between China and the Vatican is well
documented. The situation of Vietnam is less publicised. The main issue in
both countries is the rejection of external influence in their own religious
affairs. The infiltration of ‘foreign forces’ refers mainly to Vatican incursion
.
ly
and the presence of international missionaries. Religion is tolerated only if
on
it is subservient to the desires of the ruling party. This is enshrined in the
countries’ constitutions and their laws. In the case of China, two parallel
se
Catholic churches exist – the official Patriotic Church, which is an organ
lu
of the Chinese Communist Party, and the so-called ‘underground church’,
na
which professes its loyalty to the Pope. The animosity and suspicions
so
from both sides are felt in the everyday lives of ordinary Catholic faithful
and church leaders on the ground. The underground church blames the
er
Patriotic Church for living a religion of convenience and compromise.
Patriotic Church members are convinced that if they want to live their rp
Fo
faith in the present context, they need to get out of their isolation and work
e.
with the government. The low-grade conflict comes to a head on the issue
l
of the unauthorised ordination of bishops. Some bishops are ordained

sa
without Rome’s approval and others without the Communist Party’s

re
permission. The Vatican, however, has made some diplomatic inroads in

or
recent years. Though still tentative, the Pope signed an agreement with
n
Chinese officials on 22 September 2018 to accept seven bishops whom

tio
the Vatican had excommunicated earlier because their nomination was

bu
illegal. China for its part is amenable to granting the Vatican more control
tri
over underground churches and the appointment of bishops. However,

is
this event also created a stir among underground Catholics, who felt this
rd
agreement is a sell-out to the Communist Party.

fo
Though Vietnam has been under communist rule since 1975, Christi
anity in the country finds itself in a quite different situation. Followers
ot
N
Catholics in East and Southeast Asia, 2020

Region Total Christian Catholic % of region % of Christians
population population population Catholic Catholic
East Asia 1,663,619,000 128,787,000 16,901,000 1.0% 13.1%
Southeast Asia 669,016,000 153,102,000 102,371,000 15.3% 66.9%
Globe 7,795,482,000 2,518,834,000 1,239,909,000 15.9% 49.2%
Catholics 313
of Catholicism, still a minority compared with Buddhists, nonetheless

comprise a great number of the Vietnamese population and have shown
continuous growth. Unlike China, Vietnam does not have an official
church. The Vietnamese Catholic Church keeps a parallel organisational
structure with worldwide Catholicism. Dioceses and parishes are quite
free to practise their religious and apostolic services. However, religious
freedom is understood as freedom within limits imposed by the state. The
church is enjoined to ask permission from the government for some crucial
activities in exchange for being ‘protected’. Not to seek approval first
.
ly
means forfeiture of such protection. As in China, religion is not respected
on
for itself. The state is not convinced that it is intrinsic to social and human
existence. Its freedom is tolerated due to the advantages its social services
se
render to the population.
lu
na
Predominantly Catholic Countries
so
The relationship between church and state is precarious not only in
countries where Catholics are in the minority; the same ambivalence is
er
also present in predominantly Catholic countries. Both the Philippines
and Timor-Leste display this ambivalent relationship between religion rp
Fo
and the state in different contexts.
e.
After the Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste in 1975, the Catholic

l
Church – a formidable social force since the Portuguese colonial regime –

sa
went on the defensive. It was seen as the main threat to the integration
re
of East Timor into Indonesia. With the Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for
or
an Independent East Timor) driven to the mountains by the invading

n
military, the church almost single-handedly guided the people through

tio
the whole occupation (1975–99). The Indonesian government did every-

bu
thing it could to subjugate them. It tried all means at its disposal: co-option
tri
(such as bribing teachers to leave Catholic schools and transfer to govern-

is
ment schools); discrediting church leaders or fielding Indonesian priests;

rd
killing of priests and religious; resettlement and enforced starvation; and

fo
sexual victimisation of women. The Indonesian foreign minister at the

time, Adam Malik, hinted that around 50,000 or perhaps 80,000 were
ot
N
Changes in Catholics in East and Southeast Asia, 1970–2020, growth rate, % per year
Region Total population Christian population Catholic population
East Asia 1.03% 4.96% 4.16%
Globe 1.50% 1.45% 1.27%
killed during the first two years of the occupation, not counting those who
disappeared, were tortured or were internally displaced.
But East Timorese Catholics survived and lived what one author calls
‘a spirituality of resistance’ by taking care of the victims, opening the
necessary space for their political ideas, providing development assis-
tance and implementing non-violent protests on the ground. Through the
direction and strategic collaboration of their leaders – José Ramos-Horta
and Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo – they campaigned for inter
national support, leading to the withdrawal of the Indonesian military and
.
ly
the entrance of UN peacekeeping forces. Powerful Christian metaphors
on
served as the resistance’s rallying symbols: the suffering God who is vin-
dicated, the glorious death of martyrs and the victory of the cross.
se
The same role was taken by the Catholic Church during the difficult
lu
years of the Marcos dictatorship (1972–86) in the Philippines that led to the
na
famous People Power Revolution. This history has been well documented.
so
At present, the Catholic Church remains the bastion of resistance against
the violent regime of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines and his ‘war on
er
drugs’. Being a threat to political hegemony, the church is easily targeted
rp
by any regime’s brutal imposition of power. But because of its formidable
Fo
influence in both people’s psyches and everyday practices, it also serves as
e.
the centre of resistance against the same regime.

l
sa
Vatican Directives and Local Churches

re
At the official level, the Catholic Church follows the Roman structures
or
as stipulated in the Code of Canon Law. Roman Catholics around the

n
world are grouped in geographical units called dioceses. Bigger dioceses

tio
are called archdioceses and smaller ones are called prelatures, apostolic
bu
vicariates or prefectures. Of the 3,160 dioceses or apostolic jurisdictions

tri
worldwide, 357 of them are located in East and Southeast Asia (as of 31
is
May 2018). Most dioceses in the region are found in China (113), the Philip-
rd
pines (86), Indonesia (39), Vietnam (26) or Korea (21). The lowest numbers
fo
are in Laos (4), Cambodia (3) and Singapore and Brunei (a single diocese
each). These dioceses are arranged into 11 regional groupings called
ot
episcopal conferences, which decide on matters of doctrine, worship and

N
ministry, but always in collaboration with Rome.

A diocesan bishop heads and administers a diocese. ‘In the diocese
entrusted to his care, the diocesan Bishop has all the ordinary, proper and
immediate power required for the exercise of his pastoral office’ (Code of
Canon Law, 381). Though a diocese and its bishop belong to an episcopal
conference, the bishop exercises on his own authority full legislative,
executive and judicial power. He shares this power with his episcopal
vicars and the presbyterial council. The diocese is composed of several
Catholics 315
parishes, each administered by a parish priest and his assistants. Manila

in the Philippines, one of the oldest and largest archdioceses (1579), is
composed of 85 parishes divided into 13 vicariates and 5 districts. On the
other hand, the Apostolic Prefecture of Phnom Phen in Cambodia (1850),
one of the smallest, has one parish serving only 13,000 Catholics.
At the base of this hierarchical structure in countries where Catholics
are dominant, like the Philippines, are small units called the chapels and
basic ecclesial communities (BECs). Several BECs comprise a chapel, and
several chapels comprise the parish. Depending on his availability, the
.
ly
parish priest visits and celebrates Mass in these chapels once a month or
on
once a year, on the annual fiestas of their patron saints. Volunteer lay litur
gical ministers go to far-flung mountain areas that could not be reached
se
by priests. In dioceses where Catholics are a minority, like in Laos and
lu
Cambodia, the bishop works directly with the few priests at his disposal
na
to take pastoral care of many isolated parishes in rural areas. Some nuns
so
and religious brothers provide local education through schools they ad-
minister; others also help the parish priest in his pastoral duties. Large
er
congregations privately run influential educational institutions where the
rp
elite of the country – Christian or not – register to get a ‘good Catholic
Fo
education’, while small parochial schools in rural areas catering to the
e.
poorer population, especially those who cannot afford to go to the urban

l
centres, struggle to survive.

sa
The parishes normally celebrate sacraments following the Vatican-

re
sanctioned liturgical rituals, but with greater attendance on special

or
occasions like Christmas or Holy Week. The parish priests take concrete
n
directives from their bishops through circulars, which are sometimes read
tio
from pulpits. Beyond this, however, the small chapels and basic ecclesial
bu
communities are left practically on their own to manage their everyday

tri
pastoral and spiritual lives, with little intervention from their pastors.
is
Little formal Catholic formation is given at the base due to the unavailabil-
rd
ity of priests or pastoral workers. But it is also here that inculturation of

fo
the faith (the actual encounter between Catholicism and the local cultures)
finds its most flourishing expression. Ecclesiastical structures adopt local
ot
forms. Popular religious practices like devotion to Mary and the saints
N
and the celebration of the mysteries of the life of Jesus take on lively
colours and intensity, quite opposite to the formal Roman liturgical rites.
These community practices, a mixture of Christian teachings and cultural
elements, often led by lay people and held in small chapels, individual
houses or public places, most often draw more people than the priest-
centred official celebrations. Examples of these abound in different places,
which raises the following question: Is Catholicism ‘foreign’, as some have
charged, or has it become indigenous and inculturated?
Foreign and Indigenous

Catholicism in East and Southeast Asia is historically linked to the
European colonial project. Though China came into contact with Christi
anity earlier, in the seventh century, the memories of these Christian
initiatives were washed away with the changing tides of political history
of the region. What persisted were the traces of the Jesuit, Franciscan and
Dominican missions during Iberian colonial expansionism, supported as
they were by royal patronage (Padroado). First came the Portuguese and
Spaniards, then the Dutch, French and British at different times from the
.
ly
sixteenth to the nineteenth century. Christianity came to be dubbed a
on
foreign religion, the religion of the colonisers. With its close ties to colonial
powers, Catholicism also colluded with them in their pursuit of economic,
se
political and military interests.
lu
El servicio de ambas Majestades (the service of both Majesties) – a phrase
na
present in many official documents – accurately explains the relationship
so
between church and politics during the Spanish colonial regime in the
er
Philippines. The evangelisation project made possible by the Patronato Real
rp
was both evangelising and civilising. The friar’s task was both evangelistic
and political. At once, he was the Empire’s civil servant and God’s mission
Fo
ary. The rule of the friar (frailocracy) dominated the local landscape in the
e.
colony. The exaction of tribute, forced labour and military service were
l
direct instruments of exploitation and pacification. Although not directly

sa
in charge of the policies’ implementation, the friars were closely connected

re
with the system, as they were increasingly entrusted with civil duties –
or
inspector of schools and taxation, of health units and public works, certifier
n
of cedulas (a form of identification), and auditing and partitioning of lands,

tio
among others. These duties proved to be one source of corruption among

bu
the friars. This arrangement transformed the friar missionaries into land-
tri
owners, who gradually amassed large tracts themselves – some through

is
confiscation of mortgaged lands, others through outright land-grabbing.

rd
These properties came to be called ‘friar lands’ and, together with other
fo
friar abuses, fuelled the Filipino revolution against Spain. It was in this
context that the Iglesia Filipina Independiente (Aglipayan Church) was
ot
born – a local group of patriotic Catholics who rejected its Roman af-
N
filiation in favour of the struggle for Philippine independence. Together

with their secular revolutionary counterparts, they expelled the Spanish
colonisers along with their religion, which was considered ‘foreign’ and
non-Filipino.
The above view is one valid manner in which to read the Catholic
historical landscape in the Philippines. But there is another, equally valid
view. Though coming from the West, Christianity has become ‘indigen
ous’ to the everyday lives of the Filipino Catholics. It has ceased to be
Catholics 317
‘other’ because it has been assimilated and incorporated, adopted and

adapted, disrupted and subverted, altered and transformed in order to
fit its constantly changing local cultural contexts. Contemporary Catholic
events and festivities reveal a skilful combination of Iberian Christianity
and indigenous cultures – something beyond the Spanish missionaries’
intentions. The formal worship of the Holy Child (Santo Niño) in Europe
has transformed itself into mardi-gras-like revelry of dancing and feasting
in holy abandon, as the faithful utter the deepest prayers of their hearts
in the swaying of their hands and hips. The original midnight Mass (Misa
.
ly
de Gallo) celebrated on Christmas Eve in Spain has been converted into a
on
series of dawn Masses over the nine consecutive days before Christmas,
attended by thousands in joyful anticipation of Jesus’s birth. Wherever
se
they are in the world today, Filipinos take these practices as an indigenous
lu
expression of their Filipino faith.
na
Beyond accommodation and adaptation, Filipino Christianity also
so
subverts the original meanings intended by their colonial masters. One
example is the recitation of the Pasyon or the Passion of Jesus Christ – an
er
extended verse form of the salvation history narrative from Genesis
rp
to Revelation. It usually is chanted by people in their homes or in the
Fo
neighbourhood, a Holy Week tradition practised to this day, especially in
e.
rural areas. This religious practice can be viewed as an imposition by the

l
colonisers, to form native minds into submission in the emulation of Jesus’s

sa
resignation to suffering and death. At the same time, the people’s chanting
re
of the Pasyon had provided a narrative that served as a rallying symbol

or
for their hopes and aspirations of liberation, a perspective popularised

n
by historian Reynaldo Ileto. Beyond the intentions of the colonisers, the

tio
Pasyon contains a double truth which, to their surprise, was ingeniously

bu
and dexterously utilised by popular leaders to foster solidarity among

tri
the oppressed and to promote the revolution. As the unlettered masses

is
dutifully chanted the narrative of the suffering of Jesus during Holy Week,
rd
much to the pleasure of the missionaries, these popular revolutionaries

fo
were also given the language and vision to articulate their longings for an
alternative world far from what the colonisers had ever imagined.
ot
N
Multiple Religious Belonging

The recent postmodern recognition of multiple voices and perspectives
beyond the hegemonic monologue of Western rationality is not at all new
to Asian Catholicism. Christianity in Asia has always lived with and nego-
tiated with many religions, cultures and philosophies, not only in the ivory
tower of academia but also in the people’s everyday lives. The concern for
a single unadulterated religious identity is foreign to Asian consciousness.
Catholicism in this region, like any other cultural body engaged with its
multiple and complex religious-cultural systems, consequently transforms

itself in the process.
Three different interpretations from Asian theologians can be
summoned to explain this phenomenon. First is Jaime Bulatao’s notion
of ‘split-level Christianity’. Bulatao, a Filipino Jesuit philosopher and
psychologist, argued that Filipino Catholicism in general, and the Filipino
psyche in particular, display a split-level consciousness. It is described as
the coexistence within one person or community of two or more ethical
standards, attitudes and worldviews that are inconsistent with one
.
ly
another. For instance, even as a person is baptised Catholic, he or she still
on
believes in spirits present in trees or rivers (engkanto), a belief that harks
back to the culture’s pre-Christian past. In short, that person is not totally
se
converted; he or she suffers from a ‘split-level’ Christianity. This is also
lu
seen in people’s inconsistent ethical standards: pious Catholics while in
na
church, but corrupt officials in government; being convinced that bribery
so
is wrong, but quickly paying off a traffic officer if stopped for a violation.
Two different theological systems and moral norms exist side by side,
er
receding at some moments but coming back at different times.
rp
Split-level consciousness is an unconscious phenomenon, and is most
Fo
often taken for granted or is not considered a problem at all. However,
e.
this view of Bulatao applied to Catholic Christianity is founded on the

l
belief that a ‘pure’ religion is possible or that a monolithic worldview

sa
exists – a quite abstract and static view of culture that is hardly found in
re
reality. It assumes that if people accept one worldview, they will totally
or
abandon the other. And if they coexist in one community, such an entity
n
is half-bred, a mongrel, deficient as it is not integrated and complete. With

tio
psychological categories applied to the theological field, such cultures are

bu
also seen as split-level or schizophrenic, socially displaying their bipolar

tri
tendencies.
is
Peter Phan, a Vietnamese theologian working in the USA, thinks

rd
otherwise. He argues for a hyphenated Catholic Christianity in East and

fo
Southeast Asia – Asian-Christian or Christian-Asian – in which the two

poles of the binary equally exert substantive influence. In Phan’s reading,
ot
the development of Asian-Christian identity has included three phases.

N
The first era was the imposition of Western colonial Christianity on Asian
cultures, with the adjective ‘Asian’ superficially describing ‘Christian’
identity acting as the main substantive. The second period featured the
syncretistic tendencies of Ricci, de Nobili and others who enthroned the
Asian cultures as supreme expressions of the Christian faith. The third
and final phase is the Christian ‘hyphenated’ existence, which Phan at-
tributes to the theological developments of the Second Vatican Council.
In short, it is not an anomaly for a Catholic to be also Asian and an Asian
Catholics 319
to be also Catholic if one so desires. The teaching of the Catholic Church

opens itself to double belonging. Opposite to Bulatao, Phan argues that
‘Christianness’ and ‘Asianness’ can coexist in a culture fully recognising
the flourishing of each element both at the level of personal consciousness
and in the church community.
Other thinkers, however, argue against Phan’s overly conscious and
voluntaristic hyphenated Christian. Indonesian thinker Albertus Bagus
Laksana prefers the term ‘complex religious identity’ to ‘double belonging’
or ‘multiple religious belonging’. Hybrid existence is a fact on Asian soil,
.
ly
even beyond the conscious efforts of political or religious leaders ‘to form’
on
their people in some exclusive identity. Asian Christians merely live their
everyday lives and, in the process, engage in mutual borrowing from the
se
other. Beyond Phan, Laksana thinks that the Asian complex religious
lu
identity can be understood as ‘what all its members are engaged in the act
na
of living’, to borrow a phrase from British neo-Marxist Raymond Williams.
so
Through these complex religious and cultural interactions on the grounds
of one’s location, a type of hybrid Catholicism is formed. Official theologies
er
exist, but what can be seen with one’s eyes is how the people appropriate
rp
them in context. Complex religious identities come in many forms: wiping
Fo
and touching of images; multi-religious shared pilgrimage sites; prayer
e.
services from different religious traditions; statues of saints, Vishnu and

l
Buddha side by side on family altars; and offerings of food on the tombs
sa
of ancestors on All Souls’ Day. Believers do not have qualms of conscience

re
in moving from one religious tradition to another or in belonging to all of

or
them at once. Purists condemn this as syncretism or superstition, but it

n
is all that ordinary people have. Whether in cultural customs, theological

tio
reflection or religious practice, it is the grassroots communities – not the

bu
cultural virtuosos or religious luminaries – who decide which elements

tri
of their everyday religious-cultural encounters shall be assimilated or

is
modified, adopted or subverted, consented to or resisted.

rd
fo
Formal Theologies and Popular Religiosities

Though theological science has always looked up to the West in the field
ot
of theological development, significant theological production has been

N
seen in Asia since the Second Vatican Council (1962–5). Important scien-
tific and administrative bodies made the emergence of Asian theologies
possible. On the Protestant side, the Association of Theological Schools in
South East Asia was established in Singapore in 1957, and the Program
for Theology and Cultures in Asia was organised in 1983 in collaboration
with the Christian Conference of Asia. Among Catholics, the Federation
of Asian Bishops’ Conferences (FABC) was set up in the early 1970s as an
umbrella organisation of all the episcopal conferences of Asia.
The FABC has exercised great influence on East Asian and Southeast
Asian Catholic theology. Since its foundation, the FABC has produced
an impressive body of texts from its plenary assemblies and its working
commissions – Bishops’ Institute on Lay Apostolate (BILA), Inter-religious
Affairs on the Theology of Dialogue (BERA), Social Action (BISA), Social
Communication (BISCOM), Institute for Theological Animation (BITA)
and Office of Theological Concerns (OTC/TAC). Following the commen-
taries on FABC documents, 10 crucial Asian contributions to theological
discourse can be observed.
.
ly
1. Centrality of dialogue. Already in its first meeting in 1970, the FABC
on
outlined its specific character in the now-famous triple dialogue (dialogue
of cultures, dialogue with ancient religions and dialogue with the poor),
se
all relevant dimensions of the Asian context. Dialogue is Asia’s manner of
lu
proclaiming Jesus Christ and the key interpretive element in the under-
na
standing of Asian Catholicism.
so
2. The local church. Taking its cue from the churches of the New
Testament, which are all pluriform and local (the given church in a given
er
place), the FABC considers the local church as the concrete expression
rp
of the universal church, not the other way around. ‘Each local Church
Fo
is the Church in its full and integral reality, and the Church universal is
e.
a communion of local Churches, a church of churches, a communion of

l
communions’ (FABC Papers 60).

sa
3. Harmony. The all-encompassing dimension of harmony, which charac

re
terises all ancient Asian religions and cultures, serves as the hallmark of
or
Asian Catholicism. With tensions and conflicts brought about by religious

n
and cultural diversity, all the more is harmony necessary, understood from
tio
the perspective of the universe’s restoration and recapitulation in Christ.

bu
4. Inculturation. Unless a church is ‘incarnate in a people, a church in-

tri
digenous and inculturated’, the people will always consider it an outsider

is
and a foreign religion. This church should be truly Catholic and truly
rd
Asian in the way it prays, thinks, lives and communicates Jesus to others.
fo
5. Dialogue with ancient religions. Dialogue finds its deepest dimension

in the dialogue with age-old religions deeply rooted in Asia even before
ot
the coming of Christianity. It is seen as the distinctly Asian contribution to

N
theological reflection in the whole universal church.

6. Church of the poor. Located on a continent where small pockets of
affluence exist side by side with oceans of poverty, the Church in Asia
confesses itself to be the Church of the poor, living the evangelical poverty
of spirit and professing its option and solidarity with the socially excluded,
defending their rights and promoting social justice.
7. Care for the environment. With a sense of harmony and a holistic
view of reality as part of the Asian worldview, the FABC sees intimate
Catholics 321
interdependence between humans and the whole cosmos as the founda-

tion of its spirituality, theology and ecclesial practice.
8. Respect for life. Beyond the Roman Church’s discourse of respect
for life as centred on abortion and contraception, the FABC talks about
the threats to life in all its dimensions as they are experienced in Asia,
including patriarchy and gender, genocide and terrorism, the caste system
and globalisation. Retrieving the ‘image of God’ discourse from the Bible,
it also takes into account the respect for life in Hinduism, Jainism, Islam,
Buddhism and other faiths.
.
ly
9. Pluralist theological method. Pluralism is not a threat to the church and
on
theology; it is a positive resource. God’s creation – humankind, cultures
and religions (that is, the whole of reality) – is plural and manifold. So is
se
the history of the church and its theology: not only scholastic and rational
lu
but also mystical, apophatic and symbolic; not only within Christianity
na
but also in ancient religions, indigenous peoples and social movements.
so
10. The Kingdom of God. The central motif of the FABC’s theology is not
the Christian church but the Kingdom – the ‘universal reality, extending
er
far beyond the boundaries of the church’. When people from different
rp
faiths search for the transcendent divine mystery and in effect reach out
Fo
in solidarity with the marginalised, they are not far from God’s Kingdom.
e.
Leading Catholic theologians in East and Southeast Asia extensively

l
develop these themes, as is shown in their congresses, conferences and

sa
publications, which can now compete with the theological production of

re
other continents. The efforts of Asian theologians can be categorised in the

or
following themes: liberation, inculturation and inter-religious dialogue.

n
But despite this seemingly progressive theological agenda, the situation

tio
also appears quite different on the ground. Experience with priestly

bu
formation tells us that majority of the seminaries still teach classical Roman
tri
theology and philosophy taken from Western sources. Not enough effort
is
has been taken to dialogue seriously with Asian resources. In addition,

rd
most of these seminaries do not have enough capable professors and

fo
library materials to pursue the Asian theological agenda. It is not true only
for countries where Catholics are a very small minority; the same situation
ot
prevails in the Philippines and Timor-Leste, where they form a majority.

N
Moreover, many Catholic clergy who presently run the parishes were
trained in pre-Second Vatican Council theology and hardly have the time
and resources to update themselves. Thus, what is passed on to semin
arians and to ordinary faithful in Sunday homilies is most often an echo
of their Tridentine manualist deductive theologies still reminiscent of the
exclusivist paradigm of the Counter-Reformation.
While Catholic bishops and professional theologians pursue a robust
theological agenda for Asia, the lay people are left to their own devices to
survive spiritually. Like a parallel theological world with its own coherent
system of belief, ritual and ethic, lay people rely on what has been called by
manifold and sometimes derogatory names – ‘folk religiosity’ (as against
official Catholicism), ‘popular piety’ or ‘popular devotions’ (as against
official liturgy). Though tolerated by specialists and the religious elite,
most often they are viewed with suspicion and condescension. Magisterial
texts exhort that these practices be purified, elevated, renewed and evan-
gelised. These practices often are described as superstitious or syncretistic,
bordering on fanaticism and heresy. The officially sanctioned Roman
.
ly
liturgy is still the standard by which all other folk religious practices are to
on
be evaluated. Any deviation would invite some reprimand.
But contemporary thinking brings back the value of popular religiosity
se
as ‘theologies of everyday life’, ‘everyday authenticity’, ‘theology of the
lu
people’ and other parallel names. With only 10% of the Catholic population
na
having formal theological training, access to popular religiosity is the only
so
existing theology and spirituality for the non-specialists who comprise the
vast majority of the ordinary Catholic faithful. Since they have no access,
er
they also are not heard. But even in the language of classical Catholic
rp
theology, these voices from the ground – the sensus fidelium – should be
Fo
listened to, since they are also considered a locus theologicus, one of the
e.
fundamental sources of the faith.

l
Back to my first question: How does the Catholic consciousness coexist

sa
with its others in the Asian context? This phenomenon can be viewed from
re
many perspectives and the interaction is plural, calling for complex and
or
nuanced answers.
n
tio
Bibliography
bu
Alberts, Tara, Conflict and Conversion: Catholicism in Southeast Asia, 1500–1700 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
tri
England, John, Jose Kuttianimattathil, John Mansford Prior, Lily Quintos, David Suh
is
Kwang-sun and Janice Wickeri (eds), Asian Christian Theologies: A Research Guide to
rd
Authors, Movements, Sources, vols 2 and 3 (Delhi: ISPCK, 2004).

fo
Moffett, Samuel, A History of Christianity in Asia, vols 1 and 2, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,
2006).
ot
Phan, Peter, Asian Christianities: History, Theology, Practice (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,
N
2018).
Press, 2014).
Evangelicals
Kang-San Tan
.
ly
The historian David Bebbington has defined ‘Evangelicals’ as Christians
on
who share four main qualities: biblicism – a high regard for the Bible;
crucicentrism – a focus on Jesus’s crucifixion and its saving effects; conver-
se
sionism – a belief that humans need to be converted; and activism – a belief
lu
that faith should influence one’s public life. In East and Southeast Asia, the
na
term ‘mainline Protestant denominations’ is normally used to refer to a
so
stream of churches faithful to Reformation teachings, such as Lutherans,
er
Calvinists or Presbyterians. Methodism and Anglicanism, originating
rp
from Britain, are also considered to belong to the mainline denominations
associated with the World Council of Churches (WCC). However, in East
Fo
and Southeast Asia, while many from mainline denominations are associ-
e.
ated with the WCC, they are theologically Evangelical in their doctrinal
l
sa
convictions, affirming Bebbington’s quadrilateral. Others prefer not to

be associated with the WCC and opt instead to identify with the World
re
Evangelical Alliance (WEA). Evangelicalism finds expression in the region

or
through such denominations as Anglicans, Assemblies of God, Baptists,

n
Brethren, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Methodists, Pentecostals and

tio
Presbyterians, as well as non-denominational churches.

bu
tri
Evangelical Growth
is
Though Christians are a small minority in most countries in East and

rd
Southeast Asia, there are contexts in which Evangelicals are growing

fo
rapidly, such as South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Cambodia,

Myanmar and the Philippines. A few examples must suffice to illustrate
ot
N
the kind of growth that has been occurring.

In 1963, the Philippine Federation of Christian Churches was succeeded
by the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP). In 1965,
the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches (PCEC) was established
as a group of churches distinct from the NCCP. The PCEC has more than
150 member churches. As of 2011, adherents were estimated to number
11 million. Fifty years after their foundation, the two Councils remain the
largest representative groups of mainline and Evangelical Protestants.
The NCCP is a member of the WCC, while the PCEC is a member of the
324 Kang-San Tan
WEA. In 2015, a former national director of the PCEC, Efraim Tendero,

was elected secretary general of the WEA.
About 30% of the South Korean population belongs to the Christian faith,
with about a quarter of those being Catholic and three-quarters Protestant.
Most South Korean Christians identify as Evangelicals, including Pente-
costals, Charismatics and those who belong to mainline denominations,
such as Presbyterians and Methodists. Christian missionaries to South
Korea were mostly Americans, notably Methodists and Presbyterians.
Later, small but growing Baptist and independent Evangelical churches
.
ly
were established. After the Second World War, social attitudes of Koreans
on
towards China and Japan became negative due to wartime oppression.
Many Korean animists, whose adherence to Buddhism was largely formal,
se
responded positively to the Christian message. From the start, Korean
lu
Christians were encouraged to be independent and to serve as evangelists
na
among their own people. Evangelical churches, organised as independent
so
and self-governing, grew rapidly in this enterprising environment.
The growth of the Korean church has also been accompanied by the
er
development of numerous mission agencies and extensive overseas
missionary work. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the number rp
Fo
of Korean missionaries overseas grew from 1,645 serving in 87 different
e.
countries in 1990 to 10,745 serving in some 162 different countries in 2002.

l
By 2018 it was estimated that more than 25,000 Korean missionaries were
sa
serving in overseas mission. At the same time, the attitude of the public
re
to Evangelicals has been negatively affected by high-profile scandals,

or
particularly in relation to corruption in financial affairs. For example,

n
one high-profile case concerned David Yonggi Cho, pastor of the Yoido
tio
Full Gospel Church in Seoul, reputed to be the largest congregation in

bu
the world. In 2014 Cho was convicted of embezzling US$12 million from
tri
church funds. He was given a suspended sentence, but his son went to
is
jail. Evangelicals in Korea have faced numerous financial and moral

rd
scandals as well as continuing schisms (especially among Presbyterians).

fo
In addition, infighting among Evangelicals resulted in the cancellation of a

global WEA conference planned for 2014.
ot
N
Evangelicals in East and Southeast Asia, 1970

Region Total Christian Evangelical % of region % of Christians
population population population Evangelical Evangelical
East Asia 996,425,000 11,456,000 2,710,000 0.3% 23.7%
Southeast Asia 280,607,000 50,740,000 3,240,000 1.2% 6.4%
Globe 3,700,578,000 1,229,309,000 111,808,000 3.0% 9.1%
Evangelicals 325
The Persekutuan Injil Indonesia (Indonesian Evangelical Communion)

was formed in 1971, whereas Pentecostal churches in Indonesia are
mostly members of the Persekutuan Gereja-gereja Pantekosta di Indonesia
(PGPI, or Pentecostal Churches in Indonesia), which was formed in 2001
(formerly Dewan Pentekosta Indonesia, DPI, formed in 1971). Many
Reformed churches as well as Charismatic churches in Indonesia are not
part of these national Evangelical bodies but participate in international
Evangelical movements such as the WEA, the Lausanne Movement and
the Asian Evangelical Alliance.
.
ly
on
Evangelical Organisations
Founded in 1983, the Asian Evangelical Alliance (AEA) empowers
se
national Evangelical alliances to be agents of transformation in Asia by
lu
uniting Evangelical churches for dynamic action in the areas of mission
na
and church planting, theology and church renewal, religious liberty, social
so
concern, women’s ministry, youth ministry and leadership development.
It was formed as the Evangelical Fellowship of Asia in 1983 and changed
er
its name to Asia Evangelical Alliance in 2009. The AEA exists to promote
and nurture networks and collaborations among Evangelicals in Asia rp
Fo
for the purpose of strengthening and expanding the Kingdom of God in
e.
Asia and beyond. It has held regular consultations and triennial Asia con-
l
gresses, catering not only for East Asian Evangelicals but also providing
sa
cross-regional associations for South Asian Evangelicals. Since 2018, the

re
Reverend Paul Euki, president of the Japan Bible Seminary, has been the
or
chair of the AEA.

n
In Southeast Asia, members of the Chinese Christian diaspora have

tio
played a notable role. With the rise of communism during the 1950s
bu
and the subsequent wars and famines, large numbers of Chinese people
tri
emigrated to Southeast Asia. In many contexts they have formed the

is
backbone of church life and often have been disposed to adopt Evangelical
rd
belief and spirituality.

fo
Since the 1950s, the growth of the Evangelical presence has owed much
to the ministries of foreign mission bodies such as the China Inland Mission
ot
N
Evangelicals in East and Southeast Asia, 2020

Region Total Christian Evangelical % of region % of Christians
population population population Evangelical Evangelical
East Asia 1,663,619,000 128,787,000 48,675,000 2.9% 37.8%
Southeast Asia 669,016,000 153,102,000 18,322,000 2.7% 12.0%
Globe 7,795,482,000 2,518,834,000 385,826,000 4.9% 15.3%
326 Kang-San Tan
(which later became the Overseas Missionary Fellowship, now OMF Inter-
national), Worldwide Evangelisation Crusade (now WEC International),
Christian Nationals’ Evangelism Commission and other inter national
missions. Another group consists of denominational missions such as the
Church Mission Society (Anglican) and the Methodist Missionary Society
from Britain and the Southern Baptists from North America, which have
started local churches. Since the 1950s, the Assemblies of God have played
a significant role in the growth of Evangelicalism in Borneo and among the
Karen people in Thailand and Myanmar, which has also been strength-
.
ly
ened by indigenous revival movements.
on
Evangelicalism in Asia is primarily a lay mission movement. The
Philippine Missionary Fellowship, the Indonesian Missionary Fellowship
se
and the Japanese Overseas Missionary Fellowship have all been marked
lu
by lay leadership. In the 1950s several Evangelical ministries were estab-
na
lished in Singapore that focused on university students, including the
so
Navigators and Campus Crusade for Christ. In addition, OMF moved its
headquarters to Singapore and the World Evangelical Fellowship (now
er
WEA) was based there for many years. All of these bodies have featured
lay leadership and have played a significant role in the development of rp
Fo
Evangelicalism in East and Southeast Asia.
e.
Among young people, local para-church associations such as the

l
Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship, Scripture Union and their Inter-

sa
School Christian Fellowship, Youth for Christ, Navigator movements and

re
Campus Crusade for Christ (now known as Cru) were influential during
or
the 1970s in producing Evangelical youth leaders. The 1978 Billy Graham
n
Crusade saw the birth of the Evangelical Fellowship of Singapore.

tio
From the 1990s onward, the initiative in national Evangelical leadership

bu
steadily moved from national associations to senior pastors of mega-

tri
churches, such as Lawrence Khong (Faith Community Baptist Church)

is
and Edmund Chan (former senior pastor of the Covenant Evangelical Free
rd
Church) in Singapore; Daniel Ho (former senior pastor of the Damansara

fo
Utama Methodist Church) in Malaysia; and Pastor Peter Tan-Chi (Christ

Commission Fellowship) in the Philippines.
ot
N
Changes in Evangelicals in East and Southeast Asia, 1970–2020, growth rate, % per year
Region Total population Christian population Evangelical population
East Asia 1.03% 4.96% 5.95%
Globe 1.50% 1.45% 2.51%
Evangelicals 327
Theological Education
Alongside local churches, the maturing of Asian Evangelicals has also been
supported by the formation of theological colleges across Asia. Prominent
among them are China Evangelical Seminary in Taiwan, China Graduate
School of Theology in Hong Kong, Asian Theological Seminary in the
Philippines, Singapore Bible College, Bangkok Bible College, Malaysia
Bible Seminary and Malaysia Baptist Theological Seminary. In 1970 these
Evangelical seminaries formed the Asian Theological Association (ATA),
which has been instrumental in training local pastors and producing
.
ly
younger theologians.
on
The ATA was established as a direct outcome of the need expressed
at several Asia-wide conferences and consultations. It is associated with
se
the International Council for Evangelical Theological Education and
lu
plays a significant role in accreditation. Since the 1970s it has grown
na
into a movement committed to serving its members in the development
so
of Evangelical biblical theology by strengthening interaction, enhancing
er
scholarship, promoting academic excellence, fostering spiritual and min-
rp
isterial formation, and mobilising resources to promote the Christian faith
within diverse Asian cultures. ATA seminaries have played a prominent
Fo
role in nurturing pastors and lay leaders for Evangelical churches. Many
e.
of these seminaries welcome students from surrounding Asian countries

l
with limited graduate education and have played a crucial role in sup-
sa
porting and developing Evangelical leaders in Vietnam, Cambodia, China

re
and even parts of South Asia such as Nepal, Bangladesh and India.
or
The Association for Theological Education in South East Asia (ATESEA),

n
formed in 1957, is another network for seminaries associated with

tio
mainline denominations such as Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists and

bu
Lutherans. Though historically associated with more ‘liberal’ international

tri
partners, the leadership of ATESEA features a significant Evangelical

is
presence and the local congregations of the participating denominations

rd
are mostly of Evangelical faith. ATESEA took bold initiatives in contextual

fo
education and development of Asian theologies through such prominent

theologians as Kosuke Koyama, Emerito Nacpil and Yeow Choo Lak. For
ot
example, ATESEA-related seminaries seek to apply the ‘Critical Asian

N
Principle’ as a framework for theological education, which focuses on

identifying what is distinctively Asian and to use such distinctiveness
as a critical principle of judgement on matters pertaining to the life and
mission of the Christian community, theology and theological education
in Asia. As a result, they continue to be at the forefront of the develop-
ment of indigenous liturgies, engaging with religious fundamentalism in
Asia, gender and justice issues, and reclaiming indigenous identity and
minority rights in Asia.
328 Kang-San Tan
The lines between ‘liberal’ and ‘Evangelical’ institutions are not as pro-
nounced in Southeast Asia as they are in Northeast Asia or South Asia.
For example, Southeast Asian seminaries associated with mainline Prot-
estant denominations, such as Trinity Theological College in Singapore or
Malaysia Theological Seminary, are led by strongly Evangelical faculty.
Evangelical Perspectives on Religious Plurality

Asia is undergoing many changes and challenges: the economic and social
interdependence that comes with globalisation; a religious resurgence
.
ly
among Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims; and increasing violence between
on
co-religionists in South Thailand and Myanmar (Buddhist and Muslim)
and the Philippines (Christian and Muslim).
se
Asian Christians have lived for centuries with non-Christians. Religious
lu
plurality is nothing new. However, what is new is that contemporary
na
society is now more aware of the existence and reality of religious differ-
so
ences as well as the fact of religious plurality. Different religious groupings
may either respond by withdrawing into religious separatism and become
er
ghettos or seek to adapt by rethinking their theology, faith and practices
rp
in the light of changing contexts. Through globalisation, there are now in-
Fo
creasing resources for the church to better understand the nature of being
e.
a Christian community in the context of the world religions of Asia.

l
Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism and Islam reside within the Asian

sa
cultures and psyche, whereas Christianity has struggled, owing to per-

re
ceptions that it is a Western religion. To become a Christian, one had to

or
leave behind the old religions, and this often included leaving behind
n
being a member of an Asian family, social networks, festivals and cultures.

tio
Whenever Christian minorities are unable to integrate into the majority

bu
culture, Christianity continues to be treated as a tolerated foreign religion.

tri
There are many complex external factors, such as history, politics and
is
social attitudes. There are also internal factors, within Asian Christianity:
rd
identifications with Western colonial pasts as well as efforts in evangelism,

fo
social engagement and political activism that lack contextual sensitivity.

This perceived foreignness of Christianity has contributed to the lack of
ot
church growth.
N
During the Second World War, the Japanese government decided that
only three Christian bodies – the Roman Catholics, the Eastern Orthodox
and a Protestant amalgam called the United Church of Christ in Japan
(Kyōdan) – should be recognised. The majority of Evangelicals and In
dependent churches refused to join. In addition, some Anglican, Lutheran
and Holiness churches refused to join the Kyōdan and lost all legal
recognition. After the war, religious freedom was guaranteed in the new
constitution of 1947. However, negative social attitudes towards Christians
Evangelicals 329
persist and they are often regarded as fundamentalists or religious fanatics.

As a result, less than 0.5% of Japanese are Evangelical Christians today.
In societies where national identities are closely tied to specific religions,
Evangelical Christianity has found it difficult to attract mass conversions.
Whenever Thai or Japanese Christians have converted from Buddhism, or
Indonesian or Malay Christians have converted from Islam, Evangelicals
tend to demand a radical break from their previous faiths. In these cases,
such extractions of individuals from their former communities are seen
as crossing not only religious dividing lines but also cultural boundaries.
.
ly
Ethnic and religious identities are closely linked in many Asian societies
on
and conversions to Christianity can pose unique challenges when they are
perceived as a betrayal of personal and collective identities.
se
lu
Evangelicals and the State
na
Christianity in China comprises three major entities: the Three-Self
so
Patriotic Movement, the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association and the
unregistered house-church movement. Article 36 of the Chinese constitu-
er
tion protects ‘freedom of religion’, with a restriction that ‘no one may use
rp
religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health
Fo
of citizens or interfere with the education system of the state’. Under
e.
ground house churches are those churches that refused to be officially

l
registered with the government. They are spread across both cities and
sa
rural areas. Since around 2000, there is a fourth group of Evangelical

re
Christian churches (‘Urban Evangelicals’), mostly found in major cities

or
in China, whose leaders were broadly influenced by overseas returnees

n
from the West. From time to time, when Christian communities become
tio
too prominent or overtly political, the communist government feels

bu
obliged to limit their social influence. For example, hundreds of crosses

tri
were removed and church buildings demolished in the city of Wenzhou,

is
in the eastern coastal province of Zhejiang, due to their perceived threat to

rd
communist hegemony.
fo
Despite Chinese government restrictions, Christianity has experi-

enced rapid growth. From an estimated 6 million Christians in the early
ot
1980s, Yang Fenggang (2012) suggested that the Christian population in

N
China could have been around 100 million in 2010 and predicted that by
2030 nearly 250 million Christian believers will call China home. Most
Christians in China adhere to the Protestant faith, with a third attending
officially registered churches. Therefore, the underground house-church
movement as well as urban Evangelicals form a formidable group and are
influential in terms of rapid growth and future leadership for the churches.
In the post-communist countries of China, Vietnam, Laos and Cam
bodia, there appears to be a growing spiritual vacuum amidst economic
330 Kang-San Tan
growth and materialism. The sense of Christian fellowship is attractive

when compared with the hierarchical structures of other Asian religions
and social organisations. With the open doors to trade and foreign relations
since the 1980s, younger generations from post-communist nations
are attracted to Western cultures, and Christianity is viewed positively
as a progressive faith. As communist countries transition into market
economies, welcoming foreign traders and social interactions, Christianity
has entered into these countries as part of social movements. In the eyes of
their governments, Christians can be perceived either as valued partners
.
ly
for national development or hinderances to national unity. They learn to
on
chart a course that allows the former to override the latter.
Since the communist victory in 1975, the Vietnamese government is par-
se
ticularly concerned about evangelism in the highlands. Ethnic minorities
lu
are seen as resistant to the state, and unregistered or house churches are
na
regarded as siding with anti-communist sentiment. Likewise, in Laos the
so
communist government is wary of Christianity’s association with Hmong
hill tribes. In contrast, as Cambodia comes to terms with the tragedy of
er
Khmer Rouge killings, churches there are experiencing rapid growth.
rp
The First World War (1914–18) was a turning point for many Asian
Fo
Christians, as they witnessed the rise of nationalism and anti-European
e.
sentiment and the decline of Western hegemony. A good illustration is the

l
formation of the Hatopen Kristen Batak (HKB, or Batak Christian Associ

sa
ation) in Indonesia in 1917, led by Mangihut Hezekiel Mannullang, a

re
student activist who promoted nationalistic sentiment and independence

or
of the church from foreign leadership.

n
Under the leadership of Jun Vencer, together with Bel Magalit (Asian
tio
Theological Seminary) and the Far East Broadcasting Corporation, Evan-

bu
gelicals in the Philippines organised prayer movements and participated

tri
in street demonstrations that eventually led to the downfall of the corrupt

is
government of Ferdinand Marcos. At the height of the crisis, the Philip-

rd
pine Council of Evangelical Churches sent out the following statement:

fo
Our obedience to the State is subordinate . . . to God: . . . where Caesar conflicts

ot
with Christ . . . Jesus is Lord. Divine law supersedes human law. Therefore,
N
our obedience is not absolute. Whenever government rules contrary to the will
of God, then civil disobedience become a Christian duty.
In Indonesia, Islamic fundamentalism and resentment of aggressive

Christian proselytising have led to clashes and physical attacks that have
undermined the country’s reputation for religious tolerance. Muslim–
Christian conflicts in Ambon, bombings in Bali and Jakarta, and the
burning of churches in East Java all point to deep-seated suspicions and
resentments that can all too easily erupt into violence.
Evangelicals 331
In West Malaysia, Christians come mostly from the migrant populations

of Chinese and Indians, while almost 40% of East Malaysians are C hristians.
Malaysia is a multi-religious society, with the major ethnic groups in 2010
being Malays (60.3% of the population), Chinese (22.9%), Indians (7.1%)
and tribal and other races (9.7%). Because religion largely coincides with
ethnicity, inter-religious relations are greatly affected by individual racial
perceptions of the other ethnic groups. Inter-racial relations become more
complicated when they function not only as a sociological category, but
also as a tool of the state for resource allocation and political control. In
.
ly
addition, political parties draw their support from ethnic constituencies,
on
making communalism a key political issue since the independence of the
country. Though the Chinese and Indians are part of a political alliance
se
in the government, the Malays are in control of the political process. The
lu
conjunction of ethnicity and political power (inevitably linked to economic
na
interests) deeply polarised not only the issue of race, but also the religious
so
commitments of the people of Malaysia. Malays who convert to another
religion lose not only their ethnic identity but also their social, political
er
and economic privileges. Christians in Malaysia have been facing pressure
rp
from Muslims to discontinue the long-standing use of ‘Allah’ as the term
Fo
for God in translation of the Scriptures and in hymns. The Malaysian
e.
case demonstrates complexities that can be seen in other Asian countries

l
whenever religion is strongly identified with particular ethnic groups.

sa
re
Indigenous Christian Movements

or
Significant indigenous Christian movements, carrying the hallmarks of

n
Evangelicalism, have emerged in East and Southeast Asia. Watchman Nee

tio
(Ni Tuosheng, 1903–72) founded the Little Flock church in Shanghai. The
bu
evangelist John Sung Shang Chieh (1901–44) led campaigns in Southeast

tri
Asia that not only converted many overseas Chinese but also ignited a
is
powerful movement of faith that extended across ethnic boundaries. In

rd
1959, the Sidang Injil Borneo (SIB, Borneo Evangelical Assembly) was
fo
founded as an inter-tribal conference, and since that time the SIB has
established itself as a local-led and indigenous Borneo religion.
ot
Likewise, most Christians in Myanmar and Thailand belong to minority

N
tribes such as the Karen, Chin and Hmong. Christians in Myanmar are
estimated to make up around 8.2% of the population: roughly 5.5% Prot-
estant, 1.3% Roman Catholic and the remainder members of Independent
churches. About 2.5% of the country’s population identify as Evangelicals
and 2.1% as Pentecostals. The majority of Bamar people are Buddhists
whose cultures and identities are largely unaffected by Christian witness.
From the 1960s onward, Evangelicals in these regions have grown most
rapidly among tribal communities in the north-east regions of Thailand,
332 Kang-San Tan
the north-west of Myanmar, Kalimantan in Indonesia, East Malaysia

and the northern Philippines, as well as some tribes in the south of the
Philippines such as the Manobo tribes. Growth came about primarily
through local evangelists who shared about their new-found faith through
neighbourhood connections and family ties. In the 1980s, younger people
were attracted to Western cultures and ideas as they sought new identities
in urban and global contexts. Principally, local church communities are
committed to new ethical ideals, challenging traditional structures, and
have greater access to education, mission contacts and resources.
.
ly
During a period when nationalistic ideals hold sway, many foreign
on
mission leaders are not made welcome by Asian governments. Religious
visas are no longer renewed, and local churches are forced to develop
se
local leadership, start new training institutions and begin to explore roles
lu
for nation-building in the midst of Islam, Buddhism and assertive national
na
identities.
so
The Future for Evangelical Christianities
er
Evangelical theology and practice today face significant challenges that
rp
will need to be overcome if Evangelical faith is to prove its relevance in
Fo
these Asian regions. What will be the future shape of Christian mission in
e.
these complex regions? Four crucial issues can be identified.

l
The first is an appropriate contextual theology of mission. There is a

sa
growing recognition that, if it is to have credibility, the Christian message

re
must be expressed not only in words but also in deeds. The context calls
or
for a comprehensive mission that includes evangelism, church planting,

n
challenging injustices, caring for creation and showing what it means to be

tio
a reconciling community. Given the diversity of the region, there is a need

bu
for contextual expression of Christianities in tribal, rural and urban centres.

tri
The second issue is that of a deeper engagement between religions.

is
Generally, few adherents of world religions (Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists

rd
and Jews) have turned to Christianity, despite reports of the shift of

fo
Christianity toward non-Western peoples. Rapid church growth primarily

has been seen either among tribal communities or within secularised urban
ot
centres such as Singapore, Seoul and Hong Kong. However, the majority
N
of East and Southeast Asian religious communities remain largely un

affected by Christian witness. Effective outreach calls for new approaches
beyond preaching the gospel and planting churches. There is a need for
new engagements, such as inter-religious apologetics and living out the
faith as a whole-life discipleship that transforms nations. Evangelicals are
particularly concerned that many Buddhists or Muslims who might be
interested in exploring Christianity have no opportunity to do so because
there is no Christian witness within reach.
Evangelicals 333
The third crucial issue to address is the way of the cross and contex-
tualised discipleship. For Christ’s followers, the cross indicates that they
must be ready for adversity. Evangelicals affirm a cruciform discipleship
that enables them to bear faithful witness in the context of persecution
and suffering. This commitment can be expected to be highly relevant in
East and Southeast Asia in coming years and could yield opportunities for
Christian growth in what would otherwise appear to be unpromising or
even hostile circumstances.
Finally, Evangelicals need to engage wider society in dialogue. While
.
ly
mainline Christians are more open to engage in inter-religious cooperation,
on
many Asian Evangelicals are still suspicious of closer cooperation with
their non-Christian societies, since they fear that this might compromise
se
their Evangelical faith. Our modern world, however, demands deeper
lu
engagement with both secular and other religious belief systems. Effective
na
Evangelical witness in the future will depend on deep understanding of
so
the religious belief systems of Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam so as to be
able to engage a multicultural setting. In the context of friendships, Evan-
er
gelicals in these regions could contribute to nation-building and peaceful
rp
relationships between communities of different faiths.
Fo
e.
Flourishing as a Religious Minority?

l
The case of Evangelicals in Malaysia can be instructive by way of con-

sa
clusion. The Malaysian churches encountered a great challenge when

re
the Malaysian government did not renew missionary visas beginning in

or
the early 1980s. As the country went through a process of Islamisation,

n
the young church learned to adapt and had to take over the leadership
tio
of local congregations. Foreign mission groups were forced to hand over

bu
leadership and had to quickly focus on lay leadership training, on how to

tri
preach, lead Bible studies and manage the administration of a fledgling

is
church. Christians in Malaysia had to learn to be sensitive in their witness

rd
to their Evangelical faith in the midst of Asian religiosities, especially as

fo
regards relating to their Muslim neighbours. Most congregations could

not obtain legal permits to build churches and had to meet in commercial
ot
buildings, and to move whenever government officials closed these ‘illegal

N
buildings’. The church grew in strength through house-church movements,

creative use of commercial and warehouse factories and training centres,
more imaginative engagements with the poor and the marginalised, and
strong discipleship among young people and university students. Groups
such as Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship, the Navigators and church
student groups were active in equipping younger leaders for the local
churches. Christians were prominent in challenging corruption and unjust
government policies as well as being actively involved in social activism,
334 Kang-San Tan
defending the minority rights of indigenous peoples and promoting the

use of Bible in Malay languages. Through prayer movements and socio-
political activism, a new government that is more sensitive to minority
religious rights and racial harmony was elected in 2018.
Both East and Southeast Asia are complex and diverse. Amidst the
complexity and diversity, Evangelical Christianity is a growing movement
in both regions, seeing steady growth in almost all countries, ranging from
mega-churches in cities to house churches among grassroots rural com-
munities. Evangelicals’ prospects will likely depend on how far they are
.
ly
able to recover a more holistic understanding of gospel witness, which
on
includes evangelism, social witness and socio-political activism and
enables the churches to act as agents of transformation in Asian societies.
se
Key to the future will be the emergence of mature Evangelical leaders
lu
who are resilient and able to thrive as they enable local congregations to
na
witness to their faith in plural, multicultural, inter-religious and consum-
so
erist Asian societies.
er
Bibliography
rp
Aritonang, Jan Sihar, and Karel Steenbrink, A History of Christianity in Indonesia (Leiden:
Fo
Brill, 2008).
Kim, Sebastian C. H., and Kirsteen Kim, A History of Korean Christianity (Cambridge:
e.
Cambridge University Press, 2014).

l
sa
Laumsdaine, David (ed.), Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Asia (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009).
re
Phan, Peter C. (ed.), Christianities in Asia (London: Wiley Blackwell, 2011).

or
Yang, Fenggang, Religion in China: Survival and Revival Under Communist Rule (Oxford:
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Pentecostals and Charismatics
Julie Ma
The Pentecostal expression of Christianity has developed in three distinct
.
ly
movements. The first is Classic Pentecostalism, which emerged in the late
on
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in various parts of the world.
In North America it originated within the Holiness Movement, which
se
emphasised fervent revivalism with an eschatological anticipation of the
lu
imminent Second Coming of Christ. In 1900, Charles Parham, a Holiness
na
evangelist, began to teach speaking in tongues as the biblical sign of
so
the baptism of the Holy Spirit. The Azusa Street Revival in Los Angeles
er
(1906–9) was led by the African American preacher William Seymour. It
rp
played a decisive role in internationalising the movement.
The second movement is the Charismatic renewal, which began in 1960
Fo
when members of mainline churches, such as Catholics and Anglicans,
e.
experienced the gifts of the Holy Spirit as listed in 1 Corinthians 12: 8–10,
l
including the more spectacular ones. Gradually moving away from the
sa
language of the baptism in the Holy Spirit, the Charismatic movement

re
began to emphasise the word of wisdom, word of knowledge, faith, gifts

or
of healing, miraculous powers, prophecy, distinguishing between spirits,

n
speaking in different tongues (languages) and interpretation of tongues.

tio
The third type to emerge in the USA was the ‘Third Wave’ or the
bu
Signs and Wonders Movement. It drew believers from both Charismatic

tri
and non-Charismatic churches, particularly from Evangelical groups.

is
The movement emphasised the supernatural power of the Holy Spirit.

rd
Its leader was John Wimber, the founder of the Vineyard Church. He
fo
later teamed up with Peter Wagner, a church growth specialist of Fuller

Seminary, to offer a historic and yet controversial course, ‘Signs, Wonders
ot
N
and Church Growth’. However, this ‘none of the above’ category has
expanded in numbers and modalities to include many African Initiated
Churches and the majority of Chinese house churches.
Moving our attention to Asia, a century ago the continent struggled
because of widespread poverty and substandard health-care and educa-
tional facilities as well as the imposition of colonial rule. As the birthplace
of all the world’s major religions, Asia provided a context in which
religions played a crucial role in providing solutions to life’s diverse chal-
lenges. Notwithstanding the advent of modern education and economic
336 Julie Ma
development along with political independence from the middle of the

twentieth century, religious faiths, both native and foreign, persist in all
the East and Southeast Asian countries.
The Pentecostals’ dynamic worship, expectancy of divine intervention,
teaching of empowerment by the Spirit and external signs like speaking
in tongues and healing have had great appeal. Their unique spirituality
has brought the affective dimension of human existence into religious ex
perience. From the outset, Pentecostal and Charismatic beliefs and practices
have had a particular appeal to the poor and socially marginalised. The
.
ly
promise of good health and blessing re-established the materiality of
on
Christian salvation to individuals, families and communities. As a result,
in many East and Southeast Asian countries upward social mobility has
se
been observed among Pentecostal and Charismatic believers.
lu
na
Revival Movement
so
The two major Chinese Pentecostal groups to rise in the 1920s and 1930s
were the True Jesus Church and the Jesus Family. Both came into being
er
through the influence of Pentecostal faith. Robust ‘nationalist’ pressures
shaped Chinese churches so that they could stand entirely on their own, rp
Fo
without the assistance of Western missionaries. Pentecostalism was no
e.
exception. The most extraordinary development was the 1931–2 ‘Revival’

l
in Shandong peninsula. First of all, the demonstration of the power of the

sa
Holy Spirit caused a large revival, through which believers experienced

re
profound empowerment. As a result, they became effective witnesses,

or
bringing a large number of people to faith in Christ. Both the Jesus Family
n
and the True Jesus Church were outcomes of the Shandong Revival.
tio
Despite heavy persecution during the communist period, today the True
bu
Jesus Church has around 1.5 million affiliates in 60 different countries. The
tri
Jesus Family also continues to grow, so that today there are more than
is
2 million members in Shandong. Its spirituality has drawn heavily from

rd
Pentecostalism. The worship of the Jesus Family was distinguished by

fo
emphasis on baptism in the Spirit, speaking in tongues, prayer for healing,

prophecy and other spiritual gifts. It also included a community pattern
ot
N
Pentecostals and Charismatics in East and Southeast Asia, 1970

Region Total Christian Pentecostal/ % of region % of Christians
population population Charismatic Pentecostal/ Pentecostal/
population Charismatic Charismatic
East Asia 996,425,000 11,456,000 1,037,000 0.1% 9.1%
Southeast Asia 280,607,000 50,740,000 3,585,000 1.3% 7.1%
Globe 3,700,578,000 1,229,309,000 57,637,000 1.6% 4.7%
of life in which everyone’s resources were commonly shared. The Jesus

Family was particularly popular in the lowliest strata of Chinese society.
As observed by an unnamed present-day believer, the church was a fel-
lowship in love, a gathering avenue for the tired and an area of rest for the
despondent – ‘no matter where you go, you can find your home’.
In Korea, the prominent 1907 Pyongyang Revival was recognised as the
‘Korean Pentecost’, and the fire of the Spirit spread all over the country
in the following years. The revival was characterised by deep conviction
and public repentance of sins, daily dawn prayer meetings, Bible classes,
.
ly
dynamic church worship services, evangelistic meetings, fervent prayer
on
and spiritual renewal. Worship and ministry meetings were accompanied
by signs and wonders. Towards the end of the revival, around 1910,
se
many thousands of people reported having gained experience of strong
lu
‘religious emotion’. The form of Christianity practised prior to the revival
na
seldom allowed such a display of emotion. Like an unrestrained ‘wildfire’
so
the revival expanded and grew in strength until the whole country was
affected. One significant outcome was the growth of the church during
er
this time. In 1905 there were 321 churches, 470 evangelists, 9,761 believers
and 30,136 catechumens. By 1907 there were: 642 churches, an increase of rp
Fo
100%; 1,045 evangelists, an increase of 122%; 18,964 believers, an increase
e.
of 94%; and 99,300 catechumens, an increase of 230%.

l
As a direct consequence of the 1907 revival, missionaries and nationals

sa
of various denominations devised the Million Souls for Christ Movement

re
as a concerted evangelisation programme, with diverse local events

or
connected to all the churches and believers in the given area to reach the
n
community. Theologians of different institutions also focused their efforts

tio
to support this nationwide campaign. The net result of this evangelistic

bu
programme was the addition of 80,000 members to the Korean churches.

tri
Thus, this revival played a significant role in the spread of the gospel and
is
the growth of churches across the country. The revival movement also
rd
produced prominent national church leaders such as Sunjoo Kil, Ikdu Kim
fo
and Yongdo Lee. All were popular revival preachers, but with varying
emphases: Kil on eschatological belief, Kim on supernatural healing and
ot
N
Pentecostals and Charismatics in East and Southeast Asia, 2020

Region Total Christian Pentecostal/ % of region % of Christians
population population Charismatic Pentecostal/ Pentecostal/
population Charismatic Charismatic
East Asia 1,663,619,000 128,787,000 38,375,000 2.3% 29.8%
Southeast Asia 669,016,000 153,102,000 52,492,000 7.8% 34.3%
Globe 7,795,482,000 2,518,834,000 635,260,000 8.1% 25.2%
338 Julie Ma
Lee on mystical union with Christ. The effect of the revival continued until
the 1930s.
Renewal Experiences
In 1973, pastor Hau Lian Kham in Myanmar, along with a tiny group
in the Tedim Baptist Church, began praying for renewal. In 1977 Kham
became a Pentecostal minister, as his church did not accept the revival that
he was initiating, and he is now well acknowledged as the most important
figure of the renewal movement among the Chin people. After intensive
.
ly
prayer, he and his group led week-long open-air evangelistic meetings. It
on
was recorded that the move of the Spirit was so strong that numerous non-
believers were converted to Christ. The renewal continued over several
se
years and many people were added to the church, while a large number
lu
of Chin believers experienced spiritual renewal. The renewal eventually
na
spread through the country. In the revival meetings, many shared their
so
experiences of healing from cancer, skin disease and other sicknesses.
Countless miracles were reported to have occurred during and after the
er
evangelistic meetings.
Bethesda Bedok-Tampine Church in Singapore is a good example of rp
Fo
the Charismatic renewal. In 1979, as soon as the church was established, it
e.
launched various ministries. Through an outreach ministry among young

l
people, the church reached out to its surrounding areas. To reach various
sa
language groups, the church has offered a bilingual healing ministry, in

re
both English and Hokkien. It invites non-believing neighbours and loved

or
ones who suffer from illness to experience God’s healing touch. The
n
church also provides a counselling ministry with a staff of both pastors

tio
and trained lay counsellors. The areas of the counselling ministry range
bu
from marital and parenting issues to personal difficulties such as low

tri
self-esteem, addiction and anger management. The church mobilises in-

is
dividuals and groups who sense a call to evangelism and are endowed
rd
with spiritual gifts. The church also sends out missionaries to Thailand,
fo
ot
N
Changes in Pentecostal/Charismatics in East and Southeast Asia, 1970–2020, growth rate,

% per year
Region Total population Christian population Pentecostal/Charismatic
population
East Asia 1.03% 4.96% 7.49%
Globe 1.50% 1.45% 4.92%
North Sulawesi, the Philippines, Northeast and South India, Mongolia

and East Asia.
Catholic Charismatic renewal occurred in Indonesia through those who
had encountered similar renewal overseas. Upon their return, they shared
their renewal experiences with their fellow Catholics in Indonesia. This
initial impetus was strengthened by a renewal seminar for both priests and
lay Catholics in 1976. Two speakers were particularly influential: Brandon
J. O’Brien sj from Bangkok and Herbert Schneider sj from Manila. They
presented on the topic ‘New Life in the Spirit’. This occasion served as
.
ly
an introduction and endorsement of the Charismatic renewal within the
on
national Catholic Church. In March 1977, Lambertus Sugiri sj invited
some who had completed the seminar run by O’Brien and Schneider to
se
offer a similar seminar on Charismatic renewal to his parish in Mangga
lu
Besar Jakarta. Around 300 attended and experienced the baptism of the
na
Holy Spirit in the seminar. Soon the parish experienced renewed spiritual
so
life and the manifestation of spiritual gifts. The move of the Spirit was
evident in the lives of the believers. The renewal soon spread to other
er
districts, in both Jakarta and many other parts of Indonesia, and seminars
rp
mushroomed. As a result, the Catholic Charismatic Renewal expanded
Fo
throughout the country.
e.
Although it is difficult to count the number of Charismatic Catholics in

l
the country, they are estimated to reach 1 million believers. As a distinctly

sa
lay movement, Catholicism in Indonesia has been revitalised and renewed

re
through the Charismatic movement. The main features of the Catholic

or
Charismatic group’s meetings are:

n
tio
• focusing on Jesus, with the ultimate goal of having a deep, personal

bu
relationship with him;

tri
• using a contemporary worship style, which is often found in Pente

is
costal Charismatic services;

rd
• emphasising Bible study – all members of Catholic Charismatic

fo
Renewal groups bring the Bible with them and read and trust it;
• speaking in tongues, with other manifestations of the Spirit also
ot
allowed.
N
Worship
Pentecostal and Charismatic worship is spiritually dynamic. A typical
worship service consists of lengthy and lively praise, dynamic preaching,
messages of prophecy and in tongues, praying for salvation and healing
and the manifestation of various spiritual gifts. The centre of such worship
is experiencing God. Accordingly, themes of Pentecostal and Charismatic
preaching directly deal with life-connected problems. They range from
340 Julie Ma
sickness, poverty and family issues to business matters and relation-

ships. It is important to recall that the majority of Pentecostal Charismatic
believers come from the lower strata of a given society. They regularly
search for God’s direct and immediate help more than their middle-class
counterparts would do. Every component of Pentecostal and Charismatic
worship is a building block towards the experience with God.
In Pentecostal and Charismatic worship, music plays an important role.
Energetic music and passionate singing with various musical instruments
draw many young people in particular. With eyes closed during worship
.
ly
and arms frequently raised upward, worshippers are submerged in the
on
presence of God. The dynamic spirituality, immanent expectancy, lively
worship, manifestation of the spiritual gifts, prayer with fasting, dawn
se
prayer and all-night prayer meetings all have contributed to its fast growth
lu
and spread.
na
so
Church Growth and Expansion
The growth and expansion of Pentecostal and Charismatic churches are
er
often attributed to the dynamic spirituality of these churches and their
rp
ability to address felt needs of everyday life. However, the mission practice
Fo
of Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity, in addition to its focus on
e.
evangelism and church planting, is the holistic approach to Christian

l
ministry. The following cases illustrate this.

sa
In 1929, the True Jesus Church, an independent Chinese church charac-

re
terised by Pentecostal and Charismatic practices, founded congregations

or
in a number of Southeast Asian countries. For instance, in Taiwan the first

n
church was started in March of that year. Within a short period, hundreds
tio
of people were baptised. The church grew rapidly, and the membership
bu
reached 28,000 in 1968. Charismatic groups such as the True Jesus Church
tri
and the Taipei Truth Church from Hong Kong made a significant impact
is
on East and Southeast Asian Christianity, including Pentecostal and

rd
Charismatic Christianity.
fo
Yoido Full Gospel Church in Seoul, Korea, is a well known Pentecostal

mega-church. It was begun by David Yonggi Cho and Jashil Choi, who
ot
later became Cho’s mother-in-law, as a tiny tent church with five members
N
in a slum area of Seoul in 1958. Cho was born and raised in a Buddhist
home. When he was a teenager, he contracted tuberculosis, which was
potentially fatal. At his sickbed, several Christians visited and told him
about Jesus. Physically weak, he opened his heart and accepted Christ
as his personal Saviour. To his surprise, he experienced God’s healing
touch. In 1956 he entered Full Gospel Bible College to take theological
training. In the winter of 1957, Cho was ill with severe flu. For two weeks
Jashil Choi, a former nurse and Cho’s classmate, took good care of him in
both prayer and medically. Cho recovered completely. By 1962 the tent
church had grown to 800 through the message and experience of healing,
exorcism and miracles. In 1964, the church moved to Saedamoon and its
membership grew to 2,000. The church acquired new land in Yoido in 1969
and completed a 10,000-seat church building in 1973. Today the church
has more than 700,000 members.
Cho preaches a positive and uplifting message, presenting Jesus as
healer, miracle worker and supplier of all our needs. He offers a ‘theology
of hope’. Rising from the rubble of the Korean War, the struggling nation
.
ly
desperately needed a message of hope and miracles. It is in this context
on
that Cho’s message found a ready reception. The church also emphasises
the power of prayer. Taking inspiration from the life of Jesus and the early
se
church, and also from traditional religious practices, the Korean church
lu
in general, and Pentecostal and Charismatic churches in particular, have
na
maintained a strong tradition of prayer. Yoido’s large ‘prayer mountain’
so
has been known for fasting and prayer. There is an expectation of the
experience of the Holy Spirit. The church’s rapid growth has brought chal-
er
lenges to its organisation and pastoral life, not least the expectation that it
rp
will raise a prophetic voice in relation to the life of the nation.
Fo
One of the lively and growing Pentecostal Charismatic churches in
e.
Indonesia is the Indonesian Bethel Church (Gereja Bethel Indonesia),

l
located in Surabaya. Niko Njotorahardjo has led the church since its
sa
founding. In recent decades, the church has been growing exponen-

re
tially through planting daughter churches in various Javanese cities. Its

or
combined membership reached 100,000 in 1963 and 400,000 by 1968. The

n
current membership is around 12 million. Several unique characteristics of

tio
the church are observed. The first is worship, which the church considers
bu
to be the foremost part of church life, drawing people to Christ. A modern

tri
worship style is used, with outstanding musicians, excellent singers,

is
tambourine dancing groups and flawless sound systems. The second is

rd
the pragmatically oriented preaching. Almost all sermons address the

fo
immediate concerns of life, to the extent that they are sometimes criticised
for being theologically thin. The message is communicated in lively,
ot
dynamic and entertaining ways, generously interjected with testimonies,

N
stories and jokes. The third is the focus of church theology on miracles,
particularly divine healing. Testimonies of miraculous healing are widely
disseminated throughout the church network.
Also in Indonesia, a remarkable revival took place in West Timor in
1964 when several thousand people experienced healing and there was
a contest with sorcerers and exorcists. Soon, other revivals followed, for
example in Java. Over 2 million Javanese became Christians in 1965–71,
with the Pentecostal and Charismatic churches gaining the most members.
342 Julie Ma
In Vietnam, the first Pentecostal church started in Vung Tau in 1972

and grew rapidly to number 10,000 members by 1975. After the North
Vietnamese triumph in 1975, churches were suppressed: many were
shut down, belongings were removed by the communist government
and membership declined rapidly. The impact of the Pentecostal Church
was huge during what a historian called the ‘Silent Period’ (1975–88). For
a decade from 1988, still under harsh persecution, Pentecostal churches
grew and spread to all parts of the country. An official operating licence
was obtained in October 2009, and the church is in the process of receiving
.
ly
official recognition from the Vietnamese government.
on
Hope Church in Bangkok, Thailand, was started by Kriengsak
Charoenwongsak in 1981. In this staunch Buddhist country, the church
se
grew fast and established 430 satellite churches nationwide. Also, this
lu
Charismatic church has a plan to plant 120 Hope churches in different
na
parts of the world. The New Creation Church in Singapore began with 25
so
people in 1984, rising to 150 members in 1990, more than 10,000 in 2004
and 30,000 in 2013.
er
In September 1980, the Light of Jesus had its initial prayer gathering at
rp
a home in Quezon City in the Philippines. In the second prayer gathering
Fo
of the group, 14-year-old Bo Sanchez preached for the first time. He has
e.
not stopped preaching since and has become a crucial figure for the Light
l
of Jesus Family in the Philippines. As a Catholic lay minister, who is bib

sa
lically oriented and who believes in the work and movement of the Holy
re
Spirit, he has travelled to different parts of the world to preach. Sanchez

or
has been given numerous honours, including being named one of the
n
Ten Outstanding Young Men in the Philippines in 2006 and the Serviam
tio
Award, the highest award a lay Catholic can receive in the Catholic Mass
bu
Media Awards in 2007. (The Serviam Award is part of the Catholic Mass
tri
Media Awards.) In 2016, the community had 35,000 members in the

is
Philippines and different parts of the world. The community organised

rd
two large meetings: the annual inspirational convention Kerygma confer-

fo
ence and 200 weekly fellowship and worship groups named ‘The Feast’ in
the country and other regions of the world.
ot
Couples for Christ (CFC) was started in 1981 in Manila by the charis
N
matic group Ang Ligaya ng Panginoon (LNP, ‘The Joy of the Lord’). The
new community invited married couples to private homes for prayer
meetings and faith discussions. In 1996, CFC was recognised by the
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines as a national private
associ ation of lay faithful, and in 2000 it was acknowledged by the
Vatican as a private international association of the lay faithful of di diritto
pontificio, that is, of pontifical right. CFC has bloomed internationally. It is
today present in dioceses across all 82 Philippine provinces as well as in
163 countries. It has become a leading force for energising family life and
the church.
In 1999, CFC began the first Gawad Kalinga (GK, ‘To Give Care’)
project, which aimed to provide houses for the poor. During its formal
inauguration in 2004, GK777 was unveiled as a campaign to build
700,000 homes in 7,000 communities in 7 years. In 2006, GK set up the
Isang Milyong Bayani (GK1MB, ‘One Million Heroes’), an international
programme of contributing four hours of work per month to support the
GK communities. GK1MB volunteers also pledge to come together for a
.
ly
week-long build activity to help poor families construct their own homes.
on
Its 16 area coordination teams are ready to go wherever assistance is most
needed. The GK example has also been followed in countries such as
se
Cambodia, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. It is also at the forefront of
lu
peace-building in conflict zones in Mindanao (Southern Philippines) and
na
contributes in post-disaster rehabilitation efforts all over the Philippines.
so
GK began as an outreach of CFC, but disagreements among its leaders
resulted in GK becoming a separate group.
er
Singles for Christ (SFC) is one of several family works of Couples for
rp
Christ (CFC). The work began in 1993 to provide support to single men
Fo
and women (aged 21–40 years), initially in the Visayan Islands of the
e.
Philippines. Through three-day workshops, new SFC members are led to

l
experience the empowering presence of the Holy Spirit, helping them hear
sa
God’s call and commit to the building of a Christ-centred society. SFC

re
spread quickly, and now there are over 65,000 SFC members around the
or
world.
n
El Shaddai is a large Charismatic Catholic group in the Philippines,

tio
led by Mariano ‘Brother Mike’ Velarde. It claims a membership of some

bu
7–8 million in the country and another 1 million overseas. When he was
tri
37 years of age, Velarde was miraculously healed of heart disease before

is
surgery. In 1982, he received a revelation from God. According to him,

rd
God told him, ‘Come, and build me a centre’. An estate agent by pro-
fo
fession, he initially planned to build an enormous basilica, and he even

travelled to Rome to receive a blessing from the Pope. During this period,
ot
however, he went through bankruptcy, a family disaster and a crisis at his

N
radio station. Then he came to realise the true meaning of God’s call: not
building a basilica but establishing a holy temple of people. Soon he used
his radio programmes to spread the message of the power of the Spirit
to ordinary Catholics. After overcoming financial difficulty in 1988, his
work has expanded across the country. Due to the large numbers, Sunday
masses are held in large parks and stadiums. International branches were
opened in Hong Kong, Canada, the USA, Singapore, the Middle East and
Italy, and they continue their national and international expansion.
344 Julie Ma
A commonly asked question is, what is involved in adopting a Pente-

costal kind of faith while still remaining a faithful Catholic? A few practical
areas of Christian experience have been proposed as a response: healing
through the power of God; encounter with God, including receiving
direction; and experiencing God’s call through the Word or hearing the
internal voice of God. One common experience is that God reveals himself
to his people, be they Catholics, Pentecostals or Charismatics. Thus,
practising this Spirit-initiated faith is a shared experience, whether its pro-
ponents remain in their churches, such as Catholics, or become members
.
ly
of Pentecostal churches.
on
Evangelism
se
In the 1970s in Malaysia, both the Tabernacle of God and the Latter Rain
lu
Church (LRC) actively reached out to young people, particularly in the
na
universities and colleges. As a result, a large number of university students
so
came to faith in Christ in Kuala Lumpur. LRC reached its peak in 1989–91.
Pentecostal and Charismatic emphasis on spiritual practice is ascribed
er
to their unique worldview, close to many Asian animistic counterparts.
rp
They assume the dynamic presence and outworking of spiritual beings,
Fo
both benevolent and malevolent. In such contexts, Pentecostal and Charis
e.
matic believers often engage in what is called power encounters, which

l
have served as an effective tool in winning people in East Asia to Christ.

sa
Also, their unique theological identity has shaped Pentecostal and

re
Charismatic believers as zealous, committed and effective missionar-

or
ies. Their belief in the baptism in the Holy Spirit assumes that every
n
believer is called and empowered to be a witness. The Holy Spirit forms

tio
missional people to fulfil God’s purpose. As a distinct people of God, they

bu
experience a new in-breaking reality through the renewing work of the

tri
Holy Spirit. The combination of belief in the gifts of the Holy Spirit and
is
the priesthood of all believers has given birth to this fresh structure of the
rd
missionary community. Every believer – including women, the needy, the

fo
unschooled, the young and the laity – is called and empowered by the
Holy Spirit to serve in leadership positions and to proclaim the gospel.
ot
This universal mobilisation with the Spirit’s empowerment has resulted

N
in power evangelism, revitalisation and missional community formation.
Mission
Pentecostals and Charismatics have been a missionary movement in both
heart and principle. It began with a firm persuasion that the Holy Spirit
had endued God’s people with signs and wonders to reach the nations
with the salvation through Christ before the end of the age. The outburst
of the Holy Spirit recorded in Acts has primarily been understood as
the Spirit’s empowerment for God’s mission. The Holy Spirit prepares,
according to this belief, men and women for frontline mission even to
the uttermost parts of the world. Spirit-endowed missionaries have pro-
claimed the message of salvation, divine healing, personal holiness and
baptism with the Spirit. The early Pentecostals were convinced that the
return of Christ was imminent, hence the urgency of the mission.
An exceptional example is that of the missionary work in Japan by
Yoido Full Gospel Church. It began with a 40-day evangelistic meeting
led by Jashil Choi. The Holy Spirit laid on her heart a burning desire to
.
ly
evangelise Japanese people. The humble initial gathering at a member’s
on
home in 1979 soon grew rapidly in number to become Full Gospel Tokyo
Church. Then David Yonggi Cho held a two-day crusade at the Nippon
se
Budokan with more than 6,000 people attending the crusade. Today, Full
lu
Gospel Tokyo Church has around 1,500 members, leading Cho’s ambitious
na
evangelistic campaign ‘Salvation for 10 Million Souls’ in Japan.
so
The International Christian Assembly in Hong Kong, under the lead-
ership of Leroy Cloud, undertook highly effective short-term mission
er
work. It played an important role in preparation for the launch of Pente-
rp
costal Charismatic churches in Mongolia. In 1993, the church organised
Fo
a 52-member team comprising gospel singers, musicians and preachers.
e.
They held a three-day evangelistic crusade in Mongolia. The response

l
to the very first Christian evangelistic work in Mongolia was beyond

sa
anyone’s anticipation. Many people came forward to accept Jesus as their

re
personal saviour. Then the team was divided into groups and distributed
or
invitation flyers to the first Sunday worship. Through this effort, the
n
first local church, Hope Church, was born under the leadership of Mike
tio
Louton. His teaching was Pentecostal Charismatic, including deliverance,

bu
speaking in tongues and healing. The church rapidly grew in number,

tri
and its membership reached 1,300 in 1997. The church led the translation
is
project of the Bible into Mongolian. The New Testament was published
rd
in 1996, and 10,000 copies were sold within a month. Also, many worship
fo
songs were translated into Mongolian, including more than 80 from

Hillsong Church in Australia.
ot
N
Church Planting
Jesus Is Lord Church in the Philippines was planted in 1978 by Eddie
Villanueva with a small group of Bible study participants in the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines in Manila, where Villanueva, an economics
and finance professor, grabbed every opportunity to preach the gospel
to his students. A Bible study that began with 15 students grew remark-
ably every year, and within 10 years the church had 5 million members.
It has planted churches all over the Philippines and has turned out to be
346 Julie Ma
the largest Charismatic church in the Philippines, with a stress on holistic

mission. Soon the church expanded to an international multi-ministry
network, establishing churches in various cities around the world. The
church maintains 106 Sunday worship sites in Metro Manila, 25 in Bulacan
Province and 275 in the rest of the country. Also, there are 72 international
sites in 27 countries, totalling 478 worship sites, with 2 million worship-
pers altogether. The church also runs a television station (ZOE TV-II) that
broadcasts church services. At one time, the Jesus Is Lord Church was the
only Pentecostal Charismatic group in the nation that operated a school
.
ly
from nursery and kindergarten through primary and high school and to
on
university.
se
Conclusion
lu
Pentecostals and Charismatics have gained strengths and weaknesses
na
throughout their development. The following are some common criticisms
so
from other Christian groups that they have generally acknowledged and
accepted:
er
rp
• The emphasis on the Spirit-filled, empowered exercise of spiritual gifts
Fo
in church life can breed spiritual pride over other Christian traditions.
• There has been a tendency to downplay the ‘theology of the cross’ by
e.
focusing on a theology of triumphalism.

l
sa
• There has been a lack of dialogue with and witness to people of other
re
faiths, who dominate most Asian societies.

• A narrowly focused ‘soul-saving’ mission practice has neglected the
or
social dimension of Christian mission.

n
tio
Positively, there is an increasing awareness of the broader work of mission,

bu
including church cooperation and unity.

tri
Pentecostals and Charismatics continue to encounter challenges. The

is
emphasis on ‘blessings’ or ‘prosperity’ as a theological priority needs to

rd
be balanced by bringing out the scriptural teaching of human reality and

fo
suffering. They have established hierarchical power centres, which might

appeal to many Asian cultures but contradict the ‘egalitarian partnership’
ot
ethos of Pentecostal Charismatic spirituality. As they experience rapid

N
growth it becomes a challenge to maintain authentic Pentecostal and

Charismatic characteristics – theological, spiritual and practical.
Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity has grown and expanded in
the twentieth century and into the current century, and is perhaps the
most significant Christian movement in our day. This movement’s genius
includes its outstanding ability to adjust itself to diverse socio-cultural
settings. As a result, it provides realistically contextualised expressions of
Christianity in many different situations. This type of faith is intrinsically
flexible: the vitality, passion, impulsiveness and spirituality of Pentecostal

and Charismatic faith are well known. Also, it is ready to address life’s
pressing issues, such as illness, scarcity, job loss, loneliness and crisis.
With all these combined, its sustained exponential growth is natural.
Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity in East and Southeast Asia
has proclaimed by word and action a practical gospel for daily survival
and witnessing. It has addressed straightforward obstacles of life for
everyday living, producing the tangible outcome of faith. Pentecostal and
Charismatic believers are taught that everyone is called and empowered
.
ly
to proclaim God’s good news. Testimonies of healing and supernatural
on
interventions are generously shared with others, and this creates a ‘viral’
effect in evangelism. With its spirituality of intrinsic flexibility, messages
se
assume a contextual character that allows them to communicate with
lu
relevance and effectiveness.
na
so
Bibliography
Anderson, Allan, An Introduction to Pentecostalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University
er
Press, 2004).
rp
Anderson, Allan, and Edmond Tang (eds), Asian and Pentecostal: The Charismatic Faces of
Fo
Christianity in Asia (Oxford: Regnum Books, 2005).
Ma, Julie C., and Wonsuk Ma, Mission in the Spirit: Towards a Pentecostal/Charismatic Missiol-
e.
ogy (Oxford: Regnum Books, 2010).

l
sa
Ma, Wonsuk, and Robert Menzies (eds), Pentecostalism in Context: Essays in Honor of William
W. Menzies (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1997).
re
or
Press, 2014).
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tri
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Key Themes
tio
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or
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l e.
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.
Faith and Culture
Just as multiple wind and water currents routinely sweep East and
.
ly
Southeast Asia, diverse social forces shape Christianity and the cultures
on
within the region, and thus their interaction. Such forces have emerged, to
a great extent, with movements of peoples and their material and cultural
se
baggage within and across the region and have thus generated different
lu
modes of interaction throughout history and in today’s globalised world.
na
Both terms of the interaction are themselves complex. Christianity
so
came to this region, as elsewhere, in particular historical incarnations.
er
Early Eastern Christianity influenced by Nestorius (c. 386–450) flourished
rp
in ninth-century China, European Catholicism in sixteenth-century
colonies and Protestantism in nineteenth-century missions. And despite
Fo
the endemic attempts to define ‘the essence of Christianity’, Christianity
e.
always exists as lived and living, therefore as subject to these changing

l
currents. Hence the growing preference among contemporary scholars to

sa
refer to ‘Christianities’.
re
Furthermore, describing Christianity as religion – that is, as an in

or
tegrated network of beliefs, moral codes and ritual practices of a clearly

n
delineated community – comes from European historical experience

tio
and does not fit Asian faith and wisdom traditions such as Buddhism
bu
or Confucianism. With no equivalents for ‘religion’ in Asian languages,

tri
Christianity has been labelled with distorting nomenclature, just as these

is
traditions are not recognised to have the characteristics of religion.

rd
The term ‘culture’ proves similarly multifaceted. In plural form, it refers

fo
to specific ways of life of particular social groups. Given Asia’s enormous

breadth and extensive history, the number of its diverse interacting
ot
N
cultures is legion. In the singular, ‘culture’ points to the realm of social life
encompassing shared worldviews and ethos, differentiated from politics
and economics. This differentiation is based on earlier views of secularisa-
tion in European historical experience, where the cultural, political and
economic realms constitute ‘the secular’ in contrast to ‘the sacred’.
These views of culture(s) as integrated wholes and as distinct from
the political and economic have been questioned on both empirical and
theoretical grounds. For instance, cultural, political and economic forces
are often interwoven in Asian contexts. Moreover, ‘culture’ could be
352 José Mario C. Francisco
ambiguous, as it could take both descriptive and analytical functions. Thus

‘culture’ is best considered as a heuristic tool for understanding diverse
social contexts.
Set within the context of these general considerations, this essay offers
a broad overview of the vibrant and multifaceted interaction between
Christianity and cultures in East and Southeast Asia. Though the contri-
bution to this interaction of Christian educational institutions is noted,
the essay focuses on the platforms of language, social space and mass
and digital media, each of which has proved crucial for and representa-
.
ly
tive of the interaction. Sections on each platform describe the modes and
on
outcomes of the interaction between different incarnations of Christianity
and local cultures, traditional as well as globalised. The concluding section
se
points to common and emerging currents in the interaction.
lu
na
Interaction through Language
so
Interaction between Christianity and culture started with the arrival of
Christians in East and Southeast Asia. Whether merchants or missionaries,
er
they brought the Christianity of their places of origin and provided witness
rp
in word and deed to the peoples of the diverse contexts they encountered.
Fo
For this witness to be heard, they had to communicate the gospel through
e.
the languages of these contexts in the same manner that earlier Christian
l
expansion first employed Greek and Syriac and then Arabic in West Asia.
sa
Thus, language became the first necessary, and arguably most critical,
re
platform in this interaction between Christianity and culture.

or
This interaction through language, which occurred during successive

n
waves of Christian mission, required the appropriate linguistic infrastruc-

tio
ture involving the region’s multiple languages. In a little-known instance

bu
during the seventh-century T’ang dynasty in China, churches of the East,

tri
commonly named Nestorian by the Western churches, embraced the

is
highly developed Chinese script and language in preaching the gospel.

rd
However, during the sixteenth-century missionary movement accom-

fo
panying European colonisation, regional languages had to be transformed

to facilitate their use by missionaries. Thus, the construction of a linguistic
ot
platform became a deliberate, systematic and widespread strategy. For

N
example, the very first Synod of Manila (1582–6) voted to evangelise using
native languages rather than Spanish. This strategy in the Philippines,
as elsewhere, often required that grammars and vocabularies of these
languages be codified after European models and non-Roman scripts like
the Philippine syllabic baybayin or the Vietnamese chu nom be alphabetised.
With the linguistic platform established, interaction between Christi
anity and the region’s diverse cultures ensued, particularly through the
mode of translating Christian discourse. Needed devotional texts like
prayers and instructional materials like catechisms were first translated

from European texts and later written by missionaries and Christianised
natives.
Multiple factors shaped the creation of native Christian discourse, such
as the fear of making Christianity appear equivalent to ‘false’ or ‘inferior’
local traditions or the concern about whether a translation was intended
for the ‘literati’ or ‘folk’ among the natives. Some nomenclature was
directly transliterated from European languages; an example is the word
grasya, from the Spanish gracia, referring to God’s grace, in many Philip-
.
ly
pine languages. Others were approximations from local usage, as in the
on
unusual use of binyag, originally referring to Muslim purification before
prayers, instead of the Spanish bautismo for the sacrament of baptism in
se
the Philippine Tagalog vernacular.
lu
The dynamic of this interaction between Christianity and the region’s
na
cultures through the platform of language is most profoundly illustrated
so
in the local renditions of the Christian term ‘God’. Subject to not only lin
guistic but also theological concerns, the challenge of translating God’s
er
name is indicative of the complex interaction between Christianity and
rp
local cultures. Extant texts and relics from the brief tenure of Nestorian
Fo
Christianity, like the famous bronze Nestorian Inscription, attest to
e.
their efforts at translating ‘God’ into Chinese and their consideration of

l
existing vocabulary derived from Taoist, Buddhist and other traditions;

sa
even ‘Buddha’ was initially appropriated for God’s name. This search for
re
the equivalent translation became more pronounced with the sixteenth-

or
century wave of Christian mission. Jesuit Francis Xavier (1506–52), the

n
‘Apostle of Asia’, settled for the Japanese rendition of the Latin Deus
tio
instead of his native informant’s Dainichi, a Buddhist deity’s name.

bu
Another prominent Jesuit, Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), appropriated Shangti

tri
(‘Lord on High’) in consideration of his Chinese Confucian audience.

is
Translating the divine name clearly points to what is at stake in the

rd
interaction between Christianity and native cultures through language.

fo
Translation is not just the product of matching words with pre-existing

realities or of finding equivalences, literal or functional, between different
ot
languages. Contrary to earlier philosophies of language and translation,

N
it is more commonly described today as the mediation between social

worlds involving texts, semiotic systems and other elements. Thus, trans-
lating both God’s name in particular and Christianity in general into these
local languages proves to be a multidirectional process.
Christian texts in these languages integrate not only native vocabulary
but also local views and ethos in communicating the gospel. Some well
known examples are Doctrina Christiana (1582–91?) by Franciscan Juan de
Oliver (?–1599) for lay Tagalogs and the Vietnamese–Latin Catechismus
(1651) of Jesuit Alexandre de Rhodes (1593–1660). This Vietnamese

catechism, influenced by Ricci’s approach, shows keen awareness of Viet-
namese religious thought and employs vernacular proverbs and sayings
to explain Christian doctrine.
Other native Christian texts like novenas chronicle lives of exemplary
Christians and use local rhetorical forms for prayer. In the enduring Philip
pine tradition of chanting the epic of Christ’s life, available in all major
languages, biblical characters come to life as natives in thought, feeling
and behaviour and thus serve as native Christian models. For instance,
.
ly
ordinary natives during the 1896 Philippine Revolution perceived their
on
struggle as participation in Christ’s Passion.
Thus, the interaction between Christianity and local cultures through
se
the mode of translation truly becomes a two-way rather than a unilaterally
lu
controlled process that integrates the preaching and the reception of the
na
gospel. Inasmuch as language is the primary carrier of culture, the inter
so
action translates what is brought by foreign missionaries and gives birth to
Christianity in East and Southeast Asian cultures – a Christianity through
er
which their people could witness to their own Christian faith.
rp
Moreover, as cultures change through time, this process of translating
Fo
Christianity becomes constitutive and ongoing. Thus, the work of transla-
e.
tion has continued beyond earlier missionary movements. From the late
l
nineteenth century, efforts of newly arrived Protestant groups to translate

sa
the Bible into Chinese had to overcome factors such as the variety of levels
re
and dialects as well as denominational and theological differences. They

or
succeeded in producing a common translation only in 1919.

n
Then, with the development of modern social science in the latter half
tio
of the twentieth century, Christian churches became more aware of and

bu
knowledgeable about the nature and dynamics of cultures. The World

tri
Council of Churches began to employ anthropological concepts like ‘in

is
digenisation’ or ‘acculturation’ in its theological and pastoral reflections.

rd
The Catholic Church’s Second Vatican Council allowed the general use of
fo
vernaculars in church liturgies and applied a social science view of culture

in analysing the contemporary situation in its major document Gaudium et
ot
spes (1965).
N
Given these recent developments, efforts at deepening the inter

action with cultures within the region became deliberate and extensive.
Pioneer scholars from the region begin to publish theological works in
their native languages; for example, Korean theologians used the concept
of han (woundedness, suffering) for the liberation of the Minjung (poor,
oppressed). Others integrated native cultural ethos in their theologising;
C. S. Song incorporates Chinese folk tales, and Filipino José de Mesa the
Tagalog understanding of loob (interiority).
At present, this interaction through the platform of language remains

dynamic within the region and sets various strategies for and outcomes in
translation. Some differences in translation have been accepted as a sign
of diversity, but others have led to conflict. For instance, the prayer ‘Our
Father’ has two versions in Korean, corresponding to differences between
the Protestant and Catholic traditions. It has had many different Javanese
translations throughout the twentieth century because of differing theo-
logical views.
The Christian use of ‘Allah’ has recently proved contentious in Malaysia.
.
ly
It has historical roots in the first Christian communities in West Asia and
on
is currently accepted in Indonesia and Malaysian Sarawak. But because
the political status of Islam in peninsular Malaysia has had a different his-
se
torical configuration, Christians have been ordered by federal courts not
lu
to use ‘Allah’ in their publications.
na
Apart from the many forces at play in specific cases, these current dif-
so
ferences in translations simply indicate the central importance of language
as platform and translation as mode of interaction. They illustrate the con-
er
tinuing growth of Christianity as constituted in and through the cultures
of the region. rp
Fo
e.
Interaction in Social Space

l
Social space, both geographical and cultural, is another important platform

sa
where Christianity and East and Southeast Asian cultures interact. In

re
certain parts of the region, this space has been severely limited by different
or
forms of dominant political power. Such power from traditional leaders,

n
nationalist and communist regimes or strong ethnic or religious majorities

tio
have restricted, if not prohibited, Christian interaction with local com

bu
munities. During certain periods in their past and even in the present,
tri
such has been the case in Laos, Cambodia and even Myanmar. Thus,
is
Christian missions have often concentrated on marginal groups, such as

rd
ethnic minorities, or oppressed sectors.

fo
But in more open social spaces, Christianity has been able to interact
with culture and to show its public face through communal practices and
ot
in material artefacts. This interaction occurs in three modes: when Christi-

N
anity encounters deeply embedded cultural practices and artefacts, when

local cultures shape Christian practices and artefacts, and when Christian
practices and artefacts move into new contexts. These modes of interaction
illustrate how the constitutive strands of these cultures – ethnicity, class,
or other religious and wisdom traditions, among others – come into play.
The first mode of interaction consists in Christianity’s encounter with
existing social contexts. Upon its relatively recent arrival, it encountered
a rich repertoire of cultural practices, like common rituals and symbolic
objects, all of which had evolved in the enduring traditions of diverse local
communities. Christianity, though identifying itself as ‘true religion’, was
not reticent in appropriating whatever was helpful for evangelisation. In the
colonial Philippines, for instance, Spanish missionaries taught catechism
through local musical idioms. In Java, Catholics consider their pilgrimages
to major Marian shrines as part of the long-standing local ziãrah pilgrimage
tradition, in the same spirit that Muslims visit tombs of prominent Islamic
missionaries. Given this inclusive tradition, Catholics and Muslims visit
each other’s shrines without compromising their own religious identities.
.
ly
This first mode of interaction is best illustrated by the Christian
on
encounter with the traditional ethos of filial piety and its ritual expressions,
beginning with Ricci’s China mission and enduring in parts of the region
se
with Chinese and/or Confucian influences.
lu
Contemporary studies still discuss this complex encounter, memorial
na
ised in the so-called Chinese Rites Controversy and concerned with their
so
compatibility with Christian faith. Given Ricci’s Renaissance humanist
background and serious study of Chinese thought, he viewed them as
er
cultural and ethical practices, not religious, and thus compatible with
rp
Christianity. However, following their 1635 arrival in Fuan, Domin
Fo
icans and Franciscans, who preached to Christian converts rather than
e.
Confucian scholars, opposed Ricci’s position and sent an indictment to

l
church authorities in the Philippines and Rome.

sa
What was initially a theological dispute proved to be a conjuncture of

re
various forces within the Catholic Church and Chinese society. Ancestral
or
rites were intertwined with power relations between lineages and thus im-
n
plicated in political hierarchy and social harmony. Subsequently, even the

tio
Kangxi emperor and his courtiers became concerned about this conflict.
bu
Within the church, the continuing dispute involved various power centres
tri
in Asia and Europe, among them religious congregations and orders, theo-
is
logical commissions, papal legates and even several popes. In 1704, Pope
rd
Clement IX issued a ban on the rites, which Pope Benedict XIV reaffirmed
fo
in 1742. However, in 1939 Pope Pius XII reversed the ban. At present, these
rites have been accepted and even integrated into liturgies among some
ot
Catholic communities across the region, but not among the more reticent
N
Protestant groups.
Though commentators see this controversy as ‘a missed opportunity’
for Christianity in Asia and beyond, the more fundamental issue in this
interaction is Christianity’s presence in the social space of native com
munities. More than just an issue of ritual practice and its theological
status, this tradition is deeply woven into the social fabric of many East
and Southeast Asian societies, and therefore Christianity’s response delin-
eates its public place vis-á-vis local cultures.
The second mode of interaction through social space consists in how

native cultures adapt and appropriate Christian forms and artefacts as
their own. In line with Christianity’s traditional view of mission as trans-
planting the church, foreign missionaries and native clergy brought church
practices familiar to them or from their places of origin. Church architec-
ture and art provide the most obvious examples. Malaysia’s St George’s
Church, the earliest Anglican Church in Southeast Asia, completed in 1818
by the East India Company, is modelled after its namesake in Chennai
along the Georgian Palladian style common then.
.
ly
Despite this importation of foreign styles in constructing sacred spaces,
on
the native, unlike passive platforms, asserted its materiality and character
in different, even subtle, ways. First, materials for these churches came from
se
local resources. In the colonial Philippines, missionaries built European-
lu
style churches in cities and towns with improvised local materials like red
na
clay, volcanic tuff (adobe) and dressed coral stone (tabliya). Moreover, other
so
factors, such as local topography and climate, forced European church
designs to be modified; because of the recurrent earthquakes, colonial
er
churches could not be as high as their European models, hence their being
termed ‘earthquake’ or ‘squat’ baroque. rp
Fo
Native forms and motifs appear in churches throughout the region. For
e.
instance, though Singapore’s Catholic Church of Saints Peter and Paul was
l
built in colonial neo-Gothic style, its exterior neo-Gothic columns feature

sa
lotus details. Vietnam’s Phát Diệm Cathedral, designed by local priest

re
Tran Luc and built in 1892, is a stone cathedral with traditional Vietnamese
or
roofs. Though these design details might appear simply ornamental and
n
therefore superficial, they show the intrusion of native cultural ethos and
tio
suggest a subtle subversion of colonial Christian design. In many Philip-

bu
pine colonial churches, botanical motifs like familiar banana and papaya
tri
fruits abound, hinting at a lush tropical environment.

is
This mode of interaction is most evident in the depiction of Christian

rd
images in painting, relief and statuary. Although these images, like church
fo
architecture, borrowed European representations, native artists crafted

them using traditional expertise and styles. Facial features, especially
ot
the eyes, bear resemblances to those of the natives, thus projecting them
N
as their own. In the retablo (altarpiece) of the Jesuit church in Silang, the
Archangel Gabriel’s Annunciation to Mary takes place in a room complete
with what appears to be the mosquito net ubiquitous in ordinary Filipino
houses.
This localisation of Christianity becomes more widespread and deliber
ate in the second half of the twentieth century, with greater Christian
openness to local cultures. Jesus and the saints are represented in native
dress and within local settings. But even with such openness, Christianity’s
interaction with local cultures has not been free of tension and conflict,
because other forces also shape these cultures. Korean Christians have
disagreed about whether the Holy Family should be represented in
elaborate royal robes or in ordinary peasant attire. More striking is the Re-
demptorist Church building in Pattaya, Thailand, completely rendered in
the Buddhist tradition. Not only does the church itself look like a temple,
but Christ is also portrayed through Buddhist iconography. Some Thai
Catholics feel completely at home in it, while others cannot pray in what
they see as a Buddhist temple.
.
ly
The third mode of interaction in social space began with recent wide-
on
spread, sustained and systematic movements of peoples who bring their
Christian practices and artefacts into new contexts. Its most documented
se
instance relates to the migration of Catholic Filipino workers within the
lu
region and beyond, which affects the dynamic between Christianity and
na
culture in their places of destination.
so
While local churches in Korea and Taiwan, for example, have shown
concern for Catholic migrants, differences between the migrants’ ethos
er
and practice, rooted in Filipino Christianity, and those of local Christian
rp
communities have made negotiations necessary and challenging. Filipino
Fo
traditions like patronal feasts and Christmas novena Masses are given
e.
religious space at local parishes, as in the Kuala Lumpur Cathedral, but

l
these traditions do not become part of the local community. In other

sa
instances, migrants are integrated into parish life, singing at regular

re
Sunday Masses and welcoming other parish members to typically Filipino

or
religious celebrations.
n
This mode of interaction involving Christian practices and artefacts

tio
from different local contexts raises an important issue regarding the

bu
public place of different Christian forms within a particular church and

tri
society. In Japan, for instance, migrant Catholics from the Philippines and
is
Latin America exceed native Catholics in number, thus making Japanese

rd
Catholics a minority in society and also in the Catholic Church itself.

fo
At the same time, the presence of Filipino Catholic women as wives or

nannies sometimes leads to baptism, first of the children and subsequently
ot
of other family members. These situations pose practical challenges to the

N
catholicity of Christianity.
Beneath these modes of interaction on the platform of social space lies
the dynamic between Christianity’s appropriation of local cultures and its
concern over the integrity of its tradition. How this dynamic is negotiated
in each case – for example ancestor veneration, Buddhist representations
of Christ and differing forms of Christian practice – shapes Christianity’s
public presence in local societies. These negotiations, however, also take
place through and within Christian educational institutions in many
rural and urban areas across the region. Envisioned as a strategic base for
reaching the large Asian youth population, these schools and universities
not only facilitate interaction between the Christian minority and those
from other religious, ethnic or economic backgrounds but also provide
formal education to sectors without traditional access, such as women and
the poor.
Interaction through Media

With advances in transport and communications technologies in the
.
ly
second half of the twentieth century, movements of peoples within and
on
beyond borders and the consequent increase in the number and density of
urban centres brought profound changes within a Christianity confronted
se
by modernity and in East and Southeast Asian cultures no longer repre-
lu
sented by traditional rural communities. Thus, their interaction has taken
na
new modes through the equally new platforms of mass and digital media.
so
The first mode of interaction emerged with radio and television, early
forms of mass media that provided means for evangelising those beyond
er
geographical reach, either because of their remote locations or due to
rp
political restrictions. Initially cautious, but also conscious of mass media’s
Fo
potential, Christian churches and groups established international and
e.
local radio stations. Among the most prominent internationally were the
l
Catholic Vatican Radio in 1931 and Radio Veritas Asia in 1969, as well as
sa
the Protestant Evangelical Far East Broadcasting Corporation (FEBC) in

re
1945, all of which later expanded coverage by broadcasting in various

or
languages. Though initially focused on religious themes, they have also

n
responded to critical historical circumstances and provided news infor-

tio
mation independent of government control. For instance, Radio Veritas

bu
supported the 1986 People Power Revolution against the Marcos dictator-
tri
ship in the Philippines.

is
But the greater impact of Christianity’s interaction with cultures

rd
through the mass media platform has been in the transformation of

fo
Christian presence and of the social fabric of local communities them-

selves. Through mass media, Christianity and local cultures interact in
ot
new ways. The voice of Christianity is no longer just that of the resident
N
foreign missionary or native pastor; those from across local and national
borders are now heard. Through radio and television, Christianity speaks
in multiple voices heard by local communities, bringing about what has
been called the ‘de-territorialisation’ of Christianity. Transformation also
occurs within local communities, once isolated villages but now connected
to and in conversation with others, both Christian and non-Christian.
For instance, the spread of Evangelical Protestantism among in
digenous Hmong communities in Vietnam and other parts of Southeast
Asia began in the 1980s through FEBC radio programmes in Hmong.

Mountain villages heard through transistor radios Hmong preachers
using traditional folk tales to explain Christian faith, so much so that they
accepted Christianity as their new tradition. In response, listeners sent
cassette tapes to FEBC radio stations to ask questions express and their
concerns. This interaction has fostered Christian community and a sense
of religious identity transcending geographical boundaries.
This mode of interaction has also been present among Charismatic
or Evangelical groups in urban centres like Seoul, Taipei and Manila.
.
ly
Groups such as the Korean Yoido Full Gospel Church and the Filipino
on
El Shaddai use mass media to enhance interaction between Christianity
and rapidly developing cultures. Their religious ethos is often a mixture
se
of imported and traditional sources, bringing about either modification or
lu
reinforcement of traditional values. On the one hand, such groups preach
na
an American-style ‘prosperity gospel’ to local city-dwellers influenced by
so
Confucian tradition and now searching for better opportunities and build
community fellowship with loud electronic music, television videos and
er
new gestures and body movements. On the other, the common promin
rp
ence of male Charismatic leaders within them reinforces traditional
Fo
patriarchy in many Asian cultures. These illustrate how Christianity and
e.
cultures interact in the region’s urban centres through the platform of

l
mass media.
sa
The second mode of interaction between Christianity and culture

re
operates on the platform of digital space. Given the movements of peoples

or
in our globalised world, connectivity through digital space has become a

n
valued and central platform for all areas of contemporary life, including
tio
the interaction between Christianity and culture. Following the birth of

bu
the World Wide Web, Christian churches and groups initially employed
tri
its countless applications as a more far-reaching means of preaching the

is
gospel, just as they did through radio and television. They put up websites
rd
to provide basic information about Christianity and to share religious re-

fo
flections on Christian themes.

But as websites have become interactive and social media increasingly
ot
popular (especially among the young, urban-based and technologically

N
fluent), interaction between Christians has taken new forms on the digital
landscape. Religious practices like spiritual accompaniment, recollections
and even the Filipino Holy Thursday tradition of visiting seven churches
are offered interactively on the Web. The blogsite DiscipleSFX, created and
curated by Malaysian Catholics, provides a forum for exchange open not
only to Christians but also to those with other or no religious affiliation. Its
recent discussion of the ‘Allah’ controversy illustrates its cogency and role
in Christianity’s interaction with contemporary culture.
A similar example from the Philippines shows the importance and

impact of social media. Since the 1970s, efforts to pass reproductive health
legislation have failed because of official Catholic opposition, expressed
in numerous pastoral letters from the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
Philippines read during Sunday services. However, from 2010 onwards,
Catholic groups and individuals argued in favour of the current legislative
proposal through social media. This platform provided an alternative
voice and created a Catholic constituency for the legislation. Thus, the
proposal was subsequently passed by Congress and signed into law by
.
ly
President Benigno Aquino III.
on
Though these interactions on the platform of mass and digital media are
not hermetically sealed from traditional face-to-face situations and often
se
have links to Christian institutions, they alter the dynamics of Christian
lu
connectivity and identity. No longer is community solely structured along
na
geographical proximity, or the public voice of Christianity limited to its
so
official leaders.
er
Common and Emerging Currents
rp
This essay on ‘Faith and Culture’ has discussed the interaction of Christi
Fo
anity in its various historical incarnations with diverse traditional and
e.
contemporary cultures in East and Southeast Asia along the platforms

l
of language, social space, and mass and digital media. Though these
sa
platforms give rise to different modes of interaction, one finds certain

re
common and emerging currents related to the dynamic and outcome of

or
this interaction.
n
First, the interaction between Christianity and local cultures of the

tio
region involves all aspects of individual and social existence. Inasmuch as

bu
these cultures are practically inseparable from the economic, political and
tri
religious forces in each local context, their interactions with Christianity

is
are often subject to these same forces. Christianity’s relations with his-
rd
torical colonial and commercial interests or with modern nationalist and

fo
modernising sentiments influence its encounter with local communities

and determine its appropriation or rejection. All these forces are at play,
ot
for example, in Christianity’s complex interaction with contemporary

N
China, with its traditional heritage, tumultuous encounters with Western

and other Asian nations in both past and present, ever-changing relations
with the Catholic Church and rapid modernisation under communist
leadership. Moreover, the dominant status of other religious and wisdom
traditions in parts of the region and Christianity’s regard of them affect
the dynamic and outcome of this interaction. As a result, this interaction
has been subject to social forces based on nation, ethnicity, class and other
factors. This too is evident through Christianity’s public presence in the
region’s social space through ritual, art and architecture and in mass
and digital media, where its encounters with traditional practices and
urbanised cultures are played out. What all these indicate is Christianity’s
significant place within the region despite its minority in number.
Second, this manifold interaction is multidirectional and thus trans-
formative of both Christianity and local cultures. Whether this interaction
is spontaneous, as shown in the use of native materials, expertise and
motifs in Christian architecture and art, or is deliberate, like the translation
of Christian nomenclature and belief into native languages, Christianity
.
ly
and local cultures encounter each other in all their concreteness and
on
materiality and together give birth to the incarnation of Christianity in
each local culture. This dynamic and outcome belie earlier views of in-
se
culturation or contextuality that ignore this constitutive mutuality. Thus,
lu
despite Christianity’s initial entry through ‘outsiders’, its stature within
na
the region cannot be reduced to that of colonial imposition. Throughout
so
history and at present, the witness of Christian churches and individuals,
as well as their native voices in prayer and reflection, call into question the
er
popular view that Christianity, despite its birth in West Asia, is foreign
rp
to Asia. At Mass in some Malaysian Catholic parishes, one hears Bible
Fo
readings and liturgical songs in Malay, Tamil, Mandarin and English.
e.
Third, the interaction on the different platforms is nevertheless

l
characterised by a dynamic tension between the centripetal pull towards

sa
localisation and the centrifugal push towards de-territorialisation of both

re
Christianity and local cultures. On the one hand, Christianity is subject

or
to the compelling force of local cultures; its vocabulary, rituals and other
n
forms of practice are pulled to take native incarnations. On the other, local
tio
cultures and Christianity itself are linked to others beyond geographical

bu
boundaries. Even before communications technologies, local churches,

tri
no matter how isolated, became part of the wider Christian network, and
is
communities are subject to entities and influences in society at large. The

rd
interplay between these centripetal and centrifugal forces could be illu

fo
strated in the interaction with what is commonly seen as Asian traditions

of authoritarianism and patriarchy. Clericalism of traditional Christianity
ot
has reinforced this in many instances in local churches. But in recent

N
decades, Asian Christian women have articulated Christian discourse that

interrogates these traditions in Christianity and local contexts and, at the
same time, respects the integrity of Christianity and their own cultures.
Fourth, this tensive interaction not only transforms Christianity and
local cultures but also renews incarnations of Christianity in the diverse
spaces of the region. Asian Christian representations of Jesus as guru, the
traditional master, or as ‘the enlightened’ open different avenues towards
a richer understanding of who Jesus is.
Furthermore, greater and faster mobility across geographical and

digital spaces provides more far-reaching means of preaching the gospel
as well as different structures for communication and of community.
Christianity’s interaction on these constantly developing platforms chal-
lenges its reliance on geographical proximity and traditional structures
for governance and belonging. All these diverse instances of interaction
between Christianity and local cultures attest to Christianity’s vibrant
presence and promising future in East and Southeast Asia.
.
ly
Bibliography
on
Evers, Georg, The Churches in Asia (Delhi: ISPCK, 2005).
Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences, For All the Peoples of Asia, 3 vols (Quezon City:
se
Claretian Publications, 1992, 1997, 2002).
lu
Phan, Peter C. (ed.), Christianities in Asia (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
Tirimanna, Vimal (ed.), Harvesting from the Asian Soil: Toward an Asian Theology (Bangalore:
na
Asian Trading Corporation, 2011).
so
Press, 2014).
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Worship and Spirituality
Wonsuk Ma
Spirituality is bi-dimensional. It has an inner dimension consisting of
.
ly
personal beliefs (based on the Scriptures and traditions) forming values
on
and attitudes, and an outer dimension, which is the expression of these
in one’s life, in community worship and mission to the world. At least
se
two elements play an important role in the formation of individual and
lu
communal spirituality: the role of the social, cultural and religious context,
na
and the transcendent realm that Christians understand in terms of the
so
work of the Holy Spirit.
er
In East and Southeast Asia, Christianity has, in general, a shorter
rp
history than other religions. In this religiously rich region, many still view
Christianity as a Western religion, despite its Asian origin. The process
Fo
through which Christianity was introduced to different parts of the region
e.
is varied and often entangled with tumultuous socio-political events. The

l
shaping of Christianity, therefore, is deeply rooted in its engagement

sa
with long-standing and still prevailing religious traditions and practices.

re
Christianity’s exclusivistic claim to be the only true religion often meets

or
with reaction, rather than interaction, on the part of other religions.

n
The spread of Christianity in the region is extremely uneven. With

tio
two exceptions (Timor-Leste, with around 89% of its 1.3 million popula-
bu
tion identified as Christians, and the Philippines, with 93% of its over
tri
100 million population claiming to be Christian), most Christians live as

is
religious minorities in countries where other religions are dominant. In

rd
the three Islamic states in the region – Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia –
fo
freedom of religion is constitutionally recognised. However, various social

and political measures are in place to limit Christians’ social, political and
ot
N
religious engagement. Treatment of Christians in Buddhist- dominated

nations varies. Christians in Cambodia, Mongolia and Thailand are
repressed less than those in Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Equally
prominent in the region are several political systems that are inclement
or hostile towards Christians. In addition to legal restrictions, in some
areas the frequency of mob attacks, church burnings and terrorist attacks
is on the rise. For example, Christian presence is almost nonexistent in
North Korea due to that country’s socialist system, which completely
denies freedom of religion except for a few ‘showcases’. The unregistered
churches in China practise their faith and mission ‘underground’. In parts

of the region, however, the struggling state of Christianity cannot be
explained by such hostility alone. In completely free environments, such
as Japan and Thailand, Christianity is still trying to establish itself even
after many centuries of mission.
Despite the challenging circumstances of the region, Christians and
churches have developed a vibrant spirituality, worshipping lifestyle and
missionary engagement. In many countries in the region, Christianity
historically has brought much-needed social change. Challenging long-
.
ly
standing social traditions and customs – such as taking concubines, the
on
use of narcotics like opium and unjust social-class systems – has led many
to see modernity as naturally concomitant with Christianity. Still, in other
se
countries, Christianity is often perceived as the religion of the Western
lu
imperial powers. Christian self-identity in each context is, therefore, the
na
result of an active process wherein Christian belief, missionary tradition,
so
socio-cultural context and local religious beliefs interact with and against
each other.
er
Worship: Centre of Christian Spirituality rp
Fo
Worship expresses the spirituality of believing individuals and com
e.
munities. Consider a lively worship scene where local and global influence
l
comes together. The All Gospel Church in San Fernando, the Philippines,
sa
gathers between 120 and 150 members for Sunday morning worship. They
re
range from fish vendors to a city clerk, from students to the elderly. After
or
a short prayer, a group of young musicians and singers leads the congre-
n
gation in worship. There are no hymn books, and the songs are highly
tio
‘contemporary’ (such as the music originating from Hillsong in Australia).

bu
The atmosphere is lively and the music loud. Several young girls dance
tri
with cymbals in their hands, and the congregation moves along clapping
is
and raising their hands. The music slows down, and the pastor extends
rd
a warm welcome, shares announcements and gives updates on recent

fo
missionary trips. Being Pentecost Sunday, the message traces the appear-
ance of God through ‘fire’, especially the appearance of ‘tongues of fire’ on
ot
the day of Pentecost. The congregation continually responds with various

N
expressions of agreement. The sermon concludes with a prayer for baptism

in the Holy Spirit, which eventually turns into a communal prayer as the
audience divides into groups of three and four to pray for one another.
The congregation then spends some time in koinonia (fellowship), as the
pastor acknowledges and prays over birthday celebrants. After the col-
lection of tithes and offerings, the pastor pronounces a benediction, and
the worship service ends with a burst of applause and another period of
joyous singing.
366 Wonsuk Ma
This is just one example of the many types of worship practised in the
region. It is important to recognise the powerful influence of globalisation
on the formation of spirituality and the practice of worship. Contemporary
worship music, often from Pentecostal and Charismatic communities, has
spread across geographical and ecclesial boundaries.
Central to this widespread culture of worship is simple and yet con-
temporary worship music, such as that produced by Hillsong or Bethel
Music. This modern Christian culture is closely related to the spread and
popularisation of Charismatic spiritual experiences, forms of spirituality
.
ly
and worship. Extremely modern in their look, sound and environment,
on
many church gatherings resemble rock concerts. Such worship gatherings
naturally attract the younger generation, which otherwise would have
se
been left out by traditional worship. A guitar, instead of a pipe organ,
lu
creates a worship atmosphere, promoting a casual, friendly and mobile
na
environment for the Christian community. This supra-denominational
so
culture has also presented a context in which fellowship across denomi-
national lines takes place by sharing common worship songs and prayers.
er
In the coming years, therefore, Christian spirituality will draw from both
local and global experiences. rp
Fo
e.
Spirituality Shaped by Christian Status

l
With large numbers of Asians having not yet heard the Christian message,
sa
there is no other continent in the world for which the call for mission is
re
more pronounced. The meagre footprint of Christianity has sharpened

or
the church’s sense of mission. Individual Christians might exercise their

n
faith away from their families, who might not support their new-found
tio
faith. Frequent accounts of persecution are part of the East and Southeast
bu
Asian Christian experience. Such circumstances encourage Christians

tri
and churches to set evangelism as their mission priority. While people

is
of dominant religions might not feel a need for conversion, ethnically

rd
or socially marginalised groups tend to be more open to the Christian

fo
message. For example, in the Buddhist nation of Myanmar, the Chin tribe
in the north are predominantly Christian, and the majority of Malaysian
ot
Christians are either Chinese, indigenous or Indian. These groups also

N
develop a stronger sense of missionary call to reach out to the rest of

the nation for Christ. Fervent prayer and commitment for mission often
spark a series of revivals, which frequently result in large evangelistic
programmes. For example, the 1907 Pyongyang Revival gave birth to the
Million Souls for Christ Movement in Korea during the harsh colonial era.
When Korea was divided after independence (1945), Christian refugees
from the communist North formed congregations in Seoul, praying and
preparing for the restoration of churches in North Korea. The majority of
Korean Christians have remained politically conservative and missionally

committed due to this historical experience.
The Bario Revival in the Island of Borneo in Malaysia is another case.
Begun among students in 1973, the revival resulted in a missionary
fervour, and many evangelistic teams were formed to reach out to nearby
communities. The revival eventually gave birth to the largest Protestant de-
nomination in Malaysia, Sidang Injil Borneo. The church today maintains
its missionary commitment, sending out missionaries to many parts of the
world. Perhaps the most enduring case of Christian spirituality shaped
.
ly
by a sense of mission is post-Cultural Revolution Christianity in China.
on
Through the harsh socio-political turmoil, people were more open to the
message of an alternative community with a new identity, and so both
se
registered and unregistered churches mushroomed. The unregistered
lu
churches soon became a missionary force, mobilising young believers to
na
form missionary teams to spend months doing evangelism. The outcome
so
was a rapid spread of the Christian faith. Many mission movements in
China today, including the well known Back to Jerusalem Movement,
er
are a natural outgrowth of spirituality shaped by the struggling status
rp
of Christianity there and the self-awareness created by the missionary
Fo
mandate to bring the good news of Christianity to their communities.
le.
Mission, Church, Spirituality: New Understandings

sa
The traditional concept of Christian mission was introduced and exempli-

re
fied by Western missionaries. As a result, Christian mission came to be

or
understood as a programme only rich (Western) Christian countries could

n
undertake. This historically shaped mission understanding and practice,

tio
however, have recently been challenged by a rediscovery of the biblical

bu
teaching that every believer (and therefore church) is sent to the world
tri
and called to witness, both locally and beyond. The inherited unhealthy
is
notion of mission has slowly been challenged and broken among East
rd
and Southeast Asian churches. Several important factors have caused this
fo
change. The first is increasing awareness of the church’s missionary call.

This awareness is linked to the increasing study of the Bible. For example,
ot
Gipung Lee – one of the seven members of the first graduating class of
N
the Chosun Presbyterian Theological Seminary of Pyongyang in 1907 –

initiated a missionary tradition that continued for many years, going to Jeju
Island as the first ever Korean missionary. The theological consciousness
of mission (by every believer) best explains this missionary awareness in
the very early years of Christian presence in Korea. The Back to Jerusalem
missionary movement is another example of indigenous mission impetus.
The second factor is contextual. East and Southeast Asia, as the home of
many religions, finds the church in a setting ripe for mission. Living with
368 Wonsuk Ma
other religions, adversity and marginalisation help the church to sharpen

its missionary mandate.
The third factor is the (possible) influence of missionaries. Through
the intentional work of missionaries (including non-Westerners), national
missionary movements have spread. It is not clear how much influence
Western missionaries exerted on the early years of Korean Christianity,
for example. However, it is clear that the new mission movement in
Nagaland, India, was fostered by national church leaders, assisted by
Korean missionaries.
.
ly
Finally, the fourth factor is the drastic increase in mobility. Christian
on
mission has been positively affected by globalisation. In so-called ‘creative
access’ regions, professional Christians best serve as mission actors.
se
Hundreds of thousands of Christian immigrant workers from the Philip-
lu
pines, for example, have been effective gospel bearers in homes, factories
na
and hospitals. In large cities such as Hong Kong, these – sometimes very
so
large – gatherings are a conspicuous demonstration of Christian faith in
social settings where it is restricted. The net result is a serious revision of
er
the traditional understanding and practice of mission, allowing the church
rp
in East and Southeast Asia to emerge as a committed mission actor in
Fo
global Christianity.
le.
Engagement with Culture

sa
The relationship between Christianity and other religions has been

re
complex. The ‘foreign’ nature of Christianity and its exclusive claim for
or
truth have placed the church on a collision course with other religions.
n
Conservative Christians simply condemn other religions and their related

tio
cultural practices as ‘pagan’, while more progressive Christians detect ‘pre-

bu
evangelism’ elements in a given culture. In East Asia, where Confucian

tri
influence has loomed large, how Christians deal with the traditional
is
ancestor veneration has served almost as a litmus test to gauge the ‘purity’
rd
of their Christian faith. Many early believers were ostracised, persecuted

fo
or disowned by their families for refusing to participate in the family

rite of offering a table to the spirits of deceased ancestors. At some point,
ot
state-sanctioned persecutions were carried out to reinforce the Confucian

N
practice, and thousands of Christians lost their lives. In their minds, if

any spirits are present around the table, they are evil spirits. The whole
practice of ancestor veneration was considered to be a violation of the first
commandment given through Moses. This attitude of complete separation
has established Christianity as a radical ‘other’ faith against all the tradi-
tional beliefs and increased the distance between Christianity and Asian
religions, perpetuating the perception of it being a Western religion. On
the other hand, some East Asian churches, such as the Anglican Church,
tend to lean towards formal (or High Church) worship, connecting with
Confucian and Taoist traditions that regard formality and propriety as the
foremost elements in their civic and religious rites.
More progressive Christians view some elements of culture and
religions as the manifestation of the presence and work of the Holy
Spirit. One well publicised example is the Spirit/spirit(s)-invoking dance
performed by a Korean woman theologian at the General Assembly of the
World Council of Churches in Canberra, Australia, in 1991. In this pro-
vocative performance, she called the spirits of those killed by oppression
.
ly
and of the earth and rainforests. After calling ‘the spirit of the Liberator,
on
Jesus Christ’, she claimed that through these spirits we could experience
the Holy Spirit. Although this might be considered an extreme case, it
se
symbolised a quest to present the Christian message through the existing
lu
religious symbols and categories. Indeed, openness to regional cultures
na
and religious ideas has been surprisingly common throughout the history
so
of Christianity. For example, in almost all Bible translations, the tradi-
tional name of the supreme deity in the given context has been adopted
er
for ‘God’. Even in the controversial issue of ancestor veneration, churches
rp
in various socio-cultural contexts have developed Christian responses to
Fo
social needs. For example, at an early stage of the Protestant mission in
e.
Korea, the Methodist Church modified the traditional ancestor rite into a
l
Christian family memorial. The Korean Catholic Church issued a formal

sa
statement admitting its teachings ‘misled’ early believers to refuse the

re
ancestor rites. Generally, there is a growing awareness of God’s ongoing

or
presence and work in creation, including culture.

n
tio
Prayer and Worship: Contextually Informed

bu
The intensity of spirituality is a major characteristic of East and Southeast

tri
Asian Christianity, and this is particularly visible in worship, prayer life

is
and mission commitment. The generally conservative attitude also reflects

rd
the spiritual commitment. Many denominations whose Western counter-

fo
parts are theologically and behaviourally liberal remain rather conservative

in Asia. Several factors contribute to this. The first is the minority social
ot
status of Christianity. In many settings where Christians are numeric

N
ally a minority, or socially or legally marginalised, local churches are the

focal points of spiritual life. In addition to many weekend and weekday
meetings for worship and prayer, various informal gatherings – including
the famous early-morning prayers – take place. Homes, however, are
not conducive to such spiritual practices. Marginalisation and persecu-
tion bring division to some families. It is the Christian community that
supports and strengthens the faith. Naturally, their prayer and worship
are intense and their commitment to mission strong.
370 Wonsuk Ma
The second is the deeply rooted religiosity of East and Southeast

Asians. All the region’s religions – including Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam,
Taoism and animism – feature deep devotion and dedicated prayer as
part of their spiritual values. The region is dotted with mosques, temples,
shrines and prayer huts, in both the mountains and urban centres. In
Japan, Shinto shrines are found in every community. Worship days and
festivals are immediately noticeable as the whole community changes
in attire, decoration and activities. However, religious activities are not
limited to formal locations. The Chinese offer food at their family shrines,
.
ly
while many taxis in the Philippines carry statuettes of Mary. Shamanistic
on
Korean families maintain a corner in their homes to offer clean water and
food to the spirits. Considering that first-generation Christians have made
se
a change in their religious affiliation, it is natural for them to bring their
lu
existing religious orientations to Christianity. Therefore, the influence of
na
other religions is greater than the average Christian wishes to admit.
so
The pervasive influence of regional realities impacts the forms of
worship, especially the music. During the Pre-Assembly Event of the
er
Commission on World Mission and Evangelism of the World Council
rp
of Churches held in Manila in 2012, participants were introduced to
Fo
Christian music drawn from indigenous resources. The prolific introduc-
e.
tion of Chinese Christian music among unregistered churches is often in

l
stark contrast to the registered churches, whose worship is still dominated

sa
by old Western hymns. It was said that the early-morning prayer initiated
re
in the Korean Pyongyang Revival was inspired by the Buddhist practice of

or
early-morning prayer. More convincing, however, is the suggestion that

n
the Buddhist practice of prayer motivated the prayer mountain movement

tio
in Korean Christianity. In parts of Indonesia the main Sunday worship

bu
service is held early in the morning, in part accommodating the agricul-

tri
tural cycle but also following the practice of Islam.

is
The third factor is the influence of missionaries. In settings where

rd
Christianity was part of the colonial experience, dominant churches such

fo
as the Spanish Catholics in the Philippines, French Catholics in Indochina

and Anglicans in Malaysia tended to preserve the spiritual tradition and
ot
worship forms of the ‘mother churches’. However, in settings where

N
missionaries were not associated with the ruling power, as in Korea and
China, many early missionaries tended to be pietistic in spirituality. Their
unrelenting commitment to Christian faith and an altruistic lifestyle
resulted in the intensity of Christian worship, prayer and mission.
Openness to the Spirit/Spirit(s)

Related to the general religious fervour among Christians in East and
Southeast Asia is their openness to the work of the Holy Spirit. Because
they are keenly aware of the spiritual world and its impact on daily life,
the person and work of the Holy Spirit have found an open reception.
This consciousness stands in contrast to the general tendency to downplay
pneumatology in the West. The biggest contribution to this strong pneu-
matological consciousness has to do with general religious expectations.
Although major Asian religions might not contain a strong belief in
healing and miracles, animism – which undergirds practically all religious
beliefs – has shaped a powerful understanding that the spiritual world
is the main cause of all human experiences. Consequently, to correct any
.
ly
ills in life, one needs to investigate the spiritual world, identify any spirits
on
that are responsible for misfortune, and appease them with an appropriate
ritual or offering. By similar logic, in any aspiration in life – such as success
se
in business, a good marriage, or childbearing – spirits (often benevolent)
lu
are called to act on behalf of the worshipper.
na
In each context, the number of spirits called ranges from hundreds to
so
millions, and this widespread and persistent belief system has permeated
almost every religion in East and Southeast Asia. For example, many
er
Buddhist temples include statues of major spirits and gods of the local folk
rp
beliefs. Fortune-tellers and shamans often claim that the source of their su-
Fo
pernatural ability comes from major religious figures, such as the Buddha.
e.
Faith healers in the northern Philippines attribute their supernatural

l
ability for claimed healing incidents to Jesus, Mary and José Rizal, the
sa
Filipino national hero of the independence movement. Similarly, around

re
large Catholic churches in the Philippines, local vendors sell plants, dried
or
seeds, snake spines and small bottles of unknown liquids along with holy
n
water for the purposes of healing, pregnancy and warding off evil spirits.
tio
Examples abound, and they all point to the pervasive influence of the
bu
religious orientation and expectations in East and Southeast Asia, often

tri
regardless of formal faith affiliations.

is
The Holy Spirit, as the Spirit of God and Christ, therefore occupies
rd
a special place in East and Southeast Asia’s religious psyche. It was the
fo
national Christians who explored the dynamic work of the Holy Spirit,
which frequently was curtailed by the traditional downplaying of pneuma-
ot
tology among missionary churches. Considering that religious expectations

N
among East and Southeast Asians include supernatural encounters like

healing, Christians, regardless of denomination, anticipate similar experi-
ences, especially from the God who claims to be supreme above all other
gods and spirits. The Holy Spirit has naturally been viewed as the primary
agent of such religious experiences, and healing movements began to
appear even among churches that evade the topic of the Holy Spirit.
During the early twentieth century, John Sung spread revival in China
and Southeast Asia, and his meetings frequently were accompanied by
372 Wonsuk Ma
testimonies of supernatural healing and miracles. After the Cultural

Revolution in China, around half of Christians among unregistered
church networks attributed their (or a known) experience of healing as
the primary motivation for conversion. In the 1950s, Ig-du Kim, a Presby
terian minister in Korea, led a large-scale healing movement, gaining the
attention of a national newspaper. ‘Prayer mountains’ in Korea, regardless
of denominational links, have promoted encounters with the Holy Spirit
through healing and miracles. The higher proportion of Pentecostal and
Charismatic Christians in Asia than in the rest of the world also points to
.
ly
this openness to the Spirit.
on
Church and Society
se
The age-old but famous ‘Critical Asian Principle’ takes the colonial ex
lu
perience as a critical principle in the process of theologising in Asia. Most
na
states in East and Southeast Asia were under colonial rule, generally by
so
Western powers, though also by an Asian power, Japan. In the independ-
ence process, perceptions of the church were rather ambivalent in nations
er
where the dominant church was part of the colonial experience. On the
rp
other hand, churches in contexts where Christianity was not part of the
Fo
colonial package but where Christians shared the colonial suffering with
e.
their fellow nationals played a different role in the nation-building process.

l
In Korea, Christians, including Western missionaries, were political

sa
targets of the Japanese colonial power. During the democratisation

re
process, the Catholic cathedral in downtown Seoul served as the haven for
or
the movement. Generally, Christianity has opposed communist ideology

n
in support of democracy. In places where an authoritarian or socialist

tio
system dominated, the church led a resistance movement. The Catholic

bu
Church in the Philippines raised a prophetic voice during the Marcos

tri
dictatorship, and some clergy joined the New People’s Army, the armed
is
resistance movement of the Philippine Communist Party. In Myanmar,

rd
Christians led the Karen resistance in the struggle for independence.

fo
Christian influence and leadership were so strong in the Karen National

Liberation Army that Buddhist members decided to form a separate
ot
armed movement in 1994.

N
Excelling in education, moral discipline, medical service and volun-

teerism, church and missionary communities have worked with the state
during social transition and nation-building periods, as was the case in
Cambodia after the fall of Pol Pot and in post-socialist Mongolia in the
1990s. However, the church still struggles to negotiate its relationship
with the state in some nations of East and Southeast Asia. South Korea
witnessed the growth of Christianity, but the North practically eliminated
the Christian presence there. During Mao’s revolution in China, the
Christian Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. In East Malaysia (traditionally

Christian), aggressive Islamisation has been sanctioned or supported by
the state.
Missionaries in East and Southeast Asia traditionally have paid much
attention to education. They invented writing systems and translated the
Bible into vernacular languages. In Korea, the Bible was translated into
Korean, the language that common people, including women, used in
reading and writing. In China, due to the social system, most children
of urban immigrant families do not have access to public education,
.
ly
as residency is not easily and legally transferred to urban addresses.
on
It is Christians, often from unregistered churches, who open (often
unregistered) schools to provide education to such children. In the Philip
se
pines, it was local church-operated Catholic schools that formed the
lu
backbone of the national educational system until public education was
na
introduced. Even today, an increasing number of Protestant churches
so
open and operate Christian schools.
Christianity has also excelled in demonstrating the value of life. Its
er
messages and actions of love are widely perceived to carry high moral
rp
value compared with animistic religion or the traditional teachings of Asian
Fo
religions. The introduction of modern medicine and hospitals is part of the
e.
Western missionary movement. More than life-saving new knowledge,

l
it is the sacrificial care for a ‘stranger’ that has most impressed East and
sa
Southeast Asians. When a powerful earthquake shattered the Sichuan

re
Province of China in May 2008, house churches promptly organised,

or
supplied and deployed a large contingent of relief volunteers and medical

n
professionals. These large teams of volunteers made a powerful impact

tio
not only on the victims but also on the governmental authorities. Not only
bu
were they unregistered (and thus illegal) entities, but they challenged the
tri
national law that does not grant the right of association.

is
Christian spirituality and its expression in worship constantly evolve

rd
in interaction with contextual forces. The onslaught of materialism and

fo
secularism poses a formidable challenge to the church. For this reason,

Christian spirituality is closely linked to the church’s mission. And this
ot
keeps Christianity a dynamic living faith in a region crowded with tradi-

N
tional religions.
Bibliography
Anderson, Allan, and Edmond Tang (eds), Asian and Pentecostal: The Charismatic Face of
Christianity in Asia, 2nd edn (Oxford: Regnum Books, 2011).
Chan, Simon, Spiritual Theology: A Systematic Study of the Christian Life (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 1998).
Ma, Julie C., and Wonsuk Ma, Mission in the Spirit: Towards a Pentecostal/Charismatic Missiol-
ogy (Oxford: Regnum Books, 2010).
374 Wonsuk Ma
Phan, Peter C., In Our Own Tongues: Perspectives from Asia on Mission and Inculturation
Ringma, Charles R., and Karen Hollenbeck-Wuest (eds), Walking with God: Christian Spiritu-
ality in the Asian Context (Manila: OMF International, 2014).
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ly
on
se
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er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Theology
Alexander Chow
Theology is often understood in terms of the systematising of Christian
.
ly
thought in the ivory tower: an academic enterprise, with little value for
on
the real world. We think of figures like Karl Barth, with his unfinished
14-volume Church Dogmatics, or Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae,
se
which uses Aristotelian philosophy to speak about God as ‘unmoved
lu
mover’ and ‘first cause’. When we consider theology in East and Southeast
na
Asia – as well as in other regions – we see that theology is conveyed in
so
different ways and is based on different kinds of resources. The genre of
er
a summa – that is, a text that tries to coherently summarise the doctrines
rp
of the Christian faith – has rarely been attempted by Asian Christians.
Moreover, instead of invoking Platonic, Aristotelian or Kantian terms
Fo
and philosophy, some have turned to Confucian, Buddhist or Marxist
e.
expressions and reasoning. Other Asian Christians have drawn from more
l
‘popular’ modes of theologising, such as stories, songs and drama.

sa
While it is impossible to cover every development in East and Southeast

re
Asian theology in the space allowed, this essay will begin with a dis
or
cussion of the resources used to articulate theology in this region, before

n
giving a brief overview of the two theological themes of Christology and

tio
ecclesiology.
bu
tri
Theological Resources
is
The history of Christianity in Asia has been instrumental in promoting the

rd
idea that theology should be shaped by one’s context. Two of the most
fo
important academic terms associated with this idea – ‘inculturation’ and

‘contextual theology’ – were articulated with Asia in mind.
ot
The theological understanding of inculturation was introduced into

N
Catholic circles in the 1960s and 1970s, mindful of pioneer Jesuit mission-
aries such as Francis Xavier in Japan, Matteo Ricci in China, Alexander
de Rhodes in Vietnam and Robert de Nobili in India. The Society of Jesus
later codified the term in Decree 4 of the Society’s General Congregation
32, held in 1974–5. It was also key in the formation of the Federation of
Asian Bishops’ Conference (FABC) in its first assembly, in Taipei in 1974,
which described the local church as ‘a church indigenous and incultur-
ated’ that is in dialogue with Asia’s living traditions.
376 Alexander Chow
The latter notion of contextual theology was propagated by Shoki Coe

(1914–88) through the World Council of Churches (WCC) in the 1970s.
Taking the ‘divine contextualisation’ of the incarnation as his basis, Coe
described contextuality and contextualisation as a necessary part of
theology and theological education. In contrast with inculturation’s en-
gagement with ‘living traditions’, his focus was largely on the historical
moment of a particular context. However, the idea was clearly informed
by the life experiences of Coe, also known in Taiwanese as C. H. Hwang –
born in a Taiwan under Japanese imperial rule (1895–1945), which would
.
ly
soon be followed by ‘White Terror’ under Nationalist rule (1949–87).
on
Despite the recent coinage of the terms inculturation and contextual
theology, these ideas were produced through the yearnings of genera-
se
tions of Asian Christians. Historically, they have tended to be embraced
lu
by more progressive Roman Catholics and Protestants, respectively. In
na
recent years, they have often been used interchangeably and have been
so
appropriated by others, including Orthodox Christians and Evangelical
Protestants, although with somewhat different meanings. The terms have
er
also tended to emphasise two foci of theology in Asia: on the one hand,
rp
Asia’s cultures and religions, and on the other hand, Asia’s socio-political
Fo
and economic crises. The East and Southeast Asian contexts have been
e.
moulded by the religious and political pressures of various civilisations –

l
not only from Europe with Western Christianity, but also from China with
sa
Confucian and Taoist traditions and from India with Hindu and Buddhist
re
traditions. We should also not forget the role of the Persian and Russian
or
Empires in introducing Eastern Christianity to these regions, as well as

n
the traders and mariners from Arabia, Persia, India and western China,
tio
who brought with their spices the religion of Islam. These movements of
bu
peoples and ideas, along with the more recent concerns of nation-building
tri
and the momentum gained by communism and capitalism, have offered

is
important theological resources for Asian Christianity.

rd
Much of Asian Christianity is shaped by a very long tradition of written

fo
languages and written scriptures. Christian missionaries have needed to

contend with these multiple scriptural traditions, especially Protestants,
ot
with their deep convictions of sola scriptura. Mahayana Buddhism, found

N
predominantly in East Asia, has a relatively open canon, which has resulted
in new texts such as the Lotus Sutra or the Heart Sutra. Contrastingly, the
relatively closed nature of the Qur’an, the Theravada Buddhist Tipiṭaka
and the Confucian Four Books and Five Classics (Sishu Wujing) have resulted
in the flourishing of important commentary traditions. These Asian scrip-
tures have never existed in isolation but have required dialogue and debate
and the creation of different hermeneutical approaches that shape engage-
ment with the more recent introduction of the Christian Bible. Archie C.
Theology 377
C. Lee (b. 1950), K. K. Yeo (b. 1960) and others have therefore argued that
Asian Christians cannot read the Christian Bible alone but need to read it
alongside the multiple scriptures of Asia, advocating for what has been
termed cross-textual or cross-cultural hermeneutics.
Asian textual traditions, however, tend to be associated with ‘high
culture’ as opposed to ‘popular culture’. Many groups within East
and Southeast Asia do not have as strong a written culture. Mindful of
aboriginal Christians in Taiwan, C. S. Song (b. 1929) has argued that Asian
Christians should develop a ‘story theology’ based on indigenous stories.
.
ly
Kwok Pui-lan (b. 1952) has likewise spoken about how Asian Christian
on
women often use poems, songs, dances and rituals to convey theological
ideas. Theology is sung by the Chin in Myanmar and the Lisu in south-
se
west China, as studies by Denise Ross and Aminta Arrington have shown.
lu
Theology is preached by revivalists such as Kil Son-ju (or Gil Seon-ju;
na
1869–1935), considered by some to be the father of Korean Protestantism,
so
and John Song (or Song Shangjie; 1901–44), who conducted evangelistic
tours throughout China and Southeast Asia. We must also consider the
er
material culture found in folk Catholicism, such as rites associated with
rp
self-flagellation in the Philippines or Marian devotion associated with the
Fo
Virgin’s apparition in La Vang (Vietnam) or Sheshan (China). Oral and
e.
material cultures have also been connected to the rapid rise of Christian
l
forms often described as ‘Pentecostal’ or ‘Charismatic’, which emphasise

sa
prophecy, healing and talismanic uses of the Bible or the cross.

re
The task for the rest of this essay is to explore two classic theological
or
loci, Christology and ecclesiology, from the vantage point of East and
n
Southeast Asia. Mindful of what we have just discussed, this is not an

tio
easy task. Along with basing this on more ‘theological’ writings, these
bu
overviews will also attempt to provide theological reflections on historical

tri
and social scientific studies on these expressions of the Christian faith.

is
rd
Asian Faces of Christ

fo
‘Who do you say I am?’ Responding to Jesus from a first-century Jewish

perspective, Peter immediately responds with the answer, ‘You are the
ot
Messiah’ (Matthew 16: 15–16). Jesus asks this question not only of Peter,
N
but of countless Christians who have walked the earth over the last two
millennia. Christology is perhaps the theological subject that has produced
the most copious amounts of theological writings in Asia, as well as in
other parts of the globe. This is not surprising, given that Christ, who
reveals God through the Incarnation, is the central figure of the Christian
religion. The New Testament itself includes four portrayals of Christ. We
can also consider the approaches of various theologians, such as Eusebius
and John Calvin, who spoke of the threefold offices of Christ (prophet,
378 Alexander Chow
priest and king) or the Pentecostal fourfold or fivefold gospel (saviour,

[sanctifier,] baptiser, healer and coming king). However, when we turn to
more recent Christologies around the globe, the answer is often shaped
by the ways in which Christ is first encountered. Is he a coloniser, a rich
and powerful white man, or only concerned with my well-being beyond
death? But the answer is also guided by one’s experiences and existential
concerns. Is Christ a sage, a neighbour or a fellow sufferer?
One Christology which has been the focus of many studies is that of
the eminent Chinese theologian T. C. Chao (or Zhao Zichen; 1888–1979).
.
ly
The Life of Jesus (Yesu zhuan, 1935), his most famous work on this subject, is
on
described by Chloë F. Starr as ‘imaginative nonfiction’ in the Chinese genre
of zhuan – a biography that focuses on a figure’s outward achievements,
se
serving commemorative and didactic functions. Chao’s Life of Jesus paints
lu
a portrait of Jesus as a great Confucian sage (junzi), an exemplar of moral
na
perfection. Though this would change in Chao’s later thinking, this text
so
breaks with the Chalcedonian formulation, tending to underscore only the
human nature of Christ. Jesus is not a political figure looking to restore the
er
nation of Israel through social and economic revolution; neither is he an
rp
apocalyptic prophet who preaches an imminent doom followed by a new
Fo
Heaven and a new Earth. Instead, Jesus came to establish the Kingdom of
e.
God, a spiritual kingdom built in the here and now by lives changed by
l
and embodying the love of God.

sa
The Life of Jesus offers us a snapshot into Chao’s Christology, written

re
in the 1930s when Chinese society was rethinking the foundations of its
or
civilisation and antagonistic towards the foreignness of Christianity. Un-

n
derstood more broadly, Chao held to a universality of Christianity through

tio
the cosmic dimension of God. This pre-dated many of the debates about
bu
the ‘cosmic Christ’ in the 1960s and 1970s through the WCC and through
tri
South Asian ecumenical debates. In the 1980s and 1990s, the cosmic Christ
is
became a dominant expression among Christian leaders of the state-

rd
sanctioned Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) such as K. H. Ting (or

fo
Ding Guangxun; 1915–2012) and Wang Weifan (1927–2015). For Ting, it

is the theological basis for Chinese Christians to work together with non-
ot
Christians (especially communists) in Christ’s work; for Wang, it offers

N
a mediating position for Chinese Evangelicals to uphold the priority of

Christ’s salvific work on the cross and to be involved in the socio-political
and spiritual crises of present-day China. Among various Chinese Christi
ans in the twentieth century, a cosmic Christology has underscored the
universal extent of Christ’s domain and concern and the great love of God
as expressed through the life of Jesus and his followers.
Another important East Asian example can be found in South Korean
Minjung theology, originally developed in the 1970s and 1980s in response
Theology 379
to Park Chung-hee’s military regime. Minjung theologians were socially

concerned Christians: professors and writers who positioned themselves
in solidarity with social activists in support of justice and human rights.
Ahn Byung-mu (1922–96), a New Testament professor at Hanshin Univer-
sity, articulated his understanding of Christ in the gospel of Mark as being
on the side of those described in Greek as the ochlos (the crowd made up
of the tax collectors and the sinners marginalised in society). For Ahn,
the term ‘sinner’ is ideological language used by the rich and powerful
ruling class to rob and to oppress and can never properly be applied to
.
ly
the poor or the weak. The equivalent to the Markan ochlos in the South
on
Korean context were the Minjung – the ‘masses’, who were oppressed by
the dictatorial government and dismissed by conservative South Korean
se
churches. Ahn, along with another Minjung theologian, David Kwang-sun
lu
Suh (b. 1931), has noted the particular plight by women. Not only do they
na
face oppression from the state and from religious structures; women also
so
face patriarchal oppression in society and in the homes of South Korea.
They are the ‘Minjung of Minjung’.
er
These examples from China and South Korea help us to see a theme that
rp
arises throughout much of Asia – the need to coexist and to be in solidarity
Fo
with those who do not self-identify as Christians. Often this coexistence
e.
focuses on Christ as an exemplar of one who suffered on the cross and one
l
who continues to suffer alongside those who suffer today. Other examples
sa
of this include Kazoh Kitamori’s (1916–98) Theology of the Pain of God (1946)
re
and C. S. Song’s Jesus, the Crucified People (1990).

or
Another major way of understanding this coexistence is in terms of

n
loving one’s non-Christian neighbour – what Kosuke Koyama (1929–2009)

tio
describes as ‘neighbourology’. Arising from his work as a Japanese

bu
missionary in Thailand, Koyama explains in Water Buffalo Theology (1974)

tri
that neighbourology is an incarnational principle of communication. As

is
minorities in Asia, Christians need to step back from the use of theologically
rd
dense Christological language and step first into the lives and experiences
fo
of their Asian neighbours. Koyama’s idea was further developed in the

Malaysian context by Sadayandy Batumalai’s (b. 1946) A Prophetic Christol-
ot
ogy for Neighbourology (1986) and A Malaysian Theology of Muhibbah (1990),

N
the latter appropriating an Arabic idea meaning ‘goodwill’. Even more

so than in Thailand, Batumalai argues that the sharpness of Christian–
Muslim relations in Malaysia requires a Christology of neighbourology
in which Christians offer both a prophetic voice and an experience of
neighbourly hospitality with their Muslim neighbours. Like the Chinese
and South Korean Christians mentioned above who provide a theological
rationale for working in solidarity with non-Christians for societal change,
Batumalai sees these Christological understandings as offering Christians
380 Alexander Chow
tools for working alongside Muslims in pursuit of the common good and
the transformation of Malaysian society.
In contrast with these more ‘elite’ Christologies, a very different
understanding can be found within popular Catholic spirituality in the
Philippines. We can consider the important Santo Niño (the Holy Child),
an icon said to have been given by Ferdinand Magellan to Queen Juana of
Cebu at her baptism in 1521. In Cebu City, the Santo Niño is venerated in
a festival every January as crowds gather at the Basilica Minore del Santo
Niño to celebrate in ritual dance known as Sinulog, Visayan for ‘moving
.
ly
like a current’. Such celebrations are practised elsewhere throughout the
on
Philippines. Moreover, replicas of the Santo Niño can be found in Catholic
homes and businesses and are thought to bring blessings to devotees. On
se
the other end of Christ’s earthly ministry, another popular image is the
lu
suffering Christ. Spanish colonisers used religious imagery such as the
na
Pasyon, Tagalog for Christ’s Passion, to control the colonised by inculcat-
so
ing loyalty to Spain and to the church and by instilling a preoccupation
with morality and the afterlife, as opposed to the concerns of the day.
er
According to Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto’s Pasyon and Revolution (1979), this
rp
also unexpectedly offered Filipinos an epic story – one that replaced the
Fo
indigenous epic stories destroyed by the same Spanish colonisers. Filipino
e.
folk songs, poems and plays have therefore invoked this Christological
l
imagery to critique the colonial situation and to call for change and
sa
revolution.
re
A number of Filipino women theologians have offered new en-

or
gagements with these popular Christological expressions. Muriel

n
Orevillo-Montenegro (b. 1954) raises questions about how the images of

tio
Christ in the Santo Niño and the Pasyon connect with the daily lives of
bu
devotees. She sees these images as problematic and believes the doctrine
tri
of the incarnation needs to be revisited for its moral and religious power,
is
especially for Asian women. Likewise, Virginia Fabella has critiqued the
rd
Pasyon as a ‘dead-end theology’ in which there is suffering but no resur-

fo
rection or liberation in sight. According to Fabella, Asian women need

to recognise their status of gendered oppression as contrary to the will
ot
of a just and loving God and the need to reclaim the image of Christ as
N
a saviour and a liberator. Lydia Lascano has helpfully distinguished

between Christ’s ‘passive’ and ‘active’ suffering. His passive suffering is
reflected in women’s experiences of colonialism, militarism and patriar-
chy; but Christ also experienced active suffering, which mirrors Filipino
women’s struggle for justice and freedom.
These Christological examples highlight some of the themes arising in
East and Southeast Asia when faced with Jesus’s question, ‘Who do you
say I am?’ It is instrumental that one of the major Chinese renderings of
Theology 381
‘contextual theology’ is chujing shenxue (theology of plight). Christ is met

when Christ meets one’s greatest needs. Yet if one were to describe this
Christ, the truest descriptions use the language of one’s heart, often a
deeply spiritual language. For others, Christ is described through the acts
of exemplars in our midst. In the next section, we shift from the central
figure of Christianity to the people who represent this central figure on
earth for others to encounter – that is, the church.
An Asian and Autonomous Church
.
ly
Very little has been written on ecclesiology in East and Southeast Asia
on
when compared with the vast amount written on Christology. Many of
the theological questions around the nature and expression of the church
se
have arisen due to the keen awareness of East and Southeast Asian
lu
Christians that, with the exception of the Philippines and Timor-Leste, the
na
vast majority of peoples of the region do not consider themselves Christi
so
ans. The body of believers would therefore need to articulate their dual
loyalties to Asia (independent of Western imperialism) and to Christ (as
er
the central figure of a minority faith). Moreover, disproportionate to their
rp
numbers, Christians would also need to offer a particularly strong public
Fo
voice to engage the socio-political matters of the day. Hence, ecclesio-
e.
logical ruminations of the past couple of centuries offer us an important

l
vantage point for understanding what it means to gather and to identify

sa
as Christians and to be the church in East and Southeast Asia.

re
Perhaps the most pressing critique of Christianity that has been

or
experienced by East and Southeast Asian Christians is related to its

n
foreignness – a ‘foreign’ religion, supposedly different from those ‘in-

tio
digenous’ religions of Buddhism, Islam or even communism. For many

bu
parts of Asia, this was due to the complex relationships between mission
tri
aries and foreign governments. In the Dutch East Indies, for instance,
is
Dutch colonial policy focused on converting Catholics to Protestant-

rd
ism and chose to not engage regions with a Muslim majority. In China
fo
and Japan, Christian missionaries were allowed entry in the nineteenth

century only after unequal treaties were forced upon them by Western
ot
military might. Moreover, denominational and theological differences

N
between missionaries presented a divided Christian message. Should

one follow the ‘Romish’ Catholics, who worship Mary and the Pope, or
the ‘deceitful’ Protestants, who simply toss Bibles from their boats? How
should one render ‘God’ into a local language? What was the appropriate
mode of baptism? Are we to hold to the true fundamentals of the faith
or embrace the social gospel in lieu of the ‘true’ gospel? Despite mission
policies that encouraged the establishment of indigenous churches and
the raising up of indigenous leadership based on the three-self principle
382 Alexander Chow
of self-government, self-support and self-propagation, in most East and

Southeast Asian countries local Christians were often subordinated to the
paternalism of foreign denominations and mission agencies.
In the Philippines, one of the few Asian countries with a Christian
majority, the church is often found at the crossroads of Christianity’s
relationship with nationalism. When we consider the period of the Philip
pine Revolution (1896–8), we see how divisions formed along partisan
lines, with Spanish friars tending to side with Spanish colonial powers
and Filipino clergy tending to support nationalist and revolutionary
.
ly
forces. These lines were more blurred when considering lay Catholics,
on
many of whom participated in the Revolution but also protected Spanish
friars. Later, under American sovereignty, the struggle for equal rights for
se
local clergy led to the establishment of the Philippine Independent Church
lu
(Iglesia Filipina Independiente), a schism from the Roman Catholic Church
na
in 1902 led by the nationalist Isabelo de los Reyes (1864–1938), who named
so
Gregorio Aglipay (1860–1940) its Supreme Bishop (Obispo Maximo).
However, Aglipay was initially quite reluctant to split the church, and
er
the Philippine Independent Church has struggled to maintain a strong
rp
following. Part of this was undoubtedly due to the Roman Catholic
Fo
Church’s recognition of these conflicts in the Philippines, resulting in a
e.
restructuring of church leadership through the 1902 papal constitution

l
Quae Mari Sinico and, eventually, consecration of its first Filipino bishops,
sa
beginning with Jorge Barlin in 1906.

re
A different example can be seen with the growing spirit of Protestant

or
ecumenism in China, where there was a shift of power from foreign to

n
local ecclesial bodies. When the 1910 World Missionary Conference met
tio
in Edinburgh, the Chinese pastor Cheng Jingyi (1881–1939) declared that

bu
Chinese Protestants wanted to see ‘a united Christian Church without

tri
any denominational distinctions’ and that denominationalism ‘never

is
interested the Chinese mind’. Cheng would return to China and lead a
rd
movement alongside foreign missionaries and other Chinese Protestants

fo
to establish a national Chinese church, which was formed in 1927 as the

Church of Christ in China (Zhonghua Jidu Jiaohui). Cheng was elected
ot
the first moderator of this national union of more than 15 church bodies,
N
including Presbyterian, Reformed, Baptist, Congregational, Methodist and

Independent churches. However, while it produced the largest Protestant
denomination during this time, in its cooperative ventures the new church
chose to set aside doctrinal differences; institutional unity was sought, not
theological uniformity. Conservatives who saw this as a liberal develop-
ment built their own Chinese-run denominations or denomination-like
networks, such as Yu Guozhen’s (1852–1932) China Christian Independ
ent Church (Zhongguo Yesujiao Zhilihui), Watchman Nee’s (or Ni
Theology 383
Tuosheng; 1903–72) ‘Little Flock’ (Xiao Qun) and Wei Enbo’s (1877–1919)
True Jesus Church (Zhen Yesu Jiaohui). Others chose a different route to
independence, by establishing their own indigenous churches or evangel
istic ministries, such as Wang Mingdao’s (1900–91) Christian Tabernacle
(Jidutu Huitang) and Andrew Gih (or Ji Zhiwen; 1901–85) and John Song’s
Bethel Worldwide Evangelistic Band (Boteli Huanqiu Budao Tuan). While
the Church of Christ in China aspired to establish a national church that
had a strong relationship with foreign Christians, these other develop-
ments underscored the need to be fully independent of foreign control.
.
ly
In other examples, the questions of independence from foreign powers
on
were imposed from above. This was clearly the case of the Japanese
Empire from the Meiji Restoration period (1868–1912) until the end of the
se
Second World War in 1945. Various policies were employed to control the
lu
development of Christianity in its colonies. For instance, Japanese authori-
na
ties saw Presbyterians in Taiwan as encouraging education and literacy on
so
the island and introducing advances in Western medicine, but the colonial
government was also concerned with the problems that might arise with
er
the multiplicity of denominations. Hence, Japanese authorities gave Pres-
rp
byterianism a monopoly in Taiwan from 1895 to 1925 and, by 1920, there
Fo
was a fully independent and Taiwanese-run Presbyterian church.
e.
In the Japanese state itself, authorities wanted to sever Japanese Christi

l
anity from foreign ties and, in 1941, pushed for the union of more than
sa
30 Protestant denominations to form the United Church of Christ in

re
Japan (Nihon Kirisuto Kyōdan). This pattern was also pursued after the
or
Japanese occupation of the Dutch Indies in 1942. The few local evangelists
n
in Protestant regions were hurriedly ordained on the eve of the Japanese

tio
takeover and were given charge of mission funds. Furthermore, the

bu
colonial power imposed ecumenical organisations, requiring all Protestant

tri
churches to join regional councils of churches. After the war, these councils
is
collapsed, but the foundations had been laid for indigenous leadership
rd
and the eventual development of Indonesian ecumenism.

fo
A similar practice of regional councils of churches was brought by

Japanese authorities to the Chinese mainland. While the developments of
ot
the Church of Christ in China in the 1920s and 1930s made great strides
N
towards a national church, it still had a long way to go. Timothy Brook
has argued that the developments in Japanese-occupied China brought an
independent national church closer to reality, resulting ultimately, under
the People’s Republic of China, in the TSPM in 1954 and the Catholic
Patriotic Association (CPA) in 1957.
In an ironic turn of events, Japan, an Asian colonial power that did not
have a vested interest in Christianity, accelerated the process of ecumenism
and ecclesial independence in all these regions.
384 Alexander Chow
It is worth clarifying that these ecclesiological shifts were not only

imposed from above but also arose from Christians fighting for national
independence. There is the case of contributions made by Korean Protest
ants in the ‘March 1’ movement of 1919, who made up 16 of the 33
signatories of the Declaration of Independence and, overall, had nearly as
many clergy involved as Cheondogyoist and Buddhist clergy combined.
During Indonesia’s struggle for independence from Japanese and Dutch
power, Christians died alongside Muslims in the fight. This collaboration
between Christians and Muslims continued under the Sukarno adminis-
.
ly
tration, which resulted in the five principles of the Pancasila as the basis of
on
a state that would be both secular and theistic. In both these efforts, they
proved that they were not only Christians, but that the church can and
se
should work alongside of those who are not Christians, for the common
lu
good. In other contexts after the Second World War, a number of military
na
regimes rose to power from within, often aspiring to achieve political
so
stability and economic growth. In Taiwan, South Korea and the Philip-
pines, this came at the cost of many social ills against the lower strata of
er
society. In the face of these injustices, the church became one of the main
rp
voices to speak out against these authoritarian regimes.
Fo
However, these examples of Christian participation in the fight for
e.
independence or social justice have tended to offer less theologically for-

l
mulated views on public engagement. In other examples, Christians draw

sa
from the social or public theology of their denominational backgrounds.

re
We can see this in the place of Anglican or Catholic social teaching in

or
Singapore and Hong Kong, which has empowered the church to contri
n
bute to civil society through the provision of educational and medical

tio
infrastructure. Yet at times this has resulted in ambiguous understandings

bu
of the relationship between church and state. In the Chinese mainland,

tri
Anglican social teachings (combined with ecumenical backgrounds) have

is
informed individuals such as T. C. Chao and K. H. Ting in their support

rd
of the TSPM. Contrastingly, a growing number of urban Chinese churches

fo
in the twenty-first century have turned towards Dutch neo-Calvinist

public theology, arguing that the church needs to have a public presence
ot
as a ‘city on a hill’ and be involved in God’s cultural mandate through

N
Chinese civil society. A number of these churches see themselves as being

a ‘third church’ – a new ecclesiology that transcends the historical impasse
between a clandestine and illegal existence as ‘house churches’ and an
open position through the ‘adulterous’ TSPM. Hence, while K. H. Ting has
applauded Chinese Christianity’s developments in a ‘post-denominational
era’, a number of ‘house church’ Christians have been establishing Presby-
terian and Congregationalist denominations to network with one another
in their engagement with China’s broader civil society.
Theology 385
As stated at the outset of this section, writings on ecclesiology are

far fewer than those on Christology. However, as we have seen, this in
no way suggests that considerations of the nature and expression of the
church have been absent from the minds of East and Southeast Asian
Christians. One major theme that we have seen is the desire to underscore
an Asian and autonomous church. At times this has also produced forms
of ecclesiology that are seemingly idiosyncratic to Asian religiosity, such
as the more discursive expressions like the Non-Church (Mukyōkai) in
Japan, Korea and Taiwan and the ‘cultural Christians’ (wenhua jidutu) of
.
ly
mainland China, as well as grassroots movements of house churches and
on
basic ecclesial communities. A second theme that has been underscored is
to be God’s people, gathered together and existing in a dominantly non-
se
Christian Asia. In many Western contexts, church institutionalism is seen
lu
as a problematic relic of the past. In many of the examples discussed here,
na
however, the institution of the church has enabled Christians to work
so
together, offering a collective voice in solidarity together against both
outside imperial pressures and inside authoritarian regimes. Along with
er
the rise of national churches, we must not forget the growth of various
rp
pan-Asian organisations such as the FABC and the Christian Conference
Fo
of Asia. The final theme we have seen in the discussion above is that the
e.
church exists as a public body. At times this is expressed through the

l
church’s attempt to be a people set apart to reveal God’s goodness in this

sa
world; at other times, the church must work with those outside the church
re
for the greater common good of these Asian societies.

or
n
Conclusion
tio
At the outset of the twenty-first century, the future holds many unknowns
bu
in the development of theology in East and Southeast Asia. New questions

tri
may be raised, but, more often than not, old questions will be repeated
is
in one form or another. We may consider, for instance, the two foci of
rd
theology: Asia’s cultures and religions and Asia’s socio-political and

fo
economic crises. Firstly, cultures and religions are not static but change
and develop over time. While many forms of ‘traditional’ culture and
ot
religion are waning due to the course of industrialisation and modernisa-

N
tion, there are also reverse responses, through revivals and renaissances
in Confucianism, Hinduism and Islam. Not only does this raise questions
around inter-religious engagement, but it also suggests that Christians
more often than not must seek critical intra-religious engagement – the
interplay, conscious or not, of multiple religious imaginations in a given
Christian individual or Christian community. Secondly, it is nearly im-
possible for Asian Christians to ignore the ills experienced in their local
societies. This will undoubtedly also include theological engagements
386 Alexander Chow
with the broader cosmos, sometimes drawing from non-Christian sources

to enrich theological understandings. As has been witnessed in regions
such as Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, Christians of all theological
traditions need to address this-worldly questions alongside other-worldly
aspirations.
Additionally, migration is an age-old matter that will increasingly be
important for Asian Christians. We may consider the long history of ethnic
Chinese migrating to Southeast Asia, the Asian diaspora in Western and
African countries, the influx of Westerners or Africans to various parts of
.
ly
Asia or even the movement of peoples from rural to urban centres and
on
vice versa. We may also consider the development of trans-regional and
trans-national networks and relations. Furthermore, the creation of nation
se
states in this region has severely simplified many matters, whether we
lu
speak about the Korean peninsula – where many South Korean Christians
na
can trace their lineage to the North – or about China, Burma, Indonesia
so
and the Philippines – all empires in their own right, with a multiplicity of
peoples within each of their borders.
er
Theology (or theologies) in East and Southeast Asia reflects the
rp
complexities and diversities of this vast region. This has highlighted
Fo
the importance of contextuality in theological enquiry. Yet it cannot be
e.
forgotten that the Asian church is part of a larger community with a need –
l
dare I say, a mission to – engage and be engaged by the Church Universal.

sa
What draws East and Southeast Asian Christianity together is more than
re
geography; it is the common worship of one God, as revealed through the

or
person of Christ and through the people gathered under his name.
n
tio
Bibliography
bu
Batumalai, Sadayandy, A Prophetic Christology of Neighbourology: A Theology for a Prophetic

Living (Kuala Lumpur: Seminari Theoloji Malaysia, 1986).
tri
Chow, Alexander, Chinese Public Theology: Generational Shifts and Confucian Imagination in
is
Chinese Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

rd
CTC–CCA (ed.), Minjung Theology: People as the Subjects of History (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
fo
Books, 1983).
Schumacher, John N., Revolutionary Clergy: The Filipino Clergy and the Nationalist Movement,
ot
1850–1903 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1981).

N
Starr, Chloë F., Chinese Theology: Text and Context (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2016).
Social and Political Context
Sebastian C. H. Kim
.
ly
In the 1980s, when Third World theologians were inspired to express
on
their theology locally, Asian theologians characterised their context as
featuring religions and poverty. Today, following the end of the ideologi-
se
cal conflict of the Cold War, religions have been strengthened across Asia,
lu
and they have increasingly filled the ideological gap left in the political
na
sphere. Furthermore, following processes of democratisation, civil society
so
has grown, and faith-based organisations are active in the space created
er
between the state and people. Poverty persists for the masses of citizens of
rp
Asia. Today, however, great wealth, the pursuit of prosperity and associ
ated inequalities are also part of Asian experience. In this essay, we will
Fo
treat all four dimensions that shape the context of Christian witness in East
e.
and Southeast Asia: religion and politics; the emergence of civil society;
l
poverty and marginalisation; and prosperity and economic growth.

sa
East and Southeast Asia is a densely populated region, home to more

re
than 30% of the world’s people. From a study-of-religions perspective,

or
Eastern Asia, as defined by the United Nations, roughly corresponds to

n
the historic sphere of influence of China and to the traditions of Con

tio
fucianism, Mahayana Buddhism and Taoism; that is, the modern nations
bu
of China (including Tibet), Mongolia, Korea (North and South) and Japan.
tri
The countries of the United Nations’ South-Eastern Asia region were, on

is
the whole, more influenced by India, and consequently by Hinduism and

rd
Theravada Buddhism. These include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma),

fo
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia and Timor-Leste. In

contrast, although Vietnam is part of South-Eastern Asia, it inherited a
ot
N
strong Confucian tradition. Japan, Taiwan (both Eastern Asia) and the
Philippines (South-Eastern Asia) were at the extremity of these religious
movements and retain stronger indigenous traditions. From the sixteenth
century, the Philippines, whose people were not yet incorporated into a
‘world religion’, was evangelised by Spanish priests from Latin America
and became Asia’s first Catholic nation. It and most other Southeast Asian
nations were more affected by the spread of Islam along eastern trade
routes than were their neighbours to the north.
388 Sebastian C. H. Kim
Religion and Politics

In East Asia, the pattern for the relationship of religions with the state was
drawn from neo-Confucianism: for the sake of societal harmony, there is a
strong centralised state, and religions are expected to be subservient to it.
Religious belief and practice are subject to the favour of the rulers and are
closely regulated. In the twentieth century, both China under communism
and Japan under fascism insisted on conformity to state rituals, sometimes
to an extreme extent. During the Cultural Revolution in China (1966–76),
Maoism was a substitute for religion, and the performance of Shinto
.
ly
rituals was enforced throughout the Japanese Empire, which at its peak
on
in 1942 included Korea, large parts of China, the whole of Southeast Asia,
and most Pacific islands. Today, China, Japan and other nations in the
se
region exhibit a variety of models for the relationship between religion
lu
and politics.
na
In China, religious faith is officially incompatible with membership of
so
the Chinese Communist Party and, therefore, with social advancement.
er
Nevertheless, Christian belief and practice have become widespread
rp
in China, and some party members are willing to declare themselves
Christian. Since the ‘Christian fever’ of the 1980s, when thousands of
Fo
churches (re)opened among the Han Chinese, the faith has become
e.
especially strong in urban areas and among the middle class, although
l
figures for the number of Christians vary widely. Government statistics

sa
include only those registered with the two national bodies – about 2% of
re
the population. Other recent surveys give figures two or three times that
or
number. Christianity has also taken a cultural form disconnected from the
n
churches. Centres for the study of Christianity in university departments

tio
of religion have stimulated the emergence of an intellectual Christianity

bu
with a distinctive theology of modernisation.

tri
Since the communist revolution, the Chinese state’s approach to

is
religions has gone through several stages. Initially (1949–57) it attempted

rd
to co-opt religion to support the revolution. For Christians this was

fo
through the formation of national bodies separated from Western

churches: the (Protestant) Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) and the
ot
Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA). From 1958, the state attempted to

N
suppress religion and – from 1966, under the Cultural Revolution – even
eradicate it. However, many Christians had refused to join the official
bodies. When religious practice was once again permitted from 1979 in the
context of the economic liberalisation, it was clear that Christianity had
spread as an underground movement. Protestantism had even grown in
a de-institutionalised and de-clericalised form in the prison camps and
in underground or ‘house’ churches in rural areas and had overtaken
Catholic numbers. In global terms, the underground churches were
mostly Evangelical free church or Pentecostal in form. In the new climate,

many churches were reopened or founded, and Christianity grew faster
during what was referred to as ‘Christian fever’. Since then, the policy
has been to recognise Christianity but to attempt to weaken it by criticism
and the promotion of ancient Chinese religions, or merely to contain it by
regulation.
The distinction between official and underground or unregistered Prot-
estant churches has largely broken down at the local level. There is overlap
in membership between them. Moreover, many of the un registered
.
ly
churches have their own buildings, thanks to wide variations in planning
on
permission across regions. However, nationally there is continuing tension
and mutual suspicion between unofficial forms of Christianity and the
se
two official bodies. The TSPM-controlled China Christian Council, which
lu
describes itself as ‘post-denominational’, is well recognised internationally.
na
The Holy See is treading a delicate path between the CPA – which rejected
so
the authority of the Vatican and appointed leaders outside the apostolic
succession, but which was never declared heretical – and the underground
er
Catholic Church, whose leaders asserted their loyalty to Rome.
rp
Christians in China are afforded religious freedom, provided they
Fo
do not interfere with government policies, proselytise, baptise or teach
e.
religion to children, or contact foreign organisations without permission.

l
Churches that contravene these rules, or do not register, risk censure by

sa
the authorities and are at the mercy of local officials. For example, the
re
mid- to late 2010s have seen high-profile local cases in which crosses have
or
been removed from the roofs of churches and whole church buildings
n
have been demolished. In Hong Kong, which was returned to China by

tio
Britain in 1997, there is continued religious freedom, despite fears to the

bu
contrary. Christians played an active role in negotiations for the return of

tri
the territory to China, although their attempts to ensure greater democracy

is
are suppressed.
rd
In Taiwan in the 1970s, leaders of the Presbyterian Church, which drew

fo
its main support from among the majority population who lived in Taiwan
before 1949, campaigned vigorously – and at the cost of imprisonment –
ot
for the rights of the Taiwanese against the Nationalist Chinese government
N
of the Mainlanders, who ruled Taiwan as a one-party state from 1949 to

2000. The historic churches continue to be active politically.
Vietnam was strictly controlled in the socialist republic, but since 1988
religions have enjoyed more freedoms, although religion remains highly
controlled. Today, Vietnamese Christianity, mainly Catholic, is a minority
of about 8% of the population but is growing significantly.
Religious freedom is enshrined in Japan’s post-war constitution, but
religious diversity is low. Shintoism continues to play a political role,
especially through the remembrance at the Yasukuni Shrine of those who

died in battle, but Buddhism has by far the largest number of adherents.
Protestant Christianity in Japan has not shed its image as a foreign
religion, despite a history of reaction against Western denominational
divisions, institutionalism and exclusivism. The strong sense of national
identity continues to make conversion to Christianity appear un-Japanese,
and social pressures cause high defection rates from churches. At the same
time, one can find prominent Christians with a long Christian heritage,
going back in some cases to the Catholic martyrs of the seventeenth and
.
ly
eighteenth centuries. Although Japanese Christians are a small minority,
on
they have contributed disproportionately to education and social welfare.
Moreover, Christians actively campaign for the rights of other minorities,
se
such as the indigenous Ainu people in Hokkaido.
lu
The peninsula of Korea is divided into two nations in which the
na
political conditions for Christians are at opposite ends of the spectrum.
so
The communist regime in North Korea accommodated religion for only a
few years after the partition in 1945 by the USSR and Allied forces, before
er
suppressing it almost entirely, consigning religious people to the lowest
rp
social strata and holding many in labour camps. Official Christianity re-
Fo
appeared in North Korea in the 1970s, and some churches were built from
e.
the late 1980s. The opening of the North since the natural disasters and
l
famine of the 1990s has led to increased contact of foreign Christians with
sa
North Koreans. Christian missions and faith-based organisations have

re
been doing humanitarian work in the North or helping people escaping

or
the regime. South Korean Christians have also been involved in longer-
n
term industrial and educational initiatives. However, the extent and state
tio
of underground Christianity in the North are difficult to determine. Under

bu
the leadership of Kim Jong-un, grandson of the founder of the nation,

tri
there are no signs of religious freedom, but the economic liberalisation he

is
is pursuing might make controlling religions more difficult for him.

rd
South Korea, by contrast, was founded as part of the US policy to

fo
contain communism, and the promise of religious freedom was a major

reason why Christian leaders – many of whom were exiles from the
ot
communist North – eventually supported the division of the peninsula

N
in 1948. Church leaders committed themselves to evangelistic work and

supported the undemocratic and military-backed governments of the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s for the sake of national security. In South Korea,
as in Singapore and among the Chinese diaspora across Southeast Asia,
Evangelicalism and Roman Catholicism were strengthened by their anti-
communist stance. Christianity grew rapidly until in the twenty-first
century around 30% of Koreans declared themselves Christians, eclipsing
the other main organised religion, Buddhism. Such Christian growth
is unparalleled anywhere else in Asia. It must be understood in light of

the resistance to communism but also of the vision for a nation founded
on Christian values that was articulated by the political leaders, many
of whom were Christians, which encouraged evangelism and Christian
service to society.
One reason for the lack of such growth elsewhere in Asia might be that,
historically, Christian mass movements have occurred only in societies
without allegiance to one of the other ‘world religions’. Mass movements
to Christianity have generally arisen in contexts where the main form
.
ly
of religion is a local or indigenous one, and these have continued into
on
recent times among isolated peoples. Another reason might be that in few
other Asian countries has Christianity been associated with nationalism
se
as it was in South Korea. The fact that, in most cases, Christianity was
lu
contemporaneous with Western colonialism, and even implicated in it,
na
undermines its credibility in the eyes of many.
so
In the two nations in East and Southeast Asia with the most Chris-
tians – South Korea and the Philippines – churches played an important
er
role in democratisation movements that eventually overthrew military-
rp
backed governments. From the 1970s, other radical Korean Christians,
Fo
influenced by Minjung theology towards humanisation and liberation,
e.
challenged authoritarianism on the grounds of human and civil rights.

l
They soon discovered that religious freedom did not extend to challenging
sa
the government. Nevertheless, Christian theologians and clergy – Prot-

re
estant and Catholic – were prominent in the labour and democratisation

or
movements that brought down the military-backed regimes. In the Philip-

n
pines, Catholic priests and other Christians were influential in the People
tio
Power Movement that in 1986 overthrew the military dictator, Ferdinand

bu
Marcos, and his wife, Imelda, and also in a second movement in 2001
tri
that toppled President Joseph Estrada. In the late 2010s, churches are
is
again working together in the context of the strongman rule of President

rd
Rodrigo Duterte.
fo
In Malaysia and Indonesia, political life is significantly influenced by

forms of Islam that claim a political role and social dominance. A gradual
ot
process of Islamisation in Malaysia has been aided by the fact that in

N
1957 the constitution of independent Malaysia was set up to favour the

majority Malay community, who are identified by it as Muslim. Many de-
nominations cooperate in the Christian Federation for political purposes,
especially to oppose the more radical Islamic reforms and to promote
communal peace by working together for the common good and engaging
with Islamic thought. Singapore, which separated from the rest of the
Malay peninsula in 1965, is dominated by the Chinese community. The
government of Singapore has been strongly anti-communist and also very
conservative, in a Confucian way. As in South Korea, this strengthened

conservative forms of Christianity, and more than 16% of Singaporeans
are Christians (including some from the Tamil and other communities).
However, radical and progressive Christianity was suppressed.
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and is over-
whelmingly Muslim. Nevertheless, it resisted Islamisation when it gained
independence. The constitution is based on five principles (Pancasila) that
begin with belief in one God but guarantees equal rights, regardless of
faith. In the mid-1960s, the government counteracted the threat of atheistic
.
ly
communism by requiring everyone to belong to one of five different
on
religions – Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism or Buddhism.
Partly as a reaction against Islamisation, tribal peoples, nominal Hindus
se
and Muslims – among them communist sympathisers – and also members
lu
of the economically powerful Chinese minority flocked to join the churches
na
in some parts of the country. According to census data, Christians form
so
nearly 10% of the population. A legacy of colonialism is that Protestant
Christians still exert influence in the economy and the military.
er
In most countries in Asia, the number of Christians is a politically
rp
sensitive issue. Religions, including Christianity, create communities, but
Fo
powerful interests can easily play them off against one another. Christians
e.
might be associated with particular subgroups, such as Chinese and certain

l
indigenous peoples in Indonesia. Unless, as in Malaysia, Asian Christians

sa
emphasise their unity across ethnic and denominational divides and work
re
together, their political and social influence is limited.

or
n
Christianity, Democracy and Public Life

tio
The liberalisation of communist economic systems and the democratisation

bu
of many East and Southeast Asian systems of government have opened up

tri
a public sphere and allowed for the development of civil society in many
is
countries that had previously been strongly centrally controlled. Often,

rd
this has provided opportunities for Christians to play a role in public life,
fo
from which they formerly were excluded.

The most striking example of this is China. The Three Self Patriotic
ot
Movement and China Christian Council have created space for Christi-
N
anity in the public sphere by emphasising social service and social care.
Moreover, the intellectual form of Christianity in China is particularly in-
terested in the moral and ethical contributions to society that Christianity
can bring. At first, local churches and informal groups simply served the
needs of those around them, but wider networks subsequently developed.
Since 2011, non-governmental organisations have been encouraged to
register with the government as long as they are social, not political, in ori-
entation, and many Christian-inspired groups have been among them. In
Hong Kong, Protestant denominations play an active role in society. This

includes running educational institutions, including three universities and
seven hospitals dating from the colonial period.
Peace and reconciliation is another area of public life in which Christians
have a significant impact in East Asia. The historic Japanese churches have
been active in peace-building since the end of the Second World War.
From the 1960s they admitted wartime collaboration, although the nation
has a whole has yet to deal with the militarist past to the satisfaction of
neighbouring countries. In Hong Kong, church leaders feel a responsibil-
.
ly
ity to work for reconciliation between Hong Kong and the rest of China.
on
This means overcoming the suspicion that exists between the Hong Kong
Chinese brought up in the Western system and the Chinese Communist
se
Party (CCP). Whether this can be achieved depends on whether C hristians
lu
perceive the CCP as having the interests of the people at heart. In the
na
current situation of strongman leadership and allegations of corruption,
so
this looks increasingly difficult. Some parts of Indonesia have since the
1990s seen outbreaks of Muslim–Christian violence. A group of women –
er
Protestant, Catholic and Muslim – played a significant role in bringing
rp
about reconciliation in Ambon after the worst episode, in 1999. In the
Fo
Philippines, the Ecumenical Peace Platform, which brings Protestants,
e.
Catholics and other Christians together, encourages greater democracy

l
and reconciliation. For example, it supports peace negotiations with the

sa
Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao. It also challenges hard-line

re
policies that would suppress or exclude groups from participation in the

or
public sphere.
n
Conflict between China, Japan and Korea threatens the peace of the
tio
region, and the recent militarisation of these nations is a matter of in-

bu
creasing concern, especially in the South China Sea, where many of the
tri
national interests collide. The nuclearisation of North Korea has raised

is
the possibility of even wider conflict. The instability of the Korean

rd
peninsula is at the heart of security issues in East Asia. South Korean

fo
Christians are sharply divided over how to address the issue of unifica-
tion. Nevertheless, they are at the forefront of efforts at reconciliation.
ot
Different churches have responded in different ways. Evangelicals have

N
seen prayer, underground evangelism, relief and development as the chief

means to achieve this. They were the first to send aid to the North in the
late 1980s. Ecumenicals made links with the Chosun Christian Federation,
which was re-established by the North Korean regime in the 1970s. The
first North-South meeting of any non-governmental agency took place in
1986 when Christians from both nations celebrated Communion together
in Geneva under the auspices of the World Council of Churches. Catholic
social teaching motivated South Korean President Kim Dae-jung to initiate
the ‘sunshine policy’ that first brought about a meeting of the leaders of
the two nations in 2000, and two further summits in 2007 and 2018 were
influenced by it.
The emergence of the public sphere since 1989 in South Korea has
affected Christians in rather the opposite way to those in China. Whereas
Chinese Christians are participating in civil society for the first time since
the communist revolution, Korean Christians are finding that their voice is
diminished. Christians were leaders in politics and in the democratisation
movement in South Korea. However, since democracy has been achieved
.
ly
and a vibrant civil society has developed, Christians find that their voice is
on
only one among many interest groups. Moreover, the internet and social
media have helped expose corruption by powerful Protestant pastors and
se
challenged aggressive forms of evangelism. As a result, Protestants can
lu
no longer expect a hearing. In contrast, the Catholic Church has largely
na
avoided scandal. Another reason for its high credibility rating is its
so
prominence in the overthrow of military regimes. A further explanation is
that it has shown commitment to social service. As well as its own initia-
er
tives, it delivers a large proportion of government-funded services.
rp
Fo
Poverty, Marginalisation and Persecution
e.
As well as the plural religious context, most of the Christian communi-

l
ties of East and Southeast Asia suffer from poverty and marginalisation.
sa
In most cases it was among the poor and outsiders that Christianity first
re
found a foothold, and although some Christians are now very wealthy,
or
in most nations they have a minority status. In countries that have been
n
destabilised or occupied in recent centuries, and where religious identi-

tio
ties are resurgent, Christians are often seen as an ideological and security
bu
threat, and persecution is a feature of life for them.

tri
Most Chinese Christians come from the majority Han community. In the
is
nineteenth century, Catholic missions and the Evangelical China Inland

rd
Mission drew some of the largest responses from their work in rural areas.
fo
Converts lived in isolated Christian villages. During the violence of the

twentieth century, these villages not only survived but even flourished and
ot
developed indigenous expressions of the faith. However, both church and

N
government authorities are uneasy with the way many have syncretised
Christianity with folk religion. The future of these rural communities is
threatened by the rapid urbanisation of China, which has rendered them
increasingly elderly as well as poor.
From about 1900, resistance to Western imperialism stimulated the
formation of Chinese-founded churches through local fellowships on a
house-church pattern. Since these were active in evangelism, networks of
independent churches soon emerged that are still influential today. These
included: the Little Flock led by Watchman Nee (Ni Tuosheng), who em-
phasised spiritual life as the key to bodily holiness in what he saw as the
end times; the Jesus Family of Jing Dianying, who, with his wife, set up a
cooperative or commune, which was then replicated across northern and
north-western China; the True Jesus Church, a Pentecostal group; and the
Christian Church in Christ of Wang Ming-Dao, who exercised a strictly
moral and prophetic ministry that had no time for the social gospel or
enthusiasm for indigenisation of missionary Christianity. Most of these
congregations, suspicious of the China Christian Council as a government
.
ly
organisation, have chosen to remain ‘unregistered’. The religious enthu-
on
siasm has generated even more new groups, some of which are radically
sectarian. Many of the indigenous Chinese churches migrated to Taiwan
se
with the Nationalist Chinese after the communist victory on the Chinese
lu
mainland. Recently they have been growing fast and are re-evangelising
na
China from a Taiwanese base. Chinese migrants in diaspora have spread
so
Chinese churches throughout the region, including to Malaysia.
Christianity has sometimes helped minority populations to forge an
er
identity in the modern world by preserving their language through Bible
rp
translation and by encouraging them to think of themselves as a people,
Fo
like the Israelites. Once Christianity was permitted again in China, some
e.
minority groups, such as the Lisu in Yunnan Province, who had been
l
evangelised by China Inland Mission before 1949, even claimed Christi

sa
anity as a mark of their ethnic identity.

re
The Lisu people are split by current borders between China and
or
Myanmar, where they are also recognised as a minority. Here and

n
in several other countries of Southeast Asia – Cambodia, Laos and

tio
Thailand – Christians mainly belong to minority ethnic groups among

bu
majority Theravada Buddhist societies. The majority Burmese population

tri
of Myanmar have been resistant to centuries of Catholic and Protestant

is
attempts at evangelisation. Nevertheless, Christians might make up 8% of

rd
the Myanmar population due to the conversion of several tribal groups,

fo
chiefly to a Baptist expression of the faith. The main groups are the Karen,
Kachin and Chin. However, the assertion of a distinctive Christian identity
ot
by these minority groups was seen as a threat by the Burmese, who used
N
Buddhism to create a national identity. Despite international protests,

the Burmese authorities have oppressed other religions, including these
Christians, by policies of disinformation, discrimination and violent
persecution.
The situation is similar in Thailand, which has the distinction of being
the only nation in Southeast Asia that has never submitted to colonial
rule and where Thai ethnicity is synonymous with being Buddhist. Most
of the Christians (who form less than 2% of the population) are not of
Thai descent. Some are from tribal minorities and others are Chinese or
Vietnamese.
In Malaysia, the majority Malay population is defined as Muslim and
their conversion is forbidden; nor are Christians allowed to evangelise
them. Christians, who form about 9% of the total population, are from
the other major communities: Chinese, Indians, Eurasians and indigenous
peoples whose presence predates Malay migration. The indigenous
are a tiny minority in peninsular (West) Malaysia but form a two-thirds
majority in East Malaysia – a separate territory on the island of Borneo.
.
ly
Churches tend to be organised along ethnic and language lines. The in-
on
digenous people, who make up two-thirds of Malaysia’s Christians, are
marginalised in the churches as well and are hardly represented in de-
se
nominational leadership. Malaysian Christians face a particular challenge
lu
in transcending ethnic differences and expressing their common faith in
na
the Malay language: the laws that protect Malays from proselytisation
so
forbid, for example, a Malay translation of the Bible and Christian use of
the word ‘Allah’ for ‘God’.
er
Indonesia is the most ethnically diverse nation in the region. Catholic
rp
theologians particularly have sought to recognise and celebrate the
Fo
diverse cultures of Indonesia in the church, and Protestants have em-
e.
phasised human equity regardless of religious or racial background. As

l
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, those who converted to Christianity were

sa
mainly from groups not incorporated into the major religious systems. In
re
states of largely tribal population, there are large numbers of Christians.

or
For example, the state of Papua, which shares an island with Papua New
n
Guinea, is more than 60% Christian.

tio
When Timor-Leste, which lies close to Australia, was annexed by

bu
Indonesia in 1975, 90% of the indigenous people to whom it belonged

tri
declared themselves Catholic. Their resistance against Indonesia not only

is
increased their poverty but led to widespread suffering and violence at the
rd
hands of the Indonesian military. Various agencies of the Catholic Church

fo
supported the Timorese – first by humanitarian aid and eventually by

advocacy of the people’s rights. When it was recognised as an independ-
ot
ent state in 2002, it became the second predominantly Catholic nation in

N
the region. In the other mostly Catholic nation, the Philippines, most of the
population, of over 100 million, continue to live in poverty. The story of
Jesus’s passion is popularly retold in verse form. His suffering and death
at the hands of the powerful inspires ongoing struggle and resistance.
Suffering and persecution are not just recent developments in the
history of Christianity in East and Southeast Asia. The first Catholic Chris-
tians in the region, from the sixteenth century, encountered repeated and
widespread persecution in most countries. Cults of the martyrs developed,
and these play a prominent role in the Catholicism of the region. Some
of the martyrs – local Christians and some foreign priests – have been
beatified and canonised. Pope Pius IX canonised 26 Japanese martyrs as
far back as 1862, but Pope John Paul II especially encouraged this form of
popular religiosity. For example, he canonised 16 more martyrs in Japan
in 1987, 120 martyrs in Korea in 1984, 117 in Vietnam in 1988, and 120 in
China in 2000. Protestants also commemorate their martyrs, many of them
killed by communists, but in a less systematic way.
.
ly
Christians, Prosperity and Economic Development
on
East and Southeast Asia is home to many economic success stories: Japan,
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Brunei and now China.
se
Although many Christians in East and Southeast Asia remain poor, in
lu
some places Christians have been active in the region’s economic develop
na
ment. The post-war growth of US missions in the region has included
so
Evangelical missions that are adapted to capitalism. Furthermore, in the
era of neo-liberal economics, new Christian movements have emerged that
er
are oriented to help members achieve success, and some church leaders
rp
have developed types of prosperity theology that legitimise the accumula-
Fo
tion of wealth. For example, the Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and
e.
in diaspora in many parts of Southeast Asia, were mostly anti-communist,

l
and many have been extremely successful in capitalist systems. Singapore,

sa
for instance, boasts many large Chinese churches that use English and have
re
global outreach programmes. Singaporean culture and politics discourage

or
Christian involvement in wider society, except in the form of service,

n
while Evangelical and Pentecostal worship and evangelism flourish.

tio
South Korean Christians were similarly motivated towards capitalism

bu
because of their fear of communism, but also because of their vision for
tri
the kingdom of God, which they understood in terms of modernisation

is
for the national good. That the growth of Protestantism was closely linked
rd
to modernisation is shown by the way post-war Korean churches were

fo
built in modern styles and made use of the latest technology to convey
a future-oriented message of good news. Most Korean Christians regard
ot
both the growth of the church and the economic miracle of twentieth-
N
century Korea as blessings from God and see a close connection between
the two. Christians who fled communism before and during the Korean
War had economic skills, an acquaintance with Western culture and an
admiration for US society that enabled them to take a leading role in recon-
struction in the South, together with others who returned from exile. The
mega-churches that arose in the context of mass evangelism, urbanisation
and religious market competition encouraged participation in nation-
building, disseminated education and facilitated business networking. The
Charismatic and Pentecostal churches – most famously Yoido Full Gospel

Church – developed techniques of prayer and evangelism to guarantee
health, well-being and prosperity. Such large churches now run extensive
social and educational programmes to support development. As in the case
of Singapore, these business-oriented churches support and encourage the
extensive overseas missionary movement from South Korea, which ranks
among the largest in the world.
It cannot be argued that Christians in other parts of the region have
made such a direct contribution to economic development as in South
.
ly
Korea, but the Pentecostal and Charismatic churches that thrive in late
on
modernity have been growing throughout the region. Some are linked
to Northern American, Australian or other Western missions and some
se
to Korean and Chinese movements; others are indigenous responses to
lu
these. Although many Pentecostals are from tribal groups, such churches
na
are also well adapted to the urbanisation of the region. They are growing
so
not only in liberalised communist countries such as China, Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos but even in resistant communities such as among the
er
Thai. Many such churches do empower their congregations by building
rp
community and providing educational and leadership opportunities that
Fo
enable upward social mobility. However, the fear is that many are so
e.
compromised with capitalism and the spirit of the age that they become
l
vehicles of prosperity for the few at the expense of the many.

sa
Many Filipinos were attracted to US-style Evangelicalism, and the

re
growth of these churches contributed to the reduction of the Catholic

or
population to just over 80% of the total population. Pentecostal Charis-

n
matic Christianity has reached perhaps more than 40% of the population
tio
but has provoked a backlash that stigmatises it as the refuge of the gullible
bu
and insecure. Because of the openness in the Catholic Church to Charis-

tri
matic renewal, the rise of Pentecostalism has blurred denominational

is
boundaries rather than resulting in a separate movement of independent

rd
Pentecostal churches. But whereas Pentecostalism has had something

fo
of a unifying effect in the Philippines, in a situation of religious tension

such as Indonesia, observers fear that initiatives led by outsiders and
ot
local Christian enthusiasm could endanger existing balances between

N
communities.
Christians in East and Southeast Asia continue to form a small minority
of the region’s vast population. Moreover, in most cases Christians are
economically poor and politically marginalised. Nevertheless, Christianity
is flourishing in many parts. It is missionally engaged in the region and
beyond it, and increasingly East and Southeast Asian leaders are rising to
prominence in global Christian organisations. The churches of the region
negotiate especially challenging social and political contexts in which some
are oppressed by governments or by social pressure, and even persecuted.

However, while the region as a whole is increasingly economically suc-
cessful, perhaps the greatest challenge to the church in East and Southeast
Asia today is not repressive systems but indifference to religion due to
pursuit of wealth.
Bibliography
Bays, Daniel H., A New History of Christianity in China (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).
Kim, Sebastian C. H., Christian Theology in Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
.
2008).
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Moffett, Samuel H., A History of Christianity in Asia, vols I and II (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
on
Books, 1998, 2005).
Phan, Peter C. (ed.), Christianities in Asia (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
se
Yong, Amos, and Vinson Synan (eds), Global Renewal Christianity: Asia and Oceania (Lake
lu
Mary, FL: Charisma House, 2016).
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N
Mission and Evangelism
Septemmy E. Lakawa
The ever-changing realities of East and Southeast Asia shape the in-
.
ly
creasingly complex picture of mission and evangelism there today. This
on
essay accentuates the complexity of mission and evangelism through
contemporary Asian Christian narratives that are multidimensional
se
and multidirectional. The following five themes – the ecumenicity of
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mission and evangelism; violence, inter-faith dialogue and hospitality;
na
Pentecostalism, Roman Catholicism and everyday Christianity; empire,
so
resistance and discipleship; and terrorism, spirituality and public
er
theology – reflect the interconnected features of mission and evangelism
rp
as they find various expressions in the countries of contemporary East and
Southeast Asia.
Fo
e.
Ecumenicity of Mission and Evangelism

l
Mission and ecumenism have discovered refreshing interconnections in

sa
the ways in which churches use ecumenical platforms in their missional

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response to the Asian realities of poverty, ecological crisis, economic

or
injustice, violation of human rights and the war on terrorism. The Asia
n
Mission Conference, with the theme of ‘Journeying Together: Prophetic

tio
Witness to the Truth and Light in Asia’, was held under the auspices of the
bu
Christian Conference of Asia in October 2017 in Yangon, Myanmar. This

tri
conference urged both the churches and the mission bodies in Asia, as well
is
as Christian communities outside Asia, to respond through an ecumenical

rd
framework to the emerging questions and challenges to mission arising in

fo
Asia. The call to be in mission is defined as the call to churches to journey

together in witnessing to God’s truth and light in the living realities of
ot
Asia today.
N
The site of the conference, Yangon, symbolised in a unique way the new
challenges facing mission and evangelism in Asia. Myanmar, like many
other countries in East and Southeast Asia, has a long and complex history
of the intertwining of religion, ethnicity, violence and politics. Two of
the four subthemes of the conference, ‘Mission as Prophetic Accompani
ment’ and ‘Mission as Embodying the Spirituality of the Cross’, clearly
speak to the situation at the time of the conference, when the story of the
Rohingya people complexified the narrative of figures such as Aung San
Suu Kyi. Being church in mission in places such as Myanmar, Indonesia

and Malaysia requires a process of discerning how a prophetic mission
might place minority religious communities in risky and even dangerous
situations.
The cross has been a central symbol of mission for East and Southeast
Asian churches – as in the theology of the pain of God of Kasoh Kitamori
and the water buffalo theology of Kosuke Koyama, both of Japan, and
the compassionate God theology of Choan Seng Song of Taiwan – and it
continues to be relevant today. It has also become an ecumenical symbol
.
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that connects different mission theologies and practices across churches
on
and mission bodies.
Christianity in South Korea provides an example of the distinction
se
between mission and evangelism. The rapidly growing church, which
lu
reveals the role of Korean churches in shaping the economic growth of
na
modern Korea, has been criticised for an overemphasis on individual
so
salvation that disconnects the church from the reality of unjust systems
and from its own historical roots as a forerunner in social transformation.
er
Korean churches’ long tradition of taking social responsibility as their
rp
missional task is embedded, for many, in the Korean concept of Minjung
Fo
(the oppressed, the poor, the sick and the marginalised). Minjung theology
e.
as a theology of resistance, especially in its formation and development in

l
the 1970s and 1980s, looks at Minjung as subjects of social transformation

sa
and provides a theological basis for the church to influence the people’s
re
movement to shape a democratic South Korea.

or
The ecumenicity of mission and evangelism in East and Southeast Asia

n
is also shown in the Korean churches’ response to the quest for peace
tio
and reconciliation between South Korea and North Korea. The use of
bu
ecumenical platforms – the World Council of Churches, Christian Con-

tri
ference of Asia, Korean National Council of Churches and other similar

is
approaches – has become a model for the effectiveness of mission as a

rd
prophetic accompaniment that overcomes divisions while respecting dif-

fo
ferences in the churches’ responses to one of the most complex historical,

socio-cultural, military and political problems that have affected and will
ot
affect not only the future of Asia but also that of the world, including the
N
future of Christianity in the region. The ecumenical platform provides

a way for churches in South Korea to overcome the dualistic aspects of
being church in mission by reclaiming their missional role in shaping a
just peace process for the future of the country and the peninsula.
Violence, Inter-faith Dialogue and Hospitality

A history of violence has significantly influenced the changing contours
of the East and Southeast Asian religious landscape in the twenty-first
402 Septemmy E. Lakawa
century. The impact of violence on harmonious inter-faith living, which

for centuries had characterised the Asian religious landscape, is made
more complex by the current phenomena of religious radicalism and vio-
lations of human rights.
Between 1995 and 2005, Indonesia – the country with the world’s
largest Muslim population and also a country known for its claim to be
an example of a harmonious pluralistic society – suffered from massive
communal violence in many areas. Other Southeast Asian countries, such
as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, survived the Asian economic crisis
.
ly
at the turn of the century, but Indonesia faced a slow road to economic
on
recovery in the face of riots, pogroms and violence in the context of
a national political crisis. Stories of communal violence that involved
se
religious communities were highlighted in many media outlets, including
lu
social media. Many did not realise that this long history of violence would
na
affect the shape of inter-faith relationships, particularly the discourse on
so
mission and inter-religious dialogue, in the coming years.
The story of Indonesia is not isolated. The changing global economic
er
and political landscape, which often goes hand in hand with regional
rp
political upheaval, affects inter-religious relationships in various ways at
Fo
the grassroots level. In countries where the presence of one of the world’s
e.
religions not only is predominant but also shapes the contour of the public
l
space – such as Malaysia with Islam as the state religion, Myanmar with
sa
Buddhism and the Philippines with Roman Catholicism – communal

re
violence, human rights violations, and impunity are often associated with
or
religious motives or agendas. Moreover, religious violence or communal

n
conflicts that are shaped by religious claims, symbols and narratives

tio
contradict claims of religious harmony and peace and, as a result, put

bu
into question the ability of people of different religions to live together

tri
harmoniously.
is
Narratives of local religious communities in the aftermath of violence

rd
not only detail the horrors of violence and point to the unspeakability of
fo
trauma but frequently also tell of the hospitality that a community either
received or offered to religious ‘others’ who once were their enemies. The
ot
history of violence has challenged religious communities and religious

N
leaders, including Christian theologians and mission practitioners, to

rethink the relevance of mission and evangelism in the context of religious
violence.
Peter C. Phan’s concept of ‘being religious inter-religiously’ or ‘being
Christian inter-religiously’ challenges the binaries of evangelism and
social transformation and of conversion and religious pluralism by
promoting a new way of looking at the complexity of mission from within
the reality of East and Southeast Asian multicultural and multi-religious
society. Furthermore, Phan’s inter-cultural perspective on mission, which

is built on the Vietnamese Catholic Church’s experience, provides a unique
understanding of the role of culture in shaping and accommodating the
process of crossing borders, of being the church in mission in Asian ways.
Border crossing is a model of mission that is predominant in Asian
mission discourse, and it becomes more relevant in the context of the
history of violence and its long-term impact on inter-religious relation-
ships. The local practice of hospitality in post-conflict situations, in
particular, illustrates the riskiness of mission as a border-crossing practice.
.
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As an example, the stories of Muslim and Christian women who survived
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the politically and economically based religious violence in Poso and
Ambon, two of the areas that suffered religious violence in Indonesia,
se
reveal the interlacing of bravery, caring for ‘others’ and fears for their own
lu
safety as they offered and received hospitality from one another.
na
During the period of violent conflict, a Christian family in Poso who
so
protected a Muslim neighbour, or a Christian family who hid their Muslim
relatives in their house while feeding them out of their own limited
er
resources, risked being accused of being traitors and even being harmed
rp
by their own Christian community. Gerakan Ibu Peduli (the Movement
Fo
of the Caring Mothers) was initiated by Muslim and Christian women
e.
in the early phase of the Ambon conflict. The women reconnected their
l
communities despite knowing the dangers they brought to their lives

sa
and communities by visiting other women in the ‘enemy territories’ – in

re
the marketplace, segregated neighbourhoods and so forth. The stories of

or
these women testify to the dimensions of vulnerability and resilience that

n
are embedded in the practice of hospitality as an inter-religious practice.

tio
Hospitality as a practice of embracing others requires the ability to ac-

bu
knowledge the risk of putting oneself in a vulnerable situation when the

tri
religious other is one’s enemy. This embracing is also an act of resilience,

is
as the women from both religious communities persist in crossing the

rd
borders of fear, suspicion, hatred and violence in order to meet each other
fo
and, as a result, have inspired their communities, including youths, to be

persistent in finding ways to be hospitable to each other even in the midst
ot
of violent conflict and its aftermath.

N
The aftermath of communal violence has challenged not only the

understanding of mission and its relationship to inter-religious dialogue
but also, essentially, the discourse and practice of inter-religious dialogue.
New models have arisen alongside acknowledgement of inter-religious
dialogue as a women’s practice, including local communities’ initiatives of
healing and social transformation. Lian Gogali, a young female theologian
and an activist for peace from Poso, exemplified these dimensions when
she launched the first initiative of a women’s school called the Mosintuwu
Institute. She gathered Muslim and Christian women survivors of the

Poso conflict and provided them a safe space for facing their own fears,
misconceptions of each other and trauma caused by the conflict. This
school provides a model of inter-religious hospitality and of inter-religious
education where local women’s voices and leadership are recognised as
the foundation of the transformation of communities wounded by years
of communal violence. The women of the Mosintuwu Institute witness to
each other’s trauma and healing as they continue to sustain one another
and testify to the possibility of healing and transformation in the aftermath
.
ly
of one of the most violent communal conflicts that Indonesia has ever
on
witnessed. Furthermore, the narratives of these local women provide
a contextual model of mission in the aftermath of religious communal
se
violence as a practice of inter-religious hospitality.
lu
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Pentecostalism, Catholicism and Everyday Christianity
so
The growth of Pentecostal and Charismatic movements has changed
the landscape of Catholic and Protestant churches in East and Southeast
er
Asia. Pentecostal movements in South Korea have played a significant
rp
role in making Protestantism the second-largest religious group in the
Fo
country after Buddhism, followed by Catholicism. Yonggi Cho’s Yoido
e.
Full Gospel Church is an example of the magnitude of the growth of

l
Pentecostals in East and Southeast Asia and their role in shaping social
sa
movements. Indonesia witnessed an increase in Pentecostals at the turn

re
of the twenty-first century, when they represented approximately 3% of

or
the total population of the Muslim-majority country. The Philippines, the

n
only Catholic-majority country in Asia, experienced a significant shift in

tio
its Christian landscape as the proportion of Catholics declined due to the

bu
influence of Pentecostalism.
tri
In addition to South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines, China has

is
witnessed a phenomenal expansion of Pentecostalism. J. M. Prior’s study

rd
‘The Challenge of the Pentecostals in Asia’ (in Exchange, 36 [2007]) predicts

fo
that in the twenty-first century, China might become the Asian country
with the largest number of Christians as well as the country with the
ot
largest number of Pentecostals, Charismatics and neo-Pentecostals. Today,

N
more than 40% of Asian Christians are Pentecostal or Charismatic.

Allan H. Anderson argues that Asia has more Evangelicals than the
entire Western world. He describes Pentecostalism in China through
house-church movements that reflect the process of the indigenisation
of Christianity in China, which is characterised by its informality, spon
taneity, flexibility and evangelistic outreach (‘Pentecostalism in East Asia:
Indigenous Oriental Christianity?’,PNEUMA: The Journal of the Society for
Pentecostal Studies, 22:1 [2000], 116).
The house-church movements also epitomise Pentecostalism as a

religious and social phenomenon, which positions China as key to under-
standing the Asian face of Pentecostalism.
The importance of Pentecostal movements in the context of church
unity has become a primary concern for the Roman Catholic Church and
for ecumenical bodies such as the World Council of Churches. Prior’s
study reveals the complex relationship between Pentecostals and the
Catholic Church, one that not only shapes the contours of Asian Christi
anity but also determines the direction of mission and ecumenism in East
.
ly
and Southeast Asia today.
on
Prior’s identification of the stark differences between the Pentecostal
and Charismatic theological and cultural undertaking – which is oral,
se
inclusive and narrative – and conventional Christianity – which is literary,
lu
exclusive and conceptual – provides both challenges and opportunities for
na
dialogue. Furthermore, the demographic shift of Christianity that is pre-
so
dominantly shaped by Pentecostal movements and the Catholic Church
implies the urgency of dialogue between Roman Catholics and Pente-
er
costals, including dialogue on the understanding and practice of mission
rp
and evangelism. The Philippines has witnessed the challenges that Pente-
Fo
costal movements have brought to the Catholic Church by reshaping the
e.
Christian demographics and the grassroots movements in the country.

l
The country has also witnessed growth in the number of Charismatic

sa
Catholics, which renders the everyday practice of Catholic teachings more

re
complex.
or
Many have argued that the rapid growth of Pentecostalism in Asia is

n
due to its Spirit-oriented practices that are attuned to Asian religiosities.

tio
East and Southeast Asian Pentecostal movements reveal the unique di-
bu
mensions of Christianity in the region as, to use Nancy T. Ammerman’s

tri
term, an ‘everyday religion’. In each of the four countries – South Korea,

is
Indonesia, the Philippines and China – where Pentecostal movements

rd
have growth rapidly, many similar dimensions of Pentecostalism are

fo
exhibited: it is a grassroots, indigenous and Spirit-oriented phenomenon;

the Bible is used as a source of everyday hope for healing and justice; and
ot
Pentecostalism emphasises the independence and autonomy of local con-

N
gregations, the importance of the personal experience of salvation and the

roles of women and lay people. These characteristics are addressed in a
recent study on mission and migration. Maraike Bangun, in her master-
of-theology thesis ‘From Soul Evangelism to Compassionate Presence:
Migration, Missional Presence, and the Migrant Church in Malaysia’
(Jakarta Theological Seminary, 2015), identifies the ordinariness of Christi
anity as a characteristic of the religion of migrants. She highlights the
roles of Indonesian and Filipino women migrants in Sabah, Malaysia, in
shifting their local Charismatic church’s understanding from evangelism

as a soul-saving practice to evangelism as Christian presence. Her study
showcases the fluidity of Pentecostal and Charismatic movements in their
theology and mission practices, highlighting the openness of Pentecostals
and Charismatics to dialogue with other branches of Christianity in the
contexts of mission and ecumenism in East and Southeast Asia today. As
dialogue has become one of the major tenets of Asian religious practices,
the coming together of churches in the region through dialogue is a sig-
nificant feature of contemporary East and Southeast Asian Christianity as
.
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an everyday religion.
on
The encounters of Pentecostals and Charismatics with other churches
in the region have also shown the importance of arts and Asian cultural
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practices. In various Christian communities, it has become a common
lu
practice to sing Pentecostal or Charismatic songs. Dialogue through the
na
arts is increasing. In ecumenical seminaries, various Christian traditions
so
are being studied, and Pentecostal and Charismatic spiritual practices are
being introduced in the context of student formation for church ministry.
er
Empire, Resistance and Discipleship rp
Fo
Mission in the context of empire is one of the central features of the global
e.
conversation on mission. Joerg Rieger’s characterisation of empire as

l
massive concentrations of power, uncontrollable and affecting all parts

sa
of life, reveals the multifaceted nature of empire, which can take form
re
in nations, corporations, the military, the economy, culture and politics.

or
Today, empire has taken on multiple shapes, both in East and Southeast
n
Asia and globally.

tio
Although the discourse on empire is not foreign to the study of Christi

bu
anity, exposing the massive concentrations of economic, political and

tri
military powers that affect all life globally has made it obvious that any
is
conversation on mission has to take into consideration this reality. The

rd
Asian mission discourse has always been embedded in the three inter-
fo
connected features of Asian society – widespread and extreme poverty,

cultural diversity and religious plurality. The contemporary conversa-
ot
tion on mission in the context of empire has disclosed the delicate thread
N
of concentrated power that permeates these three intertwined layers.

Therefore, analyses of widespread poverty, for example, cannot overlook
the economic imperialism that has maintained the unjust structure of the
economy that degrades the humanity of the poor and the oppressed.
Stories of congregations reverberate with the complex dynamics of
empire and its repercussions on the church’s understanding and practice
of mission. The three interconnected layers of power – state, corporation
and religion – in the above stories of migration manifest the grip of empire
on the lives of ordinary people. They also display the multiple roles of the
church in providing a safe space for migrants. However, the church often
plays a role in maintaining a form of religious imperialism by not protest-
ing, for example, about the domestication of women.
Resistance is one of the central themes in the discourse of mission in the
context of empire. Forms of resistance to widespread religious, economic
and political imperialism are witnessed in the daily lives of religious com-
munities, including churches and civil society. In the church and civil
society in South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan, movements for resist-
.
ly
ance against political, economic and religious imperialism have shaped
on
mission discourse and practice.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Mission and Evangelism Desk, and
se
the Education Desk of the Christian Conference of Asia had a joint
lu
programme called ‘Reading the Bible with New Eyes’. The premise was
na
that reinterpreting the Bible from the perspectives of the poor, the mar-
so
ginalised, the feminist and the religious other would provide a contextual
biblical basis for creating inclusive communities that would resist every
er
form of violence. In one of the workshops in 1997 in Pattaya, Thailand, a
rp
Dalit participant reinterpreted the story of Jesus healing an ill man at the
Fo
pool of Bethesda, in John 5: 1–18, from a Dalit perspective. He read the
e.
gospel story of healing as a story of empowerment, of the power to speak

l
to the powers that be by redefining discipleship as a resistance against the

sa
religious imperialism that denies the humanity of Dalits. The healing of

re
the Dalit man at Bethesda became a symbol of resistance to the power of

or
religious, cultural, political and economic dominance.

n
Resistance as a form of discipleship is a pivotal theme in the develop-

tio
ment of mission theology and evangelism in the context of empire. In

bu
the case of China, the issue of empire takes another route. Rapid social
tri
change has opened up China to the world but also has changed the future
is
of religion in the country and, by implication, the nature of mission. Am-

rd
bivalence towards the effects of the revolution – the restriction of religious

fo
activities and their presence in the public sphere, on the one hand, and
the overthrowing of the unjust class structure, on the other hand – raises
ot
the existential question of discipleship as a form of mission. Richard P.

N
Marsden responds to this dilemma by placing the theme of discipleship in

parallel with the unlikely theme of domination. The question, therefore, is
whether discipleship as mission – understood both as Christian proselyt-
ism and as social transformation – can become a way of life without falling
into the practice of domination.
Mission has always been a practice of power – power to change, power
to influence and so forth. Resistance to the powers that be, which has been
demonstrated throughout the history of mission and in contemporary
mission practice in East and Southeast Asia, needs to be critically examined

in conjunction with the vision of Christianising the world as a fundamen-
tal aspect of discipleship. Evangelism as conversion, which adheres to a
sense of religious domination, juxtaposes the idea of evangelism as a form
of social transformation, which adheres to a practice of resistance to the
powers that be. Both dimensions are paradoxically present throughout the
mission history of East and Southeast Asia.
China is now one of the world’s largest economic powers. When
speaking about mission and evangelism in China today, one cannot
.
ly
disregard the nation’s global, imperial, economic and political power. The
on
missional presence of the church in China is more crucial than ever before,
as China will also determine the future of world peace. Being in mission
se
in China requires the practice of a discipleship that resists every form of
lu
domination.
na
Churches and Christian and inter-religious communities have had am-
so
bivalent responses to the modern South Korean missionary venture. The
economic boom of South Korea has positioned it as one of Asia’s leading
er
economic powers, which has affected the development of the missionary
rp
movement of Korean churches throughout Asia. This missionary enter-
Fo
prise, which is widely depicted as a movement of evangelising Asia and
e.
the world for Christ, undeniably carries with it an image of South Korea
l
as an economic giant. Economic dominance becomes one of the lenses

sa
through which the missionary enterprise is perceived. Economic im

re
perialism goes hand in hand with religious imperialism, which positions

or
mission as a risky undertaking.

n
The presence of South Korean churches and missionaries in many

tio
Asian cities, small towns, and even remote and dangerous areas, which
bu
is embedded in the missionaries’ strong commitment to sharing the

tri
Christian message with the world, has raised questions. It is undeniable

is
that their presence continues to bring insights for the betterment of com-
rd
munities. Their presence and ministry, however, have raised suspicion

fo
among religious communities and even resistance by local churches. The

Korean missionary enterprise, with its theological emphasis on evangel
ot
isation, has opened up educational access for many local communities,

N
partnership with local churches regarding women’s right issues, and so

forth. The evangelism paradox of conversion and social change is present
in this movement. The long-lasting prejudice against and stereotype of
the missionary movement as a colonial and Western enterprise might
overshadow this modern form of missionary movement. It might also
jeopardise long-term efforts to build and maintain harmonious inter-
religious relationships. In this context, discipleship as a form of mission
remains an ambivalent concept.
Terrorism, Spirituality and Public Theology

The year 2001 marked the beginning of the global war on terrorism.
The global landscape of the human network has been changed radically
because of the misuse of power and religion in an ideology called terrorism.
The Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia are considered safe harbours for
terrorist cells. The recent war on terrorism on the island of Mindanao, in
the Philippines, has demonstrated the dangerous and catastrophic nature
of the ideology of terrorism. The 2018 suicide bombings of three churches
and several other places in the city of Surabaya, Indonesia, stunned society
.
ly
because the perpetrators were women and children as well as men; this is
on
an unfamiliar aspect of terrorism.
The war on terrorism has placed Islam in a very difficult position,
se
both globally and locally. The spread of radical Islam at various levels of
lu
society and the use of social media for religious campaigns are considered
na
conducive to the spread of terrorist ideology. Blaming Christian evangelis
so
ation for the rise of Muslim fundamentalism, the spread of hate speech,
er
attacks at minority worship spaces and public facilities that have caused
rp
widespread trauma and wounded the long tradition of inter-religious re-
lationship – all of these have shaped the contours of the East and Southeast
Fo
Asian religious landscape in recent years.
e.
The 2017 Asia Mission Conference stated that mission is an embodiment

l
of the spirituality of the cross. Using the cross as a symbol of Christian

sa
spirituality in the context of daily terror, religious enmity and suspicion,

re
however, faces complex challenges. The current theological discourse on

or
mission spirituality has brought Christology into conversation with pneu-

n
matology. Pentecostalism is playing an important role in reintroducing

tio
and reclaiming the role of the Holy Spirit in mission spirituality. The
bu
conversation allows for the emergence of new perspectives on the role

tri
of the Spirit in the midst of violence and terror and their aftermath. The
is
discourse and practice of healing as a form of mission spirituality are not

rd
seen as merely a domestic affair that takes place in the internal circle of
fo
Christian communities. Healing becomes a public affair. Mission spiritu

ality becomes a search for God that cuts through the binaries of private
ot
and public.
N
The old metaphor of carrying the cross is being extended to include

the biblical metaphors of breathing, dancing and embracing the Spirit
(Septemmy Lakawa, ‘Risky Hospitality: Mission in the Aftermath of
Religious Communal Violence in Indonesia’, ThD Dissertation, Boston
University, 2011). Cultural stories, symbols and metaphors are being
reclaimed. The world that is imbued with fear of difference is faced with
a spirituality of resilience that welcomes and respects differences. In 2017,
the Council for World Mission held a series of seminars with the theme
‘De-centring Perspectives on Evangelism’. A seminar was held in Jakarta,

with participants representing various dimensions of difference – countries,
religions, denominations, ethnicities, genders and socio-economic back-
grounds. The seminar provided a unique platform where evangelism
was discussed across differences that in many cases have caused pain and
trauma. A Muslim transgender participant expressed her gratitude for
having experienced such a welcoming space where her voice was heard.
A Christian participant’s perspective on Islam was changed as she listened
to the stories of a Muslim activist sharing his experience of building a
.
ly
grassroots youth movement for inter-religious dialogue as a platform for
on
facing the challenges of religious radicalism. In this space, evangelism is
extended and the mission spirituality of welcoming difference and being
se
resilient in the midst of hatred and violence is embodied.
lu
The public space has become a contested site in many East and Southeast
na
Asian countries. Several years ago, the government of Malaysia officially
so
prohibited non-Muslim Malays from using the word ‘Allah’ (‘God’);
it defined Allah as an exclusively Muslim word, since it is in Arabic. In
er
countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, which use the word ‘Allah’,
rp
Arabic is considered an Islamic language. In contrast to the situation in
Fo
Malaysia, however, in Indonesia the issue remained insignificant in circles
e.
of conversation. The Malaysian case is one of many examples of the ways

l
the religion of the majority plays a central role in shaping the character
sa
of the public space. In the past several years in many cities in Indonesia,
re
banners that declare the refusal to accept those who are different are being
or
displayed along public roads, in residential neighbourhoods, in front of

n
worship spaces and at other public sites.

tio
In Malaysia, non-Muslim communities fought for their right to use the

bu
word ‘Allah’, with which they were familiar and which they had used for
tri
centuries. The Catholic Church in Malaysia, which owned the newspaper

is
The Herald, appealed to the Malaysian High Court for the right to use the
rd
word ‘Allah’ in the newspaper. After five years, it lost its case, marking
fo
the end of this long struggle for the rights of non-Muslim citizens. The
response of Christians along with other non-Muslim communities in
ot
Malaysia models a spirituality of resilience.

N
The story of the congregations of Gereja Kristen Indonesia (GKI)

Yasmin, and of Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP) Bekasi, of Indonesia,
reflect the public face of mission spirituality. They have been holding
their Sunday worship together every other week since 2012 in front of
the presidential palace in Jakarta as a sign of protest for the lack of action
by the government to afford them the right, which has been guaranteed
by the Indonesian High Court, to worship in their own buildings. A few
years previously, their Muslim neighbours had prohibited them from
worshipping in their church buildings. One of the reasons was that the
neighbourhood was majority Muslim. Many similar stories of contested
public space could be told.
The role of religion in the public space, which indicates that mission is
public discourse, raises the question of the compatibility of religion and
democracy in East and Southeast Asia. Robert W. Hefner, a leading scholar
on Islam in Asia, has claimed that Islam is compatible with democracy. In
a similar tone, churches in East and Southeast Asia have constructed their
missional responses by looking at the compatibility of Christianity and
.
ly
democracy. Churches in this region have struggled to shape the public
on
space as a just space through which a model of mission as public theology
has been lived out. One of the profound challenges for churches and
se
Christian communities in East and Southeast Asia today is to continue to
lu
be in mission by shaping the public space of their nations and by shaping
na
a just and peaceful future for Asia.
so
Conclusion
er
This essay has identified five interconnected themes of mission and evan-
rp
gelism in East and Southeast Asia today – the ecumenicity of mission and
Fo
evangelism; violence, inter-religious dialogue and hospitality; Pentecostal-
e.
ism, Roman Catholicism and everyday Christianity; empire, resistance and

l
discipleship; and terrorism, spirituality and public theology. The essay has
sa
also sketched the multiple angles – theological, political, economic, cultural

re
and artistic – from which mission and evangelism can be envisioned,

or
discussed and lived out contextually. These themes emphasise the multi-
n
dimensionality and multidirectionality of mission and evangelism in East

tio
and Southeast Asia today. They mirror the changing contour of mission
bu
and evangelism in the region that is playing a significant role in shaping

tri
the landscape of Asian Christianity in the twenty-first century. Questions

is
of mission and evangelism in the context of Asian religiosities and the

rd
socio-economic and political landscapes are responded to by highlighting

fo
the similar as well as the unique approaches that each East and Southeast
Asian country brings to shape the face of mission and evangelism today.
ot
N
Bibliography
Freston, Paul, Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Hefner, Robert W. (ed.), Global Pentecostalism in the 21st Century (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
Phan, Peter C., Being Religious Inter-religiously: Asian Perspectives on Interfaith Dialogue
Phan, Peter C., In Our Own Tongues: Perspectives from Asia on Mission and Inculturation
Prior, John Mansford svd, ‘The Challenge of the Pentecostals in Asia Part One: Pentecostal
Movements in Asia’ and ‘The Challenge of the Pentecostals in Asia Part Two: The
Responses of the Roman Catholic Church’, Exchange, 36 (2007), 6–40; 115–43.
.
ly
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Gender
Sharon A. Bong
The intersection of gender and Christianity finds myriad expressions
.
ly
across East and Southeast Asia, where Christians are a minority (with
on
the exceptions of the Philippines and Timor-Leste in Southeast Asia). An
analytical review of this important intersection draws from the rich litera-
se
ture of Asian feminist theologies and, to a lesser extent, queer theologies,
lu
whereas most historical documentation on Christianity in this region (such
na
as mission studies and early church history), including contemporary
so
trends such as mega-churches (in Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines,
er
South Korea), are often gender blind (without a gendered or feminist
perspective).
rp
This review tangentially considers the corpus of gender and sexuality
Fo
studies in Islam and in Confucianism, Buddhism and Chinese folk
e.
religions, as Muslims are the demographic majority in Indonesia (which

l
hosts the most populous ummah or Muslim community in the world),

sa
Malaysia and Brunei in Southeast Asia (where both Brunei and Aceh,
re
Northern Indonesia, are Islamic states), while a syncretic mix of Confucian-

or
ism, Buddhism and Chinese folk religions are still influential in Thailand,
n
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Singapore in Southeast Asia and

tio
in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau and South Korea in East Asia.
bu
Politically, this intersection is negotiated within communist frame-

tri
works (Vietnam and Laos in Southeast Asia, China and North Korea in
is
East Asia) as well as current and past military dictatorships or incursions

rd
(Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia and Timor-Leste in Southeast Asia,

fo
and China, Japan, and North and South Korea in East Asia). This inter-
section is also embedded in narratives of colonisation, beginning with the
ot
N
introduction of Christianity in this region through colonisation (Catholi-

cism via the Portuguese, French and Spanish; Protestantism via the British
and Dutch) and neo-colonisation (such as Korean Protestantism founded
on American far-right conservatism and Protestantism).
A consideration of the intersection of gender and Christianity in this
region is made more complex by the broader intersectional frameworks
and ideologies as outlined above. In navigating these private–public,
individual–institutional and local–global matrices, this essay is divided
into three sections: conformity, challenge and controversy. The section
414 Sharon A. Bong
on conformity shows how the basic tenets of Christianity complement,

even augment, gender ideologies in this region. The second section, on
challenge, foregrounds the under-quoted scholarship of Asian feminist
theologians who call into question many of these gender ideologies as
they negotiate the tension between being dutiful daughters and becoming
defiant daughters in the home, church and nation. The final section, on
controversy, builds on the transgression of gender ideologies for LGBTQ
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer) communities in Asia.
.
ly
Conformity
on
The category of ‘gender’ is largely differentiated from ‘sex’, as the latter is
deemed to be biologically determined (one is born male or female) while
se
the former is socially constructed (one becomes masculine or feminine).
lu
A cisgender person refers to one whose ‘sex’ is aligned with his or her
na
‘gender’ identity and expression. A person born male thus becomes mas-
so
culinised and one born female becomes feminised. These are also generally
accepted to be mutually exclusive categories, as a person is either male or
er
female, masculine or feminine, not both–and. Gender binaries or dualisms
rp
as such are denoted as male/female and masculine/feminine. Across
Fo
time and space, these have given rise to other dualisms that have come
e.
to be aligned with male and masculinity – such as the mind, rational-

l
ity, muscularity, hairiness, aggression, agency, good – while the body,

sa
emotion, slenderness, hairlessness, docility, passivity and evil have come

re
to be aligned with female and femininity. The first terms of each of these
or
dualisms—mind/body, rationality/emotion, muscularity/slenderness,

n
hairiness/hairlessness, aggression/docility, agency/passivity and good/

tio
evil—are dominant categories (because they are aligned with the male
bu
and masculinity) and the second terms, secondary and subordinate ones
tri
(because they are aligned with the female and femininity).

is
Gender binaries as a construct play up differences between the sexes

rd
that are ontological (for example, one is logical and the other is given to
fo
excesses of emotion), physical (one is muscular; the other, slender – hence

the beauty myths that more women than men historically have been
ot
subjected to), and behavioural (one is aggressive; the other, docile – which
N
problematically feeds into rape cultures). Gender binaries as a construct

are premised on oppositional differences (being female is not being male,
and vice versa) and this leads to gender statuses under which men are
generally perceived and treated as superior to women, who are, conse-
quently, inferiorised and even infantalised. The gender work involved
in sustaining the purposeful and systemic marginalisation of not only
women (and girls) but also qualities or attributes associated with femin
inity, principally the body and emotions, takes the form of patriarchy.
Gender 415
Gender binaries that are the foundational bases of gender ideologies are
thus premised on differences and mutual exclusivity (oppositional differ-
ences) that cement the superiority of most men over most women, most of
the time and in most spaces.
These spaces are largely constructed as heteronormative spaces that
enforce the naturalness and rightness of heterosexuality or opposite-sex
attraction. If one is born male, one ought to become masculinised, and,
conversely, if one is born female, one ought to become feminised – and for
both opposite-sex attraction is prescribed, with same-sex attraction pro-
.
ly
scribed. This gives rise to a corresponding gender (and sexuality) dualism,
on
heterosexuality/homosexuality or heteronormative/non-heteronormative,
with legitimacy accorded to the first terms and the second terms con-
se
structed as unnatural, deviant, even sinful. Bodies and sexualities are
lu
disciplined and heterosexuality made compulsory, especially for LGBTQ
na
persons, by both secular and religious laws with (worldly and other-
so
worldly) rewards for conformity and sanctions for non-conformity.
Gender as a category thus becomes intimately intertwined with sexuality.
er
In the context of East and Southeast Asia, Confucianism, past and
rp
present, ascribes to the girl-child and woman ‘Three Obediences and Four
Fo
Virtues’. Where obedience is concerned, a woman is required to obey her
e.
father as a daughter, her husband as a wife and her son in widowhood.

l
The feminine virtues comprise wifely virtue, wifely speech, wifely manner
sa
or appearance and wifely work. What are apparent are not only the
re
presumed heterosexuality of women in general (as the roles of wife and

or
mother are naturalised) but also the gender ideologies at work. Obedience
n
as a feminine virtue is accorded inter-generational legitimacy, which,

tio
in turn, sustains gender dualisms of a man’s lifelong dominance over a

bu
woman’s lifelong subservience.

tri
To many, these obediences and virtues might seem archaic, but to

is
scholars who work on trafficking in human persons, such expressions of

rd
feminine gender identity, compounded by another key Confucian trait,

fo
filial piety, exacerbate the vulnerability of the girl-child and woman

whose virginities and bodies are knowingly sold into prostitution by their
ot
families. These willing daughters manifest ambivalent positions: shame

N
at their defilement, pride as providers to their poverty-stricken families

and hurt by familial rejection upon returning. In addition, Vietnamese
folklore romanticises women’s unconditional devotion and loyalty to
their families and in doing so institutes an inter-generational inferiority of
women in relation to men, which some impute as a perversion of family
and Asian values.
The unquestioning daughter’s filial piety, with its Confucian basis,
finds a haunting parallelism, in discourses on prostitution, with the
416 Sharon A. Bong
feminised martyr complex in the Philippines, which is overwhelmingly

Catholic. The cultural-religious construction of the ‘Filipino woman’ as a
dutiful wife, mother and daughter, not unlike the three obediences of Con-
fucianism, finds its highest expression in ideal victimhood, in imitation of
Jesus as the archetypal sacrificial lamb. A machismo culture aggrandising
gender inequality and gender inequity between men and women, and
a Christianised machismo culture as a Spanish legacy of Catholicism in
the Philippines, aggravate the plight of the ‘Filipino woman’ destined
to a life of suffering and silent acquiescence, with her gaze directed at
.
ly
other-worldly redemption. The Filipino woman is further oppressed by
on
two inaccessible Christian female role models: the thoroughly chastened
ideal of a virgin-mother in the form of Mary and the thoroughly castigated
se
nemesis, the evil seductress that Mary Magdalene is often portrayed to be.
lu
Feminist theologians like Mary John Mananzan osb courageously
na
speak out against Christianity as the root of women’s oppression in the
so
Philippines. Feminist theologians, including the contingent of the 1994
Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians, denounce the
er
masculinised image of God as a tyrannical father that could be interpreted
rp
as legitimising domestic abuse (as the sacrifice of a son is entailed) and
Fo
fostering a victim attitude among women. The practice of such endemic
e.
gender ideologies in the home is further fuelled by Christian ideology that,

l
in turn, reinforces the distortion of family values that are lopsidedly borne
sa
by the dutiful daughter in selling her body to feed her family. Against the
re
cultural-religious signification of ideal femininity as the embodiment of

or
passive victimhood, the Filipino women’s movement GABRIELA, had

n
to deploy a victimhood narrative to better relate to girls and women as

tio
prostitutes before deploying an agentive narrative intended to re-socialise

bu
prostitutes in empowering them to gradually transition from victims to

tri
agents who are imbued with self-determination.

is
The global movement of consecrated women against trafficking in

rd
human persons (TIPs), Talitha Kum (meaning ‘little girl, arise’), deploys
fo
another tenet of Christianity, the fundamental dignity of the human person

as created in the image of God (imago dei). This is a core goal of Talitha
ot
Kum Asia, which articulates imago dei from a gendered lens: ‘To renew
N
the values of the church to respect and uphold the dignity of women and
men created in the image and likeness of God’. Talitha Kum Asia’s vision
(formed by chapters in Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand
in Southeast Asia and Japan, Korea and Taiwan in East Asia) lies in its
commitment to eradicate ‘human trafficking, modern-day slavery, forced
labour and debt bondage, especially among children and women, in the
Southeast/East Asia region’. A Christian framework in this regard affords
Talitha Kum Asia not only a faith-based but also a rights-based framework
Gender 417
within which to operate. Whereas a faith-based framework is premised

on the (biblical and doctrinal) dignity of the human person, a rights-based
framework is premised on human rights of the individual as universal
(applicable to all persons, at all times, at all places), indivisible (economic,
social and cultural rights are inseparable from civil and political liberties)
and inalienable (integral to being human).
However, the challenge of bridging the chasm between an ideological
understanding and praxis of human dignity and the everyday trampling
of human dignity – especially the human dignity of women, who suffer
.
ly
TIPs differently and disproportionately – persists. In addition to gender
on
ideologies at work, this is a challenge that involves other binaries, which
include, but are not limited to, Western ideology (Christianity) versus
se
Asian values (unconditional filial piety more onerously borne by the girl-
lu
child and woman) and atomistic individualism (individual rights) versus
na
communitarian spirit (personal sacrifice for familial or common good,
so
again more onerously borne by the girl-child and woman). As the bases of
both human rights and human dignity have historically and theologically
er
been gender biased (androcentric), as argued by feminist theologians and
rp
women’s human rights activists, the composite challenge is a postcolonial
Fo
and feminist one.
le.
Challenge
sa
The prior and more fundamental challenge is a feminist one as gender

re
ideologies in Christianity find expression not only in sexism (such as

or
Augustinian positioning of women as the devil’s gateway) but also the

n
(deceptively egalitarian notion of) gender complementarity of the sexes

tio
embedded in the concept of ‘feminine genius’.

bu
The term ‘feminine genius’ gained visibility in Pope John Paul II’s 1995
tri
‘Letter to Women’ in conjunction with the fourth (and last) UN World

is
Conference on Women, held in Beijing in that year. A fuller sense of the

rd
‘feminine’ is an intrinsic feature of his 1988 Apostolic Letter Mulieris

fo
Dignitatem, on the dignity and vocation of women in the Marian year. The
term is back in circulation as used by Pope Francis to facilitate women’s
ot
greater leadership role in the church. Although women continue to be

N
excluded from priestly ordination, the Vatican had initiated a commission

to study the historical precedence of female deacons in the Catholic
Church, with a view to the potential resuscitation of this practice in this
millennium. The ‘feminine genius’ of women encapsulates three inter
related effects: it is complementary, essentialising and regulatory.
First, in ‘Letter to Women’, Pope John Paul II notes that: ‘Womanhood
expresses the “human” as much as manhood does, but in a “different
and complementary way”’. The complementarity of womanhood and
418 Sharon A. Bong
manhood are not only physical and psychological but also ontological: ‘It
is only through the duality of the “masculine” and the “feminine” that
the “human” finds full realization’. The ‘gender complementarity’ that is
also the bedrock of the church’s theology of the body makes sacred gender
and sexual differences – from the very beginning ‘male and female’ were
created (Genesis 1: 27) – thereby justifying gender dualisms: the ‘unity of
the two’. In doing so, it effectively brackets off gender and sexual diver-
gences, dissonances and diversities. There are only two ways of being in
the world: the human is created male or female and gendered masculine
.
ly
or feminine.
on
Secondly, from this foundational principle of the gender complemen-
tarity of womanhood and, by extension, ‘feminine genius’, Pope John
se
Paul II contextualises the ‘genius of women’ as ‘a specific part of God’s
lu
plan’ where the ‘creation of woman is thus marked from the outset by the
na
principle of help: a help which is not one-sided but mutual’. In other words,
so
the essence of womanhood is that of a ‘helper fit for [man]’ (Genesis 2: 18),
to assist him in reproductive ways (propagating the species) and produc-
er
tive ways (exercising dominion over the earth and all living creatures).
rp
The concomitant qualities that have become essentialised (naturalised
Fo
and fixed) as feminine are nurturing, life-giving and subsidiary; that
e.
is, woman assists rather than initiates. One may argue that the gender
l
dualism inherent in a feminised ‘principle of help’ is ‘one-sided [rather

sa
than] mutual’. Mutuality in this context does not mean reciprocity, as the
re
Pope adds that ‘Their most natural relationship, which corresponds to the
or
plan of God, is the “unity of the two”, a relational “uni-duality”’. Woman

n
is man’s helpmate. In contrast, man does not, cannot and therefore should
tio
not serve in this capacity. This is woman’s singularity, her ‘genius’, her
bu
‘feminine genius’.
tri
Thirdly, the ‘feminine genius’ puts ‘every woman’ in her place. The
is
cautionary note glimpsed in John Paul II’s ‘Letter to Women’ finds clearer
rd
expression in Mulieris Dignitatem in relation to the quest and ‘question of

fo
women’s rights’:
ot
Consequently, even the rightful opposition of women to what is expressed in

N
the biblical words ‘He shall rule over you’ (Genesis 3: 16) must not under any
condition lead to the ‘masculinization’ of women. In the name of liberation
from male ‘domination’, women must not appropriate to themselves male
characteristics contrary to their own feminine ‘originality’. There is a well-
founded fear that if they take this path, women will not ‘reach fulfilment’, but
instead will deform and lose what constitutes their essential richness.
The ‘feminine genius’ is femininity made proper. It is to exercise her

‘originality’, which is her essential acting and being in the world as a
Gender 419
‘helper fit for [man]’. It is to stay in place within the dualisms of man/
woman, masculine/feminine, Christ/church, bridegroom/bride and
ministerial/common priesthood. It is to emulate the impossible ideal of
virgin-mother (as Mary, Mother of God, embodies the ‘highest expression
of the “feminine genius”’), beginning with the feminised quality of
obedience to man and God. The ‘question of women’s rights’ risks women
overreaching their place, of overstepping the boundaries of male/female
and active/passive. To do so, in misappropriating ‘male characteristics’,
is a transgression of the boundaries set up within the economy of gender
.
ly
dualisms and risks the ‘“masculinization” of women’. What is revelatory is
on
that ‘male “domination”’ is masked as ‘mutuality’. The full import of John
Paul II’s ‘Letter to Women’ is now made clear. While all believers share
se
in the ‘common priesthood’, only the elect male may rise to ‘ministerial
lu
priesthood’ — in fidelity to the complementarity of these principles,
na
‘entrusted only to men the task of being an “icon” of his countenance as
so
“shepherd” and “bridegroom” of the Church’.
The genius, feminine or otherwise, of feminists theologising from the
er
bowels of Asia has been precisely and necessarily to ‘overreach’ their place
rp
in challenging untenable gender ideologies that form the bedrock of how
Fo
Christianity has come to be interpreted and practised. As Christianity
e.
in Asia is understood and experienced as the religion of the colonisers,

l
feminists theologising in Asia are triply marginalised: on accounts of

sa
their sex, faith and ideological persuasion. Where the overriding rhetoric
re
of many postcolonial states positions Christianity as not only foreign

or
but Western, and hence potentially polluting Asian values and morality,
n
feminist theologians risk being triply branded: as unfilial daughters

tio
(and sons, for men who identify as feminist), unpatriotic citizens and
bu
masculine women. They embody the socially marginal (insider–outsider)

tri
and socially marginalised identities of belonging but not quite within the
is
home, church and nation. To find her place – after all, women hold up half
rd
the sky (as the Chinese proverb goes) – women paradoxically need to lose
fo
their place, to cross over and inevitably transgress boundaries, especially

those steeped in gender binaries. In this way, the related and no less fun-
ot
damental challenge for feminists theologising in Asia becomes a feminist

N
postcolonial one, as they reflexively seek ways to reconcile the conflicting

ideologies and ontologies of being feminist, being Christian and being
Asian.
For a feminist, finding her place entails, firstly, a coming into her own.
On the one hand, there is humble recognition of those who had paved
the way, given that Asian feminist theologies are a successor epistem
ology or later body of knowledge inherited from – or at least richly
informed by – Western feminist theologians such as Elisabeth Schüssler
420 Sharon A. Bong
Fiorenza, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Mary Daly, Carter Heyward, Sallie

McFague and many others. Asian feminist theologies are also successor
epistem ologies to Asian postcolonial theologies featuring Burakumin,
Dalit and Minjung theologies (such as those of C. S. Song from China,
David Kwang-Sun Suh from Korea, Kuribayashi Teruo from Japan, R. S.
Sugirtharajah and Aloysius Pieris from Sri Lanka, and Arvind P. Nirmal
from India) and liberation theologies (from Latin America and Africa).
On the other hand, there is a critical distancing from white feminists’
colonising representation of the ‘Asian woman’, often as poor, multiply
.
ly
oppressed and in need of being rescued. Such skewed representation is
on
ominously reminiscent of civilising missions that exaggerate the differ-
ences between Christian missionaries and godless natives with the intent
se
to inferiorise and the concomitant justification to conquer the latter. To
lu
illustrate, Asian feminist theologians such as Angela Wong Wai Ching
na
from Hong Kong critique the Western missionaries’ intention to save
so
Chinese heathens, especially women, by depicting the latter as hapless
victims of arranged marriages, polygamy, concubinage, slavery and foot
er
binding and by emphasising the complicity of Chinese religions, which
rp
include Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, in affording gender ideolo-
Fo
gies cultural and traditional legitimacy. The inverse strategy of othering
e.
(Chinese women as culturally oppressed and Chinese traditions as

l
debased) lies in romanticising Asian religious traditions as extensions of

sa
exoticising their foreignness. The hardening of West/East, centre/margin

re
and Christian/heathen binaries, infers the eminent Kwok Pui-Lan in

or
Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist Theology, inadvertently obscures the

n
suffering of Asian women, as these representations are not grounded in

tio
the lived realities of Asian women, who are, to begin with, not a mono-
bu
lithic group (not all Asian women are poor or oppressed, or poor and
tri
oppressed, in the same way).

is
There is also internal critique from Asian feminist theologians that

rd
is consonant with the internal dissent constituting the various waves of

fo
feminist thought that is an integral component of what sustains rather

than fragments a women’s movement. Where the quest to come into
ot
one’s own necessitates finding both one’s voice and a collective voice
N
that seeks uniqueness of the ‘Asian’ in Asian feminist theologising, others

have noted the limits of such identity politics – it is at once empowering
but also reductionist and potentially exclusive. For example, Namsoon
Kang, from the first wave of Korean feminist theologians (1980s to 1990s),
cautions feminists on the pitfalls of essentialising the Asian subject and
subjectivity, which inadvertently reifies a binary of us (Asian) versus
them (West). In doing so, one risks Orientalising oneself – not unlike
the colonising strategy of constructing the ‘Oriental’ (East) – to borrow
Gender 421
from the postcolonial theorist Edward Said – as other, different and op-
positional from the ‘Occident’ (West) – which narrows the complexities
of what it means to be Asian. Instead, Kang’s theologising moves beyond
identity politics or group-based affinities and differences such as na-
tionality, ethnicity, religion, gender and sexuality. This inclusive vision
is prophetic, given the acceleration of trans-nationalisation today that
compresses time-space for all, bringing the point home of how we are all
intimately connected.
In going beyond the binaries of West/Asia, given the myopia of not
.
ly
doing so, finding one’s place entails, secondly, having a place to call
on
one’s own (to paraphrase Virginia Woolf). This is the quest to eke out a
sense of belonging within the home, the church and nation by negotiat-
se
ing the tension between being a dutiful daughter and becoming a defiant
lu
daughter. Aye Nwe, for instance, notes the parallelism with the deeply
na
gender hierarchised society and church in Myanmar that are premised
so
on the belief that men embody phon (male power, glory or holiness). This
cultural construct of phon drives a divisive wedge in the differentiated
er
treatment, position and status of men and women, sons and daughters,
rp
in the home and church, which are manifest not only in gender-based
Fo
discrimination (such as denial of women’s ordination in most churches)
e.
and gender-based violence (rape used as a weapon of war, particularly

l
to subdue ethnic minorities such as the Karen, Kachin and Chin) but also
sa
in misogyny. Yet women remain as the bedrock upon which the home,
re
church and nation are built, amid Myanmar’s political turmoil (its military
or
dictatorship and turbulent transitioning to democracy) and economic

n
insecurity. Nwe affirms Wa women (one of the 135 minority groups in

tio
Myanmar, found also in China, Laos and Thailand) as agents of transfor-

bu
mation, in the spirit of the Syro-Phoenician woman (Matthew 15: 21–8,

tri
Mark 7: 24–30) who persists in imploring Jesus to heal her spirit-ridden

is
daughter (and would not take ‘no’ for an answer).

rd
Christian feminist conscientisation extends a place to call one’s own

fo
to the streets or the grassroots and trans-nationally, as embodied by the

evolution and revolution of Filipino feminist nuns (Virginia Fabella,
ot
Maryknoll, Mary John Mananzan osb and Amelia Vasquez rscj, among
N
others). They traverse the interstices of local–global in having the privilege

of a theological education abroad, deploying this education by facilitating
gender-sensitising workshops among the grassroots in the post-Marcos
era reminiscent of the mobile consciousness-raising classrooms during
the martial law of the Marcos dictatorship regime (1970s to 1980s) and
living among the churches of the poor following the Second Vatican
Council (1962–5). The nun’s habit becomes a signifier not only of religious
piety – where individual identities were obliterated to foreground
422 Sharon A. Bong
collective identities – but also the symbolic capital of religious integrity

alongside street demonstrators against draconian laws and tyrannical
state leaders. As both dutiful and defiant daughters to the home, church
and nation, these feminist trans-national nuns stand in solidarity with
other dutiful and defiant daughters, such as Filipino comfort women or
former military sex slaves of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines
and domestic workers, including Japayuki (overseas contract entertainers
in Japan), resulting from the feminisation of poverty and labour.
Beyond the spatiality of having a local–global place of one’s own, Asian
.
ly
Christian feminists transcend the temporal by bequeathing a legacy in the
on
form of a body of theology based on the bodies and sexualities of women
especially, who suffer, resist and heal. Their ‘genius’ is embedded in the
se
setting up of theological bodies where inter-generational voices can be
lu
heard, documented and circulated. Noteworthy are the Korean Associa-
na
tion of Feminist Theologians (1985) and Korean Association of Christian
so
Women for Women Minjung (1986), which were established during
the period that witnessed the rise of Korean feminist theology and the
er
movement towards democracy and an end to authoritarian rule; and the
rp
Asian Women’s Resource Centre for Culture and Theology (1988), which
Fo
is committed to promoting Asian women’s theology chiefly through its
e.
feminist theological journal, In God’s Image, in realising the vision of Sun

l
Ai Lee Park. There is also the Centre for Feminist Theology and Ministry
sa
in Japan, which was jointly established by Satoko Yamaguchi and Hisako

re
Kinukawa as second-generation Japanese feminist theologians, to reclaim

or
and restore into the home, church and nation the memories of women
n
leaders in the Bible (such as Deborah) in sync with Korean women of

tio
the past, present and future and to do theology as Jesus did by affirming
bu
women whom he had encountered.

tri
Finding her place entails, finally, transgressing her allocated space

is
in expanding the ‘feminine genius’ and unsettling the gender comple

rd
mentarity of the sexes. The Ecclesia of Women in Asia (EWA), conceived

fo
in 2001, are Catholic feminists, both religious and lay women, theologis-
ing in Asia. EWA embodies an Asian women’s ecclesiology, reimagines
ot
the ekklesia as it affords a dialogical space (through its biennial conferences

N
and seven edited volumes) that critically interrogates what it means to be

a woman-church in Asia. EWA’s theology draws from and is sustained
by the lived realities of women, men and LGBTQ communities in nego-
tiating their identities in conversations with diverse ethnicities, cultures
and religions in political economies that range from communism to neo-
liberalism impacted by fundamentalisms, both political and religious,
ecological sustainability and the bioethical limits of trans-humanism and
post-humanism accelerated by technological advances.
Gender 423
Controversy
The ethos of transgression among Asian feminist theologians is made
more visible through the ethos of inclusivity of some that runs counter
to heteronormative ideologies within the feminist movement itself. This
is because the Asian Christian feminist movement is predominantly a
movement of, for and by (presumed) heterosexual women with a dedicated
focus on dismantling the male/female and masculine/feminine gender
binaries. A feminist movement, as such, is necessarily gender biased in
leaning towards women, given the disproportionate and different ways
.
ly
that women and girls live out poverty, gender-based discrimination and
on
violence compared with men and boys. While the Christian feminist
movement is neither necessarily nor wholly heterosexist, there has been
se
unwitting erasure of internal differences, especially gender and sexual
lu
diversities, from among Asian Christian feminists themselves.
na
Where dutiful and defiant daughters perform their genders and sexu-
so
alities that intersect with their faith, the home, church and state become
er
the loci of not only sexism, as consequences of the zeal to empower
rp
women and girls, but also homophobia and transphobia. Pope Francis,
for instance, denounces ‘gender ideologies’ as ‘terrible’, as ‘God created
Fo
man and woman . . . and we are doing the exact opposite’, thereby putting
e.
down the valuable work of feminist-queer theorists and theologians in

l
deconstructing sex/gender/sexuality as fixed and unchanging categories.

sa
As a counter-discourse to the Pope’s denouncement of ‘gender ideol

re
ogies’, the theologising of Yuri Horie, an ordained lesbian minister of the

or
United Church in Christ of Japan, is instructive here. She advocates for

n
a ‘lesbian continuum’ (to borrow from Adrienne Rich) within the Asian
tio
feminist movement that recognises the diversity of heteronormative and

bu
non-heteronormative women who form the Christian feminist movement.

tri
She does so as she is cognisant of the parallelism between sexism and

is
homophobia within the feminist movement. The sexist element rein-

rd
forces the boundary between male/female and elides differences among

fo
women (where not all women are oppressed in the same way or to the
same degree). The homophobic element reinforces the binary of hetero
ot
normative/non-heteronormative, resulting in LGBTQ persons from within

N
and without the women’s movement being stigmatised.

Horie’s ‘lesbian continuum’, which imbibes an ethos of inclusivity that
serves as a counter-narrative to feminist-based sexism and homophobia,
however unintended, finds expression in the queer-feminist theologising
of an ‘epistemology of the sacred body’ of LGBTQ persons in Malaysia
that is predominantly Muslim. With (British) colonial legacies not only
of Christianity but also sodomy laws (such as section 377 of the Penal
Code of Malaysia), LGBTQ persons are not accorded full citizenship
424 Sharon A. Bong
rights, bereft as they are of a spectrum of sexuality rights enshrined in the

Yogyakarta Principles (the right to found a family; the right to freedom
from criminalis ation and sanction on the basis of sexual orientation,
gender identity, gender expression [SOGIEs] and sex characteristics).
The marginalisation of LGBTQ persons in modern Asia, which includes
Malaysia, following the conquest of the region not only by Christianity
but also by Islam, is a marked departure from the legitimacy accorded to
those with diverse SOGIEs that was affirmed in pre-modern Asia.
A recuperation of such affirmation is articulated in an ‘epistemol-
.
ly
ogy of the sacred body’, which is premised on the lived experiences of
on
LGBTQ persons of various religious persuasions and ethnicities, given
the heterogeneity of Malaysians (Muslim gay-identifying man, Christian
se
lesbian, Tibetan Buddhist bisexual mother, New Age Spiritualist female-
lu
to-male transsexual or transman and Hindu intersex mystic). Epistemic
na
privilege is accorded to these who inhabit the margins as they negotiate,
so
as an everyday reality, what it means to be not only spiritually queer but
also queerly spiritual. The use of queer is to make strange the familiar and
er
make sacred the profane. A queer-feminist theologising of their bodies
rp
that suffer, resist and heal renders them as the embodiment of the sacred,
Fo
imago dei.
e.
The way forward in solidarity with the LGBTQ community for Asian
l
Christian feminists would be to rethink the category of ‘woman’, which, as

sa
Horie posits – based on Judith Butler’s (a feminist post-modernist theorist)

re
contention that not only is ‘gender’ a construct (therefore unstable)

or
but also, and quite problematically, ‘sex’ is as well – is a contested and

n
sometimes divisive one.

tio
bu
Bibliography
tri
Brazal, Agnes M., and Andrea Lizares Si (eds), Body and Sexuality: Theological-Pastoral Per-
is
spectives of Women in Asia (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2007).
rd
Chan, Lúcás Yiu Sing, James F. Keenan and Shaji Geoge Kochuthara (eds), Doing Asian
Theological Ethics in a Cross-cultural and an Inter-religious Context (Bengaluru: Dharmaram
fo
Publications, 2016).
ot
Chung, Hyun Kyung, Struggle to Be the Sun Again: Introducing Asian Women’s Theology
N

Gallares, Judette A., and Astrid Lobo-Gajiwala (eds), Practicing Peace: Feminist Theology of
Liberation Asian Perspectives (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2011).
Kwok, Pui-Lan, Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster
John Knox Press, 2005).
Religious Freedom
Paul Marshall
East and Southeast Asian countries vary tremendously. What they have
.
ly
in common is that they share an area of the globe containing almost
on
one-third of the world’s population and are tied together by trade and
diplomacy. China has the world’s largest population, while Brunei has
se
among the smallest. The area has major maritime and continental states
lu
and some of the world’s leading democratic states, as well as some of its
na
most authoritarian.
so
The same diversity marks the religious freedom situation. North Korea
er
is arguably the most repressive country for Christians, while Japan and
rp
Mongolia are largely religiously free. Each country has, of course, its own
idiosyncrasies and regional variations, but, for the purposes of compari-
Fo
son, they can be divided broadly into four groups:
e.
• the remaining communist, or self-described communist, states – China,

l
sa
Laos, North Korea and Vietnam;

re
• other authoritarian states – Cambodia and Myanmar;

or
• Muslim-majority countries – Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia;

• largely religiously free countries – Japan, Mongolia, the Philippines,
n
tio
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Timor-Leste.

bu
Each will be considered in terms of their compliance with, or violation of,

tri
international standards with regard to observance of religious freedom.

is
rd
Self-professed Communist Countries

fo
The remaining communist countries in the area are China, Laos, North
Korea and Vietnam. Their economies vary, but they still profess anti-
ot
religious ideologies that foster state repression of religion. In recent

N
decades, with the exception of North Korea, their ideological rigidity

has been tempered, but they remain highly repressive. Governments still
control all political and most civic activity, including religion, but now the
aim is not to eradicate Christianity but to register, regulate and restrict it.
North Korea has made no substantial reforms regarding religious freedom
since its founding.
China remains officially atheist and under the presidency (now for life)
of Xi Jinping, control of religion has become a greater priority. President
426 Paul Marshall
Xi stresses making religion more Chinese in orientation and, consequently,

the regime has begun favouring Buddhism, Taoism and folk religions and
is reviving Confucianism, in part to counter Christianity’s rapid growth.
Meanwhile, Christianity is routinely criticised in official media as a foreign
and potentially subversive religion.
The major agencies controlling religion have been the Communist
Party’s United Front Work Department and the Religious Affairs Bureaus
(RAB). These have exercised control through what are called patriotic
religious associations, including the Catholic Patriotic Association and,
.
ly
for Protestants, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement. These associations
on
are not truly independent organisations and, while their personnel may
be committed Christians, they have functioned as extensions of the RAB.
se
However, in March 2018 the Party disbanded the RAB in order to bring
lu
religion directly under the Party’s Central Committee, one sign of the
na
regime’s increased attention to religion. The Ministry of State Security
so
also monitors religious groups, particularly those thought to be cults, and
Christian sects or Christianity-inspired cultic groups have been banned.
er
Seminary students may be examined on political conformity as well as
rp
theological knowledge. Religious literature is regulated, while religious
Fo
schools for children are banned. Meetings with foreign co-religionists
e.
require state authorisation. Even the selection of church leaders must meet
l
government approval. There has also been a tightening of restrictions

sa
on student and youth work, with children being banned from attending
re
Christian camps and, in some cases, children and their teachers barred from
or
attending church. Meanwhile, unofficial Catholic and Protestant churches,

n
comprising most of China’s Christians, remain illegal. Since churches are

tio
forbidden to be under the authority of an overseas body, Roman Catholi-

bu
cism is outlawed because it is in communion with Rome. Those who follow

tri
the church magisterium and papal authority might pay a steep price.
is
While Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau remain religiously free, China
rd
now persecutes Christians at the highest rate since the Cultural Revolu-
fo
tion, with continuing arrests, disappearances and imprisonment. The US

Congressional Executive Committee on China reported that, ‘In 2011, at
ot
least 40 Roman Catholic bishops remain imprisoned, detained, or dis

N
appeared’. Many had not been seen or heard from since their arrests, and
some have spent decades in prison camps. As of the end of May 2018,
almost 100 house churches had been shut down in Henan province alone.
In 2018, more than 100 ethnic Uyghur Christians who had converted from
a Muslim background were sent to ‘re-education’ camps in Xinjiang,
where they are pressured to follow communist ideology. Comparing 2016
to 2015, China Aid found that cases of persecution rose 20.2%, numbers
detained rose 147.6%, numbers arrested rose 11%, numbers of people
sentenced rose 30%, numbers of abuse cases rose 42.6% and the number of
people abused rose 69.5%.
Even government-approved Three-Self churches have been attacked,
with some forcibly demolished. Between 2013 and 2015 more than 1,200
crosses were pulled down from official churches in Zhejiang, where there
is a strong Christian presence. Zhang Shaojie, a prominent pastor of the
state-sanctioned Nanle County Church in Henan, was jailed for 12 years in
2014 for ‘gathering crowds to disturb public order’. He has been tortured,
and his daughter reports that in 2018 he was ‘barely alive’.
.
ly
Vietnam’s constitution guarantees freedom of religion; however, laws
on
allow the government to restrict religion to protect ‘national security’
and ‘social unity’. There is a tendency to identify Catholics with French
se
colonialism and Evangelicals with the USA, a former enemy. The govern-
lu
ment also tends to see religion, especially Christianity, as a threat, and so
na
there is continuing state discrimination against Christians.
so
The government manages Christians through the Committee on
Religious Affairs within the Ministry of the Interior, which issues
er
regulations even on theological orthodoxy. There are also specific
rp
religion-focused units within the security forces and in the Communist
Fo
Party. Special police units monitor groups the state considers extremist,
e.
including unregistered Protestants, especially among ethnic minorities,

l
some Mennonite church leaders, and some Catholic priests and orders,
sa
particularly the indigenous Redemptorists.

re
A 2018 law on religion might streamline church registration and allow

or
Christians more easily to establish medical and educational institutions

n
and to work with foreigners. Private schools are required to follow a

tio
government-approved curriculum, which does not allow for religious in-

bu
struction. Unlike China, Vietnam does not have state-controlled ‘patriotic

tri
churches’, but it vets Catholic bishops and monitors priests and seminar-
is
ies. It has now accepted a papal nuncio, although he resides outside the
rd
country.
fo
Few of the dozens of house-church organisations started in recent

decades have received legal recognition. The government had said that its
ot
2013 Religion Decree would speed up registration, but half of Protestant

N
groups remain unregistered. Registration applications for about half of

the 950 Hmong congregations affiliated with the government-recognised
Evangelical Church of Vietnam have been denied or ignored for decades.
The government is afraid that widespread conversions among the Hmong
might trigger an independence movement. Given these problems, many
house churches do not bother seeking legal recognition.
Evangelical leaders have occasionally been imprisoned for ‘disturb-
ing public order’ or ‘harming national unity’. Christian human rights
428 Paul Marshall
defenders, including priests and pastors, are imprisoned and often serve
long sentences. In 2017, nearly 100 suspected plain-clothes police in Thua
Thien-Hue Province broke into the Catholic Thien An Monastery, pulled
down a cross and smashed its figure of Christ in order to pressure the
monastery into surrendering its land for a tourism project.
Problems are greater in rural areas, especially among communities that
are not ethnically Vietnamese. Catholics and Evangelicals can suffer per-
secution if they evangelise or start churches in areas where Christians had
been absent. There is harassment of Catholics by local authorities in the
.
ly
north central area, especially Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces, and police
on
have beaten priests. Converts to Christianity might be pressured to recant
and denied government benefits if they refuse, and often they cannot
se
register their new religion on their ID cards. Some have been severely
lu
beaten by police and had their belongings taken and homes destroyed.
na
Among ethnic minorities, converts might suffer persecution from fellow
so
ethnic animists, and security officials do not protect them and sometimes
even support the attacks.
er
In Laos, evangelising and distributing religious literature is allowed
rp
legally, but in practice many restrictions remain. Some officials in the
Fo
ruling Pathet Lao Movement see Christianity as a Western, particularly
e.
American, imperialist religion since the USA had supported the previous
l
government against the communists. An additional reason for hostility is

sa
a cultural ideal of social cohesion, seen as threatened by the presence of

re
disparate beliefs. Furthermore, while the country is nominally Marxist-

or
Leninist, the majority of the population, including government officials,

n
is Theravada Buddhist, which is seen as the unifying religion. Buddhism

tio
is increasingly common in official ceremonies, and the government

bu
sometimes encourages people to convert from animism to Buddhism.

tri
Christian converts from Buddhism or animism are often deemed to bring

is
shame to their community. Government permission is required for all con-

rd
versions, evangelism and church activities.

fo
In recent years, many previously closed churches have reopened; there

are reduced arrests of Christians and a public condemnation of forced
ot
renunciations of Christianity. However, forced renunciations still occur,

N
including arrests and forced evictions from villages. In 2017, six church
leaders were arrested for showing a film about Jesus as part of a Christmas
programme. They were part of the registered Lao Evangelical Church
(LEC), but when they failed to show village officers that they had LEC
permission for the event, they were arrested (they were released in early
2018).
North Korea is an extreme communist state with a ruler who is held to
be divine. Under constitutional changes in 1998, the position of president
was abolished, and Kim Il-sung, the founder and first president, who had
died in 1994, was named ‘Eternal President’. A 2013 decree stated that the
party and revolution must be carried ‘eternally’ by the ‘Baekdu bloodline’ –
that is, the Kim dynasty. The state energetically promotes this personality
cult, along with lessons denigrating religion, in weekly indoctrinations
at state study halls, replete with photographs of the Kims and shrines.
People caught worshipping another god, or carrying a Bible, can be sent to
a prison camp (along with their entire families).
The government has formed and controls the Korea Christian Federa-
.
ly
tion and the Korean Roman Catholic Association. No Catholic priests live
on
in the country, so the sacraments can be administered only by a visiting
foreign priest, which now occasionally occurs. There are no ties to the
se
Vatican and no following of the church magisterium.
lu
Tens of thousands of Christians are incarcerated in labour camps.
na
Thousands more keep their faith a secret, even from their families.
so
Defectors report that Christian prisoners are given the heaviest work, the
least food and the worst conditions. Those caught praying in prison are
er
beaten and tortured. Singing a hymn can be punished by death. Those
rp
who have foreign contacts are singled out for especially harsh persecution.
Fo
In 2018, Hea Woo, a Christian escapee from the camps, described
e.
them as a ‘living hell’. When people died, often their bodies were piled
l
up outside a crematorium too small to dispose of them, so she and other

sa
prisoners would have to chop them into smaller pieces. In one prison, she
re
lived with 50 other inmates in a cell that had ‘only a hole in the floor’ as
or
a toilet. Her husband died in prison, having reportedly been arrested for
n
being a Christian. She said she was once tortured for three days in a row,
tio
just for speaking about her faith.

bu
tri
Other Authoritarian States

is
Myanmar (Burma) and Cambodia can be as repressive as nominally

rd
communist states, but their repression is driven less by ideology than

fo
by a desire to maintain power and privilege. They have been heavily

militarised states with rulers determined to stamp out any opposition. As
ot
in the nominally communist states, the state is the prime persecutor.

N
Cambodia has an authoritarian government with widespread human

rights violations but with few specific restrictions on religion, including
on the small Christian community, many of whom are ethnic Vietnamese,
unless it is believed to be politically active. Buddhism is the state religion
and the state supports Buddhist education and other activities, benefits
denied to other religions. The constitution guarantees freedom of religion,
provided it does not interfere with other religions or violate public order,
and forbids discrimination based on religion. The law forbids religious
430 Paul Marshall
groups to openly criticise other groups and bans non-Buddhists from

door-to-door evangelism; non-Buddhist literature may be distributed only
inside religious institutions. The law also prohibits offers of money or
materials to induce people to convert.
All religious groups, including religious schools, must register with
the Ministry of Cults and Religions and provide information on leaders
and funding. The registration process can be laborious. There is no explicit
punishment for not registering, but unregistered groups cannot claim tax
exemption. New places of worship must be at least two kilometres from
.
ly
existing ones, although this does not apply to smaller ‘offices of prayer’.
on
Myanmar moves between religious nationalism and general authori-
tarianism, now perhaps tempered by an elected government. The military
se
regime repressed Buddhists, especially those who opposed it, but also used
lu
a policy of Amyo, Batha, Thatana (One Race, One Language, One Religion)
na
to privilege Buddhism. The 2008 constitution guarantees ‘freedom of
so
conscience and the right to freely profess and practice religion’ but also
enshrines ‘the special position of Buddhism’.
er
After decades of military rule, in 2015 democratic elections were held,
rp
and the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won an over-
Fo
whelming majority. However, NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi was barred
e.
from the presidency, though she continued to hold very significant power
l
in the party. The constitution gives the military 25% of parliamentary seats
sa
and control over the key ministries of Home Affairs, Border Affairs and
re
Defence.
or
Legal restrictions have included bans on house churches, evangelisa-

n
tion, and imported literature, while domestically produced literature is

tio
subject to censorship. Churches and Christian schools are allowed but

bu
face tight government surveillance and restrictions. The regime sometimes

tri
uses fines, denials of foreign aid and imprisonment to oppress Christians.

is
Religion is also intertwined with ethnicity. The majority is ethnic Burman,

rd
and Burmans tend to be regarded as necessarily Buddhists. In contrast,

fo
while there are Burman Christians, the Christian population is largely

from the Kachin, Chin, Karenni, Karen and other ethnic minorities, which
ot
have often fought for autonomy. Consequently, Christians in these areas

N
have suffered harassment, violence and forced labour for overlapping

religious, ethnic and political reasons.
Until recently, religious intolerance came from the military. Since 2012,
however, there has also been intolerance from society at large, much driven
by militant Buddhists. Their attacks have focused largely on Rohingya
Muslims, but some Buddhist monks have called Christianity a ‘guest
religion’ and Christians have found it harder to build churches. In July
2017, about 150 Buddhists attacked newly converted Christians in Sagaing
Province, destroying their homes and injuring seven people. In Chin and
Kachin states the army had a policy of forcing Christians to replace crosses
with Buddhist pagodas. In April 2018, it bombed predominantly Christian,
ethnic Kachin civilians, sending 2,000 fleeing from their homes, and then
restricted aid to them.
Muslim-majority Countries
The Muslim-majority countries in East and Southeast Asia include one
of the world’s smallest, Brunei, and the largest, Indonesia. Brunei is re-
.
ly
pressive, while Indonesia is comparatively free, though suffering from
on
increasing radicalism. Malaysia has become more repressive. A common
thread is increased radicalisation, taking different forms in each country.
se
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of oil-rich Brunei is an absolute monarch and
lu
also head of religion. He has adopted the platform of Melayu Islam Berja
na
(MIB), which claims that Brunei is Malay in culture, Islamic in religion and
so
a monarchy. All schools must propagate MIB. Non-Muslims may not use
the term ‘Allah’, and Christian symbols, even in Christian schools, have
er
been denounced as offensive to Muslims. The first stage of the Sultan’s
rp
introduction of Islamic law began in 2014 and requires all purported
Fo
Muslims, including converts to Christianity, to attend Muslim worship.
e.
The authorities restrict churches, including registered ones, and an official

l
fatwa bans construction or renovation of churches. Christian evangelism

sa
and importing Bibles are prohibited, as is celebrating Christmas. The state

re
plans to introduce capital punishment for conversion from Islam.

or
Malaysia has prided itself on developing a forward-looking ‘civilis

n
ational Islam’ (Islam Hadhar’i) but has become increasingly repressive

tio
toward non-Muslims. The constitution gives the right to profess, practise

bu
and propagate religion but makes Islam ‘the religion of the Federation’
tri
while ‘other religions may be practised in peace and harmony’. The con-
is
stitution provides that nobody can be taxed to support another’s religion

rd
but also that individual states may ‘assist in establishing or maintaining

fo
Islamic institutions’ and ‘providing instruction’ in Islam.

Ethnic Malays are given special economic preferences: property devel-
ot
opers must allocate at least 30% of new housing units to them, and at a
N
10% discount. There is similar discrimination in education and business.

Since ethnic Malays are defined as Muslim, the result is pervasive discrim-
ination in favour of Muslims. State governments often use their authority
over construction of non-Muslim places of worship and cemeteries to
impede Christian activity. Federal and state governments can restrict the
propagation of any religious belief among Muslims.
The large ‘Jerusalem Jubilee’ prayer gathering was banned in 2017 by
the home minister, who argued it would hurt Muslims’ feelings. Shortly
432 Paul Marshall
afterward, the chief executive officer of the Centre for Human Rights
Research and Advocacy argued that Evangelicalism should be banned
since it ‘threatens religious harmony’. Christians are banned from using
the word ‘Allah’ on the grounds that this might confuse Muslims. The
government and Christian leaders reached a compromise on this in 2011,
but in 2014 Selangor State religious authorities raided the Bible Society of
Malaysia and confiscated Malay-language Bibles.
Conversion from Islam is a major problem. Malaysia’s sharia courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over such conversions, and they refuse to
.
ly
recognise them. Those who attempt to convert can be detained for more
on
than three months in ‘Faith Purification Centres’. Dispute remains over
whether children converted to Islam by their parents but who never
se
practised it can leave the faith.
lu
There is ongoing state-backed proselytisation of indigenous Christians
na
in the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. Teachers in state
so
schools, and even kindergartens, have pressured Christian children to
convert. Since the 1980s, Muslim refugees and illegal immigrants from the
er
Philippines and Indonesia have altered Sabah’s religious composition so
rp
that the large Christian minority has been reduced to political irrelevance.
Fo
Restrictions on religious freedom in Malaysia have usually been legal
e.
rather than violent, but that might be changing. In 2016 and 2017, three
l
Christian workers disappeared. CCTV footage shows that one, Pastor

sa
Koh, was abducted in a very professional operation. The disappearances

re
appear to be faith-related; Pastor Koh had been suspected of evangelising

or
Muslims, and the two others were converts. The professional abduction
n
and the casual approach taken by the police prompt fears that the state
tio
was involved.
bu
Since the fall of the dictator Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has been on a
tri
broadly upward path politically and economically. However, the trajectory

is
of religious freedom has been more varied. In the period 2004–14, during
rd
the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the situation dete-

fo
riorated. The national government consistently refused to intervene when

local governments restricted religious freedom, and SBY also boosted
ot
the authority of the semi-official Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). In

N
2005, he spoke at the MUI’s national congress and promised to increase

its authority to define proper Islam. Shortly afterwards, the MUI issued
fatwas prohibiting inter-faith prayer, mixed marriages, inter-faith inherit-
ance and religious pluralism. Since 2014, under President Joko Widodo,
there have been positive changes in religious freedom, but, because of
growing radical movements, the situation on the ground has worsened.
The 1945 constitution outlines the broad state ideology of Pancasila,
whose first article is belief in one God, and combines this commitment
to monotheism with religious freedom. Religious organisations are

required to uphold the national ideology and are prohibited from criti-
cising it or committing blasphemous acts against or spreading hatred of
other religions. According to a 1979 decree from the Ministries of Religion
and of Home Affairs, evangelism is illegal, but conversions are legal and
accepted. Catholicism and Protestantism are among the six recognised
religions and their adherents have the right to establish churches, obtain
identity cards naming their religion and register marriages and births.
A 2006 Joint Ministerial Decree stipulates that building churches
.
ly
requires local community agreement, but can be in areas where another
on
religion is the majority. Permission to build a church requires produc-
tion of a list of 90 members of the congregation, signatures from 60 local
se
households of a different faith and positive recommendations from the
lu
local religious affairs office. These conditions have empowered Islamist
na
vigilante groups, who block construction or close churches in the name
so
of the local community. In 2016, Muslim hardliners closed the Santa Clara
Catholic Church in Bekasi only weeks after it had opened. In October
er
2015, a mob destroyed 11 Christian churches in the province of Aceh, and
rp
thousands of Christians fled temporarily into the neighbouring province
Fo
of North Sumatra.
e.
ISIS-inspired attacks on Christians are increasing. In November 2016,

l
a bomb at the Oikumene Church in Samarinda killed a two-year-old girl

sa
and injured three other children. In August 2016, a man attempted but
re
failed to detonate a bomb at a Catholic church in Medan. In May 2018,

or
three churches were bombed in Surabaya, Indonesia’s second-largest city,

n
by ISIS-linked terrorists. There were failed attempts on two other churches.

tio
Another major concern is Indonesia’s blasphemy law. Article 156(a) of

bu
the criminal code provides for a sentence of up to five years for those ‘who
tri
purposely express their views or commit an act that principally dissemin

is
ates hatred, misuses or defames a religion recognised in Indonesia . . . ’.

rd
This can be applied to any religion, but the most high-profile case was an
fo
accusation against Ahok, the Christian governor of the capital, Jakarta.

After massive politically charged demonstrations during an election, he
ot
was sentenced to two years in prison. In May 2018, Abraham Ben Moses
N
was sentenced to four years in prison for religious defamation for quoting
a Quranic verse about marriage and for trying to convert a taxi driver to
Christianity.
There are particular problems in Papua, which has a large Christian
population and is the least developed part of the country. Many Papuans
are worried that they are being swamped by Muslim immigrants from
other parts of Indonesia, who are getting the best jobs and giving Islam
increasing influence.
434 Paul Marshall
Largely Religiously Free Countries

Almost half of the countries in East and Southeast Asia are comparatively
religiously free. These include the two Christian-majority countries in
the region, Timor-Leste and the Philippines, and also include countries
largely shaped by Buddhist and other Eastern religions – Japan, Mongolia,
Singapore, South Korea and Thailand. Their governments do not exert
much control on Christians or others, although there are problems with
terrorist attacks in the Philippines.
Timor-Leste has a large Christian (overwhelmingly Catholic) majority.
.
ly
While it has no official state religion, the constitution commends the
on
Catholic Church for its role in the country’s liberation, and a concordat with
the Holy See provides tax benefits and safeguards the church’s cultural
se
heritage. Non-Catholics, who are usually Protestant, have sometimes
lu
objected to the state’s support for Catholicism, though they may apply
na
for government funds designated for civil society organisations. There are
so
also ad hoc incidents of individual public servants refusing Protestants
er
service, and the civil code regulates the legal procedure only for Catholic
rp
marriages. Some government officials have refused to accept the validity
of Protestant marriage and birth certificates for registering for schools and
Fo
other services. The government has said that it will address these issues.
e.
The constitution of the Philippines provides for religious freedom and

l
prohibits the establishment of a state religion. The law requires religious

sa
groups to register if they wish to receive tax-exempt status. The Catholic

re
Church has criticised the large number of extrajudicial killings associated

or
with President Duterte’s war on drugs. In turn, the president has labelled
n
some church leaders ‘corrupt’ and ‘womanisers’ and warned against the
tio
influence of religion.
bu
The principal problem facing Christians comes not from the govern-
tri
ment but from extremist Muslim terrorists operating in the south. In

is
2017, the Maute Group and related factions seized the southern city of
rd
Marawi. These ISIS affiliates bombed hospitals and schools. The groups
fo
went house to house searching for Christians and killing them and also
burned churches and took hostages, including a priest and staff members
ot
of a Catholic church. Militants killed nine Christians at a checkpoint and

N
killed at least one Christian man when he failed to recite the Shahada, a
Muslim proclamation of faith. They also targeted Christians who refused
to convert to Islam. The specific targeting of priests led some priests to
arm themselves, something that Catholic church leaders have rejected.
In Japan, the USA-imposed 1946 constitution vested legislative authority
in parliament, ended the emperor’s divine status and brought religious
freedom. Religious bodies do not have to be licensed, although doing so
can bring tax benefits. Christians and others have freedom to worship
and propagate their faith and freedom to train and appoint clergy. They
also have rights of self-government, of religious education, to carry out
charitable activities, to own and acquire property and to maintain social
institutions. They can produce, import and distribute literature, receive
donations and have contact with co-religionists overseas. Individuals can
adopt and change religion freely.
The Mongolian constitution provides for ‘freedom of conscience and
religion’ and prohibits religion-based discrimination, although it gives
Buddhism a privileged position. Religious institutions must register with
.
ly
the authorities, and there are low-level restrictions on religious freedom,
on
although these appear to be bureaucratic holdovers from the communist
years rather than deliberate policy. Some Christian groups have not tried
se
to register because they cannot meet the legal requirements, due to insuf-
lu
ficient size or lack of dedicated worship sites. The government requires
na
different congregations of the same church to have separate registrations,
so
which creates problems for churches with centralised administration.
Unregistered religious groups can often still function, though government
er
officials press them to register. Evangelism is allowed unless it involves
rp
pressure, deception or spreading ‘cruel’ religious ideology. The govern-
Fo
ment can restrict unaccompanied minors from participating in religious
e.
services, sometime requiring their parents’ written permission. Obtaining

l
visas for foreign religious workers can be difficult, and there is sometimes
sa
negative coverage of Christians in the media.

re
Singapore’s constitution and laws provide for religious freedom,

or
subject to restrictions relating to public order, health and morality, and

n
also prohibit religious discrimination by the government. Religious in-

tio
struction is allowed in the country’s government-subsidised religiously

bu
affiliated schools if it does not include evangelism. The government

tri
stresses the need for ‘religious harmony’ and the Ministry of Home Affairs
is
restrains any religious action that it believes might disturb that harmony.
rd
It is illegal to wound ‘the religious or racial feelings of any person’ or

fo
knowingly promote ‘disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill will

between different religious or racial groups’. In 2017, the government
ot
refused entry to two foreign Christian preachers whom it said had pre-
N
viously made ‘denigrating and inflammatory comments’ about Muslims

and Buddhists. The National Council of Churches advised its churches
to exercise ‘careful discernment’ before inviting preachers, in order to
preserve the ‘harmonious religious environment’ that currently exists.
There is no legal provision for conscientious objection to military service,
which creates problems for Christians committed to non-violence.
South Korea’s constitution guarantees freedom of religion and forbids
religion-based discrimination. The Religious Affairs Bureau of the Ministry
436 Paul Marshall
of Culture, Sports and Tourism manages relations with the larger religious
groups and seeks to promote religious freedom and mutual understand-
ing. Religious groups do not have to register, but there are tax benefits if
they do. As of 2018, a revision to the Income Tax Act discontinued some
benefits for Christian clergy and other religious workers. The country does
not allow for conscientious objection to military service, which creates
problems for Christians committed to non-violence, although the burden
has fallen almost exclusively on Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Thailand’s 2017 constitution provides for religious freedom and forbids
.
ly
religious discrimination. However, it also requires that the monarch be a
on
Buddhist and that the government ‘patronise and protect Buddhism and
other religions’, and it prevents ‘the desecration of Buddhism in any form’.
se
Christianity is one of five legally recognised religions and so may register
lu
to receive state benefits regarding taxes, visas or subsidies. Registration
na
is not mandatory and non-registered groups operate freely. The govern-
so
ment sets a limit on the number of foreign missionaries. In 2017, this was
1,357 Christian, six Muslim, 20 Hindu and 41 Sikh. However, many un
er
registered missionaries work freely. In an unusual quirk, Christian clergy
rp
are prohibited from voting if they are wearing religious dress.
Fo
e.
The Future
l
While it is always difficult to give intelligent predictions concerning

sa
religious freedom, in a region this diverse it is doubly so. China is likely to

re
become more repressive in coming years, while Laos and Vietnam show
or
some signs of opening up. The North Korean government has talked of
n
emphasising the economy rather than security, and this might presage
tio
some relaxation of control. The political coalition that had governed

bu
Malaysia since independence lost a national election in 2018 to a broadly

tri
based opposition, and this might halt its increased control of Christians.
is
In Indonesia much depends on whether its moderate forces can resist

rd
radicalisation, and the 2019 presidential election will be a bellwether for

fo
this. Brunei is likely to stay repressive as long as the sultan, currently in his
seventies, lives. There are no clear trends in Cambodia and Myanmar, and
ot
the currently largely religiously free countries are likely to stay that way
N
in the near future. Despite high levels of repression in several countries,

Christians have shown great resilience and the church is growing. This is
also likely to continue in the future.
Bibliography
Fattore, Elisa, Alleged Violations of the Human Right to Religious Freedom in Vietnam: A Case
Study on the Montagnards’ Minority Group (Saarbrücken: Editions Accademiche Italiane,
2017).
Johnson, Ian, The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao (New York: Pantheon,
2017).
Marshall, Paul (ed.), Religious Freedom in the World (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,
2008).
Marshall, Paul, Nina Shea and Lela Gilbert, Persecuted: The Global Assault on Christians
(Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2013).
Shah, Dian A. H., Constitutions, Religion and Politics in Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
.
ly
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Inter-religious Relations
Sivin Kit
Southeast Asia, with 11 countries stretching from the Indochina mainland
.
ly
to the Malay Archipelago, is located at the crossroads of Indian and
on
Chinese civilisations, where Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism and
Taoism have long histories. The later growth of Islam in the twelfth century
se
and the intensified presence of Christianity with the missionary movement
lu
and foreign colonial powers in the 1500s further complicate how these
na
religious communities historically interacted with each other and the local
so
indigenous population. Some might describe inter-religious relations in
er
this context as a melting pot of conflicting and complementing beliefs,
rp
values and practices; however, the reality might be closer to a mosaic of
religions in constant contestation and adaptation to not only local cultures
Fo
but also the impact of modernity. The influence of migration, trade and
e.
the flow of ideas cannot be underestimated, even without attributing too

l
much to political and colonial factors. In the twenty-first century, while

sa
inter-religious relations in Southeast Asia continue to be affected by the

re
legacy of historic cultural conditions and the impact of colonialism in the

or
past, forces of globalisation and ongoing local internal dynamics both

n
constrain and contribute to harmonious inter-religious relations in the

tio
respective countries.
bu
The East Asian countries include the historically influential China and
tri
South Korea, of rising prominence and where much attention has been
is
on the growth of Christianity. In Taiwan it appears that the development

rd
of contemporary forms of Buddhism is increasingly influential. Japan

fo
remains unique, with its fusion of developments since the Second World
War and traditional Shintoism. Hong Kong offers another exceptional
ot
N
case of the impact of colonialism and trade on religious developments. In

North Korea and Mongolia interaction with outsiders is more restricted,
and thus information much more limited.
Any comprehensive account of inter-religious relations must include
consideration of cultural coexistence, social cohesion, inter-faith dialogue,
religious belonging, inter-religious engagement, mission and evangelism,
and the role of religion in society. This essay will first offer an overview of
the religious landscape, framed mainly by majority–minority dynamics.
Secondly, it will present a range of key concerns that condition and to
some extent constrain inter-religious relations at all levels, both structur-

ally and culturally. Thirdly, it will highlight contributions that have sought
to address these concerns. Finally, it will offer some closing reflections and
remarks.
Overview of the Religious Landscape

With the exception of Singapore, which has more equal representation
of different religions, the countries in Southeast Asia have a significant
Buddhist, Christian or Muslim majority. In these contexts, it is often the
.
ly
religious minorities who articulate challenges that hinder inter-religious
on
relations among the citizenry. However, it is also important to note that
religious identities are closely associated with ethnicity. Therefore, media
se
reports of events as inter-religious conflicts often mask underlying ethnic
lu
tensions.
na
The Buddhist-majority countries of mainland Southeast Asia show the
so
dominant influence of Theravada Buddhism over religious minorities,
who are mostly Christians or Muslims. Religious and ethnic identities are
er
frequently closely intertwined. Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority
rp
country in the world but allows relative freedom to the Christian minority.
Fo
The great majority of Muslims are Sunni, with Shia and Ahmadi minori-
e.
ties. Often, intra-religious relations are brought to the surface when the
l
plight of these non-Sunni Muslim minorities is highlighted. Therefore,

sa
besides the ethnic–religious combination and the legal and cultural dimen
re
sions, internal dynamics within the majority religious communities also

or
affect inter-religious relations. In particular, the Shia and Ahmadi minori-

n
ties might face more social hostility and government restrictions than the
tio
Christian minorities.
bu
Both Brunei and Malaysia have an added legal and cultural dimension
tri
to the ethno-religious identity of Muslims. An important feature of

is
Malaysian Islam is that ethnic Malays are Muslims by birth, which is the
rd
only ethno-religious identity stated in the Malaysian federal constitution;

fo
non-Muslim minorities do not have an ethno-religious identification in the

constitution, even though the majority of Buddhists are ethnically Chinese
ot
and Hindus are majority Indian. Christians comprise a mixture of all the
N
ethnic groups, particularly in Sabah and Sarawak, where most Christians

are from the indigenous tribal communities, which also have a special
position in socio-economic affirmative action policies in the nation. In
Brunei, a small nation with a total population of 445,000, Malay Bruneians
are presumed to be Muslims, while the Chinese populations include both
Buddhists and Christians. The indigenous tribes of the Dusun, Bisaya and
Murut consist of a mixture of mostly Muslims, with the rest Christians and
other religious groups. Additionally, Brunei expounds an official national
440 Sivin Kit
philosophy described as Melayu Islam Beraja (Malay Islamic Monarchy).

Brunei is self-defined with strong Malay cultural and Islamic religious
influences that are the overarching norm for not only law but also policies
and regular social relations.
The only two Christian-majority countries, the Philippines and Timor-
Leste, are predominantly Roman Catholic. In both cases, the non-Catholic
religious minorities are smaller in percentage terms than their Christian
counterparts in Buddhist- and Muslim-majority countries. The Philip-
pines is the larger Christian-majority country in Southeast Asia. There is
.
ly
a significant minority of Muslims – who are mainly from various minority
on
ethnic groups – residing mostly in the southern islands, particularly in
Mindanao. The main issue of conflict for the Philippines has been the
se
government’s attempt to address the grievances and aspirations of these
lu
Muslims in Mindanao, especially in negotiations with groups such as
na
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Timor-Leste has the lowest religious
so
diversity in the region, with an overwhelming majority of the population
Roman Catholic.
er
In contrast to all the above, Singapore can be considered the most
rp
religiously diverse country in the world. Even in a small country like
Fo
Singapore, however, the religious and ethnic combination is evident.
e.
Singapore appears to be the model of inter-religious harmony compared

l
with the rest of Southeast Asia, but this picture of peaceful coexistence of
sa
religious communities may mask latent frustrations of religious minorities.

re
For East Asian countries, any assessment of religious membership is

or
fraught with difficulties. In Japan, the reported membership of religious

n
groups is larger than the total population, suggesting that respondents

tio
self-identify with multiple religions, such as being both Buddhists and

bu
participants in religious practices of Shintoism. In China and North Korea,

tri
it is notoriously difficult to estimate the numbers adhering to different

is
religions accurately. However, the majority–minority dynamic is evident

rd
in East Asia also, with South Korea offering an exceptional case of a

fo
balance between Buddhists, Christians and non-religious.

In sum, while the majority–minority dynamics might be a starting
ot
point for understanding inter-religious relations, one cannot neglect the

N
cultural and ethnic roots of each religious community, especially in cases

of social conflict. This is evident explicitly in countries with clear religious
majorities but is present even in religiously diverse contexts such as
Singapore. Attention to what is often labelled ‘religious conflict’ does not
necessarily bring the ethnic dimension explicitly to the surface, yet, as this
brief overview has shown, the religious identities of religious majorities
and minorities are fundamental conditions that cannot be ignored. For
instance, it is evident that while China, Japan, North and South Korea,
Hong Kong and Taiwan have deep Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist roots,
the dynamics that have arisen from religious diversity, multiple belonging
and non-religion feature prominently as well. Therefore, any understand-
ing of inter-religious relations in each country and in both regions more
broadly resists simplistic generalisations.
Challenges and Constraints

Since 2000, hostile relations between religious communities have not
been widespread, at least not compared with the situtation in parts of the
.
ly
Middle East, Africa and South Asia. However, neither have tensions and
on
conflicts been totally absent from Southeast Asia and, to some extent, East
Asia, particularly China. Arguably, deeper latent legal, political and socio-
se
cultural conditions shape – and are shaped by – the majority–minority
lu
ethno-religious dynamics. Furthermore, how religious communities
na
respond to the influence of modernisation in East Asian countries needs
so
to be considered. Historic and modern conditions that are structural and
institutional often intersect with cultural symbolic aspects of religion. The
er
following four themes are especially important in the discussion of inter-
religious relations. rp
Fo
First, most of the Southeast Asian countries have heightened govern
e.
mental restrictions on religious communities. In some cases, these

l
tightened regulations not only affect individual religious freedom but also
sa
discourage the cultivation of hospitable organic inter-religious encounters.

re
Despite constitutional differences between highly restrictive countries

or
such as Malaysia and Myanmar and relatively free countries such as the
n
Philippines and Singapore, religious minorities generally have some

tio
space to profess and practise their religions. Many restrictions are related
bu
to concerns about religious conversions and to security issues involving

tri
public order, safety and morality.

is
Although Malaysia has relative freedom of religion – which means that

rd
while Islam is named as the ‘religion of the federation’, other religions may
fo
be practised ‘in peace and harmony’ – government restrictions continue

to constrain the religious practices of non-Muslim minorities. Besides the
ot
power ‘to control and restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or
N
belief among persons professing the religion of Islam’, federal and state
laws have provisions that tightly regulate Islamic religious affairs even for
the Muslim majority. Muslims who seek to convert to another religion must
first apply to a sharia court for approval to declare themselves ‘apostates’.
In some states, enforced ‘rehabilitation’ and penalties are imposed on
apostates; in other states, conversion out of Islam is a criminal offence
for which apostates may face a fine or even a jail term. Therefore, while
inter-religious dialogue in the public sphere often addresses questions of
442 Sivin Kit
coexistence and the common good of fellow citizens in Malaysia, conver-

sion is a lingering theme that affects inter-religious relations, especially
when questions of mission and evangelism are raised. This has been a
thorny issue for Christian–Muslim relations in recent years because of al-
legations by Muslim groups about unethical proselytisation by Christians;
Christian groups have also raised concerns over unethical missionising
among indigenous tribes who were originally Christians.
In East Asia, China is well known for the severity of its restrictions and
regulations on religious communities, by both the central government
.
ly
and local governments, compared with the rest of the region (with the
on
exception of North Korea). Admittedly, religious freedom has not been
totally absent in China, but religious revivalism – especially Christian
se
groups who spread messages with a strong apocalyptic tone – can be
lu
deemed ‘sensitive’, and public proselytising is forbidden. Keeping one’s
na
religious beliefs private is the preferred option advocated by the state, for
so
national and local ‘stability’. There continue to be reports of state authori-
ties asserting more control in confrontation with not only segments of the
er
Christian minorities but also new religious movements such as Falun
rp
Gong, as well as restrictive policies for the religious practices of Uyghur
Fo
Muslims and the religious expressions of Tibetan Buddhists. Thus, any
e.
optimism for greater religious freedom is tempered by more reports of

l
harassments, detentions and other violations of human rights.

sa
Second, religious nationalism in various degrees of intensity has become

re
a growing concern. For example, Indonesia is often showcased as a model

or
of unity in diversity among religious communities in a Muslim-majority

n
context. Six religions have an official status in the country: Islam, Catholi-
tio
cism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. Its national

bu
philosophy, Pancasila, which is required to be upheld, encompasses

tri
belief in one God, justice, unity, democracy and social justice. However,
is
the inclusive nature of Indonesia is nonetheless struggling to balance

rd
contradictory tendencies. For example, Bali island is often highlighted

fo
as a historic site where Hindu influences remain strong culturally; but at

the same time, Aceh is an example of increased implementation of sharia
ot
regulations. These two cases within a country show how inter-religious

N
relations are further complicated by provincial developments in which

historic and demographic factors impact the conditions affecting mutual
interaction among people of different faiths. In the case of Aceh, unlike
Bali, the direction of policy decisions has been unfavourable towards
non-Muslim minorities. Even in the cosmopolitan capital, Jakarta, the
high-profile case of Governor Basuki ‘Ahok’ Tjahaja Purnama’s political
defeat in 2017 under tremendous pressure from Muslim groups has raised
concern over the mobilisation of conservative Muslim groups as well as
the role of the media in generating what some have termed ‘hate spin’.
In the midst of changing political dynamics, there is an ongoing tension
between a national philosophy that promotes tolerance and local practices
that hinder hospitable relations.
In Japan, neither freedom of religion nor the secular constitution is
in question. Yet in practice, perhaps to the surprise of outside observers,
government leaders appear to succumb to pressure to participate in prayer
for the spirits of the war dead and other related religious rituals at Shinto
shrines. While Japanese citizens might identify with other religions, such
.
ly
as Buddhism, Shintoism is deeply rooted in Japanese culture, and its public
on
visibility in the political sphere has caused concern for religious minori-
ties. In China, recent studies have suggested that in contrast to its hostile
se
response to Falun Gong, the Communist Party has favoured the develop-
lu
ment of Buddhism through institutions such as the Buddhist Association
na
of China. In particular, both political and religious actors converge in their
so
shared interest, on the one hand, to implement government policies, and,
on the other, to define the contours of Buddhist beliefs, practices and or-
er
ganisation. Neither of these East Asian neighbours displays a full-blown
rp
religious nationalism, but religious favouritism, especially by state actors,
Fo
hinders the cultivation of healthier inter-religious relations. Taiwan seems
e.
able to resist this trend with a version of ‘twin toleration’, in which the
l
state refrains from interfering with religious affairs and vice versa. While
sa
the Taiwanese experience is not without its own controversies due to the
re
fraudulent activity and political involvement of some religious leaders,

or
the contribution of religious institutions to a vibrant civil society has been

n
largely positive.
tio
Third, the role of religion in the public sphere sheds light on the sig-
bu
nificant place of religion in the socio-cultural imagination of the majority

tri
of Southeast Asian countries. Religion continues to be a deeply rooted

is
force, both explicitly in public discourse and implicitly in daily life. In

rd
Thailand, explicit political support for the majority religion is visible when
fo
the government is mandated to promote Theravada Buddhism through

education, propagate its principles in the public sphere, and establish
ot
structural measures and mechanisms ‘to prevent the desecration of

N
Buddhism in any form’. Although there is no official state religion, there is

a requirement for the king to be a Buddhist, who nonetheless also serves
as the ‘upholder of religions’ – which includes five officially recognised
religious communities: Buddhists, Muslims, Brahmin Hindus, Sikhs and
Christians. All students at both the primary and the secondary level are
required by law to undergo religious education that includes information
about the five recognised religious groups in Thailand. Both the Christian
and the Muslim communities have advised on the development of the
444 Sivin Kit
national curriculum. The Christian community also offers private educa-

tional options up to the university level.
In contrast, Singapore appears to minimise the place of religion in the
public sphere, or at least seeks to limit its influence to the socio-cultural
arena. Interestingly, in 1991 the notion of ‘Singapore’s Shared Values’
reframed social cohesion under the notion of a primary loyalty to the
nation over religious identity. Religious communities are free to express
themselves within this national framework, but when religious beliefs
challenge Singaporean norms, offenders face severe consequences. For
.
ly
example, both the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Unification Church
on
are banned by the government. The Jehovah’s Witnesses object to the
mandatory national service in Singapore and refuse to recite the national
se
pledge and to sing the national anthem. The Unification Church was
lu
banned because it was considered a ‘cult’. In both Thailand and Singapore,
na
the shaping of socio-cultural imagination with more or less emphasis on
so
religion is a top-down, government-dominated initiative.
At the grassroots level, the scenes arising from the Umbrella Movement
er
in Hong Kong during 2014 suggest the emergence of a liberating imagina
rp
tion for religious participation in the public sphere – one of resistance rather
Fo
than subservience. Protesters drew on religious sources and symbolism
e.
from both Christianity and Chinese religions as points of reference in their

l
public demonstration of civil disobedience against the mainland Chinese

sa
government’s antidemocratic decisions. In a rare moment of inter-

re
religious solidarity, an image of Jesus and an open Bible were exhibited

or
close enough to a bamboo and metal barricade shrine dedicated to the

n
ancient Chinese general Guan Gong to signify how religious inspiration

tio
converged with the democratic aspirations of the protestors. Dialogues and

bu
debates around the role of religion in this significant citizens’ movement,

tri
and the government’s reaction to it, will continue to shape the future of
is
inter-religious engagement and cooperation.

rd
Fourth, the celebration of religious diversity and acknowledgement of

fo
religious vitality are complemented by growing concern about religious

fundamentalism. In some cases, violent extremism has reached an
ot
alarming level. This concern has gained more public attention in Southeast
N
Asia than in East Asia. In Indonesia, the religious tensions in Maluku

between Christians and Muslims have received international attention
both for the violence reported and for the significant peace-building
initiatives. The rise of religious extremism in a Buddhist-majority context
in Myanmar has surprised those who do not normally associate intoler-
ance, even violence, with Buddhism. Debates around the ‘propagation of
conflict’ by the Buddhist Committee for Protection of Race and Religion, a
group denounced by the government, shed light on the struggle towards
more peaceful approaches to inter-religious relations. Additionally, the

use of anti-Muslim campaign slogans marred the 2015 elections in this
emerging democratic country.
Since 2004, there has been violence between Buddhists and Malay
Muslims in the deep south of Thailand. There have also been reports of
authorities detaining asylum seekers and undocumented workers, mostly
Pakistani Christian refugees overstaying their visas. A serious issue in the
Philippines is the government’s attempt to address the grievances and
aspirations of Muslims in Mindanao. Inter-religious harmony is often
.
ly
hindered in a climate of conflict generated by violent extremism and then
on
counter-terrorist operations where the dividing line between ethnicity and
religious identity is blurred. Nonetheless, important inter-religious initia-
se
tives such as the Philippines Council of Evangelical Churches in dialogue
lu
with the leaders of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front complement official
na
initiatives, such as the Presidential Task Force on Inter-religious and Inter-
so
cultural Concerns.
The cases of Indonesia, Myanmar, South Thailand and the Philippines
er
have brought to the surface complex ways in which normative religion is
rp
in tension or contradiction with lived religion on the ground – especially
Fo
when socio-political and economic factors are taken into account, such as
e.
in the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and the long-extended conflict in the

l
far south of Thailand with the Malay Muslims. The militancy of either
sa
a majority or a minority community generates a hostile environment,

re
making healthy inter-faith relations virtually impossible. Yet even in the

or
midst of seeming impasse, there appears to be some progress. Minority

n
Christian groups such as the Philippines Council of Evangelical Churches

tio
are reaping some preliminary positive results. The experience of Maluku,

bu
Indonesia, also offers lessons in peace-building and reconciliation among

tri
Christians and Muslims.

is
rd
Significant Contributions and Responses

fo
The assemblage of structural and cultural aspects of religious communi-

ties at times suggests a pessimistic outlook for inter-religious relations,
ot
particularly for religious minorities in Southeast Asia. However, contri-

N
butions that restrain inter-religious conflicts from escalating into violent

extremism or, more positively, efforts to re-imagine inter-religious
solidarity, are important interventions for both the short-term and the
longer-term well-being of religious communities. Although concerns
similar to those in Southeast Asia also exist in East Asia, there are also
distinctive features, due to cultural and linguistic homogeneity combined
with historical trajectories entangled with the reality of the impact of
modernity, that resist any reductionist understanding. A number of
446 Sivin Kit
noteworthy areas that are significant for inter-religious relations in both

regions can be identified.
First, religious leaders have initiated or participated in various institu-
tional bodies in order to engage governing authorities. For instance, the
Myanmar Inter-religious Council has risen in prominence as the nation
struggles in its democratic maturity and governance. In the wake of
tensions from the Rohingya crisis, there have been important initiatives to
monitor and counter hate speech. One representative from the Inter-faith
Dialogue Group, Catholic Cardinal Charles Maung Bo, raised awareness
.
ly
within the Burmese press and the international community of the need to
on
address actions that incite hatred and hostility towards religious m inorities,
as well as the importance of celebrating religious diversity. In Malaysia,
se
Christians organise themselves around the Christian Federation of
lu
Malaysia, the Association of Churches in Sarawak and the Sabah Christian
na
Council, from which they speak on issues related to Christian interests and
so
religious freedom. Christian leaders also played a key role in the founding
and ongoing work of the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism,
er
Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism. All these religious bodies and
rp
leaders have voiced increasing concern over matters of religious practice,
Fo
freedom, coexistence and conversion. Interestingly, these initiatives often
e.
have been led by representatives of religious minorities.

l
In Taiwan, the Taiwan Inter-faith Foundation, created by Buddhist,

sa
Taoist and Yiguandao associations, works in parallel with the Association

re
for Inter-Faith Dialogue, which also includes Christian churches and other
or
new religious communities. The two have worked together with govern-
n
ment authorities to address matters of law on religion. In South Korea, the

tio
Korean Council of Religions of Peace has worked with Buddhist groups

bu
and the Catholic Church not only in inter-faith dialogue programmes but
tri
also in issue-centred campaigns.

is
In cases of controversy and conflict, religious leaders are often the

rd
first to advocate calm and peaceful responses. In some cases, however,

fo
these religious leaders have also chastised the ruling powers for
politicising religion through public statements. Thus, religious institu-
ot
tions and religious leaders, especially for minorities, have to navigate

N
through difficult terrain, depending on the particular context. Some

who prefer religion to be private have also criticised religious leaders
from both religious-majority and religious-minority communities for
getting involved in politics. In times of peace and calm, religious leaders
strengthen social cohesion through bridge-building initiatives for mutual
understanding. Although one might argue that the role of religious leaders
within these bodies is necessarily elitist and focused on religious leader-
ship and government authorities, nonetheless their public voice provides
unifying material for collective action from religious communities and

civil society actors.
Second, Christian theologians in Southeast Asia and East Asia have
pioneered significant theological resources – frameworks, approaches and
contextual theologies – that address issues and concerns relevant to inter-
religious relations. In the practice of inter-faith dialogue, practitioners from
the Protestant traditions and religious traditions from other faiths drew
inspiration from the comprehensive approach proposed by the Federation
of Asian Bishops: dialogue of life, dialogue of action, dialogue with the
.
ly
poor and marginalised, dialogue of religious experience and dialogue of
on
theological exchange. These basic distinctions allow for participation at all
levels, from the leadership to the congregation. The Association of Theo-
se
logical Education of Southeast Asia has championed the transformation
lu
of the Critical Asian Principle into Guidelines for Doing Theology in Asia.
na
This continues to be important in the development of contextual theologies
so
that are relevant to the social, economic, political and religious realities of
Christians in the region. The Centre for the Study of Asian Christianity at
er
Trinity Theological College in Singapore has drawn attention to the value
rp
of the popular religiosity of Southeast Asian Christianity for theological
Fo
reflection and historical work. However, these important contributions
e.
have not necessarily trickled down to the weekly sermons in the pulpit.
l
There remains a gap between the rigorous and often constructive theologi-
sa
cal production and day-to-day Christian experience at the grassroots level.

re
Nonetheless, contextual theologians have consistently given attention

or
to dialogical approaches to contextual theologising. For example, the early

n
works of Asian theologians such as Kosuke Koyama advocated for – and

tio
modelled – doing theology with an inter-religious sensibility, inspired by

bu
his missionary experience in Thailand and his work in Japan. The con-
tri
tributions of C. S. Song encouraged theological reconstruction informed

is
by Asian cultures and socio-political realities, particularly in Taiwan.

rd
Subsequent Southeast Asian theologians have followed up with the notion

fo
of ‘neighbourology’. This seeks to move beyond Christian–Buddhist

relations in Thailand to encompass Christian–Muslim relations, as in the
ot
work of Albert Walters in Malaysia. Recent work by Joas Adiprasetya is

N
informed by Trinitarian theology, aiming to relate the notion of mutuality

and perichoresis to questions of religious belonging and identity in the
context of the multi-religious lived experience in Indonesia.
The works of Catholic Filipino Daniel Pilario push Christian thought
towards more a more grounded approach to contextual theologising and
inter-faith dialogue. Similarly, Pentecostal Simon Chan, speaking from a
Singaporean context, proposes a grassroots theology that interacts with
Confucianist concepts and values, such as the family and other social
448 Sivin Kit
relations. Malaysians such as Methodist Hwa Yung have raised concerns

over the lack of attention to power encounters and the spiritual dimension,
which are relevant not only to Charismatics and Pentecostals in Asia but
also to their neighbours from other faiths (especially in the context of
folk religious practices). While more work remains to be done to sustain
inter-religious and inter-cultural openness, Christian theologians across a
variety of confessions have advocated or produced contextual theological
contributions shaped by inter-religious concerns. As emerging contextual
theologies mature, they will continue to wrestle with the challenge of
.
ly
forging a confident Christian identity that will engage the religious other,
on
whether Christians are in the majority or the minority.
Third, the participation of religious people through educational initia
se
tives suggests more inclusive interactions for emerging leaders and at
lu
the grassroots level of religious communities. This is particularly true for
na
youth and university students. For example, since 2000, mutual exchange
so
programmes at the undergraduate and graduate levels have been inten-
sified and more intentional. The National University of Singapore has
er
brought students to the region for inter-faith exposure programmes, thus
rp
grounding the reflection of inter-religious round-table dialogues in lived
Fo
realities. The University of Malaya and the Malaysia Theological Seminary
e.
have had mutual visits for students from the Islamic department and
l
the theological departments, in which religious leaders and religious

sa
officers in training exchange ideas, values and personal narratives. The

re
Inter-religious Studies Programme of the Consortium of Inter-religious

or
Studies based in Indonesia is a formalised academic programme with

n
inter-religious relations at the centre of its research and academic produc-

tio
tion. The Kyoto Graduate Union of Religious Studies, founded in 2005

bu
by one Christian university and six Buddhist universities in Japan, offers

tri
opportunities for academic exchange between students as well as scholars

is
from different strands of Buddhism and other religions. While academic

rd
freedom varies from country to country, these programmes and events

fo
suggest that educational institutions are intentionally and strategically

incorporating an inter-religious dimension into their educational efforts.
ot
Besides these local, national and regional collaborations, comple

N
mentary training programmes such as the World Council of Churches’

Youth in Asia Training for Religious Amity support local initiatives
to develop leadership in the area of religious peace-building. The
Tao Fong Shan Centre in Hong Kong is renowned for its early work in
Buddhist–Christian dialogue, inculturation in Chinese culture and
Christian spirituality. The Centre continues to be an important collabor
ator regionally and internationally through conferences, workshops and
relevant capacity-building programmes. Additionally, with the support
of the Lutheran World Federation, efforts are being made in Indonesia

to empower youth through social media, thereby bringing inter-religious
concerns to the emerging digital culture. These and other innovative
approaches offer more promising ways to invite the participation of the
younger generation of Christians as well as other like-minded youth who
are keenly aware of the threat posed by inter-religious hostility.
Inter-religious cooperation via educational institutions and the training
arms of religious bodies provides an important opportunity for dialogue,
understanding and learning without the legal and political pressure that
.
ly
often plagues controversial engagements. This is an important safe space
on
in which students and faculty have relative freedom to experiment with
new approaches in a friendlier environment. However, it must be noted
se
that there have been occasions when programmes that were perceived
lu
to be apologetic in nature or, worse, polemical against other religions
na
(usually minority groups) have been condemned in the public sphere.
so
Crossroads for Religious Communities
er
The narrative of inter-religious relations in Southeast Asia and East Asia
rp
is characterised not only by diversity but also by complexity, and includes
Fo
ambiguity, fluidity, tension and even, at times, inter-religious hostility.
e.
Religious communities are confronted with the reality that they will be
l
coexisting with each other, at times with harmonious friendly neighbourli-

sa
ness and, yet, at other times with controversies and conflicts. In the light of
re
both discouraging and encouraging developments around inter-religious

or
relations, religious communities might find themselves at a crossroads

n
where they must decide how they will respond to the various conditions
tio
and constraints in a given context.

bu
The tendency for religious minorities is to seclude themselves in a

tri
ghetto-like mode of existence or to descend into a disempowered victim

is
mentality. Where there is limited religious freedom – at least to profess

rd
and practise (if not propagate) their faith – Christians are challenged to
fo
find ways to re-imagine fresh expressions of faith that are nonetheless still
faithful to their core Christian identity. This challenge to reflect on one’s
ot
religious identity and practice is also experienced by Muslim, Buddhist

N
and Hindu minorities and, even more so, by those with no religious affilia-
tion or practitioners of indigenous religions. However, when both majority
and minority religious communities, from the grassroots to the leader-
ship, are able to move beyond an inward self-preservation and defensive
mode and intentionally draw on the best of their religious resources,
collaborating with people of other faiths or life stances for inter-religious
(and inter-cultural) solidarity and engagement, then we might envision a
brighter future for all the people of Asia.
450 Sivin Kit
Bibliography
Anderson, Emily (ed.), Belief and Practice in Imperial Japan and Colonial Korea (Singapore:
Springer, 2016).
Bouma, Gary, Rodney Ling and Douglas Pratt (eds), Religious Diversity in Southeast Asia and
the Pacific: National Case Studies (London: Springer, 2009).
Clart, Philip, and Charles B. Jones (eds), Religion in Modern Taiwan: Tradition and Innovation
in a Changing Society (Hawai’i: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003).
Liow, Joseph Chinyong, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge
Welter, Albert, and Jeffrey Newmark (eds), Religion, Culture, and the Public Sphere in China
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and Japan (Singapore: Springer, 2017).
ly
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Migration
Maruja M. B. Asis
After more than four decades, international migration has become an
.
ly
enduring feature of the social landscape in East and Southeast Asia.
on
Migrants move for work, marriage or study. The region also has its share
of migrants who have been forcibly displaced due to war, conflict or en-
se
vironmental change. Because it involves the largest numbers and raises
lu
many policy challenges, the temporary labour migration of workers
na
in less-skilled occupations has dominated discussion of international
so
migration in Asia.
er
Asia is home to 79.6 million international migrants, or about 30% of
rp
the total international migrant population of 257 million. Most inter
national migration in Asia takes place within the vast continent. The
Fo
Gulf Cooperation Council countries and other countries in Western Asia
e.
together are the destination of more than half (54%) of the international
l
migrants in Asia, while East and Southeast Asia combined host one-fifth
sa
(22.2%). East and Southeast Asia have a diverse migration profile. East
re
Asia consists primarily of destination countries and areas that are among
or
the more attractive labour market destinations in the region: South Korea,
n
Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Of the four, Japan has remained wedded
tio
to its policy of not admitting foreign workers in less-skilled occupations.

bu
Nonetheless, less-skilled migrant workers have been present in Japan, but

tri
they enter the country as trainees or technical interns or as descendants of

is
former Japanese emigrants, the Nikkeijin. After decades of guardedness,

rd
Japan’s lawmakers passed a bill on 8 December 2018 to admit foreign

fo
workers in sectors facing severe labour shortages such as construction,

nursing, farming, transport and tourism. Japan may have stalled bringing
ot
N
in foreign workers who perform less skilled work, but, like other developed
economies, it did not escape the need to turn to labour migration.
China is an origin country – largely of students, the highly skilled and
investors – but in recent years it has been attracting international migrants,
who are drawn to the opportunities offered by China’s vibrant economy. It
is also attracting return migrants, who are pulled by the country’s impress
ive growth while simultaneously contributing to China’s development.
Southeast Asia, on the other hand, is a patchwork of origin countries
(the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and, to some
452 Maruja M. B. Asis
extent, Laos), destination countries (Singapore and Brunei) and countries

that are both origin and destination (Malaysia and Thailand). Destination
countries in the region are also receiving migrants from other regions in
Asia and beyond, while significant labour migration from Southeast Asia
has been directed towards the oil-rich Gulf countries since the 1970s.
Compared with Europe and, to some extent, the USA, the migration–
religion nexus has not been a focus of attention in terms of policy
and research interest in East and Southeast Asia. This might be due
to migration not generating tensions or debates in Asia in the way that
.
ly
religion has ignited deep cleavages, mostly driven by unease over Muslim
on
immigrants, in Europe. The temporary labour migration regime in Asia is
perhaps a key factor in minimising concerns over the influx of the foreign
se
population in the region: migrants are allowed to work and stay only
lu
for the duration of their employment contracts; they are not supposed
na
to settle; and they generally bear the onus of adjusting to the lifeways of
so
their intended destination country. In relation to the last factor, in origin
countries in the region many migrants undergo pre-deployment orienta-
er
tion seminars to prepare themselves for the working and living conditions
rp
that they will likely encounter overseas. In some origin countries – such
Fo
as the Philippines, Vietnam and Cambodia – similar preparations for
e.
marriage migrants going to South Korea (overwhelmingly women) are

l
offered as well.
sa
By comparison, employers or families of marriage migrants in the

re
destination countries do not have to know about the culture of the migrant
or
workers or foreign spouses. A few examples of initiatives introduced in

n
destination countries are worth noting. In Singapore, the government

tio
requires first-time employers of foreign domestic workers, as well as

bu
employers who change foreign domestic workers frequently, to complete

tri
the online Employers Orientation Programme to provide them with

is
basic information for hiring and dealing with foreign domestic workers
rd
in their employ. In Hong Kong, the Mission for Migrant Workers intro-
fo
duced the Happy Homes Programme to disseminate positive experiences

of employers and foreign domestic workers; to produce information
ot
materials on Christian values of love, care and fellowship among church-

N
goers; and to raise employer awareness. South Korea has established

multicultural centres to ease the adjustment of foreign spouses to Korean
society. Despite their name, however, the programmes and supports
offered by these centres are aimed at training foreign spouses on how to
be Korean, and no mention is made of orienting Korean families to the
cultural background of their new members.
Migration in the region involves the movement of people from and to
societies of diverse religious traditions. The primary country of origin, the
Migration 453
Philippines, is distinctly Christian (largely Roman Catholic). Indonesia is

Muslim. Vietnam is officially an atheist state, although it has adherents of
Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism. Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos are
mainly Buddhist. On the destination side, Malaysia and Brunei are pre-
dominantly Muslim. Singapore’s Chinese, Malay and Indian composition
results in a mosaic of faith traditions with a layer of secularism. Thailand
is Buddhist. Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan are secular.
The results of three surveys conducted by WIN/Gallup between 2008
and 2018 reveal varying degrees of religiosity among countries in the
.
ly
region. In general, between 82% and 97% of respondents in the origin
on
countries considered themselves religious; Vietnam is the exception,
ranking among the 20 least religious countries in the world, with only
se
about a third describing themselves as religious. Religiosity in destination
lu
countries diverges between the highly religious (Thailand and Malaysia)
na
and the less religious (ranging from 13% in Japan to 45% in Taiwan).
so
Only 7% considered themselves religious in China, the lowest globally,
although, given China’s huge population (1.4 billion), 7% translates into
er
some 98 million people in absolute figures. Despite its official stance as an
rp
atheist state, since the reforms instituted by Deng Xiaoping in the early
Fo
1980s, the number of Christian adherents has grown. In the early 1980s,
e.
an estimated 6 million Christians lived in China. Current estimates vary,

l
but they all point to a surge. In 2010, the Pew Research Center estimated
sa
67 million Christians; others suggest between 100 and 130 million. The
re
renewed interest in religion has been attributed to the rise of the modern,
or
wealthier China and a people in search of meaning in their lives.

n
This essay explores the interface between migration and religion in

tio
East and Southeast Asia, focusing specifically on encounters between

bu
migration and Christianity. Although a minority religion in the region,

tri
Christianity has inspired highly visible initiatives in the promotion of the

is
dignity of migrants. The resulting discourse and actions contribute to the

rd
predominantly market-driven view of migration and migrants. This essay

fo
examines the migration–Christianity nexus by discussing how migration

bears on Christian churches’ practices in response to the phenomenon of
ot
migration and by exploring how Christianity affects the religious practices

N
and faith life of migrants. Due to data gaps and limitations, the essay
cannot provide a comprehensive overview of how this nexus operates
in the different origin and destination countries, migrant groups and
Christian theologies and churches. That some sites, migrants and churches
are discussed more than others is more a reflection of extant literature
than an indication of differential importance. As an exploratory piece, the
essay aims to generate more critical conversations and further research on
migration and Christianity in this highly mobile region.
International migration presents challenges and opportunities to the

witness of Christian churches and communities in East and Southeast
Asia. From a pastoral point of view, the weakening or erosion of the faith
of Christian migrants who find themselves in a non-Christian and/or
secular milieu is a concern. On the other hand, migrants also possess an
evangelising or theologising potential: by their faithful witness, they can
be bearers of the Good News to all peoples. As the succeeding discussions
suggest, Christian institutions at home and overseas are rising to address
both the alienating and the evangelising potentials of migration.
.
ly
on
A Ministry of Accompaniment
As mentioned above, Christian migrants in the region are largely from the
se
Philippines, which is one of two countries in Asia as a whole (the other
lu
is Timor-Leste) where Christians, mostly Roman Catholics, comprise
na
the majority of the population. At one level, the unabated migration of
so
Filipinos since the 1970s reflects the continuing search for better opportuni-
ties in the global labour market. Seen through the lens of religion, Filipino
er
migration is also the movement of Christians from the Philippines to the
rp
rest of the region and beyond. This large-scale and sustained migration
Fo
has alerted Christian churches in the Philippines that their flocks are no
e.
longer contained within the Philippines.

l
In light of this, Christian churches in the Philippines have taken a

sa
trans-national turn in tending to their flocks, which entails accompanying

re
Filipinos in their diasporic journeys while also looking after the families
or
left behind in the Philippines. The policy of strictly temporary labour

n
migration of destination countries in the region has kept migrant workers

tio
and their families apart. To ensure that temporary labour migration will
bu
not develop into permanent settlement, family reunification is not allowed

tri
for migrant workers in less-skilled occupations (who account for the

is
majority of migrant workers in the region). In the Philippines and other

rd
origin countries, the migrant ministry includes programmes supporting

fo
the families left behind, such as psychosocial support for children, or

parenting classes for fathers, mothers or grandparents who have assumed
ot
care-giving responsibilities. In the early years of the Philippines’ labour

N
migration experience, Christian churches and related organisations

were among the pioneering providers of services addressing the myriad
concerns of overseas Filipino workers and their families. One example
is the information and education programme to prepare migrants for
their departure; this was later adopted by the government and was made
mandatory for departing migrant workers. In addition, Christian churches
and organisations also number among the persistent voices promoting the
protection of migrants.
Migration 455
In the Philippines, the response of the Catholic Church in shepherd-

ing its flock has been shaped by the realities of Filipino migration and the
response of the Universal Church to the global phenomenon of migration.
The social teaching of the Catholic Church on migration and the structures
that link the Universal Church and local churches provide the ‘software’
and the ‘hardware’, respectively, for collective reflections and actions.
At the institutional level, church engagement with Filipino migration is
manifested in the work of the Episcopal Commission for Migrants and
Itinerants of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, religious
.
ly
congregations and their counterparts overseas, and a host of Catholic-
on
inspired organisations as they engage with relevant stakeholders. The
global distribution of Filipinos prompted the Catholic Church in the Philip
se
pines to send priests, religious and pastoral workers to bring the church to
lu
those migrants. Another approach is to coordinate with its counterparts in
na
destination countries. The church also makes use of technology to enable
so
Filipinos abroad to participate in key religious activities in the Philippines,
such as the online Visita Iglesia, the practice of visiting seven churches
er
following the Mass on Holy Thursday, which is made available during the
Lenten season. rp
Fo
Philippine-based Protestant and other Christian churches have been
e.
equally attentive to the needs of overseas Filipinos, by coordinating with

l
affiliated churches, by developing a specific ministry for this particular

sa
population, or by establishing a church overseas. The last has nourished

re
the expansion of two homegrown churches. The Iglesia ni Cristo (INC;

or
Church of Christ), registered in 1914, was local until 1968, when it estab-
n
lished its first overseas congregation in Hawaii. With the migration of

tio
Filipinos to other countries, the INC followed its flock and now counts
bu
6,000 local congregations and missions in 142 countries and territories

tri
around the world. Similarly, sociologist Jayeel Cornelio attributes the

is
expansion of the Jesus Is Lord Church Worldwide outside the Philip-

rd
pines to the migration of Filipinos. Founded by Brother Eddie Villanueva

fo
in 1978, the church has grown to an estimated membership of 5 million

and has established some 60 churches overseas. In establishing a presence
ot
overseas, these homegrown churches also aim to evangelise and convert

N
non-Filipinos as well as Filipino migrants of other faith traditions.
A Ministry of Welcome
In the highly industrialised societies of Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong,
Taiwan and Singapore, the biblical teaching of hospitality and welcome
to the foreigner goes against state policies hinged on border control and a
welcome mat that extends only to foreigners with skills and capital while
imposing a conditional welcome to less-skilled migrant workers. The call
for Christian churches to welcome foreigners is the call to be a missionary

church to peoples who are at their very doorstep.
For Catholic migrants, the widespread presence of the church presents
access to a familiar institution in a strange or even hostile environment.
Migrants gravitate to the church not only for spiritual reasons but also
to meet co-ethnic believers and to avail themselves of support. One
reason why Filipino migrant workers are better protected than other
Asian migrant workers is the former’s tendency to seek out the church
wherever they are. Initially, Filipinos attend the ‘international’ Sunday
.
ly
Mass (usually the English mass for foreigners). At some point, they will
on
request a Tagalog mass. Then they will organise choirs and prayer groups
and introduce religious traditions from the Philippines (such as the
se
nine-day Christmas Masses, the devotion to the Holy Child and the block
lu
rosary). In addition to religious activities, the local church and the Filipino
na
community develop programmes and services to help migrants encounter-
so
ing problems in destination countries. Usually, these programmes provide
legal assistance, psychosocial support, shelter, skills training programmes
er
and social activities, such as sports-fests and cultural events. Specific
rp
Masses and ministries involving other groups, such as Indonesians and
Fo
Vietnamese, follow similar phases of development. The Catholic Church
e.
in Korea has introduced a continuing training programme called Exodus

l
for those involved in the pastoral care of migrants to develop skills, to

sa
have a forum for exchange and to enhance coordination.

re
Coordination between origin and destination churches has forged

or
trans-national cooperation. One recent example is the agreement between

n
the Catholic Church in Vietnam and that in Japan to work together to

tio
provide pastoral care to migrant workers and diaspora populations in

bu
both countries. Although the two have small populations of Catholics, the
tri
church saw the need to establish pastoral programmes to serve the needs
is
of 200,000 Vietnamese workers in Japan and 100,000 Japanese in Vietnam.

rd
The service-delivery aspect of Christian churches and organisations is

fo
well established across the region. To reach non-Christian migrants, some

organisations establish centres outside the church premises and recruit
ot
laypersons so as not to prevent non-Christians from accessing needed

N
services. In destination countries, Christian churches and organisations

also actively participate in the advocacy and promotion of the protection
of migrants’ rights. In Korea, many Christian NGOs played a leading role
in the reform of migration policies, and eventually the Korean govern
ment established a formal system for bringing in and protecting foreign
workers. The advocacy role of faith-based organisations is tempered by
the political climate in destination countries. In places like Hong Kong,
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, civil society organisations in general and
Migration 457
faith-based organisations in particular have more freedom to push for the

promotion of migrants’ rights. Where this is not possible, faith-based or-
ganisations concentrate on less political activities, such as counselling and
skills formation.
Gifts Migrants Bear

Migrants are not just the recipients of what the church can offer. They
also contribute to the local church in various ways. Given the generally
small and ageing population of Christians in these countries, the arrival of
.
ly
Christian migrants boosts the membership and brings new life to the con-
on
gregations. Japan is a case in point: Catholic migrants from the Philippines
and Vietnam have been described by foreign missionaries as a ‘breath of
se
fresh air’. Migrants not only increase membership but also add their youth
lu
to the profile of believers.
na
Managing cultural diversity in the church, however, is a more difficult
so
ground to tread. With the arrival of migrants, the usual ways of doing
things are unsettled, and migrants also have to adapt to different practices
er
and traditions. The building of a multicultural church thus calls for
rp
dialogue and inter-cultural mediators to bridge migrant members and
Fo
local members. In recent fieldwork in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, the author
e.
witnessed a multicultural Mass conducted in both Chinese (for the local

l
parishioners) and English (for the migrant parishioners) and songs in

sa
Chinese, English and Tagalog. To facilitate understanding, when the priest

re
used Chinese for some parts of the Mass, the English translation was
or
projected, and vice versa.

n
Welcoming migrants who come bearing religious traditions from their

tio
home countries makes visible the diversity of religious expressions in the

bu
receiving churches. Under conditions of dialogue and understanding, the

tri
different religious expressions of the same faith can be enriching, attesting

is
to the reality of the proclamation of God’s kingdom to all. Alternatively,

rd
the differences can result in ‘othering’ and even contentions about ‘proper’
fo
practices and ‘true’ faith among the community of believers.

ot
Migrants as Faith Bearers

N
Migrants embark on their journeys in the hope of achieving transforma-

tion – in most cases, a better life for themselves and their families. For this
reason, migration has been described as a kind of secular pilgrimage. The
road to the hoped-for better life is fraught with many challenges. In the
context of labour migration in Asia, the odds are stacked against migrant
workers in less-skilled occupations, as documented by the many violations
of migrant workers throughout the migration process. The vulnerabilities
of migrants increase when they migrate outside of the legal channels or,
worse, when they fall victim to traffickers. Marriage migrants, particularly

those arranged by commercial marriage brokers, also face risks and vul-
nerabilities. Abuse, exploitation, prejudice and discrimination can sorely
test the faith of migrants, as does exposure to different value systems in
non-Christian or culturally diverse environments.
In the region, the impact of migration on the faith, religiosity or spiritu
ality of Filipino migrants has received research attention, much of which
focuses on the faith life of migrants in the destination countries. Actually,
faith surfaces in different phases of migration. Before leaving, praying for
.
ly
safety during overseas employment is part of the preparation of overseas
on
Filipino workers. Novenas or prayers to the Mother of Perpetual Help
Shrine, the Black Nazarene and the Santo Niño (Holy Child Jesus) are
se
among the devotions that are popular with Filipino migrants, who invoke
lu
their help and guidance before they leave. While they are overseas, as
na
mentioned above, Filipinos seek out churches. They are visible in churches
so
in destination countries not just as Mass-goers but also in church-related
organisations, including those that provide support for fellow migrants.
er
Filipino migrants often cite faith in God as helping them cope with the
rp
challenges of working overseas, separated from their families.
Fo
Anthropologist Nicole Constable observed that migration can have
e.
both an alienating and a theologising impact on migrants confronted with

l
multiple challenges of working and living in a foreign environment: some

sa
opt to join religious groups that remind them of religious practices from
re
their home country, some join a new group, and some ignore religion or
or
shut it out of their lives. Based on their study of Filipino migrants in Hong
n
Kong, Jonas Nakonz and Angela Wai Yan Shik suggested that migration
tio
challenges can incline migrants towards more Charismatic religious

bu
groups, which they might find more attuned to helping them cope with
tri
their conditions. The families left behind in the Philippines similarly cite
is
faith in God as the main factor that keeps their families intact despite the
rd
distance. Faith thus can be empowering for migrants, as it gives them

fo
courage, provides them with a moral compass and buoys their hopes.
A study of Filipino domestic workers underscored spirituality as an
ot
important personal resource in dealing with various stresses. Praying and

N
reading the Bible were among the coping strategies to which migrants
resorted. Through these means, God is not distant but is rather part of
the migrants’ ‘network’ who provides an anchor and a refuge from their
isolation and difficult circumstances in a foreign land.
The discourse and the literature on migrant empowerment, however,
tend to focus solely on the political aspects of empowerment and view
faith or anything related to spirituality as disempowering because it does
not lead to changes in the structural conditions of migrants.
Migration 459
While some migrants turn to God to face their challenges, others can
find their faith life diminished by the demands or requirements of their oc-
cupation and by encounters with different value systems in foreign lands.
Christian migrants in destination countries that are predominantly Muslim
might not have easy access to Christian churches. Catholic migrants might
be prevented from attending Mass on Sundays if they are not given a day
off. Female Christians who work in the entertainment sector might find
their faith compromised by having to entertain male clients. The religious
practices of those who work in private homes can be subject to the surveil-
.
ly
lance of their employers.
on
In Hong Kong, for example, an Indonesian migrant worker could not
practise praying five times during the day, as is the custom in Islam, and
se
was chastised by her employer, who told her that she came to Hong Kong
lu
to work, not to pray. Some scholars propose that, although marginalised
na
in Hong Kong society, Indonesian migrants have made Islam visible in
so
the city through their expressions of Islamic piety through prayer, the
use of the veil and adherence to a halal diet. The same argument can be
er
advanced about Filipino workers, whose faith expressions make visible
rp
the Christian or Catholic faith in the destination countries, also conveying
Fo
that Filipino migrants are not just workers. Religious celebrations in public
e.
spaces allow migrants to visibly assert their space, albeit temporarily, in

l
hristopher’s Parish introduced Santacruzan,

the destination. In Taipei, St C
sa
a religious procession held during the month of May to commemorate

re
the finding of the Holy Cross by Empress Helena, the mother of Emperor
or
Constantine. The annual procession has become part of the May events in
n
Taipei and has received support from the City of Taipei in its programmes
tio
to support the cultural activities of various migrant groups. Previously,

bu
Santacruzan was a Filipino event, but in more recent editions, Vietnam-

tri
ese migrants also had representatives who served as sagalas (women

is
who portray historical or biblical characters) and consorts. In the last

rd
Santacruzan organised by Our Lady of the Miraculous Medal Church in

fo
Kaohsiung, several Buddhist monks walked with parishioners during the

procession. According to the priest who invited them, the monks readily
ot
accepted the invitation because they believe that ‘while we differ in how
N
we worship, there is only one God in heaven’.

In foreign lands, migrants are freed from the norms and mores of their
home countries, which can lead to practices and behaviours that are subject
to social control at home. Overseas, migrants meet other migrants, which
can lead to friendships or romantic relationships with people of other
faiths or no faith. In Hong Kong, conversion to Islam has been observed
among Filipino women migrants due to their romantic relationships or
inter-marriage with Pakistani men. Pastoral workers in Korea and Taiwan
have shared concerns about extramarital affairs, children born out of these
relationships, and incidences of abortion and same-sex relationships.
Chinese Migration
The link between migration and Christianity is also contributing to the
rise of Christian believers in China observed since the 1980s. This trend
is a reversal of the narrative of religious persecution in China, which led
to different waves of emigration of Christians, particularly after China
embraced communism in 1949. Although China became an atheist state,
.
ly
Christianity was not completely stamped out, as ‘underground’ churches
on
kept the faith and state-sanctioned or registered churches were allowed
to operate. The opening of China to the world since the 1980s has been
se
accompanied by increasing international migration. Initially, those who
lu
emigrated were government-supported officials or scholars, but as China’s
na
economy improved, more Chinese started to migrate independently.
so
China is the number-one source country of international students, and
like the trend observed for Korea, well-off families are starting to send
er
their children for international education even at the pre-university level.
rp
The migration of students, the highly skilled and investors is a departure
Fo
from the unauthorised migration of Chinese to Europe and the Americas
e.
in the 1990s.
l
Several scholars have commented that international migration leads

sa
Chinese migrants to encounter religion and exposes them to religious

re
freedom. The migration experience can also engender questions about

or
identity and the search for meaning in a new environment that could
n
provide openings for exploring religion. It is important to point out that

tio
the receptivity of destination countries plays a significant role in the

bu
conversion of Chinese migrants to Christianity. In the USA, for example,

tri
the welcome, assistance and fellowship provided by campus ministry

is
programmes have paved the way for Chinese migrants to encounter and
rd
embrace Christianity. Some campus ministries and churches in the USA

fo
are reported to have a specific focus on Chinese migrants. A study by

the Singapore Management University examines how Chinese Christian
ot
converts in Singapore reconcile being Chinese and being Christian and

N
how their conversion affects their relationships with other Chinese

migrants, Singaporeans, family and friends. According to the study,
many Christian groups in Singapore focus their evangelisation efforts on
Chinese migrants. The implications of conversion on Chinese migrants’
social relationships and their integration in Singaporean society suggest
multifaceted outcomes. Some converts had less interaction with non-
Christian Chinese migrants; others felt a sense of in-betweenness upon
their return to China.
Migration 461
The role of religion, particularly Christianity, in integration is an

interesting question to pursue further in the Asian context. In Australia,
where an increase in Christian affiliation among the Chinese had been
noted previously, the 2016 census revealed that the decline in Christian
affiliation seen in the general Australian population was also observed
among the Chinese population. One of the reasons could be that conver-
sion to Christianity and church affiliation, which traditionally played a
part in the acculturation of first-generation immigrants, might not be as
important a source of support for the younger generation. Another reason
.
ly
could be that the churches are not responding to the concerns and interests
on
of their young members. Other issues to explore are the return of converts
to China and their experiences, and the trans-national links between
se
Chinese Christians overseas and Christianity in the homeland.
lu
The social and political landscape in China cannot be ignored. Although
na
some doors had been opened, recent reports indicate renewed persecu-
so
tion of Christians and other religious adherents in China. It is for this
reason that some observers consider China to be a ‘religious wild card’.
er
The notion that the future of Christianity is moving away from the West
rp
and shifting to Asia means that, politics aside, imagining the future will
Fo
inevitably have to include the migration of people as well as the migration
e.
of faith.
l
sa
Conclusion
re
This essay has outlined the ways in which migration and Christianity
or
impact on each other by considering the responses of Christian churches

n
and organisations to the phenomenon of migration and how the migration

tio
experience affects the faith life and practices of migrants. Although Christi
bu
anity is a minor religion in East and Southeast Asia, the migration of

tri
Christian migrants, mostly from the Philippines, has allowed Christianity

is
to be spread to some extent in non-Christian destination countries in the

rd
region. Given the temporary labour migration regime in the region, only
fo
migrant workers move: they leave their families behind, and migrants are
not expected to settle and to integrate in destination countries. Thus, unlike
ot
permanent migrants who become residents and/or nationals of destina

N
tion countries, temporary labour migrants are trans-national subjects who

are not full members of either origin or destination countries. Under this
migration regime, institutions in origin countries, including Christian
bodies, are drawn into accompanying migrants and the families they
leave behind through the different phases: preparing migrants before they
leave, supporting migrants and their families at home while the former are
overseas, and supporting the reintegration of returning migrants. Christian
churches and organisations have become trans-national in tending to
their flocks, and in the process some homegrown Christian churches have
expanded to other countries. At the destination side, Christian institutions
are called to welcome migrants, a commandment with biblical foundation
addressed to all Christians. Christian churches and organisations are one
of the spaces of welcome for migrants in destination countries. This is sig-
nificant not least for the growing number of migrants from China. In their
welcoming, Christians have the opportunity to share the Good News with
migrants and to show that a more compassionate society can be possible.
.
ly
Bibliography
on
Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants (APMM), Faith in Action: Faith-Based Programs and Institu-
tions for Migrants in Asia Pacific and the Middle East (Hong Kong: APMM, 2014).
se
Asis, Maruja, Advocacy and Networking on Migrants’ Issues (Quezon City: Scalabrini
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Migration Center, 2010).
Baggio, Fabio, and Maurizio Pettena (eds), Caring for Migrants: A Collection of Church
na
Documents on the Pastoral Care of Migrants (Strathfield: St Paul’s Publications, 2009).
so
Ho, Wai-Hip, ‘The Emerging Visibility of Islam Through the Powerless: Indonesian Muslim
Domestic Helpers in Hong Kong’, Journal of Asian Anthropology, 14:1 (2015), 79–90.
er
Scalabrini Migration Center, Directory of NGOs for Migrants in Asia (Quezon City: Scalabrini
Migration Center, 1997). rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
Colonial and Postcolonial Context
Wai Ching Angela Wong
Historians have agreed that Christianity reached the Ganges in the first
.
ly
century and crossed the Gobi Desert to China in the fifth century. Unfor-
on
tunately, Christianity’s major expansion in modern times in what we call
Asia today has been tainted by colonialism. While Western companies and
se
their traders enjoyed privileges of sovereignty in lands they occupied, the
lu
missionaries they brought also enjoyed extraterritorial protection in cities
na
and ports opened to evangelistic activity by force. Conflicts between these
so
missionaries and local residents eventually turned into military attacks
er
and resulted in wars and unequal treaties for the occupied territories. In
rp
short, with almost every territorial annexation of the Western powers in
Asia, Christianity arrived in the company of artillery and gunboats. In the
Fo
perception of many Asians, therefore, missionaries went hand in hand
e.
with the deployment of troops and administrators of the colonial powers,

l
and the gospel was an instrument of Western imperialism. Whereas the

sa
military made territorial and material advances in the occupied territories,

re
missionaries championed the superiority of Western cultures and values

or
and undermined indigenous religions and cultures. Beginning in the

n
1950s, however, critiques of a Christianity tinged with imperialism and

tio
racism gave rise to a post-war movement for Asian Christianity.

bu
Paradoxically, it is the very history of colonialism that gave birth to the

tri
notion of ‘Asia as one’. An Asian-American historian, Joseph Kitagawa,

is
has pointed out that ‘Asia’ was unknown until the latter half of the
rd
twentieth century. K. M. Panikkar, an Indian theologian, also argues that

fo
the emergence of an Asian identity did not result from any international
agreements but rather a collective process of nationalistic resistance by
ot
N
the colonised peoples against Western colonial aggression. In contrast to

the European process of formation of nation states, the rise of nationalism
in Asia is better understood as a form of struggle against colonial ex
ploitation, with the aim of replacing the structure of colonial power with
a new order, namely, that of national power. While national independ-
ence movements dominated the Asian political scene of the 1950s and
extended to the 1970s, they varied from one another regarding historical
processes, ideological references and resultant political structures. Despite
their common goal of decolonisation, Asian nations were founded on
464 Wai Ching Angela Wong
very diverse – and sometimes divisive – grounds, with borders arbitrarily

imposed by colonial powers without reference to, or even the knowledge
of, their inhabitants. Many of these artificial borderlines were drawn across
tribal neighbourhoods, dividing families and communities and forcing
them into becoming ‘national’ enemies. In order to inculcate loyalty to the
young nation and to legitimise its authority and power, the state made
considerable effort to bind people of entirely different languages, customs
and religions into the so-called one nation. Inevitably, this arbitrary process
of Asian nation-building planted seeds of deep suspicion and hostility
.
ly
among peoples of different origins, which grew into never-ceasing ethnic
on
rivalries, with a dominant group trying mercilessly to suppress or even
wipe out the languages, religions and cultures of the others.
se
lu
What Postcolonial Context?
na
‘Postcolonial’ has been used popularly as a self-designated position for
so
the formerly colonised peoples in Africa, Latin America and Asia. In
current circulation it carries at least three meanings. First, it is used as a
er
historical indicator referring to the period that followed American and
rp
European colonisation and began with the independence of the respec-
Fo
tive nations, largely by the middle of the twentieth century. When this
e.
meaning is adopted, historical attention is given to the establishment of

l
national governments, constitutions, militaries and all other structures for

sa
social and cultural functions. The key to these new establishments is the
re
transference of the ruling power from the former colonisers to the local
or
peoples – primarily the elites who were trained and brought into leader-
n
ship positions by their colonisers.

tio
Second, and the most popular use of the term, is its political deploy-
bu
ment. It is not only about the end of colonisation but also about the process
tri
of resistance to the legacy of colonialism, well beyond the historical period.

is
Elleke Boehmer tries to distinguish these first and second meanings by

rd
designating a hyphenated ‘post-colonial’ for periodical reference and

fo
a non-hyphenated ‘postcolonial’ for the dynamic textual and political

practices that critically scrutinise colonial relationships. The latter is aimed
ot
to destabilise the structures of imperialism by re-examination, writing back

N
and deconstructing the very basis of colonial knowledge to re-establish

the colonised peoples as historical subjects. Destabilising Western colonial
knowledge is the meaning that has been widely adopted by ‘Third World’
theologians.
There is yet a third and more ambivalent meaning of ‘postcolonial’
that has been largely under-utilised but which would have implications
for historical studies of Christianity in Asia. Building on the key literary
and cultural critiques of theorists such as Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, the postcolonial context meant much more

than a ground for the champion of an anti-colonial battle against the West.
It is also a continuing battle internal to the formerly colonised peoples
and within the mind of each who lives and grows up in the formerly
colonised world. In other words, colonisation is about not only foreign
domination of territories or political dependency of national governments,
but also the internalised values and thought structures within and among
the newly independent national subjects. When Bhabha underscores the
colonial production of hybridity in the colonised world, none can take
.
ly
it lightly as something that could be easily purged or dismissed upon
on
national independence. Instead, it is something that has infiltrated not
only local political and socio-economic structures but also art, culture
se
and philosophical minds. It impacts on people’s everyday lives regarding
lu
architectural designs, urban and social organisations, and perception and
na
reception of religious and cultural values. In other words, there cannot
so
be a clear line of demarcation between what is colonial – something to be
resisted or fought against – and what is ‘purely’ indigenous – something
er
to preserve and lift for local identification in the postcolonial world.
rp
Hybridity, once produced, is there to stay and even proliferate.
Fo
e.
Christian Missions to Asia

l
East Asia is diverse in terms of languages, cultures and religions; yet it

sa
also sees some major common influences from Confucianism, Taoism and
re
Buddhism, with Confucianism providing the basis of much of the social

or
organisation of the various countries and areas, including China, Hong

n
Kong, Taiwan, Japan and Korea. As mentioned above, the first record of
tio
Christianity in East Asia is the arrival of Nestorian monks in 635. They

bu
set up the first monasteries and churches in Xian, then the capital of the
tri
Tang dynasty. The next introduction of Christianity to China was led by

is
Franciscan missionaries in 1294, followed by the arrival of the Jesuits and

rd
the Dominicans until the peak of the Rites Controversy in 1744, which
fo
resulted in the Vatican’s prohibition of Christian mission in China. When

full-scale missionary activities were launched with the backing of colonial
ot
governments in the nineteenth century, not only China but also other
N
countries in East Asia were confronted with an imperialistic Christianity

that left many countries and peoples deeply affected.
While Christianity was accused of complicity with Western colonial-
ism, its early missionaries had made significant sacrifices. Portuguese
forces arrived in Japan in 1542, bringing with them gunpowder and Jesuit
missionaries. These missionaries were initially welcomed and successfully
converted some members of the ruling class. However, a period of perse-
cution of the missionaries followed from the sixteenth to the eighteenth
century, first for fear of their political influence and later for their competi-
tion with Shintoism and Buddhism for believers. When Japan was forced
open by the Americans in the nineteenth century, Japanese Christians
were criticised by Shinto nationalists as betrayers of their own country
and culture.
Christianity first reached the Korean peninsula through returned
Korean captives during the Japanese invasion of 1592–7. Several system-
atic persecutions of Christians took place before 1900, when Korea was
forced open. At their peak, Presbyterian and Methodist missionaries
.
ly
took charge of nearly 80% of the Korean population and more than 70%
on
of all land. Because of their broad influence, the Korean churches led the
independence movement against Japanese occupation in 1919 and later
se
the opposition to Russian communist encroachment in northern Korea
lu
in 1945. In each case, Christians suffered severe loss and persecution. The
na
history of Korean Christianity is intriguing, as Christians’ holding onto
so
their American missionary faith had been, ironically, a means of exercis-
ing national resistance.
er
In Taiwan (Formosa), the Dutch implanted Christianity in 1624 through
rp
the Dutch Reformed Church, which took over Keelung and Tamsui from
Fo
Spanish Catholic missionaries. After a period of prohibition during the
e.
rule of Cheng Cheng-Kung, a general from the mainland, the English

l
Presbyterian mission arrived in 1860 and founded medical services

sa
and provided education for tribal women. Similar to the case of Korea,
re
the Japanese severely persecuted Christians and left a deep imprint on

or
Taiwan’s language and culture.

n
The cases of Macau and Hong Kong have been entirely different.
tio
Missionaries first arrived in the former in 1557 and the latter in 1841. Both
bu
cities were initially taken not as destinations in their own right but as
tri
stepping stones for missionary work in China. Unexpectedly, the Portu-

is
guese and British respectively ended up with 99-year leases on the two
rd
cities, allowing special privileges to the Catholic Church in Macau and

fo
the Anglican and other missionary churches in Hong Kong. The impact
of Christianity in these two cases has been outstanding, not only in the
ot
religious but also in the political landscapes, especially before their respec-
N
tive handovers to China at the end of the twentieth century.

Southeast Asia lies in a strategic region between the Indian continent
and South China and has been deeply influenced by the convergence
and interaction of several major cultures: Hinduism, Buddhism and
Islam from the Indian subcontinent and Confucianism and Taoism from
China. The early presence of Nestorian Christians as traders and travel-
lers to the Malay peninsula, Java and South Sumatra is also generally
assumed. Countries in this region include Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,
Myanmar (Burma), Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, Timor-Leste

and the Philippines. As with East Asia, Christian missionaries came to
Southeast Asia in the company of European traders and soldiers in the
sixteenth century. The first Christian missionaries arrived in Malacca in
1511 with the Portuguese. The Spanish took over the Philippines in 1565.
The missionaries were mainly from the Franciscan, Dominican and Jesuit
orders. As Protestant missions joined the scene in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, the political rivalry between the Catholic countries of
Spain and Portugal and the Protestant countries of England and Holland
.
ly
was aggravated by confessional diversity. While the Dutch colonial
on
officers supported Christian missionaries only when they aligned with
their political intentions, the British in Burma and Malaysia played down
se
Christianity in order to stay at peace with traders who belonged to other
lu
religions. In the Philippines, Catholics advanced their mission exclusively
na
under Spanish rule, with Protestant missions pre-eminent under the
so
Americans after the USA defeated Spain in 1898.
Yet even if missionaries made significant sacrifices concerning physical
er
deterioration and material deprivation in their evangelistic missions
rp
to bring medical service and education to the remote areas, they were
Fo
generally seen as collaborators with the colonial masters, enjoying military
e.
protection against the power of local authorities. Furthermore, missionary

l
policy varied from country to country in Southeast Asia. French mission-

sa
aries in Indochina enjoyed exclusive protection from their colonial officers,

re
while the Dutch administration in Indonesia was more careful about not
or
offending the Muslims, and so allowed Catholics and Protestants to evan-

n
gelise only in specific districts. In Singapore, Malakka and Penang, where

tio
the British took control, Christian missionary activities were generally

bu
most free.
tri
Similar to the experience in East Asia, Christians faced difficulties

is
during the Japanese occupation from 1941 to 1945. Except for missionaries
rd
from Germany and Italy, which were allies of Japan in the Second World
fo
War, all foreign missionaries were interned. Unexpectedly, it proved to be

a time when the leadership of some young churches was transferred to
ot
local Christians.
N
After the war, independence movements were successful in Indonesia

in 1945; Burma in 1948; Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1954; and Malaysia
in 1957. Each of the independence battles was fought differently. Some
ended up with communist insurgencies, as was the case in Vietnam, while
others, like that in Burma, turned into bitter ethnic rivalries. Christians in
Southeast Asian countries took part in the movements for nation-building
in their respective countries, but their efforts were not always welcomed
or later appreciated.
Christianity: Anti-colonial Force and More

Apparently, nationalism did not sit squarely with Christianity given the
latter’s alleged foreign origin and association with Western imperialism.
However, the tide of independence movements and, with it, the rise of
nationalism spread widely and affected a significant group of Christian
intellectuals and church leaders in Asia. At the Edinburgh 1910 missionary
conference, Asian representatives, though few in number, resolutely made
their voices heard. They sharply questioned the dominance of the Western
missions over the young churches in Asia and the divisions that Western
.
ly
denominationalism inflicted on the young nations. Back home, many local
on
Christian leaders began to denounce the missionary churches as Western
imports and strove to establish autonomous local churches, rejecting
se
denominationalism and rigid theological systems. With the success of
lu
the movements of national independence in Asia after the Second World
na
War, a movement of indigenisation for churches and theology gained
so
prominence.
er
As stated above, because of the non-unifying understanding of the
rp
‘nation’ in Asia, resistance to imperialism played a defining role in the
forming of ‘national’ identities in Asian countries in the twentieth century.
Fo
In other words, anti-colonialism constituted the ground of ‘nationalism’
e.
in the newly independent countries in Asia. In East Asia, the postcolonial

l
milieu of Christianity in the second sense of the term – resistance to

sa
colonialism – started from the early twentieth century, and indigenous

re
churches sprouted with innovative structures and organisation for self-

or
reliance, self-governance and self-propagation. And yet, as we shall see,

n
Christianity moving along with the nation against colonial dominance has
tio
not always meant independence of church governance in East Asia.

bu
In the face of the encroachment of the West, East Asian countries

tri
responded with very different strategies, including the comprehensive

is
reform of the Meiji modernisation of Japan and the scientific and military
rd
modernisation of China. The most drastic and lasting changes in the

fo
region, led by the Soviets, were two communist revolutions leading to

regime change in China and the partition of North and South Korea. With
ot
the Cultural Revolution set forth by Mao Zedong from 1966 until 1976, the
N
landscape of Christianity in East Asia completely changed.

In China, Christian intellectuals were conscious of the ambiguity
of their dual loyalty to Christianity and the Chinese nation, and started
early on with an indigenous ‘three-self’ movement in the 1920s, the
idea of which was taken up and developed into the Three-Self Patriotic
Movement in 1954, a unifying organisational framework for all churches
under Chinese communist rule. In Japan, besides the coming together of
32 churches to become the United Church of Christ during the First World
War, the Non-Church Movement (Mukyokai), founded in 1910, adopted an

anti-colonialist agenda and rejected denominationalism, doctrines, ordi-
nation or sacraments of the Western churches. For the Korean churches,
two significant phases of anti-colonial struggles took place, against Japan
and the Americans, successively. After leading the national movement
against Japanese control, Korea was thrown immediately into the Cold
War and became the battleground between the Americans and the com-
munists. From the 1960s to the 1970s, when American-backed military
regimes ruled South Korea, the churches were once again at the forefront
.
ly
of the struggle against dictatorship and championed human rights and
on
the welfare of the workers. In short, the anti-colonial war for Korea in the
twentieth century had multiple fronts: Japanese occupation, communist
se
encroachment from the Soviets and China, and American-backed military
lu
government. The result was an imposed division between the north and
na
south of the country that has lasted until today.
so
After Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, Taiwan was taken
over by the Kuomingtang when the Chinese Republicans retreated from
er
Nanjing to Taipei in 1949 and has remained separated from China. As with
rp
the general population in Taiwan, Christians, many of whom came from
Fo
the mainland, were divided into pro-reunification and pro-Taiwan camps.
e.
An outstanding representative of the latter was the Presbyterian Church

l
of Taiwan, whose leaders also led the Taiwan indigenous movement for
sa
self-determination. Many of its churches adopted the Taiwanese language

re
in their services and considered ministries to the aborigines as one of their

or
critical missions. For the churches that claim to have rooted themselves
n
in Taiwan, nationalism has been immensely problematic. China is politi-

tio
cally and ideologically too remote to be identified as the ‘nation’, and an

bu
independent Taiwan is not be possible due to obstruction from China. In

tri
this sense, more than Japan, China has been identified as the target for
is
Taiwan’s ‘anti-colonial’ struggle in recent decades.

rd
The rising consciousness of Asian Christians of the colonial complicity

fo
of Christianity has generated an indigenous movement in the churches

of East Asia. From the 1920s on, extensive efforts were made to integrate
ot
local architecture styles, cultural symbols and music into church buildings,
N
decoration of altars and hymns for worship in China and Korea. However,
these were soon found insufficient, and contextual theology arose and took
the lead. Minjung (literally the mass of the people) theology was a contex-
tual theology that took up the issues of a post-war Korea. It scrutinised
problems such as militarisation and dictatorship, economic and labour
exploitation; it underscored the abuse of human rights and foregrounded
people’s social biography of suffering at the centre of theologising work.
At about the same time, another contextual theology, this one led by
theologians of the Presbyterian seminaries of Taiwan, was undertaken

under the name of ‘Homeland’ theology. It called for people’s renewed
sense of belonging to the land, whose ownership the Taiwanese have long
been denied.
The Catholics, who arrived much earlier, had a more difficult time
in China as the country was taken over by the communists. Priests and
believers who would not submit to the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Asso-
ciation in place of the Vatican suffered and went underground as house
churches. There were no official consecrated priests and bishops until
.
ly
2018, when the Vatican reached a ground-breaking agreement with
on
the Chinese government. Except for similar difficulties in North Korea,
Catholics in other East Asian countries have fared well. In Japan, Catholics
se
tried to integrate Zen Buddhist practices into Christian spirituality, and
lu
Jesuit missionaries learned to become Zen masters.
na
Incongruously, colonialism in East Asia was not only exercised by
so
Dutch, British, Soviet and other European powers in parts of China, but
it was also, for a significant period, applied by Japan, a coloniser within
er
the same region. The battle of anti-colonialism was therefore filled with
rp
contradictions when the missionary churches became the base for Korean
Fo
Christians to fight against Japanese colonialism and the Soviet communist
e.
aggression from the north. Moreover, in the cases of Japan and Taiwan,
l
neither nationalism nor anti-colonialism could be taken straightforwardly.

sa
Rather than a tool against colonialism, Japanese nationalism, with its

re
militarism, had been the major obstacle to the formation of an independ-

or
ent indigenous church locally. As for Taiwan, it was, in fact, the successive
n
colonisation by the Dutch and Japan that made possible the growth of a
tio
local church determined to ground itself firmly with the people against
bu
further outside intrusion.

tri
In Southeast Asia, the process of nation-building differs from country to

is
country. The shape and composition of the population in countries of the

rd
region today are primarily a result of European colonial rule. Even after
fo
national independence, the area remained the playground of the ideologi-

cal battles of the Cold War. The USSR, China, France and the USA all played
ot
a part. Vietnam was divided and Cambodia suffered most extensively with
N
the Pol Pot regime from 1975 to 1979. Malaysia and Indonesia both felt the
pressure from communist insurgency and brutally suppressed members
of their communist parties. Since independence in 1948, the ethnic minori-
ties in Burma have never been free from conflict. A central state of national
unity in Myanmar, as with other Southeast Asian countries, has been a site
of struggle for the government as well as the people.
The role of Christianity in fighting colonialism was further complicated
by the ‘migrant’ status of Christians. In countries such as Malaysia and
Indonesia where Islam has been dominant and in several countries where
Buddhism prevails, Christianity has mostly thrived as a community of im-
migrants. In Malaysia, Christians are usually of Chinese or Indian descent;
in Cambodia, they are mainly Vietnamese; and in Thailand, indigenous
Thai are expected to be Buddhist. Nevertheless, Christians made a signifi-
cant contribution to the anti-colonial war against the Dutch in Indonesia
and against the Spaniards in the Philippines. The Asian Christian
movement led by ecumenical bodies such as the Christian Conference of
Asia, established in the 1950s, has continued to champion contextualisa-
.
ly
tion of the churches and theology, so that new generations of Christians
on
might shed the image of being a transplant of Western churches and
ground themselves in the soil of Asia.
se
Nevertheless, contextualisation of Christian churches and theology
lu
has been easier said than done. Independence from missions and colonial
na
associations can still leave the question of dual or even triple identities
so
unresolved. Much more complex than in East Asia, in the context of
Southeast Asia Christians are often viewed as representing a particu-
er
lar national or ethnic identity. Even if Christians would like to identify
rp
with the nation and adopt the national language, in countries such as
Fo
Malaysia where Islam is the dominant religion, the government would be
e.
suspicious of the Christians’ motives. The Malaysian government would

l
prefer to isolate Christians from national life and culture and to protect
sa
Malays from their influence. Some Thai, Filipino and Indonesian churches
re
feel comfortable using local or regional art to express their faith, but
or
peoples of the dominant faiths might resent their ‘syncretic’ practices and
n
prefer the lines of demarcation to be clearly drawn. As such, the presence

tio
of Christianity in multi-religious and multi-racial countries does not

bu
necessarily lead to theologising about the issues involved when different

tri
religions align with ethnic groups and complicate the situation. Christians
is
are afraid of losing freedom and rights, and Muslims or Buddhists are
rd
afraid of losing ground. For those who speak the language of an original
fo
migrant community, ethnic identity and geographical origins remain more

important than crossing boundaries. In a context where Christian identity,
ot
national identity and ethnic identity can easily come into conflict, efforts at
N
contextualisation have touched only the surface.

One of the main questions for Christianity in Southeast Asia has been
its role in the process of modernisation and hence its influence in the
inter-cultural formation of the region. Georg Evers argues that mission
aries, often bringing with them technology, medicine, education and
social service to the mission fields, have served as agents of modernisa-
tion. Moreover, with the colonial introduction of a different economy and
ways of living in the Southeast Asian countries, they were also agents of
change to people’s traditional norms and values, causing disruption to the

original patterns of behaviour and living in society. The activities of the
Christian missionaries and churches have not only brought relief to many
poor and marginalised communities but also opened up education for
girls and women, giving them the possibility to rise above the confines of
domesticity. Most controversially, however, Christian education brought
to the region the strong influence of Western ideas, which often radically
undermined traditional religions and cultures.
.
ly
The Deeper Postcolonial Question
on
With an examination of the dilemma between nationalism and colonialism
in both East and Southeast Asia, the equivalence of a postcolonial position
se
to anti-colonialism is insufficient. In other words, the postcolonial milieu
lu
is not complete without a deeper reflection on the evolution of Christi
na
anity in the two regions with regard to the third meaning of the term, as it
so
relates to hybridity. Threads of Christianity have been so entangled with
a series of variegated political, social, economic and cultural specificities
er
that as many internal as external questions remain to be answered. For
rp
example, it is undeniable that more than a few indigenous churches have
Fo
been established in various countries/areas in the region, but to what extent
e.
has Christianity been rooted in local cultures and society? In what ways
l
are indigenous churches resistant to the influence of Western churches?

sa
Colonial rule ended for most Asian countries at least three decades ago.
re
What does it mean to identify the Asian context as postcolonial?

or
When R. S. Sugirtharajah first adopted the postcolonial framework to

n
position Asian Christianity, he aimed to bring about an ideological tool

tio
to debunk Eurocentrism, colonialism and imperialism in the doing of

bu
theology and biblical interpretation by Asians. In his later work, nonethe-

tri
less, he wrote about the history of Christianity in India and explained the
is
negotiations between Christianity and nationalism and the rich cultural

rd
encounters between missionaries and Indian converts under the British

fo
Empire. Rather than a binary approach of blaming the colonialists for their
oppression of the colonised peoples, his postcolonial intervention has
ot
complicated the understanding of the missionary history from both the

N
side of the colonisers and that of the Indian natives. Although his main
concern was to expose the privileged position that missionaries often
occupied in the history of Asian Christianity and to recover the voices
of the Indians, what he did has generated postcolonial historical writing
that is more complex. It has not only troubled one’s knowledge of Christi
anity and imperialism but it has also highlighted the complicity of local
Christians, drawing attention to not only the missionaries’ destruction
of local religions and cultures but also the double-edged nature of their
contribution to the community. There are many more contradictions and

and much more inconsistency than a strict postcolonial (meaning anti-
colonial) agenda would assume.
Despite the successive declarations of independence in many Asian
countries, there is no doubt that the dominance of politics and the economy
by the First World over the Third World remains. Many national economies
in Asia today are open to the control of trans-national companies not only
from the West but also from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China. Today,
expansion of the global economy is coupled with the expansion of many
.
ly
Asian churches praying for national wealth and personal prosperity. Some
on
Protestant churches in Korea took over the model of the American mega-
church and built up their multi-billion-dollar enterprises. Before the latest
se
round of persecution of churches in Zhejiang, Hunan and Hubei, churches
lu
in the eastern coastal cities of mainland China celebrated their tremendous
na
success with the burgeoning business class. Today, some of the largest
so
mega-churches are found in Korea, India, Indonesia, Singapore and the
Philippines, with Korean churches sending large numbers of missionaries
er
out to the world. These churches are arguably both copies and hybrids of
Christian expansion in the east. rp
Fo
Politically, the newly independent nations are embroiled in the mess
e.
left by their colonial rulers, with unbalanced development between the

l
urban centres and the rural villages and economic and social disparities
sa
between different ethnic and linguistic groups. Deep corruption in local

re
and national governments perpetuates the problems. Because of the

or
prevalence of communal conflicts, ethnic rivalries and religious disputes,

n
independence wars against foreign aggressors have been turned into

tio
internal battles aimed at suppressing minorities. Political oppression,

bu
social devastation and sometimes genocide occur in countries across

tri
both regions, not necessarily instigated by external factors. In the name

is
of national security, stringent control has been exercised over minority

rd
Christian communities such as those in Indonesia, Myanmar and

fo
Malaysia. In socialist countries such as China and Vietnam, Christian-

ity is subjected to scrutiny for foreign infiltration and churches are kept
ot
under tight surveillance. For them, rather than cutting off entirely from
N
the support of international churches, ‘foreign associations’ have been

essential for the struggle and survival of local congregations in cases of
human rights violations and suppression of religious freedom. Struggling
with basic survival, these Asian churches choose to adopt a disengaged
spiritual approach to living the faith, with less concern about contextualis-
ing the gospel with social involvement. The bloom of Pentecostalism in
these countries can be understood in this light. Ironically, indigenisation
of Christianity (or ‘Sinicisation’ in the case of China) in these countries
has been a state agenda rather than the churches’ independent exercise of
postcolonial resistance to Western imperialism.
Furthermore, increasing globalisation of national economies has con
tinued to force people to migrate from the rural villages to the urban slums
and from less affluent Asian countries to more affluent ones, such as Hong
Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Japan. In the latter case, this
has resulted in a late insurgency of migrant churches or congregations. In
many cases, these represent an effort of the local churches to reach out to
the migrant population, such as offering special Filipino church services to
.
ly
domestic helpers in Hong Kong or the organisation of Bahasa ministry for
on
Indonesians in Singapore. In light of the increasing diversity of Christian
communities because of the growth of migrant populations, adding to the
se
existing tension and conflict between Islamic revivalism and Christian fun-
lu
damentalism in some countries, the enhancement of the Christian capacity
na
to cohabit well with peoples of other faiths becomes a matter of urgent
so
concern. Ecumenical platforms for multi-faith ministry and inter-religious
dialogue have been created over recent decades for education as well as
er
experimental communal worship. Moreover, following the principle of in-
rp
clusiveness, churches for sexual minorities have also recently been formed
Fo
in contexts such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Malaysia.
e.
The postcolonial context of Christianity is a complex one and should

l
not be reduced to the battle to dismantle Western colonialism. It is vital

sa
for Christianity in Asia to reposition itself on the Asian plane rather

re
than always looking to the West as its referent. The fact that Japan was a
or
coloniser of many of its East Asian and Southeast Asian neighbours has
n
ironically complicated the critique of colonialism by refuting the formulaic

tio
accusation of the West as colonisers and Asia as colonised. The imperialism

bu
narrative has been further complicated by the rise of China, as its political
tri
and economic power has begun to weigh heavily on the diplomatic and
is
trade relations of its Asian neighbours. The Belt and Road Initiative for
rd
which China invested heavily in West Asia and some maritime countries
fo
has been an emerging target of criticism. It is therefore timely to review

what is meant by the postcolonial context of East Asia today. Unless the
ot
politics between the East and the West can be placed alongside other
N
emerging issues in Asia, East and Southeast Asian Christianity will risk
remaining the ‘other’ of the West and be seen only through the colonial
(albeit with the prefix ‘post’) lens.
Bibliography
Evers, Georg, The Churches in Asia (Delhi: ISPCK, 2005).
Goh, Robbie B. H., Christianity in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia Background Series, no. 7
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2005).
Jongeneel, J. A. B. (ed.), Christian Presence and Progress in North-East Asia: Historical and
Comparative Studies (Frankfurt: Peter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der W, 2011).
Moffett, Samuel H., A History of Christianity in Asia, Vol. II: 1500–1900, American Society of
Missiology Series no. 36 (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2006).
Press, 2014).
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ly
on
se
lu
na
so
er
rp
Fo
l e.
sa
re
or
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tio
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tri
is
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ot
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rd
is
tri
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tio
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or
re
sa
l e.
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rp
er
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na
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se
on
ly
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ot
fo
rd
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tri
bu
Conclusion
tio
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or
re
sa
l e.
Fo
rp
er
so
na
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se
on
ly
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.
The Future of Christianity in East and
Southeast Asia
Mary Ho
.
ly
on
To gauge the future trajectory of Christianity in East and Southeast Asia,
we must first grasp how historically textured and pluralistic this mosaic
se
region is. East Asia is more homogeneous, defined by Confucianism, folk
lu
religion, Mahayana Buddhism and Taoism. Confucianism emphasises
na
social harmony under a strong central state in which religion is subservient
to the ruler. This state-control dynamic continues to suppress Christianity
so
in many Asian countries today. Nevertheless, since Protestantism arrived
er
in the nineteenth century, Christianity has grown in every East Asian
country. rp
Fo
The Southeast Asian countries are more varied and complex, influ-
enced by Hinduism and Theravada Buddhism and by China and India.
e.
Beginning in the thirteenth century, Islam also came through the eastern
l
sa
trade routes and has especially shaped Indonesia, Malaysia and the
re
Philippines. Southeast Asia has since been heavily influenced by various

or
Western colonial powers, which brought Christianity, including the Dutch

Protestants who colonised Indonesia; the Spanish in the Philippines; the
n
tio
French in Indochina; and the British in Singapore, Malaysia and Myanmar.

bu
Today, Christianity continues to be viewed as foreign and Western in

these countries (with the exception of the Philippines). The only country in
tri
Southeast Asia that has never succumbed to a colonial power is Thailand.

is
rd
During the Second World War, Japan dominated Asia. After the war,
Southeast Asian countries, one by one, gained independence. Several
fo
countries, including Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, became communist.

ot
Currently, every country in Southeast Asia has a dominant religion,

N
except Singapore, which has maintained a balance of religions. However,

irrespective of the predominant religion and governmental structure,
Christianity is growing throughout East and Southeast Asia. The countries
can be roughly divided into four categories: (1) communist states – North
Korea, China, Vietnam and Laos; (2) authoritarian states – Cambodia and
Myanmar; (3) predominantly Muslim countries – Indonesia, Malaysia and
Brunei; and (4) religiously free countries – Taiwan, Japan, South Korea,
Mongolia, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, Singapore and Thailand.
480 Mary Ho
Today, Asia is defined by ethnic and religious pluralism. The popula-

tion is rapidly increasing and is gravitating towards the urban centres.
Additionally, the digital age of the internet, social media, travel and trade
partnerships have brought the countries and cultures closer than ever
before, intensifying cross-pollination but also inducing conflict between
ethnic and religious groups. As we survey this complex region through
both a historical lens and its current trajectory, there are 12 prevailing
trends that can be expected to shape the future of Christianity in East and
Southeast Asia.
.
ly
on
(1) Christianity will likely grow in every country and become one of the
two largest religions, along with Islam
se
Christianity is rapidly expanding in every country in East and Southeast
lu
Asia, growing two to four times faster than the population. It is currently
na
the third-largest religion in Southeast Asia and the fourth in East Asia.
so
Even in Japan, where Christianity has not taken root in society as a whole,
partly as a result of inward migration the percentage of Christians has
er
doubled in the past century. In Mongolia, where there were only a handful
rp
of Christians in 1990, the Christian faith has grown rapidly.
Fo
During the past century, Christianity and Islam have been the two
e.
fastest-growing religions both globally and in Asia. Even in the predomin

l
antly Muslim country of Indonesia, Christianity has grown to be the

sa
second-largest religion, representing around 10% of the population.

re
Christianity can be expected to continue to grow in every predominantly

or
Muslim country. It is also likely that Christianity will grow in the predom-
n
inantly Buddhist countries of Mongolia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and

tio
Vietnam, while Buddhism and folk religion can be expected to continue

bu
to decline.
tri
The likely challenge for Christians is that while population growth

is
will lead to an increase in their numbers, younger generations will not

rd
necessarily hold on to their faith in the same way that their forebears did.
fo
Millennials and members of Generation Z appear more fluid in their com-

mitments than older generations. What will this mean for the future of
ot
Christianity?
N
Due to the rise of communist governments, there has been an increase

in atheism and agnosticism over the past few decades. However, as some
of these countries open up economically, there will be a decline in ag
nosticism and atheism. It appears that Christianity fills a spiritual void
left by atheism and provides answers to the meaning of life. Agnosticism
and atheism will continue to be present mostly because of an increase in
secularism, economic growth and attendant materialism. Christianity will
almost certainly expand in every communist country except North Korea,
where it is hard to gauge. Nevertheless, recent summit dialogues with

South Korea might open this reclusive country to new opportunities.
(2) Christianity will grow significantly through the Pentecostal and

Charismatic movements
In East and Southeast Asia, the Pentecostal and Charismatic movements
are the fastest-growing branches of Christianity, catalysing exponential
church growth, conversions and vibrant faith across denominations.
The Charismatic and Pentecostal movements emphasise the personal
.
ly
empowerment of the Holy Spirit, a living relationship with Jesus and the
on
appropriation of the Word of God, thereby solidifying the priesthood of
all believers even among the impoverished. In Asia, which remains one
se
of the neediest and least-evangelised regions of the world, the emphasis
lu
on supernatural healing, miracles, deliverance and the promise of divine
na
assistance have strong appeal among the poor and socially marginalised.
so
Consequently, in the past few decades, mass renewal movements have
swept through Asian countries, including Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand,
er
Myanmar, Borneo (Malaysia), China, South Korea and Cambodia.
rp
Asia is the birthplace to many of the world’s major religions and
Fo
countless folk religions. Therefore, Asia has a deep-seated worldview
e.
fraught with good and bad spirits that orchestrate all human events. In
l
the Asian psyche, religion is the solution to life’s ills through prayer and
sa
offerings to spiritual beings. Charismatic beliefs – centred on the Holy

re
Spirit, who aids, enlightens and performs miracles – tap into the Asian
or
worldview. For example, Christianity grew among the Hmong and Khmu
n
peoples in Laos through power evangelism, deliverance from evil spirits

tio
and miracles. In Asia, Christianity will continue to abound through the

bu
Charismatic and Pentecostal movements across denominations. The

tri
Catholic Charismatic renewal can also be expected to grow, especially in

is
the Philippines and Indonesia.

rd
Christianity will also grow among the youth through the Charismatic
fo
and Pentecostal movements. Among the mega-churches in the cities, the

lively worship, dynamic messages, testimonies and authentic experience
ot
have proved attractive to young people. In the future, the Charismatic ex-
N
perience will attract the youth, along with cause-driven activism, fervent
24/7 prayer rooms and authentic community.
(3) Christianity will continue to grow through indigenous house-

church movements
The fastest Christian growth will probably be through the multiplica-
tion of house-church movements and informal church networks. In Asia,
the Christian faith often began among ethnic minorities or marginalised
482 Mary Ho
populations who were persecuted, creating a fertile ground in which

house-church movements could emerge. For example, in Vietnam,
thousands of house churches spread among the persecuted Hmong
minority. In China, there are now conservatively more than 100 million
Christians, predominantly part of the house-church networks. In North
Korea, unofficial house-church networks might comprise between 100,000
and 300,000 believers. Accompanying this growth will be a rise in persecu-
tion and radicalism (see Trend 7, below), which will spur the spread of
Christianity through church-planting movements.
.
ly
There will also be a growth of disciple-making movements among
on
the young generation, who, as products of the Uber culture, do not want
to fight traffic to attend a large church with prescribed programmes. As
se
materialism unravels family values and increases the divorce rate, young
lu
people yearn for personal, authentic communities that social media cannot
na
provide. In the digital age, young people want to belong to authentic com-
so
munities, know their purpose in life and change the world by giving back
through social causes. Consequently, there will be a rise of small youth
er
communities in cities and universities. These might have names other than
rp
‘church’ but they will be essentially the same.
Fo
e.
(4) Christianity will be reinterpreted through indigenised worship,

l
theology, stories and social codes of honour

sa
Christianity will continue to spread mainly through indigenised forms.

re
Although all the major religions are imported, only Christianity is seen
or
as Western, while the others are seen as ‘Asian’, except in the predomin
n
antly Catholic countries of Timor-Leste and the Philippines. In the past,

tio
Christianity had the advantage of superior educational standards, but in

bu
the future, there will be a resurgence of Islamic and Buddhist intellectu-

tri
als articulating their cultural classical roots. Therefore, Christian theology

is
will need to increasingly incorporate Asian culture, oral traditions, and

rd
Confucian and Buddhist philosophy. Christianity also needs to be socially

fo
relevant and address issues specific to Asia. For example, South Korean
theology has already incorporated the concept of Minjung (the suffering
ot
masses) to portray Jesus championing the oppressed, and Asian theology

N
has adopted the Confucian concept of junzi (the gentleman-scholar) to

portray an ‘Asian’ Christ. Asian theology will increasingly employ in
digenous concepts, oral traditions and inter-religious traditions.
The indigenisation of Christianity is also seen in music, art and rituals.
In the Chinese underground church movement, indigenous worship songs
have proliferated. In Cambodia, Christians worship Jesus in the traditional
kneeling position, with hands above their heads. In Myanmar, a church-
planting movement was ignited using the Burmese-style illustration of
Bible stories. In the Himalayan Tibetan region, workers have produced

a set of 63 ‘biblical’ thankas (a Tibetan Buddhist art) to chronicle Genesis
to Revelation. Consequently, many Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns and
ethnic minorities have embraced the Christian faith. Throughout Asia,
Christianity has empowered minority populations and preserved their
culture through oral recordings, Bible translations, and redeeming cultural
traditions, fables and symbolism.
Most Asian cultures feature deep religious symbolism, practices and
celebrations. Instead of condemning local practices, Christianity will
.
ly
grow by finding culturally acceptable alternatives to pagan rituals, such
on
as honouring ancestors. The Cambodian churches have found redemp-
tive expressions of honouring parents by greeting them with bowing
se
and kneeling and bringing food and money for special occasions. Korean
lu
churches have transformed the Buddhist early-morning prayer into dawn
na
church prayers. In Laos, some churches now incorporate the animistic
so
khwan rituals by the pastor blessing a basket of strings. In Timor-Leste,
Christianity now coexists with the traditional lulik (holy) practices. In
er
Mongolia, the fastest Christian growth started as national leaders began
rp
to replace missionaries and they aim to disciple 10% of Mongolia’s popu-
Fo
lation by 2020. Churches are now writing indigenous worship songs to
e.
replace Western and Korean music in order to reach herders in remote

l
regions. Christianity will continue to grow through indigenous networks

sa
using indigenous practices.

re
or
(5) Christianity will grow through the migration of displaced peoples,

n
labour migration and reverse migration

tio
There are more migrants today than ever before, numbering around 250
bu
million people globally, of whom about a third are in Asia. Migration has
tri
been the norm in Asia, as the Chinese have long migrated to other Asian
is
countries and as the various ethnicities spill over borders. Today, there is
rd
also migration from the rural to the urban areas and by refugees displaced
fo
by conflict to other countries. Currently in Asia, the most serious refugee

crisis stems from the displacement of the Rohingya in Myanmar. Labour
ot
migration and reverse migration are also key contemporary trends.

N
There are other sources of migration as well. For example, both China
and Taiwan have offset the gender ratio imbalance by importing ‘brides’
from countries like Vietnam. Because Asian countries are closely clustered
together, there will be an increase in migration, triggering demographic
changes and tension in a complex region.
Labour migration is significant in Asia. Taiwan is currently experienc-
ing a drainage of professionals, business people and academicians to
China. Since the 1970s, the Philippines has sent some 10 million labour
484 Mary Ho
migrants to other countries, fuelling both the national economy and a

global missions movement. For example, about 70% of Christians in Brunei
are migrant workers from the Philippines and other Asian countries.
The effects of migration are complex. While migration due to labour has
brought Christianity to many places in Asia, the feminisation of migration
also means that more mothers are separated from their families, possibly
affecting the handing on of the faith in the migrants’ home countries.
Another factor is that Islam is also systematically spreading through
labour migration. In Malaysia, the Christian growth in Sabah and Sarawak
.
ly
has plunged since 2000 due to Muslims migrating from the Philippines
on
and Indonesia. Similarly, Muslim migrants are flooding into predomin
antly Christian Papua in Indonesia and are awarded the best jobs.
se
Christian influence will spread through reverse migration, especially
lu
Chinese professionals and scholars drawn by career opportunities in
na
China. China is the world’s largest source of international students.
so
Many of them embrace the Christian faith overseas and return to China
for long-term employment. Additionally, a large contingent of overseas
er
Chinese Christians is making regular trips back for business and short-
term mission assignments. rp
Fo
e.
(6) Christianity will grow through socio-economic initiatives and

l
political advocacy in a cause-driven younger generation

sa
Poverty remains a significant challenge in many contexts within this

re
region. Therefore, the social role of Christianity will continue to play

or
a pivotal role. Historically, Christianity has entered Asian countries

n
through socio-economic initiatives, including education, literacy,

tio
medicine and advocacy. For example, the first Protestant missionary to

bu
Taiwan, Dr George Mackay, established the first hospital and school, as

tri
well as planting the first church in the country. Similar patterns opened
is
up much of Asia. In the future, both evangelism and social transforma-

rd
tion will continue to spearhead the spread of Christian faith. However,

fo
social missions are unlikely to operate on a Western model of aid. As

Asian churches develop sustainable local ways of addressing social issues,
ot
Christianity will continue to be a major driver of modernisation through

N
socio-economic initiatives.
In Asia, Protestant and Catholic churches unite around social initia-
tives. In Japan, Christians advocated for the rights of the Ainu minority
in Hokkaido. Currently, in the Philippines, where the sex industry is
the fourth-largest source of income, Christian organisations are banding
together to eliminate the trafficking of up to 100,000 children and 400,000
women. Today, churches and denominations across Taiwan have united
to counter the legalisation of gay marriage through nationwide petitions,
prayer vigils and rallies. Such socio-political advocacy will continue to

define the future of Asia.
Christians can be expected to play a key role in political advocacy. In
the Philippines, the Catholic Church was instrumental in bringing down
Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 and Joseph Estrada in 2001. However, the con-
troversial anti-contraceptive campaign in 2012 created a backlash that has
diminished the church’s role in addressing socio-political issues, such as
the penal system. Despite some highly publicised scandals in South Korea,
churches will continue to exert an influential conservative platform in
.
ly
national politics. Christian leaders will play a key role in future unification
on
dialogues, as the National Council of Churches continues to advocate for
reconciliation between South and North Korea and the demilitarisation of
se
the peninsula.
lu
Education will continue to reach the marginalised populations in Asia.
na
In China, Christian-backed colleges draw ethnic minorities from rural
so
areas restricted to foreigners. As Burmese policies become more relaxed,
churches and Christian organisations are offering basic education and
er
starting private schools. In Cambodia, many from impoverished rural
rp
areas have opportunities to learn through Christian schools and churches.
Fo
Social initiatives are increasingly focused on sustainability, including
e.
agricultural projects and business-as-mission initiatives to close the

l
economic gap. A key Chinese church-movement leader predicts that

sa
whereas Christianity has traditionally grown through evangelism, future

re
growth will be predominantly through business and social initiatives that

or
serve society.
n
tio
(7) There will likely be an increase in persecution and martyrdom,

bu
along with a surge in radicalism, terrorism and violence

tri
There will be an increase in persecution, radicalism and violence in Asia.

is
In some countries, the political system is hostile to Christians through the

rd
government’s enforcement of ‘stability’, forbidding the public sharing

fo
of faith. In other countries, religious radicals target Christians through

terrorism and violence. Nevertheless, indications are that Christianity will
ot
continue to grow and thrive in these persecuted contexts.

N
Persecution is tied to the political system. Most Asian countries have

emphasised economic growth without a parallel political develop-
ment, thereby restricting Christian activities. China has been posting
breathtaking economic growth while strengthening the authority of the
Communist Party and tightening control of religions. Political develop-
ment in the Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia and Laos also lags behind
economic development. However, economic development has helped
Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia become more open to Christianity and
486 Mary Ho
the level of persecution can be expected to decrease in these countries.

Thailand is posting strong GDP growth but has been under military rule
since the 2014 coup. The Muslim countries of the region – Brunei, Indonesia
and Malaysia – will continue to limit Christian public activities. Similarly,
Christian evangelistic activities are prohibited in Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia. In Asia, political and religious freedom is most advanced
in Taiwan, Japan, Singapore and South Korea.
In pluralistic Southeast Asia, religious radicalism and violence will
rise as various ethnicities subscribe to different religions. Given the
.
ly
majority–minority dynamic, ethnic minorities will continue to experience
on
repression, hate crimes and persecution from the majority ethnic and
religious groups. For example, the predominantly Catholic nation of
se
the Philippines continues to clash with Islamic Jihadists in the southern
lu
islands, especially Mindanao, with an increase in kidnappings, killings
na
and bombings. Currently, every country in Southeast Asia has a dominant
so
religion – whether Buddhism, Christianity or Islam – except Singapore,
which has a peaceable representation of multiple religions. The following
er
are some of the countries that give cause for concern.
rp
In North Korea, tens of thousands of Christians are detained in labour
Fo
camps. Since 1994, anyone caught worshipping other gods besides North
e.
Korea’s ‘divine’ ruler is imprisoned, beaten or killed. However, the

l
natural disasters and the famine in the 1990s and the government’s recent
sa
focus on economic advancement have slightly cracked open the country.

re
Furthermore, summit talks between North and South Korea and between
or
North Korea and China might create new opportunities in North Korea.
n
China is officially atheist and will become increasingly repressive. In

tio
March 2018, the government eliminated the Religious Affairs Bureau and
bu
put religion directly under the Communist Party’s Central Committee.

tri
The Chinese government is especially targeting Christianity. While

is
Communist Party membership is around 90 million, the Christian popu-

rd
lation conservatively exceeds 100 million, representing about 7% of the

fo
total population. The government has shut down many house churches
and even the state-sanctioned Three-Self churches, especially in Henan
ot
province, where the house-church movement was birthed. Crosses have

N
been forcibly removed. Arrests, imprisonments and disappearances of

both Protestants and Catholics have increased. Since September 2018, the
government has passed rules further regulating religious texts, images
and videos through mobile apps and websites. Another key govern-
ment strategy is to ‘Sinicise’ religion to be ‘Chinese in orientation’ by
fostering folk religion, Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. Christianity,
including Catholicism, is seen as subversive and foreign. In past decades,
the Chinese government allowed only state-sanctioned Catholic churches
and bishops, while Vatican-appointed clergy operated underground.

In September 2018, the Vatican and the Chinese government signed a
landmark accord permitting the Pope to appoint bishops in return for the
recognition of seven state-appointed bishops. However, many Catholic
communities representing the 10–12 million Catholics in China believe
that this ‘sellout’ gives the government control of Catholic churches.
In Vietnam, there is still persecution of Christian ethnic minorities, who
constitute more than half of the Christian population, including beatings,
confiscations and destruction of homes. Registration applications for more
.
ly
than 1,000 Hmong churches remain unprocessed by the government for
on
fear of a possible independence movement.
Myanmar is controlled by a military government that strongly favours
se
Buddhism and restricts Christian evangelism, house churches and foreign
lu
literature. In 2018, government forces bombed the Christian Kachin areas.
na
Ethnic minorities, which make up most of the Christian population,
so
continue to suffer violent attacks, fines and imprisonment, especially the
Chin, Kachin, Karenni and Karen peoples. Currently, the most wide-
er
spread persecution is among the Muslim Rohingya refugees, who have
rp
been subjected to systematic ethnic cleansing since 1972.
Fo
Radicalism is on the rise in Indonesia, the country with the largest
e.
Muslim population in the world. It is also home to more than half of the
l
world’s Christians who live in Muslim-majority countries. It boasts one of

sa
the world’s top economies, but the economy is dominated by the Chinese,
re
a situation which has created racial tension and violence. The constitution
or
guarantees freedom of religion and resists Islamisation, but the Blasphemy

n
Law and the Penal Code undermine this constitutional provision and
tio
penalise those who are perceived to be speaking against Islam. In a highly

bu
publicised case in 2017, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly known as

tri
Ahok), the Chinese Christian governor of Jakarta, was controversially

is
indicted and imprisoned for insulting Islam. Radicalism, terrorism and

rd
violence, including riots, killings and car bombings, have increased

fo
in regions dominated by Islamic fundamentalists. Religious atrocities

committed in Maluku between Christians and Muslims have drawn inter-
ot
national attention. Non-Muslim minorities in states like Banda Aceh are

N
subjected to sharia law and churches have been destroyed. In May 2018,
three churches were bombed in Surabaya, the country’s second-largest
city. Increasingly, violence and bombings will change how Christians
gather for worship, because ‘mall churches’ and large buildings will
continue to be targeted.
Radical messages are grabbing hearts worldwide, especially among the
youth. Social media has been a conduit to tap into economic discontent
and spread radicalism, terrorist ideology and hate campaigns. A recent
488 Mary Ho
survey shows that 38% of college students in Indonesia have been exposed
to radical groups. There is a network of mosques, schools and imams
significantly funded to promote an extremist interpretation of Islam.
Despite that, a positive outcome from Ahok’s imprisonment has been
that the public has awakened to the destructive effect of radicalism and is
stepping up security and preventive measures. The future of Christianity
in Indonesia will be shaped by the growth of Muslim extremists and the
outcome of the presidential election in 2019.
In Malaysia, Islam is the official religion and Muslims are given edu-
.
ly
cational and economic preference. Although the constitution guarantees
on
freedom of religion, the civil law is subjugated by sharia law. Conversion
from Islam to Christianity is severely penalised. More than 100 radical
se
groups continue to demand a stricter interpretation of Islam. Christians
lu
are banned from using ‘Allah’ to describe God. Evangelism is illegal in
na
most states and public circulation of the Malay Bible is forbidden. Since
so
2016, violence has increased, including the abduction of Christian pastors
and converts from Islam. However, a more tolerant opposition defeated
er
the incumbent party in the 2018 elections, which might relax the legal im-
rp
positions on Christians and create new opportunities.
Fo
Brunei is officially a Muslim country, with the sultan as the head of
e.
religion. Under sharia law, non-Muslims are not allowed to use ‘Allah’.
l
Christmas celebrations in public places, evangelism, importing Bibles and

sa
building new churches are banned. Conversion from Islam is punishable

re
by death. This country will be repressive towards Christians as long as the

or
sultan continues to reign.

n
tio
(8) Increasing urbanisation will exacerbate socio-economic issues,

bu
while smart cities with digital technologies and disruptive innovations

tri
will widen the socio-economic gap

is
Many of the countries in East and Southeast Asia will be among the
rd
world’s most populous states, including China, Indonesia, Japan, Vietnam,

fo
the Philippines and Thailand. Much of the population growth will be in

urban areas. Therefore, there will be a significant rise in the urban poor,
ot
slum dwellers and women and children at risk. Since 2000, the globalisa-
N
tion of markets and technological development have been widening the

income disparity. Asian policy-makers must focus on inclusive growth to
stimulate equality of opportunity.
As urbanisation continues, Asian cities are leading digital initiatives
and disruptive innovations, including biomedical breakthroughs, artificial
intelligence, quantum computing and unmanned land and aerial vehicles.
China, through its sheer volume of start-ups, will lead in processing big
data. Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo will become smart cities that
build digital technology into their infrastructure. However, this explosion

in technology will widen the skills and income gaps in both rural and
urban areas.
A positive development is that digital technology and social media
enable information to reach rural areas and allow multiple voices to
be heard. In Asia, there are 1 billion active users of social media, and
mobile-phone usage has penetrated remote regions. Therefore, Christian
discipleship will no longer be defined by geographical proximity. In the
past, radio and television broadcasts disseminated the Christian message
.
ly
to remote areas, for example among the Khmu people of northern Laos.
on
While these methods will continue, digital media will increase ex
ponentially. Many churches in Asia now conduct discipleship through
se
interactive websites, blog sites, online forums and social media. Digital
lu
technology can also hurdle governmental barriers. For example, the 1,300
na
congregants of a church in Beijing recently shut down by the government
so
now download the sermons on their cellphones.
er
(9) Inter-religious dialogue will play a key role for peace and prosperity
in this ethnically pluralistic region rp
Fo
Christians will play a key role in reconciliation in this region fraught with
e.
ethnic conflict and religious nationalism. In times of conflict, religious

l
leaders are often the first to dialogue through inter-religious forums

sa
and Christians are often the first to initiate reconciliation. For example,
re
a Christian church-planting network in Indonesia has conducted ‘peace

or
camps’ between Christians and Muslims throughout Southeast Asia to

n
build common ground. Similarly, church leaders have facilitated summits

tio
between North and South Korea, and between Christians and Muslims
bu
after the violence in Ambon, Indonesia, in 1999. In Cambodia and Laos,

tri
there are inter-religious talks between Christian and Buddhist leaders.

is
In Myanmar, since democratic rule started in 2011, ethnic minorities

rd
are included in peace talks between the government and armed ethnic
fo
groups. In Singapore, inter-faith dialogues have built bridges among the

150 ethnic groups in the country. Inter-faith dialogues can be expected to
ot
contribute to the weaving of a tapestry of peace and understanding in this

N
mosaic region.
(10) The main threat to Christianity is the rise of secularism,

materialism and the pursuit of wealth
As Asian countries grow economically, the main threat to Christianity is
not persecution: it is secularisation and commercialisation. While persecu-
tion fuels spiritual fervour, materialism breeds a new faith that wealth can
solve all problems. In the context of Asia’s economic growth, prosperity
490 Mary Ho
theology, which claims to guarantee divine provision, health and well-

being, has gained popularity, validating the accumulation of wealth
in capitalist economies. In many cities, wealthy churches encourage
Christian business networking. Nevertheless, the focus on wealth breeds
secularism. In Hong Kong, there has been negative Christian growth, es-
pecially among the younger generation of churchgoers, since the 1970s. In
Singapore, there is a growing number of atheists and agnostics, who now
represent 18.5% of the population. Churches are losing their youth and
young adults.
.
ly
However, it is not just the wealthy cities and countries that are strug-
on
gling. Even in communist states such as Vietnam, commercialism and
materialism pose a greater threat to Christianity among young people than
se
government restrictions. In Laos, prosperity theology is gaining popu
lu
larity. Even among other religions, secularism is on the rise. As young
na
people pursue wealth and are turned off by radicalism, there is a rise in
so
‘Muslim atheists’ in Indonesia and Malaysia. Faith in wealth negates all
other religious beliefs. As Asian economies become more bullish, this
er
pressure will be brought to bear on Christianity in the region.
rp
Fo
(11) Indigenous mission movements will increase in Asia
e.
In Asia, the gospel began mainly among marginal groups, but these
l
marginal groups will be the future impetus of indigenous mission

sa
movements. In many Asian countries, oppressive governments and

re
majority religions have suppressed the gospel among the mainstream pop-
or
ulation. Consequently, mission efforts have focused on marginal groups,

n
including the Chin people in Myanmar; the lepers and the Hmong and
tio
Khmu peoples in Laos; the Chinese, Indians and Eurasians in Malaysia;

bu
and ethnic minorities in Vietnam. However, these same groups will be

tri
the catalyst for indigenous missions in Asia. For example, in Malaysia,

is
Christianity came through Christian migrants from India and China.

rd
Now, Malaysia is sending out about 500 missionaries. In Myanmar, Chin

fo
churches are sending up to 1,000 missionaries annually, mostly to other

ethnic groups and the Buddhist Burmans. Karen and Kachin mission
ot
aries are also working among the Rakhine, Wa, Plaung, Mon, Kaya and
N
Burmans. Similarly, Chinese Christians are engaging in missions under

the ‘Back to Jerusalem’ banner and might be further catalysed by the
government’s One Belt, One Road policy. In Thailand, Christians from the
Akha people are sharing with other minorities, such as the Akeu people.
Taiwanese aborigines are working in China to reach ethnic minorities who
have been oppressed by the dominant Han Chinese for centuries. Unlike
the Han Chinese, the Taiwanese aborigines are free of historical baggage,
are closer in culture and face similar socio-economic issues, including
discrimination, poverty and animistic oppression. Now many of these

ethnic minorities reached by Taiwanese aborigines are reaching neigh-
bouring ethnic minorities.
Mission in Asia is often cross-cultural within national boundaries.
Although both India and China have produced large-scale missionary
movements, these missionaries mainly stay within the national borders
or focus on diaspora populations. There could be a trend in the future
towards wider global outreach. Currently, South Korea leads the region
in sending missionaries to foreign countries. The Philippines is Asia’s
.
ly
second-largest sender of workers to other countries through its formidable
on
force of mission-minded migrant workers. Both Protestants and Catholics
have established their own Filipino churches and evangelism programmes
se
throughout the world. Given their unique sense of identity as the centre
lu
of Christianity in Asia, churches in the Philippines will almost certainly
na
continue to send many missionaries to other countries.
so
(12) Christian professionals will be the main impetus of missionary
er
outreach, using business platforms, career opportunities and trade
routes to open doors of opportunity rp
Fo
As 27 of the 30 countries with the fewest Christians are Muslim and three
e.
are Buddhist, the future of missionary outreach will be dominated by

l
businesspeople and professional ‘tent-makers’ gaining creative access to

sa
mild- to high-persecution countries. A growing number of Asian mission-

re
aries from Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia are already
or
going as teachers, engineers, medical professionals and businesspeople.

n
South Korean missionary initiative has also grown in tandem with its
tio
economic growth, because, historically, countries with strong economies

bu
have a higher sending capacity. This continues the trend of missionaries

tri
following trade routes, which has been evident since the colonial period.
is
This will continue to be the case as China launches its ambitious One Belt,
rd
One Road initiative, linking the ancient Silk Road route by land (belt) and
fo
sea (road) with Central Asia, the Middle East, Russia and Europe. So far,
68 countries have joined. This creates an ideal platform for Christian pro-
ot
fessionals to exercise missionary influence in regions that have long been

N
resistant to the Christian message.
Conclusion
Asia is a region of clashing extremes, where polar forces hang in fragile
tension. It houses some of the fastest-growing economies but is home to
two-thirds of the world’s poor. It hosts the world’s most populous atheistic
state but also vast numbers of Buddhists, Muslims and Christians. Asia
leads the world in digital technology, big data and disruptive innovation
492 Mary Ho
and yet swarms with a large unskilled population. It has the world’s most
ambitious economic expansion plan (One Belt, One Road) and yet has the
most protectionist country, North Korea. Culturally, the region ranges
from the formalised Japanese norms to those of the effusive, vibrant
Filipinos. The region is dominated by all the major religions of the world
and yet teems with a cornucopia of animistic religions. East Asia includes
the world’s second-largest sender of missionaries to foreign lands in South
Korea yet is also a hotbed for Islamic radicalism and terrorism. With North
Korea’s quest to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles, the region is
.
ly
tottering on the brink of nuclear conflict. China is also destabilising the
on
region by establishing bases in the South China Sea to which neighbour-
ing countries also have rights. Asia is a region where polar forces pivot in
se
precarious balance. It could become the world’s most explosive region. Or
lu
it could take the global lead economically, technologically and spiritually
na
as the most advanced region in the world. For Christians, the stakes are
so
high as they navigate pressure points and exploit new opportunities to
share their vision of the reign of God.
er
Bibliography rp
Fo
Economy, Elizabeth, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York:
e.
Granberg-Michaelson, Wesley, Future Faith: Ten Challenges Reshaping Christianity in the 21st
l
sa
Century (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 2018).

re
Hayes, Peter, and Chung-In Moon (eds), The Future of East Asia (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017).
or
Khanna, Parag, The Future Is Asian: Commerce, Conflict and Culture in the 21st Century (New
n
York: Simon and Schuster, 2019).

tio
Phan, Peter, Asian Christianities: History, Theology and Practice (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,
bu
2018).
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
N
ot
fo
rd
is
tri
bu
Appendices
tio
n
or
re
sa
l e.
Fo
rp
er
so
na
lu
se
on
ly
.
N
ot
fo
rd
is
tri
bu
tio
n
or
re
sa
l e.
Fo
rp
er
so
na
lu
se
on
ly
.
Christianity by Country
The table that begins overleaf provides a quick-reference, country-by-
.
ly
country listing for Christianity and its major traditions for all the countries
on
that appear in this volume. These statistics are found in the World Christian
Database (see Methodology and Sources) and all figures relate to 1970
se
and 2020. Small numbers are left unrounded to distinguish known small
lu
populations from zero but do not represent precise estimates.
na
The columns are as follows:
so
• Country (name of country in English)
er
• Region in which country is located
rp
• Total population of country (United Nations estimate, 1970, 2020) and
Fo
total numbers and percentage of population in each tradition
• Percentage mean annual growth rate, 1970–2020.
le.
The last page of the table presents regional totals.

sa
re
or
n
tio
bu
tri
is
rd
fo
ot
N
496 Christianity by Country
1970 2020 Growth

Country Region Tradition Population % Population % rate (%),
1970–2020
Brunei Southeast Asia Total population 130,000 100.0% 445,000 100.0% 2.5%
Christians 7,300 5.6% 52,000 11.7% 4.0%
Anglicans 4,000 3.1% 3,700 0.8% –0.2%
Independents 1,900 1.5% 17,500 3.9% 4.5%
Protestants 1,200 0.9% 9,400 2.1% 4.3%
Catholics 100 0.1% 20,000 4.5% 11.2%
Evangelicals 1,900 1.5% 10,200 2.3% 3.4%
Pentecostal/ 1,000 0.8% 16,000 3.6% 5.7%
.
ly
Charismatics
on
Cambodia Southeast Asia Total population 6,995,000 100.0% 16,716,000 100.0% 1.8%
Christians 33,300 0.5% 471,000 2.8% 5.4%
se
Anglicans 200 0.0% 700 0.0% 2.5%
lu
Independents 2,000 0.0% 180,000 1.1% 9.4%
Protestants 10,600 0.2% 305,000 1.8% 7.0%
na
Catholics 20,100 0.3% 25,000 0.1% 0.4%
so
Evangelicals 10,600 0.2% 320,000 1.9% 7.1%
Pentecostal/ 2,000 0.0% 365,000 2.2% 11.0%
er
Charismatics
China East Asia Total population 824,788,000
rp
100.0% 1,424,548,000 100.0% 1.1%
Fo
Christians 876,000 0.1% 106,030,000 7.4% 10.1%
Anglicans 100 0.0% 950 0.0% 4.6%
e.
Independents 183,000 0.0% 62,000,000 4.4% 12.4%

l
Orthodox 5,000 0.0% 10,000 0.0% 1.4%

sa
Protestants 254,000 0.0% 33,999,000 2.4% 10.3%

re
Catholics 400,000 0.0% 10,000,000 0.7% 6.6%

Evangelicals 59,300 0.0% 35,000,000 2.5% 13.6%
or
Pentecostal/ 93,400 0.0% 28,000,000 2.0% 12.1%

n
Charismatics
tio
Hong Kong East Asia Total population 3,873,000 100.0% 7,548,000 100.0% 1.3%
bu
Christians 623,000 16.1% 1,146,000 15.2% 1.2%

Anglicans 23,200 0.6% 29,200 0.4% 0.5%
tri
Independents 57,200 1.5% 170,000 2.3% 2.2%

is
Orthodox 50 0.0% 100 0.0% 1.4%

rd
Protestants 193,000 5.0% 411,000 5.4% 1.5%

fo
Catholics 256,000 6.6% 590,000 7.8% 1.7%

Evangelicals 122,000 3.1% 259,000 3.4% 1.5%
ot
Pentecostal/ 82,300 2.1% 320,000 4.2% 2.8%

N
Charismatics
Indonesia Southeast Asia Total population 114,835,000 100.0% 272,223,000 100.0% 1.7%
Christians 11,233,000 9.8% 33,192,000 12.2% 2.2%
Anglicans 2,000 0.0% 4,200 0.0% 1.5%
Independents 2,192,000 1.9% 6,384,000 2.3% 2.2%
Orthodox 0 0.0% 3,000 0.0% 12.1%
Protestants 6,261,000 5.5% 20,200,000 7.4% 2.4%
Catholics 2,620,000 2.3% 8,100,000 3.0% 2.3%
Evangelicals 1,715,000 1.5% 9,414,000 3.5% 3.5%
Pentecostal/ 2,179,000 1.9% 11,000,000 4.0% 3.3%
Charismatics
1970 2020 Growth

1970–2020
Japan East Asia Total population 104,926,000 100.0% 126,496,000 100.0% 0.4%
Christians 3,100,000 3.0% 2,665,000 2.1% –0.3%
Anglicans 49,100 0.0% 47,600 0.0% –0.1%
Independents 617,000 0.6% 1,113,000 0.9% 1.2%
Orthodox 26,500 0.0% 32,000 0.0% 0.4%
Protestants 417,000 0.4% 522,000 0.4% 0.5%
Catholics 361,000 0.3% 535,000 0.4% 0.8%
Evangelicals 258,000 0.2% 310,000 0.2% 0.4%
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Pentecostal/ 349,000 0.3% 430,000 0.3% 0.4%
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Charismatics
Laos Southeast Asia Total population 2,688,000 100.0% 7,165,000 100.0% 2.0%
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Christians 62,400 2.3% 199,000 2.8% 2.3%
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Anglicans 300 0.0% 200 0.0% –0.8%
Independents 400 0.0% 1,500 0.0% 2.7%
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Protestants 20,200 0.8% 150,000 2.1% 4.1%
so
Catholics 41,500 1.5% 47,000 0.7% 0.3%
Evangelicals 20,300 0.8% 145,000 2.0% 4.0%
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Pentecostal/ 40 0.0% 18,000 0.3% 13.0%
Charismatics
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Fo
Macao East Asia Total population 246,000 100.0% 652,000 100.0% 2.0%
Christians 32,600 13.2% 44,600 6.8% 0.6%
e.
Anglicans 200 0.1% 150 0.0% –0.6%

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Independents 50 0.0% 2,800 0.4% 8.4%

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Protestants 5,400 2.2% 10,200 1.6% 1.3%

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Catholics 27,000 11.0% 31,200 4.8% 0.3%

Evangelicals 3,100 1.2% 6,800 1.0% 1.6%
or
Pentecostal/ 1,800 0.7% 2,800 0.4% 0.9%

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Charismatics
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Malaysia Southeast Asia Total population 10,804,000 100.0% 32,869,000 100.0% 2.3%
bu
Christians 571,000 5.3% 2,991,000 9.1% 3.4%

Anglicans 69,600 0.6% 280,000 0.9% 2.8%
tri
Independents 24,100 0.2% 236,000 0.7% 4.7%

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Orthodox 3,700 0.0% 4,500 0.0% 0.4%

rd
Protestants 157,000 1.5% 900,000 2.7% 3.6%

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Catholics 301,000 2.8% 1,500,000 4.6% 3.3%

Evangelicals 126,000 1.2% 630,000 1.9% 3.3%
ot
Pentecostal/ 34,600 0.3% 640,000 1.9% 6.0%

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Charismatics
Mongolia East Asia Total population 1,279,000 100.0% 3,209,000 100.0% 1.9%
Christians 3,500 0.3% 62,400 1.9% 5.9%
Independents 100 0.0% 24,000 0.7% 11.6%
Orthodox 3,400 0.3% 2,600 0.1% –0.5%
Protestants 0 0.0% 34,000 1.1% 17.7%
Catholics 50 0.0% 1,300 0.0% 6.7%
Evangelicals 10 0.0% 9,000 0.3% 14.6%
Pentecostal/ 100 0.0% 17,000 0.5% 10.8%
Charismatics
1970 2020 Growth

1970–2020
Myanmar Southeast Asia Total population 26,381,000 100.0% 54,808,000 100.0% 1.5%
Christians 1,350,000 5.1% 4,362,000 8.0% 2.4%
Anglicans 27,000 0.1% 72,500 0.1% 2.0%
Independents 84,400 0.3% 680,000 1.2% 4.3%
Orthodox 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
Protestants 963,000 3.6% 2,628,000 4.8% 2.0%
Catholics 268,000 1.0% 660,000 1.2% 1.8%
Evangelicals 443,000 1.7% 1,600,000 2.9% 2.6%
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Pentecostal/ 86,900 0.3% 1,160,000 2.1% 5.3%
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Charismatics
North Korea East Asia Total population 14,410,000 100.0% 25,841,000 100.0% 1.2%
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Christians 142,000 1.0% 99,000 0.4% –0.7%
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Independents 8,000 0.1% 90,000 0.3% 5.0%
Protestants 119,000 0.8% 6,000 0.0% –5.8%
na
Catholics 15,000 0.1% 3,000 0.0% –3.2%
so
Evangelicals 8,800 0.1% 10,000 0.0% 0.3%
Pentecostal/ 8,600 0.1% 90,000 0.3% 4.8%
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Charismatics
Philippines Southeast Asia Total population 35,805,000
rp
100.0% 109,703,000 100.0% 2.3%
Fo
Christians 33,607,000 93.9% 99,577,000 90.8% 2.2%
Anglicans 63,300 0.2% 163,000 0.1% 1.9%
e.
Independents 7,142,000 19.9% 19,300,000 17.6% 2.0%

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Orthodox 200 0.0% 4,000 0.0% 6.2%

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Protestants 1,430,000 4.0% 6,237,000 5.7% 3.0%

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Catholics 30,860,000 86.2% 83,000,000 75.7% 2.0%

Evangelicals 692,000 1.9% 3,863,000 3.5% 3.5%
or
Pentecostal/ 1,182,000 3.3% 38,000,000 34.6% 7.2%

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Charismatics
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Singapore Southeast Asia Total population 2,072,000 100.0% 5,935,000 100.0% 2.1%
bu
Christians 162,000 7.8% 1,205,000 20.3% 4.1%

Anglicans 10,000 0.5% 70,000 1.2% 4.0%
tri
Independents 14,800 0.7% 200,000 3.4% 5.3%

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Orthodox 800 0.0% 2,700 0.0% 2.5%

rd
Protestants 35,200 1.7% 180,000 3.0% 3.3%

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Catholics 80,000 3.9% 270,000 4.5% 2.5%

Evangelicals 31,100 1.5% 250,000 4.2% 4.3%
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Pentecostal/ 9,900 0.5% 280,000 4.7% 6.9%

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Charismatics
South Korea East Asia Total population 32,209,000 100.0% 51,507,000 100.0% 0.9%
Christians 5,747,000 17.8% 17,277,000 33.5% 2.2%
Anglicans 32,400 0.1% 90,000 0.2% 2.1%
Independents 1,718,000 5.3% 11,330,000 22.0% 3.8%
Orthodox 3,000 0.0% 2,300 0.0% –0.5%
Protestants 2,117,000 6.6% 10,400,000 20.2% 3.2%
Catholics 838,000 2.6% 5,500,000 10.7% 3.8%
Evangelicals 2,132,000 6.6% 12,855,000 25.0% 3.7%
Pentecostal/ 324,000 1.0% 9,150,000 17.8% 6.9%
Charismatics
1970 2020 Growth

1970–2020
Taiwan East Asia Total population 14,693,000 100.0% 23,818,000 100.0% 1.0%
Christians 933,000 6.3% 1,463,000 6.1% 0.9%
Anglicans 2,100 0.0% 1,100 0.0% –1.2%
Independents 210,000 1.4% 510,000 2.1% 1.8%
Protestants 261,000 1.8% 450,000 1.9% 1.1%
Catholics 305,000 2.1% 240,000 1.0% –0.5%
Evangelicals 127,000 0.9% 225,000 0.9% 1.1%
Pentecostal/ 178,000 1.2% 365,000 1.5% 1.4%
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Charismatics
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Thailand Southeast Asia Total population 36,885,000 100.0% 69,411,000 100.0% 1.3%
Christians 240,000 0.6% 906,000 1.3% 2.7%
se
Anglicans 700 0.0% 20,000 0.0% 6.9%
lu
Independents 50,600 0.1% 89,300 0.1% 1.1%
Orthodox 0 0.0% 950 0.0% 9.5%
na
Protestants 34,000 0.1% 449,000 0.6% 5.3%
so
Catholics 154,000 0.4% 385,000 0.6% 1.9%
Evangelicals 27,000 0.1% 410,000 0.6% 5.6%
er
Pentecostal/ 55,000 0.1% 145,000 0.2% 2.0%
Charismatics
rp
Fo
Timor-Leste Southeast Asia Total population 605,000 100.0% 1,381,000 100.0% 1.7%
Christians 211,000 34.8% 1,224,000 88.6% 3.6%
e.
Protestants 22,000 3.6% 59,700 4.3% 2.0%

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Catholics 207,000 34.2% 1,143,000 82.8% 3.5%

sa
Evangelicals 6,000 1.0% 29,500 2.1% 3.2%

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Pentecostal/ 2,000 0.3% 68,000 4.9% 7.3%

Charismatics
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Vietnam Southeast Asia Total population 43,407,000 100.0% 98,360,000 100.0% 1.6%
n
Christians 3,264,000 7.5% 8,924,000 9.1% 2.0%

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Anglicans 2,200 0.0% 200 0.0% –4.7%

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Independents 44,700 0.1% 529,000 0.5% 5.1%

Protestants 159,000 0.4% 1,586,000 1.6% 4.7%
tri
Catholics 2,899,000 6.7% 7,221,000 7.3% 1.8%

is
Evangelicals 168,000 0.4% 1,650,000 1.7% 4.7%

rd
Pentecostal/ 32,600 0.1% 800,000 0.8% 6.6%

Charismatics
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1970 2015 Growth

Region Tradition Population % Population % rate (%),
1970–2015
East Asia Total population 996,425,000 100.0% 1,663,619,000 100.0% 1.0%
Christians 11,456,000 1.1% 128,787,000 7.7% 5.0%
Anglicans 107,000 0.0% 169,000 0.0% 0.9%
Independents 2,793,000 0.3% 75,240,000 4.5% 6.8%
Orthodox 37,900 0.0% 47,000 0.0% 0.4%
Protestants 3,366,000 0.3% 45,832,000 2.8% 5.4%
Catholics 2,202,000 0.2% 16,901,000 1.0% 4.2%
Evangelicals 2,710,000 0.3% 48,675,000 2.9% 5.9%
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Pentecostal/ 1,037,000 0.1% 38,375,000 2.3% 7.5%
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Charismatics
Southeast Asia Total population 280,607,000 100.0% 669,016,000 100.0% 1.8%
se
Christians 50,740,000 18.1% 153,102,000 22.9% 2.2%
lu
Anglicans 179,000 0.1% 615,000 0.1% 2.5%
Independents 9,557,000 3.4% 27,617,000 4.1% 2.1%
na
Orthodox 4,700 0.0% 15,200 0.0% 2.4%
so
Protestants 9,093,000 3.2% 32,703,000 4.9% 2.6%
Catholics 37,451,000 13.3% 102,371,000 15.3% 2.0%
er
Evangelicals 3,240,000 1.2% 18,322,000 2.7% 3.5%
Pentecostal/ 3,585,000 rp
1.3% 52,492,000 7.8% 5.5%
Fo
Charismatics
East and Southeast Asia Total population 1,277,032,000 100.0% 2,332,635,000 100.0% 1.2%
e.
Christians 62,196,000 4.9% 281,889,000 12.1% 3.1%

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Anglicans 286,000 0.0% 784,000 0.0% 2.0%

sa
Independents 12,351,000 1.0% 102,857,000 4.4% 4.3%

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Orthodox 42,600 0.0% 62,200 0.0% 0.8%

Protestants 12,459,000 1.0% 78,535,000 3.4% 3.8%
or
Catholics 39,653,000 3.1% 119,272,000 5.1% 2.2%

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Evangelicals 5,950,000 0.5% 66,997,000 2.9% 5.0%

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Pentecostal/ 4,622,000 0.4% 90,867,000 3.9% 6.1%

bu
Charismatics
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Methodology and Sources of Christian
and Religious Affiliation
Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo
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Unless otherwise designated, the demographic figures in this book, both
in the full-colour section and in the tables throughout, are from the World
se
Christian Database (Boston, MA: Brill). This essay offers a concise explanation
lu
of methods and sources related to the database. It is adapted from longer
na
treatments in Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, The World’s Religions
in Figures: An Introduction to International Religious Demography (Oxford:
so
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) and David B. Barrett and Todd M. Johnson, World
er
Christian Trends (Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library, 2001). The World
rp
Christian Database (WCD) includes detailed information on 45,000 Christian
Fo
denominations and on religions in every country of the world. Extensive
data are available on 234 countries and 13,000 ethno-linguistic peoples, as
e.
well as on 5,000 cities and 3,000 provinces. Information is readily available

l
sa
on religious activities, growth rates, religious literature, worker activity

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and demographics. Sources are evaluated and reviewed on a weekly basis

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by a professional staff dedicated to expanding and updating the WCD, and

the database is updated quarterly.
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The Right to Profess One’s Choice

The starting point of this methodology is the United Nations 1948 Universal
tri
Declaration of Human Rights, article 18:

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Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
fo
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or
ot
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or

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belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
Since its promulgation, this group of phrases has been incorporated into
the state constitutions of a large number of countries across the world.
This fundamental right also includes the right to claim the religion of
one’s choice, and the right to be called a follower of that religion and to be
enumerated as such. The section on religious freedom in the constitutions
of very many nations uses the exact words of the Universal Declara-
tion, and many countries instruct their census personnel to observe this
502 Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo
principle. Public declaration must therefore be taken seriously when en-

deavouring to survey the extent of religious and non-religious affiliation
around the world.
Religious Demography
The origins of the field of religious demography lie in the church censuses
conducted in most European societies. For many years and in many
countries, churches produced the most complete censuses of the popula-
tion. They achieved this largely by recording baptisms and funerals. These
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data, however, were seen not as referring to specific religious communi-
on
ties, but rather to the larger homogeneous societies. With the decline of
national churches in Europe beginning in the nineteenth and continuing
se
into the twentieth century, governments began tracking births and deaths,
lu
eventually replacing churches as the main bodies collecting detailed in-
na
formation on human populations. Although thousands of sources for
so
international religious demography are available, ranging from censuses
and demographic surveys to statistics collected and reported by religious
er
groups themselves, little has been done by scholars in religion, sociology,
rp
or other disciplines to collect, collate and analyse these data.
Fo
e.
Sources
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Data for religious demography fall broadly under five major headings:
sa
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1. Censuses in which a religious question is asked

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In the twentieth century, approximately half the world’s countries asked

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a question related to religion in their official national population censuses.

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Since 1990, however, this number has been declining as developing coun-
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tries have dropped the question, deeming it too expensive (in many
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countries each question in a census costs well over US$1 million), un
is
interesting or controversial. As a result, some countries that historically

rd
included a religion question have not done so in their censuses since 1990.
fo
National censuses are the best starting point for the identification of reli-
gious adherents, because they generally cover the entire population.
ot
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2. Censuses in which an ethnicity or language question is asked

In the absence of a question on religion, another helpful piece of informa-
tion from a census is ethnicity or language. This is especially true when
a particular ethnic group can be equated with a particular religion. For
example, over 99% of Somalis are Muslim, so the number of Somalis in,
say, Sweden is an indication of a part of the Muslim community there.
Similarly, a question that asks for country of birth can be useful. If the
answer is ‘Nepal’ there is a significant chance that the individual or
community is Hindu. In each of these cases the assumption is made (if

there is no further information) that the religion of the transplanted ethnic
or linguistic community is the same as that in the home country.
3. Surveys and polls

In the absence of census data on religion, large-scale demographic surveys
such as MEASURE (Monitoring and Evaluation to Assess and Use Results)
and Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) often include a question
about the respondent’s religious affiliation. In some instances, demographic
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surveys by groups such as UNICEF (the United Nations Children’s Fund)
on
include a religious affiliation question. Demographic surveys, although less
comprehensive than a national census, have several advantages over other
se
types of general population surveys and polls. Demographic and Health
lu
Surveys (DHS) are highly regarded by demographers and social scientists,
na
and provide valuable nationally representative data on religion. Surveys can
so
also be commissioned in light of a dearth of data on a particular subject and
results can be used to search for correlations between different variables.
er
4. Scholarly monographs rp
Fo
Every year, scholars publish hundreds of monographs on particular
e.
religions or religions in particular countries or regions. Such monographs

l
differ from other sources in that they attempt to provide an overall profile
sa
of religion in an area or country, bringing to light local sources of quantita-

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tive data as well as qualitative information that provides layers of context

or
and background.
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5. Religion statistics in yearbooks and handbooks

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Religious communities keep track of their members, using everything

tri
from simple lists to elaborate membership reports. The most detailed data
is
collection and analysis is undertaken each year by some 45,000 Christian de-
rd
nominations and their 4.7 million constituent churches and congregations

fo
of believers. The latter invest over US$1.1 billion annually for a massive, de-
centralised and largely uncoordinated global census of Christians. In sum,
ot
they send out around 10 million printed questionnaires in 3,000 different

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languages, covering 180 major religious subjects reporting on 2,000 socio-

religious variables. This collection of data provides a year-by-year snapshot
of the progress or decline of Christianity’s diverse movements, offering an
enormous body of data from which researchers can track trends and make
projections. Statistics collected by religious communities often enable re-
searchers to distinguish between two categories of religionists – practising
and non-practising – based on whether or not they take part in the ongoing
organised life of the religion.
In addition to the above categories, there are governmental statistical

reports, questionnaires and reports from collaborators, field surveys and
interviews, correspondence with national informants, unpublished docu-
mentation, encyclopaedias, dictionaries and directories of religions, print
and web-based contemporary descriptions of religions, and dissertations
and theses on religion. The best practices in determining the religious
affiliation of any population utilise as many sources as possible.
Affiliation
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There are at least two different perspectives on what it means to be a
on
Christian: professing Christians and affiliated Christians. Utilising the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a foundation,
se
‘professing Christians’ means all those who profess to be Christians
lu
in government censuses or public-opinion polls, that is, who declare or
na
identify themselves as Christians, who say ‘I am a Christian’ or ‘We are
so
Christians’ when asked the question ‘What is your religion?’
However, not all those who profess to be Christians are affiliated to
er
organised churches and denominations. Therefore, ‘affiliated Christians’
rp
are those known to the churches or known to the clergy (usually by names
Fo
and addresses) and claimed in their statistics, that is, those enrolled on
e.
the churches’ books or records, with totals that can be substantiated. This
l
usually means all known baptised Christians and their children, and
sa
other adherents; it is sometimes termed the ‘total Christian community’

re
(because affiliated Christians are those who are not primarily individual
or
Christians but who primarily belong to the corporate community of

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Christ), or ‘inclusive membership’ (because affiliated Christians are church

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members). This definition of ‘Christians’ is what the churches usually mean

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by the term (and thus the WCD), and statistics on such affiliated Christians
tri
are what the churches themselves collect and publish. In all countries, it
is
may be assumed with confidence that the churches know better than the
rd
state how many Christians are affiliated to them. This therefore indicates a
fo
second measure of the total Christians that is quite independent of the first
(government census figures of professing Christians).
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Children
The family is by far the most important instrumentality through which
individuals acquire personal, cultural and social self-identification. In
consequence, children of church members are more likely to remain
members than those whose parents are not church members. Children of
ardent and practising Christians usually are, to the extent that their years
permit, ardent and practising Christians. However, many churches do not
enumerate children under 15 years. One reason is that it has been widely
noted that most conversion crises occur in the 13–20-year age group in
Christian families or in majority Christian contexts. On this view, therefore,
children who have not yet reached 15 cannot reasonably be expected to
be practising and believing Christians. The WCD takes the opposite view:
children and infants also can properly be called Christians, and can actively
and regularly (to the extent of their ability) practise the Christian faith.
Consequently, where Christian denominations do not count children in
their membership rolls, their membership is reported in our adult category.
A total community figure is calculated (in the absence of any additional
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information from the denomination) by adding in the average number of
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children reported in United Nations statistics for the given country. Thus,
the total community figures are comparable from one denomination to the
se
next whether or not they count children in their membership.
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na
Choice of Best Data Available
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Religious demography must attempt to be comprehensive. In certain
countries where no hard statistical data or reliable surveys are available,
er
researchers have to rely on the informed estimates of experts in the area
rp
and subject. Researchers make no detailed attempt at a critique of each
Fo
nation’s censuses and polls or each church’s statistical operations. After
e.
examining what is available, researchers then select the best data available
l
until such time as better data come into existence. In addition, there are a
sa
number of areas of religious life where it is impossible to obtain accurate

re
statistics, usually because of state opposition to particular tradition(s). Thus

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it will probably never be possible to get exact numbers of, for example,
n
atheists in Indonesia or Baha’i in Iran. Where such information is necessary,

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reasonable and somewhat conservative estimates are made.

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Reconciling Discrepancies in Survey Data

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There are post-survey strategies that help general population surveys better
rd
reflect the actual composition of a particular country. For instance, if in a

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survey of 1,000 people, 60% were women and 40% were men, but we know
that women and men are each 50% of the country’s total population based
ot
on a recent census, then each woman’s response on the general population

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survey would be weighted down by a factor of 500/600 and each man’s

response would be weighted up by a factor of 500/400. Such adjustments
are called weighting.
Other adjustments made to general population surveys may require
taking into account that they are meant to be representative of only adult
populations. Therefore their results require adjustments, particularly if
some religious groups have more children than others in the same country.
This requires either a complete roster of members of each household or some
other way to estimate of the number of children living in the household

with the adults. When a complete roster is unavailable, most estimates of
religious affiliation of children assume that they have the same religion
as their one of their parents (usually assumed by demographers to be the
religion of the mother). Differences in fertility rates between religious
groups are particularly useful in estimating religious differentials among
children. This is because demographic projections carry forward children
born to women. It may introduce some bias to the degree that the father’s
religion is more likely to be the religion of the children than the mother.
.
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Example: Coptic Church in Egypt
At times, the results from government censuses and information from
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religious communities can be strikingly different. For example, in Egypt,
lu
where the vast majority of the population is Muslim, government censuses
na
taken every 10 years have shown consistently for the past 100 years that
so
a declining share of the population declare themselves as or profess to
be Christians. In the most recent census, some 5% identified as Christian.
er
However, church estimates point to a percentage figure three times larger
rp
(15%). This discrepancy may be due to overestimates by the churches or
Fo
attributed, at least in part, to social pressure on some Christians to record
e.
themselves as Muslims. Further, according to news reports, some Egyptian

l
Christians have complained that they are listed on official identity cards as
sa
Muslims. It also might be that church reports include Egyptian Christians

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working as expatriates outside Egypt, while the census does not, or that
or
the churches simply overestimate their numbers.

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Such a lack of clarity is compounded by media reports and even Egyptian

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government announcements repeatedly claiming that Christians make up

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10% or more of the country’s approximately 80 million people, despite

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the fact that the census repeatedly reports only 5%. The highest share of
is
Christians found in an Egyptian census was in 1927 (8.3%). Figures for

rd
Egyptian Christians declined in each subsequent census, with Christians

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seemingly making up 5.7% of the Egyptian population in 1996. The report

from the most recent census, conducted in 2006, does not, however,
ot
provide data on religious affiliation, but a sample of the 2006 census data is
N
available through the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International

(IPUMS). They sample the same Christian share (about 5%) as the latest
Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey, with a sample size of 16,527
women aged 15–49 years.
According to the Pew Forum’s analysis of Global Restrictions on Religion
(see www.pewforum.org), Egypt has very high scores for government re-
strictions on religion as well as high scores for social hostilities involving
religion. These factors might lead some Christians to be cautious about
revealing their identity. Regardless of the actual number, it is very likely

that Christians are declining as a proportion of Egypt’s population, even if
their absolute numbers are not falling. On the one hand, Christian fertility
in Egypt has been lower than Muslim fertility. On the other, is possible that
large numbers of Christians have left the country, although a 2012 study
by the Pew Forum on the religious affiliation of migrants around the world
has not found evidence of an especially large Egyptian Christian diaspora.
Dates of Statistics
.
ly
It is important, in changing situations, to know the exact date (year,
on
perhaps also month and sometimes even day) to which particular statistics
apply. This methodology compares government statistics of religion with
se
statistics from religious communities themselves; but in doing so, it must
lu
be remembered that a government census (or a public-opinion poll) is
na
almost always taken on a single, known day; whereas, by contrast, religious
so
statistics are compiled over a lengthy period – perhaps three, four or even
five years from the local grassroots counting of heads to final compilation of
er
totals by a large denomination or church. Denominational totals published
rp
in 2020 therefore probably refer to the situation in 2017, 2016 or even 2015.
Fo
e.
Counting Pentecostals
l
Three types of Pentecostals

sa
For the purpose of understanding the diverse global phenomenon of Pente

re
costalism, it is useful to divide the movement into three kinds, or types. First
or
are denominational Pentecostals, organised into denominations in the early

n
part of the twentieth century. Second are Charismatics, individuals in the

tio
mainline denominations (primarily after the mid-twentieth century). Third

bu
are Independent Charismatics, those who broke free of denominational

tri
Pentecostalism or mainline denominations to form their own networks.

is
rd
Pentecostals (Type 1)
fo
Pentecostals are defined as Christians who are members of the explicitly

Pentecostal denominations whose major characteristic is a new experience
ot
of the energising ministry of the Holy Spirit that most other Christians
N
have considered to be highly unusual. This is interpreted as a rediscovery

of the spiritual gifts of New Testament times and their restoration to
ordinary Christian life and ministry. Classical Pentecostalism usually is
held to have begun in the United States in 1901, although most scholars
have moved to a ‘multiple origins’ theory of the birth of modern Pente-
costalism, emphasising early activity outside of the Western World. For
a brief period, Pentecostalism expected to remain an interdenomina-
tional movement within the existing churches, but from 1909 onwards its
members increasingly were ejected from mainline bodies and so forced to

begin new organised denominations.
Pentecostal denominations hold the distinctive teachings that all Chris-
tians should seek a post-conversion religious experience called baptism
in the Holy Spirit and that a Spirit-baptised believer may receive one or
more of the supernatural gifts known in the early church: the ability to
prophesy; to practise divine healing through prayer; to speak (glossola-
lia), interpret or sing in tongues; to sing in the Spirit, dance in the Spirit,
pray with upraised hands; to receive dreams, visions, words of wisdom,
.
ly
words of knowledge; to discern spirits; and to perform miracles, power en
on
counters, exorcisms (casting out demons), resuscitations, deliverances, or
other signs and wonders.
se
From 1906 onwards, the hallmark of explicitly Pentecostal denomina-
lu
tions, by comparison with Holiness/Perfectionist denominations, has been
na
the single addition of speaking in other tongues as the ‘initial evidence’ of
so
one’s having received the baptism of the Holy Spirit, whether or not one
subsequently experiences regularly the gift of tongues. Most Pentecostal
er
denominations teach that tongues-speaking is mandatory for all members,
rp
but in reality today not all members have practised this gift, either initially
Fo
or as an ongoing experience. Pentecostals are defined here as all associated
e.
with explicitly Pentecostal denominations that identify themselves in

l
explicitly Pentecostal terms, or with other denominations that as a whole

sa
are phenomenologically Pentecostal in teaching and practice.

re
Among Protestants (coded as ‘P-’) are Pentecostal denominations such

or
as the Assemblies of God. Sub-categories of Oneness, Baptistic, Holiness,

n
Perfectionist and Apostolic were retained from earlier research. Each minor
tio
tradition within Pentecostalism is considered to be 100% Pentecostal (all

bu
members of Pentecostal denominations are counted as Pentecostals).

tri
is
Charismatics (Type 2)
rd
Charismatics are defined as Christians affiliated to non-Pentecostal de-

fo
nominations (Anglican, Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox) who receive the

experiences above in what has been termed the Charismatic movement.
ot
The Charismatic movement’s roots go back to early Pentecostalism, but

N
its rapid expansion has been mainly since 1960 (later called the Charis-
matic renewal). Charismatics usually describe themselves as having been
‘renewed in the Spirit’ and as experiencing the Spirit’s supernatural and
miraculous and energising power. They remain within, and form organised
renewal groups within, their older mainline non-Pentecostal denominations
(instead of leaving to join Pentecostal denominations). They demonstrate
any or all of the charismata pneumatika (gifts of the Spirit), including signs
and wonders (but with glossolalia regarded as optional).
Type 2 recognises the existence of Pentecostal individuals within the

Anglican, Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant traditions. These are
designated ‘Charismatic’ and evaluated by country as Catholic Charis
matics, Anglican Charismatics and so on, designating renewal within an
existing tradition. For example, the beginning of the Charismatic movement
in Anglican churches is described by Episcopal priest Dennis Bennett in
Nine O’Clock in the Morning (Alachua, FL: Bridge-Logos, 1970). Traditions
are assessed to determine what percentage of adherents identify themselves
as Charismatics, ranging from 0% to 100%. Self-identification percentages
.
ly
for Charismatics were calculated by contacting renewal agencies working
on
within denominations.
se
Independent Charismatics (Type 3)
lu
While the classification and chronology of the first two types is straight
na
forward, there are thousands of churches and movements that ‘resemble’
so
the first two types but do not fit their definitions. These constitute a third
type and often pre-date the first two types. For lack of a better term, these
er
are called ‘Independent Charismatics’. Part of the rationale for this term
rp
is the fact that they are largely found in the Independent category of the
Fo
overall taxonomy of Christians. Thus, Type 3 includes Pentecostal or
e.
semi-Pentecostal members of the 250-year-old Independent movement

l
of Christians, primarily in the Global South, of churches begun without

sa
reference to Western Christianity. These indigenous movements, although

re
not all explicitly Pentecostal, nevertheless have the main features of Pente
or
costalism. In addition, since Azusa Street, thousands of schismatic or other

n
Independent Charismatic churches have come out of Type 1 Pentecostals

tio
and Type 2 Charismatic movements. They consist of Christians who,

bu
unrelated to or no longer related to the Pentecostal or Charismatic denomi-

tri
nations, have become filled with the Spirit, or empowered by the Spirit and
is
have experienced the Spirit’s ministry (although usually without recognis-

rd
ing a baptism in the Spirit separate from conversion); who exercise gifts of
fo
the Spirit (with much less emphasis on tongues, as optional or even absent
or unnecessary) and emphasise signs and wonders, supernatural miracles
ot
and power encounters; but also do not identify themselves as either

N
Pentecostals (Type 1) or Charismatics (Type 2). In a number of countries

they exhibit Pentecostal and Charismatic phenomena but combine this
with rejection of Pentecostal terminology. These believers frequently are
identified by their leadership as Independent, Postdenominationalist,
Restorationist, Radical, Neo-Apostolic or ‘Third Wave.’
Thus, the third type is Independent Charismatics (also known in the
literature as neo-Charismatics or neo-Pentecostals) who are not in Protestant
Pentecostal denominations (Type 1) nor are they individual Charismatics
in the traditional churches (Type 2). Type 3 is the most diverse of the
three types and ranges from house churches in China to African Initiated
Churches to white-led Charismatic networks in the Western world. It
includes Pentecostals who had split off from established Protestant denom-
inations (Type 1) and who were then labelled as Independent. Independent
churches formed by Charismatic leaders (Type 2) who founded new congre-
gations and networks are also included. Some Independent Charismatics
speak in tongues, but healing and power evangelism are more prominent
in this type than in the other two.
.
ly
on
Three types together
One difficulty that has plagued all researchers and historians of Pente-
se
costalism is what to call the overarching movement. Some have used
lu
‘Pentecostalism’ or ‘Global Pentecostalism’, while others have used
na
‘Charismatic’. Still others have used ‘Pentecostal and Charismatic’. David
so
Barrett originally used the lengthy phrase ‘the Pentecostal and Charismatic
Renewal of the Holy Spirit’, which he later shortened to ‘Renewal’. He then
er
coined the term ‘Renewalist’ to refer to all three waves or types. For the
rp
purposes of this series, we use the term ‘Pentecostals/Charismatics’ to refer
Fo
to all three types.
e.
A demographic overview of Pentecostals/Charismatics (all types) illu

l
strates the complexities of both the spread of the movement across the
sa
countries of the world and the striking diversity of the churches them-
re
selves. While current ways of understanding Pentecostals, Charismatics

or
and Independent Charismatics reveal a global movement of immense pro-

n
portions, perspectives on classification, counting and assessment of the

tio
movement are likely to continue to evolve. In the meantime, hundreds of

bu
millions of Christians across all traditions will continue to participate in

tri
the movement – bringing vitality in some denominations and schism in

is
others. They will also promote social transformation in some communi-

rd
ties and show little participation in others. What is certain is that, for the
fo
foreseeable future, Christianity as a whole will continue to experience the

growth pains of this global phenomenon.
ot
N
Counting Evangelicals
Any effective and comprehensive method for counting Evangelicals must
take into consideration denominational affiliation, self-identification and
theology. The results of counting Evangelicals are directly related to de-
nominational membership figures. Strictly speaking, denominational
affiliation means official membership on a church roll.
Method 1: Individuals in denominations that are 100% Evangelical

The first category of Evangelicals includes individuals who are found in
denominations that are coded 100% Evangelical. That is, membership of
an Evangelical council (national, regional or global) is assessed for every
denomination and those denominations that have Evangelical affiliations
are classed as 100% Evangelical. Consequently, 100% of the members of
these denominations are considered Evangelical. Using this method alone,
the WCD estimates there are 150 million Evangelicals in the world. As of
2010, the nine largest 100% Evangelical denominations in the world were
.
ly
all Protestant, and the five largest 100% Evangelical denominations were
on
found in Brazil, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Indonesia, reflecting the global scope
of the movement.
se
lu
Method 2: Individuals who self-identify as Evangelical in non-100%
na
Evangelical denominations
so
For those denominations not identified as 100% Evangelical, an estimate
er
is made of the percentage (0–99%) of members who self-identify as
rp
Evangelical. Self-identification percentages for Evangelicals in non-100%
Fo
Evangelical denominations are verified by contacting key figures within
each denomination, and each estimate is sourced in documentation housed
e.
at the Center for the Study of Global Christianity. Adding together figures
l
sa
from both 100% and partially Evangelical denominations gives a total of

re
285 million Evangelicals worldwide. Looking at both 100% and non-100%

Evangelical denominations reveals that the movement has a significant
or
presence beyond Western Protestantism. Some of the denominations with

n
tio
the most Evangelicals are within Anglicanism in the Global South, such as
the Anglican Church of Nigeria and the Church of Uganda. Chinese house
bu
churches (classified as Independents) taken together constitute the denom-

tri
ination with the third most Evangelicals globally. The United Kingdom
is
(the Church of England) and the United States (the Southern Baptist
rd
Convention), however, are still important locations of the movement.

fo
ot
Method 3: Evangelicals not affiliated with any denomination (Unaffiliated

N
Evangelicals)
To date, no studies have addressed directly how many Evangelicals are
denominationally unaffiliated. However, two well known realities (in
Western Christianity, in particular) appear to provide indirect evidence for
this undocumented trend. The first is reflected in recent research indicating
the unaffiliated are not uniformly non-religious. The Pew Research Center
reported that 68% of America’s unaffiliated believe in God. It is reasonable
to assume that a notable proportion of Christians is among the ranks of
the unaffiliated by virtue of Christianity being the largest religion in many

of the countries studied. The second reality is the acknowledged fact that
unaffiliated Christians often attend and are active in churches, including
Evangelical churches, without becoming official members. These unaffili-
ated Christians profess allegiance and commitment to Christ but do not
maintain church affiliation.
Dynamics of Change in Religious Populations

The question of how and why the number of religious adherents changes
.
ly
over time is critical to the study of international religious demography. It
on
is more complex than simply ‘counting heads’ via births and deaths – a
well established area in quantitative sociological studies – but in addition
se
involves the multifaceted areas of religious conversion and migration.
lu
The migration of religious people has only in the past few years become
na
a more researched area of demographic study, and issues surrounding
so
religious conversion continue to be under-represented in the field. Data
on religion from a wide range of sources – including from the religious
er
communities themselves, as well as governments and scholars – must be
rp
employed to understand the total scope of religious affiliation. Given data
Fo
on a particular religion from two separate points in time, the question
e.
can be raised, ‘What are the dynamics by which the number of adherents
l
changes over time?’ The dynamics of change in religious affiliation can

sa
be reduced to three sets of empirical population data that together enable

re
enumeration of the increase or decrease in adherents over time. To measure

or
overall change, these three sets can be defined as follows: (1) births minus
n
deaths; (2) converts to minus converts from; and (3) immigrants minus
tio
emigrants. The first variable in each of these three sets (births, converts
bu
to, immigrants) measures increase, whereas the second (deaths, converts

tri
from, emigrants) measures decrease. All future (and current) projections of

is
religious affiliation, within any subset of the global population (normally

rd
a country or region), will account for these dynamics, and the changes
fo
themselves are dependent on these dynamics.

ot
Births
N
The primary mechanism of global religious demographic change is (live)

births. Children are almost always counted as having the religion of their
parents (as is the law in Norway, for example). In simple terms, if popula-
tions that are predominantly Muslim, for example, have more children on
average than those that are predominantly Christian or Hindu, then over
time (all other things being equal) Muslims will become an increasingly
larger percentage of that population. This means that the relative size of a
religious population has a close statistical relationship to birthrates.
Deaths
Even as births increase their memberships, religious communities experience
constant loss through the deaths of members. Although this often includes
tragic, unanticipated deaths of younger members, it most frequently affects
the elderly members. Thus, changes in health care and technology can posi-
tively impact religious communities if members live longer.
Births minus deaths/total fertility rate

The change over time in any given population is most simply expressed
.
ly
as the number of births into the community minus the number of deaths
on
out of it. Many religious communities around the world experience little
else in the dynamics of their growth or decline. Detailed projections rely
se
on a number of estimated measures, including life expectancy, population
lu
age structures and the total fertility rate. This means that any attempt to
na
understand the dynamics of religious affiliation must be based firmly on
so
demographic projections of births and deaths.
er
Converts to
rp
It is a common observation that individuals (or even whole villages or
Fo
communities) change allegiance from one religion to another (or to no
e.
religion at all). Unfortunately, one of the problems in studying conversion

l
is the paucity of information on it. Reliable data on conversions are hard

sa
to obtain, for a number of reasons. Although some national censuses

re
ask people about their religion, they do not directly ask whether people
or
have converted to their present faith. A few cross-national surveys do

n
contain questions about religious switching, but even in those surveys it

tio
is difficult to assess whether more people leave a religion than enter it. In
bu
some countries, legal and social consequences make conversion difficult,

tri
and survey respondents might be reluctant to speak honestly about the

is
topic. In particular, Hinduism is for many Hindus (as is Islam for many
rd
Muslims) not just a religion but also an ethnic or cultural identity that does
fo
not depend on whether a person actively practises the faith. Thus even
non-practising or secular Hindus may still consider themselves, and be
ot
viewed by their neighbours, as Hindus.

N
Converts from
Conversion to a new religion, as mentioned above, also involves conver-
sion from a previous one. Thus, a convert to Islam is, at the same time, a
convert from another religion. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries,
the most converts from Christianity were and continue to be found largely
among those in the Western world who have decided to be agnostics or
atheists.
Converts to minus converts from

The net conversion rate in a population is calculated by subtracting the
number of ‘converts from’ from the number of ‘converts to’. Conversion
to and conversion from will likely continue to play a role in changing
religious demographics in the future.
Immigrants
Equally important at the international level is how the movement of people
across national borders impacts religious affiliation. Once religious com-
.
ly
munities are established through immigration they often grow vigorously
on
(for a time) via high birth rates.
se
Emigrants
lu
In a reversal of nineteenth-century European colonisation of Africa, Asia
na
and parts of the Americas, the late twentieth century witnessed waves of
so
emigration of people from these regions to the Western world. The impact
er
on religious affiliation is significant.
Immigrants minus emigrants

rp
Fo
In the twenty-first century, international migration continues to have a
e.
significant impact on the religious composition of individual countries. One

l
can try to anticipate the way in which expected immigration and emigration
sa
trends will affect a country’s population over time. One profound change
re
to be expected is the increase of religious pluralism in almost every country

or
of the world. Increasing religious pluralism is not always welcomed and

n
can be seen as a political, cultural, national or religious threat.

tio
bu
The six dynamics discussed above determine changes in religious

tri
demographics. Gains are the result of three positive dynamics: births,

is
conversions to, and immigration. Losses are the result of three negative
rd
dynamics: deaths, conversions from, and emigration. The net change in

fo
religious demographics is the result of gains minus losses. The balance of

dynamics can be reflected in any proportions (for example, mainly births
ot
for gains, mainly conversions from for losses) but can also be represented
N
by pairing the gains and losses by type: births versus deaths, converts to
versus converts from, and immigrants versus emigrants. In each case, the
net change (either positive or negative) will be the difference between the
two. This means that any attempt to understand religious affiliation in
the past, present or future must be firmly based on demographic dynam-
ics. A proper awareness of these dynamics as well as their significance is
thus vital both for undertaking and for interpreting studies of the future
of religion.
Measuring Growth Rates

The rates of growth, increase, decrease or decline of membership in many
congregations can readily be measured from their annually reported
statistics. This has been done by obtaining the statistics for two different
years, where possible five years apart (to minimise the effects of roll-
cleaning and other annual irregularities), usually 2000–5 and 2005–10, and
working out the average annual growth rate as a percentage. Great care
must be taken in such computations to ensure that the statistics used are
measuring exactly the same entity (especially geographically) for each of
.
ly
the two years concerned. Growth, as a percentage increase or decrease per
on
year, must be measured by dividing any annual increase by the identical
category of total. Thus a church, for example, in a particular country with
se
500,000 total adherents (including children) in 2005 which grows to 600,000
lu
total adherents (including children) in 2010 shows an increase of 600,000
na
minus 500,000 = 100,000, which divided by 5 = 20,000 a year, which divided
so
by the mean membership of 550,000 gives an increase rate of 3.64% per
er
year. In practice, the methodology follows a more accurate method by
rp
using the 1970 to 2020 figures for each denomination to arrive at average
annual growth rates.
Fo
There are different ways of measuring the growth of a religious body.
e.
First, one can measure either adults only, or total community including
l
children. Secondly, the growth rate of a church or religious grouping can

sa
be measured over a single day, or a month, a year, a decade, or 50 years –

re
and all will yield differing results. This survey is concerned primarily to
or
measure long-term rates. A growth rate measured for a specific religious

n
body over a two- or three-year period may not be sustained over a decade.
tio
bu
Projecting Religious Populations

tri
The starting point of future studies is natural growth of the total population
is
of the country or region of interest, using demographic projections as

rd
a baseline. Three major areas beyond natural growth are utilised to

fo
improve the projections. First, birth and death rates vary among religious
communities within a particular country. Secondly, increasing numbers of
ot
people are likely to change their religious affiliations in the future. Thirdly,
N
immigration and emigration trends will impact a country’s population

over time. The highest-quality projections for religious communities are
built on cohort-component projections – ones that use differential rates
for each religion: age-specific fertility rates by religion, age structure in
five-year age-and-sex cohorts by religion, migration rates by religion, and
mortality by religion.
Unfortunately, this kind of detail is not yet available for many countries
(half of censuses do not ask a question about religion). Fortunately, the
process of filling in missing data using demographic and smaller-scale

general population surveys is underway, and as these data become available
through the Pew–Templeton Global Religious Futures Project, researchers
will have access to these data through the World Religion Database, where
they will be archived in full, with summary results available at the Pew
Forum’s website. In the meantime, projections cannot solely rely on the
cohort-component method. Instead, they use a hybrid projection method.
First, the 2020 religious composition of each country is established as
the baseline. Then, utilising the United Nations medium variant cohort-
.
ly
component projections of populations for five-year periods up to 2050,
on
future religious shares are modestly adjusted from the 2020 baseline.
Adjustments are based on analysis of past differential growth rates of
se
religious groups, factoring in historical patterns of religious switching and
lu
possible future attenuation of past trends. Finally, these projections take
na
into account how immigrants might alter the future religious composition
so
of country populations.
er
Ethno-linguistic People Groups
rp
A problem for social science research is the lack of available survey
Fo
and polling data in non-Western countries. While the United States and
e.
many European countries have a long history of engaging in this kind of

l
research, many – often more underdeveloped – countries can be difficult

sa
to access and/or speak languages difficult for Western researchers. The

re
WCD ’s method directly addresses this methodological challenge through

or
its additional taxonomy of the world’s ethnic groups, which are paired
n
with religious statistics.

tio
A ‘peoples’ taxonomy must take into account both ethnicity and

bu
language. The approach taken in ‘Ethnosphere’ in Part 8 of the World

tri
Christian Encyclopedia was to match ethnic codes with language codes,

is
which produced over 13,700 distinct ethno-linguistic peoples. Not all com-
rd
binations of ethnicity and language are possible, but nevertheless every

fo
person in the world can be categorised as belonging to an ethno-linguistic

people (mutually exclusive). For example, there are ethnic Kazaks who
ot
speak Kazak as their mother tongue and ethnic Kazaks who speak Russian
N
as their mother tongue. These, then, are two separate ethno-linguistic

peoples.
The work of determining the religious breakdown of ethno-linguistic
peoples was begun in the 1970s in Africa, where many Christian churches
reported the ethnic breakdown of their congregations. Utilising data
gathered by religious bodies and in government censuses, estimates of
religious affiliation for all peoples was completed in the mid-1990s and
published in the second edition of the World Christian Encyclopedia. These
data continue to be updated and published in the World Christian Database

and World Religion Database.
Each distinct ethno-linguistic group in a country is assigned varying
shares of the 18 categories of religion. For example, the Japanese in Japan
are reported as 56% Mahayana Buddhist, 23% various New religionist,
10% agnostic, 3% atheist, 2% Shinto and 1% Christian. Each group is traced
throughout the world with the assumption that whatever their religious
breakdown is in their home country will be the same abroad. This allows
researchers to locate Christian people in predominantly non-Christian
.
ly
countries. For example, the WCD reports that Pakistan – a majority-Muslim
on
country – is also home to over 3.9 million Christians. While Christians are
found among Muslim-majority people groups (for example, Punjabi at 4%
se
Christian), they are also present in the country as ex-pats, such as French
lu
(65% Christian) and British (70% Christian).
na
so
Conclusion
There are a variety of issues related to finding and choosing the best data
er
sources of religious affiliation. Censuses are generally accepted as the most
rp
reliable, but there are times when they fail to present the full picture, for
Fo
example because they omit certain regions of a country or because they
e.
do not ask clear or detailed questions about religion. General population

l
surveys can often fill the gap, but, depending on their quality, they may
sa
also have some bias. At times, religious groups may have very different
re
estimates of their sizes than are found by censuses and surveys, but for
or
some types of data, such as denominations of Protestantism, estimates by

n
the groups may be the best information available. Finally, for religions
tio
such as Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Judaism, subgroup information is

bu
routinely missing from censuses and surveys. Estimates for the subgroups
tri
of these religions often rely on indirect measures, such as ethnic groups

is
likely to adhere to a particular subgroup or expert analysis of multiple

rd
ethnological and anthropological sources. Thus, it is important to take into

fo
consideration many different kinds of data in order to arrive at the best

estimate of a particular religious population in a country.
ot
N
Index
.
ly
Aaronic Blessing, 229 All Gospel Church, 365
on
aborigine(s), 99–100, 104, 109, 469, 490–1 All Souls’ Day, 319
abortion, 244, 247, 252, 321, 460 Allah, 222, 257, 331, 355, 360, 396, 410, 431–2,
se
abuse, 52, 220, 256, 304, 308, 316, 416, 427, 458, 488
469 Allen, Horace Newton, 120
lu
acculturation, 354, 461 Alliance Church, 104
Aceh, Indonesia, 413, 433, 442, 487 Alopen, 17, 21
na
activists, 229, 379, 417 Alpha course, 160, 163, 165
so
Adam (biblical), 44 altar (s), 25, 178, 259, 319, 357, 469
Addai (Thaddeus), 31, 244–6, 249–50, 343, 360 Amakusa, Japan, 135
er
Adiprasetya, Joas, 447 Ambon, Indonesia, 204, 305, 330, 393, 403, 489
adoption, 80, 162, 262
Adoration of the Magi, 35 rp
America(ns), 18–19, 47, 76–7, 93, 101, 103–4,
107–8, 120–1, 134–5, 146, 149, 158–9, 167,
Fo
adult(s), 93–4, 168, 185, 215, 228, 236, 251, 255, 169, 176–7, 180, 183, 192, 218, 245, 269–71,
317, 384, 490, 505–6, 515 273, 275–9, 287, 300–1, 324, 326, 335, 358,
e.
Adventist(s), 76, 104, 129, 163, 173, 177, 193, 360, 382, 386–7, 398, 413, 420, 428, 460,
216, 220, 240 463–4, 466–7, 469, 473, 511, 514
l
sa
affiliation(s), 64, 95, 127, 132, 180–1, 222, 244, American Baptist Mission, 76, 146
360, 370–1, 461, 502, 504, 506, 510, 512, 514, American Episcopal Church, 269–71, 273, 278
re
516 American Metropolia, 287

or
Afghanistan, 249, 288 American Presbyterian(s), 158–9, 167, 169

Africa(ns), 31, 72, 145, 223, 249, 335, 386, 420, American War of Independence, 269
n
441, 464, 510, 514, 516 Amherst College, 139

tio
African Americans, 335 Ami (tribe), 108

African Initiated Churches (AICs), 335, 510 Amity Press, 66
bu
Agenzia Fides, 175, 180 Ammerman, Nancy T., 405

Aggiornamento, 218 Amoy, Philippines, 100
tri
Aglipay, Gregorio, 316, 382 An, Chang-ho, 121

is
Aglipayan Church, 316 An, Men Sam, 181

rd
agnostic(s), 480, 490, 513, 517 An, Nghe, 428

agriculture, 28, 94, 136 ancestor(s), 26, 51, 90, 92, 105, 127, 157, 162,
fo
Ahmadiyya, 207, 439 171, 188, 209, 230, 262, 319, 358, 368–9, 483
ot
Ahok (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama), 208, 433, 442, Anderson, H., 404
487–8 Andrianoff, Ruth, 169
N
Ai, Tran Dinh, 193 Andrianoff, Ted, 170–1

AIDS, 180, 299, 481 Ang Dating Daan, 244, 246, 248
Aileu, Timor-Leste, 257 Ang Ligaya ng Panginoon, 342
Ainu, 390, 484 angels, 274
Ajiro, Japan, 287 Angkola, 203
Akeu, 490 Anglican(s), 33, 75–6, 84–5, 89, 104–5, 147–8,
Akha, 159, 295, 490 164, 213–14, 216–17, 225, 227, 232–3, 240,
Albazin Orthodox, 283–4 270, 272, 274, 276, 278, 281, 323, 326–8, 335,
alcohol(ism), 28, 62, 84, 93–4, 107, 120, 131, 357, 368, 370, 384, 466, 508–9, 511
172, 202, 304, 308, 381, 407, 411, 413, 465, Anglican Communion, 89, 269, 274, 276–7
472 Anglican Diocese of Singapore, 232
Alexei, Father, 292 Anglican Mission, 271, 273, 275, 277
Index 519
Anglo-Burmese War, 146 Ashio Copper Mine, 140

Anglo-Catholic (s), 269, 274–5, 278 Asho Chin, 146
Anglo-Chinese College, 79 Asia Church Leaders’ Forum, 71
Anglo-Chinese War, 74 Asia Evangelical Alliance, 296, 299, 325
Anhui, China, 63, 67–9 Asia Mission Conference, 400, 409
animists, 157, 170, 172–3, 324, 370–1, 428 Asia Theological Association, 97, 297, 304, 327
Annan, Kofi, 260 Asian Theological Seminary, 327, 330
Antakya, Turkey, 16 Asian Women’s Resource Centre, 422
Anthony, Saint, 26 Assemblies of God, 76, 97, 125, 147, 182, 193,
anthropology, 209 214, 216–17, 234, 257, 323, 326, 508
Anti-imperialist Patriotic Movement, 75 Assembly Hall (little flock), 104, 217, 331, 383,
Anti-Mui Tsai, 79 395
Antioch, 16 Association for Theological Education in
.
ly
Antioch of Asia, 225, 236 South East Asia (ATESEA), 47, 297, 327
on
Antone, Hope S., 308 Association of Churches in Sarawak (ACS),
Antonio, Dom, 254 217, 446
se
António, Frei, 254–5 Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Aparício, Sebastião, 255 (ASEAN), 29, 31, 235
lu
apologetics, 332 Association of Theological Schools, 319
apostasy, 222 Association of Trading Companies, 205
na
Apostle of Asia, 353 Assumption Monastery, 289
so
apostolate, 320 Assunta, Malaysia, 220
Apostolic Administrator, 256, 259 Assyrian Apostolic Church of the East, 17,
er
Apostolic Delegate, 192 20, 92
Apostolic Nuncio, 192, 216
Apostolic Prefecture of Cambodia, 175 rp
asylum seekers, 445
Ataúro, Timor-Leste, 257
Fo
Apostolic Prefecture of Phnom Penh, 315 atheist(s), 64–6, 89, 92, 126, 312, 392, 425, 453,
Apostolic Vicar of Phnom Penh, 175 460, 480, 486, 490–1, 505, 513, 517
e.
Apostolic Vicariate of Batavia, 205 Athens, Greece, 420

Apostolic Vicariate of Brunei Darussalam, 240 ATLAS, 47
l
sa
Apostolic Vicariate of Laos, 167 attendance, 69, 78, 102, 112, 251, 315
Apostolic Vicariate of Semarang, 206 Audetat, Fritz, 168–9
re
Appenzeller, Henry Gerhard, 120 Augustine, 141

or
Aquinas, Thomas, 141–2, 375 Aun, Yos, 177

Aquino III, President Benigno, 361 Aung San Suu Kyi, 29, 430
n
Arabia, 376 Australia, 18, 47, 77, 179–80, 195, 197, 215, 233,
tio
Arabic, 222, 254, 352, 379, 410 254, 256, 279, 300, 345, 365, 369, 396, 398,
Arakan, 145 461
bu
Arawa, Bougainville, 212–18, 220, 238, 276–7, Ayutthaya, Thailand, 158

355, 432, 439, 446, 484 Azusa Street, 121, 335, 509
tri
Archbishop of Canterbury, 49, 269

is
Archbishop of Manila, 246 Back to Jerusalem (B2J), 51, 55, 66, 72, 85, 124,
rd
Archbishop of Singapore, 229 177, 260, 298, 304, 314, 332, 367, 378, 390,
Archbishop of Southeast Asia, 232 417, 436, 490, 502
fo
Archbishop of Tokyo, 287 Badma, 96

Baekdu, 429
ot
Archdiocese of Guangzhou, 75
Archdiocese of Manila, 244 Baghdad, Iraq, 92
N
Archdiocese of Saigon, 195 Baguia, Timor-Leste, 257

archdiocese(s), 75, 119, 138, 195, 215, 231, 244, Baha’i(s), 173, 505
314–15 Bahasa Melayu, 225
Archimandrite Innocent (Figurovsky), 284 Bahnar, 193
Arianism, 77, 210, 362, 391, 430 Balcombe, Dennis, 68
Armenia, 212 Bali, 31, 105, 107, 143, 195, 257, 291, 321, 328,
army(ies), 74, 80, 125, 136–7, 140, 217, 220, 226, 330, 351–2, 360, 366, 368, 438, 442, 474, 488
277, 288, 372, 431 Balide, Timor-Leste, 257
Arrington, Aminta, 377 Ballagh, James, 135
arts, 27, 28, 30, 35, 46, 49, 94, 97, 106, 128, 185, Bamar, 331
195, 227, 232, 233, 301, 357, 362, 406, 465, Ban Dom Don, Laos, 167
471, 482–3 Banda Aceh, Indonesia, 442, 487
520 Index
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 239–40 Benedict XV, pope, 57

Bandung, Indonesia, 291 Benedictines, 61, 84
Bangkok Bible College, 327 Bennett, Dennis, 509
Bangkok, Thailand, 157–9, 164–5, 289, 307, Bethel Music, 366
327, 339, 342 Bethesda Bedok-Tampine Church, 338
Bangladesh, 249, 288, 327 Bhabha, Homi, 464–5
Bangtan Sonyeondan (BTS), 19 Bhineka Tunggal Ika, 200
Bangun, Maraike, 405 Bible(s), 16, 24, 29–30, 41–4, 46–9, 54, 63–4,
baptism(s), 16, 42, 60, 68, 164, 168, 171, 196, 66–7, 70, 81–2, 88, 94, 97–8, 100, 119–20,
204, 206, 219, 240, 254–5, 260–1, 289, 293, 122–4, 129, 134, 136, 139–40, 151–2, 157,
335–6, 339, 344–5, 353, 358, 365, 380–1, 502, 160–5, 168–9, 171–2, 176–7, 179, 181–2, 186,
508–9 217, 222, 225, 233–6, 239, 246, 252, 271, 296,
Baptist(s), 27, 49, 60, 69, 76, 89, 95, 104, 108, 298, 301, 321, 323, 325, 327, 333–4, 337,
.
ly
146–9, 153, 158–60, 163–4, 177, 179, 181–2, 339–40, 345, 354, 362, 367, 369, 373, 376–7,
on
193–4, 217, 225, 227, 232, 234, 243, 255, 303, 381, 395–6, 405, 407, 422, 429, 431–2, 444,
323–4, 326–7, 338, 382, 395, 508, 511 458, 483, 488
se
Baptist Missionary Society (BMS), 146 Bible College of Malaysia, 217
Baptist Union (Britain), 181 Bible Presbyterians, 225, 234
lu
Baptist World Alliance (BWA), 49 Bible schools, 29, 46–8, 94, 9, 169, 177
Bario Revival, 367 Bible societies, 94, 96, 160, 163, 165, 176–7, 179,
na
Barlin, Jorge, 382 181, 233, 432
so
Barmen (Rhenish) Mission, 76, 204 Bible Society of Malaysia, 432
Barnabites, 145 Bible Society of Singapore, 233
er
Barrett, David B., 501, 510 Bible study, 42, 66–7, 94, 123, 139, 164, 246, 345
Barth, Karl, 103, 142, 375
Bartholomew, Patriarch, 288 rp
Bible Theological College, 97
Bible translation, 98, 172, 369, 395, 483
Fo
Baru Bian, 220 Bickersteth, Edward, 274
Basalyga, Bishop Benjamin, 287 Bigandet, Bishop Paul, 146
e.
Basel Christian Church, 216 Bintulu, Malaysia, 215

Basel Mission, 76, 213 birth(s), 15, 32, 64, 88, 113, 155, 171–2, 185, 201,
l
sa
Basic Law of Macau, 90 210, 223, 229, 232, 317, 326, 335, 344, 354,
Basilan, Philippines, 29 360, 362, 365–7, 433–4, 439, 463, 481, 486,
re
Basilica Minore del Santo Niño, 380 502, 507, 512–15

or
Basuki, Tjahaja Purnama, 208, 442, 487 Bisaya, 439

Batak Christian Church, 203 bishop(s), 21, 23, 31, 44–5, 49, 51, 53, 55–9,
n
Batak Protestant Christian Church, 203, 302 74–6, 85, 87–8, 90, 92, 103, 105, 137, 145–6,
tio
Batak(s), 203–4, 210, 330, 410 163, 167, 173, 175, 178, 180, 187–8, 190–2,
Batavia, 99, 204–6, 291 195–6, 206, 214–18, 227–9, 232, 235, 240,
bu
Bateren Tsuiho Rei, 133 246, 250, 254–7, 259–61, 265, 269–79, 284,
Bath, Danai, 289 286–7, 290–2, 298–9, 311–12, 314–15,
tri
Batha, 430 319–21, 342, 361, 375, 382, 426–7, 447, 455,
is
Battambang, Cambodia, 176–7 470, 487

rd
Batumalai, Sadayandy, 379 Bishop of Calcutta, 276

Bayan-Ulgii, Mongolia, 306 Bishop of China, 270, 273
fo
Bebbington, David, 323 Bishop of Dili, 261

Bishop of Korea, 274–5
ot
Beifang Jinde Social Service Centre, 60

Beijing Ecclesiastical Mission, 283–4 Bishop of Labuan, 276–7
N
Beijing Shouwang Church, 65 Bishop of Macau, 87–8, 255

Beijing Zion Church, 73 Bishop of Malacca, 254
Beijing, China, 60–1, 64–6, 70–3, 85, 90, 96, 110, Bishop of Rangoon, 278
119, 270, 283–5, 417, 489 Bishop of Shenyang, 58
Bel Magalit, 330 Bishop of Singapore, 229, 277
Belgium, 61 Bishop of Taiwan, 273
bells, 145 Bishop of Tokyo, 286–7, 292
Belo, Carlos Filipe Ximenes, 259–60, 314 Bishop of Victoria, 270
belonging, 24–5, 40, 59–60, 64, 83, 104, 169, Bishopric of Calcutta, 276
184, 198, 319, 342, 363, 419, 421, 428, 438, Bishops’ Conference of Thailand, 163
441, 447, 470, 516 Bishops’ Institute on Lay Apostolate (BILA),
Ben Moses, Abraham, 433 320
Index 521
Black Nazarene, 24, 32, 250, 458 424, 428–31, 434–6, 439–49, 453, 459, 470–1,
blasphemy, 202, 208, 433, 487 480, 482–3, 489–91, 517
blind, 80, 220, 413 Buddhist Association of China, 443
blood, 15, 24, 80, 178, 294, 429 Buddhist Mount Meru, 172
Blood of Christ, 294 Buddhist School, 115
Bo, Cardinal Charles Maung, 446 Buddhist Temple of Chonjinam, 127
Boayen, Boonratana, 163 Bulacan Province, Philippines, 346
Boehmer, Elleke, 464 Bulatao, Jaime, 318–19
Bolkiah, Hassanal, 238, 431 Bulgan, Mongolia, 92
Bolshevik Revolution, 292 Bulgarian Orthodox Church, 289–90
bombing(s), 157, 305–6, 330, 409, 486–7 Bullock, Geoff, 233
Bongsu Church, 113–14 Bumiputras, 212, 216
Bonifacio Global City, 249 Bun Sok, 179
.
ly
Book of Acts, 63 Bungoyaku seisho, 136
on
Book of Common Prayer, 269, 273, 278 Bunun, 108
Boone, Bishop William Jones, 270–1 Burakumin, 420
se
Borneo, 213, 215, 238, 240, 276–7, 326, 331, 367, Burkhan, 96
396, 481 Burma, 145–7, 149, 151, 153, 277–8, 386–7,
lu
Borneo Evangelical Assembly, 331 429–30, 467, 470, 490
Borneo Evangelical Church, 215 Burma Baptist Chronicle, 147
na
Borneo Evangelical Mission (BEM), 215–17 Buryatia, 96
so
Boteli Huanqiu Budao Tuan, 383 Busan, South Korea, 293, 298
boundaries, 22, 25, 28–9, 33, 59, 321, 329, 331, Bush, George W., 100
er
360, 362, 366, 398, 419, 491 business, 24, 28, 63, 69, 71, 94, 117, 140, 147,
Boxer rebellion, 19, 52, 247, 284
boys, 120, 255, 273, 279, 423 rp
186, 196, 201, 214, 245, 304, 311, 340, 371,
380, 397–8, 431, 473, 483–5, 490
Fo
Brahmin(s), 172, 443 Bystrov, Vasily, 291
Braille, 42 Byung-mu, Ahn, 379
e.
brainwashing, 310
Brazil, 23, 143, 511 Cachin, India, 305–6, 308
l
sa
Bread of Life Christian Church, 104, 108 Calcutta, India, 276–8

Brent, Charles Henry, 275 Calvinist(s), 69, 99, 130, 303, 323, 384
re
brethren, 67, 77, 149, 167, 170, 213, 217, 225, CAMA Services, 179
or
233, 323 Cambodia, 17, 19–20, 23, 27, 30, 34, 170, 176,
Brethren Movement, 67 178, 180, 182, 184, 186, 232, 249, 277,
n
bribe, 318 288–90, 295, 298–9, 304, 306, 314–15, 323,

tio
Brigham Young University, 182 327, 330, 343, 355, 364, 372, 387, 395, 398,
British, 33, 74, 76–7, 83–5, 96, 102, 120, 135, 413, 425, 429, 436, 451–3, 466–7, 470–1, 479,
bu
147, 176, 212–13, 222, 225–6, 238, 269, 481–3, 485–6, 489
272–4, 276–7, 279, 316, 319, 413, 423, 466–7, Cambodia Baptist Union, 181
tri
470, 472, 479, 517 Cambodia Bible Institute (CBI), 182

is
British and Foreign Bible Society (BFBS), 176 Cambodia Foursquare Church, 181
rd
British East India Company, 276 Cambodia Methodist Church, 181

British empire, 74, 472 Cambodian Christian Evangelical Alliance,
fo
British Mill Hill Fathers, 213 181

Cambridge Seven, 271
ot
Brook, Timothy, 383

Brooke, James, 213, 276 Campus Crusade for Christ, 160, 164, 179, 326
N
brotherhood(s), 203, 207, 209–10, 274 Can Tho, Vietnam, 193

Brown, S.R., 134–5 Canada, 77, 179, 195, 197, 274, 343
Brunei, 29, 34, 192, 240, 277, 288, 314, 364, 387, Canberra, Australia, 369
397, 413, 425, 431, 436, 439–40, 452–3, 467, Candau, Father Sauveur Antoine, 142
479, 484–6, 488 candles, 24
Bua Ya, 169–70 Canon Law, 55–6, 61, 314
Buddhist(s), 16–17, 20, 25, 29–30, 48, 69, 84, Canossian Sisters, 77, 79–80, 255–6, 265
115, 124, 127–8, 130, 132, 134, 145, 150–2, Canton, 74, 83–4, 88
155, 157, 161, 165, 168, 171–3, 175, 181, Cantonese, 83–4, 88
183–5, 195, 197, 229, 231, 238, 254, 297, Cape of Good Hope, 145
305–8, 310–11, 313, 328, 331–2, 340, 342, Cape Town, South Africa, 70–1
353, 358, 364, 366, 370–2, 375–6, 384, 395, capitalism, 126, 131, 140, 198, 376, 397–8
522 Index
captives, 466 Ceylon, 278

Carey, Felix, 146, 259, 264, 501 Chaktomuk Conference Hall, 178
Carey, William, 146, 501 Chalcedon, 291, 378
Caritas, 80–1 Chan, Edmund, 227–8, 231, 326
caste, 163, 321 Chan Pan, 168
Castilians, 25 Chang, Aloysius B., 105
catechism, 99, 175, 215, 261–2, 293, 353–4, 356 Changchun, China, 113
cathedral(s), 17, 29, 58, 67, 95, 113, 135, 137, chants, 145, 172, 352
195, 232, 239, 272, 276, 286–7, 289, 357–8, Chao, Jonathan, 68
372 Chao, T. C. (Zhao Zichen), 378, 384
Cathedral of St Mary, 276 Chao, Vouch, 177
Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ, 286–7 Chaozhou Chinese, 159
Catholic(s), 16–19, 21–3, 26–8, 30–3, 35, 42, 48, chapel(s), 243, 257, 283, 292–3, 315
.
ly
52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 69, 74–6, 78–85, 87–90, chaplain(s), 24, 124, 145, 258, 272, 274–7, 292
on
92–3, 95, 99–100, 103, 105, 112–13, 115, 119, Charismatic(s), 29, 31, 33, 49, 66–8, 73, 77, 95,
124, 126–8, 130, 132, 134–9, 141–3, 146, 148, 105, 108, 197, 214–15, 217–19, 227, 232,
se
157, 160–3, 173, 175–8, 181, 188–90, 192, 244–7, 250, 252, 277, 296, 304, 324–5, 336,
194–8, 200–2, 205–7, 209, 213–18, 220, 225, 338, 340, 342, 344, 346, 360, 366, 372, 377,
lu
229, 231, 239–48, 251–2, 254–5, 257–60, 398, 404–6, 448, 458, 507, 509–10
262–5, 269, 271–6, 278, 281, 289, 297–9, 305, charity, 48, 77, 124, 136
na
312, 314, 316, 318, 320, 322, 324, 328–9, 331, Charter, James, 146
so
335, 339, 342–4, 351, 354–62, 369–73, 375–7, Chau, Uth, 179
380–4, 387–8, 400, 402–3, 405, 410–11, Chen, Nan-Jou, 106
er
416–17, 422, 426–9, 433–4, 440, 442, 446–7, Cheng, Cheng-Kung, 466
453–5, 457, 459, 466–7, 470, 481–2, 484–7,
491, 508–9 rp
Cheng, Jingyi, 382
Chengdu, China, 69
Fo
Catholic Bishops’ Conference, 145, 163, 175, Chennai (madras), India, 357
216–17, 250, 299, 342, 361, 455 Cheondogyoists, 384
e.
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Laos, 175 Cherepanin (Hegumen Oleg), 289

Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Myanmar, Chhirc, Taing, 179
l
sa
145, 299 Chhoum, Sok, 177

Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Thailand, 163 Chi Tao Church, 89
re
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Chiang Kai-shek, 103

or
Philippines, 250, 342, 361, 455 Chiang Mai, Thailand, 71, 162, 167, 297
Catholic Charismatics, 31, 214, 244, 250, 339, Chiang, Generalissimo, 106
n
481 Chien-Jen, Dr Chen, 21, 105

tio
Catholic Commission of Japan, 143 Chien, John C. T., 273

Catholic Farmers Movement, 126 children, 28, 54–5, 69, 81, 93–4, 101, 113, 135,
bu
Catholic Patriotic Association, 53, 75, 383, 388, 140, 152, 160–2, 165, 168, 181, 183, 185, 190,
426 194, 196, 215, 220, 228, 236, 255, 296, 358,
tri
Catholic Priests Association, 128 373, 389, 409, 416, 426, 432–3, 454, 460, 484,
is
Catholic Relief Services, 80, 177 488, 503–6, 512, 515

rd
Catholic Welfare Services, 220 Chilgol Church, 114–15

Catholicos of the Church of the East, 92 Chin Baptist Association of North America,
fo
Caucasians, 16 149
Chin Baptist Churches, 149, 153
ot
Caunter, George, 276

Cebu (Philippines), 243, 250, 380 Chin, 21, 100, 146, 148–51, 153, 305–6, 308, 331,
N
celebrations, 189, 196, 239, 241, 260, 263, 315, 338, 366, 377, 395, 421, 430–1, 487, 490
358, 380, 459, 483, 488 China, 17–20, 23, 25, 27–8, 30–4, 40, 42, 44, 46,
cemeteries, 310, 431 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70,
censorship, 430 72, 74–9, 83–4, 87–90, 92–4, 99–107, 110,
census(es), 76, 78, 149, 177, 212, 231, 235, 254, 116–19, 134, 139, 168, 175, 177, 187, 193,
275, 295, 392, 461, 501–7, 513, 515–17 213–14, 217, 233, 238, 271, 273, 281, 283–5,
Central Asia, 491 288, 295, 299–304, 306–7, 312–14, 316,
Central Committee of the KCF, 115 324–5, 327, 329, 351–2, 356, 361, 365, 367,
Central Committee of the VCP, 191 370–3, 375–9, 381–9, 393–5, 397–8, 404–5,
Central Java, 205–6, 209–10 407–8, 413, 420–1, 425–7, 436, 438, 440–3,
ceremonies, 102, 105, 132, 155, 157, 172, 210, 451, 453, 460–3, 465–70, 473–4, 479, 481–8,
428 490–2, 510
Index 523
China Aid, 426 Christian television, 123

China Christian Church, 76–7 Christmas, 29, 42, 132, 140, 181, 210, 215, 218,
China Christian Council (CCC), 41–2, 45–9, 239–40, 248, 315, 317, 358, 428, 431, 456,
110, 164, 271, 299, 307, 389, 395 488
China Evangelical Seminary, 327 Christmas Masses, 456
China Gospel Fellowship, 68 Christology, 30, 375, 377–9, 381, 385, 409
China Graduate School of Theology, 327 Chrysostom, John, 289–90
China Inland Mission (CIM), 67, 270, 325, Chuang Tzu, 15, 19, 27, 30, 34–5
394–5 Chuncheon, Korea, 293
China Peniel Missionary Society, 83 Chundokyo, North Korea, 115
Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church, 283, Chung, Peter, 215
285 Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui, CHSKH, 271–2
Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association Chunghyeon Presbyterian Church, 307
.
ly
(CCPA), 53, 55–60, 329 Chungjin, 116
on
Chinese Catholic(s), 51–3, 57–8, 60, 240 church architecture, 18, 357
Chinese Church Coordinating Centre, 159 Church Dogmatics, 375
se
Chinese Church of Christ, 76 Church Doubling Movement, 103
Chinese Communist Party, 22, 57, 75, 190, 312, Church Missionary Society (CMS), 76, 219,
lu
388, 393 269, 272–3
Chinese Overseas Christian Mission, 77 Church of Christ in Thailand (CCT), 163
na
Chinese Regional Bishops’ Conference, 103 Church of Christ of Congo (ECC), 107
so
Chinese religion, 84, 90, 225, 389, 420, 444 Church of Christ, 76, 89, 102, 104, 135, 139,
Chinese Rites Controversy, 188, 356 158, 163, 225, 242–3, 274, 302, 328, 382–3,
er
Ching, Angela Wong Wai, 420 455, 468
Ching Empire of China, 100
Chins for Christ in One Century (CCOC), 148 rp
Church of Divine Mercy, 298
Church of England, 146, 269, 511
Fo
Chiuchow, 83 Church of God, 244
Cho, David Yonggi, 108, 227, 324, 340, 345, 404 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
e.
Choi, Jashil, 121, 340, 345 (LDS), 182

choirs, 456 Church of Joy, 163
l
sa
cholera, 168 Church of Love, 163

Chonjugyo, 28 Church of Our Lady of the Assumption,
re
Chosen Christian College, 120 239–41

or
Chosun Christian Federation, 393 Church of Saint Alphonsus, 231

Chosun Presbyterian Theological Seminary of Church of Saints Peter, 17, 357
n
Pyongyang, 367 Church of St George the Martyr, 276

tio
Christ’s Commission Fellowship, 243, 245 Church of St George, Limassol, 276

Christian and Missionary Alliance (C&MA), Church of St Michael and All the Angels, 274
bu
168, 176–7, 182, 302, 323 Church of St Peter, 275

Christian Batak Clan Church, 203 Church of the East, 17, 20, 92
tri
Christian Brethren, 213, 217 Church of the Province of Burma, 278

is
Christian Church of Jawa, 302 Church of the Province of South East Asia,
rd
Christian Conference of Asia (CCA), 49, 125, 277

296–8, 299–300, 304, 308, 319, 385, 400, 407, Church regulations, 50
fo
471 Church Union, 274

Church Universal, 320, 386
ot
Christian Council of Asia, 106

Christian Council of Korea (CCK), 126, 299 Church World Services, 80
N
Christian education, 132, 152, 180, 183, 352, Cireneu, Marcelo, 257
472 citizen(s), 47, 54, 57, 64, 69, 102, 138, 155, 161,
Christian Federation of Malaysia (CFM), 217, 180, 190–1, 202, 212, 215, 220–1, 238, 285,
299 289, 291, 329, 387, 410, 419, 423, 439, 442–4
Christian Fellowship Church (CFC), 342–3 citizenship, 138, 212, 221, 423
Christian Institute of Barmen, 204 City Harvest, 227–8, 232–3
Christian Nationals’ Evangelism Commission civil war(s), 271
(CNEC), 326 civilisation, 79, 133, 376, 378, 438
Christian Outreach, 179, 302 clan(s), 187–8, 203
Christian Shuen Tao Church of Macau, 89 Clark, William Smith, 136, 139
Christian Study Center, 84 cleansing, 127, 487
Christian Tabernacle, 383 Clement, 356, 364
524 Index
clergy, 45, 49, 51, 53–4, 59–60, 76–7, 85, 132, Confucian(ism), 20, 84, 90, 119, 122, 127, 139,
137, 139, 189, 196, 214, 240, 250–2, 255–6, 201–2, 275, 305, 351, 353, 356, 360, 368–9,
265, 273–4, 277, 279, 292, 321, 357, 372, 382, 375–6, 378, 385, 387–8, 392, 413, 415, 420,
384, 391, 435–6, 487, 504 426, 438, 441–2, 447, 453, 465–6, 479, 482,
clinics, 81, 160, 220 486
clothes, 33, 428 congregation(s), 40, 42–3, 49, 55–6, 60, 67,
Club Asia, 244 77–8, 81, 89, 104, 113, 115–16, 124, 126, 129,
clubs, 81 131, 136, 139, 162, 177, 183, 193–4, 196–7,
CNN Indonesia, 207 203, 215, 218, 231–3, 247, 249, 258, 281,
Cochinchina, 187 288–9, 298, 300–2, 310, 312, 315, 324, 327,
Cockey, T. A., 277 333–4, 340, 356, 365–6, 375, 382, 384, 395,
Code of Canon Law, 314 398, 406, 410, 427, 433, 435, 447, 455, 473,
Coe, Shoki, 106, 376 503, 515–16
.
ly
cohorts, 515 Congregation for the Evangelisation of
on
Coiás, Francisco, 257 Peoples, 197
Cold War, 105, 121, 387, 469–70 Congregational Church, 136
se
colleges, 102, 234, 236, 245, 248, 273, 279, 327, conservative(s), 33, 64, 66, 89, 105, 111, 122,
344, 485 125–6, 128–30, 208, 222–3, 244–5, 247,
lu
Colloquium of the Six Religious Leaders of 251–2, 277–8, 295–6, 298–300, 302, 307–8,
Hong Kong, 84 367–9, 379, 382, 392, 442, 482, 485–6, 505
na
colonialism, 21, 54, 109, 127, 145, 151, 153, 197, Constable, Nicole, 458
so
225, 269, 380, 391–2, 427, 438, 463–4, 468, Constantine, 459
470, 472, 474 Constantinople, 287–9, 292–3
er
combat, 208 Constituent Assembly, 260, 290
commerce, 134, 195
Communalism, 331 rp
Constitution(s), 22, 41, 82, 137, 141, 150, 156,
180, 190, 200, 202, 210, 212, 221–2, 251, 254,
Fo
Communion of Churches, 299 260, 305–7, 312, 328, 364, 382, 389, 391–2,
communion, 30, 42, 49, 51, 53, 56, 89, 261, 269, 427–32, 434–6, 439, 441, 443, 464, 487–8, 501
e.
272, 274, 276–7, 290, 299, 302, 320, 325, 393, Constitutional Court, 202
426 Contesse, Gabriel, 167–8
l
sa
communism, 126, 128, 189–90, 198, 325, 376, Contesse, Marguerite, 168
381, 388, 390–2, 397, 422, 460 contextualisation, 45, 50, 105, 161, 295, 305,
re
Communist Party, 20, 22, 41, 57, 64–6, 69, 75, 376, 471
or
190, 197–8, 271, 284, 312, 372, 388, 393, Converse, Charles Crozat, 16
426–7, 443, 485–6 conversion(s), 21, 25, 31, 43, 63–4, 82, 100, 130,
n
Communist Party’s United Front Work 158, 160, 198, 206, 214, 223, 230, 246, 261,
tio
Department, 426 289, 295–6, 301–2, 304, 310, 329, 366, 372,
Communist(s), 20, 22–3, 28, 32, 34, 41, 52–4, 390, 395–6, 402, 408, 427, 431–3, 441, 446,
bu
57, 64–6, 68–9, 75, 85, 92, 94, 96, 99, 103, 459–60, 481, 488, 505, 508–9, 512–14
105–6, 112, 122, 126, 130, 170, 179, 189–90, Cooke, Eliza C., 101
tri
193–8, 234, 246, 271, 273, 284, 312, 329–30, Corfe, Bishop, 275
is
336, 342, 355, 361, 366, 372, 378, 388, 390–5, Corinthians, 16, 335
rd
397–8, 413, 425–9, 435, 443, 466–70, 479–80, Cornelio, Jayeel, 455
485–6, 490 Cornelius Sim, 240
fo
Community of St Peter, 275 Cornelius, Justice Alvin Robert, 240

Cosmic Christ, 44–5, 378
ot
compassion, 28, 66, 105, 161, 179, 401, 405,

462 Costa Nunes, 256
N
Compassionate Presence, 405 cotton, 18

competition, 22, 29, 160, 197, 202, 247, 252, 397 Council of Churches of East Asia (CCEA), 276,
Cone, James, 172–3 279
confession, 107, 124, 129, 131, 196, 252, 274, Council of Churches of Malaysia (CCM), 217,
448, 467 299
conflict(s), 20–1, 51, 58, 79, 83, 90, 107–8, 122, councils, 41, 180–1, 299, 323, 383
127–9, 157, 164, 187–8, 195, 200, 204, 210, counselling, 61, 338, 457
222, 229, 260, 305, 312, 320, 343, 355–6, 358, Counter-Reformation, 321
382, 387, 393, 402–4, 419, 438–41, 444–6, Couples for Christ (CFC), 342–3
449, 451, 463, 470–1, 473–4, 480, 483, 489, couples, 16, 18, 342–3
492 Covenant Evangelical Free Church (CEFC),
Confucian Four Books, 376 227–8, 298, 326
Index 525
creation, 101, 125, 131, 169, 227–8, 232, 245, debate(s), 15, 45, 83, 85, 96, 107, 129, 296, 307,
284, 296, 303, 321, 332, 342, 353, 369, 376, 376, 378, 444, 452
386, 418 Deborah, 422
Crete, 83, 315, 320, 362 debt, 122, 416
crime, 138, 147, 306, 486 declaration of human rights, 106, 501, 504
Crisóstomo, Frei, 255 Declaration of Independence, 384
Critical Asian Principle, 327, 372, 447 decolonisation, 463
cross, 22, 29, 32, 66–8, 70, 73, 77, 110, 138–9, Deep River, 142
171, 194, 259, 263–4, 275, 297, 304, 314, 325, Dega, 194
333, 346, 377–9, 400–1, 409, 419, 428, 459, deity, 96, 119, 136, 138, 353, 369
480, 491, 513 deliverance, 171, 219, 345, 481, 508
Crossover Project, 232 democracy, 45, 79, 85, 93, 106, 110, 126, 138,
Crossroads, 83, 382, 438 210, 246, 251, 372, 389, 393–4, 411, 421–2,
.
ly
Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, 110 430, 442
on
Cross-Straits Christian Forum, 110 Democratic Kampuchea, 178–9
Crown Colony, 74 Democratic Progressive Party, 105, 107, 307
se
Cru, 299, 326 demographics, 236, 248, 250, 405, 501, 503,
crucifixion, 142, 323 505, 506, 512, 514
lu
crusades, 149, 160–1, 164, 179, 219, 247, 326, demons, 24, 43, 45, 61, 94, 106, 108, 114, 128,
345 130, 171, 177, 184, 193, 206, 228, 241, 259,
na
Cruz Jovem, 263 264, 281, 292, 308, 330–1, 368, 373, 407, 409,
so
Cu Sau, 195 422, 433, 444, 508
Cuarteron, Carlos, 213 Deng Xiaoping, 57, 453
er
Cuellar, 260 denominations, 39–40, 63–4, 68–9, 75–7, 89,
cults, 18, 60, 290, 396, 426, 430
Cultural Affairs, 132 rp
99, 103, 121, 124, 129, 136–7, 139–40, 149,
164, 180–2, 193, 197, 216, 219–20, 225–8,
Fo
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 87 233–4, 242–3, 257–8, 271, 274, 279, 281,
cultural revolution, 53, 55, 59, 61, 64, 69, 73, 292, 296–7, 299, 301, 323–4, 327–8, 337,
e.
75, 87, 271, 285, 367, 372, 388, 468 369, 382–4, 392, 410, 481, 484, 501, 504–5,
curriculum, 46–7, 50, 182, 303, 427, 444 507–10, 517
l
sa
customs, 79, 83, 119, 127, 131, 133, 297, 311, depression, 84, 140
319, 365, 464 Desnitskaya, Ekaterina, 288
re
Cyrillic, 92, 96 Destombes, Bishop Emile, 175, 178, 180

or
Deus, 136, 257, 353

Daechuri, South Korea, 128 Devi, Renuka, 54, 202, 207, 255, 281, 321–2,
n
Daendels, Herman Willem, 205 337, 415, 417

tio
dainichi, 136, 353 devil, 54, 417

Dalit(s), 335, 407, 420 devotees, 24, 32, 380
bu
Daly, Mary, 420 Dewan Pentekosta Indonesia, DPI, 325

Daman, India, 193, 326 diakonia, 122, 125
tri
Damien, David, 68 dialects, 83–4, 92, 201, 354

is
dance, 42, 47, 69, 78, 82, 94, 97, 102, 112, 114, dialogue, 30–1, 48–9, 54, 57–8, 61, 84, 110,
rd
123, 171, 185, 227–8, 251, 263, 315, 365, 369, 113, 117–18, 126–7, 143, 173, 198, 235, 299,
377, 380, 458, 508 320–1, 333, 346, 375–6, 400, 402–3, 405–6,
fo
Dangun Myth, 130 410–11, 438, 441, 444–9, 457, 474, 481, 485
Diana, Lady, 16
ot
Davao, Philippines, 243–4

Day of Pentecost, 365 Dias, Cardinal Ivan, 77–8, 94, 98, 131, 149, 195,
N
De Béhaine, Pierre Pigneaux, 195 197, 249, 297, 325, 386, 390, 395, 397, 454,
De Brito, Philip, 145 456, 491, 504, 507
De Carvalho, Bishop José Manuel, 255 Dias, Priya, 77–8, 94, 98, 131, 149, 195, 197,
De Cruz, Gaspar, 175 249, 297, 325, 386, 390, 395, 397, 454, 456,
De La Salle Brothers, 27, 194 491, 504, 507
de Nobili, Roberto, 318, 375 diaspora, 94, 98, 131, 149, 195, 197, 249, 297,
De Rhodes, Alexandre, 187, 195, 354, 375 325, 386, 390, 395, 397, 456, 491, 507
deacons, 114–15, 273, 417 dictators, 21, 198, 246, 314, 372, 413, 421, 469
deaf, 46 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 195
death, 26, 51, 127, 139, 155, 168–9, 171–2, 223, Dili, Timor-Leste, 255–8, 261–2
226, 230, 239, 247, 252, 261, 270, 306, 314, Ding Guangxun, 378
317, 378, 396, 429, 488, 502, 512, 514–15 Dinh Thien Tu, 193
526 Index
diocese(s), 58–61, 74–8, 81–3, 85, 87, 89–90, earthquake(s), 17, 357, 373
119, 138, 148, 163, 194–5, 215–16, 231–2, East Asian Christian Council Hymnal, 300
240, 244, 256, 262, 272–9, 284, 287, 291, East Asian Exarchate, 284
313–15, 342 East Malaysia, 212–14, 216–18, 331, 373, 396,
Diocese of Dili, 256, 262 432
Diocese of Hawaii, 273 East Nusa Tenggara, 206
Diocese of Kuching, 240 East Simalungun, 204
Diocese of Labuan, 276 East Timor, 260, 313–14
Diocese of Rangoon, 278 Easter, 17, 19–20, 31, 42, 54, 57, 83, 102, 114,
Diocese of Singapore, 231–2, 277 168, 181, 193, 203, 205, 254, 285, 287, 291–2,
Diocese of Taiwan, 272–3 328–9, 351, 376, 387, 434, 473, 479
Diocese of Udon Thani, 163 Eastern Europe, 54, 57, 291–2
Diocese of Victoria, 89, 272 Eastern Indonesian Protestant Christian
.
ly
disasters, 39, 390, 486 Church, 203
on
disciples, 68, 92, 95, 97, 134, 171, 186, 231, 236, Eastern Japan Diocese, 287
295, 298, 301, 305–6, 332–3, 360, 400, 407–8, Eastern Mennonite Board of Missions, 193
se
411, 489 Eastern Orthodox, 19, 287, 291, 328
Discipling a Whole Nation (DAWN), 240, 263, Eastern Orthodox Metropolitanate of Hong
lu
300, 317, 337, 340, 483 Kong, 287
discrimination, 55, 113, 148, 153, 184, 200, 207, Ebenezer Home, 80
na
220–1, 293, 305, 311, 395, 421, 423, 427, 429, Ecclesia of Women, 422
so
431, 435–6, 458, 491 ecclesiology, 50, 67, 107, 299, 375, 377, 381,
disease, 143, 338, 343 384–5, 422
er
dissidents, 109 Echica, Father Ramon, 251
diversity, 42, 77–8, 128, 200, 202, 207, 210–11,
234, 242–4, 247, 250, 270, 279, 320, 332, 334, rp
ecology, 246, 308
Ecumenical Consultative Committee, 107
Fo
355, 389, 406, 423, 425, 440–2, 444, 446, 449, Ecumenical Patriarchate, 288, 292–3
457, 467, 474, 510 Ecumenical Peace Platform, 393
e.
divinity, 152, 281 ecumenism, 42, 44, 75, 77, 81–2, 84, 104, 106–7,
divorce, 247, 252, 482 110, 126, 197, 217, 258, 288, 292–3, 298–300,
l
sa
Doctor of Ministry, 47 378, 383–4, 393, 400–1, 405–6, 416, 471, 474
Doctor of Theology, 47 Edinburgh, Scotland, 281, 382, 468
re
doctors, 24, 201 education, 21, 28–30, 39, 45, 47–50, 52, 55, 60,
or
Doctrina Christiana, 353 63, 68, 72, 78–81, 85, 89–90, 93–4, 97–8,
doctrine(s), 20, 45, 60–1, 64, 68, 119, 130, 171, 100–2, 113, 115, 120, 132, 135–41, 144,
n
193, 208, 233, 244, 250, 281, 314, 354, 375, 152–3, 155–6, 160–1, 180, 182–5, 189, 195–7,
tio
380, 441, 469 201, 204, 220, 228, 233–4, 238, 243–4, 248,
dogma, 25, 111, 293, 305, 375 255, 261, 264–5, 273, 277, 279, 286, 288, 295,
bu
Doi Moi, 190 297, 302–4, 311, 315, 329, 332, 335, 352,
Dominican(s), 77, 99–100, 103, 175, 188, 254, 358–9, 372–3, 376, 383–4, 390, 393, 397–8,
tri
316, 465, 467 404, 407–8, 421, 426–7, 429, 431, 435, 443,
is
Dong, Bishop, 59 447–9, 454, 460, 466–7, 471–2, 474, 482,

rd
Donghak, 127 484–5

Dooley, Pastor Eric, 183 Egypt, 68, 507
fo
Doshisha Eigakko, 136 Eigaku, 135

Ejercito-Estrada, Luisa, 239
ot
dreams, 508
drugs, 314, 434 El Shaddai, 31, 244–6, 249–50, 343, 360
N
drums, 97, 295 elderly, 48, 78, 81, 230, 293, 365, 394, 513
Dusun, 439 elders, 32, 42–3, 49, 65, 70, 97–8, 112, 114–15,
Dutch, 21, 33, 99–100, 201, 204–6, 213, 276, 316, 186, 263, 299
381, 383–4, 413, 466–7, 470–1, 479 elections, 203, 223, 430, 445, 488
Dutch East Indian Company, 99 elites, 79, 101, 111, 137, 207–8, 395, 464
Dutch Reformed Church, 99, 466 Ellison, David W., 176
Duterte, Rodrigo, 314, 391, 434 empire, 74, 92, 96, 100, 134, 137, 175, 316, 376,
Dwi Byantoro, Archimandrite Daniel 383, 386, 388, 400, 407, 411, 472
Bambang, 291 employment, 34, 55, 452, 458, 484
empowerment, 41, 312, 336, 344–5, 407, 458,
Eagle Television, 301 481
Early Rain Covenant Church, 69 Enbo, Wei, 383
Index 527
England, 146, 269, 275, 467, 511 evangelism, 39, 41, 43, 52, 67, 70, 79, 100,
English-educated Singaporean Chinese, 230 123–4, 126, 147–9, 160–1, 163–6, 176, 182–3,
English language, 16, 19–20, 31, 79, 83, 88, 93, 186, 229, 234, 277, 301–2, 304–5, 326, 328,
97, 100–2, 135–6, 142–3, 147, 155, 159–60, 330, 332, 334, 338, 340, 347, 366–8, 370, 391,
165, 177–8, 180, 185, 216, 218, 225, 227, 393–4, 397–8, 402, 406, 408, 410, 428, 430–1,
230–1, 254, 269–70, 274–6, 278, 300–1, 338, 433, 435, 438, 442, 481, 484–5, 487–8, 491,
362, 397, 456–7, 466, 495 510
English Presbyterian Mission, 100, 102, 466 Evangelize China Fellowship, 104
English Reformation, 269, 278 evil, 24, 130, 134, 169, 368, 371, 414, 416, 481
Enlightenment, 25, 101 evolution, 53, 55, 59, 61, 64, 69, 73, 75, 79, 87,
Enoch, 164 113, 178, 233, 244–6, 269, 271, 285–6, 292,
entrepreneurs, 47, 63, 304 313–14, 316–17, 354, 359, 367, 372, 378, 380,
environment, 24, 41, 55, 70, 72, 84–5, 127, 382, 388, 394, 407, 421, 429, 468, 472
.
ly
129–30, 184, 234, 243, 247, 250, 308, 320, Ewha Hakdang, 120
on
324, 357, 365–6, 435, 445, 449, 456, 458, 460 exegesis, 130
Episcopal Church, 134, 269–70, 272–4, 276, 278 exile, 113, 195, 390, 397
se
episcopate, 269 exodus, 88, 100, 456
epistemology, 423 exorcism(s), 341, 508
lu
Epistles of John, 134 extremism, 236, 444–5
equality, 31, 45, 119, 127, 133, 137, 202, 221,
na
302, 310, 416, 488 Fabella, Virginia, 380, 421
so
Ermera, Timor-Leste, 256 Facebook, 160
eschatology, 30 Faith Community Baptist, 227, 232, 326
er
Esther, 176 Faith Purification Centres, 432
Estrada, Joseph, 391, 485
ethics, 25, 32, 61, 94, 122, 133, 205 rp
Falun Gong, 442–3
families, 23, 31, 81, 94–5, 97, 101–2, 112–17,
Fo
Ethiopia, 511 127, 135, 148, 162, 184, 225, 227, 232, 243,
ethnicity, 23, 27, 200, 207, 238, 305, 331, 355, 257, 264–5, 336, 343, 366, 368–70, 373, 415,
e.
361, 395, 400, 421, 430, 439, 445, 516 429, 452, 454, 457–8, 460–1, 464, 484, 505
Ethos Institute, 233 Family Guardian Coalition, 111
l
sa
Eucharist, 60, 171, 240, 259–60, 293 famine, 116, 325, 390, 486
Euki, Paul, 325 Fang, Mark, 105
re
Eurasians, 216, 231, 396, 490 Far East Broadcasting Corporation, 244, 330,
or
Eurocentrism, 472 359

Europe, 25, 27, 47, 54, 57, 94, 99, 101, 133, 138, farmers, 126, 130, 140
n
145, 158, 176, 179–80, 192, 205, 231, 245, fascism, 388
tio
248, 291–2, 295, 297–8, 316–17, 330, 351–3, fasting, 164, 206, 294, 340–1
356–7, 376, 452, 460, 463–4, 467, 470, 491, Fatima, Portugal, 256
bu
502, 514, 516 Fatumeta, 257–8

Eusebius, 377 fatwas, 432
tri
Evangelical(s), 25–6, 49, 64–5, 76, 81–2, 89, 95, feasts, 94, 250, 358
is
97, 101, 108, 124, 126, 143, 163–4, 169–70, Far East Broadcasting Corporation (FEBC),
rd
177–82, 184, 193, 197, 215, 217, 219, 227–8, 181, 360
231, 235, 242–7, 252, 269, 271, 274, 277, 281, Federation of Asian Bishops Conference
fo
296–300, 303–4, 308, 320, 324, 326, 328, 330, (FABC), 31, 192, 299, 319, 375, 385, 447
female(s), 120–1, 263, 272, 278, 403, 414–19,
ot
334–5, 359–60, 376, 378, 389–90, 393–4,

397–8, 404, 427–8, 432, 445, 512 423–4, 459
N
Evangelical Church of Vietnam, 193, 427 feminist theology, 125, 420, 422
Evangelical Covenant Church, 108 Fernandes, Captain Francisco, 255
Evangelical Fellowship of Asia, 325 Fernandez, Hilary, 175, 220
Evangelical Fellowship of Singapore, 326 Fernandez, Irene, 220
Evangelical Fellowship of Thailand, 163 fertility, 506–7, 515
Evangelical Formosan Church General festivals, 192, 328, 370
Assembly, 300 Filipino(s), 16–17, 19, 23, 27, 83, 88, 105, 231,
Evangelical Mongolian Church Council, 299 240, 242, 246–52, 275–6, 300, 304, 316–18,
evangelisation, 51, 58, 60, 70, 82–3, 89, 124, 354, 357–8, 360, 371, 380, 382, 398, 405, 416,
197, 229, 246, 249–50, 255, 261, 265, 297, 421–2, 447, 454–6, 458–9, 471, 474, 491–2
310, 316, 326, 337, 356, 395, 460 finance, 21, 39, 42, 53, 75, 232, 303, 307, 345
Evangelisation of Peoples, 55–6, 197 fire, 17, 87, 246, 252, 337, 365
528 Index
First Opium War, 74, 270 Full Gospel Bible College, 340
First Sino-Japanese War, 272 Full Gospel Church, 121, 324, 340, 345, 360,
First World War, 140, 330 398, 404
fishing, 83, 225 Full Gospel Tokyo Church, 345
Five Classics, 376 Fuller Theological Seminary, 335
Five Years Mission, 148 Fundamental Law of Education, 141
Five-Year Outline Plan, 45 fundamentalism, 28, 33, 36, 62, 68, 219, 242,
Five-Year Plan, 66 245, 252, 306, 327, 330, 409, 422, 444, 474
Flores, 206 funding, 161, 430
food, 40, 125, 129, 162, 179, 185, 209, 230, 240, funerals, 127, 210, 502
248, 319, 370, 429, 483 Futaba School, 137
Food for the Hungry, 125, 179 future, 27, 50–1, 57, 65, 70, 85, 90, 106, 131,
Forcade, Father Theodore-Augustin, 134–5 147, 152–3, 177, 179–80, 185, 209, 223, 233,
.
ly
Foreign Bible Society, 176 241, 246, 252, 256, 258, 260, 263, 271, 279,
on
Foreign Institutions of the Moscow Patriar- 291, 308, 329, 333–4, 363, 385, 394, 397, 401,
chate, 290 407–8, 411, 422, 444, 449, 461, 480, 482, 484,
se
foreigners, 26, 87, 102, 145, 157–8, 177–8, 239, 488, 490, 510, 512, 514–16
273, 427, 455–6, 485 Fuzhou, China, 83
lu
forests, 369
Formosa, 99, 111, 300, 466 G12 strategy, 165
na
forts, 22, 39, 44, 83, 94, 96, 100, 105, 111, 120–1, Gabriel (angel), 357
so
136–7, 142, 145, 147, 149, 151–2, 187, 214, GABRIELA, 416
222–3, 231, 261, 276, 298, 303–4, 308, 319, Gadjah Mada University, 209
er
321, 328, 337, 343, 353–4, 361, 384, 393, 408, Gafatar, 207
445, 448–9, 460, 467, 469, 471, 490
Forum Igreja-Igreja Kristaun Protestante, 258 rp
Gallo, 240, 248, 317
Gallup, 453
Fo
Four Virtues, 415 Gama, Vasco da, 145
Foursquare Church, 181, 183 gambling, 90
e.
fragmentation, 203, 235 Ganges River, 142, 463

France, 77, 137, 141, 143, 155, 158, 182, 187, Ganghwa Island, 275
l
sa
189, 205, 470 Gangjeong, 128

Francis, Pope, 51, 58, 167, 192, 417, 423 Gatolic, 28, 298
re
Franciscan(s), 61, 96, 175, 188, 316, 353, 356, Gaudium et spes, 354
or
465, 467 Gawad Kalinga, 343

Francisco, José Mario C., 20 gender equality, 302
n
Free China, 106 gender-based violence (GBV), 421

tio
Free Community Church, 235 gender, 15, 97, 106, 110, 124, 127, 129, 184, 200,
Free Methodists, 104 235, 299, 302, 311, 321, 327, 380, 410, 414,
bu
freedom, 22, 34, 40–1, 45, 48, 63, 65, 70, 84–5, 416, 418, 420, 422, 424, 460, 483
90, 102, 114, 123, 126, 134, 137, 139–41, 152, genealogy, 262
tri
155, 157, 173, 180, 189–91, 194–5, 197–8, Generation Z, 480

is
200, 202, 205, 207–10, 212, 219, 221–2, 238, Genesis, 36, 299, 317, 483
rd
259, 264, 305–6, 310, 313, 328–9, 364, 380, Geneva, Switzerland, 189, 193, 393
389–91, 424, 430, 432, 434, 436, 439, 441–3, genocide, 179, 321, 473
fo
446, 448–9, 457, 460, 471, 473, 486–8 geography, 238, 386
Georgian Palladian, 357
ot
freedom of religion, 102, 141, 180, 195, 200,

202, 205, 207, 210, 222, 238, 329, 364, 427, Gereja Bethel Indonesia, 341
N
429, 435, 441, 443, 487–8 Gereja Kemah Injil Indonesia, 302
French, 33, 119, 169, 176, 188, 213, 249, 316, Gereja Kristen Indonesia, 410
370, 413, 427, 467, 479, 517 Gereja Kristen Luther Indonesia, 203
Fretilin, 313 Gereja Kristen Protestan Indonesia, 203
Friends of Jesus, 140 Gereja Kristen Protestan Simalungun, 203
friends, 32, 44–5, 48, 59, 93, 140, 160, 171–2, Gereja Kristen Timor Timur, 258
184, 211, 236, 240, 333, 459–60 Gereja Masehi Injili, 302
Fuan, 356 Gereja Mission Batak, 203
Fujian, 64 Gereja Protestan Persekutuan Batak Karo, 203
Fujii, Takeshi, 140 Gereja Punguan Kristen Batak, 203
Fukuoka, 273 Gereja Sidang Jemaat Allah, 257
Full Gospel Assembly, 214 Gereka Kristen Protestan Angkola, 203
Index 529
Gereka Kristen Protestan Pakpak Dairi, 203 Guangdong, 69, 74, 159
German(s), 104, 119, 142, 204, 249 Guangqi Press, 61
Germany, 57, 467 Guangzhou, China, 64, 74–5
Germany, East, 57 Guinea, 163, 343, 396
ghettos, 234, 328 Guiyang, China, 69
Gibbens, John, 96 Guizhou, 69
Gideons, 179 Gulf Cooperation Council, 451
Gidokgyo, 28 guru(s), 362
Gih, Andrew, 383 Gusmão, Xanana, 260
Gijang, 121 Guterres, Bernardo, 257
Gilmour, James, 93 Gutheinz, Luis, 105
Giovanni of Montecorvino, 96 Gützlaff, Karl, 134
Girelli, Archbishop Leopoldo, 192 Gwangrim Methodist Church, 301, 307
.
ly
Global Day of Prayer, 228 Gyeonggi Province, 128
on
globalisation, 31, 105, 107, 143, 195, 321, 328,
366, 368, 438, 474 Habibie, B. J., 207
se
Glorious Revolution, 269 Hainan, 83
glossolalia, 296, 508 Hakdang, 120
lu
gnosticism, 480 Hakha, 148
Gobi Desert, 463 Hakka, 83, 213, 254
na
Goddess of Macau, 90 Hakodate, 137–8
so
Goh, William, 229, 232 Hall, Bishop Ronald, 272
gold, 27, 145 Halmahera, 204
er
Gomes, Anima Mukti, 257, 259 Hammond, Arthur L., 176
Gomes, José, 257
Gomes, Major General John, 257, 259 rp
Han Chinese, 388, 490
Hangul, 119–20
Fo
Gomes, Maria, 257 Hanoi, Viet Nam, 168, 188–9, 194–5
Gomes, Seabra, 257 Hansalim Movement, 130
e.
Gomes, Subrata Augustine, 257, 259 Hansen’s disease, 143

gong, 442–4 Hao, Yap Kim, 235
l
sa
Good Friday, 24 Happy Homes Programme, 452

Goshkevich, 286 Happy Valley Racecourse, 83
re
gospel, 19, 21, 32, 39, 44, 63, 68–70, 72–3, 81–2, harassment, 147, 310, 428, 430, 442
or
93–4, 101, 108, 111, 121, 123–4, 134–5, Harbin, China, 284–5, 291, 304
146–7, 149, 151–3, 159, 161, 168, 172, 176, Harun, Mustapha, 214
n
178–9, 184, 190, 214, 219, 227–8, 230, 264, Hatopen Kristen Batak, 330
tio
269, 293, 296, 303–4, 324, 332, 334, 337, 340, Hatta, Mohamad, 201
344–5, 347, 352–4, 360, 363, 365, 368, 378–9, Hau Lian Kham, 338
bu
381, 395, 398, 404, 407, 463, 473, 490 Hawaii, USA, 182, 273, 455
Gothic, 17, 195, 243, 357 He Qi, 35, 74, 87, 283
tri
Goto, 135 Hea Woo, 429

is
Goulart, Jaime Garcia, 256, 265 Healer Panteleimon, 290

rd
Grace Baptist Church, 227 healing, 32, 51, 54, 63, 108–9, 160, 171–2, 184,
grace, 44, 55, 64, 68, 73, 202, 227, 294, 353 193, 219, 236, 335–6, 338–41, 344–5, 347,
fo
Graham, Angus Charles, 15 371–2, 377, 403–5, 407, 409, 481, 508, 510
health, 28–9, 35, 45, 48, 52, 88, 94–5, 120, 124,
ot
Graham, Billy, 15, 82, 149, 195, 225, 326

Graham, Franklin, 149 158, 160, 163, 167, 173, 180, 183, 189, 197,
N
grassroots, 58, 64, 109, 123, 125, 127, 191, 218, 220, 230, 232, 238, 248, 251, 265, 295, 302,
319, 334, 385, 402, 405, 410, 421, 444, 447–9, 304, 316, 329, 335–6, 361, 367, 398, 435, 443,
507 445, 490, 503, 506, 513
Great Commission, 82, 231 Heart Sutra, 376
Great Harmony, 42 heaven, 44, 119, 122, 130, 134, 136, 378, 459
Great Martyr, 289–90 Hebei, 56, 69, 270
Great Missionary Movement, 99–100 Hebron Brethren Assembly, 149
Greek(s), 287–9, 292, 352, 379 Hede, Bishop Liu, 59
Greene, Graham, 195 Hee, Kong, 227, 232
Gresnigt, Dom Adelbert, 84 Hefner, W., 411
gross domestic product (GDP), 34, 40, 486 hegemony, 314, 329–30
Guan Gong, 444 Heilongjiang Province, 285
530 Index
Helena, 459 Hong Kong Catholic Social Welfare

hell, 130, 429 Conference, 80
Help International, 299 Hong Kong Chinese Christian Churches
Henan, China, 63, 67–8, 70, 271, 426–7, 486 Union, 77, 298
Hepburn, James Curtis, 134–5 Hong Kong Christian Council, 77, 298
herbs, 204 Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee,
heresy, 244, 322 79
hermeneutics, 35, 43, 130, 377 Hong Kong Christian Services, 80
heroes, 343 Hong Kong Christian Welfare, 80
heterogeneity, 424 Hong Kong Church Census, 76
Heuvers, Father Hermann, 142 Hong Kong Council of Social Services, 80
Heyward, Carter, 420 Hong Kong Harbor Mission Church, 83
Hi-Eng, Gou, 102 Hong Kong Mutual Christian Improvement
.
ly
Hick, John, 142 Society, 79
on
High Church, 216, 269, 278, 369 Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui, 89, 272
Hilarion, Archimandrite, 283 Hope African University (HAU), 338
se
Hillsong, Australia, 18, 233, 300–1, 345, 365–6 Hope Church, 342, 345
Himalayan Tibetan, 483 Hope of Bangkok Church, 164
lu
Hindu(s), 157, 202, 210, 230–1, 376, 424, 436, Horie, Yuri, 423
442, 449, 503, 512 hospice, 94
na
Hinduism, 157, 201–2, 212, 217, 225, 321, 328, hospitality, 16, 94, 127, 379, 400, 402–4, 409,
so
333, 370, 385, 387, 392, 438, 442, 446, 466, 411, 455
479, 513, 517 hospitals, 27, 81, 85, 102, 105, 124, 160, 163,
er
Hirado, Japan, 135 167, 194, 220, 274, 276, 304, 368, 373, 393,
HIV/AIDS, 180, 299
Hla, John Aung, 278 rp
434
hostel, 81, 220
Fo
Hmong, 21, 169–71, 193, 295, 301, 330–1, house church(es), 19, 22, 32, 43, 64, 66, 70,
359–60, 427, 481–2, 487, 490 72, 115, 185, 194, 281, 302–3, 306, 329–30,
e.
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, 194 334–5, 373, 384–5, 426–7, 430, 470, 482,
Hoeryong, North Korea, 116 486–7, 510–11
l
sa
Hohulo-Raimansu, 263 Hsu, Francis, 76

Hokkaido, Japan, 136, 390, 484 Huang, Po-Ho, 106
re
Hokkien, 83, 338 Hubei, 473

or
Holiness Church, 76, 83, 101, 103–4, 328 Hue, 189, 194, 428
Hollywood, 34 Hui, 89, 271–3, 300
n
Holy Great Synod of Constantinople, 288 Huiyang, 74

tio
Holy Korean Orthodox Church, 293 human rights, 106, 110, 190, 207, 210, 239, 245,
Holy Metropolis of Korea, 292 252, 264, 299, 305, 307, 379, 400, 402, 417,
bu
Holy Orders, 278 427, 429, 432, 442, 469, 473, 501, 504
Holy Resurrection Cathedral, 137 Human Rights Research, 432
tri
Holy See, 51, 53, 55, 57, 87, 105, 197, 254, 256, humanism, 31, 62, 422
is
260, 389, 434 Humanist Society, 231

rd
Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 288 humanists, 231

Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, Hunan, 69, 473
fo
284, 289, 292 Hungary, 273

hunger, 301
ot
Holy Thursday, 360, 455

Holy Trinity Church, 84 Hungry Ghost Month, 24
N
Holy Week, 315, 317 Hungry International, 179

Hom, Neak, 177 Huria Kristen Batak Protestan, 203, 410
Home Affairs, 430, 433, 435 Huria Kristen Indonesia Protestan, 203
Homeland Theology, 106 Huria Kristen Indonesia, 203
homeless, 82 Hwang, C. H., 376
homosexuality, 129, 298, 415 Hyesan, 116
Hong Kong, China, 27, 31, 47, 49, 51, 60, 68, Hymnal of Universal Praise, 300
71, 76, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86, 88–90, 96, 135, hymns, 18, 123, 128, 136, 159, 171, 179, 185–6,
248–9, 272, 278, 287–9, 298, 302, 323, 327, 300, 331, 370, 469
332, 340, 343, 345, 368, 384, 389, 392–3, 397,
413, 420, 426, 438, 441, 444, 448, 451–3, iban, 215–16, 218
455–6, 459, 465–6, 474, 488, 490 Iberia, 316–17
Index 531
icons, 250 Indonesia, 19–22, 28–9, 31, 33–4, 109, 202,

identity, 21, 60–2, 83, 85, 105–7, 110, 145, 150, 204, 206, 208, 210, 214–15, 225, 231–2,
153, 155, 170, 172, 185, 197–8, 200, 202–4, 240, 254, 257–62, 264, 277, 283, 288, 295,
207–9, 236, 239, 254, 305, 310–11, 317–19, 299–300, 302, 304–6, 308, 311, 313–14, 319,
327, 331, 344, 360–1, 365, 367, 390, 395, 325–6, 329–30, 332, 339, 341, 343, 355, 364,
414–15, 420–1, 424, 433, 439, 444–5, 447–9, 370, 383–4, 386–7, 391–3, 396, 398, 401–5,
460, 463, 471, 491, 506–7, 513 409–10, 413, 416, 425, 431–3, 436, 439, 442,
ideology, 81, 105–6, 121, 139, 190, 198, 200, 444–5, 447–9, 451, 453, 456, 459, 467, 470–1,
202, 238, 244, 262, 372, 409, 416–17, 426, 473–4, 479–81, 484, 486–91, 505, 511
429, 432–3, 435, 487 Indonesian Assemblies of God, 257
idioms, 356 Indonesian Bethel Church, 341
Iesu, 140 Indonesian Christian Church, 203
Ig-du Kim, 372 Indonesian Evangelical Communion, 325
.
ly
Iglesia Filipina Independiente, 316, 382 Indonesian High Court, 410
on
Igorot, 276 Indonesian Missionary Fellowship, 326
Igreja Evangélica Assembleias, 257 Indonesian Orthodox Church, 291
se
Ileto, Reynaldo, 317 Indonesian Protestant Christian Church, 203
illness, 172, 230, 273, 338, 347 Indonesian Ulama Council, 432
lu
Iloilo, Philippines, 243 Industrial Relations Institute, 79
imagery, 246, 380 Industrial Training Center, 95
na
imagination, 385, 420, 443–4 industrialisation, 104, 124, 385
so
imams, 157, 488 inequality, 31, 416
immigrant(s), 23, 83, 88–9, 293, 368, 373, infant(s), 35, 171, 188, 414, 505
er
432–3, 452, 461, 512, 516 infrastructure, 57, 60, 155, 208, 226, 384, 489
immigration, 143, 514–15
Imperial Rescript, 137 rp
Ing-wen, Dr Tsai, 110
Injil, 215, 302, 325, 331, 367
Fo
imperialism, 39, 75, 122, 269, 381, 394, 406–8, injustice, 54, 69, 109, 126–7, 221, 299, 304, 332,
463–4, 468, 472, 474 384, 400
e.
imprisonment, 173, 202, 256, 306, 389, 426, Inner Mongolia, 92–3, 285
430, 486–8 Innocent, Archimandrite, 284
l
sa
Inagaki, Ryosuke, 142 instability, 393

incarnation, 293, 310, 351–2, 361–2, 376–7, Institute for Theological Animation (BITA),
re
379–80 320
or
Incheon, South Korea, 274, 293 Institute of Church Planting Cambodia, 183
inclusivity, 423 Institutio Generalis Missalis Romani, 105
n
income, 40, 160, 228, 232, 238, 304, 308, 436, intellectuals, 28, 52, 63–4, 68, 73, 79, 141, 284,
tio
484, 488–9 468

Income Tax Act, 436 Inter-Faith Dialogue, 49, 235, 400, 438, 446–7,
bu
inculturation, 19, 34, 51–2, 57, 62, 142, 262, 489

315, 320–1, 375–6, 448 Inter-religious Affairs on the Theology of
tri
Independent Churches, 104, 106, 181, 216, 233, Dialogue (BERA), 320
is
240, 245, 299, 331, 382, 510 Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship, 326, 333
rd
Independent(s), 29, 33, 39, 42–3, 54, 57, 63, intermarriage, 236
75–6, 89, 95, 104, 106, 108, 110, 117, 164, International Christian Assembly, 345
fo
181, 201, 214, 216–17, 226, 232–3, 238, 240, International Council of Christian Churches,
105
ot
242–3, 245, 254–5, 269, 271–2, 276, 278–9,

299–300, 303–4, 313, 324, 331, 340, 359, International Social Survey Programme, 251
N
381–3, 391, 394, 398, 426, 460, 465, 468–9, Internet, 155–6, 159, 222, 394, 480
473–4, 504, 507, 510–11 interventions, 223, 347, 445
India, 23, 51, 77, 99, 134, 145–6, 204, 212–14, intolerance, 201, 208, 210, 430
216–18, 225–6, 230–1, 240, 276–8, 288, 300, Iran, 505
327, 331, 339, 357, 366, 368, 375–6, 387, Iraq, 235
396, 420, 438–9, 453, 463, 466, 471–3, 479, Ireland, 77, 214
490–1 isan, 163
Indians, 212, 216, 225, 230, 331, 396, 472, 490 Isang Milyong Bayani, 343
indigenisation, 84, 105, 110, 127–8, 138, 278, Islam, 25, 30, 48, 84, 92–3, 157, 173, 181, 192,
295, 395, 404, 468, 473, 482 201–2, 207–8, 212, 214, 221–3, 225, 231,
individualism, 32, 417 234–6, 238–41, 243, 301, 305, 321, 328–30,
Indochina, 87, 175, 193, 370, 438, 467, 479 332–3, 355–6, 364, 370, 373, 376, 381, 385,
532 Index
387, 391–3, 402, 409–11, 413, 424, 431–4, Jesus Family, 67, 250, 336–7, 342, 395
438–42, 445, 448, 459, 466, 471, 474, 479, Jesus film, 93
482, 484, 486–8, 492, 513, 517 Jesus Is Lord Church, 25, 345–6, 455
Islamic law, 431 Jews, 332
Islamic State, IS, ISIS, 19, 72, 235, 364, 413, Jianan Shige, 300
433–4 Jiangsu, 69
Island of Borneo, 238, 367, 396 jihad, 305, 486
Israel, 151, 378, 395 Jin, Bishop, 58
Italian, language, 16, 59, 167 Jin, Tianming, 71
Italy, 77, 138, 143, 343, 467 Jinping, Xi, 62, 69–70, 72, 285, 425–6
Itinerants of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference Jit-asa, 157
of the Philippines, 455 Joaquim, Father António, 255
Iwasawa, Arseniy, 286 jobs, 216, 248, 433, 484
.
ly
Iwashita, 138–9, 141 John Paul II, Pope, 56–7, 188, 207, 258, 260–1,
on
397, 417–19
Jainism, 321 John the Baptist, 255
se
Jakarta, Indonesia, 99, 200, 203–5, 208, 291, John XXIII, Pope, 189
330, 339, 405, 410, 433, 442, 487 Johnston, William, 142
lu
Jakarta Theological Seminary, 405 Jorge, Frei, 254
James, Walter, 176 jubilee, 228–9, 431
na
Janes, Leroy Lancing, 136 Judaism, 517
so
Japan, 16, 18–21, 23–5, 27, 30–4, 39, 76, 78, judgement(s), 108, 222, 227, 327
83–4, 87, 89, 99–104, 111–12, 120–1, 127, Judson, Adoniram & Ann, 146
er
134, 136, 140, 142, 144, 205, 256, 271–5, Justice and Peace Commission, 82
277–9, 283, 286–7, 292, 295–6, 298–9, 302,
307, 311, 324–6, 328–9, 345, 353, 358, 365, rp
justice, 45, 54, 59, 69, 82, 105–6, 109–10, 124–9,
195–6, 218, 221, 245, 252, 257, 264, 296, 299,
Fo
370, 372, 375–6, 379, 381, 383–5, 387–90, 301, 303–5, 308, 320, 327, 332, 379–80, 384,
393, 397, 401, 413, 416, 420, 422–3, 425, 400, 405, 442
e.
434, 438, 440, 443, 447–8, 451, 453, 455–7,

465–70, 473–4, 479–80, 484, 486, 488, 492, Kabaw, 147
l
sa
517 Kachin Baptist Churches, 149

Japan Bible Seminary, 325 Kachin(s), 146, 148–9, 151, 395, 421, 430–1, 487,
re
Japan Christian Yearbook, 132 490

or
Japan Imperial Public Educational Kadazans, 218

Association, 139 Kagawa, Toyohiko, 140
n
Japan’s Nippon Sei Ko Kai, 278 Kajinosuke Ibuka, 135

tio
Japanese, 16, 18–20, 23, 25, 27, 30, 76, 78, Kalay, 147
83–4, 89, 100–4, 111–12, 120–1, 127, 132–4, Kalgan, 93
bu
136–44, 205, 256, 271–5, 277–9, 285–7, 307, Kalimantan, 200, 305, 332
326, 328–9, 345, 353, 358, 372, 376, 379, Kalmucks, 96
tri
383–4, 388, 390, 393, 397, 422, 443, 451, 456, Kambuja, 175
is
466–7, 469–70, 492, 517 kami, 136

rd
Japanese Congregational Church, 136 Kamiya, 143

Japanese Holy Catholic Church, 274 Kampong Som, 183
fo
Japanese Nobori Kanai, 273 Kampuchea, 175, 178–80

Kanagawa, 273
ot
Japanese Orthodox Church, 285–7

Japayuki, 422 Kanamori, Michitomo, 136
N
Jarai, 193 Kang-Tak, John, 292

Java (Indonesia), 200, 204–7, 209–10, 291, 330, Kang, Namsoon, 420
341, 356, 466 Kang, Won-Yong, 125
Jehovah’s Witnesses, 129, 177, 181, 243, 281, Kao, C. M., 106
436, 444 Kaohsiung, 457, 459
Jeju Island, 98, 128, 130, 367 Karen (Kayin), 146, 148–9, 151, 159, 295, 305–6,
Jemaa Islamiyah, 235 308, 326, 331, 372, 395, 421, 430, 487, 490
Jeonju, 293 Karen Baptist Convention, 148–9
Jerusalem, 20, 66, 72, 121, 304, 367, 431, 490 Karen National Liberation Army, 372
Jesuit(s), 18, 51–2, 77–8, 87, 133, 142, 167, 175, Karenni, 430, 487
179, 187–8, 204, 206, 255–6, 265, 316, 318, Karo, 203
353–4, 357, 375, 465, 467, 470 Kasatkin, Ivan Dmitrievich, 137, 286
Index 533
Kaya, 490 Kolkata (Calcutta), India, 276–8

Kayah, 149 Korea, North, 34, 114, 116, 118–20, 122, 126,
Kazakh(s), 92, 516 128, 130, 292–3, 295, 305–7, 364, 366, 390,
Kazan, Russia, 290 393, 401, 413, 425, 428, 436, 438, 440, 442,
Kebatinan, 210 470, 479–80, 482, 485–6, 492
Kedah, 212–13 Korea, South, 27–8, 31–2, 34, 70–1, 94–5, 98,
Keelung, 466 103, 114–15, 117–18, 122, 124, 128, 130, 180,
Kelabits, 215 183, 293, 295, 298–301, 303–4, 307–8, 311,
Kernolong Church, 203 323–4, 372, 378–9, 384, 386, 390–4, 397–8,
Kerygma, 122, 342 401, 404–5, 407–8, 413, 425, 434–5, 438, 440,
Ketuhanan, 208 446, 451–3, 455–6, 468–9, 479, 481–2, 485–6,
Khalkh Mongolian, 92 489, 491–2
Kham, 338 Korean Association of Christian Women, 422
.
ly
Kheng, 169–70 Korean Association of Women Theologians,
on
Khleang Province, 179 125
Khmer, 175–8, 181–5, 290, 298, 330 Korean Buddhist Federation, 115
se
Khmer Evangelical Church, 177–9, 182 Korean Catholic Association, 115
Khmer New Year, 185 Korean Chondoist Association, 115
lu
Khmer Rouge, 178–9, 184, 330 Korean Council of Religions of Peace, 446
Khmu Bible, 169 Korean Missionary Brotherhood, 274
na
Khmu, 167, 169–70, 172, 481, 489–90 Korean National Council of Churches, 299,
so
Khong, Lawrence, 227–8, 235, 326 401
kidnappings, 486 Korean Orthodox Church, 115, 293
er
Kil, Son-ju, 337–8, 377 Korean Presbyterian Church, 125, 298
killing(s), 179, 313, 330, 434, 486–7
Killing Fields, 179 rp
Korean Religionists Council, 115
Korean War, 103, 112, 121, 130, 275, 292, 307,
Fo
Kim, Chang-su, 128 341, 397
Kim, Ikdu, 337 Koreans, 18–19, 33, 67, 116, 119–20, 292, 324,
e.
Kim, Jae-June, 125 390

Kim, Kyu-sik, 121 Koryo, 299
l
sa
Kim, Maria, 121 Kosai, Masuda, 286

Kim Il-sung, 113, 429 Kosai, Tachibana, 286
re
Kim Jong-un, 390 Koshin Presbyterian Churches, 299

or
kindergartens, 81, 432 Kota Kinabalu, 214, 217

King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 155 Kounthapanya, Khamphone, 169
n
King Dome, 249 Kounthapanya, Saly, 169

tio
King Gojong, 127 Kowae, Wirachai, 163

King Louis of Holland, 205 Kowloon, 74
bu
King Narai, 158 Koya, 30, 138, 327, 379, 401, 447
King Norodom Sihanouk, 181 Koyama Fukusei Hospital, 138
tri
King of Portugal, 87, 145 Koyama, Kosuke, 30, 327, 379, 447
is
King Sisowath Monivong, 176 Kozaki, Hiromichi, 136

rd
kingdom, 17, 134, 140, 175, 180, 230, 244–9, Kren Jai, 156–8
255, 288–9, 294, 299, 321, 325, 378, 397, 457, Kriengsak Chareonwongsak, 164, 342
fo
511 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 217, 344, 358

Kuching, 216, 232, 240, 276–7
ot
Kingdom of Cambodia, 175, 180

Kingdom of God, 140, 299, 321, 325, 378, 397 Kumamoto School of Western Studies, 136
N
Kingdom of Mena, 255 Kumamoto Yogakko, 136

kings, 24, 145–6, 150, 153, 187 Kuomintang, 105, 273, 469
Kinmen, Taiwan, 68 Kuribayashi Teruo, 420
kinship, 258, 262 Kuzure, Urakami Yoban, 135
Kinukawa, Hisako, 422 Kwok, Pui-Lan, 377, 420
Kiribati Protestant Church (KPC), 125 Kwong, Peter, 75, 272
Kirill, Patriarch, 285, 291 Kyoto Graduate Union of Religious Studies,
Kirishitans, 134–6 448
Kitamori, Kazoh, 142, 379 Kyushu, 273
Kobe, Japan, 140, 273–4
Koh, Pastor, 432 La Salle Brothers, 27, 194
Koho, 193 La Vang, 377
534 Index
labour, 15, 33, 41, 79, 82, 105, 124, 140, 167, Lee, Stephen, 88
213, 248, 316, 390–1, 416, 422, 429–30, Lee, Cheon Hwan, 275
451–2, 454, 457, 461, 469, 484, 486 Lee, Chong, 170
Labuan, 213, 276–7 Lee, Gipung, 367
Lady of the Assumption, 239–1 Lee, Kuan Yew, 226, 229
Lahane, 255 Lee, Myungbak, 130
Lahu, 151, 159, 295 Lee, Yongdo, 337
Lai, Bishop José, 88 Leira, Giovanni, 167
laity, 51, 67, 189, 196, 218, 233, 250, 265, 344 Lenin, Vladimir, 287, 428
Lak, Yeow Choo, 327 Leningrad, 287
Lakawa, Septemmy, 409 Lenten, 455
Laksana, Albertus Bagus, 319 Leo XIII, Pope, 167
Lam, Domingos, 88 Leontiev, Maxim, 283
.
ly
Lam, Chung-kong, 89 Leow, Archbishop Julian, 217
on
Lam, Yam-man, 89 leprosy, 15, 138, 168–9
Lamb, Samuel, 64 Les Sœurs, 137
se
land, 23, 83, 92, 99, 107, 128, 175, 203, 209–10, Leuven, Belgium, 61
220–1, 257, 259, 273, 308, 310, 316, 341, 428, LGBTQ, 414–15, 422–4
lu
458, 466, 470, 488, 491 Li Tianen, 64
Langham, 97 Li Xinheng, 19, 72
na
language(s), 18, 25, 33, 42, 60, 72, 88, 92, 96, Liaoning, 69
so
119–20, 136, 139, 142, 155, 165, 169, 172, liberalisation, 388, 390, 392
175, 178, 185, 187, 194–5, 200–1, 205, 212, liberation, 24, 39, 107, 112, 126, 193, 218, 246,
er
218, 222, 225–6, 249, 254, 257–8, 284, 287, 252, 260, 275, 308, 317, 321, 354, 372, 380,
290–1, 293, 298, 300, 305, 317, 322, 334–5,
338, 351–5, 359, 361–2, 373, 376, 379, 381, rp391, 393, 420, 434, 440, 445
liberation theology, 126, 218, 246
Fo
395–6, 410, 430, 432, 464–6, 469, 471, 503, liberty, 325
516 Life Fellowship Phnom Penh, 183
e.
Lanzhou, 69 Liggins, John, 134, 273

Lao Evangelical Church, 169–70, 428 Light of Jesus Family, 250, 342
l
sa
Laos, 20, 24, 31, 34, 168, 170, 172, 175, 232, 277, Lim, Timothy, 281
288–9, 295, 304, 310, 314–15, 329–30, 355, Limbang, Malaysia, 238
re
364, 387, 395, 398, 413, 421, 425, 428, 436, Ling Liang World-Wide Evangelistic Mission
or
452–3, 466–7, 479–81, 483, 485–6, 489–90 Association, 104

Laranjeira, Manuel Mendes, 262 Lisi, Meng, 19, 72
n
Larantuka, 255 Lisu, 159, 377, 395

tio
Lascano, 380 literacy, 152, 231, 303, 383, 484

Latin America, 192, 218, 358, 386–7, 420, 464 literature, 41, 78, 127, 139, 141, 165, 195, 221,
bu
Latter Rain Church, 344 239, 242, 244, 300, 426, 428, 430, 435, 453,
Latter-day Saints, Mormons, 181–2, 243, 281 458, 487, 501, 509
tri
Lausanne Congress, Third, 70 Lith, Van, 206–7

is
Lausanne Movement, 70, 219, 325 Lithuania, 271

rd
Lausanne World Congress, 71 Little Flock, 331, 383, 395

law(s), 43, 45, 55–6, 61, 65, 76, 85, 90, 104, Little Sisters of the Poor, 78, 80
fo
107, 109–10, 116, 141, 197, 201–2, 208, 210, Liturgical Commission of the Diocese of Dili,
262
ot
222–3, 239, 284, 286, 291, 305, 314, 340, 361,

373, 421, 427, 429–31, 433–4, 440, 443, 446, Liturgical lectionaries, 262
N
487–8, 512 liturgy, 43, 60, 84, 123, 127, 159, 250, 261–2,
Lawas, 217 287, 289–90, 292–4, 301, 322
lawyers, 201 Liturgy of St John Chrysostom, 289–90
Lay Apostolate, 320 Living Hope in Christ Church, 183
leadership, 25, 33, 39, 41–3, 54, 56, 61, 89, 93–6, Lock Tao Christian Association, 77
108, 112, 129, 148, 151, 156, 165, 171, 177, Logos Evangelical Fellowship, 300
180–3, 186, 193, 195, 213, 219, 223, 227–8, London Missionary Society, 76, 88–9
247, 254–5, 265, 271, 273–4, 278–9, 290, London, UK, 76, 88–9, 146, 274
302–3, 325–7, 329–30, 332–3, 344–5, 361, loneliness, 347
372, 381–3, 390, 393, 396, 398, 404, 417, Loochoo Naval Mission, 273
447–8, 467, 509 Los Angeles, California, 121, 335
lectionaries, 262 Lotus Sutra, 376
Index 535
Louton, Mike, 345 Malik, Adam, 313

Love Singapore, 228 Maluku, 204, 444–5, 487
Luang Prabang, 167, 169 Mamdu, Dom Joseph, 84, 167
Luc, Tran, 17, 195, 357 Mamuya, 204
Luke, 176 Manalo, Felix, 245
Lun Bawang, 215 Mananzan, Mary John, 421
Luther Christian Indonesian Church, 203 Manas, 264
Lutheran(s), 49, 80, 95, 103, 105, 108, 164, Manatuto, 256
216–17, 225, 233, 243, 296, 300, 302, 323, Manchuria, 119, 139
327–8, 449 Mandailing, 203
Lutheran World Federation, 49 Mandalay, 278
Lutheran World Services, 80 Mandarin, 36, 42, 83, 104, 232, 254, 258, 301,
Luzon, Philippines, 99, 276 362
.
ly
Lyfoung, Touby, 169 Mangga Besar Jakarta, 339
on
Mangihut Hezekiel Mannullang, 330
Macanese, 88, 90 Manichaeism, 20
se
Macau, 32, 49, 88, 90, 134, 255, 270, 272, 288, Manila, Philippines, 24, 56–7, 100, 179, 243–4,
413, 426, 466 246, 250, 275–6, 315, 339, 342, 345–6, 352,
lu
Macau Anglican Church, 89 360, 370
Macau Baptist Church, 89 Mankhanekhoun, Bishop Louis-Marie Ling,
na
Mackay, Australia, 101, 484 167, 173
so
Mackay, George, 484 Mankin, Pramod, 321
Madame Song, 103, 106 Manobo, 332
er
Madras (Chennai), India, 357 Manso, Frei Pedro, 255
Magellan, Ferdinand, 380
magic, 24, 227 rp
Manuel, Bishop José, 255
Mao Zedong, 468
Fo
Maha Esa, 208 Maoism, 388
Mahayana Buddhism, 84, 376, 387, 479, 517 Mar Thoma Church, 217
e.
Mai, Tran, 193 Marawi, 434

Maiorica, Gerolamo, 195 Marçal, Arlindo, 258, 262
l
sa
Maitrichit Baptist Church, 159 Marçal, Florindo, 257

Majapahit, 291 Marcos, Ferdinand, 245, 248, 330, 391, 485
re
Majestades, 316 Mardon, Richard, 146

or
Majlis Gereja-Gereja Malaysia, 299 marginalised, 31, 79, 82, 103, 105, 108–9, 121,
Malacca, Malaysia, 87, 212–13, 254, 277, 467 124, 168–70, 232, 235, 321, 333, 336, 366,
n
Malay Archipelago, 438 369, 379, 396, 398, 401, 419, 447, 459, 472,
tio
Malay Bumiputras, 212 481, 485

Malay Islamic Monarchy, 440 Marian devotion, 377
bu
Malay-language Bibles, 432 Mariano, 343

Malay Muslim Monarchy, 238 Marino, Archbishop Joseph S., 216
tri
malaya, 212, 277, 448, 483 Maritain, Jacques, 141

is
Malaysia, 16, 19–20, 23, 31, 33–4, 180, 182–3, Mark of Yegoryevsk, Archbishop, 290
rd
192, 214, 216, 218, 220, 222, 225–6, 232, markets, 488
238, 240, 277, 288, 295, 299, 301, 303, Maromak, 263
fo
305–6, 308, 326–8, 331–3, 344, 355, 357, marriage, 24, 94, 110–11, 196, 201, 210, 235–6,
239, 244, 247, 252, 255, 307, 371, 420, 432–4,
ot
360, 362, 364, 366–7, 370, 373, 379–80, 387,

391–2, 395–6, 401–2, 405, 409–10, 413, 451–2, 458–9, 484
N
416, 423–5, 431–2, 436, 439, 441–2, 446–8, Marsden, P., 407
452–3, 467, 470–1, 473–4, 479, 481, 484, Martino, Cardinal Renato, 260
486, 488, 490–1 martyr(s), 19, 22, 65, 70, 72–3, 112, 119, 122,
Malaysia Baptist Theological Seminary, 217, 134, 188, 198, 276, 289–90, 314, 390, 396–7,
327 416
Malaysia Bible Seminary, 217, 327 martyrdom, 65, 72, 198
Malaysia Evangelical College, 217 Marxist(s), 62, 229, 319, 375, 428
Malaysia Theological Seminary, 217, 328, 448 Mary Magdalene, 416
Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Maryknoll, 77, 80, 421
446 Maryknoll Sisters Catholic Welfare Centre,
Maldives, 288 80
Maliana, 256 masculinity, 414
536 Index
mass, 18, 28, 32, 54, 58, 60, 83, 88, 100, 112, 143, Metropolitanate of Hong Kong, 287–8
205, 209, 214, 229, 240, 251, 256, 259–62, Mexico, 77
298, 310, 315, 317, 329, 342, 352, 359–62, Micah Asia, 308
391, 397, 455–9, 469, 481 Micah, Hieromonk, 291
materialism, 198, 330, 373, 480, 482, 490 Michelangelo’s Pietà, 35
Matthew, Apostle, 377, 421 Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 27, 31,
Mau Duan, 263 72, 92–3, 223, 248, 300, 343, 441, 491
Maute Group, 434 migrant(s), 23, 27, 49, 80, 83, 88–9, 94, 131, 143,
Mawlamyine, 277 203, 213–14, 218, 220, 225–6, 231, 234, 236,
May Fourth Movement, 52 238, 240, 248, 277, 284, 288, 293, 300, 304,
Mbour, Senegal, 341 331, 358, 368, 373, 395, 405, 407, 432–3,
McCaul, Jesse, 183 451–62, 470–1, 474, 483–4, 490–1, 507, 512,
McCaul, Chuck, 183 516
.
ly
McClean, Hector, 147 Migrant Church, 218, 405, 474
on
McClean, Sigrid, 147 migration(s), 32, 64, 143, 204, 213–15, 292, 304,
McDougall, Francis Thomas, 276 358, 386, 396, 405–6, 438, 452, 454, 456, 458,
se
McFague, Sallie, 420 480, 484, 512, 514–15
McGilvary, Daniel, 167 militants, 434
lu
McIntire, Carl, 105 military, 99, 102–3, 110, 119, 124, 128–9, 139,
Medan, Indonesia, 204, 433 141, 149–50, 170, 180, 186–8, 195, 201, 223,
na
Medeiros, Father, 255, 265 256, 258–9, 262–4, 278, 283, 286, 288, 310,
so
media, 28, 49, 56, 69, 79, 83, 104, 129, 155–6, 313–14, 316, 379, 381, 384, 390–2, 394, 396,
159–60, 164, 244, 260, 297–8, 314, 340–2, 401, 406, 413, 421–2, 430, 435–6, 463, 467–9,
er
352–3, 360–2, 370, 377–8, 394, 402, 409, 426, 486–7
435, 439, 443, 449, 457, 469, 480, 482, 487,
489, 506 rp
Military Ordinariate, Australia, 119
Military Ordinariate of South Korea, 119
Fo
medicine, 39, 101, 133, 373, 383, 471, 484 Million Souls, 140, 337, 345, 366
meditation, 206 Mindanao, Philippines, 243, 276, 343, 393, 409,
e.
Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs, 204 440, 445, 486

mega-church, 18, 31, 108, 122, 129, 226–7, 230, Ming-cheung, Bishop Michael Yang, 51
l
sa
232–4, 243, 296, 307, 334, 340, 413, 473, 481 Mingjing, 307
Megawati, 207 Minh Mang, 188
re
Meiji empire, 133, 135–40, 383, 468 Minh Thien Voan, 179
or
Mekong River, 167 Ministry of Cults, 430

Melayu Islam Beraja, 431, 440 Ministry of Education, 47, 136
n
Melee, 147 Ministry of Home Affairs, 435

tio
Mendes, Bonnie, 262 Ministry of Information, 181

Meng Lisi, 72 Ministry of the Interior, 427
bu
Mennonite (s), 104, 193, 427 Minjung theology, 19, 126, 378, 391, 401
merchants, 145, 352 Minor Seminary of Our Lady of Fatima, 256
tri
Mercy Associates, 179 minorities, 24, 129, 151, 153, 170, 172–3, 193,
is
Mertens, Father, 206 202, 207, 238, 244, 303–4, 306–7, 310–11,
rd
Merton, Thomas, 15, 19 328, 330, 355, 364, 379, 390, 396, 421, 427–8,
Meru, 172 430, 439–42, 445–6, 449, 470, 473–4, 481,
fo
Mesa the Tagalog, 354 483, 485–7, 489–1

miracle(s), 33, 64, 104, 184, 230, 338, 341,
ot
Methodist(s), 76–7, 95, 97, 103–5, 112, 120, 125,

147–8, 164, 181–2, 193, 213, 216–17, 225, 371–2, 397, 481, 508–9
N
227–8, 232–3, 235, 240, 296, 298, 301–3, 307, Miri, 217
323–4, 326–7, 369, 382, 448, 466 Misa, 240, 248, 317
Methodist Missionary Society, 326 missiles, 492
Methodist Theological School, 217 Mission Batak Church, 203
methods, 95, 97, 130, 159, 489, 501 Mission China, 66, 69, 71–2
Metropolitan Archdiocese of Seoul, 119 missionaries, 19, 21, 26–7, 39, 44, 51, 66–7,
Metropolitan Daniel, 287 69, 71–4, 76–7, 79, 82–3, 87, 92–7, 99–103,
Metropolitan Kirill, 291 105–6, 119–23, 132–6, 138, 142, 145–9, 151,
Metropolitan of All Japan, 287 157–8, 160–3, 167–71, 177–80, 182–3, 186–8,
Metropolitan of Hong Kong, 288 200, 204–5, 213–15, 219, 223, 225–6, 232,
Metropolitan of Korea, 293 234, 236, 245, 249, 254–6, 263, 270–1, 273,
Metropolitan Sergius, 286–7 275, 277–9, 283–4, 303–4, 312, 316–17, 324,
Index 537
336–8, 345, 352–4, 356–7, 367–8, 370, 372–3, movements, 29, 40, 52, 94, 103, 105–6, 108–9,
376, 381–2, 408, 420, 436, 457, 463, 465–7, 121, 126, 173, 210, 219, 245–6, 250, 252, 263,
470, 472–3, 483, 490–2 281, 295, 304, 308, 321, 325–6, 330, 333–5,
Missionary Alliance, 168, 302, 323 351, 354, 358–60, 367–8, 371, 376, 385, 387,
Missouri, 18 391, 397–8, 404–7, 432, 442, 463, 467–8, 482,
Miyabe, Kingo, 136 491, 503, 509
mizo, 147 Muhammad (prophet), 25, 29, 211
Mnong, 193 Muhammadiyah, 29, 211
mobility, 303, 336, 363, 368, 398 Muhibbah, 379
models, 82, 243, 302, 352, 354, 357, 388, 403, Mukyokai (non-church movement), 469
410, 416 multidimensionality, 411
modernisation, 21, 28, 31, 55, 79, 133, 302–3, Muntilan, 206
361, 388, 397, 441, 468, 471, 484 Murut, 439
.
ly
Moi, Daniel Arap, 190 Musan, 116
on
Moisés, 258 music, 18–19, 29, 46–7, 49, 84, 97, 123, 128,
Molucca, 204 158–60, 171, 185–6, 195, 227, 232–3, 300,
se
Mon, 94, 136, 149, 167, 490 340–1, 345, 356, 360, 365–6, 370, 469, 482–3
Mon, Vang, 167 Muslim(s), 21, 25, 28–30, 34, 48, 69, 130, 157,
lu
monarchy, 79, 87, 155, 238, 431, 440 181, 200–1, 204, 206, 208–12, 215, 217,
monasteries, 20, 90, 185, 285, 465 220–3, 229, 231, 235, 238–40, 242, 254–5,
na
money, 138, 164–5, 185, 430, 483 276–7, 306–7, 328, 330–3, 353, 356, 379–81,
so
Mongol Empire, 92, 96 384, 391–3, 396, 402–4, 409–11, 413, 423–6,
Mongol(s), 18, 28, 34, 87, 94, 96, 98, 285, 288, 430, 432–6, 439–45, 447, 449, 452–3, 459,
er
295, 299, 301–6, 308, 339, 345, 364, 372, 387, 467, 471, 479–80, 484, 486–91, 502, 506–7,
425, 434–5, 438, 479–80, 483
Mongolia, 18, 28, 34, 87, 94, 96, 98, 285, 288, rp
512–13, 517
My Tho, 20, 193
Fo
295, 299, 301–6, 308, 339, 345, 364, 372, 387, Mya, Francis Ah, 278
425, 434–5, 438, 479–80, 483 Myanmar, 16, 20–1, 27, 29, 31, 34, 150, 152,
e.
Mongolian Bible Translation Committee, 96 159, 214, 278, 288, 295, 298–9, 303, 305–6,
Mongolian Evangelical Alliance, 97 308, 310–11, 323, 326, 328, 331–2, 338, 355,
l
sa
Mongolian Research Institute, 98 364, 366, 372, 377, 387, 395, 400–2, 413, 421,
Mongolian Standard Version, 96 425, 429–30, 436, 441, 444–6, 451, 453, 467,
re
Mongolian Union Bible Society, 96 470, 473, 479–83, 485–7, 489–90

or
monks, 16, 115, 127, 157, 161, 185, 289, 306, Myanmar Council of Churches, 299
430, 459, 465, 483 Myanmar Missions International, 149
n
monotheism, 142, 433 Myitkyina Diocese, 148

tio
Montfort, 220 myths, 414

Moody, Dwight Lyman, 111
bu
Moody, N., 111 Na’i, 262

Moon, David, 182 Nacpil, Emerito, 327
tri
Mooneyham, Stanley, 178 Nagaland, India, 368

is
Moore, Edwin, 178 Nagas, 134–5, 138, 273

rd
Morais, Joaquim, 257 Nagasaki, 134–5, 138, 273

morality, 51, 94, 137, 380, 419, 435, 441 Nagasaki Magistrate, 135
fo
Moravia, Czech Republic, 96 Nagasaki’s Urakami, 135

Nagoya, 274
ot
Moravian(s), 96
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 393, 440, 445 Naha, 134, 273
N
Morrison, Robert, 74, 134 Nahda, 211

mortality, 230, 515 Nahdatul Ulama, 29, 211
Moscow, Russia, 284–7, 289–92 Nai Kheng, 169–70
Moscow Patriarchate, 284, 287, 289–90, 292 Nai Phum, 288
Mosintuwu Institute, 404 Naide, John Yasutaro, 274
mosques, 370, 488 Nak-Joon, 130
Motael, 255, 259 Nakai Tsugumuri, 287
Mother of Perpetual Help Shrine, 458 Nakonz, Jonas, 458
mothers, 97, 403, 454, 484 nande, 175, 220, 255
Motoda, Joseph Sakunoshin, 274 Nanjing Union Theological Seminary, 46
Moulmein, 277 Nanjing, China, 46, 74, 271, 469
Movement of the Caring Mothers, 403 Nanle County Church, 427
538 Index
Narai, 158 Nimitmai Christian Church, 163

Nasarah (Nazarenes), 193 Nippon Budokan, 345
nation-building, 219, 332–3, 372, 376, 397, 464, Nippon Sei Ko Kai, 272, 274, 278
467, 470 Nirmal, Arvind P., 420
National Chinese Christian Conference, 45 Nishida, Kitaro, 142–3
National Christian Church Networks Njotorahardjo, Niko, 341
Cambodia, 181 Nobel Peace Prize, 260
National Christian Council (China), 125 Nobili, Roberto de, 318, 375
National Christian Council of Japan, 299 Nol, General Lon, 177
National Council of Churches of Singapore, Nommensen, Ludwig Ingwer, 204
228 non-church movement, 140, 143, 469
National Council of the Mongolian Church, non-governmental organisation(s) (NGOs),
95 27, 88, 93, 312, 456
.
ly
nationalism, 121, 271, 308, 330, 382, 391, 430, North Africa, 31, 223
on
442–3, 463, 468–70, 472, 489 North America, 47, 101, 107, 149, 277, 300, 326,
Natshinnaung, 145 335
se
nature, 17, 44, 51, 106, 122, 158, 197, 210, 294, North Borneo, 277
328, 354, 368, 376, 378, 381, 385, 406–7, 409, North Tapanuli, 204
lu
433, 442, 449, 473 North Vietnam, 189, 342
Navigators, 326, 333 Norway, 512
na
Nazarene(s), 24, 32, 193, 250, 458 Norwegians, 84
so
Ndoni, Nigeria, 298 Novena Church, 231
Nectarios, 288 nun(s), 53, 135, 255, 275, 315, 421–2, 483
er
Nee, Watchman, 67, 104, 217, 331, 395 nurses, 24
neighbourology, 29–30, 379, 447
neighbours, 29–30, 33, 169, 171, 184, 211, 333, rp
Nusantara, 201, 205
Nusiro, 287
Fo
338, 379, 387, 410, 443, 448, 474, 513 Nwe, 421
neo-Confucianism, 388 Nyack College, 176
e.
Nepal, 232, 277, 288, 327, 502

Nestorian(s), 17, 20, 212, 352–3, 465–6 O’Brien, Brandon J., 339
l
sa
Nestorius, 351 Obispo Maximo, 382

Netherlands, 201, 204–5 Occupied Territories, 463
re
New Age Spiritualists, 424 Oceania, 192

or
New Apostolic Church, 181–2 Oe-Cusse, 254, 256

New Century Mission Movement, 103 Office of Theological Concerns, 320
n
New Creation Church, 342 Ogata, Sadako, 143

tio
New Life Fellowship (NLF), 183 Oikumene Church, 433

New People’s Army, 372 oil, 238, 248, 291, 431, 452
bu
New Religious Movements (NRMs), 173, 245, Okinawa, Japan, 134, 273
442, 517 Okryu, 115
tri
New Testament, 96, 136, 168, 176, 287, 320, Old Catholic(s), 251, 299
is
345, 377, 379, 507 Old Testament, 96, 136

rd
New Zealand, 179, 300 Oleg, Hegumen, 289–90

newspapers, 155, 239 One Belt, One Road (OBOR), 72, 474, 490–2
fo
Nguyen, Ba Tong, 188 One Million Heroes, 343

Ono, 286–7
ot
Nguyen, Van Thieu, 195

Nicholas, Archbishop of Japan, 286–7 Open Doors, 330
N
Nicholas, Hieromonk, 287 oppression, 20–1, 113, 120, 147, 153, 198, 205,
Nicholas Alexeev, 292 295, 303, 324, 369, 379–80, 416, 472–3, 491
Nicholas II, 288 orality, 51, 94, 137, 380, 419, 435, 441
Niger, 511 Orang Asli, 214, 216, 218
Nigeria, 511 Order of Friars Minor, 77
Nihon Kirisuto Kokai, 135 Order of Preachers, 77
Nihon Kumiai Kirisuto Kyokai, 136 Ordinary of the Mass, 262
Nihongo, 16 ordination, 23, 42, 56, 59, 67, 76, 90, 125, 129,
Nikitas, Archimandrite, 288 167, 173, 193, 196, 274, 278, 287, 312, 343,
Nikkeijin, 451 417, 421, 456
Nikorai-do (Nicholas Temple), 286 Orevillo-Montenegro, 380
Niles, D. T., 300 orphanages, 94, 152
Index 539
orphans, 140, 183 parliament(s), 92, 150, 220–1, 430, 434

Orthodox, 19, 33, 49, 95, 115, 119, 124, 132, Parliamentary Select Committee, 221
137, 194, 217, 281, 284, 286, 288, 290, 292, Parolin, Cardinal Pietro, 58
294, 306, 328, 376, 427, 508–9 partnership(s), 182, 233, 262, 298, 308, 346,
Orthodox Book of Prayer, 289 408, 480
Orthodox Metropolis of Korea, 293 pastors, 22, 24, 26, 42–3, 59, 63–5, 67–72, 97–8,
Orthodox Prayer Book, 290 103, 110, 112, 125, 129–30, 165, 171, 177,
Orthodox Theological Seminary, 286 180, 182, 193, 217, 227–8, 231–3, 236, 257–8,
Orthodoxy, 119, 281, 285–6, 288–92, 306, 427 299, 303, 315, 326–7, 338, 394, 428, 488
Osaka Shinai Girl’s School, 137 Pasyon, 317, 380
Osaka, Japan, 137–8, 273–4 Pathet Lao Movement, 428
Oshikawa, Masayoshi, 135 Patriarch of Moscow, 287, 291
Ossu, 256 Patriarchate of Constantinople, 287, 288–9,
.
ly
Our Lady of Mount Carmel Cathedral, 29 292–3
on
Our Lady of the Miraculous Medal Church, patriotism, 40, 45, 102, 191, 197
459 Patronato Real, 316
se
Oura Cathedral, 135 Pattaya, Thailand, 358, 407
outreach, 28, 71, 93–4, 124, 177, 179, 205, 218, Paul VI, Pope, 83, 261–2
lu
220, 248, 302, 332, 338, 343, 397, 404, 491 Pchum Ben, 185
Overseas Missionary Fellowship (OMF), 170, peace, 36, 69, 82–3, 109, 125, 128, 130–1, 149,
na
179, 219, 326 152, 157, 166, 173, 180, 195–6, 228–9, 234,
so
Owari, 134 259–60, 290, 299, 307–8, 314, 333, 343, 391,
393, 401–3, 408, 411, 431, 440–1, 444–6, 448,
er
Pacific Ring of Fire, 17 467, 486
Pacific War, 102, 139, 141
Pacquiao, Manny, 247 rp
Peduli, Ibu, 403
Peixian, Jin, 58
Fo
Padroado Real, 187 Penang, Malaysia, 213, 216–17, 219–20, 276–7,
Padroado, 187–8, 316 467
e.
Paiwan, 108 Pentecostal(s), 23–4, 29–30, 33, 62, 66–8, 76,

Pakistan, 19, 72–3, 278, 288, 445, 459, 517 83, 95, 108, 121, 123, 130, 143, 146–7, 149,
l
sa
Pakpak, 203 151–2, 164, 193, 197, 214, 217, 219, 296, 304,
Pakse, 167 323, 325, 331, 336, 338, 340, 342, 344, 346,
re
Palang-Li, 293 366, 372, 377–8, 389, 395, 397–8, 400, 405–6,
or
Palaung, 149 409, 411, 447–8, 473, 508–10

Palawan, 246 Pentecostal Holiness Church, 76, 83
n
Palestine, 16 People Power Movement, 391

tio
Pali, 231 People Power Revolution, 245–6, 314, 359

Pallu, Bishop, 188 People’s Rights Movement, 137
bu
Palmerston, Lord, 74 Perak Sultan, 222

Pamba, India, 299 percussion, 17, 34, 110, 406
tri
Pancasila (five principles), 21, 200–2, 208, 305, Perempuan, 208

is
384, 392, 432, 442 Perestroika, 190

rd
Panginoon, 342 Pero Marqués, 187

Panikkar, K. M., 463 Perry, Bill, 246
fo
Panyajan, 165 persecution, 20, 23, 30, 36, 53, 64–8, 70, 72,
100, 103, 119, 142, 146–7, 153, 170, 173, 188,
ot
Papua New Guinea, 343, 396

para-church organisations, 63, 93–4, 164, 193, 274, 300, 305–6, 333, 336, 342, 366, 368,
N
179–80 395–6, 426, 428–9, 460, 466, 473, 486–7, 489,

paradigms, 30, 198, 262, 308, 310 491
Parham, Charles, 335 Persekutuan Gereja-gereja, 299, 325
Paris Foreign Missions Society, 167, 175 Persekutuan Injil Indonesia, 325
parishes, 81, 88, 95, 167, 231–2, 240, 243, 248, Persia, 300, 376
251, 285–6, 293, 313–15, 321, 358, 362 Peru, 143
Park Chung-hee, 126, 379 Petaling Jaya, Malaysia, 217, 220
Park Hyung-Nong, 125 Peter the Great, 283
Park Kun-Hye, 126 Peters, Andrej, 286, 288–9
Park Soon-Kyung, 125 Petitjean, Father Bernard-Thadée, 135
Park, Sun Ai Lee, 422 Pew Research Center, 453, 506–7, 511, 516
Park Yoon-Sun, 125 Phan, Peter, 318–19, 402–3
540 Index
Phiasayawong, 291 poor, 28, 31, 61, 78, 80, 82, 93, 95, 140, 151, 177,
Phii Pop, 168 184, 219–20, 232, 250, 264–5, 295–6, 303,
Philippine Communist Party, 372 308, 320, 333, 336, 343, 354, 359, 379, 394,
Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches, 397–8, 401, 406–7, 420–1, 447, 472, 481, 488,
323, 445 491
Philippine Episcopal Church, 276 Pope Alexander VI, 187
Philippine Federation of Christian Churches, Pope Benedict XIV, 356
323 Pope Clement IX, 356
Philippine Independent Church, 242, 276, 279, Pope Francis, 51, 58, 167, 192, 417, 423
382 Pope John Paul II, 56–7, 188, 207, 258, 260–1,
Philippine Missionary Fellowship, 326 397, 417
Philippine Statistics Authority, 242 Pope John XXIII, 189
Philippines, 17, 21, 23–5, 29, 31, 33–4, 77, 99, Pope Leo XIII, 167
.
ly
143, 200, 215, 225, 239, 244, 246, 248, 250, Pope Paul VI’s Evangelii Nuntiandi, 261
on
252, 276, 278, 281, 288, 295, 299–301, 304–5, Pope Pius IX, 134, 397
310, 313–16, 321, 323, 326–8, 330, 332, 339, Pope Pius XII, 356
se
342–3, 345–6, 352, 356–9, 361, 364–5, 370–2, Portugal, 87, 133, 145, 256, 260, 467
377, 380–2, 386–7, 391, 393, 396, 398, 402, Portuguese, 16, 87–8, 90, 143, 145, 153, 175,
lu
404–5, 407, 409, 413, 416, 422, 425, 432, 434, 187–8, 204–5, 213, 249, 254–8, 260, 262, 313,
440–1, 445, 451–8, 461, 467, 471, 473, 479, 316, 413, 465, 467
na
481–6, 488, 491 Portuguese Bishops’ Conference, 90
so
philosophy, 21, 101, 119, 134, 136, 138–9, Poso, 403–4
141–3, 201–2, 321, 375, 440, 442–3, 482 Potsdam Declaration, 141
er
Phimphisan, Bishop George Yod, 163 poverty, 34, 40, 48, 82, 125, 140, 245, 299,
Phitsanulok, Catherine Na, 288
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 175–83, 290 rp
304–5, 308, 320, 335, 340, 387, 396, 400, 406,
415, 422–3, 484, 491
Fo
Phoenicia, 421 Pradabchananurat, Thongchai, 163
Phuwanat, Chakkraphong, 288 prayer, 24, 32, 42, 54, 66–7, 97, 107–8, 115,
e.
Pierce, Charles, 275 123–4, 137, 160, 164, 172–3, 181, 186, 206,
Pieris, Aloysius, 420 218, 223, 228, 240, 249, 257–8, 262–3, 269,
l
sa
pietism, 33, 67 273, 278–9, 289–90, 293, 299–301, 307, 317,

Pigneaux, Pierre, 195 319, 330, 334, 336–8, 340–2, 353–5, 362,
re
Pilario, Daniel, 447 365–6, 370, 372, 393, 398, 430–2, 443, 456,
or
pilgrimage, 191, 196, 206, 209, 319, 356, 457 458–9, 481, 483, 485, 508
Pink Dot Movement, 235 Prayer Mountain, 108, 370, 372
n
Pinto, Fernandez Mendez, 175 preaching, 42, 67, 81, 97, 99, 108, 122, 142, 152,
tio
Pius IX, Pope, 134 261, 279, 332, 339, 341–2, 352, 354, 360, 363
plantations, 213–14 Prefect Apostolic, 213
bu
Plaung, 490 pregnancy, 371

Plenum, 196 Prek Talong, 179
tri
pluralism, 142, 296, 308, 321, 402, 432, 480, Presbyterian(s), 69, 95, 97, 100–4, 108, 112,
is
514 120–1, 123, 125, 130, 134, 147, 158–9, 167,

rd
PocketSword, 165 169, 183, 193, 213, 217, 225, 233–4, 258, 269,
poetry, 97, 136, 195 273–5, 296, 298–300, 302–3, 307, 323–4, 327,
fo
pogroms, 402 367, 382–3, 389, 466, 469–70

priest(s), 24, 31, 53–61, 65, 79, 87, 89, 93, 95,
ot
Pol Pot, 178, 372, 470

Poland, 54, 57 100, 119, 128, 133, 135, 137–8, 141, 145, 157,
N
police, 116, 186, 201, 240, 427–8, 432 161, 167, 172–3, 175, 178, 188–9, 195–6,
politics, 25, 27–8, 32, 54, 65, 109, 131, 150, 155, 205–7, 213, 215, 218, 240, 250, 256, 272, 278,
195, 202, 205, 207–8, 215, 220, 244–7, 251, 283–7, 289–92, 311, 313, 315, 321, 339, 344,
262, 265, 316, 328, 351, 387, 394, 397, 400, 357, 378, 387, 391, 397, 417, 419, 427–9, 434,
406, 420–1, 446, 461, 473–4, 485 455, 457, 459, 470, 481, 509
Politics of Ethics, 205 Priimak, Father Polikarp, 292
polls, 504–5 Prince, Joseph, 227
polygamy, 420 Prince Chakkraphong, 288
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Prince Chakrabongse Bhuvanath, 288
345 Prince Charles, 16
Pontifical Commission, 82 Prince Norodom Sihanouk, 177
Pontifical Council of Justice, 195 printing, 66
Index 541
prison, 28, 51, 53, 56, 63–5, 72, 82, 94, 106, 112, Quito, Ecuador, 357
173, 180, 195, 202, 208, 239, 256, 306, 388–9, Qur’an, 231, 376, 433
426–30, 433, 486–8
privacy, 113 race, 23, 200, 206, 218–19, 221, 229, 305, 331,
Propaganda Fide, 187–8 430, 444
properties, 87, 147, 195, 249, 316 radicalism, 201, 402, 410, 431, 482, 486–8, 490,
prophecy (gift), 219, 335–6, 339, 377 492
proselytising, 176, 276, 307, 330, 442 radio, 56, 94, 172, 181, 244, 343, 359–60, 489
prosperity, 31, 45, 49, 108, 122, 125–6, 165, 171, Radio Veritas Asia, 359
198, 214, 219, 227, 230, 346, 360, 387, 398, Raffles, Sir Stamford, 225
473, 490 Rahman, Tungku Abdul, 202, 226
prostitution, 140, 415 Rai, D. R., 263
Protestant(s), 16–18, 21, 28, 30, 33, 40, 42, 48, raids, 240
.
ly
50, 52–3, 59–60, 64, 69–70, 74–5, 78–85, railway, 213
on
87–90, 93, 95–6, 108, 112–17, 119–26, 128–9, rain, 69, 344
131–2, 134–9, 141–2, 145–7, 151–2, 156–7, Rajah of Sarawak, 213, 276
se
159, 162–3, 170, 173, 176–7, 180–2, 192–8, Rajaprasong, 157
200–2, 213–14, 216, 219–20, 225, 228, 231–2, Rakhine, 149, 151, 490
lu
240, 242–7, 254, 258, 263, 269–71, 274–5, Ramadan, 29, 210
278–9, 281–2, 296, 298, 300, 302, 304, 306, Ramos-Horta, José, 314
na
308, 319, 323–4, 328–9, 351, 354–6, 359, 367, Ranau, 217
so
369, 373, 376–7, 381–3, 388, 390, 392–7, 404, Ranchi, India, 60
413, 426–7, 433–4, 442, 447, 455, 467, 473, rape, 414, 421
er
479, 484, 486, 491, 508–11, 517 Raphael, 138
Protestant Batak Karo Brotherhood Church,
203 rp
Ratburi Province, 289
Rawang, 217
Fo
Protestant Christian Simalungun Church, 203 Ray of Hope, 32
Protestant Church of Sabah, 216 reconciliation, 58–9, 61, 131, 184, 228, 259, 287,
e.
Protestant Episcopal Church of America, 134 307–8, 393, 401, 445, 485, 489
Protestant Reformation, 269, 298 reconstruction, 41, 44–5, 50, 397, 447
l
sa
Protestant Urban Industrial Mission, 126 Red Hero, 92

protests, 128, 135, 239, 314, 395 Redemptorists, 427
re
proverbs, 354 Reformation, 269, 278, 297–8, 321, 323

or
Provincial Council of the Church of India, 278 Reformed Baptists, 69

psalms, 96, 287 Reformed Churches, 49, 69, 73, 106, 302, 325
n
Public Christianity, 233 refugee(s), 77–8, 80–2, 88, 103–4, 113, 116–17,
tio
Public Welfare Charitable Activities, 48 130, 143, 170, 177, 179–80, 220, 272, 284,
publishing, 61, 139, 168, 287, 293 307, 366, 432, 445, 483, 487
bu
pulpits, 315 Regional Bishops’ Conference, 103, 105

Punjab, India, 517 Regulating Religious Circles’ Participation, 48
tri
purification, 353, 432 regulations, 23, 50, 69, 102, 167, 208, 308, 427,
is
Putian Songzhan, 300 441–2

rd
Putonghua, 88 rehabilitation, 81, 220, 343, 441

Pwo Karen, 146 Reichelt, Karl L., 84
fo
Pyeongtaek, 128 relief, 48, 61, 78, 80, 177, 179, 357, 373, 393, 472
Religion Decree, 427
ot
Pyongyang, North Korea, 114–16, 120–1, 337,

366–7, 370 religiosity, 32, 35, 322, 370, 385, 397, 447, 453,
N
Pyongyang Revival, 337, 366, 370 458

Pyongyang Theological Seminary, 115 Religious Affairs Bureau, 306, 426, 435
religious affiliation, 127, 222, 244, 360, 370,
Qing dynasty, 20, 52, 74, 79 502, 504, 506, 512, 514, 516
Quae Mari Sinico, 382 Religious Charity Week, 48
Quakers, 104 Religious Corporation Ordinance, 141
Quang Nam, Vietnam, 187 religious diversity, 243–4, 250, 389, 441, 444,
queen(s), 254–5, 380 446
Queen Juana of Cebu, 380 religious freedom, 34, 48, 84–5, 90, 114, 126,
questionnaire(s), 503–4 137, 139, 190–1, 194, 197, 207–9, 212, 219,
Quezon City, Philippines, 342 221–2, 310, 313, 328, 389–91, 432, 434, 436,
Quiboloy, Apollo, 245–6 441–2, 446, 449, 460, 473, 486, 501
542 Index
Religious Organisation Law, 141 Romyen Church, 163

renaissance, 356, 385 rosary, 456
renewal, 63, 84, 105, 109, 189, 214–15, 218–19, Ross, Denise, 377
246, 250, 252, 325, 335, 337, 339, 398, 481, Ross, John, 119
508–10 Royal Citizen Movement, 102
research, 98, 112, 139, 142, 183, 201, 209, 432, Royal Laotian Aviation, 176
448, 452–3, 458, 503, 505, 508, 510–12, Royal Letters Patent, 89
516–17 Rubinstein, Murray, 108
respondent(s), 24, 132, 440, 453, 503, 513 Ruether, Rosemary Radford, 420
restoration, 48, 100, 135, 184, 246, 251–2, 320, Rungus, 218
366, 383, 507, 509 Runi, 92
resurrection, 137, 169, 261, 286–7, 293, 310 Russia, 49, 92, 94–5, 119, 137, 194, 271, 283–93,
returnees, 297, 329 376, 466, 491, 516
.
ly
revival(s), 43, 67, 72, 81, 101, 108, 115, 120–1, Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, 283–4, 286–7
on
123, 149, 164, 215, 291, 326, 335, 337–8, 341, Russian Orthodox Church, 49, 95, 284–5, 287,
366–7, 370–1, 377, 385, 442, 474 289–92
se
revolution, 53, 55, 59, 61, 64, 69, 73, 75, 79, 87, Russians, 283–4, 288, 290, 292
113, 178, 233, 245–6, 269, 271, 285–6, 292, Russo-Japanese War, 138–40
lu
313–14, 316–17, 354, 359, 367, 372, 378, 380, Rwanda, 277
382, 388, 394, 407, 421, 429, 468 Ryukyu, 134
na
Reyes, Isabelo de los, 382
so
Rhenish (Barmen) Mission, 76, 204 Sabah, Malaysia, 212–18, 221, 232, 277, 405,
rhetoric, 354, 419 432, 439, 446, 484
er
Rhodes, Alexandre de, 187, 195, 354, 375 Sabah Council of Churches, 217
Ricardo, Father Alberto, 259, 262
Ricci, Matteo, 53, 318, 353–4, 356, 375 rp
Sabah Theological Seminary, 217
sacraments, 30, 42–3, 54–6, 58, 139, 315, 429,
Fo
Rich, Adrienne, 423 469
Rieger, Joerg, 406 sacrifice, 19, 67, 72, 96, 147, 188, 207, 416–17,
e.
Riesenhuber, Father Klaus, 142 465, 467

Ritchie, Hugh, 101 Saedamoon, 341
l
sa
Rites Controversy, 25, 51, 87, 105, 188, 356, Sagada, 276
465 Said, Edward, 421, 464
re
rites, 16, 18–19, 25, 51, 87, 105, 188, 210, 315, Saigon, Vietnam, 176, 189, 194–5
or
356, 369, 377, 465 St Andrew’s Anglican Church, 240

ritual(s), 32–3, 41, 43, 45, 49, 60–4, 67, 73, 78, St Andrew’s Cathedral, 232
n
81, 94, 98, 102, 105, 108–9, 111, 122, 124, St Anthony’s Church, 255
tio
131, 133, 142–3, 145, 150, 152–3, 157, 161, St Christopher’s Parish, 459
165, 172–3, 193, 198, 206, 210, 223, 233, 243, St Francis’ Canossian College, 79
bu
246–7, 252, 260–5, 269, 277, 284, 289, 293–4, St George Church, 290
297, 300–1, 304, 314–15, 321–2, 325, 327, St George’s Church, 357
tri
329, 336–40, 344, 346–7, 351, 355–6, 360, St George’s School, 239–40
is
362, 366, 370, 377–8, 380–1, 388, 395, 400, St Ignatius Church, 142
rd
406, 410–11, 424, 443, 448, 456, 458, 470, Saint Jean-Baptiste, 27, 194
473, 480–3, 489, 492, 507 St John the Baptist, 255
fo
rivers, 308, 318 St John’s Cathedral, 272

St John’s College, 271
ot
Rizal, José, 371

Rodrigo, Michael, 141, 314, 391 St Joseph’s College, 79
N
Rodrigues, Alberto, 257 St Louis Jesuits, 18

Roffe, George Edward, 169 St Mary’s Church, 84
Rohingya, 29, 306, 310, 400, 430, 445–6, 483, Saint-Maur, 137
487 St Nicholas Cathedral, 289
Roman Catholic(s), 74–5, 81, 163, 167, 173, St Nicholas Orthodox, 285
175–6, 178, 181, 197–8, 213, 225, 229, 231, St Nicholas Parish, 289
240, 242, 244, 269, 275–6, 281, 299, 314, 328, St Paul’s College, 79, 87, 272
331, 376, 382, 390, 400, 402, 405, 411, 426, St Paul’s School, 273
429, 440, 453, 509 Saint Petersburg, Russia, 286, 288–9
Romania, 57, 289, 292 Saint Petersburg Theological Seminary, 289
Rome, 51, 53, 55–60, 96, 187, 189, 195–6, 216, St Peter’s Church, 213
312, 314, 343, 356, 389, 426 St Peter’s College, 216
Index 543
St Savior’s College, 79 Scripture Union, 219, 299, 326

St Stephen, 272 Scriven, Joseph, 16
St Vincent, 80, 220 Second Vatican Council, 18, 53, 60–1, 76, 82,
St Yoseph Bintaran Church, 205 84, 105, 189, 198, 218, 262–3, 265, 318–19,
saints, 17, 19, 22, 30, 35, 70, 111, 181–2, 243, 321, 354, 421
281, 315, 319, 357 Second World War, 101, 104, 108, 141, 205,
Saipan Island, 109 215, 219, 256, 277, 324, 328, 383–4, 393, 438,
Sait Ni Nuta, 204 467–9, 479
Salesians, 77 sect(s), 207, 212, 244, 426
salvation, 44, 80–1, 122, 125, 129, 131, 140, 142, sectarianism, 77
157, 217, 220, 225, 246, 293, 298, 304, 306, secularism, 373, 453, 480, 490
317, 336, 339, 344–5, 401, 405 seekers, 445
Salvation Army, 80, 125, 140, 217, 220 Seelye, Julius H., 139
.
ly
Saly, Reverend, 169 Seikyo Jiho, 287
on
Samarinda, 433 Selangor State, 432
Sanchez, Bo, 250, 342 Sem Bun, 179
se
sanctification, 45 Semarang, 205–6
sanctions, 305, 415 seminaries, 29, 46–9, 54–5, 61, 63, 69, 78, 85,
lu
sanctuary, 70 103, 164, 191, 205, 216–17, 233–4, 321,
Sangju, 128 327–8, 406, 470
na
Sanjiang Church, 23 Sendai, 137
so
Sanskrit, 175 Sendangsono, 206, 209
Santa Cruz massacre, 259 Seng, Eu Hong, 217
er
Santa Isabel Cathedral, 29 Seng, San Hay, 177
Santa Luzia, 254
Santacruzan, 459 rp
Sengoi, 216
Seo Sang-ryun, 119
Fo
Santo Niño, 250, 380, 458 Seon-ju, Gil, 377
São Jacinto, 255 Seoul, South Korea, 71, 119, 128, 274, 292–3,
e.
São Tiago, 255 324, 332, 340, 360, 366, 372

Sarawak, Malaysia, 212–18, 220, 238, 276–7, Seremban, 217
l
sa
355, 432, 439, 446, 484 Sergii, Archbishop, 292

Sarekat Jesuits, 206 sermons, 45, 60, 123, 131, 157, 171, 301, 341,
re
Sarin Sam, 179 447, 489

or
Sasaki, Paul Shinji, 274 Serviam, 342

Savannakhet, 167–8 settlement(s), 83, 94, 140, 256, 276–7, 313, 454
n
Sawabe, Takuma, 137 Seung-hun, 119

tio
Sayama, 287 Seventh-day Adventist(s), SDA, 76, 104, 163,

Scandinavia, 93 177, 193, 216, 240
bu
Schereschewsky of Shanghai, Bishop Samuel, Seymour, William, 335

271 Sgaw Karen, 146
tri
schism(s), 53, 56–7, 109, 235, 299, 324, 382, Shafi’i, 212
is
509–10 Shahada, 434

rd
Schmidt, I. J., 96 shamanism, 18, 92, 95, 119, 127–8

Schneider, F. E., 339 Shan, Tao Fong, 84, 448
fo
Schneider, Herbert, 339 Shandong, 64, 270

Shanghai, China, 61, 64, 71–2, 83, 270–1, 284,
ot
schools, 27–9, 42, 46–8, 79–81, 85, 88–90, 94,

97, 101–2, 105, 112, 135, 147, 153, 158, 160, 300, 306, 331
N
163, 178, 184, 194, 204, 214, 217, 219–20, Shangti, 353
231, 243, 255, 265, 273, 276, 279, 303–4, 313, Shaojie, 427
315–16, 319, 359, 373, 426–7, 430–2, 434–5, sharia, 222, 239, 305, 432, 441–2, 487–8
485, 488 Shears, A. 277
science, 64, 101, 103, 119, 195, 245, 261, 264, Shen Tsai-sen, 271
319, 354, 430, 435, 516 Sheng-si, 300
scientists, 145, 201, 503 Shenists, 230
Scorsese, Martin, 142 Shenyang, China, 58, 69
Scotland, 215, 269 Sheshan, 377
Scottish Enlightenment, 101 Shia, 207, 439
scripture(s), 96, 160, 219, 231, 247, 252, 296–7, Shijiazhuang, 60
299, 326, 331, 364, 376–7 Shik, Angela Wai Yan, 458
544 Index
Shinto, 16, 18, 25, 102, 132, 136–7, 141, 370, Social Weather Stations, 251
388–9, 438, 440, 443, 466, 517 socialism, 45, 298–9, 308
ships, 21, 32, 42, 47–8, 75, 94, 123, 147, 156, Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
160–1, 166, 184–5, 220, 245–6, 333, 340, 381, (SPG), 146, 269–70, 273, 276–7
394, 402–3, 408, 413, 459–60, 464, 480, 513 Society of Jesus, 138, 375
Shirayuri University, 137 Society of St Vincent, 80, 220
Showa, 138–9, 141 Society of the Holy Cross, 275
Shrine of Our Lady of Lavang, 196 Society of the Sacred Mission, 274
Shrine Shinto, 137 sociology, 502
shrines, 102, 132, 356, 370, 429–30, 443 Soegijapranata, Archbishop Albertus, 21,
Shuang, 285 206–7
Siam, 158, 163, 167, 216 Soekarno, 201–2, 210
Sibu, 217 Sœurs, 137
.
ly
Sichuan, China, 69, 373 Soibada, 255–6, 265
on
sickness, 172, 230, 338, 340 soldiers, 145, 255, 292, 467
Sidang Injil Borneo, 215, 331, 367 Solnae, 119
se
Siem Reap, 177, 290 Solomon, Robert, 227–8, 231, 298
Sieng Ang, 179 Solor, 254–5
lu
Sihanoukville, 290 Somalis, 502
Sikhs, 217, 436, 443, 446 Somang Church, 307
na
Silang, 357 Son, Tay, 188
so
Silk road, 491 Song, Choan Seng, 106, 354, 377, 379, 401, 420,
Silva, 255, 258–9, 262 447
er
Simalungun, 203–4 Song (Sung), John, 67, 331, 371, 377, 383
Simmons, Duane B., 134
sin, 36, 44, 55–6, 111, 125, 246 rp
Song Shangjie, 377
Songbun, 112
Fo
Sin, Cardinal, 246 Songs of Canaan, 300
Singapore, 17, 19, 23, 31, 34, 71, 107–8, 134, Sonne, Son, 177, 179
e.
180, 182–3, 192, 212, 216, 226, 228, 230, Sophia University, 138, 142
232, 234, 236, 248, 276–7, 288, 295–9, Souphine, 168–9
l
sa
301–3, 305, 308, 314, 319, 323, 326–8, 332, South Africa, 249
338, 342–3, 357, 384, 387, 390–1, 397–8, South Asia, 288, 325, 327–8, 378, 441
re
402, 413, 425, 434–5, 439–41, 444, 447–8, South China Boat Mission, 83
or
452–3, 455, 460, 467, 473–4, 479, 486, South China Mission, 270
488–91 South China Sea, 238, 393, 492
n
Singapore Bible College, 233, 327 South Sudan, 119, 377

tio
Singapore Management University, 460 South Sumatra, 466

singing, 97, 159, 232, 259, 279, 340, 358, 365, South Vietnam, 178, 189, 195, 232
bu
429 Southern Baptist Convention, 511

Sinicisation, 62, 66, 73, 306–7, 474 Soviet Union, 190, 192, 468–9
tri
Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, 103 Sowards, Erville, 147

is
Sino-British Joint Declaration, 76 Sowards, Genevieve, 147

rd
Sino-Japanese War, 76, 78, 139, 272 Spain, 33, 77, 87, 133, 275, 316–17, 380, 467
Sinuiju, 116 Spanish, language, 99–100, 142–3, 188, 249,
fo
Sinulog, 380 316–17, 352–3, 356, 370, 380, 382, 387, 413,
416, 466–7, 479
ot
Siong, Wong Nai, 213

Siraya, 99 spirituality, 43, 60–2, 64, 67, 142–3, 206, 233,
N
Sirikul, 164 243, 277, 294, 301, 304, 314, 321–2, 325, 336,
Sister Cyril, 214 340, 346–7, 366, 370, 380, 400, 410–11, 448,
Sisters of St Paul, 77 458, 470
Sisters of the Precious Blood, 80 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, 465
Sitiawan, 214 Sri Lanka, 213, 288, 300, 420
Sixth Party Congress, 113 Stahl, Max, 259
Skype, 301 Stallybrass, Edward, 96
slavery, 220, 416, 420 Stanton, Vincent John, 272
slums, 474 Starr, Chloë F., 378
Smith, George, 270, 272 statistics, 78, 82–3, 121, 176, 215, 242, 258, 388,
social action, 33, 250, 320 495, 502, 504–5, 515–16
Social Service Department, 48 stewardship, 302
Index 545
Stieng, 193 T’ang dynasty, 352

stigma, 20, 22, 61, 398, 423 Taberd, Jean-Louis, 195
students, 46–7, 49, 71, 85, 95, 110, 135, 153, Tabernacle of God, 344
160–1, 163–5, 177–8, 182–6, 204, 207, 209, Tagalog, 25, 143, 353–4, 380, 456–7
219, 234, 239, 243, 245, 326–7, 333, 344–5, Tai, Masakazu, 273
365, 367, 426, 443, 448–9, 451, 460, 484, 488 Tai, Northern, 99
sub-Saharan Africa, 386 tai, Southern, 99–100
suffering, 30, 32, 57–8, 63–5, 67–8, 73, 103, 107, Tainan, 272–3
111, 122, 140, 142–3, 150, 230, 259–60, 308, Taipei, Taiwan, 272–3, 340, 360, 375, 459, 469
314, 317, 333, 346, 354, 372, 380, 396, 416, Taipei Truth Church, 340
420, 431, 469, 482 Taisho Democracy, 138
Suga, 143 Taiwan, 19, 21, 25, 27, 31–2, 47, 49, 60, 68, 87–8,
Sugiri, Lambertus, 339 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, 273, 278, 288, 295,
.
ly
Sugirtharajah, R. S., 420, 472 299–302, 305, 307, 311, 327, 340, 358, 373,
on
Suharto, 207–10, 432 376–7, 383–5, 387, 389, 395, 397, 401, 407,
suicide, 301, 409 413, 416, 426, 438, 441, 443, 446–7, 451,
se
suicide bombing, 409 453, 455–7, 459, 465–6, 469–70, 473–4, 479,
Sukarno, 384 483–4, 486, 490–1
lu
Sulawesi, 200, 305, 339 Taiwan Inter-faith Foundation, 446
Sultan of Brunei, 238 Taizhou, 69
na
Sulu, 29 Takai, Archpriest Anthony, 287
so
Sumatra, 200, 203–4, 210, 291, 433, 466 Takeo Province, 182
Sun, Yeow, 232 Takhmau, 179
er
Sundanese, 203 Takizawa, 142
Sunday Mass, 343, 358, 456
Sunday school, 168, 231 rp
Talitha Kum, 416
Tamil(s), 213, 216, 218, 225, 240, 362, 392
Fo
Sunflower Movement, 307 Tamsui, 466
Sunni(s), 212, 238, 439 Tan, Chee Khoon, 220
e.
Sunquist, Scott, 296 Tan, Kang-San, 281

superstition, 188, 319 Taoism, 15, 20, 26, 48, 84, 90, 217, 328, 370, 387,
l
sa
Supreme Bishop, 382 420, 426, 438, 446, 453, 465–6, 479, 486
Supreme Court, 128, 208 Tarutung District, 204
re
Surabaya, Indonesia, 207, 305–6, 341, 409, 433, Tasi-tolu, 260

or
487 Tau, Vung, 290, 342

Surjadinata, 258 Taungoo, 145
n
Surugadai, 137 Taveira, Fr. Antonio, 254

tio
surveillance, 70, 112, 430, 473 Tayal, 108

survey(s), 43, 97, 111–12, 132–3, 179, 207, 251, Taylor, Charles, 24
bu
283, 388, 453, 480, 488, 502, 504–6, 513, Taylor, Hudson, 67, 270
515–17 teachers, 92, 98, 140, 182, 256, 303, 313, 426,
tri
survival, 39, 72, 147, 304, 347, 473 432, 491

is
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 207, 432 Teatro Ekumenikal, 301

rd
sustainability, 422, 485 technology, 79, 131, 165, 195, 248, 397, 455,
Swaratama, 206 471, 489, 491, 513
fo
Sweden, 502 Tedim Baptist Church, 338

television, 29, 94, 123, 155, 159, 227, 244, 249,
ot
switching (religious), 513, 516

Switzerland, 168, 182 301, 346, 359–60, 489
N
swords, 246 Temple, Nicholas, 286

Sydney, Australia, 233, 256 temples, 17, 20, 115, 130, 161, 231, 370–1
symbols, 263, 314, 369, 402, 409, 431, 469 Tenaganita, 220
syncretism, 24, 49, 128, 210, 319 Tendero, Efraim, 324
Synod of Manila, 352 Tenth National Christian Conference, 50
Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 288 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, 128
synods, 102, 104 Ternate, 204
Syria, 17, 92, 145, 217, 235, 291, 352 Territorial Abbey of Tokwon, 119
Syriac, 17, 92, 352 terrorism, 235, 321, 400, 411, 487, 492
Syriam, 145 Terry, Thomas, 301
Syrian Orthodox Church, 217 testimonies, 63, 157, 186, 341, 347, 372, 481
Syro-Phoenician, 421 Tetum, 254, 258, 262
546 Index
Thai, 17, 19, 25, 155–66, 168, 170, 288–9, 329, tombs, 319, 356
358, 395–6, 398, 471 Tong, Stephen, 68
Thai Christian Students Association, 160 tongues, 30, 193, 219, 296, 335–6, 339, 345, 365,
Thailand, 17, 25, 30–1, 33–4, 71–2, 109, 158, 508–10
160, 162, 164, 167, 170–1, 179–80, 216, 232, Tonkin, 187
249, 277, 283, 288–90, 295–7, 302, 304–5, torture, 57, 135, 142, 256, 310, 314, 427, 429
310–11, 326, 328, 331, 338, 342, 358, 364–5, Touch Community Service, 228
379, 387, 395, 402, 407, 413, 416, 421, 425, Toungngu Diocese, 148
434, 436, 443–5, 447, 452–3, 471, 479–81, tourism, 428, 436, 451
486, 488, 490 Toyotomi, Hideyoshi, 133
Thailand Baptist Convention, 163–4 trade, 74, 87, 92, 99, 110, 126, 133, 254, 330,
Thailand Bible Society, 160, 163, 165 376, 387, 425, 438, 463, 466–7, 474, 479–80
Than, Van, 188 tradition(s), 16, 18, 27–9, 32, 42, 61, 63–4, 66–9,
.
ly
Thanlyin, 145 72–3, 76, 81–4, 88, 95–6, 107, 114, 119–20,
on
Thapa, Agatha, 169 123, 125, 127–8, 155–6, 165, 191, 195, 200,
Thatana, 430 202, 206–7, 209–10, 226, 232–3, 240, 245,
se
theologians, 19, 120, 125–6, 130, 142, 251, 297, 247, 254, 261, 263–5, 269, 274, 278–9, 286,
318, 321, 327, 337, 354, 377, 379–80, 387, 291, 293, 297, 299, 301, 304, 317, 319, 332,
lu
391, 396, 402, 414, 416–17, 419–20, 422–3, 341, 346, 351–71, 373, 375–7, 385–7, 401,
447–8, 464, 470 406, 409, 420, 438, 447, 452–3, 455–7, 461,
na
theological education, 45, 47, 49, 78, 97–8, 101, 472, 482–3, 485, 495, 505, 508–10
so
182, 196, 233, 297, 376, 421 trafficking, 165, 220, 415–16, 484
theology, 19, 30–1, 44–7, 49–51, 53, 61, 64–5, training, 42, 45, 48–50, 54, 57, 59, 61, 93, 95,
er
67–9, 89, 101, 103, 105–6, 108, 122, 125–6, 97–8, 101, 115, 152, 160, 165, 171–2, 177,
138–9, 142, 165, 171, 198, 212, 219, 227, 231,
233–4, 244, 246, 249, 262–3, 277, 296, 303, rp
179–80, 182–6, 217, 220, 234, 248–9, 256,
274, 277, 293, 311, 322, 327, 332–3, 340,
Fo
310, 319–22, 325, 327–8, 332, 341, 346, 376, 448–9, 452, 456
378, 380, 384, 386–8, 391, 397, 400–1, 405–7, trances, 108
e.
411, 418, 420, 422, 447, 468–72, 490, 510 Trans World Radio, 181
theory, 28, 99, 233–4, 244–5, 293, 507 Transitional Justice Commission, 109
l
sa
Theravada Buddhism, 387, 443, 479 trauma, 402, 404, 409–10

Thien An Monastery, 428 treaties, 381, 463
re
Thieu Tri, 188 Treaty of Amity, 134

or
Thomas, Apostle, 15, 19, 141–2, 276, 301, 375 Treaty of Nanjing, 74, 271
Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), 22, 39, tribal(s), 155, 159, 161, 172, 182, 193, 218, 300,
n
64, 75, 271, 299, 329, 378, 388, 426, 468 331–2, 392, 395–6, 398, 439, 464, 466
tio
Thua Thien-Hue Province, 428 Trinh, 187–8

Tian Feng, 47 Trinity Christian Centre, 232
bu
Tiananmen Square, 63, 69 Trinity Theological College, 228, 233, 277, 297,
Tianjin, China, 284 328
tri
Tibet, 30, 69, 387, 424, 442, 483 Trollope, Bishop Mark, 275
is
Tibetan Buddhist(s), 30, 69, 424, 442, 483 True Jesus Church, 76, 101, 103–4, 108, 217,
rd
Tikhomirov, Sergii, 292 336, 340, 383, 395

Tikhon of San Francisco, Archbishop, 291 Truku, 104
fo
Tim-Oi, Florence Li, 89, 272 Truth Lutheran Church, 108

Try Hoc, 177
ot
Timor-Leste, 22, 26, 34–5, 88, 256, 258, 260,

262, 275, 288, 291, 295, 302, 310, 313, 321, Tsilis, 288
N
341, 364, 381, 387, 396, 413, 416, 425, 434, Tsukamoto, Toraji, 140
440, 454, 467, 479, 482–3 Tsuwano, 135
Ting, Bishop K. H., 44, 271, 378, 384 Tu, Han Mac, 195
Tinh, Ha, 428 Tu Duc, 188
Toba Batak, 204 Tulu, India, 215
Tokugawa, 135 Tunis, Tunisia, 263
Tokyo Imperial University, 138 Turkey, 16
Tokyo Orthodox Seminary, 287 Tuva, 92
Tokyo, Japan, 137–8, 273–4, 286–7, 292, 345,
488 Uber, 482
tolerance, 40, 129, 201, 207–8, 210, 330, 430, Uchimura, Kanzo, 20, 136–8, 140–1
443 Uemura, Masahisa, 135
Index 547
Uganda, 511 Vasquez, Amelia, 421

Ukrainians, 288, 292 Vatican, 18, 21–2, 51–8, 60–1, 65, 76, 82, 84,
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 92 105, 175–6, 189–90, 196–8, 206, 216, 218,
Ulsan, South Korea, 293 262–3, 265, 312, 315, 318–19, 321, 342, 354,
Umbrella Movement, 444 359, 389, 417, 421, 429, 465, 470, 487
ummah, 413 Vatican Radio, 359
Un, Uong, 177 Vaz, Father Simon, 204
underground church, 32, 53–4, 56–9, 71, 76, Velarde, Brother Mike, 31, 245–6, 250, 343
113, 117, 179, 312, 388, 482 Vencer, Jun, 330
Underwood, Horace Grant, 120 veneration, 263, 358, 368–9
unemployment, 34 Verbeck, Guido H. F., 134
UNESCO World Heritage Site, 87 Veritas, 56, 244, 359
Unification Church, 444 vernacular(s), 18, 60, 353–4, 373
.
ly
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), vestments, 230
on
288–9, 390, 470 Vicar Apostolic of Japan, 135
Union Theological Seminary, 46 vicariates, 138, 163, 167, 255, 311, 314–15
se
Unitarian(s), 177, 417 victims, 69, 207, 209, 314, 373, 416, 420
United Bible Societies, 96 Victory Christian Fellowship, 243, 245, 248
lu
United Church of Christ, 102, 139, 274, 328, Victory Family Centre, 232
468 video, 301, 360, 486
na
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Vientiane, Laos, 167, 171
so
181, 503 Vietnam, 16–17, 20–1, 23, 27–8, 31, 34, 88, 143,
United Nations General Assembly, 256 167–70, 178–9, 183–4, 188, 190, 192, 194,
er
United Nations High Commissioner for 196, 198, 232, 249, 277, 283, 288, 291, 295–6,
Refugees (UNHCR), 143
United Nations, 32, 106, 143, 256, 260, 387, rp
301–6, 312–14, 318, 327, 329–30, 342, 352–4,
357, 359, 364, 375, 377, 387, 389, 396–8, 403,
Fo
495, 501, 503–5, 516 413, 415, 425, 427–9, 436, 451–3, 456–7, 459,
United States (USA), 18, 21, 27, 31, 33, 77, 94, 466–7, 470–1, 473, 479–83, 485–8, 490
e.
118, 120, 122–3, 134, 149, 153, 170, 177, 179, Vietnam War, 170, 193
182–3, 194–5, 197, 214, 244–5, 248–9, 258, Vietnamese Episcopal Conference, 190
l
sa
269–70, 275, 278, 287, 318, 335, 343, 427–8, Vietnamese War of Independence, 193
434, 452, 460, 467, 470 vigils, 485
re
unity, 32, 42, 44–5, 50, 57–8, 61–2, 77, 98, 123, Vila Verde, 257–8
or
130, 143, 157, 180, 200, 202, 210–11, 221, Villanueva, Eddie, 246–7, 345, 455
223, 259, 299, 330, 346, 382, 392, 405, 418, Villanueva, Joel, 247
n
427, 442, 470 Vineyard Church, 335

tio
Universal Declaration of Human Rights violence, 35–6, 207, 305, 310–11, 328, 330,
(UDHR), 501, 504 393–4, 396, 400, 402–4, 407, 409–11, 421,
bu
University of Indonesia, 209 423, 430, 435–6, 444–5, 486–9

University of Leuven, 61 Virgem Peregrina, 264
tri
University of Malaya, 448 Virgin Mary, 35, 251, 264

is
unregistered church, 367, 370, 372–3, 389 virtue, 207, 251, 415, 512
rd
Upper Burma, 147 Visayan, 343, 380

urbanisation, 43, 49, 63, 104, 303–4, 308, 394, vishnu, 319
fo
397–8 Vladimir, Archbishop, 286

Vo Van Lac, 193
ot
Uyghur, 285, 426, 442

vocations, 54, 59
N
validity, 27, 56, 434 Voice of New Life Radio, 181

values, 45, 62, 79, 90, 107, 121, 135, 150, 153, Volga, Russia, 96
182, 184, 202, 206, 209, 258, 260–1, 263–5, volunteers, 148, 343, 373
303, 360, 364, 370, 391, 415–17, 419, 438, Vong, 176
444, 447–8, 452, 463, 465, 472, 482
Van Lith, Franciscus Georgius Josephus, 206 Wagner, Peter, 335
Van Thio, Henry, 21, 150 Wahid Institute, 202, 207
Van Thuan, Archbishop Nguyen, 195 Walters, Albert, 447
Vancouver, Canada, 68 Wang, Hsien-Chih, 106
variable(s), 503, 512 Wang, Mingdao, 64–5, 67, 383
Vasconcelos, Vincente, 257–8 Wang, Weifan, 378
Vasily, Father, 285, 291 Wang, Yi, 69
548 Index
Wang, Zuoan, 285 World Day of Prayer, 181

war, 39, 74, 76–8, 80, 101–2, 104–5, 108, 112, World Evangelical Alliance (WEA), 49, 126,
121, 130, 133, 139–42, 146, 170, 189, 193, 180, 323, 326
205, 215, 219, 246, 256, 269–70, 272, 274–5, World Human Rights Day, 106
277, 279, 287, 292, 307, 314, 324, 328, 330, World Missionary Conference (Edinburgh
341, 383–4, 387, 389, 393, 397, 400, 409, 421, 1910), 138, 382
434, 438, 443, 451, 463, 467–71, 479 World Presbyterian Alliance, 104
Warri, Nigeria, 133, 180, 246 World Vision International, 161, 165, 177
Wat Koh Church, 159 worldview(s), 25, 44, 101, 157, 230, 244, 306,
Wat Phnom, 180 318, 320, 344, 351, 481
Water Buffalo Theology, 379, 401 Worldwide Evangelisation Crusade (WEC),
water, 21, 24, 30, 36, 116, 150, 246, 251, 351, 326
370–1, 379, 401 worship, 17–18, 22–3, 25, 27, 29–30, 40,
.
ly
Wati, Imachaba Bendang, 207 42–3, 51, 53–4, 58–60, 63, 66–7, 90, 96–7,
on
Watson, Burton, 15 112–14, 116–17, 123–4, 127, 129, 134–5,
Way of the Cross, 67, 70, 73, 333 137, 148, 157, 161–2, 164, 171, 173, 177,
se
wealth, 31–2, 90, 198, 238, 250, 308, 387, 394, 184–6, 193, 196, 207, 210, 215, 218, 227,
397, 399, 453, 473, 490 230–1, 233, 239, 243, 249, 259, 269, 271,
lu
WEC International, 326 275, 278, 290, 293, 301, 314, 317, 336–7,
weddings, 16, 18–19, 171–2 339–42, 345–6, 366, 370, 381, 386, 397,
na
Wednesday, 123 409–11, 429–31, 434–5, 459, 469, 474, 481,
so
Wellesley College, 220 483, 486–7
Wenzhou, China, 20, 23, 63–4, 66–7, 69–70, worshippers, 67, 135, 137, 215, 231, 259, 340
er
306, 329 Wu, Bishop John B., 85
Wesley Methodist Church, 232
Wesleyan Methodist Mission, 76 rp
Wuhan, China, 58
Wujing, Sishu, 376
Fo
Western Europe, 133 Wuzong, 20
Westernisation, 137, 302
e.
White Rajah of Sarawak, 213 Xavier, Francis, 133, 204, 353, 375
White Terror, 109, 376 Xian, 71, 465
l
sa
Widodo, President Joko, 432 Xiao Qun (Little Flock), 383

widows, 183 Xiaomin, Lü, 30, 67, 300
re
Willekens, Monsignor Petrus, 205 Xie, Moses, 64

or
Williams, Channing Moore, 134, 273 Xieng Khouang Province, 169–70

Wilson, Daniel, 127 Xin’an, China, 74
n
Wilson, Woodrow, 127 Xinjiang, China, 30, 69, 72, 284–5, 426
tio
Wimber, John, 335 Xueyuan of Baoding, Bishop Fan, 56

Win, General Ne, 150
bu
wisdom, 30, 72, 265, 335, 351, 355, 361, 508 Yamaguchi, Satoko, 422
witnessing, 19, 308, 347, 400 Yamamuro, Gunpei, 140
tri
women, 16, 21, 33, 43, 79, 97, 101, 108, 110, Yanaihara, Tadao, 140
is
114, 120–1, 123–5, 129, 135, 143, 147, 162, Yang, Fenggang, 329
rd
182, 201, 207–8, 220, 247–8, 255, 264–5, 274, Yangon (Rangoon), Myanmar, 149, 278, 400
278, 295–6, 301–3, 313, 325, 343–5, 358–9, Yap (Micronesia), 235
fo
362, 373, 377, 379–80, 393, 403–5, 407–9, Yasukuni Shrine, 390
Yemen, 130
ot
414–23, 452, 459, 466, 472, 484, 488, 505–6

Won Buddhism, 128 Yeo, K. K., 377
N
Woolf, Virginia, 421 Yertuntsiin Ezen, 96

Word Harvest, 299 Yi-Han, Alexis Kim, 292
World Alliance of Reformed Churches Yiguandao, 446
(WARC), 106 Yihetuan (Boxer) Rebellion, 284
World Bank, 31, 304 Yinshang house churches, 68
World Christian Database (WCD), 495, 501 Yizhou, Father Andrew Zhao, 105
World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE), 516 yoga, 136
World Communion of Reformed Churches Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 205, 207, 209, 424
(WCRC), 49, 302 Yoido Full Gospel Church, 108, 121, 324, 340,
World Council of Churches (WCC), 49, 64, 345, 360, 398, 404
104–5, 125, 181, 296, 307, 323, 354, 369–70, Yokohama, Japan, 135, 273–4
376, 393, 401, 405, 448 Yongjia County, 23
Index 549
Yonsei University, 120, 130 Yugoslavia, 54, 57

Yoshimitsu, Yoshihiko, 141 Yunnan Province, 395
Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), Yuttasak, Reverend, 164
79–80
Young Women’s Christian Association Zen Buddhism, 15, 51, 85, 470
(YWCA), 79–80 Zending, 204
Young, Brigham, 182 Zhangmeizhichuan, 300
Youngnak Church, 307 Zhao, Peter, 61
youth, 49, 57, 69, 88, 93–4, 97, 135, 152, 160, Zhao, Simon, 72
164, 177, 179, 183, 201, 220, 231–2, 235–6, Zhao, Zichen, 378
252, 263, 279, 287, 299, 301, 325–6, 359, 403, Zhejiang Province, 20, 23, 64, 271, 329, 427,
410, 426, 448–9, 457, 481–2, 487, 490 473
Youth With A Mission (YWAM), 97, 179, 299 Zhen Yesu Jiaohui (True Jesus Church), 383
.
ly
YouTube, 159–60, 301 Zhiwen, Ji, 383
on
YouVersion, 165 Zhongguohua, 45
Yu-Ping, Cardinal, 105 Zhonghua Jidu Jiaohui, 382
se
Yu, Gwan-sun, 121 Zoroastrian(s), 20
Yuan, Allen, 64 Zschech, Darlene, 233
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英语 南亚和东南亚的基督教

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EDINBURGH COMPANIONS TO GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY

Edinburgh Companions to Global Christianity

José Mario C. Francisco sj

Editor: Gina A. Zurlo

Data Analyst: Peter F. Crossing

Layout and Design: Justin Long

Cartography: Bryan Nicholson

Christianity in East and

printed and bound in Poland by Hussar Books

ISBN 978 1 4744 5160 4 (hardback)

ISBN 978 1 4744 5163 5 (epub)

Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).

Series Preface viii

Mainland China (Catholic) 51

Mainland China (House Churches)  63

The Philippines 242

Major Christian Traditions

Ken Christoph Miyamoto

Nikolay Samoylov and Ambrose-Aristotle Zographos

Pentecostals and Charismatics 335

Inter-religious Relations 438

Colonial and Postcolonial Context 463

The Future of Christianity in East and Southeast Asia 479

While a number of compendia have recently been produced on the study

examines current trends. The aim of the series is to comprehensively map

worldwide Christianity and to describe it in its entirety. Country-specific

current regional and continental trends are examined.

Each volume is devoted to a continent or sub-continent, following

the United Nations classifications. Through a combination of maps,

prehensive demographic analysis of Christianity in the relevant area.

Commentary and interpretation are provided by essays on key topics,

each written by an expert in the field, normally an indigenous scholar. By

1. Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa

9. Christianity in Eastern and Southern Europe

As series editors, we rely heavily on the regional expertise of the

global Christianity that will be groundbreaking in its demographic quality

to anyone seeking a fuller understanding of the worldwide presence of the

Kenneth R. Ross and Todd M. Johnson

millionaires. According to US News and World Report, as of 2018, Hong

Kong had 93 billionaires, ranking it seventh in the world. By contrast, in

in the top 10 (Singapore at number 8 and Japan at number 9). By contrast,

this and nearby countries, fundamentalist violence will increase before

1,800 languages are spoken in these regions, by adherents of Buddhism,

and Southeast Asia. Rather, it comes to expression in many different ways.

of a dedicated essay, while China, in view of its size and population, is

Christianity, with a further two essays devoted to the Special Administra-

tive Regions of Hong Kong and Macau.

Thirdly, Christianity in East and Southeast Asia is considered in terms

of its principal ecclesial forms or traditions. Four types of church are

considered: Anglican, Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic. It is a distinctive

feature of this volume that it does not include an essay on Independent

churches. This respects the problematic nature of this category in the

two regions, while an editorial note points to essays elsewhere in the

volume that include consideration of this ecclesial type. In addition, the

Evangelical and Pentecostal/Charismatic movements, which cut across

Fourthly, selected themes are considered. Eight of these run right

through the entire Edinburgh Companions series: faith and culture;

As is evident from the short bibliography offered at the end of each

The essay authors employ a variety of disciplinary approaches – historical,

英语南亚和东南亚的基督教

英语南亚和东南亚的基督教

英语南亚和东南亚的基督教

Series Preface viii

Mainland China (Catholic) 51

Mainland China (House Churches) 63

The Philippines 242

Pentecostals and Charismatics 335

Inter-religious Relations 438

Colonial and Postcolonial Context 463

The Future of Christianity in East and Southeast Asia 479

Alexander Chow is Senior Lecturer in Theology and World Christianity at the

Barnabas Mam is Asia Ministry Advisor of Ambassadors for Christ Inter