G.R. No.

217611, March 27, 2019

ROGELIO LOGROSA, PETITIONER, v. SPOUSES CLEOFE AND CESAR AZARES,

SPOUSES ABUNDIO, JR. AND ANTONIETA TORRES, SPOUSES NELSON SALA
AND ARLENE ANG, AND SPOUSES BONIFACIO, JR., AND WELHELMINA
BARUIZ, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Rogelio Logrosa (petitioner Logrosa) against
respondents Spouses Cleofe Azares (Cleofe) and Cesar Azares (Cesar) (collectively,
respondents Sps. Azares), Spouses Abundio Torres, Jr. (Abundio) and Antonieta
Dumagan Torres (Antonieta) (collectively, respondents Sps. Torres), Spouses
Nelson Sala (Nelson) and Arlene Ang (Arlene) (collectively, respondents Sps. Sala),
and Spouses Bonifacio Baruiz, Jr. (Bonifacio) and Welhelmina Baruiz (Welhelmina)
(collectively, respondents Sps. Baruiz), assailing the Decision 2 dated July 30, 2014
(assailed Decision) and Resolution3 dated February 26, 2015 (assailed Resolution)
promulgated by the Court of Appeals - Cagayan de Oro City (CA), Special Twenty-
First Division and Former Special Twenty-First Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 02878-MIN.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

As narrated by the CA in its assailed Decision, and as culled from the records of the
case, the essential facts and antecedent proceedings of the instant case are as
follows:
The facts, as summarized by the [Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao del
Norte, Branch 30 (RTC)], are as follows:
In his verified complaint [for partition filed before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. 4026, petitioner Logrosa] alleged that he, together with the [respondents] are
co-owners of eight (8) parcels of lands [(subject properties)], all situated in [the]
Municipality of Tagum (now Tagum City), Davao del Norte, and more particularly
described under the following Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT), to wit: TCT No.
T-52508,4 TCT No. T-52509,5 TCT No. T-52510,6 TCT No. T-52511,7 TCT No. T-
52512,8 TCT No. T-52513,9 TCT No. T-52514,10 and TCT No. T-52515.11 [The
aforementioned TCTs all indicate that petitioner Logrosa, together with the
respondents, are co-owners of the subject properties.]

[Petitioner Logrosa alleged that in 1987, the original owner of the subject
properties, one Benjamin A. Gonzales (Gonzales), sold the subject properties
collectively to petitioner Logrosa and the other respondents. The records show that
a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale12 dated April 14, 1987 was executed by the
parties, bearing the signatures of Gonzales, petitioner Logrosa, respondents Cleofe,
Nelson, Bonifacio, and Abundio.]13

[Petitioner Logrosa likewise] claimed that the aforementioned titles were issued to
the parties herein on May 19, 1987, hence the co-ownership over the
aforementioned properties had already existed for more than ten (10) years,
without the parties having entered into [any] subsequent agreement to keep the
above-said properties undivided. He anchored his complaint on Article 494 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
"No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand a[t] any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned. [x x x]"
Summoned to plead, only [respondents Sps. Azares] filed their Answer to the
complaint, and opposed [petitioner Logrosa's] prayer for partition.

[Respondents Sps. Torres], as well as [respondent Welhelmina], respectively filed a

manifestation and declared that they are not filing an answer to the complaint and
that they interpose no objection to the partition of the properties subject of this
case. On the other hand, [respondents Sps. Sala] did not file any answer.

Answering [respondents Sps. Azares] contended that while it may be true that
[petitioner Logrosa's] name appeared in the titles of the properties aforementioned,
however, they belied [petitioner Logrosa's] claim that he is a co-owner of the same,
as he never contributed as to its acquisition and never contributed for their
maintenance, much less paid the taxes due thereon.

Answering [respondents Sps. Azares] further alleged that sometime in 1985,

[petitioner Logrosa], being their cousin, used to work for them as their trusted
laborer together with the other [respondents] at their gold mining tunnel in Mt.
Diwata, Diwalwal, Monkayo. [Petitioner Logrosa], being young and inadequately
schooled, was sent to school at the expense of the answering [respondents Sps.
Azares]. They also allowed [petitioner Logrosa] to construct his house at Nova
Tierra, Lanang, Davao City upon condition that [petitioner Logrosa] would pay and
reimburse them for all his expenses thereto when [petitioner Logrosa's] finances
allow.

Sometime in 1986, answering [respondents Sps. Azares] purchased all the

properties subject of this case to provide one place for all the parties herein to live
near each other for easy access and mutual security. [Petitioner Logrosa] and the
other [respondents] have not contributed to their acquisition. As time went by,
[petitioner Logrosa] and the other [respondents] turned hostile against the
answering [respondents Sps. Azares].

During trial, [petitioner Logrosa] testified in court to support his claim. He likewise
presented to the witness stand [respondent Antonieta] to identify the document in
connection with the acquisition of the aforementioned properties.

Answering [respondents Sps. Azares] presented only one (1) witness, in the person
of [respondent] Cesar Azares who debunked the claims of [petitioner Logrosa],
asserting that he did not make [petitioner Logrosa] and the other [respondents] as
co-owners of the properties subject of this case. [Respondent Cesar] further
claimed that [petitioner Logrosa] as well as the other [respondents] had no
capacity to acquire the said properties way back to the time the properties were
purchased as they were only his employees in his mining business in Mt. Diwata,
Diwalwal, Monkayo.
After trial, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit [in its Decision 14 dated
February 27, 2012.]

Hence, [petitioner Logrosa appealed the RTC's Decision before the CA, alleging, in
the main, that the RTC erred in holding that there is no co-ownership that exists
between petitioner Logrosa and respondents Sps. Azares.] 15
The Ruling of the CA

In its assailed Decision, the CA denied petitioner Logrosa's appeal. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision
dated February 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, 11 th Judicial Region, Branch
30, Tagum City, Davao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 4026, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.16
In the assailed Decision, the CA held that "after a careful scrutiny of the records,
the [CA] finds that the evidence adduced by [petitioner Logrosa] were insufficient
to warrant a positive finding of co-ownership." 17

Petitioner Logrosa filed a Motion for Reconsideration 18 dated August 22, 2014, which
was denied by the CA in its assailed Resolution dated February 26, 2015.

Hence, the instant Petition.

Respondents Sps. Azares filed their Comment19 dated July 17, 2017, to which
petitioner Logrosa responded with a Reply20 dated November 29, 2017.

Issue

The central question to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in
upholding the RTC's Decision dated February 27, 2012, which dismissed petitioner
Logrosa's complaint for partition because of its finding that the latter is not a co-
owner and is a mere trustee of the subject properties.

The Court's Ruling

The instant Petition is meritorious.

After a careful review of the records of the instant case, the Court finds that the
evidence on record sufficiently substantiates petitioner Logrosa's claim that he is a
co-owner of the subject properties.

The Court notes that petitioner Logrosa does not rely merely on his own testimony
to prove that he is a co-owner of the subject properties. No one disputes the fact
that there are eight certificates of title, i.e., TCT No. T-52508,21 TCT No. T-
52509,22 TCT No. T-52510,23 TCT No. T-52511,24 TCT No. T-52512,25 TCT No. T-
52513,26 TCT No. T-52514,27 and TCT No. T-52515,28all of which clearly and
unequivocally identify petitioner Logrosa as one of the co-owners of the
subject properties.

It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title

serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.29 It becomes
the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. Such principle of indefeasibility
has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of
the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no
application.30 In the instant case, there is no accusation whatsoever that petitioner
Logrosa was included as co-owner in the TCTs through means of fraud or bad faith.

Aside from the foregoing, it is also not disputed by any party that a duly notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1987 was executed by all the parties,
wherein it clearly states without ambiguity that one of the vendees of the subject
properties is petitioner Logrosa. It must be stressed that respondents Sps. Azares
do not deny whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa is a co-vendee under the Deed of
Absolute Sale. In fact, respondent Cleofe was even a co-signatory of the said Deed
of Absolute Sale, evidencing her assent and consent to petitioner Logrosa's status
as a co-vendee of the subject properties.

The Court has previously held that a document evidencing a sale transaction, such
as a deed of sale, which is duly notarized is considered a public document and
therefore enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due
execution.31 Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court likewise state that public
documents are prima facie evidence of the fact which gave rise to their execution.

Moreover, as held in Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,32 one's assertion of

ownership is further strengthened and buttressed by the fact of possession, i.e., by
building and occupying a house on the subject lot, coupled with the lack of
opposition of such possession on the part of the other parties. 33 In the instant case,
it is not disputed that petitioner Logrosa possesses a portion of the subject property
with no opposition by the other parties, aside from respondents Sps. Azares, who
disclaimed petitioner Logrosa's status as co-owner only after more than two
decades since the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and only as a
mere reaction to the Complaint for Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa.

Hence, with the strong legal presumption created by the eight certificates of title
and duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale that petitioner Logrosa is a co-buyer and
co-owner of the subject properties, the burden to prove otherwise was shifted to
respondents Sps. Azares.
From the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondents Sps. Azares have
not successfully hurdled this burden.

To controvert the strong legal presumption in favor of petitioner Logrosa's co-

ownership over the subject properties, respondents Sps. Azares can only muster
the sole testimony of respondent Cesar. A solitary, self-serving testimony cannot
successfully overturn petitioner Logrosa's prima facie status as co-owner brought
about by the execution of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale and the issuance of the
certificates of title.

It is the main contention of respondents Sps. Azares that despite the inclusion in
the documents of title of petitioner Logrosa and the other parties, i.e., respondents
Sps. Torres, Sala, and Baruiz, the latter are only co-owners on paper and that
respondents Sps. Azares are the sole buyers of the subject properties. According to
respondents Sps. Azares, the sole reason why they included the other parties in the
documents of title is "to provide one place for all the parties herein to live near
each other for easy access and mutual security." 34

First and foremost, respondent Cesar's testimony is self-serving. The self-serving

testimony of a party to an instrument cannot be given more weight and reliability
than the contents of such instrument, especially if such instrument enjoys
presumptive weight.35

Further, the Court finds respondents Sps. Azares' theory perplexing and contrary to
ordinary human experience. Assuming arguendo that respondents Sps. Azares are
indeed the true sole owners of the subject properties, there was absolutely no need
for them to include the other parties in the documents of title if only to allow the
latter to stay within the premises of the subject properties.

In other words, if respondents Sps. Azares' mere motivation was to provide one
place for all of the parties to live near each other, respondents Sps. Azares could
have easily achieved such objective without including the parties in the sale
transaction. The inclusion of persons in a deed of sale and a certificate of title is by
no means a prerequisite to allow such persons to occupy such property.

Hence, no one in his right mind would include non-buyers or non-owners in a

notarized deed of absolute sale and in indefeasible certificates of title if he truly
believes that he is the sole owner of the property. Bearing in mind the strong
presumption created by public documents such as a notarized instrument and
certificates of title, if respondents Sps. Azares really believed that they are the sole
owners of the subject properties, one would expect that they would, at the very
least, execute another document evidencing their true agreement as a
precautionary measure. But no such precautionary measure was employed by
respondents Sps. Azares to protect their supposed right as sole owners of the
subject properties.

Likewise striking is the nonchalant and unassertive attitude adopted by respondents

Sps. Azares in claiming sole ownership of the subject properties. To reiterate, it
took respondents Sps. Azares more than two decades from the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale and issuance of the certificates of title to assert their sole
ownership. Not only that, such assertion was only a reaction to the Complaint for
Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa.

Simply stated, the Court is convinced that the actuations and demeanor of
respondents Sps. Azares are wholly inconsistent with their contention that they are
the sole owners of the subject properties.

With respect to the tax declarations presented by respondents Sps. Azares,

jurisprudence holds that tax declarations and tax receipts as evidence of ownership
cannot prevail over a certificate of title which, to reiterate, is an incontrovertible
proof of ownership.36 Hence, in order for respondents Sps. Azares' tax declarations
to successfully overturn the strong presumption of petitioner Logrosa's co-
ownership, it was incumbent upon respondents Sps. Azares to fortify their position
with other supporting evidence. As stated above, respondents Sps. Azares were not
able to do so.

Moreover, the Court takes notice of petitioner Logrosa's unrebutted allegation that
the tax payments made by respondents Sps. Azares were only made in 2010, which
was already after the filing of the Complaint for Partition in 2009. In addition, it is
likewise unrebutted by respondents Sps. Azares that respondent Abundio, who
testified under oath in open court, paid for the real property taxes covering the
subject properties for at least two years. Respondent Abundio was able to submit
before the RTC an official receipt of his tax payment; a tax declaration issued in the
name of respondents Cleofe, Abundio, and Nelson, and petitioner Logrosa; and
Owner's Duplicate Copies of TCT Nos. T-52510 and T-52508 registered in the name
of the abovementioned parties.37 This demolishes respondents Sps. Azares'
assertion that they exclusively paid the real property taxes covering the subject
properties and that their payment of real property taxes is sufficient proof of their
sole ownership over the subject properties.

Lastly, both the RTC and CA put much emphasis on respondents Sps. Azares'
contention that petitioner Logrosa has no capacity to purchase the subject
properties on account of the latter's status as a lowly employee of respondents Sps.
Azares.

The Court finds the lower courts' heavy reliance on petitioner Logrosa's supposed
incapacity to purchase the subject properties misplaced; it made a mountain out of
a molehill.

Assuming for argument's sake that petitioner Logrosa did not contribute in the
payment of the purchase price of the subject properties, it does not necessarily
mean that he could not become a co-owner of the subject properties who can
compel partition.

A person may exercise the right to compel the partition of real estate if he/she sets
forth in his/her complaint the nature and extent of his title and subsequently proves
the same.38 The law does not make a distinction as to how the co-owner derived
his/her title, may it be through gratuity or through onerous consideration. In other
words, a person who derived his title and was granted co-ownership rights through
gratuity may compel partition.

Respondents Sps. Azares maintain that there was no gratuitous granting of title and
co-ownership rights to petitioner Logrosa and that they only intended to designate
petitioner Logrosa as a mere trustee of the subject properties. However, to
reiterate, this self-serving testimony of respondents Sps. Azares based on their
mere say-so cannot stand, vis-a-vis the strong legal presumption created by the
certificates of title and the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale that petitioner Logrosa
is a co-owner of the subject property.

As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its
existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the
trust and its elements. While implied trusts may be proved by oral evidence, the
evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, and
should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated. 39

To the contrary, as pointed out by petitioner Logrosa, the testimony of respondent

Cesar actually lends credence to petitioner Logrosa's claim that respondent Cesar
really intended to designate the former, together with the other respondents, as co-
owners of the subject properties.

During the trial, when he was asked why he did not require petitioner Logrosa and
the other parties to execute a document acknowledging his status as sole owner of
the subject properties, respondent Cesar explained that there was no need to do so
because "we previously agreed x x x with each other that whatever they would
decide to till the land in that particular area that would be given to them. x x x I
have my intention to give that house constructed to them then, I will give that
particular land to them."40

With this clear admission against interest on the part of respondents Sps. Azares
that there was indeed an intention on their part to make petitioner Logrosa and the
other respondents as co-owners of the subject properties, the Court cannot
subscribe to the CA's view that there is insufficiency of evidence confirming
petitioner Logrosa's status as co-owner of the subject properties.

As a parting note, while it is true that the Court has previously held that the mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the registrant may only be a trustee,41 to controvert the legal
presumption brought about by the execution and issuance of public documents
pointing to the existence of co-ownership, the opposing party must carry and
satisfy the burden of proving with clear, convincing and persuasive evidence to
repudiate the co-ownership. In this case, the Court finds that respondents Sps.
Azares failed to fulfill such burden.
WHEREFORE, premised considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated July 30,2014 and Resolution dated February 26, 2015 promulgated
by the Court of Appeals - Cagayan de Oro City, Special Twenty-First Division and
Former Special Twenty-First Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 02878-MIN
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, the Decision dated February 27, 2012 promulgated by Regional Trial
Court of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, Branch 30 in Civil Case No. 4026 is
likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is DIRECTED to
issue an Order under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court for the partition of the subject
properties.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.