Fire Service Manual Volume 2 Fire Service Operations Incident Command HM Fire Service Inspectorate Publications Section London: TSO7/0 Published by TSO (The Staonery Office) and avaiable rom: Online ‘wwrmstso.co.ukdbookshop Mail,Telephone, Fax & E-mail 150 PO Box 28, Norwich, NR3 1GN. Telephone ordersiGenecal enquires: 0870 600 5522 Fax orders: 0870 600 5533 E-malt [email protected] Texephone 0870 240 3701 TSO Shops 123 Kingsway London, WC28 6°Q (020 7242 6393 Fax 020 7242 6394 68-69 Bull Sret, Birmingham 84 6AD 0128 236 9696 Fax 0121 236 9699 9.21 Princess Street. 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The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and the title of the publication specified This is a value added publication which falls outside the scope of the HMSO Class Licence. ‘Applications for reproduction should be made in writing to HMSO, The Licensing Division, St Clements House, 2-16 Colegate, Norwich, NR3 18Q Fax: 01603 723000 or e-mail: [email protected] ISBN 0 11 3412800 ‘Cover and part-title photographs: West Yorkshire Fire Service Printed in the United Kingdom for The Stationery Office 1109338 8/02 C50Incident Command Preface The first edition of this manual introduced the incident command system to the fire service. It built upon best practice in the management of emergency incidents that had been developed throughout the UK over many years. The ICS sys- tem has since been well received by brigades throughout the whole of the UK. This 2nd edition is published following wide con- sultation with all key stakeholders and has resulted in extending the standard approach to incident command even further, particularly in the area of dynamic risk assessment and command compe- tence. The opportunity has also been taken to clar- ify some of the issues surrounding sectorisation and inner cordons. The systems, procedures and practices described in the following pages were developed under the “Safe Person Concept’. It sets out good practice and offers supporting advice and guidance in those areas of operational activity considered to be criti- cal to the health and safety of fire service person- nel, of which the safe and competent command of operational incidents is key. The style avoids being prescriptive, however, it gives clear leads to Chief Officers who are keen to censure that the approach they adopt is consistent with the rest of the UK to a sufficient degree to facilitate effective cross-border operations; to be able to offer, and receive, support from brigades from much further afield than normally required, if this is called for; and finally to be able to maximise the benefits of centralised joint command training at the Fire Service College. Additionally, the appendix dealing with the opera- tions and management of incidents by the police and ambulance service has been updated to ensure continued effective joint service operations. ‘The incident command system features the follow- ing elements: (i) Astandard structure for organising resources ‘on the incident ground which takes account of the dynamic nature of an emergency incident, assists Incident Commanders’ decision making and en- courages effective communication and delegation. (ii) A process of dynamic risk assessment which ensures that Incident Commanders place safety considerations upper-most in their command deci- sion-making priorities and the method of demon- strating this. (iii) A system of structured support for the Incident Commander. (iv) A national framework which describes the tasks and the performance standards expected of commanders at emergency incidents (¥) A consistent methodology and terminology for exercising operational command which will contribute to safer systems of work both in training and at operational incidents, especially when attending ‘cross-border’ incidents and external training centres. (vi) A recognition of the role of performance management and review which, in the operational context, centres particularly on post-incident debrief procedures. The safety of firefighters at operational incidents and during realistic training is a critical area of Incident Command iiiresponsibility for fire service commanders and managers. ‘Across the very wide range of emergency incidents attended by brigades, there are essential principles of organisation and command, which can be applied to ensure successful incident management and closure. The frequent requirement for firefighters from one brigade to work under the command of officers from another, the need for firefighters to work with other emergency services and the need for firefighters and commanders at all levels to be trained at national centres, all highlight the impor- tance of systems of work which operate against national standards. The contents of this manual were developed to meet these requirements. iv Fire Service ManualIncident Command Contents Preface Chapter 1 Introduction to the Incident Command System Ld 12 Incident Command System in Context ‘The Key Elements of the Incident Command Structure Chapter 2 Organisation on the Incident Ground 24 22 3 24 28 26 Incident Command Structure Explanation A Clear Line of Command Span of Control Shared Responsibility and Authority — Roles in the Incident Command System Sectorisation of Incidents Examples of Seetorisation Chapter 3 Incident Risk Management 3a 32 33 34 35 3.6 37 3.8 39 3.10 3.1 3.12 33 3.14 Health & Safety on the Incident Ground Dynamic Risk Assessment ial Stage of Incident Development Stage of Incident The Tactical Mode ‘The Application of Tactical Mode Adopting a Tactical Mode when Sectors are in use Responsibilities for Determining Tactical Mode Summary of the Procedure Examples of Application of Tactical Mode Analytical Risk Assessment Phase Safety Responsibilities of Personnel at Incidents, Safe Systems of Work Summary of the Safety Function of Work Chapter 4 Competent Incident Managers 4a 42 43 44 45 Introduction Integrated Personal Development System National Occupational Standards National Development Modules Initial Development Incident Command Page 34 35 35 36 38 39 40 41 41 42 47 47 48 48 49 50 50 50 82 82 vAppendices AL An Example of West Yorkshire Fire Service’s Fire Ground Risk Assessment Process to Confirm Tactical Mode. A2 Roles of the other Emergency Services A3__ The Psychology of Command A4 Legal Considerations in Command & Control: Legislative Requirements AS _ Incident Command System: Further examples of Application Glossy of Terms Bibliography Further Reading Acknowledgements vi Fire Service Manual 53 59 eo B 81 on 95 96 7Incident Command Chapter Chapter 1 - Introduction to the Incident Command System THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM Incident Command — 11.1 Incident Command System in Context ‘An Incident Command System does not exist in isolation. The following sections of this manual address, principally, the design of systems for inci- dent command and the training and assessment of individuals and teams to operate those systems safely and effectively. There are, however, a num- ber of other critical factors that support the inci dent command funetion and which a brigade will need to consider in integrating the function within its management system. The development of an Incident Command System should be seen as part of a brigade's overall organisational system for ‘managing risk. The approach advocated by the Health & Safety Executive in HSG6S to the design of organisational structures and processes for man- aging safely and successfully, provides a useful framework for this. 1.1.1 Policy ‘A brigade should have a clear and coherent policy that sets out the approach to delivering effective incident command. 1.1.2 Organising The arrangements by which the Incident Command System is delivered and supported should be defined clearly, This will allow all involved to understand the brigade's approach and objectives in relation to the command function. Examples of issues to be addressed would include the provision of vehicle/equipment availability, mobilising arrangements and training facilities, resources and programmes. 1.1.3 Planning There should be a planned approach to the devel- ‘opment and implementation of the incident com- ‘mand function, the aim of which should be to min- mise and mitigate risks. Risk assessment should be used to identify priorities for the development of the Incident Command System and to set objec- tives to eliminate hazards and reduce or control risk. Issues relating to operational preplanning would feature here. 2 Fire Service Manual 1.1.4 Measuring There should be agreed and documented standards of performance in incident command and a system in place to measure performance and identify areas for improvement. 1.1.5 Auditing & Reviewing Performance ‘A system should be adopted which enables the brigade to undertake reviews of incident command performance to ensure that all relevant experience can be captured and lessons learned. 1.2. The Key Elements of the Incident Command Structure Successful incident command requires certain key features in the structure. 1.2.1 The Incident Commander’s Task The fire service commander at an operational inci- dent has the right to exercise authority over fire service resources on the incident ground, The Incident Commander has much to consider when dealing with an emergency and this will become even more complex with increased scale and duration, Clearly, no officer can be expected to remember everything, so the system of incident command described in this manual will provide operational and managerial prompts to reinforce those given by the incident itself and the personnel in support roles. The Incident Commander must ensure that ade- quate resources are available and that arrange- ments have been made to control them. At larger incidents these will normally be delegated as the responsibility of supporting officers in the com- mand structure. Good communication between personnel is essen- tial throughout the incident but especially at the time of the handing over of command, which can result in confusion if it is not done properly, The accumulated knowledge of the site, the incident, the risks and the actions taken so far need to be communicated, in an easily assimilated form, to the officer taking over.Figure 1.1 ‘An Incident Commander should be prepared to brief a more senior officer at any time so that he/she can make a decision whether or not to assume command. If the senior officer decides to take command he/she is to inform the current Incident Commander by stating “I am taking over”. Having assumed command the senior offi- cer may elect to retain the previous commander in the command structure to give assistance. Its the duty of officers being relieved to give the senior officer all the relevant information they possess concerning the incident. Handover of com- mand to more junior officers as the incident is being reduced in size must be equally thorough When taking over a command role on the incident ground, it is necessary to bear in mind the key ele- ments of the role. (Assume command and make it clear that a single team under your leadership is now operating, (ii) Confirm existing tactics and operations according to list of Tactical Priorities. ne ii é Lt Confirm Tactical Mode and safety of all personnel (see Chapter 3) (iv) Be satisfied that resources are adequate and properly deployed, or request assistance, (v) Ensure communications are adequate and sufficient and well-structured informative messages have been sent, (vi) Review operations as they progress, to include examination of resource levels, spans of control, information flow, rank of crew and/or sector commanders. (vil) Ensure welfare of personnel, including rest and reliefs, food and liquid and personal comfort as far as the demands of the operation permit, (viii) Note all learning points for the debrief. Incident Command 31.2.2 Strategy, Tactics & Operations Strategy, tactics and operations are the descriptions given to the different managerial levels of fire ser- vice activity on the incident ground. These terms need to be understood in the context of the incident command structure, (a) Strategy Strategy is the planning and directing of the organ- isation in order to meet its overall objectives, which include © Saving and protecting those in danger. © Ensuring the safety of operational personnel. © Protecting property. © Protecting the environment The strategic level of responsibility includes the formulation of systems to manage the risks of cer- tain incident types in seeking to achieve these objectives. Such systems are necessary to ensure safe and effective working on the incident ground. ‘As each operational incident will differ, Incident Commanders may need to adapt the strategic plans and systems in the light of the specific features of risks presented by the incident and the resources available to deal with those risks. (b) Tacties Tactics can be summarised as the deployment of personnel and equipment on the incident ground to achieve the strategic aims of the Incident Commander, who is principally concerned with the tactical co-ordination of tasks in progress, which will almost invariably be based on approved operational procedures. (©) Operations Operations can best be described as tasks that are carried out on the incident ground to achieve desired objectives, using prescribed techniques and procedures in accordance with the tactical plan. At the smallest incidents all three levels of com- mand decision making will be the responsibility of 4 Fire Service Manual Figure 1.2 one individual, likely to be the first arriving Crew Commander, who will be very much concerned with the tactics and operational tasks in the initial stages, delegating responsibility for the opera- tional level if sufficient resources are available. At larger incidents the team of officers responsible for the various command functions will be organised by the Incident Commander to discharge the oper- ational tasks, while the Incident” Commander retains overall tactical command, Therefore, at any incident, the Incident and/or Sector Commanders have a set of tactical priorities to follow. The following is an example of a list of priorities at a structure fire. This assumes an appropriate risk assessment has been completed, has been properly announced and is under contin- ual review. These ‘tactical priorities’ will also be helpful at debriefs and = when Incident Commanders or Sector Commanders are self assessing their, and their team’s, performance at an incident (© Perform rescues and ensure medical support is called for casualties without delay.@ ) wy) wi) (vi) If the building is already fully involved in fire, take steps to prevent spread to exposure risks, Contain the spread of fire within the building as soon as possible. Extinguish the fire ‘Commence salvage operations as soon as conditions and resources allow. ‘Commence ventilation as soon as conditions and resources allow. Commence cutting away and investigations to ensure all cavities and voids have been covered, Consider the welfare of victims or those who have suffered foss at the earliest possible time, calling in external support as necessary. 1.23 Resources & Control ‘The Incident Commander is responsible for secur- ing and controlling resources on the incident ground. The assessment of resources will include consideration of the need for additional: Appliances Personnel Equipment Firefighting media Consumables (e.g. fuel, BA cylinders) ‘The degree of control an Incident Commander will need to maintain will depend, in part, on the size and demands of the incident, At larger incident specific areas of resource control may be delegat- ed to appointed officers. Such areas may include: Operational Sectors Command support Marshalling Logistics Decontamination Figure 1.3 Incident Command 5Water Foam BA Main Control Relief Management Crew Rehabilitation and Welfare Safety and may be designated as ‘sectors’ for the purpos- of control and identification. 1.2.4 Cordon Control ‘When considering control of the incident ground, the Incident Commander will, in particular, con- sider the need to maintain the safety of firefight- ers, the public, members of other emergency ser- vices and voluntary agencies attending. Cordons may be employed as an effective method of controlling resources and maintaining safety. ‘There are two types, inner and outer cordons. (a) Inner cordons Inner cordons are used to control access to the immediate scene of operations. Access to the area controlled by an inner cordon, which by definition is a high hazard zone, should be restricted to the minimum numbers required for work to be under- taken safely and effectively. Personnel should only enter when they have received a full briefing and been allocated specific tasks. The scale of major incidents is usually such that overall organisation of the fire and rescue opera- tion alone stretches the command officers who are first on scene. This applies equally to the police who may take quite some time to build a presence beyond the initially attending patrol officers. During the dynamic, early phase of a major emer- gency, Incident and Sector Commanders, whilst very well aware of their responsibilities in respect of other parties and agencies, tend to manage this at the sector level. This avoids the problems that can arise, particularly in the early stages of a large incident, if the inner cordon is too quickly estab- lished as a zone around the whole area of opera- tions. The Incident Command System offers the struc- ture to support sector level cordon control with lit 6 Fire Service Manual tle extra procedural detail. It is already a responsi- bility of Incident Commanders, delegated to Sector Commanders when the incident has been sec- torised, to be aware of which personnel and crews are active in their sector. This responsibility may be more effectively discharged if the Sector ‘Commander has some kind of sector command folder or board, as used by some brigades already. The addition of space for other agencies’ person- nel, together with checklists for PPE, escorts if necessary, and details of working location, would ‘bea minor but necessary addition. It would also be necessary to consider a safety briefing, a record of their presence and agreed evacuation signals. (b) Outer cordons Outer cordons prevent access by the public into an area used by the fire service, and other services, for support activities. The Police will usually con- trol outer cordons. Marshalling areas will usually be located within the outer cordon area if one or more are estab- lished. 1.2.5 Briefing & Information Effective communication is of critical importance at all incidents. Information has to be relayed accu- rately from the Incident Commander to the crews carrying out the work and vice-versa so that the crews are aware of the tacties being employed and the Incident Commander is aware of what is hap- pening on the incident ground. The Incident Commander also has a responsibility to relay mes- sages and information back to Brigade Control to give more senior officers an accurate picture of the nature and demands of the incident. The effective briefing of crews is essential. This may commence en route to an incident and will be supplemented on arrival, following an assessment of the incident and its associated risks by the Incident Commander. Following the initial assess- ment, crews will be briefed as to the tasks to be undertaken and the hazards and risks they will face. The extent of the briefing will depend large- ly on the nature and extent of the incident; the pre- briefing for small fires that crews regularly deal with is likely to be relatively straightforward. Onthe other hand, at incidents where crews have little experience and where there is a high risk factor, the briefing will need to be more comprehensive. 1.2.6 Managing Crews on the Incident Ground On arrival crews should be kept together and, as far as possible, work as a team, An Incident Commander should remember that, for a variety of reasons, crews can be tempted to self-deploy. This is bad practice, reduces accountability and robs the Incident Commander of resources, which may be urgently required for other tasks. Brigades should adopt procedures to prevent this occurring. ‘After crews have been briefed they must follow the briefand work safely. This will include wearing the appropriate personal protective equipment and ensuring that access and egress is properly secured. The Incident Commander will need to maintain 2 position where, as far as practically possible, he/she can effectively monitor everything in progress. Where the risk level requires it, the appointment of one or more safety officers should be considered, Once crews are at work they will require support. This means having the necessary resources avail- able (e.g. BA cylinders and servicing facilities) and to ensure that their welfare needs are addressed, Care must be taken to give crews suffi- cient rest, relief and refreshment. The frequency of reliefs will depend upon the demands of the inci- dent and brigade practice. A recognised problem exists at protracted rescues where personal com- mitment to the victims is high. Under these cir- cumstances the crews’ level of fatigue needs to be ‘measured against their continued desire to work. A balance must be found between safe operations and crew morale. ‘The potential for post-incident stress is inereasing- ly recognised and officers should be trained to identify individuals who may be susceptible and situations that may give rise to such problems. Support and counselling may need to begin on the incident ground. 1.2.7 Inter-Agency Liaison The Incident Commander must establish and maintain effective liaison with all other agencies, which can contribute to resolving an incident, This will include liaison with other emergency services to co-ordinate activities effectively, and liaison with technical specialists whose specific know!- edge may be critical in helping to respond to the risk. There is also a need to maintain effective liai- son with the media, if in attendance, in order that appropriate and accurate information is made available. The command structures and responsibilities of the other emergency services are summarised in Appendix 2. The model of the way the services relate to each other is described in detail in the publication entitled “Dealing with Disaster” (3rd Edition, 1997, HM Stationery Office). In broad terms, commands at Strategic, Tactical and Operational levels are identified. These levels are also commonly referred to as ‘Gold, Silver and Bronze’ respectively, although this terminology is not used in all areas e.g., Scotland. To be able to effectively manage inter-service operations it is necessary to understand where fire service roles fit into the inter-service command model. (a) _ Bronze (Operational) level In the incident command system, firefighting crews under the command of a Sector Commander are operating at the “Bronze’ task or operational level. ‘Bronze’ commanders must motivate and control crews doing difficult, dangerous, and sometimes distressing work. They frequently have to lead from the front. Consequently, their time- frames are routinely short, with quick decisions and ongoing appraisals of the developing risks being necessary most of the time. (b) Silver (Ta al) level The Incident Commander is the fire service ‘Silver’, whose role, which is at the tactical level, is to co-ordinate the actions of the Sector Commanders. It should be noted that if an Incident Command 7Operations Commander comes into operation, that officer is a member of the ‘Command Team’ tak- ing on the Incident Commander's role of co-ordi- nating the Sector Commander's (‘Bronze’ level) activities (©) Gold (Strategic) level The strategic, or ‘Gold’ level is the most senior in the organisation and rarely comes into play in pure fire service operations. However, it can often fea- ture in multi-service operations such as major inci- dents, large-scale civil disorder, wide area flooding or other protracted and serious incidents. Whereas “Gold” does not directly influence operations on the ground, at tactical or ‘Silver’ level, it can often involve political considerations and policy level decisions that extend beyond a single organisation. ‘Gold’, or strategic command is invariably exer- cised at a distance from the scene of the incident. It is intended to take the longer view of the situa- tion; the time frame of ‘Gold’, or strategic com- ‘mand, is in days rather than hours or minutes. (@) General There are many cases where the roles overlap out of necessity. Common sense dictates that if'a deci- sion of a tactical nature has to be taken when only an officer of junior rank is in attendance, it will be taken, Equally, someone operating at tactical level will not overlook an urgent operational issue that arises that can easily be dealt with, merely on the grounds that itis not an appropriate task for their command level. A further point to bear in mind is that different ser- vices may choose to exercise command at similar levels'from different locations, also, that because an incident might be serious for one service, e.g., large fire for the fire service or a murder for the police, it does not necessarily involve other ser- vices, either at all, or at the same command level If the incident does escalate to being a ‘Silver’ or “Gold” command level event, the fire service Incident Commander will usually choose to oper- ate on scene if it is a fire or accident or at some suitably central location to cater for more multiple scenes of operation, for example in the case of widespread flooding. The police ‘Silver’ 8 Fire Service Manual Commander will, in all likelihood, not be in atten- dance on-scene but prefer to operate from a silver control facility, sending a liaison officer to liaise with the fire and ambulance ‘Silver’ Commanders. Ifa fire incident escalates to a ‘Gold’ level event, it is entirely probable that the fire Incident Commander, who may be a chief or assistant chief officer, will assume incident command, sending a lower ranking officer to act as liaison at ‘Gold’. It can be seen that the positions are role, rather than rank, related. Iti, therefore, important for purpos- es of effective inter-service liaison that the levels of command and the labelling associated with them are understood but not interpreted over rigid yy. 1.2.8 Communications The Incident Commander must establish effective arrangements for communications. Information is one of the most important assets on the incident ground; information must be gathered, orders issued and situation reports received. The needs of other agencies must be assessed and provided for. Regular situation reports should be passed to the Incident Commander from all Sector Commanders via the established communication links. The Incident Commander will need to: (Establish communication links with brigade control, (ii) Ensure that incident ground radio channels and call signs have been correctly allocated, Establish communications with other agencies. (This may employ communications equipment on agreed channels or simple direct verbal communication.) (iv) _ Establish communications with Sector ‘Commanders for regular reporting between Incident Commander and Sector Commander. (¥) Utilise local systems. Many new and complex buildings have communication systems installed for emergency use.1.2.9 The Closing Stage of the Incident The key activities involved in the closing stages of an incident are: © Maintaining Control © Welfare © Closing Operations and Transfer of Responsibility for Health and Safety @ — Post-Incident Procedures (@) Maint ing Control The process of task and hazard identification, assessment of risk, planning, organisation, control, ‘monitoring and review of the hazard control mea- sures must continue until the last appliance leaves the incident ground. There are usually fewer reasons for accepting risks at this stage, because there are reduced benefits to be gained from the tasks being carried out. Incident and Sector Commanders should, there- fore, have no hesitation in controlling the tempo of work in order to maintain safety. As the urgency of the situation diminishes, the Incident Commander may wish to nominate an officer to gather information for the post-incident review. Whenever possible, this officer should start to debrief crews before they leave the incident, whilst events are still fresh in their minds. Details of all ‘near misses’ i.e. occurrences that could have caused injury, but did not in this instance, must be recorded because experience has shown that there are many near misses for every accident that causes harm. (b) Welfare ‘The welfare of personnel is an important consider- ation, It must be given particular attention by the command team at arduous incidents or incidents that require a rapid turnover of personnel Supervisors must continually monitor the physical condition of crews Welfare includes provision of rest, food and drink, It should, where possible, be provided outside the immediate incident area and always away from any risk of direct or indirect contamination. (©) Closing Operations and Transfer of Responsibility for Health and Safety During the closing stages of an incident the Incident Commander should continue to ensure that all practical steps have been taken to eliminate or minimise any remaining hazards and risks on the incident ground. Before finally closing an incident and withdrawing all fire service resources, the Incident Commander should inform the person having ongoing respon- sibility for health and safety on the incident ground, or their agents, that fire service operations have closed down and indicate all hazards and risks still present, In the absence of advice from other appropriate agencies, the Incident Commander may wish to give advice on how the hazards and risks may ultimately be dealt with and advice about appropriate interim control measures. The Incident Commander must ensure that the responsible person fully understands the hazards and risks and accepts responsibility for ensuring health and safety on the site; this may include the control of potential environmental hazards caused by fire service operations. Brigades may wish to consider some form of documentary evidence of this kind of handover. (d) _ Post-Incident Procedures ‘The Incident Commander, and anyone nominated to gather information at the incident, should super- vise completion of any necessary documentation for the incident, to ensure that this is complete, accurate and is able to be made available promptly. Debriefs play an important part in promoting improvements in personal and organisational per- formance and should take place whenever there is an opportunity to improve standards of service delivery. Such post-incident reviews may be infor- mal or formal; they can range from something as simple as brief discussions on return to station from a minor incident, to a large multi-agency Incident Command 9debrief or a Public Enquiry following a major inci- dent. The format chosen for the review should be appropriate to the nature of the incident attended and should be conducted in a manner that pro- ‘motes open, supportive and constructive discus- sion of all aspects of the incident. If the perfor- ‘mance of individuals is considered in the review then performance should be measured against the standards relevant to the role of each individual. Effective performance and meritorious conduct should be acknowledged where appropriate. Risk-critical issues highlighted during post-inci- dent reviews should be addressed immediately through review of personal performance, equip- ‘ment, working practices or systems. Following an incident any significant information gained, or lessons learned, relating to existing operational intelligence information, personal pro- tective equipment, the provision and use of equip- ment, other systems of work, instruction, training, and levels of safety supervision etc, must be fed back into the policy and procedures of the brigade highlighting equipment, systems or procedures which did NOT work satisfactorily, or which made the working environment unsafe. It is equally important to highlight any unconven- tional system or procedure used which was suc- cessful or made the working environment safe. Where a formal post-incident review is required it should be held at a venue that is suitable and con- venient for those to be invited to attend. Copies of relevant documentation should be available and provision made for recording proceedings, out- comes and learning points, Notes of the outcomes and details of action taken, or planned, to address the learning points raised should be made available to the relevant people as soon as practicable. 1.2.10 Post-Incident Considerations The majority of fire service activities and interests, centre around the emergency phase of an incident. However, there are issues, which involve the fire service for well beyond the emergency phase. Examples include the following: 10 Fire Service Manual © Post-mortem enquiries and Coroner's hearings © Fire Investigation © Accident Investigation © Public or judicial enquiries © Litigation © Financial costs to the brigade i.e. damaged equipment © Criminal Investigation © Incident Debriefing and Evaluation © Fire Safety issue The Incident Commander must, at the earliest con- venient time, attempt to assess what the post-inci- dent considerations might be. On the basis of this assessment, the following tasks might need to be undertaken: () Scene Preservation: As soon as it is identified that detailed examination of the scene might be required; efforts must be directed to preserve it from any further interference. This is particularly important at fatal incidents Recording and Logging: This might include a written log in the Command Unit during the incident or voice recording of critical messages. The early attendance and planned deployment of ser- vice photographic/video personnel can prove to be of great benefit in‘this area. The obtaining of security videos from on-site equipment can also often be of value in sub- sequent investigations. Action on this matter needs to be taken without delay, as some systems will re-use the tapes. Impounding Equipment: Where accidents or faults have occurred, any associated equipment should be pre- served for later investigation. (Should majorw malfunction of Fire Service equipment ‘occur, in addition to the normal required notification being carried out, Her Majesty's Fire Service Inspectorate should also be informed.) Identification of Key Personnel: The names and location of witnesses to important events should be obtained and recorded for later interviews. It may be nec~ essary or appropriate to commence inter viewing during the incident. ‘Managing the Closure of the Incident: This includes considerations such as proper handovers and the incident reduction in size, continued vigilance regarding risks and haz~ ards that continue to exist or newly emerge, making appliances and crews available again at the earliest possible time, and ensuring that site occupiers and others who have been affected by the incident are kept appropriately informed, Incident Command 11Incident Command Chapter Chapter 2 - Organisation on the Incident Ground | (oem lines of Gey \ /_ ORGANISATION ON | _(w \ Decision ‘Span of \ Support t- TH ROUND. j a ] \ |= \ / aS o> ( [inter Frat | | Sectorisation | Previous page is blank2.1 Incident Command Structure Explanation The Incident Command System (ICS) is based on a framework, which ensures manageable ‘Spans of Control’. Other elements are built onto that frame- work. This provides the Incident Commander with the means to find a way through the complexity of the emergency situation and assists with the devel- ‘opment of an effective and appropriate incident ‘ground structure. ‘The concept of the ‘Span of Control’ is important to this basic structure. At a serious incident, during stressful and rapidly changing situations, an Incident Commander has to deal effectively with many people and a large amount of information. Therefore, the commander's span of control has to be limited. Sectorisation is central to managing spans of control and provides everyone on the inci- dent ground with a clear line of reporting. The pat- tem of sectorisation must be both predictable and flexible. Research showed that, at most large incidents, Incident Commanders were not only making decisions about tactics, reinforcements, logistical problems etc,, but also mentally building an organ- isation chart at the same time. The ICS provides a clear framework, which expands from a one-pump attendance to the largest incident that might ever occur and provides the Incident Commander with a ready to use organisational framework. Terminology is important and it is necessary for everyone to use and understand a standard termi- nology. The system uses role titles, e.g., Incident Commander, Sector One Commander etc. This assists with good management and effective com- munications at incidents where only the fire brigade is involved and more so, for multi-agency incidents, where the ‘Gold, Silver and Bronze (or “Strategic, Tactical and Operational’)’ terminology is used. Inter-agency operations are also enhanced by all personnel appreciating where they feature in the complete incident organisation structure. ‘The other main elements of the standard frame- work are: 14 Fire Service Manual © A clearly defined and visible line of command, © Management of the commander's span of control. © Appropriately shared responsibility and authority, with clear definition and understanding of roles and responsibilities. © Devolved information management and support for commanders; the ‘Command Team’ © Predictable patterns of sectorisation, e.g., at a standard four-sided building, the front is one, rear three and sides two and four, in a clockwise pattern, Unusual buildings or incident sites are sectorised by the Incident Commander upon arrival according to where resources are being deployed and what appears intuitively correct. Another important use is on the ‘divided incident ground’, where, due to geographical spread (forests, moorland etc.) or separation due to spillage, toxic clouds or collapse, the Incident Commander is deprived of direct contact with the areas of operation in progress. At debriefs, the chosen pattern should be discussed to see what can be learned. 2.2. A Clear Line of Command The system provides a framework for managing incidents based on a single, clearly defined, line of command, which runs from the Incident Commander to every individual on the incident ground. The line (or chain), of command is as described in the diagrams showing the framework of the ICS (ee Figures 2.8 to 2.15). The command framework is flexible enough to be adapted to incidents of any size and is based upon one essential element, ice, that every unit on the incident ground, be it a crew or a sector has a single individual who is responsible for the effective management of that unit, Individuals also have responsibility for their own safety,2.3. Span of Control ‘The span of control is the number of lines of rela tively constant communication that must be main- tained. ‘The system reflects the fact that the direct lines of communication and areas of involvement of any officer need to be limited to enable the individual to deal effectively with those areas, and cope with the information flow. In this diagram (below) an Incident Commander is responsible for 3 working crews at an incident and has detailed a firefighter to carry out a specific task, which involves regular contact. The span of control for this Incident Commander is 4. No individual should be responsible for so many aspects of the incident that itis difficult or impos- sible to give sufficient attention to each, The system seeks to ensure that an appropriate “Span of Control’ is exercised at all times by the requirement for additional officers to be intro- duced into the chain of command when the demands on any individual's attention become excessive The span of control for tactical roles should ideal- ly be limited to five lines of direct communica- tions, to ensure that commanders do not become overburdened. (The span of control for logistical roles, e.g. the Command Support Officer, may be wider). | lake ate af igh tf Reh In a rapidly developing or complex incident the span of control may need to be as small as 2-3 lines. In a stable situation, 6-7 lines may be accept- able. At small incidents where the area of operations is easily manageable and there are no sectors, the Incident Commander may oversee all aspects of the incident directly. 2.4 Shared Responsibility and Authority — Roles in the Incident Command System 2.4.1 The Inc lent Commander The Incident Commander will normally be the senior officer present at the incident according to each brigade’s policy determining ranks and responsibilities at incidents On occasion a more senior officer may choose to attend an incident as an observer. That officer will, under the Fire Services Act 1947, have overall responsibility for the incident, but need not assume the role of Incident Commander. The senior officer may opt to act as an advisor to the Incident Commander, reviewing tactical plans, assessing resource management and giving guidance as appropriate, but that officer will work directly with the Incident Commander and will not interrupt the chain of command, Naturally, a senior officer may choose to assume the role of Incident Commander should it be considered appropriate. In order to manage the span of control effectively at larger incidents it will be necessary for the Incident Commander to delegate responsibility and devolve authority for some operations. To achieve this the Incident Commander may choose to sectorise the incident. Sectors are creat- ed when the Incident Commander wishes to devolve responsibility for particular operations. Sectors can only be created when a competent individual is available to assume responsibility for the operations within it, All crews within a sector should report directly to the Sector Commander. ‘The Incident Commander is responsible for the overall management of the incident and will focus Incident Command 15Figure 2.2 on command and control, deployment of resources, tactical planning, the coordination of sector operations, in particular BA search co-ordi- nation, and the health and safety of crews. At all incidents the Incident Commander will ensure that an individual is nominated as Command Support (Gee paragraph 2.4.4) and a contact point identi- fied. The level of Command Support should be appropriate to the scale of resources assigned to the incident ground and the level of resources available. At an incident that has been sectorised, consideration should be given to providing some form of command support for the Sector Commanders, The Incident Commander, following an assess- ment of the incident, will allocate areas of respon- sibility to officers as necessary. These officers and specialist officers will be Sector Commanders. 16 Fire Service Manual Depending on the brigade's policies and resources, the officers, of necessity, may be junior officers. As the size and/or complexity of an incident increases, the demands on the attention of the Incident Commander increase. While it is reason- able to assume an Incident Commander could manage a house fire by dealing directly with all crews and individuals on scene, the same assump- tion cannot be made, for example, at a warehouse fire with crews working front and back, or when many crews are involved. In order to allow clear definitions of sector respon- bility, sectors must have clearly defined bound- aries. These may be topographic, usually the case for operational (as opposed to support) sectors, or functional, e.g. Water Sector, or Decontamination Sector.Figure 2.3, 2.4.2 The Sector Commander It is necessary for the boundaries of responsibility at an incident to be clearly defined. This is best achieved by ‘sectorisation’. A sector can be a phys- ical area of the incident ground or an area of sup- port operations, (See Section 2.5) It will be necessary for the Incident Commander to identify suitable areas of operations as sectors of responsibility and to designate each sector. A Sector Commander will be appointed for each sector. The Sector. Commander will report to the Incident Commander, or where appropriate, to the Operations Commander and then take responsibility for the resources within the sector and management of the sector. The Sector Commander will principally focus on command and control, deployment of resources, tactical planning, BA search co-ordination, and health and safety of crews, in close conjunction with the Incident Commander, or Operations Commander if one is in place. It is imperative that a system of sector identifica- tion is used. Although the method of identification can vary (for example when dealing with complex premises or at incidents not easily conforming to the method normally employed), it is vital that whatever method is adopted by a brigade is used consistently at incidents and understood clearly by all personnel. Some examples of sectorisation are offered in Section 2.6, and Appendix 5. An officer assigned as a Sector Commander should assume the sector name as the incident ground radio call sign, e.g. ‘Sector Two’. This identification of the sector names and their use as call signs can be extended to the functional support sectors. Examples would be ‘Water’, ‘Decontamination’ or ‘Marshalling’ ‘A Sector Commander is a ‘Bronze’ Commander, being identified as ‘Fire Bronze I’, ‘Fire Bronze 2', Fire Bronze HazMat’ etc., in inter-service oper- ations At the very large and infrequent incidents that may demand it, the Incident Commander may appoint ‘one or more Operations Commanders to take responsibility for a number of sectors each. 2.4.3 The Operations Commander The role of Operations Commander exists as a means of maintaining workable spans of control when the incident develops in size and complexity. If, for example, the incident has 4 operational sec tors, some support sectors (e.g., water, decontami- nation, salvage, ete.) and there are also demands for the Incident Commander’s time from press, specialist support, other services etc., the Incident ‘Commander's span of control is likely to be at its upper limit, In this example, the operational sec- tors can be condensed to one line of communica- tion by using an Operations Commander in the way shown in Figures 2.13 to 2.15, The Operations Commander is a member of the Command Team. As such, the role is at the ‘Silver’ or Tactical level assisting the Incident Commander who is the fire service ‘Silver’ The Operations Commander's function is to co- ordinate the operational sectors and to exercise the Incident Command 17Incident Commander's authority in that sphere. The Operations Commander must not become involved in support activities, e.g., management of support sectors, liaison with press or other matters ete; that should be dealt with by Command Support. The Operations Commander's role should be purely focused on duties such as supporting the Sector Commanders, co-ordinating their objectives and requirements, BA search co-ordination and monitoring safety and risk assessment. Itis important to note that if an incident does not demand the use of an Operations Commander because there are not enough sectors o activity is too low, then this extra tier is best omitted. There is no advantage in over structuring an incident. ‘At unusually large incidents, it may be necessary to use more than one Operations Commander to main- tain span of control (see Figure 2.15). Such inci- dents are likely to be rare. If multiple Operations Commanders are used, it is essential that they are distinguished either by descriptive terms (e.g. High St Operations, Quayside Operations etc.) or alphanumeric terms (Alpha Operations, Bravo Operations etc.) and that both they and Sector Commanders know which sectors they are responsi- ble for (e.g. Sectors 1-4, High Street Operations; Sectors 5-8 Smith Street Operations). 2.4.4 Command Support Command Support should be introduced at all incidents to assist the Incident Commander in the ‘management of the incident. At small to medium size incidents, the Incident Commander should nominate a junior officer or firefighter as ‘Command Support who will operate from the des- ignated contact point, which should be identified at every incident, usually by continuing to display flashing beacons. Consideration should be given to identifying a contact point that is not involved directly in opera- tions. An appliance not involved in pumping, or an officer's car, may be suitable for this purpose. Command Support should initially provide, and maintain, radio communications between brigade control and the Incident Commander and may also be allocated the following responsibilities: 18 Fire Service Manual © To actaas first contact point for all attending appliances and officers and to ‘maintain a physical record of resources in attendance at the incident. © To operate the main-scheme radio link to the brigade control and to log all main scheme radio communications. © To assist the Incident Commander in liaison with other agencies. © © Todirect attending appliances to an operational location or marshalling area as instructed by the Incident Commander and to record the status of all resources. © To maintain a record of the outcome of the risk assessment and any review, as well as any operational decisions or actions taken asa result of it © To record sector identifications and officers’ duties as the assignments are made. To assist those undertaking command support duties, the provision of some form of command support pack would be advantageous, containing pre-prepared aids and recording sheets. At a larger incident, say above 5 pumps, a Command Unit is usually mobilised by brigades together with some form of support. An officer should head the Command Support Sector and be responsible for all areas of support to the Incident ‘Commander. The position is described in all the following illustrations as Command Support. The additional duties of Command Support at a large, escalating incident may well include: © Arranging appliance positioning and parking to minimise congestion. This role may require close liaison with the Police or other agency in order to arrange for parked vehicles to be moved. © Liaising with crews of specialist units to censure optimum support to operational sectors.© Arranging additional or specialist equip- ‘ment and crews to Sector Commanders as required by the Incident Commander. © Liaising with other agencies as necessary, including booking-in and supervision of their staff, managing the media etc. © Briefing designated personnel © Arranging the reliefs of appliances and personnel. The span of control within Command Support should be continually monitored. Where appropri- ate a request for additional officers to assist should be made to the Incident Commander. 2.4.5 The Command Team Incident Commanders cannot manage a complex and rapidly developing incident alone; effective and structured support is essential to successful operations. ‘A Command Team comprises the Incident Commander and whichever officers ot staff are supporting that role. At the simplest level, this is the Incident Commander in charge of a one-pump attendance, with Command Support simply being the driver who is operating the radio, At a more complex level, the Command Team includes the expanded command support function. Sector Commanders, although located in the operational sectors and widely dispersed, are still members of the Command Team, Brigades will take different approaches to which roles and functions form part of the command team. The aim is to integrate communications and decision making as seamlessly as possible between the Incident Commander and personnel engaged ‘on operational tasks. Some of the command sup- port functions may take place at a location remote from the incident, particularly at major and multi- agency incidents. 2.4.6 Identification of Command Roles ‘The Command Team comprises officers holding a variety of roles. It is essential that each can be easily identified. Whilst this is important within the brigade it is even more so when operating at cross-border incidents. Some degree of consisten- cy is, therefore essential. Whereas there are a vari- ety of patterns in existence, some common princi- ples apply: INCIDENT COMMANDER - White surcoat. SECTOR COMMANDER - Yellow surcoat with red shoulders. OPERATIONS COMMANDER ~ Red surcoat, COMMAND SUPPORT ~ Red and White chequers. ENTRY CONTROL OFFICER (BA) — Yellow and Black chequers. It is important to avoid patterns and colours used by other services, for example blue is associated with the police and green with the ambulance ser- vice. When deciding on the exact pattern of surcoat for ICS and other purposes, brigades will want to take into account considerations surrounding use at incidents on or near railways and high speed roads where other guidance exists 2.5 Sectorisation of Incidents Sectorisation should be introduced when the demands on an incident make it imperative that responsibility and authority is delegated in order to ensure appropriate command and safety monitor- ing of all activities. As stated in paragraph 2.1 and 24.2, methods of sector identification can vary provided the pattern used is consistent and clearly understood by all personnel. The creation of sec- tors will only be done on the instructions of the Incident Commander who will sectorise appropri- ate to the demands of the incident. Even if it is possible for the Incident Commander to oversee all operations, the need to sectorise will arise if there is so much going on that the Incident Commander risks being distracted and unable to give sufficient attention to each task. This would indicate that the Incident Commander's span of Incident Command 19Figure 2.4 control is too great. If an Incident Commander's span of control is greater than about 5 lines of direct communication at a working incident, it is possible that performance will be adversely affect- ed. ‘There are times when a limited sectorisation of small incidents can be useful, as follows; Frequently, operations take place in more than one location during an incident, for example at the front and rear of a building. In such cases the Incident Commander's span of control may only be 2 or 3 (to crew commanders). For instance, at a typical semi-detached house fire the Incident Commander has the ability to monitor tasks at front and back simply by moving to and fro; there is unlikely to be a need to sectorise. However, if the house is mid terrace and there is no quick access from front to back, then despite the small span of control, itis unlikely that the Incident Commander 20 Fire Service Manual will be able to adequately manage operations and supervise safety at front and back. In this case the most appropriate response would be for the Incident Commander to retain command of the front of the building and any support activities, but to nominate a Sector Commander and assign all operations at the rear of the building to that sector. It is important to note that where a Sector Commander has been appointed for the rear of a building this does not necessarily mean that a sep- arate Sector Commander has also to be created for the front of a building if the Incident Commander is satisfied that he/she can retain a satisfactory level of command. It is quite acceptable for an Incident Commander to retain command of the majority of an incident in such circumstances, Similarly, at an RTA there is usually no need to fully sectorise, but if crews are assigned to a car, which has rolled 30 metres down an embankmentwhile the main scene of operations is on the road- way, it may be necessary to assign that car as a sep- arate sector. The principle is that sectorising is driven by the need to delegate responsibility and authority in order to ensure appropriate command and safety monitoring of all activities. Except in exceptional circumstances, sectorisation should follow the pre- ferred model, 2.5.1 Location of Sector Commanders It must be emphasised that Sector Commanders should physically stay in their sector. Sector ‘Commanders provide direct and visible leadership at each sector and need to remain directly accessi- ble to the Crew Commanders for whom they are responsible. Deviations from proper procedure would include Sector Commanders visiting the Command Unit, or touring the incident ground attempting to supervise operations in another see- tor whilst neglecting their own. In cases where it is essential that a Crew or Sector Commander leaves theit post, at the direction of the Incident Commander, for a meeting, briefing or another purpose, they must be replaced by someone with appropriate competence and author- ity to maintain continuity of command, supervi- sion, safety, ete. Support, or non-operaticnal sectors, e.g. water, decontamination etc., are designated as the Incident Commander sees fit and may be grouped according to availability of officers and resources to suit the need, One of the principal purposes of the ICS is to pro- vide clear command and manageable spans of con- trol; to enable this to happen the proper line of command should be observed: a Sector Commander of an operational sector reports only to the Incident Commander, (or the Operations Commander if one is in place). Commanders of support sectors report to Command Support. 2.5.2 Exposures Unless the Incident Commander has directed oth- erwise, a sector includes not only the face of the building in the sector, but also the exposure risk at the other side of the street, or the exposed parts of an adjoining building. The Sector Commander is responsible accordingly. Deployment of crews and requests for assistance should be made taking proper account of this. 2.5.3 Assuming and Handing-over ‘Command of Sectors When command of an incident changes it must be done formally. In the same way there must be a proper recognition of the appointment or change of a Sector Commander. The Sector Commander must be formally briefed on his duties by the Incident Commander, and on the status of opera- tions in progress by the outgoing Sector Commander when taking over a sector. 2.5.4 Vertical Sectorisation Section 2.5 outlined the accepted approach to sec- torisation at a building fire. However, because the circumstances of incidents involving high rise buildings, basements, ships etc. are different, with areas of operations above and below each other, further guidance on the application of the princi- ples of sectorisation at such incidents is necessary. The rationale for this suggested model is based on maintaining effective spans of control when Sector Commanders cannot follow the normal practice of being physically present in the sector, due to smoke etc., as well as cases where internal and external sectorisation is required at the same time. As with the organisation of any incident, fit is not necessary to sectorise, then, to reduce the possibil ity of barriers to information flow between crews and the Incident Commander, it is best not to. Using the example of an incident in a multi-storey building, the extemal sectorisation, if necessary (eg, aerial appliances being used for access or res- cue) would follow the normal model, identifying the sectors by number, It may, on some occasions, only be necessary to operate a single “Fire Sector” internally, with external and support sectors oper- ating outside in the conventional way. However, there will occasionally be incidents with large numbers of personnel directly firefighting, involved in search, ventilation, salvage operations Incident Command 21etc where more than one internal sector is neces- sary. The zones of activity within the structure (c.g., internal firefighting operations) could then be identified as in the following examples: © Fire Sector: this would be the main area of firefighting operations, consisting of the floor/s directly involved in fire, plus one level above and one level below. If crews involved in this exceeded acceptable spans of control, consideration should be given to activating a Search Sector; © Search Sector: this would be the area of operations, in a high rise, above the “fire sector’ where search and rescue, venting and other operations are taking place. In a basement scenario the Search Sector would extend from fresh air all the way to the lowest level. Ifthe distance from the ‘ground floor lobby to the bridgehead is more than two or three floors and spans of control require it, consideration should be given to activating a Lobby Sector; © Lobby Sector: this would cover the area of operations from the ground floor lobby to the bridgehead, which is normally two floors below the fire floor. The Lobby Sector Commander will act as the co- ordinator of all logistics needs of the Fire and Search Sector Commanders, who will on most occasions need to be located at the bridgehead directing operations via radio and liaising with the BAECO's. The Lobby Sector Commander would also co-ordinate all operations beneath the bridgehead level, including salvage and ventilation, liaising with fellow Sector Commanders in the usual way, Other approaches may need to be taken. If, for example, in a large or complex building it is nec- essary to introduce more than one sector on a floor, one large metropolitan brigade has had success in setting up two sectors, each with its own bridge- head in different stairwells, with an Operations Commander co-ordinating the sectors from the lobby area. 22 Fire Service Manual All other aspects of the structure, e.g., lines of responsibility, lines of communication and report- ing for the Sector Commander would function in the normal manner. See Figure 2.5, Section 2.6, for examples of vertical sectorisation. ‘These principles can be readily applied to other sit- uations where vertical, internal sectorisation may be necessary. The following diagrams are examples of the Incident Command structure applied to incidents, and how the command structure expands to match the demands of an escalating incident. The layout is not intended to be prescriptive, but certain features are considered “standard”. For example, operational sectors are generally num- ered not named. All operational sectors report direct to the Incident Commander or, exceptional- ly, to the Operations Commander if one is in place. All support sectors must report to the Incident Commander via the command support function. This is important to preserve spans of control. At more serious incidents, it is likely that the com- mand support function will be headed by an offi- cer of some seniority. Although the diagrams give examples of five, eight, fifteen etc, pump incidents, this is illustra- tive only and the range is, of course, variable and dependent on the requirements of the incident and the resources of the brigade. Services and organisations listed to the right of the command support function, eg, “Police”, “Press” etc, are examples only and the list is far from exclusive. It may include any or all of the agencies that are stakeholders in the incident. The larger number of crew members in the vieini ty of Command Support that appear in the diz grams after a command unit is in place, represent those allocated as “runners”, radio operators etc. Individual brigades will have different ways of managing this requirement,2.6 Examples of Sectorisation Sector Fire Sector Lobby Sector ‘Sector Model High Rise Fire Figure 2.5 (above) Socorais Sector Model building utilising Structure Fire vertical sectorisation. Sector 3 Sector 2 Sector 4 © Main Entrance» Fi 2.6 (right Sed Severson Sector 1 around a building. Incident Command 23Incident Commander ‘Sector Commander Junior Officer or Crew Commander Working Crew in R t t Sector Boundary Figure 27 Key forthe following diagrams. 24 Fire Service ManualFigure 2.8 [1 of 8] queplouy dung Z yoddng puewwoo fouog epeBig ¥ quapiouy dung y a M Jepuewwwod juapiou} yoddng puewwod yoquog apebug — JepueWED JUSPIOU 8 tae yee ¥ yy Incident Command 252.9 [2 of 8] Figure yuaprouy ding ¢ woddng puewwoo ssalg equos epebue, ‘SO0/L98 J0\YO PUP 201K0d Fire Service Manual 26Figure 2.10 (3 of 8] Incident Command 27Figure 2.11 [4 of 8] 28 Fire Service ManualFigure 2.12 [5 of 8} Incident Command 29Figure 2.13 [6 of 8] 30 Fire Service ManuatFigure 2.14 [7 of 8] JEpUeWIWIOD SdO YM quepiouy ding gz payee cc ¥) eg A ae vt . 7, Why 'y woes pusuon eae s 2029 sone a ae smn wang - ay En cispes | ¥ yty s vy vy vy > ve WY ye ayy ‘yay z 2023 Incident Command 31Figure 2.15 [8 of 8] ‘saopuewuios sdo nin jueprouy dung oy 32 Fire Service ManualIncident Command Chapter 3 Chapter 3 - Incident Risk Assessment ( Hazard \. Spotting / NZ | | | Son \ ~~ { Generate \ INCIDENT (Evaluate \ \ vers] RISK ASSESSMENT i / foo Control Risk}3.1 Health & Safety on the Incident Ground The principal consideration of the Incident Commander is the safety of all personnel. This must be established by assessing the hazards that are present and the possible risks to the health and safety of those at the scene and adopting appropri ate, safe systems of work The following summarises the philosophy of the fire service's approach to risk assessment: © Firefighters will take some risk to save saveable lives; © Firefighters will take a little risk to save saveable property; © Firefighters will not take any risk at all to try to save lives or property that are already lost. Regulation three of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, requires that brigades carry out suitable and sufficient risk assessments of the risks to which operational per- sonnel are exposed to. 34 Fire Service Manual The term “Dynamic Risk Assessment” is used to describe the continuing assessment of risk that is carried out in a rapidly changing environment. The key elements of any assessment of risk are: © Identification of the hazards; © Assessment of the risks associated with the hazards; © Identification of who is at risk; © The effective application of measures that control the risk. When considering what control measures to apply, the Incident and Sector Commanders need to maintain a balance between the safety of personnel and the operational needs of the incident. For example, whereas it may be considered appropriate to commit personnel into a hazardous environment for the purposes of saving life, it may be that pure- ly defensive tactics are employed in a similar situ- ation where there is no threat to life. The Incident Commander must ensure that safe practices are followed and that, so far as is reason- Figure 3.1ably practicable under the circumstances, risks are eliminated or, if not, reduced to the minimum com- ‘mensurate with the needs of the task. However, because personnel may be working in sectors or smaller teams, everyone must be constantly aware of their own safety as well as that of their col- leagues and others who may be affected by the incident or work activity. Therefore all personnel should as a matter of course continually risk assess their position 3.2. Dynamic Risk Assessment “Dynamic Risk Assessment” is a process of risk assessment carried out in a changing environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken. This is further complicated for the fire service commander in that, often, rescues have to be performed, expo- sures protected and stop jets placed before a com- plete appreciation of all material facts has been obtained. It is nevertheless essential that an effective risk assessment is carried out at any scene of opera- tions. However, in the circumstances of emergency incidents, it was less clear what methodology best served the need, Trials and experience have shown that it is impractical to expect the first arriving Incident Commander, in addition to the incident size-up and initial deployment and supervision of crews, to complete some kind of checklist or form. Also, it is important that the outcome of a risk assessment is recorded, preferably in a way that is “time stamped” for later retrieval and analysis, such as would be achieved by transmission over the main scheme radio. Although the dynamic management of risk is con- tinuous throughout the incident, the focus of oper- ational activity will change as the incident evolves. Itis, therefore, useful to consider the process dur- ing three separate stages of an incident © The Initial Stage © The Development Stage © The Closing Stage 3.3 Initial Stage of Incident ‘There are 6 steps to the initial assessment of risk: © Evaluate the situation, tasks and persons at tisk © Introduce and declare tactical mode © Select safe systems of work © Assess the chosen systems of work © Introduce additional control measures © Re-assess systems of work and additional control measures 3.3.1 Step 1: Evaluate the situation, tasks and persons at risk On the arrival of the initial attendance the Incident ‘Commander will need to gather information, eval- uate the situation and then apply professional judgement to decide the most appropriate course of action, Hazards must be identified and the risks to firefighters, the public and the environment considered. In order to identify hazards the Incident Commander will initially need to consider: © Operational intelligence information available from risk cards, fire safety plans ete. @ The nature of the tasks to be carried out © The hazards involved in carrying out the tasks © The risks involved to: m= firefighters, other emergency service personnel, the public, and the environment The resources that are available, e.g., experienced personnel, appliances and equipment, specialist advice Incident Command 353.3.2 Step 2: Introduce and declare tactical mode The declaration of a tactical mode, which is the simple expression of whether it is appropriate to proceed to work in a hazard area or not, is a device to enable commanders of dynamic emergency inci- dents to comply with the principles of risk assess- ‘ment and be seen to have done so. The detail of the process can be found in Section 3.5 of this chapter. However, in simple terms, after a rapid appraisal of the situation the Incident Commander will either be comfortable in announcing ‘offensive mode which is the most usual mode of operation, or not must announce ‘defensive mode’ until suffi cient additional information has been gathered, control measures taken, ete, and eventually allow ‘offensive’ to be declared. This approach is com- monly known as ‘Default to Defensive’. (See Section 3.5, Tactical Mode.) 3.3.3 Step 3: Select safe systems of work The Incident Commander will then need to review the options available in terms of standard proce- dures, Incident Commanders will need to consider the possible systems of work and choose the most appropriate for the situation, The starting point for consideration must be proce- dures that have been agreed in pre-planning and training and that personnel available at the incident have sufficient competence to carry out the tasks safely. 3.3.4 Step 4: Assess the chosen systems of work Once a course of action, be it offensive or defen- sive, has been identified Incident Commanders need to make a judgement as to whether or not the risks involved are proportional to the potential benefits of the outcome. If YES, proceed with the tasks after ensuring that: © Goals, both individual and team are understood. © Responsibilities have been clearly allocated, 36 Fire Service Manual © Safety measures and procedures are understood. INO then go back to step 3. 3.3.5 Step 5: Introduce additional control measures Incident commanders will need to eliminate, or reduce, any remaining risks to an acceptable level, if possible, by introducing additional control me: sures, such as: © Use of Personnel Protective Equipment eg, safety glasses, safety harnesses @ Use of BA © Use of specialist equipment eg. HP, TL © Use of Safety Officer(s) 3.3.6 Step 6: Re-assess systems of work and additional control measures Even when safe systems of work are in place, there may well be residual risks. Where these risks remain, the Incident Commander should consider if the benefit gained from carrying out the tasks against the possible consequences if the risks are realised: © Ifthe benefits outweigh the risks, proceed with the tasks. © Ifthe risks outweigh the benefit do NOT proceed with the tasks, but consider viable alternatives 3.4 Development Stage of Incident Ifan incident develops to the extent that sectors are designated, the Incident Commander will delegate the supervisory role to Sector Commanders. They will be responsible for the health and safety of all personnel within their sector. Sector Commanders may feel that they can super- vise safety within their own sectors. Alternatively, afier consideration, the Sector Commander mayl namic Risk Assessment TACTICAL MODE |, Select Systems of Work Are the Risks Proportional to Evaluate the Situation J... . ssess systems of of hazard & li occurrence in response adopted. Identify Hazards ©.9. Chemicals, Collapse, Smoke Identify Who's at Risk e.g. Personnel, Public, etc. Evaluate Risks based on severity ikelinood of ‘Declare the appropriate Tactical Mode, OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, or TRANSITIONAL tothe HAZARD & RISK evaluated Choose & assess the optimum +] system(s) of work & tasks o be ‘Do not proceed with tasks, until you have considered viable alternatives. the Benefits? personnel. introduced process pri message Figure 3.2 Dynamic Risk Assessment flow chart incorporating Tactical Mode. Proceed with selected systems of ‘work once satisfied that itis beneficial to do 50 + +] Control operations, inciude all possible measures to protect ‘Consider whether further control ‘measures can/should be Monitor incident & review the or to sending the ‘next TACTICAL MODE update Incident Command 37feel it necessary to nominate a safety officer. This officer will be responsible to the Sector Commander. ‘As the incident develops changing circumstances ‘may make the original course of action inappropri- ate, for example: @ Fire fighting tactics may change from defensive to offensive. @ New hazards and their associated risks may arise e.g., the effects of fire on building stability © Existing hazards may present different risks. © Personnel may become fatigued. Both Incident and Sector Commanders, therefore, need to manage safety by constantly monitoring the situation and reviewing the effectiveness of existing control measures, 3.5 The Tactical Mode The Tactical Mode procedure assists the Incident ‘Commander to manage an incident effectively without compromising the health and safety of personnel by: © Ensuring that firefighting operations being carried out by a single crew, or sector, do not have adverse effects on the safety or effectiveness of firefighters in other crews or sectors. (For example, it will ensure that BA wearers inside a building are not subjected to an aerial monitor being opened up above them, or to the impact of a large jet through a window from another sector without warning). © Generating a record of the outcome of the dynamic risk assessment process conducted by the Incident Commander. On arrival at an emergency incident where imme- diate action is required, the Incident Commander will make an immediate judgement about whether it is safe to proceed with normal, offensive opera- 38 Fire Service Manual tions. Normally with usual procedures and control ‘measure in place it will be, so ‘offensive’ can be announced. If the Incident Commander feels it is not safe enough, defensive tactics should be used until a suitably safe approach to deal with the inci- dent can be decided upon. It is never acceptable not to be able to announce a tactical mode, if the Incident Commander is unsure, ‘defensive’ must be announced (i.e, Default to defensive). As soon as the Incident Commander is able, a review of the risk assessment should be conducted (see 3.11) The key to effective use of the Tactical Mode pro- cedure is speed of application. The process is founded on the psychology of naturalistic deci- sion-making, and specifically ‘recognition primed decision making’. More details about these theo- ries can be found in Appendix 3, but in application the principles are the same. There are three Tactical Modes: Offensive, Defensive, and Transitional. 3.5.1 Offensive This mode may apply to a sector, and/or the entire incident. This is where the operation is being tackled aggressively. The Incident Commander will have established that the potential benefits outweighs the identified risks, so the Incident Commander will be committing crews into a relatively haz~ ardous area, supported by appropriate equipment, procedures and training, ‘An offensive approach is appropriate when identified risks are managed by additional control measures (Risk Control); Elimination Isolation Substitution Control The correct level of PPE Appointing a “Safety Officer” Offensive Mode is the normal mode of operation used at, for example, house fires, road traffic acci- dents and industrial premises to fight the fire, effect rescues, or close down plant, ete.Examples © Committing BA crews to a smoke filled or toxic atmosphere to rescue persons or undertake firefighting action is an offensive action. © Committing crews to a structural collapse to undertake rescues is an offensive action. © Committing crews to an RTA rescue is an offensive action © = Committing a crew to fight a field fire is an offensive action. 3.5.2 Defensive ‘This mode may apply to a sector, and/or the entire incident. This is where the operation is being fought with a defensive approach. In defensive mode, the identi- fied risks outweighs the potential benefits, so no ‘matter how many additional control measures are put into place the risks are too great. In these circumstances the Incident Commander would announce Defensive Mode, fight the fire with ground monitor jets and aerial jets, and pro- tect exposure risks and adjoining property without committing crews into the hazard area. Examph © Withdrawing a crew from a hazardous area because the risk has increased is a defensive action. © Using jets outside a hazard area is a defensive action, © Standing by awaiting expert advice, before committing crews is a defensive action, © Standing by awaiting specialist equipment is a defensive action. © RTA: chemical tanker involved, the tanker is leaking a hazardous substance. No persons reported. Crews are standing by awaiting attendance of a specialist advisor and second tanker for decanting is a defensive action. 3.5.3 Transitional This mode is never applied to a sector, but only to the whole incident. Transitional should be declared where there is a combination of Offensive and Defensive modes in operation at the same incident, in two or more sec- tors. The main purpose of the announcement of “Transitional Mode’ is to keep commanders of sec- tors operating in defensive mode, using large jets and perhaps aerial monitors, aware that other per- sonnel on the incident ground may be operating in areas of risk, which could be affected by their ‘operations or tactics ‘An example of when a “Transitional Mode” would be adopted is: where a building fire being fought with the majority of sectors in Defensive Mode, has an annex that can be saved, safely, by using an Offensive Mode ie., by fighting the fire inside the annex. Here there may be, for example, three sec- tors in Defensive Mode and one in Offensive: the incident would be Transitional. Before allowing a sector to operate in ‘Offensive Mode’ at an otherwise ‘defensive’ incident, which will cause the incident to become transitional, the Incident Commander must be satisfied that the actions of one sector will not adversely affect the safety of crews in any other sector. 3.6 The Application of Tactical Mode ‘A Tactical Mode should be decided upon and announced at all working incidents. As the incident grows and the Incident Commander's span of con- trol increases, it is essential that all personnel are aware of the tactics on the incident ground and the prevailing Tactical Mode. The first verbal message and further messages to brigade control should include a confirmation of the Tactical Mode for the information of oncoming appliances and officers. Incident Command 39A typical Informative Message might be ‘Informative message from ADO Black at Green Street, Anytown; Factory premises, used for textile manufacturing, three floors, 20m x 20m. Ground and first floor well alight, three large jets in use, “WE ARE IN DEFENSIVE ‘DELTA MODE” (for easy of recognition over the radio, it has been found helpful to use the phonetic alphabet to suffix defensive ‘Delta’, or offensive “Oscar’), This should then be updated by informing brigade control of which mode the incident is in at frequent intervals 3.7. Adopting a Tactical Mode when Sectors are in use When the incident has been divided into sectors, the Incident Commander will retain responsibility for the Tactical Mode at all times. 40 Fire Service Manual Figure 3.3 There will be occasions when Sector Commanders wish to change the Tactical Mode in their sector from ‘offensive’ to “defensive” quickly. For exam- ple; they may detect signs of collapse or obtain information about some previously unknown dan- ger. In such circumstances, they must take the necessary action for the safety of the crews and then advise the Incident Commander of the devel- opments. However, if, the Sector Commander wishes to commit personnel internally in “Offensive Mode” when the prevailing mode is “Defensive”, the per- mission of the Incident Commander must be sought and no change made until itis granted, . The Incident Commander will assess whether the Tactical Mode can change to Offensive in that sec- tor, making the incident mode Transitional. This decision will be based on an understanding of the status of operations in all other sectors.Sector Commanders must be involved in any inter- vention by the Incident Commander to change the Tactical Mode. Sector Commanders may then implement the change effectively and ensure that personnel under their command are aware of the prevailing Tactical Mode. However, it is more usual for the initiative to change mode to come from the Sector Commander. 3.8 Responsibilities for Determining Tactical Mode 3.8.1 Incident Commander The Incident Commander should make an assess- ment of the incident.and decide which Tactical Mode will be appropriate. ‘Any message sent should include which Tactical Mode is in operation at the incident. This should be repeated at regular and frequent intervals up until the time that the ‘stop’ message is sent and at appropriately regular intervals thereafter. The Incident Commander should review and con- firm the Tactical Mode on initial and all subse- quent briefings to Crew and Sector Commanders. 3.8.2 Sector Commanders Sector Commanders should continually monitor conditions and operational priorities in the sector and ensure that the prevailing Tactical Mode con- tinues to be appropriate. They must immediately react to adverse changes, withdrawing personnel from risk areas without delay if necessary, and advise the Incident ‘Commander of the change in conditions as soon as possible thereafter. Ifthe Sector commander considers itis appropriate to change Tactical Mode he/she must seek the per- mission of the Incident Commander to do so. (Before giving this permission, the Incident Commander will determine the status of all other operational sectors to ensure that nothing is in progress, or planned, in the other sectors, which would compromise the safety of personnel com- mitted internally.) It is appropriate to consider appointing a sector safety officer or officers, either for specific areas of concer (¢.g,, structure stability, dangerous ter- rain, etc.) or for general support. Such safety offi- cers report direct to the Sector Commander, even if a “Safety Sector’ has been designated, but must liaise with members of Safety Sector at every “opportunity. It is essential to update the tactical mode to the crews working in the sector at a suitably frequent interval. 3.8.3. Crew Commanders All Crew Commanders should continually monitor conditions in the risk area and draw the attention of the Sector Commander to significant develop- ments, also react immediately to adverse changes and withdraw crew members from the risk area without delay where necessary. 3. Safety Sector (if operating) A safety sector may be established © To survey operational sectors, identifying hazards, and advise the Sector Commander as appropriate © Toliaise with sector safety officers, if appointed, to support and exchange infor- mation, © Toconfirm the validity of the initial risk assessment and record as appropriate © — Toact as an extra set of eyes and ears to the Sector Commanders in monitoring the safety of personnel. 3.9 Summary of the Procedure Arrive at incident Evaluate situation Carry out dynamic risk assessment and announce tactical mode Communicate tactical mode Commence operations Review tactical mode Incident Command 4]‘There are only three Tactical Modes ~ Offensive, Defensive, or Transitional. Sectors can only be Offensive or Defensive. ‘The incident can be Offensive, Defensive or, if combinations of these two are in use, it will be ‘Transitional. The Incident Commander must adopt a Tactical Mode when operations are in progress. When a Tactical Mode has been decided, the Incident Commander must ensure that everyone on the incident ground is aware of it. Confirmation of the prevailing Tactical Mode must be maintained between Sector and Crew ‘Commanders throughout the incident. 3.10 Examples of Application of Tactical Mode 3.10.1 Example 1 3-pump house fire. Ground floor well alight, per- sons reported, believed to be in a first floor bed- room. Large jet to work through a front window to knock down the fire on the ground floor. 2.BA teams committed from the rear door up stairs to search the first floor. Incident is not sectorised The incident is in Offensive Mode. Later ... Fire on the ground floor has been knocked down. BA team with hose reel enter ground floor to con- tinue fire fighting, ‘The incident is in Offensive Mode. 3.10.2 Example 2 2-pump RTA persons trapped. Crews are working on the vehicles to effect rescues. Incident is not sectorised. The incident is in Offensive Mode. 42 Fire Service Manual 3.10.3 Example 3 2-pump grass fire railway embankment involved. Any firefighting operations being conducted are from a safe distance. Crews standing by awaiting confirmation of caution passed to rail operator. No personnel have been committed to the embank- ment, No other operations are under way. Incident is not sectorised. The incident is in Defensive Mode. Later... Caution has been confirmed and lookouts are in place. Crews are working on the embankment. The incident is in Offensive Mode. 3.10.4 Example 4 2-pump RTA chemical tanker involved, the tanker is leaking a hazardous substance. No persons reported. Road closed. Crews are standing by awaiting attendance of a specialist advisor and second tanker for decanting. Incident is in Defensive Mode. Later A crew has been committed in chemical protection suits to prevent the substance entering a drain. No operations at the crash scene. The incident is in Offensive Mode. 3.10.5 Example 5 5 pump retail unit fire in a covered shopping mall. The retail unit is heavily involved in fire, all per- sons are accounted for. Smoke is issuing from the front of the unit into the shopping mall but is being contained and vented from a large atrium roof space. The smoke level is several metres above the ‘mall floor and is stable. Operations in the mall are taking place in relatively fresh air and within easy reach of final exits. The back of the unit is outside the mall. Smoke is issuing from the unit's roof and from an open loading bay.Figure 3.4 '€ 101088 epIs 14BU pur Jee! ur ‘| 401096 opis Yel PUB UY, ou :Pesuoyoes useg Sey IUSPIOUI UL “episino e1j Woy ouy oun YOY 0} pew ueeq sey UOIs}oep ey. ONISUB}OQ,, S| POW [LOND OL Jepuewuiog e0pes @pow ensuayeq ¥ yy ¥ e2uequa UPA JepueUW0 Luopes epow ensuayeq € Joe apoywy eAlsuajaq Incident Command 43Figure 3.5 “Bulpjing urew ay) UL} SeMIAROe BunyBy aay 294}0 10 aay JO SyeYe o4y WOY ¥SU IE OQ. 10u nm swnai2 au Bupa eu jo-ued oyoods © suowezedo reurew ayeuepun 0} epuEUALOD € 0126S esuouine $y JOPUEUILOD APU aU 8AOMOH “Bupina 24g opssinO ‘WOs, @1y 84) 1YBY 0} EPEW UBER SEY UOIS}DEP SY euORsuel S| pow OHI Bu poddng puewuies Fire Service Manual pow jeuonisues) 44Figure 3.6 Buipiing ayy eprsut Bunyiom sea} Butsn aay oug 1USy 0} epeui useg sey UoSDeP eu, JANSUAYJO, $1 9POUL e91!9E SUL, Jepuewwwod es0peas pow ensueyo € 100g Spo sAisusyHO 45 Incident CommandFigure 3.7 94) @pysul BupyOM aie | 10988 U! sma YBNOUNTY epow erisuejeq Bulpying se61e7 & uly eu jUoWPedWOD y 46 Fire Service ManualCrews are at work inside the mall with jets into the front of the retail unit, Crews are at work at the rear of the unit with jets through the loading bay. No crews have made an entry to the retail unit. The incident is in Defensive Mode. As a general guide in these circumstances, if con- ditions within a large building allow a sector or incident commander and associated staff to work within the building, then the risk assessments should be made on the basis of specific areas or compartments within the building rather than the whole building. Commanders and support staff should always work from an area of relative safety, so only crews committed beyond that area into a more hazardous environment could be considered as being committed offensively (Figure 3.7). This is very similar to the principle of using a “bridgehead” two floor below the fire floor of a multi-storey building for rigging and committing breathing apparatus wearers. 3.10.6 Example 6 Fire in multi-occupancy, single story range of premises. Crews in sector | are fighting a severe fire in a storage unit with two large jets and an aer- ial monitor, therefore in defensive mode. Crews in sector 2 and 4 (sector 3 is not in use) are conduct- ing salvage operations in adjoining retail units using BA and are in offensive mode. The incident is in Transitional Mode. 3.11 Confirming the Risk Assessment Phase Having carried out the dynamic risk assessment and established a tactical mode, the Incident Commander will be aware of the immediate haz- ards, the people at risk and the contro! methods necessary to protect those people. Due to the changing nature of the environment at an incident, the Incident Commander must ensure that as soon as resources permit, a more analytical form of risk assessment is carried out and, when necessary, new control measures implemented whenever the hazard or degree of risk demands it The outcome of the review of the risk assessment will either confirm that the dynamic risk assess- ‘ment and chosen tactical mode was correct, or will result in a change of mode with the appropriate announcements and action occurring without delay. At incidents that do not require sectorisation, responsibility for the completion of the analytical review of the risk assessment lies with the Incident Commander or any assistant if delegated. At incidents that do require sectorisation, the responsibility for the risk assessment may be dele- gated to the Sector Commanders, who may in turn delegate to a deputy, as each sector is required to be assessed. The review of the risk assessment should be com- pleted at every incident as soon as practicable and reviewed when necessary. Any form used should bbe amended accordingly at the time of each review. For incidents where a formal debrief may take place, the results of the risk assessment should be submitted to the Incident Commander for use at the debrief. ‘An example of a procedure used by one brigade to conduct a review and record the outcome of the risk assessment is shown in Appendix 1 3.12 Safety Responsibilities of Personnel at Incidents All personnel on the incident ground MUST wear the personal protective equipment that has been provided. This standard may only be varied by the Incident Commander, having considered the health and safety of all personnel and having taken all reason- able and practicable steps to minimise risks. All personne! must be trained in the procedures to be used at operational incidents and must be alert to the ever-changing environment at the scene of operations and the consequences of exposure to hazardous substances, Incident Command 47All personnel must be certain that they clearly understand the tasks that they are required to per- form and must follow the instructions of the offi- cer responsible for their area of work. 3.13 Safe Systems of Work - General Operational procedures and practices are designed to promote safe operating systems (safe systems of work). To minimise the risk of injury Incident! Sector Commanders must ensure that recognised safe systems of work are being used so far as is reasonable and practicable. Where possible, operational crews should work together in teams. Whenever practicable the teams should be made up of people who are familiar with each other and have trained together. When necessary, safety briefings must be carried out and, as the incident develops, or where the risks of injury increase, those briefings must be more precise and appropriate precautions deployed, 3.14 Summary of the Safety Function Identify safety issues. Initiate corrective action. Maintain safe systems of work. Ensure all personnel are wearing appropriate personal protection equipment. Observe the environment. Monitor physical condition of personnel. Regularly review. Sector Commanders or nominated Safety Officers should update the Incident ‘Commander of any changing circumstances. 48 Fire Service Manual Further Reading Fire Service Guides to Risk Assessment Volume 1 - A Guide for Senior Officers ISBN 0 11 341218 5 Volume 2—A Guide for Fire Service Managers ISBN 0 11 3412193, ‘Volume 3 — A Guide To Operational Risk Assessment ISBN 0 11 3412207Incident Command | Chapter 4 Chapter 4 - Competence in Incident Command [oem IN | INCIDENT se MMAND YL \ nt Incident Command 494.1 Introduction Incident Command is a key function for all opera- tional managers. This chapter identifies what Incident Commanders must do to demonstrate competence. Information within this Manual gives guidance on good practice in the context of incident command. It will not, on its own enable an individual to acquire all the knowledge and understanding required to become a competent incident comman- der. The definition of competence is: “The ability to consistently achieve the stated out- comes of workplace performance within an indi- vidual’s role as defined by the Fire Service National Occupational Standards” When developing and assessing the competence of incident commanders, the following must be taken into account: © Integrated Personal Development System © National Occupational Standards © National Development Modules 4.2. Integrated Personal Development System The Integrated Personal Development System is the system approved by Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council (CBAC) for the Fire Service to develop its people. Incident commanders must be developed in line with the requirements of the system, 4.3 National Occupational Standards National Occupational Standards specify the expected standards of people's performance in the Emergency Fire Services. One of the key functions of the standards is incident management. For each of the following roles, National Occupational Standards are being developed: 50 Fire Service Manual © Crew Commander @ = Watch Commander © Station Commander © Group Commander @ Area Commander © Brigade Commander The standards are used to: (a) identify the expected standards of performance of incident commanders (b) develop people to become incident commanders (©) measure the performance of incident ‘commanders National Occupational Standards have three com- ponent parts. The parts are: @ ELEMENTS, which identify the different activities of Incident Command @ PERFORMANCE CRITERIA, which are outcome statements that identify what the Incident Commander is required to achieve during the incident @ KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTAND- ING, which the Incident Commander will need to apply at incidents 4.3.1 Worked Example of a National Occupational Standard for Incident Management For incident management, National Occupational Standards require Crew Commanders and Watch Commanders to perform to the same standard, The standard is “Lead and support people to resolve operational incidents”. (Refer to the National Occupational Standards for Watch Management.)Figure 4.1 43.2 Lead and support people to resolve incidents There are four stages (Elements) to “Lead and support people to resolve operational incidents” They are: © Plan action to meet the needs of the incident © Implement action to meet planned objectives © Close down the operational phase of incidents, © Debrief people following incidents 4.3.3 Key words and concepts At the beginning of the Standard for “Lead and support people to resolve operational incidents”, guidance is provided on the meaning of some of the words and concepts used in the Performance Criteria Incident Command 514.3.4 Performance Criteria During each of the four activities of an incident, the Incident Commander is required to take identi- fied actions, When incident commanders are assessed, their performance should match the requirements of these standards. 4.3.5 Knowledge and Understanding To enable Incident Commanders to perform com- petently to the required standards, they need to have the relevant knowledge and understanding to support their actions. Every action that the Incident Commander makes has knowledge and understanding linked to it When considering the above statements (Performance Criteria) Incident Commanders must take into account the relevant knowledge and understanding that is needed for them to perform competently at different incidents. Knowledge and understanding relevant to the different activities of the incident, is identified within each of the four elements of “Lead and sup- port people to resolve operational incidents”. Specific information required for different inci- dents will vary depending of the nature and cit- cumstances of the incident. As the incident progresses, incident commanders ‘must apply all of the knowledge and understanding that is relevant to each of their actions. 4.4 National Development Modules To support the Integrated Personal Development System and to give further guidance about how incident commanders should be developed, three Development Modules have been produced: @ Incident Command ~ Planning and Management © Incident Command ~ 2 Tactical (Incident tactical planning) © Incident Command — Support (Management of incident resources) 52 Fire Service Manual Using Development Modules will enable people to meet the requirements of the National Occupational Standards. 4.5 Initial Development It is not usually practical to try to assess the com- petence of an incident commander at an ongoing live incident. In order to provide additional opportunities to attain experience of incident command, there will be a need to develop simulated operational scenar- ios using a variety of training aids and methods. Examples may include: © realistic training scenarios © exposure at incidents commanded by others, taking full advantage of debrief © table top exercises @ role play © case study Individuals should ideally be able to demonstrate competence in all risk critical areas of their responsibility before assuming the role as an Incident Commander.Incident Command | Appendices Appendices AL An Example of West Yorkshire Fire Service’s Fire Ground Risk Assessment Process to Confirm Tactical Mode. ‘A2 Roles of the other Emergency Services i A3__ The Psychology of Command A4 Legal Considerations in Command & Control: Legislative Requirements AS Incident Command System: Further | examples of Application Incident Command — 53APPENDIX 1 An Example of West Yorkshire Fire Service’s Fire Ground Risk Assessment Process to Confirm Tactical Mode A 1.1 Introductio {As part of the risk assessment process at a dynam- ic emergency incident, it is essential that the ‘dynamic risk assessment and subsequent tactical mode are re-assessed/reviewed. The following provides details of the procedure that is applied in West Yorkshire Fire Service (See Chapter 3, ‘Dynamic Risk Assessment” in main text) to achieve this objective. A12 Analytical Risk Assessment Procedure For the purposes of this procedure, ‘Analytical Risk Assessment’ includes the following elements: A formalised assessment of the hazards, who or ‘what is at risk from those hazards, the likelihood and severity of risk. ‘An assessment of existing control measures with additional control measures introduced as appro- priate, Confirmation that the dynamic risk assessment and tactical mode was correct. As can be seen in diagram A 1/1 (below) it is a tool used on the incident ground. However it also can be used to feed relevant information from the inci- dent ground, via the incident debrief, back into the risk assessment process at the systematic level, Thereby confirming or amending the brigades “Generic Risk Assessment’ or the ‘Standard Operational Procedures’. Each West Yorkshire pumping appliance carries a command support pack, containing a set of stan- dard aid-memoirs and analytical risk assessment form, This pack is used to assist in the completion of the process. Standard Operating Procedures Figure I/1 Risk Management 54 Fire Service ManualAPPENDIX 1 AL.2.1 The Analytical Process The following is a guide to completing a ‘Conformation of Dynamic Risk ‘Assessment’ form. See page 57 for the complete form. 1. Commence each risk assessment form for the incident by completing standard information: Address Is the assessment for an incident of for a sector Date and time Current Tactical Mode 2. Use a hazard-spotting chart to identify the hazards. Treat each hazard separate- ly; decide who is at risk and list the control measures in place. aaiagcoatel meaner 1 Seer iad oT ae Cer Sy Ea 3. Use the eight-point grid to decide the SEVERITY and the LIKELIHOOD asso- ciated to each hazard. Multiply the severity and likelihood scores together and enter the total to calculate the risk rating; "e.g. tolerable, moderate, high, very high. ——_ Severty Rating (6) ‘Laeiood Rating) 2 Rit rida) 2 enmirwal mtocew 3 Meera p03 cee ene) 3 Mayas Moe ey 4 aay 5 Seewinjey Cre monavewenn) 5 at & SSkuy Goaswansioned — & Vaytkay Bea 1 Pet wit cae ee eats a Nae s{i]q Existing control measures ta} ra} S| baws fully briefed of hazard 7[4 ws fully briefed of hazard 7/4 Kerestraint iause Incident Command 55APPENDIX 1 4, Enter the total and the risk rating, Decide if existing control measures are adequate. If the answer is NO, list the contro! measures needed to reduce the risk. eases Sy E | Toit | asa | Senet ENO, Lit contol meanres 8) ia] sa || Se seeded o reduce rik Se [Fined TYE) LH] No | Sikeiy Ofer pointed | | Rescced aren stop and sepervand [Fad TYE) || Wo | Satay Oca pointed Restricted area setup and supervised 2 a When completed the form must be taken to the Command Unit for the Incident Commander to approve and put any recommendation in place, or to the Sector Commander if one is in place for approval and action prior to submitting to the Incident Commander. Repeat assessment and confirm Tactical Mode As the incident progresses new hazards may appear Therefore the risk has been reduced to an acceptable level START In our example (wall collapse) additional control measures will have been added The severity remains the same but the likelihood has been reduced Figure showing Analytical Risk Assessment Process 56 Fire Service ManualAPPENDIX 1 ‘pounbal uoRDe eIDeULIL| pauibas suoNse JOU) sone — foppeysnesun ~ Aiojaejsnes Aqeuoseoy, = vonoe soupy on | SIE HOIH 62-02 alvu3GON 61-01 agvusI01 6-1 z 4 |(s) 21200 WMA ‘suieep arsniniy © rz | A {000 Hm AoC ‘aeeq 9 eta. 9 Quowe;gesip jueuewed) Ainful snoveg 2 rit 3 or re} u ® zh o|3 £ LIA z Sk 2] 4 t t zlelrvristelzlefxls (1) Buney pooyre9!7 (s) Buney Auenes dOoHMayT (Gonna, yeaus sjsedes uo enuwoo) | PRSTISGS BIE GN 765 Care POISE | Beqwodde somo hajeg nH |e | > | 2 | prreusopeieva din snaio| 14] axdai0o ven 83 ysusonpa! wey | PS | er ys e ©) pepeau sounseous 1U00 9871 'ONJI evo | 7 seinseou joquco bursa | SIoum) —— smuezeH eu areq = “ETT WG JO WOpIoUy = JUALUSSOSSY YSTY [EIA ApEUY — punosy waproWT AayHs puw MPH — aDLAIIG DALY DANYSYAOA ISDA Log JuoWISsaSsY YsRI RON KeMY Jo aduexg 57 Incident Commandaumeubig, sequin Jepuewwog sopeghuepiout ON/SHA &LOAMYOD IGOW TVOLLOVL GAL SI ‘eunjeusig sequin, ‘fq payeydwoo wos “suoraas sayso ayy sof parajdwos u2aq aavy susof moussasso ysys ayosndag ‘apou pwanam ayi fo asvmn o4p punoad auyf ay uo jounossad 11°31 N@MVL NOLLOV / NV'Td / SALON APPENDIX 1 Fire Service Manual 58APPEN The roles detailed below reflect national guidance and are generally accepted by most services. There ‘may be some local variations and where this occurs all services should be aware of them. E.g., in Scotland, police do not formally use the ‘Gold’, ver’ and ‘’Bronze system of command and con- trol, For further notes on inter-service command and liaison matters refer to para 1.2.7 in the main text. A2.1 Role of the Police at an Incident The Police have their own policies and procedures for operational command The primary areas of Police responsibility, when attending an incident, can be summarised as fol- lows: © The saving of life in conjunction with other cemengency services. © Co-ordination of the emergency services and other subsidiary organisations. © The protection and preservation of the scene © The investigation of the incident, in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable. © The collation and dissemination of casualty information. © Identification of victims on behalf of the Coroner who is the principal investigator when fatalities are involved. © The restoration of normality at the earliest opportunity. While the Police have the overall co-ordinating role, itis important to note that no single organisa~ tion has the sole responsibility for ‘Command’ at a large or major incident. The Fire Service will be expected to exercise some control over other emer- gency services within the hazard zone at incidents involving fire, rescue and hazardous materials. At incidents other than fire, the police role is IX 2 — Roles of the other Emergency Services Figure A 2/1 primarily one of co-ordination and facilitation of the overall situation. In such circumstances, the police will co-ordinate the response of the emer- gency services and facilitate the mobilisation and access of resources to the incident site. Where the Fire Service responds to a hazardous area to under- take its rescue role, they will normally set up and maintain an inner cordon and take charge of oper- ations inside it Where it is appropriate and safe to do so, the police may take over control of access. This should be achieved by mutual agreement at the time, with a clear briefing and acknowledged handover of responsibility. The police may establish an inner cordon with different boundaries for a different purpose, e.g., for investigative purposes. The police will normally be responsible for the setting up and maintaining an outer cordon, A2.2 Police Incident Command Structure Dependent on the size and location of the incident, three levels of police command may be imple- ‘mented, 2.3 Police Forward Control Point (Bronze or Operations Command) Normally the first control to be established, or the nearest to the scene of the incident and responsible for immediate deployment and security. Initially under the command of the Police Incident Officer, Incident Command 59APPENDIX 2 the functions of the Forward Control Point may vary considerably dependent upon the type of inci- dent, setting up arrangements and location of the Incident Control Post. Initially, the first police vehicle at the scene will serve as the Forward Control Point/Incident Control Post with the first officer on the scene acting as Incident Officer. His/her initial responsibility is to assume interim command, assess the situation and inform police control; but should not get involved in rescue work. Where possible, all emergency service forward controls should be sited adjacent to one another but the fire service may influence their location in the interests of safety. A2.4 Police Incident Control Post (Silver or Tactical Command) If the size and/or nature of the incident requires it, a separate Police Incident Control Post will be set up to, co-ordinate and manage the response to the incident at the tactical level, providing a central point of contact for all emergency and specialist services. The Police Incident Control Post will be the responsibility of a co-ordinator and also under the command of the Police Incident Officer who will be senior in rank to the police officer initially having assumed command. A2.5 Police Major Incident Control Room (Gold or Strategic Command) The need for such a control is very much depen- dent on the size and scope of the incident. In some cases, even though there may be a number of casu- alties, all aspects of the operation can be co-ordi- nated through the Incident Control Post. However, ith large scale/protracted incidents, a Major Incident Room (Gold) may be established to co- ordinate the multi-agency response at the strategic level. In summary: © Police Gold is the overall Incident Commander located at the Major Incident Control room. 60 Fire Service Manual © Police Silver is the incident officer, located at the incident control post. © Police Bronze is the sector commander(s) located at the forward control points). A2.6 Role of the Ambulance Service at an Incident The primary areas of Ambulance Service responsibility, when attending an incident, can be summarised as follows: © Provide a focal point at the incident, through an Ambulance Control Point, for all medical resources. © The saving of life, in conjunction with other Emergency Services. © The treatment and care of those injured at the scene, either directly or in conjunetion with other medical personnel. © Either directly, or in conjunetion with ‘medical personnel, determine the priority evacuation needs of those injured. (Triage) © Determine the main Receiving and Supporting hospitals for the receipt of those injured. @ Arrange and ensure the most appropriate ‘means of transporting those injured to the Receiving or Supporting hospitals. © Ensuring that adequate medical staff and support equipment resources are available at the scene. © The provision of communications facilities for National Health Service resources at the © The restoration to normality at the earliest possible opportunityA2.7_ Ambulance Service Incident Command Structure The Ambulance Service, like the Police, employ a three tier approach to Incident Command; these tiers are known as Gold, Silver and Bronze, although the role of Gold Command differs slight- ly from that of the Police. A28 Ambulance Forward Control Point (Bronze Command) Normally the first control to be established, or the nearest to the scene, where the Incident Officer/Forward Incident Officer can direct the operation with mobile communications. The Forward Control will also act as a focal point for the NHS/Medical resources at the initial point of patient contact on the scene. There may be a requirement for more than one Forward Control, which will be sited outside the Inner Cordon. The access of Ambulance staff to the Inner Cordon will be controlled by the Fire Service. A2.9 Ambulance Control Point (Silver Command) ‘An emergency control vehicle, readily identified by a green flashing light, providing an on-site com- ‘munications facility, which may be distant from the incident. It is to this location that all NHS/Medical resources should report and from where the Incident Officer will operate. Ideally this point should be in close proximity to the Police and Fire Service Control vehicles, subject to radio interference constraints. 2.10 Ambulance Control Management (Gold Command) The Ambulance Control Management Officer should not be involved directly with the controlling of the Ambulance Service resources but rather have a listening brief, providing an overview of how the incident is progressing. Through this mon- itoring, he/she will provide a valuable backup to the Ambulance Incident Officer, highlighting any likely problem areas and taking account of the implications for normal day to day operations. APPENDIX 2 He/she should be responsive to the needs of the Ambulance Incident Officer at the scene. In summary: © Ambulance Gold is the ambulance control ‘management officer. © Ambulance Silver is the incident officer located at the ambulance control point. @ = Ambulance Bronze is the forward incident officer located at the forward control point. Incident Command 61APPENDIX 3 - The Psychology of Command The psychology of command is beginning to emerge as a distinct research topic for psycholo- gists interested in selection, training, competence assessment, decision making, stress management, leadership and team working. The following overview of recent research into decision making, stress and leadership is based on Flin (1996) which gives a more detailed examination of these issues. A3.1 Decision Making The decision making skill of the Incident Commander is one of the essential components of effective command and control in emergency response. Despite the importance of high speed decision making in the fire service and a number of other occupations, it has only been very recent- ly that research psychologists have begun to inves- tigate leaders’ decision making in demanding, time-pressured situations. The traditional decision-making literature from management, statistics and economics is very extensive but it offers little of relevance to the Incident Commander, as it tends to be derived from studies of specified problems (often artificial in nature), inexperienced decision makers and low stake payoffs. Moreover, it is rarely concerned with ambiguous, dynamic situations, life threatening odds, or high time pressure, all important features ofa fire or rescue environment. If we tum to the standard psychological literature on decision-making it tells us almost nothing of emergency decision making, as so much of it is based on undergraduates performing trivial tasks in laboratories. Similarly, the management research is concerned with individuals making strategic decisions when they have several hours or days to think about the options, carefully evaluat- ing each one in turn against their business objec- tives using decision analysis methods. These pro- vide a range of explanatory frameworks, which may have value for managers’ decision making where they are encouraged to emulate an analytical style of decision making, AC its simplest form this usually incorporates the following stages. (1) Identify the problem. 62 Fire Service Manual (2) Generate a set of options for solving the problem/choice alternatives. (3) Evaluate these options concurrently using, one of a number of strategies, such as weighting and comparing the relevant fea- tures of the options. (4) Choose and implement the preferred option. In theory, this type of approach should allow you to make the ‘best’ decision, provided that you have the mental energy, unlimited time and all the rele- vant information to carry out the decision analysis. This is typically the method of decision-making in which managers are trained. But we know from our everyday experience that when we are in a familiar situation, we take many decisions almost automatically on the basis of our experience. We do not consciously generate and evaluate options; wwe simply know the right thing to do. This may be called intuition or ‘gut feel” but, in fact, to achieve these judgements some very sophisticated mental activity is taking place. So we can compare these two basic types of decision-making, the slower but more analytic comparison and the faster, intuitive judgement. Which style do commanders use when deciding what to do at the scene of an incident? A3.2_ Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) In the last ten years there has been a growing inter- est by applied psychologists into naturalistic deci- sion making (NDM) which takes place in complex real world settings (Klein et al, 1993; Zsambok & Klein, 1997; Flin et al, 1997), These researchers typically study experts’ decision making in dynamic environments such as flight decks, mili- tary operations, firegrounds, hospital trauma cen- tres/intensive care units and high hazard industries, for example nuclear plant control rooms. This NDM research has enormous significance for the understanding of how commanders and their teams make decisions at the scene of an incident as it offers descriptions of what expert commanders actually do when taking operational decisions in emergencies:Ten factors characterize decision making in natu- ralistic settings: (1) Il defined goals and ill structured tasks. (2) Uncertainty, ambiguity and missing data, (3) Shifting and competing goals. (4) Dynamic and continually changing conditions, (5) Action feedback loops (real-time reactions to changed conditions). (6) Time stress. (7) High Stakes. (8) Multiple players (team factors). (9) Organizational goals and norms. (10) Experienced decision makers In typical NDM environments information comes from many sources, is often incomplete, can be ambiguous, and is prone to rapid change. In an emergency, the Incident Commander and her or his team are working in a high stress, high risk, time pressured setting and the lives of those affected by the emergency, (including their own fire rescue personnel) may be dependent on their decisions. How then do they decide the correct courses of action? In the view of the NDM researchers, tradi- tional, normative models of decision making which focus on the process of option generation and simultaneous evaluation to choose a course of action do not frequently apply in NDM settings. There are a number of slightly different theoretical approaches within the NDM fraternity to studying decision making but they all share an interest in dynamic high pressure domains where experts are aiming for satisfactory rather than optimal deci- sions due to time and risk constraints. APPENDIX 3 3.3 Recognition-Primed Decision Making (RPD) Dr Gary Klein of Klein Associates, Ohio, conducts research into decision making by attempting to “get inside the head’ of decision makers operating in many different domains, Klein’s approach stemmed from his dissatisfaction with the applica- bility of traditional models of decision making to real life situations, particularly when the decisions could be lifesaving. He was interested in opera- tional environments where experienced decision makers had to determine a course of action under conditions of high stakes, time pressures, dynamic settings, uncertainty, ambiguous information and multiple players. Kilein’s research began with a study of urban fire- ground commanders who had to make decisions such as whether to initiate search and rescue, whether to begin an offensive attack or concentrate on defensive precautions and how to deploy their resources (Klein et al, 1986). They found that the fireground commanders’ accounts of their decision ‘making did not fit in to any conventional decision- tree framework. ‘The fire ground commanders argued that they were not ‘making choices’, ‘considering alterna- tives’, or ‘assessing probabilities . They saw them- selves as acting and reacting on the basis of prior experience; they were generating, monitoring, and modifying plans to meet the needs of the situations. Rarely did the fire ground commanders contrast ‘even two options. We could see no way in which the concept of optimal choice might be applied Moreover it appeared that a search for an optimal choice could stall the fire ground commanders long enough to lose control of the operation alto- gether: The fire ground commanders were more interested in finding actions that were workable, timely, and cost-effective.” (Klein et al, 1993, p39) During post-incident interviews, they found that the commanders could describe other possible courses of action but they maintained that during the incident they had not spent any time deliberat- ing about the advantages or disadvantages of these different options. 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