ST2187 Block 1
ST2187 Block 1
modelling
There is an introduction video on the VLE, you can access it here:
https://emfssvideo.s3.amazonaws.com/MT%26ST/ST2187/ST2187_Block1_Intro.mp4
We begin the course by considering decision-making under uncertainty. Decisions are taken in the
present with uncertain future outcomes. In business, decision-making is problematic precisely because
the outcomes of decisions are unknown at the time the decision is made. To assist us, we construct
models to simplify the (complex) real world, hopefully retaining the most important aspects of reality
such that we do not depart from reality too much.
After completing this block, you should be able to:
describe how decisions taken in the present have uncertain future outcomes
discuss the features of a good model, in that it achieves maximum simplicity while retaining
maximum realism
explain how models typically have simplifying assumptions and appreciate the importance of
the validity of assumption.
Readings
Albright, S and Winston, W.L, Business Analytics Data Analysis & Decision Making, (Cengage
Learning, 2017) 6th edition [ISBN 9781305947542] Chapter 1.
Bayesian updating
We now solve probabilistically the Monty Hall problem.
Suppose the three doors are labelled A, B and C. Let us define the following events.
DA, DB, DC: the prize is behind Door A, B and C, respectively.
MA, MB, MC: Monty opens Door A, B and C, respectively.
Suppose you choose Door A first, and then Monty opens Door B (the answer works the same way for
all combinations of these). So Doors A and C remain unopened.
What we want to know now are the conditional probabilities P(DA | MB) and P(DC | MB).
You should switch doors if P(DC | MB) > P(DA | MB), and stick with your original choice otherwise.
(You would be indifferent about switching if it was the case that P(DA | MB) = P(DC | MB).)
Suppose that you first choose Door A, and then Monty opens Door B. Bayes’ theorem tells us that:
𝑃(𝑀𝐵 |𝐷𝐶 ) 𝑃(𝐷𝐶 )
𝑃(𝐷𝐶 |𝑀𝐵 ) = .
𝑃(𝑀𝐵 |𝐷𝐴 ) 𝑃(𝐷𝐴 ) + 𝑃(𝑀𝐵 |𝐷𝐵 ) 𝑃(𝐷𝐵 ) + 𝑃(𝑀𝐵 |𝐷𝐶 ) 𝑃 (𝐷𝐶 )
We can assign values to each of these.
The prize is initially equally likely to be behind any of the doors. Therefore, we have
P(DA)=P(DB)=P(DC) = 1/3.
If the prize is behind Door A (which you choose), Monty chooses at random between the two
remaining doors, i.e. Doors B and C. Hence P (MB|DA) = 1/2.
If the prize is behind one of the two doors you did not choose, Monty cannot open that door,
and must open the other one. Hence P (MB | DC) = 1 and P (MB | DB) = 0.
Putting these probabilities into the formula gives:
1
1 ×3
𝑃(𝐷𝐶 |𝑀𝐵 ) = = 2/3
1 1 1 1
×
2 3 + 0 × 3 + 1 × 3
and hence P(DA | MB) = 1 − P(DC | MB) = 1/3 (because also P(MB | DB) = 0 and so P(DB | MB) = 0).
The same calculation applies to every combination of your first choice and Monty’s choice.
Therefore, you will always double your probability of winning the prize if you switch from your
original choice to the door that Monty did not open.
The Monty Hall problem has been called a ‘cognitive illusion’, because something about it seems to
mislead most people’s intuition. In experiments, around 85% of people tend to get the answer wrong
at first. The most common incorrect response is that the probabilities of the remaining doors after
Monty’s choice are both 1/2, so that you should not (or rather need not) switch.
This is typically based on ‘no new information’ reasoning. Since we know in advance that
Monty will open one door with a goat behind it, the fact that he does so appears to tell us nothing new
and should not cause us to favour either of the two remaining doors - hence a probability of 1/2 for
each (people see only two possible doors after Monty’s action and implicitly apply ‘classical’
probability by assuming each door is equally likely to reveal the prize).
It is true that Monty’s choice tells you nothing new about the probability of your original choice,
which remains at 1/3. However, it tells us a lot about the other two doors. First, it tells us everything
about the door he chose, namely that it does not contain the prize. Second, all of the probability of that
door gets ‘inherited’ by the door neither you nor Monty chose, which now has the probability 2/3.
So, the moral of the story is to switch! Note here we are using updated probabilities to form
a strategy - it is sensible to ‘play to the probabilities’ and choose as your course of action that which
gives you the greatest chance of success (in this case you double your chance of winning by switching
door). Of course, just because you pursue a course of action with the most likely chance of
success does not guarantee you success!
If you play the Monty Hall problem (and let us assume you switch to the unopened door), you
can expect to win with a probability of 2/3, i.e. you would win 2/3 of the time on average. In any
single play of the game, you are either lucky or unlucky in winning the prize. So you may switch and
end up losing (and then think you applied the wrong strategy - hindsight is a wonderful thing!) but in
the long run you can expect to win twice as often as you lose, such that in the long run you are better
off by switching!
If you feel like playing the Monty Hall game again, I recommend visiting this site.
In particular, note how at the end of the game it shows the percentage of winners based on multiple
participants’ results. Taking the view that in the long run you should win approximately 2/3 of the
time from switching door, and approximately 1/3 of the time by not switching, observe how the
percentages of winners tend to 66.7% and 33.3%, respectively, based on a large sample size. Indeed,
in statistical inference as the sample size increases we tend to get a more representative (random)
sample of the population. Here, this equates to the sample proportions of wins converging to
their theoretical probabilities.
Note also the site has an alternative version of the game where Monty does not know where the sports
car is! Good luck!
The normal distribution is frequently-used in models. One example is that financial returns on assets
are often assumed to be normally distributed.
Under this assumption of normality, the probability of returns being within three standard deviations
of the mean is approximately 99.7%. This means that the probability of returns being more than three
standard deviations from the mean is approximately 0.3%. (In the graph above, the mean is 0 and the
standard deviation is 1, so ‘mean ±± 3 standard deviations’ equates to the interval [−3,3][−3,3]. This
means that 99.7% of the total area under the curve is between −−3 and 3.)
Assuming market returns follow a normal distribution is fundamental to many models in finance, for
example Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory and the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model.
However, this assumption does not typically reflect actual observed market returns and ‘tail events’,
i.e. black swan events (which recall are low-probability, high-impact events), tend to occur more
frequently than a normal distribution would predict!
For now, the moral of the story is to beware assumptions - if you make a wrong or invalid
assumption, then decisions you make in good faith may lead to outcomes far from what you expected.
As an example, the subprime mortgage market in the United States assumed house prices would only
ever increase…… but what goes up usually comes down at some point!
Computing requirements of the course