Rivera v. People, 462 SCRA 350 (2005)
Rivera v. People, 462 SCRA 350 (2005)
Rivera v. People, 462 SCRA 350 (2005)
DECISION
GARCIA, J : p
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review oncertiorari
are the October 16, 1998 decision 1 and April 5, 1999 resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17284, which respectively affirmed in toto an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet convicting herein
petitioner Enrique "Totoy" Rivera of the crime of direct assault, and denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Contrary to law.
Not long after, SPO1 Jose Bangcado and SPO1 Rivera Dayap,
members of the La Trinidad Police under Inspector Leygo were
conducting patrol aboard a police car somewhere at Km. 6, La Trinidad,
Benguet when they observed a truck loaded with chicken dung
proceeding towards Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet. Having in mind the
instructions of La Trinidad Mayor Edna C. Tabanda and their
Commanding Officer Inspector Leygo to Implement Ordinance No. I-91,
the two policemen followed and stopped the truck at Cruz, La Trinidad,
Benguet. Immediately they called Inspector Leygo on the radio and
informed him that they stopped a truck carrying chicken dung.
Inspector Leygo ordered them to restrain the truck, as he would be
proceeding to the area.
Reproduced from the same decision of the appellate court, the defense's
version 5 runs:
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of March 20, 1993, while the
accused was at the Trading Post at Km. 5, La Trinidad, Benguet, the
driver reported to him that he was prevented by the police from
unloading chicken manure at Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet. The
accused reminded the driver that he should have brought the chicken
manure to Acop, Tublay, Benguet where dealers sell it when prevented
from unloading within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. As it
would be more expensive to return the chicken dung to Batangas
where it came from, the accused told the driver to bring the chicken
dung to Acop, Tublay, Benguet. The driver expressed his fear that the
police might stop him along the way and so the accused ordered the
driver to proceed and gave him the assurance that he (accused) would
follow later.
The truck then proceeded as instructed and the accused
following after a short while. Arriving at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, the
accused noticed that the truck was stopped at the side of the road
while a police vehicle and three policemen were across the road.
Thinking that the policemen were there trying to extort money from
the driver, the accused told the truck driver to proceed. The truck
driver complied and the accused tailed along. cAHDES
After weighing the parties' respective versions of the incident, the trial
court found that of the People more credible. Accordingly, in its decision of April
22, 1994, 6 it convicted petitioner of the crime of direct assault and sentenced
him, thus:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby renders judgment finding
the accused Enrique "Totoy" Rivera GUILTY and sentences him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of arresto
mayor as MINIMUM to One (1) Year, One (1) Month and Eleven (11)
Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM. He is likewise ordered to pay
a fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court,
petitioner then went on appeal to the Court of Appeals whereat his recourse
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17284.
We AFFIRM.
Admittedly, the record shows that the trial judge had to call Lt. Leygo's
attention for testifying in such a low voice while on the witness box. Evidently,
however, this did not prevent the trial court into believing his testimony and
from according it full faith and credit. As it is, the witness was able to narrate
and communicate the events that transpired. Both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals found the witness to have clearly and adequately recounted how the
incident happened, and we find no valid reason to discredit the truth and
veracity of his narration. We quote:
Q Now, you said that Mr. Rivera faced you, when he faced you after he
removed his jacket what did you do?
A He positioned himself in a fighting stance, sir.
Q How about you, what did you do when Mr. Rivera did that?
A I informed him that I am arresting him.
Q How far were you when he faced you at first?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do when you approached him?
A I told him that I am arresting him, sir.
Q And what was his response?
Nor is Lt. Leygo's credibility any less diminished by the circumstance that
he failed to categorically identify which of petitioner's hands was used in
punching him, and the exact distance between them at that time. In all
likelihood, this police officer was not expecting a physical attack by the
petitioner as he was just confronting the latter about the prohibited unloading
of chicken dung when petitioner laid hand on him. Under this scenario, any
person, like Lt. Leygo, cannot be expected to remember every single detail of
the incident with perfect recall. 12 For sure, far from adversely affecting Lt.
Leygo's credibility, his failure to recall every minute detail of what transpired
even fortifies it. We have thus held that the failure of a witness to recall each
and every detail of an occurrence may even serve to strengthen rather than
weaken his credibility because it erases any suspicion of a coached or
rehearsed testimony. 13 What is vital in Lt. Leygo's testimony is the fact that
petitioner punched him on his face, about which he was steadfast and
unflinching. IaEACT
In any event, this Court has said time and again that the assessment of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial
court, what with reality that it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses
first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while testifying. Its
findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of
facts or circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon
this Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal. 14
Petitioner also asserts that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1
Jose Bangcado and Brenda Dup-et did not corroborate Lt. Leygo's testimony.
For, while SPO1 Bangcado merely testified during direct examination that
petitioner punched Lt. Leygo, this witness failed to reiterate said testimony
during cross-examination. As regards prosecution witness Brenda Dup-et,
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petitioner alleged that this witness never testified that petitioner boxed Lt.
Leygo.
The imputed shortcomings in the testimonies of said two (2) prosecution
witnesses are not of their own making. A witness is supposed to confine his
answers only to questions propounded of him. Here, the defense counsel
focused his line of questioning on what the two protagonists were doing
immediately prior to the punching incident, and the answer correctly received
by counsel was that both petitioner and Leygo were pushing each other. There
is no showing that counsel asked the witness as to what happened after the
pushing incident, as what the public prosecutor did of SPO1 Bangcado during
the latter's direct examination, to wit:
PROS. BOTENGAN:
Q And what happened when they faced each other?
Q So each one was holding each other's breast, is that what you mean?
caCSDT
But even assuming, in gratia argumente, that Lt. Leygo's testimony was
not corroborated by the two (2) other prosecution witnesses during their cross-
examinations, still the day cannot be saved for the petitioner. Well-settled is
the rule in this jurisdiction that the testimony of a single witness, if
straightforward and categorical, is sufficient to convict. After all, witnesses are
weighed, not numbered, and evidence are assessed in terms of quality, not
quantity. It is not uncommon, then, to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of
the testimony of a lone witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary
only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified
the truth or that his observations had been inaccurate. 16 Unfortunately for the
petitioner, the trial court found nothing to indicate that Lt. Leygo falsified the
truth or that his observations had been inaccurate.
Petitioner theorizes that he could not have hit Lt. Leygo, what with the
circumstance that his co-policemen were present at the scene of the incident,
and he finds it unusual that none of them retaliated if he really hit Lt. Leygo.
We are not persuaded. The evidence on record clearly bears out that it
was Lt. Leygo who was attacked by petitioner, not the other way around, as
petitioner would want us to believe. Both the witnesses for the prosecution and
the defense are one in saying that it was only petitioner who was in
confrontation with Lt. Leygo. Evidently, petitioner's anger started to burst when
the truck driver reported to him that Lt. Leygo prohibited the unloading of the
chicken dung and ordered him to return, such that when the same delivery
truck was again intercepted by Lt. Leygo's group, petitioner's anger was too
much for him to contain. We quote with approval what the trial court has said in
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its decision:
The accused, however, denies that he ever laid hands on the
cop. But the bigger question is, how then did the policeman sustain his
injuries? It is highly improbable, if not absurd, for the policeman to
inflict it on himself. It is also very unlikely that his co-policemen would
punch him just to make it appear that the accused did it. The accused
admits of being at the place. He admits having been confronted by the
policeman but he denies that he ever lifted a finger against the
policeman. Yet all the witnesses both for the prosecution and the
defense are in accord in saying that it was only the accused who was in
confrontation with the policeman. The only logical conclusion that can
be derived from this is that it is indeed the accused who punched the
policeman. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of the credible witness but it must be credible in itself. No better
test has yet been found to measure the value of the testimony of a
witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience
of mankind (People vs. Maspil, Jr., 186 SCRA 751).
That the other police officers did not retaliate is no basis for us to share
petitioner's submission that Lt. Leygo was the aggressor. In the nature of
things, they naturally reacted the way they should, i.e . placed petitioner under
arrest when ordered by Lt. Leygo. aIAcCH
Petitioner next contends that Lt. Leygo was not in the performance of his
official duties as a police officer and as Deputy Chief of Police for Operation and
Patrol at the time he was attacked.
Again, We disagree.
It is a matter of record that at the time of the assault, Lt. Leygo was
engaged in the actual performance of his official duties. He was wearing the
designated police uniform and was on board a police car conducting a routinary
patrol when he first came upon the truck unloading chicken manure. Because
the unloading of chicken dung was a violation of La Trinidad Municipal
Ordinance No. 1-91, the lieutenant ordered the truck driver to return from
where he came, but petitioner, in defiance of such lawful order, commanded
the truck driver to return to Shilan, the place where the truck was first
intercepted, and on being informed that the same truck had returned, the
lieutenant had every reason to assume it did return for the purpose of
unloading its cargo of chicken dung, thus stopped it from doing so.
Under the circumstances, it simply defies reason to argue that Lt. Leygo
was not in the performance of his lawful duties as a police officer when the
assault upon him was perpetrated by the petitioner.
Nor are we impressed by petitioner's submission that the prosecution's
failure to present the doctor, who examined Lt. Leygo, proved disastrous to the
People's case, arguing that the alleged injury of Lt. Leygo cannot be proved
without the testimony of the attending physician.
That Dr. Antonio T. Carino did not testify on the medical certificate he
issued is of no moment. If ever, the medical certificate is only corroborative in
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character and is not an indispensable element of the crime of direct assault
filed against petitioner. The unequivocal piece of evidence against petitioner is
no less Lt. Leygo's credible and consistent testimony that he was punched on
his face by the petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner puts the Court of Appeals to task for sustaining the trial
court's observation that he exuded an aura of arrogance and defiance of
authorities.
We have consistently ruled that the trial court judge is in the best of
position to see and observe the demeanor, actuation and countenance of a
witness, matters which are not normally expressed in the transcripts of his
testimony. We see no reason, therefore, to disturb the following observations of
the trial court in its decision:
The demeanor of the accused on the witness stand also shows
that he is the kind who is impatient with authority. His manner of
answering questions bespeaks of one who has trouble abiding with
authority. He portrayed a very aggressive manner and his answers
were always on the defensive as if he had every right in this world to
do and say whatever he wanted to. Over all, he exuded an aura of
arrogance and defiance of authority.
In closing, let it be noted that the attention of this Court has not been
called to of any ulterior or improper motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses to falsely testify against petitioner. Absence such a motive, the
presumption is that they were not so moved, and their testimonies are entitled
to full faith and credit. 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto. cSIADa
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred in by Associate
Justices Artemon D. Luna (ret.) and Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis; Rollo , pp. 42-53.
2. Rollo , p. 55.
3. Original Record, pp. 4-5.
4. Rollo , pp. 43-45.