LEANDRO CARILLO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.
86890, January 21, 1994
Facts:
Petitioner Dr. Leandro Carillo, an anesthesiologists, seeks review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
28 November 1988, which affirmed his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of the crime of simple negligence
resulting in homicide, for the death of his thirteen (13) year old patient Catherine Acosta.
The deceased, daughter of spouses Domingo and Yolanda Acosta, complained to her father of pains in the
lower part of her abdomen. Catherine was then brought to Dr. Elva Peña. Dra. Peña called for Dr. Emilio
Madrid and the latter examined Catherine Acosta. According to Dr. Madrid, his findings might be appendicitis.
Then Dr. Peña told Catherine’s parents to bring the child to the hospital in Baclaran so that the child will be
observed.
At the Baclaran General Hospital, a nurse took blood sample form the child. The findings became known in the
afternoon and the child was scheduled for operation. When brought inside the operating room, the child was
feeling very well and they did not subject the child to ECG (electrocardiogram) and X-ray.The appellant Dr.
Emilio Madrid, a surgeon, operated on Catherine. He was assisted by appellant, Dr. Leandro Carillo, an
anesthesiologists.
It has been established that the deceased was not weighed before the administration of anesthesia on her.
When Catherine remained unconscious until noontime the next day, a neurologist examined her and she was
diagnosed as comatose. Three (3) days later, Catherine died without regaining consciousness.
The Court of Appeals held that Catherine had suffered from an overdose of, or an adverse reaction to,
anaesthesia, leading to her death.
The Court of Appeals found criminal negligence on the part of petitioner Dr.Carillo and his co-accused Dr.
Madrid, holding that both had failed to observe the required standard of diligence in the examination of
Catherine prior to the actual administration of anaesthesia.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr.Carillo is guilty of the crime of simple negligence resulting in homicide.
Held:
Yes. Simple negligence, penalized under what is now Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,is defined as “ a
mere lack of prevision in a situation where either the threatened harm is not immediate or the danger not
openly visible.” Put in a slightly different way, the gravamen of the offense of simple negligence is the failure
to exercise the diligence necessitated or called for the situation which was not immediately life-destructive but
which culminated, in the present case, in the death of a human being three (3) days later.
In the case at bar, the Court considered that the chain of circumstances above noted, namely: (1) the failure of
petitioner and Dr. Madrid to appreciate the serious post-surgery condition of their patient and to monitor her
condition and provide close patient care to her; (2) the summons of petitioner by Dr. Madrid and the
cardiologist after the patient’s heart attack on the very evening that the surgery was completed; (3) the low
level of care and diligence exhibited by petitioner in failing to correct Dr. Madrid’s prescription of Nubain for
post-operative pain; (4) the extraordinary failure or refusal of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to inform the parents
of Catherine Acosta of her true condition after surgery, in disregard of the requirements of the Code of
Medical Ethics; and (5) the failure of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to prove that they had in fact exercised the
necessary and appropriate degree of care and diligence to prevent the sudden decline in the condition of
Catherine Acosta and her death three (3) days later, leads the Court to the conclusion, with moral certainty,
that petitioner and Dr. Madrid were guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide.
Labor Law Digest: MARITIME FACTORS INC. V. BIENVENIDO
HINDANG [G.R. No. 151993, October 19, 2011]
Topic: Exception to the rule on availing death benefits
MARITIME FACTORS INC. V. BIENVENIDO HINDANG
[G.R. No. 151993, October 19, 2011]
Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic manning agency for sea vessel engaged the services of Danilo to work as GP/Deckhand
effective for 12 months contract. However, while on board the vessel somewhere in Saudi Arabia, his body was found
inside the locker of his cabin. Upon autopsy immediately after the death, the medical examiner of the Saudi police
concluded that Danilo committed suicide by hanging himself. The body was repatriated to the Philippines.
Thereafter, Danilo’s brother filed for death compensation benefits against petitioner. Petitioner denied, contending
they are not liable since the cause of Danilo’s death was suicide, hence, not compensable.
Labor Arbiter decided in favour of Danilo’s heirs. NLRC affirmed, CA sustained.
ISSUE:
If the employer is exempt from paying death compensation, when the employee has committed suicide.
RULING:
Yes. By way of an exception, the employer may be exempt from liability to the employee's heirs for death
compensation benefits, if the employer can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury
directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. In this case, Maritime Factors was able to prove that Danilo's death
was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by committing suicide. Thus, the company does not need to pay
for any death benefits to the employee’s heirs.
General rule - The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for
death compensation benefits.
ITEMCOP VS FLONZO (GR NO. L-21969 AUGUST 31, 1966)
Industrial Textile Manufacturing Company of the Philippines vs Flonzo
GR No. L-21969 August 31, 1966
Facts: Respondent Sofia Reyes Flonzo is the mother of the deceased Ricardo Flonzo, an employee of petitioner
ITEMCOP for a little less than four years up to March 20, 1950 when he died after becoming paralyzed at the age of
25. His job was to replace empty loom beams attached to a weaving machines with fully loaded ones. An empty
beam weighs from 15-30 kilos. During an 8-hour period, about 20 t0 30 beams are substituted on a total of 406
machines. Ricardo worked 8 hours a day, 6 days a week. Ricardo fell ill and was diagnosed by the ITEMCOP’s
physician, Dr. Alfonso Ayesa to be thrombocytopenic purpura, idipathic which was later on discovered as cerebral
hemorrhage, secondary to blood deporia. When he died, his autopsy findings by Dr. Pedro Solis was anemia, severe,
secondary to hemorrhagic gastric ulcer. A claim for Ricardo’s benefits was filed by his mother, Sofia at the
Worker’s Compensation Commission.
Issue: Whether or not the death of Ricardo is compensable.
Held: Yes. Flonzo suffered bleeding in the stomach. Dr. Pedro Solis explained that even if the stomach is not empty,
the frequent stress brought about by lifting heavy objects might produce an ulcer in the stomach, and this is known
in medicine as “stress ulcer.” Further, the effect of continuous work on a person with stomach ulcer, Dr. Solis added
is that will aggravate the deceased condition of the stomach, and most likely, it may produce hemorrhage which
could be uncontrollable or controllable. There is then reason to believe, as the commission observes, that the
continuous exertion of carrying beams during his employment gradually, if imperceptibly, resulted to his illness
causing paralyzation of half of his body and ultimately his death.
People vs. Mendoza, G.R. No.
113791, February 22, 1996
FACTS:
Maria Gina Avila Mendoza, a mother of three young children, was put to fire in
her home in Balasing, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, on 22 November 1989. She
suffered extensive second to fourth degree burns and died of hypostatic
pneumonia and infected fourth degree burns on 30 November 1989. Her
husband, accused-appellant Rolando Mendoza, was charged with the crime
of parricide in an information filed on 29 June 1990 with Branch 8 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The prosecution presented
as its witnesses Paul Michael Mendoza, a five-year old child of the victim and
the accused-appellant; Jhun Avila, Teofisto Avila, and Rodora Avila, the
victim’s brother, father, and sister, respectively; and Dr. Nieto M. Salvador, the
Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NRI). On its part,
the defense presented the accused-appellant himself and Erlinda Porciuncula,
a childhood friend. As to how Gina was burned, only five-year old Paul
Michael could testify thereon. In his testimony during the presentation of the
evidence in chief on 18 February 1991, Paul Michael declared that one
evening inside their house, his father boxed his mother on her mouth and then
tied her up. However, the witness did not answer succeeding questions which
sought to elicit what happened thereafter, although he kept on looking at his
father throughout this period. He later revealed that he saw matches and
kerosene in their house. He likewise declared that his mother was now in
heaven because she was dead. During his rebuttal testimony on 12 October
1992, Paul Michael categorically declared that it was his father who “burned”
his mother. The accused-appellant, who was drunk at that time, first tied the
victim’s hands behind her back, then “poured kerosene” on the front of her
body and set her aflame. Paul Michael further declared that his father tied-up
his mother because they quarreled when his mother wanted him (Paul
Michael) to go with the accused-appellant to the street corner, but his father
refused. Finally, many times before, his parents quarreled because his father
was always drunk. In giving full credence to the testimony of eyewitness Paul
Michael, the trial court observed that:
As provided by Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a person who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others, may be a
witness. A four-year old boy can already speak clearly, can understand things
happening around him, and ready to study, to read and to write. For families
who can afford, a four-year old child is already sent to the nursery to begin
his/her studies. An intelligent boy is undoubtedly the best observer to be
found. He is little influenced by the suggestion of others and describes objects
and occurrences as he has really seen them (Pp. vs. Bustos, 45 Phil. 9).
Paul Michael was five months over four years when the incident happened.
He could perceive things happening around him. This was the reason why
when his grandfather and an uncle found him in the house of a neighbor, he
was in a state of shock, or at least dumbfounded (tulala). Because he knew
the implication of what had happened to his mother. He knew that the burning
of his mother might cause her death. If, indeed, he could not yet perceive
things, such happening would pass unnoticed and without impact on him.
Unless a child’s testimony is punctured with serious inconsistencies as to lead
one to believe that he was coached, if he can perceive and make known his
perception, he is considered a competent witness (Pp. vs. Cidro, et al., 56
O.G. 3547). The first time Paul Michael was presented as [a] witness, the only
thing substantial he testified on was that his father boxed his mother in the
mouth and tied her. On further questions, he refused to answer anymore. The
Court noticed the reason for such adamant attitude of the witness. His father,
the accused, was directly in his sight and whenever their eyes met, the child
could speak no more. The second time the witness was presented, the private
prosecutor covered the child from the accused. The Court likewise directed
the accused to sit farther away thereby placing the accused out of the direct
sight of the witness. As a result, the child was able to testify freely and
extensively without hesitation. The accused asked this Court to disregard the
testimony of Paul Michael for being “open to serious question and
consideration” as it was “often attended [by] unintelligible answers and
punctuated by contrary answers to previously given answers”; “[b]esides the
child’s tender age, he suffer[s] from [a] lack or inadequacy of sense of duty to
tell the truth.” He further claims that per the findings of the Medico-Legal
Officer, the victim did not die of burns but of hypostatic pneumonia. After a
thorough examination of the records and scrutiny of the evidence, we find no
merit in this appeal. The accused-appellant’s seven-page Brief miserably fails
to present convincing grounds why the challenged decision should be
overturned. The lower court convicted the accused-appellant primarily on the
basis of the testimony of eyewitness Paul Michael Mendoza, and it is obvious
that the pith of the present appeal is the child’s competency to testify and the
credibility of his testimony.
Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses . . . .
With respect to the disqualification of children to be witnesses, Section 21(b)
of the abovementioned rule reads:
The following persons cannot be witnesses:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully.
It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if
he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others
and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined. In United
States vs. Buncad, the Court stated:
The requirements then of a child’s competency as a witness are the: (a)
capacity of observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of
communication. 32 And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient
intelligence according to the foregoing requirements, it is settled that the trial
court is called upon to make such determination.
ISSUE: W/N the five year old child of the accused and victim is considered a
competent witness.
HELD: YES.
The Supreme Court sustained that the trial court has adjudged Paul Michael
competent to testify. A close and careful examination of the testimony of Paul
Michael shows that at the time he testified, he could be deemed a child of
above average intelligence, i.e., capable of giving responsive answers to the
questions asked of him by the trial judge, as well as recalling events and
relating them to such recollections. The initial hesitancy of Paul Michael to
name his father as the author of the crime was sufficiently explained by the
trial court as follows: The first time Paul Michael was presented as [a] witness,
the only thing substantial he testified on was that his father boxed his mother
in the mouth and tied her. On further questions, he refused to answer
anymore. The Court noticed the reason for such adamant attitude of the
witness. His father, the accused, was directly in his sight and whenever their
eyes met, the child could speak no more. The second time the witness was
presented, the private prosecutor covered the child from the accused. The
Court likewise directed the accused to sit farther away thereby placing the
accused out of the direct sight of the witness. As a result, the child was able to
testify freely and extensively without hesitation. The accused-appellant’s
contention that Paul Michael’s testimony could have been influenced by the
relatives of Gina, who were full of “unwavering anger, hatred, hostility,
resentment, revenge,” more so since the child had been in their custody since
after 22 November 1989, is unacceptable. The charge is nothing but
unmitigated speculation as not a shred of evidence was offered in support
thereof. Not even the rigorous cross-examination Paul Michael underwent
dented the probative force of his testimony; on the contrary, it merely added
strength thereto as it elicited nothing less than the boy’s adherence to truth.
We realize how extremely painful it was for Paul Michael to reveal that it was
his father who burned his mother. He knew that such a revelation could send
his father to jail and thus brand him a son of a killer or a convict. If he did,
nevertheless, it was to expose the truth and give justice to his mother who met
an excruciatingly painful death. Verily, “from the mouths of children we get the
truth.” Neither are we persuaded by the accused-appellant’s claim that the
cause of death of his wife was hypostatic pneumonia and not due to the burns
she sustained. Such a claim borders on misrepresentation, for as earlier
shown, both the Autopsy Report (Exhibit “H-1”) and the Certificate of Post-
Mortem Examination (Exhibit “H-1”) indicated the cause of death to be
“hypostatic pneumonia; infected fourth degree burns.” Moreover, as testified
to by Dr. Nieto Salvador, the proximate cause of the hypostatic pneumonia
was Gina’s recumbent position due to the fourth degree burns she suffered.
Jurisprudence says:
A medical malpractice suit is “an action available to victims to redress a wrong committed by
medical professionals who caused bodily harm to, or the death of, a patient. The suit is proper
whenever a medical practitioner or health care provider fails to meet the standards demanded by
his profession, or deviates from this standard, and causes injury to the patient.” (Noel
Casumpang, et. al. v. Nelson Cortejo, G.R. No. 171127, March 11, 2015)
For medical malpractice to be actionable, it must be established that medical negligence is
present. In the above-cited case, the Supreme Court discussed the elements of medical
negligence, which are “(1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation.”
Professional and Legal Duty
Duty in general, as discussed in the case of Casumpang, refers to the standard of behavior that
imposes restrictions on one’s conduct.
In medical practice, it requires proof of professional relationship between the physician and the
patient. Without this professional relationship, a physician owes no duty to the patient, and
cannot therefore incur any liability.
The legal duty of care exists once a physician-patient relationship is established.
When is a relationship between the physician and the patient
created?
Jurisprudence says:
“A Physician-patient relationship is created when a patient engages the services of a physician,
and the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient.” (Casumpang, citing the case of
Lucas v. Tuaño, G.R. No. 178763, April 21, 2009)
Noel Casumpang, et al vs. Nelson Cortejo, G.R. No. 171127
[Case Digest]
Noel Casumpang, et al vs. Nelson Cortejo,
G.R. No. 171127, March 11, 2015
Facts:
Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11-year old son, Edmer Cortejo (Edmer), to the Emergency Room
of the San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) because of difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain, and
fever. r. Ramoncito Livelo (Dr. Livelo) initially attended to and examined Edmer. Dr. Livelo took his vital
signs, body temperature, and blood pressure.6 Based on these initial examinations and the chest x-ray
test that followed, Dr. Livelo diagnosed Edmer with "bronchopneumonia.7 " Edmer’s blood was also
taken for testing, typing, and for purposes of administering antibiotics. Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave
Edmer an antibiotic medication to lessen his fever and to loosen his phlegm.
At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang for the first time examined Edmer in his
room. Using only a stethoscope, he confirmed the initial diagnosis of "Bronchopneumonia.
At that moment, Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the doctor’s diagnosis. She
immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds or cough10 but Dr.
Casumpang merely told her that her son’s "blood pressure is just being active," 11 and remarked that
"that’s the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm."12 Dr. Casumpang next visited and examined
Edmer at 9:00 in the morning the following day.13 Still suspicious about his son’s illness, Mrs. Cortejo
again called Dr. Casumpang’s attention and stated that Edmer had a fever, throat irritation, as well as
chest and stomach pain. Mrs. Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the traces of blood in Edmer’s
sputum. Despite these pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang simply nodded, inquired if Edmer
has an asthma, and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer’s illness is bronchopneumonia.
In the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer vomited "phlegm with blood streak" 15 prompting the
respondent (Edmer’s father) to request for a doctor at the nurses’ station.16 Forty-five minutes later,
Dr. Ruby Miranda-Sanga (Dr. Sanga), one of the resident physicians of SJDH, arrived. She claimed that
although aware that Edmer had vomited "phlegm with blood streak," she failed to examine the blood
specimen because the respondent washed it away. She then advised the respondent to preserve the
specimen for examination.
Thereafter, Dr. Sanga conducted a physical check-up covering Edmer’s head, eyes, nose, throat,
lungs, skin and abdomen; and found that Edmer had a low-grade non-continuing fever, and rashes that
were not typical of dengue fever.17 Her medical findings state:
the patient’s rapid breathing and then the lung showed sibilant and the patient’s nose is flaring
which is a sign that the patient is in respiratory distress; the abdomen has negative finding; the
patient has low grade fever and not continuing; and the rashes in the patient’s skin were not
"Herman’s Rash" and not typical of dengue fever.
Dr. Sanga then examined Edmer’s "sputum with blood" and noted that he was bleeding.
Suspecting that he could be afflicted with dengue, she inserted a plastic tube in his nose, drained the
liquid from his stomach with ice cold normal saline solution, and gave an instruction not to pull out the
tube, or give the patient any oral medication.
Dr. Sanga advised Edmer’s parents that the blood test results showed that Edmer was
suffering from "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever." One hour later, Dr. Casumpang arrived at Edmer’s
room and he recommended his transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), to which the respondent
consented. Since the ICU was then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to the respondent that they hire a
private nurse. The respondent, however, insisted on transferring his son to Makati Medical Center.
After the respondent had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the last time, checked Edmer’s
condition, found that his blood pressure was stable, and noted that he was "comfortable." The
respondent requested for an ambulance but he was informed that the driver was nowhere to be found.
At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr. Casumpang, was
transferred to Makati Medical Center.
Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the patient’s clinical history and laboratory
exam results. Upon examination, the attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that
was already in its irreversible stage.
Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988. Believing that Edmer’s death was caused by the
negligent and erroneous diagnosis of his doctors, the respondent instituted an action for damages
against SJDH,
RTC held that the doctors were negligent. CA affirmed the decision of RTC in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed "inexcusable lack of precaution" in
diagnosing and in treating the patient.
Held:
YES. Dr. Casumpang is Liable. àAttending physician
Dr. Sanga is Not Liable for Negligence because the latter is only a resident doctor
The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation.
Duty refers to the standard of behavior that imposes restrictions on one's conduct.35 It requires
proof of professional relationship between the physician and the patient. Without the professional
relationship, a physician owes no duty to the patient, and cannot therefore incur any liability.
A physician-patient relationship is created when a patient engages the services of a
physician,36 and the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient.37 The establishment of this
relationship is consensual,38 and the acceptance by the physician essential. The mere fact that an
individual approaches a physician and seeks diagnosis, advice or treatment does not create the duty of
care unless the physician agrees.
Once a physician-patient relationship is established, the legal duty of care follows. The doctor
accordingly becomes duty-bound to use at least the same standard of care that a reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a medical condition under similar circumstances.
Breach of duty occurs when the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly performs his duties
under professional standards. This determination is both factual and legal, and is specific to each
individual case. If the patient, as a result of the breach of duty, is injured in body or in health, actionable
malpractice is committed, entitling the patient to damages.
To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the causal relation between the
negligence and the injury. This connection must be direct, natural, and should be unbroken by any
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the
injury.44 The injury or damage is proximately caused by the physician’s negligence when it appears,
based on the evidence and the expert testimony, that the negligence played an integral part in causing
the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result, or a reasonably probable
consequence of the physician’s negligence.
First, we emphasize that we do not decide the correctness of a doctor’s diagnosis, or the
accuracy of the medical findings and treatment. Our duty in medical malpractice cases is to decide –
based on the evidence adduced and expert opinion presented– whether a breach of duty took place.
Second, we clarify that a wrong diagnosis is not by itself medical malpractice.65 Physicians are
generally not liable for damages resulting from a bona fide error of judgment. Nonetheless, when the
physician’s erroneous diagnosis was the result of negligent conduct (e.g., neglect of medical history,
failure to order the appropriate tests, failure to recognize symptoms), it becomes an evidence of
medical malpractice.
Third, we also note that medicine is not an exact science;66 and doctors, or even specialists, are not
expected to give a 100% accurate diagnosis in treating patients who come to their clinic for
consultations. Error is possible as the exercise of judgment is called for in considering and reading
the exhibited symptoms, the results of tests, and in arriving at definitive conclusions. But in doing all
these, the doctor must have acted according to acceptable medical practice standards.
In the present case, evidence on record established that in confirming the diagnosis of
bronchopneumonia, Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated some and not all of the symptoms
presented, and failed to promptly conduct the appropriate tests to confirm his findings. In sum, Dr.
Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue fever, which failure, especially when reasonable prudence
would have shown that indications of dengue were evident and/or foreseeable, constitutes
negligence.
Apart from failing to promptly detect dengue fever, Dr. Casumpang also failed to promptly undertake
the proper medical management needed for this disease.
As Dr. Jaudian opined, the standard medical procedure once the patient had exhibited the classic
symptoms of dengue fever should have been: oxygen inhalation, use of analgesic, and infusion of fluids
or dextrose;67 and once the patient had twice vomited fresh blood, the doctor should have ordered:
blood transfusion, monitoring of the patient every 30 minutes, hemostatic to stop bleeding, and oxygen
if there is difficulty in breathing. Dr. Casumpang failed to measure up to these standards.
Also in Evans v. Ohanesian, the court set a guideline in qualifying an expert witness:
To qualify a witness as a medical expert, it must be shown that the witness (1) has the
required professional knowledge, learning and skill of the subject under inquiry
sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on the subject; and (2) is familiar with
the standard required of a physician under similar circumstances; where a witness has
disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the
question of the degree of his knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence than
to its admissibility.
PEOPLE VS COLINARES (GR NO. 72025 JUNE 30, 1988)
People of the Philippines vs Colinares
GR No. 72025 June 30, 1988
Facts: Respondent Carlos Colinares Y Solmerano is the accused for the murder (alleged) of Armando Cardinas Y
Luberiano. There are two sides of the story – the prosecution’s and the defense’s. The version of the prosecution
states that the victim Armando Cardinas just recently arrived from the Visayas, was the nephew of the spouses
Roberto and Trinidad Lopez, residents of Don Fabian Subdivision, Fairview, Quezon City, two of the five
testimonial witnesses. That at about 10:00am of Novenmer 29, 1981, a quarrel between the spouses neighbours De
Leon and Martinez family ensued in front of their house and some thirty armed persons arrived at their house and
mauled and kicked them, that Armando was taken to the barangay service jeep and was later brought to Quirino
Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where he was pronounced dead on arrival. On the other hand, the defense’s side
was that Colinares was doing his usual job on the said day and don’t even know the identity of the victim. The
medico legal report by Col. Gregorio Blanco states that Colinares when the autopsy was done on November 29,
1981 at the funeral parlor, Armando has been dead for an estimate 12 hours already.
Issue: Whether or not the medico legal report could be the basis of the acquittal of conviction of Colinares absent
other evidence.
Held: Yes. Aside from the fact that there is no evidence presented to show where the crime took place and who
inflicted the fatal wounds sustained, the record is not clear as to the time of the mauling incident and the death of the
victim. Roberto Lopez testified that the mauling incident happened on November 28, 1981 between 10-11:00am,
Trinidad Lopez testified that it happened on the same day but at 7:30am and Rowena Lopez that it happened at
10am. Another witness for the prosecution Col. Gregorio C. Blanco after qualifying himself as a medico-legal expert
testified that the cadaver of the victim was already in rigor mortis (more than 12 hours dead) when he autopsied it at
high noon of November 29, 1981. Taking into consideration this unimpeachable testimony of the doctor and the
necropsy report which substantially support the doctor’s oral testimony, the death of the victim could be calculated
to have occurred at least 12 hours before time of necropsy which is about November 28, 1981 at 12 midnight. Thus,
the mauling incident of the victim did not happen or could not have happened because the victim was already dead
at that time of the alleged mauling incident. There is no inconsistency between the doctor’s oral testimony and the
necropsy report because the time and date of death of the victim appearing on the necropsy report as a/1040H 29
November 1981 pertains to the time and date as reported to the doctor by the authorities concerned since the victim
was dead on arrival at 10:40am November 29, 1981 at the Quirino Memorial Hospital, Quezon City.
